ORDER

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

SUBJ: RUNWAY SAFETY AREA PROGRAM

5200.8

EXHIBIT

i .:r;:TFJ1 21A1. PURPOSE.

This order establishes

a. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Runway Safety Area (RSA) Program

and

b. The procedures that FAA employees will follow in implementing that program.

2. DISTRIBUTION.

This order is distributed to the division level in the Office of Airport Safety and Standards and

the Office of Airport Planning and Programming; to the division level in the regional Flight

Standards, Airway Facilities, and Air Traffic Divisions; to the branch level in the regional

Airports Divisions; and a standard distribution to all Airport District Offices.

3. EFFECTIVE DATE. October 1, 1999

4. BACKGROUND.

The RSA is an integral part of the runway environment. RSA dimensions are established in

AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design and are based on the Airport Reference Code (ARC). The

RSA is intended to provide a measure of safety in the event of an aircraft's excursion from the

runway by significantly reducing the extent of personal injury and aircraft damage during

overruns, undershoots and veer-offs.

5. OBJECTIVE

The objective of the Runway Safety Area Program is that all RSAs at federally obligated

airports and all RSAs at airports certificated under 14 Code of Federal regulations (CFR)

part 139 shall conform to the standards contained in AC 150/5300-13 Airport Design, to the

extent practicable.

6. RESPONSIBILITY AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.

a. The Regional Airports Division Manager ensures that the program is implemented in

accordance with the procedures provided in this directive.

b. The Regional Airports Division Manager approves all RSA determinations required by

Paragraph 8.0 of this order. This authority may be delegated to the ADO Manager, only

when it is determined practicable to obtain the RSA.

Dist: A-W(AS/AP)-2; A-X (FS/AF/AT)-2); A-X(AS)-3; A-FAS-O (STD) Initiated by AAS-31 0
5200.8 10/01/99

7. RSA INVENTORY.

Each regional airports division shall collect and maintain data on the RSA for each runway

at federally obligated airports and airports certificated under part 139 within their

geographic purview. The data will include the current width of each RSA and the length that

the RSA extends beyond each runway end. The data will also contain the standards that

apply to each RSA at the airport. In addition, all objects within the area that comprises a

standard RSA shall be documented. Appendix 1, Runway Safety Area Database, provides

a format for this data collection.

8. RSA DETERMINATIONS.

a. Supporting Documentation. The region/ADO shall prepare documentation for each

RSA. Appendix 2, Supporting Documentation for RSA Determinations, provides guidance

that must be adhered to in preparing this documentation. The Regional Airports Division

will decide the level of detail required for all planning, environmental, and engineering

factors that are to be incorporated in analyzing the practicable alternatives. The objective

is to assure that accurate and complete information supports the decision making process

on RSA determinations.

(1) For an RSA that does not meet current standards, the Regional Airports Division

Manager will make a determination as required in paragraph 8b, based on this

documentation.

(2) Determinations are based on the best, current, available information. However,

information that becomes available at a later date can effect changes or revisions to a

determination and, as a result, updates the determination. For example, the final

determination may depend on the outcome of an Environmental Assessment process.

Until that outcome is known, a determination is made on the best, current, available

information.

(3) Although for data collection purposes it is convenient to describe the RSA in terms

of runway ends, the determination shall be made for the entire RSA, i.e., both runway ends

as well as the full width.

b. Determination. The Regional Airports Division Manager shall review the data collected

for each RSA in Paragraph 7, along with supporting documentation prepared by the

region/ADO for that RSA, and make one of the following determinations:

(1) The existing RSA meets the current standards contained in AC 150/5300-13.

(2) The existing RSA does not meet standards but it is practicable to improve the RSA

so that it will meet current standards.

(3) The existing RSA can be improved to enhance safety, but the RSA will still not meet

current standards.

(4) The existing RSA does not meet current standards, and it is not practicable to

improve the RSA.

c. Form of Determination. The RSA determination will be signed and dated by the

Regional Airports Division Manager and kept on file along with the supporting

documentation in the regional office or ADO. The determination and its date will also be

included in the RSA database. See Appendix 1.

Page 2
10/01/99 5200.8

d. Revision to Determination. If new information becomes available, the Regional

Airports Division Manager may issue a revised determination. The revised determination

shall be in a form required by Paragraph 8(c) and supported by documentation required by

Paragraph 8(a). The date of the revised determination shall be recorded in the RSA

database.

9. TIMING OF DATA COLLECTION AND DETERMINATION.

The RSA inventory and RSA determinations specified in paragraph 7 and 8 will be

completed in accordance with the following schedule:

a. For runways used by air carriers at airports certificated under 14 CFR Part 139,

the RSA inventory and determination will be completed by June 30, 2000.

b. For all other runways at federally obligated airports, the RSA inventory and

determination can be done at any time, but will normally be done during the master

planning process. However, the inventory and determination must be completed prior to

any project for runway construction, reconstruction, or significant expansion that involves

Federal funds.

1O. IMPLEMENTATION OF RSA IMPROVEMENTS.

a. A project to improve an RSA in accordance with the determination made in Paragraph

8 may be initiated at any time.

b. Whenever a project for a runway involves construction, reconstruction (includes

overlays), or significant expansion, the project shall also provide for

improving the RSA in accordance with the determination made in Paragraph 8.

Reconstruction and significant expansion are construed as any project that results in

changing the capability of the airport or the load-bearing strength of the pavement,

restores the original design life of the pavement, or changes the actual or potential design

aircraft use.

(1) The requirement to upgrade RSA under Paragraph 10b is applicable at part

139 airports regardless of the funding source for the runway project.

(2) The requirement to upgrade RSA under Paragraph 10b is applicable at federally

obligated airport, if Federal or Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) funds are used for the

project.

11. OVERSIGHT.

The Airport Office of Safety and Standards (AAS) is the office of primary interest.

This office may selectively review RSA analyses or the entire program on a periodic basis

to assure consistency. The office also provides consulting and guidance in judging the

merits of a specific alternative.

David L. Bennett

Director of Airport Safety and Standards

Page 3
10/01/99 5200.8

Appendix 1

Appendix 1. RUNWAY SAFETY AREA DATA BASE

A national data base that is accessible on the Intranet is being developed as part of this

program. The following pages provide sample copies of the formats to be used for entering

RSA information into this data base. The electronic version of this Appendix, along with

accompanying instructions, is available on the FAA intranet and is to be used for transmitting

the above information. As AAS-1 00 and AAS-300 gain experience in using the data that are

collected through these forms, modifications and/or clarifications may be necessary. The

latest version of this Appendix will always be found on the Intranet.

Page 1
5200.8

Appendix 1

Runway Form

Locid: 11...- _

10/01/99

Airport: 1,-- _

City/State: I ADO:I

Region:!•••. _

Runway: 1 -,

Part

Length:

Width:

139:w0

CRITICAL AIRCRAFT:

Approach Category: C==:J

Design Group:C==:J

Visibility Minimums: II...- ....J

PUBLISHED RUNWAY

SAFETY AREA STANDARDS:

Length:C==:J

Width:C==:J

Uniformity Comments:

Runway Ends:! ...L... _

Actual RSA Length

Actual RSA Width

RSA Grade (+/- 5%)

Dimensional Uniformity

0 0

0 0

- RSA D~terminiiltion

Currently Meets Standards 0 0

Practicable to Meet Standards 0 0

Can be Improved But Will Not Meet Standards 0 0

Not Practicable to Improve 0 0

Date of Determination (month/year): I I

- Plann~d Impro\!~m~nts

RSA to Design Standards Obtainable: 0 0

Runway Realignment or Relocation: 0 0

Shift Runway From Present Alignment: 0 0

Use Declared Distances: 0 0

Use EMAS: 0 0

Other: 0 0

Scheduled Completion (year): C==:J

Remaining Costs: C==:J

Improvement Comments:

Page 2
10/01/99

Object Form

Lo cid: 11...-__ ---'

R IJl"lway Safety Area Data Sheet

C ity/State: I

Airport:I ---J R egion:L...1__ ..J

ADO:I

5200.8

Appendix 1

L th RUNWAY -

el"lg

~ ~ ~

:E

--

" ---- ------- - --- ~

R IJl"lway S fety Area

Object Idel"l1iticatiol"l Object Lo cation Object Status

No. Type Name f@y 8ld Dist UR UR Dist

Rwy

8ld

" <Dt;j '" '"

"••00

u"ii

0:

o

•.. '"

'" '"

:a..c:

.- 0

0"

" .- C!M ....

Owner

Page 3
10/01/99 5200.8

Appendix 2

Appendix 2. Supporting Documentation for RSA Determinations

1. GENERAL.

RSA determinations must be supported by documentation that provides the rationale upon

which the determination was based. The extent of the documentation will vary, depending

upon the circumstances. For example, in cases where the RSA already meets the current

standards through a traditional graded area surrounding the runway a simple statement to this

effect will suffice. Where declared distances have been implemented to obtain the RSA, the

documentation would contain a statement to this effect and also identify the graded area that

exists beyond each runway end. In contrast, in cases where it is not practicable to improve a

safety area to meet current standards, the documentation must address the alternatives that

were considered and explain the reasons why one was selected over the others.

2. CONSIDERATIONS IN EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES.

In evaluating alternatives for obtaining or improving RSAs, there are many factors that could

affect the viability of the alternative. What may be viable at one airport may not be viable at

another. Factors to be considered include:

a. Historical records of airport accidents/incidents.

b. The airport plans as reflected in current and forecast volume of passengers, number

of operations, design aircraft and percent runway use, both for all weather and IFR

operations,

c. The extent to which the existing RSA complies with the standard. High performance

aircraft, operating at higher loads and speeds have greater requirements than small, low

performance aircraft.

d. Site constraints. These include, for example, precipitous terrain drop-off, the

existence of bodies of water, wetlands, a major highway, a railroad at a runway end,

etc.

e. Weather and climatic conditions. These include conditions such as low visibility,

rain, snow, and ice and the frequency of these conditions. Overruns on contaminated

runways constitute a significant percentage of runway excursions.

f. Availability of visual and electronic aids for landing.

3. ALTERNATIVES TO BE CONSIDERED.

The first alternative to be considered in every case is constructing the traditional graded area

surrounding the runway. Where it is not practicable to obtain the entire safety area in this

manner, as much as possible should be obtained. Then, the following alternatives shall be

addressed in the supporting documentation. The applicability of these alternatives will vary,

depending on the location.

a. Relocation, shifting, or realignment of the runway.

b. Reduction in runway length where the existing runway length

exceeds that which is required for the existing or projected design aircraft,

Page 1
5200.8

Appendix 2

10/01/99

c. A combination of runway relocation, shifting, grading,

realignment, or reduction

d. Declared distances.

e. Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS).

4. CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES.

When making determinations about the practicability of obtaining the RSA, the first attempt

shall consist of investigating fully the possibility of obtaining RSA that meets the current

standards through a traditional graded area surrounding the runway. Land acquisition, grading

requirements as well as environmental conditions must be examined. Any portion of land that

will increase the RSA, even if it is but an incremental increase (see Paragraph 4a below) and

will not result in meeting the standard fully, is preferable and will serve as a starting point for

the consideration of additional alternatives (see paragraphs 4b through 4f below).

a. Incremental gains must be obtained whenever possible. The gain may be relatively very

little, but any gain is valuable. The following example illustrates this.

The design standard for an RSA beyond the runway end, 1,000' by 500', is not met. The

dimensions are 300' by 500' on each of the ends. By filling and grading, another 200'

could be gained on one end. This should be accomplished as an incremental gain, even

though it will not provide the design standard. Other alternatives (see Paragraphs 4b through

4f below) would then be considered for obtaining the remainder of the safety area.

300'

additional 200' by

filling and grading

500'

b. When obtaining a standard RSA is not practicable through traditional means (e.g. land

acquisition, grading, fill, etc.), alternatives must be explored. During some types of projects, it

may be feasible to relocate, realign, shift, or change a runway in such a way that the RSA may

be obtained. It is recognized that the costs of this kind of adjustment may be justified only in

an extensive project, but the concept should be evaluated to determine if it is a practicable

alternative.

Page 2
10/01/99 5200.8

Appendix 2

c. Another alternative to be addressed is a reduction in runway length. This is a viable option

if the current critical aircraft requires less than what is presently available, or the use of other

runways, if available, will accommodate the larger aircraft.

d. When considering the configuration of RSA, if the total RSA area available is less that the

total required to meet the design standard, an appropriate balance may be achieved by

allocating a greater portion of RSA to one runway end. The factors to consider in this

allocation are: navaids (ILS, PAPI, PLASI, VASls), which provide vertical guidance and lessen

the likelihood of an undershoot; predominant direction of runway use by air carrier aircraft, and

historical data on overruns on the runway. For example, the total available RSA below is

1400'. Because there is an ILS for air carrier use, a determination is made to allocate 900' to

the departure end of this runway and 500' to the approach end of the runway

6,~

~OOO'

500' 500' 900'

ILS is located on this end of the runway

e. Declared distances present another alternative that may provide an acceptable

means of providing RSA. This requires a thorough understanding of user needs and

views, since their cooperation is an integral factor in selecting this alternative. However,

the airport, in conjunction with FAA, will determine the final disposition of this type of situation.

f. At any time, when it is not practicable to obtain a safety area that meets current standards,

consideration should be given to enhancing the safety of the area beyond the runway end

with the installation of EMAS. The AC 150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting

Systems (EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns, pertaining to the installation and use of EMAS,

provides details on design to be considered in determining feasibility of this alternative.

Page 3
5200.8

Appendix 2

10/01/99

g. When it is not practicable to obtain an RSA that meets current standards through the

measures identified in Paragraphs 4a through 4e, the feasibility of increasing the size of the

RSA by including additional land parcels should be considered, even if their inclusion will result

in an RSA with an irregular shape. This alternative should be explored, irrespective of a

decision to install EMAS in the RSA. For example, the design standard for an RSA beyond the

runway end is not met. However, a parcel of land is available and would lengthen the RSA on

one side only. This should be accomplished and noted in the comment section provided in the

database. The following example illustrates this.

300' 250'

additional

irregularlyshaped

piece that

will extend

the RSA

on one

side

500'

at this

point.

Page 4
,

•

. EXHIBIT·

~2J..B

-

u.s. Department

of Transportation

FederalAviation

Administration

Advisory

Circular

Subject: Engineered Materials Arresting Systems

(EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) contains

standards for the planning, design, and installation of

Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) in

runway safety areas. Engineered Materials means high

energy absorbing materials of selected strength, which

will reliably and predictably crush under the weight of

an aircraft.

•

2. BACKGROUND. Aircraft can and do overrun

the ends of runways, sometimes with disastrous results.

An overrun occurs when an aircraft passes beyond the

end of a runway during an aborted takeoff or while

landing. The majority of such overruns by air carrier

aircraft come to rest within 1000 feet of the runway

end and between the extended edges of the runway.

Data on aircraft overruns over a 12-year period from

1975 to 1987 indicate that a large majority of all

overruns (approximately 90%) occur at exit speeds of

70 knots or less (Reference 7, Appendix 2). In order to

minimize the hazards of overruns, the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) incorporated into airport design

standards the concept of a safety area beyond the

runway end. To meet the standards, the safety area

must be capable, under normal (dry) conditions, of

supporting aircraft that overrun the runway without

causing structural damage to the aircraft or injury to its

occupants. Besides enhancing airport safety, the safety

area provides greater accessibility for emergency

equipment after an overrun incident. There are many

runways, particularly those constructed prior to the

adoption of the safety area standards, where natural

obstacles (bodies of water or sharp drop-offs), local

development (roads and railroads), or environmental

constraints (wetland encroachment), make the

construction of a standard safety area impracticable.

There have been accidents at some of these airports

where the ability to stop an overrunning aircraft within

the runway safety area would have prevented major

damage to aircraft and injuries to passengers.

•

Date: 8/21/98

Initiated by: AAS-l 00

AC No: 150/5220-22

Change:

Recognizing the difficulties associated with achieving

a standard safety area at all airports, the FAA

undertook research programs on the use of various

materials for arresting systems and, in conjunction

with industry, conducted a series of field tests utilizing

an instrumented Boeing 727 aircraft. As a result of the

data obtained from these test programs, the Port

Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYINJ), in

1997, installed an EMAS comprised of cellular cement

on the Runway 4R safety area at John F. Kennedy

International Airport. This prototype system is being

monitored to provide information on system longevity.

3. APPLICATION. At some airports,

reconstruction of a runway requires its safety areas to

be brought up to current standards to the extent

practicable. Of course, conformance with current

standards is desirable at all airports, even when not

required by regulation. Occasionally, however, it may

not be practicable to achieve a standard safety area as

specified in Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 of

AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design. In these situations,

Appendix 14, Declared Distances, ofthat AC provides

an alternative means of enhancing safety. The

declared distance alternative allows an airport owner to

declare what portions of an operational runway are

available to satisfy the aircraft's accelerate-stop and

landing distance requirements, with runway beyond

these "declared distances" available as runway safety

area. However, the use of declared distances at some

airports may result in the inability to accommodate

aircraft that are currently in use at that airport. In such

a situation, installing an EMAS may be another way of

enhancing safety. An EMAS is NOT a substitute for,

nor equivalent to, any length or width of runway safety

area and does not affect declared distance calculations.

An EMAS is also not intended to meet the definition of

a stopway as provided in AC 150/5300-13.
AC 150/5220-22

The guidelines and standards contained herein are

recommended by the FAA for the design of EMAS.

This AC is not mandatory and does not constitute a

regulation. It is issued for guidance purposes and to

outline a method of compliance. One may elect to

follow an alternate method, provided it is also found by

the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to be an

acceptable means of complying with Title 14, Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR), Chapter I, FAA.

Therefore, mandatory terms such as "shall" or "must"

used herein apply only to those who seek to

demonstrate compliance by use of the specific method

described by this AC, or for those for whom the use of

these guidelines is mandatory, such as those installing

an EMAS funded under Federal grant assistance

programs.

4. RELATED READING MATERIAL.

Appendix 2 contains a listing of documents with

supplemental material relating to EMAS. These

documents contain certain information on materials

evaluated, as well as design, construction, and testing

procedures utilized to date. Testing and data

previously generated under FAA studies referenced in

Appendix 2 may be used as input to an EMAS design

without further justification.

5. PLANNING CHARTS. The purpose of

Figures AI-I through AI-4 is to allow a preliminary

analysis, providing sufficient information to determine

whether to proceed with a detailed engineering design

of an optimum EMAS installation. They are intended

to be used as a preliminary screening tool only. They

are not sufficient for final design, which must be

customized for each installation. The charts illustrate

estimated EMAS stopping distance capabilities for

various aircraft types. The design used in each chart is

optimized specifically for the aircraft noted on the

chart and assumes the availability of brakes and

reverse thrust. It should be noted that the absence of

either would result in longer stopping distances.

a. Example 1. Assume a candidate runway has

a runway safety area that extends 500 feet beyond the

end of the runway and the design aircraft is a DC-9 (or

similar). Figure AI-I shows that an EMAS 500 feet in

length (including a 100' jet blast buffer) is capable of

stopping a DC-9 within the confines of the system at

runway exit speeds of up to 94 knots.

b. Example 2. Assume the same runway safety

area but assume the design aircraft is a DC-IO (or

similar). Figure AI-3 shows an EMAS of the same

length, but designed for larger aircraft, can stop the

2

8/21/98

DC-IO within the confines of the system at runway exit

speeds of up to 72 knots.

6. SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. For

purposes of design, the EMAS can be considered fixed

by its function and frangible since it is designed to fail

at a specified impact load. Therefore, an EMAS is not

considered an obstruction under 14 CFR Part 77,

Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace. The following

system design requirements shall prevail for all EMAS

installations.

a. Concept. An EMAS is designed to stop an

overrunning aircraft by exerting predictable

deceleration forces on its landing gear as the EMAS

material crushes. It must be designed to minimize the

potential for structural damage to aircraft, since such

damage could result in injuries to passengers and/or

affect the predictability of deceleration forces.

b. Location. An EMAS is located beyond the

end of the runway, centered on the extended runway

centerline. It will usually begin at some distance from

the end of the runway to avoid damage due to jet blast

and short landings (Figure I). This distance will vary

depending on the available area and the EMAS

materials.

c. Design Method. An EMAS design shall be

supported by a validated design method, which can

predict the performance of the system. The design

aircraft is defined as that aircraft using the associated

runway that imposes the greatest demand upon the

EMAS. To the extent practicable, however, the EMAS

design should consider the range of aircraft expected to

operate on the runway. In some instances, this may be

preferable to optimizing the EMAS for the design

aircraft. The design method shall be derived from field

or laboratory tests. Testing may be based on passage of

either an actual aircraft or equivalent single wheel load

through a test bed. The design must consider multiple

aircraft parameters, including but not necessarily

limited to allowable aircraft gear loads, gear

configuration, tire contact pressure, aircraft center of

gravity, and aircraft speed. The model must calculate

imposed aircraft gear loads, g-forces on aircraft

occupants, deceleration rates, and stopping distances

within the arresting system. Any rebound of the

crushed material that may serve to lessen its

effectiveness must be considered.

d. Operation. The EMAS shall be a passive

system.

,

•

•

•
•

•

•

\

8/21/98 AC 150/5220-22

ELEVATION VIEW

EMAS

PLAN VIEW

Figure 1. Typical EMAS (Not to Scale)

e. Width. The minimum width of the EMAS

shall be the width of the runway (plus any sloped area

as necessary - see paragraph 6.h below).

f. Base. The EMAS shall be constructed on a

surface capable of supporting the occasional passage of

the critical design aircraft using the runway and fully

loaded Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF)

vehicles without deformation of the base surface or

structural damage to the aircraft or vehicles. It shall be

designed to perform satisfactorily under all local

weather, temperature, and soil conditions. It shall

provide sufficient support to facilitate removal of the

aircraft from the EMAS. Full strength runway

pavement is not required.

g. Entrance Speed. To the maximum extent

possible within the available safety area, the EMAS

shall be designed to decelerate all air carrier aircraft

expected to use the runway at exit speeds of 70 knots or

less without imposing loads that exceed the aircraft's

design limits, causing major structural damage to the

aircraft, or imposing excessive forces on its occupants.

For design purposes, it shall be assumed that the

aircraft has all of its landing gear in full contact with

the runway and is traveling within the confines of the

runway and parallel to the runway centerline.

h. Aircraft Evacuation. The EMAS shall be

designed to enable safe ingress and egress as well as

movement of ARFF equipment (not necessarily without

damage to the EMAS) operating during an emergency.

If the EMAS is to be built above existing grade, sloped

areas sufficient to allow the entrance of ARFF vehicles

from the front and sides must be provided. Provision

for access from the back of the EMAS may be provided

if desirable, but will result in a shorter effective length.

Maximum slopes should be based on the EMAS

material and performance characteristics of the

airport's ARFF equipment.

i. Maintenance Access. The EMAS shall be

capable of supporting regular pedestrian traffic for the

purposes of maintenance of the arresting material and

co-located navigation aids without surface damage. An

EMAS is not intended to support vehicular traffic for

maintenance purposes.

j. Undershoots. The EMAS shall be designed

so as not to cause control problems for aircraft

undershoots touching down in the arresting system.

Fulfillment of this requirement may be based solely on

flight simulator tests. Materials of density and strength

greater than those shown by flight simulator tests not

to cause control problems for aircraft undershoots will

be deemed acceptable.

k, Navigation Aids. The EMAS shall be

constructed to accommodate approach lighting

structures and other approved facilities within its

boundaries. It shall not cause visual or electronic

interference with any air navigation aids. All

navigation aids within the EMAS must be frangible as

required by 14 CFR Part 139, Certification and

3
AC 150/5220-22

Operations: Land Airports Serving Certain Air

Carriers. To meet the intent of this regulation,

approach light standards must be designed to fail at

two points. The first point of frangibility shall be zero

to three inches above the top of the EMAS. The

second point of frangibility shall be zero to three

inches above the expected residual depth of the EMAS

after passage of the design aircraft.

I. Drainage. The EMAS shall be designed such

that water will not accumulate on its surface or any

portion of the runway or runway safety area.

m. Jet Blast. The EMAS shall be designed and

constructed so that it will not be damaged by expected

jet blast.

n, Repair. The EMAS must be designed to be

repaired to a usable condition within 45 days of use by

the design aircraft at the design entrance speed. It

should be noted that this is a design requirement only -

not an operational requirement.

7. MATERIAL QUALIFICATION. The material

comprising the EMAS shall have the following

requirements and characteristics:

a. Material Strength and Deformation

Requirements. Materials must meet a force vs.

deformation profile within limits having been shown to

assure uniform crushing characteristics, and therefore,

predictable response to an aircraft entering the

arresting system.

b. Material Characteristics. The materials

comprising the EMAS must:

(1) Be water-resistant to the extent that the

presence of water does not affect system performance.

(2) Not attract vermin, birds, or other

creatures.

(3) Be non-sparking.

(4) Be non-flammable.

(5) Not promote combustion.

(6) Not emit toxic fumes or malodorous

fumes in a fire environment after installation.

(7) Not support unintended plant growth with

proper treatment.

4

8/21/98

(8) Have constant strength and density

characteristics during all climatic conditions within a

temperature range appropriate for the locale as

specified by the airport owner.

•

(9) Be resistant to deterioration due to:

(a) Salt.

(b) Typical aircraft and runway deicing

fluids.

(c) Aircraft fuels, hydraulic fluids, and

lubricating oils.

(d) Sunlight.

(e) Water.

(1) Freeze/thaw, if installed where

freezing is possible.

(g) Blowing sand.

8. DESIGN PROPOSAL SUBMITTAL. The

EMAS design shall be submitted to the FAA, Office of

Airport Safety and Standards, through the responsible

FAA Airports Regional or District Office, for review

and approval and shall be certified as meeting all the

requirements of this AC. The submittal shall include

all design assumptions and data utilized in its

development as well as proposed construction

procedures and techniques.

•

9. INSTALLATION.

a. Material Conformance Requirements. A

material sampling and testing program shall be

established to verify that all materials are in

conformance with the previously qualified force vs.

deformation profile/limits. The sampling and testing

program must be submitted to and approved by the

FAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards.

Materials failing to meet requirements based on the

testing program shall not be used.

b. Construction. A quality assurance program,

submitted to and approved by the FAA, Office of

Airport Safety and Standards, shall be implemented to

ensure that construction is in accordance with the

approved design.

10. MARKING. An EMAS is marked as an area

unusable for landing, takeoff, and taxiing with yellow

chevrons in accordance with AC 150/5340-1,

Standardsfor Airport Markings. •
8/21/98

•

11. MAINTENANCE. An inspection and

maintenance program, submitted to and approved by

the FAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards, shall

be established and carried out by the airport sponsor to

ensure original specified density and strength are

maintained throughout the operating life of the EMAS.

The program shall include any necessary procedures

for preventive maintenance and unscheduled repairs,

particularly to weatherproofing layers. Airport

personnel must be notified that the EMAS is designed

to fail under load and that precautions should be taken

when activities require personnel to be on, or vehicles

and personnel to be near, the EMAS.

12. AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING

(ARFF).

a. Access. As required by paragraph 6.h, an

EMAS is capable of supporting typical ARFF

DAVID L. BENNETT

•

Director of Airport Safety and Standards

•

AC 150/5220-22

equipment. However, as the sides of the system are

typically steeply sloped, and the system will be severely

rutted after an aircraft arrestment, ARFF vehicles so

equipped should be shifted into all-wheel-drive prior to

entering and maneuvering upon an EMAS.

b. Tactics. Any fire present after the arrestment

of an aircraft will be three-dimensional due to the

rutting and breakup of the EMAS mat~rial. A dualagent attack and/or other tactics appropriate to this

type of fire should be employed.

13. NOTIFICATION. Upon installation of an

EMAS, its length, width, and location shall be

included as a remark in the Airport/Facility Directory.

The following is an example of a typical entry:

"Engineered

400'L x 150'W,

runway 16."

Materials

located

Arresting

at departure

System,

end of

5 (and 6)
NOTES:

1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0· PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP.

2. PERFORMANCE BASED ON WET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS.

PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY

NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN. SEE PARAGRAPH 5

DC-9

GW = 114,000 Ibs.

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200 300 400 500 600 700 800

RUNWAY SAFETY AREA AVAILABLE (FEET)

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• •

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NOTES:

1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0" PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP.

2. PERFORMANCE BASED ON WET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS.

•

PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY

NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN· SEE PARAGRAPH 5

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RUNWAY SAFETY AREA AVAILABLE (FEET)

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NOTES:

1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0" PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP.

2. PERFORMANCE BASED ON WET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS.

•

PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY

NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN· SEE PARAGRAPH 5

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GW = 209,000 Ibs.

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1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0· PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP.

2. PERFORMANCE BASED ON WET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS.

PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY

NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN - SEE PARAGRAPH 5

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GW = 820,000 Ibs.

MAXIMUM THRUST REVERSE & BRAKING

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200 300 400 500 600 700 800

RUNWAY SAFETY AREA AVAILABLE (FEET)

FIGURE A1-4

•

00

i0

--- -'0

00
8/21/98 AC 150/5220-22

Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2. RELATED READING MATERIAL. •

This appendix contains a listing of documents with supplemental material relating to the subject of EMAS. These

documents contain certain information on materials evaluated as well as design, construction, and testing procedures

utilized to date. These publications may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS),

Springfield, VA 22 I51.

1. DOT/FAA/PM-87/27, Soft Ground Arresting Systems, Final Report-Sept. 1986 - Aug. 1987, published Aug. 1987

by R.F. Cook, Universal Energy Systems, Inc., Dayton, OH.

2. 2. DOT/FAA/CT-93/4, Soft Ground Arresting Systems for Commercial Aircraft - Interim Report-Feb. 1993 by

Robert Cook.

3. DOT/FAA/CT-93/80, Soft Ground Arresting Systems for Airports - Final Report - Dec. 1993 by Jim White, Satish

K. Agrawal, and Robert Cook.

4. Draft Report - DOT/FAA/CT-95, Preliminary Soft Ground Arrestor Design for JFK International Airport - March

1995.

5. Draft Test Report - Soft Ground Arresting System Using Cellular Concrete - Nov. 1994.

6. DOT/FAA/AOV 90-1 - Location of Commercial Aircraft Accidents/Incidents Relative to Runways, July1990.

7. UDR-TR-88-07, Cook, R.F., Evaluation of a Foam Arrestor Bedfor Aircraft Safety Overrun Areas, University of

Dayton Research Institute, Dayton, Ohio. 1988. •

•

1 (and 2)