UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-5211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

STEVEN ALLEN HALL, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. 

Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (2:08-cr-00006-1) 

Submitted: July 6, 2009 Decided: July 24, 2009 

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Troy N. Giatras, THE GIATRAS LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charleston, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States 

Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Steven Allen Hall was convicted by a jury of 

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced Hall to thirty 

months of imprisonment, and Hall appeals his conviction and 

sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Hall first challenges the district court’s denial of 

his suppression motions. Hall argues that the officer who 

arrested him did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him. 

“In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, 

we review the court’s factual findings for clear error, and its 

legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Cain, 524 F.3d 

477, 481 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). When the district 

court denies a defendant’s suppression motion, the court 

construes “the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

[G]overnment.” United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 

(4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 

 “[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer 

has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 

is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) 

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The officer must 

have “at least a minimal level of objective justification for 

making the stop” and “must be able to articulate more than an 

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inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal 

activity.” Id. at 123-24 (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). Courts assess the legality of a Terry stop 

under the totality of the circumstances, giving “due weight to 

common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their 

experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 

317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The court will 

“credit the ‘practical experience of officers who observe on a 

daily basis what transpires on the street.’” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993)). 

 With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the 

record and find that the district court’s conclusion that the 

officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity might 

have been afoot was not erroneous. We also find that Hall’s 

reliance on the Second Amendment is misplaced, and that he 

failed to preserve for our review his claims based upon the 

state concealed weapon statute. Thus, the district court 

properly denied Hall’s suppression motions. 

 Hall next challenges the district court’s denial of a 

two-level reduction in offense level for acceptance of 

responsibility under the guidelines. Following United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court must engage in a 

multi-step process at sentencing. After calculating the 

appropriate advisory guidelines range, a district court should 

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consider the resulting range in conjunction with the factors set 

out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), and determine an appropriate 

sentence. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 259-60 (4th 

Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). 

 This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness, 

applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, ___, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); see also

United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 742 (4th Cir. 2009), 

petition for cert. filed (May 29, 2009) (No. 08-10729). In so 

doing, the court first examines the sentence for “significant 

procedural error,” including: “failing to calculate (or 

improperly calculating) the [g]uidelines range, treating the 

[g]uidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) 

factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, 

or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . .” 

Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. “If the district court decides to 

impose a sentence outside the [g]uidelines range, it must ensure 

that its justification supports ‘the degree of the variance’; 

. . . .” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 476 (2008) (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 

597). Finally, the court then “‘consider[s] the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence imposed.’” Id. (quoting Gall, 

128 S. Ct. at 597). If the sentence is within the guidelines 

range, the appellate court may apply a presumption of 

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reasonableness. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, ___, 127 

S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007) (upholding presumption of 

reasonableness for within-guidelines sentence). 

The guidelines provide for a two-level reduction in 

offense level for a defendant who “clearly demonstrates 

acceptance of responsibility.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

Manual (“USSG”) § 3E1.1(a) (2007). The defendant bears the 

burden of proving that he is entitled to the reduction by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Harris, 882 

F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1989). In addition, this court will 

review the district court’s determination of acceptance of 

responsibility with “great deference.” See USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. 

n.5. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district 

court did not err in concluding that Hall failed to demonstrate 

acceptance of responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED