UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRENDA K. BROWN,

Plaintiff, 

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

_______________________ __________/

CASE NO. 2:14-cv-13738

HON. MARIANNE O. BATTANI

OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS 

AND ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are Plaintiff Brenda K. Brown’s objections (Doc. 15) to

Magistrate Judge David R. Grand’s November 24, 2015, Report and Recommendation

("R&R") (Doc. 14). In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Grand recommended that the Court

grant Defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for summary judgment (Doc.

13) and deny Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 11). For the reasons that

follow, the Court OVERRULES the Plaintiff’s objections and ADOPTS the R&R.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

As the parties have not objected to the R&R’s recitation of the facts, the Court

adopts that portion of the R&R. (See Doc. 14, pp. 2-9.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

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A district court must conduct a de novo review of the portions of a magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The district “court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate” judge. Id. The requirement of de novo

review “is a statutory recognition that Article III of the United States Constitution

mandates that the judicial power of the United States be vested in judges with life

tenure.” United States v. Shami, 754 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1985). Accordingly,

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) to “insure[ ] that the district judge would be the

final arbiter” of a matter referred to a magistrate. Flournoy v. Marshall, 842 F.2d 875,

878 (6th Cir. 1987).

The Sixth Circuit has made clear that “[o]verly general objections do not satisfy the

objection requirement.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006). Only

specific objections are entitled to de novo review; vague and conclusory objections

amount to a complete failure to object as they are not sufficient to pinpoint those

portions of the R&R that are legitimately in contention. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636,

637 (6th Cir.1986) (per curiam). “The objections must be clear enough to enable the

district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Miller v.

Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). "‘[O]bjections disput[ing] the correctness of the

magistrate's recommendation but fail[ing] to specify the findings . . . believed [to be] in

error' are too general.” Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725 (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380).

B. Standard of Review Applicable to Social Security Cases

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This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review is limited to determining

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and was

made pursuant to proper legal standards. Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d

234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but

less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If

the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, "it must be affirmed

even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial

evidence also supports the opposite conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human

Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).

When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings for substantial evidence, the

Court is limited to an examination of the record and must consider that record as a

whole. Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). 

There is no requirement, however, that either the Commissioner or this Court discuss

every piece of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, this Court does "not try the case de

novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility." Bass v.

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s sole objection to the R&R challenges the weight the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) afforded to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Duncan Magoon,

M.D. On March 27, 2014, Dr. Magoon completed a Mental Residual Functional

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Capacity Report on Plaintiff’s behalf, indicating that she suffered marked limitations in

most work-related functions. (Tr. 550-51). According to Plaintiff, Dr. Magoon’s opinion

should have been afforded controlling weight pursuant to the “Treating Physician Rule,”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).

Treating physician opinions are given controlling weight if they are “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and

[are] not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). The Social Security regulations explicitly state that the length

of the treating relationship is to be taken into account in assigning weight, such that “the

longer a treating source has treated you and the more times you have been seen by a

treating source, the more weight we will give to the source's medical opinion.” Id. In

deciding not to afford Dr. Magoon’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ observed that he

“appears to have only recently begun to treat the claimant; the record contains only one

examination report of Dr. Magoon (his initial December 2013 examination).” (Tr. 21

(emphasis added)). Plaintiff contends that this observation is inconsistent with the

R&R’s summary that “[a] review of the documentary evidence in the record

demonstrates that Dr. Magoon initially examined Brown in December 2013 (Tr. 480-82),

and according to her own testimony, he at most saw her on two other occasions before

drafting the above RFC [Residual Functional Capacity] assessment in March 2014.” 

(Doc. 14, p. 13 (emphasis added)). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ inappropriately

premised her determination that Dr. Magoon’s opinion was not entitled to controlling

weight on the erroneous finding that this opinion was based only on one examination.

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During the administrative hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had seen Dr. Magoon

three times prior to the March 31, 2014, hearing date. (Tr. 54, 56). The ALJ was

correct, however, in stating that the record contains only one examination report by Dr.

Magoon. The R&R does not contradict the ALJ’s finding. Rather, it reasons that even if

Plaintiff’s testimony is to be credited, Dr. Magoon treated Plaintiff at most on two other

occasions before drafting his RFC assessment – and, therefore, for what remains a

short treating relationship.

Plaintiff also objects to the fact that the ALJ credited examination reports

rendered by her primary care physician, Donald Robinson, M.D., over Dr. Magoon’s

opinion. Plaintiff contends that as a specialist in the field of psychiatry, Dr. Magoon

should have been afforded greater weight than a primary care physician. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c)(5) (“We generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about

medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who

is not a specialist.”). Both the ALJ and the Magistrate Judge have observed that Dr.

Robinson’s notes indicate that Plaintiff has normal attention span and concentration. 

The Magistrate Judge made specific and numerous citations to the record in observing

that “Dr. Robinson’s records indicate that, over the course of approximately one year,

Brown reported that she no longer suffered from depression, she denied having any

difficulty with concentration, and disclaimed any thoughts of anxiety or other mental

issues.” (Doc. 14, p. 13). Accordingly, the ALJ’s written decision and the R&R rely not

only on Dr. Robinson’s non-specialist observations but also on the inconsistencies

between Plaintiff’s own self-reports and her claims of disability. Taken together with

reports by one-time treating source Leslie MacAuley, M.D., and consultative examiner

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R. Scott Lazzara, M.D., the weight of substantial evidence could reasonably be said to

support the ALJ’s conclusions.

Finally, Plaintiff objects that, consistent with the little weight accorded to Dr.

Magoon’s opinion due to the brevity of the treatment relationship, the ALJ should have

also accorded little weight to one-time examining sources Drs. MacAuley and Lazzara. 

This argument misses the mark. Dr. MacAuley’s and Dr. Lazzara’s opinions properly

offer support for the ALJ’s conclusion because they are consistent with the record as a

whole. See Winn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 514 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015) (“If an

ALJ decides that the opinion of a treating source should not be given controlling weight,

the ALJ must take certain factors into consideration when determining how much weight

to give the opinion, including . . . ‘consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole .

. . .’”) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

Indeed, the ALJ noted in reference to Dr. Lazzara’s opinion that it “is supported by the

evidence in general and is not contradicted by other medical opinion evidence provided

by a treating or examining source.” (Tr. 21 (emphasis added)). Further, it is not

improper for an ALJ to afford greater weight to a reviewing source than to a treating

source, if the former is supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., McGrew v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x. 26, 31-32 (6th Cir. 2009).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections and

ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 7, 2016 s/Marianne O. Battani 

MARIANNE O. BATTANI

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Order was served upon counsel of record via the Court's ECF System to their

respective email addresses or First Class U.S. mail to the non-ECF participants on March 7, 2016.

s/ Kay Doaks 

Case Manager

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