Russia’s Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, 

and Opportunities for the United States

by John W. Parker 

Strategic Perspectives 3

Center for Strategic Research

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National 

Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm.  INSS includes 

the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Technology and National 

Security Policy, Center for Complex Operations, and Center for 

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who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by 

performing research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy 

support, and outreach. 

The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary 

of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified 

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the academic programs at NDU, and to perform outreach to other U.S. 

Government agencies and to the broader national security community. 

Cover: President Barack Obama meets with Russian President Dmitry 

Medvedev at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Japan, 

November 2010.

Photo courtesy of Associated Press/Charles Dharapak
Russia’s Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, and

Opportunities for the United States

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

Series Editor: Phillip C. Saunders 

National Defense University Press

Washington, D.C.

January 2011

By John W. Parker 

Russia’s Revival: Ambitions, Limitations, and

Opportunities for the United States
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please go to the 

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First printing, January 2011
v

Contents

Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Putin’s Record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Medvedev’s Challenge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Demographic Determinism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Price Paradox. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Corruption Complex. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Military Malaise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

The “Near Abroad”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Iran. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Implications for the United States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

1

Russia’s Revival

Executive Summary

Independent Russia is approaching the start of its third decade of post-Soviet existence. 

After the economic chaos of the Boris Yeltsin decade and the recovery and stabilization of the 

Vladimir Putin decade, Russia’s leaders have high ambitions for a return to great power status 

in the years ahead. Their aspirations are tempered, however, by the realities of Russia’s social, 

economic, and military shortcomings and vulnerabilities, laid painfully bare by the stress test 

of the recent global financial crisis. Looking ahead, some also calculate that Russia will be 

increasingly challenged in the Far East by a rising China and in the Middle East by an Iran 

that aspires to regional hegemony. 

With energy riches abundant enough to compensate for a multitude of governance and 

managerial shortcomings, the Russian economy will likely continue to grow in absolute terms 

in the years ahead. Indeed, if Russia wants to remain a mediocre power, it can do so without 

effort by not changing its current behavior patterns. But with growing corruption, businessstifling political controls, and dependency on raw materials exports retarding the full potential 

of Russia’s growth, the country is facing the prospect of decades of decline relative to other more 

dynamic regional and world powers. 

Russia will retain its nuclear weapons and permanent veto-empowered seat in the United 

Nations Security Council. But Russia will likely slip on many of the measures commonly used to 

assess great power status: size and vitality of its population, growth and vibrancy of its economy, 

and the ability of its armed forces to project conventional military power beyond its own borders. Russia will continue to be the preponderant influence across a large swath of former Soviet 

territory, but not beyond it. 

As a result, Moscow is already seeking to strengthen Russia’s ties with Europe and 

the United States. The West is seen as crucial to Russia’s modernization as well as a hedge 

against what may develop to Russia’s east and south in coming decades. This process of 

Russia’s anchoring itself more firmly in the West will proceed with lots of tactical hiccups 

and sporadic crises. Nevertheless, it will bring consequences and opportunities for U.S. 

diplomacy and strategic development, some of which the Barack Obama administration’s 

policy of “reset” is already reaping. But Russian policy toward the United States is conditional on a U.S. approach that engages Russia in positive ways. If that policy were to change, 

it could push Russia and China closer together on some issues in an effort to constrain the 

United States. 

3

Russia’s Revival

Introduction

In February 2008, then-President Vladimir Putin unveiled his vision for Russia’s development strategy to 2020, often referred to as “Russia 2020.”1

 Guided by Putin’s speech, the Ministry 

of Economic Development and Trade formulated ambitious plans to make Russia the fifth largest economy in the world after the United States, China, India, and Japan. Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) would expand an average 6.5 percent per year. Its share of the world GDP 

would increase from 2.5 percent to 4 percent. A national innovation system, competitive human 

capital, and regional development centers would boost Russia’s per capita GDP from $12,000 to 

$30,000—that is, from the equivalent of a quarter of the U.S. average to half of it.2

Nearly 3 years later, in the wake of the global financial crisis, it is clear that achieving the 

goals of “Russia 2020” will be a stretch. The 2008–2009 crisis hit Russia especially hard, underscoring its vulnerabilities. Oil went from $145 a barrel in July 2008 to $36 in January 2009. In 

the decade leading up to the onset of the crisis, Russia’s GDP had soared from $200 billion to 

$1.8 trillion, one of the fastest growth rates in the world. But in 2009, Russia’s GDP fell by 7.9 

percent, the largest drop of any of the Group of 20 (G–20) countries (the world’s largest economies).3

 By fall 2010, according to one poll, the proportion of Russian citizens confident that 

Russia would return to superpower status within 10 to 15 years had dropped from 50 percent 

before the crisis to 36 percent.4

In 2010, even as the price of oil recovered to the $70–$80 per barrel range and continued to 

rise, Russia’s GDP struggled to rebound and remains sluggish. The Ministry of Economic Development in September forecast 3.5 to 4 percent growth by the end of the year, but reported that 

the economy had actually contracted by 0.4 percent in both July and August; others now believe 

growth for the year will be closer to the 3 to 3.5 percent range.5

 Looking forward to 2011–2013, 

the ministry forecast annual growth between 3.9 percent and 4.5 percent, several percentage 

points short of “Russia 2020” growth targets. Moreover, the draft budgets for these years assume 

that oil will stay in the $76–$79 per barrel range, but even at that world market price, experts 

envision deficits whose state financing could lead to a serious rise in inflation.6

During the decade when Russia boomed financially, many began to describe it as an “energy superpower.”7

 However, the factors that will prevent Russia from attaining superpower status 

in the years ahead also soared during this same decade: corruption, renationalization, top-down 

political controls, and dependency on raw materials exports, particular oil and gas. Yegor Gaidar, Russia’s first post-Soviet prime minister, several years ago argued that the mid-1980s drop in 

world oil prices contributed to the oil-dependent Soviet Union’s collapse. Although numerous 
4 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

other factors also played a role in its dissolution, some analysts now see similar vulnerabilities 

for a post-Soviet Russia that has become greatly dependent on high energy prices for its economic and political sustainability.8

While the collapse of Russia may not necessarily be in the cards, the deck is certainly 

stacked against it becoming a superpower by 2020, or by any other date in the foreseeable future, and perhaps of even remaining a great power in the years ahead. Russia will retain its 

nuclear weapons and permanent veto-empowered seat in the United Nations (UN) Security 

Council. But Russia will likely slip on many of the measures commonly used to assess great 

power status: size and vitality of its population, growth and vibrancy of its economy, and the 

ability of its armed forces to project conventional military power beyond its own borders. 

Some key variables are trending in the negative direction, and they are going to be hard 

to reverse. To make Putin’s 2020 targets, labor productivity would have to average over 9 percent per year in the next decade, surpassing even China’s recent astounding productivity rates.9

At the same time, Russia is not making the most of some areas where it still retains a strong 

hand—particularly efficient exploitation of its fabulous endowment of energy and other natural 

resources. Even if high oil prices continue, demography will constrain Russia’s advancement. 

Moreover, the geographic advantages Moscow had during imperial and Soviet times, when it 

expanded in all directions against weak neighbors, are now vulnerabilities. Russia in the decades ahead will have to contend with newly dynamic and historically aggrieved direct or near 

neighbors, particularly China and Iran. Twenty years after the Soviet collapse, Moscow no longer fields a first-class military to protect its borders, and it is still too early to presume the success of current military reform efforts. 

Russia will continue to be the preponderant influence across a large swath of former Soviet 

territory, but not beyond it. Russia’s hard and soft power will reinforce each other in the “near 

abroad.”10 Georgia, though, may remain the only place where Russia might again risk using hard 

power against a fractious neighbor, as it did in August 2008. Meanwhile, the Muslim populations 

in Russia’s North Caucasus and even the central Volga regions are susceptible to influence by Sunni money and extremist ideologies from abroad. In a civil war with no letup in sight, over 10,000 

military and internal security personnel have died and 27,000 have been wounded in the North 

Caucasus since 1988. Counting civilians, total fatalities in the post-Soviet period could be as high 

as 100,000,11 and some have speculated that if current trends continue, Russia will sooner or later 

“lose” these territories.12 In the thinly populated Far East, a burgeoning China poses a largely 

unspoken challenge in the decades ahead and is already pouring investment money into Central 

Asia and the Caucasus. To the south, Iran is a rising power intent on becoming a nuclear player. 
5

Russia’s Revival

With energy riches so abundant that they make up for a multitude of governance and managerial shortcomings, the Russian economy will likely continue to grow in absolute terms in 

the years ahead. But with these shortcomings retarding the full potential of Russia’s growth, the 

country is facing the prospect of decades of decline relative to other more dynamic and booming regional and world powers. This will constrain Russian political and military ambitions, 

which some in Moscow already realize. Russia’s share of global economic output fell from 4.1 

percent in 1992 to 3.3 percent in 2008. Relative to China, Russia slid over this same period from 

having a GDP that was roughly equal to China’s to one that was less than a third (and is now 

close to just a quarter). Relative to the United States, Russia’s GDP fell from 18 percent in 1992 

to 16 percent in 2008.13 It is no wonder that President Dmitry Medvedev has underscored—

however rhetorically—the need for modernization, without which Russia will slip further out 

of the top tier of world powers.14

Russia’s current trajectory, however, opens up multiple opportunities for U.S. diplomacy, 

some of which the Obama administration’s policy of reset has already been able to tap. In fact, 

a strategic reorientation of Russian foreign policy toward greater cooperation with Europe and 

the United States already seems under way. It is driven mainly by the economic vulnerabilities 

exposed by the global financial crisis, the military and security shortcomings underscored by 

the recent war with Georgia, the relentless rise and growth of China, and the frustrations of 

dealing with an Iranian leadership intent on pursuing a nuclear weapons program and becoming the dominant power in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. 

On the Chinese front, even though Russia and China tout their current “strategic partnership,” the future is uncertain and often troubling for Russian strategic thinkers and policymakers. As a result, some in Moscow argue that, even while doing everything to maintain good 

relations with China now, it is already important for Russia to begin to cooperate more fully 

with the United States and Europe because of inevitable problems with China in the future. To 

Russia’s south, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and expanding influence in the Middle East are also 

nudging Moscow toward this same conclusion.

Putin’s Record

When Putin outlined his goals for “Russia 2020,” the average 6.5 percent annual economic 

growth that his economic planners formulated did not seem outlandish. It was well within the 

margins of the growth rates that Russia had achieved during Putin’s years in power. From 1999 

through 2007, after all, Russia had averaged 7 percent GDP growth per year. As mesmerizing as 

that rate was, however, it was deceiving, since it followed a decade of post-Soviet collapse and 
6 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

contraction. In actual fact, Russia’s economy at the beginning of 2008 was probably only around 

5 percent bigger than it had been in 1990 in constant 1990 prices.15

Nevertheless, Russia, or at least Moscow, in 2008 was far beyond the “Upper Volta with 

nuclear missiles” of Aleksandr Bovin’s famous 1989 quip.16 There had been great economic 

changes since the ruble collapse of 1998 thanks to the economic reforms of the early Putin years 

and subsequent high prices on world oil and gas markets. A tremendous amount of new money 

has coursed through the Russian economy, and a lot of people—even ordinary ones—were a lot 

better off than before. Unfortunately, a large portion of the profits from high hydrocarbon prices 

had gone into corruption and consumption rather than into dynamic infrastructure investment. A joke making the rounds asks, “What is the difference between the American dream and 

the Russian dream?” The punch line answers, “The American dream is how to earn a million. 

The Russian dream is how to spend a million.” 

All the same, a visitor to Moscow will be rightfully impressed by its glitter and growth 

since the Soviet collapse. Russia’s capital added 1.75 million inhabitants from 1989 to 2006, an 

increase of 20 percent.17 But beneath that glitter and beyond the capital lay infrastructure rot 

caused by pervasive corruption, shoddy governance, demographic decline, and the still undone 

Soviet legacy of production assets—factories and workers—plunked down in economically untenable places by central planning. All these factors are a drag on efficient growth, and the list 

of painful consequences is long and continuing: from the tragic sinking of the Kursk submarine 

at the beginning of the Putin era, to the many test failures of the Bulava SLBM, to Gazprom’s 

reluctance to invest in new domestic fields and pipelines, to a clumsy war against tiny Georgia, 

to regions in the Far East that are emptying while China booms on the other side of the border, 

to smoke from peat bog and forest fires drifting across central Russia and threatening the health 

and welfare of the residents of Moscow and other cities.18

Moscow’s glitter is the exception, not the trendsetter. In attracting those fleeing economic 

bust and social violence elsewhere, the capital’s economic magnetism exacerbates the gap instead of smoothing out the disparities between the center and the periphery. Beyond Moscow, 

abandoned villages and shrinking towns are common.19 In suborning local interests and plundering local resources, Putin’s “vertical of power” is reportedly spawning autonomy movements 

even in a number of ethnic Russian regions, leading some observers to ponder whether the 

Russian Federation could collapse just as did the Soviet Union.20

Nevertheless, the stock market by 2008 had soared to 20 times its original size. Foreign 

investors helped by pouring money into a booming emerging market. The Reserve Fund (Oil 

Stabilization Fund) held $140 billion to hedge against a drop in oil prices, and the National 
7

Russia’s Revival

Welfare Fund held another $30 billion to help safeguard pensions. Moreover, Russia’s growth 

during these years benefited more than just the rich and powerful. Real incomes and wages 

more than doubled and tripled. Cell phones became ubiquitous. Car ownership boomed. Real 

estate in Moscow went from $700 to $6,000 per square meter.21 To a visitor it would seem that 

everyone in Moscow has a cell phone. They constantly check them, even in the subway. They 

pull them out upon landing at the new Domodedovo airport to let their rides know they are on 

the ground. They have computers and want to know not only a visitor’s phone number but also 

his or her email and Skype addresses.22 According to a recent survey, computer ownership has 

risen from 8 percent in 2001 to 52 percent in 2010, with 63 percent of computer owners using 

them to access the Internet.23

Analysts attribute over half of Russia’s growth during the 1999–2008 decade to early economic reforms.24 From 1992 to 1997, during the Yeltsin years, Russia underwent the largest 

privatization campaign in history. Then, from 1998 into 2002, from just before Putin’s early brief 

premiership into his first term as president, Putin pushed through a thorough reform of the tax 

system, including introduction of a flat personal income tax of 13 percent. At the same time, 

Russia integrated into the world economy as its imports and especially exports surged. Exports 

now account for 33 percent of Russia’s GDP. Even in 2008, the current account surplus was $113 

billion, or 7.7 percent of GDP. Rising oil prices contributed to much of this trade surplus, but 

the share of oil and gas in Russia’s exports actually fell from 90 percent in the Soviet Union’s last 

years to 60 percent in 2008.25

But Russia’s reform efforts, particularly in the oil sector, came to a screeching halt and then 

went into reverse in 2003 when Putin imprisoned Yukos oil company head Mikhail Khodorkovsky. Yukos had been Russia’s most profitable privately held oil company. Its $35 billion market value at one time was more than half of the Russian Federation’s budget. But Khodorkovsky 

also had political ambitions and little respect for Putin, flaunting his independence from and 

even rivalry with the president. His plans to sell a big chunk of Yukos to Exxon-Mobil or Chevron and to change tax legislation challenged Putin’s vision of the state dominating Russia’s energy and natural resources sector. 

Since 2001, Putin had been reining in headstrong, overly independent political and economic players, beginning with “capitalist ministers” inside the Russian state’s own structures. 

Yevgeny Adamov from MinAtom was his first victim in April 2001. Shortly afterward, Putin 

ousted Rem Vyakhirev as Gazprom’s chief executive officer and replaced him with protégé 

Aleksey Miller. This was the beginning of the end of Gazprom’s status as a “state within the 

state.” That June, government representatives gained a majority on Gazprom’s board for the 
8 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

first time. A year later, this majority made Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chief of the Presidential 

Administration, chairman of the board; this was the same Medvedev who in 2008 would succeed Putin as president. 

The action was a model and a precursor for what the Putin regime had in store for other 

“strategic sectors” in coming years. Putin had a high interest in and knowledge of the oil and gas 

sector, and the move against Khodorkovsky accelerated the state takeover of the commanding 

heights of those sectors. Gazprom declared a monopoly on gas exports from Russia, forcing 

private producers to play exclusively by Gazprom rules. Foreign energy majors also had their 

positions in Russian joint ventures undermined. Finally, Putin’s green light to regime insiders to 

cannibalize Yukos cemented in place a system of continuous clashes over lucrative resources for 

political and personal gain between competing elite groups with Kremlin ties.26

As the regime reinstituted state control of the oil industry, it weakened private ownership 

and the discipline of capital markets. Oil export taxes rose to fill state coffers, depriving oil 

companies of funds to reinvest in exploration, modernization, and expansion. Inefficiencies set 

in as state control grew to over 80 percent of gas production and to around 45 percent of oil 

production. The impact was quick and measurable. In 2005, oil production growth slowed. In 

2008, it actually declined.27 

The impact of these measures and trends was masked by the spectacular growth in world oil 

prices beginning in 2004. The windfall allowed Russia to keep posting growth rates averaging 7 percent per year. Pundits began referring to Russia as an “energy superpower.” But inflation remained 

high at over 10 percent, corruption expanded, and the economy remained heavily dependent on raw 

materials exports, primarily hydrocarbons, minerals, and metals. Moreover, with these raw materials 

exports accounting for around 30 percent of Russia’s GDP as world commodity prices skyrocketed, 

Russia’s economy was particularly vulnerable to a collapse once the bubble burst.28

Medvedev’s Challenge

When that collapse in world commodity prices finally came, it was spectacular: oil went 

from $145 a barrel in July 2008 to $36 in January 2009. With around 85 percent of its exports 

based on hydrocarbons and other raw commodities, Russia’s trade balance and GDP took a 

huge hit. After a decade of averaging 7 percent growth, Russia’s economy contracted 7.9 percent 

in 2009, the most of any G–20 country. With the system on the line, Russia’s initial response in 

2008 was “mostly adequate,” according to experts. But as oil prices recovered in 2009, the impulse of many reverted to preserving the status quo of comfortable stagnation instead of engaging in the painful restructuring necessary for long-term gain.29
9

Russia’s Revival

Indeed, if Russia wants to remain a mediocre power, it can do so without effort by not 

changing its current behavior patterns. With oil again trading over $80 a barrel, it will take 

enormous political energy and determination to go back and pick up the thread of the Putin 

reforms that stopped in 2003. After all, while Russia’s foreign currency reserves dropped from 

$598 billion in August 2008 to $436 billion in March 2010, they were still the third largest in 

the world.30

All the same, there is probably an increasing if grudging understanding that reforms are 

necessary if Russia is to compete with the world’s advanced economies. Medvedev and even 

Putin seem to realize that something needs to be done. There are strikingly common themes 

in Putin’s call for an “innovation society” in February 2008 and Medvedev’s call for “modernization” in November 2009. Medvedev has criticized Russia’s reliance on oil and gas exports as 

“primitive,” and his call for “modernization” is a sign that Russia’s leadership is aware of the 

problem, although the solutions laid out to date are inadequate and the obstacles to achieving 

even these half-measures are enormous.31

The challenge is to overcome inertia, systemic impediments, and outright opposition, particularly if oil prices remain relatively high. Not surprisingly, there is a lot of skepticism that 

Medvedev can turn things around. Sixty-one percent of participants in one session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June this year foresaw a stagnation scenario for the 

next 2 to 5 years, and 55 percent see it for the next 10 years.32 Some see Putin as a cynic who is 

playing the game about modernization, while Medvedev, who is 10 years younger, is a believer. 

According to this view, this is a huge age gap. In this analysis, whether Medvedev is reelected as 

president in 2012 will be important.33

For now, Medvedev continues to push forward. His speech to Russia’s ambassadors on July 

12, 2010, was a landmark. He explicitly pointed to the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war and 

the global financial crisis as having spurred the new course toward “modernization” and a “paradigm shift in international relations.” According to Medvedev, “We need . . . special modernization alliances with our main international partners. . . . First and foremost with countries like 

Germany, France, Italy, the EU [European Union] as a whole, the United States of America.”34

Even Medvedev’s cheerleaders, however, concede that there have been no “cardinal” 

changes so far and that Medvedev’s signing in July of a law expanding the powers of the Federal 

Security Service (FSB) was a dangerous “step back” from democratization and modernization. 

Medvedev is conducting a “silent war,” insists Igor Yurgens, head of the Institute of Contemporary Development and coauthor of a widely publicized critique of Russia’s capabilities.35 But he 

faces “very significant forces in the country that don’t want any liberalism, any modernization,” 
10 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

as well as a “conformist” society for whom “today’s seeming well-being is more important than 

what happens 5–7 years from now.”36

Even though the Russian economy saw some growth again in 2010, the return to $70-plus 

oil has knocked substantial wind out of the modernizers’ sails. A participant in the annual 

Valdai Club discussions in September 2010 reported that the “momentum for reform” had “dissipated” compared to 2009. One senior Russian official at the meetings noted that the oil price 

rebound had brought with it a return to “complacency” and a worsening of corruption back to 

its precrisis level.37

As a result, Russia may actually wind up with the worst of both worlds: with recovered oil 

prices undercutting reform efforts, and this in turn hobbling a return to precrisis growth rates, 

leading to more budget deficits and possibly setting the stage for a return to politically destabilizing high inflation rates. In fact, some critics have begun to suggest that the government, 

lacking any thought-through strategy for a return to growth, is now beginning to “pray” for a 

jump in oil prices back to $100 a barrel or higher as the only way out of an impending crisis.38

Demographic Determinism

Beyond politics and economic policy, the objective obstacles to Russia remaining a great 

power are formidable. Foremost among them is a starkly declining population. Just after the 

Soviet collapse, on January 1, 1992, Russia’s population stood at an estimated 148.5 million. Seventeen years later, on January 1, 2009, it was down to 141.9 million, a drop of nearly 7 million, 

or close to 5 percent. In the last 16 years of the Soviet era, births outnumbered deaths by 11.4 

million. In the first 16 years of post-Soviet Russia, deaths outnumbered births by 12.4 million. 

Only thanks to migration has the post-Soviet population loss been limited to just under 7 million rather than exceeding 12 million.39

Russia’s population has been experiencing a catastrophic decline in health for almost half 

a century, with no letup in sight. According to a leading expert, “No country in the modern 

era—not even the AIDS-ravaged states of sub-Saharan Africa—has sustained health setbacks 

as severe as Russia’s for such a very long stretch of time.” Too much drinking, too many cigarettes, a bad diet, and poor health care have all contributed to the calamity. Life expectancy for 

a 15-year-old male in Russia in 2006 was lower than in Cambodia, Haiti, Rwanda, or Somalia. 

A typical 20-year-old Russian male in 2006 had a less than even chance of making it to age 65, 

lower than his counterparts in Nigeria or Kenya. For Russian males and females together, the 

U.S. Census Bureau has projected a lower life expectancy in 2025 than in Bolivia, East Timor, 

and even Pakistan.40 
11

Russia’s Revival

If Russia could count on high oil and gas prices to sustain its growth as a world power, then 

a declining population would not be a big tragedy since oil and gas extraction are not labor-intensive enterprises. However, if economic growth and national survival depend on getting beyond 

dependency on hydrocarbon income to achieving sustainable economic diversification, then Russia’s demographic projections are disastrous. Russia will have an increasingly declining population 

with less and less human capital to act as an engine for diversification and economic growth.41

Responding to the looming crisis, then-President Putin in 2007 endorsed a “Concept of 

Demographic Policy to 2025.” By 2015, Russia’s population would stabilize at 142 to 143 million, and by 2025 rise to 145 million. Life expectancy would rise to 75 years in 2025, up from 66 

years in 2006. The fertility rate would reach 1.95, 50 percent higher than in the pre-2007 period. 

However, professional demographers give Russia no chance of reaching these targets. According to Russia’s own official projections, the population will drop another 5.5 million by 2025 to 

under 136 million. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) projects a range of 

127 to 137 million in 2025, and 122 to 135 million in 2030. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates 

128 million in 2025 and 124 million in 2030.42

For the decades ahead, Russia’s population decline is inevitable. According to Russia’s own 

official projections, by 2025 there will be only 6.4 million women in their twenties, the prime 

child-bearing years, 45 percent less than now. With a shrinking cohort of potential mothers, 

maternity rates would have to surge dramatically just to maintain already low birth totals. At 

the same time, Russia’s working age population will decline 14 percent from 2009 to 2025, and 

the ratio of working to retired population will drop from 3 to 1 in 2010 to 1.9 to 1 by 2030.43 A 

good immigration or migrant worker policy could alleviate the impact of these trends on Russia 

as well as smooth relations with its neighbors, but so far Russia does not have one.44

If U.S. Census Bureau projections are on target, Russia’s population will have declined by 

some 20 million between 1990 and 2025. Its size will have dropped from sixth to twelfth in the 

world, and from 2.2 percent to 1.6 percent of projected total global population. Russia’s working 

age population will fall even more sharply, according to UNDP projections. As a result, annual 

labor productivity increases in Russia will have to average 2 percent more than the rest of world 

just to maintain Russia’s current share of global GDP in 2025.45

Price Paradox

Russia’s reliance on raw materials exports makes the country’s welfare highly vulnerable 

to the volatility of commodity prices on world markets. In 2007, oil and gas accounted for 

18 percent of Russia’s GDP, 61 percent of its exports, and about 50 percent of its federal rev-
12 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

enues.46 According to one study of the 1994 to 2009 time period, every 1 percent increase (or 

dip) in the price of oil contributed to a 0.46 percent rise (or decline) in Russia’s GDP.47 This 

made the drop in the price of oil from $145 per barrel in July 2008 to $36 in January 2009 a 

severe shock. But even that low price is historically high and there is no guarantee that oil will 

stay in the range of $70 to $80 per barrel.48 Gas profits are similarly unpredictable. According 

to preliminary data, Gazprom sales to Europe fell from $65 billion in 2008 to $42 billion in 

2009.49 The shift to shale gas and other alternative energy resources in the years ahead will 

contribute to further uncertainty.

Even at today’s relatively high prices, Russia’s immense raw materials riches are unlikely 

in the long run to be able totally to counterbalance the country’s spectacular demographic decline.50 Indeed, rather than setting the stage for Russia to become a sustainable great power, 

they contribute to making its situation worse by undermining incentives to reform, invest, and 

diversify. As long as oil, metals, and mineral prices stay high, today’s profits obscure Russia’s real 

situation, spawn ever greater corruption, and lower the incentive for investments and reforms 

aimed at improving Russia’s long-term prospects. Russia already needs substantial international 

investments in new fields to keep up current oil and gas output.51 

Putin’s “Russia 2020” plan from early 2008 was evidence of this cycle of complacency. The 

global financial crisis that followed soon shattered many illusions. But as oil prices recovered 

from their early 2009 lows, that impact proved temporary. As Medvedev put it in May 2010, “To 

be blunt, $140 a barrel—this would be a catastrophe for Russia, this would destroy all stimuli 

for development.”52

What many have described as the “energy curse” wreaks havoc in several ways. It focuses 

public and private energies on reaping energy profits rather than investing in diversification and 

new and upgraded production facilities. It saps the leadership and population of their will to 

pursue reforms that may cause short-term hardships. And its immense boom-year profits foster 

extreme corruption and degradation of the business environment. One of the results, as Anders 

Aslund and Andrew Kuchins have noted, is that “Russia’s public administration has proven 

itself too incompetent and corrupt to undertake major [infrastructure] projects.” Paved roads 

are an especially sore issue. From 2000 to 2006, they increased only from 754,000 kilometers to 

755,000 kilometers, and then at three times the cost as in the West.53

Finally, as welcome as today’s return to comparatively high oil prices might be in Moscow, 

there is yet another way in which they may actually be a harbinger of Russia’s further relative 

decline as a world power. China will be addressed later in this paper, but for now it is relevant 

to note that at least $80-a-barrel oil is partly due to booming China’s need for energy to fuel its 
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Russia’s Revival

spectacular growth. But as long as China continues to boom, Russia’s world standing will continue to slide unless it undertakes drastic reforms. 

Corruption Complex

Major reforms will be difficult, however, because Russia’s economy is seized up by corruption. It is not just an ancillary phenomenon that is present in other countries as well but is at 

the core of the political-economic system that has evolved in Russia today. Aleksandr Golts, a 

long-time observer of the Russian military-industrial complex, for example, estimates that 30 to 

50 percent of the state money allocated for new armaments disappears into kickbacks.54

Sergei Guriev, head of Moscow’s Russian Economic School, argues that corruption is the 

“key problem of the Russian economy.” Guriev points out that there can be “real achievements 

in the fight against corruption only when we have political competition, accountability of power, 

and transparency of governance.”55 The odds against this happening, however, are underscored 

by another joke recently making the rounds: after several days of deliberation, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation declared that the slogan “Down with corruption” is of 

an obviously extremist character because it calls for dismantling the existing political system in 

Russia and removing its current authorities.

Nevertheless, unless Russia tackles corruption, there will be no movement forward on reform. 

However, when then-President Putin’s own precrisis fortune was put by one observer at over $40 

billion in 2007, the chances of an anticorruption campaign having much impact are very low.56 In 

fact, the trend in many ways seems to be in the other direction. According to a recent poll by the 

Levada Center, 60 percent of Russians believe that the scale of corruption at the top has grown over 

the past 10 years. Ten percent said corruption had gone down, while 23 percent felt that nothing 

had changed.  In 2005, only 45 percent of respondents reported an increase in corruption.57

Other polling likewise suggests that corruption has gone from being the grease that makes 

the wheels of the Russian economy spin to a spreading sludge that slows them down. A recent 

online survey of over 10,000 businesspeople underscored the extent to which corruption is perceived as a systemic phenomenon that impedes modernization. Slightly over 23 percent of respondents pointed to corruption as a barrier to modernization, and 15.9 percent indicated that 

bureaucratic opposition was the problem. Only 9.5 percent pointed to Russia’s dependence on 

world prices for raw materials and another 9.2 percent to Russia’s lag in science and technology 

as the culprit. Not surprisingly, 68.7 percent were doubtful that Russia would hit its modernization marks by 2020, while only 16.4 percent were optimistic that the country would at least put 

in place the preconditions for realizing them.58 
14 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

Yet other accounts reinforce the enormity of the problem. UBS/Campden Research recently polled 25 businessmen whose businesses did at least $100 million in annual volume, and who 

had a minimum personal worth of $50 million (half of the respondents’ worth was $100 million 

to $500 million). The poll found that 84 percent kept their money overseas—with Cyprus, Switzerland, and the Virgin Islands the most popular—not for the tax breaks, but rather to keep it 

safe. (Net capital flight from Russia was likely to reach $22 billion in 2010.59) Across the board, 

the respondents complained of corruption and bureaucracy, especially in the regions. Because 

of the economy’s history of unpredictability, they claimed not to plan further out than 2 years. 

The only thing they felt certain about was an unfriendly business climate. All but two were ready 

to sell out for a good price; just under half were ready to do this in the next 2 to 4 years. Only 

a third hoped to pass on their businesses to their children; two-thirds said they would let their 

children decide for themselves what to do in life.60

Military Malaise

Russia faces still another major challenge to remaining a great power. Shortages of manpower and money have been relentlessly degrading the Russian military establishment since the 

collapse of the Soviet Union. During Soviet times, Russian scientific and technological innovation was focused on advancing the military-industrial sector. When that sector crumbled, so 

did Russia’s high-tech sector, aggravating the challenges Russia now faces to revive its military.61

The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 gave some the illusion of a well-run military 

machine. Russian forces fought well relative to those of Georgia, demonstrating impressive 

surge capability and mobility and achieving swift victory. However, a Russian commander at 

one point had to borrow a satellite phone from a journalist to communicate with his forces, 

the Russian army relied on old compasses and maps instead of modern satellite-based systems 

to orient itself, and Georgian troops shot down a Russian strategic bomber that was employed 

for aerial reconnaissance instead of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Russia’s shortcomings 

in the war gave additional, real-life ammunition to advocates of the long-anticipated and still 

controversial military reform, reorganization, and rearmament programs now under way.62

Demographic constraints on military manpower are already noticeable. By 2016, it is estimated that the number of young men of draft age will be half that of two decades earlier.63 Sergei 

Stepashin, a former prime minister and now head of Russia’s federal audit chamber, warned in 

2007 that the “reduction in the size of the population and the reduction of population density 

. . . will create the danger of weakening Russia’s political, economic, and military influence in 

the world.”64
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Russia’s Revival

The pool of 18-year-old men available for drafting into 12-month tours of duty can no 

longer support a one-million-man army. From 2008 to 2017, this pool of prospective recruits 

will shrink by almost two-fifths, from 1.021 million to 626,000. Moreover, in 2006, of the 20 

regions in the Russian Federation where births exceeded deaths, 19 were “republics” or “autonomous districts” for non-Russian peoples. Of these, the only two with natural increases of over 

1 percent were Ingushetiya and Chechnya, where the net increase was almost 2 percent.65 The 

higher birth rates among Russia’s historically Muslim communities mean increasing numbers 

of draftees will hail from these areas. This trend is likely to present growing challenges for commanders. In July 2010, a fight between Dagestani and Russian soldiers broke out in one Moscow 

division. The fracas involved more than 200 soldiers, and a video of the melee wound up being 

posted on YouTube.66

Last summer, after Medvedev called for an overhaul of the draft system, Vasily Smirnov, 

deputy head of the General Staff, floated several possible measures to increase the size of the 

draft pool and to fight widespread draft evasion. Student deferments would be dramatically 

reduced, and men would be available until age 30 for the draft, up from 27. Rather than being 

summoned, 18-year-olds would have to show up on their own at local draft boards for registration and case dispensation. Without a proper document from their draft board, young men 

would not be able to travel abroad. These measures provoked instant criticism. Abandonment of 

student deferments, it was argued, would further degrade the professional preparation of Russia’s young male population for civilian employment. Requirement of draft board certificates 

for travel abroad would simply enlarge the category of officials to whom bribes would be paid 

to dodge the draft. No longer would it be just doctors and draft board members getting money 

under the table, but also police, border officials, and military police.67

The Russian military budget stood at $61 billion in 2009, compared to $663.3 billion for the 

United States, $98.8 billion for China, $69.3 billion for Britain, and $67.3 for France.68 That budget 

was set last summer to increase from 2.6 percent of the national budget in 2010 to 3.2 percent in 

2013, but is now being revised upward to around 3.5 to 4 percent of GDP.69 Even at the higher rate, 

however, Russia’s spending on its military establishment will still lag far behind that of the United 

States and even China, and be closer to the amount spent by Britain and France. In comparison 

to China, the real gap will probably be even wider, given the corruption that some Russians claim 

eats away at 30 to 50 percent of Russian spending on new weapons and Russian estimates that 

China’s real military budget is 30 to 40 percent greater than its declared budget.70

Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov has admitted that he was, “quite frankly, dismayed 

by the volumes of stealing” that he found when he arrived at the ministry. The basic budget 
16 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

problems are exacerbated by the fact that Russia spent almost nothing on rearming the military from 1991 to 2000. Much of the military’s equipment and weapons systems are outdated, 

obsolete, or nonfunctioning, so Russia is playing serious catch-up vis-à-vis both the United 

States and China. Most serious military analysts conclude that Russia will have to choose sectors in which to invest, rather than maintain a globally capable force. Serdyukov has pointed 

to the “nuclear deterrence forces, the space forces, air defense, aviation, communications” as 

the priorities in the new rearmament program.71

The ability to project military power over long distances is a critical difference between a 

superpower and a great power. Russia, however, will not be able to project sizable conventional 

forces far beyond its borders consistently and repeatedly for many years to come. After Russia’s 

armed action against Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden in May 2010, General Nikolai Makarov, 

head of the General Staff, said that Russia did not plan to send more warships to the gulf because 

of financial problems. (This decision has since been reversed.72) However, there was no cause 

for worry, Makarov said, since North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU naval force 

ships were always on duty in the gulf, and “we maintain cooperation with them, hold exercises 

as well as exchange information.”73

A few weeks later, Minister Serdyukov reportedly told a closed session of the Federation 

Council that creating new military bases abroad “is an expensive treat; we already have four 

military bases outside Russia. Raising their number further would probably be too burdensome.” Referring to the loss of the Soviet-era naval base in the Gulf of Aden, Serdyukov reportedly said, “Of course, it would have suited us to have a base there, where our ships could refuel, 

but objectively we must proceed from the state’s financial capabilities.”74 In fall 2010, the Foreign 

Ministry denied that Russia intended to hold talks with Vietnam on restoring its naval base at 

Cam Ranh Bay.75

Russia’s state plan will now call for spending $613 billion on new arms between 2011 and 

2020, according to Serdyukov.76 This is up from the approximately $420.7 billion called for in 

a previous draft plan that provoked criticism for shortchanging the military’s real needs. Lieutenant-General Oleg Frolov, for example, the acting chief of acquisitions for the armed forces, 

argued that the earlier amount would only cover the needs of strategic nuclear forces, air defense, and the air force. To meet the additional requirements for rearming ground troops, navy, 

and space forces, Frolov maintained, almost three times as much would be necessary: some $1.1 

trillion instead of the proposed $420.7 billion.77 While the additional moneys will help to rearm 

Russia, they will put a tremendous and probably unsustainable strain on Russia’s budget down 

the line while still falling short of the sums that Frolov insisted are actually needed.78
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Russia’s Revival

While it is not surprising that a Ministry of Defense official would lobby for more funds, Russia 

in fact will need to spend much more than it envisioned if it is to have a first-rate military in the decades ahead. Already, Russia’s strategic strength lies in missiles and nuclear warheads left over from 

the Soviet era. In other areas, for example, Russia’s Pacific Fleet strategic submarines will need to be 

decommissioned in the next 2 to 3 years, and the Northern Fleet will face the same situation 7 to 10 

years from now, according to analyst Igor Korotchenko.79 On air defenses, Russian Air Force generals 

claim that Russia lags behind its “virtual adversary” by 20 to 30 years and is not capable of repelling 

every threat even from North Korea and Iran.80 Ground forces are undergoing radical reorganization under Russia’s ongoing military reform but still make do without modern weapons and global 

positioning systems or UAV support and still rely on analog rather than digital communications.81

However, Russia’s own defense industry sector is atrophying while continuing to hang on 

largely on the remaining but dissipating momentum from the Soviet era. The average age of employees in the sector is around 55, and three-quarters of its equipment is worn out.82 Rather than 

reviving the sector, Russia is increasingly going abroad to shop for the latest in military technology. The most prominent recent examples include the purchase of Mistral amphibious assault ships 

from France, UAVs from Israel, armored personnel carriers from Italy, and even digital receivers 

for its Global Navigation Satellite Systems from India.83 According to some Russian forecasts, Russia may spend as much as $12 billion in the next 5 years to buy defense technologies from European and Israeli companies.84 After meeting with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in September, 

Serdyukov announced that his ministry would quickly put together a list of specific products and 

technologies that it would be interested in acquiring from the United States.85

Commenting on the decision to buy UAVs from Israel, Air Force Commander Colonel-General Alexander Zelin conceded that “we would be happy to buy our own devices, but unfortunately 

they don’t meet the high standards that this kind of weapons is supposed to meet.”86 One analyst 

concluded, “The VPK [military-industrial complex] is losing the capability of putting out arms.” 

In the words of Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “We are becoming dependent on imports in an ever 

greater number of directions, and no one hides this. We will be able to purchase weapons only in 

the West, because only there are they modern.”87 Even as the Russian military begins to buy more 

foreign-made equipment, it likely will not be able to afford enough to keep up with the geopolitical 

standards and tasks the political leadership will inevitably want to set for them. 

The “Near Abroad”

As hard as Russia has been rocked by the global financial crisis, undermined by demographic decline, and sapped by corruption, poor governance, and military decay, many of the 
18 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

other former Soviet republics have been hit even harder. While energy-rich Kazakhstan and 

Azerbaijan still wield substantial economic power, vast numbers of unemployed from Ukraine 

to Tajikistan seek work in Russia and send remittances to support their families back home. 

Ukraine and Belarus share Russia’s trend toward population decline and are still vulnerable 

to Russian pressure tactics on energy supplies.88 As a result, Russia arguably still has as much 

influence across Eurasia today as it did in the 1990s. This influence, however, is not automatic, 

varies on a case-by-case basis, and often backfires. Moreover, it will probably decline in the 

decades ahead as the former Soviet states ramp up their engagement with states around them 

and beyond. 

Russia enjoys many soft power plusses in the former Soviet near abroad. Russian private 

investment in telecoms and other sectors has been substantial and successful but relatively nonpolitical.89 The reach and popularity of Russian television are vast but not necessarily decisive 

to the outcome of political contests. Soft power, and even hard power, does not necessarily 

produce pliable partners. Having dealt with their powerful Russian neighbor for centuries, the 

former Soviet states are experienced at saying the right things to please Moscow while pursuing 

their own national interests. 

Russia’s close neighbors are all also adept at courting outside international ties to counterbalance Russian influence, and the greater Moscow’s influence, the greater the perceived need 

to engage other outside partners. The United States and the EU have vastly increased their 

presence throughout the near abroad in recent years. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 

the United States has been the countervailing power of choice, but European states, Turkey, and 

even Iran have also offered options along the way. 

Now, rich and booming China has finally emerged as a substantial addition to this mix, with 

the opening of a major gas pipeline from Turkmenistan in late 2009 and investments and loans 

across the region.90 After years of trying not to attract attention, China suddenly looms as a much 

greater player across Central Asia and even into the Caucasus and Ukraine and other Western 

states.91 Turkmenistan, meanwhile, is pushing ahead to diversify its energy export ties with not 

only China but also Western companies, giving short shrift to Russia, its traditional partner.92

In Ukraine, Russian state-sponsored media interference backfired and contributed to the 

Orange Revolution in 2004. Russia was better served by a more subtle approach in 2010, after 

which Moscow used the promise of cheaper gas prices to gain an extension of its lease on the 

base in Sevastopol for the Russian Black Sea fleet. However, while the new Viktor Yanukovych 

administration in Kyiv has moved quickly to reprioritize relations with Moscow, it is not a Russian patsy. Yanukovych and his supporters have their own economic agenda and constituents 
19

Russia’s Revival

that must be protected.93 In Kyrgyzstan, a Russian media campaign arguably played a role in 

President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s ouster last April. But Russia declined to intervene militarily 

to staunch the subsequent bloodshed then and in June, in contrast to 1990, when elite Soviet 

troops were deployed to the region after similar violence.94 Medvedev subsequently signed a 

statement of cooperation on Kyrgyzstan when he met with President Obama in Washington on 

June 24. 

Even more recently, after a natural gas pricing dispute erupted in June 2010, Moscow is 

now aiming its media guns at President Alyaksandar Lukashenka in Belarus. However, the Russian campaign has arguably had little effect except to motivate Lukashenka to court Georgian 

leader Mikheil Saakashvili, downgrade the effort to seek some sort of union with Russia, and 

call for lessening dependence on Russia and for establishing new markets and sources of investment.95 Although a Russian-led Customs Union with Kazakhstan and Belarus came into force 

on July 1, 2010, the widening dispute with Belarus, nationalist opposition in Kazakhstan, and 

Russia’s unilateral ban on grain exports have underscored its fragility and cast doubt on its future viability.96

Russia was quick to employ hard power against Georgia in August 2008, but Georgia may 

be the only former Soviet state where this could have happened: bordering Russia, with a tiny 

army and population, and with rebellious and ethnically diverse regions that have historically 

looked to Russia for support against Tbilisi. Russia was reluctant to intervene militarily in the 

Tajik civil war in 1992,97 and has not done so 18 years later in Kyrgyzstan. The argument could 

be made that Russia would be forced to intervene in Kazakhstan, not in the context of political 

disagreements with Astana, but should there be a total collapse of state power across the country with no signs of quick restitution. Russia’s long border with Kazakhstan, the still-large ethnic 

Russian population in that country, and Russia’s sizable investments in Kazakhstan’s economy 

might indeed bring that about and might even enjoy the support of many Kazakhs, the majority 

of whom still view Russia favorably. 

Still, while Russia is currently in the throes of reorganizing its conventional forces, the jury 

will be out for quite some time on whether the “new look” will give Russia a more effective tool 

for projecting military power beyond its borders. Meanwhile, the usefulness of the Russian-led 

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Rapid Reaction Force is questionable, an impression reinforced by the failure of the CSTO to deploy it last year to Kyrgyzstan or to provide 

Kyrgyzstan with any military aid at all. 

While Russia successfully concluded the war with Georgia and the Russian military remains entrenched on internationally recognized Georgian territory, Russia has not necessarily 
20 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

won the peace. Others in the Commonwealth of Independent States were reminded of the worst 

aspects of having an overbearing Russian neighbor and stimulated to reinforce and seek out ties 

with other regional powers.98 Whatever their discomfort with Georgian President Saakashvili, 

none has recognized the independence of South Ossetia or Abkhazia, and all have been supported in this nonrecognition and nose-thumbing at Russia by China.99

China 

Despite the disagreement over recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Sino-Russian 

official relations for now are arguably the best since the 1969 border clashes.100 Russia is working hard to smooth relations with China, and China is wary of feeding any Russian concerns 

over the future. When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Moscow to help celebrate the 65th

anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, he and Medvedev stressed the importance of the “strategic partnership” between China and Russia.101 In Khabarovsk in the Far East 2 months later, 

Foreign Minister Lavrov underscored that the region’s two biggest countries, China and India, 

were both “strategic partners” of Russia, and that it was important that both look on Russia as 

a “comfortable partner.”102 In September, meeting with the Valdai discussion group, Putin accused foreign experts of “always trying to frighten [Russia] about China,” which he denied presented a current or future threat.103 Several weeks later in Beijing, Medvedev said that relations 

with China were now “at their highest point.”104

Nevertheless, the sharp reversal in Russia and China’s relative standing in the world is “the 

starkest in a short period during peacetime for any two neighboring great powers in modern history.”105 Chinese analysts already view China, the United States, and the EU as the world’s dominant political-economic powers, with China having surpassed Russia.106 According to one Russian 

expert, these Chinese analysts include Russia in the second tier of world powers at best, along with 

Japan and India, but sometimes even below this. In any case, according to this same expert, China 

and the United States are already the most important world powers.107 When Medvedev, during 

his recent summit in Beijing, fired Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, it quickly gave rise to the joke 

among Russians that everything is made in China, even the decree dismissing Luzhkov.

At the same time, Russia’s relations with the West are in flux. Traditional Russian paranoia 

about the intentions of NATO and the United States is currently abating. After the Soviet collapse, Russian mistrust had begun to grow when the first prospects for NATO enlargement 

appeared in spring 1993, and surged particularly after the March 1999 bombing of Serbia. At 

their summit in Moscow in May 2002, however, in the wake of 9/11, Presidents George W. Bush 

and Putin issued a joint declaration on the “new strategic relationship” between Russia and 
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Russia’s Revival

America, signed the Moscow Treaty on nuclear reductions, and endorsed the NATO–Russia 

Council (NRC) created a few days earlier by the NATO summit in Rome. 

That high point of Russian-American relations under Bush-Putin began to fray after the invasion of Iraq in May 2003. Five years later, the NRC went into eclipse after Russia fought with Georgia, stationed troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and recognized their independence. In 2009, 

however, the pendulum began to move in the other direction. In the wake of President Obama’s 

invitation to reset and Medvedev’s call for “modernization” and closer contacts with the West, 

Washington and Moscow negotiated the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and 

Moscow agreed to the transit across Russia of U.S. and NATO supplies for forces fighting in Afghanistan. By November 2010, Putin’s successor joined in reviving the NRC when he attended the 

NATO summit in Lisbon, where he agreed that Russia would cooperate on theater missile defenses 

with NATO and even explore participation in a broader U.S.-planned Europe-wide network.108

While most Russians are nevertheless probably still focused on the West and NATO as 

a potential threat, it is possible to detect signs that they are beginning to be really spooked by 

China’s dramatic rise in the world and the implications for relations between the two countries 

in the decades ahead. Since Russia and China began to rebuild ties in 1989, for example, arms 

sales have been a key part of the self-described “strategic relationship.” Sales and coproduction 

deals played an important role in building China’s military capabilities, particularly in aircraft. 

But this facet of the relationship is now beset by tensions in the wake of China’s 2004 decision 

to break its 1996 coproduction deal with Russia on a variant of the Su-27 fighter, which China 

attempted to reverse-engineer and produce as the J–11. China has not been able to duplicate 

the engine for the J–11 and still relies on Russia for advanced jet engines. Nevertheless, China’s 

violation of the contract and increasing rivalry with Russia as a source of weapons systems for 

third-country markets have understandably become impediments to technological sharing between the two countries.109 Even in Central Asia, which Russians view as their backyard, China’s 

pursuit of its own self-interest has begun to cut against Russian interests and reduced Russian 

leverage on Central Asian energy resources. China is a vast and courted market for Russian 

energy sales, but with the opening of the major gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China in late 

2009, China has broken Russia’s monopoly on Central Asian energy.110

As a result of these and similar developments, one can already hear among close observers of the relationship the view that Russia now sees China as a major player that is bigger and 

more dynamic than Russia. In reality and in principle, some recently noted to this author, China 

already impinges on Russia’s interests. As a pole in a multipolar world, China has grown so 

much that it presents a problem for Russia. According to this view, it is not quite to the point 
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

where Russia will side with the United States against China, because Russia does not want to 

turn China into an enemy. But if China threatens Russia, then Russia would look for allies.111

Russian and Chinese officials generally avoid portraying each other as a potential enemy, and 

indeed in the short term do everything they can to accentuate the positive. Russia and China have a 

program for joint economic cooperation to the year 2018 between Russia’s Eastern Siberia and Far 

East regions and China’s North-East provinces. Occasionally, however, candor brings forth a disquieting view of this regional cooperation. According to one analyst, the transportation infrastructure 

that will be built will just make it possible for China’s “troops and military hardware . . . [to] get to the 

heart of Russia more quickly.”112 More generally, General Makarov, head of the General Staff, in July 

2009 gave a presentation that some interpreted as clearly implying that NATO and China were “our 

most dangerous geopolitical adversaries.” Several months later, Lieutenant-General Sergei Skokov, 

chief of staff of the Ground Forces, admitted that China was, in effect, “our potential enemy.”113

On the Russian side, the greatest fear is the future of its thinly populated Far East. Dmitri 

Trenin, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow Center, notes that “The fate of Russia 

will be decided east of the Urals, not west of the Urals.”114 Konstantin Kosachev, chairman of the 

Duma’s International Affairs Committee, warns that if Russia does not “grow Siberia and the 

Far East, we’ll remain on the sidelines” of international developments.115 Medvedev this summer called the Far East’s 25 percent decline in population since 1991 “unquestionably the most 

worrying and most dangerous trend in the district, and something that requires our constant 

attention.” Lavrov argued that “there are no direct threats to Russia’s national security here,” 

although he conceded that “the potential for conflict does still exist in the region.”116

Others put it far more strongly. They point to the great and increasing disparities between 

China and Russia, overall and across the Far East border. China’s 1.32 billion population and 

$4.326 trillion GDP (in 2008), third largest in the world, dwarf Russia’s 141 million people and 

$1.601 trillion economy, in ninth place globally. (In August 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy.)117 The population density on the Chinese side of the 

Far East border is 62 times that on the Russian side.118 Only 6 million Russians in the Far East 

and Eastern Siberia face 141 million Chinese in the two provinces across the border. Moreover, 

there is creeping “Chinification” on the Russian side of the border as increasing numbers of 

ethnic Chinese settle in the Far East and Eastern Siberia “under the slogan of strategic partnership.”119 The 2.8 million soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army outnumber Russia’s onemillion-member armed forces.120 In just the two military districts on the Chinese side of the 

border—Shenyang and Beijing—Chinese forces are stronger than all of Russia’s conventional 

armed forces from Kaliningrad in Europe to Kamchatka in the Far East.121 
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Russia’s Revival

Analysts in Moscow do not foresee a conflict with China across the Far Eastern border 

for at least 20 years, if then.122 Nevertheless, both sides have already begun to hedge their bets. 

China held a major military exercise across the border from the Russian Far East in 2009, and 

Russia’s “Vostok-2010,” its largest exercise since the collapse of the Soviet Union, focused on 

the Far East in mid-2010.123 While Russian officialdom and official press refrained from commenting on the point, one Russian analyst pointed out that the Chinese exercise was clearly a 

“rehearsal of aggression against Russia.”124

Indeed, the views of some Russian analysts verge on the apocalyptic. China is preparing for war, 

according to Aleksandr Aladdin, and could start Russia’s collapse by sabotaging Russian infrastructure as far away as the Urals and central Russia. China will try to expand into Russia’s Far East peacefully, predicts Aleksandr Khramchikhin, but he does not rule out the use of force. The spark could 

be a domestic crisis that causes Chinese leaders to seize Russian territory in the Far East in order to 

distract the Chinese population from civil war. Otherwise, for the next several decades, China will 

focus on resolving the Taiwan issue. After that, China will seriously take on Russia.125

“Vostok-2010” concluded with a limited, “low-yield” nuclear strike against the notional opponent, described as a large separatist bandit force.126 Analysts pointed out that the bandit scenario was 

absurd and that Russia’s forces were clearly rehearsing how to fight a full-fledged war against regular 

army groupings and armored vehicles.127 They also pointed out that a Russian nuclear strike would 

only invite a Chinese nuclear response. In their view, the only way to deter China from starting a war 

in the Far East would be for Russia to field credible and impressive conventional forces.128

The report card on “Vostok-2010” is still incomplete, as is an assessment of how far the 

“new look” to be achieved by Russia’s military reform has moved beyond an aspirational plan.129

Nevertheless, comparisons of the previous year’s Russian “Zapad-2009” with Chinese exercises 

were not favorable. Russia’s crack Taman combined arms brigade reportedly took 7 days to travel the 900 kilometers to the exercise range, while Chinese regiments were said routinely to take 

only 5 days to traverse analogous 2,400-kilometer spans.130 The least that could be said about 

“Vostok-2010,” according to one observer, was that it signaled to China that Russia was not 

yet prepared simply to surrender.131 Another expert, however, has judged that it demonstrated 

progress in achieving the goal of major structural reform of the Russian military.132

In the meantime, Russia is doing everything possible to keep China close to it diplomatically, 

while also using reset to draw closer to the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, China 

and Russia have cooperated strategically to resist U.S. power. Even here, however, there have been 

limits to Russian-Chinese cooperation, as both have regarded their separate relationships with 

the United States as more important than their ties to each other. Nevertheless, American power 
24 

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has pushed Russia and China together and they have worked together in various ways to try to 

constrain the United States. Their shared view of the United States as too powerful, irresponsible, 

and bent on achieving hegemony and dominance was one of many factors that contributed to the 

Russian-Chinese arms relationship described above.

The Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC) grouping is one of the more recent manifestations 

of Russian and Chinese efforts to cooperate to constrain U.S. power. Bringing together Russia 

and China with India and Brazil, the BRIC was actually first conceived in 2001 by Goldman 

Sachs investment bankers as an investment strategy focused on the four rising economic powerhouses. The four countries then adopted the concept and sought to transform it into another 

venue through which to restructure global economic relations, in particular America’s impact 

on global markets in the wake of the global financial crisis, and Russia hosted the first summit 

of BRIC presidents in Ekaterinburg in June 2009.133

When Russia is worried about a stronger, more assertive United States, its BRIC ties are 

more pronounced. When this is not the case, Russian worries about China come more to the 

fore. At the same time, Russia also worries about U.S. ties with China eclipsing its ties with Russia. All are elements of Russian policy, and all have been manifest in recent years. In early 2010, 

with Russia increasingly concerned about China both in the Russian Far East and in Central 

Asia, both as an economic actor and a military threat, Foreign Minister Lavrov underscored the 

need to track “China’s increasing role in international affairs, including from the angle of the 

consequences of Beijing’s activity for our global and regional interests.” 

But the Russian foreign minister drew attention to the “fundamental importance of anchoring China to positions of acting jointly with us,” and fretted about perceived U.S. efforts to marginalize formats such as the BRIC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that bring together 

Russia and China but do not include the United States.134 Russia seems to be worried that Washington could partner with China and leave Russia in the ditch, isolated or ignored. U.S. trade with 

China, after all, stood at $366 billion in 2009, compared to just $24 billion with Russia.135

Iran 

After the Iranian-supported Hizballah frustrated the Israeli army in Lebanon in 2006, 

Yevgeny Satanovsky, head of the Near East Institute in Moscow, warned that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was “testing the region’s strength” and would have nuclear weapons in “two 

or three years’ time.”136 According to Satanovsky, who represents a school of thought in Moscow, “the Shiite crescent, from Lebanon and Syria to the south of Iraq, Saudi Arabia’s eastern 

province, and the minor monarchies of the Persian Gulf, are a priority zone of interest.” Iran’s 
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“nuclear programs and, in the very near future, nuclear weapons are a guarantee of its inviolability.” Satanovsky speculated that after settling matters with its Persian Gulf rivals, Iran would 

turn its sights to its former “northern territories” in the Caucasus and Central Asia. By 2050, 

Satanovsky predicted, Russia’s population would shrink to 100 million while Iran’s—now over 

70 million—would grow by 20 million, and Iran would “be fully organized in terms of oil, gas, 

and nuclear technologies.”137

Less than 3 years later, one of the first public signs that Moscow was considering toughening its stance toward Tehran and moving closer to Washington concerned the S–300 longrange air defense missile system. Even before Obama’s swearing in as President, hints began 

that Moscow was rethinking the deal and perhaps moving toward holding up the transfer of the 

missiles to Iran.138 By February 4, 2009, Rosoboroneksport General Director Anatoly Isaykin 

stated publicly that the S–300 contract still needed presidential approval for the system’s transfer 

to Iran to be executed.139

However, Putin and Lavrov in September 2009 reportedly regarded Iran as a rising power 

in the Middle East and were therefore disinclined to confront it directly.140 This was still the perception among analysts in Moscow in May 2010. Iran was likely to become the regional power 

of the “first rank” in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, so Russia could not afford to ignore or 

anger it. With a population of 73.6 million, Iran already determined stability in the region. One 

expert called for a “cautious partnership” and argued that Russia’s approach to Iran needed to be 

“cooperation and deterrence” everywhere.141

Around that time, however, as negotiations quickened on the final language of UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which would pass with Russian support in June, Putin and 

Medvedev had already begun to push the envelope of Russian commentary critical of Iran, and 

Ahmadinejad in return insulted both. After passage of the sanctions measure, Medvedev’s treatment of Iran in his July 12 speech to Russia’s ambassadors abandoned any diplomatic pretenses 

designed to give Russia, and Iran, wiggle room. “It is obvious that Iran is coming close to the 

possession of potential that could in principle be used to create nuclear weapons,” the Russian 

president stated. This was against the background of Medvedev’s call, in the same speech, for a 

“paradigm shift” in Russian foreign policy and “special modernization alliances with our main 

international partners. . . . First and foremost with countries like Germany, France, Italy, the 

EU as a whole, the United States of America.”142 Ahmadinejad responded by calling Medvedev’s 

remarks “an advertisement of a propaganda show, which is going to be performed by America.” 

“Why does the Russian president want to have a role in this play?” asked the Iranian president. 

“We are sorry to see this. They should not be deceived.”143
26 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

Both sides subsequently tried to use the late August ceremony marking the launch of 

preparations to load fuel at the Bushehr nuclear power station, some 10 years late, to cool off 

the rhetoric. Nevertheless, Russian suspicion of Iran’s nuclear program and regional ambitions 

remained high, as did Russian incentives to work more closely with the United States against the 

common threat. The tough decree that Medvedev issued on September 22 spelling out Russian 

sanctions of Iran pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1929, including nontransfer of 

the S–300 system, was a clear signal to Tehran intended to reinforce the point.144

Implications for the United States

In the coming decades, Russia will retain its status as a nuclear power and its hold on one 

of the UN Security Council’s five veto-wielding seats. On other measures of its status as a great 

power, however, Russia is likely to slip further behind relative to today’s great and rising powers, especially the United States and China. Based on current high world commodity prices, 

especially oil, Russia’s newfound affluence will remain vulnerable to market fluctuations and to 

the possible rise of alternative energy sources. Russia’s wealth will also decline in relative terms 

should it fail to invest today’s easy profits in the industries and knowledge sectors essential for 

prospering in an ever more technologically challenging future. Russia’s economy, mired in corruption and deteriorating demographics, conceivably may not even be able to sustain today’s 

Moscow-centric growth in prosperity. 

Russia’s conventional armed forces will not be able to project substantial and sustained 

power far beyond Russian borders. They will still overshadow the military establishments of 

Russia’s surrounding former Soviet neighbors, and therefore retain some leverage. But the multiple challenges to Moscow of a military intervention into any of these states will dictate extreme 

caution and consequent reluctance to employ armed force. The exceptions may be in case of 

renewed tensions with Georgia or the wholesale collapse of the state in Kazakhstan.

Russia’s greatest external challenge will be China. As the world’s largest and fastest rising 

power, China already looms as a threat to Russia’s hold on its sparsely populated Far East regions. Russia’s increasingly weak position relative to China will raise the incentives for Russia 

not only to court Chinese good graces, but also to bolster its conventional military presence 

in the Far East as well as to retain tactical nuclear weapons as a deterrent of last resort in both 

the Far East and in Russia’s European western regions. At the same time, Russia’s concerns 

may lead Moscow to cooperate more consistently with the United States and Europe, both 

directly and in the Asia-Pacific region, as economic and military counterweights to rising 

Chinese power. 
27

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Trenin has written that “a key challenge for Russia’s foreign policy will be to learn to live 

alongside a China that is strong, dynamic, assertive, and increasingly advanced.”145 According 

to Trenin, Russia is absolutely committed to stable and peaceful relations with China but is also 

wary: the current Chinese Communist Party leadership could eventually be replaced by more 

nationalistic elements; China could also become embroiled in domestic problems.146 Already, 

China’s increasing confidence and assertiveness are casting a “longer and thicker” shadow over 

Russia. Together with the global financial crisis, the Russian-Georgian war, and the new Obama 

administration, a rising China contributed to the reset of relations between Washington and 

Moscow. Russia’s “backwardness” relative to the West and even to some emerging powers dictated a modernization drive, in Trenin’s view, which in turn required improved relations with 

the United States and the West.147

Fedor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, similarly views China’s growth as becoming the dominant factor in Russian foreign policy and forcing its reorientation, primarily 

toward the United States. The current high level of Russian-Chinese relations “does not save 

[them] from complications in the future.” Russia needs a “sustainable presence” in the AsiaPacific region, but its “central problem” today is avoiding becoming China’s “satellite.” In general, Lukyanov writes, “Russia cannot afford to have bad relations with China, as this may bring 

very big risks in all areas. . . . At the same time, a search for a soft system of counterweights will 

probably become the leitmotif of Russia’s policy in Asia and beyond.”148

Russia and the United States share the problem of how to deal with a China on the rise, but 

from different angles, according to Lukyanov. Russian perceptions of the U.S. military presence 

in Asia are very different from those of its presence on Russia’s western and southern borders. 

Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, therefore, might become a new basis for U.S.-Russian 

relations once reset achieves all its aims. Washington and Moscow will need a new agenda, and 

its centerpiece could be the Asia-Pacific region after New START is ratified and the arms control 

track comes to an end.149

Similarly, Sergei Karaganov, head of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, 

warned in February 2010 of the danger of a “sagging” Russia “sliding past the status of a ‘respected younger brother’ and turning into an outright raw and energy appendage of Great 

China.” Avoiding this fate, according to Karaganov, demands that Moscow continue to work 

for “rapprochement” with Washington, including joint efforts, along with Asian countries, 

to develop Siberia and the Russian Far East.150 In September 2010, Karaganov proposed the 

United States and Russia play “an important role” in the rapid creation of a security system in 

East and South Asia, not to deter China militarily according to “old methods” but to fill what 
28 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

he called the security “vacuum” forming around an “increasingly powerful China.” He also 

urged the creation of a security system in and around the Persian Gulf, with security guarantees that at this point could only be offered by Russia and the United States, presumably 

working together.151

A rising and potentially threatening Iran may also be spurring Russia to move closer to 

U.S. positions because of Russia’s own security concerns, and not simply to butter up Washington. Analysts in Moscow are already focusing on how to deter a nuclear Iran and prevent it from 

becoming a regional bully. One analyst recently suggested that the ultimate future counter to a 

nuclear Iran may have to be Article Five–type guarantees to Iran’s threatened neighbors, including Israel and Saudi Arabia, by the United States, Russia, and perhaps also China. This analyst 

saw a political strategic security alliance with the United States as the best outcome for Russia 

from the current reset process.152

Declining powers have rising vulnerabilities, but so do rising powers as they contest the 

established regional or global dominance of other major powers. The increasing weight and 

muscle flexing of a rising power may cause neighboring second-rank powers to move closer 

to the United States to counterbalance their increasingly assertive neighbor. This phenomenon 

extends beyond the Russian reaction to a rising China, arguably one of the several reasons 

for Moscow’s “modernization” campaign and positive response to Washington’s offer of reset. 

Across the Asia-Pacific rim, a number of China’s neighbors have also moved closer to the United States as they have responded to a rising, increasingly assertive, and historically distrusted 

China.153 Similarly, around the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East, many states look 

to the United States for security vis-à-vis a rising Iran even as they worry that the United States 

(or Israel) might try to solve the Iranian nuclear problem militarily.154

This opens up opportunities for sage diplomacy and leadership by the United States where 

American and Russian goals overlap. In fact, we may already be seeing the beginning of a shift 

toward a new triangulation paradigm, particularly when it comes to China. Several years ago, 

before the global financial crisis hit, Bobo Lo speculated that Russia, reacting to “strategic tension” with China down the road, could “gravitate slowly back to Europe and become part of a 

larger Western consensus.”155 China’s continued spectacular growth and Russia’s postcrisis slowdown may have dramatically accelerated that development by many years. 

It is therefore likely that long-term concerns over the impact on Russian interests of a mighty 

China will encourage Moscow to seek common ground with Washington increasingly more often 

and more consistently, as was recently on display at the NATO–Russia Council summit in Lisbon. 

At the same time, China’s fear of isolation and of Russian-American rapprochement may also 
29

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encourage China to continue to treat the United States with a greater degree of caution than contestation. This appeared to be the case when China, rather than striking out on its own, in the end 

voted for the most recent Iran sanctions resolution in the UN Security Council.156 A continuation 

of this dynamic could leave the United States in the catbird seat for many years to come. 

Providing the United States continues to be a vibrant society and plays its hand well, it 

should have many strong cards to play as a worried Russia looks to reinforce its position against 

its rising and pressing Chinese neighbor. But Moscow’s policy toward Washington is conditional on a U.S. approach that engages Russia in positive ways. If that policy were to change, it 

could push Russia and China closer together. This was what happened in some ways during the 

recent Bush administration as Moscow and Beijing cooperated to manage and constrain what 

they perceived as a strong and aggressive Washington. Since then, the Obama administration 

has worked hard to reset relations with Russia. On arms control and Iran, it has recognized Russia as an important power that can affect U.S. achievement of its policy aims. It has made clear 

that missile defense in Europe is not aimed at Russia. It has kept alive but not made a pressing 

priority of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. 

But this could change with a new administration in Washington, and if it does, it will affect 

Russian-Chinese relations. As much as Moscow has welcomed Washington’s reset of relations, it 

has not managed to shake the worry that it is transitory. Foreign Minister Lavrov in early 2010 

underscored what he described as attempts by “right-wing conservative forces” in the United 

States to force a reversal to the “confrontational policy of the previous administration.”157 Well 

before the midterm elections, Russian analysts echoed the same concern both publicly and privately.158 Should such a U.S. policy reversal come to pass, Russia will find itself in a very uncomfortable world, stuck between a dominant United States and an assertive China, both of which 

impinge on Russia’s perceived long-term interests. The United States, on the other hand, to the 

extent that it does not respect those interests, will not be able to make the most of the opportunity to derive significant benefits from Russia’s concerns about China and to work with Russia 

to face the challenges that China will increasingly present to both countries.
30 

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Notes 1 “Putin’s Keynote Speech to State Council—Text,” Rossiya TV, February 8, 2008, 

CEP20080208950541 (Open Source Center product number).

2 Anders Aslund and Andrew Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2009), 

42–43. Throughout this paper, the author has not attempted to sort out whether a particular observer 

has used gross domestic product figures based on nominal values or adjusted for purchasing power parity, or whether the source has used International Monetary Fund, World Bank, or Central Intelligence 

Agency World Factbook figures. 

3 Ibid., 146; Anders Aslund, Sergei Guriev, and Andrew C. Kuchins, eds., Russia After the 

Global Economic Crisis (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, and New Economic School, June 2010), 9.

4 Poll by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion. See Boris Tumanov, “Daydreaming at the Fence,” Gazeta.ru, September 23, 2010, CEP20100923046011.

5 Anastasiya Bashkatova, “Dokhody grazhdan pod bol’shim voprosom,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 

November 15, 2010, available at <www.ng.ru/economics/2010-11-15/1_income.html>.

6 Konstantin Smirnov, “Rossiyu nakrylo novoi volnoi krizisa. VVP padaet vtoroi mesyats nodryad,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, September 24, 2010, available at <www.mk.ru/economics/

articles/2010/09/23/531710-rossiyu-nakryilo-novoy-volnoy-krizisa.html>. For an analysis focusing on 

the fall in industrial production, see Anastasiya Bashtakova, “Novyi promyshlennyi spad nachalsya,” 

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 30, 2010, available at <www.ng.ru/economics/2010-09-30/1_industry.

html>.

7 See especially Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2008).

8 Yegor T. Gaidar, The Collapse of the Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia (Washington, DC: 

Brookings Institution, 2007); Aslund and Kuchins, 59; and Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 9–38, 259–

260.

9 Nicholas Eberstadt, Russia’s Peacetime Demographic Crisis: Dimensions, Causes, Implications 

(Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Project Report, May 2010), 293–294.

10 Andrei Trenin and Dmitri Trenin, “The Wider Implications of the Russian-Armenian 

Defense Deal,” RFE/RL, August 24, 2010, available at <www.rferl.org/content/The_Wider_Implications_

Of_The_RussianArmenian_Defense_Deal/2136480.html>.

11 Vladimir Mukhin, “Zhestokii schet Severnogo Kavkaza,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 11, 

2010. 

12 Aleksandr Belov, head of the Movement against Illegal Immigration, on the “Matter of Principle” talk show, Center TV, September 29, 2010, CEP20101001950155.

13 Eberstadt, 296, 298–299.

14 “The Modernization of Russia’s Foreign Policy. Q&A with Dmitri Trenin,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 2, 2010, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/

index.cfm?fa=view&id=41322>.
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15 United Nations Statistics Department, “National Accounts Main Aggregates Database,” 

available at <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resCountry.asp>. See also Eberstadt, 294, for slightly 

different percentages.

16 Aslund and Kuchins, 19. Bovin was a regime insider and well-known commentator who 

would become post-Soviet Russia’s first ambassador to Israel.

17 Eberstadt, 26.

18 Andrew E. Kramer, “In a Summer of Extremes, Russia’s Response to Fires Does Little to 

Calm Anger,” The New York Times, August 8, 2010; Michael Schwirtz, “Russian Fires Raise Fears of Radioactivity,” The New York Times, August 11, 2010; and Sergei Turchenko and Anatoliy Dmitriyev, “S takoi vlast’yu my vse srogrim. Anomalnaya zhara postavila “dvoyku” rossiiskoi gosudarstvennoi sisteme,” 

Svobodnaya Pressa, August 13, 2010, available at <www.svpressa.ru/society/article/28988/>.

19 Eberstadt, 26, 192–193.

20 For a thorough survey, see the interview with ethnographer Viktor Nikolayev, a former 

deputy in the Leningrad Soviet, in “Rossiya-2010: v ozhidaniii raspada,” Svobodnaya Pressa, June 10, 

2010, available at <www.svpressa.ru/society/article/26211/>. 

21 Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 10, 12.

22 Author’s observations, May 2010.

23 “Zachem vam kompyuter?” Press-vypusk No. 1549, available at <http://wciom.ru/novosti/

press-vypusk/press-vypusk/single/13710.html>.

24 Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 14.

25 Aslund and Kuchins, 44–45.

26 John W. Parker, Persian Dreams: Moscow and Tehran Since the Fall of the Shah (Washington, 

DC: Potomac Books, 2009), 130–131, 166–167, 354, fn. 128; and Joe Nocera, “Unyielding, An Oligarch 

vs. Putin,” The New York Times, November 6, 2010. 

27 Aslund and Kuchins, 52, 60–61. 

28 Ibid., 47, 69; Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 13.

29 Aslund and Kuchins, 146; Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 9, 24–25.

30 Aslund and Kuchins, 147; Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 9–10, 24–25, 257.

31 “Putin’s Keynote Speech to State Council—Text”; “Medvedev 12 November State-of-theNation Address to Russian Parliament—Full Text,” November 13, 2009, CEP20091113950187. 

32 Sergei Guriev and Oleg Tsyvinsky, “Ratio economica: Vot on kakoi, zastoy,” Vedomosti, June 

22, 2010.

33 Personal communication with the author, June 2010.

34 “Medvedev Speech to Envoys Notes ‘Paradigm Shift in International Relations,’” Russian 

Federation President Web site, July 12, 2010, CEP20100713009001.

35 Igor Yurgens et al., “Russia in the 21st Century: Vision for the Future,” January 2010, available at <www.riocenter.ru/files/INSOR%20Russia%20in%20the%2021st%20century_ENG.pdf>.

36 Aleksandra Samarina, “Povestka dnya dlya presidenta—2012. InSoR: Medvedev vedyet 

‘tikhuyu voynu,’” available at <www.ng.ru/politics/2010-08-05/1_povestka.html>.

37 Charles Grant, “Observations from Russia,” Insight, Centre for European Reform, September 

23, 2010.
32 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

38 Vladimir Milov, “Illyuziya krasivoy zhizni,” Gazeta, September 27, 2010, available at <www.

gazeta.ru/column/milov/4323088.shtml>.

39 Eberstadt, 9–10, 12. Estimates are by the official Russian Federal State Statistical Service. 

40 Eberstadt, 282, 286, 288.

41 Aslund and Kuchins, 91. 

42 Eberstadt, 30, 283–284.

43 Eberstadt, 283–287.

44 Anatoly Vishnevsky, “Hado delat’ stavku na detey migrantov,” Novaya Gazeta, October 22, 2010.

45 Eberstadt, 30, 294.

46 Aslund and Kuchins, 57.

47 Katsuya Ito, “The Impact of Oil Price Volatility on Macroeconomic Activity in Russia,” Economic Analysis Working Papers 9, no. 5, July 2010, available at <www.unagaliciamoderna.com/eawp/

coldata/upload/impact_oil-price_volatility_russia.pdf>. 

48 Aslund and Kuchins, 59–60.

49 “Sechin Says Gazprom Must Raise Game,” The Moscow Times Online, June 21, 2010, 

CEP20100621964088.

50 Eberstadt, 292–293.

51 Aslund and Kuchins, 58.

52 Medvedev meeting with “United Russia” activists, “Alternatives to Modernizing the Country 

Do Not Exist,” May 28, 2010, available at <www.kremlin.ru/news/7885>. 

53 Aslund and Kuchins, 47–48, 51.

54 Aleksandr Golts, “The Disarmaments Program,” Yezhednevnyy Zhurnal, May 26, 2010, 

CEP20100526037004.

55 Sergei Guriev, interview by Danila Galperovich at the June 2010 St. Petersburg International 

Economic Forum, in “Medvedev—ne Putin?” (Is Medvedev Putin?), Radio Liberty, June 19, 2010, available at <www.svobodanews.ru/articleprintview/2076719.html>.

56 Stanislav Belkovsky, interview by Manfred Quiring, “One Should Not Overestimate Putin’s Active Role,” Die Welt, November 12, 2007, EUP20071112301004; Oleg Salmanov, “MoneyEquidistant,” The New Times, November 14, 2007, CEP20071116009011; and Luke Harding, “Putin, 

the Kremlin Power Struggle and the $40 bn Fortune,” The Guardian, December 21, 2007, available at 

<www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/dec/21/russia.topstories3/print>. Putin dismissed the reports as “just 

rubbish, excavated from someone’s nose” and claimed his personal wealth consisted only of an apartment in St. Petersburg, two Soviet-era cars, a plot of land outside Moscow, and $149,000 in the bank 

(James Kilner, “Putin scoffs at rumours of huge wealth,” Reuters, February 14, 2008, available at <http://

uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKL1479180020080214>). 

57 “Most Russians note rise in corruption over past 10 years—poll,” Interfax, July 21, 2010, 

CEP20100721950077.

58 “Korruptsiya peresilit modernizatsiyu,” Yezhednevnaya Delovaya Gazeta, October 1, 2010, 

available at <www.rbcdaily.ru/print.shtml?2010/10/01/focus/515069>.

59 Yekaterina Mereninskaya, “Kapital ne uderzhalsya,” Gazeta.ru, November 16, 2010, available 

at <www.gazeta.ru/financial/2010/11/16/3438036.shtml>.
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60 Olga Kuvshinova, “The Oligarch Is Modest,” Vedemosti, May 28, 2010, available at <www.

vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/2010/05/28/235758>. In another survey, 40 percent of firms reported 

having to make frequent bribes; see Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 32. 

61 Elina Bilevskaya, “Innovations to Protect Defense Capability,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, 

September 22, 2010, CEP20100923677005.

62 Roger McDermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,” Parameters

(Spring 2009), 65–80; Aleksandr Anatolyevich Khramchikhin, “Lessons of the ‘Five-Day War’: Did 

the Russian Army Change Following the ‘Hot Date’ of 08.08.08?” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye

Online, August 13, 2010, CEP20100813358004. 

63 Aslund and Kuchins, 92.

64 Eberstadt, 294–295.

65 Ibid., 22.

66 Georgii Trushin, “Za draku russkikh i dagestantsev otvetili ofitsery Kantemirovki,” 

Svobodnaya Pressa, August 14, 2010, available at <www.svpressa.ru/accidents/article/29009/>. For 

a subsequent incident in Perm region, see Sergei Ishchenko, “‘Islamskiy bunt’ na aviabaze VVS 

pod Perm’yu,” Svobodnaya Pressa, October 14, 2010, available at <http://svpressa.ru/society/article/32098/>.

67 Vladimir Mukhin, “Den’ ‘X’ dlya prizyvnikov,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 4, 2010, available at <www.ng.ru/politics/2010-08-04/3_kartblansh.html>.

68 “Rossiya predstoit za 10 let sozdat’ ‘novuyu armiyu’—bez sovremennogo oruzhiya reformy bessmyslenny,” available at <www.newsru.com/russia/04aug2010/budget.html>. The figures 

are clearly those of SIPRI (see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures>). SIPRI’s estimate of the Chinese defense budget falls far short of the $150 billion that 

the U.S. Defense Department has estimated as China’s real budget, as opposed to its $70.3 billion 

published budget. 

69 Daniil Ayzenshtadt, “The Army Took a Stab at Trillions,” Gazeta.ru, June 3, 2010, 

CEP20100607358003; Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s State Armaments Program 2020: Is the Third Time 

the Charm for Military Modernization?” available at <http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/10/12/

russia%E2%80%99s-state-armaments-program-2020-is-the-third-time-the-charm-for-militarymodernization/>; Viktor Myasnikov, “Russia Begins Renewal of Arms Race. Military Budget Sets 

Out for Growth at Record Pace,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, October 25, 2010, 

CEP20101027037014. 

70 The corruption estimate is from Golts. The estimate of China’s hidden defense expenditures 

is that of China expert Aleksandr Aladdin, who put China’s declared 2010 defense budget at $78 billion, 

in Andrey Polunin, “China Is Expanding: First Taiwan, Then Siberia and the Far East—PRC is Building Roads Along Russo-Chinese Border at an Accelerated Pace,” Svobodnaya Pressa, June 28, 2010, 

CEP20100629041016. 

71 Yuliya Taratuta, interview of Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, “‘I Was Dismayed 

by Volumes of Stealing.’ Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov Tells Newsweek Why Russia Should 

Spend Trillions on Arms, Why Defense Ministry Does Not Want to Buy Russian Ships, and How People 

Steal in Army,” Russkiy Newsweek Online, October 4, 2010, CEP20101004037002.
34 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

72 “Russian Navy’s Anti-piracy Presence in Gulf of Aden to Continue in 2011,” RIA-Novosti, 

November 3, 2010, CEP20101103950073.

73 “Russia Does Not Plan to Send More Ships to Gulf of Aden,” ITAR–TASS, May 7, 2010, 

CEP20100507950147.

74 “Russia Can’t Afford Opening New Bases Abroad, Says Defence Minister,” ITAR–TASS, June 

9, 2010, CEP20100609950129. 

75 “Russia Not Planning to Reopen Navy Base in Vietnam—Foreign Ministry,” Interfax, October 29, 2010, CEP20101029950143.

76 Ilya Arkhipov and Lyubov Pronina, “Russia Boosts Arms Spree to $613 Billion, Seeks U.S. 

Technology,” Bloomberg.com, September 20, 2010.

77 Ayzenshtadt.

78 Sergei Aleksashenko, director of Macroeconomic Research at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, estimates that military expenditures would explode to 29.4 percent of the federal budget 

in 2020 under current plans. Aleksashenko, presentation on “Russian Economy after the Global Crisis,” 

Carnegie Endowment, Washington, DC, October 12, 2010.

79 “Russian Pacific Fleet Strategic Subs Have 2–3 Years’ Life Left in Them—Pundit,” Center TV, 

June 2, 2010, CEP20100603950151.

80 “General Says Russian Air Defenses in ‘Complete Stagnation,’” newsru.com, May 13, 2010, 

CEP20100513037005.

81 “Rossiya predstoit za 10 let sozdat’ “novuyu armiyu”—bez sovremennogo oruzhiya reformy 

bessmyslenny,” available at <www.newsru.com/russia/04aug2010/budget.html>.

82 Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 184; Eberstadt, 295–296. 

83 “Minoborony kupit bolshe 1,5 tysyach italyanskiykh bronevikov—russkiye “Tigry” okazalis 

ne nuzhniy,” available at <www.newsru.com/russia/06aug2010/tigers_failed.html>; Golts.

84 Ilya Arkhipov and Lyubov Pronina, “Russia Boosts Arms Spree to $613 Billion, Seeks U.S. 

Technology,” Bloomberg News, Bloomberg.com, September 20, 2010.

85 Taratuta interview. 

86 “Russian Domestic Industry Incapable of Building State-of-the-art UAVs,” Interfax-AVN 

Online, August 16, 2010, CEP20100816950020.

87 Aleksandr Khramchikhin in Yury Kotenok, “A Nanoarmy for a Nanocountry,” Segodnya.ru, 

July 10, 2010, CEP20100712358035.

88 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of Belarus has fallen by half a million 

and of Ukraine by almost 6 million. See Eberstadt, 20. On Russian energy pressure tactics, see Richard 

Andres and Michael Kofman, “European Energy Security: Potential Solutions for Reducing the Volatility of Ukraine-Russia Gas Pricing Disputes” (forthcoming).

89 Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 236, 239.

90 “Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline Put in Operation,” ITAR–TASS, December 14, 2009. 

91 Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 238.

92 Bruce Pannier, “Turkmenistan Tips Its Hand on Future Energy Exports,” RFE/RL, August 

22, 2010, available at <www.rferl.org/content/Turkmenistan_Tips_Its_Hand_On_Future_Energy_Exports/2134389.html>.
35

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93 “Ukraine Under Yanukovych: An Analytical Debate,” Atlantic Council, August 23, 2010, 

available at <www.acus.org/event/ukraine-under-yanukovych-analytical-debate>. 

94 “The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan. Executive Summary,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report 

No. 193, August 23, 2010, EUP20100823167023.

95 Michael Schwirtz, “In Information War, Documentary Is Latest Salvo,” The New York Times, 

August 1, 2010; “Lukashenko Urges Lowering Dependence upon Russia,” ITAR–TASS, June 25, 2010, 

CEP20100625950118.

96 Farkhad Sharip, “Russia’s Customs Union Tinged with Failure,” Asia Times Online, August 

20, 2010, available at <www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LH20Ag01.html>.

97 Parker, 57–81.

98 Armenia even explored the possibility of rapprochement with Turkey but most recently 

has agreed to extend the lease on the Russian military base at Gyumri to the year 2044 (“FYI—Russian President Hails Significance of Remaining Military Base in Armenia,” Rossiya 24, August 20, 2010, 

CEP20100820950152.

99 See also the useful survey by Katinka Barysch, Centre for European Reform, “Who Is Winning Eastern Europe’s Great Game?” Insight, July 19, 2010, available at <http://centreforeuropeanreform.

blogspot.com/2010/07/who-is-winning-eastern-europes-great.html>.

100 See Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); and Richard Weitz, “Russian-Chinese Security Relations: Constant and Changing,” in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, ed. Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2010), 389–453.

101 “Russia, China to Continue Strategic Partnership Course,” Interfax, May 9, 2010, 

CEP20100509964010; “China and Russia Hold Consultations Between the Two Countries’ Foreign 

Ministries,” Xinhua Domestic Service, June 30, 2010, CPP20100630005003.

102 “Medvedev Outlines Key Tasks for Russia’s Far East in Khabarovsk Speech—Text,” July 2, 

2010, CEP20100704950102.

103 Fiona Hill, “Dinner with Putin: Musings on the Politics of Modernization in Russia,” Foreign 

Policy Trip Reports, No. 18, Brookings Institution, available at <www.brookings.edu/reports/2010/10_

russia_putin_hill.aspx>; and Andreas Rinke, Reuters, “Beijing No Threat to Russia, Putin Says,” National 

Post, September 7, 2010, available at <www.nationalpost.com/todays-paper/Beijing+threat+Russia+Putin

+says/3487882/story.html>.

104 “Medvedev: Russia-China Relations ‘at Their Highest Point Now,’” Rossiya 24, September 28, 

2010, CEP20100928950055.

105 Aslund, Guriev, and Kuchins, 245.

106 Qian Tong and Li Shijia with Han Jie, Li Zhongfa, and Liao Lei, “China Strategizes MajorPower Diplomacy and Embraces Global Cooperation in the ‘Post-Crisis Era,’” Xinhua Domestic Service, 

May 24, 2010, CPP20100524636005. 

107 Aleksandr Khramchikhin, Deputy Director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, interviewed by Yuriy Kotenok in “A Nanoarmy for a Nanocountry,” Segodnya.ru, July 10, 2010, 

CEP20100712358035.
36 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

108 Edward Cody, “Russia to Aid NATO on Antimissile Network in Europe. Accord Signals 

New Era of U.S. Security Relations with Former Cold War Foe,” The Washington Post, November 21, 

2010.

109 Phillip C. Saunders and Joshua K. Wiseman, “Buy, Build, or Steal: The PLAAF’s Quest for 

Advanced Military Aviation Technologies,” paper prepared for the 21st CAPS–RAND–CEIP–NDU 

Conference on the PLA, October 28–30, 2010, Taipei, Taiwan; and Stephen Blank, “New Strains Emerge 

in the Sino-Russian Military Relationship,” China Brief 10, no. 1 (October 22, 2010).

110 “Turkmenistan-China Gas Pipeline Put in Operation,” ITAR–TASS, December 14, 2009, 

CEP20091214950079.

111 Author’s interviews with Russian analysts in Moscow, May 2010.

112 Andrey Polunin, “China is Expanding: First Taiwan, Then Siberia and the Far East—PRC is 

Building Roads Along Russo-Chinese Border at an Accelerated Pace,” Svobodnaya Pressa, June 28, 2010, 

CEP20100629041016.

113 Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia’s Diversionary Maneuver,” Zvezda Povolzhya, June 3, 2010, 

CEP20100607358004.

114 Dmitri Trenin, “U.S.-Russian Relations: How Does Russia See the Reset?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 28, 2009, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/

Full_Transcript%20of%20Event.pdf>. 

115 Konstantin Kosachev, “Yeshche raz ob eksporte prostranstva i mozgov,” Ekho Moskvy, August 20, 2010, <http://echo.msk.ru/blog/kosachev/704720-echo/>.

116 “Medvedev outlines key tasks for Russia’s Far East in Khabarovsk speech.”

117 David Barboza, “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy,” The New York Times, 

August 16, 2010.

118 Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia’s Diversionary Maneuver,” Zvezda Povolzhya, June 3, 2010, 

CEP20100607358004.

119 Polunin.

120 Saradzhyan.

121 Aleksandr Khramchikhin in Aronov and Bazanova, “If There Is War Tomorrow,” The New 

Times, February 22, 2010, CEP20100222358018; Khramchikhin in Yury Kotenok, “A Nanoarmy for a 

Nanocountry,” Segodnya.Ru, July 10, 2010, CEP20100712358035.

122 Fedor Lukyanov in Aronov and Bazanova, “If There Is War Tomorrow.” 

123 Sun Yefei, “Game Playing Between Great Powers Behind Frequent Military Exercises in 

Northeast Asia,” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, July 9, 2010, CPP20100709788007; Mikhail Lukanin, “Military Reform Will Be Checked Out in ‘Vostok,’” Trud, June 28, 2010, CEP20100628358012; Saradzhyan; Kotenok; Aleksandr Karasev, “A Summertime Exacerbation at Sea,” Vladivostok, July 28, 2010, 

CEP20100729358001.

124 Khramchikhin in Kotenok, “A Nanoarmy for a Nanocountry.”

125 Aleksandr Aladdin and Aleksandr Khramchikhin in Andrey Polunin; and Khramchikhin in 

Kotenok.

126 Valery Usoltsev, “Combat at the Sergeyevskiy Range,” Suvorovskiy Natisk, July 17, 2010, 

CEP20100719358011.
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Russia’s Revival

127 Khramchikhin in Kotenok. 

128 Khramchikhin in Aronov and Bazanova; Saradzhyan.

129 Dale Herspring, “Is Military Reform in Russia for ‘Real’? Yes, But . . . ” in Blank and Weitz, 151–191.

130 Anatoly Tsyganok in Lukanin.

131 Khramchikhin in Kotenok. 

132 Dmitry Gorenburg, “Vostok-2010: Another Step Forward for the Russian Military,” July 19, 

2010, available at <http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/07/19/vostok-2010-another-step-forward-forthe-russian-military/>.

133 Cynthia Roberts, “Russia’s BRICs Diplomacy: Rising Outsider with Dreams of an Insider,” 

Polity 42, no. 1 (January 2010), 38–73; Michael A. Glosny, “China and the BRICs: A Real (but Limited) 

Partnership in a Unipolar World,” Polity 42, no. 1 (January 2010), 100–129.

134 “Apparent Text of ‘Leaked’ Draft of Russian Foreign Policy Document [“Program for 

the Effective Systemic Utilization of Foreign Policy Factors in Support of the Long-Term Development of the Russian Federation,”] and Accompanying Letter to President Medvedev from 

Foreign Minister S. Lavrov [dated February 10, 2010],” Russkiy Newsweek Online, May 11, 2010, 

CEP20100514037004.

135 Peter Baker, “Obama Aims to Build Economic Ties with Russia,” The New York Times, June 

23, 2010.

136 Yevgeny Satanovsky, “Opinions,” Izvestiya, August 10, 2006, CEP20060810018002. 

137 Yevgeny Satanovsky, “Iran, the Once and Future Empire,” Izvestiya, August 14, 2006, 

CEP20060814021001. See also Parker, 291.

138 Viktor Litovkin, executive editor of the Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye military magazine, told Ekho Moskvy, “The fact that we have a contract with Iran on the supply of S–300PMU-1 is 

also an open secret. Such a contract exists. Another question is that because of some political motives 

we are not currently supplying [it] or we have not yet managed to produce this battalion [Russ: division] 

or two battalions of these air defense missile systems and therefore we cannot supply [them].” Ekho 

Moskvy Radio, December 22, 2008, CEP20081222950246.

139 Interview of Rosoboroneksport General Director Anatoly Isaykin by Vadim Soloyev, “Rosoboroneksport Strengthens Positions,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 4, 2009.

140 Ariel Cohen, “Russia’s Iran Policy: A Curveball for Obama,” The Heritage Foundation, 

Backgrounder, No. 2359, January 15, 2010, 2. Cohen cites meetings with Putin and Lavrov in Moscow 

in September 2009. The present author heard other sources say much the same at a conference in Washington, DC, in early 2010.

141 Author’s interviews with Russian analysts in Moscow, May 2010.

142 “Medvedev Speech to Envoys Notes ‘Paradigm Shift in International Relations,’ Transcript of 

speech delivered by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at a conference with Russian ambassadors and 

permanent representatives to international organizations in Moscow on 12 July 2010 at 1700 hours,” 

Russian Federation President Web site, July 12, 2010, CEP20100713009001.

143 “Speech by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad during a closing ceremony of the 

Iranian Youth Festival in Tehran,” Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN), July 23, 

2010, IAP20100724950093. 
38 

Strategic Perspectives, No. 3

144 Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1154 of 22 September 2010, “On Measures 

for the Fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 of 9 July 2010,” September 22, 2010, 

CEP20100922753001. 

145 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Reborn: Reimagining Moscow’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 88, 

no. 6 (November–December 2009), 77.

146 Dmitri Trenin, presentation on “Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy: An Update,” Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, September 17, 2010.

147 Dmitri Trenin, “The Reset Has Begun,” The Moscow Times Online, June 4, 2010, 

CEP20100604964009.

148 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Strategic Triangle in Uncertain Environment: U.S.-China Relations as 

Seen Through the Russian Prism,” paper presented at conference, Impact of U.S.-China Relations in Asia: 

Regional Views, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, September 20, 

2010.

149 Fyodor Lukyanov, panel remarks delivered at conference, Impact of U.S.-China Relations in 

Asia: Regional Views.

150 Sergei A. Karaganov, “The Past Year and the Upcoming Decade,” February 15, 2010, available at <http://karaganov.ru/en/publications/preview/99>.

151 Sergei Karaganov, “After the ‘Reset,’” Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, September 29, 2010, 

CEP20100929006001.

152 But, in his view, there could be no strategic alliance between Russia and China. Author’s 

interviews with Russian analysts in Moscow, May 2010.

153 They include Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Australia. See, for example, John 

Pomfret, “Issues Remain as U.S.-China Talks End,” The Washington Post, May 26, 2010; John Pomfret, 

“U.S. Continues Effort to Counter China,” The Washington Post, July 23, 2010; Craig Whitlock, “Gates 

to Meet Chinese Counterpart in Hanoi,” The Washington Post, October 6, 2010; and Mark Landler, Jim 

Yardley, and Michael Wines, “As China Rises, Wary Neighbors Form Alliances,” The New York Times, 

October 31, 2010. 

154 See, for example, Marina Ottaway, “Iran, the United States, and the Gulf: The Elusive Regional Policy,” Carnegie Papers, Middle East Program, Number 105, November 2009, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. 

155 See Lo, 157–195, for an excellent historical analysis of triangulation assertions and reality up 

to 2008, prior to the onset of the global economic crisis, and of five alternative scenarios for RussiaChina relations in the future. Lo briefly hints at something akin to the tentative new paradigm described in the present paper in his discussion of the “strategic tension” scenario. There (p. 193) it 

appears as one of two possible Russian reactions to “strategic tension” with China: either persist in 

attempting to play the role of balancer between East and West, or “gravitate slowly back to Europe and 

become part of a larger Western consensus.” 

156 For the roller-coaster story preceding the vote, see Edward Wong, “Differences in Priorities Drive Rift with China,” The New York Times, February 20, 2010; Colum Lynch, “China Signals 

Shift on Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Post, March 25, 2010; Mark Landler and Andrew Jacobs, 

“Strains Easing, Chinese Leader Plans U.S. Visit,” The New York Times, April 2, 2010; John Pomfret, 
39

Russia’s Revival

“Out of an Intricate Dance, Improved U.S.-China Relations,” The Washington Post, April 10, 2010; 

Mary Beth Sheridan and Scott Wilson, “Obama Presses for Unity on Iran,” The Washington Post, 

April 13, 2010; and Colum Lynch, “Six Powers Discuss Iran Sanctions,” The Washington Post, April 

15, 2010.

157 “Apparent Text of ‘Leaked’ Draft of Russian Foreign Policy Document.” 

158 Author’s interviews with Russian analysts in Moscow, May 2010; Fedor Lukyanov, “Loading 

Back,” Gazeta.ru, August 19, 2010, CEP20100819041020. 

41

Russia’s Revival

About the Author

John W. Parker is a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He served previously in the U.S. Department of State’s 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he was Deputy Office Director and Chief of the 

Division for Caucasus and Central Asia in the Office for Russian and Eurasian Analysis. His 

principal areas of expertise are Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union and RussianIranian relations. He has served two tours at the American Embassy in Moscow, where he 

was Chief of the Political/Internal Section from 1989 to 1991, and was Deputy Director of the 

U.S. Information Agency’s “Research and Development—USA” exhibit in the Soviet Union in 

1972. Dr. Parker has also been a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution. He holds a Bachelor of 

Arts degree from Indiana University and a Ph.D. from Yale University. 

Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows

Col Michael H. Belding, USMC

Senior Military Fellow

Ms. M. Elaine Bunn

Distinguished Research Fellow

Mr. John A. Cope

Senior Research Fellow

col Mark Fields, USA

Senior Military Fellow

Dr. T.X. Hammes

Distinguished Research Fellow

Col Michael P. Hughes, USAF

Senior Military Fellow

Dr. Christopher J. Lamb

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Andre Le Sage

Senior Research Fellow

Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III

Distinguished Research Fellow 

Mr. Leo G. Michel

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. James J. Przystup

Senior Research Fellow

LTC JOEL D. RAYBURN, USA

Senior Military Fellow

CAPT Mark E. Redden, USN

Senior Military Fellow

Dr. C. Nicholas Rostow

Director

Dr. Phillip C. Saunders

Director of Studies

Dr. Judith S. Yaphe

Distinguished Research Fellow

Dr. Christopher Yung

Senior Research Fellow

For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm.