UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

United States of America, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

Devin Dantzler, 

Defendant. 

________________________________/ 

Case No. 14-cr-20425-6 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE 

SENTENCE [572] AND DENYING HIS 

AMENDED MOTION [579] 

 Before the Court is pro se Defendant Devin Dantzler’s motion to 

vacate his sentence. (ECF No. 572.) Defendant also filed a motion to 

amend/correct his motion to vacate his sentence. (ECF No. 579.) For the 

reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to vacate and the motion to 

amend are denied. 

I. Background 

 Defendant pleaded guilty to a RICO conspiracy on January 17, 

2017, as set forth in the Third Superseding Indictment. (ECF No. 273). 

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His plea agreement included an agreed-upon sentence of 30 years. (ECF 

No. 323, PageID.1391). 

 In exchange for Defendant’s plea, the government agreed to dismiss 

all remaining charges against Defendant. (Id. at PageID.1393.) 

Defendant waived his right to appeal his conviction “on any grounds,” but 

he did not waive his right to file an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

(ECF No. 323, PageID.1394.) 

 On June 28, 2017, the Court sentenced Defendant to 30 years 

imprisonment, as set forth in the plea agreement. The judgment was 

entered on June 29, 2017. (ECF No. 366). 

 Defendant brought his motion to vacate his sentence under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255. In his motion, he argues that his counsel was ineffective 

for the following reasons. 

 First, he argues that when his counsel was appointed, “the United 

States Marshalls [sic] violated my right to a lawyer. ‘Telling me’ [t]hat he 

can’t pull one out of the closet that I might as well waive my rights.” (ECF 

No. 572, PageID.3784.) 

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 Second, he argues that his lawyer was ineffective because his 

lawyer “waived [Defendant’s] Preliminary Exam Hearing without 

[Defendant’s] [k]nowing.” (Id. at PageID.3785.) 

 Defendant’s third argument that his counsel was ineffective is that 

his attorney “did NOT argue any downward departure for my mental 

health problems.” (Id. at PageID.3786.) 

 The United States responded to Defendant’s motion arguing that 

Defendant’s motion is untimely and meritless. (ECF No. 578.) 

 Defendant filed a motion to amend, which contains supplemental 

arguments in support of his motion to vacate. (ECF No. 579.) In his 

motion to amend, Defendant argues that United States v. Laurent, 33 

F.4th 63 (2nd Cir. 2002), requires that the Court vacate his sentence. 

II. Legal Standard 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”) of 1996, an inmate in federal custody who files a motion to 

vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence must demonstrate “that the 

sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 

United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 

a sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 

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by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” Shaw v. United 

States, 604 F. App’x 473, 476 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)). 

“A motion brought under § 2255 must allege one of three bases as a 

threshold standard: (1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a 

sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or 

law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” 

Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 

United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185–86 (1979)). 

To prevail under § 2255 on an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, “[petitioner] must establish (1) that his lawyer’s performance was 

deficient as compared to an objective standard of reasonable 

performance, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that the 

lawyer’s errors prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings against him.” 

Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)). 

When a court evaluates an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

“counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 

judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “When a convicted defendant 

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complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel’s assistance, the defendant 

must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. 

Review of counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential,” and 

“every effort must be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight.” Id. at 689. As to the requirement that a defendant show 

prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

III. Analysis 

A. Timeliness 

 Defendant’s arguments are untimely. Defendant’s judgment was 

entered on June 29, 2017. (ECF No. 366.) He did not appeal and therefore 

his judgment became final on July 13, 2017 (which is 14 days after entry 

of the judgment). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(A). There is a “1-year period of 

limitation” that applies to a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

which runs from “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes 

final.” 

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 Accordingly, Defendant had until July 13, 2018, to file this motion. 

Defendant filed this motion on March 28, 2022. It is not timely and is 

denied on this basis. 

B. Merits 

 Even if Defendant’s motion had been timely, it is denied on the 

merits. As set forth above, Defendant has the burden of showing: “(1) that 

his lawyer’s performance was deficient as compared to an objective 

standard of reasonable performance, and (2) that there is a reasonable 

probability that the lawyer’s errors prejudiced the outcome of the 

proceedings against him.” Arredondo, 178 F.3d at 782. 

 Defendant’s first argument, that “the United States Marshalls [sic] 

violated my right to a lawyer when they ‘[told] me’ [t]hat he can’t pull one 

out of the closet that I might as well waive my rights.” (ECF No. 572, 

PageID.3784) is not adequately explained or supported. Nor does 

Defendant set forth how his lawyer and/or the United States Marshals 

Service prejudiced him. 

 Defendant’s second argument, that his attorney improperly waived 

his preliminary examination, is also denied. As the United States 

explains in its response brief, Defendant was indicted. (ECF No. 45.) 

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Accordingly, there was no preliminary examination hearing, much less 

one that was improperly waived. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a)(2). 

 Defendant’s third argument, that his counsel did not “argue any 

downward departure for [Defendant’s] mental health problems,” is also 

rejected. (ECF No. 572, PageID.3786.) Defendant agreed to 360 months 

imprisonment as part of his Rule 11 plea agreement. (ECF No. 323, 

PageID.1392.) He also agreed that the “only reason” that he could 

withdraw from the plea agreement or appeal is if the Court imposed a 

sentence “higher than a term of imprisonment of thirty years.” (Id. at 

PageID.1394.) 

 The plea agreement’s terms are unambiguous. The agreement, 

along with the transcript of Defendant’s sentencing hearing, where he 

stated that he wished to maintain his guilty plea, make it clear that 

Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to challenge his 

thirty-year sentence. (See id.; see also ECF No. 597.) See United States v. 

Stevenson, 96 F. App’x 315, 315 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that a plea 

agreement is a “contractual bargain” and that a waiver of a defendant’s 

right to appeal a sentence is enforceable). Moreover, Defendant was 

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deemed to be competent to offer a change of plea. Accordingly, 

Defendant’s third argument in his motion to vacate is denied. 

 Next is Defendant’s motion regarding the impact of United States 

v. Laurent, which is suggests requires that his sentence be vacated. 

Laurent is inapplicable and Defendant’s argument is denied for the 

reasons set forth below. 

 In United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), the Supreme 

Court limited the offenses that qualify as “crimes of violence.” After Davis

was decided, the Second Circuit evaluated whether a RICO conspiracy 

qualifies as a “crime of violence.” United States v. Capers, 40 F.4th 105, 

117 (2nd Cir. 2021). The Second Circuit found that, “the mere agreement

to commit such crimes does not require the use of force—or any action 

beyond the agreement itself—and therefore is not categorically a violent 

crime.” Id. at 118–19 (emphasis in original). 

 After Capers was decided, the defendants in Laurent, who were 

convicted by a jury on charges of a RICO conspiracy, argued that their 

jury verdicts constituted a legal error. The error, they argued, derived 

from the fact that the jury found “the essential element of a crime of 

violence” when it found them guilty of a RICO conspiracy. Laurent, 33 

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F.4th at 86. And, after Capers, a RICO conspiracy in the Second Circuit 

“cannot constitute a crime of violence.”1 Id. 

 Defendant argues that under Laurent, his RICO conspiracy “cannot 

be a crime of violence” and his trial lawyer was “fully aware of this” and 

“ineffective for not bringing to light” the Laurent case. (ECF No. 579, 

PageID.3813.) This is incorrect. First, Laurent is a Second Circuit case, 

and Defendant’s case was tried here in the Sixth Circuit. Second Circuit 

cases are not binding on the Sixth Circuit. Second, Laurent involved a 

jury trial and conviction, while Defendant’s case involved a Rule 11 plea 

agreement. This distinction is determinative of the outcome. Moreover, 

the RICO count in this case includes a crime of violence – the murder of 

Mr. Al-Yasiry. (See ECF No. 323, PageID.1389–1391.) 

 In the Sixth Circuit, when a defendant enters into a plea agreement 

and knowingly and voluntarily waives their appellate rights regardless 

1 Ultimately, the Second Circuit found that the district court did not err in 

allowing the jury to find “that a substantive RICO violation served as a crime of 

violence” in Laurent because the racketeering charges against the defendants were 

“predicated on at least one crime of violence.” Id. at 90. In other words, even though 

a RICO conspiracy is no longer categorically a “crime of violence” in the Second 

Circuit, it can still qualify as one if the conspiracy is predicated on an underlying 

crime of violence. The Laurent defendants’ convictions on the RICO charges were 

undisturbed. Id. at 90–93. 

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of later developments in the law, the defendant will be bound by their 

obligations under the plea agreement. See Portis v. United States, 33 

F.4th 331 (6th Cir. 2022). “Plea bargains always entail risks.” Id. at 335 

(internal citations omitted). “[I]f courts disturb the parties’ allocation of 

risk in an agreement, they threaten to damage the parties’ ability to 

ascertain their legal rights when they sit down at the bargaining table.” 

Id. And the “principle that future changes in law do not vitiate [postconviction challenge waivers] is mainstream.” Id. Plea agreements, 

therefore, do “not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions 

indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” Id. 

 To be clear, the Court does not agree with Defendant that his plea 

rested on a faulty premise in this case. But even if it did, the Court would 

be obligated to uphold the parties’ agreement, except under very limited 

circumstances that are not present here (i.e., if the government breached 

the agreement or the defendant’s waiver was “infected by race 

discrimination.” Id. at 335.). 

 Here, Defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered 

a guilty plea under a Rule 11 plea agreement. Under the agreement, 

Defendant received the benefit of the bargain: that is, the United States 

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dropped other pending charges against Defendant in exchange for his 

plea. Defendant agreed not to appeal except under limited circumstances 

that are not applicable here. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s 

arguments that his conviction should be vacated based on the Second 

Circuit’s decision in Laurent. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to vacate and its amendment (ECF 

Nos. 572, 579) is denied. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 21, 2022 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or first-class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on December 21, 2022. 

s/William Barkholz 

WILLIAM BARKHOLZ 

Case Manager 

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