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NUCLEAR ENERGY RISK MANAGEMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND 

OVERSIGHT 

JOINT WITH THE 

SUBCOMMITTE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FRIDAY, MAY 13, 2011 

Serial No. 112–18 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HON. ANDY HARRIS, Maryland, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Friday, May 13, 2011 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Paul Broun, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 11 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 12 

Prepared Statement by Representative Donna F. Edwards ................................ 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14 

Statement by Representative Andy Harris, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. 

House of Representatives .................................................................................... 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Brian Sheron, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 28 

Mr. Lake Barrett, Principal, L. Barrett Consulting, LLC 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 36 

Dr. John Boice, Scientific Director, International Epidemiology Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 38 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 42 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 47 

Mr. Dave Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned 

Scientists 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 51 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 53 

Biography .......................................................................................................... 84 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Brian Sheron, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission ................................................................................... 216 

Mr. Lake Barrett, Principal, L. Barrett Consulting, LLC 246 

Dr. John Boice, Scientific Director, International Epidemiology Institute 249 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Statement of Mr. Peter B. Lyons, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, 

U.S. Department of Energy ............................................................................. 258 

(1) 

HEARING ON NUCLEAR ENERGY 

RISK MANAGEMENT 

FRIDAY, MAY 13, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

JOINT WITH THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 9:04 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul Broun 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight] 

presiding. 
2 
3 

1 Additionally, the Committee has jurisdiction over all environmental research and development, and the commercial application of energy technology, as well as all scientific research, 

development and demonstrations and projects. In addition to its legislative jurisdiction, the 

Committee is also tasked with the special oversight function of reviewing and studying on a continuing basis laws, programs, and Government activities relating to nonmilitary research and 

development. 2 ‘‘Nuclear Energy Quick Facts.’’ Nuclear Energy Institute. 9 May 2011. http://www.nei.org/ 

filefolder/NuclearlEnergylQuicklFacts.pdf. 

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Nuclear Energy Risk Management 

FRIDAY, MAY 13, 2011

10:00 A.M. TO 12:00 P.M. 

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

On Friday, May 13, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. the House Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight & Subcommittee on Energy and Environment will hold a joint hearing entitled, ‘‘Nuclear Energy Risk Management.’’ 

The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has jurisdiction over all energy 

research, development, and demonstration projects and all federally owned or operated nonmilitary energy laboratories. 1 The purpose of the hearing is to examine nuclear energy safety, risk assessment, public health protection, and associated scientific and technical policy issues in the United States in light of the earthquake 

and tsunami in Japan. 

Witnesses 

• Dr. Brian Sheron, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

• Mr. Lake Barrett, Principal, LBarrett Consulting, LLC 

• Dr. John Boice, Scientific Director, International Epidemiology Institute 

• Mr. Dave Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists 

Overview 

In the United States, 104 operating nuclear reactors currently supply approximately 20 percent of U.S. electricity. 2 The majority of nuclear reactors came online 

throughout the 1970’s and 80’s, with the newest nuclear plant beginning generation 

in 1996. Currently, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering license 

applications for several new nuclear plants that industry is seeking to bring online 

over the coming decade. Southern Company is furthest along in this process, and 

is seeking a license from NRC to construct and operate two new nuclear reactors 

at its Vogtle site near Augusta, Georgia. These reactors would be the first in a new 

generation of nuclear plants in the United States. 

The U.S. nuclear industry has experienced significant advancements in reactor 

safety and risk mitigation since the construction of the previous reactor. Recent 

events have refocused attention to the need for continual attentiveness to these 

issues. 

Review of Japan 
4 

3 ‘‘Largest Earthquakes in the World Since 1900.’’ U.S. Geological Survey. 9 May 2011. http:// 

earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/10llargestlworld.php. 

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck just off Japan’s east coast. 

The earthquake was the fourth largest recorded in the last century. 3 Compounding 

the devastation of the earthquake, a massive tsunami followed shortly after the initial earthquake and struck Japan’s coast with little preparation time. The earthquake and resulting tsunami generated widespread destruction throughout the Japanese islands and is estimated to have killed over 10,000 people. Aftershocks continued for weeks impeding humanitarian response efforts. 

The earthquake triggered the automatic shutdown of 11 of Japan’s 55 operating 

nuclear power plants, as designed. Within close proximity to the earthquake’s epicenter stood three sites with nuclear reactors, Onagawa, Fukushima Daiichi, and 

Fukushima Daini. Of the six nuclear units located at the Fukushima Daiichi site, 

three were in operation on March 11 while the remaining three units were shut 

down for inspections and maintenance. 

While further investigation is necessary to assess the specific consequences of the 

earthquake inside the reactors, it is believed all of the Daiichi reactors responded 

to the earthquake as intended. The site, cut off from the electric grid due to the 

earthquake, operated during this period as expected with the onsite backup diesel 

generators powering the cooling system for each reactor. Approximately one hour 

after the earthquake, an estimated 14 meter tsunami reached the Fukushima 

Daiichi site, overwhelmed the six meter high barrier, flooded the generators, swept 

away the diesel fuel tanks and eliminated all backup cooling systems located at the 

station (figure 1). 
5 

Lacking the ability to cool the reactors, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), 

the owner of the Daiichi reactors, immediately began to experience severe difficulties associated with rising temperatures in the reactors. Absent primary and secondary cooling systems, TEPCO began to cool the reactor cores by pumping seawater into the reactors. Lacking the necessary information on the status of the reactor cores, water levels in the units dropped, resulting in partial exposure of fuel rods 

inside the reactor vessel (figure 2). As the fuel rods were exposed, the fuel rod’s zirconium cladding reacted with water and generated hydrogen, which accumulated 

within the unit. The hydrogen buildup within the reactors ultimately led to explosions in Units 1, 2 and 3 within days of the tsunami and removed the secondary 

containment structures of those units. 

In addition to the difficulties TEPCO faced stabilizing the cooling systems for 

Units 1, 2 and 3, the spent fuel pool located inside Unit 4 experienced problems. 

Unit 4 was undergoing maintenance at the time of the earthquake and had 

offloaded additional fuel rods in the spent fuel pool. While details are still not clear, 

in the days following the earthquake multiple fires ignited inside Unit 4 as a result 

of problems with the spent fuel pool. Investigation into the cause of the fires and 

specific spent fuel pool issues in Unit 4 are ongoing. 

TEPCO continues to pump freshwater into the reactors at Units 1, 2 and 3. Further evaluation of the site’s infrastructure is necessary prior to reconnecting electricity to the reactor and stabilizing the reactor cooling process. TEPCO is shooting 

water aimed at Unit 4’s spent fuel pool to ensure the pool is adequately filled. Radiation levels surrounding the reactors remain elevated; however, they have notably 

decreased from spikes following the initial explosions. 
6 

4 For more information on radiation health implications and dose levels see Congressional Research Service Report titled, ‘‘The Japanese Nuclear Incident: Technical Aspects,’’ R41728 5 Mason, Julie. ‘‘Fears Cause Run on Pills.’’ Politico 16 Mar 2011. 9 May 2011. http:// 

www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0311/alrunlonliodidel9de5fce3-9807-44b1-9721- 

48d1b9abab2e.html. 6 ‘‘Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident.’’ Nuclear Regulator Commission. http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html. Retrieved May 5, 2011. 7 Gilinsky, Victor (March 23, 2009). ‘‘Behind the scenes of Three Mile Island’’. Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists. http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/behind-the-scenes-of-three-mile-island. Retrieved March 31, 2009. 

Public Health Implications 

Immediately following the tsunami and explosions at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, the Japanese government ordered the evacuation of a 20 kilometer (12 mile) 

area surrounding the plant and directed those living within 30 kilometers (18 miles) 

to stay indoors. Japanese health authorities immediately began testing Japanese 

citizens, particularly children, for traces of radiation, but found only minimal levels 

of exposure. As of April 27, 2011, over 175,000 people have been screened. Radiation 

levels in the food supply were also evaluated and some restrictions were placed on 

distribution. Testing and evaluation of public health is ongoing and continue to be 

closely monitored. Workers at the Fukushima Daiichi plant were exposed to higher 

than normal radiation, though under the emergency dose limit set by the Japanese 

government and not enough to induce sickness. TEPCO rotates employees once the 

workers reach the permitted dose threshold. 

As a consequence ofthe overheating of reactor fuel at Fukushima Daiichi Units 

1, 2 and 3 and overheating within spent fuel storage areas, radiation was released 

into the atmosphere and environment. In the weeks following the release, traces of 

radiation were detected over portions of the United States. The trace amounts of 

radiation led to public discussion regarding the advisability of purchasing potassium 

iodide (KI) pills to prevent uptake of radioactive potassium and the possibility of radioactive material entering the food chain. 4 Of particular note, despite a lack of evidence suggesting human health would be impacted in the United States, U.S. Surgeon General Dr. Regina Benjamin noted in response to questioning about citizens 

stocking up on potassium iodide that such actions were ‘‘definitely appropriate’’ precautions to take. 

The spread of radiation has refocused attention on the need for appropriate evacuation plans in the event of an accident or natural disaster at a nuclear facility, for 

appropriate plans for the return ofpopulations to evacuated areas, the efficacy of KI 

distribution and long-term health implications for exposure to low-dose radiation. 5

Evaluations of U.S. nuclear safety 

The nuclear industry and governmental bodies consistently review nuclear reactor 

safety and risk mitigation measures in the United States. However, the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island and the attacks of September 11, 2001, in particular, 

spurred significant reviews of and enhancements to nuclear reactor safety. 

Previous reviews provide context for current and future evaluations of nuclear energy, such as the review currently underway by the NRC in response to the incident 

in Japan. 

Three Mile Island 

On March 28, 1979, a series of mechanical and human errors led to the most significant accident in the history of the U.S. nuclear power industry. For reasons still 

unknown, water pumps feeding the generator shut down. Because operators had 

closed valves on the secondary water system for routine maintenance, the system 

could not pump any water and the reactor began to overheat. A relief valve opened 

automatically to relieve primary system pressure; however, the valve failed to close 

once pressure had been released, allowing coolant water to escape. Compounding 

the problem was the failure of plant operators to recognize the opened valve and 

a misinterpretation of readings on the control panel. 6 Once operators realized the 

problem, serious damage had already occurred. When the core was opened four 

years later it was discovered that half the fuel rods had melted—a partial meltdown. 7

In response to Three Mile Island, President Carter chartered the Kemeny Commission to investigate the accident. The Commission’s recommendations covered a 

wide range of issues. One recommendation of note was for the nuclear power industry to establish a program that ‘‘specifies appropriate safety standards including 

those for management, quality assurance, and operating procedures and practices, 
7 

8 ‘‘Report Of The President’s Commission On The Accident At Three Mile Island.’’ 1979. 9 May 

2011. http://www.pddoc.com/tmi2/kemeny/utilitylandlitslsuppliers1.htm. 9 Ibid 10 ‘‘About.’’ Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Web. 9 May 2011. http://www.inpo.info/ 

AboutUs.htm. 11 ‘‘NRC’s Response to the 9/11/01 Events.’’ Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 25 Apr 2011. 

http://www.nrc.gov/security/faq-911.html. 12 All NRR and Division responsibilities are summarized from: United States. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards., 20 Apr 2011. Web. 9 May 2011. http://nrc.gov/about-nrc/ 

organization/nmssfuncdesc.html. 

and that conducts independent evaluations.’’ 8 Further, ‘‘there must be a system 

gathering, review, and analysis of operating experience at all nuclear power plants 

coupled with an industry-wide international communications network to facilitate 

the speedy flow of this information to affected parties.’’ 9

As a consequence of that recommendation, the nuclear power industry established 

the Institute of Nuclear Power of Operations (INPO) and directed INPO to ‘‘promote 

the highest levels of safety and reliability—to promote excellence—in the operation 

of commercial nuclear power plants.’’ 10 INPO continues to actively engage in a partnership with industry to provide valuable safety and risk mitigation expertise. 

September 11, 2001 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001 the NRC issued a series of orders and 

advisories to its license holders directing them on specific threats and security enhancements. For example, the NRC has issued orders requiring license holders to 

increase specific security measures, including: ‘‘increased patrols, augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, installation of additional physical barriers, vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances, enhanced coordination 

with law enforcement and military authorities, and more restrictive site access controls.’’ In addition, the NRC has made several changes to its Design Basis Threat 

(DBT), first implemented after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. Although the 

DBT is not public, it outlines specific threats and characteristics of adversaries. In 

April 2003 and March 2006, the NRC made additions to the DBT with lessons 

learned from September 11. In January 2007, the DBT was further amended to consolidate previous additions and incorporate specific threat factors outlined in the 

Energy Policy Act of 2005. 11

DOE and NRC Nuclear Energy Research Programs 

Both the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and the NRC fund extensive 

research programs across a wide variety of topics. DOE and NRC conduct significant 

research focused on all components of nuclear facility safety, risk analysis, and reactor design. Given recent events, the manner in which government research programs inform reactor safety and regulations are integral to ensure public health and 

safety. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (NRR) is NRC’s primary research entity, coordinating research and informing regulatory decisions for the organization. 

The NRR provides all encompassing research relating to reactor safety, operational 

regulations, environmental radiological impact, and performance and reliability. The 

NRR office consists of Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis 

Staff; the Division of Engineering; Division of Systems Analysis; and Division of 

Risk Analysis. The primary responsibility of NRR is to provide ‘‘leadership and plan, 

recommend, manage, and implement programs of nuclear regulatory research and 

interface with all NRC Offices and the Commission on research issues.’’ 12
8 

13 Ibid 

Among NRR’s tasks, the Office: 

• Recommends regulatory actions to resolve ongoing and potential safety issues 

for nuclear power plants and other facilities regulated by the NRC; 

• Conducts research to reduce uncertainties in areas of potentially high safety 

or security risk or significance; 

• Develops the technical basis for risk-informed, performance-based regulations 

in all areas regulated by the NRC; 

• Leads the agency’s initiative for cooperative research with DOE and other 

Federal agencies, the domestic nuclear industry, U.S. universities, and international partners; 

• Maintains technical capability to develop information for resolution of nuclear 

safety and security issues and provides technical support and consultation to 

the Program Offices in the specialized disciplines involved in these issues 

and; 

• Collects and analyzes operational data; assesses trends in performance from 

this data; evaluates operating experience to provide insights into and improve 

the understanding of the risk significance of events, precursors and trends; 

and produces and disseminates periodic performance indicator and Accident 

Sequence Precursor (ASP) Reports. 13

The various divisions provide valuable, informative research relating to reactor 

safety and risk mitigation. For example, the Division of Systems Analysis conducts 

research to quantify margins, reduce unnecessary burden, and reduce uncertainties 

for areas of potentially high risk or safety significance, supports identification of accident phenomena and assessment of anticipated safety issues in new and advanced 

reactors, and develops technical bases for dose limits in regulations. The Division 

of Risk Analysis develops, recommends, plans, and manages research programs relating to probabilistic risk assessments (PRA); develops and uses PRA-based methodologies, models, and analysis techniques, as well as other risk assessment techniques to determine overall risk; and supports agency efforts to use risk information 

in all aspects of regulatory decision making. 

Department of Energy—Office of Nuclear Energy 

The primary mission of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) is to ‘‘advance 

nuclear power as a resource capable of meeting the Nation’s energy, environmental, 

and national security needs by resolving technical, cost, safety, proliferation resistance, and security barriers through research, development, and demonstration as 
9 

14 ‘‘Mission Statement.’’ U.S. Department of Energy. 9 May 2011. http://nuclear.energy.gov/ 

neMission.html. 15 ‘‘Nuclear Energy.’’ Idaho National Laboratory. 9 May 2011. https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/ 

server.pt/community/nuclearlenergy/277. 16 ‘‘Risk Assessment Technical Experts Working Group.’’ U.S. Department of Energy, Office 

of Health, Safety and Security. 9 May 2011. http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/ns/rawg/. 

appropriate.’’ 14 The Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 continuing resolution provided $737 million for the Office of Nuclear Energy. 

Unlike the NRC, NE’s research, development, and deployment programs are not 

consolidated within one office, but rather undertaken throughout all of NE’s program offices. Safety and risk mitigation activities span fuel cycle research, advanced 

reactor research, and light water reactor sustainability research. For example, future reactor designs have passive cooling systems to cool nuclear reactor cores even 

in the absence of electricity. The Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design, currently 

under consideration for licensing by the NRC, has a passive cooling system and 

Small Modular Reactors also incorporate the technology. 

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is DOE’s lead nuclear energy research and development facility. Primary NE tasks undertaken at INL include nuclear safety 

analysis, irradiation services, nuclear operations, management of spent nuclear fuel, 

and biocorrosion offuels. 15 These efforts are carried out through funding from the 

various NE research programs. Located at INL are a munber of facilities providing 

world class research capabilities for DOE, such as the Advanced Test Reactor Complex which is also a DOE National Scientific User Facility. Significant additional 

NE R&D is carried out at other Federal facilities, such as Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. 

DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security includes the Risk Assessment Technical Experts Working Group to assist DOE with the use of ‘‘quantitative risk assessment in nuclear safety related activities.’’ These activities ‘‘help DOE ensure 

that risk assessments supporting nuclear safety decisions are conducted in a consistent manner, or appropriate quality, properly tailored to the needs of the decisions they are intended to support and documented.’’ 16

The Modeling and Simulation Energy Innovation Hub, located at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, will create a Virtual Reactor (VR) to model and simulate a nuclear reactor. The VR aims to enhance the scientific understanding of fission and 
10 

17 ‘‘Advanced Modeling and Simulation.’’ U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. 

9 May 2011. http://www.ne.doe.gov/AdvModelingSimulation/casl.html. 

reduce uncertainties associated with safety and risk. The capabilities can be used 

to assess and improve safety of existing reactors. 17

Need for future reactor safety research, risk assessment, and accident 

mitigation 

The incident at the Fukushima Daiichi reactors has highlighted the need for continual examination of safety and risk assessment in the United States. Policies and 

priorities undergoing heightened assessment include: 

• Spent fuel management. What is the best and most secure method of storing 

spent nuclear fuel? In a spent fuel pool or dry cask storage? In a single centralized storage facility, such as the proposed, but now cancelled Yucca Mountain repository, or onsite at individual reactor locations, including at sites 

containing decommissioned reactors? 

• Risk assessment modeling and risk mitigation. How can risk uncertainty be 

reduced to the greatest degree and incorporated into risk mitigation measures? What are the necessary inputs to produce the most realistic risk assessment models? 

• Reactor design. What design features may warrant incorporation into the new 

reactors to make nuclear reactors inherently more safe and resilient to natural disasters? Do different reactor technologies offer additional safety and 

risk mitigation benefits? 

• Emergency planning. Are current Emergency Planning Zones adequate? Are 

the lines of communication between stakeholders clear and proper? Are additional steps to ensure public health safety necessary? 

• Response. How can response capabilities be improved in the event of a disaster? What R&D is needed in this area? 
11 

Chairman BROUN. Good morning. This joint hearing of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcommittee 

on Energy and Environment will come to order. I welcome everyone 

here to this hearing, ‘‘Nuclear Energy Risk Management.’’ In front 

of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies, 

and truth of testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. 

Before we get started, since this is a joint hearing involving two 

Subcommittees, I want to explain how we will operate procedurally 

so all Members understand how the question and answer period 

will be handled. As always, we will alternate between the Majority 

and Minority Members, and allow all Members an opportunity for 

questioning before recognizing a Member for a second round of 

questions, if we have time for the second round. We will recognize 

those Members present at the gavel in order of seniority on the full 

Committee, and those coming in after the gavel would be recognized in the order of their arrival. 

I now recognize myself for a five minute opening statement. I 

would first like to welcome our witnesses to today’s hearing, and 

express my sincere appreciation for their effort in joining us here 

today. 

Risk assessment and risk management associated with nuclear 

energy are timely and important topics for the Science Committee 

to address. This topic is clearly a priority for the Science Committee, as two of our Subcommittees are here today together. While 

the facts and implications of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami, 

and resulting nuclear disaster are still being determined, it is an 

opportunity for us to reassess our Nation’s current safety posture 

here in this country. 

After the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, September 11, and several other incidents, the United States regularly revisited the state 

of our nuclear power infrastructure. Today’s hearing is yet another 

opportunity to evaluate whether we, as a Nation, are doing everything that we can to ensure that nuclear energy is a safe component of our energy supply. This includes evaluating the current research and development portfolio for reactor safety, spent fuel storage, and public health monitoring. 

The Department of Energy was invited to this morning’s hearing 

and would have provided a valuable contribution to the hearing. 

Unfortunately, they were unable to provide a witness here today. 

DoE did provide written comments, but that does not substitute for 

actually appearing. Testifying is not a correspondence course. The 

Science Committee understands the many demands that agency officials have on their time. As Members of Congress, we have similar demands. Because of this, the Committee provided four weeks 

of notice and did not request a specific individual, leaving that determination to DoE. Unfortunately, it seems as though the entire 

Department only has one individual that they believe is qualified 

to speak on the issues that we are addressing here today, and he 

was otherwise engaged for multiple days. 

While I find this troubling in and of itself, what is more frustrating is that this has now become a trend for this Administration. 

The TSA refused to testify at a hearing earlier this year before the 

I&O Subcommittee. Two days ago EPA refused to testify before the 
12 

full Committee unless they could dictate the terms of their attendance. 

Let me be clear. This Committee is willing to work with the Administration to reach neutral accommodations, but it will not allow 

it to obstruct our oversight efforts. We take our oversight responsibilities very seriously. This Administration’s arrogance continues 

to undermine its claims of transparency and openness, particularly 

when they fail to be accountable to Congress and to the American 

people. If the Administration is not willing to work with this Committee, we have several options that can compel their cooperation. 

Unfortunately, it appears that we may have to exercise those options in the future. 

For the witnesses that did appear today, I want to sincerely 

thank you for your cooperation. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Broun follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PAUL BROUN, M.D. 

I would first like to welcome our witnesses to today’s hearing and express my sincere appreciation for their effort in joining us here. Risk Assessment and Risk Management associated with Nuclear Energy are important and timely topics for the 

Science Committee to address. This topic is clearly a priority for the Science Committee as two of our Subcommittees are here together today. While the effects and 

implications of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami, and resulting nuclear disaster 

are still being determined, it is an opportunity for us to reassess our nation’s current safety posture here in this country. After Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, September 11th, and several other incidents, the United States regularly revisited the 

state of our nuclear power infrastructure. Today’s hearing is yet another opportunity 

to evaluate whether we, as a nation, are doing everything we can to ensure that 

nuclear energy is a safe component of our energy supply. This includes evaluating 

the current research and development portfolio for reactor safety, spent fuel storage, 

and public health monitoring. 

The Department of Energy was invited to this morning’s hearing and would have 

been provided a valuable contribution to the hearing. Unfortunately, they were unable to provide a witness to appear today. DOE did provide written comments, but 

that does not substitute for actual appearing. Testifying is not a correspondence 

course. The Science Committee understands the many demands that agency officials 

have on their time, as Members of Congress have similar demands. Because of this, 

the Committee provided four weeks of notice, and did not request a specific individual, leaving that determination to DOE. Unfortunately, it seems as though the 

entire Department only has one individual they believe is qualified to speak to the 

issues we are addressing today - and he was otherwise engaged for multiple days. 

While I find this troubling in and of itself, what is more frustrating is that this has 

now become a trend with this Administration. The TSA refused to testify at a hearing earlier this year before the I&O Subcommittee, and two days ago EPA refused 

to testify before the Full Committee unless they could dictate the terms of their attendance. 

Let me be clear, this Committee is willing to work with the Administration to 

reach mutual accommodations, but it will not allow it to obstruct our oversight efforts. We take our oversight responsibilities very seriously. This Administration’s arrogance continues to undermine its claims of transparency and openness, particularly when they fail to be accountable to Congress and the American people. If the 

Administration is not willing to work with this Committee, we have several options 

that can compel their cooperation. Unfortunately, it appears we may have to exercise those options in the future. 

For the witnesses that did appear today, I want to sincerely thank them for their 

cooperation. I look forward to their testimony, and will now recognize Ms. Edwards, 

the Ranking Member of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee for an 

Opening Statement. 

Chairman BROUN. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Edwards for an 

opening statement. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. I 

look forward to today’s hearing and thank the witnesses, because 
13 

I think for far too long we have heard just a drum beat about how 

nuclear energy is both safe and efficient, with electricity produced 

‘‘too cheap to meter.’’ I want to thank the Chairman for giving 

Members a chance to get to the bottom of these claims and others. 

The idea of nuclear power as a cost effective source of power can 

be traced back to a statement in 1954 by the then-Chairman of the 

Atomic Energy Commission, who suggested that ‘‘Our children will 

enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to meter.’’ Unfortunately that same year, of course, General Electric ran an advertisement which I am attaching to my statement—it is quite interesting—from 1954 that optimistically trumpeted how the industry 

would be on its own two feet within five to ten years. That was in 

1954. After suggesting that the big question on atomic energy was 

whether it could be done economically, the ad says, and I quote, 

‘‘We already know the kinds of plants which will be feasible, how 

they will operate, and we can estimate what their expenses will be. 

In five years, certainly within ten, a number of them will be operating at about the same cost of those using coal. They will be privately financed and built without government subsidy.’’ So here we 

are and it is 2011, and the reality is that nuclear power has always 

required government subsidies. In the almost 60 years since that 

ad appeared, the taxpayer has seen more than $80 billion spent on 

nuclear power research and development. In fact, it is the largest 

single energy research area since 1948. There are billions and billions and billions of dollars in other subsidies created through government actions designed to distort markets to give nuclear power 

a competitive edge over other sources of energy, although we are 

in a discussion now about how heavily subsidized the oil industry 

is. 

Despite decades of support, nuclear power plants are still unable 

to operate competitively in the United States energy market, and 

now we are being asked for still more subsidies to build another 

generation of plants. According to an analysis by the Union of Concerned Scientists, these subsidies could be worth twice as much as 

the value of the electricity produced by the plant. That strikes me 

as throwing a lot of good money after bad. 

We recently held a hearing on renewable energy in which the 

Majority seemed to want to make the point that subsidizing renewable energy would be picking winners and losers, and yet that 

same strategy that energy produced would not be competitive without government support is being used with respect to the nuclear 

industry. 

Well, if you truly reject such support, the nuclear power industry 

should be the poster child for an industry that needs government 

to profit up, and profit up to the tune of billions of dollars. I support subsidies to help emerging energy sources such as wind and 

solar and battery technologies. They deserve at least as much of a 

chance as nuclear has had, and since nuclear cannot stand on its 

own feet after 60 years, it is time to say enough. The public gravy 

train has got to come to a stop for now for this mature industry, 

and it is indeed a mature industry, it just can’t stand on its own, 

and its claims of safety, the events of Japan’s Fukushima plant illustrate how safety is contingent on a complex set of systems all 

working perfectly. If those systems go down, system safety starts 
14 

to slip beyond our control. Natural disasters and human folly know 

no national bounds, and it would be beyond arrogant to think that 

something similar to Fukushima could not happen here in the 

United States. 

To avoid another accident requires aggressive regulators, safetyminded operators, and perfect luck. As was illustrated in a recent 

New York Times article, attached also to my statement, operators 

often confuse profit margins with safety margins and regulators 

are too passive or overwhelmed to always enforce accountability. In 

fact, there are claims that the regulatory agency is too cozy with 

the industry. 

A recent report from the Union of Concerned Scientists documents 14 near-misses in just the past year, including one at Maryland’s own Calvert Cliffs plant, located approximately 50 miles 

from where we sit today. Calvert Cliffs has two reactors. In February 2010, both reactors were automatically shut down. The cause 

of the shutdown was that water had shorted out a degraded piece 

of electric equipment that had neither been inspected or replaced. 

A subsequent study—investigation by the NRC revealed that the 

water resulted from chronic roof leaks. In fact, the NRC found that 

there were 58 outstanding work orders to repair roof leaks, and despite some of the orders being two years old, not one of them had 

even been scheduled for repair. 

Each shutdown, like the one at Calvert Cliffs, caused plant own- ers and ultimately rate payers an average of more than $1.5 billion. Since the Three Mile Island accident, safety failures have resulted in plant shutdowns costing more than $80 billion. So we 

subsidize the energy—the industry’s creation, the building of plants 

the production of electricity, and then we subsidize a failure of 

plant management. I think enough is enough, and with that, I 

yield. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Edwards follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE DONNA F. EDWARDS

I look forward to today’s hearing because for too long we have heard a drumbeat 

about how nuclear energy is both safe and efficient, with electricity produced ‘‘too 

cheap to meter.’’ I want to thank the Chairmen for giving Members a chance to get 

to the bottom of these claims. 

The idea of nuclear power as a cost-effective source of power can be traced back 

to a statement in 1954 by the then-Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission 

who suggested that ‘‘Our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too 

cheap to meter. . .’’ That same year, General Electric ran an advertisement that optimistically trumpeted how the industry would be on its own two feet within five 

to ten years. After suggesting that the big question on atomic energy was whether 

it could be done economically, the ad says: 

‘‘We already know the kinds of plants which will be feasible, how they will operate, and we can estimate what their expenses will be. In five years—certainly within ten—a number of them will be operating at about the same cost as those using 

coal. They will be privately financed, built without government subsidy.’’ 

The reality is that nuclear power has always required government subsidies. In the almost sixty years since that ad appeared, the taxpayer has seen more than $80 

billion spent on nuclear power research and development. In fact, it is the largest 

single energy research area since 1948. And there are billions and billions and billions of dollars in other subsidies created through government actions designed to 

distort markets to give nuclear power a competitive edge. Subsidies include the 

Price-Anderson Act, which caps nuclear plant operators exposure to costs that would 

come from an accident, loan guarantees to underwrite the capital costs of plants, 

tax exempt bonds for construction of public plants, no charges to plants for their 

use of water and the list goes on and on. 
15 

Despite decades of support, nuclear power plants are still unable to operate competitively in the U.S. energy market. Now, we are being asked for still more subsidies to build another generation of plants. According to an analysis by the Union 

of Concerned Scientists, these subsidies could be worth twice as much as the value 

of the electricity produced by the plants. That strikes me as throwing good money 

after bad. 

We recently held a hearing on renewable energy in which the Majority seemed 

to want to make the point that subsidizing renewable energy would be ‘‘picking winners and losers’’ or distorting the market and that the energy produced would not 

be competitive without government support. Well, if you truly reject such support, 

the nuclear power industry should be the poster child for an industry that needs 

government to prop it up. 

I do not oppose subsidies to help new energy sources get on their feet I believe 

we should be investing in wind and solar and battery technologies and exploring 

other potential renewables to give them a chance to demonstrate their value to 

meeting our country’s energy needs. They appear to be safer to the public and the 

environment than any other sources of electricity and they promise true energy 

independence without worries about proliferation of nuclear materials. They deserve 

at least as much of a chance as nuclear has had, and since nuclear cannot stand 

on its own feet after sixty years, it is time to say ‘‘enough.’’ The public gravy train 

has got to come to a stop for this now mature industry. 

As to c1airus of safety, the events at Japan’s Fukushima plant illustrate how safety is contingent on a complex set of systems all working perfectly. If those systems 

go down, safety starts to slip beyond our control. Natural disasters and human folly 

know no national bounds and it would be beyond arrogant to think that something 

similar to Fukushima could not happen here. 

The risks posed by nuclear power are unique in their potential health and environmental scope. In the last thirty years, we have had three catastrophic accidents 

of varying effect: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. To avoid another 

accident requires aggressive regulators, safety-minded operators, and perfect luck. 

As was illustrated in a recent New York Times article, operators often confuse profit 

margins with safety margins and regulators are too passive or overwhelmed to always enforce accountability. 

To keep the public safe from disaster, you have to get nuclear plant safety right 

every second of every day of every year and everywhere. And natural disasters cannot be allowed to interfere or those carefully calibrated perfect systems can fail. I 

think that this is an impossible standard, but a failure once a generation or so is 

not acceptable to me. In fact, the Union of Concerned Scientists has issued a report 

documenting 14 near misses just in the past year, including one at Maryland’s own 

Calvert Cliffs plant. 

Located approximately 50 miles from where we sit today, Calvert Cliffs has two 

reactors. In February 2010, both reactors were automatically shut down. The cause 

of the shut-down was that water had shorted out a degraded piece of electrical 

equipment that had neither been inspected nor replaced. And the water, as a subsequent NRC investigation revealed, was the result of chronic roof leaks. In fact, the 

NRC found that there were 58 outstanding work orders to repair roof leaks. Despite 

some of the orders being two years old, not one of them had even been scheduled 

for repair. 

I am sure that a nuclear advocate would point to Calvert Cliffs’ automatic shutdown as a ‘‘success.’’ But such successes, in which safety systems shut reactors down 

in the face of systems operating out of spec, are not cost free. Each shutdown costs 

plant owners, and ultimately rate payers, an average of more than $1.5 billion dollars. Since the Three Mile Island accident safety failures that resulted in plant shutdowns cost more than $80 billion. 

So we subsidized the industry’s creation, the building of plants, the production of 

electricity and then we subsidize the failures of plant managers. 

I think enough is enough. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

I now recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy 

and Environment, Dr. Harris, for his opening statement. 

Dr. Harris, you are recognized for five minutes. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank our witnesses also for being here today to testify on issues 

relating to nuclear energy risk management, and I do look forward 

to hearing from all your testimony. 
16 

First I would like to echo Dr. Broun’s disappointment with the 

Department of Energy’s inability to provide a witness for the hearing. I do recognize that the head of the Office of Nuclear Energy 

was unavailable due to international travel, but I would hope that 

in a program with a budget of over $850 million that the Department has more than one individual qualified to represent it before 

Congress. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine nuclear energy safety, 

risk assessment, and public health protection. Nuclear energy is 

clearly an integral piece of America’s energy portfolio today, and 

will probably continue to be in the future. 

In Maryland, my State, one-third of our electricity is generated 

by nuclear reactors, and the State is home to two reactors located 

near my district at Calvert Cliffs. 

DoE’s Energy Information Administration projects that U.S. electricity demand will increase by 31 percent over the next 25 years. 

We simply have to get this electricity from somewhere, and nuclear 

energy may indeed provide a clean, safe, and affordable source of 

base load power to meet this demand. However, as with all critical 

energy sources, producing nuclear energy is certainly not without 

risk, and we must take great care to appropriately manage those 

risks. The March earthquake and tsunami in Japan clearly serves 

as a stark reminder of this. However, it is important to note that 

the incident and response at Fukushima did not happen in a vacuum. Both the nuclear industry and government regulators continually assess safety measures and mitigate those kind of risks. 

Largely due to this diligence and attentiveness, nuclear facilities in 

this country are among the safest workplaces across all industries, 

and not a single death has been attributed to nuclear energy production here in the United States. 

As I hope to hear today, continued improvements in reactor design and operating procedures will make what is already safe nuclear energy even safer. To this end, I am interested in learning 

how the Federal Government can best prioritize its nuclear energy 

research programs to further reduce these risks. 

I am also interested in key policy questions associated with nuclear energy risk management. For example, is a Fukushima-like 

event even possible here in the U.S., given our regulatory environment and reactor design? Do facilities pre-stage the necessary 

equipment to manage unexpected incidents? What are the comparative risks associated with storage of spent nuclear fuel scattered throughout the country or consolidated into centralized storage, such as Yucca Mountain. 

Finally, as a medical doctor by training, I believe it is important 

to objectively and responsibly discuss potential radiologic effects on 

public health. Senior government officials encouraging Americans 

to stockpile potassium iodide pills due to detection of miniscule 

traces of radiation is simply not responsible, since potassium iodide 

can obviously have harmful results if those pills are unnecessarily 

taken. This kind of alarmism also feeds unnecessary public fears 

about nuclear energy potentially harming its future viability. 

I hope the witnesses can help provide perspective on this issue. 

I look forward to hearing today’s discussion surrounding these top-
17 

ics. Again, I thank you all for appearing. I thank the Chairman for 

holding the hearing, and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Harris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ANDY HARRIS

I thank our witnesses for being here today to testify on issues relating to Nuclear 

Energy Risk Management and I look forward to hearing your testimony. First, I 

would like to echo Dr. Broun’s disappointment with the Department of Energy’s inability to provide a witness for this hearing. I recognize that the head of the Office 

of Nuclear Energy was unavailable due to international travel, but I would hope 

that with a program budget of over $850 million, the Department has more than 

one individual qualified to represent it before Congress. 

The purpose of this hearing is to examine nuclear energy safety, risk assessment, 

and public health protection. Nuclear energy is an integral piece of America’s energy 

portfolio today and will continue to be in the future. In Maryland, one third of our 

electricity is generated by nuclear reactors and the state is home to two reactors 

located near my district, at Calvert Cliffs. 

DOE’s Energy Information Administration projects that U.S. electricity demand 

will grow by 31 percent in the next 25 years. We have to get this electricity from 

somewhere, and nuclear energy provides a clean, safe, and affordable source of baseload power to meet this demand. 

However, as with all critical energy sources, however, producing nuclear energy 

is not without risk, and we must take great care to appropriately manage these 

risks. The March earthquake and tsunami in Japan serves as a stark reminder of 

this. 

However, it is important to note that both the incident and the response at 

Fukushima did not happen in a vacuum. Both the nuclear industry and government 

regulators continually assess safety measures and mitigate risk. Largely due to this 

diligence and attentiveness, nuclear facilities are among the safest workplaces 

across all industries, and not a single death has ever been attributed to nuclear energy production in the United States. As we will hear today, continued improvements in reactor design and operating procedures will make nuclear energy even 

safer. To this end, I’m interested in learning how the Federal government can best 

prioritize its nuclear energy research to further reduce risks. 

I’m also interested in key policy questions associated with nuclear energy risk 

management. For example: Is a Fukushima-like event even possible in the U.S.? Do 

facilities pre-stage the necessary equipment to manage unexpected incidents? What 

are the comparative risks associated with storage of spent nuclear fuel-scattered 

throughout the country or consolidated into centralized storage, such as Yucca 

Mountain? 

Finally, as a medical doctor by training, I believe it is important be responsible 

when discussing potential radiological effects on public health. Senior government 

officials encouraging American citizens to stockpile potassium iodide pills due to detection of miniscule traces of radiation is not responsible, and can have harmful results if those pills are unnecessarily taken. This alarmism also feeds unnecessary 

public fears about nuclear energy, potentially harming its future viability. I hope 

the witnesses can help provide perspective on this issue. 

I look forward to hearing today’s discussion surrounding these topics. Thank you 

and I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

If there are Members who would like to submit additional opening statements, your statements will be added to the record at this 

point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our panel of witnesses. Dr. 

Brian Sheron, is that correct, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory 

Research, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Mr. Lake Barrett, Principal Consultant, Barrett Consulting, LLC; Dr. John Boice, Scientific Director, International Epidemiology Institute and Professor 

of Medicine, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine; and Mr. 

Dave Lochbaum, Director of Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists. 
18 

As our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to 

five minutes and I would ask you, because we are really pressed, 

we are going to have votes about 9:45 to 10 o’clock, so please limit 

your testimony to five minutes. If you can shave a few seconds off 

that, we would appreciate it, but we don’t want to shortchange you, 

either. After your spoken testimony, Members of the Subcommittees will have five minutes each to ask questions. Your written testimony will be included in the record of the hearing. 

It is the practice of the Subcommittee on Investigations and 

Oversight to receive testimony under oath, and we will use that 

practice today as well. Do any of you have any objection to taking 

an oath? If you shake your head, it will be fine. 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses have shaken their heads 

from side to side, indicating that they have no objection to taking 

an oath. 

You may also be represented by counsel. Do any of you have 

counsel here today? 

Let the record reflect that none of the witnesses have counsel, indicated by them shaking their heads from side to side. 

If you would now please stand and raise your right hand. Do you 

solemnly swear and affirm to tell the whole truth and nothing but 

the truth, so help you God? 

Let the record reflect that all witnesses participating have taken 

the oath. Thank you. You may sit down. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Brian Sheron, Director of 

the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC. Dr. Sheron, you are recognized for five 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF DR. BRIAN SHERON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Dr. SHERON. Thank you. Good morning Chairmen Harris and 

Broun, Ranking Members Miller and Edwards, Members of the 

Subcommittees. I am pleased to appear before you on behalf of the 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC, to discuss 

the Agency’s research program and our current activities in response to the events that have occurred at the Fukushima-Daiichi 

nuclear power plant site. 

My name is Brian Sheron. I have been the Director of the NRC’s 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research for the past five years, and 

have been at the NRC and its predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, for nearly 38 years. 

The following testimony is intended to provide an overview of 

NRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, or RES, and its current activities, as well as provide a discussion of the Agency 

taskforce and research activities related to the Fukushima-Daiichi 

event in Japan. 

Office of Research is a major NRC program office mandated by 

Congress and created along with the NRC in 1975. The NRC’s regulatory research program addresses issues in the areas of nuclear 

reactors, nuclear materials, and radioactive waste. My office plans, 

recommends, and implements programs of nuclear regulatory research, standards development, and resolution of generic issues for 
19 

nuclear power plants and other facilities regulated by the NRC. 

There are currently about 260 staff members in my office. 

We do not conduct research for the primary purpose of developing improved technologies. That is a function that is more appropriately the nuclear industry’s. Rather, the NRC conducts research 

to confirm that the methods and data generated by the industry 

ensure that adequate safety margins are maintained. 

We work with the offices that are responsible for licensing activities within the NRC to develop appropriate regulatory actions to 

resolve potential safety issues for nuclear power plants and other 

facilities regulated by the NRC, including those issues designated 

as generic issues. Generic issues are potential technical or security 

issues that could impact two or more facilities. 

My office coordinates the development of consensus and voluntary standards for agency use, including appointment of Agency 

staff to numerous domestic and international standards committees. Participation by the NRC staff in consensus standards development is essential because the codes and standards are an integral part of the Agency’s regulatory framework. 

We have implemented over 100 international cooperative agreements with other nuclear regulators and international organizations to share information and leverage resources. We also participate extensively in several International Atomic Energy Agencies, 

and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency committees and working groups that facilitate 

the exchange of information between countries on topics such as 

risk assessment, events, and best practices. 

The NRC has a robust reactor operating experience program, and 

we have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. As you know, on Friday, March 11, 

2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunami occurred near the 

northeast coast of Japan, resulting in the shutdown of more than 

10 reactors. From what we know now, it is likely that the earthquake caused the loss of normal alternating current power and it 

is likely that the reactor’s response to the earthquake went as designed. The ensuing tsunami, however, caused the loss of emergency A/C power to four of the six units at the Fukushima site. 

The phenomena associated with the events at Fukushima involved numerous disciplines in which my office has expertise and 

has done substantial research. I would now like to discuss some of 

these technical areas that have been raised since the events. 

The Office of Research has a seismic research program that is 

currently addressing updated geological assessments, particularly 

in the central and eastern United States. We have also initiated a 

current tsunami research program in 2006, and our tsunami research leverages work being done at the United States Geological 

Survey and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. This will help form the basis for NRC review of new license 

applications. 

We have performed significant severe accident research since the 

TMI accident to better understand the phenomena and improve 

both accident prevention and mitigation. 
20 

The NRC has been using probabilistic risk assessment, or PRA 

methods to obtain estimates of risk associated with severe accidents since 1975. 

The NRC has previously studied spent fuel pool issues and implemented additional requirements to minimize spent fuel pool 

vulnerabilities. Following the events in Japan, we have begun to 

update spent fuel pool studies to estimate the relative consequence 

of removing older fuel from the spent fuel pool and placing it into 

dry storage, versus leaving it in the spent fuel pool. 

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that the NRC has a very robust 

regulatory research program that performs confirmatory research 

to allow the licensing offices to make technically-informed regulatory decisions. The research office has expertise in a multitude of 

technical disciplines and has performed significant research in the 

past related to reactors, materials, and waste. 

In light of the events in Japan, the NRC has initiated a nearterm evaluation of the event’s relevance to reactors in the U.S. and 

we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to 

take a longer, more thorough look at the events and their lessons 

for us. Based on the lessons learned from these efforts, we will pursue additional regulatory actions and research as needed to ensure 

the continuing safety of the U.S. fleet. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sheron follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BRIAN SHERON, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR

REGULATORY RESEARCH, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Good morning, Chairmen Harris and Broun, Ranking Members Miller and Edwards, and Members of the Subcommittees. I am pleased to appear before you on 

behalf of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to discuss the 

agency’s research program and our current activities in response to the events that 

have occurred at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant site. 

My name is Dr. Brian Sheron, and I have been the Director of the NRC Office 

of Nuclear Regulatory Research for the past five years and have been at the NRC 

and its predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, for nearly 38 years. 

The following testimony is intended to provide an overview of the NRC’s Office 

of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) and its current activities, as well as provide 

a discussion of the agency task force and research activities related to the 

Fukushima-Daiichi event in Japan. 

As you are aware, the NRC is an independent Federal agency established to license and regulate the Nation’s civilian use of production and utilization facilities, 

as well as the use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and 

security, and to protect the environment. The NRC currently licenses, inspects, and 

assesses the performance of 104 operating nuclear power plants, as well as many 

materials licensees, fuel cycle facilities, and research and test reactors. 

The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (or RES) is a major NRC program office, mandated by Congress and created along with the NRC in 1975. RES is one 

of the offices that reports to the Executive Director for Operations. RES plans, recommends, and implements programs of nuclear regulatory research, standards development, and resolution of generic safety issues for nuclear power plants and 

other facilities regulated by the NRC. The Office coordinates research activities 

within and outside the agency, including NRC participation in national and international volunteer standards efforts. There are currently about 260 staff members 

in the office, which is organized into three technical divisions: the Division of Engineering, Division of Risk Analysis, and Division of Systems Analysis. 

RES is responsible for developing methods, technical expertise and computer 

codes that are used by the NRC to assess safety and regulatory issues for materials 

licensees, fuel cycle facilities, operating reactors as well as new and advanced reactor designs. We develop the data needed to assess these codes by conducting experi-
21 

ments at national laboratories, universities, or in collaboration with international 

organizations. 

The NRC regulatory research program addresses issues in the three arenas of nuclear reactors, nuclear materials, and radioactive waste. The research program is 

designed to improve the agency’s knowledge where uncertainty exists, where safety 

margins are not well-characterized, and where regulatory decisions need to be confirmed in existing or new designs and technologies. Typically, the regulatory offices 

approach us with an issue, and we determine how to appropriately resolve it 

through research or analysis. The majority of our work is this user need driven 

work performed in response to requests from our regulatory offices, as shown in the 

following chart: 

RES coordinates research activities with the other NRC program offices, as appropriate, and leads the agency’s initiative for cooperative research with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other Federal agencies, the domestic nuclear industry, U.S. universities, and international partners. RES coordinates the development 

of consensus and voluntary standards for agency use, including appointment of 

agency staff to various standards committees. Based on research results and experience gained, we work with the regulatory offices to develop appropriate regulatory 

actions to resolve potential safety issues for nuclear power plants and other facilities 

regulated by the NRC, including those issues designated as Generic Issues (GIs). 

GIs are technical or security issues that could impact two or more facilities or licensees. RES also develops the technical basis for those areas regulated by the NRC 

that have risk-informed, performance-based regulations. 

RES supplies technical tools, analytical models, and experimental data needed to 

support the agency’s regulatory decisions. RES does not conduct research for the primary purpose of developing improved technologies, a function that is more appropriately that of the Department of Energy or the nuclear industry. Rather, the NRC 

conducts research to confirm that the methods and data generated by the industry 

ensure that adequate safety margin is maintained. 

In addition to supporting regulation of the commercial use of radioactive materials 

to protect public health and safety and to protect the environment, RES is responsible for providing the technical basis for regulations to ensure the protection and 

safeguarding of nuclear materials and nuclear power plants in the interest of national security. Thus, while its primary focus is on supporting the licensing and regulatory process, the research conducted by and for the NRC plays an important role 

in supporting broad government-wide initiatives associated with national security. 

The Office of Research’s staff is very well qualified and educated, with 30% of 

staff holding PhDs, and 33% of staff with master’s degrees. The staff continues to 

reflect diversity in education, demographics, and technical disciplines. The wide 

range of engineering and scientific disciplines includes expertise in nuclear engineering, materials science, human factors and human reliability, health physics, fire 

protection, and probabilistic risk assessment, to name a few. It is this diversity in 

highly technical and specialized disciplines that allows RES to support the licensing 
22 

offices as they carry out their licensing and regulatory tasks. Given this internal expertise, we perform a significant amount of research in-house. However, because we 

have more work than RES staff’s capacity, we use contractors to supplement our 

work to perform research that requires special skills or facilities. Our staff develops 

the work plan and is engaged in the research process with the contractor throughout the entire research effort. 

In addition to conducting confirmatory research, RES also conducts forward-looking research. The objectives of forward-looking and long-term research are to develop the technical basis to support related regulatory decision making. We monitor 

areas where the regulated industry may be moving and determine the technical information needed for future regulatory decisions to prepare the agency to respond 

to anticipated future industry requests and initiatives. 

These activities address new safety technologies or developments in analytical 

technologies or infrastructure. By their nature, these items span a wide range of 

disciplines, from risk assessment to structural integrity to fission product transport. 

Our development of data and assessment tools for these technologies will ensure 

that the agency is prepared to meet its future regulatory needs. 

In addition to our research efforts, the NRC cooperates with professional organizations that develop voluntary consensus standards associated with systems, structures, equipment, or materials used by the nuclear industry. In fiscal year 2010, 184 

NRC staff members participated in 325 standards activities, such as membership 

on a standards-writing committee. The organizations governing these committees include the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the American Nuclear Society, the Institute of Electrical 

and Electronics Engineers, the American Concrete Institute, and the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. 

For example, ASME developed the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and the Operations and Management Code which are widely acknowledged as an acceptable set 

of standards used to design, construct, and inspect pressure-retaining components, 

including nuclear vessels, piping, pumps, and valves. Similarly, NFPA has developed consensus standards to define acceptable methods to design, install, inspect, 

and maintain fire protection systems. The NRC has incorporated into its regulations 

various standards from the groups discussed above. 

The NRC’s use of voluntary consensus standards is consistent with statutory requirements. Participation by the NRC staff in voluntary consensus standards development is essential because the codes and standards are an integral part of the 

agency’s regulatory framework. The benefits of this active involvement include cost 

savings, improved efficiency and transparency, and regulatory requirements of high 

technical quality. The agency acknowledges the broad range of technical expertise 

and experience of the individuals who belong to the many consensus standards organizations. Thus, participation in standards development minimizes the expenditure 

of NRC resources that would otherwise be necessary to provide guidance with the 

technical depth and level of detail of voluntary consensus standards. 

Over the past 35 years, RES has developed or sponsored over 40 computer codes 

for use in its safety analyses. These codes are used in many aspects of the NRC’s 

mission and perform wide ranging tasks including modeling fuel and reactor systems behavior, radiation’s health effects, atmospheric dispersion, probabilistic risk 

assessment and more. They are shared with domestic and international counterparts to capture the value of a larger expert user community, which adds robustness 

to the codes and certainty to their results. 

NRC uses computer codes to model and evaluate fuel behavior, reactor kinetics, 

thermal-hydraulic conditions, severe accident progression, time-dependent dose for 

design-basis and beyond design-basis accidents, health effects, and radionuclide release and transport during various operating and postulated accident conditions. 

Computer codes are validated against scaled tests and actual plan data. Results 

from such code applications support regulatory decision making in risk-informed activities, confirmatory and exploratory analyses, review of licensees’ codes, performance of audit calculations, and resolution of other technical issues to inform the 

NRC staff on a wide variety of emergent technical questions for ensuring the health 

and safety of the general public. NRC code development is focused on improving the 

realism, accuracy and reliability of code results while improving code usability. 

However, the modeling of some novel systems (e.g., medical isotopes production) and 

new and advanced reactor design (e.g., Next Generation Nuclear Plant) requires further code development and additional assessment against specific experimental 

data. 

Some specific examples of codes and how they are more specifically used in the 

regulatory environment are the MELCOR and MACCS2 codes. The MELCOR code 

models the progression of severe accidents in light-water nuclear power reactors. 
23 

MELCOR models several phenomena including thermal-hydraulics, core heatup, 

containment performance, hydrogen production, and fission product release and 

transport behavior. The MACCS2 code is used to evaluate doses and health risks 

from the accidental atmospheric releases of radio nuclides. It is also used to confirm 

license renewal analyses regarding plant specific evaluation of Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMAs) that is required as part of the environmental assessment for license renewal. The MACCS2 code is also routinely used in environmental 

impact statements (EIS) supporting early site permits (ESP). 

The agency shares its codes with other organizations under various agreements 

and has organized user groups for some codes that are widely used. Two such programs are the Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP) and the Cooperative Severe Accident Research Program (CSARP). CAMP, which has existed as 

a user community for almost 30 years, includes thermal-hydraulic codes, and has 

members from more than 25 nations. CSARP includes members from 20 nations 

who focus on the analysis of severe accidents using primarily the MELCOR code. 

Through the CAMP and CSARP programs, the NRC is able to share some of the 

codes’ development and maintenance cost, while improving their quality and performance. 

RES has implemented over 100 international cooperative agreements with other 

nuclear regulators and international organizations to share information and leverage resources. RES also participates in several International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) committees and working groups that develop safety 

standards and facilitate the exchange of information between countries on topics 

such as risk assessment, events and best practices. These include the IAEA Nuclear 

Safety Standards Committee, the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, 

the Working Group on Risk Assessment, and others. In addition, I serve as viceChair for the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations at the OECD/NEA. 

The NRC has a robust reactor operating experience program, and we have taken 

advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement 

a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned 

from experience across a wide range of situations, including, most significantly, the 

Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we 

significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating 

procedures for licensees, and made substantive improvements in NRC’s incident response capabilities. We also addressed many human factors issues regarding control 

room indicators and layouts, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help 

prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced 

control room displays of the status of pumps and valves. 

Two particularly significant changes after TMI accident were the expansion of the 

Resident Inspector Program and the incident response program. Today, there are at 

least two Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. The inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees’ activities, and serve as NRC’s eyes and ears at the 

power plant. The NRC headquarters operations center and regional incident response centers are prepared to respond to all emergencies, including any resulting 

from operational events, security events, or natural phenomena. Multidisciplinary 

teams in these centers have access to detailed information regarding licensee facilities, and access to plant status information through telephonic links with the Resident Inspectors, an automated emergency response data system, and directly from 

the licensee over the emergency notification system. NRC’s response would include 

the dispatch of a site team to supplement the Resident Inspectors on site, and integration with the licensee’s emergency response organization at their Emergency Offsite Facility. The program is designed to provide independent assessment of events, 

to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the events, and to ensure 

that State officials have the information they would need to make decisions regarding protective actions. 

The NRC had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program in the 1990’s, which resulted in the installation of hardened vent systems for 

containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system. 

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces 

of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a 

plant, we want licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well as new 

procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe 

situation. 

As you know, on Friday, March 11, 2011, an earthquake and subsequent tsunami 

occurred near the northeast coast of Japan, resulting in the shutdown of more than 

10 reactors. From what we know now, it appears possible that the reactors’ response 
24 

to the earthquake went according to design. The ensuing tsunami, however, likely 

caused the loss of emergency alternating current (AC) power to four of the six units 

at the Fukushima Daiichi site. It is these four units that have received the majority 

of our attention since that time. Units One, Two, and Three at the site were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four, Five, and Six were in previously 

scheduled outages. 

Our program of continuous improvement based on operating experience will include evaluation of the significant events in Japan and what we can learn from 

them. We have already begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the Resident Inspectors at each nuclear 

power plant and the region-based inspectors in our four Regional offices, to look at 

licensees’ readiness to deal with both the design basis accidents and the beyond-design basis accidents. The information that we gather will be used for additional 

evaluation of the industry’s readiness for similar events, and will aid in our understanding of whether additional regulatory actions need to be taken in the immediate 

term. 

The phenomena associated with the events at Fukushima-Daiichi involve numerous disciplines in which RES has expertise and are in areas where we have already 

done substantial analysis. I would now like to discuss some of these technical areas 

that have been raised since the events in Japan and discuss our related existing 

or planned research activities. 

First, the NRC has an extensive seismic research program. Seismic safety in the 

design and operation of nuclear facilities has been evolving since the development 

of the first rules and guidance for seismic design by the NRC’s predecessor, the 

Atomic Energy Commission. In 1998, the NRC issued a policy decision to move towards a risk-informed and performance-based regulatory framework. Risk-informed 

frameworks use probabilistic methods to assess not only what can go wrong, but 

also the likelihood of going wrong. Over the last decade, significant advances have 

been made in the ability to assess seismic hazards. The NRC is currently sponsoring 

several projects in support of both an updated assessment of seismic hazards in the 

Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) and an enhancement of the overall 

framework under which the hazard characterizations are developed. The products 

of these projects will be used in the determination of seismic hazard design levels 

for new reactors and are being used in a program to reassess seismic hazards at 

existing plant locations. Although no immediate safety issue has been identified, the 

NRC will take action if our further analysis shows that safety improvements can 

be justified. 

Since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, significant advances have been made in the 

ability to assess tsunami hazard globally. The NRC initiated its current tsunami research program in 2006. It focuses on bringing the latest technical advances to the 

regulatory process and exploring topics unique to nuclear facilities. The tsunami research program focuses on several key areas: landslide-induced tsunami hazard assessments, support activities associated with the licensing of new nuclear power 

plants in the United States, development of probabilistic methods, and development 

of the technical basis for new NRC guidance. This program, which includes cooperative work with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), has already resulted in several important publications on tsunami hazard assessments on the Atlantic and Gulf 

Coasts of the United States. The publications and research results help form the 

basis of NRC review of new license applications. Whether additional work is needed 

for operating reactors will also be examined. 

The NRC has performed extensive research since the TMI accident to understand 

the phenomena associated with severe accidents and has developed analytical models that predict accident progressions and their consequences. This research includes 

test programs on zirconium fires, source term analysis, molten core-concrete interactions, and containment analyses. 

The NRC is conducting research to estimate the possible public health and safety 

consequences in the unlikely event that a severe accident occurs at a commercial 

nuclear power plant in the United States. The State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence 

Analysis (SOARCA) program takes maximum advantage of extensive national and 

international reactor safety research and reflects improved plant design, operation, 

and accident management implemented over the past 25 years. Using computer 

models and simulation tools, the NRC is developing a set of realistic consequence 

estimates of accidents at two U.S. reactor sites representative of different reactor 

and containment designs used in the United States. The two pilot plants are a General Electric boiling-water reactor (BWR) with a Mark I containment (Peach Bottom) and a Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR) with a dry, sub-atmospheric containment (Surry). The results of the analyses are showing thus far that 
25 

analyzed scenarios could reasonably be mitigated, either preventing core damage or 

delaying or reducing the radiation release. For cases assumed to proceed unmitigated, accidents appear to progress more slowly than previously thought and usually result in smaller and more delayed radiological releases than previously predicted. 

A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a structured analytical process that provides estimates of risk by (1) identifying potential initiating event scenarios that can 

challenge system operations, (2) estimating the likelihood of event sequences that 

lead to an adverse event such as core damage, containment failure, and offsite radiological effects; and (3) estimating the consequences associated with accident sequences. These rankings are very valuable in the sense that resources can be directed towards the major contributors to risk. There are three levels of PRA for nuclear power plants. Level 1 PRA covers the initiating event to the onset of core damage. Level 2 PRA covers the onset of core damage to radioactive material release 

to the environment. Level 3 PRA covers radioactive material release to offsite radiological consequences. 

The first study to use PRA methods to obtain more realistic estimates of risk associated with severe reactor accidents was completed in 1975. In 1988 the NRC asked 

the licensees to conduct Individual Plant Examinations to ensure that NRC’s regulations were adequate and no undue risk was posed to the public by any plant. In 

1990, NRC completed a Level 3 PRA for five commercial nuclear power plants of 

different reactor and containment designs. Since this last NRC-sponsored Level 3 

PRA, the design, operation, maintenance, testing, and inspection of NPPs and the 

state-of-the-art in PRA technology, and data have evolved considerably. Our staff 

therefore continues to improve NRC’s PRA capability and risk understanding to enhance PRAs role in NRC’s current risk-informed regulatory approach. 

The NRC has developed independent confirmatory PRA models for operating and 

new reactor nuclear plants. The NRC maintains Standardized Plant Analysis Risk 

(SPAR) models that represent the 104 operating commercial plants in addition to 

2 SPAR models for new reactor designs. These SPAR models are used to support 

a variety of NRC regulated activities including the reactor oversight and the accident precursor programs. The SPAR models are updated periodically to reflect plant 

modifications, new operating experience data, and improved risk modeling capabilities (e.g., support system initiating events, external hazards, and loss of offsite 

power). 

As part of the PRA program, the NRC conducts human reliability analysis (HRA) 

research to assess the human contribution to risk. We study human performance 

because it can significantly influence the reliability and safety of nuclear plant operations. HRA research is key to understanding accident sequences and appropriately 

representing their relative importance to overall risk. Research is conducted both 

domestically and internationally in cooperation with other organizations. In addition, the NRC participates in and I am the Board Chairman of the OECD/NEA 

Halden Reactor Project. Halden is a research facility in Norway that advances HRA 

through research. Several regulatory agencies and private sector companies participate in Halden research activities. NRC continues to study human performance in 

nuclear power plants and improve the methods for assessing human reliability. 

Another PRA based program that measures risk is the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program. The NRC established ASP in 1979 after the TMI accident. 

The ASP Program systematically evaluates U.S. nuclear power plant operating experience to identify, document, and rank the operating events most likely to lead 

to inadequate core cooling and severe core damage (precursors), given the likelihood 

of additional failures. 

The ASP Program provides (1) a comprehensive, risk-informed view of nuclear 

power plant operating experience and a measure for trending core damage risk; (2) 

a partial check on dominant core damage scenarios predicted by probabilistic risk 

assessments; and (3) provides feedback to regulatory activities. The NRC also uses 

the ASP Program to monitor performance against the safety goal established in the 

agency’s strategic plan and report significant precursors to Congress. 

The NRC has previously studied spent fuel pool (SFP) issues and modified licensee requirements in various areas such as an aircraft impact assessment, loss 

of SFP cooling, modifications to assembly configurations, and additional requirements following the attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result of the recent events 

in Japan, an updated SFP safety study to estimate the relative consequences of removing older fuel from the SFP and placing it into dry storage versus leaving it in 

the spent fuel pool is being considered. 

Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from the events in Japan, the 

NRC staff has established a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical 

and systematic review of our regulatory processes to determine whether the agency 
26 

should make any improvements to our regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction. This activity will have both nearterm and longer-term objectives. 

For the near-term effort, we have started a 90-day review. This review will evaluate the currently available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the United States, including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include: the ability to protect against natural disasters; response to 

station blackouts; severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression; and severe 

accident management issues. Over this 90-day period, the task force will develop 

recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing 

review guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or additional regulations are needed. 

This 90-day effort includes a briefing to the Commission after approximately 30 

days to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the condition of the U.S. 

fleet based on information it has available at that time. This briefing, which occurred on May 12, also ensured that the Commission is both kept informed of ongoing efforts and prepared to resolve any policy recommendations that surface. However, over the 90-day and longer-term efforts the task force will seek additional 

stakeholder input. At the end of the 90-day period, a report will be provided to the 

Commission and to the public in accordance with normal Commission processes, and 

it will be provided to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards for its review. 

The task force’s longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has sufficient 

technical information from the events in Japan. 

The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event 

to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that 

should be pursued by the NRC. The task force is also expected to evaluate potential 

interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability 

of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. The task 

force is expected to seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with 

appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months 

of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available in accordance with our regulatory decision making. The NRC has expertise in a multitude of technical disciplines and has performed significant research in the past related to reactors, materials, and waste. In light of the events 

in Japan, the NRC has initiated a near-term evaluation of the events’ relevance to 

the U.S. nuclear power plants, and we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events and their lessons 

for us. Based on the lessons learned from these efforts, we will pursue additional 

regulatory actions and research, as needed, to ensure the continuing safety of the 

U.S. fleet. 
27 
28 
29 
30 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you very much, Dr. Sheron. 

I now recognize our next witness, Mr. Lake Barrett, Principal of 

L. Barrett Consulting, LLC. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LAKE BARRETT, PRINCIPAL, L. BARRETT 

CONSULTING, LLC 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Edwards, and Chairman Hall. I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

before you today. 

I would like to just quickly try to go through what happened at 

Fukushima-Daiichi plant. It is a large, six reactor facility on the 

northeast coast of Japan. On March 11, there was a huge earthquake. The earthquake was slightly beyond the design basis of the 

plant, but the safety systems all performed satisfactorily there. 

There was a greater-than-designed basis tsunami, a huge wave 

that surrounded the plant as you can see in the lower right-hand 

corner, and when it hit, it took out all the emergency A/C power 

in the plant. They were able to cool the core for about eight hours 

using a backup system that was operated with batteries. After 

about eight hours the battery power exhausted and there was no 

more cooling, and the core started to uncover and overheat. As the 

core overheated, it started to melt and there was a steam cloud 

interaction producing hydrogen. This led to an over-pressurization. 

The primary containment was vented to the secondary containment 

and there was hydrogen gas in that. That led to an explosion in 

the Unit 1 building, and then there was another explosion in the 

Unit 3 building. 

Units 1, 2, and 3 were operating at the time of the earthquake 

and tsunami. The operators started to inject seawater to cool the 

core and through the feed and bleed operation, and they are doing 

that to this day now. They are working to restore recirculation cooling. They also have had to spray water up onto the spent fuel 

pools, which are in the upper areas, with fire trucks in the beginning. They now have an injection boom with a concrete injection 

pump. 

Thirty years ago at Three Mile Island there was another accident 

that had core degradation also. There were entirely different reasons for the accident at Three Mile Island. It was the Unit 2 reactor which is in the foreground on this photo. At Three Mile Island, 

it was an operator misunderstanding of the reactor system. There 

was an abnormal shutdown and a valve stuck open. The operators 

thought it was closed and the operators thought there was too 

much water in the reactor, when in reality there was not enough. 

They turned off the emergency pumps and this led to the core 

being overheated. It melted approximately a little over half of the 

core. This is what I expect we will find at Fukushima when they 

eventually get inside. Hydrogen gas was generated. The hydrogen 

gas did have a deflagration event, but it was contained primarily 

within the reactor building. There was about a half a million gallons of highly radioactive water on the floor of the containment 

building. This would be a sequence of how the core would melt and 

redistribute down toward the bottom of the vessel, which again, as 

reported last night from Japan, is a situation like in Unit 1. 
31 

At Three Mile Island, sophisticated clean up systems were installed, and the spent fuel pool, which was empty. Special refueling 

tools were built and damaged fuel, the damaged fuel was placed in 

canisters. This was safely completed in about a decade, cost about 

$1 billion and about 3 million gallons of highly radioactive water 

was processed. 

At Fukushima, they are still stabilizing the plant. It is not stable 

yet. They are looking to establish clean areas. They are working to 

mitigate the airborne releases, which are unmonitored. They are 

working to capture the 10-plus million gallons of highly radioactive 

water that is in the plant, and gain access. This is just an old picture of the four reactors that are severely damaged at Fukushima, 

another side angle where you can see some of the vapors coming 

off probably the spent fuel pools and the reactors, which are located 

down in the lower parts of the buildings. They are taking mitigative actions to mitigate the airborne effluents such as spraying resins and fixatives on the contaminated soil on the plant site. There 

is also the work to contain the tens of millions of gallons of highly 

radioactive water. They have robotic equipment trying to remove 

the highly radioactive debris from the site so they can gain access 

to the buildings inside. There is offsite contamination, but it is not 

that severe, but nonetheless it significant. 

My observations on Fukushima: it is not a public health catastrophe, it certainly is an industrial plant catastrophe. The tsunami 

was the critical safety matter. I think Units 1 and 4 are a complete 

loss, but the cleanup, I believe, can be done. The technology is 

there. We had it 30 years ago at Three Mile Island, and it is much 

better today than it was back then. The Japanese have a strong 

technological society, and I believe they can handle this in the future, but they still have challenges. As far as U.S. plants, I believe 

they have adequate safety margins today. The tsunami risk was 

the main issue for safety. That is primarily limited to the northwest coast of the United States. We have no operating reactors 

there on the coast, but there are two shut down reactors that have 

spent fuel that is stored there, and that is a risk that probably 

shouldn’t be there. But it is a small risk because it is in dry storage. 

The United States has done a lot of work in severe response improvements over past decades, and I think that is a good basis for 

the United States, but we need to have a systematic, methodical 

risk informed, lessons learned evaluation. The industry is doing it, 

and so is the NRC. We should resist quick fix, emotional reactions 

to this until we get the facts and learn what has happened and 

what is the right course of action. 

The lessons learned from Three Mile Island greatly improved 

U.S. nuclear safety and productivity. The most painful lessons are 

the most teachable lessons, and we had very painful lessons at 

Three Mile Island and we are undergoing one now with 

Fukushima. I believe history will probably look back, if we keep on 

a steady course, that Fukushima will improve our entire energy situation, improve safety and performance for the future, just like 

Three Mile Island did 30 years ago. 

Thank you very much. 
32 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lake Barrett, Principal of L. 

Barrett Consulting, LLC, follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LAKE BARRETT, PRINCIPAL OF L. BARRETT

CONSULTING, LLC 

Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Member Edwards, and Ranking 

Member Miller, good morning and I am honored to appear before you today to 

present my views on the events surrounding the incident at the Fukushima Daiichi 

nuclear reactors in Japan, the current status of reactor safety in the United States, 

and how the events at Fukushima can inform policies and technology advancement 

to improve safety and risk management for nuclear facilities. I am presenting my 

views as a private person in the context of my experience as the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission Site Director in charge of recovery and cleanup at Three Mile Island. 

On March 11, 2011 a subduction slip fault, where the Pacific plate slides under 

the Japan plate, snapped and released a tremendous amount of energy causing a 

massive 9.0 earthquake that shocked the north east coast of Japan. The earthquake 

caused a massive. tsunami that hit the coast approximately one hour after the 

earthquake. This was reported as the largest earthquake to hit Japan in over the 

last 1,000 years. The earthquake and tsunami caused immense destruction throughout northern Japan destroying entire towns and killing over 20,000 persons with 

early damage estimates of over $300 billion. 

The massive earthquake took down the northern Japan power grid causing the 

operating major power plants in the region to automatically shutdown. The 

Fukushima Daiichi power reactor complex was impacted by the earthquake and the 

three operating reactors there safely shutdown. Although the earthquake dynamic 

loading was reportedly slightly above the seismic design basis of the facility, there 

was no reported damage to safety systems and the shutdown appeared to function 

normally despite the massive earthquake. The emergency diesels started as designed and there was no reported significant structural damage to safety systems. 

Approximately one hour after the earthquake, a massive 15 meter high tsunami 

hit the Fukushima Daiichi site and overwhelmed the tsunami protections that had 

a reportedly nominal design basis of 5.7 meters with the major facility buildings located approximately 10 meters high. This ultra high ‘‘mega’’ tsunami flooded all the 

emergency diesels, swept away their fuel supplies, and destroyed much of the electrical switch gear. This complete loss of AC power and destruction of electrical components resulted in an extended ‘‘station blackout’’ situation. 

With the loss of all AC electric power, reactor Units 1, 2, and 3, which had automatically shutdown, were then cooled by their DC battery controlled backup cooling 

systems: an isolation condenser for the older Unit 1 reactor and the steam turbine 

driven Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system pumps at the newer larger Units 2 

and 3. After approximately 8 hours these backup systems apparently failed and thus 

the operators were unable to remove the decay heat from the reactor cores. The operators and government officials declared a site emergency and initiated a phased 

evacuation and sheltering order in areas surrounding the site with a 30 KM radius. 

With the loss of cooling, the reactor primary coolant system water in the reactor 

core started to boil away and increase the primary coolant system pressure. This 

led to either an automatic opening of the system overpressure protection relief 

valves or manual opening of the valves to relieve primary system pressure by releasing steam to the primary containment suppression pool in the basement of the 

reactor building, The continued loss of coolant lowered the reactor vessel water level 

such that the core became uncovered, but was bathed in superheated steam, With 

this loss of cooling water, the fuel cladding temperatures increased significantly 

until the zirconium alloy rods that encase the uranium fuel pellets over heated, became over pressurized, and likely burst As the temperatures further increased there 

was a chemical reaction between the zirconium alloy cladding material and the 

superheated steam, The chemical reaction was an oxidation of the zirconium metal 

by the oxygen in the steam which produced additional heat and also hydrogen gas, 

This release of additional gas and energy into the primary coolant system led to further over pressurization of the primary coolant system which in turn led to further 

release of steam, which now contained hydrogen and noble gas fission products, into 

the suppression pool and primary containment. 

Since there were no cooling systems available to cool the primary containment 

system suppression pool, the water temperature of the suppression pool began to 

rise past the boiling point and the primary containment system pressure began to 

rise, At some point, likely around 5 atmospheres of pressure, the primary containment system was in danger of over pressurizing toward a possible structural failure, 

Although I do not know exactly what happened at this point, it appears that the 
33 

operators manually released pressure from the primary containment to prevent a 

failure of the primary containment system, They were likely trying to vent the 

steam, hydrogen, and fission product gas mixture through filters and up the 100 

meter ventilation stack, However, for some unknown reasons, there may have been 

leaks in the system or they may have intentionally vented the gas mixture into the 

reactor building (which serves as a secondary containment) trying to minimize releases of radioactive materials to the environment Regardless of the operator actions, the hydrogen gas apparently mixed with oxygen rich natural air in the reactor 

building resulting in an explosive gas mixture within the reactor building, 

Some unknown ignition source ignited the explosive gas mixture resulting in the 

destruction of the roof and upper sides of the Unit 1 and Unit 3 reactor buildings, 

As expected, the hot gases rose toward the top of the reactor building doing the 

most damage to the upper areas, The primary containment system boundary in the 

lower levels of these reactor buildings seemed to not be seriously compromised and 

seemed to maintain their ability to contain and scrub fission products from hot radioactive effluents venting from the primary coolant system, 

Although no details are yet available on specific mitigation actions that the operators were taking to cool the reactor cores and mitigate the release of radioactive releases, there was one heroic effort apparently made to prevent a hydrogen explosion 

in Unit 2 reactor building, The operators went into the Unit 2 reactor building and 

removed a side wall panel to allow hydrogen gas to naturally diffuse into the environment before it could build up to explosive levels and ignite, There was however, 

a reported explosion in the lower regions of the Unit 2 reactor building that likely 

damaged the primary containment; however information as to the situation there 

is not yet available, 

Portable diesel power generators and fire engine pumps were brought into the site 

as soon as possible, however, the huge extent of earthquake and tsunami damage 

to the local area was a major delaying factor. 

Eventually the operators were able to connect the fire truck pumps to directly inject seawater into the reactor cores of Units 1, 2 and 3 to start removing decay heat 

from the cores, thus likely preventing further core overheating and damage, Unfortunately, considerable damage was already done to the cores, but with the seawater 

and later freshwater injection to the cores, the situation seems to have stabilized. 

At the time of the earthquake and tsunami the Unit 4 reactor was shut down for 

maintenance with its reactor core removed from the reactor vessel and placed in its 

spent fuel pool. Several days after the earthquake and tsunami there was one or 

more major explosions in the Unit 4 reactor building. At this point, I do not know 

the source of explosion energy. At an early time, it was theorized that the Unit 4 

spent fuel pool may have overheated, but recent water samples from the Unit 4 pool 

do not indicate major fuel damage. So at this point, more information is necessary 

to determine what happened in Unit 4. 

Although information is very sketchy, it seems based on water samples taken, 

there has been damage to spent fuel that is stored in the Units 2 and 3 spent fuel 

pools. Information as to what happened in these pools is still unavailable, so it is 

impossible to determine the significance at this time, but it certainly appears that 

something of significance occurred. Once information becomes available, a careful 

analysis should determine what happened and what are the appropriate lessons 

learned regarding spent fuel pool storage safety. 

The U.S. Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI) accident back on the morning of March 

28,1979 resulted in similar reactor core overheating and core damage similar to 

what has now happened to the cores in the Fukushima Units 1,2 and 3. The TMI 

accident led to localized core melting, hydrogen generation and release of radioactive 

materials from the reactor core, but for entirely different reasons. Although the 

physical core degradation mechanisms were similar for TMI and Fukushima, I expect that the primary safety lessons learned will be different because of different 

circumstances involved. 

At Three Mile Island there was no natural catastrophe as at Fukushima. It was 

a major man-machine interface problem when, during an abnormal reactor shutdown, the reactor operators were not aware of a stuck open pressurizer relief valve, 

which had a faulty valve position indicator, resulting in the operators believing that 

there was too much water in the reactor when actually there was not enough. The 

operators stopped automatic water injection when they should not have done so. The 

lack of water injection led to the core becoming uncovered and grossly overheating. 

As in the Fukushima cores, the fuel cladding burst, chemically reacted with superheated steam, released hydrogen gas and melted approximately 50% of the reactor 

core. Again, as at Fukushima, the TMI primary coolant system over pressurized and 

radioactive steam, hydrogen gas, and radioactive fission products were released into 

the TMI reactor containment building. The hydrogen gas mixed with the oxygen in 
34 

the air inside the TMI containment building and ignited in a deflagration burn wave 

pressure spike that was fully contained within the primary containment. At TMI 

there was no breach of the primary containment system. 

Once the TMI operators realized what the reactor situation was, cooling water 

was immediately added and a sustainable core cooling function was restored later 

on the first day by operating the large main coolant pumps. Decay heat was then 

removed through the steam generators until cold shutdown was achieved. 

The operation of the main coolant pumps required some highly contaminated primary coolant to be circulated into the Auxiliary Building which led to some radioactive gases being released into the Auxiliary Building ventilation system. Virtually 

all significant releases were contained within the reactor containment building. 

There were approximately two and one half million gallons of highly radioactive 

water generated during the accident and recovery that needed to be cleaned up. All 

the accident related water was contained on site and special water processing systems were built to remove the radioactive fission products, primarily Cesium and 

Strontium. Eventually the processed accident water was safely discharged by evaporation. 

The stabilization and cleanup of TMI took approximately a decade and cost approximately one billion dollars. Building accesses had to be established, ventilation 

system improvements made, high radiation areas mitigated, radioactive water removed, buildings decontaminated, building infrastructures (e.g. cranes) restored, access to the damaged reactor cores accomplished, special defueling systems deployed, 

packaging of damaged fuel and other highly radioactive waste products completed, 

temporary onsite storage facilities constructed, and eventual offsite shipment of the 

damaged fuel and radioactive wastes for lessons learned research and development 

accomplished. This was safely achieved with virtually no offsite environmental impacts. 

There were no radioactive injuries or adverse health effects from the Three Mile 

Island accident and cleanup. Inadequate operator response to deficient control room 

instrumentation proved to be the root cause of the accident. The primary lessons 

learned from TMI was that a much better integration of the operator’s understanding of the reactor systems was needed during off normal events. Major industry wide improvements were instituted which included creation of the Institute of 

Nuclear Power of Operations (lNPO) and risk informed regulatory processes. Thus 

the TMI lessons learned responses led to improved U.S. nuclear safety and improved 

reactor productivity. 

It should be noted that the sister Three Mile Island Unit 1 reactor, which has 

a similar design to the damaged Unit 2, was restarted after a thorough lessons 

learned review and continues to operate safely today with one of the highest capacity factors in the country. 

I believe Fukushima is nearing the end of their initial stabilization period and 

will hopefully soon be entering their recovery/cleanup and lessons learned phases. 

They are working to establish closed circuit core cooling for Units 1, 2 & 3 so that 

they do not continue to create large quantities of highly radioactive water containing fission products and continuing radioactive gas venting. In addition, they 

are working to mitigate the releases of contaminated water that has accumulated 

in all the reactor and turbine buildings by installing new water storage tanks and 

processing systems. Airborne releases are being mitigated by the installation of air 

filtration systems and spraying of resin fixatives to onsite areas that were highly 

contaminated by earlier airborne releases. Even though the radioactive effluent 

mitigation challenges are great, I expect they should be able to establish sufficient 

capability to minimize any future significant radioactive releases from the site. 

In summary, it is my view that the public health consequences of the Fukushima 

accident should be infinitesimal when compared to the impact of the earthquake 

and tsunami. From a radiological perspective, this should be inconsequential from 

a national public health perspective. There are some areas to the northwest where 

Cesium and likely Strontium contamination has deposited and significant remediation challenges will have to be addressed. 

From an overall reactor safety perspective, I expect that there will be much 

learned from Fukushima that will confirm present U.S. safety margins and should 

also provide information to further improve reactor safety in the coming years. The 

fundamental U.S. reactor safety level that exists today is likely to be demonstrated 

as adequate because there is a limited tsunami risk to most U.S. reactor facilities. 

The only significant tsunami risk area in the U.S. is in the Northwest Pacific coast 

where there are no exposed operating reactors, but there are two shutdown reactor 

sites which have stranded spent nuclear fuel in dry storage casks. In my view, I 

believe that all stranded spent fuel at shutdown reactor sites should be removed to 

completely eliminate ‘all radiological risks at these decommissioned sites. 
35 

There are two other southern Pacific coast reactors, Diablo Canyon and San 

Onofre; however, I expect that further reviews will confirm there are adequate tsunami safeguards already in place at these sites that should demonstrate adequate 

facility safety. 

In the U.S. a lot of attention has already been placed on severe accident mitigation over the last 25 years and especially since September 11, 2001. Many safety 

improvements have already been made which I believe will demonstrate that U.S. 

reactors are well prepared to withstand severe accidents regardless of the initiating 

event. So although a systematic methodical risk informed Fukushima lessons 

learned evaluation should be performed and enhancing improvements should be 

made, I expect that fundamental existing severe accident safety margins will basically be confirmed. 

I strongly recommend that the U.S. lessons learned process be methodical, deliberate, risk informed and primarily led by private industry. The independent Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission will do their own safety reviews into the adequacy of their 

regulations with their own lessons learned function. NRC and DOE nuclear research 

programs should be adjusted as more is learned. 

The NRC should resist political or emotional calls for quick actions in one area 

or another until a thoughtful, fully informed lessons learned analysis is completed 

based on facts and public health and safety significance. Of course, if some immediate safety issue is discovered requiring immediate action, the NRC has all the necessary authority to act as necessary, but only when a clear significant safety situation exists. 

Three Mile Island lessons learned programs strengthened U.S. nuclear energy in 

many different ways. The most painful lessons are often the most teachable. Although we are just beginning to understand the Fukushima lessons, I firmly believe 

that they will further strengthen U.S. nuclear energy programs and other nuclear 

energy programs throughout the world. 
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Chairman BROUN. Thank you very much, Mr. Barrett. We have 

been notified that we will be taking votes shortly, but what we are 

going to do is we are going to hear from the last two witnesses and 

then recess. We are going to go vote and we are going to come back 

for questions. 

So I now recognize our next witness, Dr. John Boice, Scientific 

Director of the International Epidemiology Institute. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN BOICE, SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY INSTITUTE 

Dr. BOICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking Members, and 

Members of the Subcommittee. I am a radiation epidemiologist, 

and I have spent my entire career studying populations exposed to 

radiation, from Chernobyl cleanup workers to populations living 

near nuclear power plants. I was in Hiroshima just a few days before the accident as a member of the Science Council of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation, reviewing the study of atomic 

bomb survivors. 

Fukushima is not like Chernobyl. The Chernobyl accident resulted in massive radiation exposures. There was no containment 

vessel, and a fire burned for 10 days, spewing radioactive material 

into the environment. The first responders and the fire fighters received so much radiation that 28 died of acute radiation sickness 

within a few months. Radioactive iodines were deposited on large 

areas, and were ingested by grass-eating cows who gave milk that 

was drunk by children, and an epidemic of thyroid cancer resulted. 

In contrast, Fukushima appears to have resulted in substantially 

lower worker and public exposures. The Japanese authorities 

raised the annual limit of worker exposure from 2 to 25 rem, but 

only 21 workers received more than 10 rem. These levels are far 

below the hundreds of rem needed to cause acute radiation sickness, but they are sufficient to increase the lifetime risk of developing cancer over their lifetimes by about 1 percent. 

Exposure to the public was minimal in large part because the 

prevailing winds blew much of the radioactive releases toward the 

ocean, and because of the actions taken by the Japanese authorities. They evacuated people living within 20 kilometers of the 

Fukushima plant, and recommended that those within 30 kilometers stay indoors to minimize exposure. They monitored the food 

and water supplies, and banned the shipment of foodstuffs and 

milk when the radiation levels exceeded allowable standards. 

These protective measurements, including the distribution of stable 

iodine pills or syrup for children minimized public doses, and subsequently, there was unlikely to be any or minimal health consequences. This is borne out in a survey of over 1,000 children who 

had their thyroids measured for possible uptakes of radioactive iodine. Not one child had a measurement above normal. Nonetheless, 

some of the prevailing winds did blow toward populated areas and 

these areas will be a concern for remediation before allowing public 

access to return. 

Fukushima is 5,000 miles away from the United States, and radiation is substantially diluted after traveling such a long distance. 

The detection of trace amounts of radiation speaks more about the 

sensitivity of our detectors than to the possible consequences to 
39 

public health. They pose no threat to human health. They represent at most only a tiny fraction of what we receive each day 

from daily sources of radiation. 

The minute levels of radioactive iodine detected in milk in Washington State were 5,000 times below the levels set by the FDA to 

trigger concern. An infant would have to drink hundreds of gallons 

of milk to receive a radiation dose equivalent to a day’s worth of 

natural background radiation exposure. These trace levels are not 

a public health concern, and potassium iodide tablets should not be 

taken as a preventive measure to block the thyroid’s uptake of such 

tiny levels. There are potential adverse effects from taking these 

tablets, and these risks have to be a balance against a non-existent 

benefit. 

We live in a radioactive world. If I could have that first slide? 

[Slide] 
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In comparisons might help place the radiation levels from 

Fukushima in context. Practically all the food we eat contains 

small amounts of naturally occurring radioactive elements. We 

breathe radioactive radon. Bricks and granite contain radioactive 

materials that emit gamma radiation. The Capitol building has 

some of the highest radiation levels in the United States. Water 

contains small amounts of radioactive radium, thorium, and uranium. 

These examples are not to minimize the health consequences of 

high and moderate exposures, but just to place in perspective the 

tiny amounts from Fukushima which pose no public health problems to the United States. 

The Fukushima accident, however, highlights the need for continued health research to fill important gaps in knowledge. We 

know much about the effects of high levels of radiation when received briefly, as was the case for the atomic bomb survivors whose 

exposure was in less than a second. However, the level of risk following exposures experienced gradually, over long periods of time, 

are uncertain and remains the major unanswered question in radiation epidemiology and risk assessment. 

One untapped opportunity that should not be wasted is to study 

our own U.S. radiation workers and veterans. The Low Dose Radiation Program within the Department of Energy had the foresight 

to provide seed money to evaluate the feasibility of studying one 

million Americans, and this comprehensive work should continue. 

The studied populations include Department of Energy and Manhattan Project workers, atomic veterans who participated in nuclear weapons tests, nuclear utility workers, and others. 

Thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Boice follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN BOICE, SCIENTIFIC DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

EPIDEMIOLOGY INSTITUTE

Good morning, Mr. Chairmen, ranking Members, and Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to discuss the possible health implications of radiation from 

the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan. Just a few days before the natural disasters struck on March 11, 2011, I was in Hiroshima, Japan as 

a member of the Radiation Effects Research Foundation’s Science Council, reviewing 

the study of atomic bomb survivors. I would like to begin by expressing my heartfelt 

sympathy for the families of the tens of thousands who lost their lives as a result 

of the tsunami and earthquake and for the hundreds of thousands who have been 

displaced from their homes and livelihoods. The health consequences associated 

with the radiation exposures emanating from the Fukushima Daiichi plant pale in 

comparison. 

As background, I am a radiation epidemiologist and Professor in the Department 

of Medicine at Vanderbilt University and Scientific Director of the International Epidemiology Institute. I have spent my career studying human populations exposed 

to radiation, including Chernobyl clean-up workers, patients receiving diagnostic 

and therapeutic radiation, underground miners exposed to radon, nuclear energy 

workers, atomic veterans, persons living in areas of high background radiation and 

U.S. populations living near nuclear power plants and other facilities. I am also a 

commissioner of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, an emeritus member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, a 

U.S. delegate to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 

Radiation, and a member of the Congressionally-mandated Veterans Advisory Board 

on Dose Reconstruction. 

My remarks will cover five areas: 

• Fukushima is not Chernobyl. 
43 

• The health consequences for Japanese workers and public appear to be minor. 

• The health consequences for United States citizens are negligible to nonexistent. 

• We live in a radioactive world. 

• There is a pressing need to learn more about the health consequences of radiation in humans when exposures are spread over time at low levels and not received briefly at high doses such as in atomic bomb survivors. 

Fukushima is not Chernobyl [Slide 1] 

The Chernobyl accident on April 26, 1986, resulted in massive radiation exposures, both to the emergency workers putting out the ensuing fire and to the environment. There was no containment vessel and after the explosion a fire burned for 

ten days and spewed radioactive particles continuously into the environment. The 

emergency workers, the first responders and fire fighters, received so much radiation that 28 of them died of acute radiation sickness within a few months of exposure. Those who survived developed cataracts at a high rate and several subsequently died of myelodysplastic disorders. Radioactive iodines were deposited on 

large areas throughout the Ukraine, Belarus and Russian Federation and were ingested by cows who gave milk that was drunk by children, and an epidemic of thyroid cancer ensued beginning about five years after the accident. Over 520,000 recovery workers were sent to clean up the environment and build the so-called sarcophagus to contain the damaged nuclear reactor. To date there is little conclusive 

evidence for adverse health effects associated with radiation received during these 

clean-up operations. There have, however, been indications of severe psychological 

stress and increased rates of suicide. 

In contrast, while the radiation releases from Fukushima [Slide 2] are estimated 

to be up to 10% of that from Chernobyl, there appears to be substantially less worker and public exposure. The Japanese authorities relaxed the allowable annual limit 

of worker exposure from 2 to 25 rem for this emergency situation, but only about 

21 workers received more than 10 rem and only two workers received between 20 

and 25 rem. These levels are far below the hundreds of rem needed to cause acute 

radiation sickness. Those workers who experienced levels over 10 rem to their entire 

body, however, have an increased lifetime risk of developing cancer of about 1-2% 

over the expected normal lifetime rate of about 42%. There were reports of high radiation fields in the vicinity of the damaged reactors and spent fuel storage ponds 

and with the contaminated water, but apparently the Japanese authorities rotated 

workers in such a way that cumulative exposures to individuals were minimized. 

Three workers received beta particle exposures to their legs from an estimated 200- 

300 rem to the skin, but the health consequences of these localized exposures were 

minimal and resulted in only a reddening of the skin. 

Exposure to the public was minimal in large part because of the prevailing winds 

and the quick action taken by the Japanese authorities. The prevailing winds were 

generally to the east and over the ocean and thus did not result in meaningful radiation exposures to the Japanese public. In contrast to the circumstances around 

Chernobyl where the authorities failed to alert or evacuate the surrounding populations until several days had passed, the Japanese government quickly evacuated 

persons living within 20 km of the Fukushima Daiichi plant and recommended that 

those living within 30 km stay indoors to minimize any possible exposure to radioactive releases. In addition, they immediately monitored the food and water supplies 

and banned the shipment of foodstuffs and milk where the radiation levels exceeded 

allowable standards. 

These protective action measures, including the distribution of stable iodine pills 

(or syrup for children), minimized public doses and suggest that there will be minimal health consequences associated with any radiation exposures to the Japanese 

public. This is borne out in one survey of over 1,000 children who had their thyroids 

measured for possible uptakes of radioactive iodine. Not one child had a measurement above detectable limits. This is in contrast to children living near Chernobyl 

for whom large numbers had extremely high levels of radioactive iodine detected in 

their thyroids from drinking contaminated milk shortly after the accident. 

Nonetheless, some of the prevailing winds did blow toward populated areas shortly after the accident and during the hydrogen explosions, and to the north-west in 

particular. Rain, snow and hail deposited radioactive particles in certain regions, including some beyond 20 km, and these areas will be a concern for remediation before allowing public access or return. The Japanese authorities are considering regular medical examinations for workers and inhabitants who received more than 10 
44 

rem. To reduce anxiety, they are considering medical check-ups for those who may 

have received between 2 to 10 rem. They are also grappling with important issues 

as to when and how to allow evacuated inhabitants to return to their homes. Childhood exposures are of particular concern and topsoil is already being removed from 

some school playgrounds. 

Thus, while Fukushima is clearly a major reactor accident, the potential health 

consequences associated with radiation exposures in terms of loss of life and future 

cancer risk are small, particularly in contrast with those resulting from the 

Chernobyl accident some 25 years ago. 

For completeness, the 1979 reactor accident at Three Mile Island did not release 

appreciable amounts of radioactive substances into the environment, and public and 

even worker exposures were minimal. The average dose to people in the area was 

only about 1 millirem, or about what would be received in three days from sources 

of natural background radiation to the surrounding population. 

The health consequences for United States citizens are negligible to nonexistent. [Slide 2] 

Fukushima is 5,000 miles away from the United States and the radiation that has 

been detected was substantially diluted after traveling such a long distance. The detection of trace amounts of radiation speaks more about the potential health consequences from the radiation itself. In addition to EPA’s RadNet system that monitors water, milk and the atmosphere, the Department of Energy has radiation monitoring equipment that can detect minute quantities of radioactive particles from the 

other side of the world as part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The 

tiny amounts of detected radioactive materials from Fukushima pose no threat to 

human health. They represent, at most, only a tiny fraction of what we receive each 

day from natural sources, such as the sun, the food we eat, the air we breathe and 

the houses we live in. 

It is impressive that radiation monitors can detect levels of radioactive iodine-131 

as low as 0.03 Bq/L (0.8 pCi/L) in milk in Washington State; this is the decay of 

one radioactive atom per second in about 33 gallons of milk. Such a level is 5,000 

of times below the Derived Intervention Level set by the Food and Drug Administration to trigger concern over radionuclides in food. An infant would have to drink 

hundreds of gallons of milk to receive a radiation dose equivalent to a day’s worth 

of natural background radiation exposure. Such tiny levels of radiation are inconsequential compared with the levels we experience in daily life. 

Interestingly, the radiation monitoring stations in Washington State had to detect 

radionuclides other than iodine-131 in order to distinguish radiation from 

Fukushima from that at any local hospital in the area. Most nuclear medicine departments use radioactive iodine for imaging the thyroid and to treat thyroid diseases, and patients are discharged shortly after intake and remain radioactive for 

several months, releasing small but detectable levels of radioactive iodine into the 

environment. 

The trivial levels of radiation from Japan, while detectable, should not be of a concern and Americans should not take stable iodine (potassium iodide pills, KI) as a 

preventive measure to block the thyroid’s uptake of radioactive iodine. There are potential adverse health effects from taking KI pills and these risks have to be balanced against a nonexistent benefit. 

We live in a radioactive world. [Slide 3] 

To place the radiation levels from Fukushima in brief perspective, it is important 

to recognize that we live in a radioactive world. A banana, for example, has 10 Bq 

of activity, that is, 10 radioactive potassium atoms decay every second. All the foodstuffs we eat that contain potassium also contain a small amount of radioactive potassium, a primordial element with a billion year half-life. There are no concerns 

and no health consequences from such exposures. 

We breathe radioactive radon which contributes over the year to about 210 

millirem of natural background radiation. Bricks and granite contain radioactive 

materials that result in radiation exposures to the public (20 millirem). The Capitol 

Building was constructed with granite and is frequently cited as having some of the 

highest radiation levels in all of the United States, about 85 millirem per year. 

Water contains small amounts of radioactive radium, thorium and uranium, all 

within allowable limits. 

Not only do we live in a radioactive world, our bodies are radioactive (30 millirem 

per year). Each second over 7,000 radioactive atoms in our bodies decay and can 

irradiate those sitting next to us. The atoms are largely radioactive potassium in 

our muscles and carbon-14 in our tissues. The amount of radiation we receive each 

year from medical sources (300 millirem), such as CT and medical imaging, equals 
45 

the amount received from natural sources (300 millirem). International travel increases our exposure to cosmic rays and space radiation. A roundtrip from Dulles 

to Tokyo would result in 20 millirem. Living in Denver for a year results in 450 

millirem of radiation dose, or 35% more than the U.S. average of 310 millirem from 

natural sources. About 2.5 million Americans (0.8% of the population) receive more 

than 2,000 millirem per year from natural sources. 

These examples are not to minimize the health consequences of high-level exposures which are clearly demonstrable in human populations and include acute radiation sickness at very high doses in excess of 200 rem and an increase in cancer 

at moderate doses above about 10 rem (10,000 millirem). The examples do indicate, 

however, that we live in a world of exposures to the U.S. population from 

Fukushima are tiny and thousands of times below U.S. standards or guidelines 

where remedial action would be triggered. 

What research is needed? [Slide 4] 

Although we know much about the health effects of high levels of radiation when 

received briefly, as was the case for atomic bomb survivors, the risk following exposures experienced gradually over time is uncertain and remains the major unanswered question in radiation epidemiology. 

One untapped opportunity is to study our own U.S. radiation workers and veterans. The Low Dose Radiation Program within the Department of Energy had the 

foresight to initiate pilot investigations of over one million such workers and this 

comprehensive work should continue. Cooperating agencies include the National 

Cancer Institute, the Department of Defense, the Department of Veterans Affairs, 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and others. The study populations include early 

DOE and Manhattan Project workers, atomic veterans who participated in nuclear 

weapons testing in the 1940s and 1950s, nuclear utility workers, medical workers 

and others involved in the development of radiation technologies, as well as nuclear 

navy personnel. 

Such a large study in the United States is critically important to understand scientifically the health consequences of low-dose radiation experienced over time and 

is directly relevant to the setting of protection standards for workers and the public; 

the assessment of possible risks from enhanced medical technologies such as CT and 

nuclear medicine imaging; the expansion of nuclear power; the handling of nuclear 

waste; the compensation of workers with prior exposures to radiation; and even the 

possible consequences of the radiation released from reactor accidents such as at 

Fukushima. To date, no direct study of these issues has been exposures in 1945 

have to be relied upon. 

Summary [Slide 5] 

Fortunately, the health consequences from the radiation releases from the 

Fukushima Daiichi power plant appear to be minimal and are of little importance 

with regard to the U.S. public. The Japanese authorities acted quickly to evacuate 

over’200,000 inhabitants living near the damaged reactors; they monitored food and 

water and took rapid action to ban foodstuffs with increased radiation levels; they 

distributed stable iodine pills and syrup; and they made measurements on over 

175,000 persons. The lasting effects upon the Japanese population will most likely 

be psychological with increased occurrence of stress-related mental disorders and depression associated not necessarily with the concern about reactor radiation, but 

with the horrific loss of life and disruption caused by the tsunami and earthquake. 

There is a need for better public understanding and better communications on the 

health effects of radiation exposures. Finally, there is now the opportunity in the 

United States to learn directly about low-dose, long-term radiation health effects by 

studying our workers and veterans. 

Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I welcome any questions that you may 

have. 

Relevant References 

Boice JD Jr. Lauriston S. Taylor lecture: radiation epidemiology—the golden age 

and future challenges. Health Physics 100(1):59-76, 2011. 

Christodouleas JP, Forrest RD, Ainsley CG, Tochner Z, Hahn SM, Glatstein E. 

Short-Term and Long-Term Health Risks of Nuclear-Power-Plant Accidents. New 

England Journal of Medicine, April 20, 2011. 

Idaho National Laboratory. Oversight Program: Guide to Radiation Doses and 

Limits. [http://www.deq.idaho.gov/inl-oversightlradiation/radiation-guide.cfm] 

International Atomic Energy Agency. Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log 

[http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.html] 
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National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, NCRP Report No. 

160, Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States, March 

2009. 

Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Washington, D.C. (The Kemeny Commission Report), October 1979. 

Smith J. A long shadow over Fukushima. Nature, April 5, 2011. 

UNSCEAR. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation, UNSCEAR 2008 Report to the General Assembly, with Scientific Annexes, Volume II, Annex D, health Effects due to 

Radiation from the Chernobyl Accident (United Nations Publications, New York), 

2011. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. [http://www.lrb.usace.army.mil/fusrap/docs/fusrapfs-uranium-2008-09.pdf] 

Wakeford R. And now, Fukushima (editorial). Journal of Radiological Protection 

(in press). 
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Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Dr. Boice, and now I recognize our final witness, Dr. Dave Lochbaum, the Director of Nuclear 

Safety Project for the Union of Concerned Scientists. 

Mr. Lochbaum? 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR 

SAFETY PROJECT, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Edwards, and other Members of the Subcommittees. On behalf of 

the Union of Concerned Scientists, I appreciate this opportunity to 

share our perspectives. My written testimony describes lessons already evident from the Fukushima disaster that are applicable to 

ensuring safer nuclear power plants in the United States. This 

morning, I would like to focus on three of those lessons. 

The first lesson involves severe accident management guidance. 

In NRC terminology, a severe accident involves some fuel damage. 

The NRC and the nuclear industry representatives have claimed 

that the severe accident management guidelines developed after 

the Three Mile Island meltdown would protect us from the problems faced at Fukushima. They have not been telling the whole 

story. As broadcaster Paul Harvey used to say, here is the rest of 

the story. 

The entry for severe accident management guidelines in NRC 

manual chapter 0308 states ‘‘The staff concluded that regular inspection was not appropriate because the guidelines are voluntary 

and have no regulatory basis.’’ The NRC never checks the guidelines to determine if they might actually work under severe accident conditions. From March 2009 until March 2010, I worked for 

the NRC as an instructor at their technical training center. My duties included teaching the severe accident management guidelines 

to NRC employees. I and the other instructors emphasized that 

NRC inspectors were not authorized to evaluate the adequacy of 

the guidelines. Plant owners are required to have the guidelines, 

while NRC inspectors are required not to assess them. 

If the NRC continues to rely on these guidelines to protect public 

health, it must evaluate their effectiveness. It would be too late 

and too costly to find out after a nuclear plant disaster that the 

guidelines were missing a few key steps or contained a handful of 

missteps. 

The second lesson involves upgraded guidance for spent fuel pool 

events. As I mentioned, the NRC and the nuclear industry upgraded the procedures used by the operators during reactor core accidents. The upgraded procedures provide the operators with a full 

array of options available to deal with the reactor core accident, not 

just those options relying on emergency equipment. In addition, the 

upgraded procedures would help the operators handle problems 

like unavailable or misleading instrumentation readings. No such 

procedures and associated training are available to help the operators deal with spent fuel pool events. The NRC must require robust 

procedures for spent fuel pool problems comparable to those available for reactor core problems so that operators can prevent fuel 

damage from occurring, or mitigate its consequences when those efforts fail. 
52 

The last lesson involves additional regulatory requirements for 

defueled reactors. When the earthquake and tsunami happened in 

Japan, the reactor core in Fukushima Unit 4 was fully offloaded 

into the spent fuel pool. This configuration is termed a defueled 

condition. There is a gaping hole in the regulatory safety net when 

reactors are defueled. When the NRC issues operating licenses for 

reactors, appendix A to that license contains the technical specifications. These specifications establish ‘‘the lowest functional capability of performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility,’’ along with the scope and frequency of testing 

required to demonstrate that capability. 

The operational condition of the reactor determines which requirements are applicable when. When the entire reactor core has 

been offloaded into the spent fuel pool, very few requirements still 

apply. For example, the containment structure surrounding the 

spent fuel pool is no longer required to be available to be intact. 

This containment significantly reduces the amount of radioactivity 

reaching the environment from damaged fuel in the spent fuel pool, 

but only when it is intact. Likewise, the specifications do not require normal power, backup power, or even battery power to be 

available. 

When the fuel is in the reactor core, the specifications mandate 

safety measures to protect Americans from that hazard, but when 

that hazard is entirely relocated to the spent fuel pool, nearly all 

those safety measures can be removed. The NRC must fix this deficiency as soon as possible to provide adequate protection of public 

health when reactor cores are defueled. In the interim, the NRC 

should seriously consider banning full core reactor offloads into the 

spent fuel pool. 

In conclusion, the measures we have recommended will lessen 

the chance of a disaster at a U.S. nuclear power plant, but if it 

happens anyway, the Federal Government would be able to look 

Americans in the eye and say we took every reasonable measure 

to protect you. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lochbaum follows:] 
53 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID LOCHBAUM, DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR SAFETY

PROJECT, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
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Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Lochbaum. The Committee will now recess so we can go and vote. We will reconvene 

five minutes after the last vote. 

Committee is in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman BROUN. I want to thank the witnesses for your indulgence and apologize for the break, but we will try to expedite this. 

I want to thank the panel for your testimony. I remind Members 

that the Committee rules limit questioning to five minutes. 

The Chair, at this point, will open the round of questions. The 

Chair recognizes himself for five minutes. 

I am concerned nuclear groups will exploit the tragedy in 

Fukushima as an excuse to halt not only future expansion of nuclear power, but restrict relicensing of existing plants. Dr. Sheron, 

are you—I have a hard time pronouncing it—Chairman Jaczko and 

NRC committed to continue moving forward with reviewing the application—license application for the Vogtle plant in Georgia? What 

commitment can you provide that your office will continue to provide the necessary information for these licenses to advance? 

Dr. SHERON. Right now the Agency does not believe that there 

are any impediments to the continued either licensing of new 

plants or the renewed license of existing plants, such as the Vogel 

plant. So the Agency, as I understand, is moving forward with the 

relicensing of the plant, the review, and provided that the licensee 

provides all of the required information, I believe they will maintain on the agreed upon schedule. 

Chairman BROUN. Well, I certainly hope so. It is absolutely critical for us to go forward in as expeditious a manner as possible, 

and I would encourage you to do so. 

The impetus for this hearing was the tragic event in Japan. 

Since then, the American south has experienced a tragedy of its 

own, in fact, even in my north Georgia district, several of my counties have been hit by that tragedy. Recent tornados in Alabama 

and the flooding of the Mississippi River unfortunately provide another opportunity for us to learn. How has the NRC incorporated 

in lessons learned from the recent events in the South? It has been 

reported that some reactors were taken offline as a result of the extreme weather. To your knowledge, were there any problems with 

any of these? How will this impact NRC’s research portfolio, and 

how did the previous safety reviews prepare the U.S. for these 

events? 

Dr. SHERON. The events, the tornados that took place in the 

South did take down some transmission lines at some plants, 

which did cause loss of offsite power. My understanding is the 

emergency diesel generators at those sites did work as designed. 

We look at all natural phenomena that occur in the United 

States. We confer with other agencies, as I said before, like USGS, 

to determine if there is any new information that we need to take 

into account in the design of these plants. Nuclear plants are designed for tornados, for high winds, for storms. We look at floods 

that might occur in the vicinity when these plants are licensed to 

make sure that they are designed such that they can handle them. 

If we learn anything new that says the current design base for 

these plants is not adequate, then obviously the Agency will take 
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action to make the plant—install, you know, whatever corrections 

are necessary. 

Chairman BROUN. The answer is no problem at this point? 

Dr. SHERON. Yes. 

Chairman BROUN. Okay, very good. Now that this Administration has decided to ignore the law and clear congressional direction, 

our Nation has no long-term storage plans for radioactive waste. 

Where is spent fuel stored at Fukushima? Where is the U.S. currently storing its spent fuel? How many sites have currently filled 

their available storage space? Have any waivers been granted or 

regulatory changes made to allow greater onsite storage, and has 

any comparative risk analysis been done to compare centralized 

storage with dispersed storage? Doctor? 

Dr. SHERON. The spent fuel at the Fukushima plant, as I understand, was stored on the site in the pools. I do not know if they 

had any dry cask storage. At the U.S. right now, plants store their 

fuel either at—in their spent fuel pools which have been designed 

to handle the amount of fuel that they can put in, that they can 

hold, or to independent spent fuel storage facilities, ISFS, they are 

called. Usually these are dry casks that are stored onsite or nearby, 

and are basically—require air cooling. 

Chairman BROUN. Are you going to allow expansion of those local 

pools since the Administration has closed down the Yucca Mountain storage facility? 

Dr. SHERON. Some licensees have come in and proposed to rerack 

the pools, which is to ‘‘do’’ a more dense configuration where they 

can hold more fuel. Licensees have to come in and present a safety 

analysis to demonstrate why that is acceptable and safe. I can’t tell 

you which ones have done that so far. I don’t have that information 

with me. I know there are some plants that do have the high density fuel racks. 

With regard to a comparative risk study, with regard to—let me 

call it a minimally loaded spent fuel pool versus a fully loaded one, 

my office is beginning to undertake a comparative risk study to see 

what the differences are in risk to public health and safety between 

the two. My personal opinion is that pools have a lot of water in 

them, and regardless of the amount of fuel, it takes a very long 

time, if there was an accident, to actually drain the pool to the 

point where there would be an uncovering of the fuel, which gives 

licensees ample time to bring in either emergency equipment or to 

restore whatever did fail. 

Usually—and even if it was a drain down that was occurring or 

a boil off, the amount of time that is available before one actually 

starts as a release of radioactivity provides ample time for evacuation in the vicinity of the site so that people could be evacuated 

and there wouldn’t be any harmful radiation effects. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Doctor. Your answer just further 

points out the need to open up Yucca Mountain for the Administration to start obeying the law. 

I now recognize Ms. Edwards for five minutes, and I will give you 

some leeway on that, Ms. Edwards. You are recognized for five 

minutes. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for your patience. Before I begin questions, I would like 
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to ask the Chairman for unanimous consent to enter two Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission reports relating to the shutdown at Calvert 

Cliffs that I referenced earlier, and a report by Mr. Lochbaum at 

the Union of Concerned Scientists on the 14 near-misses at U.S. 

power plants and their safety. 

Chairman BROUN. Any objections? Hearing no objections, so ordered. 

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Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a 

question, actually, for Mr. Lochbaum. I know that the Union of 

Concerned Scientists in that report that we just entered into the 

record concluded that ‘‘Nuclear subsidies effectively separate risk 

from reward, shifting the burden of possible losses onto the public 

and encouraging speculative investment by masking the true cost 

of nuclear power, and that subsidies also allow the industry to exaggerate its economic competitiveness. Consequently, they diminish 

or delay support for more economical and less risky alternatives, 

like energy efficiency and renewable energy.’’ That is a direct quote 

from your report. Do you believe that the nuclear power companies 

would be economically viable without substantial federal subsidies 

they receive from taxpayers? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Based on the work we have done and the industry’s own request for loan guarantees and other subsidies, the answer seems pretty clear that they would not be. 

Ms. EDWARDS. I wonder if you could elaborate on how public subsidies, and especially at the levels at which we subsidize the industry to nuclear power distort risk in the nuclear power industry? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I think the best example of that would be the 

Price-Anderson Federal Liability Protection. Plant owners have to 

get approximately $375 million of private liability insurance, and 

the Price-Anderson Act protects against liability costs above that. 

That is a big savings for the plant owners, but more importantly, 

it discourages the reactor vendors from developing designs that are 

less risky and much safer, because there is no incentive—while the 

higher cost of those safety features may be borne out, because they 

don’t get a break on the insurance protection, the liability insurance that they get, it is hard to sell that into a marketplace when 

you are competing with cheaper, less safe reactors. So the federal 

subsidies are actually discouraging reactor designers from coming 

up with safer reactors that better protect Americans. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So this leads me to a question about identifying 

and fixing safety risks. Do you think the NRC does what it needs 

to in both identifying safety risks and forcing fixes to these known 

safety problems at our power plants in a timely way? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. During my ten years experience with UCS and 

during my predecessor’s 20 years, we find that the NRC does a 

very good job at setting the safety bar at the right height. They establish regulations that provide adequate protection of public 

health. They don’t do a very good job of enforcing those regulations. 

Too many plant owners are limboing beneath the safety bar for too 

long, putting Americans at higher risk, and additionally driving the 

costs of nuclear power upwards inexplicably. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So in my colleague Mr. Harris’s opening statement, he indicated that Fukushima is a type of accident that really 

is not possible here, given our nuclear regulatory environment, and 

so Mr. Lochbaum, I wonder if you could respond to that question 

as to whether there is a major nuclear—whether a major nuclear 

accident is actually possible here in the United States, given the 

NRC’s oversight of our reactors? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I think, again, the best proof that it is possible 

is the fact that the nuclear industry cannot operate nuclear power 

plants without federal liability protection. If there wasn’t a chance 
200 

of such a catastrophic accident, they could go down to State Farm 

and get private liability insurance. The fact that they can’t means 

that they themselves recognize that these plants are unusual hazards of unprecedented nature. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So let us go to something as simple as battery 

backup. At Fukushima, you indicated that the battery—I think it 

was in Mr. Barrett’s testimony—I apologize, I probably got it all 

wrong. Whoever had the slides up there—that the battery backup 

at Fukushima was eight hours of battery backup, and compared to 

U.S. plants, what is the backup like at U.S. plants in the event of 

some catastrophic disaster? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. The battery backup is basically the same for 

U.S. reactors. Some reactors only have four hours of battery 

backup, so they would be even more vulnerable to that situation. 

Studies done by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission show that 

many of our reactors, the station blackout where you are relying 

on battery, the De Salle plant in Illinois, for example, that is 80 

percent of the overall risk of core meltdown. It is equal to four 

times the risk of all other things leading to meltdown combined, so 

it is station blackout and battery dependence at our U.S. reactor. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Yes, so let us take away the fact that we might 

have a hurricane or tornado, or some other thing, simple blackout 

that could be caused by any number of factors actually poses a 

strong vulnerability for risk, isn’t that right? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. That is absolutely right. I mean, when you get 

down to station blackouts, you only have one safety system working. If something causes that to go away, you played beat the clock 

and lost, like they did in Japan. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

Now I recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for five minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing. 

Let me first ask, you just made a statement about the subsidies, 

and without the subsidies nuclear power would not be able to compete. Is that not also true of solar and most of the other renewables? By the way, we subsidize them to the tune of billions every 

day, so here we are—are those subsidies not necessary? Is this a 

new revenue source for us to defund those subsidies for the renewables? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Everybody gets a shot at the apple. I think the point we were trying to 

make was that nuclear power has been subsidized so heavily over 

so many years and has built in subsidies that it is not a level playing field. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I got you, but you reach a certain plateau 

and subsidies are still necessary for the nuclear energy, but let me 

just note, as we stand today, we are subsidizing perhaps even 

heavier these new supposed renewable sources of energy. 

How many people—I am just asking the panel—how many people have died in nuclear power accidents over the last 50 years 

here in the United States? Anybody? 
201 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. There is the one that is buried in Arlington from 

the January 3, 1961 accident, so—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So since 1961 has there been anybody? I 

mean, there is one guy back in 1961. Anybody else? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. He had two colleagues. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. How many people have died in the 

production of coal during that time period? I think we are talking 

about hundreds of people, are we not, maybe thousands. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Probably in the thousands. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Probably in the thousands, because we are 

also talking about lung disease that people get from coal, et cetera. 

So there is a place for that, too, although coal isn’t subsidized, or 

is it subsidized? Yes. Perhaps we are taking care through the black 

lung whatever fund that we have and that we fund federally, so 

there are subsidies for coal even as well. 

So what strikes me today is, of course, we have seen the crisis 

over in Japan, this horrible accident which we now seem to say 

that there are not large numbers of people dying, but this puts people at risk. Have people lost their lives in Japan already? Has anybody been—and I mean, I know in Chernobyl they certainly did. Is 

the Japanese accident resulted in loss of life? 

Mr. SHERON. We are not aware of any nuclear related deaths 

from the Fukushima. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well the tsunami, of course. Right. 

Mr. SHERON. Yeah, the tsunami, obviously people died there, but 

if not—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Any nuclear-related deaths? All right. Now 

let me just say that this is—all of this is happening while we are 

utilizing 50-year-old technology. All the complaints that we hear 

and the risk that is being taken, if there is a risk, is happening 

because we are utilizing 50-year-old nuclear technology. Light 

water reactors were put in place in the ’60s, were they not? 

Mr. SHERON. Even sooner than that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, even sooner than that. There is a new 

generation of nuclear power plants that come to grips with many 

of the challenges that exist that require subsidies, et cetera, for the 

nuclear industry, and that new technology is actually focused on 

small modular reactors and high temperature gas cool reactors. 

Should we not then start focusing our efforts on these new technologies rather than making the light water reactors a bit safer? 

Shouldn’t we be focusing our research and energy on putting in 

place high temperature gas cool reactors which cannot melt down 

and maybe these small modular reactors, which would be dramatically safer? 

Mr. SHERON. I will take a shot at that. At the NRC, we don’t 

really pass judgment on what kind of reactors should be built. We 

leave that up to the industry and the Department of Energy to determine that. Our job is to determine if what is put in front of us 

meets our regulations and is safe. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me just—for the record, Mr. Chairman, 

state that in various studies that I have made and hearings that 

I have been at, it is very clear that we have now the capability of 

overcoming many of the challenges that nuclear energy 50 years 

ago posed to us. For example, the elimination of waste, you actu-
202 

ally have some of these new reactors that will bring the level of 

waste being stored in Yucca Mountain down, rather than bundle it 

up, meaning that it actually burns used fuel as part of its own fuel 

cycle. 

So as we look at the safety and the challenges of nuclear energy, 

I would hope that we keep in mind that a lot of the challenges and 

a lot of the criticisms are the old technology, and we have a great 

new opportunity to move forward with new technology and solve 

these problems. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Chair now recognized Mr. Miller for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Dr. Lochbaum mentioned the Price-Anderson Act as a substantial subsidy for the industry, and in traditional economic theory, the market mechanism for safety is liability, that if you cause harm to others, then you are responsible for 

it. You make them whole, you compensate them for their losses. 

Does anyone dispute that a cap on liability is a subsidy to an industry? 

Okay, so you all agree with that. I understand that Price-Anderson limits the liability to $375 million. What relationship does that 

have to the actual risk? Dr. Lochbaum? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. It is pretty much decoupled from that. That was 

set as a number that has been upped over the years. The way 

Price-Anderson works, if there is offsite damages that exceed that 

number, whatever it is, then the rest of the surviving reactors are 

invoiced to make up the difference. In the old days when they regulated utility companies, that secondary pool was pretty much guaranteed. Today, many of the reactors are limited liability corporations that may shut down and not be available to pay into that secondary pool. 

Mr. MILLER. I guess my question is will the actual lawsuits of 

Fukushima or a similar accident be anywhere in the neighborhood 

of $375 million, or whatever the liability is under Price-Anderson, 

or it could be substantially more? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. If Fukushima is any indication, they drive by 

that almost the first day, very quickly. Much higher. 

Mr. MILLER. And the subsidy is perhaps not borne by taxpayers, 

but it is borne by random depending on which way the wind blows. 

Mr. Rohrabacher mentioned the experience since 1961, and usually lawsuits go into actuarial considerations and underwriting and 

insurance is pretty good at that. That is their business. Even with 

no deaths since 1961, do any of you think that industry could get 

insurance—liability insurance without a cap, given the 50 years of 

no deaths? No one thinks that? I mean, so the industry continues 

to say that the risk is acceptable, so long as someone else bears it? 

If the risk is on them, it is unacceptable. 

Dr. Lochbaum, there sometimes is a tradeoff between safety and 

profits. In your work in the industry, have you identified any shortcuts that might be—might make operations more profitable but 

less safe? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. There are those opportunities. For example, we 

are aware of right now that the industry knows of about half the 

plants operating in the United States don’t need fire protection reg-
203 

ulations who were adopted after the 1975 fire at Brown’s Ferry. 

The plant owners who have consciously spent the money to come 

into compliance are actually at a cost disadvantage to their neighbors who are outlaws, nuclear outlaws. The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission is basically enabling bad behavior that drives cheaper 

plants to be less safe plants. If the industry were to enforce its regulations, those fire protection regulations, people would be protected, but more importantly, the people wouldn’t benefit from violating the law as they have in the past. 

Mr. MILLER. All right. Mr. Rohrabacher also mentioned new 

technologies. Do you think the new technology will dramatically 

change the potential risk of nuclear accidents? Could a nuclear 

power company—a company operating a nuclear power plant go to 

insurance companies and say look, we have got this new technology, now will you write us some coverage? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. At a House hearing back in I think it was 2006, 

there was a vendor, reactor vendor at the table who was asked that 

question, and he said his company was so—could stand behind 

their reactor design and opt out of Price-Anderson. No other reactor vendors I have heard have said that, and reactor operators 

haven’t said that either. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay. Do you—Dr. Lochbaum, how safe do you 

think these plants will be if—compared to the old technology? Will 

there be a dramatic difference in safety? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. What we have in the new reactors is that the 

chances of an accident are less with the new reactors, but any time 

a safety gain is made in that regard, the containment is made less 

robust and there are savings done, so that the cost remains the 

same. As a result, the number of accidents would be fewer, but the 

number of dead bodies will be greater. 

Mr. MILLER. My time is almost expired. I will yield back the little bit that I have got. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 

Chair now recognizes Dr. Harris for five minutes. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

thank the panel for your patience as we went and voted. 

Mr. Lochbaum, from what I understand, you are making the 

availability to get liability insurance kind of a guide as to how safe 

something is. I know a lot of obstetricians and neurosurgeons in 

some States who just can’t get liability insurance from commercial 

companies. They literally couldn’t get it, so the State had to form 

insurance companies. How is that different from what is going on? 

I mean, I assume that there are people who still think it is safe 

to go to an obstetrician, safe to go to a neurosurgeon, but in fact, 

there are instances where you can’t conduct normal business, because look, there is tort in this world. What can I say? Isn’t that 

true? I mean, aren’t there other circumstances where the government has to step in to insure things that people consider pretty 

safe, I mean, going to an obstetrician, going to a neurosurgeon? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. There is, but if you look in the energy technology 

sector, nuclear power is the only one that is so hazardous that it 

needs—— 

Dr. HARRIS. Oh, I understand that, but in the medical sector it 

is only OB/GYNs and neurosurgery. That doesn’t mean that it is 
204 

dangerous to go to a neurosurgeon, that is my only point. I mean, 

to use that as—you know, because you do represent the Union of 

Concerned Scientists, I mean, I don’t think that is a very scientific 

way to look at it, to be honest with you, because we know from 

other areas where tort law is an issue that that just doesn’t work. 

The world just doesn’t work that way. It is not that simple. 

Dr. Boice, there has been—you know, part of the discussion and 

I think Mr. Lochbaum’s testimony actually brings it up, part of the 

problem is with spent fuel and the risks with spent fuel. You know, 

an issue that I think is probably going to come before us at some 

point is the getting spent fuel out of these plants and eventually 

getting to a central location. Have you looked into at all the risks 

associated on populations with using a central repository like 

Yucca Mountain? Do you have any writings that you can provide 

me or provide the Committee? 

Dr. BOICE. No, not specifically with regard to spent fuel and enhanced levels of radiation in the background. We have done a number of studies of people that lived in areas of enhanced background 

radiation in China and other countries where they have been exposed to increased levels that might, in some sense, be relevant. 

We have also done studies that evaluated cancer risks around all 

the nuclear power facilities, including those with proximal spent 

fuel storage in the United States and all the DoE facilities. So 

there actually are a number of studies in counties and areas close 

by that we could provide for you that might be somewhat relevant, 

but not specific to spent fuels and the levels of radiation from those 

exposures. 

Dr. HARRIS. And is it because—I mean, is the reason because 

that is a—is probably a much, much lower risk than the risks associated with the plant, which is already low enough, than the storage of spent fuels in a facility like Yucca Mountain? 

Dr. BOICE. I just have not had an opportunity to look at that 

issue, except indirectly since many nuclear power plants have their 

spent fuel stored in areas close to the operating reactor. 

Dr. HARRIS. Okay, thank you very much. 

Mr. Barrett, as you are aware, the Department of Energy does 

and has been moving forward with their next generation nuclear 

plant project for some time. My understanding is that the high 

temperature gas cooled reactors may have some very specific safety 

advantages, some of which—mitigating some of the risks we have 

been talking about today. Could you speak to the safety characteristics of that kind of reactor? 

Mr. BARRETT. I am not an expert on gas cooled reactors, but I 

know a little bit about them. They have very excellent physics. 

They have a lot of very valuable safety aspects. They have developmental challenges ahead of them, economics and other things as 

well. But gas cooled reactors are a very good, safe technology. It 

is very passive, it doesn’t heat up as quickly as some of the others 

do. 

Dr. HARRIS. In your opinion, would that be a reason perhaps for 

the Department of Energy to more aggressively pursue research 

into that, because it does address some of those problems with 

things like passive cooling? 
205 

Mr. BARRETT. The Department of Energy has many worthy 

projects that they are working in their R&D program, that certainly is a worthy project and it is there. Relative to other R&D 

projects, I am afraid I can’t really judge from where I am today. 

Dr. HARRIS. Okay, thank you very much. I am going to yield back 

my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

Now the Chair recognizes Mr. McNerney for five minutes. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the advantages of being the last Member to ask questions, I may have a little 

extra leeway in terms of my time, so I don’t feel quite as pressured. 

We are a little lucky here in Congress to have so many physicians that can expand their experience to the rest of life, so I really 

appreciate the wisdom that we get very frequently from the other 

side of the aisle in that regard. 

Let us talk about the backlog at the NRC. Would—Dr. Sheron, 

can you describe how long it would take for someone or an organization that submits a design to get the decision on that design? 

Mr. SHERON. I presume you are talking about a new plant design? 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Yes. 

Mr. SHERON. I believe that the Agency has identified a schedule. 

I can’t remember exactly what the time is. I believe it is on the 

order of maybe several years. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Five years? 

Mr. SHERON. I think it is less than that. A lot of it is dependent 

upon the quality of the submittal, however, whether the licensee— 

the applicant has adequately addressed all of the safety issues and 

is providing a strong technical basis to support them. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So is the new design evaluation in competition 

for resources, for NRC resources with safety evaluations of existing 

plants or new issues that come up in that regard? 

Mr. SHERON. No. When there was an indication that there would 

be new designs coming in, the Agency purposely split the Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation into two separate offices. One is the 

Office of New Reactors, and the other is the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation focuses 

solely on the safety of the current 104 operating plants. The Office 

of New Reactors focuses solely on the licensing of the new applications. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So would you say that your modeling—and I am 

not trying to throw arrows here or anything—that your modeling 

capabilities are state of the art, you have the best computers, the 

best numerical techniques and so on in doing modeling, both of the 

design and of the nuclear fuel rod modeling, safety modeling? 

Mr. SHERON. Yes, I would probably say that the NRC has the 

best—some of the best models in the world, which is evidenced by 

the fact that most of the other nuclear countries—developed nuclear countries request our models, and we have a numerous cooperative programs where we provide our models to others to use. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Okay, good. Now with regard to failsafe, in my 

mind, failsafe means fail safe. It doesn’t mean fail badly. We have 

had a couple of cases lately, one in Fukushima, one in the Gulf 

Coast last year where failsafe really didn’t mean fail safe. Is your 
206 

modeling able to predict any of these failures that were supposed 

to be failsafe that actually weren’t failsafe? 

Mr. SHERON. We don’t—I don’t think there are any designs right 

now that are totally failsafe. Obviously one can postulate failures 

that are going to, you know, lead to an accident. Our computer 

codes are able to model those failures and to predict the consequences. If we see that the consequences are too high or that 

there are other mitigative things that could be done, then we certainly pursue them with the industry or through regulation. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. So I mean, you basically have said—I think you 

just said that the current design is not really failsafe. That is basically the situation, isn’t it? 

Mr. SHERON. Well, what I am saying is that there are low probability events that one could postulate, okay? In other words, if one 

postulates enough failures, which again, become very low probability—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well they sound like they are low probability 

until they happen, and then they say geez, that wasn’t as unlikely 

as we thought it was. Obviously, no one predicted a 14-meter tsunami in Japan. That was completely unforeseen. 

Mr. SHERON. It was not unforeseen. I have heard reports that 

there was some prediction that the design basis at Fukushima was 

not adequate, but I am not at liberty or I am not really going to 

speculate on whether that is appropriate, you know, in other words 

whether or not the TEPCO organization designed the plant properly. What I will say is that we have looked at the design of U.S. 

plants against tsunamis and earthquakes, and we have concluded 

that we believe that our plants, you know, are adequately designed 

for those. In other words, we can predict fairly well, for example, 

the wave height of any tsunami that might occur and we make 

sure that the plants are adequately designed. 

Mr. MCNERNEY. But we have heard this morning that a simple 

blackout, which could last, depending on what the cause is, for a 

week or a month if there is a significant transformer that goes 

down at a substation, which puts these plants at significant risk. 

Mr. SHERON. You have got to be careful when you say it is a simple blackout. It is not a simple blackout. What the—what you are 

concerned about is first that you lose the offsite power source, 

which is the preferred source of power to the plant. The plant has 

two independent diesel generators that are designed to start and 

provide electricity to power the safety systems. You now have to 

postulate that both of those diesels don’t start, not just one, but 

both don’t start. Then there are additional backup systems that 

will run for some period of time. We do—— 

Mr. MCNERNEY. That sounds good, but we just saw at 

Fukushima that that wasn’t necessarily the case. 

I just want to make a little plug here. You know, you talk about 

the current generation of nuclear being safer—the current technology being safer than 50-year-old technology, and maybe that is 

the case, you know. I don’t really know, I am not a nuclear engineer. But there is fast neutron technology that would be inherently 

failsafe, is that correct, Dr. Lochbaum? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I am not aware of that, I would have to look. I 

don’t know offhand if that is true or false. 
207 

Mr. MCNERNEY. Well, I find myself in agreement with Mr. Rohrabacher, and I am going to take just a few more moments here. We 

need to be aware of the new technology and make sure that if there 

is a fourth generation or fast neutron technology that it gets proper 

attention, and meanwhile, be very skeptical of claims of failsafe or 

highly improbable incidents. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Chairman BROUN. You are quite welcome. 

We will now undertake a second round of questions, and I yield 

myself five minutes. 

Mr. Barrett, Chairman Jaczko made a recommendation or made 

a judgment of a 50-mile evacuation to U.S. citizens at Fukushima. 

Were you involved in evacuation actions during the Three Mile Island accident? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, I was at Three Mile Island, not at 

Fukushima. 

Chairman BROUN. I should just ask you about Three Mile Island. 

Were there any NRC lessons learned from that experience? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, the NRC and everybody learned a lot from 

that experience. One of the lessons learned from that is it is not 

just the nuclear computer codes and the ‘‘what if’’ calculations that 

are made at that time, but it is also what are the conditions on the 

ground, what is the situation with the people? Because you are trying to make a judgment call, whoever is making these evacuation 

recommendation decisions, to do the best thing for the people at 

that time under those conditions. 

Chairman BROUN. Do you think this was done properly at Three 

Mile Island? 

Mr. BARRETT. At Three Mile Island, at the time we made the decisions, and I was part of that, I thought it was the right thing to 

do at that time. However, I went and lived there for four years and 

I saw what the impact of that was and what the practicality of 

what an evacuation does to the people. After I learned from that 

experience, I felt it was inappropriate that we did that evacuation 

at Three Mile Island in the early days. 

Chairman BROUN. After your experiences at Three Mile Island, 

do you believe that the 50-mile judgment by NRC Chairman Jaczko 

made for U.S. citizens at Fukushima was appropriate, and if you 

would please explain? 

Mr. BARRETT. No, I don’t think that really was Chairman 

Jaczko’s judgement in the net sense. I believe that decision was a 

poor judgment decision, insofar as it was counterproductive and 

detrimental to all the people in Japan, the Japanese people as well 

as the Americans, because I don’t think it appropriately considered 

the horrendous conditions that the people of Japan were under at 

that point with the tsunami and the earthquake. I mean, people 

were freezing in the north. A 50-mile evacuation radius hinders the 

ability of the people in the unaffected south to bring lifesaving supplies and things to people in the north. So I think it did not appropriately consider the situation on the ground. It was my understanding it was more of a worst case computer analysis ‘‘what if’’ 

type of projection. So my sense is there was not a sufficient evaluation of the conditions in Japan. I think it put a lot of confusion and 

uncertainty in the minds of people between the 12-mile official Jap-
208 

anese radius and the 50-mile U.S. one. People would ask each 

other ‘‘Why is yours different from mine?’’ In my view, I think one 

country should not second guess another country from 10,000 miles 

away as to what is the best thing for the citizens at that point. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Barrett. 

Next question is for Dr. Boice. In the days following the Japanese 

disaster, U.S. Surgeon General Regina Benjamin responded to 

questioning about citizens stocking up on potassium iodide—actions were ‘‘definitely appropriate’’ cautions to take. What is your 

reaction to this suggestion, and is there any scientific basis for 

such recommendation, given the radiation levels that were detected? 

Dr. BOICE. I believe—when the surgeon general mentioned that, 

it was shortly after the accident and all the evidence wasn’t in 

about the radiation releases. When we found that the levels were 

so tiny, it certainly is an inappropriate action to make the statement that we should be distributing potassium iodide pills. I concur with the public health department from California and also the 

director of our own CDC that potassium iodide should not be given. 

There are adverse health effects, and particularly dangerous for 

people who have sensitivities to iodine, people who have thyroid 

disease and also people who are allergic to shellfish. Then if it is 

taken inappropriately, there can be serious effects such as heart 

abnormalities, nausea, and diarrhea. So the benefit, which is almost nonexistent because the levels of radiation are so incredibly 

small, is not sufficient with regard to these potential adverse 

health effects. 

Chairman BROUN. Dr. Boice, I appreciate your efforts to put radiation risk in perspective. I was struck that you note that the U.S. 

Capitol building is frequently cited as having some of the highest 

radiation levels in the United States at 85 millirem per year. Could 

you put that level, which Members and employees of Congress are 

exposed to every day, in perspective with amount of elevated radiation that Americans on the West Coast might have been exposed 

to as the result of Fukushima? 

Dr. BOICE. Certainly. The Capitol building for long term exposures of over a year might be on the order of 85 millirem from the 

gamma rays from the granite that was used in the building. From 

the Fukushima radiation, the potential exposure even to California 

is much, much less than one unit, 1 millirem. So it is a very tiny, 

inconsequential exposure. It is much less than just what we get 

every day from normal radiation exposures from natural background. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Boice. I now recognize Ms. Edwards for five minutes. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very 

much for this second round of testimony. 

You know, we heard from Mr. Rohrabacher that since we haven’t 

had scores of dead bodies from past nuclear accidents, we shouldn’t 

be worried about the future safety of nuclear plants, and I think 

the jury is still out, frankly, on what the long-term consequences 

are of even Fukushima, and I would note that as yet, nobody has 

done one of those longitudinal studies because we haven’t actually 

had sufficient time pass. And yet, I keep seeing claims also that ac-
209 

cidents like Fukushima couldn’t happen here and that health effects of the disaster in Japan were inconsequential. Again, I think 

the jury is still out, but it does seem to be a bit of a mixed message 

that suggests that we are safe and nothing bad has happened anyway, and so, you know, let us just wait. And then here I see the 

cover of this week’s New York Times on the Wednesday edition, 

and here you have got people—a couple in Japan in radiation protection gear, clearing out their precious possessions from a home 

that they may never be able to return to because of an accident. 

So I don’t think we should have to wait until the accident happens 

before we figure out the safety of our plants. 

Mr. Lochbaum, I wonder if you could tell us whether we understand the full impacts of Fukushima on health and safety in the 

communities around the plant, and if you could, elaborate on the 

14 near-misses that occurred at U.S. power plants last year alone, 

and your key findings about what your biggest concerns are regarding nuclear safety here in this country? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. To address the first part of that question, I don’t 

think we know what the human fallout from Fukushima will be. 

For example, because of the contamination they have had to increase the dose at schools in the area. Essentially, they have drafted all the school children into the nuclear workforce and the school 

children are now applied to the same radiation limits as nuclear 

plant workers. They had to do that, they really had no choice. The 

radiation levels are so high. The radiation elevation could cause 

problems for those children down the road, and we won’t know 

that, unfortunately, for a while. 

The study we did, we looked at the 14 near-misses, and the nearmisses were times—events that occurred at nuclear power plants 

where the NRC had to send out a special team to look. What we 

found was that most of those 14, there were warning signs that 

were missed by the plant’s owner and by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission that had they been heeded, the near-miss would have 

been avoided. 

What concerns us about that is if you continue to miss—overlook 

the near-misses, the warning signs, you are setting the stage for 

preexisting conditions to cause that very bad day, should they be 

challenged. So the fact that we got lucky on those near-misses is 

great, but we need to remove luck from the equation to the extent 

we can. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you very much. 

Lastly, I think we have heard a lot about—and Mr. Rohrabacher 

alluded to this—that we haven’t built a new plant in this country 

for 30 years. New plants are being built overseas. I understand 

that they are being build in Finland and France and those have 

been pointed to as examples of where we need to go in terms of the 

technology, but I wonder if you can tell us, particularly Mr. 

Lochbaum, how the construction of those reactors is going? Are 

they on schedule, are they on budget, are we going to see them 

come online at any time, because it underscores, I think, the question about whether it makes sense to invest in these kind of longterm huge costs for a new plant without having the most aggressive regulatory scheme in place to make sure that they are safe. 
210 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Well, both the nuclear plant under construction 

in Finland and in France are over budget and behind schedule. It 

is more than 25 percent over budget in Finland and several years 

behind schedule. They had trouble pouring concrete. They got bad 

concrete as a result. They had trouble with pipes, basic stuff that 

is nuclear 101 we didn’t learn from the first go around and they 

are paying the price, not us. 

Ms. EDWARDS. So what was—the cost of the French plant was 

what, initially? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. I don’t—$6 billion. 

Ms. EDWARDS. And it is 25 percent over budget? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. So far, they are not done yet. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Okay, and they are not done yet, so in the end we 

could be talking about a $10 billion plant, and we still can’t assure 

all of the safety considerations will be made. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Going back to an earlier question, one of the 

things that France is doing—France is the vendor of that reactor 

that is being built. In order to try to market it elsewhere, they are 

taking some of the safety features out to reduce the price tag of the 

plant. 

Ms. EDWARDS. Thank you, and with that, I yield back. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. 

I now recognize Dr. Harris for five minutes. 

Dr. HARRIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 

a second round so we can clear up some of these questions. 

Dr. Sheron, very briefly in a minute or less, can you outline the 

evidence that our plants are not safe? 

Mr. SHERON. Our plants are not safe? 

Dr. HARRIS. Yeah, because there has been discussion that our 

plants aren’t safe. Is there any evidence, scientific evidence, any 

evidence, injuries in the United States in the, you know, use of nuclear power for civilian use, anything like that. Is there any evidence that our plants are not safe? 

Mr. SHERON. I am not aware of any. 

Dr. HARRIS. Okay, thank you. Now, your office is considering updating spent fuel safety studies to estimate the relative consequence of removing older fuel from the spent fuel pool and placing it in dry storage. Have you specifically studied the additional 

risk associated with storing spent fuel onsite at operating reactors, 

as well as not operating and decommissioned reactors versus storing the spent fuel in a centralized geologic repository? 

Mr. SHERON. No, that we haven’t. 

Dr. HARRIS. And is that something you think deserves closer examination, to answer that question about spent fuel? Where is it 

safer to store? 

Mr. SHERON. I am probably not qualified to answer that. I think, 

you know, what we look at is if there is not a repository, is it safe 

to store the fuel in an interim, you know, location such as onsite 

in dry casks? 

Dr. HARRIS. But not a question of whether—because you, I guess, 

make the practical assumption there may not be another repository, so that is probably why you haven’t looked at it, I imagine, 

because it is simply a theoretical possibility? 

Mr. SHERON. Well, I just don’t know. 
211 

Dr. HARRIS. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Lochbaum, thank you for coming and testifying. You stated 

up front, you know, in your testimony that your organization’s goal 

was to minimize the inherent risk of nuclear energy, and I take it 

that if you could make it safe that it would be something that 

would kind of satisfy your organization’s search for something to 

minimize climate change, for instance. 

But with that in mind that your organization wants to minimize 

the inherent risks, what is the organization’s position or your position on how to manage our stockpile of nuclear waste? Do you 

think it is safer to leave it onsite at the 100-plus individual sites 

we have, or put it at a single location that is geographically isolated, away from population centers, underground, miles underground? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. We talked to that subject to the president of the 

Blue Ribbon Commission on the American Nuclear Future last august, and what we recommended was centralized interim storage 

for the permanently shut down plants where the only hazard left 

is spent fuel. Transfer that to some centralized location. We didn’t 

specify it was above ground or below ground, but—— 

Dr. HARRIS. So you do think that is a good idea? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Yes. 

Dr. HARRIS. Mr. Barrett, given your experience at the Department’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, what do 

you think about that? 

Mr. BARRETT. I fully agree. I believe we also need a geological 

repository for the permanent disposal of the waste that our generations have been making now for 40, 50 years and not just give this 

problem to our great grandchildren. So I think this country needs 

to move forward with Yucca Mountain, or if it has a better facility, 

let us have the better facility, but let us move forward while we 

are alive. 

Dr. HARRIS. And I take it you feel—that is not only for decommissioned plants, but that is even for the spent fuel when it cools 

down enough even to be shipped from operating plants. 

Mr. BARRETT. The decommissioned plants should be the first to 

go, and we have the two plants up in the northwest where there 

is a tsunami risk, even though it is in dry storage, that risk should 

not be there at all. There are almost a dozen of these old facilities. 

These should be the first to move but then we also need to start 

removing spent fuel from the operating plants, too, and reduce that 

risk as well. 

Dr. HARRIS. Sure. 

And finally, Dr. Sheron, would you please describe where the 

NRC currently is in its licensing efforts for the next generation nuclear plant project? How long do you think it might be or would 

take the Commission to issue a combined license? 

Mr. SHERON. For the NGNP, we have already started doing research at the NRC to support our licensing reviews of that design 

when it is submitted by the Department of Energy. The last schedule I saw was that of the application, again, is complete and technically defensible. We had a three year review schedule, in which 

case—I’m sorry, at the end of three years we would issue the combined operating license. 
212 

Dr. HARRIS. Okay, thank you very much. I will yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Dr. Harris. 

The chairman will recognize Mr. Miller for five minutes. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. 

Quickly on the fact that there have been no new nuclear power 

plants in 30 years, in North Carolina 30 years ago, almost all of 

the cities and municipalities that had municipal power systems invested in a piece of one of Duke Power’s nuclear facilities, and almost all of those cities came very close to bankruptcy as a result. 

It was hideously more expensive, even with all the subsidies that 

we have discussed. So it probably is not a regulatory burden, it 

probably was truly just much more expensive, even with the dramatic—very substantial subsidies that we have gotten. 

We have had some discussions of storage of spent fuel, about 

Yucca Mountain, about what to do with the closed down facilities, 

but you know—and we haven’t even discussed the transportation 

of that fuel. There is not a star Trek transporter technology. It will 

not be beamed from the plant to a permanent facility. There are 

risks and transportation and on and on. 

Part of the story coming out of Fukushima has been the spent 

fuel pools. Dr. Lochbaum, what have we learned—should we have 

learned form the Fukushima experience with spent fuel. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. When the event occurred at Fukushima, there 

were seven spent fuel pools that contained the radiated fuel. There 

were also radiated fuel in dry casks. That doesn’t make the news 

very much because it survived without a problem. There was—the 

spent fuel in dry casks is safe, secure, not leaking radioactivity, so 

the dry cask endured that challenge that the spent fuel pools did 

not. I think it was a reminder—it wasn’t so much a lesson—that 

dry cask storage is less vulnerable both from a security standpoint 

and a safety standpoint, and we should act upon that lesson rather 

than just continue to document it. 

Mr. MILLER. Okay, and you think that that should be required 

by regulation, by the NRC? 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. It should happen. It would be nice if the plant 

owners did it for safety reasons; if not, then the NRC should do it 

for — to protect the American public safety, and if not then the 

Congress should make it happen. However it happens, we need to 

make that happen. 

Mr. MILLER. All right. Dr. Lochbaum, again, you are very familiar with this industry. How would you characterize the level of candor of the industry with respect to safety issues that have arisen. 

Mr. LOCHBAUM. Well, the industry does release a lot of information. There is very little dirty laundry that is withheld from the 

American public, that is why we know about the tornado that hit 

Surry plant at Brown’s Ferry. With the exception of security information, there is very little withheld from the public, so I think the 

industry deserves credit for that candor. 

I think the candor issue is really internally. There is a failure 

within the plants themselves sometimes to recognize problems, 

that is why Calvert Cliffs had roof leaking for years that they tolerated but didn’t fix, because there was this complacency or lack of 
213 

candor about realizing what that could do that led them to—not to 

solve the problem they kept seeing happen over and over again. 

Mr. MILLER. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman BROUN. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 

I thank the witnesses for you all’s valuable testimony. If you are 

not from the South, you all means all of you all. And the Members 

for all of you all’s questions. Members of either Subcommittee may 

have additional questions of you all, and we ask that you respond 

to those in writing. The record will remain open for the two additional weeks for additional comments or questions from Members. 

Witnesses are excused, and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(215) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses from Dr. Brian Sheron, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
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Responses from Mr. Lake Barrett, Principal, L. Barrett Consulting, LLC 
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Responses from Dr. John Boice, Scientific Director, International Epidemiology Institute 
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(257) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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