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70–947PDF 2011

DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN CENTRAL

AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LORD’S

RESISTANCE ARMY DISARMAMENT AND

NORTHERN UGANDA RECOVERY ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 2011

Serial No. 112–77

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................... 8

The Honorable Alexander Vershbow, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense .................................... 15

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Yamamoto: Prepared statement ...................................... 11

The Honorable Alexander Vershbow: Prepared statement .................................. 17

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 46

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 47

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Statement 

by the Honorable James M. Inhofe, a U.S. Senator from the State of 

Oklahoma .............................................................................................................. 49

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 51

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 53

The Honorable Karen Bass, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 55

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DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN CENTRAL 

AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 

LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY DISARMAMENT 

AND NORTHERN UGANDA RECOVERY ACT 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

That was my gavel. We improvise. But before we begin, I’d like to 

acknowledge the presence of Ms. Evelyn Apoko. 

Evelyn, is that you right there? Thank you, Evelyn. Evelyn, if 

you could stand a second? Thank you. Evelyn is an LRA survivor 

who has traveled to Washington to witness this important hearing 

firsthand. We thank her for coming and for her continued efforts 

on behalf of children impacted by this horrific conflict. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, 

for 7 minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize the 

chair and ranking member of the Africa Global Health and Human 

Rights Subcommittee for 3 minutes and the chair and ranking 

member of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee also for 3 minutes each for their opening remarks. 

We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection the 

witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a part of the record. 

And members may have 5 legislative days to insert statements and 

questions for the record subject to the length limitations in the 

rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. The Department 

of State has included the Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA, on the 

‘‘Terrorist Exclusion List’’ since 2001. In 2008, its leader, Joseph 

Kony, was designated as a ‘‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’’ 

(SDGT). The LRA is responsible for one of the longest, most violent, yet most under reported conflicts in Africa—a conflict which 

has spread from Northern Uganda to South Sudan, the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo, and Central African Republic—and threatens costly U.S. investments in peace and stability in the region. It 

is a predatory, guerilla force which has perpetrated some of the 

most deplorable human rights atrocities known to man. 

The LRA makes no attempt to hold territories but murders, mutilates, tortures, rapes and loots with impunity. They move in small 

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groups with limited communication, striking remote villages, 

slaughtering civilians, abducting woman and children to serve as 

fighters, porters, and sex slaves. It has been estimated that more 

than 80 percent of the LRA is comprised of abducted children. 

These children are forced to commit atrocities in front of their families and participate in bizarre indoctrination rituals before being 

forced to fight. Those who manage to escape find it difficult, if not 

impossible, to return home. 

But we are not here today to determine whether Joseph Kony is 

evil. We know that he is. We are here because in May 2010, the 

President signed into law the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. With the backing of 

thousands of committed advocates, including from my own District, 

and with over 200 co-sponsors in the House and some 64 co-sponsors in the Senate, the act enjoyed overwhelming support. It required the President to develop a comprehensive strategy to deal 

with the LRA and established that it shall be the policy of the 

United States to: ‘‘Provide political, economic, military, and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians, 

apprehend or eliminate top LRA commanders, and disarm and demobilize remaining LRA fighters.’’

The President’s strategy was released in November 2010. It set 

four strategic objectives: (1) increased protection of civilians;(2) apprehension to or ‘‘removal’’ of Kony and other senior LRA commanders; (3) promotion of defections from the LRA and the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA combatants; and lastly, provision of humanitarian relief to affected 

communities. 

The strategy emphasized that the U.S. will ‘‘work with national 

government and regional organizations’’ to accomplish these goals. 

What steps did the U.S. undertake in the last year to achieve the 

objectives outlined in this strategy? That is what we will be focusing on with our witnesses. 

Further, I would to ask our distinguished witnesses to summarize for the committee, what progress had been achieved toward 

meeting the strategic objectives before the President’s recent announcement that U.S. troops were being deployed to central Africa? 

On October 14, 2011, the President transmitted a report, consistent 

with the War Powers Resolution, informing the Congress that: ‘‘In 

furtherance of the Congress’ stated policy, I have authorized a 

small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central 

Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield.’’ He further 

stated: ‘‘Although the U.S. forces are combat equipped, they will 

only be providing information, advice, and assistance to partner nation forces, and they will not themselves engage LRA forces unless 

necessary for self-defense.’’

As the sole House committee of jurisdiction for the LRA Act and 

the primary committee of jurisdiction over the War Powers Act, it 

is incumbent upon us to ensure that this action complies with both 

the letter and the spirit of the law and further U.S. national security interests. Pertinent information related to this mission, such 

as the anticipated cost, the scope the duration of this deployment, 

was omitted from the report to Congress. We need clarity on the 

3

rules of engagement, the mission parameters, and the definition of 

success, as well as how U.S. military presence in central Africa furthers U.S. national security interests and the objectives outlined in 

the President’s November 2010 strategy. What is the precise nature of the assistance that will be provided to our partners, and 

how will these partners be vetted? Does the submission of the October 14th report to Congress start the clock on reporting and authorization requirements, consistent with the War Powers Resolution? If not, why? Does the administration interpret the LRA Act 

as an authorization of use of force? 

We intend to address these issues and more throughout the 

course of the hearing. 

Thank you to the Assistant Secretary Vershbow for attending 

and the Ambassador, for making yourselves available to testify on 

this very important issue today. We thank both of you, gentlemen. 

I now am pleased to recognize my good friend, Mr. Berman, the 

ranking member for his opening remarks. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Two 

weeks ago, the Obama administration announced that it would 

send about 100 U.S. military advisors to central Africa to support 

regional efforts to defeat the Lord’s Resistance Army or LRA. Following that announcement, many questions were raised about the 

deployment. Why the LRA? Why now? And what specific role will 

our forces play on the ground? This timely hearing provides an excellent opportunity to discuss those important issues. 

As noted in President Obama’s October 14th letter to the Speaker, and as reflected in the title of this hearing, it is Congress that 

played a leading role in putting the LRA on our foreign policy 

agenda. For years, the House and Senate passed resolutions drawing attention to the LRA’s reign of terror. And in 2010, as noted, 

Congress passed The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and 

Northern Uganda Recovery Act. That bipartisan legislation which 

President Obama signed into law, required the administration to 

develop a comprehensive strategy for dismantling the LRA and protecting civilians throughout the region. 

We’ve all heard about the horrors perpetrated by the LRA and 

its deranged leader, Joseph Kony: Mass killing, rape, mutilation of 

innocent civilians, children forced to kill their neighbors and family 

members, more than 20,000 children abducted and forced to become soldiers or sex slaves, nearly 2 million people displaced, and 

tens of thousands murdered. 

While the LRA may not pose a direct national security threat to 

the U.S. in narrowly-defined terms, it does threaten the stability 

of a large swath of central Africa, the size of California. This region 

includes South Sudan, the newest nation in the world, whose independence efforts the U.S. strongly supported; Uganda, one of America’s strongest allies in the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, alQaeda linked terrorist organization; the Central African Republic 

and the Democratic Republic of Congo, two countries that face significant challenges policing their territories and whose civilians are 

currently suffering the brunt of LRA’s atrocities. 

I believe it is squarely in our national interest to build the capacity of allied forces so that they can fight bad actors on their own 

4

and to support our allies when they need assistance as we expect 

them to do for us. 

The U.S. and the international community have long recognized 

that the LRA poses a serious threat to the stability of central Africa and have taken a number of steps to stop their barbaric behavior. In 2005, the International Criminal Court indicted Joseph 

Kony and three of his commanders for crimes against humanity. 

The U.S. placed the LRA on the terrorist exclusion list and Joseph 

Kony on the specially-designated global terrorist list. 

From 2006 to 2008, Uganda tried to negotiate a peace agreement 

with the group only to have Kony walk away from the final deal. 

Uganda, Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo then launched a joint military operation, but failed to apprehend Kony or stop the LRA. 

I’m very hopeful that the administration’s comprehensive strategy, including the deployment of a modest number of combatequipped advisors will finally help turn the tide in the struggle 

against the LRA. While most of the focus has been on the military 

dimension of the strategy, it’s important to remember that civilianled programs are also an integral part of this effort. These include 

constant diplomatic engagement with all of the central Africa countries to maintain strong cooperation; a robust demobilization, disarmament, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration program; effective public awareness campaigns to encourage child soldiers and 

mid-ranking LRA members to abandon the group; and reconstruction assistance for devastated communities. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the goals and 

expectations for the military deployment, as well as the details of 

these critical civilian efforts. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Berman, for your 

opening statement. I’m pleased to yield 3 minutes to Mr. Royce, the 

chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. The LRA has been 

pillaging central Africa for a generation now under the sadistic Joseph Kony. That group exists for one reason: To kill, capture and 

to resupply for the next plunder. There is no other reason for the 

Lord’s Resistance Army’s existence. And this savagery has landed 

Kony and his LRA on U.S. terrorism lists. His targets are children; 

70,000 girls and boys have been abducted and I must say it’s good 

to see Evelyn here. We appreciate her efforts on behalf of other abducted girls and boys. But one boy told how he was forced to kill 

eight other children. The victims were surrounded in a circle. Children were forced to take turns bashing them with a bat in a collective kill. Now if this is not a crime against humanity, I don’t know 

what is. And it was orchestrated by Kony. And with these horrors 

in mind, Congress passed legislation to counter the LRA threat. 

We pressed the administration to be bold, to develop a plan to 

help apprehend or remove Joseph Kony and his top commanders 

from the battlefield. A broad coalition of young activists was key 

to passing this legislation. So the administration is now sending 

small teams, specializing in training foreign units to give information and advice. This is the reason the U.S. Africa Command was 

5

created. This mission, which recognizes the need for a light footprint is targeted assistance. This is far from the peacekeeping 

model that has proven unsuccessful and wasteful elsewhere. 

The U.S. has made a big commitment in South Sudan. The LRA 

threatens to destabilize this new country. We provided humanitarian relief when LRA attacks forced millions to flee their homes. 

This deployment seeks to eliminate the root of these problems and 

the need for these commitments. 

The Africans aren’t sitting on their hands. The Ugandans are 

fighting al-Qaeda terrorists in Somalia, but they’d like some help 

getting Kony. That is a fair deal. Sometimes just getting rid of one 

person does make a big difference. History is full of captivating 

leaders with bad ideas who do great damage. Liberian Charles Taylor devastated neighboring Sierra Leone. And after his removal, the 

region is mainly peaceful. Kony’s removal won’t guarantee peace, 

but it is the one thing that makes peace possible in that region. We 

tried this mission once before against Kony in late 2008. Let’s succeed now at sidelining this terrorist. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. I’m 

pleased to yield 3 minutes to Mr. Payne, the ranking member on 

the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you very much for 

calling this very important hearing and Ranking Member Berman. 

After years of congressional bipartisan support and resounding 

support from the American people, the administration has taken 

action to bring an end to the predatory military group known as 

the Lord’s Resistance Army or the LRA. Over the last nearly 25 

years, the LRA has murdered, raped, abducted tens of thousands 

of innocent men, women, and children. In June 2011 alone, the 

LRA reportedly carried out as many as 52 attacks, killing 32 civilians and abducting 39 while looting the villages. I was in Uganda 

in the early ’90s when we heard about the Lord’s Resistance Army 

who at that time, with the support of Bashir from Sudan, was 

reaping havoc on the community. 

There is no doubt that without bold and sustained U.S. action, 

Joseph Kony, the brutal leader of the LRA and his gang, will increase their attacks on civilians and the abduction of children to 

be soldiers. Kony has taken advantage of the growing security vacuum in the LRA-affected areas and appears to be regrouping and 

reorganizing the LRA with the large number of senior commanders 

recently from the Central African Republic. 

In August, I traveled with CARE to eastern Congo where I met 

with women who were raped and sexual violence was used as a 

weapon of war by Joseph Kony. I spoke to women there who had 

been victimized and some of them lost their children, ages 11 and 

12, abducted from their villages. 

I’m looking forward to hearing from our witnesses today about 

the details of the deployment and the strategy that will be used. 

I was very pleased that my friend, Senator Inhofe, recently stated 

on the Senate floor the statement that the LRA must be eliminated. And he said that we are not at war with the LRA. The 

troops are specifically prohibited from any kind of combat aside 

from self defense. 

6

As you know, last year we passed the LRA Resistance, Disarmament in Northern Uganda Act and the bill directs the administration to develop a plan. The President announced expressly that 

the troops will follow the letter of the law. 

I have gotten in my District alone over 13,000 people who have 

called or have written saying that we should do something to eliminate this scourge from the face of the earth. And I strongly support 

the President’s action. We must eliminate this murderer of known 

people and we have a right to protect. I urge our Government to 

go after this with all earnest, with training the troops in Uganda 

to do the job. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne, for 

that eloquent statement. I will now yield 1 minute to any members 

who wish to make opening statements. Mr. Fortenberry had indicated that he would like to make an opening statement. He’s recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair, for convening this 

important and timely hearing. I believe that it’s important for the 

public to know that we never take lightly the use of military force 

and personnel around the world. But the U.S. forces are engaged 

in more than 50 countries around the world and more than 1,000 

forces are providing support in more than 20 African countries 

alone. 

Many Americans are rightly concerned about the magnitude of 

our military presence throughout the world, but I am hopeful that 

this limited military and technical assistance mission which has 

been discussed and approved on multiple occasions by the House 

and the Senate is critical to both our national security as well as 

global stability. 

Unfortunately, I fear there is widespread information about the 

current mission and even a defense of the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

This body and good Americans watching the hearing right now 

know that the Lord’s Resistance Army has terrorized central Africa 

with impunity for more than 25 years. It’s leader, Joseph Kony, is 

a war criminal guilty of unspeakable crimes. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Thank you. 

Mr. Carnahan is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member 

Berman for holding this hearing regarding the U.S. Government’s 

strategy to end atrocities of the Lord’s Resistance Army in central 

Africa. With the administration’s recent deployment of 100 military 

advisors to the region, this hearing is especially timely and helpful. 

The LRA led by Joseph Kony has terrorized civilian populations 

in Uganda, Southern Sudan, Central African Republic and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo for over two decades. Its tactics 

have included the employment of child soldiers, sexual violence, 

widespread killings, abductions and enslavement. The United Nations estimates that 385,000 people have been displaced as a result 

of LRA brutality. 

Last Congress, this body took an important step in passing the 

LRA Disarmament in Northern Uganda Recovery Act reaffirming 

the U.S. efforts to support regional partners in combating the LRA. 

7

The deployment of military advisors is but one pillar of the comprehensive strategy. I look forward to an update on this broader 

approach including humanitarian assistance, reconciliation and reintegration of post-conflict recovery. 

Madam Chair, I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. I’m very 

pleased to yield my friend, Ms. Buerkle, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, Madam Chair. In the last decade, the 

LRA has killed thousands of innocent civilians, displaced hundreds 

of thousands of people and most horrifically, used thousands of abducted children to carry out its campaign of terror against the people of Uganda and their neighbors in central Africa. 

The President’s recent authorization of combat-equipped U.S. 

forces to deploy in central Africa to work with regional partners toward the removal of Joseph Kony is ostensibly in support of the 

2010 strategic objectives. 

I look forward to hearing the perspectives from our witnesses 

here this morning on the wisdom and on the effectiveness of the 

proposed actions involving U.S. forces in central Africa. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentlelady. Mr. Connolly 

of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

our witnesses today. The LRA is a destabilizing presence in Africa. 

And the decision by the President to dispatch 100 military advisors 

to assist in the effort to address that threat is consistent, it seems 

to me, with congressional intent in the passage of previous legislation. 

It is important and we need to hear in the testimony today, however, exactly what the rules of engagement are going to be and how 

the United States in a very specific and targeted way, which I certainly support, can be of assistance without being dragged into 

somebody else’s right in central Africa. The President has demonstrated leadership in Libya in the fight against terrorism and I 

think he’s demonstrated leadership here in this limited strategic 

and targeted intervention. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. Mr. Manzullo, the 

chair of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific is recognized for 

1 minute. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this 

important hearing. The LRA is, without a doubt, a heinous and 

horrible group that have brutally murdered, tortured, and raped 

hundreds of thousands of people in Uganda, in the border regions 

between the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. In their reign of terror is obviously welcome our concern regarding the President’s report to Congress is that this mission may be an expansion of U.S. military 

presence in a role that does not directly bolster the national security of our nation. The announcement that this was occurring, I believe came out on a Friday afternoon just before members were 

breaking for a week to go back for our District work periods. 

8

I have a lot of concerns, a lot of anxious moments about whether 

or not the number of troops will grow to 200, 300 or even more. 

With this in mind and despite having these concerns I’ll try to reserve judgment of this deployment until there’s more information 

regarding the size and the scope of the operation including an exit 

strategy. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman. And now the 

chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First, I would like to 

welcome Donald Yamamoto. He is the Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for African Affairs. He previously served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from November 2006 to July 2009; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and 

the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006; and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Djibouti from 2000 to 2003. We thank you 

for being here, Mr. Ambassador. 

And then we will welcome Mr. Alexander Vershbow. He is currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs, ISA. Prior to his appointment he served as U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1998 to 2001; 

U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 2001 to 2005; and 

U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2005 to 2008. 

I’d like to kindly remind our witnesses to keep your oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes and without objection, the witnesses’ written statements will be inserted into the record. We will 

begin with you, Mr. Ambassador Yamamoto. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD YAMAMOTO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you so very much, Madam Chairwoman, 

Congressman Berman, and the honored members of this committee. Thank you so very much for having this hearing here today 

on a very important and very difficult topic and for the opportunity 

to brief this committee on the implementation of the on-going U.S. 

strategy to help our regional partners mitigate, eliminate the 

threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

We are deeply grateful for Congress’ widespread bipartisan support for the LRA Disarmament in Northern Uganda Recovery Act 

that was signed last year. The legislation sent a very strong message, not only the support of Congress, but of the American people 

that we will help to protect civilians and bring an end to the LRA 

threat. 

We also want to express our deep appreciation to the hundreds 

of thousands of Americans who have sent and mobilized and expressed their concern for the communities under siege by the LRA 

and also the people who are here today and those who have the 

courage to stand up to the atrocities of the LRA. 

For two decades the LRA has terrorized innocent people across 

central Africa. The LRA has filled its ranks with abducting tens of 

thousands of children and forcing them to become child soldiers 

and sex slaves. From 2005 to 2006, the LRA moved from Uganda 

into the more remote border regions of Central Africa Republic, the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo, and what is now known as the 

9

Republic of Southern Sudan. In that region, the LRA has continued 

to commit atrocities. The United Nations estimates that over 

385,000 people are currently displaced in this region as a result of 

the LRA activities and according to the U.N., there have been over 

250 attacks attributed to the LRA this year alone. 

Over the recent years, regional militaries have worked together 

to pursue the LRA across a vast area of densely forested and difficult jungle terrain. They have had some success in reducing the 

LRA’s numbers and keeping them from regrouping. However, as 

long as the LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony, and other top commanders 

remain at large, the LRA will continue to pose its serious regional 

threat which undermines stability and development. 

In its report to Congress in November 2010, our strategy centers 

on four areas: The increased protection of civilians, apprehension 

and removal of Joseph Kony and his senior LRA commanders from 

the battlefield, the promotion of defections from the LRA and support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters, and finally, the provision of continued humanitarian relief to afflicted areas. 

Over the past year, the United States has continued to work with 

the United Nations, the African Union, and the regional governments to sustain and increase diplomatic and military pressure on 

the LRA. We have provided logistical support, training to the regional militaries pursuing the LRA. The United States has a strong 

interest in supporting our partners in the region to develop their 

capacity and to address the threats to peace and security posed by 

the LRA. 

The United States is now deploying U.S. military advisors to improve our support to the regional coalition, to increase the likelihood of successful military operations against the LRA. And I 

would defer to my colleague, Ambassador Vershbow in the Department of Defense to describe the details of those operations. 

We continue to consult with all the regional leaders and they 

have all said, granted their consent for the deployment of these advisors to the field. Remember, this is a short-term deployment with 

specific goals and objectives. We believe the U.S. advisors can provide critical capabilities to help regional forces succeed. We will 

regularly review and assess whether the advisors’ effort is sufficient to enhance the regional effort to justify continued deployment. 

Our Ambassadors and Embassy staff will work closely with these 

advisors and make sure that they are sensitive to civilian protection consideration and local regional political dynamics. The State 

Department has also deployed an officer to the region to help coordinate all of our efforts in the field to counter the LRA with the 

work of the advisors. 

The administration is funding projects to help communities in 

the DRC that involve protection plans and join an early warning 

network. This includes setting up high frequency radios and cell 

phone towers. The same kind of early warning and basic telecommunication capacity does not yet exist across the border in the 

CAR. We recognize this gap and we hope to work with our partners 

over the coming year to help address this. 

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We will continue to call on the LRA fighters to peacefully disarm 

and leave the organization ranks and to come home. And currently, 

there are about 12,000 who have done so. 

Over the coming months, we will continue to work with the regional governments to ensure that the rank-and-file fighters and 

abductees who escape the LRA have the necessary support to be reunited with their families and reintegrated into normal society. 

Madam Chairwoman, again, we appreciate and we are grateful 

to you and the members of both the House and the Senate for this 

bipartisan support in countering the LRA. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Ambassador Vershbow. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Congressman 

Berman, and distinguished members of the committee. I want 

thank you all for inviting me today to discuss with you our efforts 

to assist the central African militaries encountering the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

As has already been mentioned, there are four pillars to the administration’s comprehension strategy to help our regional partners 

end the threat posted by the LRA. The second of these is the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and other top LRA commanders 

from the battlefield. That’s the focus of DoD’s efforts and will be 

the focus of my remarks this morning. 

The Ugandan military in cooperation with other regional militaries has been pursuing the LRA for several years. They’ve reduced the LRA’s strength significantly. The LRA has moved out of 

northern Uganda completely. It’s now operating in small groups 

across the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African 

Republic and South Sudan. While weakened, LRA leader Joseph 

Kony and other top commanders remain at large and they continue 

to direct the group’s members to commit unspeakable atrocities. 

So consistent with the LRA Act and with the consent of the regional governments, we have deployed a small number of U.S. military personnel to the LRA-affected area to advise and assist the regional forces who are pursuing the LRA. 

The personnel deploying under this mission will travel out to 

field locations with the regional forces where they will work in an 

advisory and liaison role. These U.S. personnel, which are primarily U.S. Army Special Forces, will collaborate with the regional 

militaries engaged in the counter LRA effort to strengthen information sharing, operational cooperation and overall effectiveness. 

While the Department of Defense isn’t in the lead with regard 

to the other pillars of the President’s strategy, our advisors working alongside regional forces will be sensitive to the challenges of 

civilian protection and they’ll work to ensure that protection considerations are incorporated into operational planning by our partners. They’ll also seek to encourage defections and to strengthen 

the relationships in sharing of information between regional militaries and local populations, officials, and humanitarian actors. 

The approach we’re undertaking reflects lessons learned from 

prior regional operations in pursuit of the LRA and it is designed 

to fill key capabilities gaps by enhancing regional forces’ ability to 

fuse intelligence with operational planning. This approach will deliver maximum operational impact while exposing U.S. forces to 

minimum risk. Although roughly 100 personnel will ultimately deploy for this mission, we expect that only a portion of the personnel 

will directly advise and assist forces in the field pursuing the LRA. 

Most of the U.S. personnel will carry out logistical and other functions to support the advisors. 

16

To be clear, U.S. forces deploying to this mission will not themselves engage LRA forces, but given the potential need to defend 

themselves, they will be equipped for combat. That’s why consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the administration provided a formal report to Congress on their deployment. 

We appreciate the strong congressional interest in and support 

for this effort and we are committed to continuing to engage with 

the Congress to keep you informed about the progress of our effort 

as it moves forward. I would say that this is a great example of 

a joint initiative between the Executive and Legislative branches. 

Despite the strong bipartisan support, we know that there are 

still many questions. Many of them were posed by you, Madam 

Chairman, and by Mr. Berman at the outset. I’d like to address 

several of these questions in the remainder of my remarks. 

First regarding the purpose and timing of the deployment, we’re 

providing advisors to the regional forces because Joseph Kony and 

the other senior leaders have proven unwilling to end the conflict 

peacefully and have continued to commit atrocities against innocent civilians. As you know, there was an opportunity for a negotiated peace agreement during the Juba talks in 2006, 2008, but 

they ended when Kony refused to sign and conducted new attacks 

and abductions. So regional governments have had to continue to 

pursue a military approach to end the LRA threat. 

As for our regional partners, we have provided significant assistance to the region’s militaries in recent years, training the 391st 

Battalion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s armed forces, 

assisting in professionalization of the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Army, providing equipment to the armed forces of the Central African Republic and supporting the Ugandan People’s Defense Force, 

so it can both counter the LRA and maintain its critical presence 

in Somalia. But we think despite the assistance to date, the Ugandan and other regional militaries would benefit from increased capacity to acquire and process actionable information on the locations of LRA leaders and to convert that information quickly into 

operational plans. 

The U.S. advisors deploying for the operation have the right skill 

sets to help address these capability shortfalls and the specific timing of the deployment was predicated in part upon the availability 

of the approach U.S. forces. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vershbow follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Maybe we’ll get to the 

rest. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Measuring success and what is the U.S. national 

interest. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We’ll ask you about that. Thank you 

very much. Thank you to both of you for excellent testimony. We 

will begin our question and answer segment now. 

I wanted to ask you if the President’s October 14, 2011 report to 

the Congress transmitted consistent with the War Powers Resolution trigger the reporting and authorization requirements under 

Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution and if not, why? 

And secondly, what is the anticipated scope, duration and cost of 

this deployment and from where in the budget will those costs be 

absorbed? And how does this deployment square with the Department of Defense’s effort to cut $350 billion over the next 10 years. 

And the Secretary’s suggestion to the House Armed Services Committee that cuts may force DoD to pull back from Africa. 

Ambassador Vershbow? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Madam Chairman, on the war powers issues, I 

think the reason why we made the notification was based on one 

simple fact, that the nature of the weapons that our forces are carrying for self defense are considered—make those forces considered 

to be equipped for combat, a phrase that is in the War Powers Resolution itself. So even though they’re not going to be engaging in 

combat, but only carrying those weapons for self defense, the fact 

that they’re equipped for combat triggered the requirement to file 

a report to Congress when they are going to be entering the territory of a foreign nation. 

I don’t know if Don may have more on the legal aspects of that. 

I’m not a lawyer, but we can give you a more detailed response for 

the record, a full legal analysis. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. We would appreciate it because we 

have some of our members and I have many questions about the 

legal analysis of when the War Powers Act is triggered and what 

in this operation would constitute that and your interpretation of 

it. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Okay, we will do that. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Then on the cost, the scope, the duration, and from where these monies will be coming. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well first, I think that the clear goal for this advisory mission is to enhance the capacity of the regional forces so 

that they can better protect their civilians, track down Joseph 

Kony, and end the threat posed by the LRA. So I think we will be 

measuring success in a number of ways. We’ll be looking to see 

whether the regional forces are able to successfully apprehend or 

remove top LRA commanders from the battlefield. That would be 

a very clear-cut measure of success, whether we can encourage 

larger numbers of defections from the LRA, whether we can see a 

substantial reduction in LRA attacks, and whether we can see a 

visible and measurable degree of professionalization of the forces 

engaged in this effort so that they have greater capacity, both to 

protect their citizens and conduct counter-LRA operations. 

But we have made very clear that this is not an open-ended commitment. As part of the decision to deploy our advisors, we have 

23

agreed that there would be a review after several months in order 

to assess whether our advisors are making sufficient progress for 

our objectives. Continuing this deployment is conditional on a number of factors including a sustained commitment and sustained cooperation by the regional governments in addressing the LRA 

threat. So it is not open ended. We don’t have a specific time line 

that we’ve adopted. As I said, we will be reviewing the state of affairs. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. I don’t know that that 

answered the question, but we’ll follow up with that. This has been 

going on sadly for so many years. What assurances can you offer 

that we won’t be in this entrenched and expanded protracted conflict, as you point out? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think that we’ve already seen a lot of progress 

by the Ugandan and other regional militaries in conducting this 

mission and reducing the LRA’s numbers, inhibiting their efforts to 

regroup. So we think we’re building on a fairly strong foundation 

here. But we do, as I said in my remarks, feel that the regional 

forces have been limited by their capacity to acquire and process 

actionable information and so that giving them the greater skills 

in terms of fusing intelligence with operational plans could create 

a significant improvement in their ability to track the leaders and 

hopefully take Kony and other leaders off of the battlefield. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. So I look forward to getting some written responses about the cost, the scope, the duration, 

where the funds are coming and about triggering the War Powers 

Act. So if you could provide that in writing, I’d be very grateful. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Okay. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. Just a 

few points. On the issue raised by the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. 

Manzullo, regarding briefing, the fact is that the administration 

pursuant to congressional law prepared a strategy which specifically included references to a military objective to remove Joseph 

Kony and his top commanders from the battlefield and U.S. assistance in achieving that. It was a public document done almost a 

year ago and that doesn’t even go into any classified private briefings on more specific subjects. So this has been out there for almost 

a year. 

Secondly, I’d like to ask a few questions. First, the historically 

tense relationship between Uganda and Democratic Republic of the 

Congo, in light of that, do you see a Ugandan military as the force 

leading operations in DRC or will we have some of our Special 

Forces working with the DRC’s 391st Battalion that was trained by 

AFRICOM? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Congressman Berman. 

On the issue of Kony militarily, I think we need to focus that the 

approach is a multi-faceted comprehensive approach, not only militarily, but it has to be also addressing the problems with the crises 

from the victims who have been——

Mr. BERMAN. I understand that, but——

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The other issue is politically is to help politically, militarily, and economically, all these countries that are victims of Kony, to coordinate much better to go after Kony. 

24

Mr. BERMAN. Will our forces be working with the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s 391st Battalion? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That’s correct. 

Mr. BERMAN. Yes? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. That’s correct. And in that effort, we have, 

the State Department, has trained the 391st Battalion. They’re 

right now on the border area. The issue of Ugandan troops in the 

area, it has to be a coordination between the DRC and the Ugandan troops. And of course, the issue of sovereignty is to coordinate 

the work between those two forces and how they will corner Kony’s 

forces and how they would eliminate. 

The issue is—I’ll give you one example. When we transferred the 

MONUC which was the DRC peacekeeping operations to 

MONUSCO, in there was one aspect of having a focus on the LRA 

and better coordination between these two forces. And that’s something that we’ve been trying to do over the last decade. 

Mr. BERMAN. Do you envision that our advisors will be deployed 

at the brigade level, at the platoon level? Are they authorized to 

be deployed with Ugandan forces in the field? Or is this more of 

a headquarters deployment? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Thank you. As Ambassador Yamamoto said first 

of all, anything we do will be based on full coordination and consent on the part of the respective governments. And while they’ve 

all come out in support of this initiative, we take nothing for granted. There will be continuing consultation to ensure that any steps 

we take to execute will be with their consent. 

So it’s certainly within the concept of operations that we would 

deploy forces forward into the DRC, possibly at the platoon level 

and/or at the headquarters level. It’s what would be most effective 

and what our partners——

Mr. BERMAN. There’s no artificial constraint on where you might 

deploy then? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. No. But there will be full consultation. 

Mr. BERMAN. I understand. But they could well be deployed at 

the platoon level in the field? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. That’s right. It’s still in an advisory and assistance role. 

Mr. BERMAN. I understand. What will the trainers be equipped 

with, our military trainers and advisors? When you say they’re 

going to be combat equipped, that’s what triggered the report. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I’d have to give you a specific answer after the 

hearing for the record. I mean they will basically be carrying small 

arms for their own self protection and there may be other communications gear of course. But beyond that, I think I’d like to consult 

with my colleagues back in the Joint Staff to give you a more specific answer for the record. 

Mr. BERMAN. Okay, thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I would encourage the esteemed Ambassadors to be a little more precise about the answers 

to the questions that we’re posing, but thank you for getting it for 

us later. 

Mr. Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade is recognized for his questions. 

25

Mr. ROYCE. The question I was going to ask has to do with the 

reality on the ground that the Ugandans have been doing some 

pretty heavy lifting in Somalia. They’ve been fighting and dying 

there, and given that effort, I’ve heard concerns that they might be 

a little distracted on the follow through on this. Obviously you have 

a different read. 

Can you tell me your discussions with Uganda’s Ambassador and 

how you read their willingness on this? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I did met with President Museveni on separate 

issues, but on this issue as well. We have had very close discussions with President Museveni as well as the other leaders. President Museveni is fighting a multi-frontal conflict, not only the LRA 

but also AMASOM in Somalia. It does not mean that he has lost 

or he is distracted because of these two conflicts. He is equally focused on both areas and both fronts. And on the LRA and the violence that has been perpetrated against Uganda that still sits very 

much in the psyche of the Ugandan people. When you still have 1.8 

million who are displaced in the northern part, you still have 

66,000 kids who are——

Mr. ROYCE. We understand that. But to the extent that we can 

keep him focused on this is going to be part of our task and then 

the other question is about Ugandans operating in Congolese territory. How are we planning to address this? Are you able to dialogue with the Congolese on that issue? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. We spoke to President Kabila and we’re trying to do processes in which he and President Museveni will arrange how these forces will coordinate their forces against the LRA. 

Mr. ROYCE. What steps are you taking to try to improve intelligence, because that’s been one of the big failings in the past, one 

of the missing pieces on the location of Kony and his commanders? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The issue is trying to get the intelligence that 

each of these countries have and then to fuse it together and then 

to analyze it and that’s why the U.S. military will be very helpful 

in that effort. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me suggest though that that is somewhat limited, their intelligence is somewhat limited. You’ve got the ability 

to utilize leaflets, radios, in order to try to get defectors. To the extent that you can get defectors out of the LRA, your boots on the 

ground are going to be able to advise and direct the Congolese and 

Ugandans. Will U.S. personnel be deployed in that kind of an effort? I would suggest it would be wise to do so. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. The U.S. forces will be able to help advise and 

train the indigenous forces, improving their skills in terms of civil 

affairs, outreach to local communities, encouraging as you suggested, Congressman, that people provide tips to the forces, early 

warning. 

Mr. ROYCE. We need better intel than we had in 2008 on that 

mission. And to do that, we’re going to have to drive the intelligence-gathering capacity by getting defectors to come in and give 

us the information needed for that mission. 

The Army Special Forces teams specializing in training foreign 

units are going to provide advice and assistance to these units. My 

expectation would be that you would have some at the platoon 

level, but I would imagine the bulk of them would be back in UganVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:44 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\102511\70947 HFA PsN: SHIRL
26

da coordinating the logistics and the intelligence and the communications. Would that be correct? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Yes, Congressman. The bulk of the overall 

roughly 100 people would be in Uganda, but small teams would deploy forward in partnership with the local forces to sort of help 

them improve their skills on the front line. 

Mr. ROYCE. And Special Operations Command Africa is headed 

by Rear Admiral Brian Losey. He’s a Navy SEAL who previously 

commanded U.S. forces in the Horn, so he knows the region well. 

Is he assigned to oversee this operation? I was wondering how that 

would be engineered. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I believe that is the case. It is under the overall 

direction of SOCAF, yes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I yield back, Madam Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Royce. Mr. 

Payne, the ranking member of Africa, Global Health, and Human 

Rights Subcommittee is recognized. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. As I mentioned, I was at an 

IDP camp last month and visited with people from villages that 

had been disrupted by the LRA and they were in Goma. So we see 

the destruction that is continuing on. I think a number of people 

wonder well why are we going after the LRA and why should we 

care about Uganda? 

I think we all know that Uganda has tremendous number of 

troops in Somalia. I had the chance to go to Mogadishu several 

years ago and saw them. As a matter of fact, I was escorted by the 

Ugandan troops throughout Mogadishu and they were doing an excellent job and I think that we have somewhat of a responsibility 

because of the fact that al-Qaeda is supporting Al-Shabaab. It was 

al-Qaeda that destroyed the USS Cole off of Yemen and so it’s all 

connected. We wonder, well, why do we have any concern? 

It’s very clear why we ought to be there and the fact that Kenya 

now is being attacked by al-Qaeda because of them going after Somalis. The Kenyan Embassy was bombed because Kenya voted 

with the United States most of the times in the U.N., all the time, 

and was one of the strongest supporters of the U.S. democracy 

around the country. And therefore they were the target where hundreds and hundreds of Kenyans died, and the same thing with 

Tanzania, because of our relationship. So I think this business is 

kind of intertwined and I think that when countries are going out 

to support our causes around the world, I think at least we have 

a reciprocal for having 100 U.S. troops train folks there. 

I just want to ask quickly, Ambassador Yamamoto, what impact 

will the elections in DRC have? How is that going and will any of 

this disruption of LRA impact on the election there? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The elections in the DRC are very, very tight. 

It’s not clear whether President Kabila could be reelected or the 

presence of the opposition from Tshisekedi to the others. The issue 

comes in as the commitment on the LRA operations by the DRC 

and Uganda still remains pivotal and we’ve discussed this closely 

with President Kabila and President Museveni. 

Mr. PAYNE. What about President Bashir in Sudan? As you 

know, Bashir supported the LRA and its formation. That’s when alQaeda was in Sudan. Bashir supported al-Qaeda and LRA toVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:44 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\102511\70947 HFA PsN: SHIRL
27

gether. Is there any evidence that Bashir government is supporting 

LRA today? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We have not seen any of the intelligence or evidence since about the middle of 2002 and beyond. We have been, 

obviously, had very close discussions with the Sudanese military 

issue, but we’ve not seen evidence that there is support. 

Mr. PAYNE. And what about the LRA’s activity in Southern 

Sudan? As this new country is trying to put together its government, are the LRA there in any large numbers? And what has the 

SPLM been able to do? And will they be a part of the training? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The LRA has been operating in Southern Sudan. 

Of course, the 285,000 who are displaced, part of them are in 

Southern Sudan as well as the CAR and DRC. But the forces of the 

LRA which is now depleted to probably around 150 to 200 core 

fighters, 800 total accompanying people, are either in the CAR or 

DRC area. 

Mr. PAYNE. And what about a special advisor to the Great Lakes 

Region that’s been suggested. I didn’t use the word special envoy, 

but a special advisor. Is this in the making and what’s the prospect 

of that? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We are taking it under advisement, very serious 

advisement based on your recommendations, Congressman, and 

from your committee. 

Mr. PAYNE. And the fact that we know that there’s an expansion 

of mobile phones and FM radios, will you be using that technology 

to try to get words out to ask for deflection from LRA fighters? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That’s correct, sir. The US AID has provided cell 

towers and the use of cell phones and right now they’re using UHF 

radios, but the cell towers now are—the communities are calling in 

on a regular basis to say where the LRA is located, so better communications and better coordination. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Mr. Duncan of 

South Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Back in the spring 

in March or April, the Deputy National Security Advisor Ben 

Rhodes was talking about the Libya involvement and he said this, 

‘‘I think what we’re doing is enforcing a resolution that has a very 

clear set of goals which is protecting the Libyan people, averting 

a humanitarian crisis in setting up a no-fly zone. Obviously, that 

involves kinetic military action, particularly on the front end. But 

again, the nature of our commitment is that we are not getting into 

an open-ended war, a land invasion in Libya.’’

And according to STRATFOR Global Intelligence, since 2008, the 

U.S. has helped finance regional military efforts to capture LRA 

commanders where the U.S. has spent $497 million strengthening 

the Ugandan army. Presently, the LRA is estimated to have somewhere between 200 and 400 fighters which lacks the numbers, I 

think, or the weapons from what I understand for a sophisticated 

insurgency. So as we delve into this, I have to ask myself and ask 

you guys today before deciding to deploy approximately 100 U.S. 

military personnel, did the administration receive a request from 

Uganda, the DRC, CAR or the African Union to provide this assistance? I’ll ask Ambassador Vershbow. 

28

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, this has been a continuing effort, as you’ve 

just said, Congressman. We’ve been working in partnership with 

the regional states and they have, I think, welcomed the assistance 

to date and I think they’ve been indicating that additional support 

would be needed. 

We looked at the experience from 2008 when we did provide advisors to Uganda at the request. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Did they specifically ask for boots on the ground, 

American personnel? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think they understood, as we have judged, that 

they lack this critical capability of fusing intelligence with the operational plans that have been the main handicap to finishing the 

job. They have made substantial progress in degrading the LRA, 

but they’re still out there. They’re still committing atrocities. So I 

think they indicated that they would welcome this kind of handson training. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So what we’re doing is training, mainly. No predator drones, no—could you define kinetic military action? I’m struggling with that term. What does that mean? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I understand the term kinetic to mean the use 

of actual lethal force. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Did we use kinetic military action in Libya which 

was lethal force? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. At the front end of the operation, we used considerable kinetic force to take out the air defenses of Libya as part 

of the first week or 2 weeks of the operation. Then most of the kinetic activity was carried out by our partners and NATO allies who 

conducted the lion’s share of the air strikes in the civil protection 

mission. 

We did continue, when necessary, to support the suppression of 

enemy air defenses. And we did, on occasion, use armed predators 

for specific targets that no other ally had the capability to hit. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Did we in this action and in Uganda, did we garner 

tangible financial or military support from other countries such as 

the U.K. and France, like we did in Libya or are we there alone? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. There has been assistance by our partners. I 

would defer to my colleague who may know more. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Is this a NATO action, I guess——

Mr. VERSHBOW. This is a U.S. initiative, but there’s been other 

assistance over the years. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes, we have very careful coordinations, French 

in CAR, the U.K. in Uganda, but yes, that’s true in the sense that 

we’re providing the bulk of the assistance as far as the military 

training, etcetera. The other donor communities are doing the other 

parts on humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation, reconciliation. 

Mr. DUNCAN. How long do we anticipate the U.S. forces being 

there? Do we have some sort of time table at all? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. We don’t have a specific time table. We are talking, I think, months, but I wouldn’t put a number on it at this 

point. But we will review the operation in a few months to see 

whether it’s achieving the desired effect through this enhanced 

qualitative change in the nature of the training that we’re providing and to see whether it’s having effects on the ground in terms 

of further eroding the LRA. 

29

Mr. DUNCAN. What do you define as success? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think we define success first and foremost on 

the basis of whether Kony and other commanders are actually captured, whether we see further fracturing of the LRA and more defections, whether we see tangible improvement in our partners’ capacities out in the field to succeed and that includes not just the 

kinetic parts of it, but in terms of whether they are also more capable of engaging with the local population to develop the climate in 

which people report on and turn in LRA sympathizers. 

Mr. DUNCAN. When we put Americans in harm’s way like this, 

I think we need to be very clear what we do. We need to be very 

clear when the President comes to Congress with the War Powers 

Resolution and I’m out of time, so I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Carnahan is 

recognized. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I wanted to start with really a general 

question about how the U.S. is working with the international and 

regional partners to strengthen coordination. In particular, what 

are the strategies and approaches, both diplomatically and otherwise that the U.S. Government is utilizing to ensure a more effective collaboration among key actors to counter LRA efforts. And let 

me start with Ambassador Yamamoto. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. In that effort, we have not only been talking directly to the Presidents Kabila, Bozize, Salva Kiir and Museveni, 

at that level, but also within their command structures, militarily, 

as well as diplomatically to see how we can coordinate better on 

our efforts, not just militarily, but comprehensively against the 

LRA. That’s the first of it. 

The second thing is that we’re talking to the African Union, to 

regional groups, as well as to the donor community, to see how we 

can all bring to bear some of our own specific assets that we have. 

For instance, we will do the military training program, U.K., 

France, others are doing humanitarian programs. The African 

Union is doing a lot on coordination from other countries. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And Ambassador Vershbow? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, I would also add that what we’re doing in 

this specific case is a subset of the broader efforts that we are making throughout Africa to promote professionalization of militaries, 

to promote capacity of the African countries to solve their own 

problems. And part of that is to invite countries to participate in 

both bilateral and multi-national training and exercises which 

would hopefully inculcate a greater pattern of cooperation among 

them. I think this initiative in addition to hopefully achieving the 

specific goal of taking Joseph Kony off the battlefield will also encourage greater military cooperation among the four key states involved that would be a factor for longer term stability in the region 

so that we don’t have to intervene in the future. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Let me next turn, I guess a more particular 

question for these operations. Is this, in your opinion, a unique 

model that is being used in central Africa? Or is this comparable 

to some other operations like in southern Philippines? Chairman 

Rohrabacher led a delegation there a few months ago where we got 

to see a unique operation there where a limited number of U.S. 

30

military were advising, not engaging in combat, but trying to be 

very focused on the safe havens and training campus there. 

Again, is this a unique model? Is this drawing on some other experiences in other places that have worked? And let me start with 

Ambassador Vershbow. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, this is not a unique model in the 

sense that training and equipping partner forces is something that 

we’ve done for many years in many parts of the world. My experience, if you look at my bio, is more in Europe. We’ve had training 

and equip programs to train the Bosnian armed forces after the 

Dayton Accords. We helped train the Georgia armed forces to try 

to deal with terrorist forces in the border regions with the Russian 

Federation. So each mission is tailored to the specific circumstances and the requirements of the partner involved. But this 

sort of advice and assist so that they can then deal with the problem more effectively and more professionally is a well-established 

model that has proven its value. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And Ambassador Yamamoto? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And I think it’s in the context of if you look at 

Africa as far as really good cooperation and coordination between 

the Department of Defense and Department of State and looking 

at how we can do training on not on a specific area, but also continent wide. For instance, as you know, the State Department has 

trained about 160,000 troops for peacekeeping operations in 24 

countries. We use that also with the Department of Defense for 

guidance and advice and coordination. In this context as well, you 

have the State Department helping to do diplomatic coordination 

or doing also assistance as far as money-wise to provide logistical 

support and of course, DoD is providing the actual individuals to 

do some training. So those are issues that were kind of a model for 

this area, but also we’re looking at other areas and parts of Africa. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. Ms. 

Schmidt of Ohio is recognized. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you very much. Ambassador Vershbow, I 

read your report and I’m a little confused by it. In one point, on 

page four, you refer to this as really nothing more than what we 

already do with AFRICOM that we have in place in Africa; and I’ve 

been over there and I’ve studied it, and that’s basically, unless I’m 

wrong, an educational tool that we use to help African nations develop a more professional military. We also do some building of 

schools and hospitals on the ground. But you add in your report 

that the reason why we had to go, why the President had to go to 

Congress, is because there might be a potential need to defend 

themselves, the troops that are on the ground, and so, therefore, 

the War Powers Resolution was put in place. 

What confuses me is this: Is this what we do under AFRICOM 

or is this different, because under AFRICOM there’s always the 

danger that they might have to defend themselves so there 

wouldn’t have to be any need to come to Congress and say the War 

Powers Act may be invoked? Or, are we really, and not just anticipating, but expecting some conflict to arise, so that this is a heads 

up? That’s question number one. 

31

Question number two, in the report you said that you felt we 

would be asking about the purpose and the timing of the deployment and how we are going to judge success of the mission, and 

yet I didn’t hear any real clear answers as to what success is or 

the timing of this deployment. 

And my final is this: I think we should, somebody should know 

what the cost is per day for these troops to be on the ground, just 

real costs right now and anticipated costs if they have to go into 

combat. So those are my questions. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Thank you, Congressman. Good questions. I’m 

sorry if my statement confused you a bit. I think that when we say 

that this is not fundamentally different from previous AFRICOM 

missions it’s because the overall concept of training and advising 

and assisting partner forces is kind of the watchword of U.S. 

AFRICOM. We do it in other parts of the world, too, but I think 

we have a particular——

Ms. SCHMIDT. Right, we’ve created AFRICOM because we wanted 

specific attention to the region. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. More attention and help develop a greater expertise of how to deal with the region than we have by borrowing 

forces from other combatant commanders. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Exactly. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. This is a little different though in some of the 

specifics in the sense that we don’t always put our advisors and 

trainers in the field with the forces that are going to be carrying 

out the actual military operations and that’s what in this specific 

case led to the judgment by our military planners and commanders 

and then by the President when he approved this that despite their 

mission not including any engagement in combat, they could be in 

a hostile environment in some circumstances and that they should 

be carrying the kinds of weapons needed to defend themselves. And 

that’s what, in turn, triggered the war powers notification. But we 

don’t anticipate that they’ll get into the midst of conflict, but I don’t 

want to exclude that possibility. But they will have the capacity to 

defend themselves if the need should arise. 

In terms of defining success, I think beyond the very specific 

metric of capturing or killing Joseph Kony and other commanders, 

it’s going to be a judgment call as to whether our partners are 

making substantial gains, they’re making effective use of the additional training, that they’ve learned this fusion of intelligence and 

operational planning that we think is the missing piece that has 

prevented them from going from reducing the LRA to actually 

eliminating the threat. 

But we will consult with the Congress and inform you of our assessment of the operation as it unfolds because as I said, this is 

a unique example of executive legislative collaboration, so we want 

to work with you all the way along. 

In terms of the cost, I apologize for not having the bottom line. 

I can actually say more about some of the State Department expenses than the DoD expenses. U.S. AFRICOM is drawing on existing operations and maintenance funding to support the operation, 

but we’re still working on an overall cost assessment to give you 

that day-by-day estimate and we will provide it to the committee 

once that estimate has been refined. 

32

Ms. SCHMIDT. I’m almost out of time. Do you have any idea when 

we’re going to get that cost? I mean is it tomorrow, the next day? 

It should be relatively easy. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I don’t want to give you a specific commitment. 

We’ll try to get it to you very soon. 

Ms. SCHMIDT. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Schmidt. Mr. Connolly 

is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I’m sure Mr. Assistant Secretary, you can understand the sensitivity up here about 

the cost of military operations. The previous administration low 

balled the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan and here we are well in excess of $1 trillion later, a significant contributor to the United 

States debt which so many of my colleagues express concern about. 

And yet, we accepted false assurances or very loose assurances 

about the cost of those engagements. 

I think it’s a reasonable question to ask, what is this going to 

cost? or what is your estimate of what it’s going to cost? and to get 

that information obviously in a timely fashion. Let me ask, what 

is the rationale for putting troops, U.S. military advisors into 

Uganda? What is the goal? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, Congressman, first of all, I’ll reiterate, 

we’ll get you the cost figures as soon as we can. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. But this will certainly be much more modest 

than the costs of actual combat operations. As for the reasons why 

we’re there, I think there’s a continued threat to civilians and 

threat to stability in the region. We think that this very discrete, 

specific increase in the scale and form of our military assistance 

can make a difference in ending the threat of the LRA. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, Mr. Assistant Secretary, so is the goal, 

given what you just said, to in fact, defeat the LRA and to disband 

it? Or is the goal to lessen the threat to civilian control in the region? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. We would certainly hope that this additional 

support will lead to the breakthrough of capture of Joseph Kony 

and the other commanders and the literal destruction of the LRA, 

but we will not necessarily wait for that to happen. This is going 

to be an operation that runs in the months, not an open-ended operation. And we will evaluate whether the assistance has achieved 

its purpose in terms of raising the capacity of our partners and we 

may disengage even as they continue the fight on their own. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, but is the ultimate goal the deposing of 

Mr. Kony and the dismemberment of the LRA? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. That is the stated goal. That’s one of the four 

parts of the strategy, removing the battlefield——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I think it’s very important that we have a clear 

mission. Okay. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. There’s also a broader objective that we’re serving which is to support partners in Africa so that they can address 

the threats to their citizens, to achieve stability, and become more 

productive contributors to security in the region and more broadly. 

We’ve seen some of them stepping up as has been mentioned in Somalia at great risk and loss of life. This is a problem that is debiliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:44 Dec 13, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\102511\70947 HFA PsN: SHIRL
33

tating for several countries, so to the extent that we can help them 

finally put an end to this threat, I think we’ll help their security 

and make them better partners for us going forward. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was there a perception in making this decision 

that our partners were on their own not capable of meeting that 

goal? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think—yes, Congressman. The judgment was 

that while they’ve made a lot of progress, we’ve seen the LRA size 

reduced substantially, going that final distance to destruction of 

the LRA was something that they were not quite capable of and 

that this assistance could make the critical difference. So we 

thought it was a worthwhile investment to make. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Moving to 30,000 feet, a devil’s advocate question 

for you, as well, Mr. Ambassador, what is the strategic interest of 

the United States in this in doing this? There are lots of unpleasant people in the world. There are lots of insurgencies and terrorist 

movements in the world. The United States obviously cannot try to 

dethrone every one of them. What is our strategic interest here? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, I would say that we’ve seen in today’s 

world that everything is increasingly connected to the extent that 

eastern and northeastern Africa is unstable, under developed, an 

ungoverned space in which these kinds of rapacious extremists and 

terrorists can run amok. It ultimately can affect our interests. It 

creates the conditions in which other radical threats could emerge. 

We’ve seen the worst case in Somalia with both the breakdown of 

governance and the rise of the Al-Shabaab terrorist movement. 

While that is not directly linked to the LRA threat, it’s all part of 

a challenge to stability in the region that ultimately jeopardizes 

our interest. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Madam Chair. A question for Ambassador Vershbow. If the stated goal is to decapitate the leadership 

of the LRA, as I understood from your question before, we are not 

using aerial drones or observation and would we be authorized to 

use predators to take out the leadership if they were seen and observed? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, at the present time, the use of 

drones is not envisaged in this operation. I think that the kind of 

intelligence that is most important to the success of this operation 

is the human intelligence gathered on the ground. That depends on 

closer ties between the military forces of the countries involved and 

the local population. And so our training and assistance has, as 

part of its broader objectives, helping them to acquire and make 

better use of that kind of ground intelligence that could make the 

difference. 

I think the questions of authorities for drone strikes against extremists in terms—there’s a more delicate matter which is probably 

not suitable for commenting on in this open session, but again, the 

focus is on advising and assisting the forces on the ground so that 

they can gather and use intelligence more effectively to do the job. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I yield back. 

34

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. Higgins also of New York is recognized. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. The Lord’s Resistance 

Army emerged from northern Uganda in the 1990s. Since that time 

has murdered, killed, mutilated some tens of thousands of people. 

Joseph Kony was indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the tribunal at The Hague. Kony is also designated as 

a specially-designated global terrorist. Some 300 fighters originating out of Uganda now more prevalent in central Africa. 

I mean the United States deploys 100 military advisors who happen to be Special Forces. I think we should just call this what it 

is. It’s a kill and capture mission. I would ask you to comment on 

that. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Well, Congressman, I think we certainly are trying to enhance the capacity of our partners to capture or kill Joseph Kony and other commanders, but they will be doing the actual military mission on the ground. We will be advising, assisting 

them so that they can be more effective in doing it. 

So yes, I don’t disagree with you on terms of one of the end results of this, if it works, but I think it makes sense from the United 

States’ point of view to enable partners to act when they have the 

capacity to do so. As we’ve said, they have some capacity and 

they’ve done a lot and we’ve helped them get to this stage, but to 

go the final distance requires this additional support and we think 

it’s a good investment in our long-term security and theirs. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Ambassador? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes, you’re absolutely correct. The main objective is to support these countries to do the jobs themselves and to 

build the capacity and that’s what we’ve been trying to do for the 

last decade. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I just think there’s a tendency sometimes to dance 

around this stuff. And obviously Joseph Kony is a bad guy, doing 

bad things to otherwise good people in a region that is strategically 

important to us and I just think sometimes we need to call it what 

it is and this clearly, to me, not unlike our involvement with military advisors in other regions, troubled regions, of that region of 

central Africa, north Africa, and the Middle East. We send advisors 

there, obviously, very well trained. Have a particular expertise at 

doing certain things, in particular, taking bad people out and I 

think that this is indicative of that. 

It’s a religious group, the Lord’s Resistance Army, presumably 

Islamists? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, it’s not religious. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Published reports indicate that it is. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It uses images or statements as an ideology to 

justify their terror. I know that Kony said in the early days that 

he was related to Christ. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Any relationship to al-Qaeda? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We have not——

Mr. HIGGINS. Any relationship to the Janjaweed? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No. 

Mr. HIGGINS. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Using the Lord’s name in 

vain, not a good thing. I’m pleased to yield to Mr. Fortenberry. 

35

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to return 

to a question that was posed earlier. It’s important in light of that. 

We need to make sure that our efforts in the region are not discordant, that they’re not piecemeal. We have requested through a 

number of hearings the reappointment of a special envoy to the 

Great Lakes Region. 

Ambassador Yamamoto, you said we would continue to take that 

under advisement. We’ve gone this direction before, but can you explain, if you are resistant, as to why this has not happened or are 

there other concerns that we may not be aware of? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. As you know, we had the Special Envoy Howard 

Wolpe who did a fantastic job. I think after that the issue is to assess where do we go from here? And I think we heard loud and 

clear from the Congress that a special envoy is needed. We’re taking that——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. How long has the position been vacant 

though? It’s been some time. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It’s been over a year now, a year and a half. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, again, given the heightened intensity of 

these measures, I think this is the appropriate time to revisit this 

question with a certain sense of urgency. 

Let’s return, as well, to gain a broader understanding of who are 

the other international partners involved here, specifically in military operations. We talked about other international donors for relief work and then specifically what is the Ugandan army’s effort 

going to be? It has been in the past to specifically demobilize Joseph Kony and the LRA. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. You’re absolutely correct. The specific amount of 

assistance of militarily supporting the UPDF in this effort has been 

the United States. I mean $40 million from the United States in 

the last 3 years, specifically aimed at providing logistical support 

as the LRA moved from Uganda into the CAR. The other countries 

are providing other types of support other than the military. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. You’re talking about the affected countries, 

not other international donors? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, the other international donors, that’s right. 

As far as the other countries are concerned, the Ugandans themselves are also providing support and assistance through providing 

their own equipment and military tactics and of course, the troops 

itself. The CAR, that is a coordination effort with the FACA troops 

by the Ugandans and the CAR because Ugandan troops are in the 

CAR in a sovereign country and that is the coordination between 

President Bozize ́ and President Museveni to work out those 

logistical issues. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Those two countries, then in a coordinated effort, are the primary drivers currently of the military operation, 

correct? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. But also the DRC is getting involved because the 

LRA has gone in and out between the CAR and DRC. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Are there other international countries such 

as France who are engaged militarily? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Only insofar as training the CAR troops. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So France is involved in the CAR? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

36

Mr. FORTENBERRY. All right, what other international actors are 

involved beyond the military operation to coordinate disarmament 

efforts and rehabilitation efforts, reintegration efforts? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The United Nations and the African Union. The 

United Nations from the DRC side which was the establishment of 

MONUSCO or the reestablishment of MONUSCO basically to coordinate those efforts between the FARDC troops in DRC and the 

UPDF and Uganda——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Okay, I think we probably ought to stop using 

the acronyms because it gets too confusing too quickly. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The Congolese troops and the Ugandan troops to 

coordinate together. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Okay, but then the African Union’s involvement? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The African Union is not as extensive as the 

U.N. It’s basically the leadership under Chairman Ping and his 

group to talk to the leaders. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. I’m sorry, explain that further? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. In other words, to discuss with the Presidents 

and the leadership when these countries on the LRA problem and 

what more they need to get the job done. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. So African Union effectively is not involved 

here other than in conversation? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Discussions. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Is that a potential development? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That’s right. It is. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. The reason for pressing the issue is clearly 

that the United States cannot solve all problems for all people and 

you have been authorized by Congress to engage in this activity. 

And again, we’re all hopeful for a positive and quick outcome. But 

to continue to press the international community for switch engagement as is appropriate as well needs to be a part of this broader, comprehensive effort. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

First of all, let me just note that I don’t know if I’m disappointed 

or what, but not even having a cost estimate for us coming before 

Congress, letting us know that there’s a military operation, have 

the troops already been, are these 100 troops already been sent or 

are they on the way? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Only some of the initial personnel have arrived. 

The full 100 have not yet deployed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the mission is actually under way. You actually have some people who have already been sent, but you don’t 

have a cost estimate of what it would cost? Even an estimate? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I apologize, Congressman. I’m embarrassed not 

to have a more specific answer for you. The forces that are already 

there are being funded by regular operations and maintenance 

funds, but when we get further along, there will be more costs incurred and we will definitely have that estimate for you before we 

reach that state. 

37

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I take it the 100 troops are also going to 

bring with them their equipment. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now I don’t think it’s our place to ask about 

specific equipment going into a combat area, but that’s considerably costly as well. 

I noticed in your testimony you said that this LRA has been reduced to approximately 200 core fighters? So it might be significant 

for us to know if the cost of this mission is going to be $500 million 

or whether it’s going to be $100 million or $20 million in terms of 

the cost of getting 200 fighters who are people who are criminals, 

we could basically call them, 200 organized criminals in central Africa. 

I take it also that if they’re reduced to 200 men and what we’ve 

got are the armies of these various countries you’re talking about, 

we’re talking about 200 men who are now fighting thousands of 

other armed troops, but we feel compelled to send 200 of our own 

troops there. I’m not sure whether or not that—I’ll look closely at 

this and I think the American people will as well, whether or not 

this was a right decision. 

Would you say that tribal loyalties have anything to do with the 

ongoing strength of the LRA? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I’ll defer to my colleague who knows more about 

the context. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The LRA obviously was originally a northern 

Uganda Acholi base, but right now it’s kind of morphed because it 

has gone into—it does have groups from Southern Sudan, Congo, 

and the DCAR. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You would think tribal allegiances have 

something to do with the survivability of this and the effectiveness 

of the LRA? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It’s the open areas that are terribly hard to 

track people. That’s his cover. That’s how he’s been able to escape 

for two decades without capture. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I take it that was a yes? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we’re sending our troops in take on head 

on this whole tribal challenge in Africa. Let me just note that that 

doesn’t sound very good to me in terms of possible success, but 

there again, this force may be evil enough to justify sending our 

troops in. 

Let me ask you, you were involved in Ethiopia. You were our 

Ambassador to Ethiopia. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. During that time period there was a border 

dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That went up to arbitration. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The arbitration ended up deciding what on 

whose favor? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The EBC made a determination on the border 

between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 

38

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right, and they decided basically that Eritrea 

had the rightful position, is that correct? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Only in the Bdame area. But the other area 

went to Ethiopia. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, so did our Government at that time 

while you were Ambassador recommend that Ethiopia respect the 

arbiters or did we—we did? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We did. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When Ethiopia rejected the arbitration over 

our advice, what did we do and what was our Government’s position on Ethiopia considering that we have since the time, that they 

decided not to settle their dispute through arbitration, but instead 

decided to thumb their nose at arbiters, have we provided Ethiopia 

with weapons and training and guns since then? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We have not provided weapons. We have provided training because of their forces in Darfur and now in Abyei. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So—but we haven’t sold them any 

weapons or anything? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, no weapons. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And Mr. 

Marino will now be recognized and I thank him because he will be 

asking questions that have been submitted through our committee’s Web site which connects our constituents more directly to our 

work in Congress and we’re also asking the public to enter their 

questions when we have the honor of having Secretary Clinton appear before our committee on Thursday. 

So thank you, Mr. Marino, for using those questions. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Madam Chair. And in addition to the 

questions that were submitted to the committee, I have a Web site 

for my District and I asked my constituents to send questions to 

me prior to my hearings, so the questions I’m going to ask are 

going to be repetitive, but if you could answer them in a different 

light. Please bear in mind I have now less than 41⁄2 minutes. 

Please be succinct and whoever feels that they can answer the 

question to satisfy my constituents, please jump in. 

First question comes from Sharon, ‘‘Who will be paying for this 

troop deployment and what is the anticipated cost and how many 

troops will be involved for how long?’’

Mr. VERSHBOW. The United States will be paying for this operation and as I’ve said sheepishly to Congressman Rohrabacher, we 

don’t have precise costs, but I can assure him that it’s like to be 

in the tens of millions of dollars, not the hundreds or the $500 million. We think it’s an investment worth making in terms of just advising and assisting local forces we can eliminate a very evil force 

from the earth. 

Mr. MARINO. From Titus: ‘‘How will U.S. forces in central Africa 

help address widespread development needs of the region? And if 

the LRA is removed without making improvements to the economic 

and social stability of the region, then another military force could 

easily replace it.’’

39

Mr. YAMAMOTO. It’s not much the U.S. military as it is the efforts 

of US AID, the U.S. diplomatic efforts in coordination with the 

international donor community, international organizations and 

the regional states to look at how we can establish economically develop these countries. 

Mr. MARINO. From Michael: ‘‘What are the Europeans and other 

allies doing to help stop the LRA?’’

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Raising consciousness, supporting, assisting 

what’s rehabilitation, reconciliation, rehabilitation of victims, and 

also supporting the governments in their efforts to go after the 

LRA. 

Mr. MARINO. How about any money? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The assistance, right, and again, our money so 

far for the region has been around $50 million in total for the last 

3 years, just on the LRA operations, but then overall on the LRA 

operations, the Europeans, the U.N. and other organizations are 

also contributing money. I don’t have the specific amount. 

Mr. MARINO. This is from Greg: ‘‘Is this a peacekeeping/humanitarian mission or more of an advisory role?’’

Mr. VERSHBOW. It’s clearly an advisory mission, helping to prepare partner forces to do the job themselves more effectively, but 

it certainly has a humanitarian motivation, namely, that there’s 

been long suffering for more than two decades by the population 

at the hands of the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

Mr. MARINO. This is from Danielle. First of all, and to show that 

I’m trying to cover both sides of the story here, ‘‘Thank you to the 

Members of Congress who have decided that the destruction of 

human life in central Africa at the hands of the LRA matters and 

have taken important action steps toward bringing peace to those 

affected? Could you gentlemen be more specific about the ways in 

which the troops deployed have been trained to advise, specifically 

in the hunt for Kony as opposed to other large-scale tactical planning?’’

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think that it should be understood that our 

forces are going there to help train and improve the capabilities of 

the local militaries who will then carry out the actual operations 

in the field. The key thing we’re hoping to help them with is fusing 

the intelligence information with the operational plan so that they 

can more quickly respond to reports that the LRA is active and engage and we hope eliminate the remaining leadership of the LRA. 

We’re not taking on a combat role ourselves. 

Mr. MARINO. Most of these questions were from my constituents 

in Pennsylvania 10, north central and northeast Pennsylvania, but 

here’s my question. Do you have an exit strategy? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. We do because we said from the outside that this 

is not an open-ended mission in terms of its goals or its duration. 

We certainly hope that it achieves the over-arching goal which is 

eliminating Joseph Kony and the other commanders from the battlefield, but we will not go on indefinitely even if that maximum 

goal isn’t achieved. We will judge whether we’ve been effective in 

improving our partners’ capacity to deal with the threat, to engage 

the LRA, to encourage more defections, to substantially reduce the 

threat and then we will pull back and we hope that they will be 

able to continue with this experience and training to finish the job. 

40

Mr. MARINO. And quickly, this should be a yes or no from both 

of you, are we following the money or just handing a check over? 

Are we following the money or are we just handing a check over? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We’re accounting. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. We’re following the money as we will be there 

on the ground ensuring that what we use the taxpayers’ money for 

is achieving positive results. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Marino, I don’t know 

how that could have been answered with a yes or no, given two 

choices, but well done. And you have very wise constituents. They 

ask excellent questions and I encourage all of my members to try 

to bring in our constituents to the committee process. Thank you, 

Mr. Marino. 

Mr. Sherman from California is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Yamamoto, in this enterprise, are we introducing American armed forces into hostilities or into situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated? 

I’m citing the War Powers Act. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Right, I mean the reason why they’re there is 

they’re mainly for advice and support and assistance. However, if 

obviously to defend themselves they need to be fully equipped. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, the U.S. Marines in the London Embassy 

would defend themselves. In Vietnam, we used the term training 

to mean American troops going out on combat missions when a 

company by indigenous forces. Are they in safe areas training or 

are they out training through engaging the enemy? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I’ll defer to my colleague. 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, some of the training will take 

place in safe areas at bases far removed from the area of conflict, 

but under the mission approved by the President, our forces will 

have the possibility based upon what the commanders judge to be 

most effective and based on what the partners feel would be most 

effective to deploy to the field to advise and assist at the front line 

level. But we don’t believe that it is highly likely that our forces 

will be engaged in hostilities. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Will we be shooting at the enemy? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Only in self defense. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Will be placing ourselves within 100 yards of the 

enemy such that self defense would obviously be necessary? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. Congressman, I honestly don’t know whether 

they would be within a 100 yards or 200. At this point, it’s hypothetical because we’re just at the early stages. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean the Constitution said provides the Congress with authority to declare war and engage in war and now 

you’re telling me that that decision will be made by lieutenants. 

We’ve seen in Libya a terrible lesson brought home to the American people. If you shred the war powers provision of the Constitution, good things happen in the world. My fear is that you’re going 

to be teaching the American people this lesson a second time, that 

is to say I think you may very well accomplish something good in 

eastern Africa, but will we do so in a way that constitutes a second 

intentional violation of the War Powers Act? 

41

And both of you have been rather vague on what our forces are 

going to do except that lieutenants and captains and majors on the 

ground will decide what to do. Are these combat officers authorized 

to bring their forces into hostilities? 

Mr. Vershbow? 

Mr. VERSHBOW. I think the short answer is no, that the only condition in which they might use the weapons that they’re carrying 

is if they’re fired upon in an act of self defense. I would ask to defer 

to my legal experts at the Pentagon as exactly what——

Mr. SHERMAN. That’s as good an answer as I’m likely to get. Let 

me shift over to Mr. Yamamoto. Let’s say the mission changes and 

in fact it is necessary to introduce the armed forces of the United 

States into situations where imminent involvement and hostilities 

is clearly indicated by the circumstances. Will the administration 

follow the War Powers Act? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We’re following the War Powers Act in this instance. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you acting in serendipity—acting parallel to 

the War Powers Act or are you conforming to the War Powers Act? 

Is that act the law of the land that you are following? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We are expecting the intent of the U.S. Congress 

in providing that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you respecting the law or just kind of the 

free-floating intent? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The law. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay, so it’s the law of the land and you’re going 

to follow it. Is that correct? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. That’s all I need. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. Rivera, my colleague from Florida is recognized. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Madam Chair, and with your permission 

may I yield to my subcommittee chair, Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Let me just state for 

the record, even though we have questions that are pointed questions, that should not necessarily indicate whether we support or 

oppose this particular mission. 

I happen to believe that missions like this are positive and can 

play a positive role and a positive strategy in post-Cold War strategy should be helping other people fight for their freedom. The cost 

is really an important factor because the United States can’t afford 

to pay the price to win everyone else’s freedom in the world. 

The Libyan operation that this administration just engaged us in 

is perhaps a good example of that and if indeed the Libyans now 

and I would challenge the Libyan authorities now to step forward 

and announce that they will repay the United States for every 

dime that we spent in helping them win their freedom, we are in 

a financial crisis. They are sitting on the biggest deposits of oil and 

gas in the world. They should repay us. If indeed they do, then it 

was the right thing for us to help the people of Libya overthrow 

their tyrant. 

If indeed the cost of this mission is repaid to us from those who 

benefit from it, then this type of mission, helping others fight 

42

against evil forces in the world is justified and speaks well of the 

United States of America. 

What doesn’t speak well of us is when we become intertwined 

with dictatorships and that’s why I am asking, have been asking 

questions about Ethiopia and I would ask our former Ambassador 

to Ethiopia was there an election held while you were Ambassador 

in Ethiopia? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I came in after the election. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. After the election. Was that election that 

happened right before you became Ambassador, did the winners of 

that election then take over the government or did they arrest 

those who won the election? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. To answer your question——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They arrested those who won the election, 

Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The Parliament took out their seats because we 

negotiated with them behind the scenes to do so. The issue was the 

City Hall. They refused to—they did not take up their seats and 

in the context that they were arrested. 

And we worked with the government and the communities——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You answered the question is that they arrested the ones who won the election. Those who lost the election 

stayed in power. Those who won the elections ended up in jail and 

during that time period, OPEC decided that there were several 

cases in Ethiopia, where American citizens owned property and the 

Ethiopian Government, now run by those who didn’t win the election, but imprisoned those who did, had expropriated property of 

Americans and was illegally refusing to give it back to them. 

Do you believe—and OPEC still has that standard, by the way, 

still is that finding. Do you agree with that finding? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. First, the Carter Center declared the election, 

the winners, the winners. They declared that the government of 

Meles had won as was their——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The government declared that? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No, Carter Center. And we abide by what the 

Carter Center and the international observers had stated. Now the 

second issue is as far as the OPEC, the person you’re referring to 

his property was confiscated under the communist——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I’m not talking about a person. I’m talking 

about the general theory that Americans have property claims that 

have not been adjudicated by the Ethiopian Government. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We’ve tried to help adjudicate with the government. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have. That’s correct and that was why 

OPEC declared that Ethiopia was now no longer eligible for OPEC 

loan guarantees. They have not yet changed that policy, correct? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Because of restrictions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. The restrictions were based on the fact 

that American citizens still had property claims that were not 

being met. 

Now back to Ethiopia and Eritrea. There was an agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia to abide by an arbitration. In the end, 

it is my understanding that the arbiters actually decided at least 

for a major part of that in Eritrea’s favor, yet we permitted the 

43

Government of Ethiopia to renege on the agreement to follow the 

arbiters. Is that correct? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. No. In 2003, we announced that it was final and 

binding because the parties said so, so therefore we held both parties accountable to the results. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much and Mr. 

Rivera’s time has expired. 

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before us. We look 

forward to your written answers and I remind the committee members, if you could join me to say hello to Evelyn Apoko. It is a true 

delight and an honor to have you here with us. Thank you. 

And the committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:54 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY


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