UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROGER VAN HECK

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 14-CV-12679

HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

vs.

HEARING OFFICER

WHITE-SIMMONS, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT

This matter is presently before the Court on plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis [docket entry 2]. For the following reasons, the Court shall (1) grant the application and

allow the complaint to be filed without prepayment of the filing fee, and (2) dismiss the complaint

because it is frivolous and/or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may permit a person to commence a

lawsuit without prepaying the filing fee, provided the person submits an affidavit demonstrating that

he/she “is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” In the present case, plaintiff’s

application to proceed in forma pauperis makes the required showing of indigence. The Court shall

therefore grant the application and permit the complaint to be filed without requiring plaintiff to

prepay the filing fee.

Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards” than those drafted by lawyers.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, the Court is required by statute to dismiss

an in forma pauperis complaint if it 

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(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or

in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In other words, a complaint is frivolous if

it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or “clearly baseless” facts or “a legal interest

which clearly does not exist” or “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28. To avoid

dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.

Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Further,

the Court is required to dismiss the complaint, whether or not plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

In this case, to the extent plaintiff contends that the Driver Assessment and Appeal

Division of the Michigan Department of State (“DAAD”) violated his right to procedural due

process when it restricted his driver’s license, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in

Jefferson v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch. Sys., 360 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2004) is controlling. There, the

appellate court ruled that: 

[i]f satisfactory state procedures are provided in a procedural due process case, then

no constitutional deprivation has occurred despite the injury. Hudson[v. Palmer],

468 U.S. [517] at 533 [1984]; Vicory[v. Walton], 721 F.2d [1062] at 1065-66 [6th

Cir. 1983] (in procedural due process cases claiming deprivation of property interest,

plaintiff must attack the state’s corrective procedure as well as the substantive

wrong). Plaintiff may not seek relief under Section 1983 without first pleading and

proving the inadequacy of state or administrative processes and remedies to redress

her due process violations. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on

other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Mansfield Apt. Owners

Ass’n v. City of Mansfield, 988 F.2d 1469, 1475 (6th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff must

prove the inadequacy of state remedies as an element of her constitutional tort. See

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Marino v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Although one need not exhaust

state remedies before bringing a Section 1983 action claiming a violation of

procedural due process, one must nevertheless prove as an element of that claim that

state procedural remedies are inadequate.” (emphasis added)).

Id. at 587-88. Since plaintiff does not allege that the corrective remedies under Michigan law are

wholly inadequate to address DAAD’s imposition of certain restrictions on his driver’s license, he 

has not adequately pleaded a colorable procedural due process violation.

Additionally, the Court lacks jurisdiction because the complaint collaterally challenges the

DAAD’s administrative determination, which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As the

Sixth Circuit has explained:

In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 75 L. Ed.

2d 206, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983), the Supreme Court held that federal court review of

state court proceedings is jurisdictionally limited to the Supreme Court of the United

States by 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See also Patmon v. Michigan Sup. Ct., 224 F.3d 504,

506 (6th Cir. 2000). We refer to this doctrine as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See

also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 68 L. Ed. 362, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923).

The Feldman Court stated that “United States District Courts . . . do not have

jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out

of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action

was unconstitutional. Review of those decisions may only be had in this Court.”

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; see also Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266

F.3d 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2001). In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court restated

the doctrine as follows: “under [the doctrine] a party losing in state court is barred

from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in

a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state 

judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S.

997, 1005-06 (1994).

Tropf v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 936-37 (6th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). This

doctrine equally applies to administrative agency decisions so long as the agency exercises “powers

that are inherent to the judiciary, or because the state has provided mechanisms for judicial review

of their determinations that distinguish those determinations from other types of state administrative

action.” Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 166 (2d Cir. 2004). Because Mich. Comp. Laws §

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257.323 specifically provides for judicial review of DAAD’s decisions in the state circuit court,

plaintiff’s attack on the driver’s license restriction proceeding clearly falls within the parameters of

Mitchell and is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Ultimately, if plaintiff wishes to challenge

the DAAD’s determination, he must pursue whatever remedies are available to him in the state

courts. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.323. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted. The complaint is filed and the filing fee need not be prepaid.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

_s/ Bernard A. Friedman____

Dated: July 22, 2014 BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

Detroit, Michigan SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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