Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kristin A. Mulholland

Appellate Public Defender

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Megan M. Smith

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dwight Caprice Cross,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 29, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-23

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G04-1603-F2-3

Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 2 of 11

[1] Dwight Caprice Cross appeals his convictions for robbery resulting in bodily 

injury and burglary and raises one issue: whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in admitting certain evidence. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 17, 2016, at about 8:15 a.m., Carole Bloom dropped off groceries at 

the house of her daughter and granddaughter, Jennifer and Jasmine Bloom. As 

she left to start work at 8:30 a.m., she saw a gray vehicle with two black men 

she did not recognize as being from the neighborhood driving very slowly in 

front of the house.

[3] That morning, as she was on a couch in her basement room watching

television, Jasmine heard a “really loud banging on the door,” the back door 

was broken open, “someone ripped [her] bedroom door off” its hinge, and a 

“dark-skinned black guy,” a bit taller than her, with short buzzed hair and dark 

grey clothes, stood in the doorway. Transcript Volume II at 201-203. He 

shouted something that she did not understand, left, and returned with a 

second, short, lighter-skinned man with blond twists at the end of his hair. The

two men began “going through [her] room” and screamed, “Don’t look at me” 

and “Get down on the ground.” Id. at 203-204. Jasmine “kept looking at 

them,” and the men hit her on the top of her head, causing a “small contusion, 

bumps and bruises.” Id. at 204. She observed the men “kind of have a knife 

between them,” which was “big – like a combat knife” and which the men held 

and pointed at her while instructing her not to move or look at them. Id. at 206-

207. They looked through her drawers, closet, clothes, cabinets and dressers, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 3 of 11

and they stole her television, Xbox, computer, and iPhone, which they had 

Jasmine unlock and “turn off . . . all the tracking stuff . . . so that it couldn’t be 

traced.” Id. at 205.

[4] The lighter-skinned man went upstairs, Jennifer opened her bedroom door and 

screamed, and he stood “right in front of [her] face” and screamed at her to get 

down on the floor, which she did, and about “a safe, saying that [she] was on a 

list of people that had safes.” Id. at 149-150. He asked her the location of the 

safe and money, and Jennifer replied they did not have a safe and she did not 

have money. During this exchange, the man “kind of t[ore] up the room,” went 

through several “purses, looking for money,” took her MacBook Pro and her 

iPhone, and had Jennifer “turn off ‘Find my iPhone’” on the phone. Id. at 151. 

At some point, she rose from the ground, he punched her head with his fist, and 

she fell back down. The darker-skinned man entered the room, the two men 

spoke in the hallway briefly about cutting the women’s throats before returning to 

Jennifer’s bedroom, and one of the men held out the knife and threatened her. 

The men then left the house, taking a television from the living room. 

[5] The following day, Jennifer and Jasmine examined a photo array of suspects at 

the police station, and Jennifer “wrote, ‘Due to my limited vision – I’m blind in 

my right eye and have limited vision in my left – I cannot identify anyone at 

this time’” on the photo array and noted that the individual in Photograph No. 

5 “looked like [the individual in her bedroom] because he had the same skin 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 4 of 11

coloring.”1

 Id. at 173-174. Jasmine identified Cross as the “lighter-skinned, 

shorter male”2 and, when shown a second, different photo array, identified the 

other assailant. Id. at 217. 

[6] The State charged Cross as amended with three counts of burglary as level 2, 3, 

and 4 felonies, robbery resulting in bodily injury as a level 3 felony, two counts 

of criminal confinement as level 3 felonies, two counts of armed robbery as

level 3 felonies, and residential entry as a level 6 felony. The State indicated in 

a response to a discovery order that it had provided Cross with a vehicle search 

warrant and, in a supplemental discovery response, that it had provided a 

“Search Warrant Affidavit, Return for Infiniti Vehicle.” Appellant’s Appendix 

Volume II at 103. 

[7] At Cross’s jury trial, the State presented the testimony of Carole, Jennifer, and 

Jasmine, as well as the testimony of an Indiana State Police forensic analyst 

who investigated the area around Jennifer and Jasmine’s house for security 

video and who indicated that Cross and the other assailant were involved in a 

traffic stop together on the same day as the incident. The State also presented a

surveillance photograph taken six or seven blocks away bearing a date and time 

stamp of “3-17-2016 . . . 08:41:47” of a vehicle that matched the description of 

1 State’s Exhibit 17 is a photo array signed by Jennifer and contains a separate sheet that states, “Position . . . 

5. . . . Cross, Dwight Caprice.” Exhibits Volume II at 25.

2 State’s Exhibit 25 is a photo array with a circle around a photograph in the third position, which depicts the 

same individual that appeared in the fifth position of the array signed by Jennifer. On a separate sheet, the 

exhibit also states, “Position . . . 3 . . . Cross, Dwight Caprice.” Exhibits Volume II at 34. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 5 of 11

Cross’s vehicle. State’s Exhibit 116. See also State’s Exhibit 117 (second 

photograph). The State also presented photographs of latent fingerprints 

discovered on the bottom of the interior-side of the door to the house, which 

appeared “as if somebody had tried to pry the door open or got their hands 

underneath it to break the door open”; the ten-print card documenting Cross’s 

fingerprints; and the testimony of a law enforcement fingerprint examiner who 

compared them and testified that he was able to identify Cross as a match. 

Transcript Volume III at 30. 

[8] Hammond Police Detective Daniel Young testified without objection that he 

was working the day shift at the office on March 17, 2016, when he learned 

from another detective about a home invasion that happened earlier in the 

morning, he started to “ask around to see if there’s anything [he] [could] do to 

assist,” and that, while he assisted, Cross developed as a person of interest. Id.

at 67. He testified he learned Cross drove a “silver passenger car,” “an 

Infiniti,” and that he spotted a silver Infiniti sometime later in the Merrillville 

area and discovered during a subsequent traffic stop that Cross’s mother was 

driving the vehicle. Id. He indicated he detained and transported the vehicle in 

preparation for a search warrant and Cross’s mother took another officer “to a 

residence where there was an individual of interest in another case.” Id. at 70.

[9] During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between Cross’s 

counsel and Detective Young:

Q. . . . . What about that that [sic] caught your attention, the 

home invasion or the silver vehicle? 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 6 of 11

A. Both. 

Q. Okay. Tell us why. 

A. I currently had been investigating a burglary where the person 

of interest was driving a silver vehicle. 

Q. How many burglaries? 

A. For the silver vehicle, at that time just one. 

Q. And you thought that []Cross was involved in that other 

burglary? 

A. Yes. I’d actually developed a probable cause and had filed 

charged [sic]. 

Q. You had filed charges? 

A. Correct. 

Q. For burglary? 

A. I believe it was for theft. 

Q. That’s not a burglary. 

A. No. I was investigating a burglary. I presented the case to 

the prosecutor’s office, and they signed off. I believe it was theft. 

I don’t know if it was burglary. 

Q. The police reports in this matter indicate that there were 

multiple home invasions and multiple burglaries –

A. That could be. 

Q. – that []Cross could have been involved in. 

A. I was investigating one. 

Q. Do you know of any others? 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 7 of 11

A. I do not. 

Q. Do you know of any other criminal charges dealing with 

home invasions where Mr. Cross was charged –

A. There was –

Q. – other than this one? 

A. Charged? 

Q. Charged. 

A. No. 

Q. As of March 17, 2016, had []Cross been charged in that theft 

case? 

A. I would have to check the date. If that was the same date 

where I was trailing that vehicle, then the probable cause 

affidavit had been signed by the prosecutor’s office. 

Q. Well, when you say on the date that you were following the 

vehicle, is that when you had seen that silver vehicle in 

Merrillville? 

A. Correct. 

Q. And that was the – later in the day is when []Cross was taken 

into custody? 

A. Correct. 

Q. That’s when the theft charge was filed? 

A. Prior to that. 

* * * * *

Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not the date of that theft was 

before or after March 17, 2016? 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 8 of 11

A. It was before.

Id. at 72-75. The prosecutor approached the bench and argued Cross’s counsel 

opened the door to ask about how the witness knew Cross and recognized the 

vehicle, the court asked Cross’s counsel to respond, and Cross’s counsel 

answered: “I asked if he was charged in any other cases, and I said that the police 

report involving this matter indicated as such. I mean, if the State wants to go 

through the door – .” Id. at 76. The prosecutor indicated: the purpose of the 

putative inquiry was to show the witness “knows him,” “[t]here’s no lack of 

mistaken identity,” Cross “was familiar with the burglaries he did,” and that they 

“were similar in nature”; the State was going to ask how Cross became a person 

of interest and if the witness was aware that this is the vehicle he used; and that 

the State “wasn’t going to go into any facts about [Cross’s] uncharged 

burglaries.” Id. at 78, 80. On redirect-examination, Detective Young was asked 

how he was familiar with Cross, he responded “[t]hrough an investigation on an 

unrelated offense” and indicated he was the lead investigator on that unrelated 

offense and thus familiar with Cross, and the following exchange occurred:

Q. What type of unrelated offense were you investigating him 

for?

A. Burglary.

Q. And were you aware that []Cross drove a silver Infiniti from 

that unrelated burglary that you were investigating?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was prior to this one?
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 9 of 11

A. Correct.

Id. at 81. 

[10] The jury found Cross guilty of two counts of burglary as level 3 and 4 felonies,

robbery resulting in bodily injury as a level 3 felony, and residential entry as a 

level 6 felony. The court merged the convictions for burglary as a level 3 felony

and residential entry into the conviction for burglary as a level 4 felony, 

sentenced Cross to fifteen years for the robbery resulting in bodily injury and 

eleven years for burglary as a level 4 felony, and ordered the sentences to be 

served consecutively with the final two years served on community corrections. 

Discussion

[11] The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain 

evidence. The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of 

evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A trial court’s ruling 

on the admission of evidence is generally accorded a great deal of deference on 

appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh’g denied. We will not 

reverse an error in the admission of evidence if the error was harmless. Turner 

v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1058 (Ind. 2011). Errors in the admission of evidence 

are to be disregarded unless they affect the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 

1059. In determining the effect of the evidentiary ruling on a defendant’s 

substantial rights, we look to the probable effect on the fact-finder. Id. 

[12] Cross argues that the State introduced impermissible evidence of his prior bad 

acts, and that the jury made the forbidden inference that he probably committed 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 10 of 11

the charged crimes due to a criminal propensity. He contends the State did not 

prove the admissibility of the testimony under an express exception to Ind. 

Evidence Rule 404(b), that he was prejudiced by its admission as it likely led the 

jury to assume he was a serial burglar, and that it was of minimal probative 

value. The State maintains that Cross first elicited the evidence regarding the 

prior investigation on cross-examination and that the minimal testimony could 

not have prejudiced the jury.

[13] We observe that Cross’s defense counsel elicited testimony from Detective 

Young that he “had been investigating a burglary” in which the person of interest 

was driving a silver vehicle, asked for additional explanation after Detective 

Young indicated that “[b]oth” the home invasion and the silver vehicle caught 

his attention, and elicited Detective Young’s statement that he “was investigating 

one” of multiple home invasions and burglaries in which Cross could have been 

involved. Transcript Volume III at 72-73. The invited error doctrine forbids a 

party to take advantage of an error that the party “commits, invites, or which is 

the natural consequence of [the party’s] own neglect or misconduct,” Durden v. 

State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 

907 (Ind. 2005)), given some evidence that the error resulted from an “appellant’s 

affirmative actions as part of a deliberate, ‘well-informed’ trial strategy.” 

Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 558 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Brewington v. State, 7 

N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077, 135 S. Ct. 

970 (2015)). In light of the record, we conclude that Cross invited any error with 

respect to the challenged testimony.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-23 | July 29, 2020 Page 11 of 11

[14] Further, we find that any error with respect to allowing the State to ask 

questions on redirect and Detective Young’s responses was harmless. Upon 

being questioned by Cross’s defense counsel, Detective Young testified he was 

investigating a burglary. The implication of Detective Young’s statement is that 

he had believed Cross to be involved in an unrelated burglary he was 

investigating, and we conclude that his subsequent statements on redirect 

examination did not impact Cross’s substantial rights. See Pritchard v. State, 810 

N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that, even if it could be 

concluded that it was error for the trial court to admit certain testimony, the 

error would have been harmless and the defendant was not prejudiced by the 

admission of the testimony). Any error is also harmless given the substantial 

independent evidence set forth above and in the record. See Turner, 953 N.E.2d 

at 1059 (“The improper admission is harmless error if the conviction is 

supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing 

court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to 

the conviction.”) (citing Lafayette v. State, 917 N.E.2d 660, 666 (Ind. 2009)); Cole 

v. State, 970 N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that an error in the 

admission of evidence does not justify reversal if the evidence is cumulative of 

other evidence presented at trial).

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Cross’s convictions.

[16] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.