UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID DOUGLAS McCLOY,

Plaintiff,

 CASE NO. 14-13110

v. HONORABLE SEAN F. COX

OAKLAND COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, 

JOHN SKRZYNSKI, JANE/JOHN DOE(S), 

WATERFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

DET. WAGNER, SGT. GIROUT1, FNU POST, 

JANE/JOHN DOE(S), OAKLAND COUNTY 

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE COLLEN O’BRIAN2

and STAFF, JANE/JOHN DOE(S), 

USDC JUDGE JANET NEFF and STAFF, 

JANE/JOHN DOE(S), MICHIGAN ATTORNEY 

GENERAL’S OFFICE, JOHN PALLAS, and 

JANE/JOHN DOE(S), MRS. GIROUX, MR. COLLS, 

MRS. BYRON, GREG GWYZDOWSKI, 

USDC JUDGE DAVID LAWSON and STAFF, 

JANE/JOHN DOE( S),

Defendants.

________________________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STOP CORRUPTION (Dkt. # 9),

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (Dkt. #11),

AND DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT (Dkt. #14)

I. Introduction

This matter is pending before the Court on David Douglas McCloy’s pro se civil

rights complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a state prisoner currently confined

at the Egeler Reception and Guidance Center in Jackson, Michigan. The defendants

1

 Plaintiff spells this person’s name as “Giroux” elsewhere in his complaint.

2 The correct name for this defendant appears to be Colleen O’Brien. 

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are various government officials and a few individuals who appear to be private citizens. 

Because the defendants include both state and federal officials, the Court liberally

construes the pro se complaint, as it must, Wallace v. FedEx Corp., 764 F.3d 571, 583

(6th Cir. 2014), to be brought under both § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).3

 

Plaintiff commenced this action on August 8, 2014, by filing a lengthy handwritten

complaint with multiple attachments. More recently, Plaintiff filed a second complaint,

which makes many of the same allegations as the first complaint. The second

complaint is an amended complaint, which supersedes the “earlier complaint for all

purposes.” In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litigation, 731 F.3d 586, 589 (6th

Cir. 2013). Therefore, Plaintiff’s only pending complaint before this Court is his second

complaint. See Calhoun v. Bergh, 769 F.3d 409, 411 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that, after

the petitioner filed his amended petition, “only that petition remained pending before the

district court”). 

The complaint alleges that the defendants are corrupt and that they violated

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during a criminal prosecution against him and during his

incarceration. He seeks injunctive relief and any other relief to which he may be

entitled. He has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion to stop

governmental corruption.

II. Legal Standard

3

 Bivens is the federal analog to a suit brought against state officials under 42

U.S.C. § 1983; it implies a private cause of action for damages against federal officers

alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

675-76 (2009). 

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The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 requires federal district courts to screen 

a prisoner’s complaint and to dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim for which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Flanory v.

Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th

Cir. 2001). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 

“In determining whether a prisoner has failed to state a claim, [courts] construe

his complaint in the light most favorable to him, accept his factual allegations as true,

and determine whether he can prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief.” 

Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005). While a complaint need not

contain “detailed factual allegations,” the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. To prevail on his claim under either Bivens or § 1983, Plaintiff must prove

two elements: “(1) that he . . . was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting

under color of law.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th Cir. 2014). 

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III. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint is a rambling document containing string citations and mostly

incomplete sentences. The discernible allegations fall into two categories: (1) a

challenge to a state criminal prosecution and (2) a challenge to the conditions of

Plaintiff’s confinement in prison. For the reasons given below, the allegations lack an

arguable basis in law and fail to state a plausible claim for relief. 

A. The Challenge to the Criminal Prosecution

Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutor’s team in his criminal case engaged in

misconduct throughout the investigation. More specifically, Plaintiff claims that the

prosecution relied on false testimony, tampered with evidence, and hid evidence. 

Although Plaintiff has already been convicted and sentenced, he seeks to have the

Court order the defendants to refrain from prosecuting him on the warrant or criminal

information. He also seeks a final judgment declaring that the defendants’ incarceration

of him violates his constitutional rights. 

When, as here, “a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his

physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to

immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal

remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s challenge to the state prosecution against him is “cognizable only in

federal habeas corpus, with its attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.” 

Id. at 499 n.14. Furthermore, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme

Court stated:

to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

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imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence

that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under 1983. 

Id. at 486-87 (1994) (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original). Although Plaintiff may not

be seeking money damages, 

a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) -- no

matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target

of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison

proceedings) -- “if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate

the invalidity of confinement or its duration.

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis in original). 

Success in this action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of Plaintiff’s

confinement. Therefore, his challenge to the state prosecution against him is barred in

this civil rights action. 

A number of the defendants, moreover, are immune from suit. “The immunity of

judges for acts within the judicial role is . . . well established.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.

547, 554 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 476 U.S. 800

(1982). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit,

not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)

(citations omitted). Further, Plaintiff’s “claim for injunctive relief fails because ‘injunctive

relief shall not be granted’ in an action brought against ‘a judicial officer for an act or

omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.’” Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 496 (6th

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Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Plaintiff has not alleged that a declaratory

decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable. Therefore, his claims

against Judges O’Brien, Neff, and Lawson are barred. Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757,

761 (2d Cir. 1999).

Plaintiff’s claims against the Oakland County Prosecutor’s Office and assistant

prosecutor John Skrzynski fail because “[f]unctions that serve as an ‘integral part of the

judicial process’ or that are ‘intimately associated with the judicial process’ are

absolutely immune from civil suits.” Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir.

2010) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). As an assistant

prosecutor, defendant John Skrzynski and other assistant prosecutors in the Oakland

County Prosecutor’s Office have absolute immunity for “appearances at probable cause

and grand jury hearings, evaluation of evidence and presentation of that evidence at

pre-trial and trial proceedings, and preparation of witnesses for trial.” Id. (citations

omitted). Prosecutorial immunity also extends to the knowing use of false testimony at

trial. Id. (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991)).

“The principles set forth in Pierson v. Ray to protect judges and in Imbler v.

Pachtman to protect prosecutors also apply to witnesses, who perform a somewhat

different function in the trial process but whose participation in bringing the litigation to a

just-or possibly unjust-conclusion is equally indispensable.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S.

325, 345-346 (1983). The defendants identified in the complaint as Sergeant Giroux,

Mrs. Giroux, Greg Gwyzdowski, Mrs. Byron, and Mr. Colls apparently were witnesses in

Plaintiff’s criminal case. As witnesses, they enjoy immunity from a claim for money

damages, and to the extent they were testifying as private citizens, they cannot be held

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liable because they were not state actors. 

B. The Challenge to the Conditions of Confinement

Plaintiff’s remaining allegations pertain to the conditions of confinement. He

claims that correctional officials are using insulin as an attack weapon by giving him

either the wrong amount of insulin or no insulin at all. Plaintiff further alleges that the

defendants have denied him pain medication, a stress test, an opportunity for exercise,

a prison job, and a check-up for possible cancer of the mouth. Additionally, the

defendants allegedly have segregated Plaintiff repeatedly, forced him to live in

unsanitary conditions, placed in living quarters with diseased and violent inmates, and

interfered with his ability to conduct legal research. 

While some of these allegations are serious, none of the named defendants

appear to be employed by the Michigan Department of Corrections or to have any

responsibility for Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. “Because vicarious liability is

inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each

Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; accord Terrance v. Northville Reg’l

Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a plaintiff must

allege what each defendant did to violate the asserted rights and that claims against

governmental officials for alleged violations of constitutional rights “cannot be founded

upon conclusory, vague, or general allegations”); Ridgeway v. Kentucky, 510 F. App'x

412, 413 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that, "for the plaintiff to proceed, he should provide

detail as to how each defendant allegedly violated his constitutional rights"). Plaintiff

has failed to show how the named defendants personally contributed to his

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unacceptable living conditions. Thus, his allegations about the conditions of prison life

do not warrant relief. 

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s allegations lack an arguable basis in law and fail to state a plausible

claim for which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the complaint is summarily

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel certain federal entities to stop government corruption

(dkt. #9) and Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (dkt. #11) are denied as moot. 

Finally, the Court certifies that an appeal from this order would be frivolous and could

not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369

U.S. 438, 445 (1962).

Dated: November 21, 2014 S/ Sean F. Cox 

Sean F. Cox

U. S. District Judge

I hereby certify that on November 21, 2014, the foregoing document was served on

counsel of record via electronic means and upon David McCloy via First Class mail at 

the address below:

David McCloy 471229 

Charles Egeler Reception and Guidance Center Annex 

3855 Cooper Street 

Jackson, MI 49201 

S/ J. McCoy 

Case Manager 

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