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i 

65–809 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–38] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. PACIFIC 

COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 6, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM JOHNSON, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, April 6, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests for U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea ............... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, April 6, 2011 ....................................................................................... 39 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUESTS FOR U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Sharp, GEN Walter ‘‘Skip,’’ USA, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea .................... 5 

Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 43 

Sharp, GEN Walter ‘‘Skip’’ .............................................................................. 77 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 45 

Willard, ADM Robert F. ................................................................................... 47 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[The information is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 116 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 113 

Mrs. Hanabusa ................................................................................................. 117 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 120 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 119 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 117 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FOR U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony on the fiscal year 2012 President’s Budget Request for 

the U.S. Pacific Command [USPACOM] and U.S. Forces Korea 

[USFK]. 

I welcome our witnesses, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, 

Admiral Bob Willard, and Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, General Skip Sharp. Thank you both for being with us. It is a pleasure 

to see you again. 

I am sure you are much happier here than in the Pacific. 

Just kidding. 

First, on behalf of this entire committee, please allow me to express my heartfelt sorrow to the people of Japan for the terrible 

disaster which struck unexpectedly on March 11th. Japan is not 

only an esteemed trading partner, but the military alliance of our 

two nations forms the cornerstone of our mutual security in the Pacific. 

Admiral Willard, please convey to your counterparts in the government of Japan that the U.S. Congress stands by them and offers 

our support to continue to help its citizens rebuild and recover. 

In preparing for this hearing, I noted with amazement that the 

physical damage from the earthquake and tsunami is currently estimated at $250 billion to $309 billion. That is more than 350 percent higher than Hurricane Katrina. 

Admiral Willard, please let us know what type of assistance the 

U.S. military has been able to offer Japan, what additional help 

they may need, and what the status of U.S. personnel and their 

families is right now. 

Apart from Japan, however, our witnesses have responsibility for 

one of the most geographically and ethnically dispersed regions of 
2 

the globe, which will present some of the greatest opportunities 

and challenges to our national security in the coming decades. 

In its 2011 edition of The Military Balance, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, or IISS, drew ominous conclusions 

about global developments in defense policy and our Armed Forces. 

The IISS head, Dr. John Chipman, warned, ‘‘The United States, 

in the next few years it is going to have to make some very significant decisions on what it does.’’ 

The IISS highlighted the contrast between defense cuts in the 

West and booming military spending and arms acquisitions in Asia 

and the Middle East, concluding, ‘‘there is persuasive evidence that 

a global redistribution of military power is under way.’’ 

In particular, the rapidly expanding military power of China continues to overshadow other Asian states’ military efforts and creates unease among American allies in the region. 

The report further observes that ‘‘the Korean Peninsula is now 

as dangerous a place as it has been at any time since the end of 

the Korean War in 1953,’’ given the ‘‘imminent and possibly unclear leadership succession’’ in North Korea and that country’s aggression towards the South. 

In this context, it has never been more important to ensure that 

our forces in the Pacific have the personnel, training, equipment, 

and authorities they need to instill confidence in our allies, deter 

aggression, and remain ready to respond decisively to any contingency that may arise. 

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you for your many years 

of service. Thank you to those who serve with you. 

Please express to them our sincere appreciation for all that they 

are doing. 

We look forward to your testimony. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome Admiral Willard, General Sharp. I appreciate your 

work on behalf of our country. You are in a very, very important 

region. 

I also want to begin by joining in the chairman’s comments about 

the terrible tragedy in Japan and the impact there, to pass along 

our best wishes to a very strong partner and a very strong nation, 

during a very difficult time. 

And also, to thank the Pacific Command for all of their work, to 

help with that disaster you have done an amazing job and shown, 

I think, once again, what the reach of the U.S. military can do in 

terms of humanitarian, in terms of being able to help people when 

they need it most, throughout the world, you have been a fine example of that in Japan, though I know the challenges remain 

great. 

So, thank you for your service on that. 
3 

More broadly speaking, I think the Pacific Command covers a 

very vitally important region. 

There are many challenges in that region, but I think also there 

are great opportunities. 

Some of the larger, strongest economies in the world are there, 

as well as a lot of others that are emerging. These are some of the 

central emerging markets in the world and a positive relationship 

between the United States and these countries can be critical towards our economic growth, towards our economic opportunities 

and certainly towards creating a more stable world. And I appreciate both of your work to try to make that happen. 

Obviously, in the region, beyond Japan, is a central partner. 

China is a critical, critical country. And building a more positive 

relationship with them, I think, is very important as we go forward, and also very difficult, because our interests do not always 

coincide. But I still believe that what we have in common outweighs what is different and I think with strong leadership, we can 

build positive partnerships so that, hopefully, as we go forward, 

China works with us occasionally to help the stability of the region 

and the stability of the world, for that matter. 

So, the relationship with China is critical; anxious to hear what 

you gentlemen’s take is on where that is at. 

And then lastly, of course, is North Korea itself. I agree with 

what the chairman said, very volatile area, very dangerous and 

seemingly getting more so every day. So, I look forward to your testimony about how we manage that very difficult challenge to regional and global stability. 

With that, I yield back and I look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Both of your testimonies will be included, completely, in the 

record. We look forward to hearing what you have to say. 

Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman McKeon. 

And, Mr. Chairman, in order to accommodate the committee’s 

questions sooner, I will keep my remarks here brief and, as you 

have already suggested, ask that my full statement be included for 

the record. 

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and discuss the United States Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific region. 

I would like to extend our best wishes to Representative Giffords 

for a speedy recovery. As a Navy spouse, she is a key member of 

our military family and our thoughts and prayers remain with her 

and with her family. 

I would like to begin by recognizing my wife, Donna, who has 

been at my side for 37 years. She is an outstanding ambassador for 

our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men and women of our 

military and their families. She recently accompanied me to Japan 

where she met with service spouses and then traveled into the 
4 

tsunami-stricken region to visit a shelter for 1,200 displaced Japanese survivors. 

On that note, I would like to begin by offering our deepest sympathy for the people of Japan who have been affected by an unprecedented confluence of earthquakes, tsunamis and consequent nuclear accidents. 

In the midst of tragedy, the people of northern Honshu have 

demonstrated remarkable courage and resolve. Their ability to endure, to assist one another through hardship, to clean up their 

communities and recover their lives should be an inspiration for us 

all. 

The devastation Donna and I have observed from the 11th of 

March natural disasters was staggering. And the significance of the 

continuing nuclear crisis adds a level of disaster response complexity and urgency that is without peer. 

U.S. Pacific Command remains fully committed to supporting response efforts by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. I established a 

joint support force in Japan, whose mission includes humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief, including support to the Japanese 

defense forces who are spearheading the Fukushima nuclear accident response. 

At the same time, we are guarding the safety of U.S. service personnel and their families, whether they are operating in direct support for the relief effort or carrying out their normal duties at their 

home bases. 

A second PACOM joint task force planned and executed the voluntary departure of spouses and dependents, and maintains a follow-on departure plan, should it be required. 

The level of cooperation and collaboration between the service 

men and women of the United States and Japan has been remarkable, and the job they are doing together is inspiring. 

Worthy of special recognition is General Oriki, Japan’s Chief of 

the Joint Staff, for his exceptional leadership of nearly 100,000 

Japanese service members who are engaged in this effort. 

Our ability to quickly and effectively support their work is testimony to the maturity and strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 

No doubt, Japan will emerge from this terrible combination of 

disasters a stronger nation. Our hopes and prayers continue to go 

out to the Japanese people. 

Natural disasters are but one of the many challenges facing the 

United States Pacific Command throughout the Asia-Pacific. This 

vast region that covers half the earth is unique both in its size and 

diversity and the importance to the future of every other nation in 

the world. 

Containing the great populations, economies and militaries along 

with more than $5 trillion of seaborne commerce per year, this region has been and will continue to be of utmost importance to the 

United States. 

The United States Pacific Command’s role is to oversee its security and to help to keep the peace both in our Nation’s interests 

and in the interests of our five treaty allies and many regional 

partners. 
5 

The security environment is never static. Rather, it is characterized by a dynamic range of 36 nations, whose varying personalities 

and influence more or less affect the neighborhood. 

Each of our four sub-regions—Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, 

South Asia and Oceania—contain unique challenges and challengers that test our collective commitment to security and peace. 

Yet, in the face of actors such as North Korea, transnational extremist organizations such as Lashkar-e Tayyiba, Jemaah 

Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf Group, and uncertainties created by a rapidly expanding and assertive Chinese military, multilateral organizations such as ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], 

the East Asia Summit, and bonds between the United States, its 

allies and partners serve to moderate the challenges, deter the 

challengers and provide forums for advancing the collective security of the Asia-Pacific region. 

Overall, the prospects for continued peace, economic growth and 

advancing security cooperation in the region remain promising. 

We are repeatedly reminded that only through the U.S.’s ability 

and willingness to underwrite the security through our continuous 

presence, extended deterrence and protection of the global commons upon which the region’s livelihood depends, will regional 

peace and security endure. 

Every day, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians 

work to advance security in the Asia-Pacific. Their success has long 

been enabled by this committee’s sustained support. You have provided the service men and women of USPACOM with the most 

technically advanced military systems in the world and a quality 

of life worthy of the contributions of this All-Volunteer Force. 

On behalf of the more than 330,000 men and women of United 

States Pacific Command, thank you and thank you for this opportunity to testify on our defense posture in this most critical region 

of the world. 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Sharp. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER ‘‘SKIP’’ SHARP, USA, 

COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA 

General SHARP. Chairman McKeon, Representative Smith and 

other distinguished members of this committee; I welcome this opportunity to discuss the current state of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea 

and to answer your questions. 

I also want to thank this committee for its support for our service members, Department of Defense civilians, and family members 

that are all working together in the Republic of Korea. 

The Republic of Korea, a strong and enduring ally, is located in 

Northeast Asia, where the world’s largest militaries and economies 

reside. The Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance ensures security and 

stability in Northeast Asia. 

The Republic of Korea is also a great global security partner with 

a PRT [Provincial Reconstruction Team] in Afghanistan, anti-pi-
6 

racy operations off the coast of Somalia and several U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world and they are assisting in 

tackling proliferation. 

Most importantly, the Republic of Korea and the U.S. alliance 

continues to face a North Korea that threatens both regional and 

global security and peace. 

Last year, the Republic of Korea was the victim of two 

unprovoked attacks by North Korea. On 26th March, 2010, a North 

Korean submarine attacked the Republic of Korea naval ship, the 

Cheonan. And on 23rd November, 2010, a North Korea artillery 

barrage on the Republic of Korea island of Yeonpyeong-do. 

These brutal attacks resulted in the death of 48 South Korean 

service members and 2 civilians and numerous other casualties. 

The command’s mission is to deter North Korean provocations 

and aggressions and if deterrence fails, to fight and win. 

In support of this mission, forces are maintained on the Korean 

Peninsula and operate closely with our South Korean allies. 

The command’s first priority is to prepare to fight and win. 

Maintaining a combined ‘‘fight tonight’’ readiness is a key reason 

why U.S. forces are stationed alongside their Korean counterparts 

in the defense of the Republic of Korea. 

The alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict 

that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula. 

Maintaining this preparedness is accomplished through the development and continual refinement of our bilateral plans to deter 

and defeat aggression, while maintaining an ability to respond to 

other destabilizing conditions that could affect the Korean Peninsula. 

Successful execution of these bilateral plans will require a welltrained force; three annual, joint, combined and interagency exercises, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve and Full Legal Service, key enablers for maintaining the combined command’s ‘‘fight 

tonight’’ readiness, while also preparing for the future transition of 

wartime operational controls. 

The second priority of the command, to strengthen the Republic 

of Korea-U.S. alliance, supports the June 2009 United States-Republic of Korea Joint Presidential Vision Statement. A strong alliance better deters North Korea’s provocative acts and promotes 

peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, 

the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. 

Last year, President Obama agreed to the Republic of Korea 

President Lee Myung-bak’s request to adjust the timing of the 

transition of wartime operational control from April 2012 to December of 2015. 

He also agreed to develop a plan to better synchronize all of the 

ongoing transformation initiatives, of which OPCON [operational 

control] transition is just one of the elements. 

Called ‘‘Strategic Alliance 2015,’’ this plan was affirmed and 

signed by the United States Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, 

and the then Republic of Korea Minister of Defense, Minister Kim 

Tae-young, at the 42nd security consultant meeting in October of 

2010. 

Strategic Alliance 2015 synchronizes multiple U.S. and Republic 

of Korea transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive 
7 

and flexible capabilities to deter and to defeat aggression, should 

it occur. 

Key elements of Strategic Alliance 2015 include refining and approving combined defense plans, defining and developing the new 

organizational structures and capabilities required by the Republic 

of Korea to lead the war fight, implementing more realistic exercises based upon the North Korean threat of today and tomorrow, 

preparing for the transition of wartime operational control in 2015 

and consolidating U.S. military forces in the Republic of Korea onto 

two enduring hubs, under the Yongsan Relocation Program and the 

Land Partnership Program. 

This repositioning of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea improves force readiness and quality of life, my third priority. It realizes stationing efficiencies and signals the continued American 

commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea and engagement in the region more broadly. 

Restationing also enhances force protection and survivability. 

Finally, normalizing tours in Korea was reinforced in October of 

2010, when Secretary of Defense Gates directed the U.S. Forces 

Korea into services to proceed with full tour normalization as affordable. 

As a force multiplier, tour normalization keeps trained and ready 

military personnel in place for a longer period of time. It improves 

readiness, combat capability, lowers turbulence in units and reduces the stress placed on troops, units and families. 

In closing, the men and women assigned to United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea remain 

committed and stand ready. Our ongoing efforts to implement Strategic Alliance 2015, the Yongsan Relocation and Land Partnership 

Program and tour normalization demonstrate a long-term U.S. 

commitment to not only security for the Republic of Korea, but for 

the broader region of Northeast Asia as well. 

I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 

Department of Defense civilians and their families serving in the 

great nation of the Republic of Korea. And your support for them 

is truly appreciated. 

This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in the 

Appendix on page 77.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Willard, the IISS Report I mentioned in my opening 

statement is just the latest analysis that suggests there is unease 

among American allies in the Pacific. What do you hear about perceptions of the United States in this region and this growing disparity between the growth of China’s military and plans to cut defense spending in the United States due to budgetary pressures? 

And what more can the U.S. military do to bolster confidence in 

our allies and deter future aggression in the region? 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes. Thank you, Chairman McKeon. 

The general perception, I think, within the Asia-Pacific and, especially among Southeast Asian nations, when I took command a 

year and a half ago, was of uncertainty regarding U.S. commitment 

to the region overall and frankly uncertainty regarding our pres-
8 

ence in the region and whether or not, as a consequence of the 

wars in the Middle East, that had been diminished. 

We have made a concerted effort, and I think Secretary Clinton 

and Secretary Gates’ commitment to the region and statements 

made in Vietnam and Singapore, throughout 2010, helped to reinforce and re-establish the United States’ commitment to the AsiaPacific. 

The presence of our forces has been made more noticeable. 

Interestingly, in this region of the world, for many of these nations, in order to know that we are present, we have to tell them 

and so part of that message has been shared. 

But I think that our allies in the region, in particular, and Australia, to point out one, have been vocal regarding their desire to 

help enhance U.S. presence throughout the region, and especially 

in Southeast Asia, in and around the South China Sea, by making 

overtures to the United States to team more broadly with them and 

perhaps enable a rotational force presence from regions closer to 

that particular area. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Sharp, do you agree with the IISS assessment that the 

Korean Peninsula is now as dangerous a place as it has been any 

time since the end of the Korean War in 1953? And how do the 

South Koreans view their relationship with the U.S. today? 

The South Koreans have made significant strides in developing 

a robust military capability, in light of the existential threat they 

face from the north. This growth in capability has enabled the 

United States to reduce its presence on the peninsula, somewhat. 

Please explain how tour normalization will help you increase 

readiness, even with a smaller force. What else do you need in 

terms of facilities and family services to achieve these goals? 

General SHARP. Sir, thank you. 

If you look at, back, over last year, the two attacks that I named 

and then look forward over the next couple of years, I believe that 

there are some real challenges from North Korea that we have to 

be prepared to deter and if deterrence does not work, be prepared 

to respond to. 

And as North Korea works through the succession that they are 

ongoing now, as North Korea tries to become, as Kim Jong-Il has 

claimed, to be a great and powerful nation in 2012, I do worry that 

there are additional attacks and provocations that are being considered within North Korea. 

We call on North Korea, that those are not necessary and we are 

working very hard with the Republic of Korea to deter any future 

provocations, but be prepared if deterrence does not work. 

The way that we are working through that, as you said, is to 

make sure that the alliance is as strong as it can be right now and 

we are of one voice and one set of actions in order to be able to 

prepare for North Korea. 

We have 28,500 troops in North Korea at this time and it has 

been that way for the last several years under Secretary Gates and 

President Obama’s leadership. They have said that force level will 

be sustained for the foreseeable future. 
9 

And I believe that is about the right force level for Korea to do 

what we need to deter and to respond across a wide range of possible scenarios from North Korea. 

U.S., specifically, help toward normalization has helped increase 

the alliance together and increase our readiness. And we have 

moved from, in the summer of 2008, about 1,700 command-sponsored families to the point now where we have over 4,100 command-sponsored families in Korea. 

All of those forces have moved from a force where you would rotate one year at a time to troops that are now there for 2 and 3 

years. You can imagine the increase in unit capability, unit cohesion if you don’t have to train new soldiers every year. 

I have seen, just in that short period of time, a great increase 

of readiness of our units, a great, stronger desire within units to 

make differences within units. If you stay there one year at a time, 

you can stand on your head for a year. You really don’t focus on 

the long-term good for units and the overall strength that your unit 

needs to be. 

So as we move forward and toward normalization and as I said 

in my opening statement, I and the services owe to Secretary Gates 

an affordable plan to be able to move, where all of our families can 

come to Korea and Korea can become a tour, just like Germany, 

just like Japan, where you are there for 2 and 3 years at a time, 

really focusing on not only your unit, but also improving relationships on a personal basis within the Republic of Korea. 

That plan is going to the Secretary over the next month or so. 

He will then make decisions on how to move forward, based upon 

the budget and the importance of this initiative and that will be 

presented to you all on the budget that comes forward next January. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Or, Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I don’t think I look like Smith. 

The CHAIRMAN. Not at all. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first I would like 

to say that as a representative from Guam, I too join the rest of 

the world in sending our deepest sympathies to the people of 

Japan. 

The people of Guam, in their generosity, have organized many 

fundraising drives on the island and at last count, when I was 

home, we have raised several millions of dollars. 

Admiral Willard and General Sharp, thank you for your testimonies this morning. And Admiral, for your information, with all 

the increased activities going on in Guam now, we are still afloat. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. My first question is for you, Admiral. Can you describe what progress the U.S. and Japan are making toward 

achieving tangible progress? Tangible progress is often portrayed 

as the time when we can move a single Marine off Okinawa to 

Guam. 

But I do know, in reality, much must be achieved before tangible 

progress can be realized. MILCON [military construction] on Guam 
10 

must continue to achieve slow and steady progress, so in due 

course, a Marine can move to fully functioning facilities on Guam. 

So, what are some of the immediate and medium-term steps that 

must be taken to achieve tangible progress in Okinawa? 

And further, Admiral, can you describe how this year’s military 

construction budget for Guam achieves our commitment to the 

Guam international agreement? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo. 

The progress toward the Futenma Replacement Facility [FRF] 

that occupied so much of our time with the Japanese last year, we 

think has begun to move forward this year, as a consequence of 

both Prime Minister Kan’s commitment to seeing this forward, to 

the conclusion of the local elections in Okinawa that took place last 

fall, and most importantly the continued effort on the part of both 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] and the Ministry of 

Defense in Guam to continue their dialogue, through working 

groups, in order to accomplish what we need to, to move FRF forward. 

And we are progressing toward the signed commitment by the 

governor of Okinawa to begin to make the actual contracting and 

movement of soil for the first time in the FRF location. 

I think there are some issues to finalize with regard to runway 

configuration and so forth, some items that we have talked about 

in the past. But we feel that progress is being made. 

I think the overall budgetary commitment on the part of the Government of Japan toward Guam remains strong. They continue to 

carry a considerable amount forward for Guam, DPRI [Defense Policy Review Initiatives] issues. And as you and I have discussed, 

previously, they have continued to make overtures that despite the 

crisis that is currently ongoing in Japan that they will be able to 

continue to proceed with the tenets of DPRI, of which Futenma Replacement Facility and the movement of 8,000 Marines to Guam is 

only one of 19 actions that DPRI contains. 

So, I feel confident that progress, tangible progress, is in fact 

being made. There are uncertainties, unquestionably, as a consequence of what else Japan is contending with now and the scope 

of that disaster in terms of financial impact to Japan. But with the 

commitments that you have heard and that I have seen from the 

Japanese and the continued progress that we have seen being 

made, at least in dialogue, if not in actual construction, I am confident that we will continue to progress towards the tenets of the 

defense review initiative. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral, I also—the second part of that question 

is how about this year’s military construction budget on our part? 

Admiral WILLARD. I will have an opportunity next week to discuss our military construction budget before the MILCON committee. And we intend to discuss Guam initiatives in particular. 

I remain concerned that there be sufficient commitment within 

the MILCON budget to proceed with the infrastructure development in particular, attendant to the Marine Corps facilities as they 

have been described. 

So, the infrastructure in and around the area south of Andersen 

Air Force Base, Finegayan and the infrastructure needed on the 

defense posts themselves in the area of Andersen Air Force Base, 
11 

both very critical to precede the development of housing and other 

military construction that comes later. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

And my next question is for General Sharp. General, I believe we 

share a common mission of layered defense against potential North 

Korean aggression. In Guam, we are poised to host the development of a ballistic missile defense system that will be a key component of strategic deterrence in the Pacific. 

What other elements of defense do you see as necessary to demonstrate U.S. resolve in the Pacific theater? And how else should 

the administration and the military illustrate that regardless of 

events taking place around the world today, we are still committed 

to assured access for us and our allies to, and freedom of maneuver 

within, the Pacific global commons? 

And I once heard a general officer recently at a hearing who was 

stationed in Korea state that he felt more comfortable when the B– 

52s or the B–2s were stationed in Guam. So do you share that sentiment? 

And can you explain the role of long-range strike on the Korean 

Peninsula? 

General SHARP. Thank you. I can answer from a Korean Peninsula perspective and then the broader—the Pacific perspective and 

I am sure Admiral Willard would like to comment on that. 

Within Korea, we are working very hard to make sure that our 

missile defense both the Republic of Korea and the U.S. alliance 

are strong and prepared for what North Korea could throw at it. 

And so the Republic of Korea is moving forward, buying and employing more radars and command-and-control systems for their 

Patriots, which they have recently bought. 

They just launched the third Aegis ship. 

We are working in concert with them to establish a good system 

within the Republic of Korea for missile defense in order to protect 

the valuable assets that we would need if we have to go a war fight 

there. 

The deterrent value that comes from the B–52 and other systems 

that Admiral Willard would send to the fight in Korea is a huge— 

more than just a deterrent value, it is critical for our war fight and 

it is key component in order to be able to take down long-range 

systems, to include missiles that would be coming towards South 

Korea. 

But that is from a Korean perspective of what we are working 

together to be able to do. I don’t know if you want to add any comment? 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral. 

Admiral WILLARD. I would just comment that among five treaty 

allies in the Asia-Pacific region, the Republic of Korea is certainly 

an important one. 

The systems at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, specifically 

the B–52s and B–2s, as you have mentioned, are an element of the 

extended deterrents that the United States affords our allies and 

partners in the region. 

And certainly their ability to respond to contingency on the Korean Peninsula is an important part of why they are there. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 
12 

Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question, one more. 

This is for you, Admiral Willard. We have had some significant 

achievements in progress in reducing the capabilities of extremists 

in the southern Philippines, thanks to a number of initiatives with 

the Philippine military, including the State Partnership Program. 

Are there any lessons in this anti-insurgency strategy in the 

Philippines that we could utilize in Afghanistan? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think that is a good question. 

The southern Philippines has been a relative success, we believe. 

Over the past half dozen years, the 400 or 500 special operators 

that Pacific Command has maintained in the southern Philippines 

have done a credible job in working with the Armed Forces of the 

Philippines in order to defeat and contain Abu Sayyaf Group and 

Jemaah Islamiyah extremists that were operating there. 

And we think we are at a point where planning can commence 

for a next phase. 

So in general, we consider this to have been successful. 

I think one of the key comparisons between the southern Philippines and Afghanistan has been the role that the Armed Forces 

of the Philippines have played in the lead of this counterterrorism 

effort. 

And when you consider the work that is ongoing in Afghanistan, 

in order to build up the Afghani security forces and Afghan police 

forces, in order to make them as self-sufficient and accomplished 

as the Armed Forces of the Philippines has been, it points to the 

need for that work to continue. 

So, I think the idea of our Armed Forces being in support of a 

self-sufficient host-nation armed force that can conduct the 

counterterrorism in the lead is the lesson that we have derived 

from our success in the Philippines. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I would like you to take two questions for the record, if you 

would, because I think that at the table, you may not have the consultation necessary to formulate an adequate answer. 

The first for Admiral Willard, the Chinese, as you know, are buying oil reserves all over the world. We use 25 percent of the world’s 

oil. We produce—we have only 2 percent of the world’s reserves. 

We import about two-thirds of what we are using and yet we are 

buying no oil reserves anywhere in the world. 

You might note that at the same time, the Chinese are aggressively building a blue-water navy. 

Why this difference in our national strategies, relative to the 

purchase of oil? And how should this instruct us for our future 

planning? 

General Sharp, there is a nuclear detonation above the atmosphere in—over Korea. The North Koreans, in a panic, call and say, 

gee, I am sorry that bird got away from us, but we detonated it 

in the atmosphere so it wouldn’t produce any harm. 

Of course, it will produce a huge electromagnetic pulse. 
13 

How much of your warfighting capability will be decremented by 

this as compared to the North Koreans? And what will be the effect 

of that on our warfighting capability? 

I would like to read a couple of brief paragraphs from an op ed 

piece in the April 4th commentary in the Washington Times. It is 

called ‘‘Dear Leader to Dead Duck.’’ And it is ostensibly written by 

Kim Jong-Il and he is admonishing Qadhafi as to his failures. 

‘‘The imperialists call us both crazy men, but there is a difference. They fear my craziness, not yours. This time last year, our 

glorious North Korean military forces struck like a hammer and 

sank a warship belonging to the puppet regime below our southern 

border. What did the imperialist forces do? Nothing. A few months 

later, we shelled the territory, right in the middle of their wargame practices. What did they do this time? Again, nothing.’’ 

‘‘You, on the other hand, have not raised a hand against these 

sniveling hypocrites for many years. You played ball with them, as 

they like to say. You allowed the yellow wind of capitalism to blow 

through your country. You invited the giant capitalist bloodsucker 

BP to siphon off your people’s birthright for its own profit, all so 

fat capitalists can ride around in luxury vehicles.’’ 

‘‘Oh, what a mistake it was to give away your weapons of mass 

destruction.’’ 

And it goes on. 

And my question is, how much of the world sees it this way? 

General SHARP. Sir, I believe that—I can talk for the Republic 

of Korea and our alliance there, is that we do believe that North 

Korea is continuing to develop their nuclear weapons. 

Kim Jong-Il has said that. He has said the importance of that 

to him; that he will—his plan is to continue to do that. I do not 

believe that he will give that up. 

What we worked to do is to be able to deter future attacks that 

will come out of North Korea, like the two that are mentioned in 

those articles. 

The Republic of Korea and the U.S. since then have made great 

progress in strengthening the defenses for the types of provocations 

that North Korea has and could do in the future. 

We are working very hard to have appropriate plans in place to 

not only deter, but be prepared for a strong response against North 

Korea. 

I think that from a South Korean perspective, the attack on YPdo, Yeonpyeong-do, on the 23rd of November changed the Republic 

of Korea. At that time, the Republic of Korea, everybody across the 

nation was watching that attack live on their handheld devices. 

It was clear evidence that North Korea was willing to attack the 

Republic of Korea and kill civilians. And that changed the Republic 

of Korea’s view that if North Korea does attack again, a very, very 

strong response, proportionate, but strong response, in self-defense 

will be going back towards North Korea. 

There was a response on the 23rd of November, a fairly rapid response that went back as far as artillery, back towards the source 

of the provocation. 

Since then, a lot of work has been done to really determine what 

is the appropriate response and the accuracy of that for future 

types of provocations. 
14 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much and I look forward to your 

written responses to my questions for the record. Thank you very 

much. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, I want to thank you both for 

your attendance here today and most especially for your service to 

our Nation. 

Let me begin by also thanking the sailors and marines who have 

assisted with the recovery effort in Japan. They are obviously— 

Japan is one of our Nation’s most important friends and allies in 

the region and, clearly as a sign of respect and a sign of how important that friendship is, that we send our best and brightest young 

men and women to their aid in their time of their national need. 

Gentlemen, I want to discuss several topics right now that are 

of personal interest to me around two strategic issues vis-a-vis our 

military posture in the region. 

Over the past 10 years, China has made significant investments 

in their ability to project regional sea power, specifically a rapid increase in the size of their submarine fleet. 

In the U.S., we have begun the process of doubling our production rate for the superior Virginia-class submarine. However, we 

still face the near-term challenge of a declining fleet. 

So Admiral Willard, can you please discuss some of the importance of the U.S. submarine fleet in the Pacific and China’s decision to increase its seapower projection capabilities? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think, unquestionably, China has made tremendous investment in its maritime capabilities across the board, 

to include the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] Navy. And we have 

no doubt that they have aspirations to make that a blue-water 

navy that is deployable around the world and they are demonstrating that today, with anti-piracy operations in and near the 

Gulf of Aden. And they demonstrated it, to a lesser extent, by moving some of their surface fleet into the Mediterranean Sea during 

the Libya crisis in order to assist in evacuating Chinese citizens. 

So, they are expanding their fleet, patrolling more, penetrating 

the first island chain and extending their operations further into 

the Pacific on a fairly steady pace. 

The importance of United States submarines to the Asia-Pacific 

can’t be overstated. The submarines afford us both a covert and 

highly capable platform from which to characterize the undersea 

environment and to help to dominate that domain. 

The increased production of the Virginia-class submarine, I 

think, was a critical national decision for the United States and a 

very important one for the naval forces. And I think an important 

one, at the end of the day, for U.S. Pacific Command. 

And there is no question that within that PLA Navy expansion, 

they have placed great emphasis on an expanding submarine force 

in their own right. And we endeavored to watch that development, 

that dimension of the PLA Navy development, very closely. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 
15 

The second issue I wanted to discuss was the threat to the U.S. 

and our allies from ballistic missile attack. The North Korean government has proven time and again its willingness to dangerously 

push the line of what is acceptable behavior in the region. 

Given their interest in developing missile technology and nuclear 

capabilities, it is vitally important to retain a serious missile defense capability in the region. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, 

could you both please discuss our regional defense—missile defense 

capabilities and their importance, not only to our own forces, but 

to the long-term security of our regional allies? 

In addition, what challenges do we face, relying on shipborne 

systems and is there any discussion of utilizing more land-based 

systems, such as those proposed under the President’s European 

phased adaptive approach [PAA]? 

Admiral WILLARD. I will begin if I may, to say that we place 

great emphasis on what I would cast as a growing ballistic missile 

defense capability in the Pacific. 

There have been a number of investments, both on the command 

and control side of missile defense as well as on the platform and 

weapons side of missile defense. 

Our Aegis fleet continues to grow in terms of its capacities to 

provide for missile defense and the production line of standard missiles that our missile defense capable continues to produce. 

That said, for the United States, recalling when ballistic missile 

defense became a serious commitment, we continue to grow the capacities that are required to contend with the potential threats 

from sites such as North Korea. 

We currently believe that we have an adequate missile defense 

capability to contend with what we believe to be North Korea’s 

threat that is posed to the region and to the United States. 

We continue to work with allies and partners to see their interest 

in developing their own missile defense capabilities. As you are 

aware, the Japanese are investing substantially there. And as General Sharp has already mentioned, the Korean Peninsula is investing both in land-based and considerations for sea-based tracking, if 

not ballistic missile defense capabilities. 

So this is a growing capability in the Asia-Pacific and a growing 

capability, as you are aware, elsewhere. And yes, we are considering the land-based systems that complement our sea-based systems, such that we are not overly reliant on any particular domain, 

but rather we have the defense and depth that we think BMD [ballistic missile defense] demands. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral and General, thank you for your service to our country 

and you have both done great jobs in helping to keep us free. 

And, Admiral, I particularly appreciate you mentioning your 

wife, Donna. We know oftentimes our spouses have greater sacrifices than we do. They just don’t get to wear the medals. So we 

appreciate you mentioning that. 

Admiral, you have been great at talking about all the needs that 

we have in the Pacific and we thank you for that. 
16 

In today’s world, with all the gag orders we see coming from the 

Pentagon and the prescreening that is going on, oftentimes don’t 

know what you can say and what you can’t say, and so the best 

we can do is throw out the questions we think we need to ask for 

the defense of the country and then you can either answer it or 

glance off of it. 

But one of the things that I have been concerned about for years 

is the growing modernization we see with the Chinese military. It 

is unprecedented, I think, in terms of its speed and the depth that 

we have seen. 

And every time we ask about it, we always get the same response. Well, we don’t want a conflict with China. 

None of us want a conflict with China. 

I don’t think they want a conflict with us. 

Yet if you read all of their white papers, if you study their literature, if you listen to their comments, everything they do is focused upon us. Their modeling has our carriers in their modeling. 

They look at our weapons systems to defend against our weapon 

systems. 

If we don’t ask the same questions, we are not being smart. We 

are being foolish. 

And so when you look at our strategy, they always come down 

to a number of things, but at the end, it is how long we can withstand an intensified conflict. 

If you look at some of their literature, they don’t feel that we can 

take a body blow and keep going for a long period of time. 

My question for you, this morning, is with the resources you 

have under your command, if we did have an intense conflict that 

were to develop, none of us want it, but if it were to develop with 

the Chinese, given their growing modernization, how long could we 

sustain that kind of conflict? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think the question is a fair one. I think the 

question is a very difficult one to answer when you consider the 

vast number of scenarios that we may be discussing here in terms 

of any contingency the United States Armed Forces would face, depending on its intensity and the way in which we would choose to 

deal with it. 

There are obviously methods where United States Armed Forces, 

together with the whole of government, can approach a problem, 

not necessarily in the form of attrition warfare, in the way that we 

have classically contended, at times, in the past. 

So, how symmetrical, how asymmetrical, we would choose to approach a conflict matters and ultimately is part of the answer to 

your question. 

I think when you look around the world at what the United 

States has contended with, in the Middle East, 10 years of warfare 

and we remain pretty resilient and committed to finishing the warfare that is currently ongoing in Afghanistan. 

And at the same time, we are able to flex to issues like Libya. 

Or, in my case, flex to a large-scale disaster response in Japan. 

And continue to conduct an exercise series across the Asia-Pacific, albeit, at a somewhat diminished rate. But nonetheless, we 

meet our commitments throughout the region. 
17 

There is capacity in the Asia-Pacific that sometimes belies, I 

think, the assumptions made regarding both the combat power and 

the power to sustain operations there. 

I am confident that I have got the force structure right now postured forward and available to me to do the work that I need to 

do, to include a next contingency, should I need to confront one. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. And, General, thank you for 

what you are doing. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, I want to change the focus a little bit here and go 

Down Under. 

First, Admiral Willard, you mentioned New Zealand and Australia in your written testimony and New Zealand’s contributions 

to supporting our common interests in a variety of ways around the 

globe. 

With regards to Australia, this is—I understand a discussion 

going on with the Force Posture Review with Australia and it is 

in discussion stage and I was curious about PACOM’s role and your 

assessment of the progress of these discussions and the focus of 

these discussions? 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes. Thank you. 

The Australians have been extremely forward-leaning in their 

overtures to the United States Government and to the Department 

of Defense to consider whether or not increasing our level of involvement with their armed forces, taking advantage of some of the 

existing capacities in Australia would lend to an improved Pacific 

Command posture, particularly in accessing Southeast Asia and 

the South China Sea region. 

And we have taken a hard look at that. I, myself, visited Australia and nearly circumnavigated the continent. In viewing areas 

in northern Australia, the prospects of an improving force posture 

in those directions are very appealing. 

I think that those ongoing between the United States Government and Australia Government, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Ministry of Defense in Australia will likely lead to 

fruitful opportunities for us to provide for rotational forces in and 

out of Australia in the future. At least I am hopeful for that. 

As Secretary Gates made very clear, ultimately he will make a 

proposal into the U.S. interagency and beyond his recommendation. 

It will become a United States Government decision at the end of 

the day, with the Australian Government, obviously, in the ultimate discussion. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. 

And General Sharp, I sense you had some things to say with regards to Mr. Langevin’s comments on regional missile defense and 

I had some questions about it too. So, I will give you the opportunity to sort of build on what Admiral Willard said, with regard 

to Mr. Langevin’s question. 

But just with regards to the regional aspect of missile defense 

and how ROK [Republic of Korea] would fit into that? 
18 

General SHARP. That is right. Thank you for the opportunity to 

say that. 

Just real quickly, also, on New Zealand and Australia, they are 

both, of course, key countries within the United Nations [U.N.] 

Command in the Military Armistice Commission, and last year 

were key components in the investigations of both of the attacks 

on North Korea, and participate in our exercises. So they are very 

important to my command also and what they would do for U.N. 

sending states and work very closely with that part of the alliance 

also. 

The only thing I was going to mention, in addition, on ballistic 

missile defense, is I think on a good defense, you also need a very 

strong offense. And to be able to have the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] type of assets, to be able to look into 

North Korea, to see what they are doing, I think what north—what 

the Republic of Korea is doing now to buy a Global Hawk, what 

we have done in order to be able to synchronize our ISR assets help 

in a ballistic missile, overall, architecture also. 

And then finally, on the proliferation side, PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative] is a big element to get nations to be able to work 

together to not allow proliferation of missiles out of North Korea, 

that type of technology to include nuclear technology and the Republic of Korea, being a member of the PSI group now, and recently hosting a large conference and exercise along those line are 

other things that are being done in order to be able to help stop 

both the use and the proliferation of missile technology and nuclear 

capability. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. And then just quickly, I will see how quickly 

you can answer this question. 

In your testimony, you mentioned tour normalization as, I think, 

as affordable, perhaps. Does that indicate the budget is not big 

enough for tour normalization? Or how is that progressing? 

General SHARP. As I said, we are at the point now where we 

have reached about our capacity for all of the facilities that we 

have to bring families there now. 

And the limiting factor, to be honest, is schools and the building 

of more schools will be the next that go up. 

As Secretary Gates has said on several occasions, the goal is to 

be able to move to full tour normalization. But that costs money 

in order to be able to build the schools, to be able to build the 

apartments in order to be able to do that. 

And that is what we yield back to Secretary Gates. What is affordable? Over what time period in order to be able to complete 

this very important initiative, so that, I mean, today, as we sit 

here, there are 7,000 families that are separated for a year because 

we don’t have the infrastructure in Korea to be able to afford to 

bring them. 

Secretary Gates has directed that we work to be able to do that 

at an affordable pace. As I said, in my opening earlier, that is what 

we owe him back over the next several months, so he can give direction to the service forces as they build their POMs [Program Objectives Memoranda] for submission next year. 

Mr. THORNBERRY [presiding]. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
19 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service. You 

certainly have an incredibly important area of the world as we look 

to the threats that are emerging. 

As we look to the threats that are emerging from North Korea 

and also from Iran, we turn to our issues of discussing missile defense and I would appreciate if you could discuss how the missile 

defense mission and the multi-mission capability of the Aegis ballistic missile defense ships are affecting the overall force structure 

requirements for the Aegis fleet. 

In particular, can you describe how operational considerations, 

such as the need for additional ships, for force protection, influence 

PACOM’s overall missile defense force structure requirements, recognizing that an Aegis ship is going to need assistance, while it is 

providing missile defense capability? 

And according to a Defense News article in June of 2010, they 

stated that U.S. Aegis radar readiness plunges and indicated that 

it is in the worst shape ever, raising questions about the service 

fleets’ ability to take on a high-profile new mission next year, defending Europe from ballistic missiles. 

Could you please discuss any Aegis readiness concerns that you 

may have and how it may impact the Navy’s ability to meet missile 

defense mission requirements? 

Admiral. 

Admiral WILLARD. I will start with the second question first, if 

I may, and discuss the readiness piece. 

With the exception of all of our ships being steamed at a very 

high pace, and by and large they have been for the last decade, 

while we have been occupied in wars elsewhere and moving forces 

around a great deal, also maintaining our forward presence in the 

Asia-Pacific, there are not overarching concerns about Aegis readiness in my fleet. 

So, as far as Pacific Command is concerned, the readiness of the 

Aegis fleet, in terms of conducting its ballistic missile defense mission or any of its other multi-mission tasks, is not a concern for me. 

With regard to the multi-mission role of Aegis, and its self-protection capability, these are very competent platforms. As you allude, they have about a half a dozen missions that they contribute 

to, to include the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

mission that was previously mentioned, but also an air defense 

mission, a surface defense mission, an undersea warfare mission 

and so on. 

So they are contributing to a great deal at any time when they 

are at sea. 

The ballistic missile defense capabilities that they have are limited only by virtue of the capability of the missile systems that they 

are employing. 

So as we see advances in the SM–3 system and larger envelopes, 

the freedom of action that the ships will have to operate at extended ranges away from ballistic missile sites where they can also 

perform that function will increase. 

So, over time, the freedom of action of ships committed to ballistic missile defense will improve as they also perform their other 

functions. 
20 

I would have to understand the scenario you described to say 

that they themselves have to be protected while they are conducting BMD. The—— 

Mr. TURNER. Well, certainly they have needs for additional systems. 

I mean, but that does provide some demand on your overall ship 

force structure. 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, we operate in a variety of modes, you 

know, with other ships, sometimes singly. These ships, again, are 

pretty self-sufficient. 

So to understand the conditions under which they would be operating in a surface action group or in a larger carrier strike group 

as opposed to independently is something that is probably worth 

discussion. 

But, by and large, these ships are self-sufficient and, as you suggest, multi-role. To the maximum extent possible, we intend to 

keep them that way. 

As the ballistic missile defense missile systems continue to improve, the freedom of action to have these ships located at extreme 

distances from the ballistic missile threat sites will continue to improve as well. 

Mr. TURNER. I look forward to having additional conversations 

about that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General and Admiral, for being here. 

Mrs. Willard, thank you especially for your service. When we 

consider our military personnel, their families are front and foremost, also, with our considerations. 

General, we had talked about and you had mentioned earlier 

that South Korea has stated that, you know, if there are any provocations from North Korea they will respond in kind, and greater. 

In your opinion, how much of an impression can they make on 

North Korea? Can they—I am not asking for specifics, but, also, 

you all discussed this and is there any concern that they might 

overreact to provocation? 

General SHARP. Thank you. South Korea has a very strong military force that continues to grow stronger every day. 

In fact, they recently just published their new defense reform 

plan based upon a lot of lessons learned out of 2010 and are really 

focusing on the ability to be a more joint type of force that is optimized towards the North Korea threat that we see for today and 

in the future. 

Without getting into classified session, I have reviewed the plans 

that the Republic of Korea, and we have worked together on for a 

variety of different types of provocations. 

They are strong, appropriate and meet the test of self-defense. I 

am confident in General Han, the Republic of Korea’s chairman— 

who is a chairman for the Republic of Korea, and Minister Kim’s 

capability to make sure that they, the South Koreans, do not unnecessarily escalate. 

What North Korea will do is up to North Korea. But I am absolutely confident that South Korea has the controls that the re-
21 

sponse that goes back will be firm, but it will not force an uncontrolled escalation from a South Korean perspective. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral, we had hearings in the previous Congress. At one point 

in time, our ships as they were in international waters, were being, 

for lack of a better word, harassed by the Chinese fishing boats, 

whatever. 

We had trouble just simply making our way through the waters 

without, you know, fear of hitting other boats. You know, memory 

doesn’t serve perfectly, but there were a couple of points where, you 

know, we did have interaction with some of these other ships. 

But I don’t hear about that so much now at all. What is the status of that? 

Are they continuing to harass our movements in international 

waters? Or what is this relationship now? 

Admiral WILLARD. From the standpoint of the Chinese maritime 

activities in and around the East China Sea and South China Sea, 

Yellow Sea regions where we sometimes operate, we have not had 

confrontations with the PLA Navy or with their maritime security 

forces since the incidents that you allude to. 

The Chinese do continue to shadow some of our ships as they 

conduct their missions in international waters that are proximate 

to China. 

The confrontations that have occurred have occurred with our 

partners and allies in the region. You are, no doubt, aware of the 

incidents that occurred with the Japanese over the Senkakus and 

confrontations continue to persist in the South China Sea, most recently, with a Philippine ship that was operating there. 

So we continue to observe for, watch over, the maritime activities 

across the board that are occurring in the Southeast Asia region 

and East Asia region in order to ascertain where confrontations or 

conflict could emanate. 

But, to date, this year, there have been no confrontations with 

our forces. 

Mr. KISSELL. Admiral, at one time, these confrontations were to 

the point where we had a hearing about it to talk about it; and, 

now that has been withdrawn is there a particular reason that you 

might know that they pulled back there? Or was it just recognizing 

that maybe that wasn’t the best policy? 

Or just why do you think maybe that was negated in terms of 

what they are doing in terms of the relationship with us? 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, I think probably two things. One, I 

think the assertions made last year by the United States, in particular, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, very strong statements within the ASEAN and the Shangri-La Dialogue series I 

think had an effect. 

I think the fact that the ASEAN nations themselves coalesced, 

marshaled around one another to protest the very assertive actions 

that we were seeing out of the Chinese over various maritime activities in the South China Sea. 

I think for those reasons they have at least tactically withdrawn 

from any confrontations. 

But, as well, we have resumed military-to-military relations with 

China. We at U.S. Pacific Command hosted a military maritime 
22 

consultative agreement round of talks with them which has to do 

with maritime safety and air safety. 

And as you know, there had been visits in both directions with 

the President Hu’s visit that had been preceded by Secretary Gates’ 

visit to China. 

I think any time that the military-to-military relationship is ongoing and continuous, that the likelihood of confrontation such as 

you suggest is diminished. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you so much for joining 

us today. I enjoyed seeing you there at Newport News at the USS 

California ceremony there. 

Mrs. Willard, thank you so much for your effort there as the 

ship’s sponsor. That was a great, great day. 

Admiral Willard, I did want to speak a little bit about what is 

going on with China’s efforts to modernize their naval forces. As we 

know, there are some significant issues there. 

They are expanding their capability both with carriers and with 

other elements of their navy in being able to project sea power 

across the world. 

They are on the road to, I think, creating a fairly capable navy. 

As we know, they certainly have the quantity elements that begin 

to create some concern for us. They are working on the quality side 

of things. 

Right now, they are looking at it from a littoral zone issue as far 

as creating that force. But they are also projecting force out and 

beyond those particular areas and with a focus to, I think, go well 

beyond the littoral zone around China. 

As you know, just this past year, we have seen a Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa, also in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea 

and the Persian Gulf. 

So, that tells me that they are on track to do a little bit more 

than just protecting their shipping lanes and their littoral areas. 

In going back and looking historically about how the development of navies have occurred, I would like to go back to historian 

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and his idea about sea power. 

And of course, he projected this structure that nations go forthwith to be able to project sea power. As you know, at the end of 

the 19th century, he wrote pretty eloquently about that. 

In the years to come, Japan, the U.S., Germany and Britain all 

followed that. I think they have been pretty successful in projecting 

that particular seapower force. 

I want to ask you a question. That is, from their efforts in sustaining and executing sustained power projection through a navy— 

and, granted, they have got a ways to go—but in the 21st century 

with the pace at which they are pursuing this, how do you see that 

as a challenge to our naval and air forces there at the Pacific Command? 

And where do you think that we need to be in order to make sure 

that we are countering that in that particular region in addition to 
23 

all the other places where we are pulled to as we have humanitarian efforts that we are called to in that region? 

Let me ask you in your estimation where you see the Chinese future projection of naval power as a challenge and concern there for 

Pacific Command. 

Admiral WILLARD. I think, unquestionably, the Chinese have aspirations to expand their naval presence and are expanding their 

naval presence. 

Your summary, I think, was a very good one in terms of where 

they are operating today. We have no illusions that they don’t desire to operate further into the Pacific and likely into the Indian 

Ocean region as well. 

I think they are learning to sustain their forces elsewhere. It 

takes time and training and persistence to understand how to sustain forces logistically when they are underway for long periods of 

time. 

They have done an incredible job with their counter-piracy effort. 

And I think, as a consequence, they are rolling the lessons learned 

back into their other naval activities. 

Most of their naval presence is in patrol activities in the Bohai, 

Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea region and will likely 

continue to be there for the foreseeable future as they explore their 

ability to conduct business elsewhere. 

In terms of concerns for Pacific Command, I think as long as we 

remain uncertain regarding future Chinese intent, either with their 

naval forces or any of their military forces, it is important that we 

take the necessary steps and make the necessary investments to 

pace those changes as we see them occur and be able to contend 

with any possibility of something other than a constructive Chinese 

navy or a constructive Chinese military in the region. 

That said, through the mil-to-mil dialogue that is currently occurring and, I think, with patience and persistence on the part of 

the United States in trying to work with China, that at the end of 

the day, we may see a Chinese military, including a Chinese navy, 

that is contributing to the broader security of the region and not, 

instead, contending it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mrs. Hanabusa. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Aloha, Admiral and Mrs. Willard. 

Welcome, General and Admiral. Thank you for testifying. 

My question is, first, with the Admiral. Admiral Willard, especially for those of us in Hawaii, we are watching what is going on 

in Japan very critically. 

But we also do know that prior to this there were issues regarding the Democratic party and when they took over the Japanese 

Government and what the relationships would be with us. 

I think we were just getting to the point where we were getting 

a better understanding and then the tsunami and, of course, the 

earthquake tsunami and now the problems with the FukushimaDaiichi has emerged. 

First, can you explain to me how important a role Japan plays 

as our ally in the Pacific area? 
24 

Secondly, with what we have now experienced in all these different chains of events—and let’s not also forget the constitution of 

Japan, which has limitations as to their military ability, what are 

we going to have to do, at least in the short term, to compensate 

for what is going on in Japan, assuming that their military role, 

with us, is critical? 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, thank you very much, Congresswoman. 

We hear the alliance between the United States and Japan often 

referred to as cornerstone. I think that probably understates the 

importance of the alliance between the United States and Japan. 

In Northeast Asia, the ability to maintain a forward force presence in Japan affords us access into the Asia-Pacific region that 

otherwise would be very difficult to achieve. 

I think that it is a mutually beneficial alliance. I think the Japanese military, as a consequence of U.S. presence, has grown to be 

formidable and capable and, as you have already witnessed, extremely interoperable with our forces. 

I think the combination of the forward forces in Japan and the 

forward forces on the Korean Peninsula afford the United States an 

unprecedented deterrent forward in Northeast Asia that could be 

regarded as extended beyond that. 

So, you can’t understate the importance of the alliance, in general. 

In the short term, the Japanese defense forces are committed to 

assisting in saving Northern Honshu and their nation from the 

confluence of disasters that they have experienced. 

At the same time, they remain a very accomplished force. They 

are continuing to conduct their military business in the region, notwithstanding the 100,000 or so ground forces that are committed 

to helping in Northern Honshu. 

I think that at the conclusion of this, as we finish the work of 

disaster response and humanitarian relief and turn it back over to 

agencies and the Government of Japan to administer to their people, you will see the U.S.-Japan alliance stronger as a consequence 

of the support that we have provided and the work that we have 

done together. 

You will see a Japanese defense force that will emerge from this 

stronger for having experienced it. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. So, Admiral, you don’t believe that the change 

in the political party structure is going to interfere with our future 

relationship with Japan? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think that there were fits and starts as the 

DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan] administration assumed control 

of the Japanese Government. We saw that with one prime minister 

that ultimately departed in the midst of the Futenma Replacement 

Facility debate that was ongoing. 

Prime Minister Kan has enumerated many times his commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance. I think he remains a strong proponent. 

I think after what has been witnessed following this regretful 

disaster in Japan, he will remain a strong advocate of the alliance 

and our way forward. 
25 

So, right now, I am encouraged by the government’s position 

with regard to alliance matters and the United States military and 

support to it in general. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Mahalo, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Admiral WILLARD. Mahalo. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Sharp, I have a cousin under your command over there 

right now. My wife’s cousin has been over there. 

And just a question on the Korea issue; the people in South 

Korea and North Korea, is there a general desire that that be a 

unified country? Or do you believe that that leadership is in the 

way of the unification? 

Or do you believe that even with different leadership we would 

still see a South Korea and a North Korea? 

General SHARP. Sir, from the people of the Republic of Korea 

from South Korea from the president on down, there is a strong desire for a peaceful unification over time. There is no doubt in my 

mind about that. 

From a North Korean perspective, I think Kim Jong-Il focuses on 

regime survival, under any terms, in council and his continued development of nuclear capability and these provocative acts in order 

to be able to have his regime survive. 

Mr. SCOTT. So when the mortality tables catch him, is that going 

to be an opportunity there for the peace and unification of Korea? 

Is that—— 

General SHARP. Sir, as you know, you know, Kim Jong-Un is his 

youngest son; we believe we see indications that he may be becoming groomed to be the successor. 

Now, what he does as he becomes the leadership in North Korea 

is yet to be seen. Obviously, we call upon him and whoever succeeds, you know, the succession process, within Kim Jong-Il, within 

the regime, to take advantage of that opportunity to be able to care 

more about their people and care more about human rights and 

dignity. But we don’t see the indications of that happening, to be 

quite blunt. 

That is why we as a Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance are working 

very hard to make sure that we are prepared for a North Korea 

of the future that could potentially continue the types of acts that 

we have seen over the last couple of years and that continue to 

work to develop nuclear weapons. 

Again, there is another path that North Korea could take. But 

we have not seen indications that they are willing or ready or able 

to do that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are other countries, in your opinion, working to 

nudge them down that path, to encourage that path? Or do you 

think that they are standing in the way of that path? 

General SHARP. I think that if you look at, really, the entire 

world, after the actions that North Korea took, not only last year, 

and the condemnation that they got from the United Nations, but 

also in previous years after the Taepodong launch, which was in direct violation of United Nations Security Council [UNSC] and the 
26 

nuclear test, the world has called on North Korea to change their 

ways. 

But, as I said before, we don’t see any action from North Korea 

headed in that direction at this time. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Willard, the nation’s 17th Joint STARS [Surveillance 

Target Attack Radar System] aircrafts are based out of my district, 

Robins Air Force Base. 

With everything going on, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, I mean, if 

something did start, if we got into an action with North Korea, 

would we have the ISR capabilities that we need? 

Or is that an area that we are stretched thin and with all the 

actions that are occurring around the world right now? 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, I would answer it in two ways. First of 

all, the ISR capabilities on the Korean Peninsula are probably as 

robust as they are anywhere in our military and consistently are 

maintained as such because we are in armistice and because we 

are constantly deterring the North. 

So, General Sharp enjoys, you know, a capability and, frankly, a 

priority and commitment from the United States in order to meet 

his surveillance needs. 

That has only been improved upon and has gained more focus 

since the events last year and, particularly, since the crisis on the 

Korean Peninsula on December 20th of last year. 

When you consider the way in which we invest in our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, where, at 

large, during peacetime we kind of spread those capabilities around 

to the various combatant commands to meet all of our requirements, whether they are space-based or air-breathers or groundbased sensor systems. 

Whenever we go to war, or whenever a contingency erupts somewhere in the world, we tend to bias those capabilities toward that 

contingency. 

So, for 10 years, we have given over many of those capabilities 

to the Middle East wars that have been fought. When something 

like Libya erupts, ISR goes in that direction. 

Frankly, when Japan and natural disasters occurred, ISR came 

in our direction in order to meet the demand signal of trying to 

characterize the Fukushima plants and the area that was affected 

by the natural disaster. 

So, we share in those assets, and they tend to move around 

wherever they are in demand. 

General SHARP. If I may just add to that from a coalition perspective, we work very hard in Korea to take advantage of the capabilities not only of U.S. ISR, but the Republic of Korea ISR. 

So, we have a combined intel center with analysts from both the 

Republic of Korea and the United States that have been working 

this problem on the Korean side for years and years. 

It is not just about airborne, it is, again, all of the different components of intel to make sure that we are getting a full picture of 

what is going on inside North Korea. 

So it is the U.S. assets that combine with the Republic of Korea 

and the tactics, techniques and procedures that we learned over 

the years give us that robust capability that we really need. 
27 

And coalitions like what we have with the Republic of Korea are 

key to be able to do that in our part of the world and, really, 

around the world. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, both. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses for their service and their testimony. 

It is almost exactly a year ago to the day when the Cheonan was 

attacked by North Korean mini-subs. The forensic evidence is indisputable in terms of the analysis that was done. 

Frankly, the denial of that evidence by the Chinese Government, 

even to some degree the Russian evaluation of this, I mean, frankly, when I listen to your answer, General, about the sort of international isolation of Korea in terms of its actions the last few 

years, I mean, frankly, in terms of at least the Cheonan, that really 

hasn’t been the case. 

In terms of the mil-to-mil relationships, which you have been 

talking about with China, Admiral Willard, I mean, frankly, that 

is pretty discouraging because, I mean, that action just falls so outside any acceptable norm in terms of international law and, certainly, protection of sea lanes. 

I mean, can you update us at least in terms of whether or not 

you think there is any hope that we are going to get that international consensus about how, again, they violated, really, every 

level of law and decency in terms of what that attack represented. 

Admiral WILLARD. Are you referring to China—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Yes. 

Admiral WILLARD [continuing]. Russia not acknowledging 

the—— 

Mr. COURTNEY. Correct. 

Admiral WILLARD [continuing]. International investigation report 

and so forth? 

Mr. COURTNEY. Yes. 

Admiral WILLARD. Unquestionably, there has been alignment on 

the part of both China and to, as you suggest, to a somewhat lesser 

extent, Russia, to moderate any condemnation of North Korea’s actions last year. 

And that was disappointing. But it is important to realize that 

the PRC [People’s Republic of China] remains an ally of North 

Korea. They maintain a mutual defense treaty together. 

The longstanding philosophy of the PRC has been one of non-interference and a very strong desire for status quo or maintenance 

of just a stable condition on the Korean Peninsula regardless of the 

provocation that may have caused a disruption. 

We saw evidence of that replay itself last year. It is nothing new. 

It is an area in which the U.S. view and Chinese view are highly 

divergent. It is an area that I think between our two governments 

continues to need work, to your point. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I think that is a good answer. I just would say 

that, in this case, I mean, what we are really talking about just 

isn’t about, sir, non-intervention. But it is really about denial of the 

truth about what happened there. 
28 

I mean, that is what, again, in my opinion just raises a series 

of questions about, you know, how healthy the relationship is with 

the Chinese Government and military. 

I have only got about a minute and a half. 

I guess a follow-on question to that incident, you know, by all 

sort of press and public accounts, I mean, there clearly was a problem there for the Chinese Navy—excuse me—the South Korean 

Navy in terms of being able to detect these mini-subs in very shallow waters. 

You know, we have talked a lot about sea-based deterrents. 

I mean, if there is, it sort of raises a question about whether or 

not sonar capability is a problem in terms of making sure that we 

are going to have, you know, robust, sea-based deterrents if there 

are all these mini-subs that are being able to sort of hide in the 

noise of shallow waters. 

I wonder if you can sort of comment on whether or not you feel 

confident that we are okay and frankly, do we need to do more to 

help the South Korean Navy to deal with that issue? 

Admiral WILLARD. To your last point, we are doing more to help 

the South Korean Navy with their ASW [anti-submarine warfare] 

readiness and preparedness. 

The U.S. 7th Fleet has a long-term goal and a series of milestones to accomplish that. So we continue to train with the ROK 

Navy in earnest to ensure that our readiness is maintained at a 

very high level. 

But I think, to your first point, it is important to recognize that 

what occurred with Cheonan was an unprovoked, surprise attack, 

unexpected, typical of the provocations that we have experienced by 

Kim Jong-Il in the past. 

So this was a sneak attack, as you suggest, by a mini-sub with 

a torpedo in a shallow-water area when the relationship between 

the two militaries and the relationship on the water that particular 

night, you know, would not have caused their sonar men or anyone 

else in the military to have expected an egregious attack such as 

occurred. So very difficult to ever predict or imagine preventing an 

unprovoked surprise attack, one-off, such as occurred with 

Cheonan. But I think, to your point, that there is certainly a view inward 

that has been taken by the ROK Navy. We will continue to support, and General Sharp will oversee, and that is the improvement 

of readiness and elimination of vulnerabilities across the board to 

the extent that we can among both—across both sides, U.S. and 

Republic of Korea. 

General SHARP. And the Republic of Korea has not just stood idly 

by. They have aggressively gone after changes to their tactics, techniques and procedures out in the Northwest Island area in order 

to be able to counter that type of threat from the future. 

If you look in their defense reform, what they plan on buying and 

positioning out to take the sub threat and to be able to reduce their 

vulnerabilities, they are putting it against that, also. 

As Admiral Willard said, we work very aggressively in some antisub warfare exercises in order to be able to have the strongest both 

deterrent but then preparation if North Korea decides to continue 

that in the future. 
29 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Sharp, Admiral Willard, thank you for your service to 

our country. 

General Sharp, first of all, I appreciate your time yesterday and 

the information you shared with me on the great job the men and 

women of U.S. Forces Korea do on a daily basis. 

General, I understand that the Republic of Korea will assume 

wartime operational control in 2015. Are you confident their forces 

are ready to assume this role, and if not, what action must be 

taken to ensure they become ready? 

General SHARP. Thank you, sir. I did very much enjoy visiting 

with you yesterday afternoon. 

I am absolutely confident that by 1 December, 2015, the Republic 

of Korea will be ready to take operational control and leadership 

of a future war fight. 

We are working very hard with the Republic of Korea as part of, 

as I said in my opening statement, the Strategic Alliance 2015 

Agreement that was signed by the Secretary and the Minister last 

October to ensure that readiness. 

Let me highlight just a couple important points that are in that 

agreement. And it also includes the milestones in order to be able 

to make sure that this event will occur and that, actually, the alliance will be stronger because of it. 

First off, we are working with the Republic of Korea to develop 

what are the capabilities they need in order to be able to lead the 

war fight after 2015 and—ensuring that once that that is agreed 

that that is in their budget they are bought, organized, trained and 

equipped with those capabilities. 

Secondly, we are revising our war plans to account for the fact 

that the Republic of Korea JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] will be in the 

lead of the war fight across the full range of the different war plans 

that we have. Those will be complete by December 2015. 

We will then take and exercise all of those war plans in our two 

annual theater-level exercises that we will have multiple times between now and 2015. 

Then the last thing I will say is that the professionalism and the 

capability of the Republic of Korea military is outstanding. 

I have seen over the last 3 years the capability, the decisionmaking ability, the willingness and the ability to be able to make 

sure that we are one team as an alliance between Combined Forces 

Command and the ROK chairman staff, which will be in the lead 

of the war fight, and increase enormously as a result of all these 

provocations that we talked about. 

So, yes, sir, I am confident that the Republic of Korea will be 

ready to lead the defense of their own country while maintaining 

the full commitment that the United States has as part of the alliance, not reducing our force and commitment. But they will be 

ready for the leadership role in 2015. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General Sharp, I know in our discussion yesterday 

that you felt that any reduction in the 28,500 U.S. military personnel on the peninsula would be the wrong message. 
30 

But let me ask this question, that I understand that the intention of the Department of Defense was to draw down manpower at 

U.S. Forces Korea to 20,000, but that in 2008 the decision was 

changed to maintain manpower at 28,500. 

What would be the impact on operational readiness and the overall effectiveness of your command if this level was brought down 

to 20,000? 

General SHARP. Sir, as you correctly stated, when Secretary 

Gates came and looked at the path that we were on to move to 

20,000, at that time, my predecessor, General Bell, came to say we 

need to stop at where we are right now, which at the time was 

28,500. 

I agree with that assessment, and Secretary Gates and President 

Obama, for that matter, have stated that that will be the level that 

we continue at in the future. 

To reduce from that level would critically reduce our capabilities 

in the very beginning part of a war fight to receive forces that come 

in to reinforce, to help with the NEO [noncombatant evacuation operation] in order to be able to get our family members and U.S. citizens out there; to reduce—on the Air Force side would reduce our 

capability to rapidly strike into North Korea with the long-range 

artillery; 28,500 is the right amount for the war plans that we have 

in place now and will have for the next several years. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Do you think that after 2015 when the South Koreans take operational control that the numbers should be reexamined? 

General SHARP. Sir, I think 28,500, looking at the war plans and 

how we are currently working through what they will look like 

after OPCON transition in 2015, the current number, 28,500, I believe is the right number to maintain for that war fight and in the 

future. 

Again, the main thing that changes after OPCON transition is 

the leadership of the war fight. How we physically maneuver forces 

on the ground, who has the responsibility for different aspects of 

the war fight, for the most part stays the same. 

So again, we always evaluate this when we go through different 

analyses of our war fights and what the capability of the Republic 

of Korea is and what the threat from North Korea is. 

But from what I see right now, 28,500 is the right number for 

after OPCON transition also. 

Mr. FRANKS [presiding]. Mr. Garamendi is now recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Admiral, to you, your 

men and women in your command, the work that you are doing in 

Japan dealing with the disaster there is extremely important. And, 

I think, really represents the very best of America. We thank you 

for that and thank all of them that are involved, some in a very 

dangerous situation. 

In response to a question maybe 15, 20 minutes ago, you had, 

and this may be the end of the queries, you mentioned communications with China and the military-to-military communications. 

Could you expand on that, the current status, your goals, how 

you see that developing? 
31 

I agree with what you said very briefly before. It is extremely important; if you could cover that, please. 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, thank you. 

Well, first of all, the commitment that we have and what we believe is the right future between the United States Armed Forces 

and the Chinese military is that we achieve, maintain and sustain 

a continuous military-to-military dialogue at the highest levels and 

some level of exchange and contributing to trust-building at other 

levels within our respective militaries. 

We have done, or have been very challenged in seeing that 

achieved. 

As you know, our mil-to-mil relationship with the Chinese has 

been characterized by fits and starts often due to disagreements between our two nations. 

We went through nearly a year of hiatus last year as a consequence of the last round of Taiwan arms sales, though we have 

been episodically selling defense articles and services to Taiwan for 

the last 30 years. 

So, China gets a vote in this. But we have attempted to convince 

them and discuss with them the importance of these two, very consequential militaries in the Western Pacific having the ability to 

discuss both areas in which we converge and areas of difference. 

I think that is the most important thing. We are currently back 

in a mil-to-mil sequence, but one that is relatively modest. 

I would offer, you know, the promises that, ultimately, the milto-mil relationship will be one that we have envisioned, you know, 

probably not entirely achievable. 

But, rather, some modicum of that right now would satisfy me 

that we are headed in the right direction. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. At any time, have we cut off the discussions? 

Admiral WILLARD. With the Chinese? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes. 

Admiral WILLARD. Not in my experience, no. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. One further question; the flow of oil 

seems to be a lot about all that we are talking here. 

Could you briefly discuss the Chinese view of the flow of oil from 

the Middle East to China and the role of the American Navy in 

that? 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, the United States Navy for more than 

a century has been providing security on the high seas and in the 

Asia-Pacific region both in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean 

regions. 

Given the importance of Middle East oil to our allies and friends 

in the regions, ourselves and to include the Chinese, the United 

States has been providing safety on those sea lines of communication ranging back to tanker wars, if you will recall in the 1980s, 

where we were protecting the tanker ships exiting the Persian 

Gulf. 

The Chinese have been insatiable consumers of many resources, 

oil included. They regard the flow of oil as a national security concern, I think, from the Middle East. 

They have built both port structures, and they are establishing 

pipelines into Western China from locations on the Indian Ocean 
32 

side in order to relieve the amount of strain on the sea lines of 

communication themselves. 

Nonetheless, choke points like the Strait of Malacca remain crucial. I think we all regard its security and safety as critically important. 

The nations that guard the security of the strait is very important to both us as well as to the Chinese. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Finally, in 10 seconds, Mr. Chairman, I want to 

commend the Navy for its enthusiasm to look for other sources of 

fuel besides carbon oil, in other words, advanced biofuels. 

Admiral WILLARD. We hope to have a carrier strike group operating on advanced biofuels very shortly. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You are to be commended. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. I am going to go ahead and ask my questions now, 

gentlemen. 

Thank you for both being here. I appreciate your service so very 

much. 

This is a sort of a follow-on related to a couple of earlier questions, Mr. Bartlett’s question, Ms. Bordallo’s question. Mr. Bartlett 

pointed out the incontrovertible reality that when a nation becomes 

a nuclear-armed nation that our diplomacy is radically altered. 

To that point, it occurs to me that we need to be very aware of 

how much North Korea is cooperating with other nations or potentially passing on nuclear technology to other rogue nations like 

Iran. 

We know there has been a lot of discussion between the two 

countries and work between the two countries related to their missile technology. 

It appears that Iran is now beyond even North Korea’s capability 

in missile technology. 

So tell me, if you can, what our ability and our actions are related to preventing North Korea from sharing nuclear technology 

with other rogue nations. 

I will let you both take a look at it. 

General SHARP. Sir, as you know, there are several Security 

Council resolutions which require other nations to, on the proliferation side, to work very hard to make sure North Korea is not proliferating any nuclear missile technology. 

We have seen in the past—you know, we know the assistance 

that North Korea gave to Syria several years ago for the nuclear 

plant that they were building there. 

We have seen on some of the missile proliferation things where 

countries have stopped some shipments recently because of proliferation. 

The specific nuclear exchanges and information flow between 

North Korea and Iran I think we would have to take into a classified session to go into depth on that, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. But we are working on it is what you are saying. 

Yes. 

Well, let me just shift gears, then, because I don’t want to take 

us in the wrong direction. 

There were recent reports that North Korea is nearing the completion of an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] type of weapon. I under-
33 

stand that they are using a lot of old Soviet-style jamming capabilities to jam the South Korean GPS [Global Positioning System] and 

that South Korea believes that that is a wake-up call that this may 

be a tactic that North Korea will use more and more in terms of 

their jamming capabilities. 

If they are already working on an EMP weapon, do you have any 

indication that they might be working on some sort an intentional 

mechanical electromagnetic interference, some type of device based 

EMP jamming capability? 

And what about this EMP weapon that they talk about, an EMP 

bomb as it were? I am told that it is made to detonate at 25 miles 

up, which is a conflict in my mind since most effective EMP weapons would be higher and the 25 miles would be within the atmosphere. 

It occurs to me that that would be a suppression of the EMP 

emission itself. 

Do you know where they are on their EMP capability in terms 

of weaponizing in either device-based or any sort of a nuclear explosive—or a nuclear warhead-based EMP? 

General SHARP. Sir, unfortunately, on the EMP side, we we are 

going to need to take that into a classified session. 

I can say on the GPS jamming side we have seen North Korea’s 

use of GPS jammers up on the Northwest part of the Republic of 

Korea. The Republic of Korea government has called on North 

Korea to stop that jamming. 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you think it portends a widening of a particular 

tactic? Do you think they intend to develop their jamming capability, either EMP or radiofrequency or otherwise? 

General SHARP. Sir, I think North Korea has continued to develop a lot of different capabilities in the asymmetric threat capability way. 

I think it is one of the ways, it is where they have been putting 

their money between ballistic missile capability, nuclear and special operating forces to asymmetrically try to force change in South 

Korea to send messages to other audiences, the United States, in 

particular, that they are a nation that cannot be challenged. 

I think they look for many different ways to do that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, last question, gentlemen; I always try to ask 

the question; what is the most important, the most significant challenge that we face that needs to be addressed from North Korea? 

If you can do it at the 50,000-foot level where it doesn’t enter 

into any sort of classified concern and maybe let you both take a 

shot at it. 

Admiral Willard, sir, I will start with you on this one. 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, I think the most significant is 

nuclearization and the development of ballistic missile delivery systems that have now reached the point of being intercontinental. 

So, we are obviously concerned by that development. A denuclearized North Korea is both the commitment that the international community has made and an imperative, I think, given 

the nature of this regime. 

General SHARP. I agree with Admiral Willard. I will say it in a 

slightly different way. 
34 

The status quo is no longer acceptable. The status quo, I think, 

that the world sometimes sees in North Korea and says, ‘‘let’s just 

return to the status quo,’’ is a status quo that killed many Republic 

of Korea citizens and service members last year. 

It is a status quo that has launched ballistic missiles in contravention with U.N. Security Council resolutions. It is a status 

quo that has continued to develop nuclear weapons. 

I think at the 50,000-foot level for the world and all of the leadership of the world to understand status quo is no longer acceptable because where it is heading is not acceptable to the world. 

To force change in North Korea is the number one challenge that 

we and the world have for the future. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, General, I don’t know if it impresses you, but 

I agree with you. Thank you, sir. 

Thank you both. 

Mr. Runyan is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thank you for your service to 

this country. Thanks for being here today. 

Admiral, I just wanted to thank you for your response to Mr. 

Turner’s question earlier about the Aegis missile defense system. 

That is actually manufactured in my backyard, and I am sure 

those men and women that work to create that system and maintain it would appreciate those kind words. 

But as far as you were talking earlier, and we were talking about 

terrorism threats around the world. 

You were talking how you were complimenting the Philippines 

for their active duty and their preparedness for it. 

You know, as far as your command engaging with other international partners in Southeast Asia, do you think you have the appropriate level of funding and/or the authorities to make sure that, 

you know, is upheld in that region? 

Admiral WILLARD. Are you referring to counterterrorism in particular? 

Mr. RUNYAN. Yes. 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, thank you. It is a great question. 

In South Asia, to use a different location as an example, we are 

endeavoring to work with Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the 

Maldives and the nation of India to contain Lashkar-e Tayyiba, a 

Pakistani-based extremist organization that is already established 

in South Asia and was responsible for the attack in Mumbai. 

In order to accomplish that, we have been working very closely 

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense in ensuring that we 

have adequate resources, including authorities to be able to accomplish that mission. 

To date, in the way that support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines was developed, 

we have had the authorities commensurate with the mission that 

we were on. 

As we attempt to build capacities in other nations, it is important that we continue to identify shortfalls both in authorities and 

shortfalls in resources to be able to build the capacities in these 

partner nations such that they can become increasingly self-suffi-
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cient in dealing with the extremist organizations that are present 

there. 

So, that is currently our focus in Bangladesh and Nepal and, to 

a lesser extent, Sri Lanka and the Maldives right now. 

We are operating within authorities that are adequate, I would 

offer. And we are constantly seeking increased authorities to give 

us more latitude in order to be less episodic and more continuous 

in our efforts to build the capacities with, through, and by these 

partner nations. 

Mr. RUNYAN. To what extent have relations improved between 

China and Taiwan and its impact on the strait? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think the, you know, the evolution throughout the Ma administration with regard to Taiwan-mainland China 

relations, has been one of constant improvement. I mean, we have 

been encouraged by the relationships that have existed. 

I would offer that there is an election on Taiwan scheduled for 

2012. And that is worth watching over, given the fact that this administration will soon be, you know, coming to an end and a reelection process will then be unfolding. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, gentlemen, and I yield to Mr. Conaway 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Obviously, I am the only thing that stands between you and getting out of here. 

Admiral Willard, this doesn’t fall under your responsibility, but 

the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] requires an annual assessment of Chinese military capabilities, strategies and intentions due March 1st of each year, still not here, as of the 6th 

of April. 

Your command, I suspect, would have a chance to look at it and 

have some influence on that. Have you had a chance to look at that 

this year’s version? 

Admiral WILLARD. You are referring to the NDAA? 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, the NDAA’s requirement that the OSD provide us, the committee, with a report on China’s military capacities, locations and those kinds of things that is due March 1st of 

each year—— 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, sir. I would offer that we have been in 

continuous dialogue with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 

all issues pertaining to China and China’s military. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I understand. But, particularly, with the report itself, apparently it hasn’t risen to your level in terms of—— 

Admiral WILLARD. It has not risen to my personal level. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is it something that you and your team used, last 

year’s report? I mean, do you use that data or that information in 

the report for anything? 

Admiral WILLARD. Certainly. We definitely consume it and add 

it to the portfolio of China knowledge that we will then carry on 

with for the remainder of the year. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay, well, obviously, the NDAA and other pieces 

of legislation require this in different reports. 

It means someone has to do it and in this age of trying to cut 

costs we are looking for those that have a meaningful impact to the 
36 

way you run your business, but then also give us an insight into 

how you run your business and how it is done and how that—so 

we do the oversight. 

Admiral WILLARD. Understand. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So if you wouldn’t mind, next time you bump into 

Secretary Mabus, just say, ‘‘Hey, by the way, the committee is asking about that report,’’ one more time because we think it is reported. 

If you look through the list of things that we ask to be assessed, 

it would appear to be the exact same things that you would need 

to think about day in and day out as to how you run PACOM. 

General Sharp, good to see you again. I went over there one time 

with former Chairman Skelton. It was a great trip. 

As you are coming towards the command-sponsored tours increase in Korea, are you concerned at all about the incidences on 

the economy where, you know, people do stupid stuff from time to 

time, not necessarily the things that happened in Okinawa that 

helped drive some of the changes there? 

Have you had enough experience now to know that our kids and 

their kids can get along and that this doesn’t become sort of a problem with the Koreans? 

General SHARP. Sir, I am very satisfied. We watch, of course, our 

incident rates very, very closely as we have more service members 

and family members over there. 

Korea is an extremely safe place to live. It is a great place for 

our service members and their families to be there because of the 

love that the Korean people have and the respect that they have 

for U.S. forces there. 

There was a recent poll that just came out from the State Department that said, when asked to the people of the Republic of 

Korea, ‘‘What is the importance of U.S. forces on the peninsula,’’ 

over 87% said, ‘‘Important,’’ or, ‘‘Very important.’’ 

So the incidents, there is always one or two, we do take the appropriate action to be able to take care there. But I am very proud 

of our service members and their families. 

They understand they are ambassadors of the United States to 

the Republic of Korea. They are living up to that responsibility. 

Mr. CONAWAY. That is good to hear because we do want to be 

good guests, even though we are there to help them and protect 

them from a lot of bad stuff. 

So, gentlemen, thank you for your service. Thanks for being here 

this morning. 

I will yield back. 

General SHARP. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

As it happens, he has left an extra minute. Therefore, Mr. Larsen here has a final question. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

Admiral Willard, last year, I was out at PACOM and visited with 

the Pacific Fleet and Army. I think I met with the Marines and Air 

Force just talking about building partner capacity projects. I think 

the assessment was that things were going very well. 
37 

But the question I have for you is how you think the dollar flow 

works. Does it work well enough? Do they have the right authorities to use relative to the things that we have done here developing 

1206 and 1208 in addition to the other grab bag of tools that exist 

in the Federal budget for you all to do this effort? 

Can you give me an assessment about that? Not about how well 

the project is going, but on how the budgets work and if you have 

the authorities? 

Or should it be fewer barriers between these accounts? Does the 

flexibility help or not help? Can you talk about that a little bit? 

Admiral WILLARD. For the past several years, we have been, I 

think, all pushing to streamline these instruments that allow us to 

work with our partners throughout the world. 

I say we. Collectively, all the combatant commanders, I think, 

have been very interested in having ready access to the tools that 

we have come to rely on and that enable that work to occur, whether that is 1206 funding, IMET [International Military Education & 

Training], foreign military financing [FMF], foreign military sales 

[FMS]. 

I mean, these are items that are crucial with regard to the relations that we have with the many partners throughout the AsiaPacific; 36 nations, 34 of which have militaries or security forces 

that we are working alongside. 

So the less the impediments and difficulties with regard to administering to these instruments, the better. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. As a principle, that is great. 

Any particular problems that you or your folks have faced? 

Admiral WILLARD. I guess I would offer that coming from the 

customer base—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Admiral WILLARD [continuing]. At times, the inability of FMS to 

be as responsive as it needs to be is probably the biggest criticism 

that we receive. 

There are many, many requests to be educated in and work more 

closely, be trained inside the United States. So, for those reasons, 

our IMET funding is crucial. 

But, at the end of the day, I think delays, and complexity of process with regard to the exchange of materials with our partners, is 

the one most serious complaint that we hear. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Great, great. 

Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming to this 

committee. We have no way to express to you our gratitude. 

We do our best, but we know that you are the ones that carry 

the load of freedom on your back. The Nation owes you beyond any 

ability it might articulate. 

Thank you very much. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. FRANKS. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 6, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 6, 2011 

(113) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. The Chinese have an extensive conventional missile capacity and 

range to strike many of our existing bases. a. How do you assess the adequacy of 

the U.S. military’s capacity to withstand a Chinese air and missile assault on regional bases? b. What steps are being pursued to further strengthen regional bases’ 

capacity to survive such an assault and continue or resume operation? c. How do 

our existing basing arrangements in South Korea, Japan and Guam serve to impede 

the growing Chinese extra-territorial ambitions? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. How does PACOM assess the adequacy of resources available to Department of Defense programs that seek to defend forward-deployed U.S. bases to 

include theater missile defense and early warning systems, hardened structures and 

hangers, air defense systems, and runway repair kits? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. Last week, China released its defense white paper. What new opportunities or concerns do you have as a result of this latest strategy publication? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. What are the implications of China’s military modernization for 

PACOM’s posture? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.]. 

Mr. FORBES. What are the perceptions of regional allies with regard to the United 

States’ global leadership and effectiveness as a deterrent against regional aggression? 

Admiral WILLARD. With five of our nation’s seven mutual defense treaties in the 

Asia-Pacific, we continue to work with our allies—Australia, Japan, Republic of 

Korea, Republic of the Philippines and Thailand—to strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance the security within the region. 

Australia. Australia remains a steadfast ally who works tirelessly to enhance 

global and regional security and provide institutional assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia continues to lead the International Stabilization Force in TimorLeste and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions to global security are evident by the recently increased force presence in Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider, Australia has committed to contribute to our effort to stabilize Afghanistan. 

Australia emphasizes advancing interoperability and enhanced defense cooperation with the U.S. through well-coordinated acquisition and training programs. TALISMAN SABER 2009 (a biennial and bilateral exercise) saw unprecedented participation focusing on policies, tactics, hardware, logistics, and infrastructure. We are 

also collaborating to enhance our cooperation in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts. 

Japan. Our alliance with Japan remains the cornerstone of our strategy in the 

Asia-Pacific region and despite the recent rhetoric, it remains strong. The new political environment provides us an excellent opportunity to recognize the region’s 

achievements enabled through the security provided by our Alliance. Japan remains 

a reliable partner in maintaining regional and global stability. In the spring and 

early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to 

the Gulf of Aden region for counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Oceanbased OEF refueling mission was recently ended, Japan remains engaged in the region by providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and humanitarian 

efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the next foreseeable future. 

Japan contributes over $4 billion in Host Nation Support (HNS) annually. Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since 2002, the Japan 

Self Defense Forces continue to interact bilaterally with the U.S., and trilaterally 

with the U.S. and our allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year 
114 

witnessed the completion of several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including the completion of a year-long study of contingency command and 

control relationships and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third 

Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer. 

Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.–ROK alliance remains strong and critical 

to our regional strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our 

efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes a major transformation. 

The transformation of the U.S.–ROK alliance will also help ROK better meet security challenges off the peninsula. The ROK maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden 

in support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom. Of particular interest is the development of trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan. Although policy issues currently prevent us from realizing its full potential, the shared 

values, financial resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address 

complex contingencies throughout the region make this a goal worthy of pursuing. 

Republic of the Philippines (RP). The RP continues to be a key contributor 

in overseas contingency operations while simultaneously conducting a force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security operations, and developing a maritime 

security capability. These efforts support important U.S. regional initiatives and 

contribute to a stronger Philippine government capable of assuming a greater role 

in providing regional security. 

In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), U.S. Pacific 

Command continues to support Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). Through an approved Defense Transformation program, the AFP, in accordance with its defense 

planning guidance, will manage those portions of PDR with end states beyond 2011 

and provide a framework for the development of the programs necessary to transition from internal security operations to territorial defense by 2016. 

Thailand. Thailand remains a critical ally and engagement partner. We appreciate Thailand’s important global security contributions in the overseas contingency 

operations, counter-narcotics efforts, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, such as their upcoming deployment to Sudan. Co-hosted with Thailand, exercise COBRA GOLD remains the premier U.S. Pacific Command multilateral exercise with participants and observers from 26 countries. 

The declining health of Thailand’s King Bhumibol has elevated the issue of royal 

succession. The King, currently the world’s longest reigning monarch (62 years), is 

beloved by the Thais. The eventual leadership succession, which will be a significant 

event in Thailand’s history, has the potential to have a negative effect on the political environment and pose serious challenges for the Thai political and military 

leadership. This ally and partner is a key contributor to the regional security environment and will need our support in the years to come. 

Mr. FORBES. How could potential developments in the U.S.-India security relationship provide for greater stability on the sub-continent and within the broader 

PACOM area of responsibility? 

Admiral WILLARD. The United States and India are already in the process of developing our security relationship to address common threats in the maritime domain with the ultimate goal of extending this cooperation into other realms of mutual and global interest such as global transportation networks, space, and cyberspace. Providing for the security of these ‘‘global commons’’ will allow anyone and 

any country that uses them a better opportunity to pursue and achieve economic 

development that can foster an improved quality of life and better governance. A 

security relationship must also address the threats to stability from violent extremist organizations and other transnational threats. Economic development and responsible governance provides the foundation for greater stability on the sub-continent and within the broader PACOM area of responsibility and provides the bastion from which to successfully interdict existing threats to this stability. 

The United States and India share the need for a secure maritime domain to 

transport the raw materials and finished manufactured goods that form the basis 

of our thriving market economies. The Indians have begun to recognize the importance that maritime forces play in ensuring freedom of navigation and protection 

of commerce and are now investing more to develop these capabilities. The United 

States, primarily through the United States Navy, has been promoting the concept 

of global maritime partnerships to share the burden of assuring maritime security 

along the vast sea lines of communication—essentially each nation contributing a 

small piece that when taken collectively becomes a potent stabilizing force. To this 

end, India has taken a more proactive role in policing the Eastern Arabian Sea and 

working in concert with United States Naval forces to detect, deter, and interdict 

pirates operating out of Somalia. We are sharing information and assisting the Indi-
115 

ans in developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures to better accomplish this 

mission. As a result of these efforts, the Indian Navy has effectively halted the line 

of advance of pirate incidents emanating out of Somalia some 400 nm from their 

shores. This partnership and the ensuing stability it provides to the sea lines of 

communication in the Indian Ocean will directly benefit the Republic of the 

Maldives and allow them to focus limited resources to develop their tourist economy 

and for Sri Lanka to devote resources to rebuild maritime infrastructure following 

decades of civil war. Initial efforts to expand cooperation between the United States 

Coast Guard and the Indian Coast Guard are underway to improve maritime domain awareness along the Indian coastline in order to close off a potential line of 

attack from terrorists that operate out of the tribal areas in Pakistan bordering Afghanistan. This line of attack was used by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba to enter India and 

carry out the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Another successful terrorist attack emanating from Pakistan would have serious and far reaching destabilizing effect on the region to include the potential of full scale war between two nuclear 

armed antagonists. In fact, a more robust, whole of government approach to 

counterterrorism cooperation is needed. The Department of Defense is doing its part 

through PACOM by assisting U.S. interagency partners to engage with India’s 

counterterrorism forces to address security concerns that are common to most, if not 

all, South Asian countries. 

This assistance is not confined to counterterrorism but also includes humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief preparedness. South Asia is the target of significant 

natural disasters—tsunamis, earthquakes, flooding, droughts, and tropical cyclones. 

Scientists assess that the frequency and severity of these natural disasters will increase due to the effects of global climate change and the history of these events 

over the past three decades bears this out. Cooperation between the United States 

and India to organize, train, and stockpile relief supplies for response to a natural 

disaster anywhere in the region can mitigate the impact of these disasters which 

can overwhelm an individual country’s resources and lead to political unrest and violence. 

India’s economic rise over the past 20 years has put her in a position to be the 

benefactor for the other nations in South Asia. However historical animosities and 

mutual distrust are significant impediments to regional cooperation. A United 

States-India security relationship has the potential to break down these impediments and promote regional cooperation to overcome common security threats, both 

man-made and natural, and provide for greater stability that will have positive impacts within the region and globally. 

The following are some examples of how India could increase its role in enhancing 

regional and global stability by partnering with the U.S. 

1. India establishes linkages between its counter-piracy efforts and the combined operations already underway in the Indian Ocean Region (Combined Task 

Force 151, U.S. 5th Fleet’s Shared Awareness and Deconfliction [SHADE] meetings, 

etc.), resulting in increased deterrence to piracy in the Indian Ocean Region. If India 

continues its aggressive stance with respect to piracy in the western Indian Ocean 

and chooses to cooperate more deeply with existing multi-national efforts, the cumulative effect of counter-piracy efforts in the region could be enhanced. 

2. India deepens and regularizes its information sharing efforts with the 

U.S. on counterterrorism and other items of mutual interest. This could build greater confidence between law enforcement and military intelligence counterparts in 

both governments and mitigate risks and repercussions of possible future extremist 

attacks on India. 

3. India purchases an increasing number and variety of weapons systems 

from the U.S. to meet its military requirements. Although India is likely to continue to seek diversity in its arms acquisitions, as evidenced by the recent non-selection of U.S. tenders in their Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition, successful U.S. weapons system sales and associate technology transfers (C–130J, P– 

8I, C–17, etc.) will significantly deepen the U.S.-India security partnership. The 

long-term effect of the military-military links established through these programs 

will be to strengthen India’s defense capabilities and gradually increase alignment 

of defense and security policies and practices, making India a more effective security 

partner and more capable provider of security to the region. 

Mr. FORBES. How important is the current SSGN platform to PACOM operations? 

a. Does PACOM have any concerns with the Navy’s decision to not replace the 

SSGN after the de-commissioning of the current Ohio-class SSGNs? b. In addition 

to significant cruise missile strike capabilities, the SSGN platform has provided 

COCOM commanders with a significant amount of time on station, due to the two 

crew arrangement, as well as a significant capacity for SOF missions and equipment 

and versatility for other vital projects. Has PACOM assessed, or consulted with the 
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Navy in assessing, the number of Virginia class submarines that would be necessary 

to provide the equivalent capability of one Ohio class submarine to conduct vital 

missions in the PACOM AOR? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. FORBES. Regarding the Navy and Air Force development of the AirSea battle 

concept: Has PACOM had significant input on its development? If yes, in what 

ways? 

Admiral WILLARD. US Pacific Command is familiar with the Air Sea Battle concept development, however, we have had little input on its development. I anticipate 

being provided an opportunity to recommend changes to it. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. Can you describe what impact a continuing resolution would have 

on the commencement of a PACOM-led EIS to address broader training issues in 

the Pacific? a. Also, can you describe what this proposed EIS will evaluate once it 

commences? b. How will PACOM ensure the document takes a broad look at training requirements and balances the needs of all services? c. Also, what are some of 

the key training challenges in the Pacific and do we currently have an acceptable 

level of risk for all our services’ training in the Pacific? 

Admiral WILLARD. The continuing resolution did delay the solicitation and contract award to execute the Training in the Pacific EIS. However, with the recent 

approval of the FY11 budget, the solicitation for bids is expected to be released in 

mid-June with an estimated contract award in Aug 11. 

The EIS will evaluate options and alternatives to improve DoD’s training capabilities and mitigate training gaps in the Pacific AOR. Although the primary proposed 

option is to develop new training ranges and increase capabilities at existing ranges 

in the Marianas Islands Range Complex (MIRC), other options will be developed 

and assessed as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to ensure a complete and justifiable EIS. 

The EIS will develop alternatives that meet requirements of all Service Components and especially develop training alternatives that can be utilized by multiple 

Services, such as combined use training ranges. While the level of risk related to 

current capabilities for DoD training in the Pacific is considered acceptable, it is 

prudent to explore additional training capabilities with this EIS to complement force 

posture realignment initiatives, such as the Marine relocation to Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I am very proud of the operational efforts that the men and 

women in uniform have been providing to support relief efforts in Japan. What else 

can we in Guam do to aid in the endeavors to get the Japanese on the road to recovery and to a new state or normalcy? I know we are hosting many men and women 

in uniform and their dependents but is there anything else we can do to support 

rebuilding our very close Japanese allies? 

Admiral WILLARD. Government to government provision of relief items is over. 

Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid Assistance funding ended with the 

conclusion of Operation TOMODACHI on May 31, 2011. Although US Forces Japan/ 

Joint Support Force–Japan continues to monitor and support such things as consequence management for the Fukushima reactors, the majority of direct support 

has concluded. 

The best way for the people of Guam to aid our Japanese allies is by making cash 

contributions to humanitarian organizations that are working in the affected areas. 

Information on identifying humanitarian organizations that are accepting cash donations for their efforts in Japan is available at www.usaid.gov, www.interaction.org 

or by calling the Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI) at 703–276– 

1914. 

It is a common misperception among the public that all types of assistance are 

needed following a disaster. This often leads to spontaneous collections of unsolicited 

commodities and offers of volunteer services, which can impede relief efforts. Therefore, the U.S. Government encourages those who wish to help to make a cash donation to the humanitarian organization of their choice. Cash donations: allow disaster 

relief professionals to procure the exact commodities needed (often locally in the affected country); reduce the burden on resources that tend to be scarce in disaster 

settings (such as transportation routes, staff time, warehouse, space, etc.); can be 

transferred very quickly without transportation costs (which often outweigh the 

value of the donated commodities); support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance. 
117 

1 Aegis BMD 3.6.1 Capabilities and Limitations 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. When an Aegis BMD ship (3.6.1 configuration currently fielded) is 

operating in a missile defense mode, what percentage of its radar energy is supporting missile defense versus other missions? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. What impact does that radar utilization have on the ship’s ability 

to accomplish its other missions, including ship protection? Are there missions that 

the Aegis ship cannot support when it is in missile defense mode? 

Admiral WILLARD. The BMD computer program is designed to ‘‘favor’’ use of resources for BMD applications when operating in BMD Engage or Surveillance 

Modes and will use 100 percent of the resources if required. There are no Aegis 

Weapon System design provisions which allow, for example, ‘‘setting aside’’ a certain 

percentage of resources to support any particular AAW self defense mission. Since 

radar resources are often ‘‘stretched thin’’ during BMD search mission operations 

such as Strategic Cueing, any concurrent Anti-Air or Anti-Surface missions will 

have to rely on ‘‘non-SPY’’ systems such as CIWS, the Gun Weapon System, or possibly NULKA. On the other hand, simulations have shown that it may be possible 

to conduct certain Anti-Air Warfare engagements using a very small percentage of 

SPY resources. 

While there are scenarios where it is less than ideal and support both BMD and 

Anti-Warfare, the majority of the BMD CG and DDG missions can be conducted simultaneously and are dependent upon Joint Force availability and JFMCC stationing. The BMD ships are multi-mission and manned, trained and equipped to 

conduct the following missions in conjunction with one another: 

Command and Control 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

Anti-Air Warfare (to a lesser degree based upon above considerations) 

Anti-Surface Warfare 

Undersea Warfare 

Strike Warfare 

Naval Surface Fires Support 

Electronic Warfare 1

Mr. TURNER. Discuss how operational considerations affect Navy deployment and 

force structure requirements. For example, for a single Aegis BMD ‘‘shooter,’’ how 

many additional ships are necessary to address the radar resource challenge? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. When the next Aegis BMD ship upgrade is fully fielded (4.0.1 configuration), what percentage of the ship’s radar energy would be supporting missile 

defense versus other missions? 

Admiral WILLARD. It depends on the situation. Aegis BMD ships are multi-mission capable ships which can perform the following missions: Limited Defense Operations (LDO)/Homeland Defense, regional missile defense (both organic and Launch 

on Remote), Measurement and Signal Intelligence (MASINT)/Non-Tactical Data Collection, Air Defense, Anti-Surface Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, Naval Gunfire 

Support, Strike Warfare, Maritime Interdiction/Security Operations, Information 

Operations, and Intelligence and Collection. The Joint Force Maritime Component 

Commander will allocate Aegis assets, to include Aegis BMD assets, to accomplish 

his highest priority missions. These may or may not include BMD. SPY–1D radar 

usage is always determined by mission requirements. 

The 4.0.1 configuration provides improved target discrimination and enhanced 

launch on remote tracking data. Coupled with the new SM–3 Block IB missile, the 

Aegis 4.0.1 system will provide longer range engagements of more advanced threat 

missiles. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HANABUSA 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Given the geographic coverage of PACOM, are five aircraft carriers sufficient for the objectives of PACOM? 

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mrs. HANABUSA. What is the objective of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan? 
118 

General SHARP. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan synchronizes multiple U.S. and 

Republic of Korea (ROK) transformation efforts that are designed to build adaptive 

and flexible capabilities to deter aggression against the ROK and to defeat aggression should it occur. The plan’s objective is to sustain and enhance the U.S.-ROK 

Alliance’s combined defense posture and capabilities and to support the Alliance’s 

future vision and bilateral defense priorities as stated in the Guidelines for U.S.- 

ROK Defense Cooperation. Execution of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan ensures 

the effective synchronization of major elements of Alliance restructuring while 

maintaining a strong combined defense posture to deter or respond to the range of 

North Korean security challenges throughout the transition process. Key elements 

of the Strategic Alliance 2015 plan include: refining and improving combined defense plans; defining and developing the new organizational structures required for 

ROK lead of the war effort; implementing more realistic exercises based on the 

North Korean threat of today and tomorrow; preparing for the transition of wartime 

operational control to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in December 2015; consolidating 

U.S. military forces in the ROK onto two enduring hubs under the Yongsan Relocation Plan and Land Partnership Plan; and force management. The goal of all initiatives under the Strategic Alliance 2015 construct is to build adaptive force capabilities that deter and defeat future provocations against the ROK and fight and win 

on the Korean Peninsula should deterrence fail. The Strategic Alliance 2015 plan 

as a whole synchronizes ongoing transformation efforts to ensure they are aligned 

and mutually supporting and better postures both nations to deter, counter, and defeat North Korean provocations and aggression. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. At page 33 of your testimony you point to 107 bases to be reduced to two, how does this meet the objectives of the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan 

and/or the deterrence objective of the United States Military? 

General SHARP. The U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) governments agreed to 

consolidate and relocate American forces stationed in the ROK onto installations 

south of the capital city Seoul. Prior to the year 2005, the Command had 107 installations in Korea. Once relocation is complete, the Command will utilize 49 sites, 

concentrated for the most part around two enduring hubs: a southwest hub and a 

southeast hub. The southwest hub is centered on Osan Air Base and U.S. Army 

Garrison Humphreys. It will be the future centerpiece of U.S. military force structure in Korea. The southeast hub will include installations located in the cities of 

Daegu, Chinhae, and Busan. This hub will serve as the logistics distribution center 

and storage location for wartime and contingency prepositioned stocks. 

The consolidation of forces onto two enduring hubs satisfies Strategic Alliance 

2015 and Command deterrence objectives by improving warfighting capabilities in 

the following ways. First, the 2nd Infantry Division and future Korea Command will 

be collocated at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys, improving coordination and planning between staffs of the two organizations. Similarly, relocating 2nd Infantry Division to U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys consolidates the Division’s subordinate 

units at a single location, increasing direct face-to-face contact amongst unit personnel while reducing the physical span of control and infrastructure needed to support the Division. The unit is better postured to train and fight together. 

Consolidation at two enduring hubs also enhances command and control and coordination. In addition to strengthening relationships between operational staffs of 

the 2nd Infantry Division and a future Korea Command, 2nd Infantry Division is 

better positioned to affect initial liaison and coordination during reception, staging, 

and onward movement of deploying maneuver and sustainment brigades. Early liaison and coordination sets the conditions to more reliable and effective command and 

control during execution of later phases/stages of conflict. Positioning of the 2nd Infantry Division at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys also improves tactical flexibility 

by posturing the division in a better tactical location for rapid commitment in support of either of the forward stationed ROK armies and corps. This position also 

shortens logistical lines during the initial phases of conflict that better postures the 

division for successful employment later. 

Consolidation also enhances the execution of noncombatant evacuation operations 

(NEO). By reducing the dispersion of transportation assets, movement times are cut. 

By separating U.S. forces from initial wartime threats such as North Korea’s longrange artillery and its ground forces threatening Seoul, the vulnerability of these 

forces is reduced and their survivability enhanced. A 2nd Infantry Division located 

at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be better able to integrate follow-on maneuver and sustainment brigades while not under the fire of North Korean long-range 

artillery. This factor supports the Division’s preparation for combat activities. Finally, force consolidation enhances warfighting capabilities by improving soldier 

quality of life, realization of stationing efficiencies, optimizes use of land in Korea, 

and enhances force protection and survivability. 
119 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Given the present complement of the Republic of Korea forces, 

can it assume the control of leading the military alliance on the Korean peninsula? 

General SHARP. By 1 December 2015, the ROK will be ready and capable of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance in defense of the ROK in wartime. In December 2015 

wartime operational control (OPCON) will be transitioned from the Combined 

Forces Command to the Republic of Korea (ROK) Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under 

OPCON transition, the U.S. and ROK will disestablish Combined Forces Command 

and stand up separate but complementary national commands consistent with the 

Mutual Defense Treaty that will focus on combined defense of the ROK. Once 

OPCON transition is completed, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff will become the supported—or lead—command, and the newly created U.S. Korea Command 

(KORCOM) will be the supporting command. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff will 

have full control of ROK military forces while the KORCOM commander will have 

control over U.S. forces. 

The ROK military is a highly professional and competent force and will be capable 

of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime. Numbering over 

633,000 active duty personnel, it ranks as the world’s 6th largest military in terms 

of personnel and is a modern, mobile network centric warfare capable force that 

fields an array of advanced weapon systems. The ROK military is led by a professional officer corps that currently exercises daily command of its forces. It has 

gained operational experience through recent deployments to places such as Iraq, 

Afghanistan, the Gulf of Aden, Lebanon, as well as participating in a host of United 

Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. Initiatives to enhance force capabilities, modernize weapon systems, and improve organizational 

structures and force management are being implemented as part of the ongoing 

‘‘307’’ defense reform program. 

ROK military force capability is supplemented through the conduct of a tough and 

realistic exercise program. In addition to participating in the combined Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Key Resolve, and Foal Eagle exercises with the U.S., the ROK military also conducts annually the Taegeuk, Hoguk, and Hwarang exercises. These exercises derive requirements for joint force and unit structure development, improve 

interoperability between the military services, and practice inter-agency coordination. Thus, by 2015 the ROK will be ready and capable of leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance defense of the ROK in wartime. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within Pacific Command’s 

area of responsibility? 

Admiral WILLARD. The U.S. Coast Guard executes its eleven statutory missions 

in the Pacific including: Search and Rescue; Marine Safety; Ports, Waterways and 

Coastal Security; Illegal Drug Interdiction; Undocumented Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; Other Law Enforcement; Marine Environmental Protection; Living 

Marine Resources; Aids to Navigation; and Ice Operations. 

Furthermore, the U.S. Coast Guard supports the Pacific Command’s Theater 

Campaign Plan by participating in Theater Security Cooperation and Capacity 

building activities with allies and partners in the Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. Examples of such activities include: professional exchanges; mobile training 

teams; multi-lateral maritime surveillance operations; multi-lateral and bi-lateral 

exercises; humanitarian and civic assistance events, and bi-lateral ship rider operations with Pacific Island Nations. Most of the activities are conducted in conjunction with normal Coast Guard operations in the region. U.S. Coast Guard Theater 

Security Cooperation activities reach beyond normal military-to-military relations to 

a broader host nation maritime audience, including, but not limited to, law enforcement agencies, maritime administrations, and transport ministries. Additionally, 

the U.S. Coast Guard participates in the development of the Pacific Command’s 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan directed contingency plan development, providing 

apportioned forces to support contingency plans. 

Finally, to meet Defense contingency planning and preparedness activities under 

its Defense Readiness mission, the U.S. Coast Guard provides Service-unique capabilities (e.g. ports, waterways, and coast security capabilities; maritime intercept capabilities) in support of Pacific Command’s Operational Plans. U.S. Coast Guard 

planners support development of Operational Plans to employ, maintain, and sustain U.S. Coast Guard forces in support of homeland defense missions. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the relationship between U.S. Pacific Command and the Mongolian Armed Forces? 
120 

Admiral WILLARD. Mongolia is an enthusiastic U.S. partner that continues to support U.S. Northeast Asia regional objectives and coalition Afghanistan operations; 

however, Mongolia must balance engagement with the U.S. with their relationship 

with China and Russia. U.S. Pacific Command is committed to assisting Mongolian 

Armed Forces transform from a Soviet-era General Staff organization into a professional and competent ‘‘Napoleonic’’ or western styled Joint Staff structure. U.S. Pacific Command is assisting the Mongolian Armed Forces enhance their capability to 

fully participate in international peace support operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts. The Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) has contributed extensively to operations relative to its size and strength. Mongolia contributed over 

1300 troops and ten troop rotations to OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM from July 

2003 until September 2008 when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 

expired. The Mongolians were also early contributors to our coalition in Afghanistan 

for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. The OEF support began in October 2003 

with 21 members providing advanced artillery maintenance to the Afghan National 

Army. Recently, Mongolia committed to doubling the current troop strength in Afghanistan to 400 troops. Mongolia also hosts the annual multinational peace operations exercise KHAAN QUEST, which provides training and promotes positive 

military-to-military relations with the U.S. and regional peace support partners. 

U.S. Pacific Command Components U.S. Army Pacific and U.S. Marines Forces Pacific rotate co-hosting KHAAN QUEST with the Mongolian Armed Forces. This annual training occurs at the Five Hills Training Center. KHAAN QUEST is designed 

to improve multinational responses, effectiveness, interoperability and unity of efforts for peace support operations. This training is provided to meet UN standards 

for peace support operations. U.S. Pacific Command participates in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for Policy, Asia Pacific Security Affairs-led Bilateral Consultative Council and the Executive Steering Committee meetings. These high level 

meetings underscore U.S. Pacific Command’s commitment to the Mongolian Defense 

Reform. Commander, U.S. Pacific Command regularly meets the General Chief of 

Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces for strategic dialogue and engagement. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within U.S. Forces Korea? 

General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. My district has seen its share of devastation due to natural disasters, most memorably Hurricane Katrina. Recently, we saw another example of the 

destructive power of Mother Nature as Japan was hit by a major earthquake followed by a devastating tsunami. 

Almost exactly one year ago, in your testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, you mentioned that ‘‘In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters 

about every 60 days.’’ Following the recent devastation in Japan, could you comment 

on our military’s readiness to respond to natural disasters in the Pacific at this 

point? 

Admiral WILLARD. In the wake of OPERATION TOMODACHI, USPACOM forces 

remain ready to provide Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) and Humanitarian 

Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) throughout the PACOM AOR. Operation 

TOMODACHI was unique due to both the scope and complexity of the three overlapping disasters, even more complex than the 2004–5 Southeast Asia Tsunami relief operation, Operation Unified Assistance. Unlike most other disasters, Operation 

Tomodachi involved the simultaneous execution of FHA, FCM, and Voluntary Authorized Departure (VAD) of American citizens in response to the combined effects 

of an 9.0 earthquake, catastrophic tsunami, and resultant nuclear disaster. Despite 

these challenges, PACOM forces responded quickly, adapting to the natural and 

man-made disaster while supporting our Japan ally. 

Although we do not organize and train for FHA/HADR, the inherent capabilities 

and capacity of expeditionary military forces allow them to adapt and respond 

quickly and effectively in support of the Host Nation. Our ability to broadly task 

across available assigned forces provided flexibility and in large part mitigated the 

impact normally associated with the conduct of an operation of this scope. The assignment of rotational forces ‘‘tailored’’ for rapid response ensures our continued 

ability to respond to disasters, as well as mitigate the strain on force readiness. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Do you feel that this high rate of humanitarian missions, particularly in the Pacific, is hurting our ability to respond or plan for other, more traditional threats in the region? 
121 

Admiral WILLARD. No. Participation in humanitarian missions are ‘‘as is’’ missions 

and provide valuable opportunities to conduct ‘‘real world’’ rapid planning, execution 

of critical military skills, and theater engagement. These missions provide benefits 

that are complementary to the execution of more traditional military missions. FHA 

and HA/DR are missions performed frequently by PACOM forces, while preparing 

to respond to more ‘‘traditional threats’’. Although humanitarian missions place additional demands on our forces, our participation in humanitarian operations demonstrates to our Allies and Partners our commitment to the region and often create 

more receptive conditions for future engagements and relationships. The opportunity to respond to humanitarian mission in the AOR sends a strong message 

throughout the region, demonstrating our ability and willingness to respond rapidly 

across the AOR. Execution of humanitarian mission in addition to the execution of 

multiple scheduled conventional exercises contributes to our ability to rapidly execute where a conventional military response is required. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Who pays for these humanitarian responses? 

Admiral WILLARD. Humanitarian Responses are paid for through USAID/OFDA. 

They provide initial cost assessment through the Disaster Response Team (DART). 

Funding clearly outlines the support that will be provided by the PACOM and the 

tailored and scaled force vectored to the affected host nation. 

Mr. PALAZZO. What Asia-Pacific countries concern you most at this point and 

where are we lacking to respond (equipment, technology, manpower, money) to realistic threats from potential hot spots in the region? 

Admiral WILLARD. Within Northeast Asia, North Korea has the most potential 

need for FHA/HADR arising from natural or manmade disasters. Disaster in this 

affected state would cause great concern because of ability to interact, visibility, and 

other concerns that naturally arise. Although disasters in China have occurred since 

2009, The PRC remains reluctant to accept our offers of help, though we have provided mostly symbolic assistance in the past 2–3 years and typical requests are in 

the form of funding or spare parts for military hardware. Within Southeast Asia, 

we have seen significant improvement within the Philippines and their ability to respond to FHA over the past decade. Additional support is still required for Indonesia, but access is not always guaranteed, granted, or requested. As seen in 2007, 

Burma and associated relief is problematic. Lastly, within South Asia, current concern and planning is focused on Nepal due to its geographical isolation and recent 

predicative earthquake models that suggest potential 100-year earthquake on the 

scale of Haiti 2010. PACOM is assisting the Government of Nepal through our Embassy through planning to help mitigate potential disaster through leveraging regional neighbors, international and non-governmental organizations, and United 

Nations support. In conclusion, countries that have adversarial relationships with 

USG are the most problematic to support and provide FHA and HA/DR. 

Mr. PALAZZO. In 2009 the U.S. imported over 220 billion dollars in goods from 

China, over double the imports of any other western nation. Do you believe that this 

U.S. consumer behavior is actually fueling China’s military buildup? 

Admiral WILLARD. It is true that in 2009, according to China’s statistics, the U.S. 

imported $221.4 billion merchandise goods from China; this supersedes, by more 

than four times, the next highest level of Chinese exports to a Western nation (Germany, $49.9 billion). It is expected that some of the revenues that accrue to Chinese 

firms that sell goods to U.S. consumers comprise the firms’ net income which is 

taxed. These taxes are then available to fund Chinese Governmental operations— 

including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, based on PACOM analysis, 

we have determined that only a fraction of the sales revenue (between 60% and 

80%) accrue to Chinese firms (many inputs to Chinese production are manufactured 

in other countries). Moreover, some unknown fraction of sales revenue comprises net 

income or profits. (Let us hazard a guess of say 25%.) Finally, China taxes corporate 

profits at a 25% rate. Consequently, we would estimate that about $10 billion of the 

$221 billion would be collected as corporate profits taxes. 

We are ignoring here the taxes that are collected from Chinese citizens who 

helped produce the goods that the U.S. imported. But even if we assume that wages 

comprised 50% of the cost of goods sold, and assume a 25% tax rate, we would conclude that about $20 billion of the $221.4 billion would be collected in the form of 

income taxes. Therefore, a total of about $30 billion in tax revenue might be available to disburse for PLA operations. 

However, there is a flip side to the coin. What we know is that dollars, which are 

received via export sales, are often recycled by acquiring U.S. Treasury Securities. 

It is likely that much of the $221.4 billion in sales were used to purchase U.S. 

Treasury Securities, which, in turn, helped finance U.S. Government operations. 

Some of the funds from Treasury sales may have very well been used to support 

U.S. Department of Defense operations. 
122 

Summary: It turns out then that it is likely that U.S. imports of Chinese goods 

serve to underwrite the cost of certain PLA operations. But it is equally likely that 

those same dollars find their way back into U.S. Governmental operations. It goes 

without saying that, if the first flow is halted, then so is the second. 

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