1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

SHANNON ANDERSON, 

 Petitioner, 

 Case No. 14-cv-13856 

v. 

 HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

LORI GIDLEY, 

 

 Respondent. 

_________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE 

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

This is a habeas case brought by a Michigan prisoner, through counsel, under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 (Dkt. 1). Petitioner Shannon Anderson was convicted after a jury trial in the Macomb 

Circuit Court of second-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317; assault with intent to do 

great bodily harm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84; felon in possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 750.224f; and commission of a felony with a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. 

He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 215-to-480 months’ imprisonment for the murder 

conviction, 67-to-120 months’ imprisonment for the assault conviction, 36-to-60 months’ 

imprisonment for the felon-in-possession conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the 

firearm conviction. 

The petition raises six claims: (i) the trial court erred in admitting a witness’s prior 

consistent statement, (ii) the trial court erred in excluding videotaped evidence of a witness’s 

interview with the police, (iii) a police officer testified regarding Petitioner’s exercise of his right 

to remain silent, (iv) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments, (v) 

Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and (vi) cumulative error denied 

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Petitioner a fair trial. 

 For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the petition because the state-court 

adjudication of his claims did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Supreme Court law. The Court further declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner was convicted of offenses in connection with his participation in a shootout 

occurring at his beauty salon. Petitioner was tried twice. His first trial ended in a conviction 

that was reversed on appeal. See People v. Anderson, No. 290688 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 

2009) (per curiam) (Dkt. 5-39). 

At Petitioner’s second trial, the evidence showed that Petitioner operated the Wild Stylz 

beauty salon in Eastpointe. The shooting occurred on January 15, 2007. It was not disputed at 

trial that Petitioner shot and injured Troy Christian, and shot and killed Stanley Rhynes. 

Petitioner claimed at trial that the shooting was performed in self-defense. 

Christian testified that he was a longtime friend of Rhynes. The two worked at the same 

Chrysler plant. Rhynes was a marijuana dealer, and Christian served as his middleman. 

Christian and Rhynes were introduced to Petitioner in August 2006 through Petitioner’s sister, 

who also worked at the plant. 

Christian testified he had brokered several deals where Rhynes would buy several pounds 

of marijuana from Petitioner. On January 15, 2007, Christian testified he negotiated a purchase 

of ten pounds of marijuana from Petitioner over a series of cellphone conversations. Christian 

and Rhynes were supposed to meet Petitioner at a restaurant, but Petitioner directed them in the 

parking lot to go to his salon. Shortly after they entered the salon, Christian testified that 

Petitioner pulled a gun from what he thought was the bag of marijuana and began to fire. 

Christian ran and drew his own handgun, but he was shot in the pelvis and elbow. He 

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hid for a short time in the building and yelled for Rhynes. When there was no response, he 

returned and saw Rhynes lying face-down in a pool of blood. Christian ran outside and yelled 

for help. He then saw Petitioner and the two exchanged insults and shots. Ballistics evidence 

showed that none of the shots fired inside the salon was fired by Christian’s guns. 

Employees and customers from nearby businesses heard the yells for help and gunfire, 

and they saw individuals running with guns. Petitioner fled the scene. Christian remained in 

the parking lot. When police arrived Christian told them he had a gun, that Petitioner shot him, 

and that another man was shot and lying inside the salon. Police discovered over $34,000 in 

cash and another pistol owned by Christian on Rhynes’s body. Rhynes had been shot multiple 

times from the same weapon in the head and chest from close range. The gun found on 

Rhynes’s body had not been fired. 

Petitioner testified to a different account of the incident. He testified that he was not 

meeting with Christian for a new sale, but rather to settle an outstanding debt for $30,000 from 

an earlier deal. He went to a restaurant to meet with the pair, but he left when they did not 

show. He returned to his salon and was alarmed to see Christian and Rhynes there. 

Petitioner testified that Christian and Rhynes looked around in a way that made him 

suspicious. Petitioner explained that he was on guard because he had been shot nine days 

earlier during a robbery. He was also alarmed because Christian mentioned this prior shooting, 

even though he had not told either of them about it. Petitioner testified that when Christian and 

Rhynes suddenly appeared to go for their guns, he was quicker on the draw and fired at them in 

self-defense. 

The jury chose to accept Christian’s testimony over Petitioner’s and found Petitioner 

guilty of the offenses described above. 

Following his conviction and sentence on retrial, Petitioner filed a claim of appeal in the 

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Michigan Court of Appeals. His appellate brief raised the following claims: 

i. The trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to bolster 

the testimony of its star witness, Troy Christian, with his 

purported “prior consistent statements.” This evidentiary error 

denied appellant his due process rights to a fair trial. US Const, 

Am XIV; Const 1963, Art 1, §17. 

ii. The police memorialized two interviews with Troy Christian in 

audio/video recordings. The trial court’s denial of the 

defense-request to use these recordings, in digitized form, on 

cross examination for impeachment abridged appellant 

Anderson’s constitutional right to confrontation, to present a 

defense, to effective assistance of counsel, and to a fair trial. 

iii. Appellant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain 

silent when he hired a lawyer to arrange his voluntary 

surrender for arrest. During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, 

police detective Baker impermissibly commented on 

Anderson’s post-arrest silence by stating “I would have loved 

to have gotten an initial statement from Mr. Anderson also.” In 

denying the motion for a mistrial, the trial court deprived 

defendant of his due process rights to a fair trial. US Const, Am 

V, XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §17. 

iv. The defense objected to admission of graphic autopsy 

photographs of the deceased, as substantially more prejudicial 

than probative and serving no purpose other than to inflame the 

passions of the jury. In admitting the photographs, the trial 

court erred and denied the due-process right to a fair trial. 

v. The cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misconduct denied 

appellant a fair trial. 

vi. Ineffective assistance of counsel denied appellant a fair trial. 

vii. The cumulative effect of error requires that appellant be 

granted a new trial. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in an unpublished 

opinion. People v. Anderson, No. 302023, 2013 WL 6124284 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2013). 

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Michigan Supreme Court, but his application for leave to 

appeal was denied by standard form order. People v. Anderson, 846 N.W.2d 397 (Mich. 2014). 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, imposes the following standard of 

review for habeas cases: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 

 A decision of a state court is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court 

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or if the 

state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000). An “unreasonable 

application” occurs when “a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme 

Court] to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not “issue the 

writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court 

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411.

The Supreme Court has explained that a “federal court’s collateral review of a state-court 

decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Thus, the AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for 

evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). A “state court’s determination that a claim 

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lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the 

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). The 

Supreme Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s 

contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. Furthermore, pursuant to section 2254(d), “a 

habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, 

the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of 

the Supreme Court. Id. Habeas relief is not appropriate unless each ground that supported the 

state-court’s decision is examined and found to be unreasonable under the AEDPA. See Wetzel 

v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195, 1199 (2012). 

 “If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Harrington, 131 

S. Ct. at 786. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar 

federal courts from re-litigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it 

preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only “in cases where there is no 

possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with” the 

Supreme Court’s precedents. Id. Indeed, section 2254(d) “reflects the view that habeas corpus 

is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for 

ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. A “readiness to attribute error [to a state court] is 

inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law.” Woodford v. 

Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a 

state prisoner is required to show that the state-court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-787. 

 A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. See 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption of correctness only with 

clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-361 (6th Cir. 1998). 

Moreover, habeas review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Admission of Christian’s Prior Consistent Statements 

Petitioner’s first claim asserts that his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth 

Amendment and his right to a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment were violated by admission of Christian’s February 12 statement to police while he 

was in jail, offered by the prosecution to show that his trial testimony was consistent with 

statements made before he had a motivation to fabricate due to his plea bargain. 

Petitioner makes several arguments in support of this claim. Petitioner first argues that 

the state court allowed the prior statement into evidence in violation of Michigan Rule of 

Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), because Christian had a motivation to lie on February 12 even before he 

had formally been offered a plea bargain. Petitioner next asserts that the basis for allowing 

admission of the statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) entitled him to habeas relief under 

§ 2254(d)(2), because the determination that Christian had no motivation to fabricate when he 

made his statement was an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court record.” Finally, Petitioner primarily points to Tome v. United 

States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) as the source of clearly established Supreme Court law supporting 

his claim. 

The statement at issue is one Christian made on February 12, 2007, in an interview with 

police officers at the Macomb County Jail. The statement was made before any formal plea 

deal had been negotiated with Christian, but Christian testified at the preliminary examination 

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that, when he gave the statement, it was his understanding that a plea deal would be made based 

on what he said. Christian was released on bond two days after he made the statement. 

In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted that Christian was lying both to shift 

blame away from himself and because he had obtained a favorable plea bargain. In response to 

this argument, the prosecutor moved to introduce Christian’s preliminary examination testimony 

and his February 12 statement as prior consistent statements to his expected trial testimony to 

rebut the suggestion that Christian fabricated his testimony as a result of receiving a favorable 

plea deal. The trial court excluded the preliminary examination testimony because it was made 

after plea negotiations, but it allowed the February 12 statement (and any statements Christian 

made at the scene) to be admitted to rebut the suggestion of fabrication in light of a plea bargain. 

7/30/2010 Tr. at 7-21 (Dkt. 5-29); 8/3/2010 Tr. at 80-84 (Dkt. 5-30). 

First, to the extent that Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the disputed 

testimony under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, he merely alleges a state-law violation, which 

does not entitle him to federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Beach v. Moore, 343 F. App’x 7, 11 (6th 

Cir. 2009). State courts are the final arbiters of state law and the federal courts will not 

intervene in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); see also Bradshaw v. 

Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Sanford v. Yukins, 288 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Therefore, the determination of the Michigan Court of Appeals that the statement was properly 

admitted under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a matter of state law is binding on this Court. 

Petitioner asserts that he is, nevertheless, entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(2) because the 

Michigan Court of Appeals made an unreasonable factual determination that Christian did not 

have a motive to lie in the February 12 statement in light of his admissions at the preliminary 

examination that he expected a deal would result from his statement. Section 2254(d)(2) has 

been interpreted as precluding a federal court from setting “aside reasonable state-court 

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determinations of fact in favor of its own debatable interpretation of the record[.]” Rice v. 

Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 335 (2006). That reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree 

about the factual finding does not suffice to supersede the trial court’s factual finding. Id. 

Thus, where permissible alternatives exist, the factual finding must not be disturbed. Id. at 325; 

see also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, (2005). This section is worded in the negative 

and establishes the degree of deference afforded state court findings of fact; it does not create an 

independent basis for granting habeas relief absent a valid constitutional claim. Petitioner 

offers two constitutional bases: the Confrontation Clause and the Due Process Clause. 

Petitioner’s claim cannot be founded on the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the testimonial statement of a 

witness who does not appear at trial is inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable to testify 

and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Testimonial statements 

include preliminary hearing testimony, grand jury testimony, prior trial testimony, and 

statements made during police interrogations. Id. at 54. In this case, Christian appeared and 

testified at trial, and was available for cross-examination. Petitioner had the opportunity to 

question him about his September 12 statement, and he did so. Consequently, no confrontation 

violation occurred. 

Nor can Petitioner’s claim be supported by the Due Process Clause. Petitioner primarily 

relies on Tome v. United States. That decision, however, merely interprets Federal Rule of 

Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which is comparable to Michigan Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B). In 

Tome, the Supreme Court stated that, “[p]rior consistent statements may not be admitted to 

counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been 

discredited.” 513 U.S. at 157. Nevertheless, there is “no Supreme Court decision holding that 

the improper use of a witness’s prior consistent statements violates the Constitution.” Drain v. 

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Woods, 902 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1037 (E.D. Mich. 2012). Tome simply does not purport to 

create a constitutional limitation on the introduction of prior consistent statements. 

Petitioner cites a number of federal court of appeals cases using open-ended standards to 

determine whether the admission of evidence constitutes a due process violation, such as where 

the evidence was a “crucial factor,” “highly prejudicial,” or “egregious.” But the Supreme 

Court has emphasized “circuit precedent does not constitute ‘clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court,’” and “[i]t therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief 

under AEDPA.” Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam). It is 

doubtful that the cited standards were derived from Supreme Court holdings and can be 

considered the “clearly established” standard for purposes of § 2254(d) review. See Olson v. 

Little, 604 F. App’x 387, 406 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing how the “crucial factor” standard 

derives not from the Supreme Court but from a concurrence in a 1968 Fifth Circuit opinion). 

In fact, “[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due 

Process Clause has limited operation. . . . [The Supreme Court has] defined the category of 

infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 

U.S. 342, 353 (1990) (discussing whether admission of evidence violates fundamental fairness 

guarantee of Due Process Clause). Under clearly established Supreme Court law, the 

application of state evidentiary rules cannot rise to the level of due process violations unless they 

“offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 

be ranked as fundamental.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (citing Patterson v. 

New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-202 (1977)). The clearly established standard for a 

fundamental-fairness claim is “whether the action complained of violates those fundamental 

conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions and which define 

the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Olson, 604 F. App’x at 406 n.17 (quoting 

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Dowling, 493 U.S. at 353). Because Petitioner has not pointed to any decision of the Supreme 

Court supporting the position that the admission of the Christian’s prior consistent statements 

deprived Petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial under this very narrow standard, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief on his claim. See Benton v. Booker, 403 F. App'x 984, 986 (6th Cir. 

2010). 

B. Exclusion of Videotaped Evidence 

 Petitioner next argues that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated when 

he was prohibited from using the video recording of Christian’s interview with police to impeach 

him at trial. 

The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the 

witnesses against him or her. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1973). “Cross-examination 

is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are 

tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly 

harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness's story 

to test the witness's perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been 

allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness.” Id. at 314. The right of cross-examination, 

however, is not absolute. Trial judges “retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause 

is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, 

among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or 

interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 679 (1986); see also Jordan v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 675 F.3d 586, 594 (6th Cir. 

2012). As the Sixth Circuit has recently explained: 

The key issue is whether the jury had enough information to assess the defense's 

theory of the case despite the limits on cross-examination. So long as 

cross-examination elicits adequate information to allow a jury to assess a 

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witness's credibility, motives, or possible bias, the Sixth Amendment is not 

compromised by a limitation on cross-examination. 

United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 624 (6th Cir. 2015). 

Applying this established precedent, the Michigan Court of Appeals thoroughly 

addressed the question, as follows: 

Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in 

holding that defendant could not impeach Christian’s trial 

testimony with the digitized recordings from his police interviews 

on January 17, 2007, and February 12, 2007. We disagree. 

Preserved evidentiary issues are reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. Mahone, 294 Mich. App. at 212. When constitutional 

issues are preserved, this Court must determine if the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Dendel, 289 Mich. 

App. 445, 475; 797 N.W.2d 645 (2010). An error is harmless if it 

is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have 

found the defendant guilty absent the error.” Id. If this Court 

determines that the jury would have convicted defendant even 

without the error, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial. See 

id. at 476. 

 

Defendant argues that the use of the recordings violated his 

confrontation rights and his right to present a defense. We review 

de novo a defendant’s claim that he was denied his right of 

confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. People v. Nunley, 491 

Mich. 686, 696-697; 821 N.W.2d 642 (2012). We also review de 

novo a defendant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right 

to present a defense. People v. Unger (On Remand), 278 Mich. 

App. 210, 247; 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008). 

 

Under the Confrontation Clause, a defendant has the right “to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him” US Const, Am VI; see 

also Const 1963, art 1, § 20. This right allows a defendant to 

cross-examine and challenge the witness’s credibility, such as by 

showing that a witness is biased or that the testimony is 

exaggerated or unbelievable.” Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 

51-52 (1987) [string citations omitted]. Under MRE 613(b), 

extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement is 

admissible if the witness is “afforded an opportunity to explain or 

deny the same and the opposite party is afforded and opportunity 

to interrogate the witness thereon.” However, a trial court judge 

can impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to address 

concerns of “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 

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witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitively or only 

marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 

(1986) [string citations omitted]; see also MRE 611(a); People v. 

Canter, 197 Mich. App. 550, 564; 496 N.W.2d 336 (1992). In 

addition, it is within the trial court’s discretion to preclude 

impeachment of a witness on a collateral matter. People v. 

Wofford, 196 Mich. App. 275, 281; 492 N.W.2d 747 (1992). 

The trial court was within its discretion in concluding that the 

digitized images of Christian’s demeanor during his police 

interviews were not admissible. Christian admitted that the 

majority of his January 17, 2007, statement to police was false. 

Defendant argues that he should have been allowed to play the 

portion of the January 17, 2007, interview where Christian is 

writing on a diagram of the hair salon and showing where he, 

defendant, and Rhynes were positioned in the salon. When 

defendant tried to question Christian about the diagram, Christian 

claimed he did not remember drawing on it. Defendant asserts that 

this line of question was important because Christian’s writing on 

the diagram indicates that defendant was standing between 

Christian and Rhynes, which corroborates defendant’s testimony 

that he was ambushed. Defendant avers that the diagram is 

contrary to Christian’s testimony that defendant was facing him 

and Rhynes, who were standing next to each other and against the 

wall. However, Christian admitted that it looked like his signature 

on the diagram. Thus, defense counsel was able to effectively 

impeach Christian on this issue, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in precluding cumulative evidence. 

Similarly, defendant effectively impeached Christian regarding his 

trial testimony that Rhynes may have taken Christian’s gun from 

his center console when Rhynes was looking for some change as 

there were in a drive-through at a fast-food restaurant. Defense 

counsel impeached Christian with a receipt from the restaurant 

found in Christian’s car, which showed that cash was paid for the 

order and coins were received in change. 

Finally, defendant claims that the recordings could have been used 

to refresh Christian’s allegedly selective memory lapses. However, 

defense counsel had transcripts from the interviews that he could 

have used to refresh Christian’s memory. 

 

Anderson, 2013 WL 7124284, at *2-*3. 

The state-court’s decision constituted an entirely reasonable application of clearly 

established Supreme Court precedent. The jury had more than enough information to assess 

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Christian’s credibility based on the lengthy and effective avenues of cross-examination that were 

allowed. They knew he had lied about aspects of the incident to police, and they knew of his 

obvious motivations for fabricating an exculpatory version of events. Consequently, 

Petitioner’s right of confrontation was not violated by this minor restriction placed on the 

defense attorney’s cross-examination of Christian. More to the point, a fairminded jurist could 

conclude in light of the record evidence that Petitioner’s right to confrontation was not violated. 

Finally, even if the trial court erred, Petitioner is not entitled to relief. For purposes of 

federal habeas review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is considered 

harmless if it did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 117-118 (2007) (confirming that the Brecht standard applies in “virtually all” habeas 

cases). Confrontation errors, like other trial errors, are subject to harmless error analysis. Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. Any error in limiting cross-examination of Christian was harmless 

under this standard. The jury was well aware of his credibility issues, including the 

inconsistencies in his statements, his favorable plea deal, and his incentive to testify against 

Petitioner. Any error, therefore, did not have a substantial impact on the result of his trial. 

C. Comment on Petitioner’s Silence 

 Petitioner asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated when a 

police officer gave an unresponsive answer during direct examination stating that “I would have 

loved to have gotten an initial statement from Anderson also.” 8/5/2010 Tr. at 100 (Dkt. 5-32). 

Petitioner claims that the prosecutor’s questioning of the officer violated Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 

610 (1976). 

In Doyle, the Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment for the prosecution to use a defendant’s post-arrest silence to impeach 

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exculpatory testimony given by him at trial. This rule rests on the presumption that it is 

fundamentally unfair to assure a suspect that his silence would not be used against him and then 

to use his silence to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Wainwright v. 

Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 291 (1986). The goal of Doyle is to prevent a jury from drawing 

inferences of guilt from a defendant’s decision to remain silent after his arrest. Gravley v. 

Mills, 87 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 1996). 

It is clear from the record that the prosecutor did not violate Petitioner’s due process 

rights under Doyle. Doyle applies where a prosecutor attempts to impeach defendant’s trial 

testimony by showing that he remained silent after arrest. In this case, the prosecutor did not 

deliberately elicit the police officer’s answers regarding Petitioner’s decision not to make a 

statement. The question concerned Christian’s statement to police and had nothing to do with 

any attempt to elicit a statement from Petitioner. 8/5/2010 Tr. at 100. After the unresponsive 

remark was made by the officer, the trial court acted quickly to cure any resulting prejudice by 

giving a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard the remark. Id. at 107-108. Jurors 

are presumed to follow the court’s instructions. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 

(2001). The fact Petitioner did not make a statement to police never came up again at trial and 

was not used by the prosecutor to impeach his testimony. The Court has no difficulty in 

concluding that the witness’s stray remark which the jury was instructed to disregard did not 

render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair, and that it was nevertheless harmless. 

D. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Ineffective Counsel 

 Petitioner’s fourth claim asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct at trial by 

arguing facts not admitted in evidence and by vouching for the credibility of Christian. 

Specifically, Petitioner claims that there was no evidence presented at trial to support the 

prosecutor’s argument that Rhynes was shot while lying on the ground. He also asserts that the 

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prosecutor improperly argued that Christian had been forthcoming ever since he made his 

statement at the Macomb County Jail. Petitioner asserts in his fifth claim that his counsel was 

ineffective for failing to objection to these un-objected to instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 

 The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that prosecutors must “refrain from improper 

methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 

88 (1935). To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a habeas petitioner must 

demonstrate that the prosecutor's conduct or remarks “so infected the trial with unfairness as to 

make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 

637, 643 (1974); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (citing Donnelly); 

Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012) (confirming that Donnelly/Darden is the 

proper standard). “[T]he Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the state courts have 

substantial breathing room when considering prosecutorial misconduct claims because 

constitutional line drawing in prosecutorial misconduct cases is necessarily imprecise.” Slagle 

v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 516 (6th Cir. 2006). Indeed, because “the Darden standard is a very 

general one,” courts have “more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 

determinations.” Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155. 

 The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected the claim on the merits as follows: 

Defendant also contends that prosecutorial misconduct denied him 

a fair trial. We disagree. 

 

To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must 

“timely and specifically object[], except when an objection could 

not have cured the error, or a failure to review the issue would 

result in a miscarriage of justice.” People v. Callon, 256 Mich. 

App. 312, 329; 662 N.W.2d 501 (2003). Defendant points to three 

examples of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. In two of these 

examples, defense counsel did not object. In the third example, 

defense counsel objected but he did not specifically object that the 

argument improperly bolstered Christian’s credibility. In fact, 

defendant did not state any legal grounds for his objection. 

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Therefore, this issue is unpreserved. 

An unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed for 

plain error affecting substantial rights. Unger, 278 Mich. App. at 

235. “Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the 

conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected 

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

Id. (internal citation omitted). An error does not require reversal 

“where a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial 

effect.” Unger, 278 Mich. App. at 235. 

A claim of prosecutorial misconduct only warrants a new trial 

when the defendant “was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People 

v. Brown, 279 Mich. App. 116, 134; 755 N.W.2d 664 (2008). The 

defendant has the burden of showing that any error “resulted in a 

miscarriage of justice.” Id. The prosecutor’s statements are 

reviewed as a whole and in context with the evidence presented 

and the defendant’s arguments. Brown, 279 Mich. App. at 135. 

Prosecutors are generally “accorded great latitude regarding their 

arguments and conduct at trial.” Unger, 278 Mich. App. at 236. It 

is improper for a prosecutor to misstate the law or facts; however, 

“proper jury instructions cure most errors because jurors are 

presumed to follow the trial judge’s instructions.” See People v. 

Masik (On Reconsideration), 285 Mich. App. 535, 542; 775 

N.W.2d 857 (2009). 

First defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly argued 

facts not in evidence when he said that Rhynes was shot while on 

the ground. This argument lacks merit. “A prosecutor may not 

make a statement of fact to the jury that is unsupported by 

evidence, but [he] is free to argue the evidence and any reasonable 

inferences that may arise from the evidence.” People v. Ackerman, 

257 Mich. App. 434, 450; 669 N.W.2d 818 (2003). The prosecutor 

specifically said: 

 

Again, at some point the defendant had shot Stanley 

Rhynes as he laid [sic] on the ground. You can see from 

this blood splatter which is right by the floor right here. 

At some point he was shot while he was on the ground. 

Blood on the floor, blood on the floor corroborates Troy 

Christian’s account. 

This argument was not improper; the prosecutor made a reasonable 

inference from the evidence. See Ackerman, 257 Mich. App. at 450. 

The evidence showed that Rhynes was shot four times. The shot that 

entered Rhynes’s arm, exited, and then went through his chest 

without exiting was shot from less than eight inches away. It was 

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reasonable for the prosecutor to infer that Rhynes did not remain 

standing while he was shot four times—including once in his face 

and once in the back of his head. In addition, three of the bullets 

were fired from more than eight inches away, while the fourth was 

fired from within eight inches. This evidence supports the inference 

that defendant was approaching Rhynes while shooting 

him—perhaps because Rhynes was lying on the ground and not 

moving. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that the 

attorneys’ statements are not evidence. 

Second, defendant asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly 

bolstered Christian’s testimony by asking him a series of leading 

questions on redirect examination. MRE 611(d)(1) states that 

“[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of 

a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ 

testimony.” We agree that the prosecution asked Christian leading 

questions during part of the redirect examination. For example, the 

prosecutor asked Christian, “[d]id you not tell the detectives that you 

were shot from behind” and [d]id you not tell the detectives that . . . 

after you had gone outside, you actually shot the Cadillac window 

out?” However, a violation of this rule only warrants reversal when 

“some prejudice or pattern of eliciting inadmissible testimony” is 

shown. People v. Watson, 245 Mich. App. 572, 587; 629 N.W.2d 

411 (2001). 

First, the information elicited by the prosecutor during the 

questioning at issue was admissible as a prior consistent statement 

pursuant to MRE 801(d)(1)(B). Second, reversal is not required 

because an objection and instruction could have cured the error. See 

Unger, 278 Mich. App. at 235. For example, if defense counsel had 

objected, then the prosecutor could have rephrased his questions to 

be more open-ended. 

Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for 

Christian’s credibility when he made the following statements 

during his closing argument: 

[Christian’s] been very forthcoming ever since the 

Macomb County jail statement which was on February 

12th. 

* * * 

The February 12th, 2007 jail interview. I think that 

interview is extremely important because there was no 

promises made [sic]. . . . The truth is that only his 

statement made any sense. 

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It is improper for the prosecutor to vouch for the credibility of his 

witnesses ‘“to the effect that he has some special knowledge 

concerning a witness’ truthfulness.’” People v. Bennett, 290 Mich. 

App. 465, 476; 802 N.W.2d 627 (2010), quoting People v. Bahoda, 

448 Mich. 261, 276; 531 N.W.2d 659 (1995). The comments cited 

by defendant do not indicate that the prosecutor had some special 

knowledge concerning Christian’s truthfulness. The prosecutor 

discussed Christian’s admittedly false statements to police before 

the February 12, 2007, interview and asserted that since that 

interview, Christian’s statements have been consistent. The fact 

that Christian previously lied to police but was relatively consistent 

in his story since the February 12, 2007, interview, was not 

“special knowledge” of the prosecutor. Christian was questioned at 

length about his previous statements in front of the jury. In 

addition, “[a] prosecutor may fairly respond to an issue raised by 

the defendant.” Brown, 279 Mich. App. at 135. The prosecutor was 

responding to defendant’s assertion throughout the trial that 

Christian was not a credible witness. The prosecutor did not 

improperly vouch for Christian’s credibility. 

Anderson, 2013 WL 7124284, at *7-*8. 

 This decision did not constitute an unreasonable application of the established Supreme 

Court standard. The Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial 

misconduct in light of the record as a whole and, and even though the state court reviewed the 

alleged errors under a plain error standard, it looked first to whether the complained conduct was 

improper. If so, the state court next determined whether the improper conduct rendered 

Petitioner's trial unfair. The court then found that none of the alleged errors warranted reversal. 

 Not all fairminded jurists would disagree with the state court’s analysis. Indeed, the 

evidence showed that Rhynes was shot multiple times from different ranges and angles. 

Especially given the severity of several of the gunshot wounds, it is difficult to imagine a 

scenario where some of those shots were not inflicted when he was lying down. The 

prosecutor’s comment amounted to a fair inference based on the evidence presented. The other 

allegations fare no better. The prosecutor did not express a personal belief based on secret 

knowledge that Christian was testifying truthfully. See United States v. Francis, 170 F. 3d 546, 

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550 (6th Cir. 1999); Griffin v. Berghuis, 298 F. Supp. 2d 663, 674-675 (E.D. Mich. 2004). It 

was fair for him to argue that the jury should believe his testimony because he gave a consistent 

version of events. Finally, while the prosecutor led Christen on re-direct examination, the same 

testimony could have easily been presented by way of open-ended questions. This technically 

improper method would not lead every fairminded jurist to find that Petitioner’s trial was thereby 

rendered fundamentally unfair. 

Considering the extensive state-court analysis of Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct 

claims, Petitioner fails to establish that the state-court determination rejecting his prosecutorial 

misconduct claims were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established U.S. Supreme 

Court law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on his prosecutorial 

misconduct claims. 

Petitioner’s related ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails along with the 

prosecutorial claim. Bradley v. Birkett, 192 F. App’x 468, 475 (6th Cir. 2006) (counsel not 

ineffective for failing to object to meritless prosecutorial misconduct claim). Therefore, 

Petitioner’s fourth and fifth claims do merit a grant of habeas relief. 

E. Cumulative Error 

 Petitioner’s sixth claim asserts that the accumulation of all the alleged errors rendered his 

trial fundamentally unfair. The state court’s denial of relief with respect to this claim is neither 

contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. 

The Supreme Court “has not held that distinct constitutional claims can be cumulated to grant 

habeas relief.” Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the Sixth 

Circuit has ruled that such a cumulative error claim is not cognizable on habeas review. See 

Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 

256 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Moreland v. Bradshaw, 699 F.3d 908, 931 (6th Cir. 2012) (ruling 

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that trial counsel cumulative error claim was not cognizable and citing Hoffner v. Bradshaw, 622 

F.3d 487, 513 (6th Cir. 2010), and Moore). Petitioner thus fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted as to this issue. Moreover, given that none of his habeas claims has merit, 

he cannot establish that he is entitled to relief based upon cumulative error. Therefore, habeas 

relief is not warranted on this claim. 

F. Certificate of Appealability 

Before Petitioner may appeal this Court’s dispositive decision, a certificate of 

appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A certificate 

of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of 

a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court rejects a habeas claim on the 

merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. 

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. In applying that standard, a 

district court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold 

inquiry into the underlying merit of the petitioner’s claims. Id. at 336-337. “The district court 

must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; Castro v. United 

States, 310 F.3d 900, 901 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Having considered the matter, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to make a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, and concludes that reasonable jurists 

would not debate the Court’s conclusion that the petition should be denied. Accordingly, a 

certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

with prejudice and declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 10, 2016 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

 Detroit, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 United States District Judge 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and any 

unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail 

addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on August 10, 2016. 

 s/Karri Sandusky 

 Case Manager 

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