# CE2009075EN.01001601.xml

| 31.3.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | CE 75/16 |
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31.3.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

CE 75/16

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COMMON POSITION (EC) No 11/2009

COMMON POSITION

adopted by the Council on 9 January 2009

with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EC) No .../2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2009/C 75 E/02)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 95 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (1),

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Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions (2),

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Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty (3),

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Whereas:

| (1) | The internal market in electricity, which has been progressively implemented since 1999, aims at delivering real choice for all consumers in the Community, be they citizens or businesses, new business opportunities and more cross-border trade, so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices, higher standards of service, and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability. |
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(1)

The internal market in electricity, which has been progressively implemented since 1999, aims at delivering real choice for all consumers in the Community, be they citizens or businesses, new business opportunities and more cross-border trade, so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices, higher standards of service, and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability.

| (2) | Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (4) and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (5) have made significant contributions towards the creation of such an internal market in electricity. |
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(2)

Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (4) and Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (5) have made significant contributions towards the creation of such an internal market in electricity.

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| (3) | However, at present, there are obstacles to the sale of electricity on equal terms, without discrimination or disadvantage in the Community. In particular, non-discriminatory network access and an equally effective level of regulatory supervision do not yet exist in each Member State. |
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(3)

However, at present, there are obstacles to the sale of electricity on equal terms, without discrimination or disadvantage in the Community. In particular, non-discriminatory network access and an equally effective level of regulatory supervision do not yet exist in each Member State.

| (4) | The Communication of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ highlighted the importance of completing the internal market in electricity and creating a level playing field for all electricity undertakings in the Community. The Communications of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market’ and ‘Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report)’ showed that the present rules and measures do not provide the necessary framework to achieve the objective of a well-functioning internal market. |
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(4)

The Communication of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ highlighted the importance of completing the internal market in electricity and creating a level playing field for all electricity undertakings in the Community. The Communications of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market’ and ‘Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report)’ showed that the present rules and measures do not provide the necessary framework to achieve the objective of a well-functioning internal market.

| (5) | Besides thoroughly implementing the existing regulatory framework, the regulatory framework for the internal market in electricity set out in Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 should be adapted in line with those communications. |
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(5)

Besides thoroughly implementing the existing regulatory framework, the regulatory framework for the internal market in electricity set out in Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 should be adapted in line with those communications.

| (6) | In particular, increased cooperation and coordination among transmission system operators is required to create network codes for providing and managing effective access to the transmission networks across borders, and to ensure coordinated and sufficiently forward-looking planning and sound technical evolution of the transmission system in the Community, with due regard to the environment. Those network codes should be in line with non-binding framework guidelines developed by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators established by Regulation (EC) No .../... (6) of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the Agency’). The Agency should have a role in reviewing draft network codes, including their compliance with non-binding framework guidelines, and it should be enabled to recommend them for adoption by the Commission. The Agency should assess proposed modifications to the network codes and it should be enabled to recommend them for adoption by the Commission. Transmission system operators should operate their networks in accordance with those network codes. |
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(6)

In particular, increased cooperation and coordination among transmission system operators is required to create network codes for providing and managing effective access to the transmission networks across borders, and to ensure coordinated and sufficiently forward-looking planning and sound technical evolution of the transmission system in the Community, with due regard to the environment. Those network codes should be in line with non-binding framework guidelines developed by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators established by Regulation (EC) No .../... (6) of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘the Agency’). The Agency should have a role in reviewing draft network codes, including their compliance with non-binding framework guidelines, and it should be enabled to recommend them for adoption by the Commission. The Agency should assess proposed modifications to the network codes and it should be enabled to recommend them for adoption by the Commission. Transmission system operators should operate their networks in accordance with those network codes.

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| (7) | In order to ensure optimal management of the electricity transmission network and to allow trading and supplying electricity across borders in the Community, a European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (‘the ENTSO for Electricity’), should be established. The tasks of the ENTSO for Electricity should be carried out in compliance with Community competition rules which remain applicable to the decisions of the ENTSO for Electricity. Its tasks should be well-defined and their working method should be such as to ensure efficiency, its representative nature and transparency. The network codes prepared by the ENTSO for Electricity are not intended to replace the necessary national network codes for non-cross-border issues. Given that more effective progress may be achieved through an approach at regional level, transmission system operators should set up regional structures within the overall cooperation structure, whilst ensuring that results at regional level are compatible with network codes and non-binding 10-year network development plans at Community level. Cooperation within such regional structures presupposes effective unbundling of network activities from production and supply activities. In the absence of such unbundling, regional cooperation between transmission system operators gives rise to a risk of anti-competitive conduct. |
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(7)

In order to ensure optimal management of the electricity transmission network and to allow trading and supplying electricity across borders in the Community, a European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (‘the ENTSO for Electricity’), should be established. The tasks of the ENTSO for Electricity should be carried out in compliance with Community competition rules which remain applicable to the decisions of the ENTSO for Electricity. Its tasks should be well-defined and their working method should be such as to ensure efficiency, its representative nature and transparency. The network codes prepared by the ENTSO for Electricity are not intended to replace the necessary national network codes for non-cross-border issues. Given that more effective progress may be achieved through an approach at regional level, transmission system operators should set up regional structures within the overall cooperation structure, whilst ensuring that results at regional level are compatible with network codes and non-binding 10-year network development plans at Community level. Cooperation within such regional structures presupposes effective unbundling of network activities from production and supply activities. In the absence of such unbundling, regional cooperation between transmission system operators gives rise to a risk of anti-competitive conduct.

| (8) | All market participants have an interest in the work expected of the ENTSO for Electricity. An effective consultation process is therefore essential and existing structures that are set up to facilitate and streamline the consultation process, such as the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity, national regulators or the Agency should play an important role. |
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(8)

All market participants have an interest in the work expected of the ENTSO for Electricity. An effective consultation process is therefore essential and existing structures that are set up to facilitate and streamline the consultation process, such as the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity, national regulators or the Agency should play an important role.

| (9) | This Regulation should lay down basic principles with regard to tarification and capacity allocation, whilst providing for the adoption of guidelines detailing further relevant principles and methodologies, in order to allow rapid adaptation to changed circumstances. |
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(9)

This Regulation should lay down basic principles with regard to tarification and capacity allocation, whilst providing for the adoption of guidelines detailing further relevant principles and methodologies, in order to allow rapid adaptation to changed circumstances.

| (10) | In an open, competitive market, transmission system operators should be compensated for costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows of electricity on their networks by the operators of the transmission systems from which cross-border flows originate and the systems where those flows end. |
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(10)

In an open, competitive market, transmission system operators should be compensated for costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows of electricity on their networks by the operators of the transmission systems from which cross-border flows originate and the systems where those flows end.

| (11) | Payments and receipts resulting from compensation between transmission system operators should be taken into account when setting national network tariffs. |
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(11)

Payments and receipts resulting from compensation between transmission system operators should be taken into account when setting national network tariffs.

| (12) | The actual amount payable for cross-border access to the system can vary considerably, depending on the transmission system operator involved and as a result of differences in the structure of the tarification systems applied in Member States. A certain degree of harmonisation is therefore necessary in order to avoid distortions of trade. |
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(12)

The actual amount payable for cross-border access to the system can vary considerably, depending on the transmission system operator involved and as a result of differences in the structure of the tarification systems applied in Member States. A certain degree of harmonisation is therefore necessary in order to avoid distortions of trade.

| (13) | A proper system of long-term locational signals would be necessary, based on the principle that the level of the network access charges should reflect the balance between generation and consumption of the region concerned, on the basis of a differentiation of the network access charges on producers and/or consumers. |
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(13)

A proper system of long-term locational signals would be necessary, based on the principle that the level of the network access charges should reflect the balance between generation and consumption of the region concerned, on the basis of a differentiation of the network access charges on producers and/or consumers.

| (14) | It would not be appropriate to apply distance-related tariffs or, provided appropriate locational signals are in place, a specific tariff to be paid only by exporters or importers in addition to the general charge for access to the national network. |
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(14)

It would not be appropriate to apply distance-related tariffs or, provided appropriate locational signals are in place, a specific tariff to be paid only by exporters or importers in addition to the general charge for access to the national network.

| (15) | The precondition for effective competition in the internal market in electricity is non-discriminatory and transparent charges for network use including interconnecting lines in the transmission system. The available capacities of those lines should be set at the maximum levels consistent with the safety standards of secure network operation. |
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(15)

The precondition for effective competition in the internal market in electricity is non-discriminatory and transparent charges for network use including interconnecting lines in the transmission system. The available capacities of those lines should be set at the maximum levels consistent with the safety standards of secure network operation.

| (16) | It is important to avoid distortion of competition resulting from the differing safety, operational and planning standards used by transmission system operators in Member States. Moreover, there should be transparency for market participants concerning available transfer capacities and the security, planning and operational standards that affect the available transfer capacities. |
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(16)

It is important to avoid distortion of competition resulting from the differing safety, operational and planning standards used by transmission system operators in Member States. Moreover, there should be transparency for market participants concerning available transfer capacities and the security, planning and operational standards that affect the available transfer capacities.

| (17) | Market monitoring undertaken over recent years by the national regulatory authorities and by the Commission has shown that current transparency requirements and rules on access to infrastructure are not sufficient. |
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(17)

Market monitoring undertaken over recent years by the national regulatory authorities and by the Commission has shown that current transparency requirements and rules on access to infrastructure are not sufficient.

| (18) | Equal access to information on the physical status of the system is necessary to enable all market participants to assess the overall demand and supply situation and identify the reasons for movements in the wholesale price. This includes more precise information on electricity generation, supply and demand including forecasts, network and interconnection capacity, flows and maintenance, balancing and reserve capacity. |
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(18)

Equal access to information on the physical status of the system is necessary to enable all market participants to assess the overall demand and supply situation and identify the reasons for movements in the wholesale price. This includes more precise information on electricity generation, supply and demand including forecasts, network and interconnection capacity, flows and maintenance, balancing and reserve capacity.

| (19) | To enhance trust in the market, its participants need to be sure that those engaging in abusive behaviour can be subject to penalties. Competent authorities should be enabled to investigate effectively allegations of market abuse. Competent authorities therefore need access to data that provides information on operational decisions made by supply undertakings. In the electricity market, many relevant decisions are made by the generators, which should keep this information available to the competent authorities for a fixed period of time. Small generators with no real ability to distort the market should be exempt from that obligation. |
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(19)

To enhance trust in the market, its participants need to be sure that those engaging in abusive behaviour can be subject to penalties. Competent authorities should be enabled to investigate effectively allegations of market abuse. Competent authorities therefore need access to data that provides information on operational decisions made by supply undertakings. In the electricity market, many relevant decisions are made by the generators, which should keep this information available to the competent authorities for a fixed period of time. Small generators with no real ability to distort the market should be exempt from that obligation.

| (20) | There should be rules on the use of revenues flowing from congestion-management procedures, unless the specific nature of the interconnector concerned justifies an exemption from those rules. |
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(20)

There should be rules on the use of revenues flowing from congestion-management procedures, unless the specific nature of the interconnector concerned justifies an exemption from those rules.

| (21) | The management of congestion problems should provide correct economic signals to transmission system operators and market participants and should be based on market mechanisms. |
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(21)

The management of congestion problems should provide correct economic signals to transmission system operators and market participants and should be based on market mechanisms.

| (22) | Investments in major new infrastructure should be promoted strongly while ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. In order to enhance the positive effect of exempted direct current interconnectors on competition and security of supply, market interest during the project planning phase should be tested and congestion management rules should be adopted. Where direct current interconnectors are located in the territory of more than one Member State, the Agency should handle as a last resort the exemption request in order to take better account of its cross-border implications and to facilitate its administrative handling. Moreover, given the exceptional risk profile of constructing those exempt major infrastructure projects, undertakings with supply and production interests should be able to benefit from a temporary derogation from the full unbundling rules for the projects concerned. |
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(22)

Investments in major new infrastructure should be promoted strongly while ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. In order to enhance the positive effect of exempted direct current interconnectors on competition and security of supply, market interest during the project planning phase should be tested and congestion management rules should be adopted. Where direct current interconnectors are located in the territory of more than one Member State, the Agency should handle as a last resort the exemption request in order to take better account of its cross-border implications and to facilitate its administrative handling. Moreover, given the exceptional risk profile of constructing those exempt major infrastructure projects, undertakings with supply and production interests should be able to benefit from a temporary derogation from the full unbundling rules for the projects concerned.

| (23) | To ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market in electricity, provision should be made for procedures which allow the adoption of decisions and guidelines with regard, inter alia, to tarification and capacity allocation by the Commission whilst ensuring the involvement of Member States' regulatory authorities in that process, where appropriate through their European association. Regulatory authorities, together with other relevant authorities in the Member States, have an important role to play in contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. |
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(23)

To ensure the smooth functioning of the internal market in electricity, provision should be made for procedures which allow the adoption of decisions and guidelines with regard, inter alia, to tarification and capacity allocation by the Commission whilst ensuring the involvement of Member States' regulatory authorities in that process, where appropriate through their European association. Regulatory authorities, together with other relevant authorities in the Member States, have an important role to play in contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity.

| (24) | National regulatory authorities should ensure compliance with the rules contained in this Regulation and the guidelines adopted on the basis of this Regulation. |
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(24)

National regulatory authorities should ensure compliance with the rules contained in this Regulation and the guidelines adopted on the basis of this Regulation.

| (25) | The Member States and the competent national authorities should be required to provide relevant information to the Commission. Such information should be treated confidentially by the Commission. Where necessary, the Commission should have an opportunity to request relevant information directly from undertakings concerned, provided that the competent national authorities are informed. |
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(25)

The Member States and the competent national authorities should be required to provide relevant information to the Commission. Such information should be treated confidentially by the Commission. Where necessary, the Commission should have an opportunity to request relevant information directly from undertakings concerned, provided that the competent national authorities are informed.

| (26) | Member States should lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and ensure that they are implemented. Those penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. |
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(26)

Member States should lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and ensure that they are implemented. Those penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

| (27) | The measures necessary for the implementation of this Regulation should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (7). |
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(27)

The measures necessary for the implementation of this Regulation should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (7).

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| (28) | In particular, the Commission should be empowered to establish or adopt the guidelines necessary for providing the minimum degree of harmonisation required to achieve the aims of this Regulation. Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation, by supplementing it with new non-essential elements, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC. |
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(28)

In particular, the Commission should be empowered to establish or adopt the guidelines necessary for providing the minimum degree of harmonisation required to achieve the aims of this Regulation. Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation, by supplementing it with new non-essential elements, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC.

| (29) | Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the provision of a harmonised framework for cross-border exchanges of electricity, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. |
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(29)

Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the provision of a harmonised framework for cross-border exchanges of electricity, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

| (30) | Given the scope of the amendments that are being made herein to Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, it is desirable, for reasons of clarity and rationalisation, that the provisions in question should be recast by bringing them all together in a single text in a new Regulation, |
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(30)

Given the scope of the amendments that are being made herein to Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, it is desirable, for reasons of clarity and rationalisation, that the provisions in question should be recast by bringing them all together in a single text in a new Regulation,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Subject-matter and scope

This Regulation aims at:

| (a) | setting fair rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity, thus enhancing competition within the internal market in electricity, taking into account the particular characteristics of national and regional markets. This will involve the establishment of a compensation mechanism for cross-border flows of electricity and the setting of harmonised principles on cross-border transmission charges and the allocation of available capacities of interconnections between national transmission systems; |
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(a)

setting fair rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity, thus enhancing competition within the internal market in electricity, taking into account the particular characteristics of national and regional markets. This will involve the establishment of a compensation mechanism for cross-border flows of electricity and the setting of harmonised principles on cross-border transmission charges and the allocation of available capacities of interconnections between national transmission systems;

| (b) | facilitating the emergence of a well-functioning and transparent wholesale market with a high level of security of supply in electricity. It provides mechanisms to harmonise the rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity. |
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(b)

facilitating the emergence of a well-functioning and transparent wholesale market with a high level of security of supply in electricity. It provides mechanisms to harmonise the rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity.

Article 2

Definitions

1.   For the purpose of this Regulation, the definitions contained in Article 2 of Directive 2009/.../EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (6) apply, with the exception of the definition of ‘interconnector’ which shall be replaced by the following:

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‘interconnector’ means a transmission line which crosses or spans a border between Member States and which connects the national transmission systems of the Member States.

2.   The following definitions shall apply:

| (a) | ‘regulatory authorities’ means the regulatory authorities referred to in Article 34(1) of Directive 2009/.../EC; |
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(a)

‘regulatory authorities’ means the regulatory authorities referred to in Article 34(1) of Directive 2009/.../EC;

| (b) | ‘cross-border flow’ means a physical flow of electricity on a transmission network of a Member State that results from the impact of the activity of producers and/or consumers outside that Member State on its transmission network. If transmission networks of two or more Member States form part, in whole or in part, of a single control block, for the purpose of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism referred to in Article 13 only, the control block as a whole shall be considered as forming part of the transmission network of one of the Member States concerned, in order to avoid flows within control blocks being considered as cross-border flows and giving rise to compensation payments under Article 13. The regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned may decide which of the Member States concerned shall be the one of which the control block as a whole shall be considered to form part; |
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(b)

‘cross-border flow’ means a physical flow of electricity on a transmission network of a Member State that results from the impact of the activity of producers and/or consumers outside that Member State on its transmission network. If transmission networks of two or more Member States form part, in whole or in part, of a single control block, for the purpose of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism referred to in Article 13 only, the control block as a whole shall be considered as forming part of the transmission network of one of the Member States concerned, in order to avoid flows within control blocks being considered as cross-border flows and giving rise to compensation payments under Article 13. The regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned may decide which of the Member States concerned shall be the one of which the control block as a whole shall be considered to form part;

| (c) | ‘congestion’ means a situation in which an interconnection linking national transmission networks cannot accommodate all physical flows resulting from international trade requested by market participants, because of a lack of capacity of the interconnectors and/or the national transmission systems concerned; |
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(c)

‘congestion’ means a situation in which an interconnection linking national transmission networks cannot accommodate all physical flows resulting from international trade requested by market participants, because of a lack of capacity of the interconnectors and/or the national transmission systems concerned;

| (d) | ‘declared export’ means the dispatch of electricity in one Member State on the basis of an underlying contractual arrangement to the effect that the simultaneous corresponding take-up (declared import) of electricity will take place in another Member State or a third country; |
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(d)

‘declared export’ means the dispatch of electricity in one Member State on the basis of an underlying contractual arrangement to the effect that the simultaneous corresponding take-up (declared import) of electricity will take place in another Member State or a third country;

| (e) | ‘declared transit’ means a circumstance where a declared export of electricity occurs and where the nominated path for the transaction involves a country in which neither the dispatch nor the simultaneous corresponding take-up of the electricity will take place; |
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(e)

‘declared transit’ means a circumstance where a declared export of electricity occurs and where the nominated path for the transaction involves a country in which neither the dispatch nor the simultaneous corresponding take-up of the electricity will take place;

| (f) | ‘declared import’ means the take-up of electricity in a Member State or a third country simultaneously with the dispatch of electricity (declared export) in another Member State; |
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(f)

‘declared import’ means the take-up of electricity in a Member State or a third country simultaneously with the dispatch of electricity (declared export) in another Member State;

| (g) | ‘new interconnector’ means an interconnector not completed by ... (8). |
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(g)

‘new interconnector’ means an interconnector not completed by ... (8).

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Article 3

Certification of transmission system operators

1.   The Commission shall examine any notification of a decision on the certification of a transmission system operator as laid down in Article 10(6) of Directive 2009/.../EC as soon as it is received. Within two months of the day of receipt of such notification, the Commission shall deliver its opinion to the relevant national regulatory authority as to its compatibility with Article 10(2) or Article 11, and Article 9 of Directive 2009/.../EC.

When preparing the opinion referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission may request the Agency to provide its opinion on the national regulatory authority's decision. In such a case, the two-month period referred to in the first subparagraph shall be extended by two further months.

In the absence of an opinion by the Commission within the period referred to in the first and second subparagraphs, the Commission shall be deemed not to raise objections to the regulatory authority's decision.

2.   Upon receiving an opinion of the Commission, the national regulatory authority shall, within two months, adopt its final decision regarding the certification of the transmission system operator, taking the utmost account of that opinion. The regulatory authority's decision and the Commission's opinion shall be published together.

3.   At any time during the procedure, regulatory authorities and/or the Commission may request from a transmission system operator and/or an undertaking performing any of the functions of generation or supply any information relevant to the fulfilment of their tasks under this Article.

4.   Regulatory authorities and the Commission shall preserve the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information.

5.   The Commission may adopt guidelines setting out the details of the procedure to be followed for the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(2).

6.   Where the Commission has received notification of the certification of a transmission system operator under Article 9(10) of Directive 2009/.../EC, the Commission shall take a decision relating to certification. The regulatory authority shall comply with the Commission decision.

Article 4

European network of transmission system operators for electricity

All transmission system operators shall cooperate at Community level through the ENTSO for Electricity, in order to promote the completion of the internal market in electricity and to ensure the optimal management and sound technical evolution of the European electricity transmission network.

Article 5

Establishment of the ENTSO for Electricity

1.   By ... (9) the transmission system operators for electricity shall submit to the Commission and to the Agency the draft statutes, a list of members and draft rules of procedure, including the rules of procedures on the consultation of other stakeholders, of the ENTSO for Electricity to be established.

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2.   Within two months of the day of receipt, the Agency, after consulting the organisations representing all stakeholders, shall provide an opinion to the Commission on the draft statutes, list of members and draft rules of procedure.

3.   The Commission shall deliver an opinion on the draft statutes, list of members and draft rules of procedures within three months from the day of receipt of the opinion of the Agency.

4.   Within three months from the day of receipt of the Commission's opinion, the transmission system operators shall establish the ENTSO for Electricity, adopt its statutes and rules of procedure and publish them.

Article 6

Establishment of network codes

1.   The Commission shall, after consulting the Agency, the ENTSO for Electricity and the other relevant stakeholders, establish an annual priority list identifying the areas set out in Article 8(6) to be included in the development of network codes.

2.   The Commission may request the Agency to submit to it within a reasonable period of time not exceeding six months a draft non-binding framework guideline setting out clear and objective principles, in accordance with Article 8(7), for the development of network codes relating to the areas identified in the priority list. Each draft non-binding framework guideline shall contribute to non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market. Upon a reasoned request from the Agency, the Commission may extend that period.

3.   The Agency shall consult the ENTSO for Electricity and the other relevant stakeholders in regard to the draft non-binding framework guideline, during a period of no less than two months, in an open and transparent manner.

4.   If the Commission considers that the draft non-binding framework guideline does not contribute to non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market, it may request the Agency to review the draft non-binding framework guideline within a reasonable period of time and re-submit it to the Commission.

5.   If the Agency fails to submit or re-submit a draft non-binding framework guideline within the period set by the Commission under paragraphs 2 or 4, the Commission shall elaborate the non-binding framework guideline in question.

6.   The Commission shall request the ENTSO for Electricity to submit a network code which is in line with the relevant non-binding framework guideline, to the Agency within a reasonable period of time not exceeding twelve months.

7.   Within a period of three months after the day of receipt of a network code, during which the Agency may formally consult the relevant stakeholders, the Agency shall provide a reasoned opinion to the ENTSO for Electricity on the network code.

8.   The ENTSO for Electricity may amend the network code in the light of the opinion of the Agency and re-submit it to the Agency.

9.   Once the Agency is satisfied that the network code is in line with the relevant non-binding framework guidelines, the Agency shall submit the network code to the Commission and may recommend that it be adopted.

10.   Where the ENTSO for Electricity has failed to develop a network code within the period of time set by the Commission under paragraph 6, the Commission may request the Agency to prepare a draft network code on the basis of the relevant non-binding framework guideline. The Agency may launch a further consultation in the course of preparing a draft network code under this paragraph. The Agency shall submit a draft network code prepared under this paragraph to the Commission and may recommend that it be adopted.

11.   The Commission may adopt, on its own initiative where the ENTSO for Electricity has failed to develop a network code, or the Agency has failed to develop a draft network code as referred to in paragraph 10 of this Article, or upon recommendation of the Agency under paragraph 9 of this Article, one or more network codes in the areas listed in Article 8(6).

Where the Commission proposes to adopt a network code on its own initiative, the Commission may consult the Agency, the ENTSO for Electricity and all relevant stakeholders in regard to the draft network code during a period of no less than two months.

Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(2).

12.   This Article shall be without prejudice to the Commission's right to adopt and amend guidelines as laid down in Article 18.

Article 7

Modification of Network Codes

1.   Draft modifications to any network code adopted under Article 6 may be proposed to the Agency by persons who are likely to have an interest in that network code, including the ENTSO for Electricity, transmission system operators, system users and consumers. The Agency may also propose modifications on its own initiative.

2.   The Agency shall establish, in its Rules of Procedure, efficient processes for assessment of and thorough consultation on draft modifications, including with the ENTSO for Electricity and system users. Following this process, the Agency may make reasoned proposals for modifications to the Commission, explaining how such proposals are consistent with the objectives of the network codes set out in Article 6(2).

3.   The Commission may adopt, taking account of the Agency's proposals, modifications to any network code adopted under Article 6. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(2).

4.   Consideration of proposed modifications under the procedure set out in Article 23(2) shall be limited to consideration of the aspects related to the proposed modification. Those proposed modifications are without prejudice to other modifications which the Commission may propose.

Article 8

Tasks of the ENTSO for Electricity

1.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall elaborate network codes in the areas referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article upon a request addressed to it by the Commission in accordance with Article 6(6).

2.   ENTSO for Electricity may elaborate network codes in the areas set out in paragraph 6 where these codes do not relate to areas covered by a request addressed to it by the Commission. Those network codes shall be submitted to the Agency for an opinion.

3.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall adopt:

| (a) | common network operation tools, including a common incidents classification scale, and research plans; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

common network operation tools, including a common incidents classification scale, and research plans;

| (b) | a non-binding Community-wide 10-year network development plan, (‘network development plan’), including a European generation adequacy outlook, every two years; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

a non-binding Community-wide 10-year network development plan, (‘network development plan’), including a European generation adequacy outlook, every two years;

| (c) | an annual work programme; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

an annual work programme;

| (d) | an annual report; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

an annual report;

| (e) | annual summer and winter generation adequacy outlooks. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

annual summer and winter generation adequacy outlooks.

4.   The European generation adequacy outlook referred to in point (b) of paragraph 3 shall cover the overall adequacy of the electricity system to supply current and projected demands for electricity for the next five-year period as well as for the period between five and 15 years from the date of that outlook. The European generation adequacy outlook shall build on national generation adequacy outlooks prepared by each individual transmission system operator.

5.   The annual work programme referred to in point (c) of paragraph 3 shall contain a list and description of the network codes to be prepared, a plan on coordination of operation of the network, and research and development activities, to be realised in that year, and an indicative calendar.

6.   The network codes referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall cover the following areas, taking into account, if appropriate, regional specificities:

| (a) | network security and reliability rules including rules for technical transmission reserve capacity for operational network security; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

network security and reliability rules including rules for technical transmission reserve capacity for operational network security;

| (b) | network connection rules; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

network connection rules;

| (c) | third-party access rules; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

third-party access rules;

| (d) | data exchange and settlement rules; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

data exchange and settlement rules;

| (e) | interoperability rules; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

interoperability rules;

| (f) | operational procedures in an emergency; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

operational procedures in an emergency;

| (g) | capacity allocation and congestion management rules; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

capacity allocation and congestion management rules;

| (h) | rules for trading related to technical and operational provision of network access services and system balancing; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

rules for trading related to technical and operational provision of network access services and system balancing;

| (i) | transparency rules; |
| --- | --- |

(i)

transparency rules;

| (j) | balancing rules including network-related reserve power rules; |
| --- | --- |

(j)

balancing rules including network-related reserve power rules;

| (k) | rules regarding harmonised transmission tariff structures including locational signals and inter-transmission system operator compensation rules; and |
| --- | --- |

(k)

rules regarding harmonised transmission tariff structures including locational signals and inter-transmission system operator compensation rules; and

| (l) | energy efficiency regarding electricity networks. |
| --- | --- |

(l)

energy efficiency regarding electricity networks.

7.   The network codes shall be developed only for cross-border network issues and shall be without prejudice to the Member States' right to establish national codes for non-cross-border issues.

8.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall monitor and analyse the implementation of the network codes and the guidelines adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 6(11), and their effect on the harmonisation of applicable rules aimed at facilitating market integration. The ENTSO for Electricity shall report its findings to the Agency and include the results of the analysis in the annual report referred to in point (d) of paragraph 3 of this Article.

9.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall make available all information required by the Agency to fulfil its tasks under Article 9(1).

10.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall adopt and publish a network development plan every two years. The network development plan shall include the modelling of the integrated network, scenario development, a European generation adequacy outlook and an assessment of the resilience of the system.

The network development plan shall, in particular:

| (a) | build on national investment plans, regional investment plans as referred to in Article 12(1), and, if appropriate, on the guidelines for trans-European energy networks in accordance with Decision No 1364/2006/EC (10); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

build on national investment plans, regional investment plans as referred to in Article 12(1), and, if appropriate, on the guidelines for trans-European energy networks in accordance with Decision No 1364/2006/EC (10);

10

| (b) | regarding cross-border interconnections, also build on the reasonable needs of different system users and integrate long-term commitments from investors referred to in Article 8 and Articles 13 and 22 of Directive 2009/.../EC; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

regarding cross-border interconnections, also build on the reasonable needs of different system users and integrate long-term commitments from investors referred to in Article 8 and Articles 13 and 22 of Directive 2009/.../EC;

| (c) | identify investment gaps, notably with respect to cross-border capacities. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

identify investment gaps, notably with respect to cross-border capacities.

11.   Upon request of the Commission, the ENTSO for Electricity shall give its views to the Commission on the adoption of the guidelines as laid down in Article 18.

Article 9

Monitoring by the Agency

1.   The Agency shall monitor the execution of the tasks referred to in Article 8(1), (2) and (3) of the ENTSO for Electricity and report to the Commission.

The Agency shall monitor the implementation by the ENTSO for Electricity of network codes elaborated under Article 8(2) and network codes which have been developed in accordance with Article 6(1) to (10) but which have not been adopted by the Commission under Article 6(11). The Agency shall provide a duly reasoned opinion to the Commission where the ENTSO for Electricity has failed to implement any such network codes.

The Agency shall monitor and analyse the implementation of the network codes and the guidelines adopted by the Commission as laid down in Article 6(11), and their effect on the harmonisation of applicable rules aimed at facilitating market integration as well as on non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market, and report to the Commission.

2.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall submit the draft network development plan and the draft annual work programme, including the information regarding the consultation process, to the Agency for its opinion.

Within a period of two months from the day of receipt, the Agency shall provide a duly reasoned opinion as well as recommendations to the ENTSO for Electricity and to the Commission where it considers that the draft annual work programme or the draft network development plan submitted by the ENTSO for Electricity do not contribute to non-discrimination, effective competition, the efficient functioning of the market or a sufficient level of cross-border interconnection open to third-party access.

Article 10

Consultations

1.   While preparing the network codes, the draft network development plan and the annual work programme referred to in Article 8(1), (2) and (3), the ENTSO for Electricity shall conduct an extensive consultation process, at an early stage and in an open and transparent manner, involving all relevant market participants, and, in particular, the organisations representing all stakeholders, in accordance with the rules of procedure referred to in Article 5(1). That consultation shall also involve national regulatory authorities and other national authorities, supply and generation undertakings, customers, system users, distribution system operators, including relevant industry associations, technical bodies and stakeholder platforms. It shall aim at identifying the views and proposals of all relevant parties during the decision-making process.

2.   All documents and minutes of meetings related to the consultations referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made public.

3.   Before adopting the annual work programme and the network codes referred to in Article 8(1), (2) and (3), the ENTSO for Electricity shall indicate how the observations received during the consultation have been taken into consideration. It shall provide reasons where observations have not been taken into account.

Article 11

Costs

The costs related to the activities of the ENTSO for Electricity referred to in Articles 4 to 12 shall be borne by the transmission system operators and shall be taken into account in the calculation of tariffs. Regulatory authorities shall approve those costs only if they are reasonable and proportionate.

Article 12

Regional cooperation of transmission system operators

1.   Transmission system operators shall establish regional cooperation within the ENTSO for Electricity to contribute to the activities referred to in Article 8(1), (2) and (3). In particular, they shall publish a regional investment plan every two years, and may take investment decisions based on that regional investment plan.

2.   Transmission system operators shall promote operational arrangements in order to ensure the optimum management of the network and shall promote the development of energy exchanges, the allocation of cross-border capacity through non-discriminatory market-based solutions, paying due attention to the specific merits of implicit auctions for short-term allocations, and the integration of balancing and reserve power mechanisms.

3.   The geographical area covered by each regional cooperation structure may be defined by the Commission, taking into account existing regional cooperation structures. Each Member State shall be allowed to promote cooperation in more than one geographical area. The measure referred to in the first sentence, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(2).

For that purpose, the Commission may consult the ENTSO for Electricity and the Agency.

Article 13

Inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism

1.   Transmission system operators shall receive compensation for costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows of electricity on their networks.

2.   The compensation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be paid by the operators of national transmission systems from which cross-border flows originate and the systems where those flows end.

3.   Compensation payments shall be made on a regular basis with regard to a given period of time in the past. Ex-post adjustments of compensation paid shall be made where necessary, to reflect costs actually incurred.

Ex-post

The first period of time for which compensation payments shall be made shall be determined in the guidelines referred to in Article 18.

4.   Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 23(2), the Commission shall decide on the amounts of compensation payments payable.

5.   The magnitude of cross-border flows hosted and the magnitude of cross-border flows designated as originating and/or ending in national transmission systems shall be determined on the basis of the physical flows of electricity actually measured during a given period of time.

6.   The costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows shall be established on the basis of the forward-looking long-run average incremental costs, taking into account losses, investment in new infrastructure, and an appropriate proportion of the cost of existing infrastructure, in so far as such infrastructure is used for the transmission of cross-border flows, in particular taking into account the need to guarantee security of supply. When establishing the costs incurred, recognised standard-costing methodologies shall be used. Benefits that a network incurs as a result of hosting cross-border flows shall be taken into account to reduce the compensation received.

Article 14

Charges for access to networks

1.   Charges applied by network-operators for access to networks shall be transparent, take into account the need for network security and reflect actual costs incurred insofar as they correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator and are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Those charges shall not be distance-related.

2.   Producers and consumers (‘load’) may be charged for access to networks. The proportion of the total amount of the network charges borne by producers shall, subject to the need to provide appropriate and efficient locational signals, be lower than the proportion borne by consumers. Where appropriate, the level of the tariffs applied to producers and/or consumers shall provide locational signals at Community level, and take into account the amount of network losses and congestion caused, and investment costs for infrastructure. This shall not prevent Member States from providing locational signals within their territory or from applying mechanisms to ensure that network access charges borne by consumers (‘load’) are uniform throughout their territory.

3.   When setting the charges for network access, the following shall be taken into account:

| (a) | payments and receipts resulting from the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

payments and receipts resulting from the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism;

| (b) | actual payments made and received as well as payments expected for future periods of time, estimated on the basis of past periods. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

actual payments made and received as well as payments expected for future periods of time, estimated on the basis of past periods.

4.   Providing that appropriate and efficient locational signals are in place, in accordance with paragraph 2, charges for access to networks applied to producers and consumers shall be applied regardless of the countries of destination and origin respectively, of the electricity, as specified in the underlying commercial arrangement. This shall be without prejudice to charges on declared exports and declared imports resulting from congestion management referred to in Article 16.

5.   There shall be no specific network charge on individual transactions for declared transits of electricity.

Article 15

Provision of information

1.   Transmission system operators shall put in place coordination and information exchange mechanisms to ensure the security of the networks in the context of congestion management.

2.   The safety, operational and planning standards used by transmission system operators shall be made public. The information published shall include a general scheme for the calculation of the total transfer capacity and the transmission reliability margin based upon the electrical and physical features of the network. Such schemes shall be subject to the approval of the regulatory authorities.

3.   Transmission system operators shall publish estimates of available transfer capacity for each day, indicating any available transfer capacity already reserved. Those publications shall be made at specified intervals before the day of transport and shall include, in any event, week-ahead and month-ahead estimates, as well as a quantitative indication of the expected reliability of the available capacity.

4.   Transmission system operators shall publish relevant data on aggregated forecast and actual demand, on availability and actual use of generation and load assets, on availability and use of the networks and interconnections, and on balancing power and reserve capacity. For availability and actual use of small generation and load units, aggregated estimate data may be used.

5.   The market participants concerned shall provide the transmission system operators with the relevant data.

6.   Generation undertakings which own or operate generation assets, where at least one generation asset has an installed capacity of at least 250 MW, shall keep at the disposal of the national regulatory authority, the national competition authority and the Commission, for five years all hourly data per plant that is necessary to verify all operational dispatching decisions and the bidding behaviour at power exchanges, interconnection auctions, reserve markets and over-the-counter-markets. The per-plant and per hour information to be stored shall include, but shall not be limited to, data on available generation capacity and committed reserves, including allocation of those committed reserves on a per-plant level, at the times the bidding is carried out and when production takes place.

Article 16

General principles of congestion management

1.   Network congestion problems shall be addressed with non-discriminatory market-based solutions which give efficient economic signals to the market participants and transmission system operators involved. Network congestion problems shall preferentially be solved with non-transaction based methods, i.e. methods that do not involve a selection between the contracts of individual market participants.

2.   Transaction curtailment procedures shall only be used in emergency situations where the transmission system operator must act in an expeditious manner and re-dispatching or countertrading is not possible. Any such procedure shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.

Except in cases of force-majeure, market participants who have been allocated capacity shall be compensated for any curtailment.

force-majeure

3.   The maximum capacity of the interconnections and/or the transmission networks affecting cross-border flows shall be made available to market participants, complying with safety standards of secure network operation.

4.   Market participants shall inform the transmission system operators concerned a reasonable time ahead of the relevant operational period whether they intend to use allocated capacity. Any allocated capacity that will not be used shall be reattributed to the market, in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.

5.   Transmission system operators shall, as far as technically possible, net the capacity requirements of any power flows in opposite direction over the congested interconnection line in order to use that line to its maximum capacity. Having full regard to network security, transactions that relieve the congestion shall never be denied.

6.   Any revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection shall be used for the following purposes:

| (a) | guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity; and/or |
| --- | --- |

(a)

guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity; and/or

| (b) | maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities through network investments, in particular in new interconnectors. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities through network investments, in particular in new interconnectors.

If the revenues cannot be efficiently used for the purposes set out in points (a) and/or (b) of the first subparagraph, they may be used, subject to approval by the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned, up to a maximum amount to be decided by those regulatory authorities, as income to be taken into account by the regulatory authorities when approving the methodology for calculating network tariffs and/or fixing network tariffs.

The rest of revenues shall be placed on a separate internal account line until such time as it can be spent on the purposes set out in points (a) and/or (b) of the first subparagraph.

Article 17

New interconnectors

1.   New direct current interconnectors may, upon request, be exempted, for a limited period of time, from the provisions of Article 16(6) of this Regulation and Articles 9, 31 and Article 36(6) and (8) of Directive 2009/.../EC under the following conditions:

| (a) | the investment must enhance competition in electricity supply; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the investment must enhance competition in electricity supply;

| (b) | the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment would not take place unless an exemption is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the level of risk attached to the investment is such that the investment would not take place unless an exemption is granted;

| (c) | the interconnector must be owned by a natural or legal person which is separate at least in terms of its legal form from the system operators in whose systems that interconnector will be built; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the interconnector must be owned by a natural or legal person which is separate at least in terms of its legal form from the system operators in whose systems that interconnector will be built;

| (d) | charges are levied on users of that interconnector; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

charges are levied on users of that interconnector;

| (e) | since the partial market opening referred to in Article 19 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (11), no part of the capital or operating costs of the interconnector has been recovered from any component of charges made for the use of transmission or distribution systems linked by the interconnector; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

since the partial market opening referred to in Article 19 of Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (11), no part of the capital or operating costs of the interconnector has been recovered from any component of charges made for the use of transmission or distribution systems linked by the interconnector;

11

| (f) | the exemption must not be to the detriment of competition or the effective functioning of the internal market in electricity, or the efficient functioning of the regulated system to which the interconnector is linked. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the exemption must not be to the detriment of competition or the effective functioning of the internal market in electricity, or the efficient functioning of the regulated system to which the interconnector is linked.

2.   Paragraph 1 shall also apply, in exceptional cases, to alternating current interconnectors provided that the costs and risks of the investment in question are particularly high when compared with the costs and risks normally incurred when connecting two neighbouring national transmission systems by an alternating current interconnector.

3.   Paragraph 1 shall also apply to significant increases of capacity in existing interconnectors.

4.   The decision on the exemption under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall be taken on a case-by-case basis by the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned. An exemption may cover all or part of the capacity of the new interconnector, or of the existing interconnector with significantly increased capacity.

In deciding to grant an exemption, consideration shall be given, on a case-by-case basis, to the need to impose conditions regarding the duration of the exemption and non-discriminatory access to the interconnector. When deciding those conditions, account shall, in particular, be taken of additional capacity to be built or the modification of existing capacity, the time-frame of the project and national circumstances.

Before granting an exemption, the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned shall decide upon the rules and mechanisms for management and allocation of capacity. Congestion management rules shall include the obligation to offer unused capacity on the market and users of the facility shall be entitled to trade their contracted capacities on the secondary market. In the assessment of the criteria referred to in points (a), (b) and (f) of paragraph 1, the results of the capacity allocation procedure shall be taken into account.

The exemption decision, including any conditions referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph, shall be duly reasoned and published.

5.   The decisions referred to in paragraph 4 shall be taken by the Agency only

| (a) | where the regulatory authorities concerned have not been able to reach an agreement within six months from the date the exemption was requested before the last of these regulatory authorities; or |
| --- | --- |

(a)

where the regulatory authorities concerned have not been able to reach an agreement within six months from the date the exemption was requested before the last of these regulatory authorities; or

| (b) | upon a joint request from the regulatory authorities concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

upon a joint request from the regulatory authorities concerned.

The Agency shall consult the regulatory authorities concerned.

6.   Notwithstanding paragraphs 4 and 5, Member States may provide for the regulatory authority or the Agency, as the case may be, to submit, for formal decision, to the relevant body in the Member State, its opinion on the request for an exemption. That opinion shall be published together with the decision.

7.   A copy of every request for exemption shall be transmitted for information without delay by the regulatory authorities to the Agency and to the Commission on receipt. The decision shall be notified, without delay, by the regulatory authorities concerned or by the Agency (‘notifying bodies’), to the Commission, together with all the relevant information with respect to the decision. That information may be submitted to the Commission in aggregate form, enabling the Commission to reach a well-founded decision. In particular, the information shall contain:

| (a) | the detailed reasons on the basis of which the exemption was granted, including the financial information justifying the need for the exemption; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the detailed reasons on the basis of which the exemption was granted, including the financial information justifying the need for the exemption;

| (b) | the analysis undertaken of the effect on competition and the effective functioning of the internal market in electricity resulting from the grant of the exemption; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the analysis undertaken of the effect on competition and the effective functioning of the internal market in electricity resulting from the grant of the exemption;

| (c) | the reasons for the time period and the share of the total capacity of the interconnector in question for which the exemption is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the reasons for the time period and the share of the total capacity of the interconnector in question for which the exemption is granted;

| (d) | the result of the consultation of the regulatory authorities concerned. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the result of the consultation of the regulatory authorities concerned.

8.   Within a period of two months from the day following receipt of notification under paragraph 7, the Commission may take a decision requesting the notifying bodies to amend or withdraw the decision to grant an exemption. That two-month period may be extended by an additional period of two months where further information is sought by the Commission. That additional period shall begin on the day following receipt of the complete information. The initial two-month period may also be extended by consent of both the Commission and the notifying bodies.

When the requested information is not provided within the period set out in the request, the notification shall be deemed to be withdrawn unless, before the expiry of that period, either the period is extended by consent of both the Commission and the notifying bodies, or the notifying bodies, in a duly reasoned statement, inform the Commission that they consider the notification to be complete.

The notifying bodies shall comply with a Commission decision to amend or withdraw the exemption decision within one month and shall inform the Commission accordingly.

The Commission shall preserve the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information.

The Commission's approval of an exemption decision shall expire two years after the date of its adoption in the event that construction of the interconnector has not yet started by that date, and five years after the date of its adoption if the interconnector has not become operational by that date.

9.   The Commission may adopt guidelines for the application of the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of this Article and set out the procedure to be followed for the application of paragraphs 4, 7 and 8 of this Article. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(2).

Article 18

Guidelines

1.   Where appropriate, guidelines relating to the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism shall specify, in accordance with the principles set out in Articles 13 and 14:

| (a) | details of the procedure for determining which transmission system operators are liable to pay compensation for cross-border flows including as regards the split between the operators of national transmission systems from which cross-border flows originate and the systems where those flows end, in accordance with Article 13(2); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

details of the procedure for determining which transmission system operators are liable to pay compensation for cross-border flows including as regards the split between the operators of national transmission systems from which cross-border flows originate and the systems where those flows end, in accordance with Article 13(2);

| (b) | details of the payment procedure to be followed, including the determination of the first period for which compensation is to be paid, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 13(3); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

details of the payment procedure to be followed, including the determination of the first period for which compensation is to be paid, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 13(3);

| (c) | details of methodologies for determining the cross-border flows hosted for which compensation is to be paid under Article 13, in terms of both quantity and type of flows, and the designation of the magnitudes of such flows as originating and/or ending in transmission systems of individual Member States, in accordance with Article 13(5); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

details of methodologies for determining the cross-border flows hosted for which compensation is to be paid under Article 13, in terms of both quantity and type of flows, and the designation of the magnitudes of such flows as originating and/or ending in transmission systems of individual Member States, in accordance with Article 13(5);

| (d) | details of the methodology for determining the costs and benefits incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows, in accordance with Article 13(6); |
| --- | --- |

(d)

details of the methodology for determining the costs and benefits incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows, in accordance with Article 13(6);

| (e) | details of the treatment in the context of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism of electricity flows originating or ending in countries outside the European Economic Area; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

details of the treatment in the context of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism of electricity flows originating or ending in countries outside the European Economic Area;

| (f) | the participation of national systems which are interconnected through direct current lines, in accordance with Article 13. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the participation of national systems which are interconnected through direct current lines, in accordance with Article 13.

2.   Guidelines may also determine appropriate rules leading to a progressive harmonisation of the underlying principles for the setting of charges applied to producers and consumers (load) under national tariff systems, including the reflection of the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism in national network charges and the provision of appropriate and efficient locational signals, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 14.

The guidelines shall make provision for appropriate and efficient harmonised locational signals at Community level.

Any harmonisation in this respect shall not prevent Member States from applying mechanisms to ensure that network access charges borne by consumers (load) are comparable throughout their territory.

3.   Where appropriate, guidelines providing the minimum degree of harmonisation required to achieve the aim of this Regulation shall also specify:

| (a) | details relating to provision of information, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 15; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

details relating to provision of information, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 15;

| (b) | details of rules for the trading of electricity; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

details of rules for the trading of electricity;

| (c) | details of investment incentive rules for interconnector capacity including locational signals; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

details of investment incentive rules for interconnector capacity including locational signals;

| (d) | details of the areas listed in Article 8(6). |
| --- | --- |

(d)

details of the areas listed in Article 8(6).

4.   Guidelines on the management and allocation of available transmission capacity of interconnections between national systems are laid down in Annex I.

5.   The Commission may adopt guidelines on the issues listed in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. It may amend the guidelines referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, in accordance with the principles set out in Articles 15 and 16, in particular so as to include detailed guidelines on all capacity allocation methodologies applied in practice and to ensure that congestion management mechanisms evolve in a manner compatible with the objectives of the internal market. Where appropriate, in the course of such amendments common rules on minimum safety and operational standards for the use and operation of the network, as referred to in Article 15(2) shall be established.

Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Regulation by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 23(2).

When adopting or amending guidelines, the Commission shall ensure that they provide the minimum degree of harmonisation required to achieve the aims of this Regulation and do not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose.

When adopting or amending guidelines, the Commission shall indicate what actions it has taken with respect to the conformity of rules in third countries, which form part of the Community electricity system, with the guidelines in question.

When adopting these guidelines for the first time, the Commission shall ensure that they cover in a single draft measure at least the issues referred to in point (a) and (d) of paragraph 1 and paragraph 2.

Article 19

Regulatory authorities

The regulatory authorities, when carrying out their responsibilities, shall ensure compliance with this Regulation and the guidelines adopted pursuant to Article 18. Where appropriate to fulfil the aims of this Regulation they shall cooperate with each other, with the Commission and the Agency in compliance with Chapter IX of Directive 2009/.../EC.

Article 20

Provision of information and confidentiality

1.   Member States and the regulatory authorities shall, on request, provide to the Commission all information necessary for the purposes of Article 13(4) and Article 18.

In particular, for the purposes of Article 13(4) and (6), regulatory authorities shall, on a regular basis, provide information on the actual costs incurred by national transmission system operators, as well as data and all relevant information relating to the physical flows in transmission system operators' networks and the cost of the networks.

The Commission shall fix a reasonable time limit within which the information is to be provided, taking into account the complexity of the information required and the urgency with which the information is needed.

2.   If the Member State or the regulatory authority concerned does not provide that information within the given time-limit pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission may request all information necessary for the purpose of Article 13(4) and Article 18 directly from the undertakings concerned.

When sending a request for information to an undertaking, the Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of the request to the regulatory authorities of the Member State in whose territory the seat of the undertaking is situated.

3.   In its request for information, the Commission shall state the legal basis of the request, the time-limit within which the information is to be provided, the purpose of the request, and the penalties provided for in Article 22(2) for supplying incorrect, incomplete or misleading information. The Commission shall fix a reasonable time limit taking into account the complexity of the information required and the urgency with which the information is needed.

4.   The owners of the undertakings or their representatives and, in the case of legal persons, the persons authorised to represent them by law or by their instrument of incorporation, shall supply the information requested. Lawyers duly authorised so to act may supply the information on behalf of their clients, in which case the client shall remain fully responsible if the information supplied is incomplete, incorrect or misleading.

5.   Where an undertaking does not provide the information requested within the time-limit fixed by the Commission or supplies incomplete information, the Commission may by decision require the information to be provided. The decision shall specify what information is required and fix an appropriate time-limit within which it is to be supplied. It shall indicate the penalties provided for in Article 22(2). It shall also indicate the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities.

The Commission shall at the same time, send a copy of its decision to the regulatory authorities of the Member State within the territory of which the person is resident or the seat of the undertaking is situated.

6.   The information referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be used only for the purposes of Article 13(4) and Article 18.

The Commission shall not disclose information acquired pursuant to this Regulation of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.

Article 21

Right of Member States to provide for more detailed measures

This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the rights of Member States to maintain or introduce measures that contain more detailed provisions than those set out in this Regulation and the guidelines referred to in Article 18.

Article 22

Penalties

1.   Without prejudice to paragraph 2, the Member States shall lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that those provisions are implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Member States shall notify those rules corresponding to the provisions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, to the Commission by 1 July 2004 and shall notify the Commission without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting them. They shall notify those rules not corresponding to the provisions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 to the Commission by ... (12) and shall notify the Commission without delay of any subsequent amendment affecting them.

12

2.   The Commission may, by decision, impose on undertakings fines not exceeding 1 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year where, intentionally or negligently, they supply incorrect, incomplete or misleading information in response to a request made pursuant to Article 20(3) or fail to supply information within the time-limit fixed by a decision adopted pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 20(5).

In setting the amount of a fine, regard shall be had to the gravity of the failure to comply with the requirements of the first subparagraph.

3.   Penalties provided for pursuant to paragraph 1 and decisions taken pursuant to paragraph 2 shall not be of a criminal law nature.

Article 23

Committee procedure

1.   The Commission shall be assisted by the committee set up by Article 46 of Directive 2009/.../EC.

2.   Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5a(1) to (4), and Article 7 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall apply, having regard to the provisions of Article 8 thereof.

Article 24

Commission report

The Commission shall monitor the implementation of this Regulation. In its report under Article 47(6) of Directive 2009/.../EC, the Commission shall also report on the experience gained in the application of this Regulation. In particular the report shall examine to what extent this Regulation has been successful in ensuring non-discriminatory and cost-reflective network access conditions for cross border exchanges of electricity in order to contribute to customer choice in a well functioning internal market in electricity and to long-term security of supply, as well as to what extent effective locational signals are in place. If necessary, the report shall be accompanied by appropriate proposals and/or recommendations.

Article 25

Repeal

Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 shall be repealed from ... (13). References made to the repealed Regulation shall be construed as references to this Regulation and shall be read in accordance with the correlation table in Annex II.

13

Article 26

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

It shall apply from ... (13).

13

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at, ...

For the European Parliament

The President

...

For the Council

The President

...

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(1)  OJ C 211, 19.8.2008, p. 23.

1

(2)  OJ C 172, 5.7.2008, p. 55.

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Parliament of 18 June 2008 (not yet published in the Official Journal), Council Common Position of 9 January 2009 and Position of the European Parliament of ... (not yet published in the Official Journal).

3

(4)  OJ L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 37.

4

(5)  OJ L 176, 15.7.2003, p. 1.

5

(6)  OJ L ...

6

(7)  OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23.

7

(8)  Date of entry into force of repealed Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003.

8

(9)  Date of application of this Regulation, i. e. 18 months after the entry into force of this Regulation.

9

(10)  Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 laying down guidelines for trans-European energy networks (OJ L 262, 22.9.2006, p. 1).

10

(11)  OJ L 27, 30.1.1997, p. 20.

11

(12)  Date of application of this Regulation.

12

(13)  18 months after the entry into force of this Regulation.

13

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ANNEX I

GUIDELINES ON THE MANAGEMENT AND ALLOCATION OF AVAILABLE TRANSFER CAPACITY OF INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL SYSTEMS

1.   General Provisions

| 1.1. | Transmission system operators (TSOs) shall endeavour to accept all commercial transactions, including those involving cross-border-trade. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

Transmission system operators (TSOs) shall endeavour to accept all commercial transactions, including those involving cross-border-trade.

| 1.2. | When there is no congestion, there shall be no restriction of access to the interconnection. Where this is usually the case, there need be no permanent general allocation procedure for access to a cross-border transmission service. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

When there is no congestion, there shall be no restriction of access to the interconnection. Where this is usually the case, there need be no permanent general allocation procedure for access to a cross-border transmission service.

| 1.3. | Where scheduled commercial transactions are not compatible with secure network operation, the TSOs shall alleviate congestion in compliance with the requirements of network operational security while endeavouring to ensure that any associated costs remain at an economically efficient level. Curative re-dispatching or countertrading shall be envisaged in case lower cost measures cannot be applied. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

Where scheduled commercial transactions are not compatible with secure network operation, the TSOs shall alleviate congestion in compliance with the requirements of network operational security while endeavouring to ensure that any associated costs remain at an economically efficient level. Curative re-dispatching or countertrading shall be envisaged in case lower cost measures cannot be applied.

| 1.4. | If structural congestion appears, appropriate congestion management rules and arrangements defined and agreed upon in advance shall be implemented immediately by the TSOs. The congestion management methods shall ensure that the physical power flows associated with all allocated transmission capacity comply with network security standards. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

If structural congestion appears, appropriate congestion management rules and arrangements defined and agreed upon in advance shall be implemented immediately by the TSOs. The congestion management methods shall ensure that the physical power flows associated with all allocated transmission capacity comply with network security standards.

| 1.5. | The methods adopted for congestion management shall give efficient economic signals to market participants and TSOs, promote competition and be suitable for regional and Community-wide application. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

The methods adopted for congestion management shall give efficient economic signals to market participants and TSOs, promote competition and be suitable for regional and Community-wide application.

| 1.6. | No transaction-based distinction shall be applied in congestion management. A particular request for transmission service shall be denied only when the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled:






  (a) | the incremental physical power flows resulting from the acceptance of this request imply that secure operation of the power system may no longer be guaranteed, and |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.6.

No transaction-based distinction shall be applied in congestion management. A particular request for transmission service shall be denied only when the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled:

(a)

the incremental physical power flows resulting from the acceptance of this request imply that secure operation of the power system may no longer be guaranteed, and

| (b) | the value in monetary amount attached to the request in the congestion management procedure is lower than all other requests intended to be accepted for the same service and conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the value in monetary amount attached to the request in the congestion management procedure is lower than all other requests intended to be accepted for the same service and conditions.

| 1.7. | When defining appropriate network areas in and between which congestion management is to apply, TSOs shall be guided by the principles of cost-effectiveness and minimisation of negative impacts on the internal market in electricity. Specifically, TSOs shall not limit interconnection capacity in order to solve congestion inside their own control area, save for the above-mentioned reasons and reasons of operational security (1). If such a situation occurs, this shall be described and transparently presented by the TSOs to all the system users. Such a situation shall be tolerated only until a long-term solution is found. The methodology and projects for achieving the long-term solution shall be described and transparently presented by the TSOs to all the system users. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

When defining appropriate network areas in and between which congestion management is to apply, TSOs shall be guided by the principles of cost-effectiveness and minimisation of negative impacts on the internal market in electricity. Specifically, TSOs shall not limit interconnection capacity in order to solve congestion inside their own control area, save for the above-mentioned reasons and reasons of operational security (1). If such a situation occurs, this shall be described and transparently presented by the TSOs to all the system users. Such a situation shall be tolerated only until a long-term solution is found. The methodology and projects for achieving the long-term solution shall be described and transparently presented by the TSOs to all the system users.

| 1.8. | When balancing the network inside the control area through operational measures in the network and through re-dispatching, the TSO shall take into account the effect of those measures on neighbouring control areas. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

When balancing the network inside the control area through operational measures in the network and through re-dispatching, the TSO shall take into account the effect of those measures on neighbouring control areas.

| 1.9. | By 1 January 2008, mechanisms for the intra-day congestion management of interconnector capacity shall be established in a coordinated way and under secure operational conditions, in order to maximise opportunities for trade and to provide for cross-border balancing. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

By 1 January 2008, mechanisms for the intra-day congestion management of interconnector capacity shall be established in a coordinated way and under secure operational conditions, in order to maximise opportunities for trade and to provide for cross-border balancing.

| 1.10. | The national regulatory authorities shall regularly evaluate the congestion management methods, paying particular attention to compliance with the principles and rules established in this Regulation and these guidelines and with the terms and conditions set by the regulatory authorities themselves under these principles and rules. Such evaluation shall include consultation of all market participants and dedicated studies. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

The national regulatory authorities shall regularly evaluate the congestion management methods, paying particular attention to compliance with the principles and rules established in this Regulation and these guidelines and with the terms and conditions set by the regulatory authorities themselves under these principles and rules. Such evaluation shall include consultation of all market participants and dedicated studies.

2.   Congestion management methods

| 2.1. | Congestion management methods shall be market-based in order to facilitate efficient cross-border trade. For this purpose, capacity shall be allocated only by means of explicit (capacity) or implicit (capacity and energy) auctions. Both methods may coexist on the same interconnection. For intra-day trade continuous trading may be used. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

Congestion management methods shall be market-based in order to facilitate efficient cross-border trade. For this purpose, capacity shall be allocated only by means of explicit (capacity) or implicit (capacity and energy) auctions. Both methods may coexist on the same interconnection. For intra-day trade continuous trading may be used.

| 2.2. | Depending on competition conditions, the congestion management mechanisms may need to allow for both long and short-term transmission capacity allocation. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

Depending on competition conditions, the congestion management mechanisms may need to allow for both long and short-term transmission capacity allocation.

| 2.3. | Each capacity allocation procedure shall allocate a prescribed fraction of the available interconnection capacity plus any remaining capacity not previously allocated and any capacity released by capacity holders from previous allocations. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

Each capacity allocation procedure shall allocate a prescribed fraction of the available interconnection capacity plus any remaining capacity not previously allocated and any capacity released by capacity holders from previous allocations.

| 2.4. | TSOs shall optimise the degree to which capacity is firm, taking into account the obligations and rights of the TSOs involved and the obligations and rights of market participants, in order to facilitate effective and efficient competition. A reasonable fraction of capacity may be offered to the market at a reduced degree of firmness, but the exact conditions for transport over cross-border lines shall, at all times, be made known to market participants. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

TSOs shall optimise the degree to which capacity is firm, taking into account the obligations and rights of the TSOs involved and the obligations and rights of market participants, in order to facilitate effective and efficient competition. A reasonable fraction of capacity may be offered to the market at a reduced degree of firmness, but the exact conditions for transport over cross-border lines shall, at all times, be made known to market participants.

| 2.5. | The access rights for long and medium-term allocations shall be firm transmission capacity rights. They shall be subject to the use-it-or-lose-it or use-it-or-sell-it principles at the time of nomination. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

The access rights for long and medium-term allocations shall be firm transmission capacity rights. They shall be subject to the use-it-or-lose-it or use-it-or-sell-it principles at the time of nomination.

| 2.6. | TSOs shall define an appropriate structure for the allocation of capacity between different timeframes. This may include an option for reserving a minimum percentage of interconnection capacity for daily or intra-daily allocation. Such an allocation structure shall be subject to review by the respective regulatory authorities. In drawing up their proposals, the TSOs shall take into account:






  (a) | the characteristics of the markets, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.6.

TSOs shall define an appropriate structure for the allocation of capacity between different timeframes. This may include an option for reserving a minimum percentage of interconnection capacity for daily or intra-daily allocation. Such an allocation structure shall be subject to review by the respective regulatory authorities. In drawing up their proposals, the TSOs shall take into account:

(a)

the characteristics of the markets,

| (b) | the operational conditions, such as the implications of netting firmly declared schedules, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the operational conditions, such as the implications of netting firmly declared schedules,

| (c) | the level of harmonisation of the percentages and timeframes adopted for the different capacity allocation mechanisms in place. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the level of harmonisation of the percentages and timeframes adopted for the different capacity allocation mechanisms in place.

| 2.7. | Capacity allocation may not discriminate between market participants that wish to use their rights to make use of bilateral supply contracts or to bid into power exchanges. The highest value bids, whether implicit or explicit in a given timeframe, shall be successful. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

Capacity allocation may not discriminate between market participants that wish to use their rights to make use of bilateral supply contracts or to bid into power exchanges. The highest value bids, whether implicit or explicit in a given timeframe, shall be successful.

| 2.8. | In regions where forward financial electricity markets are well developed and have shown their efficiency, all interconnection capacity may be allocated through implicit auctioning. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

In regions where forward financial electricity markets are well developed and have shown their efficiency, all interconnection capacity may be allocated through implicit auctioning.

| 2.9. | Other than in the case of new interconnectors which benefit from an exemption under Article 7 of this Regulation, establishing reserve prices in capacity allocation methods shall not be allowed. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

Other than in the case of new interconnectors which benefit from an exemption under Article 7 of this Regulation, establishing reserve prices in capacity allocation methods shall not be allowed.

| 2.10. | In principle, all potential market participants shall be permitted to participate in the allocation process without restriction. To avoid creating or aggravating problems related to the potential use of dominant position of any market player, the relevant regulatory and/or competition authorities, where appropriate, may impose restrictions in general or on an individual company on account of market dominance. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

In principle, all potential market participants shall be permitted to participate in the allocation process without restriction. To avoid creating or aggravating problems related to the potential use of dominant position of any market player, the relevant regulatory and/or competition authorities, where appropriate, may impose restrictions in general or on an individual company on account of market dominance.

| 2.11. | Market participants shall firmly nominate their use of the capacity to the TSOs by a defined deadline for each timeframe. That deadline shall be such that TSOs are able to reassign unused capacity for reallocation in the next relevant timeframe — including intra-day sessions. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

Market participants shall firmly nominate their use of the capacity to the TSOs by a defined deadline for each timeframe. That deadline shall be such that TSOs are able to reassign unused capacity for reallocation in the next relevant timeframe — including intra-day sessions.

| 2.12. | Capacity shall be freely tradable on a secondary basis, provided that the TSO is informed sufficiently in advance. Where a TSO refuses any secondary trade (transaction), this must be clearly and transparently communicated and explained to all the market participants by that TSO and notified to the regulatory authority. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

Capacity shall be freely tradable on a secondary basis, provided that the TSO is informed sufficiently in advance. Where a TSO refuses any secondary trade (transaction), this must be clearly and transparently communicated and explained to all the market participants by that TSO and notified to the regulatory authority.

| 2.13. | The financial consequences of failure to honour obligations associated with the allocation of capacity shall be attributed to those who are responsible for such a failure. Where market participants fail to use the capacity that they have committed to use, or, in the case of explicitly auctioned capacity, fail to trade on a secondary basis or give the capacity back in due time, they shall lose the rights to such capacity and pay a cost-reflective charge. Any cost-reflective charges for the non-use of capacity shall be justified and proportionate. Likewise, if a TSO does not fulfil its obligation, it shall be liable to compensate the market participant for the loss of capacity rights. No consequential losses shall be taken into account for this purpose. The key concepts and methods for the determination of liabilities that accrue upon failure to honour obligations shall be set out in advance in respect of the financial consequences, and shall be subject to review by the relevant national regulatory authority or authorities. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

The financial consequences of failure to honour obligations associated with the allocation of capacity shall be attributed to those who are responsible for such a failure. Where market participants fail to use the capacity that they have committed to use, or, in the case of explicitly auctioned capacity, fail to trade on a secondary basis or give the capacity back in due time, they shall lose the rights to such capacity and pay a cost-reflective charge. Any cost-reflective charges for the non-use of capacity shall be justified and proportionate. Likewise, if a TSO does not fulfil its obligation, it shall be liable to compensate the market participant for the loss of capacity rights. No consequential losses shall be taken into account for this purpose. The key concepts and methods for the determination of liabilities that accrue upon failure to honour obligations shall be set out in advance in respect of the financial consequences, and shall be subject to review by the relevant national regulatory authority or authorities.

3.   Coordination

| 3.1. | Capacity allocation at an interconnection shall be coordinated and implemented using common allocation procedures by the TSOs involved. In cases where commercial exchanges between two countries (TSOs) are expected to affect physical flow conditions in any third-country (TSO) significantly, congestion management methods shall be coordinated between all the TSOs so affected through a common congestion management procedure. National regulatory authorities and TSOs shall ensure that no congestion management procedure with significant effects on physical electric power flows in other networks is devised unilaterally. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

Capacity allocation at an interconnection shall be coordinated and implemented using common allocation procedures by the TSOs involved. In cases where commercial exchanges between two countries (TSOs) are expected to affect physical flow conditions in any third-country (TSO) significantly, congestion management methods shall be coordinated between all the TSOs so affected through a common congestion management procedure. National regulatory authorities and TSOs shall ensure that no congestion management procedure with significant effects on physical electric power flows in other networks is devised unilaterally.

| 3.2. | A common coordinated congestion management method and procedure for the allocation of capacity to the market at least annually, monthly and day-ahead shall be applied by 1 January 2007 between countries in the following regions:






  (a) | Northern Europe (i.e. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany and Poland), |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.2.

A common coordinated congestion management method and procedure for the allocation of capacity to the market at least annually, monthly and day-ahead shall be applied by 1 January 2007 between countries in the following regions:

(a)

Northern Europe (i.e. Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany and Poland),

| (b) | North-West Europe (i.e. Benelux, Germany and France), |
| --- | --- |

(b)

North-West Europe (i.e. Benelux, Germany and France),

| (c) | Italy (i.e. Italy, France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and Greece), |
| --- | --- |

(c)

Italy (i.e. Italy, France, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and Greece),

| (d) | Central Eastern Europe (i.e. Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia), |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Central Eastern Europe (i.e. Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Austria and Slovenia),

| (e) | South-West Europe (i.e. Spain, Portugal and France), |
| --- | --- |

(e)

South-West Europe (i.e. Spain, Portugal and France),

| (f) | UK, Ireland and France, |
| --- | --- |

(f)

UK, Ireland and France,

| (g) | Baltic states (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). |
| --- | --- |

(g)

Baltic states (i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).

At an interconnection involving countries belonging to more than one region, the congestion management method applied may differ in order to ensure the compatibility with the methods applied in the other regions to which these countries belong. In that case, the relevant TSOs shall propose the method which shall be subject to review by the relevant regulatory authorities.

| 3.3. | The regions referred to in point 2.8 may allocate all interconnection capacity through day-ahead allocation. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

The regions referred to in point 2.8 may allocate all interconnection capacity through day-ahead allocation.

| 3.4. | Compatible congestion management procedures shall be defined in all these seven regions with a view to forming a truly integrated internal market in electricity. Market participants shall not be confronted with incompatible regional systems. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

Compatible congestion management procedures shall be defined in all these seven regions with a view to forming a truly integrated internal market in electricity. Market participants shall not be confronted with incompatible regional systems.

| 3.5. | With a view to promoting fair and efficient competition and cross-border trade, coordination between TSOs within the regions set out in point 3.2 shall include all the steps from capacity calculation and optimisation of allocation to secure operation of the network, with clear assignments of responsibility. Such coordination shall include, in particular:






  (a) | the use of a common transmission model dealing efficiently with interdependent physical loop-flows and having regard to discrepancies between physical and commercial flows, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.5.

With a view to promoting fair and efficient competition and cross-border trade, coordination between TSOs within the regions set out in point 3.2 shall include all the steps from capacity calculation and optimisation of allocation to secure operation of the network, with clear assignments of responsibility. Such coordination shall include, in particular:

(a)

the use of a common transmission model dealing efficiently with interdependent physical loop-flows and having regard to discrepancies between physical and commercial flows,

| (b) | allocation and nomination of capacity to deal efficiently with interdependent physical loop-flows, |
| --- | --- |

(b)

allocation and nomination of capacity to deal efficiently with interdependent physical loop-flows,

| (c) | identical obligations on capacity holders to provide information on their intended use of the capacity, i.e. nomination of capacity (for explicit auctions), |
| --- | --- |

(c)

identical obligations on capacity holders to provide information on their intended use of the capacity, i.e. nomination of capacity (for explicit auctions),

| (d) | identical timeframes and closing times, |
| --- | --- |

(d)

identical timeframes and closing times,

| (e) | identical structure for the allocation of capacity among different timeframes (e.g. 1 day, 3 hours, 1 week, etc.) and in terms of blocks of capacity sold (amount of power in MW, MWh, etc.), |
| --- | --- |

(e)

identical structure for the allocation of capacity among different timeframes (e.g. 1 day, 3 hours, 1 week, etc.) and in terms of blocks of capacity sold (amount of power in MW, MWh, etc.),

| (f) | consistent contractual framework with market participants, |
| --- | --- |

(f)

consistent contractual framework with market participants,

| (g) | verification of flows to comply with the network security requirements for operational planning and for real-time operation, |
| --- | --- |

(g)

verification of flows to comply with the network security requirements for operational planning and for real-time operation,

| (h) | accounting and settlement of congestion management actions. |
| --- | --- |

(h)

accounting and settlement of congestion management actions.

| 3.6. | Coordination shall also include the exchange of information between TSOs. The nature, time and frequency of information exchange shall be compatible with the activities set out in point 3.5 and the functioning of the electricity markets. That information exchange shall, in particular, enable the TSOs to make the best possible forecast of the global network situation in order to assess the flows in their network and the available interconnection capacities. Any TSO collecting information on behalf of other TSOs shall give back to the participating TSO the results of the collection of data. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

Coordination shall also include the exchange of information between TSOs. The nature, time and frequency of information exchange shall be compatible with the activities set out in point 3.5 and the functioning of the electricity markets. That information exchange shall, in particular, enable the TSOs to make the best possible forecast of the global network situation in order to assess the flows in their network and the available interconnection capacities. Any TSO collecting information on behalf of other TSOs shall give back to the participating TSO the results of the collection of data.

4.   Timetable for market operations

| 4.1. | The allocation of the available transmission capacity shall take place sufficiently in advance. Prior to each allocation, the involved TSOs shall, jointly, publish the capacity to be allocated, taking into account where appropriate the capacity released from any firm transmission rights and, where relevant, associated netted nominations, along with any time periods during which the capacity will be reduced or not available (for the purpose of maintenance, for example). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

The allocation of the available transmission capacity shall take place sufficiently in advance. Prior to each allocation, the involved TSOs shall, jointly, publish the capacity to be allocated, taking into account where appropriate the capacity released from any firm transmission rights and, where relevant, associated netted nominations, along with any time periods during which the capacity will be reduced or not available (for the purpose of maintenance, for example).

| 4.2. | Having full regard to network security, the nomination of transmission rights shall take place sufficiently in advance, before the day-ahead sessions of all the relevant organised markets and before the publication of the capacity to be allocated under the day-ahead or intra-day allocation mechanism. Nominations of transmission rights in the opposite direction shall be netted in order to make efficient use of the interconnection. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

Having full regard to network security, the nomination of transmission rights shall take place sufficiently in advance, before the day-ahead sessions of all the relevant organised markets and before the publication of the capacity to be allocated under the day-ahead or intra-day allocation mechanism. Nominations of transmission rights in the opposite direction shall be netted in order to make efficient use of the interconnection.

| 4.3. | Successive intra-day allocations of available transmission capacity for day D shall take place on days D-1 and D, after the issuing of the indicated or actual day-ahead production schedules. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

Successive intra-day allocations of available transmission capacity for day D shall take place on days D-1 and D, after the issuing of the indicated or actual day-ahead production schedules.

| 4.4. | When preparing day-ahead network operation, the TSOs shall exchange information with neighbouring TSOs, including their forecast network topology, the availability and forecasted production of generation units, and load flows in order to optimise the use of the overall network through operational measures in compliance with the rules for secure network operation. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

When preparing day-ahead network operation, the TSOs shall exchange information with neighbouring TSOs, including their forecast network topology, the availability and forecasted production of generation units, and load flows in order to optimise the use of the overall network through operational measures in compliance with the rules for secure network operation.

5.   Transparency

| 5.1. | TSOs shall publish all relevant data related to network availability, network access and network use, including a report on where and why congestion exists, the methods applied for managing the congestion and the plans for its future management. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

TSOs shall publish all relevant data related to network availability, network access and network use, including a report on where and why congestion exists, the methods applied for managing the congestion and the plans for its future management.

| 5.2. | TSOs shall publish a general description of the congestion management method applied under different circumstances for maximising the capacity available to the market, and a general scheme for the calculation of the interconnection capacity for the different timeframes, based upon the electrical and physical realities of the network. Such a scheme shall be subject to review by the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

TSOs shall publish a general description of the congestion management method applied under different circumstances for maximising the capacity available to the market, and a general scheme for the calculation of the interconnection capacity for the different timeframes, based upon the electrical and physical realities of the network. Such a scheme shall be subject to review by the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned.

| 5.3. | The congestion management and capacity allocation procedures in use, together with the times and procedures for applying for capacity, a description of the products offered and the obligations and rights of both the TSOs and the party obtaining the capacity, including the liabilities that accrue upon failure to honour obligations, shall be described in detail and made available in a transparent manner to all potential network users by TSOs. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

The congestion management and capacity allocation procedures in use, together with the times and procedures for applying for capacity, a description of the products offered and the obligations and rights of both the TSOs and the party obtaining the capacity, including the liabilities that accrue upon failure to honour obligations, shall be described in detail and made available in a transparent manner to all potential network users by TSOs.

| 5.4. | The operational and planning security standards shall form an integral part of the information that TSOs publish in an open and public document. That document shall also be subject to review of the national regulatory authorities. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

The operational and planning security standards shall form an integral part of the information that TSOs publish in an open and public document. That document shall also be subject to review of the national regulatory authorities.

| 5.5. | TSOs shall publish all relevant data concerning cross-border trade on the basis of the best possible forecast. In order to fulfil that obligation the market participants concerned shall provide the TSOs with the relevant data. The manner in which such information is published shall be subject to review by the regulatory authorities. TSOs shall publish at least:






  (a) | annually: information on the long-term evolution of the transmission infrastructure and its impact on cross-border transmission capacity; |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.5.

TSOs shall publish all relevant data concerning cross-border trade on the basis of the best possible forecast. In order to fulfil that obligation the market participants concerned shall provide the TSOs with the relevant data. The manner in which such information is published shall be subject to review by the regulatory authorities. TSOs shall publish at least:

(a)

annually: information on the long-term evolution of the transmission infrastructure and its impact on cross-border transmission capacity;

| (b) | monthly: month and year-ahead forecasts of the transmission capacity available to the market, taking into account all relevant information available to the TSO at the time of the forecast calculation (e.g. impact of summer and winter seasons on the capacity of lines, maintenance of the network, availability of production units, etc.); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

monthly: month and year-ahead forecasts of the transmission capacity available to the market, taking into account all relevant information available to the TSO at the time of the forecast calculation (e.g. impact of summer and winter seasons on the capacity of lines, maintenance of the network, availability of production units, etc.);

| (c) | weekly: week-ahead forecasts of the transmission capacity available to the market, taking into account all relevant information available to the TSOs at the time of calculation of the forecast, such as the weather forecast, planned network maintenance work, availability of production units, etc.; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

weekly: week-ahead forecasts of the transmission capacity available to the market, taking into account all relevant information available to the TSOs at the time of calculation of the forecast, such as the weather forecast, planned network maintenance work, availability of production units, etc.;

| (d) | daily: day-ahead and intra-day transmission capacity available to the market for each market time unit, taking into account all netted day-ahead nominations, day-ahead production schedules, demand forecasts and planned network maintenance work; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

daily: day-ahead and intra-day transmission capacity available to the market for each market time unit, taking into account all netted day-ahead nominations, day-ahead production schedules, demand forecasts and planned network maintenance work;

| (e) | total capacity already allocated, by market time unit, and all relevant conditions under which this capacity may be used (e.g. auction clearing price, obligations on how to use the capacity, etc.), so as to identify any remaining capacity; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

total capacity already allocated, by market time unit, and all relevant conditions under which this capacity may be used (e.g. auction clearing price, obligations on how to use the capacity, etc.), so as to identify any remaining capacity;

| (f) | allocated capacity as soon as possible after each allocation, as well as an indication of prices paid; |
| --- | --- |

(f)

allocated capacity as soon as possible after each allocation, as well as an indication of prices paid;

| (g) | total capacity used, by market time unit, immediately after nomination; |
| --- | --- |

(g)

total capacity used, by market time unit, immediately after nomination;

| (h) | as closely as possible to real time: aggregated realised commercial and physical flows, by market time unit, including a description of the effects of any corrective actions taken by the TSOs (such as curtailment) for solving network or system problems; |
| --- | --- |

(h)

as closely as possible to real time: aggregated realised commercial and physical flows, by market time unit, including a description of the effects of any corrective actions taken by the TSOs (such as curtailment) for solving network or system problems;

| (i) | ex-ante information on planned outages and ex-post information for the previous day on planned and unplanned outages of generation units larger than 100 MW. |
| --- | --- |

(i)

ex-ante information on planned outages and ex-post information for the previous day on planned and unplanned outages of generation units larger than 100 MW.

| 5.6. | All relevant information shall be available for the market in due time for the negotiation of all transactions (such as the time of negotiation of annual supply contracts for industrial customers or the time when bids have to be sent into organised markets). |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

All relevant information shall be available for the market in due time for the negotiation of all transactions (such as the time of negotiation of annual supply contracts for industrial customers or the time when bids have to be sent into organised markets).

| 5.7. | The TSO shall publish the relevant information on forecast demand and on generation according to the timeframes referred to in points 5.5 and 5.6. The TSO shall also publish the relevant information necessary for the cross-border balancing market. |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

The TSO shall publish the relevant information on forecast demand and on generation according to the timeframes referred to in points 5.5 and 5.6. The TSO shall also publish the relevant information necessary for the cross-border balancing market.

| 5.8. | When forecasts are published, the ex post realised values for the forecast information shall also be published in the time period following that to which the forecast applies or at the latest on the following day (D+1). |
| --- | --- |

5.8.

When forecasts are published, the ex post realised values for the forecast information shall also be published in the time period following that to which the forecast applies or at the latest on the following day (D+1).

| 5.9. | All information published by the TSOs shall be made freely available in an easily accessible form. All data shall also be accessible through adequate and standardised means of information exchange, to be defined in close cooperation with market participants. The data shall include information on past time periods with a minimum of two years, so that new market entrants may also have access to such data. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

All information published by the TSOs shall be made freely available in an easily accessible form. All data shall also be accessible through adequate and standardised means of information exchange, to be defined in close cooperation with market participants. The data shall include information on past time periods with a minimum of two years, so that new market entrants may also have access to such data.

| 5.10. | TSOs shall exchange regularly a set of sufficiently accurate network and load flow data in order to enable load flow calculations for each TSO in their relevant area. The same set of data shall be made available to the regulatory authorities and to the Commission upon request. The regulatory authorities and the Commission shall ensure the confidential treatment of this set of data, by themselves and by any consultant carrying out analytical work for them on the basis of these data. |
| --- | --- |

5.10.

TSOs shall exchange regularly a set of sufficiently accurate network and load flow data in order to enable load flow calculations for each TSO in their relevant area. The same set of data shall be made available to the regulatory authorities and to the Commission upon request. The regulatory authorities and the Commission shall ensure the confidential treatment of this set of data, by themselves and by any consultant carrying out analytical work for them on the basis of these data.

6.   Use of congestion income

| 6.1. | Congestion management procedures associated with a pre-specified timeframe may generate revenue only in the event of congestion which arises for that timeframe, except in the case of new interconnectors which benefit from an exemption under Article 7 of this Regulation. The procedure for the distribution of these revenues shall be subject to review by the regulatory authorities and shall neither distort the allocation process in favour of any party requesting capacity or energy nor provide a disincentive to reduce congestion. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

Congestion management procedures associated with a pre-specified timeframe may generate revenue only in the event of congestion which arises for that timeframe, except in the case of new interconnectors which benefit from an exemption under Article 7 of this Regulation. The procedure for the distribution of these revenues shall be subject to review by the regulatory authorities and shall neither distort the allocation process in favour of any party requesting capacity or energy nor provide a disincentive to reduce congestion.

| 6.2. | National regulatory authorities shall be transparent regarding the use of revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection capacity. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

National regulatory authorities shall be transparent regarding the use of revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection capacity.

| 6.3. | The congestion income shall be shared among the TSOs involved in accordance with criteria agreed between the TSOs involved and reviewed by the respective regulatory authorities. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

The congestion income shall be shared among the TSOs involved in accordance with criteria agreed between the TSOs involved and reviewed by the respective regulatory authorities.

| 6.4. | TSOs shall clearly establish beforehand the use they will make of any congestion income they may obtain and report on the actual use of this income. Regulatory authorities shall verify that such use complies with this Regulation and these guidelines and that the total amount of congestion income resulting from the allocation of interconnection capacity is devoted to one or more of the three purposes set out in Article 16(6) of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

TSOs shall clearly establish beforehand the use they will make of any congestion income they may obtain and report on the actual use of this income. Regulatory authorities shall verify that such use complies with this Regulation and these guidelines and that the total amount of congestion income resulting from the allocation of interconnection capacity is devoted to one or more of the three purposes set out in Article 16(6) of this Regulation.

| 6.5. | On an annual basis, and by 31 July each year, the regulatory authorities shall publish a report setting out the amount of revenue collected for the 12-month period up to 30 June of the same year and the use made of the revenues in question, together with verification that this use complies with this Regulation and these guidelines and that the total amount of congestion income is devoted to one or more of the three prescribed purposes. |
| --- | --- |

6.5.

On an annual basis, and by 31 July each year, the regulatory authorities shall publish a report setting out the amount of revenue collected for the 12-month period up to 30 June of the same year and the use made of the revenues in question, together with verification that this use complies with this Regulation and these guidelines and that the total amount of congestion income is devoted to one or more of the three prescribed purposes.

| 6.6. | The use of congestion income for investment to maintain or increase interconnection capacity shall preferably be assigned to specific predefined projects which contribute to relieving the existing associated congestion and which may also be implemented within a reasonable time, particularly as regards the authorisation process. |
| --- | --- |

6.6.

The use of congestion income for investment to maintain or increase interconnection capacity shall preferably be assigned to specific predefined projects which contribute to relieving the existing associated congestion and which may also be implemented within a reasonable time, particularly as regards the authorisation process.

---

(1)  Operational security means ‘keeping the transmission system within agreed security limits’.

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ANNEX II

CORRELATION TABLE

| Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 | This Regulation |
| --- | --- |
| Article 1 | Article 1 |
| Article 2 | Article 2 |
| — | Article 3 |
| — | Article 4 |
| — | Article 5 |
| — | Article 6 |
| — | Article 7 |
| — | Article 8 |
| — | Article 9 |
| — | Article 10 |
| — | Article 11 |
| — | Article 12 |
| Article 3 | Article 13 |
| Article 4 | Article 14 |
| Article 5 | Article 15 |
| Article 6 | Article 16 |
| Article 7 | Article 17 |
| Article 8 | Article 18 |
| Article 9 | Article 19 |
| Article 10 | Article 20 |
| Article 11 | Article 21 |
| Article 12 | Article 22 |
| Article 13 | Article 23 |
| Article 14 | Article 24 |
| — | Article 25 |
| Article 15 | Article 26 |
| Annex | Annex I |

Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003

This Regulation

Article 1

Article 1

Article 2

Article 2

—

Article 3

—

Article 4

—

Article 5

—

Article 6

—

Article 7

—

Article 8

—

Article 9

—

Article 10

—

Article 11

—

Article 12

Article 3

Article 13

Article 4

Article 14

Article 5

Article 15

Article 6

Article 16

Article 7

Article 17

Article 8

Article 18

Article 9

Article 19

Article 10

Article 20

Article 11

Article 21

Article 12

Article 22

Article 13

Article 23

Article 14

Article 24

—

Article 25

Article 15

Article 26

Annex

Annex I

---

STATEMENT OF THE COUNCIL'S REASONS

I.   INTRODUCTION

| 1. | On 19 September 2007, the Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network of cross-border exchanges in electricity, based on Article 95 of the Treaty, together in a package with four other proposals concerning the internal energy market. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 19 September 2007, the Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on conditions for access to the network of cross-border exchanges in electricity, based on Article 95 of the Treaty, together in a package with four other proposals concerning the internal energy market.

| 2. | The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee delivered their opinions on the complete package on 10 (1) and 22 April 2008 (2) respectively. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee delivered their opinions on the complete package on 10 (1) and 22 April 2008 (2) respectively.

| 3. | The European Parliament adopted its Opinion (3) at first reading on 18 June 2008, approving 32 amendments. The Commission did not present a modified proposal. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The European Parliament adopted its Opinion (3) at first reading on 18 June 2008, approving 32 amendments. The Commission did not present a modified proposal.

| 4. | On 9 January 2009, the Council adopted its Common Position in accordance with Article 251 of the Treaty, in the form of a recast Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 9 January 2009, the Council adopted its Common Position in accordance with Article 251 of the Treaty, in the form of a recast Regulation.

II.   OBJECTIVE OF THE PROPOSAL

| 5. | The proposal is part of the third internal energy market package, together with the Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, the Regulation on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, the Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, and the Regulation establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. It aims at contributing to achieving the objective of a well functioning internal electricity market by introducing in particular:






  — | provisions aiming at an increased cooperation and coordination among transmission system operators, inter alia through the establishment of a European Network of the Transmission Operators for Electricity (ENTSO for Electricity); |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

The proposal is part of the third internal energy market package, together with the Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, the Regulation on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, the Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, and the Regulation establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. It aims at contributing to achieving the objective of a well functioning internal electricity market by introducing in particular:

—

provisions aiming at an increased cooperation and coordination among transmission system operators, inter alia through the establishment of a European Network of the Transmission Operators for Electricity (ENTSO for Electricity);

| — | improved transparency requirements. |
| --- | --- |

—

improved transparency requirements.

III.   ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON POSITION

6.   General Remarks

| 6.1. | The Council has considered it more effective, more transparent and coherent with Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 as well as more reader friendly to recast the provisions of the Regulation. However, in doing this, the Council has as a general principle fully respected the amending proposal of the Commission in the sense that it has not opened any other provision not being part of the Commission proposal, unless changes were necessary following from the changes introduced by the Council to the proposal, changed references resulting from the renumbering of the Articles etc. To the extent possible, the Council has followed the Commission's approach regarding an identical treatment of the electricity and gas sectors.
  The Commission has accepted all the changes introduced by the Council to its proposal. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

The Council has considered it more effective, more transparent and coherent with Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 as well as more reader friendly to recast the provisions of the Regulation. However, in doing this, the Council has as a general principle fully respected the amending proposal of the Commission in the sense that it has not opened any other provision not being part of the Commission proposal, unless changes were necessary following from the changes introduced by the Council to the proposal, changed references resulting from the renumbering of the Articles etc. To the extent possible, the Council has followed the Commission's approach regarding an identical treatment of the electricity and gas sectors.

The Commission has accepted all the changes introduced by the Council to its proposal.

| 6.2. | Concerning the 32 amendments adopted by the European Parliament including one oral amendment, the Council has followed the Commission in






  — | accepting the following seven amendments |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.2.

Concerning the 32 amendments adopted by the European Parliament including one oral amendment, the Council has followed the Commission in

—

accepting the following seven amendments

| — | fully: 12; |
| --- | --- |

—

fully: 12;

| — | partly/in principle: 11, 15, 18, 24, 29, and 32;
  and |
| --- | --- |

—

partly/in principle: 11, 15, 18, 24, 29, and 32;

and

| — | rejecting the following six amendments: 5, 13, 19, 26, 27 and 30, on grounds of substance, consistency or form. |
| --- | --- |

—

rejecting the following six amendments: 5, 13, 19, 26, 27 and 30, on grounds of substance, consistency or form.

| 6.3. | The Council has deviated from the Commission's position in






  — | accepting one amendment: 23 (partially)
  and |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.3.

The Council has deviated from the Commission's position in

—

accepting one amendment: 23 (partially)

and

| — | rejecting the following 18 amendments: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, 28, 31, and the oral amendment. |
| --- | --- |

—

rejecting the following 18 amendments: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, 28, 31, and the oral amendment.

7.   Specific Remarks

| 7.1. | Regarding the EP amendments where the Council has deviated from the Commission position:






  a) | The Council has accepted amdt 23 partially because it considers that on certain conditions and with certain limits, it should be possible to take congestion revenues into account when network tariffs are calculated. |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.1.

Regarding the EP amendments where the Council has deviated from the Commission position:

a)

The Council has accepted amdt 23 partially because it considers that on certain conditions and with certain limits, it should be possible to take congestion revenues into account when network tariffs are calculated.

| b) | The Council has rejected the 18 amendments listed above (point 6.3) on the following grounds:






  i) | The amendments are not necessary or do not have added value, mainly because the issues are partly/sufficiently covered by other parts of the text, or the wording as proposed by the Commission is sufficient: amdts 1, 2, 3, 4; amdts 7 and 8 are redundant; the issue of the oral amdt is already covered by Art. 8(8 + 9). |
| --- | --- | --- |

b)

The Council has rejected the 18 amendments listed above (point 6.3) on the following grounds:

i)

The amendments are not necessary or do not have added value, mainly because the issues are partly/sufficiently covered by other parts of the text, or the wording as proposed by the Commission is sufficient: amdts 1, 2, 3, 4; amdts 7 and 8 are redundant; the issue of the oral amdt is already covered by Art. 8(8 + 9).

| ii) | The amendment is introducing text which is not appropriate regarding the role of the regulatory authorities, i.a. because the tasks and powers of these authorities are set in the electricity Directive: amdt 9; amdt 10 (in addition, the Council has transferred the Article on retail markets to the electricity Directive); amdts 20, 31. |
| --- | --- |

ii)

The amendment is introducing text which is not appropriate regarding the role of the regulatory authorities, i.a. because the tasks and powers of these authorities are set in the electricity Directive: amdt 9; amdt 10 (in addition, the Council has transferred the Article on retail markets to the electricity Directive); amdts 20, 31.

| iii) | Amdt 6 because it is not for the Commission to draw up roadmaps regarding the transmission network. |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Amdt 6 because it is not for the Commission to draw up roadmaps regarding the transmission network.

| iv) | Amendments 14 and 21 introduce text which does not correspond to the role which the Council is giving to the Agency; moreover, it is, for legal reasons, not appropriate that the Agency adopts or approves network codes or takes decisions with a general scope. |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Amendments 14 and 21 introduce text which does not correspond to the role which the Council is giving to the Agency; moreover, it is, for legal reasons, not appropriate that the Agency adopts or approves network codes or takes decisions with a general scope.

| v) | Amdt 17 because the consultations (Art. 10) should be carried out by ENTSO; consultation which the Agency has to do is covered by Art. 6. |
| --- | --- |

v)

Amdt 17 because the consultations (Art. 10) should be carried out by ENTSO; consultation which the Agency has to do is covered by Art. 6.

| vi) | Amdt 22 is not appropriate because overregulation should be avoided. |
| --- | --- |

vi)

Amdt 22 is not appropriate because overregulation should be avoided.

| vi) | Amdt 25 because parallelism with the exemption procedure foreseen for gas (Art. 35 gas Directive) should be kept. |
| --- | --- |

vi)

Amdt 25 because parallelism with the exemption procedure foreseen for gas (Art. 35 gas Directive) should be kept.

| vii) | Amdt 28 goes beyond the scope of the Regulation and provides tasks for Member States which should be the task of TSOs. |
| --- | --- |

vii)

Amdt 28 goes beyond the scope of the Regulation and provides tasks for Member States which should be the task of TSOs.

| 7.2 | Concerning the Commission proposal, the Council has introduced certain other modifications (of substance and/or of form); the main ones are set out below.






  a) | Certification of TSOs

  The Council has considered it appropriate to transfer the part of the certification procedure which sets out the role of the Commission in this procedure from the electricity Directive to a new Article 3 of this Regulation. |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.2

Concerning the Commission proposal, the Council has introduced certain other modifications (of substance and/or of form); the main ones are set out below.

a)

Certification of TSOs

The Council has considered it appropriate to transfer the part of the certification procedure which sets out the role of the Commission in this procedure from the electricity Directive to a new Article 3 of this Regulation.

| b) | Establishment and modification of network codes

  The Council has considered it appropriate to set out more in detail the procedure for the establishment of network codes (Art. 6) and another — shorter — procedure for the modification of network codes (Art. 7). These Articles have replaced Art. 2e of the Commission proposal. The Council has given a clear role to the Agency which should develop non-binding framework guidelines as a basis for the network codes to be established by ENTSO, review the draft network codes and assess proposed modifications to the network codes. If necessary, the Commission may adopt those codes through the committee procedure in order to make them binding (see also recital 6). |
| --- | --- |

b)

Establishment and modification of network codes

The Council has considered it appropriate to set out more in detail the procedure for the establishment of network codes (Art. 6) and another — shorter — procedure for the modification of network codes (Art. 7). These Articles have replaced Art. 2e of the Commission proposal. The Council has given a clear role to the Agency which should develop non-binding framework guidelines as a basis for the network codes to be established by ENTSO, review the draft network codes and assess proposed modifications to the network codes. If necessary, the Commission may adopt those codes through the committee procedure in order to make them binding (see also recital 6).

| c) | Monitoring by the Agency

  The Council has introduced two paragraphs setting out the monitoring role of the Agency with respect to the implementation of the network codes by ENTSO (Art. 9(1)(subparas 2+3)). |
| --- | --- |

c)

Monitoring by the Agency

The Council has introduced two paragraphs setting out the monitoring role of the Agency with respect to the implementation of the network codes by ENTSO (Art. 9(1)(subparas 2+3)).

| d) | Exemptions for new interconnectors

  In regard to granting exemptions for new interconnectors between Member States (Art. 17), the Council has considered it appropriate to involve the Agency only in those cases where the national regulatory authorities concerned do not find an agreement or submit a joint request to the Agency (para. 5). Moreover, Member States should have the possibility to provide, if they so wish, that the formal decision on the exemption is taken by another relevant body of the Member State, on the basis of the opinion of the regulator (para 6). |
| --- | --- |

d)

Exemptions for new interconnectors

In regard to granting exemptions for new interconnectors between Member States (Art. 17), the Council has considered it appropriate to involve the Agency only in those cases where the national regulatory authorities concerned do not find an agreement or submit a joint request to the Agency (para. 5). Moreover, Member States should have the possibility to provide, if they so wish, that the formal decision on the exemption is taken by another relevant body of the Member State, on the basis of the opinion of the regulator (para 6).

| e) | Retail markets

  The Council has considered it appropriate to redraft the Article on retail markets, taking i.a. out the cross-border reference, and transfer it from the Regulation (Art. 7a of the Commission proposal) to the electricity Directive (new Article 40). |
| --- | --- |

e)

Retail markets

The Council has considered it appropriate to redraft the Article on retail markets, taking i.a. out the cross-border reference, and transfer it from the Regulation (Art. 7a of the Commission proposal) to the electricity Directive (new Article 40).

| f) | Other points







  — | The Council has considered it appropriate to use the term ‘network development plan’ instead of ‘investment plan’ and to clarify that these plans are of a non-binding nature (Art. 8(3)(b)). |
| --- | --- | --- |

f)

Other points

—

The Council has considered it appropriate to use the term ‘network development plan’ instead of ‘investment plan’ and to clarify that these plans are of a non-binding nature (Art. 8(3)(b)).

| — | In line with the recast format, the Council has introduced a new Article to repeal the current legislative act (Art. 25). |
| --- | --- |

—

In line with the recast format, the Council has introduced a new Article to repeal the current legislative act (Art. 25).

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(1)  OJ C 172, 5.7.2008, p. 55.

(2)  OJ C 211, 19.8.2008, p. 23.

(3)  Not yet published in the Official Journal.

---