J-S84028-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1234 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85404

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.M.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1268 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85405

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1269 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85406

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.M., A 

MINOR

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-S84028-17

- 2 -

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 1270 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85407, 

DP-223-12

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1271 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85408

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1272 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85409

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.M.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-S84028-17

- 3 -

:

:

:

: No. 1273 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85410

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1274 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85411

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: L.M., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1275 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree July 11, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

85412, 

DP-447-15

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JANUARY 26, 2018

L.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the trial court’s decrees involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her nine minor children, D.M.M. (born 6/05), 
J-S84028-17

- 4 -

I.M.M. (born 6/06), A.M.M. (born 5/07), L.M.M. (born 4/09), D.M. (born 1/11), 

L.M.M. (born 12/11), J.M.M. (born 2/13), D.M.M. (born 9/14), and L.M. (born 

10/15) (collectively “Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm.

On December 15, 2015, Berks County Children and Youth Services 

(CYS) petitioned for emergency custody of Children due to concerns about 

their health and developmental limitations. CYS first became involved with 

Mother in July 2006 amidst allegations of lack of basic needs for Children, 

parents’ drug and alcohol use, inappropriate parenting skills, inappropriate 

physical discipline, unsuitable housing, lack of parental supervision, domestic 

violence between Mother and Father,2 and medical neglect.3 Mother tested 

positive for benzodiazepine and marijuana upon the birth of L.M. Children 

were adjudicated dependent on December 23, 2015, and placed in temporary 

custody of CYS. 

____________________________________________

1 Due to the divided interests of several of Children regarding placement, two 

separate attorneys were hired to represent Children’s legal interests. See

N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/26/17, at 32. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a)

(requiring appointment of counsel who serves child’s legal interests in 

contested, involuntary termination of parental rights proceedings). See also 

In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (highlighting fact that in 

termination of parental rights cases, law acknowledges two separate and 

distinct categories of interests: child’s legal interests, which are synonymous 

with child’s preferred outcome, and child's best interests, which trial court 

must determine and which is guided by statutes and rules).

2 Father’s parental rights to Children were also involuntarily terminated. He 

is not a party to this appeal.

3

In July 2015, a bench warrant was issued for Mother after she failed to 

appear for a dependency hearing. N.T. Termination Hearing, 7/10/17, at 15.
J-S84028-17

- 5 -

As part of her family service plan (FSP), Mother was ordered to 

cooperate with parenting education, obtain domestic violence, drug and 

alcohol, and mental health evaluations and comply with any recommended 

treatments, random urinalysis, casework sessions, obtain and maintain stable 

housing and income, keep CYS informed regarding any changes in residence 

or income, and act appropriately during visitation with Children. Caseworkers 

who were present during Mother’s supervised visits with Children described 

her as disrespectful, defiant, and someone who blatantly refused to follow 

routines recommended during the visits.4 N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/26/17, 

at 16. On September 15, 2016, CYS moved to have Mother’s visits with three 

of her children suspended due to her negative behaviors. After a hearing, the 

court suspended Mother’s visitation with regard to all nine Children. Mother’s 

last contact with Children was in October 2016.

On March 28, 2017, CYS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

(8),5 and (b) of the Adoption Act.6 After hearings held on June 26, 2017, and 

____________________________________________

4 The police were called to one of the supervised visits after Mother had 

threatened one of the caseworkers with physical harm. N.T. Termination 

Hearing, 6/26/17, at 54.

5 We note that “[w]ith respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to 

remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent 

to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

6 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2910.
J-S84028-17

- 6 -

July 10, 2017, the court entered final decrees involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Children. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, 

raising the following issues for our consideration:

(1) The trial court erred in involuntarily terminating the 

Mother’s parental rights where it was not supported by clear 

and convincing evidence when the Mother completed a 

substantial portion of her family service plan goals.

(2) The trial court erred in involuntarily terminating the 

Mother’s parental rights where the Mother had consistently 

visited her children and there was a bond between the 

Mother and Children and termination of parental rights could 

have a negative effect on the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs of the children and where some of the 

children expressed the desire to return home to the care of 

Mother.

Appellant’s Brief, at 5 (renumbered for ease of disposition).

In her first issue, Mother argues that termination was improper where 

she completed a substantial portion of her FSP goals. Specifically, she claims 

that termination under section 2511(a) was in error where she participated in 

parenting classes and mental health treatment and obtained appropriate 

housing and financial support for Children.

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the 

burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish 

by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for 

doing so. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as 

to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” It is well 

established that a court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each and every case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence in 

light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants 

termination.
J-S84028-17

- 7 -

In re adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), 

due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of 

refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D., 797 

A.2d 326 (Pa. Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” 

Id. at 340. Furthermore, under section 2511(a)(2), the petition for 

involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; 

and (3) that the cause of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied. In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 

1998).

Based on the record, CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence that 

Mother repeatedly and continually refused to perform her parental duties, that 

this refusal caused Children to be without essential care, control or 

subsistence, and that she is incapable of remedying this situation. Here, 

Mother poorly attended treatment that was part of her FSP, stopped attending 

random urinalysis, minimally progressed with treatments, behaved in such a 

belligerent and violent manner that caseworkers were unable to provide her 

parenting instruction, made supervised visits with Children almost impossibly 
J-S84028-17

- 8 -

difficult, was barred from family service organizations due to her threatening 

behavior, and caused her visitation with Children to be suspended as a result 

of her aggressive and undermining behavior. 

Moreover, professionals opined that Mother is not capable of providing 

for her needy Children due to her erratic behaviors and severe mental health 

issues (depression, anxiety, and anger/rage). Mother’s lack of parenting has

had such deleterious effects on Children that a CYS caseworker testified 

Children will need services until they are 18 years of age, if not further in life; 

Children were so far behind in everyday life skills when they were placed in 

CYS’ custody that some children were afraid of water and bathing, and one 

did not even recognize her own name. N.T. Termination Hearing, 6/26/17, at 

66. When Children were in Mother and Father’s care there were truancy 

issues, missed medical appointments and a lack of basic provisions for some 

children. Id. at 66-67 (“I don’t think there was bedding for everyone.”); N.T. 

Termination Hearing 7/10/17, at 124 (“We [were]n’t even able to find a jacket 

[for each child].”); id. at 131 (“[T]hey did not have shoes and socks. All of 

the children.”).

In sum, Mother has simply ignored her Children’s basic, let alone special, 

needs. She is a master at placing blame on others and is incapable of 

recognizing the harmful affects her behaviors have upon Children. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that Mother’s rights should be 
J-S84028-17

- 9 -

terminated under section 2511(a)(2),

7 where she is unable to meet Children’s 

needs in a safe, healthy manner. See In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 

434 (Pa. Super. 2017). 

Mother next contends that the court improperly terminated her parental 

rights under section 2511(b) where there was a demonstrated bond between 

her and Children, where she deeply loved her children, and where severing 

the parent-child bond would have a negative effect on Children emotionally, 

developmentally and physically.

Testimony established that Mother does have a bond with three of her 

children. However, even where there is a demonstrated parent-child bond, a 

trial court is obligated under section 2511(b) to “consider the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of” the Children. 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(b).

In In re M.A.B., supra, our Court stated:

Section 2511(b) requires the Orphans’ Court to consider 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability . . . 

when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The court 

must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, 

paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently 

severing the bond.” In re C.P., 901 A.2d [516,] 520 [(Pa. Super. 

2006)]. See also In re T.S.M., [] 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) 

(same); In re Adoption of G.L.L., [] 124 A.3d 344, 349 (Pa. 

____________________________________________

7

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court states that “the grounds for 

terminating parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) [have been met[.]” Trial 

Court Opinion, 8/11/17, at 14-15. While the court also terminated parental 

rights under sections (1), (5), and (8), we can affirm the trial court’s decision 

regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any singular 

subsection of section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (en banc).
J-S84028-17

- 10 -

Super. 2015) (noting that . . . Orphans’ court must analyze 

whether . . . relationship with . . . parents is “necessary and 

beneficial.”) (citation omitted). The extent of the bond-effect 

analysis necessarily depends upon the unique facts and 

circumstances of the particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

[753,] 763 [(Pa. Super. 2008)].

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a 

major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest 

analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be 

considered by the court when determining what is in the 

best interest of the child. The mere existence of an 

emotional bond does not preclude the termination of 

parental rights. Rather, the orphans’ court must 

examine the status of the bond to determine whether 

its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary 

and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 

[] 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003). . . . In addition 

to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize 

the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the 

intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, 

this Court [has] stated that the trial court should consider 

the importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed without 

detrimental effects on the child.

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103 (some citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d at 448 (headnotes omitted) (emphasis 

added).

Instantly, the trial court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental 

rights under section 2511(b) “would have no detrimental effect on any of her 

children. Life for her children, while in Mother’s care, could be summed up in 

one word, ‘chaos.’” Trial Court Opinion, 8/30/17, at 16; see N.T. Termination 

Hearing, 6/26/17, at 67 (caseworker testifying that there would be no 

detriment to Children if parental rights were terminated). Mother’s bond with 
J-S84028-17

- 11 -

her oldest child, D.M.M., is merely protective in nature; there was no evidence 

showing that the parent-child bond was healthy. Id. Mother’s bond with her 

next oldest child, I.M.M., is unhealthy; he is comfortable with his foster 

parents who meet his special needs. Id. at 17. In sum, the caseworkers’ 

overall testimony evidenced the fact that all Children are making substantial 

emotional, developmental and educational progress with their foster parents. 

Most of the Children have special needs, ranging from autism/severe 

developmental delays and bipolar disorder to extreme anger issues, which are 

being addressed by their foster parents. Foster parents have developed a 

secure, healthy bond with Children.

Based upon the evidence at the termination hearings, it is evident that 

any demonstrated bond between Mother and Children is not beneficial. 

M.A.B., supra. In fact, it is detrimental and toxic to their development. As 

the trial court noted, this case “presented some of the most challenging 

circumstances [it has] seen.” Id. at 20. One of the attorneys appointed to 

represent Children noted that they were in “horrible shape.” Id. “While three 

of [Mother’s] older children may miss Mother, severing this unhealthy bond 

will not only not be detrimental, it will be the first step on the path to a normal 

childhood for each of them.” Id. To obstruct this path would be an abuse of 

our discretion.

Decrees affirmed.
J-S84028-17

- 12 -

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/26/2018