16832 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 65 / Thursday, April 5, 2007 / Notices 

Agency will summarize the comments 

submitted in response to this notice, 

and will include this summary in its 

request to OMB. 

Type of Review: Extension of a 

currently approved collection. 

Title: Asbestos in General Industry (29 

CFR 1910.1001). 

OMB Number: 1218–0133. 

Affected Public: Business or other forprofit. 

Number of Respondents: 243. 

Frequency: Annually; semi-annually. 

Total Responses: 65,048. 

Average Time per Response: Varies 

from 5 minutes to maintain records to 

1.5 hours for employees to receive 

training or medical evaluations. 

Estimated Total 

Burden Hours: 23,849. 

Estimated Cost (Operation and 

Maintenance): $1,625,143. 

IV. Public Participation—Submission of 

Comments on This Notice and Internet 

Access to Comments and Submissions 

You may submit comments in 

response to this document as follows: 

(1) Electronically at http:// 

www.regulations.gov, which is the 

Federal eRulemaking Portal; (2) by 

facsimile; or (3) by hard copy. All 

comments, attachments, and other 

material must identify the Agency name 

and the OSHA docket number for this 

ICR (OSHA Docket No. OSHA–2007–

0026). You may supplement electronic 

submissions by uploading document 

files electronically. If you wish to mail 

additional materials in reference to an 

electronic or facsimile submission, you 

must submit them to the OSHA Docket 

Office (see the section of this notice 

titled ‘‘ADDRESSES’’). The additional 

materials must clearly identify your 

electronic comments by your full name, 

date, and docket number so the Agency 

can attach them to your comments. 

Because of security procedures, the 

use of regular mail may cause a 

significant delay in the receipt of 

comments. For information about 

security procedures concerning the 

delivery of materials by hand, express 

delivery, messenger, or courier service, 

please contact the OSHA Docket Office 

at (202) 693–2350 (TTY (877) 889–

5627). 

Comments and submissions are 

posted without change at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA 

cautions commenters about submitting 

personal information such as social 

security numbers and date of birth. 

Although all submissions are listed in 

the http://www.regulations.gov index, 

some information (e.g., copyrighted 

material) is not publicly available to 

read or download through this website. 

All submissions, including copyrighted 

material, are available for inspection 

and copying at the OSHA Docket Office. 

Information on using the http:// 

www.regulations.gov Web site to submit 

comments and access the docket is 

available at the website’s ‘‘User Tips’’

link. Contact the OSHA Docket Office 

for information about materials not 

available through the website, and for 

assistance in using the Internet to locate 

docket submissions. 

V. Authority and Signature 

Edwin G. Foulke, Jr., Assistant 

Secretary of Labor for Occupational 

Safety and Health, directed the 

preparation of this notice. The authority 

for this notice is the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506 

et seq.) and Secretary of Labor’s Order 

No. 5–2002 (67 FR 65008). 

Signed at Washington, DC on April 2, 

2007. 

Edwin G. Foulke, Jr., 

Assistant Secretary of Labor. 

[FR Doc. E7–6367 Filed 4–4–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4510–26–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Tennessee Valley Authority Browns 

Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 

Docket Nos. 50–259, 50–260, and 50–

296 Exemption 

1.0 Background 

The Tennessee Valley Authority 

(TVA, the licensee) is the holder of 

Facility Operating Licenses DPR–33, 

DPR–52, and DPR–68, which authorize 

operation of the Browns Ferry Nuclear 

Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3. The license 

provides, among other things, that the 

facility is subject to all rules, 

regulations, and orders of the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC, the 

Commission) now or hereafter in effect. 

The facility consists of three boilingwater reactors located in Limestone 

County in Alabama. 

2.0 Request/Action 

On November 19, 1980, the 

Commission published a new Appendix 

R to Title 10 to the Code of Federal 

Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50 regarding 

fire protection features of nuclear power 

plants (45 FR 76602). Section 50.48(a) 

requires that each operating nuclear 

power plant have a fire protection plan 

which satisfies General Design Criterion 

(GDC) 3, ‘‘Fire protection,’’ in Appendix 

A, ‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear 

Power Plants,’’ to 10 CFR Part 50. The 

approved fire protection plan is the plan 

required to satisfy 10 CFR 50.48(a). 

Specific fire protection features deemed 

necessary to ensure this capability are 

delineated in Appendix R to 10 CFR 

Part 50. Section III of Appendix R 

contains 15 subsections, lettered A 

through O, each of which specifies the 

requirements for a particular aspect of 

fire protection features at nuclear power 

plants. The Browns Ferry units are 

required to comply with the provisions 

of Sections III.G and III.J and III.O. 

Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 

Part 50 requires that where cables or 

equipment of redundant trains of 

systems necessary to achieve and 

maintain hot shutdown conditions are 

located within the same fire area outside 

of primary containment, one of the 

following means of ensuring that one of 

the redundant trains is free of fire 

damage shall be provided: 

a. Separation of cables and equipment 

and associated non-safety circuits of 

redundant trains by a fire barrier having 

a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming 

a part of or supporting such fire barriers 

shall be protected to provide fire 

resistance equivalent to that required of 

the barrier; 

b. Separation of cables and equipment 

and associated non-safety circuits of 

redundant trains by a horizontal 

distance of more than 20 feet with no 

intervening combustible or fire hazards. 

In addition, fire detectors and an 

automatic fire suppression system shall 

be installed in the fire area; or 

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment 

and associated non-safety circuits of one 

redundant train in a fire barrier having 

a 1-hour rating. In addition, fire 

detectors and an automatic fire 

suppression system shall be installed in 

the fire area; 

By letter dated October 26, 2006, as 

supplemented by a letter dated January 

11, 2007, the licensee requested a 

revision to an exemption from 10 CFR 

50 Appendix R, III.G.2. For the items 

specified in this exemption request, the 

licensee has selected III.G.2.b as the 

option for compliance with Appendix R, 

Section II.G.2. The exemption involves 

allowing intervening combustible 

materials, for example, fire hazards 

(480V reactor building (RB) vent boards 

1B, 2B, and 3B; small panels in Units 1, 

2, and 3, and 1-hour rated Thermo-Lag 

330–1 electrical raceway fire barrier 

(ERFB) material), in the specified 20 feet 

of separation protected with fire 

detection and automatic water-based 

fire suppression between redundant 

safe-shutdown trains. 

The redundant trains are separated by 

a horizontal distance of 20 feet with 

intervening combustibles in certain fire 

zones in the Units 1, 2, and 3 RBs. 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 65 / Thursday, April 5, 2007 / Notices 16833 

1The Units 2 and 3 configuration are very similar 

and the results of this analysis are applicable to 

480V (RB) vent board 2B and 480V (RB) vent board 

3B. 

2HRR is the rate at which heat energy is 

generated by burning. The HRR of a fuel is related 

to its chemistry, physical form, and availability of 

oxidant. When an object burns, it releases a certain 

amount of energy per unit of time. For most 

materials, the HRR of a fuel changes with time, in 

relation to its chemistry, physical form, and 

availability of oxidant (air), and is ordinarily 

expressed as kW (kJ/sec) or Btu/sec and denoted by 

Q ̇ (1,000 kW = 1 MW or 1 BTU/sec = 1.055 kW). 

3The incident heat flux (the rate of heat transfer 

per unit area that is normal to the direction of heat 

flow—it is a total of heat transmitted by radiation, 

conduction, and convection) required to raise the 

surface of a target to a critical temperature is termed 

the critical heat flux. Below this heat flux an object 

will typically not ignite while above this heat flux 

the time to ignition will decrease with the 

increasing heat flux. 

Exemptions are requested from the 

requirements to provide 20 feet of 

separation, free of intervening 

combustibles. The following is a list of 

those fire zone locations and 

intervening combustibles/fire hazards 

present within a 20-foot spatial 

separation zone for redundant safeshutdown trains: 

• Unit 1 Fire Zone 1–1/1–2 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... 480V (RB) Vent Board 1B. 

• Unit 1 Fire Zone 1–1/1–2 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... 1-LPLN–925–338 & 338A Process Radiation Monitor and Relay Panel. 

• Unit 1 Fire Zone 1–1/1–2 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... Thermo-Lag on Conduits ES2625-II and ES2673–II. 

• Unit 1 Fire Zone 1–3/1–4 ................. 593′ Elevation ....... Thermo-Lag on Conduits PP459-IA, PP460-IA, and ES125-I. 

• Unit 1 Fire Zone 1–3/1–4 ................. 593′ Elevation ....... 1-LPLN–925–0281A Fire Detection Panel. 

• Unit 1 Fire Zone 1–3/1–4 ................. 593′ Elevation ....... 1-LPLN–925–0315 Heat Detection Panel. 

• Unit 2 Fire Zone 2–1/2–4 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... 480V (RB) Vent Board 2B. 

• Unit 2 Fire Zone 2–1/2–2 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... 2-PWR–276–0007 480V Power Distribution Panel. 

• Unit 2 Fire Zone 2–3/2–4 ................. 593′ Elevation ....... 25–281A Fire Detection Panel. 

• Unit 2 Fire Zone 2–3/2–4 ................. 593′ Elevation ....... 25–316 Cable Tray Fire Detection Control. 

• Unit 3 Fire Zone 3–1/3–2 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... 480 V (RB) Vent Board 3B. 

• Unit 3 Fire Zone 3–1/3–2 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... 1-LPLN–925–336 & 336A Raw Cooling Water Effluent Radiation Monitor and 

Relay Panel. 

• Unit 3 Fire Zone 3–1/3–2 ................. 565′ Elevation ....... 1-LPLN–925–337 & 337A Process Radiation Monitor and Relay Panel. 

To justify inclusion of intervening 

combustibles in RB fire areas, the 

licensee performed fire modeling to 

assess potential hazards using 

methodology from NUREG–1805, ‘‘Fire 

Dynamics Tools (FDTs) Quantitative 

Fire Hazard Analysis Methods for the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Fire Protection Inspection Program,’’

December 2004. Enclosure 2 of the 

exemption request discussed the firerisk analysis for the Units 1, 2, and 3 

RBs. 

TVA provided an assessment utilizing 

fire modeling to evaluate the fire 

hazards due to intervening combustibles 

between redundant cable trains in the 

RBs. In this fire modeling analysis, the 

licensee modeled fire in Unit 1 RB 

Elevation 565′ in the 20-foot zone of 

separation between fire zones 1–1 and 

1–2.1 Specifically, 480V (RB) vent 

boards 1B, 2B, and 3B are located 

within the 20-foot zone of separation. 

The fire model uses a series of empirical 

correlations from NUREG–1805 to show 

the largest fire from a vertical low 

voltage electrical cabinet should not 

produce enough radiant energy to ignite 

the closest redundant cable trays or 

intervening combustibles within the 

redundant trains. 

The analysis is used to determine the 

extent of the potential fire damage 

associated with a realistic worst case 

fire scenario between Unit 1 RB fire 

zones 1–1 and 1–2 and the anticipated 

failure of cables or equipment of 

redundant trains of systems required for 

safe-shutdown. A fire scenario was 

postulated for the Unit 1 RB, that is, fire 

started in a vertical electrical cabinet 

(480V RB vent board 1B). This cabinet 

has 12 vertical sections with no vent 

openings. The penetrations in the 

cabinet consist of sealed conduits on top 

of the cabinet. The fire started from nonqualified Institute of Electronics and 

Electrical Engineering Standard (IEEE)–

383 cables within the cabinet and was 

assumed to be limited to one cable 

bundle. The heat release rate (HRR) 2

used to calculate heat fluxes to the 

targets (cable trays located at radial 

distance of approximately 7 feet [17 feet 

above floor], conduits located at the 

bottom of the duct approximately 9 feet 

above the top of the cabinet, and 

Thermo-Lag 330–1 wrapped conduit 

located approximately 7 feet from the 

edge of the cabinet) was based on Table 

E–4 in Appendix E of NUREG/CR–6850 

(EPRI [Electric Power Research Institute] 

TR–1019181), ‘‘EPRI/NRC–RES Fire 

PRA [Probabilistic Risk Analysis] 

Methodology for Nuclear Power 

Facilities,’’ November 2005. 

In order to evaluate the licensee’s 

conclusion that a cabinet fire would not 

result in fire damage adversely affecting 

the safe-shutdown capability in Units 1, 

2, and 3 RB located within the 20-foot 

separation area, the NRC staff identified 

areas in which additional information 

was necessary to complete its 

evaluation. The NRC staff had 

discussions with the licensee on 

November 20, 2006, concerning use of 

the HRR of a single bundle cable (vs. 

multiple bundles) fire from NUREG/CR–

6850 in fire modeling. Specifically, the 

NRC staff requested TVA to justify how 

the single bundle cable HRR assumption 

bounds the worst case cabinet fire 

scenario. On January 11, 2007 (ADAMS 

Accession Number ML070160050), TVA 

provided a revised fire model to address 

the NRC concerns. 

In the revised fire modeling analysis, 

the HRR for multiple-cable bundles was 

assumed due to multiple conduit entries 

in each section of the low voltage 

vertical cabinet. The HRR associated 

with multiple-cable bundles for a 

vertical cabinet with non-qualified 

IEEE–383 cables was based on Table E–

5 in Appendix E of NUREG/CR–6850. 

The critical incident radiative heat flux 3

for ignition is calculated from the 

cabinet fire scenario to see if ignition of 

the redundant cables and adjacent 

surrounding targets (intervening 

combustibles) is possible. The critical 

incident radiative heat flux from the 

maximum fire HRR, that is, 816 

Kilowatt (kW), was estimated at 4.28 

kW/m2. 

The licensee determined that the 

maximum radiant heat flux is not 

sufficient to ignite non-qualified IEEE–

383 cable or Thermo-Lag 330–1 

wrapped on conduits or safety-related 

cables or equipment of redundant trains 

of systems for safe-shutdown, nor to 

adversely impact any surrounding 

equipment. The targets require a large 

amount of radiative heat to ignite. The 

measured critical heat flux level for 

representative non-qualified IEEE–383 

or thermoplastic cable samples typically 

is in the range of 6 kW/m2 (NUREG/CR–

6850, Appendix H, Table H–1). The 

measured critical heat flux for ignition 

for Thermo-Lag 330–1 ERFB material is 

25 kW/m2 based on American Society of 

Testing and Materials (ASTM) E1321, 

‘‘Standard Test Method for Determining 

Material Ignition and Flame Spread 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
16834 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 65 / Thursday, April 5, 2007 / Notices 

Properties’’ (TVA October 26, 2006 

(ADAMS ML063040310)). 

Based on the above evaluation, the 

NRC staff concludes that the ability of 

Units 1, 2, and 3 to achieve and 

maintain safe-shutdown conditions in 

accordance with the requirements of 

Section III.G.2.b to Appendix R to 10 

CFR 50 is not adversely affected by the 

inclusion of intervening combustibles or 

fire hazards in certain fire zones within 

Units 1, 2, and 3 RBs for the following 

reasons: 

—The fire modeling performed by the 

licensee provides reasonable 

assurance that redundant safeshutdown trains will be maintained 

free of fire damage. This is because 

the estimated heat flux from the 

maximum exposure fire is less than 

the critical heat flux for ignition for 

non-qualified IEEE–383 cable or 

Thermo-Lag 330–1 ERFB material. 

—In the event of a postulated fire in the 

Units 1, 2, and 3 RBs, all units can 

safely shut down using the alternate 

shutdown panel located outside each 

RB. The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 

Appendix R alternate shutdown 

strategy is described in the approved 

fire protection plan. 

—A significant fire is unlikely due to 

control of transient combustibles near 

the redundant trains. RB volume and 

height would dissipate heat from a 

cabinet fire and not threaten 

redundant trains. Smoke detectors 

and portable extinguishers were 

installed for quick fire detection and 

suppression. All electrical cabinets in 

the area of concern are enclosed with 

no ventilation openings and the 

bottom of the cable tray stacks have 

non-combustible covers. 

—A fire originating in a low voltage 

cabinet exposing intervening 

combustibles/targets (cable trays 

located at radial distance of 

approximately 7 feet, conduits located 

at the bottom of the duct 

approximately 9 feet above the top of 

the cabinet (17 feet above floor), and 

Thermo-Lag 330–1 wrapped conduit 

located approximately 7 feet from the 

edge of the cabinet) would be slow to 

develop. Based on the fire detection 

arrangement in the Units 1, 2, and 3 

RBs, detection of this type of fire 

would occur well before the fire had 

time to develop into a fully developed 

cable tray fire scenario. 

—The NRC staff reviewed the physical 

configuration of the Units 1, 2, and 3 

RBs, the associated fire hazards 

(intervening combustibles) and fire 

protection features, and fire response 

procedures. This review found that a 

fire that initiated in one of the 

cabinets would likely be detected in 

its incipient stage, and fire-fighting 

activities initiated (including 

actuation of the automatic waterbased fire suppression system) before 

the fire becomes fully developed, 

thereby limiting its potential to 

spread. 

The NRC staff, therefore, finds the 

licensee’s proposed exemption to permit 

intervening combustibles in the 20-foot 

separation zone for certain specified fire 

areas in the Units 1, 2, and 3 RBs 

acceptable. 

The licensee indicated that all fire 

zones discussed previously are 

protected with fire detection and 

automatic pre-action sprinkler systems, 

manual fire extinguishers, and hose 

stations. If a fire were to occur in any 

of these locations it would be detected 

before significant flame propagation or 

increased temperature, radiative heat 

flux, and damaging smoke layering 

occurred. The fire brigade would then 

extinguish the fire using hose stations 

and manual fire fighting equipment. If 

rapid fire propagation occurred before 

the arrival of the fire brigade, one would 

expect the automatic pre-action 

sprinkler system to actuate and limit fire 

spread. Pending actuation of automatic 

pre-action sprinkler system, the 

physical separation of redundant trains 

is sufficient to provide reasonable 

assurance that one safe-shutdown train 

would remain free of fire damage. 

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that 

the existing level of fire protection for 

the redundant safe-shutdown trains is 

an acceptable deviation from Section 

III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. 

3.0 Discussion 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the 

Commission may, upon application by 

any interested person or upon its own 

initiative, grant exemptions from the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1) 

The exemptions are authorized by law, 

will not present an undue risk to public 

health or safety, and are consistent with 

the common defense and security; and 

(2) when special circumstances are 

present. These include the special 

circumstances that the underlying 

purpose of the rule is satisfied by the 

requested revision to the exemption, 

since the existing fire protection 

features and analyses demonstrate that 

the quantity of intervening combustibles 

permitted in the 20-foot separation zone 

does not affect the ability of the existing 

fire protection features to provide an 

equivalent level of protection as 

required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, 

Section III.G. 

Authorized by Law 

This exemption revision allows the 

existence of the specified intervening 

combustibles in the 20-foot separation 

zone identified previously. As stated 

above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to 

grant exemptions from the requirements 

of 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 

CFR 50. The NRC staff has determined 

that granting of the licensee’s proposed 

exemption will not result in a violation 

of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended, or the Commission’s 

regulations. Therefore, the exemption is 

authorized by law. 

No Undue Risk to Public Health and 

Safety 

The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.48 is to limit fire damage to 

structures, systems, and components 

(SSCs) important to safety so that the 

capability to shut down the plant safely 

is ensured. Compliance with the 

applicable provisions of Appendix R to 

Part 50 ensures that one train of cables 

and equipment necessary to achieve and 

maintain safe-shutdown are maintained 

free of fire damage. Based on the above, 

no new accident precursors are created 

by allowing the specified intervening 

combustibles into the 20-foot separation 

zone identified previously, thus, the 

probability of postulated accidents is 

not increased. Also, based on the above, 

the consequences of postulated 

accidents are not increased. Therefore, 

there is no undue risk to public health 

and safety. 

Consistent With Common Defense and 

Security 

The proposed exemption revision 

would allow the specified intervening 

combustibles into the 20-foot separation 

zone identified previously. This 

revision to the fire protection plan and 

existing exemptions has no relation to 

security issues. Therefore, the common 

defense and security are not impacted 

by this exemption. 

Special Circumstances 

In accordance with 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2), special circumstances are 

present whenever application of the 

regulation in the particular 

circumstances is not necessary to 

achieve the underlying purpose of the 

rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 

50.48 is to limit fire damage to SSCs 

important to safety so that the capability 

to shut down the plant safely is ensured. 

Compliance with the applicable 

provisions of Appendix R to Part 50 

ensures that one train of cables and 

equipment necessary to achieve and 

maintain safe-shutdown are maintained 

free of fire damage. As the existence of 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 65 / Thursday, April 5, 2007 / Notices 16835 

the intervening combustibles should not 

affect the capability of the installed 

suppression and detection system to 

detect and mitigate a fire, the 

underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.48 and 

Appendix R is achieved. Therefore, the 

special circumstances required by 10 

CFR 50.12(a)(2) for the granting of an 

exemption from 10 CFR 50.48 and 

Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 exist. 

4.0 Conclusion 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12, the revision to the exemption is 

authorized by law, will not present an 

undue risk to the public health and 

safety, and is consistent with the 

common defense and security. Also, 

special circumstances are present. 

Therefore, the Commission hereby 

grants the TVA a revision to the 

exemption from the requirements of 

Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 

50 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, 

Units 1, 2 and 3. 

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the 

Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment (22 FR 9036). 

This exemption is effective upon 

issuance. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day 

of March 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Catherine Haney, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 07–1696 Filed 4–4–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 

BOARD OF GOVERNORS 

Sunshine Act Meeting; Notification of 

Item Added to Meeting Agenda 

DATE OF MEETING: March 28, 2007. 

STATUS: Closed. 

PREVIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT: 72 FR 14312, 

March 27, 2007. 

ADDITION: Proposed Filing with the 

Postal Regulatory Commission for an 

Extension of the Market Test for 

Repositionable Notes. At its closed 

meeting on March 28, 2007, the Board 

of Governors of the United States Postal 

Service voted unanimously to add this 

item to the agenda of its closed meeting 

and that no earlier announcement was 

possible. The General Counsel of the 

United States Postal Service certified 

that in her opinion discussion of this 

item could be properly closed to public 

observation. 

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: 

Wendy A. Hocking, Secretary of the 

Board, U.S. Postal Service, 475 L’Enfant 

Plaza, SW., Washington, DC 20260–

1000. 

Wendy A. Hocking, 

Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 07–1717 Filed 4–3–07; 3:13 pm] 

BILLING CODE 7710–12–M 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. IC–27771] 

Notice of Applications for 

Deregistration Under Section 8(f) of the 

Investment Company Act of 1940 

March 30, 2007. 

The following is a notice of 

applications for deregistration under 

section 8(f) of the Investment Company 

Act of 1940 for the month of March 

2007. A copy of each application may be 

obtained for a fee at the SEC’s Public 

Reference Branch (tel. 202–551–5850). 

An order granting each application will 

be issued unless the SEC orders a 

hearing. Interested persons may request 

a hearing on any application by writing 

to the SEC’s Secretary at the address 

below and serving the relevant 

applicant with a copy of the request, 

personally or by mail. Hearing requests 

should be received by the SEC by 5:30 

p.m. on April 25, 2007, and should be 

accompanied by proof of service on the 

applicant, in the form of an affidavit or, 

for lawyers, a certificate of service. 

Hearing requests should state the nature 

of the writer’s interest, the reason for the 

request, and the issues contested. 

Persons who wish to be notified of a 

hearing may request notification by 

writing to the Secretary, U.S. Securities 

and Exchange Commission, 100 F 

Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549–

1090. 

For Further Information Contact: 

Diane L. Titus at (202) 551–6810, SEC, 

Division of Investment Management, 

Office of Investment Company 

Regulation, 100 F Street, NE., 

Washington, DC 20549–4041. 

The Preferred Group of Mutual Funds 

[File No. 811–6602] 

Summary: Applicant seeks an order 

declaring that it has ceased to be an 

investment company. On June 19, 2006, 

each of applicant’s series transferred its 

assets to the following corresponding 

funds, based on net asset value: T. Rowe 

Price Value Fund, Inc., T. Rowe Price 

Growth Stock Fund, Inc., T. Rowe Price 

Mid-Cap Growth Fund, Inc., T. Rowe 

Price New Horizons Fund, Inc., T. Rowe 

Price Capital Appreciation Fund, T. 

Rowe Price International Funds, Inc., T. 

Rowe Price Short-Term Bond Fund, 

Inc., T. Rowe Price New Income Fund, 

Inc. and T. Rowe Price Summit Funds, 

Inc. Expenses of approximately 

$490,000 incurred in connection with 

the reorganization were paid by 

Caterpillar Investment Management 

Ltd., applicant’s investment adviser. 

Filing Dates: The application was 

filed on July 20, 2006, and amended on 

October 30, 2006, January 12, 2007 and 

March 23, 2007. 

Applicant’s Address: 411 Hamilton 

Blvd., Suite 1200, Peroria, IL 61602. 

AIM Floating Rate Fund [File No. 811–

9797] 

Summary: Applicant, a closed-end 

investment company, seeks an order 

declaring that it has ceased to be an 

investment company. On April 13, 

2006, applicant transferred its assets to 

AIM Counselor Series Trust, based on 

net asset value. Expenses of $238,190 

incurred in connection with the 

reorganization were paid by A I M 

Advisors, Inc., applicant’s investment 

adviser. 

Filing Date: The application was filed 

on February 23, 2007. 

Applicant’s Address: 11 Greenway 

Plaza, Suite 100, Houston, TX 77046–

1173. 

Pioneer Balanced Fund [File No. 811–

1605] 

Pioneer America Income Trust [File No. 

811–5516] 

Summary: Each applicant seeks an 

order declaring that it has ceased to be 

an investment company. On November 

10, 2006, each applicant transferred its 

assets to corresponding series of Pioneer 

Series Trust IV, based on net asset 

values. Expenses of $80,698 and 

$81,259, respectively, incurred in 

connection with the reorganizations 

were paid by each applicant, the 

acquiring fund, and Pioneer Investment 

Management, Inc., investment adviser to 

both applicants and the acquiring fund. 

Filing Date: The applications were 

filed on March 5, 2007. 

Applicants’ Address: 60 State St., 

Boston, MA 02109. 

Pioneer Europe Select Fund [File No. 

811–10111] 

Summary: Applicant seeks an order 

declaring that it has ceased to be an 

investment company. On June 24, 2005, 

applicant transferred its assets to 

Pioneer Europe Select Equity Fund, 

based on net asset value. Expenses of 

$23,688 incurred in connection with the 

reorganization were paid by Pioneer 

Investment Management, Inc., 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES