J-S56018-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CLARISSA GAMBLE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL ANDERSON, GEORGE 

KINSLER, S3 ENTERPRISES, LLC, 

CHARLES MORRISON, LARRY DABNEY, 

AND CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

APPEAL OF: S3 Enterprises, LLC No. 705 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 3, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No: August Term, 2014 No. 2317

BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, and PLATT*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2017

Appellant, S3 Enterprises, LLC (“S3”), appeals from the judgment 

entered on March 3, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

in favor of Appellee, Clarissa Gamble (“Gamble”) and against S3.

1

 S3 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 On August 16, 2016, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Gamble and against 

S3. S3 filed a motion for post-trial relief, which was denied by order entered 

December 22, 2016. S3 filed an appeal to this Court before judgment was 

entered on the verdict. By Order of March 3, 2017, S3 was directed to enter 

judgment on the verdict and was advised that, upon compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 

301, the notice of appeal previously filed would be considered filed after entry 

of the judgment. S3 filed its praecipe for entry of judgment the same day. 

Therefore, the appeal is properly before this Court. 
J-S56018-17

- 2 -

contends it is entitled to a new trial based on trial court error for refusing to 

give two requested jury instructions. Following review, we affirm.

As the trial court explained:

On April 8, 2013, [Gamble] left her home in the 4500 block 

of North Broad Street to go to work. As she was walking along 

the sidewalk in front of the property at 4524 N. Broad Street and 

the vacant lot at 4526 N. Broad Street, [Gamble’s] feet got stuck 

in a crack in the pavement of the sidewalk. As she tried to get 

her foot unstuck, she fell forward and landed on her knees, 

stomach and chin. [Gamble] suffered injuries as a result of her 

fall.

[Gamble] filed a negligence action against various property 

owners, including [] Michael Anderson and [S3], as well as the 

City of Philadelphia. Following a jury trial, the jury returned a 

verdict in favor of [Gamble] and against [S3] in the amount of 

$65,000. 

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 5/9/17, at 1.2 

On appeal, S3 asks us to consider two issues:

A. Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to give 

[S3’s] proposed point for charge 5, Standard Pennsylvania Jury 

Instruction 18.50 (Civ), duty of property owner to a licensee?

B. Did the trial court commit reversible error by refusing to give 

[S3’s] proposed point for charge 9, Standard Pennsylvania Jury 

Instruction 13.220 (Civ), assumption of risk?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3 (some capitalization omitted).

____________________________________________

2 At the conclusion of the Gamble’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted a 

nonsuit in favor of defendant City of Philadelphia for failure to establish notice 

under Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8542(b)(7) 

(Sidewalks). See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Trial, 8/15/16, at 179-80. The 

jury subsequently found the owner of an adjacent property, defendant Michael 

Anderson, not negligent.
J-S56018-17

- 3 -

When reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s refusal to give specific 

jury instructions, our standard of review is limited to determining whether the 

trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law that 

controlled the outcome of the case. Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 

663, 667 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation omitted). Moreover, 

A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as a 

whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead or 

confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is 

considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what 

the trial judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to 

fundamental error. Consequently, the trial court has wide 

discretion in fashioning jury instructions. The trial court is not 

required to give every charge that is requested by the parties and 

its refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal 

unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.

Amato v. Bell & Gossett, 116 A.3d 607, 621 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

Sandusky, 77 A.3d at 667 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted)). Further, as 

our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he Suggested Standard Jury 

Instructions themselves are not binding and do not alter the discretion 

afforded trial judges in crafting jury instructions; rather, ‘[a]s their title 

suggests, the instructions are guides only.’” Commonwealth v. Simpson, 

66 A.3d 253, 274 n. 24 (Pa. 2013) (quoting Butler v. Kiwi, S.A., 604 A.2d 

270, 273 (Pa. Super. 1992)).

In its first issue, S3 argues the trial court erred in refusing to give S3’s 

requested jury instruction relating to the duty of care owed to a licensee, such 

as Gamble, by the owner of land. “The duty owed a licensee in Pennsylvania 
J-S56018-17

- 4 -

was established by our Supreme Court in Sharp v. Luksa, 440 Pa. 125, 269 

A.2d 659 (1970), when it adopted the language of section 342 of the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts.” Cresswell v. End, 831 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa. 

Super. 2003). Section 342 provides:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused 

to licensees by a condition on the land if, but only if, (a) the 

possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and 

should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such 

licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize 

the danger, and (b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make 

the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and 

the risk involved, and (c) the licensees do not know or have reason 

to know of the condition and the risk involved. 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342. 

The instruction requested by S3 is as follows:

18.50 (Civ) [OWNER] [OCCUPIER] OF LAND

(DUTY OF CARE OWNED TO LICENSEES 

GENERALLY

A person walking upon a sidewalk in front of a landowner’s 

property is deemed a licensee under Pennsylvania law. Palange 

v. City of Philadelphia, 640 A.2d 1305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).

An [owner] [occupier] of land is required to use reasonable care 

to make the land as safe as it appears, or to disclose to the 

licensees the risks they will encounter. An [owner] [occupier] of 

land is liable for harm cause to the licensees by a condition of the 

land, if

1. The [owner] [occupier] of land knows or has reason 

to know of the condition, should realize that it involves 

an unreasonable risk of harm, and should expect that 

the licensees will not discover or realize the danger, 

and 
J-S56018-17

- 5 -

2. The [owner] [occupier] fails to use reasonable care to 

make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees of 

the condition and the risk involved, and

3. The licensees do not know or have reason to know of 

the condition and the risk involved.

Appellant’s Proposed Points for Charge 5, 11/22/16 at 7.3 

Before charging the jury, the trial judge conducted a charging 

conference. With respect to requested Charge 5, the court explained, “[A]s 

to the more specific [requested] instruction regarding duties to licensee, given 

the fact that the same instructions have a specific instruction on the duty of 

care for someone in the possession of land for sidewalks, that specific 

instruction will control, and your exceptions are otherwise noted.” N.T., Trial, 

8/16/16, at 11. Rather than deliver S3’s requested instruction, the trial court 

delivered an instruction incorporating Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 

18.80, relating to the duty of care for the possessor of land abutting a 

sidewalk, stating:

Negligent conduct may consist either of an act or [omission] to 

act when there’s a duty to do so. In other words, negligence is 

the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person 

would do or that doing something which a reasonably careful 

____________________________________________

3 We note that the title given to the proposed instruction implies that it is the 

suggested standard instruction. However, the suggested instruction does not 

include any reference to Palange. As such, the requested instruction was not 

a suggested standard instruction. Further, as Gamble notes, the suggested 

standard instruction indicates that the owner or occupier of land is required to 

use reasonable care to make the land as safe as it appears or to disclose to 

licensees the risks they will encounter. Appellee’s Brief at 9. There was no 

evidence that S3 did either. Id. (citing N.T. 8/15/16, at 54-57 and 63-66). 
J-S56018-17

- 6 -

person would not do in light of all the surrounding circumstances 

established by the evidence in this case. 

It is for you to determine how a reasonable person would act in 

these circumstances. Let me explain the specific duty of care that 

is at issue in this case. 

A person in possession of land is required to maintain the abutting 

public sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition to prevent or 

eliminate any hazard or unsafe condition that, upon all the 

circumstances involved, would be a reasonable (sic) risk of harm 

to pedestrians properly using the sidewalks.

N.T., Trial, 8/16/16, at 105. The trial court further instructed the jury on 

Gamble’s burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendants and 

the defendants’ burden of proving negligence on the part of Gamble. Id. 

at 103-04, 110-11.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

In Pennsylvania, it is well-settled law that a property owner has a 

duty to keep the sidewalk of their property in a reasonably safe 

condition for travel by the public. Property owners must maintain 

their sidewalks so that they do not present an unreasonable risk 

of harm to pedestrians.

. . . .

Here, [S3’s] corporate designee, Ajay Singhal, testified that he 

owned several properties in the city as investments and that he 

managed the properties himself. With respect to the property 

where [Gamble] fell, Singhal visited that property occasionally to 

mow the grass or to clear the lot. He testified that the condition 

of the sidewalk in front of the property was essentially the same 

as the date on which he purchased the property. Singhal admitted 

that the condition of the sidewalk posed a tripping hazard if a 

person was not careful. There was no evidence that Singhal made 

any effort to repair the sidewalk. 

[Gamble] testified that she lived on the same side of the block 

where [S3’s] property was located for approximately a year and 
J-S56018-17

- 7 -

that she walked by the property twice a day. [Gamble] was aware 

of the deteriorated condition of the sidewalk. She described it as 

“broken, uneven, cracked, sinking.” [N.T. 8/15/16] at 120. She 

testified that she was careful when she walked on that sidewalk 

because she knew she could potentially trip and fall and injure 

herself.

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 5/9/17, at 4-5 (citations and some 

references to notes of testimony omitted).

We find the court’s instructions, taken as a whole, were proper. We do 

not find any clear abuse of discretion or error of law on the part of the trial 

court in rejecting the requested instruction in favor of a suggested standard 

instruction that addressed the specific duty owed by the possessor of land 

abutting a sidewalk. The instruction properly informed the jury of the duty 

owed by S3, accurately described the law, and did not mislead the jury. Again, 

the trial court has broad discretion in fashioning its jury instructions and is not 

required to deliver every requested charge. S3’s first issue fails. 

S3 next complains that the trial court erred in refusing to deliver an 

assumption of risk charge based on Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 

13.220 (Civ). As the trial court explained, “Given the fact I’m instructing on 

comparative negligence, the assumption of risk instruction is no longer 

warranted. Those instructions, at least according to the standard instructions, 

are limited to strict liability cases; or where it’s provided by statute[.]” N.T. 

Trial, 8/16/16, at 11. In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court observed:

The Subcommittee Note to Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil 

Jury Instruction 13.220, entitled “Plaintiff’s Assumption of Risk,” 

states that “No jury instruction is provided here because 
J-S56018-17

- 8 -

assumption of the risk is a question for the court to decide upon 

a nonsuit motion and not a matter for jury determination in 

negligence actions.” The Note further explains, while the defense 

of assumption of risk has generally been replaced by comparative 

negligence, it still remains a viable defense under certain specific 

situations, such as in strict liability cases or where it is specifically 

preserved by statute.

Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 5/9/16, at 7. 

Here, S3 did not request a nonsuit based on assumption of risk. Clearly, 

the case did not involve strict liability or a statute preserving assumption of 

risk. Rather, the case was one of simple negligence, asking the jury to 

determine whether S3 was negligent for failure to satisfy its duty as the 

possessor of land abutting a sidewalk, and further asking the jury if Gamble 

acted reasonably under the circumstances, knowing the deteriorated condition 

of the sidewalk. The trial court appropriately instructed the jury on 

comparative negligence. We find no error in the court’s refusal to instruct the 

jury on assumption of risk. S3’s second issue lacks merit.

Judgment affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/28/2017
J-S56018-17

- 9 -