PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Case No. 18-2648

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA,

 Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(District Court No.: 2-17-cv-03894)

District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

Argued on November 7, 2018

(Opinion filed: February 15, 2019)

Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
2

Jasmeet K. Ahuja

Alexander B. Bowerman

Virginia A. Gibson

Hogan Lovells US

1735 Market Street

23rd Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Kirti Datla

Matthew J. Higgins

Neal K. Katyal (Argued)

Hogan Lovells US

555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Columbia Square

Washington, DC 20004

Marcel S. Pratt

Lewis Rosman

Kelly S. Diffily

City of Philadelphia

Law Department

1515 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellee

Katherine T. Allen (Argued)

United States Department of Justice

Civil Division, Appellate Staff

Room 7325

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530
3

Bradley Hinshelwood

United States Department of Justice

Room 7256

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

Laura Myron

United States Department of Justice

Room 7222

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

Chad A. Readler

United States Department of Justice

Appellate Section, Criminal Division

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

Daniel Tenny

United States Department of Justice

Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch

20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.

Room 7130

Washington, DC 20530

Counsel for Appellant

Lawrence J. Joseph

Suite 700-1A

1250 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

Counsel for Amicus Appellant Immigration Reform Law

Institute
4

Adam S. Lurie

Linklaters

601 Thirteenth Street, N.W.

Suite 400 South

Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Amicus American 

Jewish Committee

Benna R. Solomon

City of Chicago

Corporate Counsel's Office

30 North LaSalle Street

Room 800

Chicago, IL 60602

Counsel for Amicus Appellee City 

of Chicago

Spencer E. W. Amdur

American Civil Liberties Union

Immigrants' Rights Project

125 Broad Street

18th Floor

New York, NY 10004

Counsel for Amicus Appellee 

American Civil Liberties Union 

Foundation 

Ilana H. Eisenstein

DLA Piper

1650 Market Street

One Liberty Place, 49th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103
5

Counsel for Amicus Appellee 

Philadelphia Social and Legal 

Services Organizations

Nicolas Y. Riley

Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection

Georgetown University Law Center

600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20001

Counsel for Amicus Appellee Current and Former Prosecutors and 

Law Enforcement Leaders

Linda Fang

Office of Attorney General of New York

28 Liberty Street

23rd Floor

New York, NY 10005

Counsel for Amicus Appellee 

State of New York

Robert Perrin

Latham & Watkins

355 South Grand Avenue

Suite 100

Los Angeles, CA 90071

Counsel for Amicus Appellee Anti 

Defamation League
6

O P I N I O N 

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

The City of Philadelphia has received funds under the federal Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (“Byrne JAG”) every year since the program’s inception 

in 2006. Last year, however, the Justice Department notified 

the City that it was withholding its FY2017 award because the 

City was not in compliance with three newly implemented conditions (“the Challenged Conditions”). These conditions required greater coordination with federal officials on matters of 

immigration enforcement. The City filed suit to enjoin the Attorney General from withholding its award, and after discovery 

and extensive hearings, the District Court granted summary 

judgment in its favor.

The City attacked the government’s ability to impose the

Challenged Conditions on several statutory and constitutional

fronts. But we need only reach the threshold statutory question. Where, as here, the Executive Branch claims authority 

not granted to it in the Constitution, it “literally has no power 

to act ... unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La.

Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). Therefore, our inquiry is straightforward: did Congress empower the 

Attorney General to impose the Challenged Conditions?

Underlying this question, and potentially complicating its 

resolution, is the stark contrast in the priorities of the City and 

those of the Executive Branch regarding immigration policy. 

In resolving the discrete legal question before us, however, we 
7

make no judgment as to the merits of this policy dispute. Rather, our role is more confined, and our focus is only on the 

legality of the particular action before us. 

Concluding that Congress did not grant the Attorney General this authority, we hold that the Challenged Conditions 

were unlawfully imposed. Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s order to the extent that it enjoins enforcement of 

the Challenged Conditions against the City of Philadelphia. 

We will vacate part of the order, however, to the extent that it 

exceeds the bounds of this controversy. See infra III. B.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Byrne JAG and the Challenged Conditions

Federal grants to state and local governments play a large 

role in facilitating national, state, and local policy. In FY2018

alone, the federal government was expected to give approximately $728 billion to state and local governments through 

1,319 federal grant programs. Robert Jay Dilger, Cong. Research Serv., R40638, Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues 1

(2018). These programs encompass a wide range of policy areas, from health care to special education to infrastructure projects. Our immediate concern, however, is one particular grant 

program for state and local law enforcement: the Edward 

Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program.

Byrne JAG, named for a fallen New York City police officer, was established in 2006 through the merger of two law 

enforcement grant programs. See Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1111, 

119 Stat. 2960, 3094 (2006). The Department of Justice administers the program through the Office of Justice Programs 

(“OJP”), which is headed by an Assistant Attorney General 
8

(“AAG”). Byrne JAG is the “primary provider of federal criminal justice funding to States and units of local government” 

and distributes over $80 million in awards each year. Edward 

Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program FY 2017 

Local Solicitation, Dep’t of Justice (Aug. 3, 2017); App. 332. 

It is a “formula grant,” meaning that funds are distributed 

among all grantees based on a statutorily fixed formula. In the 

case of Byrne JAG, the formula considers two factors: population and violent crime statistics. See 34 U.S.C. § 10156. Once 

approved, grantees may spend those funds within any of the 

eight statutorily enumerated areas.1

Any “State or unit of local government” may submit an application to the Attorney General for this grant. Id. § 10153(a). 

Historically, the OJP has included a number of conditions on 

the application (over 50 for FY2017), most of which relate to 

program integrity or impose requirements for the handling of 

federal funds. Applicants must also certify that they “will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.” Id. § 10153(a)(5)(D). Philadelphia has received an 

award under Byrne JAG every year since the program’s inception in 2006. Its average annual award from the program is 

 1 Byrne JAG funds may be used for the following programs: 

“(A) Law enforcement programs. (B) Prosecution and court 

programs. (C) Prevention and education programs. (D) Corrections and community corrections programs. (E) Drug treatment and enforcement programs. (F) Planning, evaluation, 

and technology improvement programs. (G) Crime victim and 

witness programs (other than compensation). (H) Mental 

health programs and related law enforcement and corrections 

programs, including behavioral programs and crisis intervention teams.” 34 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1).
9

$2.5 million, which it has used to modernize courtroom technology, fund reentry programs for persons on release from 

prison, and operate substance abuse programs, among other 

programs. 

In the FY2017 applications that are the subject of this case, 

the Department included three new conditions. These Challenged Conditions are:

• The Certification Condition. Grantees must “certify 

compliance with [8 U.S.C. § 1373 (“Section 1373”)].” 

Backgrounder on Grant Requirements, Dep’t of Justice 

(July 25, 2017); App. 246. Section 1373 prohibits state 

and local governments from restricting the sharing of 

information relating to an individual’s immigration status—lawful or unlawful—with federal immigration officials. 

• The Access Condition. Grantees must “permit personnel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(“DHS”) to access any detention facility in order to 

meet with an alien and inquire as to his or her right to 

be or remain in the United States.” Id.

• The Notice Condition. Grantees must “provide at least 

48 hours advance notice to DHS regarding the scheduled release date and time of an alien in the jurisdiction’s custody when DHS requests such notice in order 

to take custody of the alien.” Id.

The Attorney General maintains that these conditions are “designed to ensure that the activities of federal law-enforcement 

grant recipients do not impair the federal government’s ability 

to ensure public safety and the rule of law by detaining and 

removing aliens upon their release from local criminal custody.” Att’y Gen. Br. 12.
10

Although the Certification Condition did not apply to 

FY2016 applications, DOJ asked ten jurisdictions, including 

Philadelphia, to submit legal opinions certifying their compliance with Section 1373. Philadelphia submitted its letter in 

April 2017. Upon receiving letters from all ten jurisdictions, 

DOJ issued a press release on July 6, 2017. It stated that the 

Department was “in the process of reviewing” the letters, but 

also stated that “[i]t is not enough to assert compliance, the jurisdictions must actually be in compliance.” Press Release, 

Dep’t of Justice (July 6, 2017); App. 248.

B. Immigration Enforcement and Local Law Enforcement

Under our federal system, “both the National and State 

Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound 

to respect.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398 

(2012). While the federal government has “broad, undoubted 

power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens,”2 id. at 394, the “States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law,” United States v. Lopez, 

514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). 

These powers intersect when a state or city arrests an individual whom ICE would also like to apprehend for removal proceedings.3

 This occurs frequently: 142,356 times in FY2017. 

 2 Within the Executive Branch, immigration enforcement falls 

primarily to DHS. And within DHS, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is the law enforcement agency 

tasked with identifying, apprehending, and removing aliens 

from the United States.

3 “Removal” is synonymous with “deportation.” But as a matter of legal terminology, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
11

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, Fiscal Year 2017 ICE 

Enforcement and Removal Operations Report 8 (2017). 

An important tool used by ICE in these situations is the immigration detainer. Once ICE identifies a removable alien who 

is in state or local custody, it cannot simply wrest that individual from custody. Instead, it may issue a detainer, which serves 

to “advise another law enforcement agency that [it] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the 

purpose of arresting and removing the alien.” 8 C.F.R. § 287. 

Detainers may ask two things of the state or local agency: that 

it notify ICE at least 48 hours before a removable alien is released from custody; and that it detain a removable alien for up 

to 48 hours past the time that the alien would have otherwise 

been released to allow ICE to apprehend the individual. ICE 

Operations Report, supra at 7. A detainer is a request, not a 

demand. Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2014)

(“[D]etainers are not mandatory.”). And DHS’s current policy 

authorizes ICE officials to issue detainers only after obtaining 

an administrative warrant supported by a showing of probable 

cause that the alien is removable. ICE Operations Report, supra at 7-8.

Like the immigration detainer, Section 1373 seeks to facilitate cooperation between the State and National Governments. 

Specifically, it prohibits any restrictions on the sharing of immigration information. Section 1373 provides in relevant part: 

[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or 

official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, 

any government entity or official from sending 

 

replaced all references to “deportation” with “removal.” See

I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 (2001). 
12

to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.

8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). 

C. Factual and Procedural History

1. Factual History 

Philadelphia filed its FY2017 Byrne JAG application on 

September 5, 2017.4

 The Department issued a “preliminary 

determination” of the application on October 11, stating that 

the City “appears to have laws, policies, or practices that violate 8 U.S.C. § 1373.” No doubt, this referred to policies 

adopted by police or executive order that limit the circumstances under which City officials will share immigration information with the federal government, permit federal officials 

to access City prison facilities, and coordinate with federal officials regarding the release of aliens from local custody.5

 The 

 4 Philadelphia intended to use FY2017 funds to support the Police Commissioner’s “Crime Fighting Strategy,” support the 

City’s “Reality Based Training Unit,” purchase supplies for inner-city youth initiatives, and purchase naxalone for officers 

responding to opioid overdoses. See S.A. 23. 5 Specifically, the policies at issue are:

The Confidentiality Memo. Police Memorandum 01-06, 

adopted in May 2001, directs law enforcement officers to share 

immigration information with the federal government under 

limited circumstances: when required by law, when the immigrant consents, or when the “immigrant is suspected of engaging in criminal activity.” App. 250-51.
13

City believes that these policies help foster trust between the 

immigrant community and law enforcement. It argues that 

such policies are “critical to reassure law-abiding residents that 

contact with the City government will not lead to deportation 

by ICE.” Philadelphia Br. 7. 

2. Procedural History 

This case has unfolded in four main acts: Philadelphia filed 

a complaint seeking to enjoin the Department from implementing the Challenged Conditions; the District Court granted a 

preliminary injunction; the District Court granted summary 

judgement and a permanent injunction for the City; and, finally, the Attorney General filed this appeal.

On August 30, 2017, Philadelphia filed the complaint in 

this action against the Department of Justice in the U.S. District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The City sought 

 

The Confidentiality Order. Executive Order 8-09, enacted in 

November 2009, bars law enforcement officers from inquiring 

about a person’s immigration status, “unless the status itself is 

a necessary predicate of a crime the officer is investigating or 

unless the status is relevant to identification of a person who is 

suspected of committing a crime.” App. 254.

The Detainer Order. Executive Order 5-16, enacted in January 

2016, bars City officials from detaining an immigrant pursuant 

to an ICE detainer or from providing notice of the immigrant’s 

release, unless the request is accompanied by a judicial warrant. App. 258-59. 

The Inmate Consent Form. These consent forms are distributed to incarcerated individuals whom ICE requests to interrogate. The forms require the inmate’s consent before ICE is 

permitted access to the facility to conduct an interview. App. 

263.
14

to enjoin the Department from implementing the Challenged 

Conditions and a writ of mandamus compelling the Department to disburse its FY2017 Byrne JAG funds. The City argued that this relief was warranted for five reasons: the Department acted ultra vires in enacting the Challenged Conditions 

in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and 

the Constitution’s separation of powers; the Conditions were

enacted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA; 

they violated the Spending Clause of the Constitution; the Certification Condition and Section 1373 violate the Tenth 

Amendment of the Constitution; and the City was, in fact, in 

substantial compliance with the Challenged Conditions. App. 

411-63.

The District Court held extensive hearings and issued a preliminary injunction on November 15, 2017. In a thoughtful 

and well-reasoned opinion, the Court found that the City was 

likely to succeed on all of its claims, and enjoined the Department from denying its FY2017 application. See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (Philadelphia I). The Department appealed the preliminary injunction to this Court on January 16, 2018. After filing its appeal, 

the case continued in the District Court, where the Department 

also filed a motion to dismiss the City’s complaint. The District Court denied this motion on March 13, 2018. See City of 

Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 271 (E.D. Pa. 2018).

In two orders, the Court granted summary judgment for the 

City on all of its claims. See App. 93; City of Philadelphia v. 

Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (Philadelphia 

II). It permanently enjoined the Department from enforcing 

the Challenged Conditions, ordered the Department to disburse 

the City’s FY2017 funds, and issued declaratory relief on all of 
15

the City’s legal claims. Furthermore, the Court issued additional relief, namely, ordering that “[t]o the extent an agency 

of the United States Government has probable cause to assert 

that an individual in the custody of the City of Philadelphia is 

a criminal alien ... and seeks transfer to federal custody of such 

individual within a city facility, it shall secure an order from a 

judicial officer of the United States for further detention, as allowed by law.” App. 191. 

After the District Court issued this order, we dismissed the 

Attorney General’s appeal of the preliminary injunction. The 

Attorney General filed this timely appeal of the Court’s grant 

of summary judgment and permanent injunction.

D. Related Litigation

Philadelphia is not alone in being advised that its Byrne 

JAG award depends upon compliance with the Challenged 

Conditions. Indeed, several other jurisdictions have sued to 

enjoin enforcement of the Challenged Conditions, including 

the City of Chicago, the City and County of San Francisco, and 

the City of New York (which was joined by seven states—New 

York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Washington, 

Massachusetts, and Virginia). In all of these cases, the courts

that have ruled have enjoined enforcement of the Challenged 

Conditions. See City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 

933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (Chicago I) (issuing a preliminary injunction as to the Notice and Access Conditions); City of Chicago 

v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (Chicago II) (affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction); City of Chicago 

v. Sessions, 321 F. Supp. 3d 855 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (Chicago III)

(issuing a permanent injunction); City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, 2018 WL 4859528 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2018)

(San Francisco) (issuing a permanent injunction after declining to issue a preliminary injunction); States of New York, et 
16

al. v. Dep’t of Justice, 2018 WL 6257693 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 

2018) (New York, et al.) (issuing a permanent injunction). 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331 and 1346. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review the District Court’s findings of fact for 

clear error, and we review its legal conclusions de novo. Blackledge v. Blackledge, 866 F.3d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 2017). We 

review the scope of the District Court’s injunctive relief for 

abuse of discretion. Allstate Settlement Corp. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

The District Court addressed each of the City’s contentions 

and ruled that: the Attorney General did not have statutory authority to promulgate the Challenged Conditions; he did so arbitrarily and capriciously; the Challenged Conditions violate 

the Spending Clause; the Certification Condition violates the 

Tenth Amendment; and the City was in substantial compliance 

with the Challenged Conditions. The Attorney General challenges these rulings and also argues that the District Court 

abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief. 

We begin with the threshold issue: whether the Attorney 

General possessed the statutory authority to enact the Challenged Conditions. If the Attorney General did not have that

authority, then we needn’t reach the other claims.

A. Statutory Authorization for the Challenged Conditions

Where, as here, the Executive Branch is not acting pursuant 

to a constitutional power, it “literally has no power to act ... 
17

unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” La. Pub. 

Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374. An executive agency that acts 

without statutory authority violates the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C), and may run afoul of the

constitutional separation of powers. Accordingly, we must determine whether Congress empowered the Attorney General to 

promulgate the Challenged Conditions. We consider three

sources of authority offered by the Attorney General: first, the

Byrne JAG statute, 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10158; second, the 

provision defining the duties of the AAG for OJP, 34 U.S.C. § 

10102(a); and third, for the Certification Condition only, Section 10153(a)(5)(D) of the Byrne JAG statute. 

In interpreting the meaning of these statutory provisions,

we rely on the rules of statutory interpretation articulated by 

the Supreme Court and this Court. Our point of departure is 

the text of the statute. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 

989 F.2d 619, 633 (3d Cir. 1993). But we are mindful not to

read provisions in isolation. Rather, we look to the text and 

structure of the statute as a whole. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 

Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). We are also guided by any 

relevant, well-established canons of statutory interpretation. 

See Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 598 F.3d 156, 

160 (3d Cir. 2010).

1. The Byrne JAG Statute

The Attorney General argues that authorization for the Notice Condition and the Access Condition is found in the Byrne 

JAG statute itself.6

 See Att’y Gen. Br. 23. He pursues this 

 6 The Attorney General asserts that one provision of the Byrne 

JAG statute, § 10153(a)(5)(D), authorizes the Certification 

Condition but not the Notice and Access Conditions. We will 

discuss that provision separately, infra III. A. 3.
18

argument in the least depth, however, and for good reason. 

Such authorization is nowhere to be found in the text of the 

statute. As other courts have noted, the statute delegates some 

authority to the Attorney General, but it is exceptionally limited in nature.7

 See, e.g., San Francisco, 2018 WL 4859528, 

at *10 (“[T]he Byrne JAG statute contains limited discretionary authority for the Attorney General to carry out specific 

parts of the grant program.”). Two aspects of the statute, however, deserve closer scrutiny. The first is cited by the Attorney 

General as authorizing the Notice and Access Conditions, and 

the second, although not relied on by the Attorney General, 

highlights just how little discretionary authority the statute 

confers on him.

First, the Attorney General has limited authority to monitor 

and review grantees’ program and financial information. For 

example, the statute directs him to require grantees to certify 

that program funds “will not be used to supplant State or local 

funds.” Id. § 10153(a)(1). He is directed to require “each program funded under this part [to] contain a program assessment 

component,” id. § 10152(c)(1), but he may waive that requirement if he deems that a program is “not of sufficient size to 

justify a full program assessment,” id. § 10152(c)(2). He must

also direct applicants to report “data, records, and information 

(programmatic and financial)” that he may “reasonably require,” id. § 10153(a)(4), and require that grantees certify that 

 7 For example, the Attorney General may determine the “form” 

of the application, 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a); he may waive the prohibition on using funds on vehicles, luxury items, real estate, 

and construction projects, id. § 10152(d)(2); and he may provide “technical assistance” to jurisdictions that request it, id. § 

10153(b)(1). 
19

“there has been appropriate coordination with affected agencies,” id. § 10153(a)(5).

The Attorney General argues that these latter two provisions—regarding data reporting and coordination with affected 

agencies—authorize the Notice and Access Conditions. See

Att’y Gen. Br. 26. His theory is that notice of an alien’s release 

from custody constitutes “information” that the Attorney General may “reasonably require” and access to prison facilities 

constitutes “appropriate coordination” with an affected agency. 

But this interpretation stretches those provisions too far. The 

data-reporting requirement is expressly limited to “programmatic and financial” information—i.e., information regarding 

the handling of federal funds and the programs to which those 

funds are directed. It does not cover Department priorities unrelated to the grant program. Furthermore, the coordination 

requirement asks for a certification that there “has been” appropriate coordination. Given that “Congress’ use of a verb 

tense is significant in construing statutes,” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992), and this provision is housed in 

a subsection containing several other certification requirements regarding a grantee’s application, we interpret it to require certification that there was appropriate coordination in 

connection with the grantee’s application. This does not serve 

as a basis to impose an ongoing requirement to coordinate on 

matters unrelated to the use of grant funds. 

Second, certain provisions of the statute, and other provisions in the U.S. Code that expressly mention the Byrne JAG 

statute, give the Attorney General narrow authority to withhold 
20

or re-allocate funds under very limited circumstances.8

 For example, he may re-allocate funds among grantees and withhold 

a small percentage of funds from a particular grantee. The statute gives the Attorney General the authority to “reserve not 

more than 5 percent” of total funds in order to “address ... precipitous or extraordinary increases in crime” or to “mitigate 

significant programmatic harm resulting from operation of the 

formula” in one or more jurisdictions. 34 U.S.C. § 10157. This

provision, however, authorizes the Attorney General to re-allocate funds only in those two, narrow circumstances. And it 

only allows the Attorney General to set aside five percent of 

the total Byrne JAG funds, leaving the formula in place for distribution of the remainder of the funds. It does not authorize 

the enactment of the Challenged Conditions or the withholding

of the entirety of a particular jurisdiction’s award.

There are also circumstances in which the Attorney General 

may, or must, withhold Byrne JAG funds for a grantee’s failure

to comply with certain federal laws. For example, he may 

withhold up to four percent of a jurisdiction’s Byrne JAG funds 

if it fails to meet certain requirements of the National Instant 

Criminal Background Check System. See 34 U.S.C. § 

40914(b)(1). A mandatory reduction of five percent of Byrne 

JAG funds will occur if there are egregious violations. See id.

§ 40914(b)(2). The Attorney General also has the discretion to 

withhold “not more than [] 10-percent” of Byrne JAG funds if 

a jurisdiction fails to comply with “death-in-custody” reporting 

requirements. Id. § 60105(c)(2). All other delegations of this 

 8 The Attorney General does not rely on these provisions, but 

we think that consideration of them is necessary to make our 

analysis complete. The limited scope of authority granted by 

these provisions stands in stark contrast to the broad authority

the Attorney General seeks. 
21

sort are similarly circumscribed. See id. § 20927(a) (mandatory ten percent penalty for failure to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act); id. § 30307(e)(2) 

(mandatory five percent penalty for failure to comply with the 

Prison Rape Elimination Act).

We discuss these provisions primarily to highlight what 

they do not authorize: the power to withhold all of a grantee’s 

funds for any reason the Attorney General chooses. See Chicago II, 888 F.3d at 284 (“None of those provisions grant the 

Attorney General the authority to impose conditions that require states or local governments to assist in immigration enforcement, nor to deny funds to states or local governments for 

the failure to comply with those conditions.”). Moreover, as 

the District Court and the Seventh Circuit have observed,

9

Congress knows how to grant this sort of broad discretionary 

authority when it wants. See 34 U.S.C. § 10446(e)(3) (Grants 

to Combat Violent Crime Against Women) (“In disbursing 

grants under this subchapter, the Attorney General may impose 

reasonable conditions on grant awards....”). But it has not 

done so here. 

Such a grant of authority, if it existed, would also render 

the aforementioned limited grants of authority superfluous. If 

Congress had already given the Attorney General this sweeping authority to withhold all funds for any reason, it would have 

no need to delineate numerous, specific circumstances under 

which the Attorney General may withhold limited amounts of 

 9 See City of Philadelphia I, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 616 (“Congress 

delegated authority to impose conditions on other grants in the 

same chapter, and did so clearly.”); Chicago II, 888 F.3d at 286 

(“Congress knew how to grant such authority, and explicitly 

did so in another statute within the same Act.”). 
22

funds. Even if the statute were ambiguous—which it is not—

we generally would not interpret such a provision to render superfluous more specific delegations of power. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006) (“It would be anomalous for Congress to have so painstakingly described the Attorney General’s limited authority to deregister a single physician or schedule a single drug, but to have given him, just by 

implication, authority to declare an entire class of activity outside ‘the course of professional practice,’ and therefore a criminal violation of the CSA.”); see also Chicago II, 888 F.3d at 

286 (“Against that backdrop, it is inconceivable that Congress 

would have anticipated that the Assistant Attorney General 

could abrogate the entire distribution scheme and deny all 

funds to states and localities that would qualify under the 

Byrne JAG statutory provisions, based on the Assistant Attorney General’s decision to impose his or her own conditions—

the putative authority for which is provided in a different statute.”).

Finding no authority for the Challenged Conditions in the 

Byrne JAG statute or other provisions that specifically mention 

it, we turn to the Attorney General’s next suggested source of

authority.

2. The Duties and Functions of Assistant Attorney 

General

The Attorney General also argues that all three conditions 

are authorized by 34 U.S.C. § 10102, the provision establishing 

the “Duties and Functions of Assistant Attorney General” for 

the Office of Justice Programs. That provision provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he Assistant Attorney General shall”:
23

exercise such other powers and functions as may 

be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General, including placing special conditions on all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula grants.

34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (emphasis added). The Attorney General argues that because this provision authorizes “placing special conditions on all grants,” it authorizes placing the Challenged Conditions on the Byrne JAG grant. 

But the Attorney General’s argument runs headlong into an

obstacle: the word “including.”10 In the Attorney General’s 

view, the Special Conditions Clause confers upon the AAG 

new authority, not found elsewhere in the Code, to establish 

conditions on grants. This clause, however, is preceded by the 

word “including,” which is used to denote something that is 

within a larger whole. See Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, 1143 (3d ed. 

1993) (defining “include” as “to place, list, or rate as a part or 

component of a whole or of a larger group class or aggregate”). 

 10 Several other federal courts have identified this flaw in the 

Attorney General’s reasoning. See, e.g., Chicago II, 888 F.3d 

at 285 (“Because that interpretation is so obviously belied by 

the plain meaning of the word ‘including,’ the Attorney General’s position is untenable.”); New York, et al., 2018 WL 

6257693, at *7 (“The problem for Defendants is that the 

[Clause] begins with the word ‘including.’”); San Francisco, 

2018 WL 4859528, at *12 (“The clause begins with the word 

‘including,’ conveying a reference to part of a whole.”).
24

In the case of this provision, “including” signifies that the Special Conditions Clause is part of “such other powers and functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney General.” 

34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (emphasis added). Therefore, under 

the plain text of this provision, the AAG has the power to place 

special conditions on grants only to the extent that such power 

has been vested in him or her “pursuant to this chapter or by 

delegation of the Attorney General.” As we discussed in the 

previous section, the broad authority he urges has not been 

vested in the Attorney General or the AAG in the Byrne JAG 

statute or anywhere else in the United States Code. Therefore,

the Special Conditions Clause cannot authorize this power on 

its own. 

The structure of Section 10102 also casts serious doubt on 

the Attorney General’s interpretation. The Special Conditions 

Clause is housed in the sixth of six subsections delineating the 

AAG’s power. The preceding five subsections all deal with 

the AAG’s power to disseminate criminal justice information 

and coordinate with various agencies and officials. See 34 

U.S.C. § 10102(a)(1)-(5). The principle of noscitur a sociis—

“a word is known by the company it keeps”—is helpful here. 

Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015). Given 

the ministerial nature of the powers in the preceding five subsections, we would be hesitant to find such a sweeping grant of 

authority in the sixth subsection absent clear language to support that interpretation.

11 Moreover, hiding such a broad 

 11 In stating this, we join the District Court and several other 

federal courts. See Chicago II, 888 F.3d at 285 (“§ 10102(a)(6) 

would be an unlikely place for Congress to place a power as 

broad as the one the Attorney General asserts.”); Philadelphia 

I, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 617 (“Congress is unlikely to ground the 
25

power—the power to place any special conditions on all

grants—in a statute outlining ministerial duties for an Assistant 

Attorney General would be akin to hiding an elephant in a 

mousehole. And Congress “does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 

U.S. 457, 468 (2001).

Given its text and structure, 34 U.S.C. § 10102 does not 

authorize the Attorney General’s imposition of the Challenged 

Conditions. We turn, then, to the Attorney General’s final statutory argument.

3. All Other Applicable Federal Laws

The Attorney General next argues that the Certification 

Condition is authorized by 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D). This 

section of the Byrne JAG statute requires applicants to certify 

that they “will comply with all provisions of this part and all 

other applicable Federal laws.” Id. § 10153(a)(5)(D) (emphasis added). The Attorney General argues that Section 1373—

discussed supra, I. B., prohibiting restrictions on the sharing of 

information regarding immigration status—is an applicable

federal law, as it applies to local government entities. Accordingly, he argues that he is authorized to require applicants to 

 

Attorney General’s authority to impose substantive conditions 

in a subsection dedicated to conferring power on the AAG.”); 

New York, et al., 2018 WL 6257693, at *8 (“[Section 10102] 

would be an odd place indeed to put a sweeping power to impose any conditions on any grants—a power much more significant than all of the duties and powers that precede it in the 

listing, and a power granted to the Assistant Attorney General 

that was not granted to the Attorney General.”) (quoting Chicago II, 888 F.3d at 285).
26

certify their compliance with that law. The City responds, 

however, that the Applicable Laws Clause only covers laws 

that “expressly govern federal grants or grantees.” Philadelphia Br. 20. At first blush, both parties’ interpretations have 

merit—the text does not explicitly indicate to whom, or to

what, the laws must be applicable. But closer scrutiny of the 

text, structure, and history of the provision leads us to reject 

the Attorney General’s expansive view.

Starting with the text, we observe that 34 U.S.C. § 

10153(a)(5)(D) contains an initial specific phrase followed by 

a general phrase: a grant applicant must certify that it “will 

comply with [1] all provisions of this part and [2] all other applicable Federal laws.” In these situations, the principle of 

ejusdem generis teaches that “the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific 

enumeration.” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers 

Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). But “[t]he absence of a list

of specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem 

generis.” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 225 

(2008) (emphasis added). If the general phrase (“all other applicable Federal laws”) were preceded by a list of specific federal laws, then our task would be much easier. But here we 

find only “one specific and one general category.” Id. Moreover, the specific phrase (“all provisions of this part”) tells us 

little about the meaning of the general phrase. In short, 

ejusdem generis does not get us very far in interpreting “all 

other applicable Federal laws.”

But several other considerations all suggest that Section 

1373 is not an “applicable” law. First, the canon against surplusage counsels us to read the term “applicable” in a way that 

gives it some independent heft. See Paek v. Att’y Gen., 793 

F.3d 330, 337 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The canon against surplusage 
27

counsels us to give effect to every word of a statute.”). Here, 

the term “applicable” avoids being redundant only by doing 

some limiting work beyond delineating the set of all federal 

laws that would “appl[y]” to an entity like Philadelphia. Otherwise, Congress could have simply written that a grant applicant must certify compliance with “all other Federal laws.” See 

San Fransisco, 2018 WL 4859528 at *17 (“[I]t is superfluous 

to interpret ‘all other applicable Federal laws’ as ‘all Federal 

laws.’”). Thus, the word “applicable” must have a narrower 

meaning than one that sweeps in all possible laws that independently apply to a grant applicant.

Second, the noscitur a sociis canon—discussed supra, III. 

A. 2.—provides further guidance. The Applicable Laws 

Clause is located in the fourth of four subsections, all of which

require certifications that must be included in a Byrne JAG application. These four requirements provide that an “application 

shall include ... [a] certification ... that”: 

(A) the programs to be funded by the grant meet 

all the requirements of this part;

(B) all the information contained in the application is correct; 

(C) there has been appropriate coordination with 

affected agencies; and

(D) the applicant will comply with all provisions 

of this part and all other applicable Federal laws.

34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5). These requirements all relate to the 

programs that will be funded under the grant. See San Francisco, 2018 WL 4859528, at *17 (“[A]ll the other conditions in 

Section 10153(a) apply to the grant itself.”); New York, et al., 

2018 WL 6257693, at *9 (“The structure of § 10153, which 
28

concerns requirements pertaining to the grant and the application, points toward the [more narrow] reading.”). This is evident on the face of the first requirement. The second requirement necessarily deals with programs funded under the grant, 

as the bulk of information contained in the application is regarding the use of grant funds. And we can infer that the requirement that there “has been appropriate coordination with 

affected agencies” relates to coordination that had occurred in 

compiling a grantee’s application. Although not dispositive, 

these narrow neighboring provisions counsel against a broad 

interpretation of the Applicable Laws Clause. Thus, it would 

be reasonable to view “all other applicable Federal laws” to 

refer specifically to laws that apply to operations relating to the 

grant, not to require the City to certify compliance with every 

single law that might apply to it. 

Third, the historical practice of the Justice Department is 

also an important interpretive tool. See N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of the government’ can inform our determination of ‘what 

the law is.’”) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 

401 (1819), and Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 

(1803)). Here, the Justice Department’s historical practice 

does not comport with the broad interpretation that it urges in 

this case. Every condition that is authorized by the Applicable 

Laws Clause applies specifically to programs funded under the 

grant, not more generally to the grantee.

12 

 12 While the Attorney General does not expressly state the 

statutory authority for each condition, the City does. See

App. 391-400. The Attorney General does not take issue with 

the City’s account. 
29

The Attorney General points to several conditions—such as 

compliance with laws regarding human research, body armor 

purchases, and military equipment purchases—as establishing 

a practice of conditioning Byrne JAG funds on certification of

compliance with broader categories of federal law. But these

conditions are not blanket requirements with which the grantee 

must comply under all circumstances; rather, their applicability 

is conditioned on whether federal funds are used in a particular 

area. See, e.g., App. 379 (requiring compliance with 28 C.F.R. 

§ 46, which sets out regulations for human research that is 

“conducted or supported by a federal department or agency”). 

For example, if a grantee uses funds to purchase body armor or 

military style equipment, then it must comply with the applicable federal regulations regarding those purchases. And if a 

grantee uses funds to conduct research on human subjects, then

it must comply with the applicable federal regulations in that 

area. The Certification Condition is written differently: regardless of how a grantee uses its funds, it must certify compliance 

with this federal law. The Attorney General has not pointed to 

any historical precedent for the kind of unconditional requirement it now seeks to impose.

Fourth, as we have noted, Congress structured the Byrne 

JAG program as a “formula grant,” under which a jurisdiction’s award is calculated through a formula that considers only 

population and violent crime statistics. The Attorney General 

asserts that the Applicable Laws Clause authorizes him to condition Byrne JAG funds on compliance with any law in the 

U.S. Code. But that reading of the Clause would destabilize 

the formula nature of the grant. Allowing the Attorney General 

to withhold all funds because a jurisdiction does not certify 

compliance with any federal law of the Attorney General’s 

choosing undermines the predictability and consistency embedded in the program’s design, thus turning the formula grant 
30

into a discretionary one. Moreover, if Byrne JAG were intended to be a discretionary grant, one would think that Congress would house it in the section of the U.S. Code containing 

discretionary Justice Department grants, see 34 U.S.C. Subt. I, 

Ch. 101, Subch. V, Part B (“Discretionary Grants”), not its 

own, neighboring section, see 34 U.S.C. Subt. I, Ch. 101, 

Subch. V., Part A (“Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program”). 

Finally, there is reason to doubt that even under a broad 

reading of the Applicable Laws Clause, Section 1373 would 

apply. In the “Administrative Provisions” section of the same 

chapter of the code as the Applicable Laws Clause, Congress 

provided:

Nothing in this chapter or any other Act shall be 

construed to authorize any department, agency, 

officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over 

any police force or any other criminal justice 

agency of any State or any political subdivision 

thereof.

34 U.S.C. § 10228. Under the plain terms of this provision, the 

Applicable Laws Clause “shall” not be “construed” to authorize the Department to “exercise any direction, supervision, or 

control” over Philadelphia Police. But under the Attorney 

General’s reading of the Applicable Laws Clause, Section 

1373 would authorize the Department to direct, supervise, or 

control Philadelphia Police communications with ICE. Section 

10228 may therefore be a statutory limit to which laws are “applicable” under the Applicable Laws Clause. 

Accordingly, we find that Section 1373 is not an applicable 

law for the purposes of Byrne JAG. 
31

* * *

After reviewing the three sources of authority offered by 

the Attorney General, we hold that Congress has not empowered the Attorney General to enact the Challenged Conditions. 

Because the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority 

in promulgating the Challenged Conditions, we needn’t reach 

Philadelphia’s other arguments. Therefore, all that remains for 

the purposes of our review is the District Court’s injunctive order. 

B. The Judicial Warrant Injunction

In its final judgment and decree, the District Court issued

injunctive relief establishing that a judicial warrant shall be 

necessary to transfer a criminal alien to federal custody. The 

order provides, in relevant part:

To the extent an agency of the United States 

Government has probable cause to assert that an 

individual in the custody of the City of Philadelphia is a criminal alien (as previously defined by 

this Court in City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 

2018 WL 2725503, *19 n. 3 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 

2018), and seeks transfer to federal custody of 

such individual within a city facility, it shall secure an order from a judicial officer of the United 

States for further detention, as allowed by law.

App. 191. The Attorney General asks that, even if we find for 

the City on the merits—which we have done—we vacate this 

section of the order. In a memorandum accompanying the Order, the District Court explained that the order was necessary 

to shield the City from legal liability that might arise if it detained an individual pursuant to an immigration detainer who 

should have otherwise been released. App. 194. The Court 
32

stated that, with this order, “[t]his risk can be easily eliminated.” App. 194.

We do not doubt, as the District Court rightly decided, that 

equitable relief was warranted in this case. See Philadelphia 

II, 309 F. Supp. 3d at 338-43. The question before us, however, 

is whether the Court’s order swept too broadly.13 While there 

are tried and true standards for determining when equitable relief is warranted, see, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 

482 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing the four-part test for determine

when a permanent injunction is warranted), there is less authority regarding the scope of equitable relief. The Supreme Court 

has instructed that the equity power of the federal courts is confined to “the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English Court of 

Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.” Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, 

Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999). We have stated, consistent with 

many of our sister circuits, that “injunctive relief should be ‘no 

more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 

complete relief to plaintiffs.’” Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. 

v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 

578, 598 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 

U.S. 682, 702 (1979)); see also Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 785 (2d. Cir. 1994) (“Injunctive relief 

should be narrowly tailored to fit specific legal violations.”); 

Hayes v. N. State Law Enf’t Officers Ass’n, 10 F.3d 207, 217 

(4th Cir. 1993) (“An injunction should be tailored to restrain 

no more than what is reasonably required to accomplish its 

ends.”) (internal quotation omitted). In short, equitable relief 

 13 “We review the terms of an injunction for abuse of discretion.” Allstate Settlement Corp. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 

F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 2009). 
33

should be “dictated by the extent of the violation established.” 

Califano, 442 U.S. at 702. 

Our review of the scope of the District Court’s injunction, 

then, has two aspects: first, we must determine “the extent of 

the violation established,” id.; and second, we must determine 

whether the injunction is “more burdensome to the defendant 

than necessary to provide complete relief to plaintiffs.” Novartis, 290 F.3d at 598. On the first point, we have already

addressed the legal violation at length: the Attorney General 

acted ultra vires in imposing the three Challenged Conditions 

on Byrne JAG grants. Several aspects of the District Court’s 

order are narrowly tailored to remedying this legal wrong, including enjoining the Attorney General from enforcing the 

Challenged Conditions on Philadelphia’s application and ordering the Attorney General to issue Philadelphia’s FY2017 

award. Both of these orders speak directly to the dispute over 

the Challenged Conditions.

The judicial warrant requirement, however, goes beyond 

the bounds of the complaint. While the District Court’s concerns regarding the legality of holding an alien pursuant to a 

detainer may well be legitimate, they are not part of this case 

and controversy. Nor, as we noted above, is the broader policy 

dispute between the City and the Attorney General regarding 

immigration enforcement. The order extends outside of this 

particular case and controversy and into those disputes.

Moreover, the other aspects of the order entered by the District Court afford the City full and complete relief. The City 

filed its complaint to enjoin the Attorney General from denying 

its Byrne JAG award based on unlawfully imposed conditions. 

The other aspects of the District Court’s order require that the 

Attorney General distribute the City’s FY2017 award and re-
34

frain from ever enforcing the Challenged Conditions. A district court has discretion to fashion equitable remedies, but 

these aspects of the order left the City wanting nothing by way 

of further remedies. The judicial warrant requirement was not 

requested in the District Court and was not defended with any 

vigor at oral argument. See Oral Argument Transcript, 52 (stating that the District Court’s order is “the hardest thing to defend”). 

Accordingly, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion as to the scope of the equitable relief and will vacate its

order to the extent it imposed a requirement that the federal 

government obtain a judicial warrant before seeking custody 

of aliens in City custody.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the Attorney 

General did not have statutory authority to impose the Challenged Conditions. We also determine that the District Court 

abused its discretion in granting broader injunctive relief than 

was warranted. Accordingly, we will affirm the District 

Court’s order to the extent it is supported by this opinion, and 

we will vacate its order as it pertains to the judicial warrant 

requirement.