Filed 12/29/23 P. v. Johnson CA2/5

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLARK LORENZO JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

B318816

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BA485308)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Henry J. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.

Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Clark Lorenzo Johnson was convicted of 

trafficking three minors for commercial sex acts and attempting 

to kidnap two sex workers, one of whom he also attempted to 

traffic. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by denying his 

six requests to substitute appointed counsel; his counsel provided 

constitutionally defective representation by failing to object to 

testimony by the prosecution’s human trafficking expert; and the 

evidence is insufficient to support one of the trafficking 

convictions. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

By amended information dated August 12, 2021, defendant 

was charged with two counts of attempted human trafficking 

(Pen. Code, § 664/236.1, subd. (b); counts 1–2); one count of 

attempted kidnapping (§ 664/207, subd. (a); count 3); and three 

counts of human trafficking of a minor to engage in a commercial 

sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1); counts 4–6).

1 The information also 

alleged defendant had sustained one prior strike conviction. 

(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).) Defendant pled 

not guilty and denied the allegation.

Although defendant sought a speedy trial, proceedings were 

delayed for over a year due to the Covid-19 pandemic. After a 

jury trial at which he testified on his own behalf, defendant was 

found guilty of all counts. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury 

found the strike allegation true. 

The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the prior 

strike under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero)

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and sentenced him to an aggregate term of

36 years in prison. The court selected count 5 (§ 236.1, 

subd. (c)(1)) as the principal count and imposed the middle term 

of 8 years, doubled to 16 years for the prior strike. The court 

imposed consecutive terms of 4 years, 8 months—one-third the 

midterm of 7 years, doubled for the strike prior—for counts 1 and 

2 (§ 664/236.1, subd. (b)) and consecutive terms of 5 years,

4 months—one-third the midterm of 8 years, doubled for the 

strike prior—for counts 4 and 6 (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)). The court 

stayed sentence on count 3 (§ 664/207, subd. (g)) under 

section 654. 

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Princess, L.M., and Madison Work as Prostitutes

Sometime around Thanksgiving 2019, high school students 

Madison M., Princess W., L.M., and Raven drove from San Diego 

to Los Angeles in a stolen, red Volkswagen Jetta. All of the girls 

were minors. A pimp named S.B. may have also been in the car. 

Once Madison, Princess, and L.M. arrived in Los Angeles, 

they spent several days working for S.B. as prostitutes.2 But 

Madison soon left Princess and L.M. behind and began working 

for defendant, who went by the name Payso. 

Not long after Madison’s departure, Princess and L.M. 

spotted her with defendant in a gray car. Soon thereafter, 

Princess and L.M. decided to work for defendant. Princess made 

2 It is not clear what became of Raven once the girls reached 

Los Angeles. Defendant was not charged with any offense 

related to Raven, and it does not appear that she performed sex 

work under his direction. Only Princess testified at trial.
4

the switch from S.B. to defendant because she wanted to stay 

with Madison. 

Defendant was in charge of Princess, L.M., and Madison 

between approximately November 29 and December 4, 2019. 

Princess estimated that she saw about 10 clients during this 

period. All three girls would give defendant the money they 

earned performing sex work. 

The prosecution introduced a photograph of Princess and 

L.M. captioned “King Payso’s Bitch,” with a moneybag symbol.

Another photograph of Princess was captioned, “Making money 

moves Bitch.” It also included a moneybag. 

2. December 4, 2019 Arrests

On December 4, 2019, at 3:37 a.m., police saw defendant 

driving the stolen Volkswagen Jetta. Princess and L.M. were 

also in the car. Princess was wearing glittery brown shorts and a 

tight shirt. L.M. was wearing a black shirt, black jacket, and 

black thong underwear—but nothing else. Defendant and the 

two girls were taken into custody. (Princess later admitted a 

joyriding allegation (Veh. Code, § 10851) in the San Diego 

juvenile court.)

A search of the car revealed $1,700 in cash. Police also 

recovered a red Skytel mobile phone from the front seat and an 

iPhone from the back seat. They subsequently extracted the 

contents of both phones. 

The Skytel username was kingpaycasso@kingpaycasso; it 

contained a photograph of defendant. The phone was logged in to 

the Instagram account king.paycasso. Many of the messages in 

the account were addressed to “Daddy” and discussed 

arrangements for sex work. 

The iPhone had the usernames Bitchdusse and Princess 
5

Waggs. The call log contained numerous calls to King Paycasso. 

The phone contained a photo of defendant with the words “Smack 

Man” and “King Paycasso.” There was also a photograph of the 

stolen Jetta. The windshield was fogged over, and “Daddy” and 

“Payso” had been written in the condensation. 

3. February 12, 2020 Arrest

On February 12, 2020, Los Angeles Police Department 

Detective Vanessa Rios and her partner were monitoring 

Figueroa Boulevard between 65th Street and 66th Street. Other 

undercover units were nearby. The area, known as “the blade,” is 

one of the largest prostitution tracks in Los Angeles.

Rios observed sex workers standing on different corners. 

One of the workers, C.T., was at the corner of 66th Street and 

Denver Avenue, waving down cars. Rios saw a car speed down 

66th Street, stop quickly, then reverse. Defendant was in the 

passenger seat. Defendant yelled at C.T., “Bitch, this is 

pimping.” C.T. tried to walk away without looking at him. Then 

defendant yelled, “Bitch, there’s some pimping going on here” and 

“you’re out of pocket.” He continued: “You in the pocket, bitch. 

You in the pocket.” Rios testified that this meant C.T. had 

another pimp and was ignoring defendant. C.T. walked away, 

but defendant’s car cut her off by driving on the sidewalk. C.T. 

walked the other direction because she thought defendant was 

going to rob and kidnap her. The car left C.T. behind and 

continued north. Detective Rios followed. 

This time, defendant jumped out of the car, chased a

prostitute later identified as Jane Doe, and tried to grab her. 

Defendant yelled, “faggot bitch, you’re mine.” Rios explained this 

was a derogatory term to refer to someone who is not following 

the rules and is acting “out of pocket.” Defendant aggressively 
6

chased Doe, who fled between two parked cars. He rushed 

towards her, grabbed her right hand, and pulled her towards 

him. Believing Doe was going to be kidnapped, Rios and her 

partner got out of their car to intercede. Doe fled on foot, and 

defendant left by car; he was eventually apprehended. 

Following his arrest, defendant made three phone calls 

from jail, which were recorded and played for the jury. In one of 

the calls, defendant said he had “caught one of these cases before”

and believed the only way he would be convicted was if a witness 

were to “tell” on him. He believed “there’s nobody to tell on me”

because the police had intervened. In the second call, defendant 

reiterated his belief that “there’s no one to testify against me.”

The other caller agreed: “If they don’t have a victim, bro, it’s a 

D.A. reject.” Defendant explained his strategy: “I’m going to go 

speedy trial. This month.” In the third call, defendant asked an 

unidentified person to provide information from defendant’s 

Instagram account, which was under the name “The Real King 

Payso.”

4. Defendant’s Testimony

Defendant testified on his own behalf.

He explained that at the time of his December 2019 arrest, 

he had only known Princess for a few days. They first met at a 

nail salon on December 1, 2019, and went to a hookah lounge 

later that evening. Defendant communicated with Princess

through social media. He used the name King Paycasso on social 

media because he was an art lover who had worked at The Broad 

museum. 

The evening of December 4, 2019, Princess had invited 

defendant to a party in downtown Los Angeles. Princess 

introduced him to L.M. that evening. They went to the party in 
7

Princess’s car, but Princess asked defendant to drive because she 

had been drinking. 

Defendant did not know that the Jetta was stolen. He 

testified that the Skytel phone recovered from the front 

passenger seat was not his, but admitted that he had used it to 

log on to his Instagram account. He also denied ownership of the 

iPhone recovered from the back seat. 

Defendant denied that Princess and L.M. worked for him as 

prostitutes. He denied ever meeting Madison.

Defendant testified that on February 12, 2020, he saw his 

friend’s sister near 66th Street and Denver Avenue and stopped 

to say hello. He told the woman that her brother was looking for 

her, but she ignored him and turned away. Concerned, defendant 

got out of the car and tried again to tell the woman that her 

brother was looking for her. He denied trying to kidnap her. He 

denied ever trying to persuade or kidnap anyone into 

prostitution. 

When defendant was arrested, he was on probation for 

driving a car without the owner’s consent and on parole for 

residential burglary. He also admitted a prior conviction for 

human trafficking of a 13-year-old. 

Defendant was convicted of crimes related to all five 

women. The jury convicted him of three counts of human 

trafficking of a minor as to L.M., Princess and Madison; 

attempted human trafficking of C.T.; and attempted human 

trafficking and attempted kidnapping of Jane Doe. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends that the trial court erred, individually 

and cumulatively, by denying his six requests to substitute 

appointed counsel; that counsel provided constitutionally 
8

defective representation by failing to object to testimony by the 

prosecution’s human trafficking expert; and that the evidence is 

constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction for 

trafficking Madison.

1. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying the 

Marsden Motions

Defendant made six requests for substitute counsel under 

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden)—the first after 

nearly a year of Covid-19-related delays, and five others during 

his trial six months later. The record reveals defendant’s 

increasing frustration with his circumstances and the way in 

which his case was proceeding—frustration often directed at his 

lawyer. Frustration aside, the record does not support that the 

attorney–client relationship was so broken that constitutionally 

ineffective assistance of counsel was likely to result. We conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the 

motions. Rather, the trial court consistently displayed patience, 

empathy, and determination to protect defendant’s constitutional 

rights during often-heated proceedings. 

1.1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

Indigent criminal defendants have a constitutional right to 

court-appointed trial counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Gideon 

v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335.) But a defendant does not 

have an absolute right to more than one appointed attorney. 

(Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) The court must appoint 

substitute counsel when the defendant has shown the first 

attorney is not providing adequate representation or the 

defendant and the attorney have become embroiled in an 

irreconcilable conflict that makes ineffective legal representation 

likely to result. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 693, 696
9

(Smith).)3

“[W]hether to permit a defendant to discharge his 

appointed counsel and substitute another attorney during the 

trial is within the discretion of the trial court. . . .” (Marsden, 

supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) When a defendant seeks to discharge 

appointed counsel and asserts inadequate representation, the 

court must allow the defendant to explain the basis of his 

contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney’s 

inadequate performance. (Id., at pp. 123–125; People v. Johnson 

(2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 572.) 

“It is the very nature of a Marsden motion, at whatever 

stage it is made, that the trial court must determine whether 

counsel has been providing competent representation.” (Smith, 

supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 694–695.) “ ‘Depending on the nature of 

the grievances related by defendant, it may be necessary for the 

court also to question his [or her] attorney.’ [Citation.] [But] 

‘inquiry into the attorney’s state of mind is required only in those 

situations in which a satisfactory explanation for counsel’s 

conduct or attitude toward his client is necessary in order to 

determine whether counsel can provide adequate 

representation.’ ” (People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 

870.) Typically, once the court has afforded the defendant a

reasonable opportunity to express his concerns, the decision to 

relieve counsel rests within the court’s discretion. (People v. 

Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 623 [“If the court holds an 

adequate hearing, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion”].) 

Accordingly, we review both the adequacy of a Marsden

3 We discuss the standard for ineffective assistance of 

counsel in section 2, post.
10

hearing and the court’s denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of 

discretion. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 488.) “ ‘Denial 

is not an abuse of discretion “unless the defendant has shown 

that a failure to replace counsel would substantially impair the 

defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.” ’ ” (People v. Ng

(2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500, cert. denied sub nom. Ng v. California

(2023) 143 S.Ct. 750.)

1.2. First Marsden Hearing

Defendant’s Marsden motions are best understood against 

the backdrop of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Defendant was taken into custody on February 12, 2020. 

At the end of March, he was held to answer and denied bail. On 

April 20, he was arraigned. Defendant thought the case against 

him was weak because no victims would be available to testify, 

and he believed such testimony was legally necessary. His 

strategy was to assert his right to a speedy trial and proceed as 

quickly as possible. The matter was duly set for a pretrial 

conference within the statutory period. Things were proceeding 

apace. 

But then the Covid-19 pandemic hit. Defendant’s pretrial 

hearing date was vacated, and he remained in county jail. Over 

the next year, as his detention continued, defendant’s case was 

several times delayed.

4

In November 2020, the court noted that defendant had 

been “adamant about not waiving time.” By February 16, 2021, 

defendant had become frustrated that his appointed attorney was

not visiting him in the jail. Based on the transcripts from that 

4 Defendant does not argue on appeal that the delays 

violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
11

day and the two court dates that followed, it appears counsel 

resisted going to the jail in person until the prosecution presented 

a concrete plea offer. Counsel had been attempting to 

communicate with defendant by phone in the interim. 

Things came to a head on March 30, 2021. The court 

announced that another Covid-19 directive had been issued and 

defendant’s trial would have to be continued yet again. At that 

point, defendant requested his first Marsden hearing. 

Defendant explained: “I’ve been incarcerat[ed] about a year 

and it’s—quite frankly, I’m just, like, my communication’s not 

there.” Plea negotiations had seemed like they were starting to 

progress, but “I don’t know if my counsel would really like to see 

eye to eye on the entire situation I asked about.” Defendant 

wanted counsel to come to the jail to answer his questions, and he 

was frustrated that the only in-person meetings occurred in 

court. 

Counsel explained to the court that he had set up multiple 

telephone conversations with defendant and had sent his 

investigator to meet with defendant at the jail, but defendant 

often could not be located. Counsel believed “the problem that is 

happening is not a lack of communication. It’s [that defendant] 

wants to hear something from me that I won’t tell him because 

I’m bound . . . to give a truthful evaluation of his case. And I am.”

The court expressed sympathy toward defendant. It 

explained that visiting the jail had always been difficult—“but 

this is the worst year we’ve ever had bar none. And we are not 

done with it yet, unfortunately.” The court stressed that counsel 

had an obligation to give defendant an honest evaluation of his 

case, and that an effective lawyer will not sugarcoat the bad 

parts of a criminal case. 
12

With that, the court had reached the crux of the matter. 

Defendant replied: “Absolutely. I completely understand that. 

And I’ve been very patient. I want to go home to my family. . . . 

That’s the whole reason why I want a speedy trial. I understand 

the issues, but they have obligations, and I pled not guilty.”

Defendant was not happy with the prosecution’s plea offer and 

wanted his lawyer to understand “the case I’m being charged for 

is trumped up” and to “tell the D.A. my point of view.”

Ultimately, defendant wanted to be released from jail. 

After suggesting that both defendant and his attorney 

remain patient and act with mutual understanding, the court 

ordered them to speak face-to-face after the hearing. Although 

the court did not formally rule on defendant’s Marsden motion 

that day, defendant argues that on six occasions, including this 

hearing, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Marsden

relief. 

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to 

either the way it conducted the first Marsden hearing or any 

implied ruling that day not to substitute counsel. As a general 

matter, the “ ‘number of times one sees his attorney, and the way 

in which one relates with his attorney, does not sufficiently 

establish incompetence.’ ” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 

1192 (Cole).)

1.3. Second Marsden Hearing

When defendant and his attorney returned to court about a 

month later, in May 2021, counsel explained that he had been 

speaking with defendant on the phone and planned to meet with 

him in person at the jail as soon as the prosecution could provide 

a firm plea offer. But concerns about Covid-19 persisted, and the 

delays continued through the spring and summer. On August 3, 
13

2021, the court acknowledged defendant still had no interest in 

settling or waiving statutory time, and a trial date was set. 

The case was finally called for trial on September 7, 2021, 

but before the first prospective jurors could be sworn, defendant 

requested another Marsden hearing. Defendant explained:

“Your Honor, I’d like to bring to the court’s attention or 

awareness that I’m here fighting for my innocence. My counsel,

[Defense Attorney], has called me dumb, stupid, used words 

[such] as ‘you people,’ to intimidate me. Your Honor, [Defense 

Attorney] is telling me it’s my fault [I’ll be] sitting in prison 

serving a life sentence while I profess my innocence and try to 

communicate with him.” Defendant informed the court that 

counsel said he would visit the jail in person but had “never 

showed” and “the majority of the time, he has no consultation 

with me.”

The court first explained that defendant was not facing a 

life sentence. Then, the court turned to counsel for a response. 

Counsel replied: “I have never used the word[s] ‘dumb’ or ‘stupid’

in my conversations with the defendant.” Counsel also denied 

using “you people.” He had, however, “tried to convey to him the 

seriousness of the case, and, in my opinion, the extreme odds 

against him on this case, and to tell him everything about what’s 

going to happen because I feel I’m obligated to do that.”

Turning to defendant’s other concerns: “As far as 

communications with the defendant, I have seen him in jail. My 

investigator has seen him in jail. I’ve had conference calls that 

he has not appeared at, but when there’s not been a conference 

call, and the next time we were in court, I spent a tremendous 

amount of time going over everything with him.”

Counsel concluded: “There’s nothing more I can go over 
14

with him. It’s his choice to go to trial or not. It is my choice to 

accurately make sure that he understands the consequences of 

what will happen. And yes, I agree this is not a life case, but 

looking at his age and the amount of years he could face, I have 

said, ‘This could be the rest of your life in prison.’ ”

The court treated the motion as one under Marsden and 

denied it. The court explained that although it had “heard 

annoyance,” it had not “heard anything that suggests that Mr. 

[Attorney] is not performing the functions of counsel.” Nor was

the court persuaded that counsel had belittled defendant: “I’ve 

never heard Mr. [Attorney] refer to any defendant as ‘dumb,’

‘stupid,’ or ‘those people,’ any of that kind of thing. Lord knows 

he’s represented people on heavy cases in the past.”

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to 

either the way it conducted the second Marsden hearing or its 

decision not to substitute counsel. Although counsel may have 

been frustrated that defendant would not accept hard truths 

about his situation—and defendant may have been frustrated

based on his belief that his attorney was not wholeheartedly 

convinced of his innocence—those frustrations appear nothing 

more than the frequent give and take of the attorney–client 

relationship in criminal cases. They do not reflect an 

irreconcilable conflict. 

Nor was the court required to credit defendant’s namecalling allegations. “To the extent there was a credibility 

question between defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court 

was ‘entitled to accept counsel’s explanation.’ ” (Smith, supra,

6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) Because the court found defendant’s 

allegations were not credible, it was not required to inquire 

expressly into counsel’s attitude towards his client. (See, e.g., 
15

People v. Winn, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 870 [inquiry into 

counsel’s state of mind required only where such inquiry is 

necessary to determine whether counsel can provide adequate 

representation].)

1.4. Third Marsden Hearing

On September 9, 2021, the jury was empaneled and 

testimony began. Trial proceeded smoothly until September 14, 

when a dramatic outburst in open court led to a third Marsden 

hearing. 

After the court explained the schedule to the seated jurors 

and the prosecutor prepared to call his first witness, defendant 

interjected: “I would like to address the court.” The court told 

him to wait, but defendant continued: “I cannot and will not 

continue working with Mr. [Attorney].” As the court tried to 

quiet defendant, usher the jury out, and gain control over the 

situation, defendant offered a litany of complaints, including 

counsel’s failure to visit and refusal to ask certain questions: “I 

can’t deal with it. I want him to ask a simple question, and he 

doesn’t ask those questions for me.”

The court promptly cleared the courtroom. The court began 

by admonishing defendant to stop talking when instructed to be 

quiet and advising him that his outburst did not help him with 

the jury. 

Defendant responded: “I’m sorry, but I have—I take—I 

can’t do it no more. I continue to ask certain things, and I can’t 

get straightforward answers. Every time he talk[s] to me, he got 

attitude with me. He laughs in my face. He told me I’m going to 

lose. I’m not dealing with him. 

“I’m prepared—man, I can’t. I’d rather do this by myself if 

that’s the case. I want someone to fight for my life. And he 
16

laughing with the District Attorney. I’d rather study myself if I 

have to. I can’t do this. I’m trying. He didn’t even come back 

there and talk to me. I’m not about to keep dealing with this.”

When the court asked what counsel had not done, 

defendant replied: “A variety of different things.” Pressed for 

specifics, defendant responded that counsel’s cross-examinations 

were too brief and tracked the prosecutor’s questions too closely. 

Counsel refused to ask the questions defendant thought were 

important—“He didn’t bring up most of the different things that I 

write down and I’m asking him to say, and he’s not even saying 

them”—and defendant was concerned the opportunity was 

slipping away. For example, defendant explained that when 

cross-examining a witness the previous day, counsel had not 

elicited testimony that defendant lacked knowledge the Jetta had 

been stolen. The court reminded him that counsel had indeed 

brought out the information defendant sought, and the court 

provided specific examples of how counsel had done so. 

Defendant replied: “I’m—Your Honor, I—the only thing I 

know is the way that he—he—he makes it seem. It just—two 

months of him being my counsel is just—this is not my first time. 

Like I told you, he called me dum[b] before, and he already told 

me, ‘You’re going to lose.’ He’s not—I don’t want him. I’ll do it 

myself.”

The court found defendant’s request for self-representation 

was involuntary, then explained that although counsel was not 

bombastic, his style was effective; he had covered all the issues.5 

5 Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal or argue 

the court erred by denying his request to represent himself. (See 

Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).) 
17

The court had observed defendant passing notes to counsel and

saw counsel explain that the information defendant sought was 

inadmissible. The court assured defendant that a number of 

issues had broken his way during the trial, and concluded he had 

not received ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the court 

did not address defendant’s complaints that counsel had called 

him names and was too pessimistic about the likelihood of an 

acquittal, the court had adequately investigated—and rejected—

those concerns at the previous Marsden hearing.

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to 

either the way it conducted the third Marsden hearing or its 

decision not to substitute counsel. (See Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 

p. 1192 [complaints concerning “tactical disagreements . . . do not 

by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict’ ”]; People v. 

Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1026 [where defendant’s 

dissatisfaction was based on attorney’s in-court performance, 

court could rely on its personal observations to evaluate

defendant’s complaints].) 

1.5. Fourth Marsden Hearing

As soon as defense counsel appeared in court the following 

morning, he informed the court that defendant wanted to bring a 

fourth Marsden motion. 

This time, defendant was upset that defense counsel had 

not shown him evidence from the Skytel mobile phone before the 

prosecutor introduced it at trial. Counsel acknowledged that 

technical problems had prevented him from sharing certain

screenshots with defendant in advance; the discovery had been 

provided on the eve of trial, and defendant did not want to agree 

to another delay. Counsel explained, however, that the issue did 

not affect either counsel’s trial preparation or defendant’s ability 
18

to participate in his defense because defendant was aware of the 

phone’s contents.6

When questioned, defendant could not explain what he 

would have done differently if he had seen the screen shots in 

advance because “it happened so quickly.” As with the dispute 

over cross-examination, defendant seemed mostly concerned that 

the evidence would cause the jury to believe he had participated 

in “the robbery that I had nothing to do with. That wasn’t my 

vehicle. So it’s, like, how did I—how can evidence that has 

nothing to do with a robbery or me be basically turned in on me, 

used against me, when the car—it’s not my car. It’s not my 

belongings.”

Defendant had not been charged with robbery or anything 

related to the stolen Jetta, and the court explained, as it had the 

day before, that counsel had been laying a foundation to argue 

that the phone did not belong to defendant. The court found no 

violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel and denied 

the motion.

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to 

either the way it conducted the fourth Marsden hearing or its 

decision not to substitute counsel.

1.6. Fifth Marsden Hearing

On September 21, during the prosecutor’s closing 

argument, defendant brought his fifth Marsden motion. Again, 

6 Defendant complains that the court did not ask counsel “if 

his conduct regarding this evidence resulted from a negative 

attitude toward appellant and the case.” Because counsel had 

already provided an explanation, which the court apparently 

accepted, it was not required to inquire further on that point.
19

defendant focused on mobile-phone-related cross-examination. 

And again, he objected to receiving late discovery. Counsel 

provided a detailed explanation of his decision not to bring a 

witness back for further cross-examination, a strategy the court 

agreed was sound given the equivocal state of the evidence. 

Defendant also raised concerns about one of the jurors, who 

defendant believed had been asleep the day before. It is not clear

how or if this complaint related to the Marsden motion, since

counsel had moved for a mistrial on that basis when it happened,

but the court assured defendant it had been watching the juror 

like a hawk.

Finally, defendant asserted his right to represent himself 

under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806—but when he acknowledged 

he was not prepared to proceed with closing argument, the court 

denied the request as untimely. The court observed: “So we’re 

not continuing the case or delaying it. I understand exactly why 

you want it, and it’s not going to happen.”

We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to 

either the way it conducted the fifth Marsden hearing or its 

decision not to substitute counsel. “ ‘When a defendant chooses to 

be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is “captain of 

the ship” and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for 

the defendant.’ ” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729.) 

“Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney 

do not by themselves constitute an ‘irreconcilable conflict.’ ” (Id. 

at pp. 728–729.)

1.7. Sixth Marsden Hearing

Later that day, after the jurors began deliberations, 

defendant brought his sixth Marsden motion. This time, he 

wanted to make an additional record about the sleeping juror. 
20

Because this concern did not involve a conflict with counsel, we 

conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the 

way it conducted the sixth Marsden hearing or its decision not to

substitute counsel.

1.8. Cumulative Error

Even when no single error is prejudicial, aggregate 

prejudice from multiple errors may render a trial fundamentally 

unfair. A “series of trial errors, though independently harmless, 

may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of 

reversible and prejudicial error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 

800, 844.) Defendant contends his six Marsden hearings “showed 

an escalation in the irreconcilable differences between 

[defendant] and his appointed counsel, and the total breakdown 

of their attorney–client relationship.”

Starting with the second motion, each was more or less a 

repetition of earlier motions, and each time defendant raised the 

same or similar problems he had with counsel. The mere fact 

that defendant made, and the court denied, repeated Marsden

motions does not by itself establish irreconcilable conflict or 

cumulative error where none otherwise exists. (People v. 

Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 293; see People v. Ng, supra,

13 Cal.5th at pp. 481, 495–496, 498–499 [no abuse of discretion 

where court denied 37 Marsden motions].)

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant contends Detective Rios exceeded the 

permissible scope of expert testimony because she offered 

opinions on ultimate facts that were within the jurors’ common 

knowledge. Since trial counsel’s failure to object forfeits the issue 

on appeal, he argues he received constitutionally defective 

assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded.
21

2.1. Challenged Evidence

Rios testified as the prosecution’s human trafficking expert. 

Rios testified that on the night of February 12, 2020, she

saw defendant speeding; he yelled out the passenger window, 

“Bitch, this is pimping.” Rios testified that by using this 

terminology, defendant was identifying himself as a pimp and 

trying to catch a prospective prostitute by calling her a bitch.

Rios then heard defendant yell, “Bitch, you in the pocket. You in 

the pocket.” Rios understood this to mean that C.T. was 

following the rules of the game. Rios also testified that C.T. did 

not make eye contact with defendant, which indicated she worked 

for another pimp. After leaving C.T., defendant yelled, “Faggot 

bitch, you’re mine” and attempted to grab Jane Doe. In Rios’s 

experience, “faggot bitch” was a derogatory term for a prostitute 

who was out of pocket and not following the rules of the game.

Defendant contends this testimony exceeded the proper scope of 

expert testimony by applying definitions to defendant’s actual 

conduct and concluding the conduct was that of a pimp engaged 

in human trafficking.

Rios was also shown text messages and photographs from 

the Skytel phone seized from the Jetta. She explained that the 

names, words, and symbols in the messages referred to 

prostitution activities. Defendant contends Rios exceeded the 

bounds of permissible expert opinion by reading the messages 

aloud to the jury, interpreting what they meant based on the 

definitions she had provided earlier in her testimony, and 

positing that defendant posted the messages in furtherance of his 

pimping and human trafficking activities. 

2.2. Defendant forfeited his challenge to the evidence. 

The rules of evidence are not self-executing. We may not 
22

reverse a judgment or verdict based on “the erroneous admission 

of evidence unless: [¶] (a) There appears of record an objection to 

or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely 

made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the 

objection or motion[.]” (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) This rule 

exists to give the trial court a concrete legal proposition to pass 

on, to allow the proponent of the evidence an opportunity to cure 

the defect, and to prevent abuse. (People v. Partida (2005) 

37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) Defendant concedes trial counsel did not 

object to Rios’s testimony on the ground he now asserts, thereby 

forfeiting his challenges to it on appeal, but argues that failure 

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

2.3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Under either the federal or state Constitution, the 

“benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning 

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 

having produced a just result.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 

466 U.S. 668, 686 (Strickland).) To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, defendant must satisfy two requirements. 

(Id. at pp. 690–692.)

First, he must show his attorney’s conduct was “outside the 

wide range of professionally competent assistance.” (Strickland, 

supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690.) Then, he must demonstrate the 

deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., there is a reasonable 

probability that but for counsel’s failings, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. (Id. at p. 694.) “It is not 

sufficient to show the alleged errors may have had some 

conceivable effect on the trial’s outcome; the defendant must 

demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that absent the errors the 
23

result would have been different.” (People v. Mesa (2006) 

144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008.)

Typically, if “the record does not shed light on why counsel 

acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject 

the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to 

provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no 

satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 

1212.) These arguments should instead be raised on collateral 

review. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266–

267.)

Defendant argues counsel had no conceivable tactical basis 

not to object because he “did object to the testimony of Detective 

Rios as beyond her area of expertise.” He posits that this shows 

counsel “wanted to keep out this evidence.” Unlike the objections 

counsel actually offered, however, objecting on the grounds now 

advanced would not necessarily have led to wholesale exclusion of 

the testimony. 

Defense counsel could have reasonably expected that 

objecting would instead prompt the prosecutor to elicit the same 

information by asking detailed hypotheticals tracking the facts of 

the case—an approach that would only highlight the evidence to 

the jurors. (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1048 [expert 

may testify in response to hypothetical question that relates to 

ultimate issue to be decided by the jury but cannot testify that a 

defendant’s actions establish his criminal intent].)

Because we can discern that defense counsel may have had 

a plausible tactical reason not to object, we conclude defendant 

has not established on this record that he received 

constitutionally inadequate representation.
24

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Trafficking Madison

(Count 6)

Defendant was charged in court 6 with human trafficking 

of Madison for purposes of pimping. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).) A 

criminal defendant may not be convicted of a crime unless the 

prosecution proves every fact necessary for conviction beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.; see Cal. 

Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364; 

People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566.) Defendant contends 

there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for 

trafficking Madison. We disagree.

3.1. Standard of Review

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, we review the entire record to determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 

47, 59–60.) “The record must disclose substantial evidence to 

support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, 

and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. 

Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) 

In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably 

deduce from the evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 

1053.) We may not reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary 

conflicts (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181), and we 

must accept all logical inferences the jury might have drawn from 

the evidence, even if we would have concluded otherwise (People 

v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 242). 
25

The same standard applies where the conviction rests 

primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Thompson

(2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.) “ ‘Although it is the jury’s duty to 

acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence 

susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which 

suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the 

appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Simply put, if the 

circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the 

judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances 

might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” 

(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143.)

In sum, “reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted 

unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there 

sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.”

(People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)

3.2. Elements of Sex Trafficking

To convict defendant of trafficking Madison for a 

commercial sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)), as charged in count 6, 

the prosecution was required to prove:

◦ Defendant caused, induced, or persuaded 

Madison to engage in a commercial sex act—or 

intended to do so;

◦ When defendant acted, he intended to commit the 

crime of pimping (§ 266h); and 

◦ When defendant did so, Madison was under 18 

years of age.

(§ 236.1, subd. (c); see CALCRIM No. 1244.) To prove the second 

element—that defendant intended to commit pimping—the 

prosecution had to prove:
26

◦ Defendant knew Madison was a prostitute; and

◦ The money or other proceeds Madison earned as a 

prostitute supported defendant, in whole or in 

part; or

◦ Defendant asked for payment or received 

payment for soliciting prostitution customers for 

Madison.

(§ 266h; see CALCRIM No. 1150.)

3.3. Substantial evidence supports defendant’s 

conviction for trafficking Madison.

Defendant concedes substantial evidence supports his 

convictions for trafficking Princess and L.M. (counts 4 and 5) but 

contends the evidence is constitutionally inadequate to support 

his conviction for trafficking Madison (count 6). He argues that 

unlike Princess and L.M., Madison “had a level of autonomy and 

leadership in the business arrangement . . . .” We are not 

persuaded.

First, convictions for trafficking non-testifying minor 

victims often rest on circumstantial evidence. (See People v. 

Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 487–488 [three testifying 

victims offered substantial evidence defendant encouraged eight 

non-testifying victims to engage in prostitution where defendant 

assisted the women with prostitution-related activities].) In this 

case, only Princess testified. Madison did not. Although 

Princess’s testimony often lacked detail, it would have been 

reasonable for the jury to infer from it that Madison, Princess, 

and L.M. had similar relationships with defendant. The girls 

traveled together from San Diego to Los Angeles sometime after 

November 25, 2019. Princess identified herself, L.M., and 

Madison in several photographs taken during the period the 
27

three women were in Los Angeles making money working as 

prostitutes. When they arrived, they spent a couple of days 

working as prostitutes for S.B. After Madison left to work for 

defendant, the other two girls followed her because they wanted 

to stay together. Defendant was in charge of three of them 

between approximately November 29 and December 4, 2019. 

Taken together, the three girls spent about 10 days in Los 

Angeles; during that time, all three worked for S.B. for a couple 

of days, and all three worked for defendant for about a week. It 

is reasonable to infer from this timeline that Madison worked for 

defendant for only a day or so longer than the others. Based on 

this inference, the jury could reasonably deduce that Madison’s 

relationship with defendant was not appreciably different or 

more autonomous than his relationship with the other two girls.

Second, the jury could infer from Princess’s testimony that 

defendant had facilitated Madison’s prostitution. (People v. 

Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980, 989 [intent to influence may 

be inferred from acts of assistance].) Princess testified that she 

first encountered defendant when she saw defendant driving 

Madison around. Princess also testified that she gave her 

earnings to defendant because she had seen Madison do so. 

Madison was a “girl[ ] in the group” and one of her “wifies”

because they worked for the same person. The jury could 

reasonably infer from this conduct that defendant taught

Madison how to behave and thereby caused her to engage in sex

work. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).)

Finally, the jury could have used defendant’s prior sextrafficking conviction as evidence that he had a propensity to 

commit—and did commit—sex trafficking of Madison. “Evidence 

of prior criminal acts is ordinarily inadmissible to show a 
28

defendant’s disposition to commit such acts. [Citation.] 

However, the Legislature has created exceptions to this rule in 

cases involving sexual offenses . . . .” (People v. Reyes (2008) 

160 Cal.App.4th 246, 251.) Evidence Code section 1108 “allows 

evidence of the defendant’s uncharged sex crimes to be 

introduced in a sex offense prosecution to demonstrate the 

defendant’s disposition to commit such crimes.” (People v. 

Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1009.) 

Here, the jury heard evidence that defendant had 

previously been convicted of trafficking a 13-year-old girl. The 

court admitted into evidence the transcript of the preliminary 

hearing at which defendant was held to answer.

7 According to 

the transcript, defendant taught the victim “the ways of being a 

prostitute.” Defendant picked the victim up from her house and 

drove her to Figueroa Boulevard, where he would give her 

condoms, set prices for various sex acts, and tell her how many 

acts to perform. When the victim completed her quota, defendant 

would pick her up, and the victim would pay him a portion of her 

earnings. 

The jury was instructed under Evidence Code section 1108 

that if it concluded “defendant committed the uncharged offense, 

you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence 

that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual 

offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the 

defendant was likely to commit and did commit human 

trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act . . . as charged in 

Count[ ] . . . Six . . . .”

To be sure, as defendant stresses, the evidence against him 

7 The transcript was admitted at defense counsel’s request. 
29

was stronger as to Princess and L.M because it included 

incriminating text messages and photographs recovered from the 

phones in the stolen Jetta—evidence that did not directly pertain 

to count 6. Taken as a whole, the evidence—although perhaps 

less persuasive than that for the other counts—was 

constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for 

count 6.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, P. J.

I CONCUR:

MOOR, J.
The People v. Clark Lorenzo Johnson

B318816

BAKER, J., Concurring

I join the opinion for the court with the exception of its 

reliance on Evidence Code section 1108 propensity evidence to 

conclude substantial evidence supports defendant and appellant 

Clark Johnson’s (defendant’s) conviction of human trafficking in 

count six. I believe substantial evidence supports defendant’s 

conviction on that count without need to rely on a judgment that 

he has a general propensity to commit sex offenses.

BAKER, J.