UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT CROSSON,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 14-13607

 Honorable Sean F. Cox

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

 

Defendant. 

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [R. 13, 15]

Plaintiff Robert Crosson appeals a final decision of Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application 

for disabled child’s insurance benefits under the Social Security Act (the 

“Act”). Both parties have filed summary judgment motions, referred to this 

Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B). The Court finds that the decision by the administrative law 

judge (“ALJ”) is not supported by substantial evidence and that Crosson 

suffers from an intellectual disability as defined by Listing 12.05(C). The 

Court thus RECOMMENDS that:

• the Commissioner’s motion [R. 15] be DENIED; 

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• Crosson’s motion [R. 13] be GRANTED; and,

• the Commissioner’s decision be REVERSED and REMANDED for an 

award of benefits pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Crosson’s Background and Disability Application

Born on September 27, 1992, Crosson was 18 years old when he 

applied for benefits on May 6, 2011. [R. 8-2, Tr. 21, 23]. In 1994, Crosson 

was diagnosed with neurofibromatosis type 1 [NF-1], a genetic disorder

from which his mother died in 1998, so his grandparents adopted him.1

 [R. 

8-7, Tr. 306, 334]. NF-1 causes neurofibromas (lesions) that Crosson

began developing when he was very young and, by 2011, they were 

extensive and covered his entire chest, abdomen and back. [Id., Tr. 269, 

286-87, 290, 323]. At a young age, he was additionally found to 

experience a “quite severe” deformity of his feet and poor vision, both 

associated with his NF-1. [Id., Tr. 300, 307-10].

In 1995, Lester Weiss, M.D., who specializes in medical genetics, 

recommended that Crosson be evaluated for speech and language delays; 

Crosson was demonstrating such delays and they are common for people 

who suffer from NF-1. [R. 8-7, Tr. 318-19]. According to Jacquelyn 

 1 Thus, some of the records refer to Suzanne Crosson as Crosson’s 

grandmother, as others refer to her as his mother.

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Roberson, M.D., the Division Head of Henry Ford Hospital’s Genetics 

Clinic, learning disabilities are more common with NF-1, and Crosson was 

enrolled in an early intervention program for learning delays by 1999. [Id.,

Tr. 280, 300-02]. Crosson’s medical records reflect that he continued to be 

considered mentally impaired and to be enrolled in special education. [R. 

8-7, Tr. 339-41, 343, 359, 362, 364, 367, 371, 406, 453]. 

Crosson received Social Security benefits until he turned 18 years 

old, after which he received a notice that he was no longer entitled to 

benefits. [R. 8-4, Tr. 95]. He filed a new claim for benefits and was denied, 

so he filed a request for an administrative hearing. [Id., Tr. 85-86]. The 

ALJ held a hearing on October 22, 2102, during which Crosson, his 

grandmother and a vocational expert (VE) testified. [R. 8-2, Tr. 38-70]. In 

a November 15, 2013 written decision, the ALJ found Crosson not 

disabled. [Id., Tr. 18-32]. The Appeals Council denied review, making the 

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. [Id., Tr. 1-3]. 

Crosson timely filed for judicial review. [R. 1]. 

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Disability Framework Analysis

A “disability” is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

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can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Although Crosson is seeking child’s insurance 

benefits, he is over 18 years old, so his application must be evaluated 

under the adult standard for determining disability. 42 U.S.C. § 

402(d)(1)(B)(ii). 

Under that standard, the Commissioner determines whether an 

applicant is disabled by analyzing five sequential steps. First, if the 

applicant is “doing substantial gainful activity,” he or she will be found not 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Second, if the claimant has not had 

a severe impairment or a combination of such impairments2 for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months, no disability will be found. Id. 

Third, if the claimant’s severe impairments meet or equal the criteria of an 

impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, the 

claimant will be found disabled. Id. If the fourth step is reached, the 

Commissioner considers its assessment of the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”), and will find the claimant not disabled if he or 

she can still do past relevant work. Id. At the final step, the Commissioner 

reviews the claimant’s RFC, age, education and work experiences, and 

determines whether the claimant could adjust to other work. Id. The 

 2 A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” §§ 1520(c).

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claimant bears the burden of proof throughout the first four steps, but the 

burden shifts to the Commissioner if the fifth step is reached. Preslar v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).

Applying this framework, the ALJ concluded that Crosson was not 

disabled. She first found that Crosson had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since his alleged onset date of February 16, 1994

application date. [R. 8-2, Tr. 23]. The ALJ determined that Crosson had 

the severe impairments of neurofibromatosis and cognitive disorder. [Id.]. 

Next, the ALJ concluded that none of Crosson’s impairments, either alone 

or in combination, met or medically equaled the severity of the listed 

impairments. [Id., Tr. 23-25]. 

The ALJ then found that Crosson had the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) to perform light work, except that he could not kneel, crawl, climb 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds, or work around unprotected heights or moving 

mechanical parts. [Id., Tr. 26]. The ALJ further limited Crosson to simple, 

routine tasks and making simple work-related decisions. [Id.].

After considering Crosson’s age, education, work experience, RFC 

and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ determined that he was able to 

perform work in the national economy, and was not disabled. [Id., Tr. 31]. 

II. ANALYSIS

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Pursuant to § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining 

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and was made in conformity with proper legal standards. Gentry v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is 

“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the 

evidence in the record below may be considered when determining 

whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bass v. 

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 2007). 

The significant deference accorded the Commissioner’s decision is 

conditioned on the ALJ’s adherence to governing standards. “Chief among 

these is the rule that the ALJ must consider all evidence in the record when 

making a determination, including all objective medical evidence, medical 

signs, and laboratory findings.” Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723. See also Rogers, 

486 F.3d at 249. In other words, substantial evidence cannot be based 

upon fragments of the evidence, and “must take into account whatever in 

the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 

388 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

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The Commissioner must also adhere to its own procedures, but failure 

to do so constitutes only harmless error unless the claimant has been 

prejudiced or deprived of substantial rights. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009). An ALJ’s failure to use an 

“adjudicatory tool” that does not change the outcome of the decision is 

harmless. Id. at 655-56. On the other hand, substantial errors like ignoring 

evidence in the record or failing to follow the treating physician rule are not 

harmless. Id.; Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 940 (6th Cir. 2011); Gentry, 741 

F.3d at 729. 

Crosson argues that the ALJ’s decision, including her determination 

that his condition did not meet a listing, is not supported by substantial 

evidence. The Court agrees. 

A.

Specifically, the ALJ erred by finding that Crosson did not meet 

Listing 12.05(C), which applies to claimants with intellectual disabilities. 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05(C). “To satisfy Listing 12.05(C), a 

claimant must demonstrate: (1) valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 

60 through 70; (2) evidence of deficits in adaptive functioning initially 

manifested before age 22; and, (3) an additional and significant work2:14-cv-13607-SFC-EAS Doc # 17 Filed 02/16/16 Pg 7 of 22 Pg ID 599
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related limitation of function.” Ware v. Colvin, No. 5:13-CV-00991, 2014 

WL 584752, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2014). Here, the ALJ acknowledged 

that a consultative examiner found Crosson to have a full scale IQ of 68 

(and the Commissioner concedes this point). [R. 8-2, Tr. 25; R. 15, PgID 

568]. Nathalie Menendes, Psy.D determined that Crosson had that full 

scale IQ on January 17, 2013. [R. 8-7, Tr. 473]. 

However, the ALJ found that Crosson’s condition did not meet the 

requirements of Listing 12.05(C) because “the record does not suggest that 

[he] has any other significant work-related limitation of function or listinglevel deficits in adaptive functioning,” as demonstrated by Crosson’s 

activities of daily living, including his attendance at a “post-secondary trade 

school” five days a week and supervised janitorial work. [R. 8-2, Tr. 25]. 

These conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence and, in fact, 

the record demonstrates conclusively that they are contrary to the 

regulations and factually unsustainable. 

B.

First, the regulations tie the additional impairment required by Listing 

12.05(C) to the step two finding of severe impairments as defined by § 

404.1520(c). “For paragraph C, we will assess the degree of functional 

limitation the additional impairment(s) imposes to determine if it significantly 

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limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, i.e., is a 

‘severe’ impairment(s), as defined in §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c).” 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(A). While the Sixth Circuit has yet 

to weigh in on whether a step two finding of an additional impairment is 

conclusive, “[t]hose circuit courts that have considered the issue have 

uniformly concluded that, where an ALJ determines, at step two of the 

sequential analysis, that an impairment is severe, that impairment is 

sufficient to satisfy the significant limitations requirement of Listing 

12.05(C).” Switzer v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-01919, 2014 WL 2611945, at *9 

(N.D. Ohio June 11, 2014) (citing Cook v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 687, 690-91 

(8th Cir. 1986); Branham v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1271, 1273 (4th Cir.1985); 

Nieves v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 775 F.2d 12, 14 (1st 

Cir.1985); and Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 625, 631 (11th Cir.1984)).

See also Hinkle v. Apfel, 132 F.3d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1997) (agreeing 

that “§ 12.05C limitation is significant if the claimant suffers from a severe 

physical or other mental impairment, as defined at step two of the disability 

analysis, apart from the decreased intellectual function.”).

Here, the ALJ found at step two that Crosson’s neurofibromatosis 

constituted a severe impairment because it significantly limits his ability to 

perform basic work activities. [R. 8-2, Tr. 23]. She later reiterated that the 

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record showed that Crosson’s “neurofibromatosis limits his ability to 

perform work-related activity,” and thus imposed limitations within the 

physical RFC. [Id., Tr. 30]. Consequently, the ALJ’s determination that the 

record fails to show that Crosson has any other significant work-related 

limitation of function was internally inconsistent, contrary to the regulation, 

and thus not supported by substantial evidence. 

C.

What is left to consider is whether Crosson exhibited deficits in 

adaptive functioning that initially manifested before age 22. The applicable 

regulation describes adaptive activities including “cleaning, shopping, 

cooking, taking public transportation, paying bills, maintaining a residence, 

caring appropriately for your grooming and hygiene, using telephones and 

directories, and using a post office.” § 12.00(C)(1). These activities are 

evaluated for the purpose of identifying the claimant’s level of 

independence. “In the context of your overall situation, we assess the 

quality of these activities by their independence, appropriateness, 

effectiveness, and sustainability. We will determine the extent to which you 

are capable of initiating and participating in activities independent of 

supervision or direction.” Id.

Notably, the Social Security Administration’s definitions of mental 

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retardation [MR] is “consistent with, if not identical to, the definitions of MR 

used by the leading professional organizations.” Technical Revisions to 

Medical Criteria for Determination of disability, 67 Fed. Reg. 20018-01 

(April 24, 2002). This report cites, as an example, the American Psychiatric 

Association’s Diagnosistic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (DSM) 

definition of MR as including limitations in adaptive functioning. Id. The 

current version of the DSM describes adaptive function as referring to “how 

well a person meets community standards of personal independence and 

social responsibility, in comparison to others of similar age and 

sociocultural background” and accounts for “adaptive reasoning in three 

domains: conceptual, social, and practical,” and as referring to a person 

with a person with an intellectual disability that necessitates “ongoing 

support in order for the person to perform adequately in one or more life 

settings at school, at work, at home, or in the community.” DSM-V at 37-

38. These definitions are relevant for determining whether a claimant’s 

condition meets Listing 12.05(C). See, e.g., Wells v. Colvin, No. 

CV2014106WOBCJS, 2015 WL 5476111, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 9, 2015); 

Davis v. Colvin, No. 2:10–cv–88, 2015 WL 3504984, at *3 (M.D.Tenn. May 

28, 2015); Gardner v. Colvin, No. 14-4048-SAC, 2015 WL 4598802, at *4 

(D. Kan. July 29, 2015).

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Thus, the applicable definitions of adaptive functioning require an 

assessment of the claimant’s ability to function independently. In this case, 

the record shows that Crosson needs ongoing support in order to perform 

adequately at work and at home.

D.

The ALJ cited Crosson’s attendance at a “post-secondary trade 

school five days per week” and his performance of “supervised janitorial 

work through his school” as evidence that he did not have deficiencies in 

adaptive functioning. [R. 8-2, Tr. 25]. The fallacy in the ALJ’s reasoning is 

that Crosson was not attending a “trade school,”3 and the record is devoid 

of evidence that he was capable of working independently.

Crosson was placed in a Secondary Transitional Education Program 

(STEP) Transitions Center by an Individualized Educational Planning Team 

(IEPT) on March 29, 2011, after he turned 18. [R. 8-6, Tr. 193-221]. The 

IEPT included general education and special education teachers. [Id., Tr. 

193, 195]. Crosson was found to have many strengths, but it was noted 

that he would experience challenges without special education; that he 

needed support with writing and math calculations; that he needed 

 3 The Commissioner alleges that Crosson went to a “trade school,” but at 

least acknowledges that it was “for people with disabilities.” [R. 15, PgID 

559].

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specialized instructions in English, science, social studies and math; and 

that for testing, he needed tests read aloud to him, extended time and 

access to class notes. [Id., Tr. 197]. The IEPT scheduled Crosson to 

begin the STEP program at the SISD Transition Center on September of 

2011, for 15 hours per week. [Id., Tr. 215]. The goal of the transitional 

program, to be implemented by a special education teacher and 

paraprofessional staff, was for Crosson to demonstrate employability in a 

work environment by April 19, 2012. [Id., Tr. 202].

At the October 2012 hearing, Crosson testified that he was still 

attending the transition school from 9:45 a.m. to 12:15 p.m., five days a 

week, and performed unpaid, supervised janitorial work. [R. 8-2, Tr. 47-

49]. He was never allowed to work alone. [Id., Tr. 49]. His grandmother 

indicated that he could attend the transition program until he turns 26. [Id., 

Tr. 64].

Crosson’s participation in the transitional program is, by definition, 

evidence that he was not capable of independent employability when he 

turned 18. He was enrolled in the program in order to allow him to achieve 

employability, not because he already had that capability. He was still 

doing only unpaid, supervised work, and only doing so for about 15 hours 

per week at the time of the hearing. While the ALJ found that Crosson’s 

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attendance at the transition school demonstrated that he did not have 

deficiencies in adaptive functioning, his attendance there unambiguously

proves the opposite.

E.

In addition to the evidence that Crosson cannot work independently, 

the record further shows that he cannot live independently. Crosson’s 

grandmother, Suzanne Crosson, testified, “He wouldn’t be able to [live 

alone] right now, that’s why I’m sending him to the transition center to learn 

how to live on his own.” [R. 8-2, Tr. 59]. Her testimony was buttressed by 

the August 1, 2011 opinion of long-time treating physician Caroline Scott, 

M.D., that Crosson had neurofibromatosis with mild to moderate mental 

retardation, and that these conditions are not remediable.4

 [R. 8-7, Tr. 

276]. Dr. Scott concluded, “Robert is not capable of independent living. He 

will require supervision for the rest of his life. He is currently living with his 

mother and he remains dependent on her for his physical and financial 

needs.” [Id.]. 

The ALJ did not mention Mrs. Crosson’s testimony that Crosson

could not live independently, but gave little weight to her testimony in 

 4 The Court agrees with Crosson that the ALJ’s reliance on the fact that he 

was not being treated for his congenital neurofibromatosis makes little 

sense given the evidence that that condition was not remediable. 

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general because of her close relationship with Crosson and the “possibility 

that her statements were influenced by a desire to help the claimant cannot 

be ignored. . . .” [R. 8-2, Tr. 30]. The ALJ likewise dismissed Dr. Scott’s 

opinion that Crosson suffered from mild to moderate mental retardation as 

unsupported by her treatment notes, and gave Dr. Scott’s opinion that 

Crosson could not live independently little weight because it is “without 

substantial support from the medical evidence and the record as a whole, 

including Dr. Scott’s own treatment notes and the clinical examination 

findings of other physicians.” [Id., Tr. 29-30]. This analysis was deficient.

The “treating physician rule” requires an ALJ to give controlling 

weight to a treating physician’s opinions regarding the nature and severity 

of a claimant’s condition when those opinions are well-supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and diagnostic evidence, and not inconsistent 

with other substantial evidence. Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723, 727-29; Rogers, 

486 F.3d at 242-43. If an ALJ gives less than controlling weight to a 

treating source’s opinion, she must provide “good reasons” for doing so 

that are “supported by the evidence in the case record, and ... sufficiently 

specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons 

for that weight.” Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th 

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Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96–2p, 1996 WL 

374188, at *5 (July 2, 1996)). 

The treating physician rule is predicated on the detailed, longitudinal 

picture and unique perspective that such sources provide:

‘Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating 

sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical 

professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal 

picture of your medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique 

perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained 

from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of 

individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or 

brief hospitalizations.’ 

Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 652 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). For these reasons, a treating 

physician’s opinion is entitled to great deference in all cases. Gentry, 741 

F.3d at 723.

Dr. Scott’s records date back to 1995 (when Crosson was three 

years old), and include not only her treatment notes but also myriad reports 

from specialists to whom Dr. Scott had referred Crosson. [See R. 8-7, Tr. 

277-455]. Indeed, all of the treating medical reports in the record are 

located within Dr. Scott’s files. [Id.]. Dr. Scott is the epitome the type of 

treating physician whose longitudinal picture brings a unique perspective 

that cannot be obtained from objective medical records alone or from 

consultative examiners; she is the epitome of the type of treating physician 

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to whom the ALJ should have given great deference. The ALJ’s onesentence dismissal of her opinion that Crosson cannot live independently is 

patently insufficient. 

Ironically, after disregarding Dr. Scott’s years of treating Crosson, the 

ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Menendes in part because she 

examined Crosson once. [R. 8-2, Tr. 29-30]. Of further note, Dr. 

Menendes’s report is not contrary Dr. Scott’s opinion that Crosson cannot 

live independently. Dr. Menendes did not indicate that Crosson can live 

independently, only that he can “function independently in many areas of 

his life.” [R. 8-7, Tr. 471]. Dr. Menendes concurred with Dr. Scott’s 

conclusion that Crosson was incapable of managing his own finances. [Id., 

Tr. 474.]. Moreover, Dr. Menendes’s determination that Crosson had a full 

IQ of 68 is fully supportive of Dr. Scott’s opinion that he suffers from mental 

retardation. As noted by the Commissioner, Listing 12.05(C) was 

previously designated as “mental retardation,” and included the full IQ of 60 

to 70 criteria.

5

 See Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001)

(describing Listing 12.05(C) before the name change).6

 5 The Commissioner described the terminology change at R. 15, PgID 567, 

n. 4.

6 Dr. Menendes also found Crosson’s hygiene to be marginal and his smell 

to be somewhat unpleasant. [R. 8-7, Tr. 471]. She further noted that 

Crosson did not drive or have a driver’s license. [Id.]. Crosson and his 

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Simply put, the ALJ cited no evidence in the record that contradicts 

Dr. Scott’s opinion that Crosson is mentally retarded and incapable of living 

independently.

Moreover, the ALJ’s reasoning for dismissal of Mrs. Crosson’s 

testimony because of her relationship with Crosson is legally erroneous. 

According to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(4), the ALJ may consider nonmedical sources including family members and friends. The Sixth Circuit 

has, furthermore, found that an ALJ’s duty to investigate and fully develop 

the record requires consideration of available lay witness testimony. “If lay 

witness testimony is provided, the ALJ cannot disregard it without 

comment, and must give reasons for not crediting the testimony that are 

germane to each witness.” Maloney v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 480 Fed. 

Appx. *804, *810 (6th Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, an ALJ’s insufficient 

consideration of lay witness testimony is harmless error unless it would 

affect the disability decision and is fully supported by the reports of treating 

physicians. Id.; Simons v. Barnhart, 114 F. App'x 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2004).

If a lay witness’s close relationship with a claimant were enough to 

 

grandmother independently noted that he does not drive. [R. 8-2, Tr. 51; R. 

8-6, Tr. 166, 176]. His marginal hygiene and inability to drive support a 

finding that he has limitations in his adaptive functioning. § 12.00(C)(1); 

Gethin v. Colvin, No. 3:14-CV-53-DW, 2014 WL 4104130, at *11 (W.D. Ky. 

Aug. 19, 2014). 

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disregard her testimony, then § 404.1513(d)(4) would be meaningless; that 

section specifically allows consideration of testimony by witnesses who are

close to the claimant. Moreover, the ALJ’s failure to properly consider Mrs. 

Crosson’s testimony is not harmless because it affects a determination of 

whether Crosson has deficiencies in adaptive functioning, and is fully 

supported by Dr. Scott.

F.

Although, for the reasons stated above, the ALJ's decision failed to 

comply with the relevant legal standards, the Court can award Crosson

benefits only if “all essential factual issues have been resolved” and “the 

record adequately establishes [his] entitlement to benefits.” Faucher v. 

Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see 

also Brooks v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 Fed. Appx. 636, 644 (6th Cir.

2013). A record establishes entitlement to benefits only “where the proof of 

disability is overwhelming or where proof of disability is strong and 

evidence to the contrary is lacking.” Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176; see also 

Brooks, 531 Fed. Appx. at 644.

As noted above, the ALJ and the Commissioner conceded that 

Crosson had an IQ within the criteria of Listing 12.05(C), and the ALJ’s step 

two finding that Crosson’s neurofibromatosis constituted a severe 

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impairment was conclusive with respect to whether he had an additional 

significant limitation as required by Listing 12.05(C). Finally, proof that 

Crosson could not work or live independently was strong, and evidence to 

the contrary is lacking; the record demonstrates overwhelming that 

Crosson manifested deficits in adaptive functioning prior to the age of 22, 

as required to meet Listing 12.05(C). 

In light of this overwhelming evidence, the Court recommends that 

this matter be remanded for an award of benefits.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Crosson’s 

motion [R. 13] be GRANTED, the Commissioner’s motion [R. 15] be 

DENIED, and the Commissioner’s decision be REVERSED and this matter 

REMANDED for an award of benefits pursuant to sentence four of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g).

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: February 16, 2016

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but 

fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of 

HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection 

must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it 

may rule without awaiting the response.

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22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 16, 2016.

s/Marlena Williams

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

2:14-cv-13607-SFC-EAS Doc # 17 Filed 02/16/16 Pg 22 of 22 Pg ID 614