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i 

67–396 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–48] 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 

AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROPOSED 

DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JUNE 23, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

BEN RUNKLE, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, June 23, 2011, Recent Developments in Afghanistan and the Proposed Drawdown of U.S. Forces .......................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, June 23, 2011 ......................................................................................... 49 

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE PROPOSED 

DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 6 

Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le .................................................................................... 61 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 53 

Mullen, ADM Michael G. ................................................................................. 57 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 55 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 69 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 69 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 69 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 73 

(1) 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE 

PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF U.S. FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, June 23, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Good morning. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony on the President’s decision to withdraw 10,000 U.S. 

troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year and the remaining 

23,000 surge forces by next summer. 

My position on the war effort has remained consistent: Afghanistan’s stability is vital to our national security. Any removal of 

forces should be based on conditions on the ground and consistent 

with the advice of our senior military leaders. Based on the President’s speech last night, it is not clear to me that his decision was 

based on either. 

At West Point, in 2009, the President committed to a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan by surging 33,000 

troops. Every witness before this committee has testified that this 

strategy is beginning to bear fruit by seizing the momentum from 

the Taliban. 

Many Members have been to Afghanistan and seen this progress 

for themselves. Districts that were once Taliban strongholds are 

now being contested, and once-contentious regions are being handed over to Afghan security forces. The Afghan National Army and 

Police [ANA and ANP] are growing in number and beginning to develop the capabilities to secure their country. These gains are significant. We should guard them jealously. 

I am deeply concerned, therefore, about the aggressive troop 

withdrawals proposed by President Obama. The President’s decision could jeopardize the hard-won gains our troops and allies have 

made over the past 18 months and, potentially, the safety of the 

remaining forces. This announcement also puts at risk a negotiated 

settlement with reconcilable elements of the Taliban, who will now 

believe they can wait out the departure of U.S. forces and return 

to their strongholds. 

Today, I hope to hear more about the details underpinning the 

President’s plan; that we have allowed enough time to achieve suc-
2 

cess; that this drawdown is a military, not a political, consideration; and that it does not put our remaining forces at risk. 

I am interested not only in the number of forces the President 

plans to redeploy, but the location and composition of those forces. 

I am concerned that we will withdraw combat forces before they 

are able to cement recent gains and that areas which have been 

economy-of-force missions thus far will now never witness similar 

progress. 

With the Taliban stumbling, we need a strategy designed to 

knock the enemy to the mat, not give them a breather. I wish I had 

heard the President forcefully renew his commitment to winning in 

Afghanistan. We need our Commander in Chief to remind the 

American people why this fight must be won and to reassure our 

military service members and their families that their sacrifices 

are not in vain. 

Instead, I heard a campaign speech, short on details and confusing multiple theaters of operation that have little to do with a 

plan to succeed in Afghanistan. I look forward to hearing more 

about how this plan will advance our shared national security interests. 

I would yield now to our ranking member, Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank our witnesses for being here this morning to further explain the President’s policy in Afghanistan. 

It is a very, very difficult set of choices that confront our country. 

I think everyone agrees on two broad points: One, we want our 

troops home as soon as possible. The cost and finances but, more 

importantly, in terms of lives and those injured is enormous. And 

we are weary of the war, without question, and we want our troops 

to come home as soon as possible. 

But the second thing that we want is we want to make sure that 

Afghanistan does not descend back into chaos, as it did in the late 

1980s and early 1990s. We understand the threat to our national 

security that comes from an Afghanistan that is in chaos, the safe 

havens that will become available to Al Qaeda and Taliban and 

other allies that clearly threaten us. 

The question, the challenge that our two witnesses before us 

today and the President and others face is, how do you balance 

those two things? And I think the President has struck a very, very 

reasonable balance in this plan. 

It is important to point out that, even with the drawdown that 

is announced, we will have vastly more troops in Afghanistan at 

the end of that drawdown late next year than we had when President Obama took office. Nearly twice as many U.S. troops will be 

there. It is a relatively modest drawdown over the next year and 

a half. 

And the other point that I hope folks will understand: Yes, there 

is a risk in us leaving, but that will always be the case. If we had 
3 

150,000 troops there and kept them for 10 years, 10 years from 

now when we decide to draw them down, there would be a risk. 

This is not a historically stable part of the world. That risk will always be there. 

But what fails to be understood and what I applaud the President for emphasizing is the risk involved in staying too long, and 

not just in terms of the cost that we will bear as a country and certainly the cost that our men and women serving in uniform will 

bear, but to the very security of Afghanistan itself. 

On a daily basis, we hear complaints from the Afghan people 

about our military presence, about civilian deaths, about the simple 

fact of having 100,000 or, add the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] folks in there, 150,000 U.S. troops in your country. 

It is not a pleasant experience. It doesn’t make you want to support 

your government, to know that they are reliant on 150,000 foreign 

troops and, in the case of a Muslim country particularly, 150,000 

western troops in your country. That, too, has a risk attached to 

it. 

So you have to strike a balance. If we were to say to the Afghan 

people tomorrow, ‘‘We are just going to stay here for as long as we 

feel like it,’’ that, too, would undermine our national security interests. A balance must be struck. And I think in the President’s 

speech last night he struck that balance. If I have a concern, it is 

that we may be staying there too long into next year. 

So I can certainly understand why our two witnesses and the 

President and all those who put together this decision have a difficult balance to strike. And I, too, look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses about how that plan is going to play out over the course 

of the next year and a half and beyond, because there is no question that Afghanistan and Pakistan are central to our national security interests. There is also no question, I think we all wish they 

weren’t. It is a very, very difficult part of the world. 

But we have to manage a plan there to try to protect our national security interests. You know, I applaud the President for 

taking steps in that direction. And I look forward to the testimony 

from our witnesses that will further elaborate on those plans. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. I know this 

is very short notice, but it is very timely, and I appreciate you 

making the extraordinary effort to get statements out and to be 

here today. 

We are fortunate to have with us the Honorable Miche`le 

Flournoy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Admiral 

Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]. 

We were talking the other day, and he made the comment that 

people kind of figure—have made comments to him that, ‘‘Well, you 

know, you are just going to coast through the next so many 

months,’’ and he says, ‘‘Yes, like I have coasted through the last 4 

months.’’ 

People, when they were preparing their New Year’s resolutions, 

probably weren’t thinking about Egypt and Yemen and Libya and 
4 

all of the different things that are happening. So, again, I want to 

thank you for your many years of service and for making the extraordinary effort to be with us here today. 

And we will listen now to Ms. Flournoy. Or who—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Yeah, I think we—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Admiral Mullen. 

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral MULLEN. Good morning, sir. 

Mr. Chairman and Representative Smith, distinguished members 

of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss with 

you the President’s decisions regarding the beginning of our drawdown in Afghanistan and our continued transfer of responsibilities 

to Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. 

Let me start by saying that I support the President’s decisions, 

as do Generals Mattis and Petraeus. We were given voice in this 

process, we offered our views freely and without hesitation, and 

they were heard. As has been the case throughout the development 

and execution of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, the Commander in Chief presided over an inclusive and comprehensive discussion about what to do next, and I am grateful for that. 

And I can tell you that foremost on everyone’s mind throughout 

the discussion was preserving the success our troops and their civilian counterparts have achieved thus far. We believed back when 

the strategy was established in December of 2009 that it would be 

about now, this summer, before we could determine whether or not 

we had it right, whether the resources were enough and the counterinsurgency focus was appropriate. Well, now we know. We did 

have it right. The strategy is working. 

Al Qaeda is on their heels, and the Taliban’s momentum in the 

south has been checked. We have made extraordinary progress 

against the mission we have been assigned and are, therefore, now 

in a position to begin a responsible transition out of Afghanistan. 

We will, as the President has ordered, withdraw 10,000 American troops by the end of this year and complete the withdrawal 

of the remaining 23,000 surge troops by the end of next summer. 

General Petraeus and his successor will be given the flexibility inside these deadlines to determine the pace of this withdrawal and 

the rearrangement of remaining forces inside the country. 

There is no jumping ship here; quite the contrary. We will have 

at our disposal the great bulk of the surge forces throughout this 

and most of the next fighting season. And I am comfortable that 

conditions on the ground will dominate, as they have dominated, 

future decisions about our force posture in Afghanistan. 

Let me be candid, however. No commander ever wants to sacrifice fighting power in the middle of a war, and no decision to demand that sacrifice is ever without risk. This is particularly true 

in a counterinsurgency, where success is achieved not solely by 

technological prowess or conventional superiority but by the wit 

and the wisdom of our people as they pursue terrorists and engage 

the local populace on a daily basis. In a counterinsurgency, firepower is manpower. 
5 

I do not intend to discuss the specifics of the private advice I rendered with respect to these decisions. As I said, I support them. 

What I can tell you is the President’s decisions are more aggressive and incur more risk than I was originally prepared to accept. 

More force for more time is, without doubt, the safer course. But 

that does not necessarily make it the best course. Only the President, in the end, can really determine the acceptable level of risk 

we must take. I believe he has done so. 

The truth is, we would have run other kinds of risks by keeping 

more forces in Afghanistan longer. We would have made it easier 

for the Karzai administration to increase their dependency on us. 

We would have denied the Afghan security forces, who have grown 

in capability, opportunities to further exercise that capability and 

to lead. We would have signaled to the enemy and to our regional 

partners that the Taliban still possess strength enough to warrant 

the full measure of our presence; they do not. We would have also 

continued to limit our own freedom of action there and in other 

places around the world, globally. The President’s decisions allow 

us to reset our forces more quickly, as well as to reduce the notinconsiderable cost of deploying those forces. 

In sum, we have earned this opportunity. Though not without 

risk, it is also not without its rewards. And so we will take that 

risk and we will reap those rewards. The war in Afghanistan will 

enter a new phase, and we will continue to fight it. And we will 

continue to need the assistance, persistence, and expertise of our 

allies and partners. 

The President said it well last night: Huge challenges remain. 

This is the beginning, not the end, of our effort to wind down this 

war. No one in uniform is under any illusion that there will not 

be more violence, more casualties, more struggles, or more challenges as we continue to accomplish the mission there. 

We know that the progress we have made, though considerable, 

can still be reversed without our constant leadership, the contributions of our partners and regional nations, and a more concerted 

effort by the Afghan Government to address corruption in their 

ranks and deliver basic goods and services to their people. 

But the strategy remains the right one. This transition and the 

concurrent focus on developing the Afghan National Security 

Forces was always a part of that strategy. In fact, if you consider 

the continued growth of the ANSF, the Taliban could well face 

more combined force, in terms of manpower, in 2012 than they did 

this year, and capable enough if the ANSF has strong leadership 

and continued outside support. 

Going forward, we also know we need to support an Afghan political process that includes reconciliation with the Taliban who break 

with Al Qaeda, renounce violence, and accept the Afghan Constitution. And we know we need to continue building a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, one based not on military footprint but 

on mutual friendship. 

Our true presence will diminish, as it should, but the partnership between our two nations will and must endure. That is ultimately the way we win in Afghanistan, not by how much we do, 

but by how much they do for themselves and for their country; not 
6 

by how much our respective soldiers fight, but by how much our 

statesmen lead. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I stand ready to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in the 

Appendix on page 57.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting us 

both here today to update you on Afghanistan. 

As you all know, in his December 2009 speech at West Point, 

President Obama announced a surge of 30,000 U.S. troops, with 

the clear objectives of seizing the initiative from the Taliban and 

reversing the momentum of the campaign on the ground. At that 

time, the President also specified that the surge would not be openended and that he would begin to reduce U.S. surge forces beginning in July 2011. 

Last night, true to his word, President Obama announced to the 

American people that the United States is beginning a deliberate, 

responsible drawdown of our surge forces in Afghanistan. An initial 

drawdown of 10,000 troops will occur over the course of this year, 

with a further drawdown of the remainder of the surge by the end 

of summer 2012. Secretary Gates believes that this decision provides our commanders with the right mix of flexibility, resources, 

and time to continue building on our significant progress on the 

ground. 

Even after the recovery of the surge forces, totaling about 33,000 

troops, we will still have 68,000 U.S. service members in Afghanistan. That is more than twice the number as when President 

Obama took office. Clearly, this is not a rush to the exits that will 

jeopardize our security gains. 

More importantly, at the end of summer 2012, when all of the 

surge forces are out, there will actually be more Afghan and coalition forces in the fight than there are today. That is because, by 

the time we complete our drawdown, we anticipate that the Afghan 

National Security Forces will have added another 55,000-plus 

members, not including the Afghan local police. The growth in the 

quantity and the quality of the ANSF, which has fielded more than 

100,000 additional forces over the past 18 months, is one of the 

critical conditions that is enabling the drawdown of the U.S. surge 

forces. 

More broadly, as the admiral said, our strategy in Afghanistan 

is working as designed. The momentum has shifted to the coalition 

and Afghan forces, and, together, we have degraded the Taliban’s 

capability and achieved significant security gains, especially in the 

Taliban’s heartland in the south. 

These security gains are enabling key political initiatives to 

make progress. We have begun a transition process that will ultimately put Afghans in the lead for security nationwide by 2014. We 
7 

are beginning to see reintegration and reconciliation processes gain 

traction. And we are in discussions with the Afghans about a strategic partnership that will signal our enduring commitment to the 

Afghan people and to regional peace and stability. Together, these 

initiatives promise a future Afghanistan that is stable, peaceful, 

and secure. 

So I want to emphasize that this announcement in no way marks 

a change in American policy or strategy in Afghanistan. It is wholly consistent with the goals that President Obama and our allies 

agreed to at Lisbon, the NATO summit at Lisbon last year. There, 

we committed to the gradual transfer of security leadership to the 

Afghans by the end of 2014 and to an enduring commitment to a 

security partnership with Afghanistan to ensure that we never 

again repeat the mistake of simply abandoning that nation to its 

fate and risking the re-establishment of Al Qaeda safe havens 

there. 

I want to emphasize that, although our progress in Afghanistan 

has certainly been substantial and our strategy is on track, there 

are significant challenges that remain. In the months ahead, we 

will be confronted by an enemy that will try to regain the momentum and the territory that it has lost to Afghan and coalition 

forces. 

However, that enemy will also face an Afghan population that is 

increasingly experiencing the benefits of security and self-governance. And those benefits will only become clearer as we begin the 

transition to full Afghan security responsibility in selected areas. 

Those communities will provide us with useful lessons on security 

and governance, as well as a potential model for other parts of the 

country. 

Finally, let me emphasize how crucial it is for us to maintain the 

continuing role of our coalition partners in Afghanistan: 48 countries with some 47,000 troops along our side. These partner nations 

have made significant contributions and significant sacrifices. Even 

as we recognize the progress that we and our partners have made 

toward our shared goal of destroying terrorist safe havens, we must 

sustain this partnership to ensure that we ultimately leave behind 

an Afghanistan that will never again serve as a base for terrorist 

attacks against the United States or our allies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, and distinguished members of the committee. That concludes my remarks, and we look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy can be found in 

the Appendix on page 61.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

You know, there is not a single Member of Congress who does 

not want our troops to come home as soon as possible. Personally, 

I believe the objective of transitioning to an Afghan lead on security within 3 years is both a desirable and an achievable objective. 

The last visit I made, compared to the one before, I saw significant progress. Areas that we weren’t able to go into before, we were 

able to go and walk down the streets in Marjah without body 

armor. We opened a school while we were there. I think we have 

made significant gains. This will enable, as we transition, it will 

enable our forces to come home. 
8 

However, I am concerned that the drawdown plan announced by 

the President last night will significantly undermine our ability to 

responsibly enact this transition. I am concerned with the gains we 

have made in the south. We have been holding, as I understand, 

more of a holding pattern in the north and the east. And the plan 

was, I thought, to move more of those forces, as we solidified the 

gains in the south, to move them to the north and the east. And 

I am concerned that this drawdown may not let us do all that we 

could in that area. 

Admiral Mullen, based on your best professional judgment and 

that of your commanders, how many of the forces to be drawn 

down will be combat forces? 

And I will ask these, and you can answer them. 

Is the President’s plan to redeploy all 33,000 surge forces by next 

summer aggressive? What regional commands will these forces be 

drawn from? Does it put our recent security gains at risk? And 

does it risk the security and safety of our remaining forces? 

Admiral MULLEN. Let me talk about, broadly, the approach. 

Clearly, as you have said, Chairman, we have made significant 

gains over the course of the last 18 months and, really, since the 

President made the decision to put the surge forces in, and particularly in the south. And we are in the hold phase now and, in fact, 

moving into a phase where the Afghans have the lead. 

So that was where we were, with respect to, literally, the most 

recent discussions and meetings with respect to what to do next, 

and we understand that. The south consciously has been the main 

effort. And it is that focus that has allowed us to achieve the gains 

we had. 

Not insignificant when we debated this in 2009 was the very 

small chance that everybody—an awful lot of people gave us in 

terms of building the Afghan National Security Forces, because of 

the illiteracy challenge, because we didn’t have a training infrastructure, because we didn’t have noncommissioned officer [NCO] 

leaders, et cetera. The extraordinary progress that has been made 

with respect to setting up that infrastructure and fielding forces— 

Ms. Flournoy said over 100,000. I think it is about 120,000 forces 

that have been trained and fielded. Some 35,000 are in training literally this week. By the end of next year, we will have Afghan 

units that are manned at the NCO level to the 85 percent level 

across the board. So, extraordinary changes with respect to that. 

And when we talk about whether gains are reversible and fragile, these gains can only be made irreversible by the Afghan National Security Forces and the Afghan people, in the end. So that 

is where this is headed, and we have made great progress with respect to that. 

The secondary effort was the east. And I wouldn’t describe it over 

the course of the last year as a holding action at all. And, in fact, 

what David Petraeus and others have done out there is reconfigure 

forces to deal with the challenges of that very rugged territory. 

And, in fact, it is not to take a lot of—the plan is not to take a 

lot of our forces and put them in the east. But it is, as Dave 

Petraeus says, it provides the jet stream between the safe havens 

in Pakistan for the Haqqani network, in particular, and getting to 

Kabul. 
9 

And Kabul, where roughly 20 percent of the Afghan population 

has been secured, Afghans are in the lead. And, obviously, you 

want to keep it that way, with respect to the capital of that country. 

So what General Petraeus has done over the course of the last 

year is reconfigure those forces, look at an adjustment in literally 

strategy on the ground, if you will, to layer the forces in a way so 

that that jet stream is really cut off and it is made much more difficult on the enemy. 

And there are layered forces from the border right through to 

Kabul which are now doing that. I am actually more confident in 

what we have with respect to the east than we had a year ago because I think we understand it. That doesn’t mean it is not hugely 

challenging. It clearly is. But there was never an intent to do exactly in the east what we have done in the south with respect to 

our forces. And I think that all lies within this overall strategic approach. 

All of us knew, going into this, that the surge forces were going 

to come out next year at some point in time. So the discussion 

about exactly when is obviously relevant but, in terms of numbers 

of months and getting through the fighting season, the end of September is almost all the way through the fighting season. There 

will be those that argue October is a pretty tough month. It is, but 

it is winding down in October. 

So what we have is the vast majority of our forces for the next 

two fighting seasons, not unlike what I said in 2009. We put 10,000 

Marines in Helmand in 2009. My position then was, if we didn’t 

have a good handle on what was going on in 18 to 24 months based 

on what we were doing from a strategy standpoint as well as what 

has happened on the ground, then we would probably have to 

change our strategy. 

I believe these decisions and our strategy gives us time to understand how good the Afghan security forces are going to be; how 

well the government actually stands up; how does President Karzai 

get at corruption; how well are we dealing with the risks associated 

with safe havens; and is there political space that this buys, where 

you can start reconciliation, move it from where it is right now in 

its beginning stages, where you can continue reintegration. And we 

have a couple thousand former Afghan Taliban—or, former Taliban 

who are now being reintegrated. 

So, in essence, in ways, from my perspective, we are talking 

about the margins here, after a lot of progress, a good strategy, and 

continued focus in that direction. I think I would be remiss if I said 

publicly where these forces are going to come from, because I am 

not anxious to give up, you know, anything to the enemy in that 

regard. I would be happy to, you know, go through that with you. 

But, most importantly, I think where the forces come from next 

year will depend on what happens this year. And that will be conditions-based, inside, obviously, the deadline set. And that General 

Petraeus and General Rodriguez and, obviously, their reliefs will 

make these determinations, given the mission that they have been 

given to carry out and, obviously, the direction from the President. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Would you term the redeployment for this summer ‘‘aggressive’’? 
10 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, not the words—as you know, we all 

have to choose our words very carefully. You used ‘‘significant’’ earlier. 

I think it is well within reason for us to be able to do this. As 

I said in my opening statement, it was more aggressive and it has 

more risk than, you know, I was originally prepared to—than I recommended. That said, in totality, it is within the ability to sustain 

the mission, focus on the objectives, and execute. 

The CHAIRMAN. I didn’t mean, when I asked where the forces 

would be withdrawn, to pinpoint locations. 

I was referring to—and I am glad that you answered that the 

way you did. But what I was talking about, will they be coming 

from the fighting forces? 

Admiral MULLEN. You know, ‘‘combat forces’’ is a term that has 

been broadened dramatically in these wars. I have been asked as 

recently as a couple days ago about, will they be the enablers? 

Enablers are every bit the combat force anybody else is in the classic sense. And so, in ways, are our support forces, because the 

threat is a 360-degree threat oftentimes. 

So I can’t actually tell you, Chairman, where they are going to 

come from. I think, clearly, a commander on the ground is going 

to keep as much fighting power, whatever that means, given the 

situation, as he possibly can for as long as he can. And I am sure 

that General Petraeus and, if confirmed, General Allen will proceed 

in that direction. But I just don’t have the specifics yet. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You had mentioned in your opening remarks about the number 

of Afghan security forces that have been trained over the course of 

the last—I guess it is 18 months now since the surge began. I have 

heard the statistic, 100,000 in the Afghan Army. I know we also 

have made significant improvements in the police force. 

I think one of the logical things that occurs to us, if we have that 

many more Afghan troops available, that much more Afghan security, how does that figure in and help us with this drawdown? How 

capable are they? How reliable are they? How can we move them 

in to take over some of the responsibilities? 

Because, I mean, if we are adding 100,000 Afghan troops—I don’t 

know what the figure is on the police force—and this year, next 6 

months, our plan is to draw down a total of 10,000 U.S. forces, it 

seems to me we are still in pretty good shape. 

And one final little piece of that. The other NATO forces are 

going to be keeping roughly the same amount for the rest of this 

year, is my understanding. Can you confirm that and then comment on how the Afghan forces add into the mix? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, let me go to the second question first. 

I mean, we were in both consultation and contact with our NATO 

allies over time. And they were obviously focused very much on 

what the United States was going to do, and any decisions that 

they were going to make were clearly going to be informed by this 

decision that the President has made. 

That said—and I think it is worthy of focusing on—part of what 

the President focused on last night was the Lisbon summit, the 
11 

whole issue of transition, the number of heads of state and countries that are committed to this transition in 2014, which we think 

is about right—that is certainly the intent—and everything coming 

into this, as far as I know, Mr. Smith, I mean, the allies were very 

much with us. 

They have specific decisions they have to make, and I don’t know 

what—I don’t know what those are. Certainly, I think as Secretary 

Flournoy pointed out, it is important for them to stay in this. Not 

lost on me over the totality of this is, 48 countries have committed 

combat forces here over time, which is a huge statement specifically in and of itself. 

With respect to the ANSF, I think the number—and I can get it 

if it is wrong—for the army and the police is about 128,000 between the two. And, in fact, you know, 2 years ago, it was illiteracy, you know, it was essentially no training infrastructure. 

There was nothing that was set up except you recruited somebody 

on a Friday, and Monday they were on the street in a unit that 

wasn’t well-led, didn’t have senior leadership, senior or midgrade 

leadership, and hadn’t had any training. 

We have now set up 12—what we call 12 branch schools that 

have been set up. So this 35,000 that I mention—and the number 

has been between 25,000 and 35,000 in training for months. So it 

was a matter of setting up the infrastructure, many countries contributing to trainers. And we are about where we need to be with 

respect to trainers from all of these countries. 

So there is now a system of training, which has produced a much 

more capable individual and what we see as a much more capable 

fighting force in the field. They are leading, in some cases, now. We 

are partnering with them throughout Afghanistan. And, over the 

course of the next year, that will increase exponentially. 

I am not naive to think—you know, they have some challenges. 

They haven’t done this before. We don’t expect it to be magical. But 

in terms of the progress we have made over the course of the last 

18 months or so, it really has been enormous. And we expect to 

continue on that pace and actually have it pick up. They will get 

better and be more and more in the lead. 

Mr. SMITH. Yeah, the improvement in training over the course of 

the last 18 months I don’t think can be overstated. Because, as you 

said, it is one thing to say we are going to pick someone up, turn 

them into a soldier, and send them out the door. It is another thing 

to actually have a trained force. And the surge wasn’t just in our 

troops; it was in the totality of the effort—improving the training 

and also improving the governance. 

The last time I was there, a few months back, you know, I have 

never seen so much activity on the State Department, Agriculture, 

Justice Department. We had USAID [U.S. Agency for International 

Development]. We had a comprehensive effort to improve the governance. 

And I will just conclude by saying, you know, if we put 128,000 

more Afghan security forces over the course of the last 18 months, 

I don’t think it is fair to say that drawing down 10,000 U.S. troops 

this year and even another 23,000 next year significantly reduces 

our effort. I think, clearly, we have resourced this effort appropriately, and we are making progress. 
12 

And I certainly appreciate your leadership on that. It was a very 

tough fight, but the improvement that all of us have seen over the 

course of the last 18 months is truly remarkable and to be commended. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Thank you for your service and your testimony. 

Four and a half years ago, I led a CODEL [congressional delegation] to China to talk about energy. I believe Mr. Larsen was on 

that CODEL with me. We were stunned when the Chinese began 

their discussion of energy by talking about post-oil. Oil is finite; of 

course there will be a post-oil world. 

With our focus of the next election, which is never more than 2 

years away, and the next quarterly report, which is always less 

than 3 months away, I have heard none of our leadership mention 

that there will be a post-oil world. This is a dominant factor in the 

Chinese planning. So, clearly, people in that part of the world have 

a different perspective of time and agenda than we do. 

I am the Afghan Taliban; I am not constrained in my thinking 

about the next election, which is less than 2 years away, or the 

next quarterly report. What may seem to those Americans is a very 

long time, 3 years, to me in my planning it is little more than the 

blink of an eye. In just 3 years, they are going to be out of there. 

For the next 3 years, I am going to continue the fight as a diversion, but what I am really going to be doing is recruiting and reconstituting so that I am going to be ready when they are gone. I 

know they are working very hard to improve the security forces 

and the police. They are trying to make the mayor of Kabul look 

like the President of Afghanistan. But these gains are all very fragile and reversible. And with the forces that I am going to hold in 

reserve from this fight, they will be easily reversed when they are 

gone. 

Do you think that we have the ability—you know, what one sees 

depends upon where one sits. Do you think that we have the ability 

to see the world through the prism of the Taliban? 

Admiral MULLEN. We see that world a lot more clearly than we 

used to, Mr. Bartlett, as I am sure you can appreciate, because of 

the fights and because of the sacrifices. 

We also see that world through the Afghan people’s eyes, because 

we are in so many villages, subdistricts, and districts with them. 

And I just disagree that the gains are going to be easily reversed. 

In fact, I see a stream of intelligence routinely of the Taliban in 

significant disarray, at the leadership level, many of whom live in 

Pakistan, as well as in the field. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, I was just repeating what I am told by General Petraeus and others. And every testimony—read it in the Congressional Record—they sit where you are sitting, and they say, 

‘‘The gains are fragile and reversible.’’ I was simply repeating that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. I have said that, as well. 

What you also said, that they are easily reversible, I just disagree that that is the case. They only become irreversible if we get 

the Afghan security forces in charge of their own destiny. That is 
13 

the goal over the course of the next 3 years. Four years ago, they 

virtually had no Afghan security forces, certainly no effective 

forces. 

That is the challenge. That is the path home. We all know that. 

And we see that through their eyes, as well as look at it through 

the Taliban’s eyes. 

The Taliban had a really bad year last year. They are having a 

really bad year this year. They are going to have another really 

bad next year. It is for them to decide how long they want to just 

sit on the side. And I certainly understand that. That is less—as 

far as I am concerned, that is more than just a blink in the eye, 

even in their eyes, and they have been fighting this for many years. 

They are also tired, and I see that routinely. 

So I guess I come at it from a different position than how you 

see it. I certainly understand what you are saying, but we have 

just seen great progress. And there is an opportunity here to succeed against the objectives we have, which have been limited and 

get to a point where Afghanistan is in charge of their own destiny 

and we have a long-term relationship with that country that puts 

them in a position to be a lot more peaceful and stable than they 

have been in the last three to four decades. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here this morning. 

I think, at least from my perspective—and this is after having 

a conversation with former Ambassador Khalilzad about the region 

in general and the challenges that we may face, given the decision 

that the President made. 

And we were there; I was part of the trip with the chairman. 

And one of the anecdotes that stands out in my mind speaks to just 

the comments that you are making about the advances that we 

have made that some people categorize as ‘‘fragile.’’ But we were 

told about one of the soldiers that had been trained, was intending 

on being deployed, but what was significant about that was that 

his idea was, once he completed his term, was to go back to his village and work on the next generation in the context of literacy. We 

all know that is one of the big challenges that we have faced, is 

the rate of illiteracy in the general population. 

So my question is, given the decision that has now been made 

in terms of starting the drawdown, one of the expectations that we 

have is that the civilian leadership will set the direction and that 

the Afghani National Security Forces are going to provide the security. So my question is for both of you. Is the civilian leadership 

at a point to where they can provide that direction, that oversight? 

And how are we—where are we and how are we are ensuring that 

both evolve at the same time? 

Because we are also very troubled by the amount of corruption 

that exists, the control or lack of control that is exercised by the 

central government. So it seems to me that those are still questions 

out there that we need to take into account as we do the drawdown. 
14 

And then the last point is, we are being told that even once this 

is accomplished, just for the ANSF, the security forces, it is going 

to take somewhere between $6 billion and $8 billion a year to sustain them. The central government does not have that kind of—at 

least at this point, we don’t have the expectation that they will 

have that kind of income. So where is that money coming from? 

How much and how long are we on the hook for? Either $6 billion 

or $8 billion or more if you take into account the civilian government, as well? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you, Congressman. 

We are certainly investing in developing Afghan governance and 

institutions as well as the ANSF. 

The greatest progress we are seeing so far has really been from 

the bottom up, starting at the local and district level, moving to the 

provinces. I think I would say that something like 75 percent now 

of the district and provincial officials that are in place are now 

merit-based appointments. These are capable people who are qualified to do the jobs they are doing. And you are seeing a dramatic 

change at the local level, where most Afghans have their most direct experience with their government. So that is the good news. 

I think, when you move to the national level, in terms of ministries that can provide basic services, an accountable justice system and dealing with corruption and so forth, we still—this is a 

work in progress, and there are many challenges that we still have 

to work through. But we are working through—we have partnerships with each of the major Afghan ministries, working with them 

to develop the capacity and go after corruption. 

On your question about ANSF sustainability, we share your concern, the President shares your concern. We are currently working 

with the Afghans to scrub our long-term model for the ANSF to 

better understand, as the insurgency comes down, what will the 

needs of that force really be, how can we bring down the costs, do 

things in a way that gets us into a more sustainable range in terms 

of what the Afghans, together with the international community, 

can support over time. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, you said in your statement that the commanders have 

flexibility inside the deadlines, which tells me there is no flexibility 

to extend the deadlines. And you also said in your statement that 

‘‘the President’s decision was more aggressive and incurs more risk 

than I was originally prepared to accept.’’ Interesting choice of 

words, ‘‘prepared to accept,’’ to me. But what that tells me is, your 

best military advice was something other than and less aggressive 

withdrawals than what the President announced. 

So I guess the first question that comes to my mind is, is there 

a military reason to have a mandated withdrawal in September 

rather than November or December? 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Thornberry, what I said in my statement—and I will stick to that—is, I am not going to review my private military advice. We presented a range of options to the Presi-
15 

dent. He has obviously chosen one based on his judgment, and we 

intend to carry that out. 

I honestly believe that within both the numbers of troops and 

timelines, given that we will have the vast majority of our forces 

through these two fighting seasons, that we are on the margins 

here in terms of having an impact. And, as I said earlier, there is 

not a commander on the ground, there is not a military individual 

in the chain of command that wouldn’t want more, longer. That is 

normal. But it is not my decision; it is for the President to decide. 

And I would re-emphasize that inside that deadline—which is 

not flexible, I understand that—the commander on the ground— 

and the President has been very specific about this—has all the 

flexibility so he can move the forces where and when he wants to, 

as long as he meets those deadlines. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, as you referenced, there are other people 

who are concerned about the military effects of this. Now, as you 

know, there is speculation that politics plays a role in this timetable. I am trying to focus on the military aspects. 

I am looking at today’s New York Times, where Michael 

O’Hanlon talks about that if the troops have to be out in September, they are going to spend most of the summer on the 

downsizing effort rather than, arguably, where they should be 

spending most of their time, and that it is in the fighting season. 

And it also quotes General Barno, who was the ground commander there in Afghanistan and is now affiliated with the Center 

for a New American Security, saying that the 10,000 by December 

is more than the military wanted but doable. But putting a September 2012 expiration tag on the rest of the surge raises real concerns. That is the middle of the fighting season. 

Admiral MULLEN. Neither one of those guys are military guys. 

And I know them both. Barno commanded it years ago. And the 

focus from the perspective of the military leadership—Rodriguez, 

Petraeus, others, Mattis, and myself—and how we both recommended and integrated that—not integrated, but had discussions about this decision—certainly, we were focused on the military piece of this. 

And, again, at the end, it increases the risk, but not substantially 

from my point of view, and that, you know, O’Hanlon’s view that 

we are going to be focused on logistics is not, from my perspective—in a fighting season, we have to meet the deadline, but it is 

not going to divert the main effort. 

Now, that is my view. He and I can differ on that. But I assure 

you that is the view coming from the commanders, as well. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, let me ask you one other thing. Some of 

my colleagues and I have just recently been there, focused on the 

village stability operations. It looks like one of the great successes 

that is spreading, but the key determinate is manpower. As you 

know, we are augmenting Special Forces with conventional forces 

now. Plans to expand them to a bunch more villages, but if the people aren’t there, obviously that cannot happen. 

So does this decision put at risk what seems to be one of the 

most promising things going on in Afghanistan to allow them to 

stand up and provide for their own security? 
16 

Admiral MULLEN. I agree with that. The Afghan local police and 

the village stability operations, which have been enormously successful, have stood up, I think as recently as this week, to a level 

of about 6,400 Afghans who are in this program. And, certainly, in 

discussions I have had with General Petraeus and others, there is 

no intent to slow that down and that this decision shouldn’t do 

that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I worry about that, but thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being before us. 

I have a line of questioning from three different aspects because 

I think all three of these are very important for us to be able to 

leave Afghanistan and not have to return. 

And, as you probably already know, I have been one of those people who have been saying, let’s get out of this, because I can’t seem 

to get—and you have been before us many times, and so has Secretary Gates and others. I haven’t seemed to really get from any 

of you or from General Petraeus or the others what is the real end 

game and what it really looks like, other than stability and the Afghan people able to do this on their own. 

So I think that is dependent on three things: education of the 

population, because we know that it is very undereducated; secondly, the leadership of that country; and, third, a strong Afghan 

Army/police force, whatever you want to call it. 

So my first question is, when did we start training the Afghan— 

what year, I can’t recall now, did we start training the Afghan 

Army and police? Secondly, how many have gone through our 

training or NATO’s training or our allies’ training program at this 

point? 

Admiral MULLEN. I mean, I can speak to that, and certainly Secretary Flournoy, as well. 

The exact year would be hard for me to pin down, but there has 

been a training effort almost as long as we have been there. My 

own personal experience is, it was well under way, although underresourced, in 2006–2007. So it has been a number of years. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And how many would you say we have trained, 

who have gone through the training program that we have had or 

our allies have had, in total, during this time? 

Admiral MULLEN. About 300,000—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 300,000. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. 302,000, 304,000. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So, currently, according to the information you 

gave that we have in front of us, we have 305,000, total, target end 

strength for this year of the ANSF. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So there has been—so we have trained 300,000 

and we still have 300,000? So nobody has gone away like in Iraq, 

where they walked away with arms, they walked away, they didn’t 

come to the fight, they went back to their villages? You are saying 

we have 100 percent retention? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, no, no, no. I am saying that we—certainly, 

we have had retention problems. 
17 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. But I asked you how many had we trained 

during the total time. 

Admiral MULLEN. Oh, I couldn’t—I would have to go—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. I would like to get that number—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Sure. 

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. When you get a chance. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma’am. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. 

My second question comes to the whole issue of a corrupt government. And I start from the standpoint that the first time I met 

President Karzai, I told him I thought he was—I was reading a 

Newsweek article that had been written that day that called him 

the mayor of Kabul, and that is about it. 

In my last visit there, his own parliamentarians said a type of 

election where he won a second term should never happen again 

in that country. Some were of his own party. So they don’t even 

believe that was a good election. 

So my question to you is, what are we doing about leadership 

there? What have we done to try to cultivate leadership? Who are 

we identifying? Or are we just leaving it up to these corrupt people 

to take advantage of their own country, as they currently are 

doing? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would just say what I mentioned before. 

We have worked bottom-up to systematically work with the Afghans to ensure first at the district level where Afghans experience 

government most directly, then at the provincial level, and then at 

the national level that we replace corrupt and incompetent leadership so that the Afghans replace them. 

I think we are 75 percent of the way there at the district and 

provincial level. I think you are starting to see President Karzai, 

who is our partner in this effort—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Corrupt, I might add, but go on. 

Secretary FLOURNOY [continuing]. Make the connection between 

corruption—the need to fight corruption to be able to gain and sustain legitimacy of government in the eyes of the people. 

And one of the things that he has begun to do, with our support 

and encouragement, is start to make those replacements—so, you 

know, for example, dismissing a number of officers from the ANSF 

who he found to be corrupt. A lot of the work we are doing on the 

police, again, historically one of the most corrupt institutions in the 

country, the revetting, retraining, refielding of those units with a 

totally different philosophy about what their job is, in terms of 

serving the communities that they protect. 

Those are all concrete efforts toward dealing with the corruption 

problem. That said, we certainly have a long way to go. And we are 

pressing our Afghan partners every day on this issue. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time. 

I just would like to add to the record, I think when all is said 

and done about this effort of ours, we will find that a corrupt government is what really brought our efforts to naught there. 

Thank you. 
18 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, I would like to pick up on a line of questioning that Mr. 

Thornberry began with your statement that you made, both in 

writing and orally, where you said, ‘‘What I can tell you is the 

President’s decisions are more aggressive and incur more risk than 

I was originally prepared to accept.’’ 

Risk to whom? 

Admiral MULLEN. Risk to the overall mission. 

Mr. FORBES. But not risk to—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Risk in the strategy. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Our troops? 

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly, it has increased—I think it has increased risk across the board. But it is—— 

Mr. FORBES. The other thing—— 

Admiral MULLEN. But, Mr. Forbes, it is manageable risk. And 

we—— 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Know where we stand. 

Mr. FORBES. But, Admiral, I am taking your words that it is 

more risk. And let me ask you this question. I notice from your 

Web site that you state that you are the principal military advisor 

to the President and, as such, that you present the range of advice 

and opinions you have received, along with any individual comments from other members of the Joint Staff. 

What is your role when you come before us? Is it to do the same 

thing, or is it to support the decisions of the administration? 

Admiral MULLEN. It is—I think the Web site says ‘‘Joint Chiefs,’’ 

not ‘‘Joint Staff,’’ although—— 

Mr. FORBES. Joint Chiefs. 

Admiral MULLEN. And it is certainly to provide my both assessment and advice, if you will, views, based on the questions that I 

get. It is typically—— 

Mr. FORBES. Is it the same role that you have to the President, 

to give us the same type of advice? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, sir, it is not exactly—— 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. I looked through your testimony as you have 

appeared before both the Senate and the House during the administration’s time. Can you tell us one time that you have, in any of 

your testimony, not supported the decision that the administration 

has made before any hearing? 

Admiral MULLEN. I have worked for two Presidents, and I have 

supported those Presidents. 

Mr. FORBES. So when we come here, we know that we are going 

to basically have the support of what decision was made. 

My question, then, comes back to this: In May of this year, you 

said you think we will have a better picture of where to go in Afghanistan toward the end of the year. You then said on May 30th, 

‘‘I think it is a very difficult fighting season right now. This is 

going to be a tough year.’’ Then in June, I think you said, ‘‘We 

shouldn’t let up on the gas too much, at least for the next months.’’ 

And my question to you today is, what has changed between that 

original acceptable risk that was risk to our troops as well as our 
19 

mission, that was not acceptable then, and today? Have you reassessed your position, and were you wrong when you thought it 

wasn’t an acceptable risk? Or has there been something that has 

changed on the ground, something that has changed militarily, that 

makes that a more acceptable risk today? 

Admiral MULLEN. What I have said for many months is, this is 

going to be—I go back up to what I said earlier—a very difficult 

year on the Taliban last year. It is going to be and continues to be 

a very difficult year with respect to the Taliban’s goals this year. 

And my recommendations and the risk that is out there is very 

focused on achieving those objectives. And while there is more risk, 

I don’t consider it significant. And I don’t consider it in any way, 

shape, or form putting the military in a position where it can’t 

achieve its objectives. 

Mr. FORBES. Were there any of the Joint Chiefs or any of the 

commanders on the ground that recommended this particular action that the President is taking? 

Admiral MULLEN. Again, I’m not going to talk about individual 

recommendations. 

Mr. FORBES. You know, Admiral, I will just close with this. It 

just astounds me that when we had ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’’ you 

were willing to come before a committee, unsolicited, and say, ‘‘I 

am willing to state my personal opinion, and this is what I think 

it should be,’’ but yet, when we are talking about potential risk to 

the troops that this committee has to make, which is our numberone concern, that you are not willing to say what those individual 

commanders were willing to say or your personal recommendations. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, it is an honor to be in the process with someone 

whose integrity is as unimpeachable as yours, both in the quality 

of your advice and the strength of your character. And we thank 

you for it. 

And, Madam Secretary, thank you, also, for your terrific contributions here. 

Madam Secretary, I think you have succinctly stated our purpose 

in Afghanistan: that we ultimately leave behind an Afghanistan 

that will never again serve as a base for terrorist attacks on the 

United States and our allies. 

I have always thought that Al Qaeda was the parasite and the 

Taliban was the host in Afghanistan. And our military mission, essentially, has been focused on destroying the parasite and either 

weakening the host or making the host unwilling to become the 

host for the parasite. 

And I note that Admiral Mullen says, ‘‘We need to support an Afghan political process that includes reconciliation with the Taliban 

who break with Al Qaeda,’’ which I think is a wise and understandable view. 

So with that framework of what we are trying to accomplish, it 

is my understanding that when the administration took office, 

Madam Secretary, that we had about 34,000 troops in Afghanistan. 
20 

The surge built that up to 98,000. And when the present withdrawal plan is completed, we will be at 68,000. Is that correct? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. That is correct. 

Mr. ANDREWS. And, at present, there are 47,000 troops from allied countries that are in-country. What do we know about the 

plans of the allies to withdraw those 47,000? How many and when? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think, in the discussions we have 

had, I think they are—we have an in-together, out-together principle; a very strong sense of resolve right now in ISAF [International Security Assistance Force]. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Uh-huh. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. And I think that, as we have talked about 

bringing down our surge forces, some of the allies are thinking 

about bringing down their surge contributions. But we should remember—— 

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, in that context—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY [continuing]. Many—— 

Mr. ANDREWS [continuing]. In that context—I am sorry—of security for Afghanistan, the target number of ANSF forces is 305,000, 

and, as of April, we were at 286,000. And the public reports indicate that, by about a three to one ratio, those units were deemed 

to be ‘‘effective’’ as opposed to ‘‘dependent.’’ 

Let me ask you a question that is not a rhetorical question. 

Given the strengthening of the ANSF, the presence of allied troops 

that we don’t expect a precipitous drop in—we expect it to be somewhat on par with ours—what will the mission of the 68,000 remaining Americans be after September 30th of 2012? Why are they 

there? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think they are there to continue the implementation of the strategy on the road to successful transition, 

which will be completed—you know, at the end of 2014, we expect 

that Afghans will be fully in the lead across the country. We are 

on a glide slope toward that Lisbon goal. And this drawdown is totally consistent with that, and the strategy and the mission will 

keep aiming for that goal. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, Admiral or Madam Secretary, either of you 

can answer this. In terms that our constituents would understand 

and that we would understand, what will these 68,000 troops be 

doing in the country after September 30th of 2012? What will their 

mission be? 

Admiral MULLEN. First of all, it will be to sustain the transition. 

But, specifically—and this is, from my perspective, a rock-solid 

principle from Iraq—it is the partnership piece. What we see in 

Iraq today and what we have seen throughout the shift in Iraq of 

our mission to the assist side is the enormity of the impact of partnership. And that is where we are, even now, focused with the Afghan security forces. And you talked about the ratio. And in 2 or 

3 years from now, it will be much better than it is right now. 

So that will be, if you will, a significant part of the main effort. 

But that doesn’t mean we won’t have forces still involved in combat 

to continue the gains, if you will. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral, when the day hopefully comes when the 

Afghan security forces are at their optimal point and can control 
21 

and defend their own country, what will the appropriate U.S. troop 

level be then? 

Admiral MULLEN. It is indeterminate right now. I mean, dramatically reduced, clearly. The model is still Iraq. And then that 

gets into what is being worked right now in this strategic-partnership approach between Afghanistan and the United States. And 

what does it mean, long term, in terms of any kind of U.S. footprint, I just don’t have the answer to that. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much, again, for your testimony 

and your integrity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, Madam Secretary, thank you for being here today. 

And, Admiral, I appreciate your testimony, bringing up the extraordinary progress by the American military, their service in Afghanistan. And I am just so grateful, too, for your reference to winning in Afghanistan. The American people need to know that 

progress is being made and we can win. 

And, Madam Secretary, I appreciate you referencing how important it is that we do win and that we are successful in Afghanistan. 

I wish the American people knew really the level of achievement, 

such as the security forces. And you have provided the information 

today, and I appreciate Congressman Andrews referencing it, too. 

And that is, at the end of this year, in the last 3 years, we will 

have doubled the number of Afghan police and army personnel up 

to 305,000 personnel—trained personnel. And General Bill 

Caldwell has certainly done extraordinary work. I had the privilege 

of visiting my former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade, as 

they were training Afghan security forces. And I don’t think they 

get the credit, our military or theirs, for the professionalism that 

is being created in that country. 

With that said, I am very concerned about conditions on the 

ground. And for each of you, the President did not reference any 

conditions on the ground that would justify withdrawing 10,000 

troops by December and an additional 23,000 next summer. Every 

witness before this committee has previously testified that any 

withdrawal would be conditions-based. 

The first question: What specific conditions on the ground justify 

withdrawing 10,000 troops by December? 

Admiral MULLEN. We are literally starting transition in seven 

districts next month, in this overall transition process which is 

agreed to by everybody—you know, it was the Lisbon agreement— 

certainly NATO and other countries who are contributing. So this 

is the beginning of that, very specifically. And the conditions on the 

ground in those provinces support that transition. That is the approach. 

The other transition provinces, if you will—and it will, in great 

part, be tied to violence levels and tied to the ability of the Afghan 

security forces. And we get a lot of credit on the military side for 

the gains; there have been considerable gains on the diplomatic 

side. I mean, we have surged diplomatically over the course of the 

last 2 years extraordinary civilians who have also made a big difference. 
22 

So the idea is, in the various provinces to—or districts, if you 

will; sorry—to transition these as conditions allow. And inside the 

numbers and the dates that you specifically cited, Mr. Wilson, any 

movement, any changes that will be associated with where the 

troops come from are going to be conditions-based. There is just no 

question about that, that the President has given us that flexibility. 

Mr. WILSON. And, certainly, looking at level of violence, the establishment of a civil society within those districts, what are the 

future conditions that are anticipated to merit the removal of 

23,000 additional troops? 

Admiral MULLEN. The improvement in the security conditions. I 

mean, the most representative example, clearly, is in the south, in 

Helmand and Kandahar specifically. It is actually—and we have 

enabled this, but we have allies fighting in the north and in the 

west. And in the north it is actually turning. It has not turned; I 

wouldn’t say that. But it is turning. It is better than it was. And 

a year ago, there were grave predictions about losing the north because of what was going on there. 

And we talked earlier today about the challenges in the east, and 

there are challenges there. But General Petraeus has a strategy 

that I have seen and believe in, in terms of being able to create 

the kind of conditions where we transition there, as well. 

So we are committed to not transitioning until it is ready, and 

we are working our way through this with the Afghan security 

forces, who have dramatically improved in size and in quality. That 

doesn’t mean we don’t have retention problems and attrition problems, although they are, particularly in the police force, much better. And, in fact, on the attrition side for the police force, we exceed 

our objective—meaning, attrition is lower than it needs to be to 

sustain that force. 

Mr. WILSON. As decisions are being made in terms of troop withdrawal, is it being considered, the effect on the morale of the 

Taliban and the extremists? Are we not giving false hope to them 

that they may prevail, that we don’t have resolve, Madam Secretary? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I do not think that we are giving them any 

comfort. If I were a member of the Taliban and I am looking out, 

where will I be next year, 2 years more, 3 years more, I am going 

to control less territory; I am going to have less support from the 

population; I am going to face more forces in the field, and more 

and more of them Afghans who will be there for a very long time; 

I am going to have less access to finances; I am going to have more 

internal dissension and division and defection. 

So, any way you slice it, things are getting worse for them, not 

better. 

Mr. WILSON. And we will not abandon our allies? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Absolutely not. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here. 
23 

And, Admiral Mullen, I know you will continue to give your extraordinary attention to the issues in the next few months, as you 

have in all of your tenure. And I appreciate your leadership and 

your service. 

We had a hearing yesterday, and I think the comment was made 

that the numbers are probably less important than how our troops 

are utilized or which troops, actually, would be leaving and, certainly, which troops would be staying. 

Can you break that down a little bit more, in terms of support 

troops, in terms of combat troops, in terms of training troops, and 

whether or not that decision has been made? 

I think just a follow-up question to that really is, when we think 

about the Afghan forces, how are they going to be sustained financially into the future? And how do we envision our help and support to them as we move forward? 

Admiral MULLEN. With respect to the Afghan security forces and 

the bill that is associated with that, I think President Karzai and 

his people recognize that—and, certainly, we do from our side— 

that at the current level of $6 billion to $7 billion a year, you know, 

it is not sustainable. 

And so there is a lot of work going on on both sides right now 

to figure out what is sustainable, what will be needed, and including a view that, do you need 352,000 in 2014 or 2015? And I don’t 

know the answer to that. 

But everybody recognizes that the current level, from a financial 

standpoint, it is not sustainable, and solutions have to be taken 

with respect to a way forward there. 

And what was the first part? I am sorry. 

Mrs. DAVIS. The way that the remaining troops—and, of course, 

there are large numbers; we are talking about 68,000—but in 

terms of breaking down with support troops versus combat troops, 

training? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I think the combat—in those three categories, were I a commander on the ground, I would be focused on 

the combat and training troops first, keeping them as long as we 

possibly could. 

But I just don’t discount the need for the kind of support troops, 

if you will. And I include in the first group the enablers, and that 

General Petraeus and General Rodriguez and their reliefs are going 

to have to determine the specifics. 

And I think, on the 23,000, I think knowing exactly where they 

will come from, it is far too soon to know that, because that will 

be conditions-based, and the conditions are going to change between now and when they really have to focus on executing that. 

I think in the near term, clearly, that General Petraeus and General Rodriguez had some expectation, obviously, there would be a 

withdrawal here over the course of this year and specifically what 

that might entail. And they have done a lot of that work. I have 

not seen it, although they will certainly come in in the near future 

with how to do that. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. 

If I could, I want to follow up on the reintegration, reconciliation 

issue. And we know, if we look around for success, I think a lot of 

that is defined by the number of young women that are in school, 
24 

girls that are in schools. I have had a chance to visit at those 

schools, as well as a number of the trips that we have taken for 

Mother’s Day to visit with our troops but also to engage with 

women in villages as well as in leadership. A number of those 

women were here in the Capitol this last week. 

What role are we really playing to make sure that it is not just 

a lot of rhetoric about the fact that they are important to the development of a civil society there? How are we moving forward to be 

certain that their voices are a meaningful voice in this process? 

And at what point would we consider that the reconciliation is not 

even working or moving forward? And what role would that play 

as we continue to look at troop withdrawal? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that Secretary Clinton and many 

other members of the administration have consistently raised the 

issue of female participation in both the reintegration, communitybased processes, but also the larger reconciliation process. And we 

have raised that issue with our Afghan interlocutors, continue to 

press the point. 

I think you see a gradual expansion of women involvement in the 

High Peace Council, for example, involvement in more of the community-based oversight efforts that are emerging. 

So, you know, when we talk about the key criteria that those 

who reconcile must meet and we talk about respecting the Afghan 

Constitution, the key element of that is respect for minority and 

women’s rights. And that has been a key plank in our policy from 

the get-go. It is something we continue to try to translate into concrete improvements with our Afghan interlocutors. It is very important. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you both. 

And, Admiral Mullen, I want to go back to a topic that I think 

goes to the heart, really, of what we see in the conflict in Afghanistan, which is the issue of opium production and the drugs that are 

fueling and funding the Taliban and other insurgent activities. 

Frequently, when we have these hearings, I hold up this chart 

that is a Congressional Research Service bar chart that shows the 

opium production that has occurred during our time period and historically in Afghanistan. If you look at the chart, you can see that, 

in the 4 years of 2006 through 2009, opium production almost doubled. That is the time period when we saw that we needed to go 

in with the surge. The period beforehand, there was historical levels of opium production. 

I have used this chart both with President Karzai and General 

Petraeus to raise the issue of, you know, we need to do more to 

lower the opium production and the narcotics trade. General James 

Jones said that he believes that these funds go directly to fund the 

Taliban, and he of course said that it also goes to fund the issues 

of corruption. 

Now, when General Petraeus was here last time and I held up 

this chart, he kindly told me that there was new information as to 

what successes we have had, and he has sent me a new bar chart. 

And the new bar chart shows that, in 2010, there was a 48 percent 
25 

decrease as a result of our counternarcotics efforts; also, there was 

disease among the crops; but, also, that there has been a 341 percent increase in our nationwide drug seizures in Afghanistan, 

clearly showing that this was a result of the activities of increased 

focus. 

Admiral, with our reduction in troops, my concern is that we are 

going to go back to a period where we take our eye off the ball and 

that we may again see a surge in narcotics. What assurances can 

you give us that, with the lower number of troops, we will be able 

to maintain a counternarcotics strategy to reduce opium production 

and the funding of the Taliban? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I think we will continue to certainly 

press on this issue. 

You have looked—just showing the charts, you look at the levels 

over the years, and, in many ways, it is a way of life that isn’t 

going to go away quickly. There have been considerable improvements, and we continue to keep pressure on that. 

I mean, one of the challenges—and this is going on—obviously, 

it comes principally from Helmand—and the landscape, the dynamics are changing in Helmand. By no means is it gone. And the long 

term goal is obviously to produce a better way to provide for one’s 

family than what has happened to date. 

I think it actually happens over the long term based on the security environment and having, you know, profitable crops that are 

able to do that. But I don’t think that is going to mean we are 

going to dry it up overnight. 

The focus—a critical focus here on the Taliban is where they get 

their finances from, as it is for any terrorist organization. And certainly this is—and, over the years, this has varied. I have seen 

many estimates of how much money they actually get from it, but 

it is substantial. And we need to continue to focus on that, as well. 

So, really, there is a near-term piece here, but there is a longterm piece. And from an overall strategy standpoint, my view 

would be that we would have the conditions in the south, in 

Helmand in particular, in a place where they couldn’t sustain that 

kind of production over the long term. 

Mr. TURNER. Admiral, I would like to yield the rest of my time 

to Joe Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

And, Admiral, a question—I want to conclude—in regard to conditions-based. The success of the surge, the ultimate reduction in 

violence, the development of a civil society, if in fact violence increases, if we are unable to promote a civil society, will the President change his course? Or is the timeline of withdrawal more important than conditions? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that is for the President to decide. But 

what I said earlier, Mr. Wilson, is—and I go back to mid-2009, we 

put 10,000 Marines in Helmand, and my view then was, if this isn’t 

working within 18 to 24 months, we really need to reassess our 

strategy. 

I think, from the standpoint of the next 18 to 24 months, given 

the transition—and it doesn’t just include the military side here. 

Because the issues of corruption, the issues of governance, the 
26 

issues of Pakistan, those are all still significant, inherent risks in 

this overall strategy. 

So I think, you know, certainly from my point of view, after a period of time, if it is not working, that a reassessment is in order. 

But that is not for me to decide. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral Mullen. I appreciate your extraordinary 

service. It is not easy doing your job, and one of your toughest 

parts may be the patience you have to demonstrate in front of committees like this. So I appreciate your forbearance. 

One of the most important factors, as you well know better than 

anyone, is the Pakistan reaction. And I assume that the Pakistan 

situation was taken into account when this decision was made? 

Admiral MULLEN. It was. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. What is that reaction? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I—you mean the Pakistan reaction or 

Pakistan itself? 

Mr. COOPER. Pakistan’s reaction to the decision to have a slight 

troop drawdown? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I actually haven’t gotten it yet. I spoke 

with my Pakistani counterpart yesterday, as we made many contacts. And so, we agreed to talk in the near future after he is able 

to sort of absorb it. 

I mean, from a standpoint of how Pakistan views the future— 

and it is consistent across their government—they see a stable, 

peaceful Afghanistan as a goal they, too, would like to be a result 

of this overall strategy. They live there. Seeing is believing. And, 

over time, exactly how they view this will be determined on how 

this works, I think, personally. 

I also think that they are clearly going through, you know, a very 

difficult time right now. From a strategic standpoint, I and many 

others believe, including the President, that we have to sustain this 

relationship, as difficult as it is. This is a country who has a significant terrorist problem. It is a country whose economy is very 

weak. And it is a country with nuclear weapons that is in a very 

dangerous and strategically important part of the world. 

I think, not just the United States, but the regional countries 

need to continue to focus on this, so that stability is something that 

is the output of all of what we do there, not just—not continued 

instability. Because I think the continued downward trend is dangerous for all of us, with respect to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the 

region writ large. 

Mr. COOPER. Well, I know it takes a great deal of patience and 

expertise to deal with folks like that. I find that my constituents 

don’t usually realize that Pakistan has more people than Russia, 

for example. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yeah. I mean, they are projected to have over 

200 million here in the next 20 or 30 years and be the fourth- or 

fifth-largest nuclear power, if you consider weapons, I think the 

fourth, in roughly the same time frame. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. 
27 

Admiral MULLEN. So it is not a country I—it is just a country 

I think we have to continue to engage with and be frank with. 

And, at the same time, you know, I think we are paying the price 

in Afghanistan and Pakistan for walking away in 1989. And that 

is a model that just runs in my head 20 years from now, whoever 

is sitting here or sitting in your seat, we are having the same conversation, were we to walk away, except it is much more dangerous 

than it is right now. 

Mr. COOPER. Increasingly, Pakistan has, itself, been the victim of 

terrorist attacks. 

Admiral MULLEN. Correct. 

Mr. COOPER. In Karachi, most recently, and other instances. So 

they have felt the wrath of the Taliban and the Haqqani network 

and other groups. 

Admiral MULLEN. They have lost tens of thousands. They have 

lost, specifically, over 3,000 of their military. They have had tens 

of thousands wounded. They have sacrificed greatly for their own 

country. Sometimes that sacrifice gets lost. 

And they have some enormous, enormous challenges. They have 

faced them. They will continue to face them. And I think we need 

to help them, not hurt them. 

Mr. COOPER. Uh-huh. As you say, they are a reality that we are 

going to have to deal with regardless. And we might as well face 

up to that, and not push the problem to the side or ignore it. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COOPER. General Bing West wrote a book recently called 

‘‘The Wrong War,’’ talking about the war in Afghanistan. And he 

said that one of the chief problems is Hamid Karzai’s unwillingness 

to let us police the gaps in the mountains, the valleys, and actually 

terminate flow of folks across those treacherous border regions 

along the Durand Line. 

Is he mistaken? Is this something that we need to demand of 

President Karzai? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I go back to what General Petraeus and 

General Rodriguez have done over the course of the last year, particularly in the east, and that is where he is talking about it. And 

General Petraeus made the—along with General Rodriguez and 

General Campbell, who basically ran the campaign in the east for 

the last year, to refocus it, to layer it from the border at Pakistan 

to Kabul, and, in fact, to pull forces out of those very remote places, 

which none of us thought was strategically significant. That doesn’t 

mean we didn’t have bad guys out there; we do. But this layered 

approach to ensure that we could protect the capital and deal with 

the Haqqani, make it much more difficult on the Haqqani network, 

which is the one that flows most of the fighters in there, was a better strategy. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, you are here during an interesting time. And, Secretary 

Flournoy, you have been back here month after month. And I just 

want to say thanks for both of your service. We don’t always see 
28 

eye to eye on stuff, but you are out there out front, and you are 

doing what you believe is in the best interest of the Nation. 

I haven’t heard anybody talk about a strategy. You know, people 

ask what we think about the troop numbers. I have no idea what 

the troop numbers are supposed to be. I am not a military planner. 

But I know what our troops are capable of, and I know that higher numbers are better for a big counterinsurgency operation. If we 

had 10 years and 300,000 troops, we could make Afghanistan into 

San Diego. It would be a nice place to go fly fishing and sheep 

hunting at. But we don’t have 10 years; we don’t have 300,000 people on the ground. 

I haven’t heard any talk about change in strategy to accompany 

the change in the troop numbers. How come? We are at the lowball end—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I mean, actually, the short answer is, the 

strategy hasn’t changed. 

Mr. HUNTER. We are at the low-ball end of the numbers that 

McChrystal asked for. So I don’t—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think—— 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. Want to get wrapped up in the numbers game. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yeah, but, I mean, McChrystal was talking 

about troops, this is 2 to 3 years ago. And it has just—it has 

changed, you know, it has changed dramatically on the ground 

since then. So, clearly, it is something we look at all the time. 

You know, it is interesting in overall numbers, because, you 

know, I mean, I spend a lot of time looking at who is there and 

who is making a difference and who isn’t. And, you know, we have 

a culture of putting a lot of numbers in; historically, we have, all 

of us. 

We have learned a lot with respect to that. I was just in a meeting with General Odierno as recently as yesterday. We were talking about, you know, what we learned with respect to Iraq. And we 

had excess forces in Iraq just because we were moving them so 

fast. 

So we literally take those lessons into account as we look at how 

we do this. And despite the pressure on numbers, that has also 

forced us to, not adjust our strategy, but look at how we focus this, 

prioritize, and still achieve success. 

You talked about the military. I mean, it is an unbelievably innovative, creative, capable military that we have. And, again, I talked 

about, you know, more risk and quicker than I had originally anticipated. But it hasn’t put me anywhere close to out of the risk envelope, if you will, of getting this done. 

And, at some point in time, if it is not working, we are going to 

have to adjust the strategy. The strategy still is—— 

Mr. HUNTER. You don’t think this—— 

Admiral MULLEN. The strategy still is, you know, a counterinsurgency focus, without any question, you know, properly resourced. 

And, you know, we could probably get into a debate about that. I 

think it is, given the mission and the objectives that we have right 

now and the progress that we have made. 

If it is not working in a year or two, you know, my recommendation would be it needs to be reassessed. 
29 

Mr. HUNTER. We probably have different interpretations of counterinsurgency. I mean, it can be an all-encompassing thing, where 

you are building hospitals and schools, or it can be where you have 

village security operations which are working very, very well, little 

militias in each town. I mean, you obviously know what VSOs [Village Stability Operations] are. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sure. 

Mr. HUNTER. Those are working. Some things aren’t working. 

But you don’t think that there is any need—so you are telling me 

there is no need for a relooking at the strategy as we draw down 

in the tens of thousands for the ‘‘clear, hold, build’’? 

Admiral MULLEN. It goes to—I will be very specific—it goes to, 

well, how are we going to handle the east? And the east is going 

to not be held by U.S. forces. It is going to be both denied across 

the border as well as held by Afghan forces. 

Mr. HUNTER. But you are going to have to hold the south as you 

go east, or you are going to lose all the gains you have had in the 

south. 

Admiral MULLEN. But it is—— 

Mr. HUNTER. So, a drawdown in troops and hold what we have, 

which has taken so many troops, and move east at the same time 

with fewer troops? 

Admiral MULLEN. The intent, certainly, over the course of this 

transition is to hold and transition to Afghan security forces. And 

that is going to be the challenge. I mean, I am not here to say that 

is a done deal, because it isn’t. But that is the strategy. 

And within the resources that we see right now, we see it as executable. No one—not Petraeus, not Rodriguez, not anybody—has 

said that is not the case. Is it going to be hard? You bet it is going 

to be hard. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Madam Flournoy. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I was just going to add, if you go back to 

the original six campaign objectives laid out in the West Point 

speech—reverse the Taliban’s momentum; deny them access to population centers; disrupt them in areas outside of that; degrade 

them to levels manageable by the ANSF; build the ANSF capacity; 

and then build the capacity in selective areas of the Afghan Government—as we do that, we always anticipated—— 

Mr. HUNTER. We are successful now, kind of, on all of those 

things. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Correct. But as we do that, that success enables a shift of the effort more toward the Afghans as they stand 

up. It allows us to thin out our—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I was in Iraq. I understand how it works. Yeah, I 

mean—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. And so, we have always anticipated that, 

with success, the strategy would require fewer resources on the coalition side and more on the Afghan side. And that is the path we 

are on. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
30 

Admiral and Under Secretary, thank you very much for your 

service. I know that you have worked long and hard on extraordinarily difficult challenges, and it is much appreciated. 

I want to just confirm, I think I heard you say, Admiral Mullen, 

a moment ago that the mission remains a counterinsurgency mission. Is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. That is correct. The strategy is a counterinsurgency strategy. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. And that involves all that was just 

said just a moment ago, all of the ‘‘clear and hold’’ and all that goes 

with it. In other words, nation-building is very much a part of this. 

Admiral MULLEN. You know, it isn’t—from my perspective, it 

isn’t very much a part of this. It is a counterinsurgency strategy 

focused on, as the Secretary just laid out, limited objectives, which 

is what it has been and is what the President talked about in his 

speech in 2009. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The notion of counterterrorism—that is, to focus 

on the terrorists, wherever they happen to be around the world— 

seems to be secondary to this mission in Afghanistan. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it is not secondary at all. It is integral, 

very much. And it has been. I have spoken about that before. That 

is also how it is being executed. And I just don’t separate the two. 

It is part of it. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just add, if you look at the region 

at large, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and you look at the progress 

that we have made in terms of focusing pressure on Al Qaeda senior leadership—the Osama bin Laden raid as the latest example— 

but that pressure continues. It is looking at them globally. 

So there is, I would say, only an intensification of our focus on 

counterterrorism alongside a complementary counterinsurgency 

campaign in Afghanistan. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are all of the Taliban the same? That is, the 

Taliban in Herat, the Taliban in Kandahar, and so forth. Are they 

all the same? And do they have the same goal? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. They are not all the same. This is a diverse, symbiotic network of groups that assist one another, that 

rely on one another, but do have overlapping but sometimes distinct goals. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Some would describe Afghanistan as a five- or 

six-sided civil war. Do you agree or disagree with that? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would disagree with that. I think what is 

happening right now in Afghanistan is really the emergence of a 

nation from 30 years of war and the rejection of the Taliban by the 

population and, with that, the reduction of the threat to us, because as the population rejects that movement and as they build 

their own national capacity, Afghanistan is less and less likely to 

become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and attacks against the United 

States and its allies. 

Admiral MULLEN. Can I just add one thing to this? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes. 

Admiral MULLEN. This border area that we have obviously focused on—and Al Qaeda receives the focus. And Ms. Flourney said 

‘‘symbiotic.’’ I have watched terrorist organizations over the last 3 

or 4 years merge with each other, increase their horizon in terms 
31 

of objectives. So LET [Lakshar-e-Taiba], which is a local outfit in 

eastern Pakistan focused on India, is now in the west and now has 

transnational aspirations. 

So terrorist organizations are also different, generally in support 

of each other. And in this place, this is the epicenter of terrorism 

in the world. And that is one of the reasons the focus on both Afghanistan and Pakistan is so important. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the cost of the strategy that you have 

described to us today—the cost in 2011, 2012, ’13, ’14? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If you look at the costs over time, what we 

do see happening is those costs actually coming down. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, let’s be very specific. Surely, you have figured out what the cost of your strategy is. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Right. So, for 2011—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And could you please share that with us? 

Secretary FLOURNOY [continuing]. The request for Afghanistan 

was $43 billion—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sorry? 

Secretary FLOURNOY [continuing]. In OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations]. So the request for Afghanistan—I am sorry? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, it is—I mean, we are running right now at about $10 billion a month. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I’m sorry, that’s obligation. 

Admiral MULLEN. The 2011 request I think is for $117 billion. The bill of this, we look at it coming down about $30 billion or $40 

billion a year based on the strategy that is laid out. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And 2012 will be how much? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Less than $120 billion for 2012. It was 

$160 billion in 2011. So it is about a $40 billion decline from 2011 

to 2012. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Could you please give us those numbers? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yeah, we can give you that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 69.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, Secretary Flournoy, thanks again for your service and dedication to this country. 

Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, they are not absolutes. 

It is really more of a continuum. And how would you gauge the current strategy? Are we then shifting a little bit more to add more 

counterterrorism elements as we draw down forces? Or how would 

you state that, Admiral Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. Again, I think where we are a year from now 

is going to be determined on how it goes this year. It is heavily focused on both, as we speak. I mean, the CT [counterterrorism] effort inside this counterinsurgency strategy is significant. And General Petraeus asked for and got more forces to do that. 

So, will there be a different balance a year from now? Probably. 

How much, I think it is hard to say. And I think, again, what 
32 

forces the commander on the ground recommends taking out next 

year is going to be determined by what happens this year. And we 

are not even halfway through this fighting season, so it is really 

difficult to say exactly how it is going to look a year from now. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral Mullen, I think you stated, quote, ‘‘In a 

counterinsurgency, firepower is manpower,’’ unquote. And can you 

drill down just a little bit on what does that mean? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, you have to have people out there engaged. The whole idea in a counterinsurgency is to focus on and 

protect the people—in this case, the Afghan people. 

What is important in this—this goes back to the success of the 

build of the Afghan security forces. The army, for sure; the police, 

absolutely. And not unlike Iraq, the police lag the development 

here, although, you know, it is going better and better. 

So, in the end, it is the protection of the people, security for the 

people. And there is going to be, in numbers, you know, a larger 

number of people focused on this in 2012 than focused in 2011, just 

because of the continued build of the forces. So it is not just U.S. 

manpower or coalition manpower; it is the totality of manpower. 

And, in fact, to these VSOs that have gone so well—and they are 

small in number right now, 6,400, as I indicate—that is an enormously successful program, VSOs and Afghan local police. And we 

will continue to build that. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Admiral Mullen, in the Lisbon conference, I believe the policy decision coming out of that was that we would 

transfer operational control to Afghan security forces by the end of 

2014. 

Can you just be more specific as to what that really will look 

like? Does that mean we will still have some boots on the ground 

then in support of Afghan security forces? 

Admiral MULLEN. The model that certainly is very much in the 

front of our minds is Iraq. And we will, clearly, continue to have 

forces there. And the Lisbon commitment is to have Afghans in the 

lead, you know, throughout the country, every single district, by 

the end of 2014. And that is where we are headed. As much advise 

and assist and support as is necessary at that point. 

But, I mean, what we have watched in terms of the both growth 

rate and learning rate, they are on a pretty good glide slope right 

now, in terms of ascendance to be able to do this, the Afghan security forces. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My questions flow along the lines of what Mr. Wilson brought up 

earlier, and Ms. Davis, talking about the drawdown being determined by conditions on the ground, the movement toward the Afghan security forces, the Afghan National Police being able to take 

over security. 

My concern comes from the future of this operation at an economic level. The Afghan security forces are taking over more geography, but are we creating a situation where we have created such 
33 

a large Afghan Army that the Afghan economy just will not be able 

to support that? 

And I think we have to look at this, you know, if the crystal ball 

says that we will be drawn down to a condition sort of like what 

we have in Iraq right now by 2014, what is the dollar amount that 

the Afghan Government, the Afghan economy, is going to have to 

generate? And then how much of the U.S. support is still going to 

be there in a financial sense? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. That is something we are looking at in 

great detail right now. One question is, once the insurgency is degraded, the level of threat is degraded, how big an army and police 

force do you really need? And it may well be smaller than what we 

have currently planned. They may be experiencing their own surge 

right now. Maybe they will settle at a lower level. 

Secondly, we are working very hard with the Afghan Government on revenue generation, whether it is substantially increasing 

their border revenues, growing their economy, working with them 

on extractive industries to gain from their strategic mineral and 

mining resources. 

But, ultimately, we do have to get this on a more sustainable 

footing, and it has to cost less than what is currently anticipated. 

But I think we are working through that now with lots of analysis 

and the Afghans. 

And we do believe we can get there, but it is going to—but let 

me be clear, this is going to be a substantial assistance effort, not 

at the levels that are currently projected, but this is going to be— 

Afghanistan is going to require international development assistance for many, many years. It will remain one of the poorest countries in the world for quite some time. 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, and, obviously, you have heard from this committee. I mean, the support from this committee for what our military personnel are doing is second to none. Because they are 

doing—I mean, besides being warfighters, they are educators, they 

are counselors, they are parents, and they are doing more than 

probably any military has ever had to do. So the support is very 

strong. 

But, again, it just seems that we have developed a model that 

is just not sustainable. And, of course, then you look forward, and 

if you say a shrinking of the security forces, well, you know, we 

know it in this country; we call them ‘‘layoffs.’’ That means there 

are people not working. And, obviously, with an economy, the delta 

is so large. 

You know, I am really very concerned about this, as are a lot of 

people, that we are setting ourselves up for either many decades 

of support just to maintain this or just something that is just not 

functional, come down the road. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Madam Secretary and Admiral Mullen, 

for being here today. I really appreciate your testimony. 

You know, I want our troops to come home as soon as possible. 

Everyone here does. But notwithstanding your reassurances, Admiral Mullen, I am not yet comfortable that the decisions related to 
34 

this drawdown or future decisions related to our force posture in 

Afghanistan are, in fact, going to be primarily based upon conditions on the ground. So I hope to get comfortable with that. 

One of the conditions on the ground, as I see it, that is very important as we consider our existing force posture and future force 

posture is, of course, the conditions on the ground in Pakistan, 

where there are elements, various extremist elements, including 

elements of the Taliban, that reside over there in a relatively safer 

haven than Afghanistan. 

You acknowledged that yourself, Admiral, that the situation in 

Pakistan is a significant, inherent risk to our overall strategy. 

These elements, extremists laying in wait in Pakistan, threaten to 

create the very conditions, destabilizing conditions, that justify our 

presence in Afghanistan, regardless of our progress toward the six 

components of our overall strategy articulated in the President’s 

West Point speech. 

So my first question, laying that groundwork, is: Admiral 

Mullen, are you prepared to say that the conditions on the ground 

in Pakistan have improved to such an extent that the threat to the 

government in Afghanistan and to the people of Afghanistan by 

these extremists in Pakistan has diminished to a significant degree? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it is really important to remember that 

the, you know, core goal of the President’s strategy was to disrupt, 

dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda. And Al Qaeda is very much on the 

ropes right now. I don’t say that thinking it is over, because they 

still would like to kill as many of us as they possibly could, and 

they have aspirational goals to do that. 

Secondly is to make sure that Afghanistan can’t turn into fertile 

ground for Al Qaeda or another organization which would threaten 

us long term. And that is really what the Afghanistan piece of this 

is. 

Mr. YOUNG. I am going to very rudely interject, which is a euphemism for ‘‘interrupt’’ here on the Hill. 

But, all right, so we are trying to create conditions, of course, 

where Afghanistan can’t become a safe haven. But it seems that 

Pakistan is a relatively safer haven already. 

Admiral MULLEN. And that is where, first of all, targeting significant leaders in those other organizations, the Afghan Taliban, the 

Haqqani network, et cetera, with, in many cases, our Pakistani 

partners, which is problematic, is a part of this. And what the 

strategy is intended to do is buy space so that there can be political 

reconciliation across the board. That is not an insignificant—— 

Mr. YOUNG. All right, Admiral. So it seems that we are approaching Pakistan with a very limited sort of counterterrorist 

strategy, when we are implementing a counterinsurgency strategy 

over in Afghanistan. We have our UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], much reported, that are going after—— 

Admiral MULLEN. I think our—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Yes? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think our approach with Pakistan has been 

to engage them, to try to partner with them, support them in training, so that they can deal with the threats which are both internal 

to them as well as external. 
35 

Now, that is a very, very difficult strategy and execution, just because of both the history, the lack of trust—we left them before— 

and, obviously, recent events. 

Mr. YOUNG. Right. Okay. 

So, Admiral, in your estimation, we can never send in enough 

American troops to Afghanistan to create conditions where the extremists across the border in Pakistan would not present a threat 

to the Afghans, conceivably a threat to the United States—— 

Admiral MULLEN. No, it has to change in Pakistan. 

Mr. YOUNG. Right. So all of this depends upon the Pakistanis 

playing ball, if you will, to put it colloquially. 

Admiral MULLEN. There is great risk in the strategy tied to Pakistan. There has been from the beginning. 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. 

Now, finally, is our remaining presence on the ground in Afghanistan in part a hedge against, or a deterrent to, future efforts by 

these militants in Pakistan to use regions of that country as an unfettered training ground for their activities, or even a worse case 

scenario, to get control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, perhaps 

through violent means? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think, through Pakistani eyes, what you say, 

you know, they are very concerned about an unstable Afghanistan 

that could threaten them with a much larger force. That is why 

getting to some level of stability and peaceful outcome here is so 

important. And I believe, if we can, Pakistan will come to that. 

Mr. YOUNG. So, as I assess whether we should keep troops there 

or not, we should in no way factor in the fact that our troops are 

playing a productive role in perhaps deterring those extremists—— 

Mr. SCOTT [presiding]. The gentleman’s—— 

Mr. YOUNG [continuing]. Taking control of the nuclear arsenal. 

Admiral MULLEN. Am I allowed to answer that? 

Mr. YOUNG. Can he answer? 

Mr. SCOTT. Admiral, if we could get that question on the record 

and get the answer for the committee, we would appreciate it. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sure. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, thank you for being here; Secretary Flournoy. 

Appreciate your service to our country and all that you are doing 

to keep America safe. 

Admiral, let me just say that, you know, I am concerned that we 

are reaching a point of diminishing returns in Afghanistan. Clearly, the war has cost us billions of dollars and thousands of lives lost 

or wounded. I was mindful of that just this past Tuesday when I 

went out to Walter Reed to visit some of our wounded soldiers 

there. 

At our Emerging Threats hearing yesterday on evolving terrorist 

threats, Dr. Sebastian Gorka of National Defense University noted 

that Al Qaeda no longer exists in Afghanistan in any reasonable 

number. Ultimately, clearly, we deployed to Afghanistan to eliminate Al Qaeda and deny the region as a source of terrorist activity 

there. Our troops clearly have performed the mission incredibly 
36 

well; Al Qaeda effectively is gone from Afghanistan. But, obviously, 

new terrorist threats are being cultivated in other trouble spots 

like Pakistan, Yemen, and North Africa. 

Now, the President, in his strategy that he released last night, 

is going to bring home 33,000 troops by next summer. 

My question is—and I know that you have talked about that the 

reason to leave that number there and not bring them home sooner 

is to ensure that we have enough troops to support another wave 

of heightened violence that accompanies the summer months in Afghanistan so that our claimed victories there won’t be lost. 

I have to say that I really remain unconvinced. As both a member of the Armed Services Committee and the House Intelligence 

Committee, I have transparency into both worlds. And I question, 

where are the gains that really have been made that would justify 

us keeping the additional 23,000 troops in there until next summer? 

Can you further convince me? What is the real rationale for not 

bringing the 33,000 troops home by the end of this year? I know 

that my constituents are looking for that answer, and I need to 

have it, as well. 

Admiral MULLEN. From a military standpoint, it is the focus on 

keeping the firepower, if you will, the manpower, there through the 

fighting season, and certainly by the end of September, it does that 

next year, and then, obviously, putting the commander in a position to make decisions about where he may or may not take troops 

from, first of all. Secondly, I get the Al Qaeda—no Al Qaeda or a 

very small number of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. That is not the 

case in Pakistan. 

And I just never looked at this as a single-country approach. You 

can’t, from my perspective, you can’t do that. It is the region and 

part—you know, the other core objective, if you will, of this strategy is to make sure Afghanistan is stable enough so it can’t return 

to where it was when Al Qaeda grew up there and struck us in the 

first place or some other outfit that would seek to do the same 

thing. There are growing numbers of those. So—and that is not— 

that is not where we are in Pakistan. That is where we are in Afghanistan. 

Admittedly, Al Qaeda is not there in any kind of significant numbers. Al Qaeda, however, is very tightly wound with the Haqqani 

network, who continues to try to destabilize Afghanistan and take 

over that government. The Taliban’s strategic goal is to still run 

the country. And I am hard-pressed to think that if the Taliban are 

still running the country or get back to that position, that they 

won’t be the host, if you will, for organizations like Al Qaeda in the 

past. 

So the focus, again, I think, is to have as much combat power 

there through this fighting season. We have talked about that and 

the importance of getting through—vastly through next fighting 

season as well and then move the troop—and that to me is the 

time to bring the surge troops out. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me try this from then another perspective. I 

had hoped, quite frankly, to hear that the President was going to 

be withdrawing more troops than what he has planned over the 

next—even the next year. Why are we not cutting our forces in half 
37 

by next summer? What is the margin of utility of having the extra 

17,000 troops there between the 30,000 that the President wants 

to bring home by next summer and the number of—would achieve 

50 percent, that extra 17,000 troops by the summer? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think if we did what you just described, we 

undo all the gains that have occurred since he put the surge in 

simply. The strategy has absolutely no chance of succeeding were 

we to do that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I know that my time has expired. I thank you 

both for your service. We, obviously, have still tough questions and 

tough roads ahead. But I appreciate the work that you are doing. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Admiral, I had a couple of questions when I was 

down front. 

I will be very brief so that we can move on to the other members. 

If you would, just my concern after being there a couple of weeks 

ago and talking to the soldiers, the generals, our intelligence community, you hit on this when Congressman Cooper was talking 

about Pakistan and that if we walked away now, we would be right 

back here in 20 years. I recognize that we weren’t talking about— 

that we were talking about Pakistan at the time, if I am not mistaken. Is that—— 

Admiral MULLEN. I think, again, it goes to the regional approach. 

I wouldn’t be so specific. I mean, we walked not just from Pakistan 

in 1990; we walked from Afghanistan in 1989. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. I think my concern—and if you would speak 

to this is, as you sit there as somebody that we rely on to help us 

make the decisions, and your statement was Al Qaeda is on their 

heels, and the Taliban is in check. And does that accurately reflect 

your statement, that Al Qaeda—— 

Admiral MULLEN. The Taliban is in check in the south. They are 

not in check in the east. 

Mr. SCOTT. And so our concern and my concern is I hear that we 

have them on their heels with one group and in check, at least in 

certain regions, in others; why would we draw down until we had 

them in checkmate? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think in the judgement that we can accept 

the risk associated with that drawdown, while still able to succeed 

in the overall strategy, based on the gains of the surge over the 

course of the last—since the President announced it 18 months ago. 

Mr. SCOTT. My understanding is that Germany, France and Britain have all announced troop withdrawals somewhat simultaneous 

with ours, along a similar schedule as ours. Is that correct? That 

is what is reported in the news? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. They are very, very modest, and they are 

not uniform at all. I would say they are more modest in general 

than what we have proposed. For the most part, our allies, the 

Australians, others, are saying we are in it. We are committed. We 

are signed up to the Lisbon plan, and that is what we are sticking 

with. And I haven’t heard anybody walk away from what we all 

agreed at Lisbon. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is it public what the total NATO force will be, U.S. 

and coalition forces? Or is that classified information and when 

those drawdowns are anticipated? 
38 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I don’t think we have the particulars yet to 

be able to calculate where that will be a year from now. But we 

certainly release the numbers of where we are today. I don’t think 

we have heard enough detail from our partners to know exactly 

where we will be at the end of the next summer. From what we 

have heard so far, there will not be dramatic increases or people 

departing the coalition. There is a lot of commitment to the strategy and making it succeed. 

Mr. SCOTT. As we have that information, I would appreciate it 

if you would update me and the committee, because I do think it 

is important what the total force is as well as the U.S. force. I am 

going to yield the remainder of my time. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would be happy to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 69.] 

Mr. SCOTT. And we have got Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. Hanabusa. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, Under Secretary and Admiral, for being here. My 

question, whichever one of you can answer it, is that I think the 

public is a bit confused about what 2014 represents. I think when 

people think of 2014, given the announcement of the numbers that 

we are withdrawing, that people are construing that as the date 

that, by the end of 2014, we would have withdrawn our troops. 

But in reading both of your testimonies, 2014 is clearly being 

identified as the day that—or the time that Afghan—or Afghanistan takes over basically the whole military effort. So given that, 

what are the numbers that are anticipated? 

And I think, Under Secretary, you made a statement that if 

peace is achieved, then the numbers that are currently planned 

may then be reduced. So I assume there is some understanding of 

where we are going to be in 2014. And what is that number in 

terms of our troops? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think by the end of 2014, we expect Afghans will be in the lead for security. We will be able to shift our 

mission focus more toward advise, assist, training, supporting 

them, continuing to partner with them on counterterrorism, intelligence and so forth. This is a lot of what we are flushing out in 

our discussions about an enduring strategic partnership. 

The expectation is that the numbers will be substantially lower, 

but I don’t think until we know what the state of the Taliban is, 

what the state of the threat, the state of the ANSF, it will be hard 

to predict exactly what those numbers will be. 

But we can tell you they are going to be smaller; the mission set 

will become increasingly more focused on supporting and enabling 

the Afghans in the lead across the country. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I saw an interesting chart on the news. For example, the number, what the troop strength was in 2008, and then 

after President Obama came into office. And it looked like almost 

a doubling of those numbers, if I remember it correctly. So we were 

like at 30-something thousand, if I am correct, and then we went 

up to 60-something thousand, and we are now up to 100-something 

thousand. So we are going to draw down 33,000 by the end of next 

year. And then the question becomes from that 70,000 that we 
39 

have left to what you are considering to be not as large or whatever 

it is, what does it look like in terms of where we are in relationship 

to those numbers? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I think that we will continue on the 

curve toward 2014. 

The thing that President Obama has said from the beginning of 

this strategy is that this administration will commit to periodically 

reviewing where we are; is the strategy working? Is it not? How 

do we adjust the alignment of resources to that strategy, and I 

would anticipate that regular process of review that we have demonstrated over the last 2 years will continue through this administration, certainly, and I would hope on through to 2014 and beyond. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Under Secretary, if somebody who doesn’t understand all of this wants to know in plain English, are we going to 

have troops in Afghanistan or are we not going to have troops in 

Afghanistan at the end of 2014, the answer is we are going to have 

troops in Afghanistan; we just don’t know how many there are 

going to be? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I believe we will have troops with a different mission focus and at much reduced numbers supporting the 

Afghans who are going to be able to be leading their own security 

at that time. 

Ms. HANABUSA. But Ms. Under Secretary, the bottom line is we 

are going to have troops with guns who are going to be in some 

way in harm’s way, and I think that is what the people are really 

concerned about. So the bottom line, irrespective of what their mission or their objective may be, we are going to have men and 

women in uniform who are going to be potentially in jeopardy after 

2014? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I don’t want to—that is not—the 

President has not decided on the character or numbers of our presence beyond 2014. I think it would be unwise for someone to try 

to do that at this point in time, given that a lot is going to happen 

between now and then. 

I am just giving you my personal best judgment that there will 

still be a mission for the United States that will be in our interest 

to support continued counterterrorism operations, intelligence and 

supporting the Afghans as they take the lead for security in their 

own country. 

Ms. HANABUSA. I understand all of that. The bottom-line question is very simple. If they are going to be in uniform and if they 

are going to be—they may be in potential of harm’s way, unless 

they are somehow protected, which I don’t see that happening, 

those who are in Afghanistan would still be men and women in 

uniform, and they still will have potential of being injured and potentially killed. Would that be a fair statement? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. You know, again, I think that we anticipate a residual force, but I don’t want to put words in the President’s mouth, that he has not made decisions on the nature or composition or character of anything beyond what we have announced 

and beyond 2014. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you. My time is up. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Platts. 
40 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, Madam Secretary, we are certainly grateful for 

both of you and your dedicated service and great leadership on a 

whole host of issues and especially our strategy in Afghanistan and 

appreciate your patience here today. I will try to be quick. I know 

it has been a long morning of questions. 

I first associate myself with Mr. Cooper and his concerns and 

about the impact of what we are doing on Pakistan. I have had the 

privilege to visit our troops in Afghanistan eight times and will be 

back later this time for my ninth, as well as visits to Pakistan and 

the importance of them partnering with us and that we don’t send 

the wrong message that they focus on the insurgents that they 

think are a threat to them versus a threat more to Afghanistan 

and to us, that they continue to partner with us. 

So I think he raised those issues pretty well, and I appreciate 

your answers on his questions. Probably my overall main concern 

is, I have always said in Iraq and Afghanistan, facts on the ground 

guiding us, it was an important part of what the President said in 

December of 2009 when he laid out his plans for the surge, which 

I commended him for doing, and his hope to begin withdrawing 

this summer, but an important caveat was facts on the ground. 

And so I understand where today the ability to say we are going 

to begin drawing up to 10,000 this year, based on the facts on the 

ground today. I am a little concerned that we will get ahead of ourselves and say, we already know what the facts on the ground are 

going to be next year so we can draw down another 23,000 rather 

than waiting to see what the facts actually are next year and not 

be premature. So that is certainly a concern I have. 

The specific area of questions I want to address is the importance 

of training up the Afghan National Security Forces. And I visited 

with General Caldwell and think he and his team are doing an outstanding job and really have transformed that training mission in 

the last year, including the literacy aspect, which especially for the 

police, a key aspect of what they are doing. 

Madam Secretary, you talked about the importance of them 

being trained up as part of the calculation in this drawdown that 

we are going to see. I guess, first, I assume you calculated that my 

understanding that we are still seeing about a 30 percent attrition 

level, desertions, that that was factored into the numbers, not just 

that we have this many being trained, but we are probably going 

to lose 30 percent of them. Is that an accurate assessment or assumption? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes. I think our expectations about both 

growth and quality are based on what we have experienced to date 

but also the progress that we are making on bringing some of the 

attrition down, bringing the retention up, improving the quality, 

but importantly, on performance in the field, particularly as more 

and more units are—almost all of the units in the south, southwest 

and so forth are partnered with ours, and we are able to get a very 

good sense of how these units are performing in the field. 

Mr. PLATTS. And that relates to a follow-on question. And I guess 

a concern I have is that we are training them up through basics 

and then, because of the need, we are putting them right out there 

without the additional opportunity to kind of hone their skills, and 
41 

I think that leads to that 30 percent desertion or attrition rate. To 

counter that, we have to better—or continue to partner. The fact 

that there is going to be 33,000 fewer U.S. forces there to partner 

with, isn’t that going to create somewhat of a challenge? How do 

we do that partnering with that many less U.S. forces for them to 

be partnered with? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think the details of how this affects 

partnering will be worked through, but I don’t anticipate a significant shortfall in that regard. Part of what we are getting as we 

grow the force is more time to pull units out for retraining, more 

time to send leaders to further development. Admiral Mullen mentioned the specialty schools, that we are now developing the Afghan 

National Forces own enablers and specialists and so forth. So I 

think this is all of a piece, but I don’t think anyone has assessed 

the drawdown to fundamentally put that effort at risk in any way. 

Mr. PLATTS. I certainly hope not because probably the best training we give them is when they are out there in the field with the 

most professional, best qualified, best trained, most capable force 

in the world, that being the American soldier and marine, all of our 

personnel. And that is when we look at the numbers and not 

equate a newly trained Afghan National Security Force individual 

to our military because, obviously, there is a huge difference. 

I come back to, as I run out of time, just that my hope is the 

administration, as we get to next year, with that 23,000 number, 

that if the facts on the ground are not what we hope they will be 

today come next year, that we don’t go forward then with that 

drawdown if the facts don’t justify it. 

And a final comment, Mr. Chairman, is, Admiral Mullen, again, 

just what a record of service to this Nation. We as—I personally 

and my family, we are indebted to you and your family for your heroic service and wish you great success in all you do and thanks 

for what you have done for all of us. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The President just can’t win on this one. It is going to have one 

side saying that you are withdrawing too many troops at a time 

when we need to have them stay the course, and then, on the other 

side, you are going to have folks saying, well, look, we are tired of 

war. Bring the troops home. Osama bin Laden has been neutralized. That ends it. Let’s close the door over there, bring the troops 

home, and put all of the money into reducing our debt. So the 

President just cannot win. 

There is another way, though. And first of all, Admiral Mullen 

and Secretary Flournoy, I appreciate you all being here today. I 

want everyone to remember that the President was clear in his 

2008 campaign. He said that he would draw down U.S. forces from 

Iraq, and he pledged to refocus on the neglected war in Afghanistan. He has made good on both of those commitments. In the 

spring of 2009, we had 138,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. We 

now have 61,000 on the ground, with more leaving every day. And 

by the end of this year, we will have less than 130 Department of 

Defense boots on the ground in Iraq, unless there is some change 

in the security agreement. 
42 

With the addition of 30,000 troops and renewed focus on Afghanistan, we have been successful by all accounts. We have degraded 

insurgent groups. We have denied them territory, while neutralizing and disrupting transnational terrorists, who continue to 

threaten us and our allies. 

The President has also made perfectly clear when he pledged additional forces to Afghanistan, the 30,000-person surge, 30,000- 

troop surge, that he would begin to return those troops home in 

July of this year. Last night, true to form, the President made good 

on that commitment; 10,000 troops by the end of this year, and 

over the next year, approximately 30,000 troops to return from Afghanistan. 

Now, what would it look like if we left right now, if we just decided to close the book on this painful era in our history and just— 

let’s close the book on it and let’s get everybody out of there like 

we are doing in Iraq and just leave? What would the area look like, 

and what would the future look like for Americans? Could we be 

snug as a bug in the rug and think that we don’t have to worry 

about what is being fermented in these ungoverned areas? What 

about Pakistan, a nuclear country right next door to India, a nuclear country, India having been the victim in the Mumbai attacks 

of a terrorist plot hatched in Afghan—in Pakistan, you know? What 

would we do if we left that area just totally destabilized by withdrawing our troops from Afghanistan? 

I submit that it would not look pretty in the long term. We would 

end up having to recommit troops, probably a larger number and 

at a greater expense at a time when we would least be able to afford it. And so I regret that we are put into that kind of a situation, that that is the situation that we are in. I regret that, but 

that is where we are. And so what do we do from here? I think that 

the President has made the right decision. And I would want to 

bring every soldier home if I could right now today but it just 

would not be the responsible thing to do. And so I want to encourage the people to support the President. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Mullen, Secretary Flournoy, thank you so much for joining us today. 

Admiral Mullen, thank you for your service to our Nation and especially to that of your family. I know the sacrifice it takes to have 

a loved one serve this Nation, and we deeply appreciate that service and that sacrifice to our Nation. So we appreciate that. 

I want to ask this. We have heard a lot about numbers. We have 

heard a lot about timelines. We have heard a lot about the generalities of what we have talked about, the COIN strategy and continuing along those same lines of effort while we are drawing down 

troops. It seems to me, though, that there is another element there 

that should be as concerning as the operations in Afghanistan and 

that is what is currently occurring in Pakistan. And my concern is 

that we can mount the greatest effort in Afghanistan, but if we 

don’t have an equal effort in Pakistan, then we are going to not be 

successful I think in where we all want to be in the long run. 

I know that not long ago, General Rodriguez said that even if the 

Pakistanis do nothing more than what they are doing today, that 
43 

we would be okay in Afghanistan. Let me ask this. In light of the 

current conditions in Pakistan with the relationship between Pakistan and the United States and with the current projection of force 

drawdown in Afghanistan, do you believe that we will still be in, 

as General Rodriguez says, in good shape with our operations in 

Afghanistan in our efforts to defeat the Taliban and ultimately displace Al Qaeda with the current situation in Pakistan ending with 

the proposed drawdown? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think Pakistan’s calculus will depend on how 

things go in Afghanistan. Not completely, but significantly. And 

while, at the same time, they are going through an incredibly difficult time right now, not just in the relationship with the United 

States, but also internally, particularly their military because of 

what they have been through. And I said before and I would just 

repeat, the entire chain of command of the United States through 

the President thinks it is important that we sustain this relationship, even through its most difficult times. 

And I am actually heartened by the fact that we are going 

through a very difficult time, and in fact, the relationship is still 

there. I am just chastened by the past when we said, no, when the 

relationship was broken. So I think we all just have to be moderate, frank, careful about how we proceed in this relationship, particularly as they go through this introspection, if you will, about 

what has happened to them. 

In the long run, I think it is the region; it is both countries. And 

I think the Pakistan piece of this is a very risky part of the overall 

strategy, which is why we have been engaged so long. But it is not 

just Afghanistan/Pakistan, because there is an India piece to this, 

nuclear armed countries, all of that, which gets to the point that 

should we walk away now, I just worry like—I worry a lot that we 

will be back, and it will be much more challenging than it even is 

now and much more dangerous. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary Flournoy. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would agree wholeheartedly, that we really have to look at this region in a very integrated manner, and we 

have to re-invest in the relationship with Pakistan to secure the cooperation we need from them on counterterrorism but also in helping to reach the goals of stability in Afghanistan. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask this then. Are either of you or both 

of you confident that we can get to the point where the relationship 

between Pakistan and the United States in relation to what we are 

dealing with in Afghanistan will get us to the point where their efforts will be on the level of where we believe they need to be. I 

know, having just travelled there, there were many concerns about 

their current level of effort, especially on many of the networks 

that we are dealing with, whether it is the Haqqani network, the 

Quetta Shura, whatever it may be, the concern is, we do our part 

on one side in Afghanistan, and there is safe harbor on the other 

side in Pakistan. Do you see—even in light of the difficult relationship that we have right now, do you see us being able to get to a 

point to have an active Pakistan government and army combatting 

the Taliban in their country in a way that helps us overall strategically in the region? 
44 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yeah, I think Pakistan—as we succeed in 

Afghanistan, I think Pakistan will face some real strategic choices 

in terms of where do they want to end up when this comes to a 

successful conclusion. And I think the real question for them is 

what role will they play politically in helping to get to a political 

endgame in Afghanistan and with reconciliation and so forth. I 

think that is really where their key decisions will lie and that will 

ultimately have a huge impact, not only on their relationship with 

Afghanistan and what is on their border, but also in their relationship with us long term. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks for sticking around and helping us out to understand the 

President’s announcement last night. 

Admiral Mullen, in your statement you said we are going to continue to build a strategic partnership with Afghanistan, one based 

not on a military footprint, but on mutual friendship. And I think 

that we are—if there is something that was lacking in the President’s speech last night was further defining what that relationship 

is going to look like. 

I wrote a letter to you, Secretary Flournoy, a couple of weeks 

back on this very question about what this transition from, as I put 

it, from troops to trade as a shorthand does in fact look like? Because I think we need to maintain a substantial commitment to Afghanistan. But I think it is going to change and ought to change 

in nature. And I think most Americans want a change in nature. 

It is not just a matter of doing a drawdown. It is a matter of, what 

does it look like in the future? 

And I would be very interested in hearing from you, Secretary, 

and then you, Admiral, about what that relationship does in fact 

look like, what does that strategic partnership with Afghanistan 

look like to send the message to Afghanistan that we are not leaving like we did in the 1980s and to the American people that we 

are not staying any longer militarily than we need to be? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that the strategic partnership between the United States and Afghanistan will have many, many dimensions. One is going to be a very sustained political and diplomatic engagement. I think there will be economic investment opportunities. The early days of that is already being seen in some 

sectors like the mining sector, the IT [information technology] sector, the telecommunications, agriculture and so forth. 

I think there will be a security cooperation component that will 

be very important to continuing to press our shared counterterrorism interests and to continue to support the development of the 

Afghan National Security Forces over time. So I think it will be 

multidimensional. I think there will be people-to-people elements, 

educational elements and so forth. But the key message here is 

that even as we achieve our military goals and the military drawdown is made possible and Afghans do take—stand up and take 

more responsibility for their security, we are not going away in a 

relationship sense. We recognize we have vital interests in this region. We have—the objective of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda is one that is not going anywhere, and we are going 

to stick with this, and that means that we are going to stay with 
45 

the partnership in Afghanistan, even as the nature of the means 

by which we do this will change naturally over time. 

Mr. LARSEN. Admiral, do you have anything to add? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, it is tied up into this whole idea of transition and focused, as the Secretary has pointed out, multisector. 

There are ongoing negotiations right now about the aegis of what 

this strategic agreement would look like from my perspective, and 

I am not involved in those. From my perspective, it is talking about 

the right things, the President of the United States and the president of Afghanistan are both committed to this. So that will be the 

framework for how this looks. And it is based on the assumption, 

obviously, that we get to a point in 2014 where we have a successful transition; they are in charge of their own security; obviously 

our footprint is dramatically reduced; and there is a commitment 

to sort of the long-term relationship. I sum that up in friendship, 

but a long-term relationship that sustains a level of stability in 

that part of the world so that it can grow, so that its economy can 

improve, so that people do have comfort in investing in it, and it 

has an impact, not just in Afghanistan but next door in Pakistan. 

Mr. LARSEN. I think—honestly, I think the responsible and deliberate drawdown can be more deliberate and more responsible, 

meaning I think it can happen faster with more folks. But I just 

don’t want us to think that—and I know you do not think this. But 

in talking to folks at home who say, well, get out of Afghanistan, 

the question I always try to push back on is, well, if we do that, 

what do we have left? Have you thought about that? Their answer 

is, well, no, we don’t think about that. 

Well, we need to be thinking about that; what does that look like 

in the future? I just want to be sure that you are all talking about 

what this looks like in the future, what model, you know, of which 

relationship we have with the current country is the AfghanistanU.S. relationship going to look like? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. We are actively discussing that with the 

Afghans, and as that matures, I am sure we will be coming back 

here to talk with you about that in more detail. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. We had a hard stop at 12:30. We have two more 

members with questions. I understand our witnesses have agreed 

to stay. I would ask the members to keep it brief, if possible, and 

thank you for agreeing to continue with us another 10 minutes. 

Mr. Griffin. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary and Admiral, thank you all for your service 

and thank you for being here. I know you have been here a while. 

Just quickly, I want to ask you, looking at Afghanistan and the 

history of Afghanistan and its difficulty in establishing central control, a central—a strong central government, what changes have 

you seen over the past few years, if any, in terms of the people of 

Afghanistan willing to accept a strong central government and be 

a part of a one-nation state, if you will? Can you comment on that 

at all? Because I believe that the answer to that will—is directly 

related to our chances of success long term in Afghanistan. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I do think that Afghans increasingly do 

have a sense of common nationhood. But I think that the govern-
46 

ment that—the level of government that matters to them most and 

where we see them investing greatly, participating greatly, holding 

people accountable is at the local district and then, by extension, 

provincial level. A lot of Afghans don’t worry too much about what 

is happening in Kabul. They focus on, is my district governor listening to our priorities in my community, meeting my basic needs? 

Are the mechanisms or the instruments of government not preying 

upon me, not being predatory, not corrupt, et cetera? 

So I think the first place we have to help them get it right is at 

that local district, provincial level. I think working on the national 

government, we are making progress in terms of capacity, countering corruption and so forth. But that is a project that is going 

to take quite some time. But in the meantime, the real stability is 

coming at the local level. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. I would mention that I was in Afghanistan about 

3 weeks ago and was able to visit not only some of the larger areas 

but some of the larger cities—but was able to go and observe firsthand some of the village stabilization operations with the Special 

Forces and was struck by the success that they have had at the 

local level and particularly the progress that has been made in the 

last, I guess, 18 months, couple of years. 

So I was able to see that firsthand and I was able to actually be 

flown around in a C–130 from my district. And Mac Thornberry, 

who had scheduled the trip, assured me that he did not plant that 

Little Rock-based C–130 there for me, but we enjoyed it nonetheless. But thank you all for your time today. I appreciate it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Does the gentleman yield back? 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks for staying a few extra minutes. You know, I was 

struck listening to your testimony today. 

Yesterday we actually had a hearing on an update on Iraq and 

the drawdown in Iraq. And again, it was actually amazing to hear 

the story of how we are going to be at about 157 military by the 

end of this year. And having sat through a number of those hearings going back to 2007, and Admiral Mullen, you know, has just 

done stellar service in terms of helping guide our country through 

that challenge. 

Again, I guess first of all, I should tip my hat to you about the 

fact that what we heard yesterday was a real amazing accomplishment under your leadership, but also struck by the fact that when 

we had hearings on the SOFA agreement [Status of Forces Agreement], which really set the glide path down, frankly, there was 

angst in this committee about whether or not military advice was 

sort of being set aside and whether or not it was, you know, again, 

getting too far into a higher margin of risk, which you talked 

about. 

And I guess, you know, this probably is going to be one of your 

final appearances before this committee, and I just wonder maybe 

if you want to share a little perspective about that experience. Obviously, you know, these are totally different, you know, parts of 

the world and conflicts. But certainly there should be some con-
47 

fidence that we can draw about your success in that drawdown and 

what we are sort of contemplating here today. 

Admiral MULLEN. What we have a tendency to forget is how bad 

it was in 2006–2007. We were in free fall, from the standpoint of 

our strategy, until the surge in Iraq, and there was certainly uncertainty whether even at the time that would work. It clearly did 

turn. A lot of that was external pressure from the standpoint of 

outside forces, but also a lot of it was internal. 

It is a different country in so many ways, and we certainly understand that. But the overall model, certainly how we assisted 

them and how they developed their forces, et cetera, is one that we 

are trying to follow now. Different forces. This is from scratch in 

Afghanistan; it is a different country. I actually believe that, you 

know, there are—there will be limited—we focused in Afghanistan 

in a limited way on some of these ministries, finance, minister of 

interior, minister of defense, not across the whole government, central government of Afghanistan, if you will, and I think, the long 

run, this is a decentralized country. How do you make it flow and 

work? But that model is a very powerful model, from my perspective, of where we are. 

And I guess the question earlier was, how many are going to be 

left? We don’t know. Right now, it is 157. How many are going to 

be left in Afghanistan? It is 157 in Iraq, unless we reach some 

agreement to the contrary, based on what the leadership in both 

countries want to do. We want a strong partnership with Iraq for 

the future, for lots of reasons, and I think they are a little more 

evident now than even they were in 2006 and 2007, given the turmoil that is going on in that region. We seek the same kind of relationship, strong relationship with Afghanistan long term. So, in 

that regard, it is very instructive. 

There are huge differences, and we have got to—we have got to 

take into consideration both the similarities and the differences 

and also acknowledge that in 2006–2007, we were in our fourth 

and fifth year of war, and now it is 5 years later. We are in our 

10th, and that has got to be integrated into this overall decision 

as well, and I think the President has done that. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And I guess, you know, the deadlines, you know, 

are always, (A), subject to some change, but they also help focus, 

not just our own government but other governments as well. And 

I hope that, you know, would also be one of the, you know, just 

general similarities that will help us get through this. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that is true. One of the things that 

happened with the President’s speech in 2009, when he admit— 

when said he was going to start bringing troops out this July, 

which he has since made the decision on doing that and met that 

commitment, is it really did energize the Afghans. It sent a very 

strong message that this is not open-ended; you are going to have 

to get up and take care of yourself, which is what everybody believed anyway. 

So there is—I have talked about the risks associated with this 

in one way, but there is another side of this that there is a potential upside where they know how serious we are. They have made 

a lot of progress. They are going to have to continue to improve, 
48 

from the president down to the local villages that we have talked 

about. And they have made a lot of improvements. 

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Secretary, Admiral, if you have any closing 

comments, we will be happy to hear them now. I want to thank you 

again for staying past your stop time. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would just like to say thank you for 

hosting us today. I think this dialogue is incredibly important to 

continue this throughout the mission. 

I also want to thank this committee and the members here for 

supporting the members of our Armed Forces and their incredibly 

courageous work but also supporting this mission, which I believe 

is in the vital interest of the United States for us to succeed. 

Thank you. 

Admiral MULLEN. The committee has been incredible for years 

and years and years supporting our men and women and families, 

and words don’t capture what you have done and the impact of it. 

And certainly as someone in my position, I just—I can’t tell you 

how much we appreciate all that you do. And we will need that 

continued support in the future. 

Mr. SCOTT. Admiral, we appreciate all of those warfighters and 

their families and all of those who support them, especially you 

right now. Thank you. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

JUNE 23, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

JUNE 23, 2011 

(53) 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

JUNE 23, 2011 

(69) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Admiral MULLEN. The United States started training the Afghan National Army 

in May 2002. The United States Department of State contracted with DynCorp 

International in May 2003 to conduct police training. At the time, Germany still had 

lead responsibility for Afghan National Police development. In July 2005, the United 

States assumed responsibility for training and equipping the Afghan National Police. The Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) was created in May 2006. The NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) was created 

on 21 November 2009. Though two separate organizations with a common goal and 

combined staffs of U.S. and Coalition partners, the Commander, Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A) is also the Commander, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan. 

Since the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM–A) was established on 21 

November 2009; 190,184 members of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) 

have graduated from training courses (as of 20 July 2011). As of June 2011, there 

were 301,672 members of the Afghan National Security Force (171,050 members of 

the Afghan National Army (this figure includes the Afghan Air Force), and 130,622 

members of the Afghan National Police). [See page 17.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Secretary FLOURNOY. In response to your question about the total NATO force, 

including both U.S. and non-U.S. Coalition personnel, serving in Afghanistan, as of 

May 16, 2011, 132,305 Coalition military personnel were serving under NATO command. If you subtract the number of U.S. military personnel serving under NATO 

command, the total non-U.S. Coalition contribution was 42,305, or an increase of 

nearly 10,000 non-U.S. Coalition forces since President Obama announced the U.S. 

surge at West Point in December 2009. 

ISAF routinely publishes a ‘‘placemat’’ on its website with the total number countries and military personnel participating in the Coalition in Afghanistan. That 

website can be found at http://www.isaf.nato.int/isaf-placemat-archives.html, and the 

placemats are updated monthly. Attached is the May 16, 2011 placemat referenced 

above. [See page 38.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The following table provides Operation Enduring Freedom 

(OEF) amounts for the Department of Defense for FY 2011 and FY 2012. The 

amounts for OEF mostly support activities in Afghanistan. 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

(Dollars in Billions) 

FY 2011 

Enacted 

FY 2012 

PB Request FY 2013 FY 2014 

OEF 110.0 107.0 TBD — 

The President’s recent announcement of troop drawdown from Afghanistan will 

change the Department’s FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget 

requirements for OEF (Operation New Dawn for Iraq remains the same), but the 

exact change will depend on the Commanders’ determination of the pace of the 

drawdown and/or adjustment of the forces mix. 

The Department is in the process of reformulating its OCO requirements for OEF 

for FY 2012, and developing its OCO funding requirements for FY 2013. 
70 

The DoD OCO budget is a bottom-up budget preparation each year, and it is configured to support current military strategy, to include troop redeployments, and 

Commander needs on the ground. At this time, the Department does not have the 

information necessary to predict its FY 2014 OCO requirements, but it is reasonable 

to expect that the President’s announcement of troop withdrawals from Afghanistan 

will result in a decrease in OCO requirements for OEF over time. [See page 31.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

JUNE 23, 2011 

(73) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You referred to the region where we are fighting as the ‘‘epicenter of terrorism in the world,’’ noting that this is why ‘‘the focus on Afghanistan 

and Pakistan is so important.’’ Do you believe the terrorist threat is greater in Afghanistan or in Yemen? To your understanding, are there more Al Qaeda members 

in Afghanistan or in Yemen? 

Admiral MULLEN. We judge Al Qaeda does not have the capability to conduct a 

transnational attack from Afghanistan but continues to support the insurgency by 

sending mid-level leaders and operatives into Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s leadership 

and transnational capability is based in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. However, the group is likely attempting to further 

develop permissive operating areas in Afghanistan into future safehavens from 

which a small Al Qaeda presence could establish limited transnational attack capabilities. We judge the sustained counterterrorism pressure in Pakistan against Al 

Qaeda makes it more difficult for the group to operate than their counterparts in 

Yemen. The Pakistan-based Al Qaeda leadership continues to lead the larger Al 

Qaeda movement as well as maintain the capability to conducted less-sophisticated 

transnational attacks from the group’s safehaven in the Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas. Counterterrorism pressure in Pakistan has significantly degraded Al 

Qaeda’s ability to operate—including planning and executing transnational plots— 

whereas Al Qaeda’s regional affiliate in Yemen, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP), poses a growing transnational threat. AQAP members, operating under significantly less counterterrorism pressure in Yemen, are likely more capable of planning and executing spectacular but smaller scale transnational attacks than their 

counterparts based in Pakistan, as demonstrated by AQAP’s directed 2009 Christmas Day bomber and 2010 parcel bomb plot. AQAP has a larger presence in Yemen 

than the total number of core Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

However, a smaller proportion of AQAP members are focused on supporting transnational attacks; conversely Al Qaeda senior leaders maintain the intent to orchestrate transnational attacks from the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. 

We expect the conflict in Afghanistan to continue to draw foreign fighters from 

around the world, some of whom, through their contact with terrorist networks in 

the region, likely will be redirected or inspired to conduct transnational terrorist attacks. The majority of these foreign fighters will travel to the FATA to join a larger 

interconnected network of terrorists, including members of groups such as Tehrike Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Abdallah 

Azzam Brigades (AAB), and Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) before traveling into Afghanistan. We assess these groups are under significantly less counterterrorism pressure 

than Al Qaeda. Foreign fighters with Afghan battlefield experience and exposure to 

these groups are likely to participate in transnational terrorist attacks. As the Western presence in Afghanistan decreases, however, the appeal of the jihad in Yemen 

to foreign extremists will likely increase. We are following a trend of operatives increasingly choosing to join Al Qaeda’s presence in Yemen and we assess western recruits or others can be diverted to AQAP’s transnational operations program. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Counterterrorism experts suggest that the most likely terrorist 

threat may be ‘‘homegrown,’’ as we see an increase in Al Qaeda followers in the 

United States. Do you think our presence in Afghanistan decreases the homegrown 

terrorist threat? Might it exacerbate that threat? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information is for official use only and is retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Do you believe that maintaining anywhere from 100,000 to 

68,000 troops in Afghanistan over the next three years is the most efficient and/or 

effective way to address the threat of international terrorism? If so, why? Are there 

other strategies that might be more efficient or effective? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. We have seen significant improvement in Afghanistan 

since the President authorized the deployment of surge forces. These forces have 

successfully denied Al Qaeda’s ability to use Afghanistan as a base to plan terrorist 

attacks against the United States and its allies. Our continued presence in Afghanistan is critical to maintaining the improvements of the last few years as we transi-
74 

tion to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. We must maintain forces at a level 

that ensures Afghanistan will never again become a safe haven for international terrorist organizations. As we draw down our forces, our commitment to the development of the Afghanistan National Security Forces must be an enduring one. A 

strong Afghanistan will be a key element to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaeda and 

will foster greater regional stability. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How much will the Department of Defense spend on the war in 

Afghanistan each year between now and 2014 when we withdraw our troops? 

(Please provide figures for each year.) Based on best estimates, how much will this 

spending contribute to anticipated budget deficits each year? Do you see the rising 

deficit as a problem for our national security? 

Admiral MULLEN. The President’s recent announcement of troop drawdown from 

Afghanistan will change the Department’s FY 2012 budget requirements for OEF 

(OND remains the same), but the exact change will depend on the Commanders’ determination of the pace of the drawdown and/or adjustment of the forces mix. The 

Department is in the process of reformulating its OCO requirements for OEF for 

FY 2012, and developing its OCO funding requirements for FY 2013. The DoD OCO 

budget is a bottom-up budget preparation each year and it is configured to support 

current military strategy and Commander needs. At this time, the Department does 

not have the information necessary, e.g., military operational plans, to estimate its 

FY 2014 OCO requirements. Given that the Forces in both OEF and OND are being 

reduced over time, a reduction in the OCO request logically follows, and will have 

a positive impact on deficit reduction each successive year. I have stated in numerous forums that I believe the debt is a significant issue to our national security. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When I asked about the cost of the projected strategy, you stated 

that we are ‘‘looking at coming down 30 or 40 billion a year based on the strategy 

laid out.’’ Based on an unofficial Congressional Research Service estimate, drawing 

down to 25,000 troops by the end of 2012 (as I proposed in the attached amendment 

I introduced to the National Defense Authorization Act) would save $35 billion next 

year. How do you reconcile the difference between your statement that we would 

save $30–40 billion a year by drawing down to 68,000 troops in the summer of 2012 

and the estimate that we would save $35 billion a year by drawing down to 25,000 

troops by the end of 2012? 

Admiral MULLEN. The $30–40 billion figure was in reference to the actual reduction in the OCO request from FY11 to FY12. We reduced the total OCO budget by 

$41B from FY11 to FY12. We have not reviewed the CRS estimate you mentioned 

and we do not have specific savings identified for FY12 given that the ISAF Commander is still formulating the final withdrawal plan for FY12 and the final details 

will not be available for several months. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How many Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) members do 

you expect will be sufficient to ensure a stable Afghan state after U.S. forces withdraw in 2014? To ensure long-term stability, what average ANSF force levels will 

need to be maintained over a 5-year period (from 2014 to 2019)? Over a ten-year 

period (from 2014 to 2024)? 

Admiral MULLEN. Long-term planning for the composition of the ANSF is currently in its initial stages. We are working with our coalition partners and GIRoA 

[Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] to determine the force structure required to ensure that Afghanistan remains secure and stable. Once complete, 

the ANSF plan of record will establish final projected troop levels. The final composition of the ANSF will be based on security conditions on the ground. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How much will it cost to maintain these ANSF force levels over 

these periods? How will these costs compare to levels of revenue that the Afghan 

government is expected to be able to collect over these same time periods? Who will 

pay for the remaining costs? 

Admiral MULLEN. One of the most critical preconditions for Afghans to maintain 

stability and security will be capable, professional Afghan National Security Forces 

(ANSF). The creation of this force allows for the gradual withdrawal of U.S. and 

NATO forces. It is true that support for the ANSF will continue to require international assistance for some years, however as progress is made, the Afghan Government may be able to reduce the size, and therefore cost, of the ANSF to address 

a diminished threat. 

FY12 is the largest Afghan Security Force Fund submission to date, and will complete the majority of initial procurement and infrastructure development for the 

ANSF. As this initial stand-up cost is paid, the future requests should be less. Specific planning has guided the investment and procurement aimed at systems that 

can be maintained and supported by the ANSF and specifically steered away from 

high cost, highly complex systems. This will facilitate a lower long term cost. The 

level of reduction is currently being developed as part of the FY13 OCO request. 
75 

Subsequent assessments will be required each year to identify the overall future requirements. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Under Secretary Flournoy noted that ANSF troop levels will 

likely be reduced after 2014 because the insurgency will be degraded. How many 

ANSF members do you expect will be discharged? Are there concerns that having 

this many unemployed trained fighters could destabilize Afghanistan? 

Admiral MULLEN. We do expect to see a reduction in the number of personnel in 

the ANSF after we have completed the transition process in 2014. The number of 

personnel that could be discharged from the ANSF has not been determined. The 

long-term plan for the ANSF is currently being developed. Once completed, the longterm ANSF plan of record will support the conditions on the ground. Our intent is 

to insure that Afghanistan remains secure and stable long after our drawdown is 

complete. 

There are always concerns about unemployed fighters becoming a destabilizing 

factor in Afghanistan. It is important to remember that we are currently focusing 

on professionalization programs for the ANSF. Personnel leaving the ANSF after 

2014 will most likely be literate and possess the required skill sets to become productive members of Afghan society. 

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