STATION FIRE

Forest Service’s 

Response Offers 

Potential Lessons for 

Future Wildland Fire 

Management

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2011

GAO-12-155

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-155, a report to 

congressional requesters

December 2011

STATION FIRE

Forest Service’s Response Offers Potential Lessons 

for Future Wildland Fire Management

Why GAO Did This Study

In 2009, a wildland fire in the Angeles 

National Forest in California known as 

the Station Fire led to the death of two 

firefighters, destroyed 89 homes and 

dozens of other structures, and burned 

more than 160,000 acres. The 

Department of Agriculture’s Forest 

Service played a key role in managing 

the firefighting response. Some 

firefighters, area residents, and others 

have raised questions about how the 

Forest Service responded to the fire. 

GAO was asked to evaluate the 

response to the Station Fire. 

Accordingly, this report (1) describes 

key events in the Station Fire and the 

Forest Service’s response, including 

strategies, tactics, and assets used; 

(2) examines key issues arising from 

this response; and (3) identifies 

lessons the Station Fire offers for 

wildland fire management in the future, 

including lessons specific to Southern 

California. GAO reviewed agency 

documents and interviewed officials 

from the Forest Service and from 

nonfederal firefighting agencies 

involved in the response, as well as

other parties.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Forest 

Service (1) clarify when it expects 

agency firefighting assets be used 

instead of assets from other sources 

and (2) document the steps it plans to 

take in response to the lessons 

identified in its review of the Station 

Fire. The Forest Service generally 

agreed with GAO’s findings and 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Station Fire started on the afternoon of August 26, 2009, in steep terrain 

covered with highly flammable vegetation during very dry conditions. After 

escaping initial containment efforts, the Station Fire underwent periods of rapid 

growth and extreme fire behavior over the following several days, ultimately 

threatening thousands of homes in nearby communities. In response, the Forest 

Service and local agencies, such as Los Angeles County, deployed thousands of 

firefighters and hundreds of firefighting assets, including fire engines, helicopters, 

and air tankers. The fire’s extreme behavior, however, often prevented 

firefighters from attacking it directly, instead leading them to employ tactics 

farther away from the fire in their efforts to protect life, homes, and natural 

resources. The fire was contained on October 16, 2009.

Among the key issues raised by firefighters, area residents, and others regarding

the Forest Service’s response to the Station Fire were questions over the

adequacy of firefighting assets, strategies, and tactics used. For example, some 

observers questioned (1) why the Forest Service did not use certain aircraft that 

were available, including night-flying helicopters operated by Los Angeles County; 

(2) whether the agency followed appropriate procedures in ordering firefighting 

assets, including whether it mobilized its own assets rather than local ones in 

certain instances, even though its assets were located farther away and would take 

longer to arrive; and (3) whether more action could have been taken to protect 

homes in Big Tujunga Canyon, an area where dozens of homes were destroyed.

GAO’s review of available information was able to clarify some of these issues by, 

for example, identifying the location and availability of certain aircraft and other 

assets. In other cases, insufficient information was available to fully ascertain the 

facts—such as the exact procedures followed when ordering certain assets. Also, 

for those concerns that centered on a difference of opinion, such as whether 

additional actions could have been safely taken to protect homes, GAO was able to 

review the various perspectives of observers but had no method for addressing

these differences through analysis. While some observers were critical of the 

Forest Service’s response to the Station Fire, others commended its response, 

highlighting the difficult conditions confronting firefighters and the thousands of 

threatened homes that ultimately were protected.

The Station Fire offers several important lessons that may help improve wildland 

fire response in the future, including in Southern California. These lessons

include the importance of (1) determining the appropriate role of night-flying 

aircraft, (2) having transparent processes for ordering and mobilizing firefighting 

assets, (3) tracking aircraft water and retardant deliveries, (4) predicting fire 

behavior under a variety of conditions, and (5) having systematic methods to 

identify needed firefighting assets. The agency has taken action to implement 

some lessons, including changing its night-flying policy and the asset-ordering 

practices at the Angeles National Forest. The agency has not, however, clarified 

its expectations about when its own assets are to be ordered instead of other 

agencies’. In addition, while the agency prepared a “lessons-learned” report after

the fire, this report does not fully describe other actions the agency expects to 

take to implement lessons from the fire or time frames for doing so—potentially 

representing a lost opportunity to capitalize on the Station Fire’s lessons. 

View GAO-12-155. For more information, 

contact Anu K. Mittal at (202) 512-3841 or 

mittala@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Letter 1 

Background 3

Key Events of the Station Fire and the Forest Service’s Response 9

The Forest Service’s Response to the Station Fire Raised Issues 

Related Primarily to the Firefighting Assets, Strategies, and 

Tactics Used 25

Lessons from the Station Fire Have the Potential to Improve Future 

Wildland Fire Response 50

Conclusions 58

Recommendations for Executive Action 59

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 59

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 61

Appendix II The Station Fire’s Progression and Firefighting Assets Used over 

the Fire’s First 9 Days, from August 26 through September 3, 2009 65

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Agriculture, Forest Service 74

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 75

Tables

Table 1: Fires in California That Destroyed the Most Structures 4

Table 2: Fires in the United States with the Highest Suppression 

Costs, 2000-2011 5

Figures

Figure 1: Angeles National Forest and Vicinity, with Perimeter of 

the Station Fire and Daily Fire Progression 10

Figure 2: Location of the Station Fire on August 26, 2009, Showing 

Firefighter Divisions Alpha and Zulu 13

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Abbreviations 

CAL FIRE California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection 

FPA fire program analysis

ROSS resource ordering and status system

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

December 16, 2011

The Honorable Barbara Boxer

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein

United States Senate

The Honorable Judy Chu

The Honorable David Dreier

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

The Honorable Adam Schiff

The Honorable Brad Sherman

House of Representatives

A wildland fire known as the Station Fire began in the Angeles National 

Forest in California on August 26, 2009, and, before it was declared 

contained on October 16 of that year, led to the death of two firefighters, 

destroyed 89 homes and dozens of other structures, and burned more 

than 160,000 acres of land in Los Angeles County. The fire, which was 

set by an arsonist, began during very dry conditions in steep terrain 

covered with highly flammable vegetation, a mix contributing to periods of 

rapid fire spread and difficult and dangerous conditions for firefighters. At 

the fire’s height, more than 5,200 firefighters and other personnel 

responded as the fire threatened thousands of homes; critical 

communications and other infrastructure; and natural and cultural 

resources, including watersheds susceptible to postfire flooding and 

erosion. Suppressing the fire cost an estimated $95 million, placing it 

among the most costly fires in the nation’s history. Because the fire began 

in the Angeles National Forest, the Department of Agriculture’s Forest 

Service played a key role in managing the firefighting response. Because 

the Station Fire also burned and threatened cities and county land 

adjacent to the national forest, several local fire departments (including 

those from Los Angeles County and the cities of Glendale, Los Angeles, 

and Pasadena) entered into “unified command” with the Forest Service, 

meaning that those departments were involved in making decisions about 

how to respond to the fire.

Some firefighters, area residents, and others have raised questions about

whether the Forest Service could have mobilized firefighting assets more 

quickly, which might have allowed the agency to contain the Station Fire 

sooner. Questions have also been raised about whether different 

firefighting strategies or tactics could have allowed the Forest Service to 

either contain the fire before it became large or reduce the damage it 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

caused. In this context, you asked us to review the response to the Station 

Fire. Accordingly, this report (1) describes key events in the Station Fire 

and the Forest Service’s response, including strategies, tactics, and assets

used; (2) examines key issues arising from this response; and (3) identifies 

lessons the Station Fire offers for wildland fire management in the future, 

including lessons specific to Southern California.

To determine the key events of the Station Fire and the Forest Service’s 

response, we reviewed numerous interagency incident documents, 

including daily incident summaries, daily plans of firefighting actions to be 

taken, orders for firefighting assets, and recordings and transcripts of 

radio transmissions. We also reviewed agency and other reports that 

examined particular aspects of the fire or the response to it. In addition, 

we reviewed Forest Service policies and guidance related to firefighting, 

including the 2009 Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation 

Operations, interagency guidance on mobilizing firefighting assets, and 

the fire management plan for the Angeles National Forest. To obtain 

additional information, and to provide context for the documents 

reviewed, we interviewed selected officials from the Forest Service and 

other agencies who were directly involved in the response. We also 

interviewed Forest Service officials from national, regional, and forest 

levels; officials from the nonfederal agencies involved in the response, 

including senior officials from the firefighting agencies that were part of 

the incident’s unified command; and residents and others who witnessed 

or were affected by the fire. Some nonfederal agency officials and retired 

federal officials declined our requests for interviews. These officials might 

have provided us additional perspectives or information on the fire, but we 

believe that, given the number and variety of individuals we interviewed 

and the volume of documents we examined, our inability to interview 

these officials is unlikely to have substantially affected our findings, 

conclusions, or recommendations. In describing the Station Fire, we 

divided the fire into five phases to reflect changes in fire size and 

behavior, the risk to structures and resources, and the nature of the 

agency’s response. To determine the key issues raised by the Forest 

Service’s response and the lessons the Station Fire offers for future 

wildland fire management, we reviewed agency and other reports 

evaluating aspects of the response and reviewed information provided at 

congressional meetings held in Southern California in October 2010 and 

April 2011. We also discussed key issues and potential lessons during 

our interviews with incident personnel, Forest Service officials, officials 

from nonfederal agencies, residents affected by the fire, and other 

interested parties. Appendix I describes our scope and methodology in 

more detail.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

It is important to note that our review had the benefit of hindsight, a 

benefit not available to those who responded to the Station Fire. We 

recognize that wildland fires can be unpredictable and that fire and 

weather conditions can change quickly. Firefighters have to respond to 

such changes as they occur, using the information they have available at 

a particular moment to make decisions about the strategies and tactics 

they believe will provide the best opportunities for success, while also 

considering the risk to firefighters from taking a particular action. These 

decisions may be made with imperfect information and under severe time 

constraints, relying heavily on the professional judgment of those 

involved. In addition, it is not possible to know with certainty whether 

different decisions or actions would have resulted in a different outcome 

for the Station Fire. In conducting our review, we evaluated decisions 

made and actions taken in light of the information available to firefighters 

and forest officials at the time.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2010 through 

December 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Angeles National Forest, along with the other national forests in 

Southern California, is located in one of the driest, most fire-prone areas 

in the United States and also abuts the major population centers of 

greater Los Angeles. Firefighters have suppressed fires occurring in the 

area for decades, which has resulted in the significant accumulation of 

brush and other flammable fuels in many places. Chaparral shrublands,1

 

1

Chaparral vegetation comprises several plant species, including chamise, scrub oak, and 

manzanita, whose thick, waxy leaves adapt them particularly well to drought. 

one of the most fire-hazardous landscapes in North America, dominate 

low to middle elevations of the Southern California foothills and 

mountains. Fires in this landscape tend to exhibit extreme fire behavior 

because the vegetation’s characteristics and the steep slopes facilitate 

fires’ rapid upslope spread. Dry and hot weather characteristic of the 

region also contributes to the severity of local fires. In addition, continuing 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

development in the wildland-urban interface—where human development 

meets or intermixes with undeveloped wildland—has placed an 

increasing number of homes at risk of damage from wildland fire in this 

area. California has experienced a number of fires that have destroyed 

hundreds, and in some cases even thousands, of homes and other 

structures (see table 1).

Table 1: Fires in California That Destroyed the Most Structures

Name Year

Structures destroyed 

(approximate)

Acres burned 

(approximate)

Tunnel Fire 1991 2,900 1,600

Cedar Fire 2003 2,820 273,246

Witch Fire 2007 1,650 197,990

Old Fire 2003 1,003 91,281

Jones Fire 1999 954 26,200

Paint Fire 1990 641 4,900

Fountain Fire 1992 636 63,960

Sayre Fire 2008 604 11,262

City of Berkeley Fire 1923 584 130

Harris Fire 2007 548 90,440

Source: California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

Note: Structures destroyed includes homes, commercial structures, and outbuildings.

The cost of suppressing wildland fires has escalated in recent years. 

Since 2000, numerous fires have each cost more than $75 million to 

suppress—including some whose suppression costs exceeded $100 

million (see table 2).
 

Page 5 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Table 2: Fires in the United States with the Highest Suppression Costs, 2000-2011 

Name Year State 

Suppression cost 

(approximate, 

in millions)

Acres burned 

(approximate)

Biscuit Fire 2002 Oregon,

California

$152.7 499,570

Klamath Theater 

(Siskiyou Complex, 

Bear Wallow 

Complex, Panther 

Fire) 

2008 California 126.1 192,038

Zaca Two Fire 2007 California 122.5 240,207

Wallow Fire 2011 Arizona, 

New Mexico

109.0 538,049

Station Fire 2009 California 95.5 160,577

BTU Lightning 

Complex

2008 California 94.8 64,995

Tripod Complex 2006 Washington 84.1 175,184

Basin Complex 2008 California 78.1 162,818

Day Fire 2006 California 78.0 162,702

Texas Winter Fires 2008 Texas 77.7 22,137

Source: Forest Service.

Notes: Dollars are given as reported by the Forest Service and are not adjusted for inflation. 

According to a Forest Service official, data from fires before 2000 are not readily available, but it is 

unlikely that suppression costs for earlier fires exceeded those of fires occurring since 2000.

Because one firefighting entity alone cannot handle all wildland fires that 

may burn in its jurisdiction, especially when faced with large fires like the 

Station Fire, agencies in the United States use an interagency incident 

management system that depends on the close cooperation and 

coordination of federal, state, tribal, and local fire protection agencies. 

Although the Forest Service is the predominant federal firefighting agency 

in terms of the amount of resources devoted to firefighting, federal and 

nonfederal firefighting entities generally share their firefighting personnel, 

equipment, and supplies and work together to fight fires, regardless of 

which entity has jurisdiction over the burning lands. Agreements between 

cooperating entities govern these cooperative fire protection efforts and 

contain general provisions for sharing firefighting assets and costs.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

On a large wildland fire, fire suppression efforts generally fall into two 

phases—initial attack and extended attack. The initial attack phase 

consists of the efforts to control a fire during the first “operational period” 

after the fire is reported, generally 24 hours.2

During initial attack, firefighting entities normally follow a principle of 

closest available resource, whereby, regardless of jurisdiction, the closest 

available firefighting personnel and equipment respond. As the fire moves 

into the extended attack phase, officials consider a number of factors—

including whether the asset will arrive at the time requested—and order 

the assets they believe are most appropriate, which may not necessarily 

be the closest. Personnel, aircraft, equipment, and supplies are ordered 

through a system of local, regional, and national dispatch centers. If 

assets are insufficient in the local dispatch area close to a wildland fire, 

dispatch center personnel forward requests to the responsible regional 

dispatch center, which locates and sends additional firefighting assets 

from elsewhere within the region.

Local fire management 

officials—for example, a fire management officer for a national forest—

direct these initial firefighting efforts in their jurisdictions. While the 

majority of fires on Forest Service land—about 98 percent—are controlled 

and suppressed during initial attack, a small percentage escape and 

require further firefighting efforts. Such additional efforts are referred to as 

extended attack.

3

The Forest Service and its interagency firefighting partners use an 

incident management system designed to provide appropriate 

management and leadership team capabilities for firefighting efforts. The 

fire’s complexity determines the type of leadership team and firefighting 

assets assigned. There are five types of incidents, increasing in 

complexity from type 5 (the least complex) to type 1 (the most complex). 

For example, to manage a type 5 incident, the incident commander may 

If necessary, the regional dispatch 

center can forward requests to the National Interagency Coordination 

Center in Boise, Idaho, which locates and assigns the closest available 

asset to the fire.

 

2

An operational period is the period of time scheduled for execution of a given set of 

tactical actions as specified in an incident action plan. Operational periods can be of 

various lengths, although usually not more than 24 hours.

3

Eleven regional dispatch centers, called geographic area coordination centers, are 

located nationwide, each of which serves a specific geographic portion of the United 

States.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

be a local employee qualified to direct initial attack efforts on a small fire 

with two to six firefighters. In contrast, for a type 1 incident, the incident 

commander is one member of a highly qualified management team of 

firefighting personnel that often number more than 500. Incident 

management teams are also rated on a scale according to their training 

and experience, with type 1 teams qualified to handle the most-complex 

incidents. Type 1 team members receive additional training and generally 

have the most experience in handling complex incidents. A single incident 

commander is typically in charge, but the incident management system 

may be expanded into a unified command structure when multiple 

jurisdictions are involved. This structure brings together commanders of 

the relevant jurisdictions as a way to facilitate a coordinated and 

integrated response. In such cases, members of the unified command 

work together to develop a common set of incident objectives and 

strategies, maximize the use of assets, and enhance the individual 

response organizations’ efficiency.

Ultimately, the team that is assigned works with Forest Service line 

officers—such as forest supervisors or district rangers—and fire 

management staff from the affected national forest to determine the 

strategies and tactics to use in managing a fire. The strategy is the overall 

plan designed to control the fire; for example, a strategy may be to protect 

threatened structures and to contain the fire within a certain geographic 

area. Tactics are actions that are taken to accomplish the objectives set 

out in the strategy. For example, the fire may be attacked directly, with 

firefighters working at the fire’s edge to extinguish it. If the fire is burning 

too intensely for direct attack or if direct attack is otherwise not possible, 

practical, or safe—because the fire is burning on very steep slopes, for 

example—firefighters may choose to attack it indirectly. In such cases, 

firefighters typically select an area away from the fire and construct a 

“fireline,” where vegetation is cleared in an effort to stop the fire’s spread 

at that point or slow it sufficiently to allow firefighters to attack directly. 

Firefighters often incorporate geographic features such as roads, rocky 

areas, or ridgelines into firelines to increase their effectiveness. In some 

cases firefighters will conduct backfiring operations, in which they 

intentionally set fire to fuels between a fireline and the fire to slow or 

contain a rapidly spreading fire by depriving it of fuel.

In carrying out these strategies and tactics, firefighters use a variety of 

firefighting assets, both on the ground and in the air. Ground-based 

assets include firefighting crews; wildland fire engines; and machinery 

such as bulldozers, which firefighters use to help them construct firelines. 

Aviation assets include helicopters, which can drop water directly on a 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

fire, and fixed-wing air tankers, which can drop fire retardant ahead of the 

fire, often near a fireline that has been constructed, to slow a fire’s 

spread. (Fire retardant is most effective when applied ahead of the fire 

and is not applied directly on a fire.) Less commonly used assets include 

certain fixed-wing aircraft that carry water or suppression gel that is 

dropped directly on a fire. Fixed-wing air tankers range in size from small 

single-engine planes, which are maneuverable but carry only small 

amounts of retardant, to a limited number of large aircraft such as 

converted DC-10s or Boeing 747s—referred to as “very large air 

tankers”—which can carry substantial amounts of retardant but whose 

use can be limited in mountainous terrain because of their size.4

Firefighters and other personnel who respond to wildland fire incidents 

are required to complete training to help them identify hazards, as well as 

appropriate strategies and tactics to respond to different situations. The 

level of risk that decision makers and firefighters are willing to accept in 

any given situation—and, as a result, in some cases the strategies and 

tactics ultimately used—depends on the experience of the firefighters 

involved. Overall, agency firefighting doctrine emphasizes safety above 

all other concerns; Forest Service policy, for example, states, “In 

conducting wildland fire suppression, responsible officials shall give first 

priority to the safety of firefighters, other personnel, and the public.” In 

determining which firefighting strategies to follow, fire managers are 

instructed to make safety their primary criterion.

 

4

The Forest Service obtains fixed-wing air tanker services through contracts with private 

industry.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

The Station Fire started on the afternoon of August 26, 2009. After 

escaping initial containment efforts, the fire underwent periods of rapid 

growth and extreme fire behavior during the following several days. In 

response, the Forest Service and other agencies deployed thousands of 

firefighters and hundreds of fire engines, helicopters, air tankers, and 

other assets. The fire’s extreme behavior, however, often prevented 

firefighters from attacking it directly, instead leading them to use indirect 

tactics to protect life, homes and communities, and natural resources. 

Ultimately, the fire burned more than 160,000 acres and threatened 

thousands of homes and other structures (see fig. 1). The following 

sections describe key events of the Station Fire and the Forest Service’s 

response during each of five phases into which we have divided the fire. 

Appendix II contains maps detailing the areas that burned on particular 

dates.

Key Events of the 

Station Fire and the 

Forest Service’s 

Response 
Page 10 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Figure 1: Angeles National Forest and Vicinity, with Perimeter of the Station Fire and Daily Fire Progression

Final Station Fire perimeter

Other roads

Major highways

Legend:

Origin of the Station Fire

Angeles National Forest boundary

BigTujunga Canyon

La Cañada Flintridge

La Crescenta

Glendale Pasadena

Angeles Forest Highway

Angeles Crest Highway

Highway

39

Mt. Wilson

Camp 16

Angeles Crest

Fire Station

Mt. Lukens

Magic Mountain

Wilderness Area

Pleasant View Ridge

Wilderness Area

San Gabriel

Wilderness Area

Arcadia

Azusa

Acton

Palmdale

NASA Jet

Propulsion Laboratory

101

5

5

14

138

210

210

210 605

134

2

Chilao Fire Station

Sources: GAO analysis of Forest Service information; Forest Service (map).

Roll your mouse over the dates beneath the graphic to track the progression of the Station Fire 

over its first nine days, from August 26 through September 3, 2009. To view this progression in the 

offline version, see appendix II.

Interactive Graphic

Aug. 26 Aug. 27 Aug. 28 Aug. 29 Aug. 30 Aug. 31 Sept .1 Sept. 2 Sept. 3

Location of the Station Fire
 

Page 11 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

The Station Fire was set by an arsonist on the afternoon of August 26, 

near a pullout on the Angeles Crest Highway.5 According to a Forest 

Service report, the fire began in approximately 50-year-old chaparral 

about 6 to 8 feet high and containing more than 50 percent dead 

material—conditions that, when combined with steep slopes, low 

humidity, and high temperature, were conducive to long flame lengths,6

The fire was reported at about 3:15 p.m., and firefighters from both the 

Angeles National Forest and Los Angeles County responded. The first 

firefighters arrived at approximately 3:30 p.m., and by 4:30 p.m. 

approximately 175 firefighters and other personnel and 14 engines were 

on the scene, according to agency officials. In addition, seven helicopters 

and two air tankers were mobilized to respond to the fire during the 

afternoon, with several aircraft arriving over the fire before 4:00 p.m. 

These resources were under the overall command of an incident 

commander assigned by the Angeles National Forest. According to forest 

officials, the initial firefighting response to the Station Fire was greater 

than the typical response to a new wildland fire, because aircraft were 

able to arrive on scene more quickly than usual from another fire, the 

Morris Fire, which had started nearby in the Angeles National Forest the 

day before. As a result, the Forest Service was able to quickly move 

assets from that fire to the Station Fire.

intense burning, and rapid spread. A “red flag” warning was in effect for 

the area that afternoon, indicating weather that could result in extreme 

burning conditions. Fire records indicate that within about an hour of 

being reported, the fire had burned the hillside above the highway pullout 

and covered approximately 15 to 20 acres.

In accordance with the Angeles National Forest Fire Management Plan, 

the overall objective in responding to the Station Fire during this phase—

as with all fires burning in the Angeles National Forest—was full 

suppression.7

 

5

The fire was named the Station Fire because this location is near the Angeles Crest Fire 

Station in the Angeles National Forest.

To accomplish this objective, firefighters attempted to 

6

Flame length is a measure of fire intensity and refers to the distance from the tip of the 

flame to its base, which is generally at ground level. Thus, a fire that is burning at ground 

level and has a flame tip 6 feet high would have a flame length of 6 feet.

7

Forest Service, Angeles National Forest 2009 Fire Management Plan (Arcadia, Calif.: 

June 2009). 

Phase 1 (August 26)
 

Page 12 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

create firelines around the fire in an effort to contain it in the immediate 

area above the Angeles Crest Highway.8

 

8

The specific objectives were to keep the fire below Lukens Ridge and above the Angeles 

Crest Highway. 

The attack on the fire was 

divided into two divisions: Los Angeles County firefighters were assigned 

to Division Alpha, on the fire’s left flank, while Forest Service firefighters 

were assigned to Division Zulu, on the right flank (see fig. 2). Firefighters 

told us that Division Alpha’s county firefighters first attempted a direct 

attack on the fire’s left flank, but the fire was too intense, and the division 

supervisor determined that the firefighters should fall back and try instead 

to establish an indirect fireline in the next drainage, approximately 

200 yards to the west. Meanwhile, Division Zulu’s Forest Service 

firefighters began to create a fireline and place fire hoses along a 

ridgeline close to the fire. A firefighter present at this time estimated the 

flames were mostly about 8 to 10 feet long; agency firefighting doctrine 

indicates that flame lengths greater than 4 feet are not safe for firefighters 

using hand tools to attack directly.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Figure 2: Location of the Station Fire on August 26, 2009, Showing Firefighter Divisions Alpha and Zulu

The ground-based firefighters were supported by seven helicopters and 

two air tankers during the afternoon and evening of August 26. According 

to Forest Service officials and fire records we reviewed, helicopters 

dropped water either on or very near the fire, which helped reduce the 

fire’s intensity and allowed firefighters to work to establish firelines closer 

to the fire. In addition, air tankers dropped fire retardant on the slopes and 

ridgelines above the fire, in an effort to keep the fire from spreading 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

beyond these areas. Aircraft made numerous drops throughout that 

afternoon and evening. The two air tankers, for example, dropped about 

15,000 gallons of retardant, according to fire records, and Forest Service 

officials estimated the seven helicopters dropped more than 142,000 

gallons of water. Because aircraft are generally not allowed to fly 

firefighting missions at night,9 the aircraft began to make their last drops 

on the fire around 7:00 p.m., according to the incident commander, and 

the last helicopters were released at 7:55 p.m.10

The incident commander and other firefighters who responded to the fire 

on August 26 told us that the steep slopes and active fire behavior made 

it difficult to establish firelines and contain the fire but that firefighters 

made progress throughout the afternoon and evening and that, although 

the fire was not contained by early evening, the firelines surrounding it 

appeared to be holding. At this time, firefighters had made sufficient 

progress that the incident commander believed they would be able to 

contain the fire that night. According to the incident commander and other

forest officials, the number of firefighting assets he ordered for the next 

day was commensurate with “mop-up” operations—meaning that the fire 

was not expected to be spreading and that firefighters would be focusing 

on reinforcing the firelines and cooling off hot spots within the perimeter. 

Between approximately 10:30 p.m. and midnight, the incident commander 

released a number of Forest Service and county firefighting assets he 

believed were no longer needed to fight the fire. At about the same time, 

command of the fire transferred from the type 3 incident commander who 

had been managing the response to a type 4 incident commander.

The indirect attack on the left flank of the fire, however, left about onequarter acre of unburned vegetation remaining, generally referred to as 

the “green island.” Around 11:30 p.m., as down-canyon winds began to 

blow embers from the green island across the highway, small “spot” fires 

 

9

Los Angeles County helicopters are capable of flying missions at night, and, under 

certain conditions, these helicopters are allowed to fight fires at night on federal lands. The 

use of these helicopters in fighting the Station Fire is discussed later in this report.

10In Los Angeles, sunset was at 7:27 p.m. on August 26, 2009. According to Forest 

Service policy, helicopters that are not equipped to fly at night are required to return to 

their base no later than 30 minutes after sunset, which would have been 7:57 p.m. on that 

date. The other helicopters assigned to the Station Fire on August 26 were released at 

6:10, 7:30, and 7:40 p.m. (three helicopters were released at 7:40). The two air tankers 

assigned to the Station Fire that evening returned to their base at 6:58 and 

7:23 p.m.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

ignited in the steep canyon below the highway. Several firefighters told us 

that it is common for down-canyon winds to develop after sunset, and 

given that the green island was still burning, they had expected that 

embers would start to land below the highway at some point during the 

night. Over the next 2 to 3 hours, embers ignited at least six spot fires, 

according to fire records.11

Because of the fire’s increased severity and the higher risk posed to 

firefighters by the spot fires below the highway, command of the fire 

transferred from the type 4 incident commander back to the type 3 

commander at 2:29 a.m. on August 27, although both officials told us the 

type 3 incident commander was present and had offered advice to the 

type 4 commander beginning around midnight. Once firefighters 

determined they were unable to fully suppress the spot fires below the 

road, the type 3 incident commander ordered additional aircraft to help 

suppression efforts in the morning. Specifically, at about 12:30 a.m. on 

August 27, the incident commander radioed an Angeles National Forest 

dispatcher and requested three air tankers to be over the fire at 7:00 a.m. 

He also ordered a third helicopter, in addition to two he already had 

ordered earlier in the evening.

Firefighters involved in the response told us 

they were able to suppress several of these spot fires, but one of them 

was burning in a location that was too dangerous to attack. Firefighters 

said these spot fires posed a substantial risk to firefighters because they 

were on steep slopes. It is often unsafe to attack a fire on steep slopes 

from above because fire can burn uphill fast; it can also be unsafe to 

attack a fire from below because burning material can roll downhill past 

firefighters and ignite vegetation, which can then burn back uphill toward 

them. Moreover, firefighters told us the risk from these conditions is 

greater at night and in dense vegetation because it is difficult to see the 

terrain and the fire.

On the morning of August 27, as firefighters renewed their efforts, the 

overall goal was to contain the Station Fire before it could reach nearby 

communities and infrastructure, according to one of the firefighters 

supervising the response. Incident officials and firefighters told us they 

recognized the importance of attacking the fire as early as possible during 

 

11Firefighters told us they identified six spot fires but that there may have been others they 

could not see because of the terrain and the thick vegetation.

Phase 2 (August 27 

through afternoon of 

August 28)
 

Page 16 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

the day because it was burning on east-facing slopes and would become 

more active through the day as the sun rose and warmed the land. Four 

air tankers responded to the Station Fire during the morning, arriving at 

the fire at approximately 9:00 a.m., and seven helicopters also 

responded, arriving at the fire between approximately 7:45 a.m. and 

10:30 a.m.12

These efforts notwithstanding, the fire burning below the highway—which 

had started from the embers from the green island during the night—began 

to spread south on the morning of August 27, paralleling the Angeles Crest 

Highway toward the mouth of the canyon and densely populated areas 

adjacent to the forest. The fire also began to move up the canyon slopes 

toward the highway, ultimately crossing it once again; now above the 

highway, the fire subsequently spread quickly both up and down the 

canyon to the north and south. (See fig. 1 and app. II for maps of the fire’s 

progress.) At this point, the fire posed a direct threat to nearby developed 

areas, including homes in La Cañada Flintridge, the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and major electrical 

infrastructure. Incident documents show that by the evening of August 27, 

approximately 500 homes were threatened by the fire, a number that 

increased to approximately 1,800 by the afternoon of August 28. According 

to firefighters, protecting these areas was the priority for the evening of 

August 27 and on August 28. They told us they had air tankers drop 

retardant near the homes adjacent to the forest boundary and stationed 

A firefighter supervising the response in that area told us 

that, in an effort to keep the fire from spreading, he had air tankers drop 

retardant on nearby ridges (which were not burning) and had helicopters 

drop water directly on the fire in an effort to slow its progress and reduce 

its intensity to allow firefighters more time to try to create firelines around 

it. In addition, ground crews continued to attack the fire, including a crew 

of “hotshots”—18 to 20 highly qualified firefighters—working to create a 

fireline to keep the fire from spreading. As the fire intensified during the 

day, however, crews had to abandon this effort. The firefighter 

supervising the response emphasized the fire’s intensity, noting that as 

early as 7:45 a.m., water dropped by helicopter was having little effect; 

this firefighter also told us that the fire burned through retardant that had 

been dropped by air tankers that morning.

 

12The helicopters arrived at approximately 7:45, 9:14, 9:35, 10:00, 10:07, 10:15, and 

10:27 a.m.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

engines near these homes to respond if needed.13

As the complexity of the incident escalated, the management structure of 

the response changed, and the number of assets assigned to the fire 

rose. On the morning of August 27, the incident was managed by a type 3 

incident commander. During that morning, Angeles National Forest 

officials, in conjunction with firefighters assigned to the incident, began 

discussing the need to order a type 1 incident management team; forest 

officials ordered this team shortly before 2:00 p.m. on August 27. But 

because the type 1 team was not expected to assume command until the 

evening of August 28, officials decided to make the Station Fire a branch 

of the nearby Morris Fire—meaning that the type 2 incident management 

team managing the Morris Fire would be responsible for managing the 

Station Fire as well. Ultimately, the type 1 team assumed command of the 

Station Fire at 2:00 p.m. on August 28. In addition, because the fire 

threatened lands under the jurisdiction of both the Angeles National 

Forest and Los Angeles County, the Forest Service entered into unified 

command with the county at 1:10 p.m. on August 27, so that county 

officials were more formally involved with making decisions about how to

manage the fire.

They also told us they 

had firefighters and engines try to attack the fire directly at various times 

but that the fire’s intensity, combined with the steep terrain, made it unsafe 

for firefighters to engage too close to the fire. On August 28, they said that 

engines and hotshot crews were also used to try to keep the fire from 

spreading farther east or north, to protect communications infrastructure on 

nearby Mt. Lukens, as well as residences in Big Tujunga Canyon to the 

northwest. Although firefighters were unable to contain the fire, no homes 

were destroyed during this phase.

14

 

13Incident records confirm the use of air tankers and engines on these days but do not cite 

specific locations where they were used.

During this phase, the number of firefighting assets 

assigned to the fire increased from an estimated 191 firefighting 

personnel, 4 air tankers, 7 helicopters, and 6 engines on the morning of 

August 27 to an estimated 637 firefighting personnel, 8 air tankers, 

14Over the next several days, as the threat from the fire spread, additional jurisdictions 

entered into unified command with the incident management team. In addition to the Los 

Angeles County Fire Department, the following organizations entered into unified 

command during the incident: Glendale Fire Department, Los Angeles City Fire 

Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and Pasadena Fire Department. 

Other agencies, including the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL 

FIRE), also had representatives present and were involved in the response.
 

Page 18 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

7 helicopters, and 40 engines on the afternoon of August 28. By that 

afternoon, the fire had grown to approximately 5,000 acres.

On Friday, August 28, at 2:00 p.m., a type 1 incident management team 

assumed command of the Station Fire.15

On August 29, the Station Fire continued to spread in several directions. 

The fire continued to threaten the foothill communities to the south, west, 

and east and was also moving toward Mt. Wilson—the site of critical 

communications infrastructure—and Big Tujunga Canyon. The overall 

strategy continued to be full suppression, but, according to incident 

management officials, extreme fire behavior provided little opportunity for 

firefighters to attack the fire directly. Throughout the day, incident officials 

said they used firefighting assets where they believed doing so would be 

safe and effective. For example, because the fire was still threatening 

communities along the foothills, and mandatory evacuations were issued 

for portions of Altadena, La Cañada Flintridge, La Crescenta, and 

This command transition 

occurred in the middle of an operational period, generally considered a 

dangerous time to change command. As the evening progressed, the fire 

moved quickly to the south, west, and east and continued to threaten 

more than 1,800 homes, particularly in the foothill communities of La 

Cañada Flintridge and La Crescenta. Firefighters noted that the fire was 

moving in multiple directions simultaneously, making it difficult for them to 

predict where it was headed and forcing them to take firefighting actions 

in multiple areas. As a result, members of the incident management team 

told us they chose to focus their efforts near La Cañada Flintridge and La 

Crescenta—the area facing the greatest risk from the fire that night. Team 

members told us they continued to use air tankers to drop retardant to try 

to slow the fire’s progress toward these communities and helicopters to 

drop water in an attempt to lessen the fire’s intensity and provide

opportunities for firefighters to contain the fire; parts of La Cañada 

Flintridge were evacuated during the night of August 28. A red flag 

warning remained in effect throughout this phase; moreover, although 

wildland fires typically become less active at night when temperatures are 

lower and humidity higher, which allows firefighters to make progress, 

firefighters told us that the Station Fire continued to burn actively at night 

during this phase.

 

15The team assigned was California Interagency Incident Management Team 5.

Phase 3 (afternoon of 

August 28 through August 

31)
 

Page 19 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Glendale, incident management officials said they continued to use 

helicopters and air tankers—including very large air tankers, which can 

drop substantially more retardant than typical air tankers16—as well as 

firefighting crews and bulldozers to try to establish firelines to protect 

these communities.17

In addition to the populated foothill communities, the Station Fire also 

threatened homes located within the boundaries of the Angeles National 

Forest. In particular, the fire threatened Big Tujunga Canyon, which had 

about 200 homes, including homes on private property within the national 

forest and recreational residences on lands leased from the Forest 

Service. Big Tujunga Canyon lies on the other side of a ridge from where 

the fire started. The fire had entered the upper reaches of one of Big 

Tujunga Canyon’s side canyons no later than the afternoon of August 28, 

according to firefighters, Angeles National Forest officials, and canyon 

residents, but firefighters and forest officials said the fire was not intense 

and was burning slowly downhill—a low-intensity fire known as a backing 

fire. On the evening of August 28, after taking over management of the 

fire, the type 1 incident management team, in conjunction with officials 

from the other agencies in unified command, created a “structure 

protection group,” consisting of three “strike teams” of five engines each, 

to protect the homes in the canyon.

By the evening of August 29, the fire threatened an 

estimated 10,000 homes, and approximately 1,800 personnel had been 

assigned to the incident.

18

 

16The DC-10 has a capacity of 12,000 gallons, and the 747 has a capacity of 

24,000 gallons, substantially more than the approximately 3,000 gallons that a standard 

large air tanker can carry. The DC-10 made two drops this day, releasing more than 

20,000 gallons.

 The leader of the structure 

protection group told us he toured the canyon during the evening of 

August 28 and, in consultation with an Angeles National Forest official 

familiar with the area, determined that if the fire were to reach an area 

known as the Grizzly Flats plantation, residents of the canyon should be 

evacuated.

17Incident records confirm the use of air tankers, crews, and bulldozers on these days but 

do not cite specific locations where they were used. 

18This was one of several structure protection groups created by the incident management 

team.
 

Page 20 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

The next morning, on August 29, he returned to the canyon and noted 

that the fire had not changed much overnight and was still burning in the 

upper reaches of the canyon and slowly backing down. He told us he 

discussed the fire with Angeles National Forest officials who were present 

in the canyon, and they all agreed the fire was likely to continue burning 

and would threaten homes in Big Tujunga Canyon, although likely not for 

another 24 to 48 hours. The general consensus of the group was that 

when it did burn through the canyon, the fire would be of moderate 

intensity. A strike team leader told us that the structure protection group 

leader relayed this information to the firefighters in his group and directed 

them to take actions in the meantime, such as clearing vegetation, to help 

create defensible space around the homes in the canyon.19

Contrary to these expectations, however, the intensity of the fire in Big 

Tujunga Canyon increased dramatically on the morning of August 29 and 

quickly became extreme. The leader of the structure protection group said 

that the lifting of a temperature inversion that had prevailed throughout 

the morning had intensified the fire by increasing the flow of oxygen to it 

and had also allowed the heat and smoke from the fire to rise higher in 

the atmosphere.20 As the fire began burning hotter, it produced more heat 

and smoke, and several substantial columns of smoke developed, 

reaching altitudes of 20,000 to 40,000 feet. As one of these columns 

began developing near Big Tujunga Canyon, the fire began to spread 

more quickly, burning through the Grizzly Flats plantation—the trigger 

point for evacuating the canyon—and an evacuation order was issued at 

approximately 10:20 a.m., according to incident management officials.21

 

19Defensible space is the area around a structure, generally between 30 and 100 feet

wide, in which the removal of flammable materials and reduction of vegetation are 

undertaken to reduce the likelihood that a wildland fire will damage or destroy the 

structure. For more information on defensible space, see GAO, Technology Assessment: 

Protecting Structures and Improving Communications during Wildland Fires, GAO-05-380

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005). California law (Public Resource Code § 4291) requires 

homeowners to maintain 100 feet of defensible space around a home, although generally 

not beyond the property line. 

20In a temperature inversion, cooler air higher in the atmosphere acts as a cap, preventing 

warmer air near the earth’s surface from rising.

21Incident records we reviewed do not indicate the precise time of the evacuation. 

According to firefighters, the process for initiating an evacuation was communicated to the 

appropriate officials immediately after the fire reached the trigger point. Dispatch 

communications recorded at approximately 11:15 a.m. show that the evacuation had 

started by that time. 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Incident management officials said that fire conditions—in particular, the 

substantial smoke column—led to dangerous “plume dominated” fire 

behavior, which is atypical behavior in Southern California, according to 

local firefighting officials. The column subsequently collapsed, creating 

high winds of very hot air blowing from the column’s base and pushing 

the fire very quickly in many directions, including down the canyon toward 

homes. Firefighters who were in the canyon that day and incident 

management officials told us that the change in fire behavior happened 

very quickly and that the fire reached the homes in just a few hours, much 

faster than the 24 to 48 hours they had expected, leaving them with few

options to respond. One of the strike team leaders said that the 

firefighters under his command were still removing vegetation and taking 

other actions to help protect homes from the fire, but as the fire quickly 

moved down the canyon, he had to order them to retreat to a safety zone 

where they could wait as the fire burned around them.

After the fire burned through the area, firefighters who were in the canyon 

told us their first priority was to locate any civilians who had not 

evacuated and had stayed in the canyon. Firefighters provided 

emergency medical care to three civilians who sustained serious burns 

until they could be evacuated. Firefighters also reported they took actions 

to protect homes that may have ignited during the fire but were not 

completely destroyed or that may have still been threatened from burning 

materials close by. A report by one of the strike teams assigned to the 

area stated that they were able to save several homes through such

actions.22

Several experienced firefighters told us that fire behavior in Big Tujunga 

Canyon was the most severe they had seen in their careers. The leaders 

of both the structure protection group and one of the strike teams told us 

that, given the fire’s unpredicted and extremely rapid escalation into the 

canyon, they felt fortunate that no firefighters had been killed by it. 

Several experienced firefighters told us that, in their opinion, the 

firefighters working in the canyon quickly identified that conditions had 

changed and made the right choice to retreat to the safety zones when 

Nonetheless, the Station Fire destroyed 60 residences as it 

burned through Big Tujunga Canyon.

 

22Orange County Fire Authority, After Action Review: ORC Strike Team 1400C Structure 

Protection and Extreme Fire Behavior Event, Station Fire, Big Tujunga Canyon, Angeles 

National Forest, August 29, 2009 (Orange County, Calif.; Oct. 1, 2009).
 

Page 22 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

they did. In all, August 29 resulted in the burning of almost 32,000 acres, 

bringing the total area affected by the fire to almost 37,000 acres.

Extreme fire behavior continued on August 30, with substantially more 

land burning on that date: approximately 57,000 acres, bringing the total 

area burned to about 94,000 acres. The Station Fire continued to move in 

multiple directions, threatening a growing number of foothill communities, 

including Glendale and Pasadena to the south, and making a strong push 

north toward Acton and east toward Mt. Wilson. The fire also burned 

several residences and commercial structures located within the forest 

boundary, including several along the Angeles Forest Highway. 

Firefighters anticipated extreme fire behavior similar to that of the day 

before and, as additional communities became threatened, focused 

firefighting efforts on protecting them. Incident officials said that efforts to 

protect communities included using bulldozers to create firelines and air 

tankers to drop fire retardant, including five retardant drops from the DC10 very large air tanker, according to incident records. In addition, three 

Los Angeles County Fire Department helicopters were used during the 

night in the Acton area. By the end of the day, an estimated 

2,575 personnel had been assigned to the fire.

As the fire burned north on August 30, it moved toward a Los Angeles 

County Fire Department facility known as Camp 16,23 where 

74 firefighters were located. Two Los Angeles County firefighters—Fire 

Captain Ted Hall and Fire Fighter Specialist Arnie Quinones—lost their 

lives as they fought to protect the camp, and 13 firefighters were injured. 

The Los Angeles County Fire Department was in unified command with 

the Forest Service at this time, but the firefighters in the camp were not 

assigned to the Station Fire, and the county did not notify the incident 

management team of their presence at the camp, according to both a Los 

Angeles County report and incident management team officials we spoke 

with.24

 

23The Los Angeles County Fire Department operates nine fire camps located throughout 

the county, including within the Angeles National Forest, to assist in wildland fire

suppression, reduce vegetation, and assist with minor building construction.

24Los Angeles County Fire Department, Executive Review of Actions: Station Fire (Los 

Angeles: Nov. 17, 2009).
 

Page 23 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

The next day, August 31, the fire was still active and continued to 

threaten thousands of homes, but incident officials told us its behavior 

began to moderate, burning significantly less acreage (about 7,600 acres 

on that day) than during the previous 2 days. Nonetheless, plumedominated conditions continued in some areas, particularly to the north 

and west, and mandatory evacuations continued for several communities, 

including parts of Acton. Incident officials said that actions that day 

included using crews and bulldozers to construct fireline and conducting 

backfiring operations. Air tankers, including very large air tankers, also 

continued to drop retardant in an effort to protect homes and contain the 

fire. Specifically, the DC-10 made eight drops and the 747 made two 

drops. By the end of this phase, an estimated 3,655 personnel had been 

assigned to the fire, which had burned over 100,000 acres in total.

The fire continued to burn actively during the early part of this phase, 

burning over 13,000 acres on September 1 and 21,000 acres on 

September 2—which brought the total acres burned to about 

137,000 acres by the end of September 2. After that date, although the 

fire was still expanding and threatening structures, its severity moderated 

as cooler, moister weather set in, and containment efforts showed 

increasing success. One firefighting official characterized this period as 

fairly standard firefighting when compared with the chaos and rapid 

growth of the fire’s first week. As the fire’s intensity moderated, firefighters 

were increasingly able to attack the fire directly, using aircraft to drop 

retardant and crews and bulldozers to construct firelines. By 

September 4, firefighters had completed fireline construction on the fire’s 

western flank and were also making progress on the fire’s northeastern 

perimeter. Where the fire still threatened homes or was too intense for 

firefighters to attack directly, incident officials told us they continued to 

use aircraft, including very large air tankers, to protect homes, 

communities, and infrastructure. For example, on September 4, the 747 

made three drops, some of which were made near Chilao, an area with 

several residences threatened by the fire. From September 2 to 

September 7, the DC-10 was used on all but one day. An incident 

management team member credited one such drop, made on 

September 5, with saving the Angeles Crest Christian Camp, a private 

camp within the forest boundary.

During this phase, the fire spread farther east, expanding its threat not 

only to foothill communities such as Arcadia and Sierra Madre, but also to 

critical communications equipment atop Mt. Wilson and the surrounding 

area. Efforts to protect Mt. Wilson included creating defensible space 

Phase 4 (September 1 

through September 14)
 

Page 24 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

around the facilities, constructing firelines, dropping substantial amounts 

of water and retardant by helicopter, and delivering a 5,000-gallon 

container of retardant for additional structure protection, according to 

incident officials. A Martin Mars air tanker was also used to help protect 

the area on September 1.25

More broadly, beginning about September 4, cooler weather allowed for 

direct attack on all divisions of the fire. By September 8, more moderate 

fire behavior allowed for direct attack and construction of firelines in both 

the Pleasant View Ridge Wilderness Area to the northeast and the San 

Gabriel Wilderness Area to the east. In particular, incident management 

team members told us that they used an aggressive strategy, including 

using hotshot crews to build firelines through the San Gabriel Wilderness 

Area to keep the fire from burning too far into the wilderness. Success 

here was important, they told us, because the incident management team 

had been warned that once the fire burned into the wilderness, there was 

likely little that could be done to prevent it from burning all the way across 

to the wilderness’s eastern boundary.

By September 12, operations intended to 

protect the area around Mt. Wilson were completed. 

Additional assets continued to be assigned during this phase, reaching a 

peak of approximately 5,200 personnel on September 4, before declining 

to about 1,190 on September 14. By the end of this phase, the Station 

Fire had burned nearly 160,000 acres, almost its full extent. At the end of 

this phase, on September 14, the fire was transferred to the control of a 

type 2 incident management team, reflecting the lower threat.

Throughout this phase, firefighters focused on reinforcing the fire’s 

perimeter to ensure the fire did not rekindle. For example, ground crews 

repaired and maintained firelines constructed earlier to ensure that the 

lines would hold. In addition, because Santa Ana winds—strong winds 

that are common to Southern California during autumn—were predicted 

to develop beginning on September 19, the incident management team 

ordered additional aerial assets to reinforce firelines and cool off hot spots 

within the fire’s perimeter. Incident records show that four large 

helicopters were ordered specifically to extinguish remaining hot spots 

 

25The Martin Mars carries water or suppression gel that is dropped directly on the fire, 

rather than fire retardant that is dropped ahead of the fire. 

Phase 5 (September 15 

through December 4)
 

Page 25 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

and reduce the risk of embers igniting additional fuels, some of which 

were located in steep, rugged terrain that was not easily or safely 

accessible to ground crews. In addition, because some hot spots were 

located on a north-facing slope below Mt. Wilson, and the fire had not 

burned sufficient ground fuels for the location to be considered secure, 

the team used the Martin Mars air tanker to make additional drops there. 

During this phase, the team also took action to mitigate the damaging 

effects of fire suppression activities on natural resources—by, for 

example, restoring areas where bulldozers had been used to create 

firelines—so as to reduce future problems with erosion, which could lead 

to long-term damage in severely burned watersheds.

As the fire came under control during this phase, the number of 

firefighting personnel declined from approximately 980 on September 15 

to 350 on September 28. After September 28, the threat from the fire had 

decreased to the point where command of the incident was transferred to 

a type 3 incident management team from the Angeles National Forest. 

Forest officials declared the Station Fire contained on October 16,

26 and 

the fire, having burned a total of more than 160,000 acres, was declared 

extinguished on December 4.

Among the key issues raised by firefighters, area residents, and others in 

relation to the Forest Service’s response to the Station Fire were 

questions over adequacy of firefighting assets, response strategies and 

tactics, and overall administration of the response. We grouped the 

issues raised by these observers into 11 categories, which are discussed 

in detail below. For some of these issues, we were unable to fully answer 

the questions raised, either because the issue centered on a difference of 

opinion not resolvable by analysis or because available information was 

insufficient to fully answer the question. It is important to note, however, 

that although some observers criticized certain aspects of the Forest 

Service’s response, many others commended its response, highlighting 

the difficult conditions confronting firefighters and the thousands of 

threatened homes that were ultimately protected.

 

26A wildland fire is considered contained when a fuel break around the fire has been 

completed. This break may include natural barriers or manually or mechanically 

constructed line.

The Forest Service’s 

Response to the 

Station Fire Raised 

Issues Related 

Primarily to the 

Firefighting Assets, 

Strategies, and Tactics 

Used 
 

Page 26 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Some observers questioned why the Forest Service did not use the 

Martin Mars air tanker on the first day of the Station Fire, stating that the 

suppression gel the tanker carried could have helped put out the fire while 

it was still small; the tanker was already under contract to the Forest 

Service, and that day it was nearby and available to the agency. On the 

basis of our review, we determined that around 6:30 p.m. on the evening 

of August 26, the Martin Mars was preparing to drop suppression gel on 

the nearby Morris Fire. According to both the pilot of the Martin Mars and 

the official in charge of directing the aircraft that day,27

Accounts of the resulting conversation differ. According to the official 

directing the Martin Mars, the aviation supervisor for the Station Fire 

responded that firefighting efforts on the Station Fire appeared to be 

working and that he did not have a drop location selected, but he would 

find a place for the aircraft to make a drop if the Martin Mars official 

wanted him to do so. The official directing the Martin Mars told us he 

decided not to have the tanker fly to the Station Fire and make the drop 

there because no drop location had been selected, and it was not clear 

that there was sufficient time for the aircraft to fly to the Station Fire, make 

the drop, and return to its base before nightfall.

visibility over the 

Morris Fire was poor because of heavy smoke, and the aircraft was 

unable to make its intended drop. The official in charge of directing the 

Martin Mars then contacted the aviation supervisor for the Station Fire to 

inquire if that supervisor would like the Martin Mars to fly to the Station 

Fire and drop its gel on that fire instead.

28

In contrast, the Martin Mars pilot told us that nightfall was not a limiting 

factor and that he believed he had ample time for the tanker to fly to the 

He said that without a 

clear threat from the fire or a location identified for the drop, he did not 

believe the benefits of making the drop outweighed the risk of returning to 

base after nightfall.

 

27The Martin Mars was accompanied by a helicopter to lead it over the fire, along with an 

official assigned by the Forest Service who was in charge of directing the tanker and 

coordinating with other incident officials.

28The aircraft was required to land at its base by 30 minutes after sunset, according to the 

pilot. On August 26, 2009, official sunset at the tanker’s base at Lake Elsinore was at 

7:22 p.m., meaning that the plane had to land by 7:52 p.m. The official directing the Martin 

Mars estimated that it would have taken about 18 minutes for the aircraft to fly from the 

Morris Fire to the Station Fire, identify a drop location, and make the drop; and about 

33 minutes for it to then return to its base at Lake Elsinore.

Martin Mars Air Tanker 

Not Used on August 26
 

Page 27 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Station Fire, make its drop, and return to base before nightfall. He told us 

that, on the basis of the radio conversation he could hear between the 

two aviation officials, he did not believe that the Station Fire aviation 

supervisor offered to find a location for the Martin Mars to drop its load; 

instead, he told us that the Station Fire aviation supervisor declined the 

Martin Mars because it would interfere with the water-dropping 

helicopters already over the fire. We were unable to interview the Station 

Fire aviation supervisor, who is retired from the Forest Service, and so 

were unable to obtain his perspective on the decision not to use the 

Martin Mars, including whether he believed other safety considerations 

were associated with its use at the time. Ultimately, the Martin Mars 

remained in the vicinity of the Morris Fire, dropping its load on a nearby 

ridge at 6:55 p.m. and returning to its base at 7:15 p.m.

Some observers questioned why the Forest Service did not use Los 

Angeles County’s night-flying helicopters during the first night, which they 

believe might have allowed firefighters to contain the fire. On the basis of 

our review, we determined that on the afternoon of August 26, the 

incident commander, in consultation with a Los Angeles County Fire 

Department official, ordered one of the county’s night-flying helicopters. 

The incident commander told us that he requested the helicopter because 

he planned to use it to support firefighting operations through the end of 

daylight hours, operations that required a night-flying helicopter because 

the aircraft would return to base more than 30 minutes after sunset. 

According to a county dispatch log, the county was notified at 5:36 p.m. 

that the Station Fire was requesting a helicopter for nighttime operations; 

the county dispatched the helicopter to the fire at 5:43 p.m. but then 

recalled it at 6:01 p.m. because it was needed for emergency medical 

service coverage.

Both Forest Service and Los Angeles County Fire Department officials 

told us that the recall of this helicopter did not affect the response to the 

Station Fire, noting that three other county helicopters with night-flying 

capability remained assigned to the fire and that if the incident 

commander had determined that night-flying operations were needed, he 

could have requested to use one of those helicopters. The incident 

commander and other Forest Service officials told us that, sometime 

between 8:30 and 10:00 p.m., they discussed this possibility with the 

county official present at the fire and collectively they decided the gain 

from flying at night was not sufficient to warrant the risk because at the 

time the fire did not pose an immediate threat to life or property. This 

decision is consistent with Forest Service practice, because according to 

No Nighttime Helicopter 

Use on August 26
 

Page 28 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

a senior Forest Service official, the agency has generally concluded that 

the risks of flying at night outweigh the benefits.

Some observers questioned why the Forest Service released some fire 

engines and firefighting crews on the first evening of the fire, stating that 

the fire was not yet contained and those assets would have been 

beneficial later that night when the fire became more active. On the basis 

of our review, we determined that between 10:00 p.m. and midnight on 

August 26, the type 3 incident commander released five Forest Service 

and three Los Angeles County fire engines, and one Forest Service and 

five Los Angeles County hand crews.29 The incident commander, in 

consultation with Los Angeles County officials at the fire, determined that 

these assets were not needed because the fire was not spreading at that 

time, and he wanted the crews to be rested and available the next day. 

Forest Service officials told us that even with the release of these assets, 

approximately 61 firefighters remained at the scene during the night. 

Around 11:30 p.m., the fire became more active as it burned through the 

green island, and embers began starting spot fires below the Angeles 

Crest Highway. The incident commander told us that it is not clear 

whether additional firefighting personnel at this time would have been 

helpful, given that the greatest threat came from the spot fires below the 

highway, and officials on the scene had already decided it was too 

dangerous for firefighters to attack some of these spots at night. Once it 

became apparent that firefighters would be unable to extinguish those 

fires, the incident commander ordered more firefighting assets—including 

six firefighting crews and one helicopter—for the next morning, in addition 

to the assets he had ordered earlier in the evening.

Some observers questioned why three air tankers that were ordered 

around 12:30 a.m. on the first night of the fire arrived about 2 hours later 

than requested by the incident commander—suggesting that firefighters 

might have been able to contain the fire had the tankers arrived at the 

time requested. Moreover, questions have been raised about whether the 

dispatcher responsible for placing the order for the tankers processed the 

request improperly or whether the incident commander’s request was 

canceled or delayed by other Angeles National Forest officials. We found 

 

29A hand crew typically comprises 18 to 20 firefighters.

Release of Firefighting 

Assets on August 26

Delayed Arrival of Air 

Tankers on August 27
 

Page 29 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

that the events surrounding the ordering of the air tankers were not fully 

documented, and it is therefore not possible to determine the exact 

sequence of events in the ordering process. Nonetheless, on the basis of 

the information we reviewed, it appears unlikely that the requested aircraft 

could have arrived any sooner than they did. Specifically, we found the 

following:

• At approximately 12:30 a.m. on August 27—after it became apparent 

that firefighters would be unable to contain all the spot fires below the 

highway—the type 3 incident commander contacted an Angeles 

National Forest dispatcher to request that three air tankers be ordered 

to arrive at the fire at 7:00 a.m. At the time he made his request, the 

incident commander recognized that it might not be possible to get the 

air tankers at the fire by 7:00 a.m.30

• Following the incident commander’s request for the tankers, another 

dispatcher entered the request at 12:55 a.m. into a computerized 

ordering system known as the resource ordering and status system 

(ROSS).31 This dispatcher told us that before she formally submitted 

these requests to the geographic area coordination center,32

 

30Recordings of the conversation between the incident commander and the dispatcher 

show that when the incident commander was asked what time he wanted the air tankers 

to arrive, he said, “I know it’s not possible but, you know, 0700.”

which 

would identify available air tankers and assign them to the fire, she 

called the coordination center and was told not to formally submit the 

request until the coordination center knew which air tankers would be 

assigned. As a result, the orders remained in ROSS but were not 

formally submitted to the coordination center. The coordination center 

dispatcher, however, disputed this account, saying she does not recall 

this conversation and would never tell a dispatcher not to formally 

submit a request because it is important to keep track of all requests 

for air tankers so the center can document if it is unable to fill a 

request. The Department of Agriculture’s Inspector General examined 

this issue and determined that records of phone calls between the 

Angeles National Forest and the coordination center relating to this 

matter do not exist, so it is not possible to determine whether the 

31The three air tankers were entered into ROSS as request numbers A-16, A-17, and 

A-18.

32The geographic area coordination center for Southern California, located in Riverside, 

provides interagency logistical support for wildland fire incidents, including processing 

requests for firefighting assets.
 

Page 30 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

forest dispatcher called the coordination center or what discussion, if 

any, took place between them.33

• About 2 minutes after the incident commander’s request (and about 

20 minutes before the dispatcher entered the air tanker request into 

ROSS), two dispatch center officials discussed the incident 

commander’s request for air tankers. According to a transcript of this 

conversation, one official said that the dispatch center did not need to 

request the tankers from the coordination center and would instead 

“divert” air tankers that were assigned to the Morris Fire.34

• Angeles National Forest fire management officials and dispatch center 

personnel told us they were aware that four air tankers had been 

tentatively assigned to the Morris Fire for August 27, and they 

ultimately decided to divert the needed air tankers from the Morris Fire 

to the Station Fire because the Station Fire had become a higher 

priority overnight. The manager on duty at the Fox Air Tanker Base in 

nearby Lancaster, where the planes were stationed, told us that a 

dispatcher informed him of this decision at about 6:30 a.m. on 

August 27. A fourth air tanker was requested for the Station Fire at 

8:21 a.m.

According 

to this official, this conversation reflected his belief, based on an 

earlier discussion he had had with the coordination center, that the 

coordination center was unlikely to assign more air tankers to a 

second fire occurring at the same forest, but it did not reflect any 

decision on his part about whether the dispatcher should place the 

order. He said that neither he nor the other dispatch center official 

involved in this conversation had any role in processing the request 

for the air tankers. 

• Subsequently, at about 8:40 a.m., an Angeles National Forest 

dispatcher who had recently come on duty was notified that the air 

tankers were preparing to take off from Lancaster for the Station Fire. 

The new dispatcher reported that she was not aware that the requests 

for these tankers had already been entered into ROSS and she 

 

33Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation: 

Unidentified Employees, Los Angeles, CA (Los Angeles County), File No. SF-0801-0638 

(San Francisco: June 2011).

34Angeles National Forest dispatch personnel told us they have the authority to divert air 

tankers from one fire to another within the same forest. 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

entered requests for these same tankers into the system at that 

time.35

• Ultimately, the air tankers arrived over the Station Fire about 2 hours 

later than requested. The first tanker took off from Lancaster at 

8:42 a.m., and the other tankers took off at 8:51, 8:56, and 9:03, 

according to incident records. Flight time from Lancaster to the Station 

Fire was about 10 minutes.

She reported that she realized at about 9:00 a.m. that she had 

entered a duplicate order and, after confirming the orders were 

duplicates, she canceled the original orders in ROSS.

Regardless of how or when the air tankers were ordered, it appears 

unlikely that any federal air tankers could have arrived over the Station 

Fire sooner than they did.36 Angeles National Forest and geographic area 

coordination center officials told us that the air tankers arrived later than 

requested by the incident commander because the crews were not 

allowed to report to work earlier because of mandatory rest requirements 

enacted to ensure crew safety, and no other federally contracted air 

tankers were located close enough to have arrived at the fire any earlier. 

On the night of August 26, 10 federal air tankers were located in Southern 

California. Five of them were in Lancaster, the location of the closest 

base to the Station Fire; four were in Fresno; and one was in San 

Bernardino. The crews for the five air tankers in Lancaster all went off 

duty at 8:00 p.m. on August 26 and were scheduled to come back on duty 

at 7:00 the next morning. The crews for four of the other five air tankers 

also went off duty at around 8:00 p.m.37

 

35The three air tankers requested around 12:30 a.m. were reentered into ROSS as 

request numbers A-35, A-36, and A-37; the air tanker requested at 8:21 a.m. was entered 

into ROSS at the same time as the others—approximately 8:40—as A-38.

Under applicable contract 

36Our analysis did not include the Martin Mars air tanker. Unlike most air tankers, the 

Martin Mars does not drop retardant (it drops water or suppression gel); it therefore would 

be used in different circumstances than air tankers dropping retardant. According to an 

Angeles National Forest official, for the Martin Mars to have been mobilized to the fire, the 

incident commander would have had to specifically request it. Because the incident 

commander did not specifically request the Martin Mars, we did not analyze the aircraft's 

availability.

37The crews for two of these five air tankers went off duty at 7:59 p.m., the crew for the 

third at 8:00, and the crew for the fourth at 8:18. The Forest Service did not provide a 

record of when the crew for the fifth air tanker, which was located in Fresno that night, 

went off duty on August 26, but the tanker base manager said that the air tanker was 

assigned to the Big Meadow Fire on the morning of August 27.
 

Page 32 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

requirements and federal interagency fire aviation policies, crews must 

receive 10 hours of uninterrupted rest before their shift, meaning that the 

crews would have been eligible to report to work at 6:00 a.m., an hour 

before their scheduled arrival time.38 If, however, an aircraft manager had 

called the crews before 6:00 a.m., the call would have been considered 

an interruption to their rest period, and the crews would have been 

required to wait 10 hours after receiving the phone call before they could 

have reported to work.39

Once the air tanker crews reported for duty at the air tanker base at 

7:00 a.m. on August 27, several standard preflight tasks had to be done 

before they could take off for the Station Fire. According to the tanker 

base manager on duty that morning, the crews first performed a preflight 

inspection of their aircraft, which took approximately 5 minutes. He 

reported the crews then received a briefing about both the Station Fire 

and the Morris Fire; this briefing lasted approximately 20 to 30 minutes, 

which is longer than a typical briefing, but the proximity of the two fires 

made it critical to discuss flight patterns to avoid collisions. The aircraft 

were then loaded with fuel and retardant.

No federal air tankers were located in Northern 

California on the night of August 26; the next nearest federal air tankers 

were located in Ogden, Utah, and Pocatello, Idaho.

40

Although it appears unlikely that any federal air tankers could have 

arrived at the Station Fire any earlier, some observers noted that the state 

firefighting agency, CAL FIRE, had air tankers that might have been 

available to respond more quickly. A CAL FIRE official told us that on the 

morning of August 27, the agency had three air tankers—located in 

Ramona and Hollister—that were not assigned to other fires and might 

Once these tasks were 

completed, the pilots warmed up the engines and did required preflight 

checks, which can take up to 30 minutes. The planes were ready to fly 

between 8:42 and 9:03 a.m.

 

38The Forest Service has stated that it does not require its contractors to provide more 

than one crew for the air tankers. Although doing so would allow air tankers to operate 

from sunrise to sunset, the agency has stated that extending the hours the aircraft operate 

would not be safe because of the age and maintenance requirements of the aircraft.

39The 10-hour uninterrupted-rest restriction also applied to the crews of the air tankers 

located in Fresno and San Bernardino.

40The base manager said there was only one fueling truck available that morning, which is 

typical at the base unless a large fire is burning nearby. Because the Station Fire had just 

started the day before, base officials had not yet ordered an additional fueling truck.
 

Page 33 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

have been available if the Forest Service had requested them for the 

Station Fire. The official told us that the crews for these tankers were not 

scheduled to report until 10:00 a.m., although he said that if the air 

tankers had been requested, the agency might have been able to bring 

the crews on duty earlier. According to this official, the crews for the air 

tankers in Ramona went off duty at 6:49 p.m. on August 26 and were 

eligible to return to duty at 4:49 a.m. on August 27.41

Irrespective of the controversy over tanker arrival times, some Forest 

Service fire management officials have suggested that the delay in the air 

tankers’ arrival likely had little effect on firefighters’ ability to contain the 

fire that morning. Officials noted that the section of the fire posing the 

greatest risk was the spot fire below the highway—the section that later in 

the morning spread down canyon and escaped—and the air tankers 

would most likely not have been used on this section. They would more 

likely have been used on ridgelines above the highway because, 

according to these officials, it would have been unsafe for air tankers to 

fly in the steep canyon below the highway. In addition, the tankers would 

have had to fly high enough to clear the power lines crossing the canyon, 

and drops from such heights would likely have been ineffective because 

the retardant would have dispersed too much to penetrate the vegetation 

canopy.

The official 

estimated that if the tankers had been requested, they might have been 

able to arrive at the Station Fire at approximately 7:00 a.m., but he told us 

that because the request was never made, he does not know whether the 

air tankers would or would not have been available. Forest Service 

officials at the coordination center told us they did not request the air 

tankers from CAL FIRE because they did not receive a request for air 

tankers from the Angeles National Forest’s dispatch center. The officials 

noted, however, that they did not believe CAL FIRE would have allowed 

the tankers to be used because the three air tankers in question were the 

last unassigned air tankers in California, and CAL FIRE would likely have 

retained them for initial attack, given the threat of new fires starting 

elsewhere in the state.

 

41CAL FIRE flight crew rest requirements provide that within any 24 hour period, pilots 

shall have a minimum of 10 consecutive hours off duty.
 

Page 34 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Some observers questioned why the Forest Service did not use very 

large air tankers more often in fighting the fire. On the basis of our review, 

we determined that in some instances the use of very large air tankers 

was suggested, but they were not ordered, and in other cases when 

these aircraft were ordered, they were not available or the order was 

subsequently canceled. For example, on August 27, the use of a very 

large air tanker was suggested by the air tactical group supervisor—the 

official in charge of coordinating aircraft for the Station Fire—but the 

tankers were not ordered by the incident commander.42 The air supervisor 

reported that he requested a very large air tanker three times that day, 

but each request was denied. According to the air supervisor, he believed 

the aircraft would be useful because of the length of fireline needing to be 

constructed. Transcripts of radio communications indicate that the 

incident commander trainee for August 27 told a dispatcher that the 

incident would not be ordering the very large air tanker requested by the 

air supervisor.43

Our review of incident records also found instances where orders for very 

large air tankers could not be filled because of mechanical issues or were 

canceled for other reasons. For example, officials noted that they 

requested the Martin Mars on August 29, one of the key days of the fire, 

but the aircraft was not available that day because of mechanical issues. 

The incident commander trainee told us that he 

discussed the air supervisor’s requests with the incident commander and 

with an Angeles National Forest fire management official and that, on the 

basis of information they received from firefighters in the field, the incident 

commander determined that, because of rough terrain and the presence 

of power lines in the area, there was no suitable location for the very large 

air tanker to make a safe drop, and he therefore did not order the aircraft 

that day.

 

42According to a National Wildfire Coordinating Group handbook, the air tactical group 

supervisor is responsible for making tactical recommendations to appropriate incident 

personnel, but it is the responsibility of the operations section chief to determine asset 

needs and request additional assets. If a fire does not have an operations section chief—

for example, if the fire is being managed by a type 3 incident management team, as the 

Station Fire was on August 27—responsibility for final approval for requesting assets lies 

with the incident commander, according to a senior Forest Service official.

43A trainee may be assigned to work with a person qualified to perform a specific role, 

such as incident commander, in order to receive additional experience before being 

certified to perform that role on future incidents. A trainee meets all the required training 

and experience for the position and performs such training assignments in order to 

complete his or her qualifications for the position.

Adequacy of Very Large Air 

Tanker Use
 

Page 35 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Incident records also indicate that a DC-10, 747, and Martin Mars were 

ordered by the incident management team shortly before 6:00 p.m. on 

September 2, to be used the following day, but that the orders were 

canceled shortly after 7:00 p.m. on September 3. The Forest Service 

provided no documentation that would explain why these orders were 

canceled. However, Angeles National Forest officials told us that the 

orders were likely canceled because incident officials had requested the 

air tankers on September 2 in anticipation of needing them on 

September 3 but then did not request the tankers for any missions on that 

day. The officials said that orders would have been canceled in this 

situation to keep the dispatch ordering system up-to-date.

Nevertheless, incident management and Angeles National Forest officials 

told us they believed that very large air tankers were used in the 

appropriate situations, such as protecting communities along the foothills, 

and that using them more frequently would not have been effective.44

According to Forest Service and incident management officials, very large 

air tankers can be useful tools for firefighting because they can carry 

more retardant than other aircraft, although their size limits their use in 

rough terrain.45 In all, beginning on August 29, the DC-10 was used on at 

least 8 days, and the 747 and Martin Mars were each used on at least 

2 days, according to incident documents. Forest Service direction 

requires the forest supervisor and regional fire management officials to 

approve the use of very large air tankers, and incident management team 

members told us that all of their requests to use the air tankers were 

approved.

 

44In a review of costly fires that occurred in 2009, a panel convened by the Department of 

Agriculture reported that very large air tankers were ordered on the Station Fire in part 

because of political pressure from outside the agency and that Angeles National Forest 

officials said they would not have ordered these aircraft had they not been pressured to do 

so. See Secretary of Agriculture’s Independent Large Cost Fire Review Panel, Large Fire 

Cost Review for FY2009 (Washington, D.C.: August 2010). Angeles National Forest 

officials we interviewed, including one who was involved in approving the use of very large 

air tankers during the Station Fire, said they were not interviewed by the review panel and 

that they did not agree with this statement.

45The Forest Service contracted with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

to evaluate the safety and utility of the DC-10 and Boeing 747 for firefighting operations. In 

March 2009, that agency recommended the aircraft not be used in “steep or rugged 

terrain” unless the drop could be made with minimal maneuvering, and a lead plane and 

adequate ground clearance are available.
 

Page 36 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Some observers questioned why the Forest Service did not order an 

incident management team as soon as it became apparent that the fire 

would not be contained by initial attack, suggesting that forest officials 

should have acted earlier to order either a type 1 team or a less qualified 

but more easily mobilized type 2 team, which could have arrived faster. 

The observers told us that such actions might have allowed firefighters to 

better prepare for the extreme fire behavior of August 29 and 30. On the 

basis of our review, we determined that the Angeles National Forest 

ordered a type 1 team at approximately 2:00 p.m. on August 27. It 

typically takes 18 to 24 hours to mobilize a type 1 team, according to 

officials, and the team assumed command of the incident at 2:00 p.m. on 

August 28—approximately 24 hours after being ordered and nearly 

2 days after the fire began. For several hours before Angeles National 

Forest officials ordered the type 1 team, however, the fire was burning in 

ways that indicated that either a type 1 or type 2 team might be needed to 

manage it. For example, a complexity analysis performed by the incident 

commander during the early morning hours of August 27 concluded that 

the fire’s intensity, the number of firefighting assets being used, and the 

planning and logistical actions needed to support firefighting efforts all 

indicated the need for a type 1 or type 2 team. Moreover, firefighters 

assigned to the fire on the morning of August 27 reported that fire 

behavior was extreme as early as 8:30 a.m. and that firefighters had to 

retreat several times because the fire was so intense—further indication 

that a type 1 or type 2 team could have been needed. If Angeles National 

Forest officials had ordered a type 1 team at the first indication that it 

could have been warranted, it is possible the team could have assumed 

command at 6:00 a.m. on August 28, 8 hours earlier than it ultimately did.

In addition, some observers have stated that Angeles National Forest 

officials should have ordered a type 2 team to manage the fire until the 

type 1 team arrived. It typically takes 4 to 6 hours to mobilize a type 2 

team, according to officials—substantially less time than required to 

mobilize a type 1 team. Angeles National Forest officials told us they 

considered ordering a type 2 team but decided against it because they 

did not want to have two command transitions in a short time—especially 

given that such transitions are generally considered to temporarily 

increase risk to firefighters because of changes in responsibilities and 

lines of communication. Instead, officials decided to make the Station Fire 

a “branch” of the nearby Morris Fire, so that the type 2 team managing 

the Morris Fire could provide planning and logistical support for the 

Station Fire until the type 1 team could arrive. The incident commander of 

the type 2 incident management team told us this arrangement was 

workable but led to some difficulties as well. For example, he said the 

Timeliness of Ordering the 

Incident Management 

Team
 

Page 37 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

command post for the Morris Fire was approximately 20 miles away from 

the Station Fire, and it was difficult to keep abreast of developments at 

both fires, particularly as conditions continued to deteriorate at the Station 

Fire. A senior member of the type 1 team told us that earlier mobilization 

of either a type 1 or type 2 team might have allowed incident managers to 

better plan firefighting strategies and tactics but also said that given the 

fire’s extreme behavior, he did not know whether earlier mobilization 

would have made a difference in the outcome. Some observers, however, 

have stated that earlier mobilization of a team might have allowed 

firefighters to take more action before the fire began its period of rapid 

growth on August 29.

Some observers questioned whether, in response to a memorandum from 

the regional office overseeing the Angeles National Forest, the agency 

sometimes mobilized Forest Service firefighting assets rather than local 

ones—even though the Forest Service assets were farther away and 

would take longer to arrive—and whether this decision reduced the 

effectiveness of the agency’s response. Shortly before the Station Fire, 

the Forest Service’s Pacific Southwest regional office had issued a 

memorandum stating that because of the potential for a budgetary 

shortfall, dispatch and incident management teams should, where 

appropriate, be directed to order Forest Service firefighting assets when 

responding to a fire—rather than use contract or state and local agency 

assets—and, if non-Forest Service assets are used, to replace them with 

Forest Service assets as quickly as possible. On the basis of our review, 

the role this memorandum played in the ordering of assets for the Station 

Fire is unclear. Officials at the Angeles National Forest and the 

interagency geographic area coordination center said that the 

memorandum did not affect their decisions about which assets to order, 

but incident management team members suggested otherwise. Available 

documentation indicates that assets from multiple ownerships, including 

both the Forest Service and local jurisdictions, were ordered, but the 

documentation did not include the information needed for us to determine 

the extent to which some firefighting assets may have arrived later than 

requested because Forest Service assets were ordered instead of 

available nonfederal assets. Specifically, we found the following:

• Dispatch officials and incident management team members provided 

conflicting accounts of the memorandum’s role. Angeles National 

Forest dispatch personnel and coordination center officials told us the 

memorandum did not affect how they ordered firefighting assets for 

the Station Fire. Dispatch personnel said, for example, that during the 

Ordering Forest Service 

Assets Rather Than Other, 

Potentially Closer, Assets
 

Page 38 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

fire’s early days, they ordered the closest available assets regardless 

of which agency owned them—a practice consistent with the 

California Interagency Mobilization Guide, which directs how several 

wildland firefighting agencies, including the Forest Service, are to 

order firefighting assets in California. A dispatch center official told us 

that later in the fire, dispatchers would have ordered Forest Service 

assets first, provided that the assets could have been expected to 

arrive when requested by the incident management team. The official 

explained that if such assets could not be mobilized by the time 

requested, dispatchers could still order nonagency assets that might 

be able to arrive more quickly. According to members of the incident 

management team, however, some of the firefighting assets they 

requested were slow to arrive, particularly during the first few days 

after the team assumed command of the incident on August 28. 

These team members told us that the delay might have resulted partly 

from dispatchers ordering Forest Service assets rather than closer, 

local assets, but they also said that the delays ultimately had little 

effect on their ability to fight the fire. One incident management team 

member told us he talked to an Angeles National Forest dispatcher 

about the delay and was told by the dispatcher that because of the 

memorandum, dispatchers were ordering Forest Service assets, 

which were coming from out of the area.

• Limitations in the available documentation on orders for firefighting 

assets prevent a conclusive determination on the memorandum’s 

effect. From the information available, we could not conclusively 

determine the extent to which arrival of assets may have been 

delayed because agency assets were ordered instead of assets 

available locally, although our review of the data provides some 

information regarding this issue.46

 

46See appendix I for the details of our scope and methodology, including a discussion of 

these limitations.

Data on orders for firefighting 

assets are maintained in ROSS, and although the data in this system 

were sufficient for us to analyze the ownership of each asset, they did 

not identify assets that may have been available to respond to the fire 

but were not ordered. As a result, we were unable to determine the 

availability of nonagency assets located closer to the Station Fire in 

instances where the Forest Service ordered an agency asset that 

arrived later than requested. We reviewed data on requests for two 

types of assets that incident management team members said were 
 

Page 39 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

slow to arrive: type 3 fire engines47

For operations branch directors, we were unable to determine the 

extent to which personnel arrived later than requested. ROSS records 

show that for the 14 orders filled on August 27 through August 30, 9 

were filled with Forest Service personnel, some of whom had to travel 

long distances, and 4 of the 5 non-Forest Service operations branch 

directors were assigned on the evening of August 29. A senior federal 

and nonfederal official both told us that many nonfederal personnel 

qualified as operations branch directors in Southern California should 

have been available to mobilize more quickly. Records in ROSS do 

not identify assets that were available but not ordered, however, so 

we were unable to determine the availability of nonfederal personnel 

during this time frame.

and personnel to fill incident 

management team positions known as operations branch directors. 

For type 3 engines, of the 68 engines assigned on August 27 and 28, 

more than 90 percent were non-Forest Service engines, suggesting 

that the Forest Service did not consider agency ownership when 

ordering assets. On August 29 and August 30, however, almost half 

the orders for type 3 engines were filled by Forest Service engines, 

many of which came from outside the area. Forest Service officials, as 

well as a local agency official, told us that local fire departments have 

a limited number of type 3 engines, and the more such engines the 

Station Fire needed as the fire progressed, the more likely it would 

have become that assets would have had to be ordered from farther 

away. From August 27 to August 30, ROSS records show that 

dispatchers were having difficulty filling orders for type 3 engines. For 

example, on the afternoon of August 29, a dispatcher entered a 

notation in ROSS that no more strike teams of type 3 engines were 

available in California and that dispatchers would need to place orders 

for single type 3 engines through the National Interagency 

Coordination Center.

Forest Service officials from the Pacific Southwest regional office (which 

issued the 2009 memorandum), the geographic area coordination center, 

and the Angeles National Forest all told us they do not believe the 

 

47Engines are rated according to their size and mobility and are classified according to 

type. Among engines typically used to fight wildland fires, capacity for pumping water or 

foam increases from type 7 engines, which have the least capacity, to type 3 engines 

which have the greatest. Type 1 and 2 engines are typically used to fight structural fires 

and are not commonly used in wildland firefighting.
 

Page 40 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

memorandum resulted in delays in filling requests for assets to respond to 

the Station Fire. These officials said that the memorandum stated that the 

Forest Service should use agency assets “as appropriate” and did not 

change or repeal existing Forest Service policies and procedures for 

ordering firefighting assets. Under the policies and procedures in effect at 

the time of the Station Fire, agency officials were directed to use the 

closest available resource to respond during a fire’s early stages. 

Furthermore, the officials also said that the memorandum stated that in 

cases where dispatchers believed it was appropriate to order agency 

assets first, the ROSS order should indicate that Forest Service assets

were being specifically requested. Our review of ROSS data for 

August 27 through August 30 showed that 22 of 164 orders for type 3 

engines requested a specific engine, but none of these were Forest 

Service engines. For operations branch directors, 6 of 14 orders 

specifically requested a particular person, two of whom were from the 

Forest Service. A Forest Service official told us that one of the people 

requested was already a member of the incident management team and 

the other was an official from a nearby national forest.

Some observers questioned whether more action could have been taken to 

protect the homes in Big Tujunga Canyon and, more fundamentally, 

whether the Forest Service was even aware that homes in the canyon were 

at risk. For example, some residents and others have questioned why, 

once the fire entered the upper reaches of Big Tujunga Canyon, firefighters 

did not use air tankers to drop retardant or take other actions to suppress 

or contain the fire before it burned into the populated areas farther down 

the canyon or to mitigate its intensity as it burned through the canyon. Our 

review determined that by the afternoon of August 28, the fire had burned 

over a ridge into the upper reaches of one of Big Tujunga Canyon’s side 

canyons. According to firefighters and some residents we spoke with, 

however, the fire was not burning at high intensity or spreading very 

quickly. Some residents told us that if retardant had been dropped on 

portions of the side canyon early enough, the fire might have been kept out 

of the main canyon entirely, or the intensity of the fire might have lessened 

as it burned through, perhaps to the extent that the plume-dominated 

conditions, which made the fire in the canyon so intense on August 29, 

would have been unable to develop. Similarly, some residents told us that 

firefighters could have dropped retardant closer to homes in the canyon on 

either August 28 or 29, so that the fire would have been less intense, which 

may have allowed the firefighters who were in the canyon to safely take 

additional steps to protect homes. One resident said that he believed these 

actions would have helped save homes in Big Tujunga Canyon, but he 

Adequacy of Efforts to 

Protect Homes in Big 

Tujunga Canyon
 

Page 41 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

believed they were not taken because firefighters were focused on 

protecting larger foothill communities such as La Cañada Flintridge and La 

Crescenta. This resident also noted that while such a decision would have 

been understandable, he still believed that firefighters could have taken 

more action to protect the homes in Big Tujunga Canyon. Another resident 

told us that if firefighters had not planned to take more action, they should 

have notified residents sooner so residents could have packed some of 

their possessions and evacuated earlier.

Incident records note the use of air tankers to drop retardant on 

August 28 but do not specifically note the location of the retardant drops. 

Two firefighting officials told us that air tankers dropped retardant on the 

ridgelines along Lukens Ridge above Big Tujunga Canyon on August 28 

in an effort to keep the fire from burning farther into the canyon; officials 

told us they did not make drops farther to the east (near Hoyt Mountain), 

an area where the fire had burned into the upper reaches of Big Tujunga 

Canyon’s side canyons. One of the officials said that he did not believe 

retardant drops in this area would have been effective in part because the 

vegetation was too dense for the retardant to be able to reach the ground 

(which would have allowed the fire to burn through vegetation close to the 

ground) and another official told us that the area was too steep to safely 

place firefighters to build a fireline once the retardant was dropped. 

Agency officials noted that the purpose of retardant is not to put out a fire, 

but to slow it down and lower its intensity so that firefighters can work to 

establish a fireline to contain the fire. Officials told us that the incident 

management team took other actions to try to protect the homes in the 

canyon. For example, incident management officials said they used 

bulldozers on August 28 to try to build a fireline across a portion of the 

canyon, from the top of nearby Lukens Ridge down toward the canyon 

bottom. This line was built down steep slopes, the officials said, and even 

though the bulldozer operators were very experienced, they were unable 

to create a line all the way to the bottom of the canyon. The officials said 

they knew it was unlikely they would be able to complete this line, but 

they thought it was worth the effort.48

 

48A fire planning document created by the Angeles National Forest identified many 

locations across the forest where bulldozer or hand lines could be established in case of a 

fire. The document showed that a bulldozer line could be established in Big Tujunga

Canyon where the line was started during the Station Fire but that bulldozers would likely 

not be able to reach the canyon bottom and that firefighters would have to complete the 

line by hand.

Because the bulldozers were unable 
 

Page 42 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

to reach the canyon bottom, and the remainder of the line would have had 

to be built by hand—a task one Forest Service official estimated would 

have taken several days—the fireline was not completed. Two 

experienced firefighters told us, however, that even had the line been 

completed, they believed the fire behavior in the canyon on August 29 

was too extreme for the line to have held. Officials told us they did not 

drop retardant in the canyon on August 29—the day the fire burned 

through the canyon—because there was too much smoke in the morning 

for air tankers to safely drop retardant, which was the result of the 

temperature inversion. Once the inversion lifted and the smoke cleared, 

the fire quickly developed plume-dominated conditions, which again 

prevented tankers from flying over the area.

Some observers also questioned why more fire engines were not 

assigned to Big Tujunga Canyon and why firefighters who were in the 

canyon did not take more actions to protect homes before the fire burned 

into the canyon. These observers suggested that had more fire engines 

been in the canyon or had more actions been taken, fewer homes might 

have burned. From our review, we determined that three strike teams, 

each with five fire engines, were assigned to the canyon on August 29.49

According to incident management officials and firefighters assigned to 

the canyon whom we spoke with, having additional engines may have 

helped them protect homes, but additional engines would not have had 

enough places to safely take shelter during extreme fire behavior. It would 

therefore not have been safe to have more engines in the canyon. They 

also stated that many residences in the canyon lacked sufficient 

defensible space. A strike team leader assigned to the canyon told us 

firefighters worked to create defensible space by removing vegetation and 

other flammable materials from around residences before the fire burned 

through.50

 

49One strike team was assigned to the eastern part of the canyon, near Big Tujunga Dam; 

one strike team was assigned to the Vogel Flats area, in the middle of the canyon; and 

one strike team was assigned to the western portion of the canyon near Delta Flats. Vogel 

Flats and Delta Flats are areas of the canyon with a higher concentration of residences.

Firefighters said they also spent time talking with residents who 

did not want to evacuate to convince them of the importance of 

evacuating, which reduced the time they had to prepare structures before 

the fire arrived. As it became apparent that the fire was going to burn 

50Removing vegetation and other flammable materials to create defensible space around 

a structure is the responsibility of the homeowner, but firefighters may take such steps if 

they have time and it is safe to do so.
 

Page 43 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

through the area sooner than expected, one of the strike team leaders 

said they also hosed down homes and applied a foam retardant to a 

Forest Service ranger station for additional protection. Firefighters said 

they continued these efforts until the fire forced them to retreat to safety 

zones. After the fire passed, firefighters said they were able to leave the 

safety zones, and they resumed their efforts to protect homes that had 

not been destroyed—and successfully saved several homes—but, they 

said, their first priority became providing medical assistance to civilians 

who were hurt during the fire. In general, incident management officials, 

as well as firefighters assigned to the canyon, told us that firefighters can 

do little to protect homes during extreme fire behavior like that exhibited in 

Big Tujunga Canyon on August 29.

Some Big Tujunga Canyon residents raised a still more fundamental 

issue, stating that firefighters were not fully aware of the number or 

locations of homes in the canyon. For example, one resident noted that 

even though dozens of canyon homes were destroyed, the Forest Service 

reported only three homes destroyed—suggesting that the incident 

management team did not know how many homes were in the canyon.51

 

51Incident documents for August 29 and August 30 indicate that 3 and 18 homes, 

respectively, were destroyed.

During our review, members of the incident management team and 

Angeles National Forest officials pointed to the creation, on August 28, of 

a structure protection group specific to Big Tujunga Canyon—and the 

presence of fire engines and crews when the fire burned through on 

August 29—as indications that the incident management team was aware 

of, and responsive to, the danger to those structures. The supervisor 

responsible for this structure protection group told us he drove through 

the canyon on the evening of August 28 and met with local forest officials 

so that he could get acquainted with the area and better understand the 

number and location of homes and other structures, water sources, 

access points, and other information. The supervisor said that he was 

also given maps identifying residences in the canyon, including homes on 

private property and homes on land leased from the Forest Service. 

Regarding the inaccurate information in incident documents about the 

number of homes destroyed in the canyon, the structure protection group 

supervisor told us that although he did not know the exact number of 

homes destroyed by the fire at the time the reports were prepared, he 

knew that many homes had been destroyed. However, incident 
 

Page 44 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

management officials wanted to wait to update the early numbers cited in 

incident documents until complete and accurate information about the 

total number of destroyed homes could be established. The supervisor 

said that because developing this information took time, some observers 

may have interpreted the incorrect information as evidence that incident 

management officials were not aware that a larger number of homes had 

in fact been destroyed, which, he said, was not the case.

Some residents of Big Tujunga Canyon expressed concern that they were 

not notified early enough of the need to evacuate, while others said that 

they never received notice of a mandatory evacuation. Neither the Los 

Angeles County Sheriff’s Department—the agency in charge of 

implementing the evacuation—nor the Forest Service could provide us 

with conclusive documentation of when the canyon was evacuated.52

Many residents of Big Tujunga Canyon whom we interviewed expressed 

concern about how the canyon was evacuated. Some residents said they 

should have been given more notice, with one saying evacuations should 

have begun as early as the morning of August 28. Some residents told us 

they were never notified of the mandatory evacuation. One resident said 

that neither she nor some of her neighbors were notified, and another 

said that a sheriff’s deputy told her at approximately 9:30 a.m. on 

August 29 that a voluntary evacuation was in place but that no one 

notified her of a mandatory evacuation. She said she evacuated her 

home at around 11:30 a.m., shortly before the fire arrived. One resident 

told us that residents were not notified by means such as loudspeakers or 

door-to-door contacts. Another resident told us that she heard vehicle 

loudspeakers notifying residents to evacuate but that some residents 

were unable to hear the announcement because they were inside their 

homes, a particular concern for elderly or disabled residents who would 

have had greater difficulty evacuating quickly.

Members of the incident management team told us they believed their 

initial plan for evacuating the canyon on August 29, were it to become 

necessary, was sufficient but that the unexpectedly rapid advance of the 

fire that day contributed to their inability to provide more notice for 

evacuating canyon residents.

 

52Incident management teams determine when an area should be evacuated and request 

that an evacuation notice be issued; the responsible local law enforcement agency issues 

evacuation notices and carries out the evacuation.

Timeliness of Evacuating 

Big Tujunga Canyon
 

Page 45 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Our review found that the events surrounding the evacuation of Big 

Tujunga Canyon were not fully described by available documentation, 

and officials’ accounts of these events were not precise.53

The structure protection group supervisor told us he believed that the 

Grizzly Flats trigger point would have allowed enough time to evacuate 

the canyon, an assessment reached in consultation with an Angeles 

National Forest official familiar with the area. Once the fire reached the 

trigger point, however, it burned through residential areas of Big Tujunga 

Canyon in only a few hours, much faster than they had expected. Incident 

documents indicate that on August 29 the team recognized that extreme 

fire behavior could occur in this area, which could cause the fire to spread 

According to 

transcripts of radio communications, around noon on August 28, Angeles 

National Forest and incident management officials discussed the 

possibility of evacuating Big Tujunga Canyon, and some observers we 

interviewed told us that a voluntary evacuation was in place by Friday 

evening. Records from the Sheriff’s Department indicate that shortly 

before 5:00 p.m. on August 28, the department directed its personnel to 

begin notifying residents of Big Tujunga Canyon to be prepared to 

evacuate. Department records also indicate that at 8:52 a.m. on 

August 29, the department directed its personnel in the canyon “to 

conduct evacuations on order of the fire department.” A senior Sheriff’s 

Department official told us that this record indicates that department 

personnel were ready to evacuate residents once they received 

notification from incident management team officials. According to 

incident management officials, a mandatory evacuation was ordered at 

approximately 10:20 a.m. on August 29, shortly after the fire reached the 

Grizzly Flats plantation, the evacuation “trigger point” identified the 

previous evening by the supervisor of the structure protection group. A 

senior Sheriff’s Department official told us that the department had many 

personnel in the canyon on August 28 and 29. The department, however, 

could not provide documentation about the actions its personnel took to 

carry out the evacuation, and this official told us that events of that day 

may not have been fully documented because the situation changed so 

quickly. Firefighters and Angeles National Forest officials present in the 

canyon told us that they also notified some residents to evacuate, but that 

some residents they contacted told them they intended to stay.

 

53Although we reviewed key events related to the evacuation of Big Tujunga Canyon, we 

did not assess whether the manner in which evacuations took place followed applicable 

state and local law and policy.
 

Page 46 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

rapidly, but members of the team told us there was no indication on 

August 28 or the morning of August 29 that the fire would move through 

the canyon as quickly as it did.54

Some observers raised questions about various aspects of the Forest 

Service’s strategic and tactical approach to fighting the Station Fire, 

suggesting that a more aggressive response may have allowed the 

agency to contain the fire sooner. We heard a wide range of opinions on 

the adequacy and appropriateness of the Forest Service’s response, but 

we had no definitive way to determine whether or to what extent the ideas 

we heard would have made a difference in controlling the fire’s spread or 

reducing the extent of its damage. Incident management officials told us 

they considered numerous factors—including the risk to firefighters and 

the public, the structures and resources threatened by the fire, and the 

likelihood that particular firefighting actions would be successful—in 

determining the strategies and tactics to use to respond to the fire. Of 

these factors, Forest Service policy states that the first priority is the 

safety of firefighters, other personnel, and the public, and, officials told us, 

this policy guided the decisions made in fighting the fire.

Questions raised about the adequacy and appropriateness of firefighting 

strategies and tactics included the following:

• Some observers questioned why firefighters decided to let the fire 

burn into the green island—the source of the embers that started the 

spot fires below the highway on the first night. The green island was 

on a steep vegetated slope that presented significant firefighting 

challenges. The incident commander and other firefighters at the 

scene told us they recognized the potential risk of embers from the 

green island and tried several actions to reduce that risk, all of which 

proved unsuccessful. For example, firefighters first tried to attack the 

fire’s left flank directly, which, if successful, would have left no 

unburned fuel inside the firelines; the fire’s intensity, however, 

prevented firefighters from safely completing this action. Firefighters 

told us they then attempted to place a hose line above the green 

island, so they could get water more easily into the unburned area, 

 

54The Forest Service uses fire behavior models to help predict the intensity of a fire and 

how quickly it will spread, but the ability of the models to predict plume-dominated fire 

behavior is limited, according to a Forest Service document. 

Adequacy and 

Appropriateness of 

Firefighting Strategies and 

Tactics
 

Page 47 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

but the steep terrain and the fire’s intensity prevented safe completion 

of this action as well. Firefighters also told us they tried using deckmounted water guns on their fire engines, known as “monitors,” to 

shoot water up into the fire and reduce its intensity, but the fire was 

burning too far up the hillside for the water guns to have much effect. 

Firefighters said they then attempted to set fire to the green island 

itself, so it would burn more quickly and consume all the fuel in the 

area before down-canyon winds began to blow, but this attempt too 

was unsuccessful.

• Some observers said that if firefighters had directly attacked all the 

spot fires that started below the road on the first night, they might 

have been able to contain the fire. According to Forest Service 

officials responsible for the fire response that night, however, the spot 

fires were burning on very steep slopes, and it was not safe for 

firefighters to attack some of those fires at night. Angeles National 

Forest officials and firefighters told us they were especially mindful of 

safety issues because of the history of firefighter fatalities in the 

Angeles National Forest in fire conditions similar to the Station Fire’s. 

However, some Forest Service officials we interviewed—including 

some involved in making decisions about how to fight the fire—also 

suggested that the aggressiveness of the agency’s response was 

limited by the experience of the firefighters available to respond, in 

part because some firefighters familiar with the area were already 

assigned to the nearby Morris Fire. These officials told us that had 

more experienced firefighters been at the Station Fire the first night, 

they might have been able to safely attack more of the spot fires.55

• Some observers noted that once the Station Fire began to spread 

quickly, the incident management team attacked the fire more 

aggressively along the foothills where it threatened populated areas 

but adopted indirect firefighting strategies in other areas, suggesting 

 

55The Department of Agriculture’s Office of Inspector General examined the Forest 

Service’s plans for recruiting, training, developing, and retaining fire management 

personnel, reporting in March 2010 that the agency lacked a workforce plan specific to 

firefighters, despite the relatively high number of eligible retirees among those in positions 

critical to firefighting and the agency’s own expectations of an increase in the size and 

number of fires it will be responsible for suppressing. The Forest Service has implemented 

4 of the Inspector General’s 20 recommendations and is taking steps to implement the 

others, but these steps have not been completed. See Department of Agriculture, Office of 

Inspector General, Forest Service’s Firefighting Succession Planning Process, Audit 

Report 08601-54-SF (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2010).
 

Page 48 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

that the team deliberately allowed the fire to burn farther into the 

national forest and, in particular, into wilderness areas. The incident 

commander and members of the incident management team told us 

their goal was to fully suppress the fire in all areas, which was 

consistent with Angeles National Forest policy, but said that the fire’s 

speed and intensity were often too great for safe direct attack. Several 

firefighters we interviewed, including some with many years of 

firefighting experience, stated that the fire’s behavior on August 29 

and 30 was more extreme than they had ever seen in their careers. 

On August 29 and 30 alone, the fire burned approximately 

90,000 acres as it burned many miles in every direction; under these 

conditions, the incident commander determined that indirect strategies 

were to be used, a decision the incident commander said was agreed 

to by the other agencies in the unified command and by Angeles 

National Forest officials.

• Other observers told us they recognized that extreme fire behavior 

limited the available opportunities for direct attack but did not 

eliminate such opportunities entirely; these observers told us that the 

incident management team missed opportunities where moreaggressive action could have been safely taken. For example, some 

observers—including officials assigned to the fire—suggested that as 

the fire was burning north, firefighters could have tried to establish 

more firelines on ridgelines within the forest boundary, rather than 

wait for the fire to burn closer to communities along the forest’s 

northern boundary. Similarly, one observer noted that on the fire’s 

western flank, many ridgelines and a substantial network of roads 

might have been incorporated into backfiring operations to help 

contain the fire. Furthermore, some observers noted that the speed of 

the Station Fire often meant that it burned through places before 

planned tactics, such as building a fireline, could be completed. The 

observers said the incident management team should have been 

executing several contingency plans at the same time, so if the fire 

overtook one set of containment lines before they could be completed, 

firefighters would already be working on other lines farther away. 

Members of the incident management team noted that they 

established a contingency planning group to identify such 

opportunities and told us they constructed contingency lines where 

they believed those lines could be successful in slowing the fire, but 

the fire’s speed and size limited opportunities to effectively engage the 

fire or implement some of their contingency plans.

• Some observers noted that the Forest Service and Los Angeles 

County had not developed a plan for how best to defend the 
 

Page 49 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

communications infrastructure on Mt. Wilson and the surrounding 

area in the event of a wildland fire and that when the Station Fire 

began to threaten Mt. Wilson, the Forest Service and the county 

initially disagreed over how best to respond. Incident management 

team and Los Angeles County officials told us that the county believed 

a greater firefighter presence was needed on Mt. Wilson but that the 

Forest Service did not believe that such a presence would be safe or 

effective. In addition, Forest Service officials told us that previous 

wildland fires in the area burned themselves out before reaching the 

communications facilities atop the mountain. Ultimately, the Forest 

Service agreed to have firefighters create defensible space around 

the facilities and have helicopters drop a substantial amount of water 

and retardant to help protect the area.

Although some observers criticized the efforts to suppress the Station 

Fire, many others we spoke with commended the Forest Service’s 

response. Observers from multiple agencies we interviewed said that 

firefighters faced extremely difficult and dangerous conditions and that the 

decisions made and actions taken helped protect thousands of homes 

and the safety of the thousands of firefighters involved in fighting the fire. 

In particular, some firefighters pointed to the actions taken to keep the 

Station Fire from burning into La Cañada Flintridge and La Crescenta, 

and from burning the important communications facilities on Mt. Wilson, 

as key successes in the response.

Some observers also raised a larger concern about whether sufficient 

aviation assets were available to respond to the Station Fire and whether 

the response was indicative of a broader need for more, or different, 

assets to respond to the damaging wildland fires that occur in Southern 

California and elsewhere around the country. Specifically, noting the 

delayed arrival of air tankers, some observers questioned whether the 

Forest Service and other federal firefighting agencies have enough air 

tankers to respond to potentially damaging fires, particularly given the 

reduction in the number of air tankers available under federal contract—

from 44 in 2002, to 19 in 2009, to 14 in August 2011. One observer also 

suggested that in light of the growing number of large, damaging wildland 

fires over the past decade, federal firefighting agencies should take steps 

to reduce the damage such fires cause, including acquiring more very 

large air tankers; adopting technology enabling aircraft to fight fires at 

night; and improving aircraft capability to drop retardant in high winds, 

which frequently occur in Southern California.

Sufficiency and Capability 

of Aviation Assets 

Agencywide
 

Page 50 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

The Forest Service is evaluating some of these concerns but has not yet 

determined if it needs additional aviation assets or assets with different 

capabilities. Specifically, the Forest Service is conducting three studies 

examining different aspects of its aviation program, which agency officials 

expect to complete in late 2011 or in 2012. One study, responding to 

concerns raised by the Station Fire, is examining the benefits and risks of 

using aircraft to fight fires at night. Another is examining the agency’s 

entire aviation program to determine the appropriate mix of air tankers 

and helicopters. A third study is evaluating how the Forest Service should 

acquire new air tankers for its fleet, examining, among other things, 

different aircraft models and whether the agency should purchase or 

lease them or contract with private companies.

Because of its magnitude and impact, the Station Fire offers several 

important lessons that, if applied, could help improve wildland fire 

response in the future, including in Southern California. Through our 

reviews of incident documents and agency reports, interviews with Station 

Fire officials and others, and our previous work on wildland fire 

management, we identified a variety of areas where lessons can be 

learned from the Station Fire and applied to future firefighting efforts. 

These lessons include the importance of (1) determining the appropriate 

role of night-flying aircraft, (2) having transparent processes for ordering 

and mobilizing firefighting assets, (3) tracking aircraft water and retardant 

deliveries, (4) predicting fire behavior under a variety of conditions, and 

(5) having systematic methods to identify needed firefighting assets. 

Some of these lessons have also been discussed in a “lessons learned” 

report the Forest Service prepared in October 2010 on the basis of its 

experience with the Station Fire, in which the agency has described some 

of the steps it will take to implement the lessons.56

 

56Forest Service, Station Fire Lessons Learned Report (Washington, D.C.: October 2010). 

Of the five lessons described here, the Forest Service’s lessons learned document 

discusses four: those relating to night-flying aircraft, firefighting asset ordering and 

dispatching systems, tracking of aircraft water and retardant deliveries, and fire behavior 

modeling. Other lessons included in the Forest Service’s lessons learned document relate 

to wildland-urban interface communities, defensible space around structures, interagency 

agreements, incident documentation and record keeping, after action reviews, 

communication with the media and the public, incident management team transitions, 

firefighter training, and interagency coordination. (This document is available at 

http://wildfirelessons.net/documents/Station_Fire_Lessons.pdf.)

Lessons from the 

Station Fire Have the 

Potential to Improve 

Future Wildland Fire 

Response 
 

Page 51 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

The Station Fire exemplifies a situation where using night-flying aircraft 

may allow the Forest Service to suppress a fire before it escapes efforts 

to contain it. The Forest Service, however, does not own or operate nightflying helicopters, although it allows the use in national forests of such 

helicopters operated by nonfederal firefighting agencies. For example, in 

Southern California, five counties and two cities, including Los Angeles 

County and the city of Los Angeles, have helicopters that are capable of 

flying firefighting missions at night, according to Forest Service officials.57

In response to concerns raised about the Forest Service’s not using nightflying aircraft on the Station Fire, the agency has made two changes 

affecting night-flying operations above national forests in California. First, 

in October 2010, the Forest Service changed its night-flying policy to 

authorize the use of turbine-powered single-engine night-flying aircraft, 

including helicopters, which had previously been prohibited.58 This 

change increased the number, from three to seven, of nonfederal 

agencies allowed to operate night-flying helicopters over national forest 

lands in Southern California. Second, the Angeles National Forest and 

Los Angeles County changed their cooperative firefighting agreement to 

clarify the circumstances under which the county’s night-flying helicopters 

may be used to fight fires in the Angeles National Forest. The 2011 

agreement states that, “When appropriate, Incident Commanders can 

approve the use of helicopters at night when the fire is an immediate 

threat or may become a threat to life and/or property. This use of 

helicopters for aerial night fire fighting applies to all Angeles National 

Forest lands.”59 The agreement in place at the time of the Station Fire 

stated that, “District helicopters may be dispatched and utilized on fires 

during darkness on Federal lands when supporting the protection of life or 

property (under Unified Command).”60

 

57The other entities are Kern County, Orange County, Santa Barbara County, Ventura 

County, and the city of San Diego. 

According to some Forest Service 

and Los Angeles County officials, under the previous agreement it was 

unclear whether county night-flying helicopters could be used when a fire 

58The previous Forest Service policy limited the use of night-flying helicopters to 

multiengine aircraft.

592011 Annual Operating Plan for Cooperative Fire Protection Agreement between 

Consolidated Fire Protection District of Los Angeles County and U.S. Forest Service 

Angeles National Forest. 

602009 Annual Operating Plan for Cooperative Fire Protection Agreement between 

Angeles National Forest and Consolidated Fire Protection District Los Angeles County 

Fire District. 

Importance of Determining 

the Appropriate Role of 

Night-Flying Aircraft
 

Page 52 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

did not pose an immediate threat to life or property or if the fire was not 

burning close to county lands.

Following the Station Fire, the Forest Service also began a nationwide 

assessment of the agency’s night-flying operations and established a 

National Night Flying Operations Working Group. The agency is studying 

various aspects of nighttime helicopter use, including risk, effectiveness, 

and availability of night-flying helicopters, and is evaluating whether it 

should develop its own night-flying capability. A senior Forest Service 

official told us in May 2011 that he expected the study to be completed by 

August 2011, but the study had not been completed at the time of our 

review. This official told us that he expected the study’s helicopter portion 

to be completed later in 2011. Officials attributed the delays to the 

complexity of the issues, including the complexity of ensuring the safety 

and effectiveness of night-flying operations and the need for a 

comprehensive cost analysis. As part of the Forest Service’s efforts to 

study the issue, the agency contracted for a risk analysis that evaluated 

the available technology and reviewed past and current uses of nightflying helicopters.61 This study identified 79 hazards—such as a pilot’s 

reduced vision at night, aircraft lighting that is not certified for night 

operations, and inability to identify intended targets on the ground—that 

the agency believes it would need to mitigate before a night-flying 

program could be implemented; the study also identified 130 associated 

mitigation measures. The agency is developing an implementation 

strategy for addressing these hazards.

The Station Fire demonstrates the importance of having transparent 

processes for ordering firefighting assets to minimize miscommunication 

and improve record keeping. Following the Station Fire, the Angeles 

National Forest made several changes to its asset-ordering and 

mobilizing procedures, including (1) prohibiting informal requests for 

assets, instead directing that all requests be entered into ROSS (the 

centralized resource tracking system) and placed to cooperators or to the 

regional dispatch center, thereby clearly documenting which requests are 

filled and declined and by whom; (2) directing dispatchers to document all 

delays in obtaining ordered assets and relay this information to incident 

 

61Forest Service and Fire Program Solutions, LLC, Helicopter Night Operations Study

(San Dimas, Calif., and Sandy, Ore.: 2010).

Importance of Having 

Transparent Processes for 

Ordering and Mobilizing 

Firefighting Assets
 

Page 53 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

commanders so they may amend or alter plans of attack; and 

(3) documenting the time that individual assets are released from an 

incident and the reason for releasing them (e.g., because the agency 

providing the assets requested their release), thereby providing a record 

of the use of those assets and the reason for their reassignment. Forest 

officials told us these changes were implemented in February 2010. The 

Angeles National Forest revised its dispatch center operating guide in 

September 2011, directing dispatch personnel to enter all requests for 

assets into ROSS, and to inform incident commanders of any delays in 

obtaining ordered assets. Angeles National Forest officials told us they 

have also directed forest dispatchers to document any delays in obtaining 

ordered assets, the time assets are released, and the reason for the 

release, but they said this change was not included in the revised 

guidance. The controversy over how firefighting assets were ordered and 

mobilized for the Station Fire suggests that the Forest Service may 

benefit from providing similar direction to its dispatch centers agencywide. 

The Forest Service’s “lessons learned” document identified potential 

lessons related to standardizing the agency’s asset-ordering processes 

but did not identify specific steps the agency plans to take.

The Station Fire also demonstrates the importance of having clear 

guidance about which assets are to be ordered first. The controversy we 

identified over the effect of the Forest Service’s August 2009 

memorandum about ordering Forest Service assets first for budgetary 

reasons even though other, non-Forest Service assets might be closer 

suggests that the agency would benefit from clearly articulating the 

circumstances under which it is appropriate to order its own assets 

instead of state or local agencies’ assets. Forest Service officials told us 

the memorandum was in effect only for 2009 and pointed out that it 

directed that agency assets be ordered first only “as appropriate.” 

However, the memorandum did not specify the circumstances under 

which Forest Service assets should be ordered even if other, nonagency 

assets are closer, raising questions about the agency’s overall policy in 

this regard. Consequently, additional clarification about these 

circumstances could assist fire officials in making decisions about which 

assets to order and could help nonagency observers, including the public, 

better understand the agency’s asset-ordering policy.

The Station Fire demonstrates the importance of being able to track and 

identify the locations where aircraft deliver water and retardant. Because 

the Forest Service did not have this capability during the Station Fire, it 

had limited ability to identify the locations where aircraft had dropped 

Importance of Tracking 

Aircraft Water and 

Retardant Deliveries
 

Page 54 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

water and retardant, which made it difficult for the agency to answer 

questions about its response to the fire. Recognizing the importance of 

having this capability, a senior Forest Service official told us that, by the 

end of 2012, the agency expects to equip all air tankers with a system to 

track retardant drops. The official also said that the agency is evaluating 

other possible improvements to its ability to track and evaluate water and 

retardant drops. For example, the agency is evaluating improvements that 

could allow it to evaluate the effectiveness of each drop by means of 

infrared imaging technology, which would assess changes in fire intensity 

or rate or direction of spread. Such information, if provided in real time, 

could help incident management officials determine not only which drops 

were effective but also which drops were not achieving the desired effect 

and should be reconsidered. Combining this type of information with drop 

costs could help the agency determine the cost-effectiveness of drops in 

different areas or by different types of aircraft—information that could in 

turn help the agency evaluate which types of drops and aircraft are best 

suited to different conditions.

The Station Fire’s intensity and speed of spread also demonstrate the 

importance of having effective fire behavior models available to incident 

command officials who are making decisions about response tactics, 

strategies, and assets. Firefighters and incident management officials we 

interviewed said that even though they recognized that weather and fuel 

conditions were conducive to a high-intensity, fast-spreading fire, the 

ability of the Forest Service’s primary tools for predicting fire activity—

including modeling software known as FSPro, BehavePLUS, and 

FARSITE—are limited under certain conditions, particularly the plumedominated conditions of key days during the Station Fire. Improving fire 

behavior modeling tools might allow incident managers and firefighters to 

better predict fire behavior and adjust their strategies and tactics 

accordingly. The Forest Service reported it is taking steps to improve the 

information used to predict weather conditions, which can greatly 

influence a fire’s behavior, and that it is exploring how to better model fire 

behavior as well.

The Station Fire also demonstrates the significance of issues we have 

identified over the last decade regarding the importance of having 

systematic methods of identifying needed firefighting assets. For example, 

we have previously reported that since 2002, the Forest Service, in 

conjunction with agencies in the Department of the Interior, has been 

developing a system known as fire program analysis (FPA), which is 

Importance of Predicting 

Fire Behavior Under a 

Variety of Conditions

Importance of Having 

Systematic Methods to 

Identify Needed 

Firefighting Assets
 

Page 55 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

intended to, among other things, allow the agencies to identify the most 

cost-effective mix of firefighting assets—information that could help the 

agency determine the assets it needs and where best to locate them. 

Nevertheless, we reported in March 2011 that, after almost a decade of

work, FPA’s development continued to be characterized by delays and 

revisions, with the agencies several years behind their initially projected 

timeline for using it to help develop their budget requests.62

More fundamentally, in a series of reports dating to 1999, we have 

recommended that the Forest Service and Interior agencies develop a 

cohesive wildland fire strategy that identifies potential long-term options for 

reducing fuels and responding to fires, as well as the funding requirements 

associated with the various options.

The agencies 

are continuing to take steps to improve FPA, including submitting it to an 

external peer review. According to agency officials, the agencies expect to 

begin using FPA to inform their fiscal year 2013 budget requests. These 

efforts are still under way, and we have not evaluated the extent to which 

they may address the shortcomings we identified.

63 We have reported that, by laying out 

various potential approaches, their estimated costs, and the accompanying 

trade-offs, such a strategy would help Congress and the agencies make 

informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches to 

addressing the nation’s wildland fire problems. Congress echoed our call for 

a cohesive strategy in the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and 

Enhancement Act of 2009, which requires the agencies to produce a 

cohesive strategy consistent with our recommendations.64

 

62GAO, Forest Service: Continued Work Needed to Address Persistent Management 

Challenges, 

In March 2011, 

the Forest Service and Interior released A National Cohesive Wildland Fire 

Management Strategy, which describes the three-phase process the 

GAO-11-423T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2011). For additional information 

on FPA, see GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Interagency Budget Tool Needs Further 

Development to Fully Meet Key Objectives, GAO-09-68 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 24, 

2008).

63GAO has issued numerous reports and recommended more than 50 actions the Forest 

Service and Interior agencies could take to improve wildland fire management. For more 

information on the agencies’ efforts over the past decade in this regard, see GAO, 

Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but 

Additional, Strategic Action Is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps, GAO-09-877

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).

64Pub. L. No. 111-88 § 503, 123 Stat. 2971 (2009).
 

Page 56 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

agencies plan to use to develop a cohesive strategy.65 As of December 

2011, the agencies were working on the second phase of their efforts—

developing regional assessments of, and strategies for addressing, wildland 

fire risk—and had developed a draft document titled A National Cohesive 

Wildland Fire Management Strategy, Phase II National Report. However, 

neither the phase I nor the draft phase II cohesive strategy documents 

contain key elements we recommended—such as laying out potential 

approaches for addressing the growing wildfire threat, estimating the costs 

associated with each approach, and identifying trade-offs. In the draft phase 

II document, the agencies reported that they expect to approve phase III of 

the cohesive strategy—entailing a national trade-off analysis—in late 2012 or 

early 2013. On the basis of our review of the phase I and draft phase II 

documents, it is not yet clear the extent to which phase III of the agencies’ 

cohesive strategy will include the key elements we have recommended.

Firefighters and officials from the Forest Service and other agencies 

offered additional observations about aspects of the Station Fire that offer 

potential lessons for wildland fire management. These observations 

include the following:

• Defensible space. Firefighters and agency officials told us that the 

Station Fire highlighted the importance of maintaining defensible 

space around structures in high-risk areas. Several officials and 

firefighters told us that, particularly in Big Tujunga Canyon, the lack of 

defensible space around certain homes made them difficult to protect. 

Forest Service officials acknowledged that at the time of the fire, 

residents whose homes were located closer than 100 feet to the 

boundary of the national forest or on land leased from the Forest 

Service were not allowed to create 100 feet of defensible space, the 

minimum required by California and Los Angeles County standards. 

Following the Station Fire, on December 17, 2009, the Forest 

Service’s Pacific Southwest Region issued a memorandum directing 

forest supervisors in the region to increase the minimum requirement 

for defensible space around structures within and adjacent to national 

forests from 30 feet to 100 feet.66

 

65Department of the Interior and Department of Agriculture, A National Cohesive Wildland 

Fire Management Strategy (Washington, D.C.: March 2011).

The Angeles National Forest is 

66According to the Forest Service, forest supervisors have the authority to authorize 

greater clearance if warranted by conditions at a specific location. 

Other Lessons
 

Page 57 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

evaluating the effects of allowing private landowners to create up to 

100 feet of defensible space on national forest land (up to 200 feet in 

some locations). The forest expects to decide whether to approve new 

defensible space standards by February 2012.

• Protecting Mt. Wilson. The Station Fire identified the importance of 

having an action plan to protect critical communications and other 

infrastructure on Mt. Wilson. According to some observers we spoke 

to, the Forest Service and Los Angeles County did not have a 

previously agreed-upon plan of action to protect this area in the event 

of a fire and instead were debating what protective steps needed to 

be taken during the Station Fire. For example, some observers 

pointed to the fuel reduction work done during the Station Fire on Mt. 

Wilson as work that should have been done beforehand, given the 

location’s importance. After the Station Fire, the Forest Service and 

Los Angeles County have recognized the importance of resolving this 

issue, and the Forest Service has taken actions to better prepare the 

Mt. Wilson area to withstand future wildland fires. In May 2010, for 

example, the Forest Service completed an environmental assessment 

to reduce fuels on 736 acres in the area by 2015. The Angeles 

National Forest has also decided to allow 300 feet of defensible space 

around the communications infrastructure and the Mt. Wilson 

Observatory, according to agency officials.

• Communication with the public and media. The Station Fire 

demonstrated the importance of timely and effective communication 

with the public and the media during such an event. According to 

some observers, the Forest Service did not adequately communicate 

important information to the public or the media about the fire’s 

development or about the firefighting response, particularly after the 

extent of the damage became clear. Once questions about the 

adequacy of the Forest Service’s response were raised, the 

Department of Agriculture and the Forest Service limited local agency 

officials’ ability to communicate with the public and the media, which 

local officials said contributed to a perception that the Forest Service 

was covering up mistakes.

On the basis of its experience with the Station Fire, as well as with its 

overall wildland fire management program, the Forest Service identified 

lessons from the Station Fire in an October 2010 Station Fire Lessons 

Learned Report. This report identified lessons applicable at local, 

regional, and national levels, including lessons regarding the role of nightflying aircraft and the need for improvements in the agency’s ability to 

The Forest Service’s 

Lessons Learned 

Document
 

Page 58 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

track aircraft water and retardant deliveries and to model fire behavior 

under certain conditions. In some cases, the agency identified actions 

that it planned to take to implement these lessons, including clarifying 

night-flying capabilities and aircraft use, improving procedures for 

ordering and dispatching firefighting assets, and allowing for increased 

defensible space on national forest lands in California. However, the 

report did not indicate whether actions were to be taken in implementing 

other lessons the agency identified and in many cases did not provide 

time frames for undertaking the actions discussed. For example, the 

document identified a number of areas where the Forest Service could 

standardize its procedures agencywide for ordering and mobilizing 

firefighting assets, but it did not describe whether or how the agency 

would do so. Forest Service officials told us that the document should not 

be considered a list of actions the agency plans to take and does not 

necessarily indicate that changes to policies or procedures are needed to 

address all the lessons identified. Nevertheless, we believe that the 

document presents an opportunity for the Forest Service to capitalize on 

the lessons offered by the Station Fire, and to provide information to 

Congress and the public about areas where the agency believes 

additional actions—such as changes to agency policies or procedures—

are needed and where they are not. Such information could enhance 

Congress’s and the public’s understanding of how the agency views its 

own response to the fire and could improve their understanding of what 

changes to expect as a result.

The Station Fire was devastating in many ways—the tragic loss of two 

firefighters’ lives, the destruction of dozens of homes, and the extensive 

damage to natural resources. Not surprisingly, given the significance of 

the event, views on the Forest Service’s response to the fire vary widely. 

Some have questioned whether this devastation could have been 

prevented by a quicker or more robust Forest Service response to the 

fire, while others have complimented the agency, believing that its actions 

helped save thousands of homes in nearby communities. Answering such 

questions is a daunting challenge, both because so many firefighting 

decisions are made with imperfect information and under severe time 

constraints—and depend on firefighters’ judgments about risk, safety, and 

effectiveness—and because an after-the-fact analysis such as ours offers 

only limited ability to determine whether different decisions should have 

been made given the information available at the time. Even less clear is 

whether, and to what extent, different decisions might have changed the 

outcome of the fire.

Conclusions 
 

Page 59 GAO-12-155 Station Fire 

Nevertheless, important lessons can be learned from the Station Fire to 

help inform decisions about how to fight future wildland fires—although no 

steps can completely eliminate the threat of devastating fires. The Forest 

Service has taken actions to address some of the identified lessons 

learned from the Station Fire, such as updating its policies for using nightflying helicopters supplied by Southern California cities and counties (and 

undertaking a broader study of night-flying aircraft generally) and 

changing the Angeles National Forest’s asset-ordering procedures to 

make the process more formal and systematic. Nevertheless, other 

issues identified in this report and in the Forest Service’s own lessonslearned evaluation continue to warrant serious consideration and action. 

Specifically, the Forest Service has not yet clarified when its own 

firefighting assets should be ordered ahead of assets from other 

agencies. Similarly, the Forest Service can capitalize on other lessons 

learned from the Station Fire by taking actions that have the potential to 

improve its operations, clarify ambiguous operational processes, and 

address broader issues regarding its use of assets to fight fires, thereby 

laying the groundwork for improvements in its management of future fires. 

To improve the Forest Service’s response to wildland fires, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest 

Service to take the following two actions: 

 to clarify the Forest Service’s intent and to reduce uncertainty about 

how its assets are to be used relative to those of other agencies, 

issue guidance describing when it expects its own firefighting assets 

to be used instead of contract or state and local agency assets, and 

 document the steps it plans to take, and the associated time frames, 

to implement the lessons it identified in its review of the Station Fire. 

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the 

Department of Agriculture. In its written comments, the Forest Service, 

responding on behalf of the Department of Agriculture, generally agreed 

with our findings and recommendations. The Forest Service’s comments 

are reproduced in appendix III. The Forest Service also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 60 GAO-12-155 Station Fire 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Agriculture, the 

Chief of the Forest Service, appropriate congressional committees, and 

other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to the report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Anu K. Mittal 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 61 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Our objectives were to (1) describe key events in the Station Fire and the 

Forest Service’s response, including strategies, tactics, and assets used; 

(2) examine key issues arising from this response; and (3) identify 

lessons the Station Fire offers for wildland fire management in the future, 

including lessons specific to Southern California.

To describe the key events in the Station Fire and the Forest Service’s 

response, we obtained and reviewed Station Fire records, including daily 

incident status summaries; daily plans of firefighting actions to be taken, 

known as incident action plans; and daily logs maintained by firefighters 

and decision makers. We also listened to recordings and reviewed 

transcripts and accounts of radio communications among firefighting 

officials and dispatchers. In addition, we obtained and reviewed 

documentation on orders placed for firefighting assets; this 

documentation was generated from the resource ordering and status 

system (ROSS), a computer software program that automates the 

resource ordering, status, and reporting process. We also reviewed 

agency and other reports that examined particular aspects of the fire, 

including those prepared by or in conjunction with the Department of 

Agriculture (the Station Fire Initial Attack Review, November 2009 and the 

Large Cost Fire Review for FY2009), the Los Angeles County Fire 

Department (Executive Review of Actions, Station Fire, November 2009), 

other agencies that were directly involved in the Station Fire firefighting 

response (Orange County Fire Authority, After Action Review: ORC Strike 

Team 1400C Structure Protection and Extreme Fire Behavior Event, 

Station Fire, Big Tujunga Canyon, Angeles National Forest, August 29, 

2009), and the Department of Agriculture’s Inspector General. In addition, 

we reviewed Forest Service policies and guidance related to wildland fire 

incident management response, including the 2009 Interagency 

Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, wildland firefighting 

training manuals, interagency guidance on mobilizing firefighting assets to 

incidents, and the fire management plan for the Angeles National Forest. 

To obtain additional information, and to provide context for the documents 

reviewed, we interviewed numerous officials from the Forest Service and 

other agencies who were directly involved in the response. Specifically, 

we interviewed members of the incident management teams and other 

key support staff assigned to the Station Fire; senior officials from the 

nonfederal agencies in unified command with the Forest Service, 

including the Los Angeles County Fire Department, the Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s Department, and the Glendale, Los Angeles, and 

Pasadena Fire Departments; and agencies that were not part of the 

unified command but provided support through agency representation, 

including the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 62 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

(CAL FIRE). We also interviewed Forest Service officials from agency 

headquarters, the Pacific Southwest Region, and the Angeles National 

Forest. In addition, we interviewed several residents who were affected 

by the fire, primarily residents of Big Tujunga Canyon. Rather than 

selecting individual residents to interview, we provided our contact 

information at a public meeting on the Station Fire, held in Altadena in 

April 2011, and interviewed those residents who subsequently contacted 

us. Some nonfederal officials and retired federal officials declined our 

request to interview them. While these officials may have provided 

additional perspectives or information on the fire, we believe that, given 

the number and variety of individuals we interviewed and the volume of 

documents we examined, our inability to interview these officials is 

unlikely to have substantially affected our findings, conclusions, or 

recommendations. In describing the Station Fire, we divided the fire into 

five phases to reflect changes in fire size and behavior, the risk to 

structures and resources, and the nature of the agency’s response.

In addition, to gain a firsthand view of the Station Fire’s location and the 

geographic features of the area, we visited several locations in the 

Angeles National Forest that were affected by the fire. These locations 

included the ignition site, Big Tujunga Canyon, Mt. Wilson, and others. 

During our visits we were accompanied by forest officials and firefighters 

involved in the response.

To examine the key issues raised by the Forest Service’s response to the 

Station Fire, we reviewed agency and other reports, including those 

mentioned above, that evaluated aspects of the response and reviewed 

information provided at congressional meetings held in Southern 

California in October 2010 and April 2011. We also discussed key issues 

during our interviews with incident personnel; Forest Service officials; 

officials from nonfederal agencies; residents affected by the fire; and 

other interested parties, including retired Forest Service employees who 

did not participate directly in the incident. We also examined Station Fire 

records, including summaries, action plans, logs, recordings, and 

transcripts, as well as information from the ROSS database. Information 

from ROSS was particularly important for our assessment of the extent to 

which Forest Service assets were ordered rather than other, potentially 

closer assets. We obtained and analyzed asset-ordering information 

maintained in ROSS for two types of assets that were identified as slow to 

arrive at the incident—type 3 wildland fire engines and operations branch 

directors. For data about these assets, we requested the Forest Service 

to query ROSS for all orders placed for these assets from August 27 

through August 30, 2009. We analyzed the data provided and determined 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 63 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

the number of assets ordered and assigned by day and by ownership. 

However, limitations in the information available in ROSS on orders for 

firefighting assets precluded us from conclusively determining the extent 

to which agency assets were ordered ahead of assets available locally, 

because ROSS does not maintain information on assets that were 

available but not ordered. In addition, while orders in ROSS include the 

time and date by which the assets were needed on the fire, this 

information can be changed after the initial ROSS order is entered, 

precluding us from conclusively determining the extent to which assets 

arrived at or before the time for which they were initially requested. We 

assessed the reliability of the ROSS data used in our report by reviewing 

the methods of data entry into ROSS and determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for our use. We did not attempt to assess the 

compliance of individual firefighters or agency officials with applicable 

firefighting guidance, in part because responding to wildland fire requires 

a considerable degree of professional judgment.1

To identify lessons the Station Fire offers for future wildland fire 

management, we analyzed the information we obtained through Station 

Fire records and various interviews; we also reviewed several after-action 

reviews and narrative reports that identify suggestions for improvement, 

as well as Forest Service policy documents and previous GAO work on 

wildland fire management. In addition, during our interviews of federal 

and nonfederal agency officials and others, we specifically asked for 

participants’ views on potential lessons offered by the fire. We also 

reviewed the Forest Service’s Station Fire Lessons Learned Report

prepared in October 2010, which describes lessons for the Forest Service 

at the national, regional, and forest levels, and in many cases identifies 

actions to be taken or actions that the agency has begun to take to 

address the lessons. We also reviewed a status update provided by 

Forest Service officials that identified both the changes that have been 

made as well as areas where changes are not expected.

 

1

According to Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, “fire operations 

doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied to specific situations so much as it 

sets forth general guidance that requires judgment in application.” 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 64 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

We conducted this performance audit from December 2010 through 

December 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 65 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression and 

Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s First 9 

Days, from August 26 through September 3, 2009 
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 66 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 67 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 68 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 69 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 70 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 71 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 72 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix II: The Station Fire’s Progression 

and Firefighting Assets Used over the Fire’s 

First 9 Days, from August 26 through 

September 3, 2009

Page 73 GAO-12-155 Station Fire
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Agriculture, Forest Service

Page 74 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Agriculture, Forest Service
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 75 GAO-12-155 Station Fire

Anu K. Mittal, (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov

In addition to the contact person named above, Steve Gaty (Assistant 

Director), Ulana Bihun, Ellen W. Chu, Jonathan Dent, and Richard P. 

Johnson made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this 

report were Kirsten Lauber, Katherine Raheb, Kelly Rubin, Jena Sinkfield, 

and Kyle Stetler.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361252)
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