### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs O ct obe r 3, 200 6


### NAT HAN IEL BE NT ON, a/k /a, N AT HAN GR AY v. TO NY PARKER, Warden
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Lake Coun ty No. 04-CR -8669 R. Lee Moore , Jr., Judge

No. W2005-02539-C CA-R 3-HC - F iled Dece m ber 15, 2006

The Petitioner, Nathani el Be n ton, a/k/a, Nathan Gray filed a pr o se petition for a writ of habe as c or pu s. Th e ha

be a s c ou rt de nie d r e lie f, a ndthePe tit ion e r f ile d a tim e ly

no tic e of app e a l. O n a

pp e a l, the Pe tition e r c on te nd s that his c on vic tio n a nd su bs e qu e nt se nte nc e fo r be ing a ha bitua l c ri min a l is void because the under ly ing c onvictions upon which the habitual c riminal conviction is based a re vo id. F ind ing no re ve rs ibl e e rr or , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the ha be a s c ou rt

.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D A V I D G. H AYES , and T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J J ., joined.

P a tr i c k M c G i l l , D ye r s b u r g , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e A p p e l l a n t , N a t h a n i e l B e n t o n , a /k / a , N a t h a n G r a y.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attorne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E. Willis , Ass ist a nt Att orne y Ge ne ra l; C. Phi llip Bivens, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I. F acts
The Petitioner, Nathaniel Benton, a/k/a, Nathan Gray , filed a petition for the writ of habea s corpus on Dec ember 28, 2004. The Habe as Court a ppointed Counsel to repr esent t h e P eti tioner. On Aug ust 23, 2005, the State and the Petitioner enter ed an “Or der of Stipul ation” ag ree ing to the following fac ts: On or about Octobe r 15, 1982, in Shelby Countycase No. 92584 the Petitioner was alleg ed to have commit t ed t h e o ffense of f irst deg ree burg lary

and wa s relea sed fr om the Shelby Cou nty ja il on ba il on No ve mbe r 6, 19 82 . O n o r a bo ut N ov e mbe r 1 2, 19 82 , inShe lby Cou nty Ca se No. 90744, while out on bail for Ca se No. 92584, the Petitioner wa s alleg ed to have committed the-2-

offe nse of g rand la

rce ny in Shelby

County . On May

18, 1983, in case No. 92 584 and ca se No. 907 4 4 , the Petitioner pled g uiltyto second de g ree burg lary and to g rand la

rce ny . The Petitioner
rec eived a sentenc e of thre e y ear s for e ach of the two convictions. His sentenc es for both case s were order ed to be se rved c oncurr ent l y wi t h eac h other, whe n by law his sentenc es should have be en order ed to be serve d consec utively to eac h other. In May

of 1988, in Case No. 88- 03229, a Shelby Countyg rand jury indicted the Petitioner for first deg ree burg lary , g rand la rce ny , and the c harg e of habitual criminal. On J une 22, 1988, in Ca se No. 88-03229, the Petitioner was found g uilty by a jury of first deg ree burg lary

and grand larc eny

. Be cause of hi s prior felony convictions, including case s 9 2 5 8 4 an d 9 0 7 4 4 , he wa s also convicted a s a habitual c riminal. He wa s sentence d to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Depa rtment of Corre ction.

II. Ana lys is

On appea l, the Petitioner contends that he is e ntitled to habea s corpus r elief be cause the two 1983 convictions used to prove h i s h ab i t u al criminal status are void bec ause the trial court wa s without jurisdiction to enter c oncurr ent sentenc es. The Petitioner a sserts that bec ause the 1983 convictions th at wer e used to “ trig g er” the Petitioner’s status as a ha bitual criminal are void, then so is the habitual criminal judg ment. The State contends that beca use t he two 1983 judgme nts and sentenc es that the Petitioner cha lleng es have expired, the Petitioner is not “ imprisoned” under the chal l en ged j udg ments, and his complaint is merely a collate ral c onsequenc e of the challeng ed judgme nts. The State arg ues that, conseque ntly , the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas c orpus re lief. We ag ree with the State.

Article I , Section 15 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution g uarantees its citizens the right to see k habea s corpus re lief. I n Tenne ssee, a “per son imprisoned or re strained of [hi s or her ] l iberty , under any prete nse whatsoever . . . may prosec ute a writ of habea s corpus, to inquire into the c ause of such imprisonment . . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-101 (2003). The g rounds upon which habe as cor pus relief will be g rante d are very

narr ow. Hickman v. State, 153 S.W .3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004) ; State v. Ritc hie, 20 S.W .3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000). “Unlike the post-c onviction petition, the purpose of a habea s corpus pe tition i s to contest voi d and not mere ly voidable judgments.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d
a t 20 ; Po tts v. State , 83 3 S. W.2 d 6 0, 62 (T e nn

. 19 92 ). Th e re fo re , inor de r t o s ta te a c og niza ble c la im fo r h abe a s c or

pu s r e lie f, the pe tit ionmus t c on te st a vo id j ud g me nt. I d. “ A v oidjud g me nt i s o ne in which the judg ment is facia lly invalid because the c ourt did not have the statutory authority to rende r such judg ment . . . . A voidable judg ment is one which is fac ially valid and re quires proof

bey ond the fa ce of

the re cord or

judgme nt to demonstrate its voidableness.” Dykes v. Compton , 978 S.W .2d 52 8, 52 9 (T e nn . 199 8) (c iti ng Ar c he r v . St a te , 851 S.W .2d 157, 161 (Tenn. 1993) ). Thus, a w rit of habea s corpus is a v ai l ab l e o n l y when it appears on the f ace of the judg ment or the re cord that the convicting court wa s without jurisdi ction to convict or sente nce the def endant, or that the sentenc e of imprisonment or other restraint ha s expi red. A rche r , 85 1 S.W.2 d at 1 64 ; Po tts , 833 S.W .2d at 62. Th us , me re c le ri c a l e rr or s in the ter ms of a sen te nc e ma y no t g ive ri se to a

vo id j ud g me nt. McChristian v. State, 159 S.W .3d 608, 610 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004)

. The pe titioner bear s the burden of showing by

a pre po n d er an ce o f t he evide nce that the conviction is void or that the prison term ha s expi red. State v

. Da v en port, 980 S.W .2d 407, 409-3-

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

. Fu rt h ermore, the proc edura l require ments for ha beas c orpus re lief ar e mandatory

and mu s t be scrupulously followed. Ar cher

, 851 S.W .2d at 165. B eca use the de te rm inatio n o f w he the r h abe a s c or pu s re lie f sh ou ld be g rante d is a qu e sti on of

la w, ou r r e vie w i s de no vo wi th n o p re su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss. Ha

rt v. State , 21 S.W .3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)

.
I n Hickman, our Supreme Court de termined that “a person is not ‘re strained of liberty ’ for the purposes of

the habe as corpus statute unless the challeng ed judgme nt itself imposes a restraint upon the petiti o n er ’s fre edom of a ction or movement.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 23. “Use of the challeng ed judg ment to enhanc e the se ntence imposed on a sepa rate conviction is not a

restraint of liberty sufficie n t to permit a habe as cor pus challeng e to the orig inal conviction long afte r the sentenc e on the original conviction has ex pired.” I d. The Hic kman ca se further states, “ Howeve r, when the r estraint on a pe titione r’s liberty is merely

a collate ral c onsequenc e of the challeng ed judgme nt, habea s corpus is not an appr opriate a venue f or see king r elief.” I d.

I n Terry L ee Clifton v. State, No

. W2004-01385-CCA-R3-HC, 2005 WL1363104 (Tenn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Jun. 9, 2005), perm. app. de nied (T enn. Nov. 28, 2005) , this Court considere d whether

a petitioner c ould challeng e a ha bitual criminal conviction that was ba sed upon alleg edly void predicate sentenc es. The Clifton Court arrived at the f ollowing c onclusion:
Apply ing Hickman to the pre sent ca se, we conclude that the petitioner may not use the writ of a

habea s corpus to attac k his p re -1 9 8 3 convictions bec ause the sentenc es on those ea

rlier, pr edicate convictions have been served and have e x pired

. . . . One sig nificant upshot of this de termination is that the habea s corpus c ourt has n o au thority

to scrutinize the fac e of the rec ord of t he pre dic ate c on v ic tio ns to determine whether

the judg ments therein imposed were v oid. See Hickman, 153 S.W. 3da t 27 (r e a ff

ir min g the “ we ll- se ttl e d p ri nc ipl e that a judg me nt is v oidon ly if the fac e of the judgme nt or the rec ord of the pr ocee dings c lear ly ref lects that the c ourt lacke d jurisdiction to render the judgme nt or that the sentenc e is expired”).
That said, we conclude t h at n ei t h er Hickman nor any other tene t of habe as corpus law of wh ich we a re a war e bar s the petitioner fr om attacking the 1983 habitual cri m i n al conviction. I n adjudicating a habe as cor pus attack upon this . . . judgme nt, the court must determine whether the face of the judg ment or re cord of that proce eding ref

lects that the trial c ourt lacke d jurisdiction to impose the judg ment . . . . Be cause this determination nece ssarily entail s an adjudication that the predic ate c onvictions ex ist, the habeas cor pus court dete rmines whethe r the fa ce of the ha bitua l c ri min a l ju dg me nt o r r e cord evin c e s th e e xiste nc e of the pr e dic a te
conv i ct i o n s as jurisdictional bases, and beca use the pre dicate c onvictions-or any oth e r c on vic tio ns -m a y

no t e ma nate fr om v oidjud g me nts , the ha be a s c or pu s c ou rt is called u p o n , w h e n th e p r e d ic a te c o n v ic ti o n ju d g me n ts ap p e ar o n th e f a c e o f the habitual criminal proce eding rec ord, t o assure that nothing appear s on the face of the
re c or d th a t in dic a te s v oid ne ss o f the pr e c e din g jud g me nts

.-4-

I d. at *5 (footnote omitted).

I n acc ordanc e with Clifton and Hickman, wehave e x amined the fac e of the ha bitual criminal judgme nt and t h e re co rd of the ha bitual criminal judg ment, and we have de termined that nothing appea rs on the fa ce of

the re cord or judgme nt in the habitual criminal procee ding to indicate that the habitual criminal judgment is void. Furthe r, we conclude , as di d the habeas corpus court, that the
se nte nc e s o n th e “ pr e dic a te ” c on vic tio ns ha ve c le arl y e xpir e d a ndthu s the Pe tit ion e r is no long e r i n custody as a result of those judg ments. Acc ording ly , the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas c orpus relief

. III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing r easoning and authorities, we af firm the judg ment of the Circuit Court for L ake County

.

________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE