UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CANDY PETERSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-13116 

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan 

Magistrate Judge Mona K. Mazjoub 

 

OPINION AND ORDER (1) ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, (2) OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S 

OBJECTION, (3) DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT, (4) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT IN PART, AND (5) REMANDING THE ACTION TO THE 

COMMISSIONER 

Plaintiff Candy Peterson seeks judicial review of a final decision of 

Defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying her Title II application for a 

period of disability and disability benefits as well as her Title XVI application for 

supplemental security income, both protectively filed pursuant to the Social 

Security Act on April 26, 2011. In her applications for benefits, Plaintiff alleged a 

disability onset date of February 5, 2011 due to herniated discs in her back, 

fibromyalgia, high blood pressure, carpal tunnel syndrome, bipolar disorder, 

depression, muscle spasms, tremors, sleep apnea, and a cracked spine. The Social 

Security Administration initially denied Plaintiff’s applications for benefits on 

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November 14, 2011. On February 5, 2013, upon Plaintiff’s request, 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mary Peltzer conducted a de novo hearing at 

which Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. The ALJ issued a 

decision on March 1, 2013, finding Plaintiff not disabled because she was capable 

of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The ALJ’s 

decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Social Security 

Appeals Council denied review. Plaintiff initiated the instant suit seeking judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s unfavorable decision on August 13, 2014. 

The case was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for a report and 

recommendation (“R&R”) on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 72.1(b)(3). 

Thereafter, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On August 7, 

2015, Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub filed an R&R, recommending that 

Plaintiff’s motion be granted in part, that Defendant’s motion be denied, and that 

the matter be remanded to the Commissioner “for proper consideration and 

discussion of Dr. Pettit’s medical opinion as a treating physician in accordance” 

with the Social Security Administration’s regulations. (R&R 2.) At the conclusion 

of the R&R, Magistrate Judge Majzoub advised the parties that they may object to 

and seek review of the R&R within fourteen days of service upon them. Defendant 

timely filed a single objection to the R&R on August 21, 2015 and Plaintiff filed a 

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response on September 2, 2015. Defendant’s objection to the R&R is presently 

before the Court. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will adopt the R&R, 

grant Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion in part, deny Defendant’s summary 

judgment motion, and remand the action to the Commissioner for further 

consideration. 

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 

A. Social Security Framework 

Under the Social Security Act (hereinafter, the “Act”), disability insurance 

benefits “are available only for those who have a ‘disability.’” Colvin v. Barnhart, 

475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines “disability” as the 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (DIB); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (SSI). 

Under the authority of the Act, the Social Security Administration has 

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an 

individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If an ALJ determines that the 

claimant is or is not disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation 

does not proceed. Id. However, if the ALJ does not find that the claimant is 

disabled or not disabled at a step, the ALJ must continue to the next step. Id. “The 

burden of proof is on the claimant through the first four steps. . . . If the analysis 

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reaches the fifth step without a finding that the claimant is not disabled, the burden 

transfers to the [defendant].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 

1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. 

2287, 2294 n.5 (1987). 

The ALJ’s five-step process is as follows: 

1. At the first step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is currently 

engaged in substantial gainful activity.1

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

2. At the second step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has a severe 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the 

duration requirement of the regulations and which significantly limits the 

claimant’s ability to do basic work activities.2

 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c). 

3. At the third step, the ALJ again considers the medical severity of the 

claimant’s impairment to determine whether the impairment meets or 

equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairment meets 

any Listing, he or she is determined to be disabled regardless of other 

factors.3

 Id. 

 1

 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since the alleged onset date of Plaintiff’s disability. (Tr. 31.) 

2

 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

fibromyalgia; degenerative disc disease, lumbar and cervical spine; obesity; 

migraine headaches; and mental disorder, diagnosed to include depression, 

generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder without agrophobia, and bipolar 

disorder. (Tr. 32.) 

3

 The ALJ opined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination 

of impairments meeting or medically equivalent to a listed impairment. (Tr. 33.) 

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4. At the fourth step, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity and past relevant work to determine whether the claimant can 

perform his or her past relevant work.4

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

5. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity, age, education, and past work experience to see if he can do 

other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1420(a)(4)(v). If there is no such work that 

the claimant can perform, the ALJ must find that he or she is disabled.5

 

Id. 

B. Standard of Review Applicable to Social Security Appeals 

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final decision 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).6

 Judicial review under this statute is limited: the 

 4

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: work 

that can be done in a seated or standing position or combination thereof; occasional 

climbing of stairs and ramps; no climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional 

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling; no exposure to temperature 

extremes; avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations and respiratory irritants such 

as dust and fumes; and no exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights. She 

can perform unskilled work with specific vocational preparation (SVP) of one or 

two; can make judgments on simple work-related decisions; and can have no 

contract with the general public but occasional contact with coworkers. She can 

stay on task at least 90 percent of the workday, exclusive of normal breaks.” (Tr. 

36.) Based on this assessment, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to 

perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 42.) 

5

 Taking these criteria into consideration, and upon consulting with an 

impartial vocational expert who testified during the hearing before the ALJ, the 

ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 42.) 

6

 Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides, in pertinent part: 

Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain 

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Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that 

the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made 

findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Longworth v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 A district court’s review of an ALJ’s factual findings involves application of 

the substantial evidence standard. Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of 

evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the 

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed 

even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations 

omitted); see also Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) 

(noting that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes . . . a zone of choice 

 

a review of such decision by a civil action . . . The court shall have 

power to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without 

remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . . 

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within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the 

courts”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial 

evidence, courts are limited to examining the record and must consider that record 

as a whole. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2007); Wyatt v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992) (explaining 

that courts reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial evidence 

must consider the evidence in the record as a whole, including evidence which 

might subtract from its weight). Federal courts may “not reconsider facts, reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of credibility, 

or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (citing Youghiogheny & Ohio 

Coal Co. v. Webb, 49 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1995)). 

 The other line of judicial inquiry – reviewing for correctness of the ALJ’s 

legal analysis – may result in reversal even if the record contains substantial 

evidence supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a 

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security 

Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices 

a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Id.

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(quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007) and 

citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)); cf. 

Buchanan v. Apfel, 249 F.3d 485, 492 (6th Cir. 2001) (the Commissioner has a 

clear, nondiscretionary duty to comply with Social Security regulations). 

C. Standard of Review Applied to Objections to an R&R 

Courts review de novo the parts of an R&R to which a party objects. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 72(b). Courts are not, however, “required to articulate all the reasons it 

rejects a party’s objections.” Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. 

Mich. 2001). 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Defendant’s raises a single objection to Magistrate Judge Mazjoub’s R&R, 

arguing that the magistrate judge’s “recommendation is based on a 

misinterpretation of the Commissioner’s regulations that a diagnosis is an opinion, 

which must in turn be evaluated under 20 C.F.R. sections 404.1527 and 616.927, 

and for which the ALJ must give good reasons for the weight it is afforded.” 

(Def.’s Obj. 3 (citing R&R 6-10).) Arguing that the ALJ’s failure to explain the 

weight it accorded to Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist,7

 Dr. Pettit, was justified on 

the basis that Dr. Pettit’s treatment records contained only diagnoses as opposed to 

 7

 The parties do not dispute that Dr. Pettit qualifies as a treating psychiatrist 

whose opinion is entitled to deference unless unsupported by substantial record 

evidence. 

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an actual medical opinion, Defendant asks this Court to reject the R&R and enter 

judgment in its favor. 

 In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Mazjoub recommends denying Defendant’s 

motion for summary judgment and granting Plaintiff’s cross motion in part 

because, in her opinion, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and or assign any 

weight to the treatment records of Dr. Pettit. (R&R 9-10.) In reaching this 

conclusion, the magistrate judge rejected Defendant’s argument – rehashed in its 

objections – that the ALJ did not err “because Dr. Pettit did not author a medical 

opinion with regard to Plaintiff’s impairments or functional limitations.” (Id. at 9.) 

Magistrate Judge Mazjoub noted the Social Security Administration’s definition of 

“medical opinions” as “statements from physicians and psychologists or other 

acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of 

your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you 

can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2), § 416.927(a)(2). Noting that the ALJ not only failed to 

mention Dr. Pettit by name or the results of Plaintiff’s Burns Anxiety and 

Depression Tests, but that a “plain reading of the ALJ’s decision demonstrates that 

she did not assign any weight to the opinions of Dr. Pettit, except for the GAF 

scores that [s]he assigned to Plaintiff[,]” Magistrate Judge Mazjoub determined 

that the matter should be remanded for proper consideration and discussion of Dr. 

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Pettit’s medical opinion as a treating physician pursuant to sentence for of 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). (R&R 8, 9.) 

 Defendant argues that the magistrate judge erred by concluding that Dr. 

Pettit’s diagnoses were a medical opinion because they provided no explanation of 

Plaintiff’s specific limitations. According to Defendant’s reading of the pertinent 

regulations, a medical opinion must provide insight into a plaintiff’s actual 

restrictions or specific limitations resulting from a given condition. While this 

position is not entirely without support, the cases Defendant relies upon are 

distinguishable from the circumstances existing here, namely because Defendant 

fails to address, or even mention, Magistrate Judge Majzoub’s concerns regarding 

the Burns Anxiety and Depression Tests. As the R&R points out, if the test scores 

were completed by Dr. Pettit, they would constitute medical opinions and would be 

relevant to the ALJ’s analysis, “as they measure the severity of a person’s anxiety 

or depression.” (R&R 9.) Such evidence would serve to inform the ALJ of 

“specific limitations that impair Plaintiff’s ability to work[,]” Leidlein v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, No. 14-10718, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39122, at 

*20-21 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2015) (Berg, J.), and should therefore be considered 

on remand if it is determined that the tests were completed by Dr. Pettit. 

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

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Having thoroughly reviewed the administrative record, Magistrate Judge 

Mazjoub’s R&R, Defendant’s objection to the R&R, and Plaintiff’s response 

thereto under the lens of de novo review, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s 

objection and ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Mazjoub’s R&R. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is 

DENIED and that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART; 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is REMANDED to the 

Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) for proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order. 

Dated: September 21, 2015 

 s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Copies to: 

Karlan J. Bender, Esq. 

Derri T. Thomas, AUSA 

Karla J. Gwinn, Esq. 

Magistrate Judge Mona K. Mazjoub

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