# Supreme Court of Louisiana

Pag e 1 of 1 FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #026

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA The Opinions handed down on the **3rd day of May, 2017** , are as follows:

**BY CLARK, J.** :

2016 -C-1 395 DANIELLE DEON DICKERSON ACURIO v. DR. MICHAEL THOMAS ACURIO (Parish of Bossier)
For the reasons expr essed above and in l ight of the strong pu blic policy that favors the community property regime, we hold that for purposes of La. Civ. Code art. 23 31, an act under private signature must be duly acknowledged prior to the marriage to be fully perfected and given legal effect. Thus, we reverse the court of appeal judgment and reinstate the district court judgment. We remand the matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons. HUGHES, J., diss ents for the reasons assigned by Weimer, J. and assigns additional reasons.05 /03/2017 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA No. 2016
- C
- 1395 DANIELLE DEON DICKERSON ACURIO VERSUS DR. MICHAEL THOMAS ACURIO ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND CIRCUIT, PARISH OF BOSSIER
CLARK, Justice We granted this writ application to resolve a split among the appellate courts of our state regarding the proper interpretation of La. Civ. Code art. 2331. Specifically, we are tasked with determining whether parties must duly acknowledge their signatures prior to the marriage in order for the matrimonial agreement to have legal effect

. We find the acknowledgment of the signatures to be a form requirement , and the failure to meet all form requirements prior to the marriage renders the matrimonial agreement invalid. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
of the court of appeal and reinstate the district court judgment. We remand for proceedings consistent with this holding.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Danielle Deon Dickerson Acurio Cage, (hereinafter “the plaintiff”), and D r. Michael Thomas Acurio, (hereinafter “the defendant”), married on June 27, 1998 for the first time. That marriage ended in divorce in 2000. On January 29, 2002, the parties married for a second time. Prior to this marriage, on January 25, 2002, th e plaintiff and the defendant executed a document captioned “Prenuptial Agreement.” The document was signed by the parties before one witness and a notary. It is undisputed that the agreement was not executed by authentic act. Also, t he agreement did not contain an acknowledgment of the signature of either party.2 In 2009, divorce proceedings began. A judgment of divorce was signed and filed on October 6, 2010 . Property issues were to be decided at a November 2015 trial. However, in July of 2015, th e plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Invalid Matrimonial Agreement, seeking to exclude the 2002 document for failure to comply with the form requirements of La. Civ. Code art. 2331.
The district court granted the motion in limine, f inding the matrimonial agreement was not executed by authentic act or act under private signature duly acknowledged prior to the marriage. Specifically, the district court noted “the first acknowledgment of [the signatures] was in the deposition of [the p laintiff] on July 8, 2010.” Accordingly, it found the agreement was null and void “based upon the lack of form prior to the entering of the marriage.” The defendant appealed. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the district court’s judgment on

t he motion in limine, holding the Prenuptial Agreement was valid and enforceable because spouses do not have to acknowledge their signatures prior to marriage.
Acurio v. Acurio , 50,709 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So.3d 253. The plaintiff
filed the in stant writ application. We granted the writ to determine whether the acknowledgment of the parties’ signatures must occur prior to the marriage in order for the matrimonial agreement to be valid. Acurio v. Acurio , 16

- 1395 (La. 12/16/16), _So.3d_.
DISCUSSION Arguments of the Parties La. Civ. Code art. 2331 provides: A matrimonial agreement may be executed by the spouses before or during marriage. It shall be made by authentic act or by an act under private signature duly acknowledged by the spouses. The plaintiff argues the spouses’ signatures must be duly acknowle dged prior to the marriage. In support of this argument, she contends La. Civ. Code art. 23313 must be read in conjunction with La. Civ. Code art. 2329, which provides, in pertinent part: Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies or term inates a matrimonial regime during marriage only upon a joint petition and a finding by the court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the governing principles and rules. If spouses fail to enter into a valid matrimonial agreemen t before the marriage, La. Civ. Code art. 2329 requires them to jointly petition the court and obtain court approval to enter into a matrimonial agreement during marriage. According to the plaintiff’s view, i f the acknowledgment does not occur prior to the marriage, the

a greement is not fully perfected and is, therefore, invalid. Thus, court approval would be required to enter into a matrimonial agreement post

- nuptially . Reading these two articles jointly, as argued by the plaintiff, creates a temporal re quirement for the acknowledgment to occur prior to the marriage

. The majority of the appellate courts in this state have agreed with the plaintiff’s position. See Ritz v. Ritz , 95

- 683 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/13/95), 666 So.2d 1181 (wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal invalidated a matrimonial agreement when the parties failed to duly acknowledge their signatures prior to the marriage); Deshotels v. Deshotels , 13

- 1406 , p. 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 11/5/14), 150 So.3d
541 , 545 (wherein the Third Circuit Court o f Appeal found a matrimonial agreement invalid “because the elements of form must have been perfected before the marriage” and a later “admission in court that [a spouse] signed the marriage agreement cannot act to retroactively resurrect the defective mar riage agreement); Rush v. Rush , 12

- 1502 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/25/13), 115 So.3d 508 (wherein the First Circuit Court of Appeal held that the spouses had to get court approval for a matrimonial agreement if the spouses had not acknowledged their signatures pri or to the marriage); Lauga v. Lauga , 537 So.2d 758 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1989)(wherein the Fourth Circuit Court of4 Appeal invalidated a matrimonial agreement for the spouses’ failure to acknowledge their signatures prior to the marriage). Conversely, the defendant contends the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in the instant case correctly ruled that acknowledgment has no temporal requirement and can occur at any time. Because La. Civ. Code art. 2331 does not expressly place a
time element on acknowledgment, the defendant relies on the general law of
obl igations

. Specifically, he cites to La. Civ. Code art. 1836, which states: An act under private signature is regarded prima facie as the true and genuine act of a party executing it when his s ignature has been acknowledged, and the act shall be admitted in evidence without further proof. An act under private signature may be acknowledged by a party to that act by recognizing the signature as his own before a court, or before a notary public, or other officer authorized to perform that function, in the presence of two witnesses. An act under private signature may be acknowledged also in any other manner authorized by law. Nevertheless, an act under private signature, though acknowledged, cannot substitute for an authentic act when the law prescribes such an act. The defendant avers the validity of the private signature is a question of proof of the signatures by way of acknowledgment, which can be offered at any time. To support the noti o n that the acknowledgment is merely a matter of evidentiary proof and not an element of form, he sets forth La. Civ. Code art. 1838: A party against whom an act under private signature is asserted must acknowledge his signature or deny that it is his. In case of denial, any means of proof may be used to establish that the signature belongs to that party. Analysis Against th is backdrop of opposing viewpoints, we begin our analysis with

some basic tenets of civilian law

. “Laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other.” La. Civ. Code art. 13. “All laws pertaining to the same subject matter must be interpreted in pari materia

. . . .” Pierce5 Foundations, Inc. v. Jaroy Construction, Inc. , 15

– 785, p. 7 (La. 5/3/16), 190 So.3d 298, 303

. The legal regime of community property is presumed. La. Civ. Code art. 2340. In light of this presumption and the strong legislative policy favoring community rights, we interpret statutory provisions which waive those rights stricti juris

. (See e.g. Rush , 115 So.3d at 512; Poirier v. Poirier , 626 So.2d 868, 870 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993) , writ denied , 94

- 161 (La. 3/11/94), 634 So.2d 389

. We note the defendant’s argument is primarily grounded in the apparent
absence of a temporal requirement for acknowledgment in La. Civ. Code art. 2331.
T he defendant then navigates to the general rules of obligations to reach the conclusion that acknowledgment of a party’s signature is simply an evidentiary matter that can be proven at any time. However, we find such a departure from the applicable rules on matrimonial agreements to be erroneous. La. Civ. Code art. 1916 specifically instructs, “[n]ominate contracts are subject to the special rules of the respective titles when those ru les modify, complement, or depart from the rules of this title [conventional obligations or contracts].” For the reasons that follow, we find the collective rules assigned to matrimonial agreements, as nominate contracts, dictate that acknowledgment of spo uses’ signatures must occur prior to the marriage, elevating proof to a matter of form. As noted by the plaintiff, La. Civ. Code arts. 2331 and 2329 must be read in pari materia , or in reference to each other. La. Civ. Code art. 2329 requires spouses

w ishing to enter into a matrimonial agreement during the marriage to seek court approval. Specifically, the court must be satisfied that such an agreement “serves [the parties’] best interests and that they understand the governing principles and
rules.” T his requirement of court approval highlights the legislative decision to make opting out of the presumed community property regime a task that requires effort. Therefore, i n reading these two statutes jointly, it is clear the legislature intended to
make i t onerous to waive one’s community property rights, at least to the extent that6 certain procedural hurdles were put in place to ensure the parties consider the consequences of entering into a matrimonial agreement that is not favored by public policy. Thus, i f procedural burdens are placed on the spouses by way of authentic act before marriage and court approval during marriage, it logically follows that the relaxed act of signing one’s private signature, without the accompanying requirement of it being duly acknowledged, is disallowed. As further evidence of this conclusion, we look at the context within which
the “private signature duly acknowledged” language is placed: as an alternative to
the authentic act. Thus, we delve into a deeper analysis of the authentic act itself

. La. Civ. Code art. 1835 provides “[a]n authentic act constitutes full proof of the agreement it contains, as against the parties, their heirs, and successors by universal or particular title.” A n authentic act has been said to b e clothed with “a presumption of genuineness.” DiVincenti v. McIntyre , 611 So.2d 140, 141 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992). Authentic acts are afforded “a high degree of sanctity[.]” Id. For centuries now, we have recognized the convincing proof of an authentic a ct: The effect given by law to authentic acts, rests upon the presumption, that a public officer, exercising a high and important trust, under the solemnity of an oath, has done his duty when acting within the scope of his authority. Selected for their cha racter, capacity and probity, as notaries are presumed to be, the law attaches full credit to their official acts. This prerogative is established in the interest of public order, to maintain peace among men, and to prevent contestations concerning the pro of or evidence of their conventions

. Succession of Tete, 7 La.Ann. 95, 96 (La.1852)

. (emphasis added). The interpretation adopted by the defendant and the Second Circuit in the
instant case is contrary to the very goal envisioned by authentic acts, which is “to prevent contestations concerning the proof o r evidence” that the signatures are indeed those of the parties. Id. In stead , the result advocated by the defendant would allow parties to contest their signatures during divorce proceedings, when parti es are most contentious, sometimes decades after the document was executed. This7 possibility is wholly contradictory to a “presumption of genuineness” or “full proof” of what the thing purports to be. DiVincenti, supra and La. Civ. Code art. 1835,
respec tively. The presumption of validity created by an authentic act gives the document immediate legal significance. There is no suspensive condition attached which must be fulfilled before the agreement can be perfected. Likewise, it stands
to reason that t he requirement of acknowledgment is one with similar temporal constraints and consequences such that the proof of one’s signature is as much an element of proof as it is of required form. The defendant would have us interpret La. Civ. Code art. 2331 as t he parties’ option of executing an authentic act or executing a contract under private signature, with the acknowledgment simply amounting to a means of proving the signatures at any time. However, both the authentic act and the acknowledgment language wo uld be rendered superfluous if all that were required were the two individuals’ signatures. As noted above, the joint reading of La. Civ. Code art s . 2331 and. 2329
evidences a legislative decision to put into place certain procedural obstacles to ensure due consideration is given to the matrimonial agreement before waiving the favored community property regime. Bearing in mind this legislative purpose, we
find i t would be illogical t o give spouses the choice between the following unbalanced opt ions: (1) executing a contract under such sanctified legal conditions as the requirement of a notary and two witnesses or (2) merely placing one’s signature on a document witho ut any external authentication. Rather, the placement of the option of “private signature duly acknowledged” within in the same bank of
choices as an “authentic act” offers a window into the burden envisioned by the

statute

— a somewhat laborious one. In other words, i t makes little sense to present as an option a heightened burden fo r execution of an agreement when a much less stringent one would suffice. As instructed by La. Civ.Code art. 12, the meaning of ambiguous words must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and8 the text of the law a s a whole. Thus, we find t he very fact that “ an act under private signature duly acknowledged” is presented as the sole alternative to an “authentic
act” is a telling recognition that both methods of execution are meant to be sufficiently arduous so as to provoke thought and consid eration before entering into the agreement

. Further, w hile we acknowledge that secondary sources are not controlling , we find the following treatise excerpt helpful and relevant: “ The act under private signature duly acknowledged (also called an authent icated private act), the third type of act, is a hybrid of the authentic act and the act under private signature. ” 24 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Sales § 6:14 . This scholarly commentary adds support to our holding that the language “act under priv ate signature duly acknowledged ” is a term of art that is more than just the sum of its parts. Rather, it, as a whole, is a h ybrid of an authentic act and an act under private signature and cannot be dissected to mean

an “ act under private signature ” that can be separately acknowledged later. This
same treatise discussion specifically contrasts a matrimonial agreement with a general contract of sale , stating: “ Although there are some agreements which are valid if confected by authenticated pri vate ac t but not by private act [footnote reference to La. Civ. Code art. 2331 (matrimonial agreement)], the sale of an immovable is permissible by private act. ” This observation recognizes that a matrimonial agreement requires more than just a private act in ord er to be perfected, it requires “an authenticated private act”, i.e., acknowledgment of the signatures. Thus, this secondary source, while not governing, lends support to our holding that the placement of the requirement of proof (“duly acknowledged”) in the same code article as the manner of execution of the act itself (“an act under private signature”) elevates an evidentiary requirement to a form one, ther eby creating a temporal
element

. Accordingly, we find in order to have legal validity, a matrimoni al9 agreement executed prior to marriage must be made by authentic act or signed and duly acknowledged prior to marriage. Because the parties in the instant case did not acknowledge their signatures prior to their marriage on January 29, 2002 , the distri ct court correctly granted the plaintiff’s motion in limine, finding the matrimonial agreement invalid for failure to comply with the form requirements of La. Civ. Code art. 2331. Any acknowledgment that occurred post

- nuptially cannot be relied upon to cu re a defect
in form.
CONCLUSION For the reasons expressed above and in light of the strong public policy that favors the community property regime, we hold that for purposes of La. Civ. Code art. 2331, an act under private signature must be duly acknowl edged prior to the marriage to be fully per fected and given legal effect. Thus, we reverse the court of appeal judgment and reinstate the district court judgment. We remand the matter to
the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RE VERSED AND REMANDED.

### 05 /03 /20 17 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

NO. 20 16 -C-1 39 5
DANIEL LE DEO N DICKE RSON ACURIO

VERSUS
DR. MICHAEL THO MAS ACURIO
ON W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT O F APP EAL, SEC OND CIRCUIT

, PARISH OF BOSSI

ER

WEI MER, J. , di ss en ti ng
. The ve ne rab le Lou is ia na Ci vi l Co de w a s w rit te n an d en act ed as an 1
in te rre l a t e d , c om

pl et e bo dy of pr iv at e, su bs ta nt iv e la w to be read in pa ri mat er ia

. Aut ho rit y m or e le arn ed th an m y se lf rem ark ed th at ou r Ci vi l Co de “ is su pp os ed to be

a se lf- su ffi ci en t an d lo gi cal ly in te rd ep en de nt en act m en t, to be co ns tru ed as a who le ,”
th ro ug h a syste m at ic an d lo gi cal an al y si s o f al l t he leg is la ti ve en act m en ts av ai la bl e fo r de ci si on of th e pa rt i c u l a r q ue st io n pr es en te d. Alb ert Tate , Jr ., Tech ni qu es of
Ju di ci al In te rp re ta ti on i n Lo ui si an a , 22 La. L. Rev

. 72 7, 72 8 (1 96 1- 62 ). By th at

See the Civil Code of L ouisiana and Ancillarie s, Revision of 1870, at v (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1 Claitor’s Pu

b li s h ing Division (2 ed. 1981)), in which L ouisiana Chief J ustice J ohn Ba ptiste Four

net n d stated in the introduction:

The uniqueness of the L ouisiana civil law in the United States, and, for that matter, in world law, has long been the subject of verba l comm ent and lear ned trea tises. T he code in w hich this law is e mbodied has bee n called “the most pe rfe ct child of t he civil law,” praised as “the clear est, fullest, the m ost philosophical, and best adapte d to the exigenc ies of modern society ,” and char acte rized as “per haps the best of all moder

n codes throug hout the world.”
See also J ohn T. Hood, J r., The History and Dev elopment of the Louisi ana Civil Code , 19 L a. L

. Rev. 18 (1958):

Ba sed on Roman law, modeled afte r the g rea t Code Napoleon, enric hed with the experience s of at least twenty -seve n ce n t u ri es, and mellowed by Americ an principles and traditions, it is a li ving and durable monume n t to those who create d it. After 150 y ear s of trial, the Civil Code of L ouisiana re mains vener able, a body of substantive law adequate for the prese nt and capa ble of expanding to meet future needs.m eas ur e, th is sh ou ld be a cas e res ol ve d th ro ug h a lo gi cal an d st rai gh t f o rward
ap pl ic at io n o f th e rel ev an t p ro vi si on s o f th e Ci vi l Co de

. Thi s cas e co nc ern s th e va li di ty of a m at rimoni al ag reem en t, si gn ed by bo th
sp o u s e s be fo re a no ta ry an d on e wit ne ss fo ur da y s pr io r to th ei r Ja nu ary 29 , 20 02

m arri ag e, an d ack no wled ge d by th e sp ou se s su bs eq ue nt to th ei r m arri ag e. La. C.C.

art

. 23 31 ad dr es se s th e m at rimoni al ag reem en t an d es ta bl is he s th e fo rm th at
ag reem en t m

us t t ak e: A m at rimoni al ag reem en t m ay be ex ecu te d by th e sp ou se s be fo re or du rin g m arri ag e. It sh al l be m ad e by au th en ti c act or by an act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e d ul y

ack no wled ge d b y

th e sp ou se s. The re is no di sp ut e th at th e m at rimoni al ag reem en t in th is cas e was no t in

au th en ti c fo rm ; th eref

or e, th e qu es ti on be co m es whe th er it was an “ act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e du ly ack no wled ge d by th e sp ou se s ” w i th in th e m ean in g of La. C.C. art

. 23 31 when it was e xe cu te d p rio r to th e m arri ag e, bu t ac kn owl ed ge d t he reaf te r. The “ act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e du ly ack no wled ge d” is no t de fin ed in Arti cl e 23 31 , no r in an y ot he r pr ov is io n in th e ti tl e on Mat rimoni al Reg im es , bu t it is
ad dr es se d in th e ti tl e on Obl ig at io ns in Gen eral , to whi ch on e is di rect ed by th e
pr ov is io ns of th e Co de it se lf. See, La. C.C

. a r t s
. 19 15 , 19 16 , an d C.C. art

. 23 28 , 2 3
Rev

. co m m en ts (b ). In th e ch ap te r en ti tl ed Pro of of Obl ig at io ns , La. C.C. art

. 18 36

4

pr ov id es :

L a. C.C. art. 1915 direc ts: 2
All c ontrac ts, nominate and innominate, are subject to the rules of this title.
L a. C.C. art 1916 provides: 3
Nominate contra cts are subject to the specia l rules of the respe ct i v e titles when those r

ules modify , complement, or de part fr om the rules of this title.
L a. C.C. art. 2328, Rev. cmt. (b) provides, in per tinent part: 4
A matrimonial ag ree ment i s governe d by the g ener al rules of conventional obliga tions unless otherwise provided in this Title.
2An act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e is reg ard ed pr im a faci e as th e tru e

an d ge nu in e act of a pa rty ex ecu ti ng i t w h e n h i s si gn at ur e ha s be en ack no wled ge d, an d th e act sh al l be ad m it te d in ev id en ce wit ho ut fu rth er pr oo f.
An act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e m ay be ack no wled ge d by a pa rty to t h a t act by reco gn iz in g th e si gn at ur e as hi s own be fo re a co ur t, or be fo re a no ta ry pu bl ic , or ot he r of fic er au th or iz ed to pe rfo rm th at fu nc ti on , in th e p r e s e n ce of two wit ne ss es
. An act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e m ay be ack no wled ge d al so in an y ot he r m an ne r au th or iz ed by la w.
Nev ert he le ss , an act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e, th ou gh ack no wled ge d, can no t su bs ti tu te fo r an au th en ti c act whe n th e la w pr es cri be s s uc h a n a ct

. Si gn ifi can tl y , th ere is no pr ov is io n in t h i s art ic le req ui rin g th at th e ack no wled gm en t oc cu r a t th e sa m e ti m e or wit hi n a cert ai n ti m e of th e or ig in al

ex ecu ti on
. Thi s is co ns is te nt wit h th e co nc ep t o f th e ack no wled gm en t as a fo rm of
pr oo f: th e ack no wled gm en t ve rif ie s th at th e s ig na tu res on th e act are wha t th ey
pu rp or t to be an d, th us , a d d s t o t h e r e li ab il it y of th e act as th e do cu m en t th at was
act ua l l y ex ecu te d by th e pa rti es
. Su ch pr oo f is on ly ne ces sa ry whe n, as La. C.C.
18 31 ex pl ai ns , a pa rty d em an ds pe r f o r m an ce of th e ob li ga ti on or se ek s to es ta bl is h
th at th e “ ob li ga ti on is n u l l , o r th at it ha s be en m od ifi ed or ex ti ng ui sh ed .” Thu s, a
req ui rem en t th at th e ack no wled gm en t oc cu r co nt em po ran eo us wit h, or wi t hi n a
cert ai n ti m e of th e ex ecu ti on of th e act , is no t on ly no t req ui red by th e Ci vi l Co de , it
is co un te rin tu it iv e to th e v ery pu rp os e o f th e ack no wled gm en t.
The Co de art ic le to whi ch on e is di rect ed in th e ab se nc e of a sp eci fic pr ov is io n in th e Mat rimoni al Reg im es ti tl e– La. C.C.art

. 18 36 , th e art ic le de fin in g th e act un de r
pr iv at e si gn at ur e du ly ack no wled ge d– im po se s no te m

po ral req ui rem en t, bu t rat he r

es ta bl is he s th at th e act of ack no wled gm en t is a m at te r of pr oo f, an d no t fo rm
. The re is no pr ov is io n in th e Mat rimoni al Reg im es ti tl e req ui rin g th at th e ack no wled gm en t
of a m at rimoni al ag reem en t b e ex ecu te d pr io r to th e m arri ag e. Thu s, th e lo gi cal

3co nc lu si on to be dr awn fro m an an al y si s of th e rel ev an t Co de art ic le s i s t h a t t he

m at rimoni al a g r e e men t at is su e in th is cas e– an ag reem en t ex ecu te d pr io r to th e

m arri ag e an d a ck no wled ge d t he reaf te r– is va li d a nd en fo rcea bl e. Thi s fu nd am en ta l ci vi li an ap pr oa ch to res ol ut io n of the is su e pr es en te d is th e

on e th at was ad op te d by th e co ur t of app eal ; and , it is th e ap pr oa ch en do rs ed by the
le ga l co m m en ta to rs
. I n f

a c t , in th e Lou is ia na Ci vi l Law Treat is e on m at rimoni al
reg im es , aft er reci ti ng th e two fo rm s req ui red fo r m at rimoni al ag reem en ts un de r La.
C.C. art

. 23 31 –a n au th en ti c a c t o r a n act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e du ly
ack no wled ge d– th e au th or s ex pl ai n:

The al te rn at iv e fo rm is th e “ act un de r pr iv a t e si gn at ur e th at is ack no wled ge d b y

th e sp ou se s.” The g en eral rul es of a ut he nt ic at io n o f pr iv at e act s do no t pr ov id e an y ex pr es s ti m e pe rio d. Co ns is te nt wit h th e po li cy th at th e in te res t at st ak e is ev id en ti ary rat he r th an c a u t i o n a ry , i t sh ou ld be pe rm is si bl e to au t h e nt ic at e a m at rimoni al ag reem en t at an y ti m e. No st at ut e se em s to req ui re th at th e au th en ti cat io n oc cu r be fo re th e m arri ag e.
In de ed , in Acuri o v. Acuri o , [ 5 0,7 09 (La.App

. 2 Ci r. 6/ 22 /1 6) , 19 7 So .3d 25 3], th e Seco nd Ci rcu i t C ou rt of App eal he ld th at a pr en up ti al ag reem en t da te d fo ur da y s pr io r to th e pa rti es ’ m arri ag e was va li d ev en th ou gh it was no t ack no wled ge d un ti l ne arl y two y ears la te r. The co ur t em

ph as iz ed no t on ly th e fai lu r e o f an y st at ut es to req ui re ack no wled gm en t wit hi n a sp eci fic pe rio d, bu t al so th e pu rp os e of th e req ui rem en t to ha ve th e pa rti es “ reco gn iz e th e si gn at ur es as th ei r own .”
16 A. C ARROL L & R. M ORENO , L OUI SI ANA C I VI L L AW T REATI SE: M ATRI MONI AL
R EGI MES , § 8 :7 (4 ed ., Sup p. 2 01 6- 17 ) (fo ot no te om it te d)

. th 5

These commentators g o on to distinguish and dismantle the rea soning of the appellate courts that 5 have rea ched a contra

ry conclusion. For example, the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Ritz v. Ritz , 95-683, p. 12 (L a.App. 5 Cir. 12/ 1 3 / 9 5 ), 666 So.2d 1181, that “just as all require ments of a pre marital authentic act must be met prior to the marria g e, so too, must all elem ents of an act under private signa ture duly acknowledge d be done prior , or antec edent to the marria g e” is dismiss ed by the commentators as “dictum” and lacking authority

. 16 C A RROL L & M ORENO , L OUISIANA C IVIL L A W T REA T ISE: M A T RIMONIAL R EGIM ES , § 8 : 7 at p
. 861 n.14. L ikewise, the result i n Lauga v. Lauga , 537 So.2d 758 (L a.App. 4 Cir. 1989), is ca lled into question:

Lau ga may appea

r to be a straig htforwa

rd analy sis of these form and authentica tion require ments, but the result may be questioned. Und er the require ments for private acts “duly acknow ledg ed,” there is no require ment that the
4Nev ert he le ss , an d de sp it e th e ab se n ce of an y co da l pr ov is io n di rect in g th at

ack no wled gm en t of a pr en up ti al m at rimoni al ag reem en t an te da te th e marria ge , th e

m a jo r i t y im po se s su ch a req ui rem en t un de r th e aeg is of pr ot ect in g “ th e st ro ng le gi sl at iv e po li cy fav or in g co m m un it y rig ht s.” Acuri o v. Acuri o , 16 -1 39 5, sl ip op
. at 5 (La. 5/

__ /1 7)

. The m ajor it y m in es th is po li cy fro m th e pr ov is io ns of La. C.C. art

. 23 29 , whi ch it co nt en ds m us t b e rea d in pa ri mat er ia wit h La. C.C . art . 23 31

. Id
. Wh il e it is tru e th at la ws on th e sa m e su bjec t m at te r m us t be in te rp ret ed i n refe ren ce to each ot he r (s ee La. C.C. art

. 13 ) th e m ajor it y ap pl ie s th at pr ecep t he re to
th e ex cl us io n of ot he r eq ua ll y rel ev an t pr ov is io ns of th e ti tl e. Fo r ex am pl e, La. C.C.

art

. 23 28 rece iv es no m en ti on in th e m ajor it y ’s an al y si s. Yet, th is art ic le de fin es th e

m at rimoni al ag reem en t an d fu rth er de cl ares : “ Sp ou s e s are free to es ta bl is h by

m at rimoni al ag reem en t a reg im e of se pa rat io n of pr op ert y or m od ify th e le ga l reg im e

as pr ov id ed by la w.” La. C.C. art

. 23 28

. Rat he r th an ev id en ce a “ st ro ng le gi sl at iv e
po li cy fav or in g co m

m un it y rig ht s,” th is art ic le pr ov id es th e pa r t i e s w i th al m os t

co m pl et e free do m of co nt ract , r e le ga ti ng th e pr ov is io ns of th e le ga l reg im e to a 6

su pp le ti ve ro le

. See La. C.C. art

. 23 28 (“ The pr ov is io ns of th e le ga l reg im e th at ha ve

no t b een ex cl ud ed or m od ifi ed by agree m en t re ta in th ei r fo rce a nd effe ct .”).
Mo reo ve r, th e m ajor it y ’s c ha ract eri zat io n of La. C.C. art s. 23 29 an d 23 31 as la ws on th e “ sa m e su bjec t m at te r,” is qu es ti on ab le

. W hi le Arti cl e 23 29 ap pe ars in th e

acknow ledg ment be at the s ame tim e or wi thin a certain stated time of t he original execution. Thus, it seems that in 1986, the parties could have simply acknow ledg ed their first ag ree ment by appea ranc e betwee n a notary and two witnesses. I ndeed, since their 1986 appea

ranc e befor e the notary was to execute what appea red to be the same a g ree ment they

executed bef

ore, it ar g uably

constituted an ac knowledg ment.
16 C A RROL L & M ORENO , L OUISIANA C IVIL L A W T REA T ISE: M A T RIMONIAL R EGIM ES , § 8:7 at p. 862-63. This contra ctual fre edom is limit ed only by the require ment that the ag ree ment not addre ss matters 6 that are prohibited by

public policy . See, L a. C.C. art. 2329.
5sa m e ti tl e as Arti cl e 23 31 , th e pr oc ed ur e de sc rib ed in Arti cl e 23 29 ad d r e s s e s th e

at te m pt to m od ify or te rm in at e a m at rimoni al reg im e du ri ng m arri ag e, a si tu at io n th at
is no t im pl ic at ed in th is cas e. Si m pl y be cau se th e le gi sl at ur e h as m ad e a co ns ci ou s de ci si on to m ak e it m or e on ero us to ch an ge th e reg im e du ri ng m arri ag e (o nc e rig ht s

an d ob li ga ti on s hav e at ta ch ed ) do es no t m ean th at th e le gi sl at ur e in te nd ed th e sa m e wit h res pe ct to ag reem en ts co nf ect ed pr io r to m arri ag e. In de ed , th e op po si te ap pe ars
to be tru e. As no te d b y Pro fes so rs Sp ah t an d Sam ue l, m em be rs of th e Adv is or y Co m m it te e to th e Jo in t Leg is la ti ve Su bc om m it te e Rev is in g Lou is ia na ’s Co m m un it y
Pro pe rty Laws, th e jud ic ia l ap pr ov al req ui red un de r Arti cl e 23 29 whe n sp ou se s se ek

to en te r in to a m at rimoni al ag reem en t th at m od i f i e s o r t erm in at es a m at rimoni al
reg im e du ri ng m arri ag e was in te rp os ed as a pr oc ed ur al sa feg u a r d to pr ot ect th e
sp ou se who se co nt rib ut io ns to th e m arri ag e were no n- eco no m ic , fro m ov erre ach in g by th e sp ou se who co nt rib ut es eco no m ic al ly. Kath eri ne S. Sp ah t & Cy nt hi a Sam ue l, Equ al Man ag emen t Revi si te d: 19 79 Leg is la ti ve Mod if ic at io ns of th e 19 78
Mat ri mon ia l Reg imes La w , 40 La. L. Rev

. 83 , 90 -9 1 (1 97 9- 19 80 ). The fact th at th e le gi sl at ur e di d no t ex pr es s th e sa m e co nc ern s wit h res pe ct to m at rimoni al ag reem en ts

ex ecu te d pr io r to m arri ag e an d, th us , di d no t ex te nd si m il ar so le mnit ie s an d

sa feg ua rd s t o s uc h a gr eem en ts di d n ot go un no ti ced by the se same com m en ta to rs :
Fu rth erm or e, Act 70 9 pe rm it s m at rimoni al ag reem en ts to be m ad e by [ 7 ]
an act un de r p riv at e si gn at ur e du ly ack no wled ge d by th e sp ou se s, as well as by an au th en ti c act , whe reas Act 62 7 [th e pr ed e c e s so r Act] req ui red the sol em

n fo rm al it ie s of an au th en ti c act

. An ack no wled gm en t of th e ex ecu ti on of a co nt ract , un li ke an au th en ti c act , do es no t en ta il th e cu st om ary read in g or pa rap hr as in g by th e no ta ry of th e act ’s co nt en ts to th e p a r t i e s in th e pr es en ce of wit ne ss es
. The ack no wled gm en t is th us
Through 1 9 7 8 L a. Acts 627, the leg islature revised the laws on matrimonial reg imes, repe aling 7 “hea d and master” and repla cing it with an equal manag ement scheme

. The eff ective date of Act 627 was post p o n ed, howeve r, to allow the leg islature and its Advisory Commi ttee to make any adjustments deeme d nece ssary once the public was introduced to the revisions. This resulted in the enac tment of 1979 L a. Acts 709, § 1, which contains the provisions at issue in this case
. See, Spaht & Samue l, supra , at 83-84.
6no t as li ke ly as is an au th en ti c act to al ert a sp ou se to th e se rio us ne ss of

wha t he is do in g. It i s , t h e r e fo re, su rp ris in g th at th e le ss er fo rm al it ie s are per m it te d in le gi sl at io n whi ch , in it s ot he r pr ov is io ns , is co nc ern ed wit h s po us al ov erre ach in g. Id
. at p . 92

. Thro ug h it s in pa ri mat er ia read in g of La. C.C. art s. 23 29 an d 23 31 , it ap pe ars th e m ajor it y effe ct iv el y in te rp os es a req ui rem en t in to th e la w co nc ern in g pr en up ti al

m ari ta l ag reem en ts th at is no t pr es en t in th e l a n g u a g e of th e art ic le , ba se d on a

co nc ern no t ex pr es se d by th e le gi sl at u r e
. I n sh or t, th ere is si m pl y no ba si s in th e la ng ua ge or le gi sl at iv e hi st or y of La. C.C. art

. 23 29 fo r th e co nc lu si o n t ha t by
req ui rin g jud ic ia l ap pr ov al of m od ifi cat io ns o r t erm in at io ns of m at rimoni al
ag reem en ts du ri ng

m arri ag e, th e le gi sl at ur e in te nd ed to “ el ev at [e] pro of to a m at te r of for m ,” in La. C.C. art . 23 31 . See, Acuri o , sl ip op . at 5

. Ult im at el y , th e qu es ti on th at is pr es en te d to th is co ur t fo r res ol ut io n is whe th er th e m at rimoni al ag reem en t ex ecu te d by th e Acu rio s pr io r to th ei r m arri ag e is effe ct iv e

as “ an act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e du ly ack no wled ge d by th e sp ou se s.” La. C.C. art

. 23 31

. Des pi te th e di rect rel ev an ce of La. C.C. art

. 18 36 to th is qu es ti on , th e m ajor it y
at te m pt s to li m it co ns id erat i o n t o t h e Co de art ic le s in th e ti tl e on m at rimoni al
reg im es
. It do es so un de r th e gu is e of La. C.C. art

. 19 16 an d th e ch arac te riz at io n of
th e m at rimoni al ag ree men t a s a no m in at e co nt ract

. Howev er, La. C.C. art

. 19 16
ap pl ie s by it s te rm s on ly if th e res pe ct iv e ti tl e– he re, th e ti tl e on Mat rimoni al Reg im es

–a ct s to “ m od ify, co m

pl em en t, or de pa rt fro m ” th e ru le s of co nv en ti on al ob li ga ti on s.
La. C.C. art

. 19 16

. As i n d i cat ed ab ov e, th e m ajor it y in th is cas e si m pl y pr es um es

su ch a mo d ifi cat io n or de pa rtu re (wh ere no ne is ex pr es se d) ba se d on a pe rcei ve d
le gi sl at iv e in te nt “ to m ak e it on ero us to waiv e on e’s co m m un it y pr op ert y rig ht s” an d

“ [en te r] in to a m at rimoni al ag reem en t th at is no t fav or ed by pu bl ic po li cy .” Acuri o ,

7sl ip op . at 5 -6

. Howev er, the m ajor it y ’s fo un da ti on al pre m is e– th at th e m at rimoni al

ag reem en t is no t fav or ed by pu bl ic po li cy an d th eref or e “ pr oc ed ur al hu rd le s were pu t
in pl ace to en su re th e pa rti es co ns id er th e co ns eq ue nc es o f en te rin g in to a

m at rimoni al ag reem en t” –f ai ls to acco un t fo r th e fact th at th e le gi sl at ur e h as m ov ed
away fro m im

po si ng th e le ga l reg im e on al l m ar r i e d p e r so ns an d ha s pr ov id ed , th ro ug h La. C.C. art

. 23 28 , t h at sp ou se s are no w free to es ta bl is h th e m at rimoni al
reg im e o f th ei r ch oi ce.
In an y ev en t, aft er es ch ewin g res or t to th e co de art ic le s on ge ne ral ob li ga ti on s, th e m ajor it y tu rn s it s at te nt io n to th os e ve ry art ic le s, in p a r t i c u l a r t o La. C.C. art

. 18 35 , to arg ue th at gi ve n th e “ sa nc ti [ty] ” acco rd ed au th en ti c act s, “ it m ak es li tt le

se ns e to pr es en t as an op ti on a he ig ht en ed bu rd en fo r ex ecu ti on of an ag reem en t whe n

a m uc h le ss st rin ge nt on e wou ld su ffi ce.” Acuri o , sl ip op
. at 7. Howev er, th is is
pr eci s e l y w h a t th e la ng ua ge of La. C.C. art

. 23 31 co nt em pl at es whe n it us es th e di sju nc ti ve “ or .” Lou is ia na C.C. art. 23 31 pr ov id es th at th e m at rimoni al ag reem en t

“ sh al l be m ad e by au th en ti c act or by an act un de r p r iv at e si gn at ur e du ly
ack no wled ge d by th e sp ou se s.” (Em ph as is ad de d.) As th e co m m en ta to rs ha ve no te d,
th e fact th at th e ag reem en t can be ex ecu te d as ei th er an au th en ti c act or an act un de r
pr iv at e si gn at ur e du ly ack no wled ge d un de rs co res th e pu rp os e of th e req ui rem en t as

on e o f pr oo f rat he r th an for m :

The au th en ti c act req ui rem en t fo r m at rimoni al ag ree ment s do es no t se rv e th e typic al cau ti on ary fu nc ti on of th e au th en ti c act be cau se th e act m ay be a s i mp le writ te n ag reem en t th at is ack no wled ge d at a la te r ti m e. Thu s, th e po li cy be hi n d t h i s r eq ui rem en t, th en , is si m pl y an ev id en ti ary on e ad di ng to th e rel ia bi li ty of th e writ i n g as wha t was act ua ll y ex ecu te d by th e pa rti es
. Alt ho ug h no rm al au th e n t i c a ti on is ad eq ua te if do ne by on e pa rty to th e ag reem en t, Lou is ia n a Ci vi l Co de Arti cl e 23 31 req ui res th at th e act be ack no wled ge d “ by th e sp ou se s,” pr es um ab ly m ean in g b ot h o f th em
.

81 6 C ARROL L & M ORENO , L OUI SI ANA C I VI L L AW T REATI SE: M ATRI MONI AL

R EGI MES , § 8 :7 at p . 86 1- 86 2 (f oo tn ot es om it te d)

.

“ [L]egi sl at io n is th e su pe rio r so ur ce of la w in Lou is ia na .” La. C.C. art

. 1, Rev

.

cm t. (a). W he n a law i s cl ear a nd un am bi gu ou s an d i ts ap pl ic at io n d oe s n ot lea d to
ab su rd co ns eq ue nc es , it m us t be ap pl ie d as writ te n an d no fu rth er in te rp ret at io n m ay be m ad e in se arch of th e le gi sl at iv e in te nt

. La. C.C. art

. 9. In th is cas e, th e rel ev an t
la w is th at co nt ai ne d in La. C.C. art

. 23 31 an d in La. C.C. art

. 18 36 (wh ic h is m ad e
ap pl ic ab le by La. C.C. art s. 19 15 an d 23 28 , Rev

. cm t. (b )). Co nt rary to th e m ajor it y ’s

su gg es ti on , th ere is no th in g am bi gu ou s ab ou t th e ph ras e “ by au th en ti c act or by an
act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e d ul y ack no wled ge d b y th e sp ou se s,” as i t ap pe ars in La.
C.C. art

. 23 31 an d, th us , th ere is no ne ed to go in se arch of a le gi sl at iv e in te nt th at is

ot he rwis e cl earl y

co nv ey ed by the word s o f th e rel ev an t Co de art ic le s.
In th e fin al an al y si s, un de r th e gu is e of pr ot ect in g th e le ga l reg im e, th e m ajor it y

ov erl oo ks ch a n g es to ou r m at rimoni al reg im es la w whi ch pr ov id e fo r free do m to

co nt ract fo r a reg im e of th e sp ou se s’ ch oi ce, an d th e cl ear an d un am bi gu ou s la ng ua ge of La. C.C. art s. 2 33 1 a nd 18 36 . Furt he rm or e, it do es so in a cas e in whi ch th ere i s

no in di cat io n th at th e sp ou se s di d no t en te r in to th e m at rimoni al ag reem en t wit h th ei r
ey es wid e op en , ha vi ng m arri ed pr ev io us ly an d di vo rced

. In de ed , it was Mrs

. Acu rio
who dr aft ed th e pr en up ti al ag reem en t, whi ch was si gn ed by bo th p a rti es fo ur da y s
pr io r to th ei r mar ria ge
. Bo th pa rti es ha ve ack no wled ge d th ei r si gn at ur es on th e

m at rimoni al ag reem en t an d, du rin g th eir m ar ri ag e, the y co nduc te d the ir fi na nc ia l li ve s

co ns is te nt th erewi th (wit h th e ex cep ti on of a si ng le bu s i n e s s e n t e rp ris e). In fact , whe n Dr. Acu rio bo ug ht th e ho m e in whi ch th ey li ve d wit h hi s se pa rat e fu nd s, Mrs

. Acu rio ap pe ared an d si gn ed th e de ed an d affi rm ed th at th e ho us e was Dr. A c u rio ’s

se pa rat e pr op ert y
. Sh e st at ed un de r oa th in he r d e p o s i t i o n th at sh e si gn ed th e

9ag reem en t. Und er th es e ci rcu m st an ces , it is cl ear t ha t Mrs

. Acu rio jud ic ia ll y

ack no wled ge d he r si gn at ur e an d th e ag reem en t. Bec au se th ere is no req ui rem en t th at
th e ack no wled gm en t of th e sp ou se s’ si gn at ur es be ex ecu te d pri or to th e m arri ag e, it
f o l l o ws th at th e pr en up ti al ag reem en t is an act un de r pr iv at e si gn at ur e du ly
ack no wled ge d a nd is , th eref or e, va li d a nd en fo rcea bl e.
I res pe ct fu ll y

di ss en t fr om

th e m ajor it y ’s con cl us io n t o t he co nt rary.

1005 /03/2017 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
No. 2016
- C
- 1395
DANIELLE DEON DICKERSON ACURIO
VERSUS
DR. MICHAEL THOMAS ACURIO ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND CIRCUIT, PARISH OF BOSSIER

Hughes, J., dissenting
. I respectfully dissent. The contract in this case was entered into before the marriage. There is no question of forgery or fraud. The plaintiff acknowledges her signature under oath. The contract was honored for many years. To now hold that
the contract un der private signature, which has never been questioned over the years, is somehow invalid due to a timing requirement not found in the law will cause problems in the public record for any transactions involving the separate property of the parties that may have occurred in the interim. The contract was complete between the parties when signed. The acknowledgment is a form of proof and does not affect the substance of the contract. The law does not supply a time requirement for when an act under private sig nature, duly acknowledged, may be acknowledged. The important issue is
whether it is acknowledged, not when. In this case the act was acknowledged, in accord with the actual practice of the parties over the years.