NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JOANN THOMAS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 23-30002 & 23-935

D.C. Nos. 

2:19-cr-00210-RAJ-2 

2:19-cr-00210-RAJ 

Western District of Washington, 

Seattle

MEMORANDUM*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

ALLAN THOMAS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 23-30023 & 23-1030

D.C. No. 

2:19-cr-00210-RAJ-1

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 12, 2024**

Seattle, Washington

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concluded these cases are suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 18 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Joann Thomas (“Joann”) and Allan Thomas (“Allan”) (collectively, the 

“Thomases”) appeal their convictions for Aggravated Identity Theft under 18 

U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) following a joint jury trial in May 2022. The parties are 

familiar with the complete facts, and we summarize them only as necessary herein. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. 

A jury convicted the Thomases of several counts of mail and wire fraud

(among other charges), which serve as the predicate offenses to the § 1028A 

convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5). The Thomases challenge their 

convictions under § 1028A only. They do not challenge their convictions for the 

underlying fraud, which involved submitting falsified documents and payment

requests (also called vouchers) to the King County treasurer’s office to obtain 

payments for public works projects that never actually occurred in a special 

drainage district known as “DD5” in Enumclaw, Washington. Allan was a longtime DD5 commissioner; Joann acted as the DD5 secretary and was “actively 

involved in submitting” the vouchers. The County required at least two 

commissioners’ signatures on the vouchers to issue any payments, otherwise it 

would not accept the voucher. 

The Thomases’ § 1028A convictions are based on forging the signatures of 

two other individuals. The jury convicted both Joann and Allan for forging the 
3 

signature of Kennet Olson, who was the only other DD5 commissioner at the 

relevant times, on multiple vouchers submitted to the County between 2015 and 

2019. Joann was also convicted for forging the signature of her stepson, Alexander

Thomas, on two checks in December 2017 to use some of the fraudulently

obtained funds for personal expenses. 

The Thomases argue that their convictions for Aggravated Identity Theft 

should be vacated because Jury Instruction Number 21 (“Instruction 21”) regarding 

that charge omitted what they characterize as “elements” of § 1028A in light of the 

Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 131–32 

(2023), namely that the “use” of Olson’s and Alexander Thomas’s names had to be 

fraudulent or deceptive and had to be at the “crux” of the underlying fraud.

The Thomases concede that they did not object to Instruction 21, and indeed 

they submitted a proposed jury instruction with substantially similar language to 

the final instruction. The record indicates that the Thomases did not raise any posttrial motions for acquittal on any grounds. 

1. Where, as here, the appellants failed to timely object to jury 

instructions or the sufficiency of the evidence to the trial court, we review for plain 

error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 

(1993). Plain error also applies where grounds for the objection “have since arisen 

due to a new rule of law arising between the time of conviction and the time of 
4 

appeal.” United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 404 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Under plain error review, it is the Thomases’ burden to show that “1) there 

was error; 2) the error was plain; and 3) the error affected substantial rights.” 

United States. v. Lo, 447 F.3d 1212, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. 

at 732). Even if they satisfy those three threshold requirements, they must also 

show that “the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 508 

(2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Meeting all four requirements is 

“difficult.” Id. “[A]n instruction that omits an element of the offense does not 

necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for 

determining guilt or innocence.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999). 

Instead, “[r]eversal on the basis of plain error is an exceptional remedy and an 

improper jury instruction rarely justifies reversal of a conviction for plain error.” 

Lo, 447 F.3d at 1228 (citing United States v. Still, 857 F.2d 671, 671-72 (9th Cir. 

1988)). Plain error relief under Rule 52(b) is discretionary, not mandatory. See 

Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. 

2. Section 1028A(a)(1) provides that “[w]hoever, during and in relation 

to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, 

possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 

person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced 
5 

to a term of imprisonment of 2 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis added). 

In Dubin, the Supreme Court held that “[a] defendant ‘uses’ another person’s 

means of identification ‘in relation to’ a predicate offense when this use is at the 

crux of what makes the conduct criminal.” 599 U.S. at 131. It further clarified 

that “being at the crux of the criminality requires more than a causal relationship, 

such as ‘facilitation’ of the offense . . . [and] with fraud or deceit crimes . . . the 

means of identification specifically must be used in a manner that is fraudulent or 

deceptive.” Id. at 131–32 (internal citation omitted). 

3. The § 1028A jury instructions in this case did not define the “use” or

“in relation to” elements of the charge. We assume without deciding that failing to 

define the “use” and “in relation” to elements constitutes plain error. However, 

even assuming the instructions were plainly erroneous, the error did not affect the 

Thomases’ substantial rights because the evidence at trial strongly supports the 

convictions under Dubin’s standards. See Greer, 593 U.S. at 507-08 (requiring “a 

reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would 

have been different” to meet the third prong of plain error review).

4. Regarding Joann’s conviction for using Olson’s name and signature

(Count 10), the evidence showed that the Thomases forged Olson’s signatures on 

multiple vouchers between October 2015 and January 2019. The County required 

at least two signatures on the vouchers to issue any payments. Contrary to Joann’s 
6 

assertions, Olson’s signature was necessary for the Thomases to obtain payments 

from the County, and thus it was at the “crux” of the crime. And, by forging 

Olson’s signature, the Thomases deceived the County regarding the vouchers’ 

legitimacy. In Dubin’s terms, the Thomases lied about “‘who’ is involved” in 

signing the vouchers. 599 U.S. at 132. Joann’s remaining argument that vouchers 

from 2015–2019 were not admitted into evidence is incorrect and directly 

contradicts the record. 

5. Regarding Joann’s conviction for using Alexander Thomas’s name 

and signature (Count 11), except for her denial (which the jury rejected and found 

perjurious), the evidence that she forged Alexander’s signatures on the December 

2017 checks is uncontested. Joann and Alexander were the only authorized 

signatories on the bank account in question, and only one of their signatures was 

necessary for doing business on the account. Joann could have signed the 

December 2017 checks herself, but for some unexplained reason, she did not. 

Absent Joann’s signature, Alexander’s was necessary for the checks to be valid and 

for the Thomases to obtain money from the account, which is where they deposited 

most of the funds that they fraudulently obtained from King County. Thus, 

Alexander’s forged signature on the December 2017 checks was sufficiently at the 

“crux” of the fraud to satisfy Dubin. Even if it was not, the outcome would be the 

same for Joann because her 24-month sentence for both Counts 10 and 11 run 
7 

concurrently, such that her sentence would be the same even if the conviction for 

Count 11 was erroneous.

Additionally, the defense largely ignored the identity theft charge and 

focused on denying the underlying fraud and other charges, further undermining 

any argument that Instruction 21 affected the trial’s outcome. 

6. As for Allan’s conviction for using Olson’s name and signature 

(Count 10), even assuming Instruction 21 was plainly erroneous, it did not affect 

his substantial rights for the same reasons as we have discussed regarding Joann’s 

conviction for Count 10. Allan’s contention that the evidence of Olson’s forged 

signatures on the vouchers is “weak” is unconvincing. Allan points to nothing in 

the record that contradicts Olson’s testimony about forgery except for his own

testimony that was found to be perjurious. Instead, he implicitly asks us to 

reweigh the evidence and reassess witnesses the jury found to be credible at trial, 

which we will not do. See United States v. Hopkins, 486 F.2d 360, 362 (9th Cir. 

1973) (“Since there was a discrepancy in the evidence, it was a question for the 

jury. Suffice it to say, the jury was not impressed with [Defendant’s] version”); 

see also United States v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541, 552 (9th Cir. 2011) (“We ‘cannot 

second-guess the jury’s credibility assessments’” when reviewing the sufficiency 

of evidence (quoting United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 

2010))).
8 

The evidence in the Thomases’ case therefore satisfies Dubin. 

7. The Supreme Court’s decision in Musacchio v. United States, 577 

U.S. 237, 244–45 (2016) forecloses Allan’s additional argument that Instruction 21 

required the Government to prove Aggravated Identity Theft in relation to both 

mail and wire fraud. Section 1028A requires only one predicate offense to 

establish liability, not two. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c). Assuming Allan is 

correct that Instruction 21 required the Government to prove Aggravated Identity 

Theft in relation to two predicate offenses, then the instruction erroneously

heightened the Government’s burden. We do not apply the incorrect burden when 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, and we are not bound by the district 

court’s erroneous instructions. See Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 245. In any event, the 

record evidence sufficiently supports Allan’s conviction for Aggravated Identity 

Theft in relation to the mail and wire fraud. 

Joann Thomas’s conviction for two counts of Aggravated Identity Theft 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, Case Nos. 23-30002 & 23-935, is AFFIRMED. 

Allan Thomas’s conviction for one count of Aggravated Identity Theft under 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A, Case Nos. 23-30023 & 23-1030, is AFFIRMED.