### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Marc h 19 , 200 8 S es sio n

ST A C Y C A GL E D A V IS v. R OB ER T F

. D A V IS

Appeal from t he General Sessions Court for Loudon Cou nty No. 9670/121 William H. Ru ssell, Jud ge

No. E2007-01251-COA- R3-CV - FILED MAY 29, 2008

Af t e r m o r e t h a n e i g h t e e n y e ar s o f m arr i a g e , S t a c y C a g l e D a v i s ( “ W i f e ” ) s u e d R o b e r tF

. D a vis (“H usband”) for divorc e. The case was tried and t he Trial Court entere d a Final Dec ree decla ring the parties divorced, a

pproving the parenting plan s ubmitted with rega rd t o the parties’ minor child, ordering Husband to pay c hild support, dividi ng the marital prope rty and marital debts, and denying Hu sb a nd ’s re qu e st f

or a lim on y. Hu sb a ndapp e a ls the de nia l of his re qu e st f

or a lim on y to thi s Co urt. We r ever se the de nial of alimony t o Hu s b an d , award Husband r ehabilitative alimony of $800 pe r month for 36 months, awar d Husband a ttorneys’ fe es at trial and on appea l, a nd rema nd to the Trial Court for a de termination of the pr o p er amount of attorne ys’ fe es. The r emainder of the Tr ial Court’s Final Decr ee is a ffirme d.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Gener al Session s Court

Reve rsed, in part; Aff

irme d, in part; Case Rem anded

D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER S CHEL P. F R ANKS , P.J., and S HAR ON G. L EE , J., joined.

Ki mbe rl e e A. W a te rh ou se , L e no ir City , T e nn e sse e fo r the Ap pe lla nt, Rob e rt F. D a vis

. Rob e rt H. Gr e e n a ndCa the ri ne E. Shu c k, Kn ox vil le , Te nn e sse e fo r the Ap pe lle e , Stac y Cag le Da vis

.

OP IN ION-2- Bac kgr ound

Husband a nd Wife wer e mar ried in Marc h of 1987. In Oc tober of 2005, W ife sued Hu sb a ndfo r d ivo rc e . A t th e tim e of tr ia l Wif e wa s 42 yea

rs old , Hus ba nd wa s 4 5 y e ars old , a ndbo th parties we re in good he alth. Wife has a Bac helor’s de gree from the Un i v er sity of Tennesse e and
wo rk s a t Oa

k Rid ge Natio na l La

bo ratory. W if

e te sti fi e d that in 20 06 , h e r s a lary wa s a pp ro xim a te ly $72,000.

Hu sb a ndwo rk s a s a la b te c hn ic ia n f

or a n o pto me tr ist . Fo r the fi ve ye ars be fo re tr ia l, Husband e arne d around $20,000 a year . Prior to that, Husband worke d for A.E . Staley in Loudon, Tenne ssee. Hu s band made approximate ly $48,000 the last full year he wor ked at A.E . Staley. Hu sb a ndte sti fi e d th a t he ha s sk ill s in dis til la tio n a ndind us tr ia l w a ste ma na ge me nt.

Husband was fired from A.E. Staley. He testified that “the stre ss had gotten to me. The swing shift had gotten to me. My pe rsonal life w as in shambles and just started making a lot of mistakes and the y let me go.” W i fe testified that Husband “ had a D UI in the c ompany re nted
c ar, ” wh ic h co ntribu te d to los ing his job wi th A .E . St a le y. Hu sb a ndte sti fi e d th a t he ha d p ro ble ms with depre ssion “[t]owa

rds the end of

my working ca

ree r at Staley....” He also testified t hat he was
on medication for a while, but that he st opped taking the m edica tion in March of 2005 beca

use he is no longer dea ling with depression. Husband testified that he believes that if he goe s back to swing shift work like he did a t A.E. Staley, his problems with depre ssion will come back.

Husban d testified that he ne eds a c ollege degr ee to e arn an income similar to what he ea rned at A.E. Staley. He testified that he wants to get a de gree in industrial engineer ing, which would enable him to obtain a better paying job. Husband anticipates i t would take less than three year s to obtain this degree. He testified that he would like to “[ s]tart out at Roane State and take as ma ny c la sse s the re a s I ca n be fo re a c tua lly tr a ns fe rring to sa y the Un ive rs ity of Te nn e sse e to f

ini sh the higher le vel classe s.” Husband testified that if he obtained a degre e, he c ould ear n “[b] etwee n fifty and seventy-f

ive t housand a year starting out.” Husband admitt ed that he ha s attended c ollege in the past and that he “hated it ” and that he did not do well, obt aining C’s and D’s in some classe s and fa iling or withdrawing from other s.

Both parties submitted affidavits of their income an d ex penses a t trial. Wife’ s a ff ida vit sh ow s that a ft e r pa yme nt of re gu lar e xp e ns e s, W if e ha s a mon thl y su rp lus of

app ro xim a te ly $1,400. Husband’s a ffidavit shows a monthly def icit after payment of r eg u l ar expenses of approximate ly $1,800.

At the conc lusion of the trial, the Tri al C o u rt enter ed a Final De cre e incor porating the Trial Court’s memor andum opinion and, inter alia, decla ring the parties divorced, a pproving the pare nting plan submitted by the parties, order ing Husband to pay c hild support, dividi ng the marital property and marital de bts, and denying Husband’s re q u es t for alimony. In its memorandum opinion, the Trial Court stated:-3- Now, [H usband] ha s impli ed through his lawyer and through his t estimony for me to c onsider re quiring his soon to be ex- wife to pa y him alimony. In order f or me to do that on the basis that he ha s asked f or it, I would nee d to be convince d of
se ve ra l th ing s. In c on sid e ri ng wh e the r o r n ot t o d o th a t, I ’l l sh are wi th yo u wh a t I have c onsidered. H e says that he needs to go ba ck to school; howeve r, today, a s of this date, he submits no plan of going to school. It’s some vague thing about enginee ring, industrial enginee rin g. There is no evidence that he has ma de application to see if he c an eve n get in to school. There is no evidence prese nted that the Court could make a ny intellige n t re asonable plan based on the cost of school beca use he didn’t pr esent a ny.

He ha s te sti fi e d th a t he los t hi s jo b a t Sta le y, wh ic h w a s a pp aren tly a

fa ir ly good job, some five year s ago and has been working in a couple of differ ent place s since that t i m e, and during that ti me per iod has made no e ffort to obtain any
a dd ition al e du c a tio n. He ha s n ot a pp lie d to go to s c ho ol, he ’s take n n o p art -t ime
course s, and has made no eff ort that was prese nted into e vidence that he wa s serious about doing anything on his own to overcome what he c alls this educational dif fe re nc e a ndde fi c it. I thin k it wo uldbe gr os sly un fa ir

to as k th e oth e r p art y to thi s to support his request that he be given money t o obtain an education and I don’t have any idea that he has a ny definite plan of how to acc omplish t hat or how to do it. I’ve been pr esente d no plan. So, theref ore, t h e C o u rt is going to deny the reque st for alimony.

Another r eason, the ref

ore, is that the pa

rties have on deposit with a local bank some hund re d an d t hirty-nine thousand dollars of which ea ch party shall rece ive
on e /ha lf

. Fr om tho se a mou nts , if [H us ba nd ] is inte re ste d, he c a n s tart ob ta ini ng his education and change his status in l ife.

Hu sb a ndapp e a ls the de nia l of his re qu e st f

or a lim on y to thi s Co urt.

Discussion
Although not stated exac tly as such, Husband r aises two issues on appea l: 1) whether the Trial Court e rre d in f

ailing to awa

rd reha bilitative a limony to Husband, and, 2) whether the Trial Court erre d in failing to awar d attorneys’ fee s to Husband. Husband a lso requests an a war d of
a tto rn e ys ’ f

e e s o n a pp e a l.

Our r e vie w i s de novo up on the re c or d, a c c omp anie d by a pr e su mpt ion of c or re c tne ss of the finding s of fa ct of the tria l court, unless t he prepondera nce of the evidence is otherwise. T enn. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ); Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001). A trial c ourt' s conclusions of law ar e subjec t to a de novo revie w with no presumption of cor rec tness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Count

y Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.-4- W e f ir s t a d d r e s s w h e th e r

th e T r ia l C o u r t e rr e d in f a il in g to a w ar d r e h ab il it a tive alimony to Hus b an d

. Hu s b and requests an a war d of $1,500 per month of reha

bilitative alimony. Because the a mount of alimony to be awa rded, if a ny, is within the sound discretion of the tr ial court in light of the particular

circ umstances of the case , appellate courts will not alter such a war ds absent an abuse of discre tion. L i n d s ey v. Lindsey , 976 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). A s pe rt ine nt t o th is i ssu e , T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 12 1 p ro vid e s:
36-5-121. De cre e for s upp ort of spou se. – (a) In any a ction for divorc e, lega l separ ation or sepa

rate maintenanc e, the c ourt may awa rd alimony to be paid by one spouse to or for

the benef it of the other, or out of

either spouse ’s prope rty, ac cording to the na tur e of

the c a se a ndthe c ir c um st ances of the pa rt ie s. Th e c ou rt

ma y f ix
so me de fi nit e a mou nt o r a mou nts to b e pa id i n mont hly , s e mim on thl y o r w e e kly installments, or otherwise, a s the circ umstances may w arr ant....

* * *
(d)( 1) The court m ay award rehabilitative alimony, alim ony in futuro, also known
a s p e ri od ic a lim on y, tr a ns iti on a l a lim on y, or a lim on y in so lid o, a lso kn ow n a s lu mp sum alimony or a combination of these , as provided in this subsection (d)

. (2 ) I t is the int e nt o f the ge ne ra l a sse mbl y that a sp ou se , w ho is e c on omi c a lly disadvantage d rela tive to the other spouse, be reha bilitated, wheneve r possible, by the gra nting of an order for payment of reha bilitative alimony. To be re habilitated means to ac hieve, with re asonable eff ort, an e arning c apaci ty that will permit the economica lly disadvantaged spouse ’s standar d of living after the d i v o rc e to be
re a so na bly c omp ara

ble to the sta nd ard of

liv ing e njo ye d d ur ing the marria ge , o r t o the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse,
c on sid e ri ng the re le va nt s ta tut ory f a c tor s a ndthe e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.

* * *
(e) (1) Reha

bilitative alimony is a sepa rate class of spousa l support, as distinguished from alimony in solido, a l i mony in futuro, and tra nsitional alimony. To be
re ha bil ita te d me a ns to a c hie ve , w ith re a so na ble e ff ort, an e arn ing c apa c ity that w ill permit the ec onomically disadvantage d spouse’s standard of living af ter the divorc e to be re asonably c ompara ble to the standard of

living enjoyed during the marriage, or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse,
c on sid e ri ng the re le va nt s ta tut ory f a c tor s a ndthe e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. (2) An awar d of rehabilitative alimony shall remain in the c ourt’s control f or the dura tion of such awa

rd, and may be incre ased, de cre ased, te rminated, e xtended,
or o t h e r w i s e m o d i f

i e d , u p o n a s h o w i n g o f a s u b s t a n t i a l a n d m a t e r i a l c h a n ge in
c ir c ums ta nc e s. For

re ha bil ita tiv e a lim on y to be e xte nd e d b e yo ndthe te rm ini tia lly established by the court, or to be incre ased in a mount, or both, the rec ipient of the-5-

reha bilitative alimony shall have the burde n of proving that all rea sonable e fforts at
re ha bil ita tio n h a ve be e n ma de a ndha ve be e n u ns uc c e ssf ul.
(3 ) R e ha bil ita tiv e a lim on y s ha ll t e rm inate u pon th e de a th o f the re c ipi e nt. Re hab il it a tiv e a lim on y s ha ll a lso te rm inate up on the de a th o f the pa yo r, un le ss otherwise spe cifica lly stated.

* * *
(i) In de termining whether the gra nting of an orde r for payment of support and
ma int e na nc e to a part y is app ro pr ia te , an d in de te rm ini ng the na tur e , a mou nt, le ng th of te rm , a ndma nn e r o f p a yme nt, the c ou rt sh a ll c onsi de r a ll r e le va nt f a c tor s, including:
(1) The relative ea

rning ca pacity, obligations, needs, a nd financ ial resour ces of ea ch party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retire ment plans and
a ll o the r s ou rc e s; (2) The rela tive education and training of ea ch party , t h e abilit y and opportunity of eac h party to sec ure such education and training, and the ne cessity of a party to secure further

education and training to improve such pa rty’s ea rnings
c apa c ity to a

re a so na ble le ve l; (3) The duration of the ma rriage ; (4) The age a nd mental condition of ea ch party; (5) Th e p h y s ic a l c o n d it io n o f e a c h p ar ty , in c lu d in g , b u t n o t li mi te d to, physical disability or incapa city due to a c hronic de bilitating di sease ; (6) The extent to whi ch i t wo u ld be undesira ble for a party to see k
e mpl oy me nt o uts ide the ho me , be c a us e su c h part y will be c us tod ia n o f a min or c hil d of the mar

riage ; (7) The separ ate a ssets of each p ar t y , both rea l and per sonal, tangible and intangible; (8) The provisions made with rega rd to the marital pr operty, a s defined in § 36-4-121; (9) The standard of

living of the parties e stablished during the marriage; (1 0) Th e e xte nt to wh ic h e a c h pa rt y ha s ma de ta ng ibl e a nd in tang ibl e c on tr ibu tio ns to the marri a g e a s m o n e t a r y an d h o m e m a k e r c on tr ibu tio ns , a ndta ng ibl e and intangible contr ibutions by a party to the education, tra ining or increa sed ea rning power of the other

party; (11) The rela tive fault of the parties, in ca ses wher e the c ourt, in its dis cre tion, deems it appropriate to do so; and (12) Such other fac tors, including the t ax conse quence s to eac h party, a s are ne c e ssa ry to c on sid e r the e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s. Tenn Code Ann. § 36- 5-121 (2005)

.

As this Court dis cussed in Dube v . Dube :-6- While all rele vant factors m ust be considered when s etting the amount of a n alimony awar d, need a nd the ability to pay are the cr itical fac tors. Robertson , 76 S.W.3d at 342. Discussing the intent be hind a limony, our Supreme Court ha s held: “the pur pose of spou s al s upport is to aid the disadvantage d spouse to become and
re ma in s e lf

-s uf fi c ie nt a nd , w he n e c on omi c re ha bil ita tio n is n ot f

e a sib le , to mit igate the har sh economic r ealities of divorc e.” Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d 465, 470-71 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Anderton , 988 S.W.2d at 682).

Dube v . Dube , 104 S.W.3d 863, 869 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).

W if e arg ue s o n a

pp e a l th a t “ wh e re Hu sb a nd ’s fi na nc ia l si tuatio n w a s c re a te d b y h is own dec isions and where Husband has no clea r pl an for reha bilitation, Wife should not be require d to p ro vid e su pp ort.” Hu sb a nd te sti fi e d to his pla n to ob ta in a de gr e e in i nd us tr ia l e ng ine e ri ng wi thi n approximate ly three ye ars by “ [s]tart[ing] out at Roane State a nd tak[ing] a s many classe s there as I can befor e actua lly transfe rring to sa y the University of Tenne ssee to f inish the higher l evel classes.” Husband further testified tha t obtaini n g s u ch a d egree would e nable him to earn significantly more money tha n he currently is able to earn. This would allow Husband to a chieve , with rea sonable e ffort, an ea rning capa city that would permit his standard of living after the divor ce to b e re a so na

bly c omp ara

ble to the sta nd ardof

liv ing e njo ye d d ur ing the marria ge , o r t o th e po stdivorce standar d o f l i ving expec ted to be ava ilable to Wife , which is the purpose of re habilitative alimony.

W if

e a lso arg ue s that Hu sb a nd“ ne ve r, in f ive ye ars , ma de a ny a tte mpt to f urthe r h is education and had take n no concr ete steps in that dire ction as of the time of trial” a nd further

that

“ Hu sb a nd ’s te sti mon y s ho we d th a t he ha s lit tle apti tud e fo r o r p a tie nc e wi th the up pe r- le ve l ma th
a ndsc ie nc e c ou rs e s th a t w ou ld b e re qu ir e d f or him to o bta in a n e ng ine e ri ng de gr e e .” Th e pu rp os e of re habilitative alimony, however , is not to guarantee that the rec ipient w ill be r ehabilitated a s no c ou rt ha s th e po we r t o ma

ke su c h a gua

ra nte e , b ut r a the r i s to a llo w the re c ipi e nt the re a so na ble opportunity to rehabilitate himself or he rself.

A ca ref ul and thorough re view of the rec ord on appe al re veals tha t Hu s b and has shown a fina ncial nee d and Wif e has the ability to pay alimony. Our gende r neutra l review of the
rec ord in light of the statutory fac tors shows that Husband is e ntitled to an aw ard of reha bilitative alimony. We r ever se the de nial of alimony to Husband and awa rd Husband reha

bilitative alimony in the amount of $800 per month for 36 months.

We note t h at given the f acts of this ca se, if re habilitative alimony had not been appropriate, then tra nsitional alimony i n the same a mount for the same duration would have been ap propriate . The e vidence in the rec ord is clea r that Husband is the e conomically disadva ntaged spouse who, if he d i d not rec eive r ehabilitative alimony, would nee d assistance to adjust to the economic c onsequenc es of the divor ce a nd that Wife has the a bility t o pay this alimony. There fore , if H u s b a n d w e r e n o t t o r e c e iv e r e h ab il it a ti v e a li mo n y , tr a n s it io n a l a li mo n y w o u ldb e ap p r o p riate.-7- We tur n next to the issue of whe ther the Trial Court erre d in failing to awar d
a tto rn e ys ’ f

e e s to Hu sb a nd . A n a wa rdof a tto rn e y f

e e s in a div or c e c a se c on stitu tes ali mon y in solido. See He rre ra v . H

e rre ra , 944 S.W .2 d 379 , 390 (T e nn . Ct. A pp . 1 99 6) . A s p e rt ine nt t o th is iss ue , T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 12 1 p ro vid es: “Al im on y in so lid o may b e a wa rd e d in lie u o f o r i n addition to any other a limony award, in orde r to provide support, including attorne y fee s, where appropriate.” T enn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-121(d) (5) (2005). I n deter mining whether to aw ard attorney fee s, a trial court should c onsider the rele vant fac tors set forth in T enn. Code Ann. § 3 6 -5 -1 2 1 (i ). Awar ds of attorney fee s are within the s ound discretion of the trial court, a nd will not be disturbed on appea l unless the evidenc e preponderates against t he award. Kin c aid v . Ki nc aid , 912 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). A s this C ourt explaine d in Koj a v . Ko ja : “[A war ds of attorne ys’ fees as alimony in solido] are appropriate, howe ver, only when the spouse see king them lacks suffic ient funds to pay his or her own legal expense s,” Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Houghland v. Houghland , 844 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) , and Ingram v. Ingram , 7 21 S.W .2 d 2 62 , 2 64 (T e nn . Ct . App. 19 86 )) , o r w ou ld b e re qu ir e d to “deple te his or her

resour ces in orde r t o pay these expense s.” Id. ( citing Harwell v. Ha rwe ll , 612 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App, 1980)). W here one party has bee n awa rded additional funds for ma intenance and support and suc h funds ar e intended to provide the pa

rty with a sourc e of f

uture i n co m e, the party need not be r equire d to pay legal e xpenses by using asse ts that will provide for f uture income

. Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W.2d 849, 862 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
Koj a v . Ko

ja , 42 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Th e re c or d r e ve a ls tha t H us ba ndha s th e fi na nc ia l ne e d a ndW if e ha s the abil ity to pay. In a ddition, the recor d reve als that Husband ha d been u s i n g a joint cre dit card to pa y for
ne c e ssi tie s and a lso c ha

rg e d his at torne y’ s re ta ine r fe e to tha t card

. W if e te sti fi e d th a t sh e pa id tho se char ges with the exc eption of the lega l fee s up until t he time the parties’ marital home w as sold. She stated: “Up until that time our mortgage wa s n o t all owing him to pay that cre dit card....The
mortga ge wa s ju st u nd e r a tho us a nddo lla

rs .” Hu sb a ndpu rc ha se d a ho us e app ro xim a te ly o ne mon th afte r the m ar i t al hom e wa s sold so he would have a place to live, and his aff

idavit of income a nd expense s shows that his curre nt mortgage payment is $960 per month. Husband testified that he had to f ina nc e 10 0% of

the pu rc ha se pr ic e of

his ne w h ome . H us ba nd do e s no t ha ve su ff ic ie nt f un ds to pay his legal e xpenses without depleting his limit ed re source s. After considering all of the re levant fa c tor s, inc lud ing Hu sb a nd ’s fi na nc ia l ne e d a ndW if e ’s abil ity to p a y, we c on c lud e that H us ba ndis entitled to an awa

rd of a ttorneys’ fe es as a limony in s olido. We further hold t hat Husband is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fee s on appea l. We r emand this ca se to the Tria l Court to determine the proper amount of attorne ys’ fe es both at trial and on a ppeal.

Conclusion

The jud gme nt o f the Tr ia l Co urt is re ve rs e d to a wa rdre ha bil ita tiv e a lim on y to Husband in the amount of $800 per month for 36 months, to award a ttorneys’ fe es at trial a s alimony-8-

in solido t o Husband, a nd to awar d attorneys’ fee s to Husband on appe al. The judgm ent of the Trial Court is affirmed in a ll other respe cts. This c ase is r emande d to the Trial Court for a deter mination of the pr op e r a mou nt o f atto rn e ys ’ f e e s bo th at tr ial a ndon app e a l a ndfo r c oll e c tio n o f the c os ts be low . T he c os ts o n a

pp e a l are a sse sse d a ga ins t th e Ap pe lle e , St a c y Ca gle Da vis

.

___________________________________ D. MICHAEL SWI NEY, JUDG E