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70–664PDF 2011

NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH OF

U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 12, 2011

Serial No. 112–67

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy 

Center .................................................................................................................... 5

Mr. Michael A. Braun, Managing Partner, Spectre Group International, LLC . 21

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D., Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution ........................................................................................................................ 34

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Douglas Farah: Prepared statement ............................................................... 8

Mr. Michael A. Braun: Prepared statement .......................................................... 22

Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................ 36

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

(1)

NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH 

OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. Today we’re looking 

at the topic of narcoterrorism. Our hearing comes as a narcoterrorism-related case exploded into the public eye yesterday afternoon. 

The Justice Department detailed an Iranian directed plot to assassinate a foreign Ambassador on U.S. soil. From what we know, 

a key conspirator in the plot approached a Drug Enforcement Administration informant seeking to hire a drug cartel hit squad to 

carry out the attack here in Washington, DC. 

A plot was planned over multiple meetings in Mexico between 

the man now in U.S. custody and people that he at the time believed were cartel members. 

Iran’s Quds Force conceived of a plot to recruit Mexican 

narcotraffickers in this assassination effort on U.S. soil. The fact 

that they would do that I don’t think should be a great surprise. 

Clearly, this deadly force felt comfortable navigating the expansive 

criminal networks south of our border. 

For years, border security advocates saying that just because we 

had one or two Hezbollah operatives come across the border, that 

it was alarmism to say that this could ever escalate into the type 

of situation that we face today. But this plot proves just how important a secured border is to our national security. 

The Kourani case predates this. In that particular instance, it 

was the brother of the head of Hezbollah’s security operation, the 

very individual, the very general who was shelling Haifa. It was 

his brother who came across the border in the trunk of a car and 

made his way up to Michigan to be reunited there with a cadre of 

confederates that had embedded itself there. And that, fortunately, 

was discovered at that time. 

I saw a little bit of his brother’s handiwork because we were in 

Israel, in Haifa during the Hezbollah War, and his brother was in 

charge of the missile attacks which were coming in to downtown 

Haifa, where they had even launched an attack on the trauma hosVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:35 Nov 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\TNT\101211\70664 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

pital. Well, this was the individual’s brother who was apprehended 

here on U.S. soil. 

Yesterday, incidentally, the trial of international arms dealer, 

Viktor Bout, began in New York City. And Bout was brought down 

by DEA agents in May of ’08 for conspiracy to supply weapons to 

the FARC, a designated terrorist group. Another example of this 

type of nexus that occurs. And this ‘‘shadow facilitator’’ was notorious for supplying arms to dictators and terrorists. After I and 

others pushed hard for Bout’s extradition from Thailand, the ‘‘Merchant of Death’’ is finally getting his day in court. Michael Braun, 

who quarter-backed this operation for the DEA, will testify a little 

bit about this operation. 

These cases illustrate two things. The first is the nexus between 

drugs and terrorism, and the second is the long arm of U.S. law 

enforcement. 

Unquestionably, the links between drugs and terrorism are growing at an alarming pace. Last year, the DEA tallied 18 of 44 State 

Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations as having 

links to the drug trade. And this includes the FARC, Hezbollah, 

Hamas, and al-Qaeda. 

Earlier this year, the Treasury Department designated Lebanese 

Canadian Bank as a ‘‘primary money laundering concern,’’ finding 

that as much as $200 million per month in drug money was 

laundered through that bank into the coffers of Hezbollah to fund 

their operations. Meanwhile, ties between Hezbollah and Mexican 

drug cartels have obviously strengthened. And this makes sense, 

drug cartels get Hezbollah’s smuggling and explosive expertise, and 

Hezbollah gets a presence on the lawless Mexican border. 

As Doug Farah will testify, the ties between transnational criminal networks and terrorist organizations are ‘‘morphing into something new.’’ Looking forward, attacking those links will be critical 

to countering terrorist plots. As the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 

District of New York recently said, ‘‘The long arm of the law has 

to get even longer.’’

With a unique set of authorities, human sources, and expertise, 

the DEA has been bringing a cutting edge approach to attack this 

nexus abroad. But as we will hear today, despite its robust international posture in some continents like Africa, the DEA’s presence 

is spread very, very thin. And that’s just one of the many challenges it faces. 

The subcommittee looks forward to hearing from the DEA in the 

near future. And I’ll now turn to Mr. Connolly for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

And, obviously, the announcement yesterday of the unbelievably 

bold plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington 

at a crowded restaurant that could involve hundreds of people, innocent people, is really extraordinary to contemplate. And it’s very 

chastening, and yet maybe not surprising that the plotters turned 

to drug traffickers skilled in the arts, unfortunately, of murder and 

assassination, and terror to carry out their plot. Where else would 

you go in terms of the requisite skill set to pull off such an arrogant and breathtakingly bold crime here in Washington, DC? 

3

So, in some ways it really is a sobering reality that I hope, as 

you suggest, Mr. Chairman, has the policy community refocusing 

on this issue. It has been a while now since a number of terror 

groups from the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon with Hezbollah to the 

sort of unpoliced areas in the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, to large swaths of the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru and 

other parts of Bolivia and South America, while we’re seeing the 

nexus between terrorists and drugs. Drugs are an easy source of 

financing. 

Now, one of the things that has to concern us as Americans is 

what is happening south of our border in the northern part of Mexico, large swaths of which look more and more, frankly, like a 

failed state that ought to be equally sobering for all Americans. 

That’s our border, that’s our neighbor. 

If we’re looking for a model that mostly succeeded in turning this 

threat around when it all looked lost it’s Colombia. And I will say 

that, having an honest discussion about this here in this Congress 

is not always easy, because there are some subjects some folks 

don’t want to talk about. 

Resources to deter the threat is one of them. Guns are another. 

When I went to Mexico in a codel last year to talk to the Attorney General of Mexico about the pending threat the single most efficacious thing he could cite that would make a difference would be 

the reimposition of the assault weapon ban here in U.S. law, because of the unfettered trafficking of U.S.-made or U.S.-provided 

weapons going into Mexico. 

We could sharp the ATF on a different committee I’m a member 

of. We had hearings on the ATF, and much has been made of Fast 

and Furious, but what isn’t talked about, or isn’t always welcome 

is it’s Congress that has prevented the ATF from having a permanent directive for 6 long years. It’s Congress that has actually cut 

back on the resources ATF has requested. 

We had one ATF agent who’s a former cop from New York City 

who testified that on one block in Manhattan there are more police 

officers than there are the entire ATF force policing the southwest 

border of the United States. So, we have to get serious, too, about 

this threat. We can’t just pontificate about it, and rhetorically 

decry the nature of the threat, which is very real. We also have to 

be willing to make some tough decisions in terms of the allocation 

of resources to make sure we’re meeting that threat, and policy decisions that may not always be welcome, but that also are a necessary part of the dialogue. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Poe from Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farah, good to see you 

again today. 

Several observations about this whole situation. I think it’s important that we be realists as Americans to know exactly what’s 

taking place. International terrorism we talk about, we realize is 

a bad thing, and people in the name of certain political beliefs want 

to cause harm to Americans. But we must also understand that 

terrorists want to get into the United States some way to do their 

mischief. 

4

The easiest way to get in the United States, of course, is to go 

through Mexico. If you get to Mexico, you can get to the U.S., no 

matter—I mean, Mexico has a problem of two sea borders, two land 

borders, and it’s difficult to patrol. And I think that’s the reason 

the Iranian operative from the government, in my opinion, sought 

help from the Zetas. 

The Zetas, a notorious outfit. They remind me of the old TV series ‘‘Paladin.’’ Probably none of you all remember that, the chairman probably does. Paladin had a card that said, ‘‘Have gun will 

travel,’’ and that was his business card. And that’s like the Zetas, 

they have guns and they will travel. And they come to the United 

States, they’ll go anywhere for money, and any criminal enterprise 

that can facilitate them bringing in money they’ll be involved in. 

We have to understand, in my opinion, that this is a growing 

problem of international terrorist groups in the name of some political philosophy working with the people who will do anything for 

filthy lucre, money, and what we can do with that. 

It’s still the same problem. We’ve got people and drugs coming 

north, and we’ve got guns and money going south of our international border with Mexico. We’ve done a lot, but the drug trade 

still occurs down there in south Texas, so it’s important that we 

recognize the problem, and we actually have a strategy to deal with 

this on an international terrorist basis, as opposed to a kind of a 

hit and miss tactical strategy. 

Don’t get me wrong. I think our border patrol agents, the DEA, 

they do a great job. They do a lot of good things the American public never knows about for security reasons, but I think maybe more 

boots on the ground, on the border to keep those cartels from passing into the U.S. is something we need to look harder at. Sure, it’s 

the job of the Border Patrol to be the first line of defense, but they 

need some help. 

The Texas border is the same distance from New Orleans as it 

is to New York City. That’s a long border with just a handful of 

folks trying to keep out the bad guys. So, I look forward to hearing 

from you and have several questions for all three of you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

We’re now joined by our distinguished panel. 

Mr. Doug Farah is a senior fellow with the International Assessment and Strategy Center. For two decades, Doug served as a foreign correspondent and investigative reporter for the Washington 

Post covering Latin America, as well as West Africa. 

In November 2001, Farah broke the story about al-Qaeda’s links 

to the West African diamond trade. In November 2007, Doug coauthored ‘‘Merchant of Death,’’ detailing Viktor Bout’s deadly 

trade. He has been a valuable resource to this subcommittee and 

its staff for many years, and we appreciate him appearing here 

today. 

We also have Mr. Michael Braun, managing partner at Spectre 

Group International. Before entering the private sector, Braun 

served for 34 years in law enforcement including nearly 4 years as 

the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations for the U.S. 

Drug Enforcement Administration. He was responsible for DEA’s 

5

227 domestic and 87 foreign officers and several divisions, so we 

thank him for his service and welcome him here today. 

Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown is a fellow at the Brookings Institution. 

She is an expert on illicit economies and national and international 

conflicts, and she has done extensive research on South Asia, on 

Burma, on the Andean region, and on Mexico. She is the author of 

‘‘Shooting Up, Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs.’’

All of the witnesses have their testimony in the record at this 

time, so I’d ask them all to encapsulate this into 5 minutes, if they 

would, and we’ll begin with Mr. Farah. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, 

INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you, Chairman Royce. It’s always a pleasure 

to be here and work with your committee. 

As you described earlier, yesterday the Justice Department announced the stopping of a plot by the Iranian Government using 

special Quds Force operatives to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador 

in the United States. 

This is significant, I think, for multiple reasons. In my written 

testimony, I describe there are multiple alliances forming across 

Latin America among transnational criminal organizations, drug 

trafficking structures, terrorist groups in criminalized states that 

present a significant and perhaps unprecedented challenge to U.S. 

national security interests from that region. 

The allegation that Iran, a criminalized state which sponsors 

Hezbollah, one of the world’s premier terrorist organizations in 

dealing with the Zetas, a non-state drug trafficking organization 

that controls key access points to cross the U.S. border truly is a 

perfect storm. 

This possibility, a hostile state using special forces and proxy 

agents to engage in criminal organizations for operations inside the 

United States has long been downplayed and sometimes ridiculed 

in policy making circles. Yet, the signs of this type of gathering 

storm have been evident for some time, including possible collaboration on the transportation of WMD components. 

As the recent White House strategy put forward by the NSC to 

combat transnational organized crime noted, ‘‘While many terrorist 

links to transnational organized crime are opportunistic, this nexus 

is dangerous, especially if it leads to a transnational organized 

crime network to facilitate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and materials to terrorists.’’

This is not a remote possibility. As the Iran assassination plot 

demonstrates, many things that were once unthinkable are now 

possible. The ideological boundaries and operational constraints 

that kept many groups from working together during the Cold War 

have largely been eclipsed, and there is a constant blurring of the 

lines that once separated organized crime from terrorist groups. 

The reasons are multiple and are driven, in part, by what the 

Drug Enforcement Administration has accurately identified as the 

crucial element in the logistical structure for both groups. The 

emergence of a small group of super fixers or shadow fixers, those 

who are able to provide specific, unique services to multiple groups 

6

regardless of ideology, motivation or location. And Viktor Bout, I 

think, is one of the premier examples of that type of person. 

These new realities render obsolete the usual definitions and assumptions about non-state actors, nation states and how they relate to each other. Hezbollah engages in criminal activities in West 

Africa and Latin America, yet also acts as a proxy for Iran’s foreign 

policy and military intelligence activities. The FARC in Colombia 

produces most of the world’s cocaine and is used as an instrument 

of power by the Bolivarian Alliance led by Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. 

It is the hybrid nature of these organizations and the increasing 

support they receive from criminalized states that makes the role 

of the shadow facilitators so vital. They understand how to exploit 

the scenes in the international, legal, and economic structures and 

work with both terrorist and criminal organizations. They specialize in placing people and products in the same pipelines, in the 

same illicit structures and exploiting the same weaknesses. 

Criminalized states frequently use transnational organized criminal organizations as a form of state craft bringing new elements 

that fundamentally alter the structure of global power. The spread 

of criminalized states and the benefits they offer are often overlooked in our policy making and in our thinking about the changing world order; yet, its implications are enormous. 

Rather than operating on the margins of the state or seeking to 

co-op small pieces of state machinery, the transnational organized 

crime groups in this construct operate in concert with the state on 

multiple levels. Within that stable environment, a host of new operations open from the sale of weapons to the use of national aircraft and shipping registries, as Viktor Bout showed, to easy use 

of banking structures, the acquisition of diplomatic passports, and 

other identification forms. 

Hugo Chavez and his allies in Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua 

have allowed Iran, a state sponsor of terror, to open financial facilities, fund companies and dedicated shipping lines to evade sanctions on his nuclear program. At the same time, Iran is carrying 

out multiple mining activities in Latin America that directly benefit his missile and nuclear programs without transparency or public scrutiny. 

As has historically been the case, nation states have been slow 

in recognizing and adapting to the new series of threats and dramatic shifts in transnational organized crime in general, and particularly its relationship to terrorist organizations. 

This administration’s transnational organized crime strategy released earlier this year was the first strategy released since 1995. 

In those 16 years, the world’s illicit economy globally grew to represent up to 9–10 percent of the world GDP, or $6.2 trillion, a figure that ranks just behind the US, and EU, and ahead of Japan 

and China as global economic forces. 

The United States, despite its sluggish response, is among the 

most forward-looking nations in terms of policy relating to the 

criminal terrorist nexus. There have been some remarkable 

achievements by a small group within the government that have 

understood the challenges in the move to face them in new and innovative ways. 

7

As the chairman mentioned, the DEA has been particularly 

adept at identifying and capturing through complex operations several of the world’s most prominent super fixers, including Monzer 

Al Kassar and Viktor Bout. 

With a unique set of authorities and support from other agencies, 

the DEA has broken new ground in tracking the network of relationships among drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups 

around the world, but this is not enough. It is, indeed, a brave new 

world we are facing. The challenges of the transnational organized 

criminal state and terrorist nexus are underestimated at our own 

peril. 

Congress and the administration must insure that steps are 

taken commensurate with the scope and scale of the emerging global actor threat. Rather than tackling the enormous scope of the 

problem, the transnational organized crime terrorist nexus is generally treated as a slightly more serious version of what we have 

seen in the past. Instead, the enormous complexity, adaptive capacity and economic resources of the state and non-state actors must 

be viewed as something far larger and more dangerous than a simple iteration of past structures. It must viewed as the dynamic, 

flexible, global phenomenon that can react more quickly than government, has more resources than any individual state, and has no 

underlying loyalty to the current world order. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Braun. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL A. BRAUN, MANAGING 

PARTNER, SPECTRE GROUP INTERNATIONAL, LLC 

Mr. BRAUN. Mr. Chairman, other members of this very distinguished and critically important subcommittee, I appreciate the invitation to speak before you today. 

Doug Farah and I have long been on the same set of tracks headed in the same direction, so he’s basically covered most of what I 

was going to say, but I want to highlight a few things. And I know 

you’re itching to ask us lots of questions, and I’ll just move on from 

there. 

Mr. Chairman, you said early on in your statement that basically 

half of the designated foreign terrorist organizations are now involved in one or more aspects of the global drug trade. I think it’s 

far worse than that. That’s a very conservative estimate, as well 

it should be, but suffice it to say that it is a growing phenomenon. 

And, quite frankly, it’s happened because of our successful prosecution of the global war on terror. 

Two things that have happened specifically is state sponsorship 

declined significantly for terrorist groups after 9/11, which caused 

more of these groups to move to drug trafficking and to a lesser degree some other transnational organized criminal activity to fund 

their operations, to keep the movements alive. 

The second thing that we’ve done is our nation has done yeoman’s work working with coalition partners around the globe to 

identify and significantly disrupt the funding streams from very 

powerful private donors. Again, a second reason why more and 

more of these groups are having to turn to the drug trade, other 

organized criminal activity to keep their movements alive. 

I would also like to say that Doug is exactly right, Mr. Chairman, 

Mr. Connolly, Mr. Poe, all of your comments with respect to this 

event that took place yesterday is the perfect example of what 

Doug and I have been preaching in this town for 8 or 10 years. And 

you talked about the very dangerous threat posed by this growing 

phenomenon, this growing confluence of drugs and terror. That is 

a very dangerous threat. 

But what is just as threatening, and we need to understand this, 

is this committee gets it. You understand it, but far too many other 

folks in this town don’t understand it, and they’re not embracing 

the idea that these very powerful threats are coming together, and 

the consequences for allowing that to happen. So, there’s a lot of 

education that needs to take place, as far as I’m concerned. 

And then lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you personally. I was over at DEA back in 2008 when the Bout case was playing out in those very critical days for several months there, and I 

can say this; that had it not been for you and the other members 

of this very important subcommittee, and some others in Congress, 

had it not been for your leadership and your push to get the Thais 

to extradite him, to do the right thing, to stand by the rule of law, 

there is no doubt in my mind that Viktor Bout would not be standing trial this week in New York. And as I have said many times 

in the past, he is, as far as I’m concerned, or was one of the most 

dangerous men on the face of the earth. 

22

So, I am looking forward to answering your questions, and helping you and your staff members in any way that I can. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]


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Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you, Mr. Braun. Thank you for a very 

risky operation on your part in terms of bringing him to justice. 

Let’s go to Dr. Felbab-Brown for her remarks. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF VANDA FELBAB-BROWN, PH.D., FELLOW, 

FOREIGN POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Connolly, I thank you 

for giving me this opportunity to address the committee. 

Organized crime, illicit economies, especially when they coincide 

with military conflict generate multiple threats to states and to society. 

Yet, although the negative aspects, the threats are clear, the relationship between human security, crime, illicit economies, and 

law enforcement is, in fact, highly complex. Not understanding the 

complexity and nuances has the great potential of undermining the 

effectiveness of policies, as well as depriving law enforcement of a 

panoply of strategies for dealing with this issue. 

For many people around the world, participation in formal or 

outright illegal economies like the drug trade is the only means to 

satisfy their basic livelihoods. Any chance of social advancement, 

even as they continue to exist in the type of criminality, and security, and marginalizations. The more the state is absent or deficient in providing the necessary public goods, the more communities become susceptible to and sometimes outright dependent on 

those state entities, be they criminal groups or insurgents. 

For this very reason, those belligerent groups, as well as criminal 

groups can obtain not only large financial benefits from sponsoring 

illicit economies, but also significant political capital, significant political support. 

But although criminal groups and belligerent groups often interact in the domain of illicit economies, sometimes shear tactics, 

sometimes coordinate their action, they have not morphed into one 

homogeneous, monolithic entity. Rather, the crime nexus is far 

from stable and not necessarily inevitable. 

Frequently, relations between criminal groups and belligerents 

are characterized by as much violence, as much competition and resentment as by cooperation, and often even tactical alliances collapse quickly. That is because criminal groups are not only profit 

maximizers, but more often than not they are risk minimizers. 

Losing this nuance, losing this understanding of the different 

motivations and incentive structures of belligerent groups and terrorist groups would deprive law enforcement of critical mechanisms 

to break up the nexus and minimize threats to the United States 

and the international community. 

Because of the complexities of illicit economies and the fact they 

generate political capital for those who sponsor them with respect 

to marginalized populations, effective state response is rarely one 

solely of law enforcement. Rather, an effective response will address all the complex reasons, why populations turn to illegality, 

one of which is law enforcement, but not a sole one. 

Other aspects of an effective response would include a multi-faceted state building effort to deprive the belligerents or criminal 

groups of the potential to develop bonds with the marginalized 

community. Some of these mechanisms might include extending 

35

Rule of Law, access to dispute resolution mechanisms, or systematic development with urban or rural. 

In the case of the cultivation of illicit crop, eradication has dubious effects on the financial profits of belligerents. Only under the 

most auspicious circumstances can they use the financial profits of 

belligerents. But the definite aspect of eradication is that it antagonizes rural populations from the government, from the 

counterinsurgent forces and denies—deprives both of intelligence 

flows on the belligerent. 

Regarding third crime terror nexus the priority for the United 

States and the international community needs to be to combat the 

most disruptive and dangerous networks of organized crime and 

belligerents, those with the greatest links or potential links to 

international terrorist groups with global reach, and those that are 

most rapacious and predatory to the society and equitable state, 

and those that most concentrate rents from illicit economies to a 

narrow clique of people. 

It is important to realize that indiscriminate and uniform application of law enforcement, whether external or internal, can generate several undesirable outcomes. One of these outcomes is that 

the weakest criminal groups will be eliminated. That, in fact, applying law enforcement or interdiction might inadvertently increase 

the efficiency, lethality, corruptive and coercive power of the remaining criminal groups, might very well give rise to vertical integration of the criminal industry. 

The second need to prioritize is that uniform—not prioritized application of law enforcement does not, in fact, push criminal groups 

together into alliance with terrorist groups. The opposite should be 

the goal of law enforcement to generate incentives for the groups 

to be as much in conflict as possible. 

I think our law enforcement needs to be very much commended 

for uncovering the plot that was announced yesterday. And I think 

it’s significant that there was a differential incentive structure on 

the part of these members of the criminal community that allowed 

this access to take place. And we need to enhance such mechanisms for law enforcement. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Felbab-Brown follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, I appreciate your testimony, as well. 

Let me go to Mr. Braun with the first question, which would be 

on the DEA confidential informant who was at the heart of this 

Iranian assassination plot. According to the Justice Department, 

what we know is, presumably, Iran’s Quds Force approached the 

Iranian-American. It was last spring, and they approach him with 

the idea of recruiting narcotraffickers into the plot. 

What I was going to ask you is, if this is the case, what it would 

tell us is that Iranians were comfortable swimming in those waters 

in terms of the cartels in Mexico. I’d like you to discuss the relationship between the Quds Force and Hezbollah, and the Mexican 

cartels to the extent you can. And how are these confidential informants worked in a situation like this? 

Mr. BRAUN. Mr. Chairman, some important points. The DEA on 

any given day of the week has got several thousand confidential informants that are working for the Agency domestically and around 

the globe. 

An important point to make about law enforcement confidential 

sources, and I don’t mean to in any way diminish the importance 

of human intelligence sources within the Intel community, but in 

law enforcement those sources have to pass what I call the judicial 

test. And by that I mean at some point in time when their case 

handlers are interviewing them for the first time or the 100th time 

working with them what’s in the back of their mind is at some 

point in the future he, meaning the informant, and/or me, meaning 

the agent, is going to end up in a Federal courthouse testifying 

under oath about what’s happening, is going to be raked across the 

coals by a defense attorney being paid way too much money, and 

it’s not a pleasant experience. So, the Agency goes to great lengths 

to corroborate every piece of information that those sources reveal. 

Again, one important point. 

Another important point here is that it is not unusual for the 

DEA, which is a single mission agency, but obviously multi-faceted, 

as they’re working the most complex investigations in Federal law 

enforcement, targeting the most ruthless drug trafficking cartels in 

the world for them to come against terrorist organizations, against 

money launderers, hit men, arms traffickers, what I refer to as the 

potpourri of global scum, it happens routinely. Another important 

point. 

But with that said, the DEA relies heavily on those informants. 

They have over the last several decades relied heavily—more heavily on judicially approved telecommunications intercept operations 

that we use very effectively against guys like Bout and others. 

I don’t want to—Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to get into the details of this particular case. 

Mr. ROYCE. Just give me a little bit about the connection, if you 

have any specifics on Mexican drug cartels and Hezbollah. 

Mr. BRAUN. Well, here’s what I can tell you. 

Mr. ROYCE. I know one specific instance. 

Mr. BRAUN. Okay. 

Mr. ROYCE. The Kourani case that I referred to earlier. 

Mr. BRAUN. Here’s what I can tell you. In places like the Tri-Border area of Latin America, in places like West Africa, and I particularly believe in some permissive environments within Mexico, 

52

groups like very powerful drug trafficking groups and terrorist organizations are coming together. 

As Doug has said in the past, and I have said in the past, they 

hang out in the same sweaty brothels, they rub shoulders in the 

same city bars, and they stay at the same hotels. And what are 

they doing? They’re sharing lessons learned, they’re talking business. 

I believe that those things are playing out, and have been playing out for a long time. And I believe that it was that kind of a 

scenario that enabled the informant to be at just the right place 

at just the right time to be approached by an Iranian-American, allegedly a member of the Quds Force as a brother, and that’s how 

that informant—that investigation hinged on that informant and 

the important role that he played. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Let me ask Dr. Brown a question. 

Hernando de Soto’s work in Peru on the Third Path in terms of 

trying to install the rule of law by giving private property rights 

to people that normally would be involved in the drug trade. Is that 

the type of example that you were thinking of? I’d just like to get 

your response to some of the concepts that he has utilized in order 

to try to engage people who normally would not have an interest 

in moving away from the narcotics trade and, instead, giving them 

an alternative path. Let me ask you about that. 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. It needs to be a multi-faceted extension of 

the state presence, one of which is bringing effective and accountable law enforcement, one that is not abusive toward the population, one that has the capacity to develop good relations with the 

communities, so that the community is willing to provide intelligence, and one that is effective at protecting the community 

against non-state actors. Often, those state actors themselves are 

providers of security. 

Another aspect in extending Rule of Law in the form of justice, 

a resolution mechanism, or access to justice so that the population 

does not have to turn toward non-state actors for the dispensation 

of rules and order. 

And yet another aspect is providing the necessary socio economic 

benefits, access to legal jobs, and access to infrastructure, schools, 

clinics. 

How one actually goes about it in the particular circumstances 

will depend on the local circumstances. In Mexico, Todos Somos 

Juarez is an example of such a program. The U.S. component 

under Beyond Medidas called the Fourth Pillar. But the goal is to 

satisfy the ability of the population to have legal livelihoods, and 

access to Rule of Law through official state mechanisms. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Brown. I’ll return in the second 

round for a question for Mr. Farah. Let me now go to the ranking 

member, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I’m happy if you wish to pursue 

that, and I’ll go——

Mr. ROYCE. Very good. I’ll go with one question, then Mr. 

Connolly, and then over to Dana Rohrabacher. 

I wanted to ask you, Doug Farah, about the learning curve that 

seems to be pretty rapid in these parts of the world as we see the 

explosives used by the drug cartels, for example. They started a 

53

few years ago with pipe bombs, and then all of a sudden you’ve got 

these radio triggered plastic explosive car bombs. And it does look 

as though there’s an expertise that’s being shared. I was wondering 

if you had any information on the types of expertise that gets 

transferred, and what kind of support, outside support the cartels 

might be seeking? 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you. I think that it’s one of the great benefits 

of inhabiting permissive environments is exactly that, the chance 

to sit down and do lessons learned. If you look specifically at 

groups like the FARC, which are both a terrorist organization and 

a drug trafficking organization, they’ve gone out of their way to acquire lessons from ETA Basque terrorists, from the remnants of 

the Irish Republican Army, from numerous other terrorists groups 

which greatly enhance their explosive capacity, and their ability to 

do intelligence, counterintelligence. 

And I think that if you look at Mexico, you see the possible 

transfer, at least a great improvement in the types of tunnels 

they’re making. There’s a lot of concern that that might be coming 

directly from Hezbollah or other people who have really perfected 

the art of tunnel building. And what they really—they want a couple of things, and that is technical expertise on intelligence gathering. Counterintelligence is one of the things they value incredibly 

highly, and any sort of games and toys they can get their hands 

on that will make the lives of the cops more difficult. 

In Colombia and Mexico you see the high premium placed on 

encryption, different types of encryption that they can use because, 

as Mike knows well, when the DEA used to buy something it has 

to go through a process of acquiring it, and bidding, and all that 

stuff. These guys go buy the best off the shelf stuff and they’re generations ahead sort of almost by default. 

So, I think that those are the specific ways. But I think one of 

the things you’re finding is, I think it’s both old and new. I think 

you find this whole new range of technologies being used. But more 

and more I’m seeing, particularly in Central America and through 

Mexico the traditional routes that have always been used for smuggling, the routes that the FMLN used, the routes that the Contras 

used, the routes everybody used for different things in those wars 

are still in use in part because I think the way Vanda accurately 

describes it, the culture of their legality. It’s very difficult to establish state presence in areas that have always used illegal methods, 

or what they don’t consider to be illegal methods for their livelihoods, but the explosion of drug money into those networks is what 

really changes the game. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Farah. Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Farah, and I may be pushing you beyond your area of expertise, but based on what we know from announcements yesterday, 

what is your understanding of the relationship of the Quds to the 

government, the formal Government of Iran? 

Mr. FARAH. Well, I think that there has been a lot of concern for 

a long time. The Quds Force is not directly responsible to the formal government. Ahmadinejad does not necessarily control the 

Quds Force, or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. 

54

I think there’s a lot of concern that the Quds Force does a lot 

of things that are outside what would be the normal chain of command that goes very high up into the clerical structure. So, I would 

say that—I’m not an expert on Iran, but I—my understanding is 

that there’s significant possibility that those who hold formal power 

in Iran do not actually have the power to control the Quds Force. 

And the Quds Force is clearly one of the tips of the spear and oversees acquisitions of companies, front companies, money laundering, 

intelligence gathering. They’re the ones who are sent out, and if 

you look at the Iranian Embassies growing particularly across 

Latin America, they’re enormous in comparison to what their listed 

activity would normally require. Most of those people, a good chunk 

of those people I think we can say now with a fair degree of certainty from my research and a lot of other work that’s been done 

in the U.S. Government, a Quds Force inhabiting those Embassies 

for specific intelligence purposes. Not responsive—often they are 

carved out. 

If you look at the Buenos Aires case in 1994, the AMIA bombing, 

Quds Force had an entirely separate section of the Embassy that 

the Ambassador did not have access to. So, I think that that explains their ability to do things without necessarily being formally 

tasked by the President to do it. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Of course, one could also interpret that as a convenient compartmentalization. 

Mr. FARAH. Oh, absolutely. I don’t mean it’s not officially sanctioned. I just mean people in the formal structure who think they 

control things, maybe not when the people above them do. It 

doesn’t detract from the fact they’re state sponsors, not at all. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What I find so interesting and appalling in the 

details that we know of that have been made public yesterday, 

rarely has a sovereign state sunk this low in attempting—I mean, 

I think of a handful of examples; the Pinochet regime and the 

Letelier bombing here in Washington, the Libyan regime under 

Gaddafi, both Pan Am at Lockerbie, and also the bombing of a bar 

in Germany with U.S. service members. These were state sponsored terrorist acts by fringy if not outlaw states. And here’s Iran, 

which has been doing—taking great efforts to try to restore some 

of its respectability in the international community, Ahmadinejad 

speaking at the U.N., albeit failing, perhaps, in that effort but, 

nonetheless, making that effort. 

This is astounding that a representative even though not officially sanctioned of the Iranian Government would go and seek out 

narcoterrorists to do his dirty work, and be quoted as saying well, 

it’s sort of the nature of the game that there’d be a lot of civilian 

casualties, and maybe some political casualty, as well. We’ve got to 

kill the sovereign Ambassador of a sovereign state in the Middle 

East. 

Mr. FARAH. I would just say, sir, that if you look at Iran’s behavior, particularly in Buenos Aires in 1993 and 1994, the bombing of 

the Israeli Embassy, and then the AMIA bombing. That was—they 

didn’t go to drug traffickers to carry it out, but that was Quds 

Force, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese diaspora community working 

in conjunction to carry out an attack—a sovereign attack on a sovVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:35 Nov 29, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\TNT\101211\70664 HFA PsN: SHIRL
55

ereign nation against a sovereign nation. So, I don’t think it’s unprecedented for Iran. 

I think that the fact that they’re looking outside their normal 

channels and into drug trafficking is a new element, and one that 

we need to understand better. But I think that Iran’s main thrust 

into state sponsored terrorism is not new. And I think if you—as 

we’ve talked about in this subcommittee and elsewhere, the ability 

to deny that that relationship between Iran and Venezuela is dangerous because of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorist organizations, and 

Venezuela’s sponsorship of terrorist organizations is just living in 

a world that doesn’t exist. 

States are now willing to take on certain risks if it’s in their best 

interest, and if they think they can get away with it. And I think 

Iran, particularly, is losing its fear of the ability of people to retaliate, or the willingness of people to retaliate against it because they 

have a much broader coalition behind them, the Bolivarian states 

are arming Syria, et cetera. So, I think it’s very disturbing, but I 

think it’s not unprecedented, and it wasn’t unthinkable that that 

would happen, something general like that would happen. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. No, but (a) trying to do it here is for Iran, I 

think, unprecedented. The link with the narcoterrorists to do the 

actual dirty work I think is sort of a new low even for Iran. And 

to me, I think the downside of this is—I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman, 

I’m just taking a little bit more time, but you talked about well, 

they’re going to do it if they see it as in their self interest. 

It’s hard to believe how even Tehran thinks that the public release and disclosure of this act, this proposed act is going to add 

any kind of respectability or soften sanctions, or win Brownie 

points in the international community for it and its various arms. 

Mr. FARAH. Well, I don’t think they were counting on being 

caught. I think that was—I don’t think they were planning on that 

being made public. But I think you’re absolutely right. I think the 

relationship with a narco organization is new and extremely dangerous, and their willingness to do it in the United States I think 

is also either desperation or incredibly bold step of confidence, one 

of the two as to how they feel they can operate. But I do think it 

sets an entirely new precedent for how we have to view Iran’s willingness to act in this hemisphere. Thank you. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Congressman Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to follow-up on the line of questioning that we just had. 

And I think the categorization of this as perhaps convenient 

compartmentalization is probably on target, so let’s take a look at 

what convenient compartmentalization means in terms of where we 

are with this regime that has been implicated in a very serious 

crime. 

First of all let me just ask yes or no to the panel, do you believe 

the leadership—the mullah leadership of Iran knew about this 

scheme, just yes or no? 

Mr. FARAH. I think, certainly, elements of them had to have 

known. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. BRAUN. I believe they would have had to have known. 

56

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I don’t think we have the information to be 

able to answer that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So, you don’t assume that when someone is a vicious gangster and something happens that’s bad, that 

we could assume that the gangster knew about it even though it 

was his henchman who did it. Is that what Brookings teaches us? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. I think it would be inappropriate to jump to 

conclusions about what elements of the Iranian Government, in 

fact, knew about the operation at this point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. All right. I would—so, two out of three 

of you think that the mullah regime—now, let me ask you this. If 

in this type of government, meaning the mullah-controlled dictatorship in Iran, someone would launch a scheme like this not approved by the mullahs, and the mullahs found out about it and disapproved, that person would then be—what do you think the punishment would be of that individual? 

I guess the witnesses don’t have to really guess on that, but I 

would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if the mullahs found out that 

someone in their government was involved with something like this 

without their knowledge there would be severe punishment, if not 

death for that individual in their government who is being out on 

his own so much. So, I would hope that our—we are a little more 

realistic when we’re assessing the activity of people who murder 

their own people. 

The mullah regime—could this mullah regime, again a question, 

this mullah regime—we hesitated to speak loudly about the election fraud that happened in the last Iranian election, even though 

the streets were filled with anti-mullah protestors who were protesting the mullah dictatorship. 

Do you think our lack of energy in condemning that type of fraud 

leads to the mullah leadership going along with such schemes as 

has been exposed in the last couple of days? Whoever in the witness stand would like to answer that. 

Okay, let me put it a different way. If we were tougher with the 

mullah regime and they knew that we were a leading force supporting the democratic elements in their country rather than hesitant supporters of them, do you think that might deter them from 

becoming involved with assassination schemes that would take 

place in our own country? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Possibly. We don’t know the answer, but 

possibly it might also encourage them to engage in other provocative action in retaliation. I think it’s an open question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We could certainly go out of our way to encourage all kinds of bad guys to do things, couldn’t we? Yes, go 

right ahead. 

Mr. FARAH. I think one of the things that’s empowering Iran is 

the feeling that they’re no longer internationally isolated. It doesn’t 

go directly to our policy, but I think our policy of not dealing directly with the Bolivarian threat as it exists through Venezuela, 

Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua particularly, is one of the things that 

gives them this feeling that they can—that the sanctions aren’t 

going to bite. If you look at the amount of money they’ve invested 

through Venezuela into Panama and elsewhere to meet their basic 

57

needs, I think they’re feeling like sanctions were going to be a significant terrible problem for them. And on their key issues, they’re 

not as significant and terrible a problem as they had thought they 

would be. And I think they feel they have a little more margin to 

move internationally. 

The fact that Argentina this year didn’t walk out when 

Ahmadinejad stood up and did his usual talk at the United Nations, all of this leads them to understand that they have a lot 

more people willing to work with them. They’re not the pariah 

state that we had tried to make——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the conciliatory tone of this administration has encouraged if not the 

mullahs themselves, but at least people who work for the mullahs 

to involve themselves in the type of conspiracy that we saw exposed just yesterday that would lead to the death of American citizens, a bomb going off here, an act of such terrorism. 

Let’s remember that during the Cold War, Romania was—we 

sort of had a hands-off policy toward Romania. Well, where did the 

man who shot the Pope, where was he held—where did he hole up? 

He holed up in Romania. He was there in Romania. And I think 

it’s—the Romanian Government probably knew. And he was a 

Turk, by the way, a Turk in Romania involved in an assassination 

plot against the Pope. 

Well, we had let Romania off the hook, and the Romanian Government obviously knew about this man, but let him stay and operate out of their country. 

If we permit a reconciliatory approach to the mullah regime and 

treat them as if they were a democratic regime, I think we can expect more of the type of terrorist assassination plots that were uncovered, luckily uncovered and foiled by our agents. Thank you 

very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We go now to Jeff 

Duncan from South Carolina. Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t think anyone that’s followed the issue of the Iranian and 

Hezbollah influence in the Western Hemisphere was really surprised by the Quds Force working with the Mexican drug cartel, albeit an undercover agent of the United States, but under their understanding he was a member of the drug cartel to plan and possibly carry out a very heinous act that was thwarted by the FBI. 

And I want to congratulate them. But I don’t think anyone was 

surprised really that the Quds Force, and Hezbollah, and a Mexican drug cartel were working together, because if you followed this 

issue you’ve seen evidence of that. 

I’m very, very concerned about Iran’s influence in the Western 

Hemisphere, the fact that they’ve opened six Embassies in South 

America over the last 5 years. We continue to see very sophisticated tunneling by the drug cartels under the Mexican border that 

resembles the tunnels Hezbollah digs in Lebanon. So, that expertise I believe is being brought. 

If you look at the number of folks tied to Hezbollah that have 

been arrested in this country, the Mexican drug cartel guys that 

are arrested in this country with Farsi tattoos, and there are just 

a lot of things that show that we shouldn’t have been surprised. 

58

I’m very surprised, though, that Quds Force, an Iranian-sponsored group, would decide to carry out an attack on another nation, 

to assassinate an Ambassador in the United States of America. So, 

yesterday I drafted a resolution, and I’ve sent it to your colleague, 

and I ask Mr. Connolly because of his comments a little while ago 

to take a look at this, is House Resolution 429. 

Mr. DUNCAN. It’s a Resolution on Iran and the Western Hemisphere. 

Mr. ROYCE. And it’s a very timely resolution that documents 

Iran’s activity in this hemisphere. So, we look forward to reviewing 

it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Will my colleague yield? 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank my colleague, and I’d be glad to look at 

it. And if—are you finished? 

Mr. DUNCAN. I’m going to ask him a question. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, I’m sorry. I’d be glad to look at it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. In my remaining 2 minutes, I’ve established that 

I’m very concerned about Iran’s presence in this hemisphere. I’m 

concerned about Hezbollah’s influence with the Mexican drug cartel. I think it’s very clear. And we’ve got to really put some effort 

on that, so I’m going to ask Mr. Farah, to your knowledge, is there 

any counter terrorism task force that utilizes the efforts of Homeland Security, State, DEA, CIA, FBI, any other intelligence agencies to focus on Iran’s presence, their influence, their activity in the 

Western Hemisphere? 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you, Congressman. I had the opportunity to 

work with your staff a little bit on that resolution. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you for that, too, by the way. 

Mr. FARAH. A pleasure. As far as I know, there’s no task force. 

I think individual components of the intelligence and law enforcement community do look at that. So far, I think yesterday’s events 

will change that considerably. There’s not been traditionally a lot 

of effort put into that because of resources allocated elsewhere in 

different—and I think a lack of sense of that was a policy imperative that we needed to understand that. I think that’s wrong, but 

I think that that was sort of the mind set there, that it was—nothing could really come of that relationship. 

I think it’s also very important to reiterate something Vanda said 

earlier, and that is that you have these multiple crossings of these 

multiple terrorist and organized groups, but it doesn’t mean that 

that’s one giant conglomerate out there operating in unison or as 

a single force. Everyone has their own interest. It’s more like a series of one night stands than trying to get married to someone. 

They cycle through relationships fairly quickly. 

What I think Iran and the Bolivarian groups bring to this in the 

Western Hemisphere is more stability, more of a grounded relationship that has the capacity to last much longer. And I think that 

that—when you look at the criminalization of the Bolivarian states 

where you have senior members of the Bolivian Government deeply 

involved in drug trafficking, Nicaragua, Ecuador, the President of 

Ecuador receiving money from the FARC, as well as ongoing narcotics activities. I think there’s a more permanent criminalization 

59

that allows Iran to root itself much more deeply than it had in the 

past when we did see mostly the series of one night stands. 

But I think it’s dangerous, also, to conflate everybody as acting 

in unison, in concert together in one giant conspiracy when, in fact, 

it’s multiple networks running multiple plans that overlap at different places. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I think it would be helpful. And I think we’ve 

had so much focus on al-Qaeda, there’s a Kronos article I’ll be glad 

to share that shows a connection—the nexus connection between 

al-Qaeda and Quds Force. But we need to wake up, America, that 

Iran and Hezbollah are very active in our own hemisphere, very 

evident yesterday. And I hope that it won’t be evident in the future, but we do need a task force, I think, dedicated to this. And 

I’ll yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think Mr. Braun had a response to you. 

Mr. BRAUN. Yes. Congressman Duncan, if I could just build on 

what Doug said, and your concern that you voiced. 

You mentioned the six new Embassies, Iranian Embassies that 

have sprung up in Latin America, very fairly quickly, by the way. 

Understand that with those Embassies come the increased number of IRGC and Quds Force operatives that we know are flowing 

into the Western Hemisphere, not only through those Embassies 

under diplomatic cover, but also clandestinely thanks to Hugo Chavez, the undisputed gatekeeper for Middle Eastern terrorist organizations that have got strategic interest in our part of the world. 

Lebanese and Syrian individuals can enter Venezuela without a 

visa these days, and are welcome. 

Another point that I’d like to make with respect to Hezbollah, 

there’s growing clear evidence of this very, very close relationship 

that we’ve known has existed, but there’s growing evidence of a 

very close relationship between Hezbollah and the Quds Force 

when it comes to global organized criminal activity. It would not 

surprise me one bit if we realized at some point in the not too distant future that the Quds Force was actually in command and control, sell our directorate, if you would, for the Hezbollah’s global involvement in the—the growing involvement in the global cocaine 

trade. 

The Hezbollah are absolute masters at identifying existing smuggling infrastructures around the world, and leveraging them for everything that they’re worth. And if anyone for a moment believes 

in our Government that the Hezbollah, and Quds Force, and the 

IRGC do not realize that Mexican drug trafficking organizations 

dominate the drug trade in over 230 cities in our country and realize and recognize that for the strategic—for its strategic value, 

then those folks simply don’t understand how the underworld 

works. We better wake up. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, let me just say this before we go to Mr. 

Connolly. I think you had a question. Then we’ll go to Mr. Sherman. Let’s do it this way. Mr. Connolly, ask your question first. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just wanted to 

follow-up with my friend from California. We play tag team often 

at hearings. But Dr. Felbab-Brown, I wanted to follow-up on a response I heard you give to Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

60

You said that you thought it was inappropriate to assign blame 

or responsibility to any part of the Iranian Government and 

Tehran at this point. 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. No. What I responded was that it is premature, inappropriate to make judgments about what levels of the 

Iranian Government were involved with the plot. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, what judgment would you make? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. We know that a member of the Quds Force 

was directing the operative. What we do not know is was the sanction by the highest levels—some of the highest mullahs, was it 

sanctioned by President Ahmadinejad? What role this Quds operative had within the Quds Forces, was he a prominent member of 

the Quds Forces? Was this directed? Was it a rogue operation, or 

was it an operation at the highest levels of the Iranian Government 

directed? I do not believe that we have this information at this 

point. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That may be technically true, but you heard Mr. 

Farah point out that this is not an isolated incident by elements 

of the Iranian Government, high and low, in actually perpetrating 

murder, and assassination, and terrorism. And, therefore, the preponderance of evidence would suggest whatever level you want to 

assign it, we as a sovereign state witnessing and uncovering a plot 

to assassinate the representative of another sovereign state in our 

Capital City have a right to hold the Iranian Government fully responsible irrespective of what element, or what level of any element in that government was, in fact, planning the plot. And that’s 

why I’m very puzzled by your answer to Mr. Rohrabacher that it’s 

inappropriate to exercise such a judgment. 

Pray tell, when does a sovereign state have the right to protect 

its own people and its own capital? 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. Well, I think it’s totally appropriate that we 

condemn the act. I think it’s appropriate and encouraging that our 

law enforcement was able to uncover the plot. And I think that 

shows the talent and intelligence capacity of our law enforcement. 

I also believe that it is appropriate, very much so, that we make 

clear that no nation, Iran included, no nation cannot conduct terrorist operations on our territory, and should not conduct terrorist 

operations anywhere in the world. 

Mr. Rohrabacher’s question was was the regime fully aware, and 

I don’t believe we have the evidence of that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I would just say to you, as I coined the 

phrase, convenient compartmentalization. I don’t think we can afford the luxury of that kind of indulgence, with all due respect. I 

think the United States must hold the Iranian Government fully 

responsible until and unless they’re able to isolate a rogue element 

and hold them accountable, and take appropriate measures. 

Until and unless that happens, it seems to me that this plot was 

planned for this capital, this city. It is unacceptable, and it seems 

to me we have to hold that foreign government fully responsible 

until and unless there’s evidence to the contrary. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go to one case where I know it’s not theoretical, and bring this up again: The Mahmoud Kourani case. When 

we’re talking about whether there’s a nexus between Hezbollah and 

the cartels, which we know in that specific example there’s no 

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question. This was an individual who was trained by the Quds 

Force in Iran, in Lebanon. He offered a bribe to the Mexican consulate there, someone in the consulate, $5,000 I believe. He was 

able to come illegally into Mexico. His next step was, as a 

Hezbollah member, to team up with a cartel who provided him a 

special arrangement to hide in a compartment that was placed in 

a car. And they drove him over the border, over our southern border in California. So that would be one example. 

I just ask Mr. Braun, because I had someone bring me a few 

years ago a document from USCIS which showed terror connections 

over the border, and illegal crossings over the border. When we 

contacted the organization they basically said, well, you’re not supposed to have that. You’re not supposed to comment on that. But 

I was going to ask you, do you have information about crossings 

like Mr. Kourani’s case, evidence that individuals who are involved 

in terror making an egress or an entry over the border? 

Mr. BRAUN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any specific—any other 

specific examples. But with that said, if you’ll remember probably 

I’m guessing maybe 8 months to a year ago there was a report that 

the Mexican Federal Police, the SSP has rounded up a Hezbollah 

recruiting cell just across the southwest border. And I can’t remember which city it was in. I talked to some of my former colleagues 

while—some former high-level Mexican Federal police officials that 

I had worked with and they said that it did, in fact, happen, that 

the member was a—or that the suspect that was arrested was a 

member of Hezbollah, and that he had been sent into the country 

to recruit, basically. And I would—so, I don’t have any other specific——

Mr. ROYCE. We’re finding them in the U.S. We don’t know—in 

the Kourani case, I think there were 50 other members of the cell. 

We don’t know how they all get here. 

Mr. BRAUN. Sure. 

Mr. ROYCE. But it’s an interesting evolution as these cells are established. And from time to time, of course, we manage to break 

them up. Mr. Farah. 

Mr. BRAUN. Chairman, if I could just say one last thing. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. BRAUN. And I really don’t want to sound too crude here, but 

I was in law enforcement for 34 years. 

Mr. ROYCE. Right. 

Mr. BRAUN. And my dad used to have a saying, ‘‘Where you see 

one roach, there are thousands.’’ Now, I’m not saying there are 

thousands of Hezbollah operatives, but where we see one or two, 

and this is based on my 34 years in law enforcement, you don’t 

need an analyst, a very bright analyst sitting in a pod to tell you 

that that’s not the case. I’ve seen it one too many times. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I know where there was one in this case there 

were 52 anyway for sure. 

Mr. Farah, you wanted to——

Mr. FARAH. I was just going to say, that was the case of Mr. 

Nasr, N–A–S–R, who was rolled up in there, and the Tucson, Arizona Police wrote a report about his involvement with—there are 

multiple cases that for different reasons have not been made public. But if you look in the—if you talk to the police forces on the 

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border, particularly in Texas and Arizona, there are other cases 

that have—I don’t they’re officially classified but they haven’t 

wanted to share very broadly. But there are multiple cases not of 

big groups, but of individuals coming across. And Mr. Nasr was the 

most prominent, most public of those. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Farah. We’ll go now to Mr. Sherman, 

and Mr. Duncan. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We’re going to get distracted here about whether 

this official or that official of the Iranian Government authorized 

this particular hit. And that can be our excuse to do nothing, or 

to do a little inconsequential thing, and then pretend that we’ve 

done enough, and then go on, because that’s what the State Department and multinational corporations want us to do. 

The fact is, this was a Quds Force operation. It was not a rogue 

operation, but if no one in Iran is going to be held accountable for 

violating—they’re not going to extradite anybody to the United 

States saying here’s one of our citizens who plotted an event in 

your country. But what we know is authorized by the highest levels 

of the Iranian Government is their nuclear program, and we know 

that we’re just getting a taste of what we’re going to see with a nuclear Iran, that is to say terrorism with impunity. 

We’ve passed laws here. They have been deliberately violated by 

the last three administrations. I refer to the Iran Sanctions Act. 

Now, we’re told that an attack was going to come on our own territory, and what is the response? Four or five Iranian individuals 

will be told that they cannot visit Disneyland. And if they happen 

to have an account at Bank of America, they will be subject to a 

$5.00 a month charge whether or not they use their ATM card. 

That’s our response. 

Why such a timid response? Because that is what European—

multinational businesses and European diplomats expect of us. 

And it is a reflection on the fact that the views of the American 

people are not taken into a whole lot of account in our foreign policy. 

What we should do is require multinational businesses to decide 

are they going to do business in Iran, or are they going to do business in the United States? I don’t know anybody—any major multinational that would choose Iran. But that would offend the multinational corporations. So, we have a problem. How can we preserve 

a government policy that meets the needs of multinational corporations, that is not displeasing to European diplomats, while at the 

same time pacifying the American people? And the answer is to 

wildly exaggerate the importance of telling four or five Iranians 

they cannot visit Disneyland, and to freeze the assets in the United 

States that those five individuals don’t have. 

It is a pitiful response, but it will be one of many pitiful responses that we will make as the centrifuges turn, and as the terrorism plots continue. And soon we will be told oh, we can’t respond to this or that act of Iranian terrorism because after all, 

they’re a nuclear state. 

Now, a question or two for the witnesses. Does this new bold plot 

for Iran to commit terrorism on U.S. soil with the help of Mexican 

drug cartels signal a new trend, state sponsors of terrorism using 

criminal elements to carry out their attacks, Mr. Braun? 

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Mr. BRAUN. Ranking Member Sherman, I don’t know if it’s going 

to result in a new trend or not, but here’s what worries me about 

this, and to kind of build on that theme, if you will. 

In permissive environments that are existing around the globe 

where you have very powerful young sergeants and lieutenants 

from both foreign terrorist organizations as well as very powerful 

drug trafficking organizations that have been dispatched by their 

leadership to move their agendas forward in places like West Africa, as I said, the Tri-Border Area of Afghanistan, the AfPak Region, and some other locations. 

These tough young sergeants and lieutenants from both of these 

threats are coming together. They’re building close interpersonal 

relationships today that in my mind, it’s as clear as can be, will 

develop into strong inter-organization, or potentially could grow 

into strong inter-organizational relationships and alliances in the 

future. Why? Because these tough young sergeants and lieutenants 

are naturally going to claw their way to the—within their organizations to key leadership positions. 

And it’s one thing to say that we know that the Quds Force has 

got the ability to pick up the phone and ask al-Qaeda for a favor 

or vice versa. We know that happens, and we know it’s been happening for quite some time. 

It’s an entirely different scenario, though, when you stop to think 

what are we going to do when a member—a key leader in AQIM, 

or al-Qaeda, or the Quds Force has got the ability to pick up the 

phone and call a ranking member within, or an executive member 

of the Sinaloa Cartel, or the FARC, or the Gulf Cartel and ask for 

a favor. I don’t think that that’s too far down the road, if it’s not 

already happening now. 

Mr. SHERMAN. What we’re going to do, of course, is make sure 

that that person does not visit Disneyland, and we’re going to tell 

the American people that as a sufficient sanction. 

Mr. Farah, is there anything we can do to substantially disadvantage the Iranian regime that would not anger multinational 

businesses or European diplomats? 

Mr. FARAH. I think that’s a trick question, sir. No, I think, basically, I think the cost the Iranian regime is paying now is much 

less than it would be because we’re not—we look at the Iranian 

Government in isolation instead of as part of a broad group of 

countries that are aimed at enabling them to break their sanctions. 

You have the entire Bolivarian—foreign ministers of every 

Bolivarian country go to Tehran last year and publicly say we’re 

going to violate the sanctions, and we hope the United States keels 

over dead, the press conference, that’s Venezuela, Bolivia, Iran, Ecuador, and other countries. 

The circumstances, assuming that what we do on sanctions matters is living on another planet. They now have access to Central 

Banks across Latin America. They’re clearly willing to work with 

Syria. They were—so I think thinking about what we can do is important, but I think it’s much broader than what we can do on 

Iran. And we have to recognize that there is a coalition of countries 

out there that wish to harm the United States, and share some 

basic underlying principles, and that is primarily the—so, I think 

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er way of going about sanctions and dealing with the government 

than just looking at Iran. I think you have to go after the enablers, 

as well, and I don’t think we’re even at the point of considering 

that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Or we’re going to have to give up on non-lethal 

action and focus on whether Israel or the United States takes lethal action. But I’m still looking for the non-lethal approach. I yield 

back. Thank you. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Doctor, do you want to answer that just real quickly, real briefly, please. 

Ms. FELBAB-BROWN. And even more important that whatever 

support or whatever relations Iran has in Latin America is, of 

course, the engagement that Iran has with Russia, China, and 

India. And the gas and oil interest that these countries have with 

Iran. As long as these relations are not changed, our sanctions will 

inevitably be limited. And I would assume that the plot that was 

uncovered would be a very important opportunity to hone to countries like China, Russia, and India that strong pressure needs to 

be applied on Iran not to engage in such terrorist actions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, there’s no other members of the committee 

here, so we’ll just conclude with thanking the ranking member for 

participating today. I’d also like to thank our witnesses and our 

panelists for being here and their excellent testimony. And thank 

you for your time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just note for the record, 

I would have been here the entire hearing. The hearing had to be 

scheduled at a different time because of very important work that 

the chairman has to do, and that I strongly support on the Financial Services Committee. So, I want the witnesses to know that had 

this hearing been held at its previously scheduled time, I would 

have had a chance to see them deliver their opening statements in 

person instead of reading them tonight. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All of you bring a wealth of experience, and that 

was very evident today, and unique perspectives in the nexus between drugs and terrorism. As Mr. Royce mentioned in his opening 

statement, the subcommittee will be looking forward to follow-up 

with the DEA in the future on this issue. And with nothing further, 

we’ll stand adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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