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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CARON SPENCER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CRAIG MACDONALD, and 

JACK TAEFF, 

Defendants. 

 / 

Case No. 14-cv-13858 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

R. STEVEN WHALEN

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT TAEFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [24] 

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 6, 2014, Caron Spencer (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint and Jury Demand 

against Michigan State Police Post officers Craig MacDonald and Jack Taeff (collectively, 

“Defendants”). See Dkt. No. 1, p. 1 (Pg. ID No. 1). In his Complaint, Plaintiff raises three counts 

alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force against him 

(Count I), falsely arrested/imprisoned him (Count II), and performed an illegal search and 

seizure (Count III). See id. at 3–6, ¶¶ 20–39 (Pg. ID No. 3–6). 

Presently before the Court is Defendant Taeff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [24]. The 

matter is fully briefed. After reviewing the briefing, the Court concludes that oral argument will 

not aid in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the Court will resolve the Motion on the 

briefs as submitted. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons discussed herein, the Court 

will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant Taeff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

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II. BACKGROUND

On the night of Saturday, October 13, 2012, Plaintiff and four friends were traveling in a 

1998 Mercury Grand Marquis (“the vehicle”) on their way to a friend’s house party. Dkt. No. 24-

6, pp. 6–7 (Pg. ID No. 227–28). Shortly after their departure, the vehicle was stopped by 

Michigan State Police officers Defendants MacDonald and Taeff for violations of the Michigan 

Vehicle Code, including an inoperative license plate light1

 and the front passenger, Bradley 

Barker, not wearing his seatbelt.2 See id. at 11–15. The driver, Robert O’Neal, pulled the vehicle 

into a nearby gas station, stopping the vehicle next to a gas pump on the driver’s side, once he 

saw the police vehicle lights flashing. See id. at 14. While the vehicle was pulling over, 

Defendants claim to have seen furtive movements from the three backseat passengers. Dkt. No. 

24-3, p. 8 (Pg. ID No. 126). 

Defendant MacDonald approached the driver’s side of the vehicle, informed the driver of 

the reason for the stop, and requested license, registration, and identification from the two men in 

the front seats, O’Neal and Barker. Id. at 10. MacDonald then sought to obtain the identification 

cards for the backseat passengers as well. Id. at 13–14. Plaintiff and the other backseat 

passengers chose to ignore MacDonald’s questions and stare forward, avoiding eye contact. See 

id. After Plaintiff failed to respond to MacDonald’s request to exit the vehicle,3 MacDonald 

grabbed Plaintiff’s wrist to remove him by force. Id. at 15. During this altercation, MacDonald 

asserts that he had to maneuver Plaintiff suddenly to avoid smashing his face into the curb upon 

 

1

 There does not appear to be any dispute that the vehicle’s license plate light was burned out at the point of the 

traffic stop. Thus, there was sufficient probable cause to stop the vehicle for a violation of the vehicle code. 2

 Barker and the other vehicle passengers all assert that Barker was wearing his seatbelt that evening. 

3

 While all other accounts dispute this, Plaintiff claims that he was stepping out of the vehicle on his own, such 

that 80% of the movement was his own and 20% was attributable to Defendant MacDonald. Dkt. No. 24-4, p. 37 

(Pg. ID No. 178). 

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which the gas pump was placed. Id. at 16–18. Plaintiff contends that MacDonald grabbed his 

shirt collar and began to intentionally choke him, telling Plaintiff to “shut the fuck up” and 

choking him harder when he protested. Dkt. No. 24-4, p. 41 (Pg. ID No. 182). Although Plaintiff 

does not recall the period of time in which the alleged choking lasted, his fellow passengers 

noted that it lasted around 10–15 seconds. See id. at 42; Dkt. No. 24-6, p. 29 (Pg. ID No. 250); 

Dkt. No. 27-4, p. 24 (Pg. ID No. 288). All the while, Defendant Taeff was positioned at the rear 

of the car, observing the driver and passenger who had already exited the vehicle, as well as the 

backseat passengers. Dkt. No. 24-2, p. 17 (Pg. ID No. 114). 

Around this time, Lieutenant James Grady arrived separately as back-up and assisted 

MacDonald in securing and handcuffing Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 24-9, p. 12 (Pg. ID No. 348). After 

spitting in Grady’s vehicle, Plaintiff was transferred into custody of the Inkster Police who drove 

him to the police station and cited him for drunk4

 and disorderly conduct. Dkt. No. 24-3, p. 22 

(Pg. ID No. 140); Dkt. No. 24-10, p. 2 (Pg. ID No. 375). The rest of the vehicle’s occupants were 

allowed to leave the stop without any tickets or citations. Dkt. No. 24-7, p. 29 (Pg. ID No. 293). 

Plaintiff was released from the Inkster Police Station later that night and recalled having bruising 

on his wrists, but no other physical injuries. Dkt. No. 24-4, pp. 28, 55–56 (Pg. ID No. 169, 196–

97). 

It is with these contrasting positions regarding the facts from the incident in question that 

the Court must consider the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. 

 

 

4

 Plaintiff and other riders in the vehicle stated that Plaintiff had not consumed any alcohol that night, prior to 

the traffic stop. 

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “directs that summary judgment shall be granted if 

‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779 

(6th Cir. 1998). The court must view the facts, and draw reasonable inferences from those facts, 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 255 (1986). No genuine dispute of material fact exists where the record “taken as a whole 

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus., 

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Ultimately, the court evaluates “whether 

the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so 

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendant Taeff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s 

claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity. See Dkt. No. 24, p. 2. Defendant Taeff argues 

Plaintiff cannot bring a viable failure to intervene claim against Taeff because the use of force, if 

any, arose spontaneous and ended quickly. See id. at 16. Further, Defendant Taeff asserts that he 

was not in the immediate vicinity of where the alleged force occurred, and that another law 

enforcement officer, who was not named in the suit, was in a better position to prevent the harm. 

See id. at 16–17. The Court finds that Defendant Taeff is not entitled to summary judgment on 

Count I, but will grant dismissal of Counts II and III against Taeff. A detailed analysis is below. 

 

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1. Defendant Taeff’s Claim that He Is Entitled to Qualified Immunity 

Defendant Taeff’s Motion for Summary Judgment relies on the doctrine of qualified 

immunity to shield him against the burdens of litigation and trial. Dkt. No. 24, p. 20 (Pg. ID No. 

89). Under this doctrine, government officials, including law enforcement officers, are immune 

from civil liability unless they violate a plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights in the 

course of performing their discretionary functions. Jones v. Byrnes, 585 F.3d 971, 974 (6th Cir. 

2009). 

The Court utilizes a two-step inquiry to determine whether a defendant is entitled to 

qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, the question is whether 

the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant 

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. Next, the second question asks whether the 

constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of violation. Id. The sequence of these 

questions is not rigid, as the Court may utilize its discretion to consider these questions in 

whatever order is appropriate, in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand. 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). “The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of 

demonstrating that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Rodriguez v. Passinault, 

637 F.3d 675, 689 (6th Cir. 2011). 

Under this framework, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff pled sufficient facts 

alleging that Defendant Taeff violated his constitutional rights, and that those rights were clearly 

established at the time of the alleged violation. “In qualified immunity cases, this usually means 

adopting . . . the plaintiff's version of the facts,” unless the plaintiff’s version of the facts “is 

blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott v. Harris, 

550 U.S. 372, 378, 380 (2007). The facts alleged demonstrate a violation of Plaintiff’s clearly 

established constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Thus, Defendant’s argument must 

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hinge on whether Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts that Defendant himself violated Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights. 

2. The Court Will Not Grant Qualified Immunity to Defendant Taeff on Plaintiff’s 

Fourth Amendment Claim of Excessive Force 

In his first claim, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights 

by using excessive force against him during the traffic stop. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 3–4, ¶¶ 20–26 (Dkt. 

No. 3–4). Specifically relating to Defendant Taeff, Plaintiff alleges that “Taeff failed to intervene 

on Plaintiff’s behalf and stop the excessive force being used against him.” Id. at ¶ 23. 

Excessive force claims are analyzed by applying a reasonableness standard, which 

“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the 

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the 

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 

flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). In order to hold a law enforcement officer 

civilly liable for use of excessive force, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the officer actively 

participated in the use of excessive force; (2) supervised the officer who used excessive force; or 

(3) owed the victim a duty of protection against the use of excessive force. Turner v. Scott, 119 

F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997). The Court will assume that Plaintiff relies on the third prong: that 

Defendant Taeff owed Plaintiff a duty of protection against the force applied. 

“It is clear that there are circumstances under which police officers can be held liable for 

failure to protect a person from the use of excessive force.” Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d at 429. An 

officer may be held liable for failing to prevent the use of excessive force when “(1) the officer 

observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the 

officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” Id. In 

Turner, the plaintiff did not meet the first prong of the duty to intervene test where no facts in the 

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record indicated that the officer actually observed or should have known about the application of 

force. Id. Instead, the record indicated that the officers had not communicated with one another 

prior to or during the application of force, and that the officer seeking qualified immunity had his 

back turned during the incident. Id. Since the record showed that the officer had no reason to be 

aware of the force, the Sixth Circuit found that he could not have prevented further application of 

force and should be granted qualified immunity. See id. at 430. 

In the present case, there is a question of material fact as to whether Defendant Taeff 

actually observed Defendant MacDonald’s removal of Plaintiff from the vehicle. The record 

contains seven depositions: four from the vehicle’s passengers and three from law enforcement 

officers present during at least part of the traffic stop. See Dkt. No. 24-2–24-4, 24-6–24-9 (Pg. ID 

No. 98–218, 222–373). The accounts of the events that transpired during the traffic stop differ in 

many ways, including testimony about Defendant Taeff’s proximity to Plaintiff’s removal and 

the time period in which the alleged choking took place. 

a. Officer Depositions 

In his deposition, Defendant Taeff stated that he saw Defendant MacDonald take Plaintiff 

by the wrists at one point while he was standing in the rear of the vehicle, watching the driver 

and front seat passenger. Dkt. No. 24-2, pp. 17–18 (Pg. ID No. 114–15). Defendant MacDonald 

recalled that Defendant Taeff was standing by the back of the vehicle while he removed Plaintiff 

and used an arm bar to control him, and that Lieutenant Grady assisted in controlling and 

handcuffing Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 24-3, pp. 9, 15–21 (Pg. ID No. 127, 133–39). Under 

MacDonald’s recollection, the events “all happened so fast.” Id. at 18 (Pg. ID No. 136). 

Lieutenant James Grady recalls showing up to the traffic stop as backup and speaking with 

Plaintiff in an effort to have him voluntarily exit the vehicle. Dkt. No. 24-9, pp. 10–12 (Pg. ID 

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No. 346–48). Grady stated that Plaintiff was noncompliant and belligerent, so Defendant 

MacDonald had to reach in and force Plaintiff out of the vehicle, grabbing ahold of his shirt in 

the process. Id. at 12. Grady then helped secure Plaintiff and handcuffed him, placing Plaintiff in 

his vehicle. Id. Grady does not specifically mention Defendant Taeff in the removal of Plaintiff 

from the vehicle and subsequent arrest. See id. 

b. Plaintiff and Witness Depositions 

The depositions from the vehicle’s occupants paint a slightly different picture. Barker 

stated that he was standing by the trunk of the vehicle and felt it rock as Plaintiff was forced out 

by Defendant MacDonald.5

 Dkt. No. 24-6, pp. 26–28 (Pg. ID No. 247–49). After feeling the car 

rock, Barker turned around and saw MacDonald choking Plaintiff. See id. Troy Singleton, a 

backseat passenger, did not see Plaintiff being choked, but did recall seeing him being forcibly 

removed from the vehicle by Defendant MacDonald. Dkt. No. 24-8, pp. 21–22 (Pg. ID No. 320–

21). Singleton heard Plaintiff tell MacDonald not to choke him and otherwise struggling to talk 

during the incident. See id. at 22–23. Although Plaintiff agreed that Taeff had no physical contact 

with him, he asserted that Taeff was present on the scene when the choking occurred. Dkt. No. 

24-4, p. 72–73 (Pg. ID No. 213–14). 

Barker stated that the choking incident lasted “a couple seconds, ten to fifteen seconds.” 

See Dkt. No. 24-6, p. 29 (Pg. ID No. 250). O’Neal also stated that the choking incident lasted 

“between ten and fifteen seconds.” Dkt. No. 27-4, p. 24 (Pg. ID No. 288). Singleton reported the 

time period between Plaintiff being removed from the car and Plaintiff telling MacDonald not to 

 

5

 O’Neal stated that it was Defendant Taeff that forcibly removed Plaintiff from the vehicle prior to Defendant 

MacDonald choking Plaintiff, but Plaintiff does not adopt O’Neal’s version of the facts of that evening. Dkt. No. 27-

4, pp. 20–24 (Pg. ID No. 284–88). 

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choke him lasted about “30, 40 seconds.” Dkt. No. 24-8, p. 26 (Pg. ID No. 325). Plaintiff could 

not recall how long the choking incident lasted. See Dkt. No. 24-4, pp. 72–73 (Pg. ID No. 213–

14). 

Viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Taeff had reason to know that excessive 

force was being used and whether Taeff had the opportunity and means to prevent that harm 

from occurring. Where Defendant Taeff was positioned, near Barker and O’Neal behind the 

vehicle, was not far from where Plaintiff was allegedly choked by Defendant MacDonald, 

adjacent to the back door on the driver’s side. Indeed, Defendant Taeff stated that he was able to 

see when Defendant MacDonald initially grabbed Plaintiff’s wrists. Dkt. No. 24-2, p. 12 (Pg. ID 

No. 109). Further, Barker stated that the car rocked during this process, at which point he was 

able to turn and observe the choking incident. Dkt. No. 24-6, pp. 27–28 (Pg. ID No. 248–49). 

Since Defendant Taeff was observing Barker, he would have seen Barker turning to observe the 

choking. Indeed, Defendant Taeff was close enough to see that there was “a bit of a struggle to 

get [Plaintiff] out” of the vehicle. Dkt. No. 24-2, p. 12 (Pg. ID No. 109). Further, although 

Defendant Taeff argues in his motion that the force “did not last long,” the Court is unable to 

determine at the summary judgment stage that ten to forty seconds, the period alleged by the 

witnesses, was too short of a period in which to intervene and stop MacDonald from choking 

Plaintiff. See Dixon v. Roscommon Cty., 896 F. Supp. 2d 670, 678 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (denying 

qualified immunity to deputies where there was a question of fact as to whether six seconds was 

enough time for the defendants to observe the plaintiff being choked and intervene). 

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Contrary to the Defendant Taeff’s contention, a reasonable person could conclude that 

there was sufficient time for him to intervene on Plaintiff’s behalf. Consequently, the Court will 

not grant Defendant Taeff qualified immunity or dismiss Count I against Taeff. 

3. The Court Will Dismiss Plaintiff’s Claim of False Arrest or Imprisonment 

Against Defendant Taeff 

In Plaintiff’s second claim, he alleges that Defendants falsely arrested Plaintiff for 

disorderly conduct, a charge that was later dismissed after Defendants did not appear in court. 

See Dkt. No. 1, p. 3–5, ¶¶ 17, 27–31 (Pg. ID No. 3–5). He further alleges that Defendants 

detained him without any legal justification or probable cause. See id. 

A plaintiff pursuing a false-arrest claim must demonstrate that the defendant “participated 

in an illegal and unjustified arrest, and that [the defendant] lacked probable cause to do so.” Bletz 

v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743, 758 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Walsh v. Taylor, 263 Mich. App. 618, 

626, 689 N.W.2d 506, 513 (2004)). A claim of false imprisonment requires a showing that (1) 

the defendant committed an act with the intention of confining the plaintiff; (2) the act directly or 

indirectly resulted in the plaintiff’s confinement; and (3) the plaintiff was conscious of his or her 

confinement. Id. Additionally, false imprisonment requires that the restraint occurred without 

probable cause to support it. Id. 

With respect to the first half of Plaintiff’s claim, false arrest, Plaintiff needed to show that 

Defendant Taeff participated in his illegal and unjustified arrest, and that this arrest lacked 

probable cause. See Walsh, 689 N.W.2d at 513. A thorough review of the record indicates that 

Defendant MacDonald and Lieutenant Grady were the arresting officers at the traffic stop. 

Although Defendant Taeff was present at the traffic stop, mere presence does not imply that he 

was an arresting officer, without any allegations that he directly participated in the arrest. C.f. 

United States v. Hence, 60 F. App’x 560, 561 (6th Cir. 2003) (referring to “the arresting officer 

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and his partner” separately where the partner did not make the arrest); United States v. Coles, 

948 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing the arresting officer from his partner when the 

partner was present at the traffic stop leading to arrest). The Sixth Circuit has “never held that an 

officer who is neither the arresting officer nor the proponent of the warrant can be liable for false 

arrest.” Schulz v. Gendregske, 544 F. App’x 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2013). Since none of the facts in 

the record indicate that Defendant Taeff was the arresting officer6 or that there was a warrant 

involved, Defendant Taeff is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s false-arrest claim. See 

id. 

The second half of this claim, false imprisonment, requires that Plaintiff show that 

Defendant Taeff committed an act with the intention of confining Plaintiff, that Taeff’s act 

resulted in Plaintiff’s confinement, that this restraint occurred without probable cause, and that 

Plaintiff was conscious of his confinement. See Walsh, 689 N.W.2d at 514. Plaintiff’s allegations 

and the record lack any specific allegation that Taeff intentionally confined him, focusing instead 

on the specific acts of Defendant MacDonald and Lieutenant Grady that resulted in Plaintiff 

being handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. There does not appear to be any genuine issue 

of material fact as to whether Defendant Taeff falsely imprisoned Plaintiff. Accordingly, 

Defendant Taeff is entitled to qualified immunity on the charge of false arrest or false 

imprisonment. The Court dismisses Count II of the Complaint against Defendant Taeff with 

prejudice. 

 

6

 Although Defendant Taeff’s name was on the citation issued to Plaintiff, see Dkt. No. 24-10, p. 2 (Pg. ID No. 

375), each of the deposition testimonies confirms that Taeff was not one of the officers who arrested Plaintiff. 

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4. The Court Will Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claim of Illegal Search 

and Seizure Against Defendant Taeff 

Plaintiff’s third and final claim alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights by conducting an illegal and search and seizure. Dkt. No. 1, pp. 5–6, ¶¶ 32–39 (Pg. ID No. 

5–6). Based on the facts alleged, it appears that Plaintiff’s illegal search and seizure claim relies 

primarily on the allegations that he was seized and arrested for drunk and disorderly conduct at 

the traffic stop without probable cause. 

The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures and to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects. U.S. CONST. 

amend. IV.7 An ordinary traffic stop constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, law 

enforcement officers may legally stop a vehicle without offending the Fourth Amendment where 

there is probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Id. “When a traffic stop is 

supported by probable cause, an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant.” Id. 

In determining whether a defendant committed a violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights, “[e]ach defendant’s liability is assessed individually, according to his own actions.” 

Gordon v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 486 F. App’x 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2012). To the 

extent that this claim seeks to hold Defendant Taeff liable for Plaintiff’s detention during the 

traffic stop, that allegation fails because there is the undisputed fact that the license plate light 

had burned out. Defendants need not rely on the allegation that the front passenger was not 

wearing his seat belt, which is disputed, to sustain the validity of the stop. The stop was 

 

7

 The right to be free from illegal searches and seizures is “clearly established” and thus, satisfies the second 

prong of the Morrison test for qualified immunity. See Morrison v. Bd. Of Trustees Of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 

400 (6th Cir. 2009). 

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permitted solely on the violation caused by the burnt out license plate bulb. See Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 257.686. 

Any allegations unrelated to the original reason for the traffic stop fail to mention actions 

of Defendant Taeff. As in the prior count, the record lacks any nonconclusory allegations of 

Defendant Taeff’s involvement in his detention and arrest. The facts pled in the Complaint and 

the deposition testimonies consistently focus on Defendant MacDonald’s actions that resulted in 

Plaintiff’s arrest. Although Defendant Taeff was present at the scene, there is no question of fact 

as to whether he was the one who searched or seized Plaintiff. See Ghandi v. Police Dep't of City 

of Detroit, 747 F.2d 338, 352 (6th Cir. 1984) (“As a general rule, mere presence at the scene of a 

search, without a showing of direct responsibility for the action, will not subject an officer to 

liability.”). 

Thus, as Plaintiff has not provided any factual dispute that Defendant Taeff was involved 

in the alleged illegal search and seizure of Plaintiff, there is no need to evaluate whether there 

was sufficient probable cause to detain Plaintiff. Defendant Taeff is entitled to qualified 

immunity on the charge of illegal search and seizure. The Court will dismiss Count III of the 

Complaint against him with prejudice. 

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will GRANT in part and DENY in part 

Defendant Taeff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [24]. Counts II and III against Defendant 

Taeff are dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 30, 2015 

 Gershwin A. Drain 

 HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

 United States District Court Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel 

of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or 

First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on December 30, 

2015. 

 s/Tanya R. Bankston 

 TANYA R.BANKSTON 

 Case Manager & Deputy Clerk 

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