# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________
METALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE, INC.,

DBA SCAG POWER EQUIP MENT, Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

THE TORO COMPANY, EXMARK MANUFACTURING CO., I NC., Defendants

- Appellants

______________________

2016

- 2433, 2016

- 2514

______________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in No. 2: 16

- cv

- 00544

- WED

, Chief Judge Rudolph T. Randa

, Judge Lynn Adelman

.

______________________

Decided: February 16, 2017

______________________

M ICHAEL T. G RIGGS , Boyle Fredrickson, S.C., Milwa ukee, WI, argued for plaintiff

- appellee. Also represented by A DAM B ROOKMAN , S ARAH M. W ONG

.

R ACHEL C. H UGHEY , Merchant & Gould P.C., Minn eapolis, MN, argued for defendants

- appellants. Also repr esented by A NTHONY R ICHARD Z EULI

.

______________________

Before M OORE , H UGHES , and S TOLL , Circuit Judges.METALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 2

M OORE , Circuit Judge

. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc.’s motion for a preliminary injunction precluding T he Toro Company and Exmark Manufacturing Co., Inc. from making, using, selling, and offering to se ll lawnmowers equipped with platform suspension systems that infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,186,475 (“the ’475 pa tent”). We affirm.

B ACKGROUND Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc., d/b/a Scag Power Equi pment (“Scag”)

, manufactures commercial riding lawnmowers. To improve its mowers, Scag developed a suspended operator platform , which is disclosed a nd claimed in the ’475 patent. The ’ 475 patent discloses a suspended operator platform for a ride

- on lawnmower or other riding light utility vehicle connected to a rigid chassis by a suspension system. ’475 patent at Abstract, 2:33

– 34. The operator platform supports the entire body of the operator. Id

. at 2:51

– 52. The suspension system suspends the operator platform from the chassis in a manner that isolates an o perator from vibrations, or shock loads, generated by the mower during use or when driven over uneven terrain. Id

. at 4:1

– 6. The operator platform can suspend or isolate some controls from the rigid chassis. Id

. at 2:37

– 39. For example, the patent
teac hes that the steering controls may be mounted on the suspended platform. Id

. at 2:39

– 41.

Sca g commercialized the system disclosed in the ’475 patent in i ts Cheetah line of lawnmowers. In 2015, both The Toro Company and its wholly owned subsidiary

, Exmark Manufacturing Co., Inc.

, (collectively “Toro”)

, introduced riding lawnmower s with suspended operator platform s to compete with Scag’s Cheetah line. Toro introduced the platform as part of its new MyRIDETM suspension sys tem, and Exmark introduced the platform as an upgrade to its Lazer Z Series lawnmowers. It isM ETALCRAFT OF MAYVILL E , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 3

undisputed that the steering con trols in Toro and Exmark’s riding lawnmowers are connected to the cha ssis, not the operator platform. Appellants ’ Br. 24, Appe llee’s Br. 13. On May 5, 2016, S cag filed an infringement action against Toro in th e Eastern District of Wisconsin and simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Toro from making, using, selling, and offering to sell lawnmowers with platform suspension systems t hat infringe its ’475 patent. On August 1, the district court granted Scag’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On August 4, Toro filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay entr y of the preliminary injunction

. T he district court denied Toro’s motion to stay entry of the injunction and granted Scag’s mo tion to set bond and enter the injunction order

. Toro appeals the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. We have juris diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) and (c)(1).

D ISCUSS ION In general, we review the grant or denial of a prelim inary injunction using the law of the regional circuit, here the Seventh Circuit. Murata Mach. USA v. Daifuku Co.

, 830 F.3d 1 357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ( citing Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., L LC , 748 F.3 d 1159, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2014) )

. “However, the Federal Circuit has itself built a body of precedent applying the general preliminary i njunction considerations to a large number of factually variant patent cases, and gives dominant effect to Fede ral Circuit precedent insofar as it reflects considerations specific to patent issues.” Id

. (quoting Trebro , 748 F.3d
at 1165). Both the Seventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit review the grant or denial of a preliminary injun ction for an abuse of discretion. See Lawson Prod s. , Inc. v. Avnet, Inc. , 782 F.2d 1429, 1437 (7th Cir. 1986); Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc. , 544 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir.METALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 4

2008). “An abuse of discretion may be established by showing that the court made a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors or exercised its discretion based upon an error of law or clearly erroneous factual fin dings.” Novo Nordisk of North Am. , Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.

, 77 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
The grant or denial of a preli minary injunction is within the sound discretion of the district court. Id

. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a party must establish “that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preli mi nary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Lumin ara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co. , 814 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 555 U.S. 7 , 20 (2008)). To establish a likel ihood of success on the merits, a patentee must show that i t will likely prove infringement of t he asserted claims and that its infringement claim will likely withstand the alleged infringer’s challenges to patent validity and enforceability. Sciele Pharma, Inc. v. Lupin Ltd. , 684 F.3d 1253, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc. , 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001 ) ). A preliminary injunction should not issue if the accused infringer “raises a substantial question concerning either infringement or validity.” Amazon.com

, 239 F.3d at 1 350.

A

. Likelihood of Success

1

. Likelihood of Infringem ent Infringement is a question of fact we review for clear

error. AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc

. , 633 F.3d 1042, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2010)

. We review claim construction de novo except f or subsidiary fact findings , which we review for clear error. Teva Pharm . USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.

, 135 S. Ct. 831, 841

– 42 (2015). The factual components of claim construction include the background science or theM ETALCRAFT OF MAYVILL E , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 5

meaning of a term to a skilled artisan during the relevant time period. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. , 839 F .3d 1034, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Teva , 135 S. Ct . at 841).
Asserted independent claims 11, 14, and 21 all claim “an operator platform that supports the seat and an entire body of an operator during use of the utility veh icle.” ’475 paten t at 12:4

– 5, 12:27

– 28, 13:10

– 11. In oppo sing Scag’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Toro d id not dispute that its accused mowers meet the asserted patent claims, except with respect to one limitation. J.A. 374. Toro argued its accused mowers do not infringe because the accused devices do not meet the limitation “an entire body of an operator.” Id

. It argued its mowers lack this limitation because the steering controls of the accused mowers are mounted to the chassis, not the operator platform, and therefore the operator’s hands and arms are not supported by the platform. J.A. 375

– 77.

The district court concluded that Metalcraft was lik ely to succeed on the infringement issue. J.A. 14. It acknowledged Toro’s argument but concluded that “the fac t that the defendants’ lawnmowers have steering controls attached to the chassis, as opposed to the oper ator platform, is not a defense to infringement.” J.A. 12. It construed “an operator platform that supports

. . . an entire body of an operator” “in reference to how a person sits in an ordinary chair.” Id.
On appeal, Toro argues the district court erroneously rejected Toro’s noninfringement defense because the court’s construction of “an entire body of an opera tor” exclude s the operator’s hands and arms. We disagree

. Nowhere did the district court con clude that “an entireMETALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 6

body of an operator” excluded the operator’s arms and hands. 1

T he district court correctly determined that the claims at issue do not require that the steering controls be mounted on the suspended operator platform. A review of the claims at issue demonstrate s that no ne of them co ntain such a limitation. Unasserted dependent claims, in contrast, contain limitations that require the steering controls be connected to the ope rator platform

. See , e.g., dependent claim 12. The claims also delineate between two structurally separate elements: the operator platform that supports the seat and the entire body of the operator and the steering controls. See id. (requiring that the steering controls be connected to and move in unison with the operator platform). The steering controls are not claimed as a component of the operator platform. M ore over, the specification makes clear that the operator pla tform supports the entire body and that steering controls

are connected to, but not part of, the ope rator platform. The specification consistently distinguishes the operator platform from components that may be attached to it,

1 Toro relies for its claim that the district cou rt held that an operator’s entire body does not include an oper ator’s arms or hands on one sentence in the district court’s opinion that states “[a]ll of the accused mowers have steering controls connected to the chassis, not the su spended operator platform, which means that the platform does not support the rider’s ar ms and hands,” to unde rstand that the district court made such a finding. We decline to interpret this single sentence, located in the middle of the court’s discussion of the parties’ arguments, as a fact

- finding. J.A. 10. We agree with Scag that this

s entence is merely part of the court’s summary of the positions taken by each party and refers to Toro’s pos ition.M ETALCRAFT OF MAYVILL E , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 7

such as the steering controls. ’475 patent at 2:3 9– 40 (“steering controls may be mounted on the suspended platform”); Id

. at 2:51

- 55; i d. at 5:3

– 5 (“[s]teering co ntrols 55 include a pair of levers 58 A, 58 B that are pivota lly attached to the operator platform 70 ”); id. at 6:9

– 10 (“the components attached to the operator platform 70 such as steering controls 55 ”). The ’475 patent makes clear that it is the suspended operator platform that supports “an entire body of an operator” and that the operator platform is a separate and distinct element from the st eering controls. In light of the claims and the spec ification, we reject Toro’s claim construction argument.

Toro also argues that the “entire body of an operator” limitation requires the steering controls be mounted on the operator platform or else the operator ’s hands will not be isolated from shock loads. It argues that since its accused mowers have steering controls connected to the chassis, its mowers do not isolate the operator ’s entire body from shock loads and therefore do not meet the “enti re body of an operator” limitation. Toro improperly equate s supporting the entire body of an operator with isolating every aspect of an operator’s body from shock loads.
No doubt, the ’475 patent discusses the advantages of isolating an operator’s body from shock loads . However,
t he ’475 patent treats supporting the entire body of an operator and isolating the operator from shock loads as two distinct aspects of the claimed invention. Referring to Fig ures 1 and 2, the specification states that the mowe r includes a suspension system that “suspends the operator platform 70 from the chassis in a manner that isolates an operator from vibrations, or shock

- type o r other loads.” ’475 patent at 4:1 –4 (emphasis added) . This is differ ent from when it refers again to Figures 1 and 2 and states, “suspension system 100 is configured to support an entire body of the operator, the operator platform 70 , and the components attached to the operator platform 70 such asMETALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 8

steering contro ls 55 .” Id

. at 6:7

– 10 (emphasis a dded). The ’475 patent uses precise language to differentiate between the distinct concepts of supporting and isolating with respect to other elements as well . The specification states, “with yet another aspect of the invention, an operator’s seat is vib rationally isolated from a suspended operator platform,” and “ [ i ] solating the mower deck 20 from the suspension system 100 prevents scalping.” Id

. at 3:1

– 3, 6:22

– 23 (emphase s added)

. In contrast, the specification states, “[a] drive train is supported in a
ge nerally rigid manner in chassis 10 ” and “[m]ower deck 20 is supported by frame 12 .” Id

. at 4:9

– 10, 4:14

– 15 (emphase s added)

. Finally, the claim language itself keeps these concepts separate. In contrast to asserted claims 11, 14, and 21, which claim “an operator platform that supports the seat and an ent ire body of an operator,” claim 5 requires “a seat and at least one elastomeric isolation mount connec ting the seat to the operator platform to reduce transmi ssion of vibrations therebetween .” Since the ’475 patent discerns between the invention’s functionality of suppor ting versus isolating from vibrations, we may not import into the entire body of an operator limitation a functional requirement that every part of the body be isolat ed from shoc k loads. It would be improper to import the isolation feature into the separate entire body limitation as Toro asks us to do. As a result, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Toro’s noni nfringement defense and de termining that Metalcraft had established a likelihood of success on infringement.

2

. Substantial Question of V alidity
Obviousness is a question of law based upon underl ying factual determinations, which we review for clear

error. Senju Pharm. Co. v. Lupin Ltd. , 780 F.3d 1337

, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A claim is invalid for obviousness “if the differences between the claimed invention and theM ETALCRAFT OF MAYVILL E , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 9

prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date o f the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. In determining whether there would have been a motivation to combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention, it is insufficient to simply conclude the combination would have been obvious wit hout identifying any reason why a person of skill in the art would have made the combination. See In re Van Os , 844 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Whether a skilled artis an would have been motivated to combine the refe rences is a question of fact. Apple Inc.

, 839 F.3d at 1051.

Toro a rgued that claim 21 would have been obvious in light of U.S. Patent No. 3,420,568 (“Henriksson”) and Japanese Patent Application No. JP55

- 69340 (“Sasaki”). Henriksson discloses a device for resilient support of a driver’s compartment mounted on a vehicle frame to provide vertical movement to cushion the driver from shocks absorbed by the vehicle from the earth or road. Henriksson at 1:15 –2 5. Sasaki discloses a device for adjusting an initial load of a spring in a damper used in a

rear

- wheel suspension system of a motorcycle or the like. Sasaki at 2.
Toro argue d that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combin e Henriksson and Sasaki. It argue d that while Henriksson does not disclose dual (fine and course) adjusters, as claimed by claim 21, 2 dual shock adjusters w ere well

- known in the prior art. J.A. 379. I t presented Sasaki as prior art that discloses

2 C laim 21 claims “a suspension system connecting the operator platform to the chassis and including (i) a

course

- stiffness adjuster

. . . and (ii) a fine

- stiffness a djuster.” ’475 patent at 13:12

– 17.METALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 10

shock absorbers with both fine and course adjustment. Id

. The district court rejected Toro’s motivation to co mbine argument. It recognized that “a patent ‘composed of several elements is not proved obvious merely by demo nstrating that each of its elements was, independently, known in the prior art’” and that “it can be important to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the el ements in the way the claimed new invention does. ” J.A. 13

– 14 (quotin g KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc. , 550 U.S. 398, 418

– 19 (2007)). It concluded that Toro failed to raise a substantial question of validity, stating Toro offered “no reason, and the Court cannot imagine one, that a person of ordinary skill in this field wou ld combine a motorcycle shock with a suspended truck cab and come up with a suspended operator platform.” J.A. 13 –14

. On appeal, Toro argues the district court’s analysis is inconsistent with KSR , 550 U.S. at 420

– 21, wh ich stated : ‘The idea that a desi gner hoping to make an adjustable electronic pedal would ignore Asano because Asano was designed to solve the constant ratio problem makes little sense. A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ord inary c reativity, not an automaton. ” Toro argues it would have been obvious to a person of skill in the art to co mbine Henriksson and Sasaki because Henriksson sought to solve the problem of transmission of shock loads to the operator and specified conventional and telescope

- type shock absorbers as m ethods of reducing shock loads

. We hold that the district court’s finding that there would not have been a motivation to combine is not clea rly erroneous. The district court correct ly acknowledge d that it is not enough for Toro to merely demonstrate that elements of the claimed invention were independently known in the prior art. Often, every element of a claimed invention can be found in the prior art. In re Kotzab , 217M ETALCRAFT OF MAYVILL E , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 11

F.3 d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Moreover, Toro merely identi fies a problem that Henriksson sought to solve. However, “knowledge of a problem and motivation to solve it are entirely different from motivation to combine particular references.” Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs.

, 512 F.3 d 1363, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
We agree with the district court that T oro provides no explanation or reasoning for concluding that one of skill in the art would have combine d these particular references to produce the claimed invention. Without any explan at ion as to how or why the references would be combined to arrive at the claimed invention, we are left with only hindsight bias that KSR warns against

. See KSR , 550 U.S. at 421. And w hile we understand that “[t]he obv iousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motiv ation,” we also recognize that we cannot allow hindsight bias to be the thread that stitches together prior art patches into something that is the claimed invention. See KSR , 550 U.S. at 419, 421. For these reasons, we co nclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejec ting Toro’s obviousness defense and determining that Toro did not raise a substantial question of validity.
Toro also argued below t hat Henriksson an ticipates claims 11 and 14. The district court found that Henrik sson “discloses a heavy

- duty truck with a driver’s co mpartment, not an operator platform as described by claims 11 and 14” and therefore is not an anticipatory reference. J.A. 13. Toro chal lenges the district court’s finding

. We decline to address the anticipation issue. A party may establish a likelihood of success by showing that at least one valid and enforceable patent claim is likely to be infringed. Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm ., In c. , 473 F.3d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Because asserted claim 21 covers the accused products and because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determi n-METALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 12

ing that Metalcraft established a likelihood of success as to infringement and validity with respect to claim 21, we need not reach the antici pation arguments r egarding claims 11 and 14 to sustain the injunction as to claim 21 which reaches all of the accused produ cts

. B . Irreparable Harm
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must esta blish that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the prelim inary injunction is not granted and there is a causal nexus between the alleged infringement and the alleged harm. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. , 735 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Evidence of potential lost sales alone does not demonstrate irreparable harm. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm ., Inc. , 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006). E vidence showing that no amount of monetary damages, however great, could address the harm tends to show it is an i rreparable harm

. See Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc. , 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Where the injury cannot be quantified, no amount of money damages is calculable, and therefore the harm cannot be adequately compensated and is irrepar able

. The district court determined that Scag is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a pr eliminary injunction because “it is impossible to quantify the da mages caused by the loss of a potentially lifelong customer.” J.A. 15. Toro argues the district court abused its discr etion by ignoring evidence it presented of at least twelve other compan ies that sell mowers designed to decreas e shock loads to the operator. It also argues the court erred in accepting Scag’s argument that brand loyalty resulted in the loss of “a potentially lifelong customer, ” and there are no facts to support this finding

. We do not find Toro’s arguments persuasive.
There is no requirement that the district court discuss every fact alleged by Toro. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v.M ETALCRAFT OF MAYVILL E , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 13

Baxter Int’l, Inc. , 582 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009). E ven if Toro means to allege that th ese twelve other companies have infringing lawnmowers that compete with Scag’s, “[t] he fact that other infringers may be in the marketplace does not negate irreparable harm.” Pfizer, In c. v. Teva Pharm . USA, Inc. , 429 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Fu rthe rmore, the district court determined

“ the dama ge to Scag is irreparable because it is imposs ible to quantify the damages caused by the loss of a pote nt ially lifelong customer.” J.A. 15. The fact that Toro’s own Senior Marketing Manager declared that some customers “prefer to purchase an entire line of products from the same manufacturer for consistency” suppor ts the court’s determination. J.A. 15 (citing J.A. 432, ¶ 7). The district court did not clearly err on this record; the loss by Scag of customers may have far

- reaching, long

- term impact on its future revenues, and the sales lost by Scag are difficult to quantify due to “‘ecosystem’ effects, where one company’s customers will cont inue to buy that co mpany’s products and recommend them to others.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. , 809 F.3d 633, 641, 645 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Because of its variable and uncertain nature, this loss is very difficult to calculate.” Id. T he refore, the d istrict court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Scag is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

C . Balance of Equities and the Public Interest
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must esta blish that “the balance of equities tips in [its] fa vor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. ” Luminara

, 814 F.3d at 1352. The district court must weigh the harm to the moving party if the injunction is not granted against the harm to the non

- moving party if the i njun ction is granted. Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs. , 849 F.2d 1446, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is within the court’s discretion to balance the equities. Atlas Power Co. v. Ireco Chems. , 773 F.2d 1230, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In consi d-METALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 14

ering whether the p ublic interest favors the grant of an injunction, the district court should focus on whether a critical public interest would be injured by the grant of injunctive relief. Hybritech , 849 F.2d at 1458.

The district court identified the harms that Toro a sserted it would suffer if enjoined as those associated with losing a patent infringement lawsuit. J.A. 17. It reco gnized that in the absence of an injunction, Scag would face substantial hardship in being forced “to compete against its own patented inven tion.” J.A. 16

– 17. It concluded that Scag’s harm in the absence of an injun ction outweighs Toro’s harm if enjoined. J.A. 17. It also concluded that in light of the importance of encouraging innovation and in light of the fact that the public can contin ue to obtain the patented suspension system from Scag or other non

- infringing mowers from Toro, the public interest favors the issuance of an injunction. Id

. Toro argues that its harm outweighs Scag’s and the injunction harms the public because it disrupt s the status quo by removing from the public lawnmowers that had been available for over a year.

We are not persuaded that the district court’s contr ary determination was an abuse of discretion and decline
to disturb the grant of the preliminary injuncti on on the se base s.
D

. Content and Scope of the Injunction

Pursuant to Rule 65(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, every order granting an injunction must “state the reasons why it issued; state its terms specifically; and describe in reasonabl e detail

— and not by referring to the complaint or other document

— the act or acts restrained or required.” “[ W] hether the terms of an injunction fulfill the mandates of Rule 65(d) is a question of law that we review without deference .” Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp. , 383 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We do notM ETALCRAFT OF MAYVILL E , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 15

uphold vague or overly broad injunction s because “those against whom an injunction is issued should receive fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits.” G ranny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto T ruck Drivers , 415 U.S. 423, 444 (1974). In the patent infringement context, we have found as overly broad an injunction that “simply prohibits future i nfringement of a patent.” Int’l Rectifier Corp. , 3 83 F.3d
at 1316.

The district court’s order enjoins Toro from “making, using, selling, and offering to sell lawnmowers equipped with platform suspension systems that infringe Scag’s patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,186,457 .” J.A. 6. Toro argues the district court’s preliminary injunction is overly broad. We do not agree. The Decision and Order in which the district court grants the motion for the preliminary i njunction discusses both the claims at issue as well as the defendants’ accused products which it e njoins. J.A. 6– 18. Claim 21 was argued to cover all the accused pro ducts, and Toro has made no meaningful arguments which delineated among the accused products. We have a ffirmed the district court’s conclusion that the patentee has established a likelihood of success that the accused products infringe claim 21 and that there is not a su bstantial question of validity as to claim 21. In such a case, we affirm the preliminary injunction as to the a ccused products.

C ONCLUSION For the foregoing reaso ns , we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Scag’s motion for a prelimi nary injunction . Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of injunc tive relief on claim 21 as to the accused products

. AFFIRMEDMETALCRAFT OF MAYVIL LE , INC

. v. THE TORO COMPANY 16

C OSTS

Costs t o Appellee

.