-1- 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DAWN GUYOT, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BRYAN RAMSEY, BMR SECURITY 

SOLUTIONS, LLC, a Michigan limited 

liability company, and BMR LAWN 

CARE, LLC, a Michigan limited liability 

company, 

Defendant. 

 / 

Case No. 14-cv-13541 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MONA K. MAJZOUB

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [33] IN PART

I. INTRODUCTION

Dawn Guyot (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action on September 11, 2014 

against Bryan Ramsey, BMR Security Solutions, LLC, and BMR Lawn Care, LLC 

(“Defendants”). See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff contends that Defendants are liable for: 

(I) violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) under 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 

seq.; and (II) violation of the Michigan Opportunity Workforce Wage Act 

(“MWOWA”) under MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.381 et seq. Id. at 5–7 (Pg. ID No. 

5–7). Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on both counts on April 5, 

2016. See Dkt. No. 33. 

2:14-cv-13541-GAD-MKM Doc # 40 Filed 05/17/16 Pg 1 of 7 Pg ID 311
-2- 

The matter is fully briefed. After reviewing the briefing, the Court concludes 

that oral argument will not aid in the resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the 

Court will resolve the Motion on the briefs as submitted. See E.D. Mich. L.R. 

7.1(f)(2). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the Defendants’ 

Motion with respect to Count I, and DISMISS Count II to state court for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 11, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this action against the Defendants 

to recover unpaid wages. See Dkt. No. 33 at 8 (Pg. ID No. 133). Plaintiff claims 

she worked for Defendants from approximately April, 2012 through May, 2014. Id.

Plaintiff claims she worked an approximate total of 662 hours without pay for 

Defendants Ramsey and BMR Security, LLC, preparing logs, invoices, scheduling, 

and payroll. Id. Further, Plaintiff alleges she worked for Defendants Ramsey and 

BMR Lawn Care for approximately 24 hours without pay assisting with various 

landscaping tasks. Id. at 9 (Pg. ID No. 134). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) “directs that summary judgment shall 

be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s 

Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). The court 

2:14-cv-13541-GAD-MKM Doc # 40 Filed 05/17/16 Pg 2 of 7 Pg ID 312
-3- 

must view the facts, and draw reasonable inferences from those facts, in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 255 (1986). No genuine dispute of material fact exists where the record “taken 

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus., Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

Ultimately, the court evaluates “whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. The Scheduling Order 

Plaintiff first argues that the Motion should be denied because it was filed 

more than 30 days after the close of discovery, and well after the December 15, 

2015 dispositive motion deadline set by the Court. Dkt. No. 37 at 10 (Pg. ID No. 

262). The Court disagrees. 

This Court has taken notice that Defendant Bryan Ramsey has been in 

bankruptcy since July 10, 2015. Dkt. No. 38. On March 22, 2016, the Court held a 

status conference with the parties and gave permission to Defendants to file the 

present motion. Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion and hear the 

motion. 

2:14-cv-13541-GAD-MKM Doc # 40 Filed 05/17/16 Pg 3 of 7 Pg ID 313
-4- 

B. The Fair Labor Standards Act 

The FLSA provides employees with two means of protection. “First, 

employees may be employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or the 

production of goods for commerce and thus enjoy ‘enterprise coverage.’ ” 

Kowalski v. Kowalski Heat Treating, Co., 920 F. Supp. 799, 802–03 (N.D. Ohio 

1996). “Second, employees may themselves be engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce, enjoying ‘individual’ coverage.” Id. at 803. 

a. Enterprise Coverage 

Under FLSA, protection is extended to “employees who in any workweek 

[are] engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or [are] 

employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 

commerce....” 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). This coverage—known as “enterprise 

coverage”—extends to employees of enterprises that have “an annual gross volume 

of sales made or business done [of] not less than $500,000....” See 29 U.S.C. § 

203(s)(1); Hiar v. Hingston, No. 95–1703, 1996 WL 506501, *1 n.2 (6th Cir. 

September 5, 1996). 

Defendants argue, and have evidenced via sworn affidavit, that the 

Defendants have never generated $500,000 in revenue at any point. Dkt. No. 33 

(Exhibit 3, ¶16). This evidence goes undisputed. Therefore, there is no genuine 

2:14-cv-13541-GAD-MKM Doc # 40 Filed 05/17/16 Pg 4 of 7 Pg ID 314
-5- 

issue of material fact. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no “enterprise 

coverage.” 

b. Individual Coverage 

Plaintiff argues that regardless of the existence of “enterprise coverage,” the 

Plaintiff is still entitled to “individual coverage.” Dkt. No. 37 at 10 (Pg. ID No. 

262). An individual may gain “individual coverage” if the employee “themselves 

[is] engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce....” 

Kowalski, 920 F. Supp. at 803; Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of 

Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 295 n.8 (1985). Thus, the question before the Court is 

whether Plaintiff was “engaged in commerce.” 

 Commerce is defined under FLSA as “trade, commerce, transportation, 

transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State and 

any place outside thereof.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(b). “The ‘commerce’ referred to in the 

Act must be interstate commerce, and not all of the activities subject to the 

constitutional power of Congress over interstate commerce come within the scope 

of the Act.” Mitchell v. Welcome Wagon, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 674, 678 (W.D. Tenn. 

1954); Hiar, 1996 WL 5056501 at *1 n.2 (finding that the Mitchell decision is 

“still viable” to the extent that it directs plaintiffs arguing for individual coverage.); 

Kowalski, 920 F. Supp. at 803 (a finding of “individual coverage” still “hinge[s] on 

2:14-cv-13541-GAD-MKM Doc # 40 Filed 05/17/16 Pg 5 of 7 Pg ID 315
-6- 

the company engaging in interstate commerce.”). This definition “has no 

application to the internal affairs of the employer.” Id. 

 “The test under the Act to determine whether an employee is ‘engaged in 

commerce’ is . . . whether the employee’s activities are actually in or so closely 

related to the movement of commerce as to be a part of it.” Id. (citing McLeod v. 

Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497 (1943)). “The burden of proof is upon the Plaintiff as 

the one asserting coverage, to prove that Defendant’s employees are engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that her secretarial duties—i.e. the production and mailing of 

invoices and bill payments—qualify as “interstate commerce” under FLSA, and 

thus qualify her for “individual coverage.” Dkt. No. 37 at 11 (Pg. ID No. 263). The 

Court disagrees. 

Under Mitchell, “Plaintiff must establish that [Defendants’] employees 

spend a substantial portion of their time engaging in interstate commerce ....” 

Mitchell, 139 F. Supp. at 678. Here, Plaintiff has brought no evidence to show that 

her activities were “closely related” to the movement of commerce between states, 

or that any invoices or bill payments were ever sent out of state. Plaintiff merely 

argues that she was responsible for mailings that had the “potential” to move 

throughout interstate commerce. Dkt. No. 37 at 11 (Pg. ID No. 253). This 

argument is insufficient to carry the Plaintiff’s burden. Mitchell, 139 F. Supp. at 

2:14-cv-13541-GAD-MKM Doc # 40 Filed 05/17/16 Pg 6 of 7 Pg ID 316
-7- 

678 (“The burden is not sustained by pointing to some small incidental interstate 

activity of a fundamentally intrastate business.”). Moreover, there has been no 

evidence to suggest that Defendants conducted business out of state. On the 

contrary, Defendants’ have brought evidence that they conducted business “solely 

within Southeastern Michigan ....” Dkt. No. 33 (Exhibit 3, ¶15). Accordingly, 

Plaintiff is not entitled to individual coverage and her FLSA claim fails. 

C. The Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act 

Plaintiff has also brought a claim under the Michigan Workforce 

Opportunity Wage Act (“MWOWA”). The federal claims having been dismissed, 

the Court declines to grant supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 

V. RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ 

Motion with regard to Count I. Furthermore, the Court DISMISSES Count II for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 17, 2016 /s/Gershwin A Drain 

Detroit, MI HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

 United States District Court Judge

2:14-cv-13541-GAD-MKM Doc # 40 Filed 05/17/16 Pg 7 of 7 Pg ID 317