(Bench Opinion) Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Per Curiam 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 04ñ1581 

_________________ 

WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC., APPELLANT v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[January 23, 2006] 

 PER CURIAM. 

 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 

ß203, 116 Stat. 91, prohibits corporations from using their 

general treasury funds to pay for any ìelectioneering 

communications.î 2 U. S. C. ß441b(b)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. 

III). BCRA ß201 defines ìelectioneering communicationsî 

as any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that 

refers to a candidate for federal office and that is broadcast within 30 days of a federal primary election or 60 

days of a federal general election in the jurisdiction in 

which that candidate is running for office. 2 U. S. C. 

ß434(f)(3). Appellant Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL) 

brought this action against the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking a judgment declaring BCRA unconstitutional as applied to several broadcast advertisements 

that it intended to run during the 2004 election. WRTL 

also sought a preliminary injunction barring the FEC from 

enforcing BCRA against those advertisements. WRTL does 

not dispute that its advertisements are covered by BCRAís 

definition of prohibited electioneering communications. 

Instead, it contends that BCRA cannot be constitutionally 
2 WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC. v. FEDERAL ELECTION 

 COMMíN 

Per Curiam 

applied to its particular communications because they 

constitute ìgrassroots lobbying advertisements.î Although 

the FEC has statutory authority to exempt by regulation 

certain communications from BCRAís prohibition on electioneering communications, ß434(f)(3)(B)(iv), at this point, it 

has not done so for the types of advertisements at issue 

here. 

 The three-judge District Court denied the motion for a 

preliminary injunction and subsequently dismissed 

WRTLís complaint in an unpublished opinion. We noted 

probable jurisdiction, 545 U. S. ___ (2005). Appellant asks 

us to reverse the judgment of the District Court because 

that court incorrectly read a footnote in our opinion in 

McConnell v. Federal Election Commín, 540 U. S. 93, (2003), 

as foreclosing any ìas-appliedî challenges to the prohibition 

on electioneering communications. We agree with WRTL 

that the District Court misinterpreted the relevance of our 

ìuphold[ing] all applications of the primary definitionî of 

electioneering communications. Id., at 190, n. 73. Contrary 

to the understanding of the District Court, that footnote 

merely notes that because we found BCRAís primary definition of ìelectioneering communicationî facially valid when 

used with regard to BCRAís disclosure and funding requirements, it was unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the backup definition Congress provided. Ibid. 

In upholding ß203 against a facial challenge, we did not 

purport to resolve future as-applied challenges. 

 The FEC argues that the District Court also rested its 

decision on the alternative ground that the facts of this 

case ìsuggest that WRTLís advertisements may fit the 

very type of activity McConnell found Congress had a 

compelling interest in regulating.î No. 04ñ1260 (DC, Aug. 

17, 2004), App. to Juris. Statement 8a. It is not clear to 

us, however, that the District Court intended its opinion to 

rest on this ground. For one thing, the court used the 

word ìmay.î For another, its separate opinion dismissing 
 Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Per Curiam 

WRTLís challenge with prejudice characterized its previous opinion as holding that ìWRTLís ëas-appliedí challenge 

to BCRA is foreclosed by the Supreme Courtís decision in 

McConnell.î Id., at 3a. Given this ambiguity, we cannot 

say with certainty that the District Courtís dismissal was 

based on this alternative ground. 

 We therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case 

for the District Court to consider the merits of WRTLís asapplied challenge in the first instance. 

It is so ordered.