UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAMEEL AHMED ALI,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 14-12996

Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds

OPINION AND ORDER ACCEPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S JUNE 3, 2015

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [17]

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's

June 3, 2015 Report and Recommendation [17]. Being fully advised in the premises and

having reviewed the record and the pleadings, including Plaintiff's objections, the Court

hereby ACCEPTS AND ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

It is further ordered that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [11] is DENIED,

Defendant's motion for summary judgment [16] is GRANTED, and the case is hereby

DISMISSED.

The vast majority of Plaintiff's "objections" are little more than rehashed--at times

verbatim--arguments that were previously raised in his motion for summary judgment. "This

Court is not obligated to address objections made in this form because the objections fail

to identify the specific errors in the magistrate judge's proposed recommendations, and

such objections undermine the purpose of the Federal Magistrate's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636,

which serves to reduce duplicative work and conserve judicial resources." Owens v.

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Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12–47, 2013 WL 1304470, at *3 (W.D.Mich. Mar.28, 2013)

(citations omitted.). With respect to those objections that are sufficiently tied to a specific

finding in the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge (1)

placed undue emphasis on his ability to complete household activities, and (2) erred by

adopting the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") finding that the opinion of treating

psychiatrist Dr. Al-Najjar was worthy of only little weight. The Court considers each in turn. 

Plaintiff's first objection revolves around the ALJ's conclusion that his "described daily

activities [were] not limited to the extent one would expect given [his] complaints of

disabling symptoms and limitations." (Transcript, 20; ALJ's Decision, 9). More specifically,

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ's adverse credibility finding was based exclusively on the fact

that he is able to "drive and shop three times a week . . . ." (Plf.'s Obj. 2). The Court is not

persuaded by this contention for a number of reasons.

As a preliminary matter, there is no question that "[a]n ALJ may also consider

household and social activities engaged in by the claimant in evaluating the claimant's

assertion of pain or ailments." Kidd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 283 Fed. App'x 336, 342 (6th

Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Moreover, an ALJ's credibility findings "are to be accorded

great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing

a witness's demeanor and credibility." Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531

(6th Cir.1997). Here, contrary to Plaintiff's suggestion, the ALJ considered a whole host of

evidence in support of his conclusion that "while the claimant's daily activities reflect some

restrictions, his ability to handle hygiene tasks, drive, and shop for all necessities is

generally consistent with light work." (Tr. 20, ALJ Decision, 9). Indeed, the ALJ specifically

considered the following: 

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The claimant is independent in all personal care activities, including dressing,

bathing, and feeding himself. He resides with five children, and has reported

that he cares for and supports them. [H]e drives a motor vehicle. He buys

groceries, clothing, house supplies, and other necessities for his children. He

goes to the store as often as three times a week. He does not need

assistance to run errands.

(Id.). In other words, Plaintiff's ability to "drive and shop three times a week" was simply one

of many household activities considered by the ALJ in support of his credibility assessment. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not take issue with the factual basis offered in support of the

ALJ's conclusion. 

Nor does Plaintiff's reliance on Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 486 F.3d 234 (6th Cir.

2007) suggest that the result should be any different. There, the ALJ's findings "not only

mischaracterize[d] Rogers' testimony regarding the scope of her daily activities, but also

fail[ed] to examine the physical effects coextensive with their performance." Id. at 249.

Stated differently, Rogers holds that credibility determinations, which may include

consideration of the claimant's daily activities, must be reasonable and supported by

substantial evidence. 

Here, by contrast, the ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff's daily activities in

conjunction with his medical history in concluding that he was capable of performing light

work. See Hall v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-13101, 2010 WL 3583369, at *3 (E.D. Mich.

Sept. 13, 2010) ("Because the ALJ also considered contradictory medical evidence on the

record when making her adverse credibility finding, it was appropriate for the ALJ to

consider daily activities in her credibility finding."). In fact, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's

"treatment has been quite conservative, consisting only of injections, medications, and

physical therapy. He underwent an evaluation from a surgeon, and no surgical procedure

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was recommended." (Tr. 21, ALJ Decision, 10). In sum, "there is nothing patently

erroneous in the ALJ's decision to rely on h[is] own reasonable assessment of the record

over the claimant's personal testimony.” White v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 287

(6th Cir. 2009). As such, the Court agrees that there is substantial evidence to support the

ALJ's adverse credibility finding, especially in light of the great deference to be accorded

to his determination in this regard. 

In his final objection, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the

opinion of Dr. Al-Najjar, his treating psychiatrist. This argument can be summarily disposed

of. The Sixth Circuit has been clear that an opinion issued by a treating source is entitled

to deference if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques' and [is] 'not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the]

case record,' . . . .'". Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotations

omitted). Further, "[i]f the opinion of a treating source is not accorded controlling weight, an

ALJ must apply certain factors-namely, the length of the treatment relationship and the

frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability

of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization

of the treating source-in determining what weight to give the opinion." Wilson v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). 

As the ALJ aptly explained, the record contains numerous reasons to be highly

skeptical of Dr. Al-Najjar's opinion. First, and perhaps foremost, "[g]iven that Dr. Al-Najjar

only treated the claimant from December 2012 to February 2013, his opinion is not a good

reflection of the claimant's functioning throughout the majority of the [relevant] period . . .

in 2011 and 2012." (Tr. 20, ALJ Decision). Furthermore, Dr. Al-Najjar's conclusion that

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Plaintiff had "no useful ability" to complete a normal workday was formed after seeing "the

[Plaintiff] just once." (Id.). Moreover, it is difficult to determine whether Dr. Al-Najjar's

treatment regime--a variety of psychotropic medications--was effective in light of the fact

that his relationship with Plaintiff spanned less than three months. As the court recognized

in Barker v. Shalala, “[t]he treating physician doctrine is based on the assumption that a

medical professional who has dealt with a claimant and his maladies over a long period of

time will have a deeper insight into the medical condition of the claimant than will a person

who has examined a claimant but once, or who has only seen the claimant's medical

records.” 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir.1994). In other words, the very premise of the treating

physician doctrine cuts against providing significant deference to Dr. Al-Najjar's opinion. In

short, the Court is satisfied that the ALJ properly considered and applied all of the Wilson

factors before concluding that Dr. Al-Najjar's opinion was worthy of only limited weight. 

For the reasons thus stated, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's objections and ADOPTS the 

Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. 

SO ORDERED.

s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

Nancy G. Edmunds

United States District Judge

Dated: August 3, 2015

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record

on August 3, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol J. Bethel 

Case Manager

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