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THE EXPANDING U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 26, 2011

Serial No. 112–71

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois, Chairman 

RON PAUL, Texas 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ambassador Chris Hill, dean, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, 

University of Denver ............................................................................................ 9

Mr. Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for Northeast Asia, The Heritage 

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 16

Ms. Tami Overby, president, U.S.-Korea Business Council ................................. 30

Abraham Kim, Ph.D., vice president, Korea Economic Institute ........................ 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald A. Manzullo, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Illinois, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 8

Ambassador Chris Hill: Prepared statement ........................................................ 12

Mr. Bruce Klingner: Prepared statement .............................................................. 18

Ms. Tami Overby: Prepared statement .................................................................. 32

Abraham Kim, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 39

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a 

Representative in Congress from the State of California, and written response from Ms. Tami Overby ............................................................................ 68

(1)

THE EXPANDING U.S.-KOREA ALLIANCE 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald A. Manzullo (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. MANZULLO. The Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will 

now come to order. 

On October 12th of 2011, Congress passed the U.S.-Korea Free 

Trade Agreement, marking the dawn of a new era in U.S.-South 

Korea relations. As America’s largest free trade agreement in Asia, 

the KORUS Free Trade Agreement promises more export opportunities for U.S. businesses and manufacturers than ever before. In 

a relationship that has ebbed and flowed over the past few decades, 

President Lee’s visit to the U.S. is testament that this relationship 

is the strongest it has ever been. 

Today’s hearing is both timely and important in addressing the 

impact of expanded U.S.-South Korea relations in terms of peace, 

prosperity, and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The 16th Congressional District of Illinois, which I have the honor of representing, depends heavily on manufacturing for its livelihood. 

Many of the products produced in the district are exported around 

the world. The KORUS Free Trade Agreement promises to boost 

existing exports, with economists estimating as much as $11 billion 

in export growth. The Agreement will also provide American companies important access to South Korea’s $1 trillion market and 

boost the overall level of two-way trade beyond the $87 billion 

value recorded in 2010. 

Here in the United States, we are blessed with the fact that 1.5 

million Americans of Korean descent call this nation ‘‘home.’’ They 

are an integral part of the fabric of American society. Many Korean-Americans are small business owners, and their pursuit of the 

American dream contributes greatly to the U.S. economy. 

In November 2008, South Korea qualified to join the group of 

countries eligible to participate in our visa waiver program. Long 

overdue, South Korean citizens, along with our Japanese and 

Singaporean friends, now enjoy visa-free travel to the U.S. for tourism and business for up to 90 days. The ability to easily travel back 

and forth is a key to welcoming Korean investment and businesses 

into the United States. 

2

The U.S.-Korea relationship has grown over time, beyond a security alliance to one of incredible depth and sophistication. I’ll never 

forget the day when former Ambassador Lee Tae-Sik made a special visit to the 16th Congressional District in Illinois to personally 

thank American Veterans of the Korean War for the efforts to defend his country and protect his people. As I stood watching this 

take place, I could not but be overcome with great respect and gratitude for the friendship our two nations share. Several veterans 

told me that this was the first time anybody had ever said ‘‘thank 

you’’ for helping them achieve freedom in their country. 

While South Korea embraces freedom, democracy, and respect for 

human rights, her neighbor to the north continues to shock the 

world with threats of weapons of mass destruction and violent 

provocations. In March 2010, North Korea sent tremors when it 

sunk a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. 

It followed this attack by shelling Yeonpyeong Island in November 

of the same year. The international community was outraged further when China not only remained silent, but also rewarded North 

Korea with further food and fuel assistance. 

Just this past week, the Chinese Ambassador to North Korea announced that China and North Korea are entering a new era of vigorous development and will make unremitted efforts to consolidate 

and develop their friendship further. North Korea is one of the 

most repressive and hostile regimes on the planet. North Korea is 

in a league of its own when it comes to the level of weapons proliferation, human rights violations, and illicit activities carried out 

by the regime. 

The Kim Jong Il regime is starving its own people and at the 

same time it remains a sponsor of international terrorism. Its close 

relationship with Syria, Iran, and Burma add to this concern. It’s 

important that we continue to work with South Korea on a joint 

strategic plan and do not offer concessions. Our collective security 

is being threatened and we cannot tolerate this continued behavior. 

In his address to Congress, President Lee expressed the sentiments of the South Korean people best when he stated ‘‘America 

is our friend and neighbor.’’ Indeed, those words ring true now 

more than ever in a 60-year partnership that saw South Korea 

transform from poverty and dictatorship to the prosperous and 

thriving democracy we see today. America played a direct role in 

Korea’s epic success. I concur with President Lee that our countries 

have one of the closest, most important economic relationships in 

the world. I also agree that when we work together, we win together. 

The future of our alliance is bright. I thank my Korean friends 

for their steadfast friendship and hope our relationship continues 

to evolve to benefit generations of Americans and Koreans alike. 

[The prepeared statement of Mr. Manzullo follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. I now recognize Ranking Member Faleomavaega 

for his opening statement. You just got back from home, 50 hours 

in the air or something like that? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. You don’t want to know, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Okay, but I’m glad you’re here. If you doze, we’ll 

understand why. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 

commend you and your leadership in calling this very important 

hearing this afternoon. But first of all, I do want to recognize a 

dear friend who is here with us and is one of our star witnesses, 

my good friend, the former Assistant Secretary of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, Chris Hill, and also one of our standard bearers in 

negotiating and trying to negotiate with North Korea for all these 

years until he was transferred to another important job on behalf 

of our Government. So I do want to personally welcome Chris for 

his presence here in our subcommittee. 

Also, Mr. Chairman, I think it’s only fair that I say how wonderful it’s been in welcoming His Excellency, the President of South 

Korea, not only by the White House and President Obama, but also 

the fact that he was given the opportunity to address the joint session of Congress to tell the world how much we feel and our close 

relationship with the good people and the leaders of South Korea. 

I think it’s very indicative of President Obama’s initiative and his 

leadership in telling our friends in the Asian region that South 

Korea means a lot to us, not only militarily, but in so many other 

ways. 

I also want to commend personally the outstanding services and 

certainly his friendship, the former Prime Minister of South Korea 

who now is South Korea’s Ambassador in the United States, Ambassador Han Duk-soo, who did an outstanding job in also helping 

and not only educating, but giving our members a better understanding of how important it is to pass the KORUS Free Trade 

Agreement. And I’m so happy that we finally have been able to 

pass that very important legislation and to establish an excellent 

trade relationship with our friends in South Korea. 

Also to note personally, my good friend the chairman of the 

Hanwha Group, Chairman Kim Seung Yeon, who also was very 

much involved and personally lending his support for the importance of passage of this legislation. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing about 

expanding the U.S.-Korea alliance. Again, I commend the administration for the successful passage, as well as the colleagues in the 

Congress, in passing this free trade agreement that will create 

about 70,000 new jobs for our American workers. The U.S.-Korea 

Free Trade Agreement also promises to increase the U.S. Gross Domestic Product by $11 billion, generate about $10 billion in new 

U.S. export annually which I think, I hope, will also create a positive development in your District, since your District is very famous for manufacturing. 

Now, the U.S. continues to be South Korea’s third largest trading 

partner. South Korea is the United States’ seventh largest trading 

partner. Last year, trade between the U.S. and South Korea totalled over $86 billion. Given the historic nature of the passage of 

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licly acknowledge the grass roots efforts of Mr. Dongsuk Kim, the 

founder and former president of the Korean-American Voters’ 

Council. Mr. Kim gathered Korean-American business leaders from 

all over the country to urge the Congress to pass the U.S.-Korea 

Free Trade Agreement. And I certainly applaud him for all that he 

has done for increasing not only an understanding, but also promoting our Korean-American community which numbers well over 

3 million of our fellow Americans living here in this great country, 

giving us a better sense of understanding and appreciation about 

tremendous contributions that our Korean-American community 

makes to our country. 

Mr. Thomas Kim, my dear friend, whose tireless efforts in representing the interests of the Korean Embassy here in the United 

States, all of us know him. I want to personally thank Tom for his 

efforts as well. 

On a personal note, I also want to say that I am sorry that I’m 

not acquainted with our other expert witnesses, but I look forward 

to hearing from their testimonies and again, Chris, good to see you. 

I don’t know what you’re doing out there in Denver, but I think 

this is where all the action is. But again, thank you for coming. 

And Mr. Chairman, thank you for your calling this hearing this 

afternoon. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. I would like to introduce the witnesses. It’s with 

great pleasure that we welcome Ambassador Chris Hill, a good 

friend of ours back to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Eni, Chris 

Hill and I are survivors of the New Zealand earthquake. You got 

caught in it and our delegation left Christchurch 2 hours and 21 

minutes before it hit. It really is good to see you. 

Ambassador Hill’s long and distinguished career includes service 

as U.S. Ambassador to not one, but four countries: Macedonia, Poland, Korea, and Iraq. In between those tours as Ambassador, he 

managed to squeeze in tours as Assistant Secretary of State for 

East Asian and Pacific Affairs and as Senior Director of the National Security Council. Chris Hill’s resume is well known. It’s good 

to see you back here. He is presently dean of the Joseph Korbel 

School of International Studies at the University of Denver. 

Bruce Klingner is the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia 

at the Heritage Foundation’s Asia Study Center. He joined Heritage in 2007 after 20 years in the intelligence community working 

for the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. In 1993, Bruce was selected as Chief of the CIA’s Korea 

Branch focusing on North Korea. He later served as Deputy Division Chief for Korea of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence where 

he was responsible for analyzing Korean political, military, and 

economic issues for the President and other senior policy makers. 

Tami Overby serves as vice president for Asia at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. She’s responsible for developing, promoting, and 

executing programs and policies related to U.S. trade and investment in Asia. Tami lived and worked in South Korea for 21 years 

prior to her present role. She received the Korean Order of Industrial Service Merit Award, two letters of citation, and is an honorary citizen of Seoul. 

Abraham Kim is vice president of the Korea Economic Institute 

and oversees the organization’s research programs and publications. He’s an expert on U.S.-Korea relations, trade and investment, North Korea, and regional security issues. Dr. Kim also directs KEI’s Academy of Korean Policy Outreach, a KEI-sponsored 

nonprofit organization focused on promoting Korea and its policy 

studies toward the United States. Prior to joining KEI, Dr. Kim 

was principal Korea analyst and research manager of government 

services at the Eurasia Group. Dr. Kim has also worked at the 

Science Application International Corporation and the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies. 

I recognize the distinguished witnesses for their opening statements. We try to keep it at 5 minutes. The light will go on there. 

The yellow light goes on when you have 1 minute to go. 

Let’s start first with Ambassador Hill. It’s good to see you here. 

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHRIS HILL, DEAN, JOSEF 

KORBEL SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY 

OF DENVER 

Ambassador HILL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. It’s also a great pleasure to see you. It’s a great 

pleasure to be back here in this committee where I have spent 

many hours of my life, my past life, in these discussions. 

10

I have a prepared text which with your permission I would like 

to read into the record or have entered into the record. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Without objection, all the prepared statements of 

the witnesses will be made part of the record. 

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Chairman, for me, it’s quite unusual because I wrote it myself and cleared it with nobody except my wife, 

so it’s quite a change in my lifestyle here. 

But let me summarize from this and then of course, I will be 

happy to join with the others in taking questions. For a generation, 

Korea was known as a long and difficult war tempered by a long 

and as difficult peace. That has changed. Korea is now considered 

one of the world’s great success stories with an economy that has 

become the envy of the world, a democracy that is one of the 

world’s most successful, and a vibrant culture whose wave has 

reached the four corners of the globe. It is truly one of the great 

inspirations of our era. 

Against this enormous success, however, remains one of the 

world’s great tragedies, the continued impoverishment and virtual 

enslavement of a third of the Korean people on the northern half 

of the peninsula. The tragedy of this division on the Korean peninsula is one of the saddest and most brutal of the great legacies of 

the 20th century. 

The United States is fortunate that out of these tragic historical 

circumstances, we’ve had the leadership in Congress, both among 

Democrats and Republicans and succeeding administrations now, 

spanning one dozen Presidents to understand the importance to 

our interest and the wisdom to stay close to the Republic of Korea, 

to be committed to its freedoms and its people and to count Korea 

among our most important alliances in the world. 

It is altogether fitting that in the last month that great alliance 

has now been strengthened by a free trade agreement that, as with 

other elements of our relationship, enjoy broad support between 

both our major parties and also among all of the Republic of Korea’s major political formations. That free trade agreement rests on 

a broad and deep foundation that will endure. It’s a foundation 

that will not only act to strengthen both of our economies, but also 

to be the basis for global, strategic partnership between the two 

countries stretching into the future. 

Mr. Chairman, I live in Colorado now and like many states it has 

not been immune to the problems facing our economy and ordinary 

people. Seeing the problems of unemployment firsthand, I’m very 

aware of the need for our trade agreements with other countries to 

be ones that work for both countries. I believe the Korea-U.S. Free 

Trade Agreement does just that, as President Lee and President 

Obama both made clear during President Lee’s recent state visit to 

Washington. This trade agreement will create economic activity, 

not diminish it. 

President Lee’s pledge to our auto workers in Michigan was particularly poignant. For an economist, the logic of free trade is fairly 

obvious. For workers, it can be more of an illusive concept, showing 

these workers in both Korea and the United States a benefit of the 

agreement in the coming years and months will be our challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to shift gears somewhat to the threat 

that continues to be posed by North Korea. The challenge from 

11

North Korea, both in conventional and in weapons of mass destruction remains one of the world’s most difficult. North Korea remains 

committed to developing nuclear weapons, not to protect itself, but 

rather to threaten its neighbors. It was altogether appropriate that 

President Bush and then Korean President, the late Roh Moohyun, worked hard to create and support a regional approach to 

this threat known as the Six-Party Process. The concept behind 

this approach was as sound then as it is today. The problem posed 

by North Korean aspirations for nuclear weapons is not just a peninsula issue involving the ROK and the United States. It is a 

broader issue that the international community needs to address 

with broader measures. Russia needs to be part of the solution. So 

does Japan and so especially does China. 

China, in particular, remains the country with the greatest leverage for dealing with this issue. There are many theories why China 

has not done more. The first, and this argument is obviously one 

favored by the Chinese, is that it is proof that China does not have 

leverage. Another theory is that China fears potential refugees 

from North Korea. Still another is that there is enough old think 

in China that those who somehow worry that a North Korean collapse would amount to a victory for the United States and a loss 

for China. There are almost as many theories for why China has 

not done more than there are North Korean weapons. 

What is clear is that the U.S. and ROK need to press diplomatically with others in the Six-Party Talks, especially with China to 

address the issue before the time comes that the North Koreans 

have succeeded in putting one of their crude devices, crude nuclear 

devices, on to a crude missile system. In particular, China needs 

to be convinced by the U.S. and the ROK that in the event of a 

North Korean collapse our alliance will not seek advantage against 

the Chinese. We have our interests securing the nuclear materials, 

protecting the population against hunger, but we will not look to 

disadvantage China’s interest. 

China has nothing to fear from the U.S. or ROK relationship, nor 

does it have anything to fear from the basic proposition that further arrangements on the peninsula are for the Korean people to 

work out. China’s relations with the ROK are of enormous significance to China and to the ROK. In turn, the U.S. has nothing to 

fear or oppose in the strong ROK relationship. 

Mr. Chairman, some day this issue will come to an end and 

North Korea will either become a respectable member of the international community or it will collapse. We need to be prepared for 

however events take this. And when it does and when the historians sift through its wreckage to find out what happened, they 

will see that the unshakable U.S.-ROK alliance, self confident, able 

to engage other key players, including China, will be the reason 

why this terrible legacy of the 20th century finally comes to an end. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hill follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Klingner. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRUCE KLINGNER, SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW FOR NORTHEAST ASIA, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. KLINGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished 

members of the committee. It is indeed an honor to appear before 

you. 

The tragic 3 years of conflict that began on June 25, 1950 have 

been referred to as ‘‘The Forgotten War.’’ It is an unfitting label 

since neither North Korea’s invasion or the American sacrifices will 

ever be forgotten by the Republic of Korea, nor should that shared 

ordeal ever be forgotten by those Americans who treasure freedom 

and the willingness to defend it. 

This alliance forged in blood is not merely historic legacy. As 

tragically demonstrated by North Korea’s two unprovoked acts of 

war last year against our South Korean ally, those attacks made 

all too clear that the need for vigilance has not diminished. Alliance managers in both countries describe the current military, political, and economic ties as the best they’ve ever seen. With the 

recent approval of the KORUS FTA, there are no major substantive 

areas of disagreement between Washington and Seoul. Indeed, 

much of the recent summit between Presidents Obama and Lee 

was to discuss additional areas of bilateral cooperation beyond the 

Korean Peninsula. 

The U.S.-South Korean security alliance has been indispensable 

in maintaining peace and stability in northeast Asia. The U.S. security guarantee has long deterred a North Korean attack while 

providing the shield behind which South Korea developed its economic strength and institutionalized democratic rule. 

South Korea has devoted considerable resources to protecting 

itself against a daunting spectrum of North Korean military 

threats. Seoul has recently initiated extensive defense reforms to 

enable its military to better protect the country while concurrently 

expanding its security reach beyond the Korean Peninsula. 

In March of this year, Seoul announced 73 defense reform objectives of a new defense reform plan called DR 307. These objectives 

will better prepare South Korea to assume more time operational 

command in 2015, as well as address deficiencies identified in the 

South Korean military response to last year’s attacks. Seoul should 

be commended for creating an organizational structure capable of 

assuming independent military command with the U.S. to serve in 

a supporting role. That said, there are still challenges ahead. 

South Korean forces still have insufficient agility to respond effectively to Yeonpyeong’s tactical provocations. South Korean forces 

are not currently organized for joint operations, particularly at the 

tactical level. However, the U.S. and South Korea are currently engaged in bilateral efforts to improve Korean and alliance provocation response capabilities. 

Another area for improvement is South Korean missile defense. 

During the two previous South Korean Presidents, Seoul 

downplayed the growing North Korean missile threat for political 

reasons. The result is that South Korea currently has insufficient 

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dent Lee Myung-bak, South Korea has been more receptive to augmenting missile defenses. It has not followed through with requisite actions such as purchasing land-based PAC–3 missiles and 

seaborne SM–3 missiles. 

Of course, South Korea does not bear its security burden alone. 

Despite its security reform initiatives, South Korea will remain 

heavily reliant on U.S. military capabilities. And even after wartime OPCOM transfer, Seoul’s alliance with the United States will 

continue to play an irreplaceable role in maintaining peace and stability. 

In order to remain an effective deterrent, defense, and response 

capability, the U.S. must maintain a robust forward-deployed military presence in South Korea at promised levels and affirm our unequivocal extended deterrence commitment. We must also fully 

fund on-going U.S. military realignment plans in South Korea and 

Japan including the Yongsan Base Relocation, the Land Partnership Plan, and accompanied tours. 

Also, constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa 

for U.S. Marine Corps Air Units is crucial for maintaining U.S. 

military capabilities including for Korean contingencies. Proposed 

cuts by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee would undermine years of carefully crafted diplomacy that achieve U.S. strategic objectives. And potential additional draconian cuts of $500 billion to the defense budget could have a devastating impact on U.S. 

ability to deter security threats in Asia, protect American national 

interests, and fulfill our defense treaty obligations. 

In conclusion, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has been under valued in recent years. The U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to American 

interests, but South Korea has capabilities that are not available 

to Japan. Tokyo is constrained in its security contributions by its 

historic legacies, constitutional limits, restrictive rules of engagement, and low defense spending. U.S. policy statements that imply 

secondary status for American military relations with South Korea 

are a disservice to the stalwart military bonds forged during 60 

years of the bilateral alliance with Seoul. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you. And 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klingner follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Ms. Overby, we look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MS. TAMI OVERBY, PRESIDENT, U.S.-KOREA 

BUSINESS COUNCIL 

Ms. OVERBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. 

On behalf of the U.S.-Korea Business Council and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and its members, thank you for the opportunity 

to speak with you today. 

The U.S.-Korea Business Council is the premiere business advocacy organization representing America’s top companies investing 

in Korea. The Council is made up of senior executives of U.S. companies from every business sector that are major investors in Korea 

and are firmly committed to the Korean market. The Council has 

led efforts in support of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement 

since the start of negotiations in February 2006. 

As signed into law by President Obama last week, this agreement successfully addresses many of the market access and regulatory barriers that have long presented challenges to the expansion of trade and investment between our two countries. KORUS 

further strengthens our shared commitment to open trade and commerce and holds extremely positive implications for both large and 

small American business. 

We salute the work of Congress and the Subcommittee on Asia 

and the Pacific in ratifying the FTA and we await passage of the 

agreement in the Korean National Assembly. The U.S.-Korea FTA 

is the most commercially significant trade agreement America has 

entered into since NAFTA. Korea is America’s seventh largest 

trade partner with $88 billion in two-way trade last year; the fifth 

largest market for U.S. agriculture goods. And last year, our ag. exports totaled nearly $5 billion. 

South Korea is also the second largest market for U.S. services in Asia and U.S. cross border export of services in Korea total $12 

billion in 2010. Conservative estimates hold that KORUS has the 

potential to create as many as 70,000 American jobs, a conservative 

figure that does not capture the full potential for growth. The U.S.-

Korea FTA is vital not only for creating new jobs and growth, but 

also to halt the erosion of U.S. market share and competitiveness 

as South Korea enters into preferential trade agreements with 

other major economies. This new partnership addresses Korea’s 

complex regulatory system and other non-tariff barriers with 

strong provisions and protections that open the market, protect 

U.S. interests and set the bar higher for future trade pacts. This 

is an important opportunity for the United States to shape the future trade agenda in Asia. 

Uniquely positioned in the region, Korea will now serve as a 

launching pad for U.S. goods and services. With strong rule of law, 

enhanced intellectual property protection, a high education rate, 

and a passionate workforce, Korea will enhance U.S. ties to all of 

northeast Asia in addition to its own trillion-dollar marketplace. 

KORUS affirms Korea as the only country in northeast Asia with 

a U.S. free trade agreement, thus providing American workers, 

farmers and companies with an important edge over our global 

competitors. Successful implementation of this landmark agreeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:09 Dec 01, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AP\102611\70948 HFA PsN: SHIRL
31

ment now stands as our primary concern. Before the FTA can formally enter into force, both countries must demonstrate their compliance with all obligations that will take effect on Day 1. This includes specific tariff revisions and product-specific rules as well as 

administrative and regulatory changes covering issues such as Customs and procurement. 

Immediately following President Lee’s signature, officials from 

both nations will schedule comprehension discussions to review bilateral law adjustments and following this, the exchange of formal 

diplomatic notes will empower the agreement. While these steps 

must be expeditiously carried out in order to meet the first of the 

year deadline, this is only the beginning of a much larger plan that 

must be executed. Understanding the many challenges that will 

arise during this implementation process, the U.S.-Korea Business 

Council is poised to collaborate with government officials as well as 

our Korean colleagues to discuss and resolve issues that have impeded past agreements. 

U.S. businesses, small and large, must have a clear and navigable route to this fertile market and the Chamber is proud to play 

a leading role in these efforts. Following the implementation, a 

working level dialogue will be established to discuss economic policies that affect both countries and give U.S. companies a voice in 

the Korean marketplace. Korea wishes to become a regional financial hub and in order to do this, transparency within the market 

must be increased. Under this new spirit of openness, U.S. business will thrive. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the subcommittee, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify on this 

expanding alliance. By demonstrating that we are willing and able 

to embrace new opportunities in an increasingly competitive market, we are reinforcing America’s economic leadership in the region. 

The U.S. Chamber and the U.S.-Korea Business Council are firmly 

committed to working with Congress and the administration to ensure successful implementation of the U.S.-Korea FTA and to advance U.S. interests in Asia and around the world. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Overby follows:]

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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. Kim? 

STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM KIM, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT, 

KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE 

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman 

Faleomavaega and honorable members of the subcommittee for this 

privilege to speak before you today about the future of the U.S.-

Korea alliance after the successful state visit of President Lee and 

the ratification of the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement by the U.S. 

Congress. This is an important occasion for me on two respects. 

From a professional standpoint, my organization, the Korea Economic Institute, for the last 30 years has served as an education 

and policy research institute, has tirelessly worked to promote dialogue and understanding between the U.S. and Korea. 

From a personal standpoint, as one of the 1.7 million Korean 

Americans that live in the United States, it was deeply satisfying 

to see the ties between Korea and the United States growing 

stronger and more vibrant. Building up this critical relationship is 

a win-win situation for both countries and peoples. 

As requested by the subcommittee, I would like to focus my 

statement on three basic issues: What are the political dynamics 

that are shaping the efforts to ratify KORUS FTA in South Korea. 

Number two, looking ahead to 2012 in South Korea, how will next 

year’s national assembly elections in April and Presidential elections in December impact U.S.-Korea relations. And finally, what 

is South Korean political sentiment on North-South Korea relations? 

First of all, what is going on in South Korea? Since the U.S. Congress voted on the KORUS FTA, the South Korean National Assembly has geared up to pass it as well. However, the ruling Grand 

National Party and the liberal opposition have been locked in a political struggle over its passage, causing delay in the ratification 

process. The Democratic Party, the main liberal opposition party, 

is obviously concerned about how South Korean workers, farmers, 

and the small and medium enterprise will be negatively impacted. 

And also they are unhappy about the renegotiations that took place 

in December 2010. 

Technically, the ruling of the Grand National Party could unilaterally pass the KORUS FTA with their majority. The ruling party 

leadership, however, faces popular pressure to build a consensus 

rather than simply ramming through legislation. Furthermore, 

threats by liberal opposition to use physical force have delayed voting on the agreement. 

Although the elections are not until next year, the election politic 

season has already begun in South Korea and politicians are increasingly sensitized to voters’ perception and attitudes. That said, 

the Grand National Party leadership has announced that it intends 

to bring the free trade agreement to a vote by October 31st and the 

general sentiment is that the KORUS FTA will pass despite liberal 

opposition. For one, the political sentiment in South Korea about 

the KORUS FTA is majorly positive. According to a South Korean 

newspaper poll, 55.2 percent are in support, while 28.5 percent are 

against. Clearly, there’s a majority to support this. 

38

Once Seoul ratifies the agreement, the hope is to have this agreement enforced by January 1, 2010. 

So how will the KORUS FTA position the U.S. vis-a`-vis Europe 

and China? Well, as Tami already explained, it will level the playing field and already as we know the European Union has already 

passed a KORUS FTA with South Korea. With the passage of the 

KORUS FTA and its implementation it will put U.S. companies 

and European companies on the same foothold. KORUS FTA will 

also make U.S. companies more competitive, increasingly competitive, excuse me, with Chinese companies, but to have the U.S. regain its top position in South Korea market will be unlikely. China 

is too far ahead in the South Korean market. 

But the greater ramification of this is political. It reinforces the 

long strategic value and reinforces the strong relationship that our 

two countries have. KORUS FTA also sets the standard of openness, transparency, and rule of law as the basis of other future 

U.S. engagement with the region. Finally, and third, it reestablishes U.S. credibility as a regional leader. 

Next I turn to how will next year’s election impact U.S.-Korea relations? In 2012, the Republic of Korea will have two major elections, the National Assembly election and the Presidential election. 

Political pundits in South Korea anticipate a major political shift. 

In the National Assembly they assume that the Democratic Party, 

the opposition party, will take a majority. In the Presidential election it is yet unclear because it’s so far ahead. But despite these 

changes, the general understanding among most South Koreans is 

that whoever comes into power a strong relationship with the 

United States is important for three important reasons. One, South 

Korea needs the U.S. as a balance against a growing and more diplomatically aggressive China. Number two, North Korea continues 

to be a grave threat to South Korea and regional security. And 

North Korea’s future with its leadership transition is unclear. And 

number three, South Korea shares common political and cultural 

values and have deep people-to-people connections and have common global interests with the United States. 

Now I turn to what is the public sentiment in South Korea regarding North-South Korea relations? Well, the general public view 

about North Korea is very mixed. But in general, they appear to 

be supportive of a policy based on no unilateral economic assistance 

unless Pyongyang takes substantive move toward inter-Korean 

talks and denuclearization. Last year’s North Korean attack on the 

Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island was a defining moment for many 

South Koreans. Some have called it South Korea’s 9/11. Up to that 

point South Koreans were aware that North Korea’s military threat 

existed, but never believed the North Koreans would actually attack, and yet last year they did. 

Polls illustrate that after the Yeonpyeong Island, almost 70 percent of the respondents supported some kind of limited response. 

Another poll indicated that up to 80 percent of poll respondents 

supported that more military action should have taken place. All 

this said, South Koreans also do not support war on the peninsular. Plus, most South Korean citizens are distrustful of 

Pyongyang and many anticipate North Korea will cause more provocation as we move into 2012. 

39

Thank you very much for this opportunity. And I’m open for any 

questions, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kim follows:]


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Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. We’re going to start with Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I’d like to thank the 

panel for being here today. I’ve been accused of having some type 

of a personal interest in the KORUS moving forward and I have 

no problem with that. I’m a Hyundai Kia dealer in addition to serving in Congress. So I would gladly say that I have a personal interest not only me, but the 60,000 Americans that are directly involved with the production in Alabama and Georgia of those two 

products. 

My real concern though, I think, and we face the same challenges together when we look at our two countries, we’re much 

closer than most people realize, both strategically, geopolitically, 

and especially when it comes to elections or reelections. So it seems 

to me the discourse is more driven toward be careful what you say 

and what you do because it may have a bad reflection. 

I am very concerned, Mr. Kim. In the Republic, what would be 

the problems for getting the agreement ratified? And I know that 

you spoke—right now, there’s even threats of violence and some aspects of the agreement. I know that geopolitically it did have and 

I know in the last elections it had tremendous effects on the outcome of the elections because I think in the Republic they felt, look, 

we made concessions. President Obama came over. We agreed to do 

certain things and then went back to the United States and it sat 

for a long time before it was voted on and we did, just a couple of 

weeks ago in a bipartisan effort, passed KORUS and President Lee 

was here and gave one of the best addresses that I have heard from 

a person coming in from the outside and talking to the Congress. 

But for the American people to understand, what would be now 

the holdup and what are some of the challenges that President Lee 

faces from the opposition and knowing even that the agreement 

really was crafted by his predecessor to start off that way. So I’m 

trying to understand okay, we have an agreement, we’ve come together. It’s gone through the Republic. It’s come over to the United 

States. We’ve approved it. Now it’s going back to Korea. Now what 

are the challenges that we face right now and if you could just 

maybe articulate those a little. 

Mr. KIM. Sure. Congressman Kelly, the challenge is basically 

election season has started in South Korea and right now the ruling party is in a very vulnerable position of losing its majority because of low support. And so in order to consolidate the Democratic 

Party, the opposition, in order to consolidate their base as well as 

win the support of those who may negatively impact the KORUS 

FTA in South Korea, the politicians in the opposition parties are 

making a political stand right before the vote of this, the ratification of this agreement. 

And so in many ways this is domestic politics, but in terms of 

getting the votes to get this ratified, the Grand National Party has 

the votes to get this through and passed. And so I don’t think from 

our understanding, the general understanding is that the Grand 

National Party will be able to get this through and they will be 

able to hopefully get this implemented by the January 1st time 

line. But it’s, as you know, the old saying goes all politics is local 

and so a lot of folks are concerned about how this will impact next 

year. 

50

And so a lot of—even Grand National Party members are a little 

bit skittish or assessing to make sure that this agreement—that 

they can make a good push and good value effort and sell to the 

Korean people that this is good for everybody. And so I think this 

is much more domestic politics than the substance of the agreement. Everyone understands what this is about. 

Mr. KELLY. And I understand that. I mean we really share a lot. 

We have a lot more in common, especially when it comes to politics 

than most people understand. It really would be nice and I think 

that both sides all agree on this, if we could quit worrying about 

reelections and start worrying about getting things fixed it would 

really help both our countries dramatically. So thanks so much for 

being here and I apologize. Thank you so much for being here. 

I know the effort was a grand effort to get this done. I’m not sure 

I understand why, but now after being here 9 months it’s starting 

to become a little more clear to me. But thanks so much for your 

efforts. I think we’re moving in the right direction. It’s great for 

both our countries to move forward. So thanks so much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. Congressman Faleomavaega has deferred to Mr. Chabot so he can ask his questions and then run off 

to another meeting at noon. 

Mr. Chabot? 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the chair and I also thank Mr. 

Faleomavaega for giving me the time. Ambassador Hill, I’ve got 

five questions and I’d like to get five answers. If you could keep 

them relatively brief, we’ll try to get them all in in the 5 minutes 

I’ve got. 

Number one, in 2008, according to The Washington Post, fresh 

traces of highly enriched uranium were discovered among the 

18,000 pages of documents submitted by North Korea to the United 

States. Yet, at that time you chose as the U.S. chief negotiator to 

ignore this evidence on North Korean HEU program and to focus 

solely on plutonium processing. 

In addition, in November last year, visiting American scientist 

Siegfried Hecker was shown an HEU facility in North Korea that 

reportedly left him stunned. In retrospect, wasn’t your decision not 

to pursue the HEU topic in negotiations with the North a huge 

mistake? 

Ambassador HILL. Actually, we were concerned about HEU for a 

number of years when the evidence first started coming in. The 

question was we didn’t know how far they had gotten. The fact was 

that we know they were producing plutonium and that was a clear 

and present danger. So the policy became to do something to stop 

the plutonium, but keep the door open to discuss the uranium enrichment in particular. And the reason all the negotiations broke 

down in ’08 was over the issue of highly enriched uranium because 

we did get these indications, as you said, trace amounts on documents. 

We also got trace amounts on some actual samples that we were 

able to get back from the North Koreans. So we insisted that we 

could not accept only access to known facilities. We insisted that 

we needed access to unknown facilities. The North Koreans 

51

wouldn’t give us that access and therefore we actually ended the 

talks. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I’m going to go ahead and give you all 

four questions now and you can take whatever time to answer all 

four because I’ll never get through these in 5 minutes. 

Last February, in retirement, you published an article stating 

that ‘‘North Korea had lied repeatedly to not only the United 

States, but also to China, Russian, Japan, and South Korea and 

that North Korea has no genuine interest whatsoever in fulfilling 

its nuclear disarmament responsibilities.’’ That’s all your quote. 

Doesn’t repeated North Korean duplicity raise questions about the 

whole negotiating process including the Six-Party Talks? That’s the 

second. 

Next question, number three. In a February 2011 article, you 

stated that North Korea was ‘‘a state whose treatment of its own 

citizens is among the most abysmal in the world.’’ Given you acknowledge that Pyongyang is one of the leading human rights 

abusers in the world, do you still believe it was the right decision 

to minimize human rights and religious freedom concerns in your 

negotiations with the North Koreans? 

Next question. According to his memoirs, Vice President Cheney 

considered the North Korea built reactor in Syria to be such a 

threat to peace that he urged President Bush to take it out in a 

military strike. Now we know the Israelis, of course, took that action. The Vice President viewed the engagement policy with North 

Korea advocated by Secretary of State Rice and yourself as naive 

and a major foreign policy mistake. How would you respond to Mr. 

Cheney’s concern. 

And finally, in October 2008, you succeeded in your advocacy 

that North Korea be removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism 

list, despite the major distress this caused our Japanese ally due 

to the abduction issue. In exchange, you reportedly received North 

Korean assurances that they would accept a transparent 

verification process for denuclearization. You did not, however, according to press reports, receive North Korean assurances in writing to the reported dismay of then Secretary of State Rice. The 

North Koreans reneged on their assurances to you. By the end of 

2008, the Six-Party Talks had fallen apart and they have not reconvened for the past 3 years. Given the results, would you now 

admit that removing North Korea from the list of State Sponsored 

Terrorism was both premature and a mistake. And you have 26 

seconds to answer all four questions. 

Ambassador HILL. Let me do my best. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Ambassador, you have as much time as you 

need. 

Ambassador HILL. Thank you very much. First of all, with regard 

to the issue of North Korean duplicity, you bet, there was North 

Korean duplicity. But often when you’re conducting negotiations, 

you’re doing it for a number of reasons. One of the reasons the 

United States tried vigorously to conduct these negotiations was to 

demonstrate to other partners, especially in South Korea that we 

were prepared to do all we could on a peaceful track through diplomatic track to see if we could make progress. If you looked at polling data in South Korea in 2003, 2004, you could see that the 

52

United States was considered, along with North Korea, considered 

one of the reasons for the North Korea nuclear problem. 

So to see the United States as being held to blame by a substantial percentage of South Korean citizens suggested that we needed 

a policy that had a stronger diplomatic track. It does not mean that 

we were naive about the possibilities of getting the North Koreans 

to give up their nuclear weapons, but we did hope that through a 

step-by-step process we could make some progress. I believe we did 

make some progress in terms of shutting down the clear and 

present danger of plutonium production because they were producing plutonium and then using it in nuclear devices. So I think 

that was important to continue and I do not believe that was a mistake. And I think it was very important to show the South Koreans 

our commitment. 

Today, we have a situation where the North Koreans are still 

duplicitous, but the United States is not being held to blame by 

any substantial number of people in South Korea. We are together 

with South Korea. We’re working together and I think it’s a much 

better environment as a result of our attempting to pursue this. 

Secondly, with respect to human rights, I stand by my statement 

North Korea is one of the most abysmal human rights abusers in 

the world. And there’s no question about that. And any country 

that has that kind of record is going to have difficulty in achieving 

normalization with us, for example. And I made very clear to people at the time, in fact, I gave assurances that if we ever got to 

the point where we were going to go beyond the nuclear negotiations and try to somehow normalize bilateral ties with North Korea 

that we would address the human rights forthwith with a separate 

track to deal with human rights. That is, we were not prepared to 

go ahead and just normalize with North Korea given its human 

rights track. 

Now arguments can be made well, why didn’t you make human 

rights, why didn’t you tie it to the nuclear issue. The nuclear issue 

was a very tough issue to make any progress as some of your questions suggest. You’re absolutely right. We didn’t feel that adding 

human rights in the context of the nuclear negotiations would 

make progress either on human rights or on nuclear and besides, 

our other partners were opposed to that. So we made very clear to 

the North Koreans, we raised human rights on a number of occasions with them, on many occasions, and we made very clear that 

if we got to the point where we were prepared to improve bilateral 

ties with North Korea that we would have to deal with the human 

rights issue. 

I understand that former Vice President Cheney did not support 

the issue of the negotiations with North Korea. I was an Assistant 

Secretary taking instructions from the Secretary of State and the 

Secretary of State was taking instructions from the President. So 

Vice President Cheney’s views on this, he really should take them 

up with the President or with the Secretary of State and not with 

the person who was implementing them which was me. 

With respect to the issue of the Syrian nuclear facility, you’re 

quite right. There was apparently a reference in Vice President 

Cheney’s book to him suggesting that he felt we should take out 

the facility on our own and as I understand from his book, other 

53

people in the situation room, including the President didn’t support 

him. Again, I think this is a matter between former Vice President 

and the former President to sort out what that argument was 

about. 

Is there something else I haven’t addressed? I just want to make 

sure—oh yes, I’m sorry, the terrorism list. The issue of the terrorism list, the issue of state sponsors of terrorism, it’s essentially 

a list that says if a country is a state sponsor of terrorism, for example, if a country is giving material aid to terrorist groups, that 

country is ineligible for U.S. assistance, also ineligible for the U.S. 

to vote affirmatively on World Bank loans and other issues like 

that. So the first question was from the point of view of the statute, 

was North Korea eligible to come off of the statute? According to 

the committee which had nothing to do with me, nothing to do really—it was an inter-agency committee. The assessment was that 

North Korea was not assisting terrorist groups. There were various 

reports that North Korea might be helping groups in the Middle 

East. These assessments were tracked down and it was determined 

that they were not assisting them. 

So then becomes the political question are you prepared to take 

them off the list if you could feel you could make some political 

gains elsewhere. And the decision was made over my pay grade. 

The decision was made that if we could get North Korea to first 

of all end the plutonium production, blow up the cooling tower, 

these actions, that we would at least be able to end the plutonium 

threat. We never accepted verbal assurances or even written assurances on the issue of access to undeclared sites. We needed real assurances on access and we never got them and that’s why the negotiations fell apart. 

When the negotiations did fall apart, I think everyone understood, the South Korean public, everyone understood it was not for 

our lack of trying, it was not for our lack of good faith negotiation, 

the blame was squarely put on the North Koreans and as a consequence, no one has blamed the U.S. and the U.S.-ROK, Republic 

of Korea alliance is as strong as it has ever been. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your time. If I 

could just say one final thing, at least this one member’s opinion 

is that U.S. policy toward North Korea, particularly with respect 

to their nuclear program has been flawed and wanting, not just in 

this administration, but previous administrations as well, if you 

look at the results. And I’ll yield back. And thank you and the 

ranking member for your generosity. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Before we go to Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Kim, 

you’ve got your family here? 

Mr. KIM. Yes, I do. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Do you want to introduce them to us? 

Mr. KIM. My wife and my son and my daughter and their two 

friends are over there in the left corner. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Welcome. It’s good to have you here. Are your 

children taking notes? Yes, of course, you bet, you bet. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want 

to again thank the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on 

54

the Middle East, a very, very important and dear friend, Chairman 

Chabot, for raising the questions concerning our hearing this afternoon. 

Mr. Chairman, I have so many questions I don’t know where to 

start. I think we sometimes compartmentalize issues and to think 

that everything is all laid out in a real neat package, Korea is not 

one of those packages. It is very, very complicated. The times that 

I’ve had the privilege of visiting with the leaders and the good people of Korea for all these years, Mr. Chairman, I must say that it’s 

such a difficult situation, the fact that Korea being divided as it is, 

it wasn’t because of the Koreans doing. It was something that because of two more powerful forces caused the division that we now 

have in North and South Korea. It is very, very unfortunate. 

I’d like to raise this question first. You know, several weeks ago 

we had a hearing here and I’d like to invite our witnesses to think 

outside the box on this situation, this observation that I’ve made. 

We talked about the dangerous situation in North Korea. We 

talked about the involvement of China, the involvement of Japan, 

the involvement of the United States. 

And when all this dialogue was going on, Mr. Chairman, not one 

expert witness mentioned anything about South Korea, as if the 

people, the leaders of South Korea had no say in the process, no 

input, no sense of appreciation and understanding that by thinking 

outside the box we need to have South Korea to be just as involved 

and not just as dependent on so much of what China thinks or 

what Japan thinks, or what Russia thinks. What about the people 

of South Korea? 

When I raised the issue, it was a little of a surprise from our expert witnesses, oh yeah, yeah, South Korea is important, too. We 

need to talk about their involvement in the negotiations process. 

Chris, you know more than anybody, the years that you’ve spent 

in negotiations with North Korea—again, thinking outside the box, 

North Korea is already a nuclear country. It’s a member of the nuclear club, along with the permanent members of the U.N. Security 

Council, along with Pakistan, India, and Israel. And here, we’re 

telling North Korea, oh, put your nuclear bombs back in the box 

and pretend like as if they already do not possess eight nuclear 

weapons, have the capability only 30 miles away with 12 million 

people living in Seoul, that if there ever is to be a conflict in the 

Korean Peninsula, it’s a lose-lose proposition. 

I don’t care how you do it, I don’t care how much military assistance we give South Korea. The bottom line in my humble opinion, 

Mr. Chairman, the Korean people will suffer. The Korean people 

will die and all these negotiations that we talk about and I would 

like to say to my friend, Chris, I have very serious questions about 

the relevancy of the Six-Party Talks. 

I can understand why China should be involved because China 

borders North Korea. I understand why we should be involved. I 

can understand why South Korea should be involved, but I don’t 

understand why Russia and Japan should be involved. It’s a beautiful understanding of oh, we have to have a multi-lateral approach 

to the situation of the Korean Peninsula, but in my humble opinion, I don’t understand why the relevancy of having Six-Party 

55

Talks for all these years. And where have we ended up after negotiations? Zero. 

Chris, could you care to comment on this? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, first of all, I think it was important and 

it remains important to have all the countries in the region taking 

ownership of the problem. I do not accept the notion, first of all, 

that somehow this is just the U.S. problem. I think for that reason 

it was very important to bring in other countries, especially the Republic of Korea because the peninsula belongs to the Korean people. 

And we have a real role there. We have a security commitment. 

We have troops on the ground there. We have to be involved in 

that. But I think it was very important to bring other actors, including the South Koreans to the table. 

Secondly, I think if you look at Japanese security concerns, clearly some of them emanate from threat in North Korea, so Japan, I 

think clearly needs to be at the table. I have concerns about whether we have been able to work out precisely the same approaches, 

but I think generally speaking, the U.S. and Japan have worked 

well on the issue of North Korea. It’s true, there were some differences over the abduction issue as was previously discussed, but 

I think overall, our relationship with Japan has not suffered from 

the Six-Party process. 

And finally, I think the Russians have some potential leverage 

with the North Koreans. I think that’s also important. And finally, 

I’d like to say, Mr. Faleomavaega, that I really cannot accept the 

notion that we need to simply sit back and accept that North Korea 

is ‘‘a nuclear power.’’ I think North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are 

inherently unstable, unstable within North Korea, unstable in the 

Korean Peninsula, unstable to the neighborhood, and ultimately to 

the world. I think we have to continue to work on it. 

I grant the point you made which is that we haven’t solved it. 

I do believe getting rid of the plutonium capability which is not totally gotten rid of, but that threat is diminished. They have not 

been in the kind of breakout scenario that we worried about earlier, that some 30 kilos would become 60 or become 160 kilos. So 

I think we made some progress there, but I accept your point that 

this has been a really tough one and not enough progress has been 

made. But I think in diplomacy, as in other endeavors in life, you 

have to answer the question compared to what? And what else—

what other track exists that would get us further on the way? 

So I think we have done our best to work with other countries. 

I think that’s a key track and as I suggested in my testimony, I 

think we really need to press the Chinese to take far more ownership of this problem. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I guess my time is up, Mr. Chairman. I’ll 

wait for the second round. I have so many other things I wanted 

to ask, but my time is up. I’ll wait. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. I have a question for Ms. Overby. Actually, it’s a question to Ms. Overby and Mr. Kim. 

Ms. Overby, you say in your written testimony that opposition to 

the free trade agreement in Korea is mild. 

Mr. Kim, you say opposition is intense. I realize there’s a lot of 

politics going on here and obviously the ruling party has enough 

56

votes to ratify the agreement, trying to build a consensus, but give 

me some political scenarios. Is it possible this free trade agreement 

may not pass in Korea? 

Ms. OVERBY. I’ll start and then pass it to Abraham. I said mild 

because I lived in Korea for 21 years and watched Korean politics 

up close and personal. I was also very actively engaged with the 

current opposition party, the Democratic Party when they were in 

power with Roh Moo-hyun and they actually negotiated this agreement. In fact, one of the DP leaders, Chung Won-Kyung was Commerce Minister under President Roh and he and I lobbied in this 

house, holding hands talking about how good this potential free 

trade agreement would be for both countries. 

So I do find it a bit ironic that he and his party are now staking 

out the opposite ground. But I do believe as Dr. Kim said, it is very 

much politics. In fact, when I meet privately with my DP friends, 

they pat my arm and say, ‘‘Oh, Tami, you know it’s just Korean 

politics. At the end of the day, KORUS will pass, don’t worry. But 

we must play our role. We must have our theater.’’ And I believe 

what they’re having and what they’re going to have the next few 

days with the Mayor election and then with the ratification of 

KORUS is going to be very good theater. But I do believe it will 

pass. I see no scenario where it does not pass. 

Dr. Kim? 

Mr. KIM. Sure. When I meant intense, I meant emotionally intense. And you will probably, as Tami mentioned, see this kind of 

political theatrics appear, because it’s very much election politics. 

People are looking ahead to 2012. 

I think as Tami pointed out, the fact that the Democratic Party 

President actually negotiated the free trade agreement in ’07 is one 

factor that would suggest that the Democratic Party will eventually 

vote, will allow a vote to occur. And also, the fact that EU-Korea 

FTA passed. There was some opposition, but it was allowed to be 

voted on and passed relatively quietly. And if you look at the structure of the two agreements, they’re not exactly the same, but 

they’re pretty same. And so the fact that that was passed and implemented suggests that I think the substance of the agreement is 

probably—there’s some opposition by the most extreme politicians, 

but in general, I think they’re willing to swallow, of course, FTA. 

But I think it’s more electoral politics than anything else that we’ll 

be seeing. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes, sir. And this also gets to Mr. Kelly’s question, which is, why is there the opposition? I think three main reasons. One is that many of the members believe it’s not in the best 

interest of their country. And that’s fine. And that’s why there’s a 

democracy. They should allow a vote on the KORUS FTA instead 

of occupying the chairman’s chair or seizing his gavel in order to 

prevent an actual vote. 

But other reasons, I think, are political. One is that the DP and 

the DLP want to maintain a left-of-center alliance to lead into next 

year’s elections, so they see that they can garner more votes from 

the left-of-center voters by being opposed to this agreement. Another factor is that they want to force the GNP to railroad the 

KORUS through ratification. The GNP has the majority of the 

57

votes as given to them by the populace of South Korea. They can 

vote and they can use their majority. 

And yet, the majority party is afraid of doing that because then 

they will be accused of acting like the authoritarian regimes of the 

past. And that actually has resonance with a large part of the populace. So they are very nervous about acting like a majority party. 

Also, I think the DP wants to do that, and then they can look 

like the aggrieved party, that they were the victims of an authoritarian regime. It’s very similar to World Cup soccer players who 

feign injury and with much theatrics fall to the ground, trying to 

induce a penalty. And one, I think, can’t help but wonder if on the 

left-of-center resistance there’s not some strain of anti-Americanism because the KOREU, Korea-EU FTA, was very, very similar, and there were very few protests against it within the National 

Assembly and out on the streets. And one thinks also back on 2008 

and the massive anti-U.S. beef demonstrations and yet, at the 

time, there were far more serious dangers from Chinese products. 

There were carcinogenic chemicals in their kimchi, parasitic eggs 

and other products, Chilean pork had carcinogenic chemicals and 

yet we didn’t see a single protest against them. So I think there 

was also a strain of anti-Americanism in that resistance. Thank 

you. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Did you say they imported kimchi? Koreans imported Kimchi? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes, sir. From China. And there have been parasitic eggs in that. There were carcinogenic chemicals in Chinese 

seafood and some of the Chinese exporters were putting lead in the 

fish in order to weigh it down so that it would cost more. And also 

Chinese melamine was also seen as a danger, particularly to infants. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Right before lunch. Mr. Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. I think 

you’ve answered most of the questions. Dr. Kim, you were talking 

about these legislation would have to be taken care of before the 

KORUS could go forward, but the more I listen to the testimony, 

this is the third time I’ve said this, we are more alike than we are 

different and I think sometimes in the world the shape of your eye 

or the color of your skin makes you think you’re different, absolutely not true. We’re all the same. 

When I look at the political process and what you’re going 

through and the idea that we can somehow paint the other side as 

the problem and not really address the problems together to get 

them solved is the key to it. But I’ve got to tell you, I have a great 

affection for the Korean people because I know since 1949, 1950, 

we really have been very close allies and brothers in arms in almost every conflict and in every conflict and we do rely on each 

other quite a bit for support. So you all being here today and you’re 

expressing it. 

I think the message that we need to get across, not only to the 

Republic, but also to those in the United States that don’t understand where it is we’re trying to go is that at the end of the day, 

this is so good for both of us and the upside is such a dramatic upside that we need to get beyond these political battles that we have 

and as we do face the same problems. 

58

My friend, Tom Kim, is here today. It’s so good to see you, Tom. 

Tom has been so influential and has been so supportive in our 

backing of this agreement. 

So Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here and 

also our colleagues on the other side. I think we see the upside of 

this and we understand it, and the ability to come together and 

talk about it in an open forum like this is critical. Not only to the 

United States, but also to the world because we do work better 

when we work together. Thanks so much. We appreciate you being 

here and I yield back my time, sir. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Sherman from Sherman Oaks, California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I want to thank you for having this 

hearing in the wake of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, or 

so-called free trade agreement. Needless to say, we would focus on 

that and it is a shame that we don’t we have a single representative of American workers here, but of course, that agreement was 

never about American workers. It was only about profits for giant 

corporations on both sides of the Pacific. I’m sure it will achieve 

that purpose. 

Mr. Hill or Ambassador Hill, one of the issues, now that we’ve 

signed this agreement, both sides are supposed to enter into discussions as to whether Kaesong and similar facilities in North Korea 

will be considered part of South Korea for the purposes of the 

agreement. 

Now that would allow goods to come into our country duty free 

produced some would say by slave labor, in any case certainly not 

by those who are free to bargain over their own working conditions. 

Now Appendix 22B, I believe it is, it had a different number, says 

that before the executive branch can agree to that, there is supposed to be some involvement of the United States Congress. The 

current administration has issued a statement stating that it 

would not finalize such agreements without getting an affirmative 

vote by both Houses of Congress. Is that statement binding on the 

next administration, legally binding? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, first of all, Mr. Sherman, it’s great to 

see you again. You may have missed the fact that I’m no longer in 

the U.S. Government. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I’m asking you as an expert. You were invited because you are an expert. 

Ambassador HILL. I would like to defer my answer on this particular issue to some of my colleagues who are closer to it than I 

am. I think——

Mr. SHERMAN. They’re even further from being parts of the administration than you are, but if one of them claims to have expertise on the matter, happy to hear from them. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Congressman Sherman, the KORUS does not 

allow South Korea to declare Kaesong to be part of——

Mr. SHERMAN. No, it calls for serious negotiations between the 

executive branches of both governments which may—designed in 

the view of some to lead to that conclusion. The question is whether Congress will have—congressional approval would be necessary. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Right. The witnesses, administration officials 

from this administration and previous administration have testified 

59

including before this committee that it would require the approval, 

including legislative action by the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Legislative action. Did they ever say in anything 

legally binding, that it would require the affirmative vote of the 

majority of both Houses of Congress? 

Mr. KLINGNER. I will look for the quote. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The answer is no. They deliberately prevented 

making that statement in anything legally binding. The proponents 

of the agreement fought tooth and nail and with great success to 

keep that out of the implementing legislation and you can be sure 

that within this decade goods from Kaesong will be coming into the 

United States as the current Ambassador of South Korea to the 

United States told a rally years before he became Ambassador to 

the United States. This is an agreement that will put American 

workers up against North Korean workers in fighting for jobs in 

the United States market. And I’m sure that if we had had a representative of the American worker here today that point would 

have been made before I came into the room. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Sir, if I could comment? Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Marantis testified in April 2011 that any change to how 

Kaesong is treated under the agreement would require Congress to 

pass and the President to sign legislation. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is that legally binding or is that—Mr. Klingner, 

the point I’m making is that we got a press release instead of binding legislation. The point I’m making is that that statement is not 

binding on any administration, least of all the next one. And the 

cleverness of the proponents in giving us a press release instead of 

a provision in the implementing legislation demonstrates how successful they’ve been at achieving profits from major corporations 

and a loss of jobs for the middle class. I yield back all my time. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Klingner, did you want to further answer his 

question? 

Mr. KLINGNER. There’s also been questions about the rules of origin in the KORUS FTA and the idea that the rules of origin would 

allow North Korean products into the United States. That would be 

in conflict with existing U.S. laws and Executive Orders. For example, Executive Order 13570 declares that the importation into the 

United States directly or indirectly—indirectly, of course, covering 

components of any goods, services, or technology from North Korea 

is prohibited. And that any kind of import of North Korean products or components would require the specific approval by a U.S. 

Government agency. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could have some time after the 

witness speaks? 

Mr. KLINGNER. The existing regulations would not be superseded 

by the KORUS FTA and there’s text in the KORUS which specifically identifies that it would not be in conflict with existing rules 

and regulations. 

As for the effectiveness of these rules and regulations, during the 

past 5 years, the total imports into the United States from North 

Korea is $8,000 of stamps and during the past 4 years, the imports 

are virtually zero. So I think the regulations show that they have 

been quite effective. 

60

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Chairman, can I address that? 

Mr. MANZULLO. Sure. 

Mr. SHERMAN. First of all, the known imports from North Korea 

are $8,000. We have no idea how many North Korean components 

are contained in goods that come here from China, South Korea, 

Britain, or anywhere else. To stand here and say, sit here and say 

that we have been 100 percent effective on every item other than 

postage stamps is to misconstrue the practical world. 

Second, this committee and its chairwoman and I have introduced legislation to make those sanctions against North Korea 

statutory. Those efforts have been thwarted by the proponents of 

this agreement so that all of the Executive Orders you talk about 

can be waived by this or some other administration and the executive branch has been far less interested in sanctions than has this 

Congress and far more willing to accommodate multi-national corporations. 

But then finally, you claim that we will not be in violation of this 

agreement when goods partially made in North Korea and partially 

made in South Korea come into the United States. Yes, our current 

Executive Order, subject to change by a decision of just one individual, without any congressional input, but our current Executive 

Orders would block that at the border. That would put us in violation of the agreement and allow South Korea to take back some of 

the concessions they made, putting enormous economic pressure on 

the United States to relent. We’ve been through this already——

Mr. MANZULLO. I’m going to be unrelenting here and go on to Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I want to thank you for the extra time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think Mr. 

Sherman has made his point and his concerns concerning some of 

the provisions there in the free trade agreement and I’d like to follow up just for my own better understanding of the specifics. And 

his concerns, and correct me if I’m wrong, Mr. Klingner, Executive 

Orders have to have some guidance from the statutory provision 

that allows or authorizes the President to issue that Executive 

Order. 

My point is that isn’t there a provision in the agreement or by 

law, as you have read earlier, that the Congress has to pass any 

conditions on anything or products coming out of North Korea. I 

think we’ve put it pretty clear that it’s not to be allowed to be imported, to come to the United States. 

Can you, for the record, can you clarify that a little better? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes, Annex 22–B points out that for any additional, any outward processing zone to be included, whether it’s 

Kaesong or some other area outside of the borders of South Korea, 

there would first have to be an agreement by a bilateral committee, 

U.S.-South Korea committee that couldn’t even meet until 1 year 

after entering the force. If the U.S. team agreed that Kaesong or 

others should be included, that would require the U.S. team to 

agree that North Korea’s environmental standards, working standards had it made progress on human rights, had it made progress 

on denuclearization, all of those are requirements. Even if the U.S. 

61

team agreed to that, then it has to be—the executive branch has 

to receive approval by Congress. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. It still has to come back to Congress for 

final approval. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes. And as for Mr. Sherman’s point that the 

U.S. rules, regulations, etcetera could be in conflict, that’s not the 

case because the KORUS FTA cannot override or even be in conflict with current U.S. laws prohibiting the import of North Korean 

products or components because the KORUS contains text specifically allowing the U.S. to do that. 

Article 23.2(b) says nothing in this agreement shall be construed 

to preclude a party from applying measures that it considers, 

which is a very low standard, necessary for the protection of its 

own essential security or the protection of its own essential security. 

Article 22.8.4 says no provision of this agreement shall prevent 

the party from limiting or prohibiting the importation of the good 

of the nonparty from the territory of the other party. So there’s a 

lot of various——

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Would be correct, while I can appreciate my 

colleague’s concerns about the importation of products that are 

manufactured from North Korea, there are provisions in the agreement to be absolutely certain that if there are to be changes, it has 

to come back to the Congress for approval or disapproval? 

Mr. KLINGNER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. And I just wanted to make sure for the 

record that we’re clear on that. I was listening and trying to sense 

what his concerns are about as if we’re allowing this to be an exception, but from what you’ve just shared with us, we appreciate 

your sharing with us that provision of the free trade agreement 

very clear in my opinion. 

I have another question I wanted to raise with our witnesses, 

Mr. Chairman. As I’ve said, thinking outside the box, is our number one concern about the nuclear issues in the Korean Peninsula? 

That always seems to be the number one concern that we have, our 

Government as well as the governments in the region about North 

Korea having the capability of possessing or creating nuclear weapons. 

Two weeks ago, the President of Kazakhstan invited me to attend a world conference on getting rid of nuclear weapons altogether. Now I’m very concerned simply because I’m probably one 

of the few Members of Congress who has ever been to Ground Zero 

where we conducted nuclear tests in our history. I’ve been to the 

Marshall Islands where we literally blew up those islands to pieces, 

leaving several hundred Marshallese people for the rest of their 

lives subjected to nuclear radiation, where we exploded the first hydrogen bomb. That was 1,300 times more powerful than the bombs 

that we dropped in Nagasaki and Hiroshima; where we detonated 

67 nuclear bombs in the Marshall Islands. That bomb was so devastating which was called the Bravo Shot, the nuclear cloud floated 

and it ended up with strontium 90 in milk products in Minnesota 

and Wisconsin. 

And so what do we do? We immediately put a stop on our nuclear testing program in the Marshall Islands, and we decided to 

62

send it to Nevada where we conducted an additional 1,000 nuclear 

detonations, but this time underground thinking that maybe it’s 

safe and well, when in actuality the downwinders until to this day, 

there’s very serious questions about the higher rate of cancer 

among those people living in southern Utah as well as in other 

parts of the State of Nevada as a result of our nuclear testing program. 

The French, after detonating 17 nuclear bombs in Algeria, they 

got kicked out of Algeria where the Algerian people were fighting 

for their independence and where 1 million Algerians lost their 

lives to fighting against French Colonialism. So President de 

Gaulle decided to say well, we don’t want to test in Paris, can’t do 

that in France, so they come to the South Pacific where they exploded 220 nuclear bombs in the atmosphere, on the surface, under 

the ocean in French Polynesia. I personally went to Moruroa Atoll 

where the French conducted these nuclear tests and it was not a 

very pretty sight in my humble opinion, Mr. Chairman. To this day 

that island is still contaminated. Thousands of Tahitians were also 

subjected to nuclear radiation. 

The President of Kazakhstan years ago invited me to come to 

Kazakhstan. This is where the Russians exploded their first nuclear bomb in 1949 and afterwards detonated 450 nuclear bombs 

in Kazakhstan, subjecting some 1.5 million Kazakhs to nuclear radiation. I say that nuclear proliferation, it comes to this bearing, 

Mr. Chairman, that I think it has serious implications on the very 

issue that we’re talking about in the Korean Peninsula. 

Are we really serious about getting rid of nuclear weapons? I 

commend the Obama administration for its efforts to lessen the 

number of nuclear weapons that we now possess, between us and 

the Russians. It is a fact that the President of Kazakhstan, by his 

leadership and initiative, decided he didn’t want to be a nuclear 

nation where he could have had the fourth largest number of nuclear bombs in his possession. It could have been a nuclear country 

overnight if he wanted to, but no, he wanted to dismantle it, 

thanks to the likes of Senator Lugar, Senator Sam Nunn, and 

Chris Hill is very familiar with this, where we assisted in getting 

rid of all the nuclear bombs that the Russians left to the Kazakhs. 

The bottom line that I wanted to raise on this issue of nonproliferation, there’s a double standard that we have here in telling 

the rest of the world that you can’t have nuclear weapons, but it’s 

okay for certain countries to continue possessing nuclear weapons. 

Oh yes, we are making every effort to get rid of nuclear weapons 

altogether, but boy, we’re sure doing it pretty slow. And of course, 

we go back to President Reagan’s famous axiom, ‘‘trust, but verify.’’ 

Well, how long are we going to continue doing this with the fact 

that those who possess nuclear weapons aren’t exactly the best examples of how we can really get rid of nuclear weapons altogether. 

And I suppose this is also the implications why North Korea 

wants to have nuclear weapons because of fear that we might have 

nuclear weapons at its borders in South Korea. Of course, we will 

never admit or deny or allow to think such is the case, but those 

are the implications. 

And coming out to my point, Mr. Chairman, and I want to ask 

the witnesses, I think if there’s ever a resolution to the situation 

63

of the Korean Peninsula, 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman, I really believe that the people and the leaders of North and South Korea 

have got to be the ones to find that solution. I don’t think it’s up 

to the United States and China and all the other countries to think 

that they can do it for them. I really believe if they’re responsible 

for President Kim Dae-jung’s personal visit to North Korea and trying his sunshine policy. Some say it failed, but the principle was 

there. And unfortunately, the situation is still under negotiation, I 

suppose, in that act. 

And all I want to say, Mr. Chairman, is that, and I’m sorry that 

I’ve gone way beyond my time, the peaceful resolution in the Korean Peninsula has got to be on the minds and in the hearts of the 

people of both North and South Korea. With that, Mr. Chairman, 

I yield. 

Mr. MANZULLO. We want to thank the witnesses for coming. It 

has been a very enlightening and wonderful discussion. 

Ambassador, did you want to say something, because you had 

pressed your button there? 

Ambassador HILL. Let me just say in response to Mr. 

Faleomavaega, I think every one in the world, most people in the 

world share this aspiration for a nuclear-free world. Certainly, we 

understand the point that those nuclear weapon states also have 

an obligation and an obligation, NPT, to look for ways that they 

also build down. 

But I just want to make it very clear that the North Koreans 

have not embarked on this path for some sort of defense purposes. 

No country in the region, South Korea, Japan, to name the two 

main countries there, have nuclear arsenals. And for North Korea 

to develop one is very dangerous and destabilizing in the region 

and we need to keep focused on the task of getting them to get rid 

of these weapons. And the way to do that is to work with other 

countries in the region. 

I completely take the point, however, that there is a role in the 

overall process of negotiating with North Korea between the—in 

the inter-Korean dialogue. There’s a role for South Korea to be 

working or negotiating with North Korea on a variety of issues. but 

South Korea is also a very—member in good standing of the SixParty process, consults very closely with us, consults very closely 

with the other parties and I think what we all need to do is not 

allow a situation where the North Koreans can somehow divide 

and conquer or go shopping for various different configurations of 

countries that we all need to stand united in the fact that we cannot allow this country that cannot even feed its people to be building nuclear weapons. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Klingner, go ahead. 

Mr. KLINGNER. Mr. Faleomavaega, thank you very much for your 

very expansive and heartfelt thoughts. I’m a Northeast Asia analyst so I tend to remain in my own little box rather than having 

such an expansive view, but perhaps just to point out, I think, a 

difference between North Korea’s nuclear programs and all of the 

others you mentioned, is that North Korea vowed it would never 

pursue nuclear weapons programs, and actually signed four or five 

documents vowing it would never pursue nuclear weapons programs. And then under the Six-Party Talks, they signed three 

64

agreements that they promised to give up the programs that they 

had vowed never to pursue in the first place. 

So the requests of the United States and its allies are simply to 

ask Pyongyang to live up to its agreements, to abandon its nuclear 

arsenal, and that’s, I think, a very direct request and that’s what 

we’re hoping North Korea will do, although as Ambassador Hill 

said before, there’s not a great deal of optimism that that will be 

successful, but I think it is still a pursuit that we need to try to 

achieve with all the efforts that the United States Government can 

use as well as those of our allies. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you very much for the testimony and this 

subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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