UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LONNIE BRIDGES, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

CARMEN PALMER, 

 Defendant. 

 / 

Case Number: 14-13097 

HONORABLE TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 This is a habeas case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Lonnie Bridges 

(Petitioner) is a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Michigan Reformatory in 

Ionia, Michigan. He challenges his convictions for manslaughter, Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 750.321, felony firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b, and felon in 

possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f, on the ground that the 

prosecutor engaged in misconduct. It is plain from the face of the petition that 

habeas relief is not warranted. Therefore, the petition will be dismissed. 

 Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of 

manslaughter, felony firearm, and felon in possession of a firearm. On April 13, 

2012, he was sentenced to 10 to 22 years for the manslaughter conviction, 2 to 5 

years for the felon in possession conviction, and 5 years for the felony firearm 

conviction. 

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 Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals arguing 

that prosecutorial misconduct and the improper admission of evidence denied him 

the right to a fair trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions. People v. Bridges, No. 310176, 2013 WL 3815631 (Mich. Ct. App. July 

23, 2013). The Michigan Supreme Court then denied Petitioner’s application for 

leave to appeal. People v. Bridges, 495 Mich. 903 (Mich. Nov. 25, 2013). 

 Petitioner then filed the pending habeas petition. He raises this claim: 

The trial court denied defendant a fair trial and the prosecutor 

engaged in misconduct when the prosecutor impeached 

defendant Bridges with the details of a prior assault with intent 

to murder conviction in response to defendant’s testimony that 

he acted in self-defense, and that he was aware that the victim 

could be violent. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 Upon the filing of a habeas corpus petition, the court must promptly examine 

the petition to determine “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any 

exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4, Rules 

Governing Section 2254 cases. If the court determines that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief, the court shall summarily dismiss the petition. McFarland v. 

Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) (“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss 

summarily any habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face”). The 

habeas petition, on its face, does not establish the violation of a federal 

constitutional right, therefore, the petition will be dismissed. 

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 The claims raised are reviewed against the standards established by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 

Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). The AEDPA provides: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 

unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceedings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

 

 “A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it 

‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court 

cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from 

[this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) 

(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable 

application’ prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] 

Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). “In 

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order for a federal court find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court] 

precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than 

incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively 

unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 

529 U.S. at 409. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes 

federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness 

of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 

(2011), (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). “Section 

2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme 

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary 

error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from 

a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted). 

 Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court 

factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this 

presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Scott v. Houk, 760 F.3d 497, 

503 (6th Cir. 2014). 

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 II. ANALYSIS 

 Petitioner presents a single claim for habeas relief: the prosecutor engaged in 

misconduct when cross-examining Petitioner by referencing Petitioner’s prior 

attempted murder conviction. 

 The prosecutor filed a pretrial motion, under Mich. R. Evid. 404(b), to admit 

prior bad acts evidence, including Petitioner’s 2002 conviction for assault with 

intent to murder. The trial court denied the motion. At trial, Petitioner testified on 

direct examination that the victim was a violent person and described two 

particular occasions when the victim behaved aggressively. The trial court ruled 

that, because Petitioner offered evidence about the victim’s aggressive character, 

the prosecutor could introduce Petitioner’s character trait for aggression under 

Mich. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), and, because Petitioner claimed to have acted in selfdefense, ask Petitioner about specific instances of violent conduct under Mich. R. 

Evid. 405(a). 

 Petitioner argues that, in eliciting this evidence, the prosecutor improperly 

referred to the 2002 criminal conviction that resulted from Petitioner’s specific 

conduct, rather than just the conduct itself. The trial court struck the evidence and 

gave a curative instruction. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the 

prosecutor’s reference to the 2002 conviction did not deny Petitioner a fair trial. 

Bridges, 2013 WL 3815631 at *2. The state appellate court’s justification for its 

holding was two-fold. First, the state court noted that jurors are presumed to follow 

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their instructions. Id. Second, the state court observed that a defendant was not 

likely to be prejudiced by improper admission of the fact of a conviction when each 

of the elements of the crime leading to that conviction were already properly 

introduced at trial. Id. 

 The “clearly established Federal law” relevant to a habeas court’s review of a 

prosecutorial misconduct claim is the Supreme Court’s decision in Darden v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). Parker v. Matthews, — U.S.—, 132 S. Ct. 

2148, 2153 (June 11, 2012). In Darden, the Supreme Court held that a “prosecutor’s 

improper comments will be held to violate the Constitution only if they ‘so infected 

the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.’” Id. (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). This 

Court must ask whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision denying 

Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim “‘was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Parker, — U.S. at —, 132 S. Ct. at 2155, 

(quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at —, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87). 

 “[T]he Darden standard is a very general one, leaving courts ‘more leeway ... 

in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Parker, — U.S. —, 132 

S.Ct. at 2155, (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The 

Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably disposed of Petitioner’s prosecutorial 

misconduct claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to Mich. R. 

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of Evid. 404(a)(1) and 405(a), the prosecutor was properly permitted to crossexamine Petitioner on reports of specific instances of conduct. This Court will not 

disturb a state court’s administration of its own evidentiary rules. Marshall v. 

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit 

the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state 

evidentiary rules.”). The Court thus presumes the correctness of the state court’s 

evidentiary ruling. The state court reasonably concluded that, because evidence 

about the conduct underlying the prior conviction was properly introduced, and the 

trial court gave a curative instruction regarding the fact of the prior conviction, 

Petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not implicated by the prosecutor’s conduct. The 

court of appeals’ decision was not “so lacking in justification that there was an error 

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S., at —, 131 S. Ct., at 786-787. 

Habeas relief, therefore, is denied. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not 

proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 

Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the 

Court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order 

adverse to the applicant.” 

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 A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The substantial 

showing threshold is satisfied when a petitioner demonstrates “that reasonable 

jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the 

Court’s conclusion that the habeas petition does not warrant relief. Therefore, the 

Court denies a certificate of appealability. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus and a certificate of appealability are DENIED and the matter is 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

 

 s/Terrence G. Berg 

 TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

Dated: January 23, 2015 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on January 23, 

2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party. 

s/A. Chubb 

 Case Manager 

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