SIXTH DIVISION March 28, 2008 No. 1-06- 3309 DANIEL RYA

N, ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci

rcu it Court of Pl ai n tif f -A pp el l an t, ) Coo k Count y, Ill in ois. ) ) ) No. 01 L 004073 v. ) ) COMMONW

EALTH EDISON COMPANY , ) Ho no r ab le ) Bi

ll Tay l or Defe ndan t-Appell ee. ) Judge Presi din g. )

JU STI CE JO SEPH G OR

DO N del iv ered th e op in i on

of th e c our t: Electrici an Dan

ie l R ya n was i nj ured in an on-the-j ob ci

rcuit breaker ex

plosi on. He brought suit agai

nst Comm

onweal th Edison C ompan

y (Com Ed), all egi ng that Com Ed was
re spo nsible for t he elec t rical cu rr ent t hat flowe d int o t he building and t hat t he se ver ity o f the
acc ident was increa sed by Com E d’s ne gligent failure t o a deq uat ely perfo rm its ong oing
ma in tenance duties. The trial

court granted sum

ma ry j udgme nt in fav or o f Com

Ed on grounds that Ry an ’s clai m wastim e-b arred by the c onstruction

statute of repose , si

nc e i t occurred

m ore than ten y ears af ter t he el ectrical sy stem was

fi rst install ed. For the reasons that foll ow, we reverse an

d reman d. I. BACKG

ROUND Viewi ng th e ev i den ce l i be ral l y in f av or of the n onm

ovi ng p arty , as is appropri ate un der a summary judg ment mo t ion ( Purtill v. H ess , 111 Il l . 2d 229 , 240, 48 9 N.E.2d 867, 87 1 (198 6)),No. 1-06- 3309

-2-

we are pre sen

ted wi th the f oll owin g description of

eve nts asal leged b y Ry an: Ry an wa s a n e l ec trician em pl oy ed by the Ci ty of Ch i cago. O n A

pri l 2, 2 001 , th e d ay

of the a cci den t, Ry an wasworki

ng i n the Hea tin g an d Ref ri gerati on (H& R) bui l di ng a t O’Ha re International

Ai rport in Chi cago, Ill in ois, perf ormi ng m ai ntenan ce work on a circui

t breaker. He was workin

g with B yron Gl

ista, an empl

oyee of H igh Voltage Mai

ntenan ce Corporat ion (Hi

gh Voltage). Com Ed i

nstal led and owned the transf

ormer (known as transf

ormer num

ber 6) whi

ch provi ded el ectri

ci ty to the ci rcui t brea ker. T he pr o ce du r e fo rt he maint en an ce o pe r at io n w as t ha t Rya n w o uld firs t r emo ve t he cir cu it bre aker f rom th e cub i cl e i n whi ch it was h oused ; Gl i sta woul d then pe rf orm th e nece ssa ry repai rs on it, and Ry

an would rein stall

the ci rcuit breaker i

n i ts cubicle. However, when R ya n rei nstal led t his circu it br eak er , it explo ded , c aus ing ser iou s injury t o R yan. Ry an f il ed a compl

ai nt in two co unts. The f

irst count was agai

nst Gl ista’s em ploy er, High Voltage. In that count, which is not currently

at issue , Ryan

contended that High

Voltage
com m i tted n eg l i ge nc e th rough th e a cti ons of its em pl oy ee an d w as the ref ore r es pon si bl e f or Ryan ’s i nj uries. I t is R yan’ s s ec o nd co un t , wh ich wa s a ga inst Co m Ed , t ha t is a t iss ue in t he inst an t ap pe al. Ryan alleged t hat , a t t he t ime of t he ac cident , C om E d had a du t y to exer cise o rd inary car e in the repair an d ma in tenance of

transform

er num ber 6, whi

ch i t had breach

ed. Specif

ic al ly, he al leged that Com Ed: “(a) Carel essl y a nd negli gently repaired an

d ma in tained transform

er num ber 6 whi ch caused the [ci

rcuit breaker] to explode;No. 1-06- 3309

-3-

(b ) C ar ele ss ly and neg ligen t ly failed t o maint ain a nd r ep air t ra nsfo rme r n umbe r 6 in a s afe and r eas ona ble manner g iven the act ivities t hen and t her e t aking p lace; a nd (c) Oth erwi se, c arel

ess l y an d negl i gen tly mai ntai ne d tran sf orme r num be r 6.” Ryan fur t her alleged t hat t his negligent maintena nce by Co m Ed w as t he pr oximat e ca use of t he expl osion, and thus , of the i

nj uries he sus tained. On Ju ly 14 , 20 06 , Co m Ed mo ve d fo rsu mmar y jud gme nt . I t ar gu ed t ha t Rya n’s cla ims against it were t im

e-barred under t he Ill

in ois construct ion statut e of repose ( 735 ILCS 5/13-2 14(b ) (We st 2006 )), wh i ch f orecl oses al l clai m s f or neg l i gen t desi gn that are b

rough t more than ten y ears af ter a fi xture to real property has been in stall ed. Because the partie s agreed that th e p owe r s y ste m at issue wa s ov er 20 y ea rs old, C om

Ed c onten

de d that i t wa s e n ti tled to judgm ent as a m

atter of law. In su ppo rt of it s mot ion, Co m Ed r efer re d t o a re po rt pr epa re d by Jo hn Nelso n, t he el ec trica l en gi neer r eta ined a s a n e xp ert b y Ry an , as we ll asNe l son ’s

su bs eq ue nt d ep osi ti on t es t imo ny. Co m Ed co nt en de d t ha t t he o nly fau lt t ha t Ne lso n fo un d in Co m Ed ’s sys t em w as in its or igi nal design and install

ation, as Nelson never alleged fail ure t o r epair as a cau se of Ryan’s inju r y. Ne l son

ba se d h i s rep ort, da

ted Ju ne 7, 2 004 , up on a

si te i ns pe cti on th at h e c ond uc ted on Apri l 10, 2001, ei

ght day s af

ter t he acci

dent occurred, as well

as vari ous documents that he had
r ev iew ed
. I n t ha t r ep o r t , Ne lso n st at ed t ha t t he t r an sfo r mer s s up plying po we rt o t he cir cu it breaker i nvol ved i n the acci dent were owned by

Com Ed, and they

were set up in

such a wa

y tha t a resi stor lin

ked to t he ci

rcuit breaker, wh

ic h was supposed to reduce the el ectrical current to 300No. 1-06- 3309

-4-

am ps, was sh

ort ed out. Hence, i

n hi s professi onal opini on, one of the reasons that Ryan was in jured was that “ComEd was ca

reles s i n the desi gn, construction, comm

is sionin g, and f oll ow-up testi ng of the i nc omi ng p ower sy

stem .” In his depositi

on, dated March 11, 2005, Nelson e xplai ned that el

ectrical voltage i s si

mi la r to water pressure in a hose: the great er the voltage, the great er the flow of power. The purpo se of a re sist or is to lim

it t he flow of p ow er . I n t his case , if the re sist or at issue ha d bee n wo rk ing correct ly, it would have restricted the electric current to 300 am ps. However, Nels on stated t hat t he r esist or had s hor t ed o ut and be co me ineffect ive. As a re sult , t he cu rr ent flowing t hro ugh t he ci rcuit breaker at the tim

e of the acci

dent was unres tricted and could h ave b een as h

igh as 28,000
am ps. Nel son gave h

is opini on that if the resi stor had not been shorted out and the el ectrical current had been l

im ited to 300 amps, Ryan ’s i nj uries f rom the accident would have been less
sev ere or pos si b l y n on ex i ste n t. In elaborating on the reas ons f or t he resistor fail

ure, Nelson stated t hat the transform er in sta ll ed b y Com Ed i n cl ud ed a c om pon en t kn own as“ n eutra

l Xo b us h in g” th at h

ad sh orte d out, thus causi ng the resi stor t o short o ut. Nelson opin ed that this b

ushi ng was probab

ly pla ced when the sy stem was

fi rst install ed. Ne l son f ur th er sta ted th at i n h i s r ep ort, h e had sa i d that C om

Ed n ee de d to ch an

ge its syst em set up t o p re vent t he r esist or fro m being sho rt ed; ne ver t heless, when he went t o insp ect t he si te a ga in th e d ay b ef ore h e g av e h i s dep osi ti on , he d i sc ov ered th at n othin g had

b een don e to
corr ec t the prob l em . Th at i s, h

e s ai d th at th e c onf i gurati on of the ne utra l Xo b us hi ng ha d not been chan ged and that the sam

e dangerous condi

tion stil l e xi sted. He repeated his opi ni on thatNo. 1-06- 3309

-5-

Com Ed’ s f l aw s i n i ts s y stem ex ac erb ate d the i

nj uri es Ry an rec ei ved i n th e a cc i de nt a s a

resul t of the n egl i gen ce of hi s co-worke

r. In his r esp ons e t o C om E d’s mo t ion fo r su mmary judgment , R yan arg ued t hat t he construction statut e of repose did not apply to hi s clai

ms , because h

e was not all

egi ng negli gence in the w ay the syst em was des igned, but ra t her in Com E d’s o ngo ing maintena nce d ut ies. “[ T] he Co ur t sho uld no t allow C om E d t o c onve rt Plaint iff ’s neg ligence C ou nt II of t he Co mplaint agai nst Com Ed i

nto a *** construct ion de sign case,” h e urged. He further argued that there was a genui ne i ssue of m

aterial fact as to whether Com Ed’s fai lure to properly m

ai ntain the electrical syste m wa s a pr ox imate

ca us e of Ry an ’s in j ur i es . In su pp ort of thi s c onten

ti on , Ry an

re f er re d to the deposition testim

ony of Martin LeWa nd, a Com Ed f

oreman a nd superv is or who describ ed Com Ed’ s e x ten si v e m ai n tenan ce du ti esat O ’H ar

e a t th e ti m e of th e a cc i den t. In his depositi

on, LeWan

d testifi ed that he had been a f

oreman f or Com Ed sin

ce 1987, and h e worked at O’Hare from around 1998 to 2002. He stat ed that Com Ed had around 18
em ploy ees reporting to its O’Hare off ic e, in cl udin g ei ght under LeW

and’s direct superv

is ion, as
we ll as at lea st o ne st at io n o pe r at o ro n d ut y 24 ho ur s a da y, s ev en da ys a we ek
. He als o sa id t her e we re t hre e se par at e st at ions c ont aining Co m Ed t ra nsfor mers w hich sup plied po wer t o t he airp or t . C om E d emplo yees p er for med bo t h co rr ect ive and p re vent at ive maintena nce o n t he eq ui pm en t in th ose sta ti ons . Al thou gh the ca bl es l ink ing the tran sf orm ers to the ai rpor t were n ot
own ed b y Com Ed, Le W an d s tate d that th

e tr an sf orm er s th em selv eswe re Com Ed p rop er ty (al ong w i th as sociated eq

ui pm en t, such as b ush i ng)
. On Apr il 2, 20 01, LeWand was in his office at t he airp or t when he re ceived a t elepho neNo. 1-06- 3309

1 In the i r bri ef s, th e p arti es al so r ai se

con ten ti ons reg ard ing the prod uc ts l i abil ity sta tute of
r ep o se ( 75 3 I LC S 5 /1 3- 21 3 ( We st 20 06 ) ) ; ho we ve r , t he pa r t ies ag r ee d a t o r al a r gu men t t ha t t his statut e was no l

onger at issue. -6- call not ify ing him that an ac cident had o ccu rr ed. He w ent t o t he H&R building, w her e he a nd o ne of his em ploy ees i nspected the ci

rcuit breaker that was i

nvol ved i n the acci dent. He then procee ded to the

station tha

t housed the

trans f orme r suppl ying p ower to that ci

rcui t brea ker, whi ch was a bout half a bl ock away. Si

nce i t was obvious the transforme r had expl oded and was no longe r fun ctional , LeWan

d ma de cal ls to have the dam

aged parts removed an

d to replac e them wi th n ewpa rts. He sa i d th at h e di dn ’t k now wh y the tran sf orm er e xp l ode d, n

or di d h e k now whet her anyone fro m Com E d co nduc t ed a n inquiry into t he r eas ons for t he exp losio n. The t rial co ur t gr ant ed s ummary judg ment in favo r o f Com E d and , in a lat er or der , fo und t hat t her e wa s no just re aso n t o d elay enfor cement or app eal o f the gr ant of su mmary judgment under Suprem

e Court Rule 304. 134 Ill . 2d. R. 304. Ryan theref ore appealed. II. AN AL YSIS Com Ed contends that i

t is protected against al

l l ia bi li ty f or t he acci

dent under section 13- 21 4 o f t he Co de o f Civ il Pr o ce du r e, als o r efe r r ed t o as t he co nst r uc t io n st at ut e o f r ep o se . T his is t he so le is su e in vo ke d b y t he pa r t ies in t his a pp ea l. 1 Se cti on 13 -2 14pr ov i de s, in

re l ev an t pa rt:

“ No acti on b as ed upon tort, c ontrac t or oth erwi se may be br ough t ag ai nst an y pers on f or an ac t or om

i ss i on of su ch pers on i n th e d es i gn , pl

an ni ng , su pervi si on, obs ervati

on or ma nagem ent of construction, or construct ion of an i mprovem ent to r eal propert y a

fter 10No. 1-06- 3309

-7-

years hav e elapsed f

rom the t im

e of such act or omis sion.” 735 ILCS 5/13- 214(b) (West 2006)
. Thi s statut e appl

ie s when ever (1) the product at is sue i s an i mprovem ent to r eal propert y a

nd (2) the def en dan t’s a ctivi tie s f al l wi thi n those l i sted i n th e statute. Adcock v. Montgomery Elevator Co. , 274 Ill . App. 3d 519, 522, 654 N.E. 2d 631, 633 (1995). Ryan does n ot dis pute the fact that th e el ec tri ca l syste m se t upb y Com Ed i s a n im pr ov em en t to re al pr ope rty , n or d oes

h e d i spute t he fact t hat it w as d esigne d and insta lled well ove r t en year s ag o. Rat her , he ar gue s t hat t he second prong of the Adcock st an da r d is no t sa t isfie d: i. e. , he ar gu es t ha t t he alle ga t io ns in his
com pl ai n t do n ot co n ce rn Com Ed’ s “ de si gn , pl an n in g, sup er

v i si on , ob se rv ati on , or m anag em en t” of the electrical

system, but rat her the ongo in g mai ntenance duties undertaken by Com Ed as a
su pp lier o f p o we r . T he r ef o r e, he co nt en ds t ha t t he co ns t r uc t io n s t at ut e o f r ep o se do es no t ap pl y. In exam in in g these contentions , we are mi ndf ul that sum

ma ry j udgme nt is only proper where, “when v

iewed i n the li ght most favorable to t he nonm oving party, the pleadi

ngs, dep os itio ns, a dmissions, and a ffi davit s o n fil

e r evea l that t her e is no genu ine issue a s t o a ny ma terial fact an d that t he m

ovin g party i s enti

tled to judgm

ent as a m

atter of law.” General Casualty Insurance C

o. v. Lacey , 199 Ill . 2d 281, 284, 769 N.E .2d 18, 19 (2002), ci ting 735 ILCS 5/2- 1005(c) (West 2006) . All evidence bef

ore t he court is to be constr ued str ictly against the movi ng party, an

d the motion should onl

y b e granted if

the mova nt’s right to judgm

ent is clear an d f ree f rom d oubt. Reed v. Bascon , 124 Ill . 2d 386, 393, 530 N.E .2d 417, 420 (1988). Our standard o f revi

ew of the tr ial

cour t’s entry of summ

ary j udgment is de novo
. Gener al Casualty Insurance , 199 Ill . 2d at 284, 769 N. E.2d at 19.No. 1-06- 3309

-8-

St at ut es o f r ep o se “st em fr o m a b as ic e qu it y co nc ep t t ha t a t ime s ho uld ar r ive , at so me point, that a party i s no longer responsi bl e for a past act.” W. Prosser et al., To rts ch. 12, at 607 (8th ed. 1988); see Citgo Petroleum Co. v. McDermott International, Inc. , 368 Ill . App. 3d 603, 607, 85 8 N.E.2d

563, 56 7 (200 6); MBA Enterprises, Inc. v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. , 30 7 I ll. App. 3d 285, 288, 717 N.E. 2d 849, 8 52 (3d Dist. 1 999) (co nstruct ion statut e of repose “ins ula t [ es ] all p ar t ies in t he co nst r uc t io n p r o ce ss fr o m t he o ne r o us t as k o f de fen din g a ga inst st ale cl ai ms ”). The construction statut e of repose thus represents a l egi slative bal anci ng act between t he r igh t s o f pe r so ns h ar med by alle ge dly fa ult y co nst r uc t io n a nd t he r igh t s o f t ho se r es po nsib le fo rsu ch co nst r uc t io n; a ft er t he st at ut o r y pe r io d h as pa ss ed , “ ‘t he r igh t t o be fr ee o f st ale cla ims comes to prevai

l ove r the righ t t o pro secute them.’ ” Ocasek v. City of Chicago , 275 Ill . App. 3d 628, 633, 656 N.E. 2d 44, 48 (1985), quo ting Cargill Ferr ous International v. M/V Elikon , 857 F. Su pp . 45 , 46 ( N. D. I ll., 19 94 )
. Whe n int er pr et ing a s t at ut e o f r ep o se , co ur t s mu st co nst r ue it liberally to fulfi

ll the o bject ives it w as d esigne d fo r, yet t hey must not enlarg e it be yond t he l egi tim ate i nten t of the l egi slature. Ocasek , 275 Ill . App. 3d at 633, 656 N.E .2d at 48. 1. Pro tect iv

e Scope of the St atut e of Repose W he the r Com Ed c an inv oke the prote cti on of the sta tute of rep ose to sh i el d i tse lf f rom Rya n’s cla ims o f ne glig en t maint en an ce is c ur r en t ly in dis pu t e a mo ng t he ap pe llat e d ist r ict s o f t his st at e. In MBA Enterprises , 307 Ill . App. 3d 285, 717 N.E.2d 849, the Thi rd Dis trict found that
an inst alle ro f a p o we rsys t em c o uld be he ld lia ble fo rne glig en t maint en an ce o f t ha t sys t em, notwi thstan di ng th e f act tha t the al l eged def ects ori gi na ted duri ng th e i ns tall ati on of

the s y stem . In t hat cas e, plaint iff

’s pr op er t y was d amage d in a fire, and p laintiff sued t he ga s ut ili t y compa nyNo. 1-06- 3309

-9-

whi ch had i nstal led and m ai ntain ed the gas pi

pin g sy stem. Plai

ntif f’ s compl ai nt all eged negl ige nce in bot h insta llatio n and maint enanc e. The co ur t held t hat t he inst allatio n claims wer e bar re d by the construction statut e of repose, but that t he m ai ntenan ce cl ai ms survi ved, bec ause plai

ntif f h ad alleged t hat t he ga s ut ili

t y compa ny had violat ed a n ong oing dut y to op er at e t he ga s syst em in a safe manne r. The co ur t re aso ned t hat , in ap plying the st at ut e o f rep os e, one must loo k at t he acti vi ty b ei ng c onducted rather tha

n the status

of th e party involv ed. MBA Enterprises , 30 7 I ll. App. 3d at 287, 717 N.E. 2d at 851, citin g People ex rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc. , 11 4 Ill. 2d 252 , 50 0 N. E. 2d 3 4, ( 198 6); Krueger v. A.P. Green Refractories Co. , 283 Ill . App. 3d 300, 669 N.E.2d 947 ( 1996). Hence, the f act that a defendan

t is an in stall er wi ll not sh i el d hi m in h i s ca paci ty as i nspector an

d m ai ntai ne r. MBA Enterprises , 307 Ill . App. 3d at 287, 717 N.E .2d at 851. By contrast, cases in

the First District have taken the position that the stat ute o f repose pr ot ect s an inst aller r ega rd less o f the fact t hat t he inst aller has an indep ende nt dut y to inspec t and
mai n tai n th e prop er

ty at issue , i f its b re ac h of du ty con sists of th e f ai l ure to d i sc ov er an d c orrect a design def

ect. See O’Brien v. City of Chicago , 2 85 I ll. App. 3d 8 64, 674 N. E. 2d 9 27 ( 199 6) and Citgo , 386 Il

l . App. 3d 60 3, 858 N .E.2d 563 . Both ca ses are f actual l y si m il ar to the ca se bef

ore us t o da y. In O’Brien , t he pl ain t iff’ s d ec ed en t di ed in a n a ut o mo bile ac cid en t . P lain t iff s ue d t he cit y, al l eg in g that i

t n eg l i gen tl y “ ope ra ted , m ai n tai n ed , re pa i re d, a n d a l ter ed ” th e road b y f ai l in g to
mai ntai n a ba rrier across th

e m edian . O’Brien , 2 85 I ll. App. 3d a t 870 , 6 74 N .E .2 d at 932 . T he court found that the plai

ntif f’ s clai m wa s barred un

der the statut e of repose, despi te the fact thatNo. 1-06- 3309

-10-

he ralle ga t io ns w er e fr ame d in t er ms o f an ind ep en de nt du t y by t he cit y t o insp ec t an d ma int ain the road wa y . Th e c ourt r ea son ed tha t “ [t]h e c rux of O’ Bri en ’s com plai nt i s th e d an gerous ne ssof the exi stin

g media n *** an d is a cl ai m f or defectiv

e desi gn i n a di ff erent form .” O’Brien , 28 5 I ll. App. 3d at 870, 674 N.E. 2d at 933. Citgo , 368 Il

l . App. 3d 60 3, 858 N .E.2d 563 , involv ed a f i re tha t broke out at a r

ef ine ry . The t hird- par t y plaintiff in Citgo attem pted to im

pose l i ab il ity u pon de f en dan t Unoca l und er a negligenc e t heo ry ar ising fro m Unoc al’s du t y to inspec t and maint ain the re finery’s piping equi pme nt, which Un

ocal had i nstal led. In its com

pla in t, t he thi rd-party pla

in tif f al leged that Uno cal’s ne gligence in “inspect ion, maintena nce, and o per at ion o f the re finery’s piping equi pm en t” wasa con

trib uting c aus e of

the a cci den t. Citgo , 368 Ill . App. 3d at 604, 858 N.E .2d at 564. The pipes a

t issue we re all eged to have bee

n i nstal led when the refi nery was constructed,
ove r t en year s befo re t he fili ng o f the co mplaint. Bec aus e o f this fact , t he co ur t re fused t o g ive effect to the t heor y upon which the third- part y complai nt was framed, namel

y, breach of Unoc al’s duty to inspect and m

ai ntain , in stead fi

ndi ng that the cl ai

ms agai nst Unocal

were tim e-barred under the construction statute o f repose. Al though the court did n

ot clearly del in eate the scope of i ts holdi ng, i ts broad lan

guage would see

m to encom

pass an y c ase whe

re defen dant designed t he syst em at issue a nd t he har m to plaint iff was in some w ay tr ace able t o a flaw in tha t des ign,
even w hen plaint iff

did no t allege fau lt in t he de sign but ra t her in some o t her asp ect of t he de fen da nt ’s ac t ivit ies t ha t is no t inc lud ed in t he lan gu ag e o f se ct io n 1 3- 21 4( b)
. T he co ur t s in O’Brien and Citgo are cl ai mi ng, i n ef fect, that they wi

ll not permi

t t he other capaci

ties i n wh ic h the instal l er s erv ed to becom e th e veh i cl e to e l im ina te th e p rotecti on of

f ered by the sta tute ofNo. 1-06- 3309

-11-

repose. Fo r t he r eas ons t hat follow , w e must give de fere nce t o t he de cision in MBA Enterprises , notwithst andi

ng the policy

arguments raised i

n the Fi rst District cases. 2. A cti vi ty -Sta tus Di sti ncti on As no t ed in MBA Enterprises , the statut e of repose has cle arly been hel d to prot ect acti vi ty ra ther than status. MBA Enterprises , 307 Il l . App. 3d a

t 287, 717 N.E.2d 8 49. Co nseq uent ly, one must loo k t o t he sp ecific act ivity in quest ion r at her t han t he fact t hat t he
ne gl i gen ce i n i nspecti on wa s pe rpetrated by the s am e party that i ns talled the system

in questi on. No t o nly is t his in t er pr et at io n in line wit h t he lan gu ag e o f t he st at ut e, bu t it is s up po r t ed by amp le case l aw. In t he s emina l ca se o f Skinner , our supreme court made cl ear that the stat ute of repose, for co nst itu t ional pu rp os es, must co nsider t he ac t ivity involved r at her t han t he st at us o f the def en dan t. Skinner v. Anderson , 3 8 I ll. 2d 4 55, 459 , 2 31 N .E .2 d 58 8, 590 -9 1 ( 196 7) . T he versi on of the statute o f repose that exi sted at t he tim e, unl ike our current version, protect ed pa rties ba se d on

the i r s tatus as de si gn prof es si ona l s: it ap pl i ed to “ any person perf

orm ing or furnishing t he de sign, planning, sup er vision o f co nst ru ct ion o r c ons t ru ct ion o f such impr ove ment to real property.” Il

l. Rev . Stat ., ch. 83, par. 24f (1965) (emphasi s added). The Skinner court found this status-based di stin ction to be arbi

trary and thus un

constitutional , because i

t pro tected
en titi es ra ther than the speci f i c ac tiv itie s pe rf ormed by those e nti tie s. Skinner , 38 Ill . 2d at 459, 231 N.E.2d at 590-91. Th e court expl

ai ned: “[T]he statute single s out t he arch itect and the contractor, and grants them im mun ity . ***No. 1-06- 3309

-12-

The ar bitr ar y qualit y of t he st at ut e clea rly app ear s whe n we c ons ider t hat ar chite ct s and
con tractors a re n ot the onl y pers ons wh ose negl i ge nc e i n th e c onstruc ti on of

a b ui l di ng or ot her i mprovem ent ma y c ause dam

age to pro perty or in

jury to persons.” Skinner , 38 I ll. 2d at 460, 231 N.E .2d at 591. The Skinner co ur t t hen we nt on t o s t at e t hat t he st at ut e wo uld o nly reaso nably fulf ill t he legislat ive pur po se be hind its e nact ment if “t he bene fits co nferr ed u po n [a rc hitec t s and contracto rs] are not denied to ot hers si mi la rly si tuated. ” Skinner , 38 Ill . 2d at 461, 231 N. E.2d at 591. It explai

ned that i t was irrational

for an arch

itect or a contr actor t o receive i mm uni ty unde r t he st at ut e o f r ep o se fo rpe r fo r ming an ac t io n w hile a no t he rpa r t y pe r fo r ming t he ex ac t sa me action woul

d not b e protected

und er the statute. Skinner , 38 Ill . 2d at 460, 231 N. E.2d at 591. It was in response to t he Skinner de ci si on th at th e l eg i sl ature r e-d raf ted the con structi

on statut e of repose to creat e the versi on that exi sts to day . See State Fa rm Mutual Aut omobile Insurance Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co. , 83 4 F
. Su pp 10 52 , 10 58 ( C. D. I ll. 1 99 3)
. Co nse qu en t ly, in Hellmuth , our supreme court vali dated the current versi on of the statute o f repose, whi ch l ooked t o s pec ifi c ac t ivity rat her t han t he st at us o f the act or in defining the sco pe o f pro t ect ion u nder t he statute. Hellmuth , 114 Ill . 2d 252, 500 N.E. 2d 34. The court first rei terat ed the Skinner cou rt ’s
con cl us i on th at th e ol d ver si on of th e s tatu te w asi rra ti on al b ec au se it tre ate d d ef

en da n ts dif feren tly based on thei

r status, even i

f the suits agai

nst them were otherwise i

dentic al . It t hen
we nt o n t o st at e: “T he cu r r en t st at ut e, ho we ve r , do es no t ex clu de pe r so ns b as ed up o n t he ir status. It prot ects, on its f ace, any one who engages

in the enum erated activities . This

court has gi ve n p arti cu l ar d ef ere nc e to l eg i sl ati ve cl as si f i ca ti ons wh en thos e c l as si

f i ca ti ons are ba se d up onNo. 1-06- 3309

-13-

activ iti es rather than status.” Hellmuth , 11 4 I ll. 2 d a t 26 1, 50 0 N
. E . 2d at 37
. Ba se d u po n t his int er pr et at io n, t he co ur t fo un d t he st at ut e t o be ne it he run r ea so na ble no rar bit r ar y and t hu s u ph eld i ts constituti

onal ity. Hellmuth , 114 Ill . 2d at 263, 500 N. E.2d at 38. This ac t ivity-st at us d istinct ion wa s ap plied by t he T hird D istr ict in Krueger . Krueger, 283 Ill. App . 3 d 30 0, 669 N. E. 2d 9 47. In Krueger, p laintiff sued an as best os manufact ur er , a lleging tha t he r de ce as ed

hu sb an d s uf f ered i nj ury asa re su l t of be ing ex pos ed to as be stosem

an ati ng f rom product s sold an

d in stall ed by the ma nuf acturer. T he m

anuf acturer argued t hat it was protected from al l l ia bi li ty by the construction statut e of repose, si nce the products at issue h ad been in stall ed over ten years ago. The court rejected this cl ai m, statin g: “A lthough s ection 13-214(b) cl early appl ie s to a part y w

ho in stalls an im provemen t, sales an d distributi on are not among the acti vi ties protected by the statute. *** [It] only

appl ie s to clai ms aris in g out of the construction related activi ties un dertaken by the ma nuf acturer o r sel

le r.” Krueger

, 283 Ill . App. 3d at 304, 669 N.E .2d at 950. Acco rd ingly, the co ur t held t hat plaint iff ’s sa les-r elat ed c laims were not affect ed by t he
co nst ru ct ion st at ut e o f rep os e, and it re ver sed t he t rial co ur t ’s gr ant of su mmary judgment for t he
man uf acture r. Krueger

, 283 Ill . App. 3d at 304, 669 N.E .2d at 950. I n concurri ng, Justice Sl ater
ex plai ned th at “ [s ]uch a

hol di ng i s c onsi stent with th

e i de a th at a ppl i ca ti on of the sta tute d oes not depend on a perso n’s status as a seller, manufact ur er or dist ribut or , bu t inste ad a pplies t o t he activiti es of desi

gn, pl ann in g, supervi sion, observation, m anagem ent or construct ion.” Krueger, 283 Ill . App. 3d at 306-07, 669 N.E .2d at 952 (Slater, J., concurrin g), citin g Hellmuth , 114 Ill . 2d 252, 500 N.E.2d 34.No. 1-06- 3309

-14-

The dist inctio n bet wee n act ivity and st at us a rt iculat ed in Hellmuth and a pplied in Krueger
was furt her re co gnized by the F irst Dist rict in Risch , w hich res t at ed t he fact t hat it is t he def en dan t’s a ctivi ty w hi ch control s. Risch v. Paul J. Krez Co. , 287 Ill . App. 3d 194, 678 N.E.2d 44 ( 199 7) . I n Risch , p laintiff sou ght t o s ue a co nt ra ct or who was hired t o inst all insulatio n; h owev er , pl

ai n tif f su ed th e c ontractor

n ot i n h i s c ap ac ity

asth e i n sta ller , but i n h i s c ap ac ity

asits sel le r. The court acknowl

edged the val

idi ty of thi s di stin

ction, ci ting Krueger f

or the p ropos iti on that “the construction statut e of repose does not bar a plai ntif f’ s sui t again st a defen

dant for that dis crete por tion of the def endan t’s activ iti es not enum

erated in the

statut e.” Risch , 287 Ill . App. 3d at 198, 678 N.E .2d at 46, citing Krueger, 283 Il l . App. 3d 300, 669 N .E.2d 947 . Howev er, the court went on to fin

d in that case that the defen

dant did n ot engage i

n sal es activ iti es that
we r e in de pe nd en t fr o m it s p er fo r man ce as t he insu lat io n ins t alle rwh en it ch ar ge d fo rmat er ials and l abor; rather, the charges f or materials and l

abor were me

rely the me ans b

y w hi ch i t charged f or itsins tall ati ons. N

ev erthel ess , Risch em

pha si zed that un der Hellmuth , t he fo cu s o f an alys is
wa s on de f en da nt’ s a cti vi ti es , an d th at s ep ara

te s al es ac ti vi ti es cou l d there

f ore be a sou rce of l i ab il i ty e ven f or an i ns tal l er. Risch , 28 7 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 198 , 67 8 N .E.2 d a

t 46. See al so Adcock , 27 4 I ll. A pp . 3d at 52 3, 65 4 N
. E . 2d at 63 4 ( find ing t ha t “[ m]e r e la be ls a r e n o t dis po sit ive ” in determi ni ng wh ether activ

ity fal ls withi n statute o f repose an

d therefore rej ectin

g argumen

t based on def en dan t’s s tatus). The Uni ted St ates Dis trict Court li kewi se appl

ied the activ

ity-status distin

ction unde

r Illinois law in W.R. Grace , 8 34 F .S upp at 106 0. The co ur t in W.R. Grace fou nd t hat unde r t he langua ge o f the st at ut e o f rep os e, as w ell as und er t he de cision in Hellmuth , “m an uf acture rsNo. 1-06- 3309

-15-

rec ei ve prote cti on f rom the sta tute of rep ose onl y if the y are su ed f or on -s ite c onstruc ti on activ iti es.” W.R. Grace , 83 4 F
. Su pp at 10 60
. T hu s, t he co ur t he ld t ha t pla int iff’s cla ims regardin g defen dant’s m anuf acturing activi

ties were n

ot barred by

the statut e of repose, even though defen

dant al so conducted construct ion a ctivi ties that would presum

abl y b e prot ected und er the statute. W.R. Grace , 834 F.Supp at 1060. T he r ea so ning o f t he fo r eg o ing de cis io ns, in a pp lying t he an alys is o f o ur su pr eme co ur t in Skinner and Hellmuth , compel s the concl usion that, even though a desi gn profess iona

l rece iv es the prote cti on of the sta tute of rep ose f or de si gn an d i nstal l ati on- rel ate d acti vi ti es , i t doe s n ot receive protection for other activi ties that are not withi

n the purvi

ew of the statute. S uch other activ iti es i ncl ude m anuf acturing an

d sal es, as wel l a s breach

of duty b y one who undertakes inspec t ion and maintena nce d ut ies, s uch a s t hos e involved in MBA E nterprises as w ell as in the
ca se at b ar. Th at i s, i

f an instal l er of an im prov em en t to rea l prop erty vi ol ate s a duty arisi ng f rom i ts a cti vi ty as an ins pe ctor, rath

er th an its a cti vi ty asan instal ler, the n i t ca n b e h el d l i able f or breach of that duty regardless of the s tatut e of repose. See Hellmuth , 114 Ill . 2d at 261, 500 N.E .2d at 37; Risch , 28 7 I ll. A pp . 3d at 19 8, 67 8 N
. E . 2d at 46
. T o ho ld o t he r wis e w o uld
esse nt ially

dilut e and aband on t he ana lysi s in Skinner and Hellmuth wh i ch ap pl i es the sta tute of repose to the speci

fi c acts of the def

endan t rat her than h

is status. See Skinner , 38 Ill . 2d at 460, 231 N.E .2d at 591 ; Hellmuth , 114 Ill . 2d at 261, 500 N. E.2d at 37. I n t he ca se at ha nd , t he r e c an be no qu es t io n t ha t Co m Ed , jus t like t he de fen da nt in MBA Enterprises , h ad

a s pe ci f i c d uty to m ai n tai n its equ i pm en t. In poi n t of f ac t, w e n ote th at th i s d utyNo. 1-06- 3309

2 Durin g oral argum

ent, in answer to in

quiry from the ben ch, nei ther of the parties submitt ed t hat Co m Ed’s dut ies t o insp ect and maint ain the equ ipment der ived fro m any con tractu al agre em en t. -16- de r ive d fr o m it s c ap ac it y as t he po we rsu pp lier an d n o t fr o m it s s t at us as inst alle ro f t he sys t em. 2 I t is w ell e st ab lishe d t ha t po we rsu pp lier s ha ve an o ng o ing du t y t o insp ec t an d ma int ain the e qui pm en t through wh i ch that powe

r i s tran sm

itted. Merlo v. Public Service Co. , 38 1 I ll. 300 , 3 12, 45 N .E .2 d 66 5, 673 (1 942 ) ( spe aking o f the “req uire d ca re in the t ra nsmission and di stri bu ti on of el ec tric c urr

en t”);se e a l so O’Hara v. Central Illinois Light Co. , 319 Ill . App. 336, 341 , 49 N.E .2d 274 , 27 5 (1 943 ); Le Maitre v. Union Electric Pow er Co. , 331 Ill . App. 270, 273, 73 N. E.2 d 1 25 , 127 ( 19 47 ) (d ef en da n t pu b l i c util ity “ re qu i re d to ex erci se

re as on able c are” in

its provisi on of el ectri ci ty). In O’Hara , the c our

t f oun d that th e def en da n t pow er com pa n y , b y v i rtu e of its d uty to
ma in tain a nd i nspect i ts equipm ent, would be l

ia bl e for negl ige nce f or im properly ma in taini ng a resistor wh

i ch woul d properl y l im it the h i gh v oltag e en teri ng a hous e. O’Hara , 319 Ill . App. at 34 1- 42 , 49 N. E . 2d at 27 5. Lik ew ise , if Rya n is c o r r ec t in his alle ga t io n t ha t Co m Ed ne glig en t ly failed t o maint ain the re sist or leading t o t he circ uit bre ake r t hat Ryan wa s fixing, t hus t ra nsmitt ing a p o we rflo w h un dr ed s o f t imes in e xc es s o f t he pr o pe ramo un t – b r ea ch ing a d ut y wh ich is ind ep en de nt fr o m it s s t at us as t he o r igin al ins t alle ro f t he eq uip men t in q ue st io n – t he n it co uld not loo k t o t he co nst ru ct ion st at ut e o f rep os e fo r p ro t ect ion. Ind eed , t he pa rt ies at or al arg ument did no t dispu t e t he fact t hat if a third -p ar t y pow er sup plier w ho w as no t involved in t he insta llatio n of t he po wer syst em co mmi t t ed ne gligence in the d elivery o f tha t po wer , it co uld beNo. 1-06- 3309

-17-

held liable for bre ach o f tha t indepe ndent dut y and wo uld r ece ive no p ro t ect ion fro m the construction statut e of repose. We no t e t hat t he First Dist rict cas es c ited by Com E d cu rso rily ackno wledg e t hat t he statute of repose protects ab

il ity, n ot status, y

et non e of them purs ue the i

nqu i ry as to wh ethe r a defend ant ’s ac t ivities involving indep ende nt dut ies t o insp ect and maint ain may be pre clude d by the sta tute of rep ose . In ste ad , th ey

l ook on l y to the f ac t tha t a s ui t f or neg l i ge nt i ns pe cti on or mai nte na nc e m ay be us ed as an ex pe di en t to ove rcom e th e p rotecti on of

the sta tute of rep ose f or defec t s in desig n and inst allatio n. T hese First Dist rict dec isions r eflect a co ncer n t hat by suppl yi ng power and thus en

genderi ng a duty to in spect and m

ai ntain their equi

pme nt, power
co mpanies may st rip t hemselves o f the pr ot ect ion t hey wo uld o t her wise e njoy as inst allers a nd designers un

der the statut e of repose. However, we are unable to surrender to such poli cy co ncer ns in the face o f the explicit lang uag e o f the st at ut e as well as t he ana lysi s and interpretati on gi

ve n un der Skinner , Hellmuth , and Risch – which t he First Dist rict canno t and does not purpo rt t o repudiate. See Skinner , 38 Ill . 2d 455, 231 N.E. 2d 588; Hellmuth , 114 Ill . 2d 252 , 50 0 N. E. 2d 3 4; Risch , 287 Il l . App. 3d 19 4, 678 N .E.2d 44. T he theory of recove

ry predica ted upon Com Ed’s al

leged fai lure to disc over and repai r defects i n i ts power system

setup must be given it s du e as an ac t ivity tha t is not pr ot ect ed by t he st at ut e o f rep os e, not wit hst anding Co m Ed ’s st at us as an inst alle ro f eq uip men t . E xt en din g t ha t pr o t ec t io n t o su ch ne glig en ce wo uld
re quir e legislat ive initiat ive co nso nant wit h t he de cisions of o ur sup re me co ur t in Skinner and Hellmuth
. T hu s, we co nc ur wit h t he ho ldin g o f t he T hir d D ist r ict in MBA E nterprises in

fi ndi ng thatNo. 1-06- 3309

-18-

Ry an ’s mai nte na nc e-r el ate d c l ai m s d o not f

al l wi thi n th e s cop e of

the con structi

on statute of repose as def ine d by the l egi slature, a

nd th us we reverse the c i rcui t court’s gran

t of su m mary judgm ent to Co m Ed. Reve rse d and re manded for pr oc eed ings no t incons iste nt wit h t his op inion. McN ULTY an d O’ MA

LL EY, JJ ., concur.No. 1-06- 3309

-19- REPORTER O F DECISIO NS - ILLINOI S APP ELLATE COURT

(Front S heet to be Attached to Ea ch Case) Pleas e us e t he f oll owing f orm Dan

i el Ryan , Pl ai

nti f f -Appel l an t,
v. Co mmo nw ea lt h E di so n C o mp an y,

Defe ndan t-Appell ee, High V oltag e Ma

intenance C orp., De f en da n t.
Doc ke t No. COURT Opin ion F il ed No. 1-06-3309 Ap pe llat e C o ur t o f I llino is Fi rst Di strict, SIXTH

Di vi si on March 28, 2008 (Gi ve m onth, d ay an d year)
JUSTIC ES JUSTICE JO SEPH GORDON DELIVEREDTHE OPINION OF THE COURT: McN ul ty a nd O ’M al ley , JJ. , concur. APP EAL fr om t he Ci rcuit Court of

Cook County; the Hon___ Judge Presi

din g. Lower Court and Tri al Judge(s ) in

form indi cated i n m argi n: Ap pe al f r o m t he Cir cu it Co ur t o f Co o k C o un t y. The Hon. Bi

ll Tay l or Judge Presi

din g.

APPELL ANTS: John Doe, of Ch

ic ago In di

ca te i f attorn ey rep res en ts A PPELL ANTS or A

PPELL EES a nd incl ude attorn ey s of counsel . Indic ate the word NONE if n ot represented. A PP EL LA NT : D an i el B. Ma l on e, The H ea

l y La w F i rm, 11 1 W

es t W as h in gton

Street, Su

ite 1425, Chi cago, Ill in ois 60602 For APPEL

LEES, Sm ith a nd Sm i th of Chi cago APPELLEES: Davi d E. Neumei ster, Jenni

fer L. Medenwal

d, Querrey &

Harrow, Lt d., 175 West Jackson B lv

d., Suite 1600, Chi

cago, IL 60604No. 1-06- 3309

-20- Add attorney

s f or 3rd pa rty ap pe ll an ts a nd /or appell ees.