J-S17042-23

2023 PA Super 202

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

ZAVION TAVARIS LITTLE

Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 29 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered December 22, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-07-CR-0001071-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.: FILED: October 13, 2023

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals1from the order 

entered in the Blair County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion 

of Appellee, Zavion Tavaris Little, for writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the 

charge against Appellee of conspiracy to commit robbery. We affirm.

In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural 

history of this case as follows. 

On or about May 28, 2022, the 16-year-old [Appellee] was 

charged as an adult in Blair County...with, in relevant part, 

Count 1, Conspiracy to Commit Robbery—Inflict Serious 

Bodily Injury, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 903(a), and Count 13, 

Escape, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5121(a).1 On or about June 7, 

2022, and June 15, 2022[,] a preliminary hearing was held. 

Following conclusion of the hearing the charges were bound 

over to the Blair County Court of Common Pleas for further 

disposition. On or about June 23, 2022, [Appellee] filed a 

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth certified in its notice of appeal that the order appealed 

from will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution, in accordance 

with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).
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pleading titled “Emergency Habeas Corpus for Lack of 

jurisdiction.” The court ordered the parties to submit 

memoranda of law in advance of their position. In his 

Memorandum of Law, [Appellee] argued that the 

Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case of 

Conspiracy to Commit Robbery or of Escape in the 

jurisdiction of Blair County, Pennsylvania.[2] 

1 [Appellee] was also charged with other crimes...: 

Count 2, Receiving Stolen Property, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 

3925(a), Count 3, Fleeing or Attempting to Elude 

Officer, 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3733(a), Count 4, Possessing 

Instruments of Crime, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § [9]07(a), 

Count 5, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2705, Counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, 

traffic violation summaries.

* * *

[The Commonwealth introduced the following 

testimony/evidence at the preliminary hearing.] Trooper 

Eric Griswold of the Pennsylvania State Police testified that 

he was working an overtime shift on May 28, 2022 from 

7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., on I-99 at the Kettle Road 

underpass, where he was using radar and watching

southbound traffic. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., Griswold 

noticed a Kia Sorrento traveling at 93 mph in a 70 mph zone. 

He pulled out and waited until he got close enough to 

observe the license plate. At that point he could see it was 

a New York license plate. He attempted to effectuate a 

traffic stop for the speeding violation. Despite the Trooper 

using his vehicle’s emergency lights, the Sorrento did not 

stop along the interstate, and instead traveled to the 17th

Street exit farther south near Altoona. The Sorrento exited 

at 17th Street and traveled towards the City of Altoona 

before turning right onto Valley View Blvd. During the 

pursuit, the Trooper followed directly behind the Sorrento, 

which came to a stop on the right shoulder of the roadway 

____________________________________________

2 The parties agree that given Appellee’s age, the charge of conspiracy to 

commit robbery was the only offense that placed Appellee’s case before the 

criminal division of the Blair County Court of Common Pleas rather than in the 

juvenile division. 
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in the area of 16th Street.

As the Sorrento came to a stop, Griswold got out of his 

vehicle and commanded the driver of the Sorrento to open 

the window and show his hands. The driver initially 

complied, and Griswold was able to see that the driver was

wearing a dark T-shirt. Griswold initially could not see 

whether or not there were other occupants in the vehicle, 

and after the driver stuck his hands out of the window, 

Griswold approached the vehicle. As he approached, the 

driver “put his hands back in and took off, continuing 

traveling north on Valley View Boulevard.” Griswold 

pursued the Sorrento for “approximately 12-13 miles.” 

During the pursuant, Griswold saw the Sorrento “blow 

through red lights, run people off the road, travel an 

excessive speed of 130 miles an hour, weaving in and out 

of traffic causing danger to all motorists that were on the

roadway.” The driver attempted to enter the I-99 ramp at 

the Tipton/Grazierville exit, and was unable to negotiate a 

curve and crashed into a grassy median. After the crash, 

Griswold approached the Sorrento to determine whether the 

occupant or occupants were injured; two black males exited 

the vehicle and got on the ground at the trooper’s 

command. Griswold was unable to see the occupants’ faces 

because they were wearing masks, with the driver wearing 

a black mask and the passenger wearing a blue camouflage 

mask. Griswold also described the clothing the two 

occupants were wearing, with the driver wearing a black Tshirt with a Chicago Bulls 23 insignia and the passenger 

wearing a black sweatshirt with Champion across the back.

Griswold provided the occupants with Miranda[3] warnings, 

and [Appellee] agreed to speak with him. [Appellee’s] mask 

was removed and he identified himself[.] [Appellee] told 

the trooper he had stolen the Kia Sorrento he had been 

driving from a driveway at a house near a gas station in New 

York or just inside Pennsylvania. He said that he had 

previously driven another vehicle in New York, the latter of 

which he claimed to have had permission to drive.

[Appellee] told Griswold that “...the first vehicle that he had 

____________________________________________

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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driven to that location had [run] out of gas and therefore 

they needed another vehicle.” Trooper Griswold was asked, 

“Did [Appellee] tell you in his statement to you why he and 

his co-defendant decided to steal the second vehicle in 

Ellicottville [New York]?” He replied, “I actually asked him 

why he wouldn’t have just stolen gas and he wasn’t really 

able to—he just told me he didn’t—he wasn’t able to get me 

a legitimate reason why he stole a vehicle rather than steal 

gas.” The trooper found a black machete located on the 

driver’s side floorboard. [Appellee] denied it was his. To 

the Trooper’s knowledge, [Appellee] did not steal a car in 

Pennsylvania or rob a person in Pennsylvania. 

Trooper Joseph Fay testified that he was on patrol at the 

time of the incident, and that he “traveled parallel with 

Griswold on the interstate and Route 220 until the point 

where that vehicle crashed.” When [Appellee] was 

transported to UPMC Altoona via ambulance, Trooper Fay

followed. At the hospital, Fay spoke with [Appellee], who 

admitted that he and his co-defendant had robbed an 

individual in New York. [Appellee] also told the trooper that 

he and his co-defendant had worn masks during the 

robbery, and that it was their intention to take the robbery 

victim’s car so they could travel to North or South Carolina. 

[Appellee] stated that the pair had taken a second vehicle 

with keys in it when the first vehicle had run out of gas. He 

told the trooper he was traveling through Pennsylvania to 

get to the Carolinas. To the Trooper’s knowledge he did not 

commit a robbery in Pennsylvania. 

* * *

Blake Petty testified that he was a criminal investigator from 

Rochester, New York, assigned to investigate a “knife point 

car-jacking” that had occurred in the City of Rochester on 

May 27, 2022. Petty testified that he and his partner 

responded to the area at around 10:00 p.m. and that the 

victim in that incident, Daryl Coley, had been stabbed 

“multiple times in the back and lower leg.” The robbery

victim was not able to identify his assailants. The victim 

told Petty and his partner that his vehicle, a 2006 Toyota 

Camry, had been stolen. The New York investigators had 

retrieved surveillance video, time-stamped 9:43 p.m. on 

May 27, 2022, and were able to see the victim leave Kandi’s 
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Bar in Rochester, New York, as well as two individuals 

walking behind him who later “attacked” him in a parking 

lot around the corner. Petty was able to identify items of

clothing the individuals were wearing, including a black 

Champion style sweatshirt. 

Petty testified that the stolen Camry was recovered the 

following day, May 28, 2022, around 7:00 p.m. at a Kwik 

Fill gas station in Ellicottville, New York. Investigators 

recovered a “small folding silver bladed knife” from “the 

driver’s side floorboard.” The knife appeared “to have blood 

on the blade,” and was collected by law enforcement and a 

sample was submitted for DNA testing. Petty reviewed 

surveillance video from Ellicottville, which showed “two 

individuals getting out of Mr. Coley’s 2006 Camry with the 

same license plate. It shows the two males getting out, one 

of which has the same—appearing the same black embossed 

Champion sweatshirt and the other male wearing a black Tshirt with a Bulls 23 Michael Jordan T-shirt.” They first 

parked in front of one of the gas pumps and later pulled the 

car into a parking spot. Both individuals went into the store. 

There was additional surveillance footage from inside the 

store. It depicted both males inside the store, one wearing 

the black Champion sweatshirt, and the other wearing a

black T-shirt with the Bulls logo basketball team with the 

number 23 on the front. Petty was not able to see the face 

of either suspect in the surveillance footage because they 

are both wearing masks. One was wearing a black mask

and one was wearing a blue camouflage style mask. They 

entered and left the store without incident.

Petty testified that the two individuals did not rob the gas 

station attendant for money or gas or a vehicle, nor accost 

anyone outside the gas station. Petty identified a blue 

camouflage ski mask that was retrieved by Pennsylvania 

State Police following the Blair County crash as being 

consistent with the ski mask one of the individuals was 

wearing in surveillance footage from New York.

Hollie Chamberlain, a resident of Ellicottville, New York, 

testified at the preliminary hearing that she lives near the 

Kwik Fill gas station and that her vehicle, a Kia Sorrento with 

New York license plates, had been stolen from outside her 

residence on the evening of May 27, 2022. Chamberlain 
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testified that her vehicle had been unlocked and undamaged 

when she parked it, and that her keys were in the car’s 

center console. Her father called her in the morning when 

he noticed the car missing from her driveway. She had not 

given [Appellee] or anyone permission to use her vehicle. 

The vehicle was not taken from her by force.

She testified that neither she nor anyone she resides with 

or associates with keeps knives in her car, and that she did 

not have a knife in her vehicle when she last parked it. She 

was shown Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 which is

characterized in the transcript as a photograph of a knife; 

she testified she had never seen that knife before. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/9/23, at 1-7) (internal citations omitted). 

On December 22, 2022, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion for 

writ of habeas corpus for the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery and 

denied the motion with respect to the escape charge. The Commonwealth 

filed a timely notice of appeal per Rule 311(d) on January 6, 2023. On January 

17, 2023, the court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On February 

6, 2023, the Commonwealth timely complied.

The Commonwealth raises the following issues on appeal:4

1) Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting the

petition for writ of habeas corpus in finding that the

Commonwealth failed to meet its prima facie burden of proof 

on the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery?

2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining the

Commonwealth had not met its prima facie burden of proof

on the conspiracy to commit robbery charge when the trial

court had previously accepted a factual basis for the co-

____________________________________________

4 Appellee has not filed a responsive brief.
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defendant’s juvenile court admission to conspiracy to

commit robbery?

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 6).

“In reviewing a trial court’s order granting a defendant’s petition for writ 

of habeas corpus, we must generally consider whether the record supports 

the trial court’s findings, and whether the inferences and legal conclusions 

drawn from those findings are free from error.” Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 

172 A.3d 5, 10 (Pa.Super. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted). Further, “the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the 

Commonwealth’s prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of law,” 

and the appellate court’s review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Karetny, 

583 Pa. 514, 528, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (2005).

In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that the testimony elicited 

at the preliminary hearing demonstrates that Appellee and his co-defendant 

robbed someone, and intended to continue robbing people and stealing 

vehicles, to facilitate a drive to North or South Carolina. The Commonwealth 

asserts it presented prima facie evidence that the intended scope of the 

conspiracy was to steal cars (rather than gasoline) from the time Appellee and 

his co-defendant left New York until they reached the Carolinas. The 

Commonwealth highlights the following evidence adduced at the preliminary 

hearing: Appellee’s statement that the pair intended to travel to the Carolinas 

and stole another vehicle when the first vehicle ran out of gas; the short period 

of time between the robbery and the car thefts in New York and the crash in 
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Blair County; the presence of the machete in the driver’s floorboard of the 

wrecked Kia Sorrento as well as the knife found on the driver’s side floorboard 

of the Toyota Camry stolen in the New York knifepoint robbery; and Appellee’s 

false statement to the police about having permission to drive the Camry. The 

Commonwealth maintains that these pieces of evidence collectively show that

Appellee and his co-defendant intended to commit armed robbery, if 

necessary, to steal vehicles in furtherance of their plan to get to the Carolinas. 

The Commonwealth submits it produced prima facie evidence that 

Appellee and his co-defendant were working together in furtherance of their 

conspiracy to commit robbery from its inception in New York until its defeat in 

Blair County. The Commonwealth claims that Appellee articulated that his 

plan was to drive to the Carolinas with his co-defendant but the two had no 

way to get there. The Commonwealth posits that the two worked in concert 

to rob the owner of a 2006 Camry so they could steal his vehicle. The 

Commonwealth emphasizes that Appellee and his co-defendant were seen on 

surveillance video in New York wearing the same clothing they wore when 

apprehended, they both wore ski masks to conceal their identities, and they 

were both present in the Kia Sorrento when it crashed. 

The Commonwealth further contends that Appellee lied to Trooper 

Griswold about having permission to drive the stolen Toyota Camry in New 

York. The Commonwealth maintains that Appellee told Trooper Fay that 

Appellee and his co-defendant decided to visit his father in one of the Carolinas 
J-S17042-23

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but had no means to get there. The Commonwealth claims that Appellee 

admitted to Trooper Fay that Appellee and his co-defendant saw an individual 

on the street in New York, approached him, Appellee acted like he had a 

firearm, and robbed the individual. Appellee and his co-defendant then drove 

the stolen vehicle until it ran out of gas, at which point they stole a second 

vehicle. The Commonwealth emphasizes that Appellee admitted that he and 

his co-defendant wore masks to hide their identities. The Commonwealth 

emphasizes that the crimes in New York occurred within hours of the crash of 

the stolen Kia Sorrento in Pennsylvania. 

Based on these facts, the Commonwealth insists the conspiracy to 

commit robbery lasted from its inception in New York until the vehicle crash 

in Blair County. The Commonwealth submits that the presence and use of ski 

masks, the machete found in the Kia Sorrento, and Appellee’s statements that 

he and his co-defendant stole cars rather than gas in their effort to get to the 

Carolinas establish an overt act that the conspiracy was in effect as Appellee 

and his co-defendant traveled through Blair County. Under these 

circumstances, the Commonwealth submits that it presented prima facie

evidence of Appellee and his co-defendant’s conspiracy to commit robbery 

which began in New York and continued until the conspiracy was defeated by 

the vehicle crash in Blair County. The Commonwealth concludes that the trial 

court erred in granting Appellee’s motion for writ of habeas corpus, and this 

Court must grant relief. We disagree. 
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“The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to avoid the incarceration or 

trial of a defendant unless there is sufficient evidence to establish a crime was 

committed and the probability the defendant could be connected with the 

crime.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 849 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(internal citation omitted). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D) (stating issuing 

authority shall determine from evidence presented at preliminary hearing 

whether there is prima facie case that (1) offense has been committed; and 

(2) defendant has committed it). 

The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it 

produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant 

the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury. [T]he 

Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard 

requires evidence of the existence of each and every 

element of the crime charged. Moreover, the weight and 

credibility of the evidence are not factors at this stage, and 

the Commonwealth need only demonstrate sufficient 

probable cause to believe the person charged has 

committed the offense. Inferences reasonably drawn from 

the evidence of record which would support a verdict of 

guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read 

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth’s case.

Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Pa.Super. 2001) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Following a preliminary hearing, 

A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for 

testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence 

to establish a prima facie case. To demonstrate that a prima 

facie case exists, the Commonwealth must produce 

evidence of every material element of the charged 

offense(s) as well as the defendant’s complicity therein. To 

meet its burden, the Commonwealth may utilize the
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evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and also may 

submit additional proof.

Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2016) (en 

banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also 

Commonwealth v. Predmore, 199 A.3d 925 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 652 Pa. 301, 208 A.3d 459 (2019) (reiterating that pretrial 

motion for writ of habeas corpus is appropriate method for defendant to test 

whether Commonwealth has established prima facie case; Commonwealth is 

entitled to rely on evidence presented at preliminary hearing when responding 

to pretrial motion for writ of habeas corpus). 

The Crimes Code defines the offenses of conspiracy and robbery, in 

relevant part, as follows:

§ 903. Criminal conspiracy

(a) Definition of conspiracy.—A person is guilty with 

another person or persons to commit a crime if with the 

intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or 

one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to 

commit such crime; or 

(2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the 

planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or 

solicitation to commit such crime.

* * *

(e) Overt act.—No person may be convicted of conspiracy 

to commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuance of such 

conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been done by him 

or by a person with whom he conspired.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a), (e).

§ 3701. Robbery

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 

committing a theft, he:

(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i). 

Regarding conspiracy, this Court has explained:

To sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the 

Commonwealth must establish that the defendant (1) 

entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful 

act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared 

criminal intent and (3) an overt act was done in furtherance 

of the conspiracy. This overt act need not be committed by 

the defendant; it need only be committed by a coconspirator. 

Proof of a conspiracy is almost always extracted from 

circumstantial evidence. The Commonwealth may present 

a web of evidence linking the defendant to the conspiracy 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence must, however, 

rise above mere suspicion or possibility of guilty collusion.

Mere association, presence at the scene, or knowledge of 

the crime is insufficient; the Commonwealth must prove 

that the defendant became an active participant in the 

criminal enterprise and that he had knowledge of the 

conspiratorial agreement.

Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal 

citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). 

“[A] prosecution for criminal conspiracy may be brought in any county 

where the unlawful combination was formed, or in any county where an overt 
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act was committed by any of the conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful 

combination.” Commonwealth v. Gross, 627 Pa. 383, 393, 101 A.3d 28, 

34 (2014) (internal citation omitted). “The duration of a conspiracy depends 

upon the facts of the particular case, that is, it depends upon the scope of the 

duration of the agreement entered into by its members.” Id. at 394, 101 A.3d 

at 34 (internal citation omitted).

Instantly, Appellee filed a motion for writ of habeas corpus on the charge 

of conspiracy to commit robbery. In his motion, Appellee claimed the 

Commonwealth presented insufficient prima facie evidence at the preliminary 

hearing that Appellee and his co-defendant conspired to commit robbery (as 

opposed to theft) in Blair County, Pennsylvania. The trial court granted 

Appellee’s motion for writ of habeas corpus, reasoning as follows:

The testimony from the preliminary hearing shows that the 

two defendants worked in concert in New York to rob the 

owner of a 2006 Camry. They were seen on surveillance 

video together in New York wearing the same clothing they 

wore when apprehended, and they both wore ski masks to 

conceal their identities. After robbing the victim of his 

Camry, they abandoned it at a gas station in New York after 

it ran out of gas.

They were again seen on surveillance video at the gas 

station in New York with the same clothing and masks. 

However, they did not rob the gas station, or commit 

violence against any person inside or outside the gas 

station; they took a car from a nearby driveway that was 

parked with the keys inside it, and began driving.

Although it is clear on a prima facie basis that the 

defendants committed a robbery in New York, and 

further that the defendants agreed together, or 

conspired, to commit theft of the Kia Sorrento parked 
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with the keys in it from Hollie Chamberlain, in New 

York, and to receive stolen property, to wit the stolen 

Kia Sorrento, and took a step in furtherance of the 

continued conspiracy to receive stolen property, 

namely continuing to drive the car, in both New York 

and Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth has produced 

no facts to show that the defendants conspired to 

commit a robbery in Pennsylvania, much less in Blair 

County, Pennsylvania, or that they took a step in Blair 

County, Pennsylvania, in furtherance of conspiracy to 

commit robbery. 

Instead, the testimony about the defendants’ activities in 

Blair County was initially that they were driving South on I99. The Commonwealth had produced no evidence to show 

that the attention of the authorities in Blair County, 

Pennsylvania, would have been drawn to [Appellee] if he 

had been driving the speed limit.

Although the Commonwealth points to the fact that the 

defendants were wearing masks, obscuring their identities 

while fleeing is not evidence of intent to inflict serious bodily 

injury on another in the course of committing theft. ... 

* * *

Nor is the mere fact that a machete was found in the car 

evidence of conspiracy to commit robbery; [Appellee] 

denied ownership of the machete, and neither [Appellee] 

nor co-defendant, who both freely admitted other crimes, 

made any statements to the fact that it was their intent to 

do anything in Pennsylvania other than travel through it to 

go to the Carolinas. The folding knife allegedly used in the 

robbery was abandoned in New York and not brought to 

Pennsylvania; this can equally be taken as concealment of 

the knife or abandonment of the idea to commit robbery.

The court finds that defendants’ actions in New York, their 

voiced plan to get to the Carolinas, their traveling through 

Blair County wearing masks, and fleeing from police chasing 

them for speeding are not sufficient to show a prima facie

case including some overt act indicating specifically that a 

conspiracy to commit robbery in Blair County was 

formulated or was in effect as they traveled through Blair 
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County on I-99.

In this case, viewing the Commonwealth’s testimony in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as we must, ... 

the court finds that the Commonwealth has presented prima 

facie evidence that a conspiracy to commit robbery beg[a]n 

in New York and culminated with a robbery in New York. 

The Commonwealth’s suspicion and conjecture that the 

juvenile defendants were going to begin committing robbery 

or conspiring to commit robbery in Pennsylvania, when they 

had stopped doing so in New York, does not meet its prima 

facie burden.

In summary, based on its reading of the law, which was 

greatly aided by the well drafted memorandum of law from 

each party, which the original deciding Magisterial District 

Judge did not have the opportunity to review, and the 

transcript of the preliminary hearing proceedings, this court 

finds from the totality of the circumstances in this case and 

the case law that the Commonwealth has not proven a 

prima facie case that [Appellee] committed conspiracy to 

commit robbery in Blair County. The Commonwealth has 

shown a prima facie case of other crimes in Blair County 

impulsively committed by these juveniles, (see FN 1...), but 

not conspiracy to commit robbery.

(Trial Court Opinion at 11-15) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The trial court accurately summarized the testimony adduced at the 

preliminary hearing. The testimony demonstrated that Appellee and his codefendant wanted to visit Appellee or his co-defendant’s father in North or 

South Carolina but had no means to do so. Appellee and his co-defendant 

subsequently committed a robbery in New York on May 27, 2022, during which 

time they held up the owner of a Toyota Camry and stole his vehicle. About 

two hours away, while still in New York, the car ran out of gas. The men 

abandoned the Toyota Camry at the gas station as well as a small folding 
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silver bladed knife, which was found in the floorboard of the vehicle. Next, 

the men went inside the gas station wearing masks, but they did not rob the 

gas station attendant or commit any crimes therein. Instead, they discovered 

an unlocked Kia Sorrento in a driveway nearby the gas station, and they stole 

that vehicle. The owner of the vehicle was unaware her vehicle was stolen 

until later and conceded that no force was used to deprive her of the car. The 

next day, while in Pennsylvania, police observed the Kia Sorrento traveling at 

an excessive speed and Trooper Griswold effectuated a traffic stop. 

Ultimately, a chase ensued, and the vehicle Appellee was driving crashed. 

Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that the 

Commonwealth did not meet its burden to establish a prima facie case that 

Appellee committed the offense of conspiracy to commit robbery under 

Section 3701(a)(1)(i), in Pennsylvania. In other words, the Commonwealth 

presented insufficient prima facie evidence that Appellee and his co-defendant 

agreed to inflict serious bodily injury upon another in the course of committing 

a theft and took some overt act in furtherance of that agreement in this 

jurisdiction. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 3701(a)(1)(i). See also Gross, 

supra; Hennigan, supra. Rather, as the trial court opined, the 

Commonwealth presented prima facie evidence that Appellee and his codefendant conspired to commit the theft of the Kia Sorrento in New York and 

took an overt act in furtherance of that plan while in Pennsylvania by 

continuing to drive the stolen vehicle in this state. There is simply no evidence 
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on this record that Appellee and his co-defendant committed any overt act in 

Pennsylvania in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit robbery. See id. 

Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s findings and its legal conclusion

to grant Appellee’s motion for writ of habeas corpus on the charge of 

conspiracy to commit robbery is free of legal error. See Hilliard, supra. 

In its second issue, the Commonwealth argues that Appellee’s codefendant tendered an admission to the offense of conspiracy to commit 

robbery on or about July 7, 2022, when his case was transferred to juvenile 

court. The Commonwealth asserts that it agreed to transfer the codefendant’s case to juvenile court (but not Appellee’s case) because the codefendant was less culpable than Appellee. The Commonwealth submits that 

the testimony and evidence presented at Appellee’s preliminary hearing is 

consistent with the information presented in the affidavit of probable cause in

both Appellee’s and the co-defendant’s cases, which can be seen as the factual 

basis for the co-defendant’s admission to conspiracy to commit robbery. The 

Commonwealth emphasizes that the court accepted the co-defendant’s 

admission at the adjudicatory hearing as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 

The Commonwealth maintains that the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court 

Procedure require a court to find a factual basis for an admission before 

accepting the juvenile’s admission. The Commonwealth claims the trial court 

accepted a factual basis to justify the offense of conspiracy to commit robbery 

for the less-culpable co-defendant when it accepted the co-defendant’s 
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admission. The Commonwealth concludes that “[t]o accept a factual basis for 

conspiracy to commit robbery in the less-culpable co-defendant’s juvenile 

admission and to grant a writ of habeas corpus on the same facts leads to 

inconsistent and unfair results, and demonstrates an unreasonable exercise of 

judgment.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 32). We disagree that relief is due.

Preliminary, we observe that the Commonwealth did not raise this issue 

in its memorandum of law in opposition to Appellee’s motion for writ of habeas 

corpus. Rather, the Commonwealth advanced this particular argument for the 

first time in its Rule 1925(b) statement. Because the Commonwealth did not 

present this argument before the trial court at the appropriate stage of the 

proceedings when the trial court would have had an opportunity to consider it 

before ruling on Appellee’s motion, the claim is waived. See generally 

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 

641 Pa. 63, 165 A.3d 895 (2017) (stating failure to make timely and specific 

objection before trial court at appropriate stage of proceedings will result in 

waiver of issue on appeal).

Additionally, although the Commonwealth’s brief cites to a proceeding 

relating to Appellee’s co-defendant wherein the co-defendant allegedly 

admitted to conspiracy to commit robbery, this transcript is not in the certified 

record on appeal. The fact that the Commonwealth included this transcript in 

the reproduced record is of no moment, as we cannot consider evidence which 

is outside of the certified record. See Commonwealth v. Holston, 211 A.3d 
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1264 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc) (reiterating that our review is limited to 

those facts which are contained in certified record and what is not contained 

in certified record does not exist for purposes of our review).

Further, the Commonwealth does not develop this argument with 

relevant legal authority in its appellate brief. Aside from one blanket citation 

to the definition of an abuse of discretion and one citation to a Rule of Juvenile 

Court Procedure governing admissions in juvenile court (see Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 29, 31), the Commonwealth cites no law in support of its claim. In 

other words, the Commonwealth provides no legal authority for its contention 

that the court should have considered Appellee’s co-defendant’s admission in 

a juvenile adjudicatory proceeding when deciding Appellee’s motion for 

writ of habeas corpus in adult criminal court. The Commonwealth’s failure to 

develop this issue on appeal with relevant legal authority constitutes waiver 

of the claim on appeal on this ground as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating 

argument shall be divided into as many sections as there are questions 

presented, followed by discussion with citation to relevant legal authority). 

For all of these reasons, the Commonwealth’s second appellate issue is 

waived. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed. 
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DATE: 10/13/2023