IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Colleen M. Bradley, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

West Chester University, : No. 682 M.D. 2020

Respondent : Submitted: March 7, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: April 1, 2022

Before this Court are preliminary objections filed by West Chester 

University (University) to a claim brought by Colleen M. Bradley (Bradley) under 

the Whistleblower Law.1 For the reasons that follow, we sustain the University’s 

preliminary objections demurring to Bradley’s Whistleblower Law claim and 

dismiss Bradley’s claims against the University.

I. Background

Bradley served as Director of Budget and Financial Planning at the 

University, which is part of the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education 

(PASSHE). Complaint, 3/4/20 at 4 & 6, ¶¶ 22 & 33. Bradley’s responsibilities 

included preparation, oversight and management of the University’s operating 

1 Act of December 12, 1986, P.L. 1559, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428.
2

budget and working collaboratively with a wide range of senior leaders at the 

University. Id. at 8, ¶ 45. Bradley also assisted in the preparation of “BUD 

Reports”—budgets which the University submitted to PASSHE. Id. at 18, ¶¶ 123 & 

125. 

Bradley alleges that while she was working on one of the University’s 

annual BUD Reports, PASSHE administrators instructed her to modify the report in 

a way that would show a multi-million dollar deficit, even though the University in 

fact had a multi-million dollar surplus, so as to secure appropriation money from the 

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Id. at 21-22 & 25, ¶¶ 148-49, 162 & 189. In 

September 2012, at one of the University’s weekly Administrative Budget 

Committee meetings, Bradley questioned the ethics and legality of the BUD Report. 

Id. at 21, ¶ 147. She was reprimanded for doing so, but Bradley nevertheless

disseminated a memorandum at a subsequent Administrative Budget Committee 

meeting, reiterating her concerns. Id. at 21 & 23, ¶¶ 154 & 165. 

More than two years later, Bradley again asserted that the proposed 

BUD Reports contained misrepresentations. Id. at 51-52, ¶ 402-11. Contrary to her 

supervisor’s instructions, Bradley relayed her concerns regarding the budget at an 

Enrollment Management Committee meeting in October 2014. See id. 

In November 2014, Bradley learned that her employment with the 

University would terminate upon the expiration of her contract on June 30, 2015. 

Id. at 27 & 55, ¶¶ 208 & 449. Bradley also received a letter formalizing this decision. 

Id. at 55-56, ¶ 450. Bradley’s contract expired on June 30, 2015. Id. at 5, ¶ 32. 

In May 2015, shortly before her contract with the University was set to 

expire, Bradley filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania (federal district court) a complaint against the University, PASSHE, 
3

and several University and PASSHE administrators, alleging, inter alia, that she was 

terminated in retaliation for reporting instances of wrongdoing or waste, in violation 

of the Whistleblower Law.

2

 See Complaint, 3/4/20 at 57-58, ¶¶ 471-72. In April 

2016, the district court issued an order dismissing Bradley’s Whistleblower Law 

claim “without prejudice to refiling in the appropriate state forum” on the basis that 

the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XI,

barred Bradley’s claim. See Bradley v. W. Chester Univ. of the Pa. State Sys. Higher 

Educ., 182 F. Supp. 3d 195, 202 (E.D. Pa. 2016), aff’d, 880 F.3d 643 (3d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 139 S. Ct. 167 (2018). 

On March 4, 2020, Bradley filed a complaint with the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas (common pleas court) levying a claim of unlawful 

retaliation under the Whistleblower Law, alleging that she reapplied in March 2019 

for the position of Vice President of Accounting and Finance and that the University 

refused to hire her in retaliation for good faith reports of wrongdoing and waste made 

by Bradley prior to her termination. See Complaint, 3/4/20 at 5 & 61, ¶¶ 27-28 & 

499-502. Bradley’s complaint also included claims of intentional and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress. See id. at 62-63, ¶¶ 503-11. In March 2020, the 

common pleas court entered a judgment of non pros, but later struck that judgment 

and transferred the matter to this Court. See Common Pleas Order, 12/7/2020. The 

complaint was docketed with this Court on February 9, 2021.3

2 The remaining counts in Bradley’s district court complaint alleged violations of the right 

to free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. 

I; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See

Complaint, 3/4/20 at 57-58, ¶ 471.

3 Because this matter appears in our original jurisdiction, the proper initiating document is 

a petition for review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1513 (outlining the requirements for “[a] petition for review 

addressed to an appellate court’s original jurisdiction”). However, for the sake of consistency, we 
4

The University filed preliminary objections demurring to Bradley’s 

Whistleblower Law claim on the basis that Bradley failed to state a claim or establish 

causation, demurring to Bradley’s tort claims on the basis that they are barred by the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity and by the provision of the Workers’ Compensation 

Act4 barring other remedies for employees injured in the course of their employment, 

demurring specifically to Bradley’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional 

distress on the basis that she failed to state a claim, and objecting to Bradley’s 

complaint on the basis that the complaint’s length and inclusion of extraneous detail 

contravened Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1019(a), Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019(a). 

See Preliminary Objections at 1-11. In response, Bradley withdrew her claims for 

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Answer to Preliminary 

Objections at 5, ¶¶ 22-40. The remaining preliminary objections are presently before 

this Court for disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Alleged Retaliation by Refusal to Hire

In support of its preliminary objection,5the University argues that 

Bradley has failed to state a colorable Whistleblower Law claim, because she was 

will refer to the initiating document as a complaint, given its original filing in the common pleas 

court.

4 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710. Section 

303(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he liability of an 

employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such 

employes[.]” 77 P.S. § 481(a). 

5 When considering preliminary objections, this Court may accept as true all material facts 

set forth in the complaint and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Vattimo v. Lower 

Bucks Hosp., Inc., 465 A.2d 1231, 1232-33 (Pa. 1983). The question presented by a demurrer is 

whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Id. Any 

doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling a demurrer. Id.
5

not an employee of the University at the time of the alleged retaliation. University’s 

Brief in Support of Preliminary Objections (University’s Br.) at 9. The University 

maintains that “the plain language of the statute” requires dismissal of Bradley’s 

claim. Id. The University notes that Section 3(a) of the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. 

§ 1423(a), protects only employees, and that Bradley was no longer an employee of 

the University when it allegedly retaliated against her by denying her application for 

re-employment in 2019. Id. The University contends that “[w]hen the words of a 

statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded 

under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. at 10 (quoting Section 1921(b) of the 

Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)). The University also posits 

that the General Assembly’s omission from Section 3(a) of an express prohibition 

against discrimination or retaliation in hiring is instructive, noting that similar 

statutes specifically provide such protection. Id. at 10.6 The University maintains 

that the Whistleblower Law does not provide a cause of action for an individual 

alleging a former employer retaliated or discriminated against the individual 

following the termination of the employment relationship. Id. at 10. We agree.

“The Whistleblower Law provides a civil cause of action to employees

for violations of its provisions.” Evans v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 81 A.3d 1062, 

1064 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (emphasis added). Section 3(a) of the Whistleblower Law 

provides, in relevant part:

Persons not to be discharged.--No employer may 

discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate 

6 The University observes that Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), declares it unlawful for employers to “fail or refuse to hire” an individual 

for a protected reason. See University’s Br. at 11. Further, the University notes that Section 5(a) 

of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S.

§ 955(a), provides that an employer shall not “refuse to hire or employ” an individual on the basis 

of certain protected reasons. See id.
6

against an employee regarding the employee’s 

compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of 

employment because the employee or a person acting on 

behalf of the employee makes a good faith report or is 

about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or 

appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste 

by a public body or an instance of waste by any other 

employer as defined in this act.

43 P.S. § 1423(a). Thus, the Whistleblower Law facially proscribes retaliatory 

conduct only by an employer. The University was not Bradley’s employer at the 

time she alleges it retaliated against her.

Bradley contends that she has a viable claim under the Whistleblower 

Law because she was still in the University’s employ at the time she reported the 

alleged wrongdoing and waste. Bradley suggests that if the University’s arguments 

are accepted, any “employee who is terminated because she reports wrongdoing 

would not have a claim . . . because she is no longer employed.” Bradley’s Br. at 7-

8. However, it is a plaintiff’s employment status at the time of the alleged violation 

of the Whistleblower Law which is determinative. The Whistleblower Law prohibits 

discrimination or retaliation by an “employer” against an “employee” on the basis 

of that employee’s reports alleging wrongdoing or waste by employer. See Section 

3(a) of the Whistleblower Law, 43 P.S. § 1423(a). Here, Bradley was no longer in 

the employ of the University at the time the University allegedly retaliated against 

her in violation of the Whistleblower Law by failing to re-hire her. Thus, because 

Bradley was not a protected employee at the time of the alleged retaliation, she does 

not have a cause of action under the Whistleblower Law. See id.

For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the University’s preliminary 

objection demurring to Bradley’s complaint for failure to state a claim under the 
7

Whistleblower Law, and we dismiss Bradley’s complaint. Based on this disposition 

of her claim, we dismiss the University’s remaining preliminary objections as moot.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Colleen M. Bradley, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

West Chester University, : No. 682 M.D. 2020 

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 1st day of April, 2022, the preliminary objection filed 

by West Chester University demurring to the complaint filed by Colleen M. Bradley 

(Bradley) for failure to state a claim under the Whistleblower Law, Act of December 

12, 1986, P.L. 1559, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428, is SUSTAINED, and 

Bradley’s complaint is DISMISSED. The remaining preliminary objections are 

DISMISSED AS MOOT.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge