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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

WILLAM A. PASSARELLI, 

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-13655 

vs. DISTRICT JUDGE JUDITH E. LEVY 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB 

CHRIS SHAW, 

Defendant. 

____________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff William Passarelli, currently a prisoner at the Alger Correctional Facility in 

Munising, Michigan, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 against Defendant Chris Shaw, a 

MDOC Corrections Officer, in his official capacity, related to events that occurred at the St. Louis 

Correctional Facility (SLF) while Plaintiff was incarcerated therein. (Docket no. 1.) It is unclear 

from Plaintiff’s Complaint exactly which civil right or rights he alleges have been violated by 

Defendant, but as Defendant notes, Plaintiff appears to set forth an Eight Amendment claim, 

arguing that his conditions of confinement were unconstitutional because he feared for his own 

safety. (See docket no. 1.) Plaintiff seeks $500,000.00 in monetary damages, an order directing 

the MDOC to terminate Defendant Shaw’s employment, and an order directing the MDOC to 

provide counseling for Plaintiff. (Docket no. 1 at 3.) 

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket no. 14.) 

Plaintiff filed a Response. (Docket no. 16.) All pretrial matters have been referred to the 

undersigned for consideration. (Docket no. 9.) The undersigned has reviewed the pleadings, 

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dispenses with a hearing pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and 

Recommendation. 

I. Recommendation 

For the reasons discussed herein, the Court should grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment [14]. This matter should be dismissed in its entirety. 

II. Report 

A. Background 

On June 27, 2014, Defendant took Plaintiff to the property room at SLF so that Defendant 

could conduct a search of Plaintiff’s duffel bag. There were no other prisoners in the property 

room at the time, but there were several televisions sitting in the room, which belonged to other 

inmates. After searching Plaintiff’s bag, Defendant took several pieces of clothing to the property 

room label maker so that he could put Plaintiff’s name on the clothes. Plaintiff then returned to 

his housing unit.1 (See docket nos. 1 and 14.) 

About five minutes after Plaintiff left the property room, Defendant noticed that one of the 

televisions was missing.2 Defendant notified Plaintiff’s unit manager that the television was 

missing and that Plaintiff had been the last prisoner in the property room; the television was found 

 

1 As discussed further herein, the events leading to Plaintiff’s Complaint center on a 

missing television. Thus, the Parties make much ado regarding whether Defendant could see 

Plaintiff while he was at the label maker. Plaintiff argues that Defendant could see Plaintiff the 

entire time, so he could not have taken the television; instead, Plaintiff contends that he purchased 

the television from another inmate a day earlier. (Docket no. 16 at 1.) Defendant asserts that 

Plaintiff was out of his sight while he was at the label maker. (Docket no. 14 at 6-7.) 

Nevertheless, whether Plaintiff did, in fact, steal the television is irrelevant to the resolution of 

Defendant’s instant Motion. Therefore, for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the 

Court will accept Plaintiff’s version of events.

2 Regardless of when the television was actually taken, Defendant asserts that he did not 

notice it was missing until this time. (Docket no. 14 at 7.) 

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in Plaintiff’s housing unit. (Docket no. 1 at 2; docket no. 14 at 7.) 

 Later in the day on June 27, 2014, the owner of the television confronted Plaintiff in the 

yard. Plaintiff told him that he had purchased the television from another inmate and that he did 

not have anything to do with its theft. Later that evening, another inmate approached Plaintiff and 

“asked him if his name was, (sic) William Passarelli, was his prison number 776936, and did he 

lock in unit 2 cell 215 and (sic) did he recently transfer in from Bellamy Creek Correctional 

Facility.” (Docket no. 1 at 2.) When Plaintiff answered that he did, the inmate told Plaintiff to 

“go to the officer and lock up.” (Id.) Plaintiff refused, so the next morning, the same inmate 

approached Plaintiff with a razor blade and cut his face. (Id.) 

 Rather than report the incident or receive treatment, Plaintiff returned to his cell, where he 

bandaged his face with toilet paper. Plaintiff alleges that officers who were making rounds 

noticed the blood in front of his cell and escorted him to health services where he received 

treatment. Plaintiff was then placed in protective custody until he was transferred to another 

prison. (Id. at 3.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant put his life in danger by telling the owner of the television 

that Plaintiff stole it and by giving the same individual Plaintiff’s personal information. (Docket 

no. 1 at 3.) Defendant denies these allegations. (See docket no. 14 at 6-7.) 

B. Governing Law - Summary Judgment Standard 

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A moving party may meet that burden “by ‘showing’–that is, pointing out to the 

district court–that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” 

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Rule 56 expressly provides that: 

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the 

assertion by: 

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including 

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion 

only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or 

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence 

of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible 

evidence to support the fact. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Rule also provides the consequences of failing to properly support 

or address a fact: 

If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address 

another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: 

 (1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; 

 (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 

(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials – 

including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled 

to it; or 

 (4) issue any other appropriate order. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other 

materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 

When the moving party has met its burden under rule 56, “its opponent must do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric 

Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Ultimately a district court must 

determine whether the record as a whole presents a genuine issue of material fact, id. at 587, 

drawing “all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Hager v. 

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Pike County Bd. Of Education, 286 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2002). 

C. Analysis

The Eighth Amendment bars states from imposing punishments that are cruel and unusual, 

including those that involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Rhodes v. Chapman, 

452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). “Among ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that 

are ‘totally without penological justification.’” Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 

(1976)). But “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey v. 

Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987). Where a prisoner claims that his claims are based on 

conditions of confinement, the prisoner must demonstrate that he was deprived of “the minimal 

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. That is, the plaintiff must 

show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant acted 

with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 

35 (1993) (applying the deliberate-indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). 

“Fundamentally, the concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of 

humankind.” Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 564, 568 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotations, omissions, and modifications omitted). 

To support a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eight Amendment, a Plaintiff must 

satisfy two components: an objective component, and a subjective component. Id. (citing 

Harrison v. Ash, 538 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008)). “Satisfying the objective component ensures 

that the alleged deprivation is sufficiently severe, while satisfying the subjective component 

‘ensures that the defendant . . . acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Quigley v. 

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Toung Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 

183-84 (2d Cir. 2003)). 

In a conditions-of-confinement context, the objective component of the 

deliberate-indifference inquiry is met when the plaintiff can show that the condition of 

confinement amounts to an “extreme deprivation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992); 

Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir.2004). In such cases, “courts look to the evidence 

presented regarding the duration of exposure and totality of conditions contributing to the alleged 

deprivation.” Eidam v. Bailey, No. 10-34, 2011 WL 3269625, *3 (W.D. Mich. July 29, 2011) 

(citing Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir.2006)). 

To satisfy the subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim and show that the 

defendant had a sufficiently culpable state of mind, a plaintiff must show that “‘the official knows 

of and disregards’ the substantial risk of serious harm.” Villegas, 709 F.3d at 569 (quoting 

Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008)). The plaintiff need not prove, however, “that 

the official acted ‘for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.’” 

Comstock, 273 F.3d at 703 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). Instead, a 

plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant “subjectively perceived facts from which to infer 

substantial risk to the [plaintiff],” (2) the defendant “did in fact draw that inference,” and (3) the 

defendant “then disregarded that risk.” Quigley, 707 F.3d at 681 (internal quotations omitted). 

Moreover, “[d]irect evidence about a defendant’s knowledge is not necessary, but rather, the 

knowledge aspect of the subjective component can be determined [“in the usual ways, including 

inference from circumstantial evidence” Quigley, 707 F.3d at 682].” Villegas, 709 F.3d at 569. 

For example, “a factfinder may conclude that [the defendant] official knew of a substantial risk 

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from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Quigley, 707 F.3d at 682; see also Villegas, 709 

F.3d at 569. 

Plaintiff provides no evidence to suggest that Defendant provided his personal information 

to another inmate or that Defendant told another inmate that Plaintiff had stolen his television. 

Moreover, Plaintiff provides no information directly linking the assault by one inmate with the 

theft of another inmate’s television. At most, Plaintiff provides bare speculation that Defendant 

Shaw had something to do with the attack, but such speculation is insufficient to survive 

Defendant’s Motion. In his Response, Plaintiff asserts that he made a mistake when he used the 

phrase “[i]t is believed” that Defendant provided the information when, in fact, he should have 

used the phrase “[i]t is known.” (Docket no. 16 at 3-4.) But Plaintiff’s argument misses the 

point; regardless of the terminology used, Plaintiff has no evidence whatsoever to support his 

allegation. 

Plaintiff also asserts in his Response that he heard two guards discussing the theft of the 

television and that one of them said “someone’s going to fuck his ass up, watch.” (Id. at 2.) And 

he further asserts that the officials at SLF did nothing to investigate the attack. (Id. at 3.) But 

these new allegations do nothing to support Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff attributes the statement he 

overheard to “officer John Doe,” who was speaking to “another officer being John Doe #2.” (Id.

at 2.) Plaintiff does not contend that either of these officers was Defendant. And whether the 

officials at SLF investigated the incident is irrelevant to whether Defendant put Plaintiff in danger. 

In sum, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to suggest that Defendant provided any 

information to any other inmate regarding the television at issue in this matter. And Plaintiff has 

failed to provide any evidence to suggest that Defendant was aware of any threat to Plaintiff’s 

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safety. Thus, he has failed to support his claims under the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, as 

noted, it is unclear exactly what constitutional violations Plaintiff alleges through his Complaint. 

But regardless of his intent, Plaintiff’s lack of evidence to support his factual allegations is fatal. 

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 

D. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment [14]. This matter should be dismissed in its entirety. 

III. Notice to Parties Regarding Objections 

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); Howard v. Sec=y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States 

v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing of objections which raise some issues but fail to 

raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report 

and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec=y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed=n Of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this 

Magistrate Judge. 

Any objections must be labeled as AObjection #1,@ AObjection #2,@ etc. Any objection 

must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. 

Not later than fourteen days after service of an objection, the opposing party must file a concise 

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response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. The response must 

specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order and labeled as 

AResponse to Objection #1,@ AResponse to Objection #2,@ etc. 

Dated: June 12, 2015 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served on counsel of 

record and on Plaintiff William Passarelli on this date. 

Dated: June 12, 2015 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

Case Manager 

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