1

Filed 2/6/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.C., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND 

SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A165424

 (Solano County

 Super. Ct. No. J45321)

M.A. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s detention, jurisdiction, 

and disposition orders in this dependency proceeding regarding his four-yearold son, M.C. (Minor). Father contends that (1) the juvenile court erred in 

detaining Minor from Father’s custody; (2) there was insufficient evidence to 

support the jurisdictional allegation against Father; (3) there was insufficient 

evidence to support the disposition orders removing Minor from Father’s 

custody; and (4) the reunification services ordered for Father were 

unsupported by the evidence.

We affirm the orders regarding detention and jurisdiction, but we must 

reverse the disposition order. California law requires that the Solano County 

Health and Social Services Department (the Department) establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that placing Minor with Father “would be 
2

detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 

the child.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.2, subd. (a).)1 The record here lacked 

substantial evidence to support such a finding. The juvenile court also

abused its discretion by ordering Father to engage in reunification services

recommended by the Department—substance abuse testing, completion of a 

parenting class, and participation in a parent partner program—without any 

factual basis to support such an order. The record lacks any evidence that

Father uses or abuses narcotics or alcohol, and reflects that Father coparented three children of his prior marriage, all now adults.

BACKGROUND

A. Petition and Detention

In 2021, Minor’s mother (Mother) gave birth to Minor’s half brother. 

Mother tested positive for methamphetamines and marijuana at the hospital

after childbirth, triggering a referral to the Department. According to the 

Department’s initial report, Mother abandoned the newborn at the hospital, 

purportedly eloping with the newborn’s putative father. Then three-year-old 

Minor’s whereabouts were unknown.

The Department contacted Father two days after the delivery of the 

newborn. Minor’s birth certificate had identified a different man as Minor’s 

parent, but a DNA test had confirmed that Father was indeed Minor’s 

biological parent. Father is a professional truck driver, and he was in 

Michigan when he received the Department’s call. Father reported he had 

left Minor with Mother approximately four days prior. Father explained that 

Minor lived with Mother and maternal grandmother, but before going to the 

hospital to deliver her newborn, Mother left Minor in the care of a family 

1 Unless otherwise noted, further statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

friend. The family friend considered Minor like a “biological grandson,” 

though she had learned that Father (and not her own son) is Minor’s 

biological father.

The Department confirmed that Minor was safe in the family friend’s

custody. The friend expressed concern that Minor was not safe in Mother’s 

custody, and that everyone in Mother’s home “does ‘hard drugs’ such as 

methamphetamines.” She stated that Father was “always on the road for 

work and does not care for [Minor].” The next day, the family friend reported 

that Mother had “snatched” Minor from her house overnight. The friend did 

not have Mother’s contact information.

Father reported that Mother “used to do methamphetamines in the 

past,” but could not verify whether she was currently using 

methamphetamines. The Department had received two prior referrals for 

Minor. The Department received the first referral in 2018, when Minor was 

born, because Mother tested positive for amphetamines and marijuana. This 

referral was deemed “inconclusive” because Mother entered a residential 

treatment program. In 2019, the Department received a second referral 

based on a report that Mother had threatened to sell Minor for $20,000. This 

referral was deemed “inconclusive” because Father took custody of Minor. 

Father had cared for Minor for several months in 2019 when Mother 

was using methamphetamines and alcohol, but Mother resumed caring for 

Minor after she “got sober” in 2020. Father offered to make arrangements for 

Minor to be with his paternal grandfather until Father returned to 

California.

The Department filed a petition alleging Minor was within the 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court because he was at substantial risk of serious 

harm due to Mother’s ongoing substance abuse. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) The 
4

Department also alleged Minor was at risk because Father “knew or 

reasonably should have known [Mother] was continuing to use 

methamphetamines and marijuana during her pregnancy” and left Minor 

with her “without a safety plan for [Minor’s] care.” The Department further

alleged that Minor’s older half sibling (not related to Father) was adjudged as 

a dependent of the court in 2012. Mother’s parental rights were terminated 

in 2014. (Id., subd. (j).)

At the detention hearing in August 2021, Father’s counsel “enter[ed] a 

denial on his behalf.” The juvenile court found the Department made a prima 

facie case that Minor came within section 300 and that continuance in 

parental custody was contrary to his welfare. The court found there was a

substantial danger to Minor’s physical or emotional health, and there were no 

reasonable means to protect his health absent removal. The court ordered 

Minor detained. The Department placed Minor in an emergency foster home, 

and moved him to a resource family home shortly thereafter, with his infant

half brother. 

B. Jurisdiction and Disposition

1. Initial Findings Regarding Jurisdiction

In its October 2021 jurisdiction/disposition report, the Department

recommended that the juvenile court sustain the allegations against both 

Mother and Father, order the continued detention of Minor, elevate Father 

from “alleged” to “presumed” parent status,2 and offer reunification services

2 Dependency law distinguishes between “alleged,” “biological,” and 

“presumed” fathers, which determines the extent to which the father may 

participate in the proceedings and be entitled to certain rights. (In re Mia M.

(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 792, 806.) An “alleged” father has not established 

biological paternity or qualification as a “presumed” father under the 

Uniform Parentage Act (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.). Presumptions of
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to Father. Mother’s whereabouts remained unknown, and she had not been 

in contact with the Department. 

The Department confirmed that Father’s positive DNA test results 

were legitimate and unaltered. Father reported that he had left Minor in 

Mother’s care back in August because he “felt he didn’t have another option” 

as he regularly traveled for work. Father had adult children from a prior 

marriage; there was no child welfare history and no history of personal 

substance abuse. If reunified with Minor, Father reported that his aunt and 

uncle had agreed to help care for Minor while Father was traveling for work. 

The Department nevertheless recommended reunification services for Father 

as part of the case plan, including a Department-approved parenting 

education course and submission to random substance abuse testing by the 

Department.

2. The Contested Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing

The juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing

in April 2022. At the beginning of the hearing, Father’s counsel requested

either that the case be closed and Minor returned to Father’s custody, or that 

Minor be placed with Father on a “family maintenance” program. The 

Department’s counsel then expressed her understanding that Father was 

either “submitting or objecting and submitting on jurisdiction with [Father’s] 

counsel wanting to make a statement for the record, but that really today’s 

contesting hearing is limited to the issue of whether [Father] received family 

parenthood are set forth under this statutory framework, and a “presumed 

parent” includes a person who “receives the child into their home and openly 

holds out the child as their natural child.” (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).) A 

“presumed” father is entitled to reunification services, whereas a “biological” 

father may receive such services if the court determines that it will benefit 

the child. (In re Mia M. at p. 806; § 361.5, subd. (a).)
6

reunification or family maintenance services or whether the court is going to 

place the child in his care and close the case.” Father’s counsel responded 

that they were “going to submit on jurisdiction, but we are going to be 

arguing that he was the noncustodial parent” and that the law was “clear 

that the court must place a child with a noncustodial parent, absent finding 

of detriment.”

Father testified that he still worked as a professional truck driver and,

with his current rotation schedule, spent five nights away and then three 

nights at home. Father had prepared a plan with Minor’s paternal greataunt and great-uncle for Minor to live at their home and for them to take care 

of Minor while Father was on the road. Father said he had completed a 

virtual parenting class identified by the Department, but had not received a 

certificate. The social worker told him that she would verify it. Father 

testified that, back in August, he had left Minor with Mother because it 

seemed to him that she was not using drugs. Further, the maternal 

grandmother had told him Mother was not using drugs or drinking alcohol.

Father’s ex-wife also testified on his behalf. She testified that she had 

three children with Father, and that Father “has always been on top of 

everything in regards to his children since they were born.” She had also 

seen Father with Minor, and they had a “[v]ery good” relationship. She 

testified that despite “all his defects,” Father “is a good father,” loves Minor, 

and is attentive and responsible with him. She also testified that she was 

friends with the paternal great-aunt. Father’s former spouse had agreed that 

she would be there to help if there was an emergency or the paternal greataunt and great-uncle needed help with Minor. 

The social services supervisor (who had been the social worker assigned 

to the case) testified that the case presented an unusual situation because 
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Father was offered weekly visitation but, given the nature of his work and 

proposed plan to rely on other family members to help care for Minor, the 

Department permitted other paternal relatives to visit even when Father was 

unable to attend. In the supervisor’s view, visitation had been inconsistent. 

In the past five months, Father had attended five visits, Minor’s paternal 

great-uncle had attended six visits, and Minor’s paternal great-aunt had 

attended two visits. Father’s 19-year-old daughter (Minor’s adult half sister)

visited the most regularly.

Minor’s paternal great-aunt and great-uncle were going through the 

resource family approval process. The required background checks had not 

yet occurred, which the Department characterized as a “barrier” to current 

placement of Minor in their home. The approval process for the anticipated 

home was in progress but the home had not yet passed the Department’s 

inspection. The supervisor testified that the paternal great-aunt and greatuncle were only Spanish-speaking. While Minor knew some common words 

in Spanish, he spoke only English and could not converse in Spanish. 

The supervisor testified that reunification services were recommended 

because the Department had not seen a “behavioral change in [Father’s] 

ability to show that he can safely care for [Minor].” In her view, Father 

“placed the child in unsafe situations. He’s made unsafe plans and 

arrangements for caregivers due to work, and I haven’t seen him demonstrate 

his willingness to make sure the child’s needs come first.” When asked what 

opportunities Father had been given to demonstrate a positive behavioral

change, the supervisor testified that he was provided a “parent partner” 

(someone to provide peer support who had been through the child welfare 

system and reunified with their children), but Father was unable to

participate because he could not schedule regular weekly appointments due 
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to his rotating work schedule. She also testified that Father had not 

completed a parenting education class. When asked how the Department 

envisioned the reunification plan for Father, the supervisor testified that she 

would like Father to “get back engaged with a parent partner,” complete the 

parenting class, and “be able to verbalize on how he plans on meeting his 

child’s needs when he is parenting from afar[.]” 

3. The Juvenile Court’s Findings

The juvenile court declared Father to be Minor’s presumed parent. The 

court found true the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), 

including the allegation that Father knew or reasonably should have known 

Minor’s mother was continuing to use drugs during her pregnancy, and left 

Minor in her care without a safety plan.

The court checked the box on the form order after hearing, finding: “By 

clear and convincing evidence, placement with the following parent would be 

detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of 

the child: Presumed father.” The court’s comments on the record at the 

conclusion of the hearing, however, did not mention the bases for these 

findings nor the burden of proof.

Instead, the juvenile court primarily discussed the court’s future 

expectations of Father. The court indicated some concern that Father had 

not complied with tasks the Department had set out for him, like completing 

parenting classes. The court said, “I’ve heard what I’ve heard today . . . so far 

and what I’ve read in the file. But it seems to me we have a father that 

wants to be a father. Okay. That’s a good thing, and that’s good from the 

Department’s standpoint, from everybody’s standpoint. The problem is [the 

Department has] set up these different rules for [Father] after the events 

with the mother, and he’s attempted to follow them, but he hasn’t really done 
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everything he should. Maybe he has, maybe he’s gone to the parenting, I 

don’t know.”

The court next expressed that Father and Father’s family could have 

visited Minor more frequently. While the family members had visited Minor,

“it wasn’t really a lot” and “there really hasn’t been a lot of contact in four 

years” since Minor was born. The court noted that Father’s adult daughter 

was Minor’s most frequent contact with Father’s relatives, but it was unclear 

whether she would be a potential caretaker for Minor.

The Department had characterized Father as “historically 

unfortunately put[ting] his job over the needs of his child,” because his work 

as a truck driver “requires him to be gone for lengthy periods of time.” The 

court urged Father to try harder. The court continued, “So, I just think you 

make a big effort.” Regarding Father’s job as a truck driver, the court said, 

“If you have the power to limit those routes but, if you’re making that kind of 

money, I can’t see stopping. You just keep going. You do your routes. You 

have five days. You have two great days with your son, and it all works out.” 

The court referred again to the fact that Father had left Minor with 

Mother so he could work in the days leading up to the Department’s 

intervention. The Department speculated that Father might have known 

Mother was using methamphetamines. The court said, “But I really think 

you need this little investigation. I agree it’s not the strongest case that 

we’ve seen in this type of cases, I don’t think it’s the weakest either. I think 

he made some mistakes, but placing the child back with her after I heard 

about her and what I read about her was not a smart thing.”

The court also expressed some concern about potential uncertainty 

regarding the logistics of Minor returning to Father’s care. The Department 

had argued Father’s plan was not “viable” because it was unclear which of 
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several possible rooms at Father’s aunt and uncle’s house would ultimately 

become Minor’s bedroom. The court said, “And the room, if it is the other 

room, so be it, I guess. But we don’t know. There’s not enough for me. My 

interest is the child right now. My interest is you. Everybody says you’re a 

good father, even your ex-wife, notwithstanding . . . in spite of all his faults. 

I’ve heard that a lot. So, anyhow, we just need a little time, and my feeling 

would be that the recommendations of the Department are well taken at this 

time.”

Going forward, the court expected Father “does his job. Make a good 

living. Gets a place so he has a rent[al] if that ever ends, but at least he has 

a place to go, and the fact that the home that doesn’t concern me too much 

other than, you know, this is what people have to do now with the economics 

of the situation.” The court wanted Father “to just follow the rules to a tee.” 

“And on this you’re putting your son first, your job second, but the thing you 

can do with your son now is the visitation and follow up any of the rules that 

have to be done. Let the relatives be investigated and hopefully in six 

months or calendar it before, if it’s all done everybody recommends it, you can 

get what you wanted here today. But that will be the order of the court.” It 

found that Minor’s out-of-home placement was appropriate and necessary. 

The court ordered reunification services for Father as stated in the 

Department’s case plan. It maintained visitation for Father and his family 

and permitted video visitation for Father given his work schedule. The court

did not discuss the basis for its order as to reunification services. 

This appeal followed.
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DISCUSSION

I. No Error in Detention

Father argues that the juvenile court erred in its original 2021 findings 

and orders by detaining Minor from Father’s custody. The Department 

initially responds that Father has forfeited this challenge because his notice

of appeal identifies the 2022 jurisdiction and disposition orders, but not the 

2021 detention orders.

Father has not forfeited his right to appeal the detention orders. “An 

order entered prior to disposition . . . is ‘interlocutory and not appealable, and 

thus any issue pertaining to it must be raised in a timely appeal of the 

dispositional order.’ ” (In re B.P. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 886, 889 [dismissing 

appeal from non-appealable detention order, quoting In re Javier G. (2005) 

130 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1200].) That is precisely what Father did here, 

appealing from the order on disposition and raising arguments regarding 

detention and jurisdiction. The California Rules of Court require that a 

notice of appeal be liberally construed “ ‘so as to protect the right of appeal if 

it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and 

where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.’ ” 

(In re Joshua S. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 261, 272; Cal. Rules of Court, rule

8.821(a)(2).) The Department has not argued any prejudice here. Given

these circumstances and that Father had to raise his challenge with an 

appeal of the dispositional order, we construe the notice of appeal to include 

an appeal of the August 2021 detention findings and orders.

We nonetheless conclude that Father’s argument fails on the merits. 

Section 319, subdivision (c)(1) provides that a minor’s detention must be 

supported by a prima facie showing that the child falls within section 300. 

The Department argues that section 319, subdivision (c)(1) does not apply to 
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Father because he had only “alleged” father status at the time of detention 

and was not a “parent” within the meaning of section 319. (See, e.g. In re 

J.W.-P. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 298, 301 [“alleged” fathers have fewer rights 

and are not entitled to custody].) Father offers no authority to the contrary. 

Section 300 is satisfied where the court finds that remaining in the 

parent’s home is contrary to the child’s welfare, there is a “substantial 

danger” to the physical health of the child, and there are no “reasonable 

means” by which to protect the child’s health unless the child is removed

from the parent’s custody. The juvenile court properly found section 300 

satisfied as to Mother, given her ongoing drug abuse and her abandonment of 

her newborn, Minor’s half brother, almost immediately after giving birth. 

Even if section 319, subdivision (c)(1) did apply to Father, we are not 

persuaded that the juvenile court erred. The Department’s evidentiary 

burden at the detention hearing is “light.” (Johnny W. v. Superior Court

(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 559, 567.) The record reflects ample evidence that 

Minor was in serious danger. Father reported that he had left Minor with 

Mother, despite her history of substance abuse. While Father said he did not 

know Mother was using drugs when he left Minor with her to go to work, the 

juvenile court knew Mother had tested positive for methamphetamine and 

marijuana use and had abandoned her newborn at the hospital shortly after 

giving birth to him. She then suddenly reappeared to “snatch” Minor from 

the family friend who had been watching him while Mother was preparing to 

deliver her baby. The juvenile court can consider Father’s prior parenting 

decisions to determine whether Minor needs the court’s protection. (In re 

T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) The court did not err in finding the 

Minor in danger at this early stage.
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Father also argues that the Department failed to make “reasonable 

efforts” to prevent Minor’s removal from his custody, suggesting that the 

Department should not have detained Minor and instead waited until the 

following week when Father returned to California. Again, we disagree. “A 

reasonable efforts finding must be based on the particular circumstances of 

the case.” (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 856.) The Department 

accurately characterizes the situation in this case, at the time of the 

detention hearing, as “emergent.” No one knew Minor’s whereabouts at the 

time the Department filed the petition, Mother had disappeared after a failed

drug test, and Mother then reappeared to take Minor from the family friend 

who had been watching him. Meanwhile, Father was driving a truck over 

2,000 miles away and unable to immediately return to take custody of the 

Minor. Under the circumstances, waiting a week before detaining the then

three-year-old Minor would have been manifestly unreasonable. The juvenile 

court did not err in its “reasonable efforts” finding.

Finally, Father argues that even if detention was proper, the court 

erred in failing to consider placement with Minor’s paternal grandfather. 

Section 319, subdivision (f)(3) provides that if a child cannot be returned to 

the physical custody of their parent, the court “shall determine if there is a 

relative who is able and willing to care for the child, and has been assessed 

pursuant to Section 361.4.” 

Again, at the time of the detention hearing, Father was still an 

“alleged” parent; he lacked a putative father’s rights under the Uniform 

Parentage Act and section 319, subdivision (f)(3) did not yet apply to him. 

Even if it did, the paternal grandfather had not been “assessed” pursuant to 

section 361.4, which typically includes an in-home inspection, criminal 

records check, and child welfare history check. (§ 361.4, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) 
14

Under the circumstances, the juvenile court did not err in determining at the 

detention hearing there was no relative who satisfied the definition of section 

319, subdivision (f)(3).

II. Substantial Evidence for Jurisdictional Allegation

Father argues that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding against 

him is not supported by substantial evidence. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) The 

Department initially responds that Father either waived this challenge by 

submitting on jurisdiction at the April 2022 hearing, or that the challenge is 

nonjusticiable because the jurisdictional finding against Mother was 

sufficient to support the order.

We are not persuaded that the record shows an unequivocal waiver of 

Father’s challenge. The decision In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552 

is instructive. There, the father’s counsel represented he was “ ‘going to 

submit on the jurisdiction.’ ” (Id. at p. 565.) When read in context, however, 

it was apparent that counsel “was submitting the matter based on the 

jurisdictional/dispositional report, not the recommendations.” (Ibid.) “Such a 

submission acted as consent to allow the court to consider the report as the 

only evidence in determining whether the allegations in the petition were 

true.” (Ibid.) It did not preclude the father from appealing to challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence on the jurisdictional finding. (Id. at pp. 565–566.) 

Similarly, here, there is some indication that Father may have been 

“objecting and submitting” on jurisdiction. Father’s counsel stated that he 

was “going to submit on jurisdiction,” but nonetheless requested that the case

either be closed or, alternatively, proceed with family maintenance services. 

On this record, we cannot conclude that Father waived his challenge.

We turn next to the justiciability of this challenge. “Because the 

juvenile court assumes jurisdiction of the child, not the parents, jurisdiction 
15

may exist based on the conduct of one parent only.” (In re A.R. (2014) 228 

Cal.App.4th 1146, 1150.) “As a result, we need not consider jurisdictional 

findings based on the other parent’s conduct.” (Ibid.) Father requests, 

however, that we nonetheless consider the jurisdictional finding against him. 

We retain the discretion to consider the merits of a parent’s appeal where, as 

here, “the jurisdictional finding serves as the basis for dispositional orders 

that are also challenged on appeal.” (Ibid.) We will exercise our discretion to 

do so.

We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial 

evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “In making this 

determination, we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s 

determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to 

support the findings and orders.” (Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191 

Cal.App.4th 676, 688–689.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise 

independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to 

support the findings of the trial court.” (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 

Cal.App.3d 315, 321.) Father bears the burden on appeal to show that the 

evidence was not sufficient to support the finding. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 

98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.) Substantial evidence “means evidence that is 

‘reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof 

of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case.’ ” (In re E.D.

(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966.)

Father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

jurisdictional allegation against him here. Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) 

allows the juvenile court to take jurisdiction over a child when there is “a 

substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm or illness, as 

a result of” the parent’s “failure or inability . . . to adequately supervise or 
16

protect the child,” or “[t]he willful or negligent failure” of the parent “to 

adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian 

with whom the child has been left.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A), (B).) Father

contends there was no evidence establishing that he “knew or reasonably 

should have known” Mother was continuing to use methamphetamines and 

marijuana and that he left Minor in her care without a safety plan. We 

disagree.

As detailed above, Father left Minor with Mother despite knowing her 

troubled history of substance abuse. Father could not tell the Department

where Minor was, could not say whether Mother was currently using drugs, 

and could not immediately return home to take custody of Minor if he could 

even find Minor. Father did not know whether the family friend who cared 

for Minor, and who apparently considered herself akin to Minor’s biological 

grandmother, did so on a regular basis or for long periods of time. There was 

also evidence that this ignorance was not limited to the specific incident

triggering the referral: Father reported that when he was away for work, he 

would “try” to contact Mother to inquire about Minor, but Mother would often 

not answer his calls. It is reasonable to conclude that, had Father been a 

more consistent parental presence, he would have known about Mother’s 

substance use. For example, the family friend expressed immediate concern

to the Department that Minor was not safe in Mother’s custody because she 

believed everyone in Mother’s home “does ‘hard drugs’ such as 

methamphetamines.”

Father also argues that, even assuming he should have known about 

Mother’s drug use, there was no evidence that he would have failed to protect 

Minor from Mother at the time of the jurisdictional hearing. Substantial 

evidence remains, however, that Minor was at risk based on Father’s decision 
17

to leave Minor in the care of someone Father reasonably should have known 

was using drugs. (In re T.V., supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 133.) Father 

reported that he had previously cared for Minor in 2019 when Mother was 

using drugs and alcohol, but then returned Minor to her care when she

achieved sobriety in 2020. As detailed above, Father was not diligent in 

ensuring that Minor was not at risk from a relapse by Mother. Father has 

not satisfied his burden on appeal to show the juvenile court’s section 300, 

subdivision (b)(1) jurisdictional finding against him was not supported by 

substantial evidence.

III. No Substantial Evidence for Disposition

We conclude that the juvenile court erred in its dispositional findings. 

The court had appropriately found Father a putative parent, triggering an 

important set of rights. Before ordering the removal of a child at the 

disposition stage, the juvenile court must “first determine whether there is a 

parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the 

events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of 

Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) 

“If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the 

parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental 

to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” 

(Ibid., italics added.) 

California law places a heightened burden of proof on the 

Department—not the parent—in connection with the finding of detriment. 

“ ‘ “ ‘Parenting is a fundamental right, and accordingly, is disturbed only in 

extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood.’ 

[Citation.] ‘In furtherance of these principles, the courts have imposed a 

standard of clear and convincing proof of parental inability to provide proper 
18

care for the child and resulting detriment to the child if it remains with the 

parent, before custody can be awarded to a nonparent.’ ” ’ ” (In re Isayah C.

(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 694.) In making a finding of detriment, the 

juvenile court weighs all relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer 

net harm. (Id. at p. 700.) On appeal, “[w]e review the record in the light 

most favorable to the trial court’s order to determine whether there is 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the 

necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.” (Id.

at p. 694.)

Father argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the 

court’s finding of detriment and removal of Minor from his custody. Father 

highlights his remote employment, the proposed living arrangement with 

other caregivers, and Father’s lack of personal substance abuse issues, which

the juvenile court rejected as a basis for detriment.

The juvenile court provided very little by way of explanation concerning 

how it reached its finding of detriment. To the extent we can discern any 

specific findings of fact that might support the required showing, the juvenile 

court again mentioned Father’s earlier decision to leave Minor with Mother 

before she gave birth to Minor’s half brother. At the April 2022 hearing, 

however, Father had repeatedly expressed his desire to take full custody of 

Minor and his understanding of the dangers posed by Mother’s addiction. 

Given all that had transpired, there is no indication that the juvenile court

believed Father would give Minor back to Mother absent a court order 

requiring him to do so. 

Rather, the court focused on its expectations for Father’s future 

behavior. The court stated that it would “follow the recommendations” of the 

Department. Those recommendations included required drug testing and 
19

completion of a parenting class (if he had not already done so). The 

Department also wanted Father to provide a very specific plan for exactly 

where Minor would sleep, articulate exactly which family members would 

care for Minor while Father was driving, explain how family members who do 

not speak English would interact with Minor (who is not conversant in

Spanish), and for Father and his family members to visit more with Minor.

Father must follow the rules “to a tee,” the court urged. “It’s like you got to 

stop at the line, you got to stop at the [bus] stations, wherever you have to do 

it, you got to do it.”

Father objects that his inability to visit with the Minor as frequently as 

the Department would have permitted him is not evidence that placing him 

in Father’s care would be detrimental to Minor’s safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being. Compliance with rules imposed by the 

Department or the juvenile court can certainly support a finding that leaving 

a child with a parent would not be detrimental to the child’s well-being. 

(Cf. David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 772 [granting 

writ petition from order setting permanency planning hearing because father 

“did virtually everything the [Orange County Social Services Agency]

requested of him” and “has shown consistent dedication to her welfare and 

their reunification”].) Father accurately notes, however, that it appears like 

the juvenile court flipped the burden of proof. To regain custody, despite the 

lack of evidence regarding detriment, the juvenile court effectively required 

Father to show he and his family visited with Minor enough to satisfy the 

Department’s unwritten standards, and to articulate detailed plans for how 

Father will care for Minor while Father is working. The plan could not be to 

leave Minor alone or to have Mother care for him, but Father, of course, never 

suggested either of those possibilities. Instead, Father presented a credible 
20

though potentially challenging approach to the work-parenting balance that 

would enlist the help of his Spanish-speaking aunt and uncle. 

Care plans to address remote working parents are almost always less 

than ideal, and a language barrier between a child and his or her caregiver

may present challenges. The law, however, does not take a child away from a 

parent based on a less than ideal situation during a parent’s working hours

or because of language barriers. (Cf. In re Isayah C., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 697 [determination of detriment should still recognize parent’s general 

right to make “reasonable decisions about where and with whom the child 

will reside”].) Moreover, the record indicates the Minor may have attachment 

issues due to “his history of interruption in caregivers.” The Department 

expressed concern about Minor’s transition to preschool. The court did not 

discuss this evidence. If anything, it would seem to support a conclusion that 

Minor would benefit from a more rapid resolution of the issue of custody, 

followed by therapeutic services, rather than have him maintain ongoing ties 

to his foster caregivers.

Lost in the juvenile court’s discussion of compliance with the 

Department’s rules “to a tee” is the fact that Father is Minor’s father. 

California law presumes that a child ought to be with a parent rather than in 

the foster system absent clear and convincing evidence that keeping the child 

with the parent would be detrimental to the child’s safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) We conclude there was 

insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding of detriment on 

disposition.

IV. Abuse of Discretion on Reunification Services

The case plan is “the foundation and central unifying tool in child 

welfare services” and is prepared by the Department to ensure that “services 
21

are provided to the child and parents” to “facilitate the safe return of the 

child to a safe home.” (§ 16501.1, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) A reunification case plan 

has several components, including the identification of specific goals and the 

appropriateness of planned services in meeting those goals. (Id., subd. (g)(2).)

We review the juvenile court’s disposition case plan for abuse of 

discretion. (In re D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1071.) “When the court 

orders a parent to participate in a program—such as parent education, 

counseling, parenting programs, etc.—the program must be ‘designed to 

eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a 

person described by Section 300.’ ” (In re M.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 412, 

424.) “In other words, the court cannot arbitrarily order services that are ‘not 

reasonably designed’ to eliminate the behavior or circumstances that led to 

the court taking jurisdiction of the child.” (Ibid.) 

Father contends that a parenting education class should not have been 

included in his case plan because he has already taken the class. It is 

entirely unclear why a parenting class would benefit Minor or Father given 

that Father had already parented his three now-adult children and his exwife testified that Father “has always been on top of everything in regards to 

his children since they were born.” But given Father’s position that he has 

already completed the class, we conclude that the error in ordering a 

parenting class was harmless. (In re M.R., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 429

[applying harmless error analysis to claim regarding case plan].) Father does 

not suggest that his participation could not be confirmed, only that he did not 

yet have written confirmation.

More troubling is the juvenile court’s order that Father submit to 

substance abuse testing. There was no evidence that Father had substance

abuse issues. “A ‘mechanical approach’ to a reunification plan is not what the 
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Legislature intended: ‘[s]uch a plan must be appropriate for each family and 

be based on the unique facts relating to that family.’ ” (In re Dino E. (1992) 

6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) At the hearing, no one testified that Father was 

using narcotics or abusing alcohol.

The Department posits that the drug testing order was within the 

court’s discretion because “[i]t was clear that [Father] had some sort of 

impairment (internal or substance induced) that caused him to be unable 

and/or unwilling to see that Mother was using drugs again and/or an unsafe

person for [Minor].” Alternatively, the Department suggests that drug 

testing would somehow sensitize Father to Mother’s addiction. These

arguments are unsupported by any evidence. The evidence showed that 

Father had no prior or current substance abuse issues and his decision to 

leave Minor with Mother was based on the fact that Father drove a truck for 

a living. No one explained to the juvenile court (or to us) why subjecting

someone who does not have a substance abuse problem to a drug test would 

help that person better understand the perils of substance abuse. The 

inclusion of substance abuse testing in Father’s reunification case plan 

constituted an abuse of discretion. 

Lastly, Father disputes any requirement that he participate in the 

parent partner program. While this program was not an explicit item in the 

written case plan, Father argues that the Department nonetheless used it 

against him at the disposition hearing and indicated that it would be used to 

measure his subsequent performance for reunification. 

Father’s point is well taken. When asked about how Father had failed 

to demonstrate a behavioral change, the social services supervisor testified 

that he had not participated in the parent partner program. When asked 

how the Department envisioned the reunification plan for Father, the 
23

supervisor testified that she would like Father to “get back engaged with a 

parent partner.” But the program was not appropriately tailored to the

circumstances of this family. (In re Dino E., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1777.) 

Father himself inquired about whether he could participate in the program 

remotely and in a manner that would work with his rotating schedule. The 

Department was unable to accommodate such arrangements. We conclude

that any inclusion of participation in the parent partner program in Father’s 

reunification case plan also constituted an abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

The April 25, 2022 disposition order is reversed to the extent it made 

findings under section 361.2 that lacked substantial evidence, and to the 

extent it ordered Father to submit to substance abuse testing and participate 

in a parent partner program. The orders are affirmed in all other respects. 

The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to: (1) vacate its 

dispositional findings under section 361.2 as to Father and its order for 

Father to participate in the reunification services stated in the case plan; 

(2) set a continued dispositional hearing at the earliest appropriate time; 

(3) direct the Department to prepare a supplemental disposition report; and 

(4) make such further orders as the court deems necessary and appropriate, 

consistent with this opinion. At the continued dispositional hearing, in the 

absence of new developments that would warrant otherwise or further and 

different evidence to support a finding of detriment by clear and convincing 

evidence, the juvenile court is directed to order placement of Minor with 

Father as required by section 361.2, subdivision (a).
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_________________________

Markman, J.*

We concur:

_________________________

Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Miller, J.

In re M.A. (A165424)

* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
25

Trial Court: Solano County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. William C. Harrison

Attorney for Defendant Appointed by Court of Appeal

and Appellant: First District Appellate Project

Danley Law, PLLC

Michelle E. Danley

Attorneys for Plaintiff Office of Solano County Counsel

and Respondent: Bernadette S. Curry

County Counsel

Carrie Blacklock

Assistant County Counsel

Clarisa P. Sudarma

Deputy County Counsel