IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-11253

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER ROBERT WEAST, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Christopher Weast appeals his conviction for receipt and possession of 

child pornography, alleging four distinct constitutional violations. We 

AFFIRM.

I

On June 4, 2012, Fort Worth Police Department officer Randy Watkins 

used peer-to-peer file sharing software1 to search for computer users sharing 

 

1 Peer-to-peer networks allow computer users to download files directly from other 

users’ computers. Typically, each network user maintains a “shared folder” on his or her 

computer containing data accessible to other users. Peer-to-peer software is used to locate 

files on other users’ computers and to transfer files between computers. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 26, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

child pornography. Officer Watkins located an IP address2 whose 

corresponding user appeared to be sharing child pornography.3 He then used 

the peer-to-peer software to download six files shared by the user. The files had 

been stored on a computer that the user had nicknamed “Chris,” and they 

contained apparent child pornography.

Officer Watkins used a publicly accessible website to determine the 

internet service provider (ISP) associated with the IP address from his search.

A subsequent subpoena to that ISP revealed that the IP address was registered 

to Larry Weast. Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Weast’s 

residence, where they found his son, Chris. Chris refused to be interviewed. 

The officers seized computer equipment from Chris’s bedroom, including a 

hard drive that was later found to contain child pornography.

Chris (hereinafter Weast) was indicted in the Northern District of Texas 

for possession and receipt of child pornography.4 The court appointed him 

counsel. Weast then moved to represent himself. After an apparently 

uneventful hearing, a magistrate judge granted his motion. Weast proceeded 

to file several garbled motions of the “sovereign citizen” variety.5 The district 

court rejected them as “nonsensical and wholly without merit” and ordered a 

new hearing on the subject of Weast’s self-representation.

 

2 An IP (Internet Protocol) address uniquely identifies a particular network-connected 

device.

3 Watkins determined this by using law enforcement software to compare a listing of 

media files that that user had shared with a law enforcement database of child pornography. 

The comparison suggested that 1,761 of the user’s shared files were known child pornography 

media files.

4 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), (a)(2)(A).

5 The sovereign citizen movement is a loose grouping of litigants, commentators, and 

tax protesters who often take the position that they are not subject to state or federal statutes 

and proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Thody, No. 14-50904, 2016 WL 104369, at *1 (5th 

Cir. Jan. 8, 2016) (“Thody believed he was a ‘sovereign citizen’ not subject to federal law. He 

therefore believed that the Internal Revenue Code did not require him to pay taxes.”).

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At the hearing, Weast was repeatedly disruptive, leading the court to 

order a competency evaluation. He was again disruptive at a subsequent 

hearing convened to discuss that evaluation’s results. The court arranged for 

him to participate from another room through an audio/video link, which the 

court could mute in case of further interruption. After hearing evidence from a 

forensic psychologist and conferring with counsel from both sides, the court 

concluded that Weast was competent but could not be allowed to represent 

himself on account of his conduct.6 It entered a 39-page order justifying its 

decision. On multiple occasions, the district court told Weast that he would be 

permitted to rejoin the proceedings in person if he would agree to behave 

appropriately. However, in subsequent appearances before the court, Weast’s 

behavior remained much the same.

Weast’s trial began on July 28, 2014 and lasted two days. The jury found 

him guilty of possession and receipt of child pornography. After further 

proceedings in which Weast continued to act disruptively, the court followed 

the sentencing guidelines and gave him 30 years in prison.

II

On appeal, Weast first claims that Officer Watkins violated his Fourth 

Amendment rights by using peer-to-peer software, without a warrant, to 

identify Weast’s IP address as possibly linked to child pornography and to 

download data that Weast had made available for sharing. Citing the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Riley v. California,7 Weast moved before trial to 

suppress all evidence obtained through these activities and the subsequent 

 

6 The court also ruled that Weast would have to participate in his trial from outside 

the courtroom, again through the audio/video link. At trial, it instructed the jurors not to 

make inferences from Weast’s absence.

7 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).

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search of the Weast household.8 The district court denied the motion, reasoning 

that Weast had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information 

accessed through the software and website. We review this conclusion of law 

de novo.9

We have never explicitly stated whether IP addresses or files shared 

through peer-to-peer networks are subject to a reasonable expectation of 

privacy. However, other circuits have concluded that they are not. As the Third 

Circuit has explained, “[f]ederal courts have uniformly held that ‘subscriber 

information provided to an internet provider,’” including IP addresses, “‘is not 

protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation’ because it is 

voluntarily conveyed to third parties.”10 Similarly, other courts have 

consistently held that Fourth Amendment protections do not extend to data 

shared through peer-to-peer networks.11

Weast acknowledges much of this unfavorable precedent, but argues 

that Riley should be understood to have wiped the slate clean. In Riley, the 

Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless 

searches of arrestees’ cell phones.12 That case relied on the presumption that 

the arrestees had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information on 

their cell phones. Unlike those arrestees, however, Weast had already 

voluntarily shared all of the information at issue in this case. He broadcast his 

 

8 The warrant for that search was based on an affidavit by Officer Watkins that relied 

in turn on evidence obtained through the peer-to-peer software.

9 See United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2015).

10 United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008)); see, e.g., United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 

825, 828 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010).

11 See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 521 F. App’x 493, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2013); United 

States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 

834, 843 (8th Cir. 2009). 12 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).

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IP address far and wide in the course of normal internet use,13 and he made 

the child pornography files and related data publicly available by downloading 

them into a shared folder accessible through a peer-to-peer network.14 Such 

behavior eliminates any reasonable expectation of privacy in the information, 

rendering Riley inapposite.15

Our recent decision in Guerrero reinforces this conclusion. In that case, 

we held that Riley did not overrule our precedent withholding Fourth 

Amendment protection from cell phone location data passively transmitted to 

service providers.16 The reasoning of Guerrero easily extends to the facts now 

before us; IP addresses and peer-to-peer-shared files are widely and 

voluntarily disseminated in the course of normal use of networked devices and 

peer-to-peer software, just as cell phone location data are disseminated in the 

course of normal cell phone use. For this reason, Weast’s Fourth Amendment 

rights were not violated when Officer Watkins accessed his IP address and 

shared files.17

 

13 See Christie, 624 F.3d at 563 (“IP addresses are also conveyed to websites that an 

internet user visits, and administrators of websites . . . can see the IP addresses of visitors to 

their sites.”).

14 See Conner, 521 F. App’x at 497 (“[P]eer-to-peer file sharing . . . programs . . . are 

expressly designed to make files on a computer available for download by the public, 

including law enforcement. Peer-to-peer software users are not mere intermediaries, but the 

intended recipients of these files. Public exposure of information in this manner defeats an 

objectively reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.”). In his prewarrant investigation, Officer Watkins could not and did not access data on Weast’s computer 

other than that stored in the shared folder.

15 See United States v. Post, 997 F. Supp. 2d 602, 606 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (Costa, J.) 

(“[Riley was] not about whether an arrestee has a privacy interest in a cellphone found in his 

possession. He maintains such an interest in both the phone and its contents. The issue [was] 

whether the justifications that overcome that privacy interest and allow for warrantless 

seizure of the phone also support warrantless search of its contents.”).

16 United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358-60 & 60 n.7 (5th Cir. 2014) (Costa, J.) 

(Riley did not overturn Supreme Court precedent finding no reasonable expectation of privacy 

in “information already in the possession of an identifiable third party”), cert. denied, 135 S. 

Ct. 1548 (2015). 17 Accord United States v. Carter, 2015 WL 5474180, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2015) 

(on essentially identical facts, denying motion to suppress and distinguishing Riley).

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III

Weast next claims that the court denied him his Sixth Amendment 

rights by refusing to let him represent himself at trial. We review this 

constitutional challenge de novo, but scrutinize the district court’s underlying 

factual findings for clear error only.18 “The denial of a defendant’s right to 

represent himself, if established, requires reversal without a harmless error 

analysis.”19

As discussed above, after Weast repeatedly disrupted pretrial hearings, 

the district court entered a lengthy and detailed order detailing his

obstreperous conduct up to that point. The court explained that Weast

consistently refused to answer basic questions (e.g., what his name was and 

whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty), interrupted the court ad 

nauseam, and “barraged the court with bizarre filings.” His behavior showed 

no sign of abating over time, and he ignored numerous entreaties from the 

bench to change tack. The court concluded that Weast was pursuing “a 

deliberate and calculated defense strategy to so disrupt the proceedings that 

they cannot go forward in a meaningful way,” and determined that absent a 

change in behavior, he could not be allowed to represent himself.

Unfortunately, no such change occurred between the time the order was 

entered and the time of trial. Weast filed more nonsensical motions, and was, 

if anything, more disruptive than before in a pretrial appearance before the 

court, a remote appearance during the trial (but outside the presence of the 

jury) to determine whether he would testify, and sentencing proceedings after 

the trial.

 

18 United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2003); Gomez v. Collins, 993 

F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1993).

19 United States v. Majors, 328 F.3d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 2003).

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These antics justified the district court’s decision. “[T]he trial judge may 

terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in 

serious and obstructionist misconduct.”20 Weast acknowledges this basic 

principle, but nonetheless claims error on two grounds. First, he argues that 

the court could not be sure he would disrupt trial without actually letting him 

represent himself at trial; that is, only if he disrupted his actual trial could the 

court constitutionally deny him self-representation. This principle is nowhere 

in our case law. Indeed, in Vernier, an unpublished case, we commented that

“a defendant’s request to represent himself at trial may be rejected if it is 

intended to cause delay or some tactical advantage” or if pretrial behavior 

suggests that the defendant intends to disrupt the trial.21 We also noted that

“[o]ther circuits hold that a trial court may deny the right of self-representation 

when evidence indicates that the defendant intends to use the right to delay or 

disrupt the trial.”22 The facts in this case closely track those in Long, in which 

we found that the defendant “may well have” waived self-representation 

through similar pretrial conduct,23 and Brock, in which the Seventh Circuit 

concluded that similar behavior did waive self-representation.24 And in 

Vernier, we upheld a denial of self-representation based solely on pretrial 

conduct, although that conduct suggested a strong risk of violence (unlike 

here).25 Given this precedent, the district court was not legally required to 

 

20 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975); see United States v. Vernier, 

381 F. App’x 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“The right [to self-representation] is 

forfeited by . . . disruptive conduct, or by abusing the dignity of the courtroom.”) (citing 

Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), and Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46).

21 Vernier, 381 F. App’x at 328-29.

22 Id. at 328. 

23 United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 726-27 (5th Cir. 2010). We concluded that this 

behavior, “coupled with [the defendant], just before trial began, having told the district court 

that he did not wish to represent himself,” resulted in waiver. Id. at 729.

24 United States v. Brock, 159 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1998).

25 Vernier, 381 F. App’x at 329.

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allow Weast to disrupt the trial itself in order to appoint him counsel against 

his wishes.

Second, Weast argues that he could have represented himself without 

causing problems by participating in the trial through the audio/video link, 

subject to the judge’s ability to mute the line. But the district court reasonably 

concluded that such an arrangement would not prevent undue disruption. 

Even after being removed from the courtroom, Weast continuously interrupted 

proceedings, refused to answer questions, and delivered nonsensical rants 

through the audio/video link, forcing the court to repeatedly mute him.26 His 

conduct was no better when he briefly returned to the courtroom during a 

pretrial hearing.

Even Weast concedes (through counsel) that his behavior was “bizarre 

and disruptive.” The district court did not clearly err in concluding that 

allowing him to represent himself, even remotely, would severely compromise 

his trial. Its consequent decision to appoint him counsel against his wishes was 

constitutionally sound.

IV

Weast next challenges the district court’s decision to limit the testimony 

of his expert witness, Bill McGregor, a digital forensics specialist. In a bench 

conference before McGregor testified, the district judge decided to limit 

McGregor’s testimony to a handful of questions. Weast’s counsel did not object. 

 

26 The evidence Weast cites in arguing that he could have represented himself 

remotely – his purportedly “success[ful]” remote cross-examination of the forensic 

psychologist during his competency hearing – hardly helps his case. After asking a few 

questions about the depth of the psychologist’s evaluation, Weast launched into a speech 

questioning the court’s authority to order a competency hearing, insisting that the judge 

recuse himself, and concluding: “I’m sorry if it doesn’t bode well with all the people that are 

sitting here from the British government, but that is the way it goes here in the United 

States. We are sovereign as – as of the Treaty of Paris 1783, so I’m not sure what we’re doing 

here. . . . I’m not your property.”

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McGregor then took the stand and testified that Weast’s computer was 

susceptible to being hacked and that digital images could be and commonly 

were altered. The court cut Weast’s counsel off when he tried to ask McGregor 

about whether viruses were present on Weast’s computer, commenting that “I 

think that’s already been developed” and “I don’t think that’s the subject we 

were dealing with.” Again, Weast’s counsel did not object.

When a defendant fails to timely object to a disputed evidentiary ruling, 

we review for plain error only.27 “Under the plain-error standard, this Court 

makes three initial determinations: (1) whether the district court committed 

error; (2) whether the error is ‘clear and obvious’; and (3) whether the error 

affects substantial rights. ‘If these three conditions are satisfied, we have 

discretion to reverse the district court if we conclude that the error ‘seriously 

affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”28

“The plain error doctrine only permits us to correct egregious errors which 

result in a miscarriage of justice.”29

The court below did not plainly err. According to Weast, McGregor’s 

testimony would have shown that the images on Weast’s computer had been 

altered, that it is impossible to tell whether a digital photo depicts a real minor, 

that Weast’s computer could have been hacked, and that virus scans showed 

 

27 See United States v. Bishop, 629 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. 

Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209 (5th Cir. 2002). It is unclear whether Weast’s challenge to the 

limits on McGregor’s testimony is constitutional or statutory in nature. His brief claims those 

limits violated his Sixth Amendment rights, but appears to apply the abuse of discretion 

standard (i.e., that applicable to evidentiary, not constitutional, rulings) in its discussion. In 

either case, however, plain error review applies. And even if it did not, any error in the ruling 

below would have been harmless for the reasons described in this section. See United States 

v. Wen Chyu Liu, 716 F.3d 159, 167 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying harmless error review in an 

evidentiary challenge based on statute), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1011 (2014); United States v. 

Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying the same standard in a challenge based 

on the Sixth Amendment).

28 United States v. Wofford, 560 F.3d 341, 351 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States 

v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir. 2007)).

29 United States v. Maceo, 947 F.2d 1191, 1198 (5th Cir. 1991).

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that Weast’s computer was vulnerable to hacking. But Weast’s counsel covered 

these issues in cross-examining the government’s expert. The district court did 

not “clear[ly] and obvious[ly]” err in excluding McGregor’s cumulative 

testimony on this point.30 Even if it had, such an error would not have affected 

Weast’s substantial rights, both because the government presented significant 

incriminating evidence31 and because Weast was able to develop the points at 

issue during cross-examination and closing argument.32

V

Finally, Weast calls our attention to two allegedly improper 

prosecutorial comments. First, in examining Officer Watkins, the prosecutor 

asked whether Weast “was . . . cooperative” during the search of the Weast 

residence (i.e., before Weast was arrested). Weast’s counsel objected and moved 

for a mistrial. The court denied the motion, but instructed the jury shortly 

thereafter:

[T]he defendant has no obligation to be cooperative with law 

enforcement, and if he chooses not to be, that’s not relevant. So to 

 

30 See, e.g., United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 894 (5th Cir. 2008).

31 At trial, prosecution witnesses testified that Officer Watkins was able to download 

apparent child pornography from a peer-to-peer user with an IP address registered to Weast’s 

father; that according to Watkins’s software, the illicit files came from a computer nicknamed 

“Chris”; that Chris had a sub-account within Weast’s father’s AT&T internet service account; 

that files on a laptop and external hard drive seized from Chris’s bedroom contained 

metadata linking them to the Weast IP address; that the laptop’s primary user account was 

labeled “Chris” and contained peer-to-peer software; that the peer-to-peer software’s shared 

folder contained child pornography; that the laptop’s registry contained numerous filenames 

suggesting child pornographic content; that the external hard drive contained child 

pornography files; that the external hard drive had been connected to the laptop in the past; 

that the peer-to-peer software on the laptop had been used to search for numerous terms 

related to child pornography; that no other devices seized from the Weast residence contained 

child pornography; that the malware present on Weast’s computer could not have transferred 

illicit files to the external hard drive; that other members of the family were not in the habit 

of using Weast’s computer equipment; and that a child depicted in several of the files was 

familiar to FBI personnel from a previous child pornography investigation. Weast does not 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against him.

32 See Sanford v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 923 F.2d 1142, 1148 (5th Cir. 1991) 

(“The exclusion of cumulative testimony is harmless.”).

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whatever extent that had been brought out, the jury is not to 

consider that for any purpose, the fact that he did not cooperate 

because he had no obligation to.

Second, during the prosecution’s closing argument, the following 

exchange transpired:

[Prosecutor:] [...] We can’t bring in here every child whose pictures 

appear because they are not all identified, but I would submit to 

you, it is -- there is one person who does know what the contents of 

that hard drive and what that laptop contain. It’s the person who 

was entering their own search –

[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, improper argument as 

to Mr. Weast’s right to remain silent. 

THE COURT: I don’t interpret it that way, but be careful. Of 

course, the defendant does have the right to remain silent. Go 

ahead.

[Prosecutor]: The person who entered in those search terms 

looking for child pornography, the person who was connected to the 

internet, the person who downloaded child pornography, the 

person whose face appears on that Western Digital hard drive.33 

Weast’s counsel moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion, but 

instructed the jury immediately after the prosecutor concluded her argument:

To whatever extent her argument might have implied that the 

defendant had any responsibility to explain the material in his 

room, or to testify, or to do anything other than to remain silent, 

the jury won’t consider it for that purpose because he did not have 

any obligation to cooperate, or to make any statement, and 

certainly had the right to not testify during this trial. So, if 

anything she said implied other than that, you’ll disregard those 

statements.

On appeal, Weast claims that these comments violated his Fifth 

Amendment right not to testify and compelled a mistrial. “Generally, we apply 

a two-step analysis to claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, we assess 

 

33 Emphasis added.

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whether ‘the prosecutor made an improper remark.’ If so, then we ask whether 

the defendant was prejudiced. The prejudice step ‘sets a high bar . . . The 

determinative question is whether the prosecutor’s remarks cast serious doubt 

on the correctness of the jury’s verdict.’ We generally look to three factors in 

deciding whether any misconduct casts serious doubt on the verdict: ‘(1) the 

magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks, (2) the efficacy 

of any cautionary instruction by the judge, and (3) the strength of the evidence 

supporting the conviction.’”34

The prosecutor’s “cooperative” question might plausibly be interpreted 

to refer to Weast’s pre-arrest silence, especially since Officer Watkins had 

stated shortly before that he had “asked Christopher Weast to speak with me 

in my car.”35 However, in order for the question to potentially rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation, this interpretation must be more than plausible. 

Instead, “[a] prosecutor’s or witness’s remarks constitute comment on a 

defendant’s silence if the manifest intent was to comment on the defendant’s 

silence, or if the character of the remark was such that the jury would naturally 

and necessarily so construe the remark.”36 The comment at issue fails to clear

these hurdles.37 More fundamentally, this court has not yet decided whether a 

prosecutor may comment on a non-testifying defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-

 

34 United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 677 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Fields, 483 F.3d, 313, 358 (5th Cir. 2007)).

35 See United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 381 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he character of the 

remarks [is] determined by reviewing the context in which they occur . . . .”).

36 United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 779 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. 

Andaverde–Tinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 520 (5th Cir. 2013)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2821 (2015).

37 See United States v. Schaffer, 582 F. App’x 468, 475 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) 

(“[I]t is difficult to see how the jury could consider the vague remark, ‘wasn’t being 

cooperative,’ as a comment on [defendant’s] silence.”).

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Miranda silence.38 Weast’s challenge to the “cooperative” comment is therefore 

on uncertain footing.39

The prosecutor’s comments during closing argument are similarly 

ambiguous. In isolation, they could be plausibly be interpreted to refer to 

Weast’s silence at trial, in violation of his Fifth Amendment and due process 

rights.40 But in context, and especially given the sentence immediately after 

the disputed statement, the thrust of the comments was arguably that the user 

who had entered search terms related to child pornography (presumably 

Weast) must have known about the illicit files, not that Weast’s silence 

suggested that he knew of the files.41 The fact that the prosecutor addressed 

the defense’s “virus argument” (i.e., that the files may have been remotely 

added to Weast’s computer without his knowledge) shortly before and 

immediately after the disputed comment supports this reading.

Moreover, even assuming that the comments in dispute were improper, 

Weast cannot show that the impropriety casts serious doubt on the verdict. The 

prejudicial effect of the comments is uncertain, given that they did not directly 

reference Weast’s silence and are reasonably susceptible to interpretations 

having nothing to do with that silence. Any possible prejudice would have been

further diminished by the district court’s prompt, thorough, and unequivocal 

 

38 See United States v. Ashley, 664 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussing the circuit 

split on this issue). The Fifth Circuit has “taken the position that the prosecution can use a 

non-testifying defendant’s pre-arrest silence as long as the silence ‘is not induced by, or a 

response to, the actions of a government agent.’” Id. at 604 n.6 (quoting United States v. 

Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 758 (5th Cir. 2007). However, Weast’s lack of cooperation was arguably 

“induced by, or a response to” Officer Watkins’s request.

39 For the reasons described in this section, the court need not resolve this issue in 

order to dispose of Weast’s appeal.

40 See Salinas, 480 F.3d at 756.

41 The government’s expert testified that someone using Weast’s computer had 

entered search terms related to child pornography into a peer-to-peer program. The 

government also submitted an exhibit containing these search terms. See also United States 

v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 424 (5th Cir. 1984) (allegedly improper closing argument must be 

“considered in light of the argument to which it responded”).

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curative instructions.42 Finally, the prosecution’s evidence is robust enough to 

sustain his conviction in any event. Therefore, the comments in question do 

not justify reversal.

VI

Each of Weast’s four arguments fails. We find no reversible error in the 

judgment of the district court, and AFFIRM.

 

42 Cf. United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 399 (5th Cir. 1997) (prejudice “was 

mitigated somewhat . . . . [but] remained” when judge gave brief and somewhat confusing 

curative instruction one day after improper prosecutorial comment). The district court in this 

case also gave standard instructions concerning the defendant’s right to remain silent at the 

open and close of evidence.

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