This settlement was entered into the record on March 4, 2014. 

Hall served notice of his charging lien in both actions on March 13, 2014. 

Escrow closed, with Oswalt and Gerber acquiring the Currivans' property, 

on June 27, 2014. Prior to escrow closing, Oswalt and Gerber moved to 

strike Hall's liens and Hall moved to adjudicate them. The district court 

granted the motion to strike, finding that the liens did not attach to the 

settlement proceeds because Hall did not serve notice of the liens prior to 

the settlement being placed on the record. This writ petition followed.' 

In his writ petition, Hall argues that he has valid charging 

liens that attached to the Currivans' escrow payment, while Oswalt and 

Gerber argue that Hall did not diligently perfect his liens, that the liens 

cannot attach to the March 4 settlement, and that, because he was 

discharged, Hall cannot assert the charging liens because he did not 

obtain the settlement for his client. The sought-after writs are available 

to correct a district court's arbitrary or capricious abuse of discretion or 

actions taken in excess of jurisdiction. NRS 34.160; NRS 34.320; see also 

Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury & Standish, 

125 Nev. 527, 531, 216 P.3d 779, 782 (2009) (reviewing de novo the 

validity of a charging lien); Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. 

Court, 124 Nev. 193, 198, 179 P.3d 556, 559 (2008) ("Statutory 

1A writ petition is the appropriate method through which an 

attorney may challenge an adverse decision adjudicating an attorney's lien 

in the client's litigation because the attorney himself, as opposed to the 

client, has no right of appeal from the underlying action. NRS 34.170; 

NRS 34.330; Albert D. Massi, Ltd. v. Bellmyre, 111 Nev. 1520, 1521, 908 

P.2d 705, 706 (1995). We reject Oswalt's and Gerber's argument that 

Hall's ability to file a separate action to collect on the fee agreements is an 

adequate legal remedy precluding writ relief. 

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interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo, even in the 

context of a writ petition."). 

A charging lien may attach to money or property if notice of 

the lien is served prior to the recovery. NRS 18.015(3), (4)(a). Here, Hall 

served notice of his charging liens on March 13, after the March 4 

settlement. In general, the charging liens would not attach to a 

settlement in these circumstances, because the liens were not perfected 

until after the settlement. Id. But in this case, the March 4 settlement 

was a contingent settlement, dependent upon Oswalt's and Gerber's 

ability to raise $1.5 million to complete the $2.7 million purchase of the 

property; if they had not raised the money, the escrow funds would have 

been returned to the Currivans and other defendants. In this 

circumstance, where the settlement agreement remained executory, the 

client has not yet "recovered" the proceeds, as required by NRS 

18.015(4)(a). Leventhal v. Black & LoBello, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 50, 305 

P.3d 907, 910 (2013) (holding that a charging lien may only attach to an 

affirmative recovery, or the tangible fruits of the attorney's services). 

Thus, the March 4 settlement had not produced a recovery to which Hall's 

March 13 charging liens could attach. 

Once the purchase was completed, however, the acquired real 

property was an "affirmative recovery" gained through settlement to 

which charging liens could attach. Id. ("This 'fruit' is generally money, 

property, or other actual proceeds . . . ."); see also NRS 18.015(4)(a) 

(stating that a charging lien may attach "to any money or property" that is 

recovered). Accordingly, because Hall had previously perfected his 

charging liens by serving the required notice, the liens attached to the real 

property on June 27. 

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In this regard, we reject Oswalt's and Gerber's argument that 

an attorney who is discharged or withdraws prior to the client's recovery of 

money or property may not assert a charging lien against the recovery. 

NRS 18.015(1)(a) provides that an attorney in whose hands "any claim, 

demand or cause of action . . . has been placed" has a charging lien. Thus, 

it is not necessary for the attorney to have recovered a judgment himself 

in order to assert a charging lien; it is only necessary that the client has 

hired the attorney to perform work on the matter. See Cope v. Woznicki, 

140 P.3d 239, 241 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that "claims and demands in 

suit" was listed separately from judgments in the Colorado charging lien 

statute and concluding that it is not necessary for an attorney himself to 

obtain a judgment in order for the attorney to assert a charging lien). 

Having concluded that Hall has valid charging liens that 

attached to Oswalt's and Gerber's June 27 acquisition of the Currivans' 

property in consummation of the March 4 settlement, we decline to 

consider the parties' remaining arguments. The district court has not yet 

considered the parties' arguments concerning the value of Hall's charging 

liens, including whether the claimed fee agreements are valid or what 

they provide, whether Hall should instead be compensated in quantum 

meruit, what portion of the settlement and sale may be attributed to the 

personal injury and real property actions, or whether the amounts claimed 

by Hall are reasonable under the Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 

85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969), factors. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK 

OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PROHIBITION instructing the 

district court to vacate its order striking Hall's charging liens, to enter an 

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J. 

order denying Oswalt's and Gerber's motion to strike, and to conduct 

further proceedings consistent with this order. 

Gibbons 

91Le, J. 

Pickering 

cc: Hon. Lynne K. Simons, District Judge 

Glade L. Hall 

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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