IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48369

In the Interest of: John Doe I and John Doe II, Children Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. ) ) ) ) STATE OF IDAHO , DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE,

Petitioner

- Respondent ,

v.
JANE DOE (2020

- 40) , Respondent

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: January 14, 2021
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis
, Magistrate

. Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed

. Anthony Geddes
, Ada County Public Defender; Karen L. Jennings , Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Peter A. Mommer , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

____________________

____________________________ LORELLO, Judge Jane Doe (2020

- 40) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights

. W e affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Doe is the mother of the two minor children in this action, bo rn in 2018 and 2019

. Doe is intellectually disabled and has substance abuse issues

. Intelligence testing indicates that Doe’s overall thinking and reason ing abilities are lower than 98 percent of others in her age group. Doe’s
low

- cognitive function make s her susceptible to influence by others , which has contributed to hersubstance abuse issues. In combination, these factors led to the removal of the children from Doe’s

care and the eventual termination of her parental rights

. Doe’s involvement with the Id aho Department of Health and Welfare arose from a police investigation. O fficers investigating a hit

- and

- run accident in a hotel parking lot discovered Doe’s
older child at age nine weeks in one of the hotel rooms where Doe and four other adults were usin g drugs. There was a baggie of methamphetamine an inch from the child’s hand and a tube for snorting drugs under his blanket. The child’s diaper bag contained marijuana fragments and a baby spoon dusted with methamphetamine. When questioned
, Doe told of ficers that the previous night she had used methamphetamine and that the child had suffered seizures, vomiting, stopped breathing, and became “wobbly like Jell

- O .” Despite believing that the child might die, Doe simply patted him on the bac k a few time s t o revive him. Doe indicated that she did not seek
medical attention for the child out of fear that doing so would result in the discovery of her illegal
activities

. Based upon Doe’s drug use in the child’s presence and her failure to seek medical care
for him , officers removed the child from Doe’s care and arrested her f or felony injury to a child and various drug offenses. Doe eventually pled guilty to felony injury to a child, resulting in her being placed on probation and the entr y of a no

- contact order between Doe and the child that
allowed Doe only supervised contact with the child “as permitted ” by the Department. After a shelter care hearing , the magistrate court placed the child into the custody of the
D epartment and later app roved a case plan for Doe. While the child protection action involving the older child was pending, Doe gave birth to the younger child who is the second subject of this

case . The Department filed an amended petition under the Child Protection Act to inc lude the younger child. The magistrate court placed the younger child into the Department’s custody and

appro ved an updated case plan

. Ultimately, the Department petitioned to terminate Doe’s parental rights. After finding clear and convincing evidence that Doe neglected the children and that
termination i s in the children’s best interests , the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights

. 1 Doe appeals.

1 The magistrate court also terminated the parental rights of the older child’s father. That decision is not at issue in this appeal. The younger child’s father remains unidentified

.II.
ANALYSIS
D oe argues that the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights b ecause the Department’s reunification efforts were inadequate in light of her intellectual disability. The
D epartment responds that Doe waived this argument by failing to identify a specific error by the magistrate court , cit e pertinent portions of the record , o r suppor t her position with relevant legal authority. We hold that Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s termination decision.
To obtain review of an issue on appeal, appellants must identify the issue in their initial
brief and provide su pporting arguments along with citations to relevant legal authority. See I.A.R. 35; Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare v. Doe , 152 Idaho 263, 267, 270 P.3d 1048, 1052 (2012)

. Assertions of error that are not stat ed with particularity and suppor ted with relevant legal authority are too indefinite for consideration. See I.A.R. 35(a)(6); In re Doe , 166 Idaho 720, 727, 462 P.3d 1184, 1191 (Ct. App. 2020)

. General attacks on the findings and conclusions of a trial court that lack reference to specific evidentiary or legal errors are insufficient to preserve an issue.
See Doe , 166 Idaho at 727, 462 P.3d at 1191. In short, a party waives an issue on appeal i f either argument or authority is lacking. I n re Doe (2018

- 24) , 164 Idaho 143, 147, 426 P.3d 1243, 1247 (2018). At the conclusion of the termination hearing, t he magistrate court found that more than twenty

- three months had elapsed since the removal of th e older child from Doe’s care and that
Doe fail ed to comply with her case pl an and remain ed unable to recognize safety concerns or provide basic parenting for the children throughout that period

. For example, Doe relapsed on marijuana within months of the termination hearing
, remained unable to recognize cues from the children regarding hunger and discomfort , and could not even properly prepare a bottle. The magistrate court acknowledged Doe’s love for her chi ldre n and desir e to parent them. However, despite this and the “extra lengths” taken by the Department over twenty

- three months to reunify Doe with the children, Doe was unable to overcome her substance abuse issues and intellectual disabilities to improve her parenting

. Consequently, the magistrate court found that Doe had neglected the children 2 and that termination i s in the children’s best interests.

2 The magistrate court found that Doe neglected the older child under I. C. § 16

- 2002(3)(b) by failing to comply with the case plan while the child was in the Department’s custody for fifteen of the previous twenty

- two months and I.C. § 16

- 2002(3)(a) by leaving him without properDoe’s opening (and only) appellate brief identifies no specific error in the magistrate

court’s evidentiary rulings , nor a particularized flaw in a factual finding or legal conclusion supporting the decision to terminate her parental rights

. N either does Doe dispute that her conduct and omissions in this case constitute neglect under the relevant statutory definitions

. R ather, Doe challenges the magistrate court’s termination decision with a vague assertion that the Department’ s reunification efforts were inadequate due to her intellectual disabilities

. Doe implies that the Department’s reunification efforts provided her “no hope for reunification within th e time
allowed

. ” However, Doe neither describes the reunification efforts she actually received nor where she objected to th em as inadequate in the proceedings below. Even on appeal, Doe has not specified how th e Department’s reunification efforts were insufficient , nor what additional efforts
she contends were necessary

-- other than a conclusory assertion that this case called for more than
the “usual services.” Conclusory allegations and assertions of fact, wit hout citation to the record below, are not sufficient to support an argument on appeal. I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Doe , 166 Idaho at 727, 462 P.3d at 1191. We will not search the record for error. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe , 150 Idaho 103, 113, 244 P. 3d 247, 257 (Ct. App. 2010)

. Accordingly, we will not scour the record in an attempt to discern where or how Doe believes the Department’s reunification efforts came up short. Moreover, e ven if this Court assumed the Department’s reunification efforts were inadequate
, Doe’s arguments would still not be considered. Doe ’s opening brief cites no legal authority to support her argument that the allegedly inadequate reunification efforts in her child

protection case are relevant in her termination proceedi ng. Indeed, the law in Idaho is to the contrary. See In re Doe I , 164 Idaho 883, 890, 436 P.3d 1232, 1239 (2019) (observing that a trial court’s findings regarding the reasonableness of the Department’s reunification efforts are
irrelevant in termination proceedings). Nor does Doe cite legal authority establishing her intellectual disability as a defense to the magistrate court’s neglect findings. This precludes further
consideration of the issue. See In re Doe I , 166 Idaho 79, 83

- 84, 454 P.3d 1162, 1166

- 67 (2019)

. We will not construct and support Doe’s arguments for her. Doe’s failure to cite supporting authority in her appellate b rief precludes consideration of the merits of her arguments. See id.

parental care and control. With regard to the y ounger child, the magistrate court found that Doe committed neglect only under I.C. § 16

- 2002(3)(a) by leaving the younger child without proper parental care and control.I II

. CONCLUSION
Doe neither identified a speci fic error by the magistrate court nor cited relevant legal authority to support her argu ment s on appeal. Consequently, w e will not consider the merits of Doe’s argument that the magistrate court erred by terminating her parental rights because the Departm ent’s reunification efforts were inadequate in light of her intellectual disability. Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed. Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR

.