### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00191- CR NO. 03-03-00192- CR

Lar r y R alp h Ell iot t, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WILLI AMSO N COUNTY , 277TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 02-2 56- K2 77 & 02-2 57- K2 77, H ONO RAB LE KEN ANDERSON, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
O n J anuar y 15, 2002, appellant L arr

y Ralph Elliot drove his truck into a g roce ry store, killing one woma

n and ser iously

injuring a

nother. He was indicted f or murder

and aggr av ated assault. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. §§ 19.02 (West 2003) , 22.02 (West Supp. 2004-05). On Fe bruar y 13 , 2 00 2, a

jur y fo un d a pp e lla nt i nc omp e te nt t o s tand

tr ia l but li ke ly

to reg ain c omp e te nc e wi th treatment. On J anuar

y 13, 2003, another jury was empane led to re-e x amine appe llant’s competenc y and, af ter a hear ing, f

ound appellant c ompet ent to stand trial. On F ebrua ry 3, trial beg an bef

ore a third jury , and appellant pleade d not guilty by rea son of insanity

. The jury found appe llant guilty

of both counts, sentencinghim to li fe imprisonment for the mur der a nd twenty y ear s’ conf

inement for the a ssa ult

. On a pp e a l, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t oAt the time of appe llant’s conviction, incompetenc y hear ings w ere g overne d by section 1 46.02 of the c ode of c riminal proce dure. See Ac t o f M ay 26, 1999, 76th L eg ., R.S., ch. 561, § 1, 19 99 Te x. Ge n. L aws 30 92 , 3 09 2- 93 (r e pe a le d, c ur re nt ve rs ion a t Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 46B.003)

. I n 2003, the leg islature re peale d section 46.02 and e nacte d chapte r 46B in its pl ace . See Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt s. 46 B .0 01 -. 17 1 ( Wes t Su pp . 2 00 4- 05 ). Th e langua g e of a rt ic le 46B.003 is identica l to that used in section 46.02, § 1A, se e id . a rt . 4 6B .0 03 (a ), the re fo re we wi ll c ite to the curr ent statute for

convenie nce. 2 support the finding that he was c ompetent to stand trial and that the e vidence is factua lly insufficient to support the reje ction of his insanity defe nse. We aff

irm the judg ments of conviction.
Com petency t o Stand Trial I n h is f ir st and se c on d iss ue s on a pp e a l, a pp e lla nt c on te nd s that the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the jur y ’s fi nd ingthat he wa s c omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l. Standard of Review A p e rs on is i nc omp e te nt t o s tand

tr ia l if he e ith e r la c ks a su ff ic ie nt p re se nt a

bil ity to consult with his attorney

with a re asonable deg ree of rational understandingor lac ks a rational and fac tual understandingof t he procee dings ag ainst him. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003( a) 1 ( W e s tS u p p . 2 0 0 4

- 0 5 )

. A d e f

e n d an ti s p r e s u m e d

t o b e c o mp e t e n tu n l e s s p r o v e d o t h e r w i s e b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Id ., ar t . 46B.003( b). Howe ver, onc e a de fenda nt has bee n adjudicate d incompetent, the burden shifts to the State to prove be y ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant has re g ained c ompetence to stand trial. Ar no ld v . S tat e , 87 3 S.W. 2d

27 , 3 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Ma nn ing

v . S tat e , 730 S.W .2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). When th e St a te b e ar s th e b u r d e n in a c o mp e te n c y h e ar in g , w e r e v ie w th e fac tual
su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e su

pp or tin g a fi nd ing of

c omp e te nc e by

a sk ingwh e the r, c on sid e ri nga llAl so re fe rr e d to a s th e Ve rn on State Ho sp ita l. 2 3 the evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht, the jury was rationally

justified in finding c ompetence bey ond a
rea sonable doubt. Se e Zun iga v . S tat e , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing and clar ifying sta

ndard of revie w applied to beyond-a- rea sonable-doubt burdens of proof). The evidenc e may be insuffic ient if evidenc e of c ompetence is too we ak to support a finding of compe tence when viewed a lone or if e vid en ce of incompetenc e is so strong that the beyond-a- rea sonable-doubt standard c ould n o t h av e b ee n met. Id . at 484-85. Evidenc e may “pre ponderate” in fa

vor of competenc e but still be outweig hed by contra ry p ro o f an d t hus be fa ctually insufficient unde r the bey ond-a- rea sonable-doubt standa rd. Id . at 485.
Fa c tua l Su mm ar

y The pa rties ag ree that appellant suffe rs from para noid sc hizophrenia, dating back at le a st to 19 88 or

19 89 . D r. Mic ha e l Jume s w a s Ch ie f P sy c ho log ist of the No rt h T e xas S ta te Hospital’s Competency R estoration Prog ram whe n appellant wa s admitted to the hospital after

2 being found incompete nt in Febr uary 2002. J umes testified that while at th e h o s p i t al , appellant recei v ed tre atment that included medic ation, formal tra ining to help him under stand court proce dures, stre ss manag ement, and c lasses t o h el p him understand his medica l condition and medications. J umes testified that appe llant made substantial prog ress a nd, as of Apr il 24, 2002, was leg a ll y c o mp e te nt a

n d d is p la y ed an unde rstanding of the diff ere nce be tween f

elony and misdemea

nor char g es, the possible rang es of punishment, the conseque nces of being found g uilty , and basic leg al
conce pts like use of evidenc e, plea barg ains, and the roles of juries, judge s, and attorne y s. AppellantHa wk ins did no t ha

ve a ll o f a pp e lla nt’ s r e c or ds fr om s e ve ra l mo nth s h e sp e nt i n a pr ivate ly 3 run j ail in the s ummer and f all of 2002, and the rec ords she ha d show that for se vera l months i n 2002 appellant’ s medications wer e cut in half by the private jail’s psy chiatrist. Appellant was broug ht ba c k t o W i l l i a m s o n C o u n t y i n O c t o b e r 2 0 0 2 s o h e c o u l d b e m o n i t o r e d m o r e c l o s e l y , a ndhis medications we re inc rea sed ag ain. 4 was discha

rg ed on May 17, 2002. J umes testified that a pe rson ca n slip in and out of competenc e, wh ic h is wh y

Jume s r e c omm e nd e d th a t a pp e lla nt r e c e ive c on tin

uin g ps y c hiatr ic se rv ic e s. Dr. Mar y Ander son was appointed by the trial cour

t to evaluate a

ppel l ant’s
c omp e te nc y . Sh e saw appel lant f ive tim e s, fi rs t in

la te Janu ary

20 02 and , mo st r e c e ntl y , s ho rt ly befor e the January

2003 competenc y

hear ing. A nderson testified that in January 2002 appellant wa s havin g se ve re sy

mpt oms su c h as a hig h d e g re e of pa ra no ia , w hic h le d h im t o r e fu se to e a t be c a us e he believe d his food was poisoned, a nd i n t en s e au ditory

hallucinations on which he was ve ry focuse d. Although a

ppellant fa ctually

knew what the situation was and who the va rious people we re in the courtroom, he could not interac t in a rea sonably coher ent way

due to his distracting auditory h al lucinations. Anderson te stified that appellant’ s sy mptoms had since lessene d and, althou gh appellant sti ll repor

ted hearing voices, he understood that “the voices wer e comingfrom his hea d,” and Ande rson believe d he wa s competent to stand trial in January 2003. The State also called Annette Ha wkins, who overse es the medic al depa rtment of the Willi a mso n Co un ty

She ri ff ’s De pa rtme nt. Ha

wk ins te sti fi e d

t h a t a p p e l l a nt ’ s r e c o r d s s h o w t

hat w hil e in jai l af t er h i s hospital discharg e in May 2002 he had r ece ived and take n his medications as presc ribed. Finally , the State introduce d a letter written on May 2, 2002, by Dr. Thomas Wiman, 3 Competency

Prog ram Psy chiatrist for the North Texas State Hospital, stating that it was his opinion that a pp e lla nt w a s c omp e te nt t o s tand tr ia l.5 Discussion Appellant asser

ts that no rational jury

could have found beyond a re asonable doubt that he wa s c o mp e te n t to s ta n d tr ia l, ar g u in g th a t, e xc e p t f o r D r . A n d e r s o n , th e d o c to r s h a d not
ex am i n edh i m re ce n t l y

en o u gh t o p ro v e t h at h e wa s cu rr en t l y co mp et en t
. W e d i s agr ee . Al t h o u gh J umes and Wiman formed the ir opinions in late April and ea rly May 2002, their opinions were rele vant in dete rmining w hether appellant ha d responde d to competenc y treatment. Anderson testified that she s aw ap p ell ant for a bout an hour the w eek be fore the compete ncy trial in J anuar

y 2003. Ba sed on that and he r other examinations of appellant, Ander son opined that appellant wa s
c omp e te nt. Jume s bel ie ve d ap pe lla nt co uld ma int a in co mpe te nc y wi th me dic a tio n an d p sy c hiatr ic
c ar e , an d th e r e w a s e v id e n c e th a t a p p e ll an t h a d

c o n ti n u e d

to ta k e h is p r e s c r ib e d

me d ic a ti o n . We ho ld t hat the St a te me t it s b ur de n a nd that th e e vid e nc e is b oth le g a lly and fa c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o support a finding , bey ond a re asonable doubt, that appellant had re g ained his compe tence and wa s
c omp e te nt t o s tand

tr ia l. We ov e rr

ule a pp e lla nt’ s f ir st a nd se c on d is su e s o n a

pp e a l.
Sani tyatth e Tim e of t he Offen se I n h is thir d is su e , a

pp ell ant conte nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o support the jury ’s re

jection of his insanity

defe nse. Standard of Review I nsanity is an aff irmat i v e defense to pr osecution. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.01(a) (West 2003). When a def endant a sserts an a ffirmative defe nse, he bear s the burde n of proof on that6

issue, and in re viewing the evidence s upporting a jury ’s finding on an af firmative de fense , we consider all of the e vidence and dete rmine whe ther the judg ment is so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evidenc e as to be manifestly unjust. Zuniga , 144 S.W. 3d a t 48 2; Bi gb yv . S tat e , 892 S.W .2d 864, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A defe ndant pleading insanity who has not alre ady been a djudicated insane has t he burde n of provingby a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that he w as insane at the time of

the offe nse. Manning , 7 30 S.W. 2d a t 74 8; see Te x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt
. 46.03, § 1(c) (West Supp. 2004-05).

A p e rs on is c on sid e re d le g a lly

ins ane if , a s a re su lt of a

se ve re me nta l il lne ss, he did not know at the time the offe nse was committed that his conduct was wrong . Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.01(a) . Medica l insanity is disti ng uishable fr om leg al insanity and a pe rson m ay

be me dic all

y insane, y et s till be able to disti ng uish right f rom wrongand thus be legally sane. Tay lor v . S tat e , 856 S.W .2d 459, 468 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1993), aff’d , 885 S.W .2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Grah am v . S tat e , 566 S.W .2d 941, 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). The que stion is not whether a def endant knows his ac t was “mora lly ” wr ong , but is whether he “unde rstood the nature and quality

of his action and w hether it was an act he oug ht to do”; in other words, whe ther he knew the ac t was wrongby

societal standa

rds. Bigby , 892 S.W .2d at 878. Th e de te rm inatio n o f w he the r a de fe nd ant w a s le g a lly

ins ane a t t h e t i m e of the of fe ns e is an issue “e x clusively within the province of the jury ,” and it is for the jury to determine the weig ht and cr edibility

of witness testimony

and to de termine whether to a cce pt or reje ct all or any part of the opinion testimony

g iven by experts an d o t h er lay -witnesses. Taylor , 8 56 S.W. 2d a t 46 8; see Graham , 5 66 S.W. 2d

a t 95 2; se e als o A sc hb ac her v. Stat e , 61 S.W .3d 532, 537 (Tex. App.—San7

An tonio 20 01 , pe t. r e f’ d) (j ur y a c te d r e a so na

bly in i ts r e so lut ion

of c on fl ic tin g e vid e nc e a s to de fe nd ant’ s sa

nit y ); Sa nd e rs v . S tat e , 771 S.W .2d 645, 649 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1989, pet. ref ’d) (jury is sole judge of we ight a

nd cre dibilit y

to be g iven conf

licting e x pert testimony

).
Fa c tua l Su mm ar

y The pa rties a gr e e th a

t a p p e ll a nt s u f f e r s f r o m p a r a n o id s c h izophrenia and ha s delusions that people are try ing to take his l and and stop him from owninghorses a nd that sever al doctors ha d in the past conspire d ag ainst him, rende ring him sterile and implanting in his teeth microphones that broadc ast his thoughts. Appe llant has suffe red f rom his mental illness since at l ea s t 1 9 8 7 and eventua lly

had to stop working and go on medical disabili ty leave

. I n the fall of 2001, appellant’s doctor, Dr. J ames Kr eisle, beg an cha ng ing a ppellant’s medication because appellant wa s suffer ing fr o m s i d e e f

f e c t s an d h i s s y

mp t o m s w e r e r e tu r

n i n g . T o e f

f e c t t h e dr u g c h an g e , K

r e isl e g ra du a lly decr ease d the dosag e of the old medication, ca lled Serentil, as he incre ased the dosag e of the ne w dr ug , c a lle d Se ro qu e l.

Michae l Wi lliams was prese nt when appellant drove his truck int o the g roce ry store. Wil liams describe d appellant’ s demea nor af ter the of fense , saying that appellant seeme d dazed and expressionless, “like he ha d just g otten in trouble. I mean like a kid that just got ca

ug ht or something with his hands in the c ookie jar or whateve r. He just kind of stood there, you know, like he ha d done something w rong .” A se cond witness desc ribed a ppellant as having a “blank look on his fac e.” A third w it n e s s s a id th a t a f

te r th e in c id e n t, a

p p e ll an t c a lm ly a d mi tt e d to b e in g th e dr iv er. I n an interview with police offic ers a fter the offe nse, appe llant stated he wa s g oing to the store to buy g roce ries when he “snappe d.” He said he did not know what ha ppened, did not know why he wa s8

u p s e t , an d d i d n o t r e m e mb e r dr i v i n g i n t o t h e s t o r e . H e s a i d , “ I g u e s s I m u s th a v e j u s tw e n tc r a z y. That’s a ll I know.” Appe llant told the police that he had sc hizop h re n i a an d had re g ular doc tor appointments becau s e he “ was he aringvoices” that wer e trying to take his property . Asked what
ma de him ang ry , he sa id, “ Som e bo dy did so me thi ngto m e and

my lif e is o ve r w ith .” He a lso tol d the police that he was a fra id to sleep. One of the interview ing of

fice rs testified that h e believe d appellant r emember ed more than he a dmitted and was a shamed of w hat he ha d done.

Psy chiatrist Dr. Richa

rd Coons testified that he examined a ppellant the day

afte r the off e n s e . H e a ls o r e v ie w e d

a p p e ll an t’ s me d ic a l r e c o r d s , r e c o r d s an d s tate me n ts a

b o u t t h e offe nse,
and a pp e lla nt’ s p oli c e int e rv ie w. He te sti fi e d that he be lie ve d a pp e lla nt w a s le g a lly

sa ne a t th e tim e he committed the off

ense. Coons testified t hat appellant felt t hat he had been harmed by doctors and others, g rewang ry , could not fig ure out a solution, and committed “an ang ry g ener al act,” driving int o th e sto re . Co on s sai d tha t this “g e ne ri c a c t of ang e r” wa s c omb ine d w itha pp e lla nt’ s d e lus ion s, bu t he did no t be lie ve a

pp e lla nt wa s un a

ble to un de rs tand that hi s a c t w a s w ro ng . In o the r w or ds , appellant kne w his a ction was wr ong , but his ang er ove rwhe lmed him; C oons compare d appellant’ s act to g etting in a

fig ht or brea

king something and re g retting it later. Coons said appellant’ s failure to consider c onsequenc es is not an inability to understand rig ht a

nd wrong . Coons also testified that he did not believe a

ppellant was una

b l e t o think things throug h and stated that an urg e to exact
re ve ng e fo r i ma g ine d h arm do e s n ot e qu a te to ins anit y . Coo ns po int e d to a

pp e lla nt’ s st a te me nts

— that he knew he had “me ssed up,” that he had stopped himself fr om acting on violent urg es in the past, and that he had decided not t o hit a police off icer beca use he w ould ge t in trouble—as showing that appellant “ rec og nized the ramifications of doing those violent acts and de cided a g ainst them.”Whether a de fenda nt is unable to confor

m his conduct to the law is no long er a n element 4 of the insanity

inquiry

. See Act of Ma

y 24, 1973, 63d L eg ., R.S., ch. 399, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. L aws 883, 896 (ele ment deleted by Act of Ma

y 25, 1983, 68th L eg ., R.S., ch. 454, § 1, 1983 Te x . Gen. L aws 2640, 2640). 9 Coons said it appeare d that appellant “ had an i rr es i s tible impuls e and a cted on it,” noting that the irresistible impulse conce pt had been r emoved f rom the insanity

statute about twenty

y ear s ear lier. 4 Coons testified that, even if a ppellan t ’s medications we re not e ffe ctive whe n he committed the offe nse, he sti l l wo u l d have know n that it was wrongto drive into the store. Coons believe d

a pp e lla nt’ s a c t, t ho ug h “ no t hi g hly

tho ug ht o ut, ” wa s in te nti on a l. Dr. Ande rson, the cour

t-appointed psy chiatrist, testified that she examined appe llant five times and r eviewe d some of his medica l rec ords, police r eports, and his police interview. An de rs on a g re e d tha t a

pp e lla nt s uf fe rs fr om a

se ve re me nta l il lne ss b ut t e sti fi e d th a t he no ne the le ss knew his conduc t was wrongand that he was sane at the time he committed the offe nse. She base d her opinion on statements by appellant tha t : he fe lt remorse f or committing the of

fense ; if he had thought about it he would have controlled himself; he kne w it would be wrongto kill t he doctor s he believed ha d conspired a g ainst him; som eone w ould stop him , and he w ould g et in tr ouble if he trie d to bring a wea

pon to a n appointment with one of the doctors; and he “wa nted to g o afte r” those he believed ha d harme d him but “didn’t know how to do it” or how “to ge t away with it.” Appellant tol d A nd e rs on , “ Ima de a mis take . Ins te a d o f g oin g a ft e r som e bo dy that do ne me wr on g . . . I jus t made a mistake. . . . Iwasn’t thinking and w ent i n the wrongplace .” Ande rson testified that10

appellant sa id he was a

ng ry at the time of the of

fe n s e, an d she believe d that when he said he “snappe d,” he me ant that he a cted on his ang er. A ppellant told Anderson that if his mother or the police had be en pre sent, he woul d not have c ommitt ed the of fense . Ander son summarized her opinion as follows: “Ithink he was menta lly ill; and I think h e k n ew t hat hurting somebody was wrong ; and I

think he knew dr iving into the store w as wrong .” Psy chiatrist Dr. Scott Murry testified on appellant’ s behalf. Mur ry treated appe llant while he wa s in jai l a t o t al of seve nteen times; the first session wa s on J anuar y 23, 2002. Murry testified that some suffe rer s of par anoid schizophrenia be l i eve they are hear ing voic es and c annot be talked out of

that belief. Schizophrenia is tre ated throug h medications that are supposed to stop suffe rer s from hea

ring voices, a llow them to give up the ir delusions, and help with conce ntration and org aniz ation. Murry

testified that if a pe rson stopped taking his medications, he would expect
au d i t o ry h al l u ci n at i o n s an d o t h er s y mp t o m s t o re tu rn . He al s o s t at edt h at l o n g-p re s cr i b eddru gs sometimes lose eff

ectivene ss over time. He testified that a patient’s eating, sleeping , and bathing le ss, wo rr y ing and a c tin g a g itate d, and havin g “ a g e ne ra l g oin g do wnhil l pe rc e pti on ,” c ou ld i nd ic a te the re turn of auditory

hallucinations or par anoia. Murry test i fi edt h at h e b el i ev edt h at o nJ an u ary 1 5 , 2 0 0 2 , ap p el l an t“w as u n aw ar e that his actions wer e wrong ” and that he w as statutorily insane whe n he drove his truck into the g roce ry store. Murry came to that c onclusion beca use appellant said he was not thinking ab o u t p o t en t i al
c on se qu e nc e s and

did no t th ink any on e wo uld

g e t hu rt ; he did no t r e a lize wh a t ha d ha

pp e ne d unti l he wa s alrea dy

inside the store; he did not know how the truck stopped; he only went to the store f

or g roce ries; he did not think any one wa s inside the store; he was uncer tain as to w hy he was a

rre sted;11

he did n o t k n o w the diffe renc e betwe en beingchar g ed with a c rime and be ing c ommitt ed to a psy chiatric hospital; the worst conseque nce he could think of was losing his driver’s lice nse; and he should have attack ed t h e d o ctors he believed ha d harme d him rather tha n driving into the store. Murry viewed the videotape of

appellant’ s police interview and wa s struck by

appellant’ s “lac k of insight into his role and what had occ urre d.” Appe llant seemed shoc ked, surpr ised, and sadde ned that the re ha d be e n any inj ur y a sso c ia te d wi th his a c tio ns . Murr y a lso te sti fi e d th a t a

pp e lla nt’ s u se of the wo rd “ sn a pp e d” wa s me anin g fu l be c a us e any of us , ov e rw he lme d b y str e ss, “ c ou ld, in f

a c t, snap and take ac tions without our own awa rene ss.” Murry admitted that his sessions with appellant
wer e tre atment-re lated and not a imed at deter mining appe llant’s leg al sanity

. Appellant took his medicatio n about 9:00 p.m. on J anuar y 14. He wa s arr ested immediately

afte r committing the of

fense and did not rec eive any medication on January

15. Murry testified that appe llant’s sy mptoms of sch izophrenia wer e proba bly worse on January

16, afte r mi s s i ng his medication on the 15th. He be lieved that appe llant had at lea st “a sane moment” on Janu ary 16 , th e da

y a ft e r t he of fe ns e , w he n h e wa s in te rv ie we d b y Dr
. Coo ns and state d that he fe lt bad and kne w he “ messed up.” Murry believed that appellant wa s sane on January 30, when Murr

y
s aw a p p e l l a n tf o r t h e s e c o n d

t i m e . M u r

r y t e s t i f i e d t h a tp e o p l e c anl a

p s e i nan d

o u to f s a n i t y, de pe nd ingon

fa c tor s su c h a s st

re ss o r m e dic a tio n le ve ls. Psy chiatrist Dr. Joel Feine r re viewed a ppellant’s medica l rec ords and his interview with the police and inter

viewed a ppellant and his par ents. Fe iner be lieved the Ser oquel did not have the same level of control as the Serentil, resulting in a return of delusions and ha llucinations “in a much more dr amatic a

nd perva sive way .” F einer thought K r e is le s h o u ld ha

ve maintained a

ppellant’s12

Serentil levels until the Seroquel was built up to an adequate level and should have monitored

a pp e lla nt m or e c los e ly , r a the r t

ha n s e e inga

pp e lla nt e ve ry fo ur months d

ur ingthe tr ans iti on

in medications. Fe iner testified that appellant’ s use of the word “snappe d” was signific ant and mea nt that “ther e wa s a per iod of unknowing , wher e he was obl ivious.” Fe iner testified that he believe d appellant did not know that his conduc t was wrong at the time he drove his truc k into the store. He testified that appe llant was insane when he committed the offense and that he believed appellant was under- medicate d, which allowe d his delusions a nd external stressors to c ause him to snap. F einer also believe d that shortly

afte r the incide nt, appellant wa s “jolted into realizing wha t he had done , and at that point may have rea liz ed that it was wr ong ”; he testified that people ca n lapse in and out of sanity very quickly . Fe iner did not think it was possible to separate a per sonality trait that desire d
re ve nge from “ the pe rv a siv e ne ss” of a pp e lla nt’ s me nta l il lne ss, statin g , “ [T]he ide a that th e re is a persona lity

actingindepende nt of t he il lness to me i s a my th.” Fe iner did not think appellant’s a ng er was indepe ndent of his delusions and that “a ll [ appellant] had in his mind at [ the time of the off ense]
wer e delusions.” Fe iner stated under cross-e x amination that he had r eviewe d many of appe llant’s
rec ords and “ formed a

n opinion and had a mandate from” defe nse counse l before he met appe llant for the f irst time. Ps yc h ia tris t D r . St u a r t C r a n e intervie wed a

ppellant the day

afte r the off

ense a nd spoke to Dr. Kre isle and appe llant’s mother. After speaking to appellant, Cra ne switche d appellant f

rom Seroquel to a dr

ug called Risper dal bec ause he , like Dr. F einer , did not believe the pr es cr i b ed Seroquel wa s “an e ffe ctive dose.” Crane t es t i fi ed that Dr. Anderson’ s knowledg e of Ser oquel dosag es “at best was ser iously out of date.” Crane stated that on J anuar y 16 appellant wa s suffer ing13

fr om par ano id del usion s b ut d id n ot g ive an o pin ion a s to a pp e lla nt’ s sa nit y be c a us e he is n ot a fore nsic psy chiatrist and did not fe el qualified to do so.
Discussion Appellant ar gu es t hat he showe d by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that he w as leg ally insane, pointing to te stimony by Drs. Murry , Fe iner, and Crane that his medications wer e not eff ective a nd that he wa s in the throes of his de lusions. Additionally , Murry and Fe iner testified that appellant did not know rig ht f rom wrong when he committed the offe nse. Howe ver, D rs. Coons and An d er s o nt es t i fi edt o t h e c o n t ra ry , s t at i n g t h at t h ey b el i ev ed ap p el l an t kn ew h i s co n d u ct wa s wr o n g. Coons believed that appe llant acted on his a ng ry fee lings, pointing out that e ven if appellant felt an
un c on tr oll a

ble imp uls e to a c t on

his vio le nt u

rg e s it did no t me an h e wa s le gall y ins ane . B oth d o ct o rs t es t i fi edt h at ap p el l an t m ad e st at em en t s t h at l edt h em t o b el i ev e h e k n ew h i s ac twa s wr o n g.

All of the doctors ag ree d that appellant suff ers f rom a ser ious mental illness, but t here
was a differ ence in opinion as to whe ther he knew r ight f rom wrongat the time of the of fense . I t was for the jur y to hear the evidenc e and deter

mine whether

appellant wa s leg ally

insane. See G raham , 56 6 S.W.2 d at 9 52 ; Taylor , 856 S.W .2d at 468. We w ill not second- g uess the jury ’s deter minations on matters of cre d i b i l i t y or we ight to be g iven witness testimony

. See A schbache r , 61 S.W .3d at 53 7; Sa nd

e rs , 771 S
. W
. 2 d at 649. Two doctors te stified that they believed a

ppellant was insane when h e dr o v e h is tr

u c k in to th e g r o c e r

y s to r e . H o w e v e r , tw o d o c to r s te s ti f ie d th a t the y

believed

a pp e lla nt w a s le g a lly

sane wh e n h e c omm itt e d the of fe ns e . The e vid e nc e is f

a c tua lly su ff ic ie nt t o support the jury ’s re

jection of a

ppellant’s insanity

defe nse. We overr

ule appe llant’s third issue.14 Conclusion Having overr uled appel l an t ’s i s s u es o nap p ea l , we af fi rm t h e j u d gments of conviction.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Apr il 14, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh