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68–187 PDF 2011

HOW FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE ASBESTOS 

COMPENSATION SYSTEM AFFECT VICTIMS, 

JOBS, THE ECONOMY, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2011 

Serial No. 112–51 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS ROSS, Florida 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

[Vacant] 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Majority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana, Vice-Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Chief Counsel 

DAVID LACHMANN, Minority Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

SEPTEMBER 9, 2011 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution ....................... 1 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution ....... 2 

WITNESSES 

Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

Michael Carter, Monroe Rubber & Gasket Company 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 41 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 44 

Charles S. Siegel, Partner, Waters & Kraus LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49 

James L. Stengel, Esq., Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 84 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 87 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Lester Brickman, Professor of Law, 

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law .................................................................. 122 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Michael Carter, Monroe Rubber 

& Gasket Company .............................................................................................. 203 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Charles S. Siegel, Partner, Waters 

& Kraus LLP ........................................................................................................ 205 

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from James L. Stengel, Esq., Orrick, 

Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP ................................................................................. 223 

(1) 

HOW FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE ASBESTOS 

COMPENSATION SYSTEM AFFECT VICTIMS, 

JOBS, THE ECONOMY, AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Trent Franks 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Franks, Chabot, Jordan, Nadler, and 

Scott. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Zach Somers, Counsel; Sarah Vance, 

Clerk; (Minority) Jason Everett, Counsel; and Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. FRANKS. The subcommittee will come to order. 

Good morning, and welcome to this Constitution Subcommittee 

hearing on how fraud and abuse in the asbestos compensation system affects victims, jobs, the economy and the legal system. For 

many Americans, asbestos litigation, like asbestos itself, may seem 

like a relic of the past. However, asbestos litigation, which has long 

been rife with fraud and abuse, continues to negatively affect asbestos victims, jobs for American workers, the economy and the 

legal system. 

It has been about 5 years since Congress last conducted oversight 

into issues related to asbestos litigation. And although congressional hearings a half decade ago shed light on the asbestos bar’s 

disturbing practices, I am concerned that the asbestos compensation system remains deeply troubled today. 

When Congress last examined asbestos litigation, it was on the 

heels of the uncovering of a massive asbestos litigation fraud that 

ranks among the worst frauds perpetrated in American history. 

This massive fraud turned the worst occupational health disaster 

in U.S. history into one of the country’s greatest scandals. Yet, despite this fraud and abuse being detected over half a decade ago, 

legal observers report that the worst abuses of the tort system continue to be central features of asbestos litigation today. 

For instance, according to reports, a new generation of diagnosing doctors has emerged to provide questionable evaluations of 

asbestos claims, filling the void left as physicians subject to conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:04 Oct 31, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\090911\68187.000 HJUD1 PsN: 68187
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gressional scrutiny in the mid-2000’s shuttered their asbestos practices. Moreover, plaintiffs’ firms continue to abuse State laws in 

order to bring cases in favorable forums; they are also aggressively 

pursuing novel legal theories well outside the bounds of traditional 

tort law in order to bring indications against solvent firms only 

tenuously connected to their clients; and the longstanding abuse of 

enhanced or creative product identification in which plaintiffs are 

coached to identify the products of solvent companies as those they 

remember being exposed to, continues unabated. 

To make matters worse, it appears that fraudulent and abusive 

claims are now being filed against the ever-growing body of asbestos bankruptcy trusts. Indications are that claimants are attempting to double dip into both the tort and asbestos trust systems, 

often asserting contradictory claims against bankruptcy trusts and 

solvent companies. Falsified claims and duplicative recoveries unfairly reduce the amount of compensation available to deserving, 

present and future claimants. 

Fraudulent and abusive claims also affect solvent companies, 

most of which only have a limited link to asbestos liability. Over 

8,500 U.S. companies and over 90 percent of American industries 

have been sued for asbestos-related claims. Companies, many of 

whom never manufactured asbestos nor marketed it, are being 

sued by people who are not sick and may never be sick, and who, 

therefore, may not need compensation. 

America’s employers cannot create jobs and energize the economy 

when they are drained of tens of millions of dollars by abusive asbestos litigation in which their products were not even involved. 

Funds that could otherwise be used for research and development, 

facility construction and job creation are being lost to legal fees and 

the cost of fraudulent and abusive asbestos claims continues to 

drive otherwise viable employers into bankruptcy. 

I hope that by once again shining light on the fraud and abuse 

in the asbestos compensation system, Congress can discourage bad 

actors and direct judicial attention to troublesome practices. Fraudulent and abusive practices hurt deserving, present and future asbestos victims, American employees and employers and the U.S. 

legal system. 

With that, I would yield to the distinguished Ranking Member 

for his opening remarks. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, we are still living with the legacy of the careless 

use of asbestos and the widespread harm it caused to the health 

of still untold numbers of people. I hope that no one at today’s 

hearing will seek to deny, as the industry did for too long, that asbestos causes serious, debilitating and fatal illnesses, that there is 

a widespread health crisis resulting from exposure to asbestos, or 

that those in industry whose actions caused people to become exposed and sick should bear the responsibility for their actions. 

Just as with the tobacco industry, the days when the facts could 

credibly be denied are long over. What remains for us is to ensure 

that those who have genuinely been harmed are compensated and 

receive the care they need and deserve, and that the cost of that 

harm are borne by those responsible and not by the U.S. taxpayer 

3 

or by the victims. That we are, today in 2011, still trying to resolve 

this problem is unfortunate, to put it mildly. 

The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code provided companies facing massive future claims with the ability to get out from 

under the significant liability overhang and continue in business. 

Following the court in the Manville bankruptcy case, the Code allows companies to resolve all asbestos claims, present and future, 

and shifts liability to a trust. Although there is a representative of 

the future claimants in the case, the actual future claimants are 

never heard. Their claims will have been sent to the trust long before they ever know that they are sick. The trusts are often underfunded and inadequate to the full cost of the harm. 

While there has been much discussion and no shortage of suggestions as to how to improve the resolution of these claims, some of 

which merit careful consideration, I cannot help but express a certain amount of irritation at some companies who spent decades 

concealing the dangers, failing to protect their workers and fighting 

in the courts and Congress to avoid responsibility, who now complain about the trust system. It is a neat trick to be able to dispose 

of claims that have yet to arise involving people who never have 

the chance to be heard. I do not think anyone in the industry 

would suggest for a moment that we return to pre-Manville law 

and place these liabilities back on the companies’ books where future claims could be paid out of future earnings. 

Asbestos cases will continue to plague us for many years because 

people, unfortunately, continue to get sick and to suffer. As we consider the economic impact of these liabilities, I hope no one would 

suggest that the cost to the companies for these injuries should be 

shifted to the victims in order to improve the company’s financial 

outlook. Whatever the cost to the industry, the cost to the victims 

has been far more significant. 

There are some very serious issues, indeed, surrounding the administration of these trusts, the treatment of claims and the extent 

to which justice is being done. I hope we can remember to keep our 

eyes on the ball. Our chief mission must be to ensure that victims, 

those genuinely harmed by the asbestos industry, are aided, and 

that the wrongdoers, not the taxpayers foot the bill. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FRANKS. I thank the Ranking Member. 

I understand that the Ranking Member of the full Committee, 

Mr. Conyers, is not available for an opening statement. So then 

without objection, other Members’ opening statements will be made 

part of the record. 

I want to welcome you all here to the Committee this morning. 

Our first witness, Lester Brickman, is a professor of law and 

former acting dean at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 

where he teaches contracts and legal ethics. He has written extensively and his writings have been widely cited in treatises, casebooks, scholarly journals and judicial opinions. Professor Brickman 

has been acknowledged by four Federal courts as an expert on the 

history of asbestos litigation, asbestos bankruptcy trusts, and the 

effect of tort reform on future asbestos claim generation. 

Our second witness, Michael Carter, is president of Monroe Rubber & Gasket, a small, family-owned business that is 

4 

headquartered in Monroe, Louisiana. He served in the United 

States Navy from 1978 to 1981 and joined Monroe after leaving the 

Navy. Mr. Carter has been with Monroe for over 30 years. 

Our third witness, Charles Siegel, is the head of appellate practices at Waters & Kraus LLP. Mr. Siegel has argued appeals in 

eight Federal appellate courts, six State supreme courts and numerous intermediate appellate courts around the country. He has 

served as an adjunct professor at the University of Houston Law 

Center and as a guest lecturer at several other law schools. Mr. 

Siegel has been recognized on the Texas super lawyers list every 

year since its inception in 2003. 

Our fourth and final witness, James Stengel, is currently senior 

partner for litigation at Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP and as 

such, manages the firm’s global litigation practice. He primarily 

represents clients in large complex and multiparty class action litigation. He has handled significant actions involving the chemical, 

tobacco and medical device industries. Mr. Stengel has written and 

lectured on complex litigation and mass tort subjects at a variety 

of law schools and seminars. 

Each of the witnesses’ written statements will be entered into 

the record in its entirety, so I would ask that each witness summarize his testimony in 5 minutes or less. To help you stay within 

that time, there is a timing light only your table. When the light 

switches from green to yellow, you will have 1 minute to conclude 

your testimony. When the light turn reds, it signals that the witness’ 5 minutes have expired. 

Before I recognize the witnesses, it is the tradition of this subcommittee that they be sworn in. So if you please stand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, could I be recognized for a moment, 

please? 

Mr. FRANKS. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. I just want to take this opportunity to extend a special welcome to Professor Brickman who is a distinguished professor at Cardozo Law School, which is in my district, where he is 

very highly regarded. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I am not going to ask him if he is a Republican here this morning. 

I would now recognize our first witness, Professor Brickman, for 

5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF LESTER BRICKMAN, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. 

As you have stated, the tragedy of asbestos continues to—— 

Mr. FRANKS. Sir, could we get your microphone a little closer 

here. Is it turned on? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Asbestos has long been regarded as the ‘‘magic 

mineral’’ because of its unique qualities, but it has also caused the 

deaths of at least 200,000 occupationally exposed workers. Another 

50,000 deaths from mesothelioma, a rare cancer caused by asbestos, are projected over the next 40 years. 

5 

The tragedy of asbestos, however, is compounded by its litigation 

history. This carcinogenic mineral has given rise to a malignant enterprise. In nine published articles on asbestos litigation, I have 

documented the existence of a massively fraudulent enterprise involving the creation of literally hundreds of thousands of bogus 

medical reports. These reports have been used to extract billions of 

dollars in settlements from defendants in the tort system, and 

more recently, from personal injury trusts which have been created 

to pay the claims against the companies that were bankrupted by 

asbestos litigation. 

There has been a complete and total failure by State and Federal 

law enforcement agencies to prosecute the doctors who have received tens of millions of dollars for preparing these reports, let 

alone the lawyers who hired them. 

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York 

began an investigation in the summer of 2004. Though grand juries 

were convened and voluminous credible evidence of fraud has been 

amassed, this investigation, once again, languishes for want of 

someone to head it. The effect of this systemic neglect is to grant 

lawyers and the medical doctors they hire a special dispensation to 

commit fraud. 

This failure, I suggest, should not be allowed to stand unchallenged. I, therefore, urge this subcommittee to request the Government Accounting Office to investigate this law enforcement failure 

and then exercise oversight over a Department of Justice that effectively condones manufacturing medical diagnoses for money on 

a massive scale. 

The effects of this corrupt scheme have been devastating. Over 

90 companies have gone bankrupt. Ten years ago, the Rand Institute for Civil Justice estimated that over 600,000 jobs were lost due 

to asbestos litigation. Undoubtedly, that total would be much higher today. 

Though nonmalignant claim filings have declined precipitously 

starting in 2004, primarily because of State tort reforms, there has 

been a recent upsurge of such filings with the trusts. The impetus 

for this is the recent emergence of trusts with substantial assets 

that have significantly increased the value of nonmalignant claims 

in the trust system to as much as $40,000. Given the huge volume 

of filings, attorney fees can easily amount to over $100 million on 

an annual basis for filing these nonmalignant claims with the 

trusts. 

Over $6.5 billion have been or will be set aside by the pending 

and confirmed trusts for unimpaired and moderately impaired nonmalignant asbestosis and pleural claims. Expedited filing procedures now allow lawyers to upload thousands of claims with a key 

stroke. This combination of efficiency, a nearly $7 billion fund waiting to be tapped and the magnitude of the attorney fees potentially 

available presents a compelling incentive for asbestos lawyers to 

resume the mass recruitment of claimants. 

Trust claiming procedures are hidden from public view by the 

stealth sheathing that lawyers have constructed around the trusts. 

This system affords law enforcement and the public no transparency regarding the validity of claims filed with the trusts. Already, as the Chairman noted, there is evidence that a new generaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:04 Oct 31, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\090911\68187.000 HJUD1 PsN: 68187
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tion of litigation doctors is emerging to replace the doctors that 

have been unmasked. Unless law enforcement withdraws the free 

pass it has extended to lawyers, and to the litigation doctors that 

they hire to manufacture diagnoses for money, in the words of U.S. 

district court judge Janis Jack, and to maladminister pulmonary 

function tests, mass recruitment of those occupationally exposed to 

asbestos can be expected to resume, and that will be a sad day indeed, sir. 

Thank you for this opportunity. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Professor Brickman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brickman follows:] 

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Mr. FRANKS. I now recognize Mr. Carter for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL CARTER, 

MONROE RUBBER & GASKET COMPANY 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Carter, can you pull your microphone to you. 

We should probably turn those on in the Committee ahead of time 

because it happens constantly. 


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Mr. CARTER. Chairman Franks, Ranking Member Nadler and 

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify 

today. My name is Mike Carter and I am with Monroe Rubber & 

Gasket. 

Mr. NADLER. I can’t hear you. 

Mr. CARTER. My name is Mike Carter and I am with Monroe 

Rubber & Gasket Company in Monroe, Louisiana, the president of 

the company. 

Just to give you a little history, we were incorporated in 1975, 

and over the course of about 35 years, we have managed to employ 

about 25 people. We started with a handful, we worked hard, and 

we have got to where we are today by hard work. Unfortunately, 

I need probably four to six more people, maybe more than that, but 

I am not in a position to hire these people because I am inundated 

with lawsuits. 

Unfortunately, I was pulled into this back starting around March 

of 2002 and I received my first lawsuit which would become 104 

separate lawsuits with about 2,200 plaintiffs, and my office has got 

a designated corner now where it is just stacked full with asbestos 

lawsuits. 

Let me say, first of all, I am very sympathetic to those individuals that are sick. I think it was a horrible crime that was committed by the people that kept this quiet for so long. But I say let’s 

go after the people that we need to go after and not just anybody 

in the tier. 

But with these lawsuits, I have spent many, many hours and a 

lot of time on a grassroots effort in Louisiana, been here in Washington several times pleading my case, but to this point, to no 

avail. 

I have got a situation here where it just seems that we have got 

a very broken system. I can’t hire people that I need to hire in an 

economy that unemployment is high, and I can’t grow a business 

not knowing what tomorrow might bring for me. I feel like that at 

this point we are in a broken system caught up in a feeding frenzy 

of trial attorneys out for their own agenda, and it threatens to destroy small business across our country. And I just feel like it is 

time for our elected officials to step up to the plate and help small 

businesses like myself. 

I have been able to get out of some of these cases summary judgment, but unfortunately, my attorney is telling me now that some 

of these cases are probably going to trial. I am a small company 

in a small town that worked hard to get where I am at today in 

a country that we can call our America based on our dreams and 

hard work to become and be what we want to be here. Unfortunately, that can be taken away from me with nothing to do with 

it. 

Again, I need more people. I can’t hire them. I won’t hire them. 

I am not going to grow this company, this second company any farther, based on the fact that I don’t know what tomorrow is going 

to bring. 

I can’t tell you the number of times I have been here and pleaded 

my case in front of so many people. But I just can’t tell you enough 

how much I need help. And I am just a small voice for a lot of people across America, small business. We are the backbone of AmerVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:04 Oct 31, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\090911\68187.000 HJUD1 PsN: 68187
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ica. But it is just an unfair thing that is happening right now, and 

I surely need somebody to step up and help us. 

I don’t know how long it is going to be that I can come here and 

do this. This could be my last trip here. If I go to trial and I am 

hit with a verdict and I have to pay a certain percentage of that, 

I am probably going to be locking my doors and sending my people 

home, and I just hope there is somebody that is going to be able 

to tell me how to tell my people why they are going home. 

It is unfortunate that we live in this kind of economy that this 

kind of stuff can happen to people like myself. 

But in wrapping this up, I only hope that—I am just a small fish 

in a lot of big water here, but I hope that somebody will hear me 

and they will come to bat and help me with this. I just don’t know 

how much time I have left. Like I say, if I get hit with any kind 

of verdict, I can’t afford $3 million or $4 million. I will close my 

doors and go home. But I would love to hire some more people, but 

at this point that is just not able to happen. 

Thank you for your time. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Carter. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carter follows:] 

44 

Prepared Statement of Michael Carter 


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Mr. FRANKS. As some of you saw, we have been called to the floor 

for votes, and that has actually happened before, and we are going 

to go ahead and let Mr. Siegel testify. And then, Mr. Stengel, we 


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will have to come back after the votes and reconvene. I apologize 

to you, sir. 

Mr. Siegel, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES S. SIEGEL, PARTNER, 

WATERS & KRAUS LLP 

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you. I would like to thank the subcommittee 

for the opportunity to testify on the State of asbestos litigation 

today. My name is Charles Siegel and I am a partner in the firm 

of Waters & Kraus, and for 25 years, I have had the privilege of 

representing people seriously injured by exposure to asbestos or 

their survivors. 

I am proud to represent people such as Mark Smith from San 

Antonio who was a constituent of Chairman Smith of this Committee. He was exposed to asbestos through his father who worked 

as a contractor installing siding and roofing materials that contained asbestos. 

Mr. Smith’s father would come home with asbestos on his clothes 

that young Mark would breathe. Mark Smith died at the age of 50, 

leaving a wife and a 12-year-old son. 

But the Smith case is only one example out of hundreds of thousands. Asbestos is widely agreed to be the greatest public health 

disaster of the 20th century, and it continues unabated in this century. Even today, seven or eight persons die of mesothelioma alone 

every day in this country, and thousands more get sick with lung 

cancer and asbestosis. Asbestosis is a chronic progressive inflammation of the lungs. Mesothelioma is a rare cancer of the lining of 

the lungs known only to be caused by asbestos. 

We are here today because these deaths have a cause. Litigation 

was necessary because there was fault. Juries and judges hearing 

these cases in State courts around the country for the last 40 years 

have consistently heard evidence of corporate concealment of the 

dangers of asbestos exposure. 

A corporate official for Bendix Company, for example, wrote to 

Johns Manville in 1966 saying, ‘‘If you have enjoyed the good life 

while working with asbestos, why not die from it?’’ Another example is provided by the conduct of Union Carbide Corporation, which 

actually mined and marketed raw asbestos. It touted its own asbestos as being safe somehow, while questioning the safety of other 

forms of the mineral. 

This corporate conduct and the vast legacy of death and disease 

that resulted have led to litigation. The overwhelming majority of 

this litigation has occurred in State courts and continues to occur 

there. State law provides that a claimant may recover from each 

party found by the jury to have been responsible for the exposure 

and to have behaved negligently or to have supplied an unreasonably dangerous product. In nearly all the jurisdictions with any significant number of cases, there is no joint and several liability, so 

the jury simply assigns a percentage of responsibility to each company it finds to be liable. 

When an asbestos defendant files for bankruptcy protection, 

there is a popular perception that company offices are closed and 

employees lose their jobs and the factories are padlocked. This is 

emphatically not true in the asbestos context. Section 524(g) of the 

48 

bankruptcy code exists precisely so that companies facing substantial asbestos claims can compensate victims while continuing normal operations. Almost every company to have sought bankruptcy 

protection under this provision due to asbestos liabilities has been 

able to continue its economic health while also compensating victims of asbestos disease. 

In recent years, defendants have argued that lawsuits constitute 

double-dipping since claimants may potentially recover both from 

defendants in the State court system and from bankruptcy trusts. 

The claim is false and reflects a basic fundamental misunderstanding of the way the bankruptcy system and State court lawsuits work. 

First, trust payments are minimal. There a scheduled value of a 

particular disease claim, but then there is also a payment percentage for all claims. So, for example, while a certain trust may officially value a mesothelioma claim at perhaps $100,000, the payment percentage may be 15 percent, resulting in an actual payment of $15,000. The median payment percentage across the trust 

is roughly 25 percent, but some trusts pay as low as 0.8 percent 

of the value of a claim. 

Second, there is no ‘‘fair share’’ for a defendant in asbestos litigation, there is only what percentage of causal responsibility is assigned by a jury in a particular case and each case, of course, turns 

on its facts. In all 50 States, the fact that other parties may share 

responsibility for causing an injury is not a ground for any one defendant to avoid liability. Defendants routinely and vigorously assert their rights to discover materials submitted by plaintiffs to 

bankruptcy trusts, and defendants are, of course, free to conduct 

and do conduct their own unilateral investigation into the plaintiff’s claims as well. 

Even in States with joint and several liability, plaintiffs do not 

obtain a double recovery. Under the one satisfaction rule, a plaintiff is entitled to one recovery, and so after a verdict is entered, the 

defendant’s share will be offset against all settlements, including 

any settlements with trusts. State law provides a remedy to these 

families and asbestos victims should not have to apologize for seeking compensation for their injuries. 

Thank you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Siegel. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Siegel follows:] 

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Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Stengel, if it is all right, we are going to go 

ahead and try to get your testimony in and then return for questions at the end of the vote series, which I will try to get a timing 

on that as soon as we finish here. 

Could we get you to turn your microphone on. You are recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES L. STENGEL, ESQ., 

ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 

Mr. STENGEL. Chairman Franks, Ranking Member Nadler, my 

name is Jim Stengel. I appreciate the opportunity to come here and 


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talk to the subcommittee about these issues, particularly the question posed by the Committee, which is the impact of fraud and 

abuse in the compensation system for asbestos on victims and defendants. 

Thank you for the recital of my background. There is one additional fact which may be relevant for this subcommittee. My first 

experience in asbestos litigation was spending 10 years as outside 

litigation counsel for the Manville trust, so I am reasonably familiar with what trusts do and how they operate. Since then, I have 

represented a number of defendants in the civil litigation system 

and distressed defendants in the asbestos litigation system, so I am 

familiar with both sides of the street, so-to-speak, in this context. 

What I would like to address here this morning is the somewhat 

narrower but very important issue of how the operation of the 

trusts impacts the tort litigation system. Now, this is of critical importance, because the independent research group RAND has determined that the trusts have north of $30 billion available for the 

compensation of asbestos victims going forward. The most recent 

statistics we have on annual compensation was that the asbestos 

trusts disbursed some $3.3 billion in 2008, so we are talking about 

very substantial amounts of compensation from the trusts. 

Now, to allay a misperception perhaps, I don’t think anyone here 

today takes issue with the fact that the asbestos health crisis is 

real, there are injured people, and those people deserve to be compensated. What I think you are hearing from most of us is we want 

a level playing field. 

We want a system that awards compensation based on actual 

fact and actual evidence. And what has happened in the trust environment is, particularly with the most recent wave of bankruptcy 

trust filings starting in 2000, a wave of bankruptcies which was, 

in part, occasioned by the fraud that Professor Brickman talked 

about, the unimpaired claims overwhelming corporate defendants 

in a way that gave them no option but to declare bankruptcy, we 

saw the disappearance of first- and second-line defendants in the 

asbestos scheme and a vast number of new defendants were introduced to litigation, and I think there was an expectation that those 

companies would necessarily bear the burden of the missing bankrupt entities, at least during the reorganization process. 

That is not what happened. The process has been sticky. It has 

ratcheted in one direction and the new defendants, like Monroe 

Rubber, are continuing to bear the burden of the departed bankrupt entities. And now that these very substantial amounts of assets are available from the trusts to provide compensation, there is 

no reason why the trust system and the tort system on the other 

side should be split the way they are now. The trusts operate in 

a way that is siloed, separate and opaque from the litigation system. 

What we want is transparency in terms of a limited but critically 

important piece of information or evidence. That is, what assertions 

of exposure are being made by claimants who are also plaintiffs in 

the tort system about who is responsible for their injury. It is unfair and distorts the system for a claimant to do, as they can, under 

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86 

thelioma cases in 12 to 18 months, and before even the very rare 

statute of limitations in a trust of 3 years comes into play, have 

the opportunity then to go back and reassert those claims. 

The one thing that the 50 years of experience that we have had 

in asbestos litigation has proven to us is, one, the system is very, 

very sensitive to economic incentives, and by putting billions of dollars available in a secondary compensation system that doesn’t 

have to be reflected in the tort system, we can expect that bad 

things will happen. 

The second as we have seen is the system is remarkably bad at 

self-policing. It simply will not fix these problems. 

All we ask at this point, frankly, is transparency, and we believe 

full disclosure and airing of what is happening on the trust side of 

the ledger as well as the tort side of the ledger will improve the 

system for claimants, certainly and admittedly for solvent defendants, and for all others. 

My written testimony is more extensive and provides some concrete examples of misconduct we have discovered, concrete situations where plaintiffs have taken different positions in court and 

with the trusts. We have knowledge as to what I suspect is the 

mere tip of the iceberg. But even those stark examples I think provide this Committee with the evidence they need to look at this 

issue and look at it seriously. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Stengel. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stengel follows:] 

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Mr. FRANKS. With that, our meeting will be adjourned until the 

sound of the gavel, which will be as close to 11:30 as possible. Immediately following votes, approximately 11:30. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FRANKS. The meeting will resume. I apologize to you profoundly for it taking longer on the floor than we thought it would. 

It seems like that is a proverb, but I do apologize to all of you. 

Mr. Nadler, the Ranking Member, would have been back, but, 

unfortunately, because of the delay on the floor, he was called to 

a special briefing on terrorist threats. His district encompasses the 

World Trade Center, and he is there on behalf of his constituents. 

So we will have to plod on. Again, I appreciate you all being here. 

I also am grateful for Mr. Scott being here to allow us to continue. 

If I may, I will recognize myself for 5 minutes to begin the questioning here. Mr. Carter, I would like, if I could, to start with you, 

sir. 

From what I can tell, your business had essentially very little involvement with asbestos in general, maybe you can enlighten me, 

and I certainly hope that you survive the lawsuits that you are facing at this time. 

Can you give us just sort of a recap of your story related to what 

the involvement of your company was or was not with asbestos and 

what the lawsuits mean to you and how they affect your company 

going forward? You did quite well in your testimony, but I am wondering if you would just recap that for us. 

Mr. CARTER. Yes, thank you. Well, in the 104 separate lawsuits 

with 2,200 plaintiffs, first and foremost, I have never manufactured 

any asbestos. All I ever did was buy a product from a manufacturer 

and resell it to the end user who asked for it by name. I didn’t 

make anybody sick. I mean, in all of the 36 years I have been in 

business, not one person that has ever been affiliated with my company has ever contracted any type of asbestos-related disease. Nobody. 

I am just one of the next people in the next tier of companies 

that the trial attorneys are going after, and it is going to break us. 

We are a small business. We are trying to—we are supposed to be 

the backbone of America, and, unfortunately, we have been caught 

up in this vacuum and I don’t see an end to it. We have never manufactured it. We have never made anybody sick. I do have the utmost compassion for those individuals that are sick, but let’s go 

after the ones that did all of this. 

So, to make a long story short, we never manufactured asbestos. 

We just bought a product, like I say, sold it to the end user who 

asked for it by name, and for some reason or another, we are 

brought into this as somebody that is responsible. And if this trend 

continues, you will see a lot of small business across America do 

the same thing we are going to do if we get brought into any type 

of trial, and that is to close our doors. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir, very much. 

Professor Brickman, if I could ask you briefly, in your written 

testimony you stated that law enforcement officials have essentially given a free pass to lawyers and doctors involved in asbestos 

litigation fraud. How you do you think the failure to hold those individuals accountable affects the asbestos compensation system as 

113 

well as those who might rightfully have a claim that might be affected by overlooking the fraud that seems evident, at least according to your testimony? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Mr. Franks, I think that the enormous amounts 

of money that have been paid out to bogus claims, easily $25, $30 

billion and perhaps more, has deprived claimants who have actually been injured by exposure to asbestos from the level of compensation that could have been accorded them had these billions 

and billions of dollars not been paid out in verdicts and settlements 

to persons, to hundreds of thousands of persons who could not legitimately show any injury from exposure to asbestos. 

Going forward, what I foresee is the distinct possibility that litigation screenings that generated this entire fraudulent scheme will 

resume because of the enormous amounts of money. As I have put 

forth in my oral and written statements, there is upwards of $6.5 

billion set aside for nonmalignant claims, and the only way that 

lawyers will be able to tap into this is to resume screenings, and 

I fear that is what will happen. And the fact that law enforcement 

is just sitting back and doing nothing despite the enormous volume 

of credible evidence of fraud is only encouraging this potentiality. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Stengel, if you had seen Mr. Siegel’s written testimony, he 

seems to indicate a picture in which only truly sick and deserving 

plaintiffs sue responsible companies for their injuries, and those 

companies are forced to pay only their fair share of the damages, 

and claimants do not file fraudulent claims or double-dip the asbestos bankruptcy trust. 

I just want to give you the opportunity to respond. Do you think 

that that fits with your understanding of the facts? 

Mr. STENGEL. It does not fit with my understanding of the facts, 

Chairman Frank. We have uncovered specific instances where 

claimants as plaintiffs in the tort system have taken one position 

as to when they were exposed and what products they were can exposed to, in some cases, insisting the only asbestos they have been 

exposed to was that of a client of mine, where at the same time, 

through discovery, we have learned they made 16 or more bankruptcy trust claim filings. I can’t tell you as I sit here today which 

of those is not correct, but clearly somebody is not being told the 

truth somewhere in the system. 

The history that Professor Brickman has recited I think makes 

it very clear that there is always room for misconduct in this system given the amount of money at stake and the flux of the system, and at present, bad things will happen, and we have evidence 

of that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. 

I now yield to Mr. Scott for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we need to put a little bit of this in perspective to begin with, because we are here because of decisions 

made that exposed plaintiffs to asbestos, and in the Johns-Manville 

case, Fisher versus Johns-Manville Corporation, the judge found 

that the jury was justified in concluding that both defendants, fully 

appreciating the nature, extent and gravity of the risk, nevertheless made a conscious and cold-blooded business decision in utter 

114 

and flagrant disregard of the rights of others to take no protective 

or remedial action and pointed out that that is exactly the kind of 

behavior that ought to subject people to punitive damages. 

Now, Mr. Brickman, you talk about bogus claims. Are you talking about claims where people have indications of exposure to asbestos but no symptoms? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Congressman, the bogus claims I am referring to 

are the claims generated by litigation screenings, by the screening 

companies hired by law firms that brought mobile X-ray vans and 

then hired litigation doctors who read the x-rays as positive for exposure to asbestos, although their error rates when subjected to 

testing by doctors who had no participation in the litigation were 

in the high 90 percent range. Those are the bogus claims that I am 

referring to. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if you do something about those, what about 

the people who have valid claims. Do you have a problem with the 

valid claims? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Of course not. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are you counting nonsymptomatic as a valid or a 

bogus claim? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Nonsymptomatic, in and of itself, is not indicative 

in either way. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you have pleural thickening of the lungs, is that 

a valid claim or not? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. It depends on the nature of the thickening, but 

in many States, it is a valid claim. In some States, it is not. That 

is an area of law I am not going to comment on because of the technicalities. 

Mr. SCOTT. So if lawyers are trying to find people that have been 

victims of this conscious and cold-blooded business decision, is that 

anything inherently bad about that? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Well, let me just respond by talking about the 

cold-blooded business decision. You need to make a distinction or 

a distinction should be made between mining asbestos and companies that used raw asbestos like Johns-Manville to incorporate into 

products. The companies that sold asbestos-containing products did 

not know, had no reason to know at the time they were manufacturing these products that when the production were used in the 

workplace, they would result in injury to workers. 

That knowledge did not come out until Dr. Selikoff did his studies in the early mid-1960’s. It was then and only then that knowledge became available to the industry that products containing asbestos could also injure workers. 

Mr. SCOTT. So the information in the 1930’s and 1940’s that subjected people to the kinds of injuries that they are suffering today, 

that doesn’t count? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. That counts with regard to mining companies 

and it counts with regard to companies that used raw asbestos in 

their plants to manufacture the materials. What it doesn’t count 

for is the sale of products and the use of these products in the 

workplace. That is a separate area in terms of knowledge of the potential harm. As I said—— 

Mr. SCOTT. So should the victim, depending on who the defendant ought to be, is the defendant not entitled to full recovery, inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:04 Oct 31, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00118 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\090911\68187.000 HJUD1 PsN: 68187
115 

cluding punitive damages for being subjected to this kind of conscious and cold-blooded business decision. Isn’t the plaintiff entitled 

to recover? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Plaintiffs are entitled total recovery for injuries 

sustained—— 

Mr. SCOTT. And punitive damages? 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Punitive damages are very complex, because if 

you have multiple punitive damage awards, arguably that violates 

the 14th Amendment to the Constitution with regard to due process of law. I have written about the subject. I don’t think you can 

give a simple yes-no answer. It is a complex issue, and one that 

I think the courts have basically mishandled, although by and 

large today, courts do not permit punitive damages in many of 

these cases. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Siegel, did you want to comment? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you, Congressman Scott. Yes. What Professor 

Brickman says is exactly wrong, and I think is due to the fact that 

perhaps he is an academic and has not spent time trying these 

cases. 

Juries have consistently found that companies that took the raw 

asbestos that was mined and put it in their products and sold those 

products in the marketplace, in other words, companies that didn’t 

mine it and take it out of the ground but that bought it from the 

mining companies, put it in their products, sold those products, juries have consistently found for 30 or 40 years that those companies were negligent and grossly negligent. 

And I used the example in my statement of Bendix, which was 

a company that sold breaks that had asbestos in them. There is 

that infamous Bendix document in which the corporate officials 

said, ‘‘Well, if you made a nice living working with asbestos, you 

might as well die from it.’’ Or to take another example, National 

Gypsum, whose official in 1958, 1958, said, ‘‘There is no question 

that if you work with asbestos and you inhale it, you are going to 

get asbestosis.’’ 

Now, did that compel them to stop selling their product? No. Did 

that compel them to put a warning on their product? No. So that 

is simply a conclusion and a statement that is divorced entirely 

from the results of trials. And I would be happy to supply the subcommittee with a very, very long list of punitive damages verdicts 

upheld by appellate courts against companies that sold asbestoscontaining products. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Scott. You folks have been so patient and you were so kind to come back, if it is all right with you, 

we are going to go ahead and do a second round, give you a little 

better opportunity to develop any other thoughts that you have. 

Mr. Stengel, I might begin with you, sir. About 8,500 companies 

representing about 90 percent of all of the U.S. industries have 

been sued in cases related to asbestos. What percentage of those 

companies would you estimate were involved in the actual production of asbestos or the hiding of the harmful effects of asbestos? 

Mr. STENGEL. Well, Chairman Franks, the best way to answer 

that is probably to go back to where the litigation was when Manville was still a viable defendant in the early eighties. There were 

116 

probably at that time, and Professor Brickman can correct me, I 

think a roster of around 20-25 defendants that were routinely 

viewed as the first rank, both miners, millers and producers most 

importantly of asbestos insulating material, because those were 

viewed and that was the subject matter of the Selikoff study. So 

you ended up with a fairly small population. 

When Manville went into bankruptcy, that circle expanded somewhat to get secondary players, but it was still fairly well constricted to people who had some material role in the production of 

either raw asbestos or asbestos-containing materials or had premises that had asbestos present. 

What has happened in the period really from the late 1990’s forward has been this explosion in the number of entities and individuals named as defendants where you get from secondary to tertiary 

to peripheral defendants, and it is really a search for a solvent bystander, and companies like Monroe Gasket and other small companies are being brought into this, or even large companies with 

very little participation in the asbestos production process. So you 

get increasingly tangential connection with the production of the 

material. 

Now, as to the evidence of a conspiracy among the major asbestos producers includes Johns-Manville, that was a very small group 

of companies and that emerged in the 1930’s, 1940’s and 1950’s, 

conduct which no one here is going to defend. But that is again a 

smaller concentric circle of involved people. 

And if I could, and I don’t want to take your time, Chairman 

Franks, but to respond in part to Mr. Scott’s question, I don’t think 

anyone here is suggesting that an individual plaintiff shouldn’t be 

allowed to bring suit against defendants and seek punitive damages if they can prove their case, both as to the conduct or responsibility of the defendants they name, and they can show, and this 

is where the transparency with the trust becomes critically important, if they can show an actual connection between the products, 

premises or actions of a given defendant and their illness. 

If you look at a roster, and I believe now the number is north 

of $10,000, or 10,000 claimants, I think that is what TowersPerrin’s most recent estimate is, when you get to those peripheral 

levels of players, is there really a material substantive legally sufficient causal link between whatever those defendants were alleged 

to do and the illness of those people? 

Again, we are not saying that asbestos plaintiffs shouldn’t have 

their day in court. We think a day in court is a wonderful thing, 

if we have a single day in court where all the evidence is available 

and we can allocate fault and have the jury make the decisions 

that are appropriate. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Professor Brickman, I might ask you another question. Not to pick on Mr. Siegel, but in his written testimony, he asserts that the large number of nonmalignant claims are 

a thing of the past essentially. And in your opinion, do nonmalignant claims still exist, either in the court system or as claimants 

to the asbestos bankruptcy trust? 

That is a sincere question. I assume your asbestos will probably 

be yes, but enlighten me if you can. 

117 

Mr. BRICKMAN. Yes, sir. There has been a huge increase in nonmalignant claims put to trusts beginning around 2007, almost a 

doubling every year. The trusts don’t publish this information. 

They don’t make it available. The trusts are opaque. They are the 

model of non-transparency. They are run by plaintiffs’ lawyers. All 

decisions of the trusts are made by people that are appointed by 

plaintiff lawyers. So this information is very hard to come by. 

But my research shows it has been a huge increase in trust filings, and that most of these trust filings are re-filings of claims 

that were made in States like Ohio, Georgia, Mississippi, States 

which have enacted tort reforms, which basically preclude these 

screening-generated claims. So what the lawyers are doing is refiling them with the trusts, and now the significant difference is 

they can get serious money from the trusts, I said up to $40,000 

for a nonmalignant claim. And my concern is that because law enforcement has given a free pass to lawyers and doctors to perpetrate this fraud, that lawyers will not be content, given almost 

$7 billion available for nonmalignant claims, lawyers will not be 

content with simply refiling claims they have already brought in 

the tort system, but will again reinstitute screenings because that 

money, it is a pot of gold sitting there waiting for them to harvest 

it. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Professor. I will now recognize Mr. Scott 

for 5 more minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Siegel, questions of double-dipping have been brought up. 

You referred to this in your testimony. Is it possible to get compensated twice for the same injury? 

Mr. SIEGEL. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. Why not? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Because when a person has a claim against the various companies that caused his injury, in other words, the various 

companies that made the products to which he was exposed, he will 

pursue those claims either in the court system or in the trust system. And the notion that the one is hidden from the other or that 

the one should pay and the other shouldn’t pay and therefore the 

other paying is a double-dip is just—it is completely wrong. 

Mr. SCOTT. Can the defendant figure out that through discovery? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Absolutely. And the way we know this again is 

through the results of actual trials. In my written statement, I provided several recent examples of California trials, and I know Mr. 

Stengel is familiar with these cases because his client was in some 

of them, not in the trials, but was in some of the cases earlier in 

which the jury hears all the evidence, the defendant puts on evidence of other products to which the plaintiff was exposed, and the 

jury allocated significant shares of responsibility, usually much 

more than was allocated to the solvent defendants, significant 

shares of responsibility to the bankrupt defendants. That way we 

know that the defendants in the tort system are not handcuffed, 

are not being shielded from the truth, because they have the evidence that is necessary to convince the jury of alternate exposures. 

There is sort of pervading all of this is a very elitist notion that 

the jury will never get it right and the jury can’t understand anything between, for the smoke screen that is being erected in front 

118 

of it, but we know that that’s not true. And we know that the results of actual trials show they are perfectly capable of seeing the 

exposure to bankrupt companies, perfectly capable of deciding who 

is liable and who isn’t because we certainly lose our share of trials 

as well. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now speaking of transparency, when you settle a 

case, is there any pressure put upon you to keep the settlement 

confidential? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Yes, there is. I guarantee you Mr. Stengel would not 

pay us a cent in any case without an ironclad confidentiality agreement. That is an absolute condition of defense agreements in the 

tort system all the time. And what there—it is sort of a violation 

of the first rule in law school in the case of Goose v. Gander. They 

want complete confidentiality in the tort system, and they want 

complete so-called transparency, i.e., no confidentiality at all otherwise. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, a lot has been made about the idea, and you 

have kind of referred to it, about the connection of present defendants to the asbestos liability. Some of them are saying they didn’t 

have anything to do with it. What is your response to that? 

Mr. SIEGEL. Again, we trust juries in State courts to decide these 

things. And for any—just like I think my clients are always right, 

it has been my experience that most lawyers for defendants think 

their clients are always right and never committed any negligence 

whatsoever. And that’s why we have juries. Juries hear the evidence, they decide if a company was negligent, they decide if a 

company knew or should have known the hazards of its products. 

And what we are facing and what these defendants frankly are facing are the verdict of juries. That is how we operate these things 

in the United States, we trust them to State court juries. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now victims of this conscious and cold-blooded business decision activity that creates nonmalignant situations, what is 

the—is there any damage—what kind of damages would occur if 

someone has nonmalignant—— 

Mr. SIEGEL. Right, we have to remember exactly what nonmalignant means, people who are being castigated for having the temerity to seek compensation for a non malignant condition. That includes severe disabling, fatal asbestosis. That includes pleural 

thickening. That includes an entire spectrum of lung function or 

lack of decrease in pulmonary function, all of which comes under 

the heading of nonmalignancy. As we know, the first massive wave 

of asbestos deaths in this country was the massive wave of asbestosis deaths, and there are continuing cases of asbestosis even 

today. And to suggest that $40,000 for asbestosis is some kind of 

windfall to these people is frankly offensive. I know it would be offensive to my clients. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I am glad we settled the issue today. And I 

think thank you all for being here and without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to submit to the chair additional 

written questions for the witnesses which we will forward and ask 

the witnesses to respond as promptly as they can so that the answers may be made a part of the record. 

Without objection all Members will have 5 legislative days with 

which to submit any additional materials for inclusion in the 

119 

record. And with that, I sincerely thank all of the witnesses again, 

I thank the Members and observers and this meeting is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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182 


68187A-61.eps
183 


68187A-62.eps
184 


68187A-63.eps
185 


68187A-64.eps
186 


68187A-65.eps
187 


68187A-66.eps
188 


68187A-67.eps
189 


68187A-68.eps
190 


68187A-69.eps
191 


68187A-70.eps
192 


68187A-71.eps
193 


68187A-72.eps
194 


68187A-73.eps
195 


68187A-74.eps
196 


68187A-75.eps
197 


68187A-76.eps
198 


68187A-77.eps
199 


68187A-78.eps
200 


68187A-79.eps
201 


68187A-80.eps
202 

f 


68187A-81.eps
203 


68187B-1.eps
204 

f 


68187B-2.eps
205 


68187C-1.eps
206 


68187C-2.eps
207 


68187C-3.eps
208 


68187C-4.eps
209 


68187C-5.eps
210 


68187C-6.eps
211 


68187C-7.eps
212 


68187C-8.eps
213 


68187C-9.eps
214 


68187C-10.eps
215 


68187C-11.eps
216 


68187C-12.eps
217 


68187C-13.eps
218 


68187C-14.eps
219 


68187C-15.eps
220 


68187C-16.eps
221 


68187C-17.eps
222 

f 


68187C-18.eps
223 


68187D-1.eps
224 


68187D-2.eps
225 


68187D-3.eps
226 


68187D-4.eps
227 


68187D-5.eps
228 


68187D-6.eps
229 


68187D-7.eps
230 


68187D-8.eps
231 


68187D-9.eps
232 


68187D-10.eps
233 


68187D-11.eps
234 


68187D-12.eps
235 


68187D-13.eps
236 


68187D-14.eps
237 


68187D-15.eps
238 

Æ 


68187D-16.eps