1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-cr-20676 

vs. HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

JERRY WAYMEN-TIMOTHY BIGHAM 

 

 Defendant. 

_______________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

EVIDENCE (Dkt. 20) 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Defendant Jerry Bigham filed a motion to suppress (Dkt. 20), seeking to exclude all 

evidence obtained as the result of a search warrant executed at the residential address 1073 

Levona Street in Ypsilanti, Michigan. Defendant argues that the affidavit in support of the 

search warrant failed to establish probable cause, and that law enforcement could not have 

reasonably relied on the affidavit in good faith. The government filed a response to Defendant’s 

motion (Dkt. 23); Defendant did not file a reply. A hearing on Defendant’s motion was held on 

June 23, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies Defendant’s motion to suppress 

the evidence. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 On August 9, 2014, law enforcement searched the premises at 1073 Levona Street in 

Ypsilanti, Michigan, and recovered, among other items, currency, firearms, and marijuana. See 

Search Warrant & Aff., Ex. A to Gov’t Resp., at 7 (Dkt. 23-1). The seizure led to charges of 

(i) possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); 

(ii) felon in possession of a firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e); and 

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(iii) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c). See Indictment at 2-3 (Dkt. 7).1

 The search was authorized by a state court warrant, 

issued upon an affidavit sworn by Ypsilanti Police Officer Michael Thomson. The affidavit 

details Officer Thomson’s background and his prior experience in controlled substance 

investigations. Search Warrant & Aff. at 1-2, ¶¶ A-C. 

 The search was the result of an investigation into Defendant that had begun 

approximately one week earlier. On August 2, 2014, Ypsilanti Police Officer Peterson 

conducted a traffic stop of a black male driving a black Lexus. Id. at 2, ¶ E.2 At some point, the 

driver of the black Lexus was identified as Defendant, although it is unclear how or when this 

identification was made. Id. After Defendant informed Officer Peterson that he did not have his 

license on him, Officer Peterson asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle; in response, 

Defendant drove off at a high rate of speed. Id. Officer Peterson pursued Defendant, but 

ultimately lost sight of the vehicle and terminated the pursuit because of the residential nature of 

the area and the presence of pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Id. 

Later, dispatch advised Officer Peterson of a 911 call regarding a bag having been thrown 

out of a window of the black Lexus Officer Peterson had been pursuing. Id. at 2, ¶ F. Officer 

Peterson went to the location described by the caller and retrieved “an orange lunch bag which 

contained marijuana, sandwich baggies and a digital scale.” Id. According to Officer Peterson, 

the materials were packaged in a manner consistent with drug trafficking. Id. Officer Peterson 

contacted the 911 caller, who requested anonymity. Id. at 2, ¶ G. The caller reported that a 

 

1

 Defendant was also charged with an additional count of possession with intent to distribute a 

controlled substance, see Indictment at 1, but Defendant does not challenge the evidence 

supporting that charge. 

2

 Defendant does not challenge the legality of the stop. 

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black male driver of a black Lexus “had thrown the orange bag and digital scale out of the 

vehicle he was in before the patrol car turned onto” the street. Id. 

 Officer Peterson contacted Officer Thomson with this information, who then conducted a 

background check of Defendant. Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ G-J. That effort revealed that Defendant had a 

criminal history of possessing and manufacturing controlled substances. Id. at 3, ¶ J.3 Similarly, 

during a prior arrest for an unrelated crime, Defendant was found in possession of “two large 

ziplock baggies of suspected marijuana, [a] digital scale and several empty clear plastic sandwich 

baggies.” Id. at 3, ¶ H. From a TLO check, Officer Thomson learned that utility bills for the 

residence at 1073 Levona Street, Ypsilanti, Michigan were in Defendant’s name, and that 

Defendant associated with Chaya Letrice Bonner, a woman who resided at the same address. Id. 

at 3, ¶ I.4 The same day (August 2), Officer Thomson visited the identified residence and spoke 

with Ms. Bonner. Id. at 3, ¶¶ K, L. Ms. Bonner refused to say whether Defendant lived at the 

address, but she did inform Officer Thomson that Defendant was the father of her child and that 

Defendant had utility bills in his name at the location. Id. at 3, ¶ K.5

On August 8, 2014, officers conducted a “trash pull” at 1073 Levona, the contents of 

which included a plastic grocery bag and a clear zip lock baggie, both containing marijuana 

 

3

 Specifically, Defendant had been arrested for and pleaded guilty to charges of (i) delivering and 

manufacturing cocaine in 1993, (ii) possession of marijuana in 2003 and 2008, and 

(iii) manufacturing and delivering marijuana in 2009. Search Warrant & Aff. at 3, ¶ J. At the 

time the affidavit was sworn, Defendant was on probation for possession of a controlled 

substance. Id. 

4

 While not explained in the affidavit, a “TLO check” appears to be the use of a program called 

“TLOxp,” a “streamlined, custom, scalable investigative and risk management tool for due 

diligence, threat assessment, identity authentication, fraud prevention and detection, legislative 

compliance, and debt recovery.” It is composed of “public and proprietary records” that allow 

organizations, such as law enforcement agencies, to “locat[e] and research[ ] connections 

between individuals, businesses and assets.” See TLOxp, www.tlo.com (last visited July 8, 

2015). 

5

 This statement regarding utility bills, as detailed infra, is disputed by Defendant. 

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residue. Id. at 4, ¶¶ M-O. The trash also contained mail addressed to Ms. Bonner at 1073 

Levona. Id. at 4, ¶ N. At the time of the trash pull, the officers also observed a black Lexus in 

the driveway of 1073 Levona, which appeared to be the same Lexus Defendant was driving at 

the time of the traffic stop. Id. at 4, ¶ M. Based on this information, a search warrant was 

obtained and a search was executed the following day. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard 

For a search warrant to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. 

amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized.”). To determine whether an affidavit establishes probable cause, an issuing magistrate 

must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 

the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying 

hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Accordingly, the 

affidavit must demonstrate “a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought.” 

United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747-748 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 

Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In reviewing the magistrate’s probable-cause determination, this Court’s task is to ensure 

that the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for his conclusion. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239. To 

encourage the use of and reliance on judicially-approved warrants in the course of law 

enforcement investigations, “reviewing courts are to accord the magistrate’s determination ‘great 

deference,’” and a probable-cause determination “should only be reversed if it was arbitrarily 

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exercised.” United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Gates, 

462 U.S. at 236). The Court’s review for sufficiency of evidence is limited to the information 

contained within the four corners of the affidavit. United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 892 

(6th Cir. 2006). 

B. Discussion 

 The affidavit at issue here does not present a close call. The magistrate was well within 

his discretion to conclude that there was a “fair probability” that a search of the premises at 1073 

Levona would yield evidence of criminal activity or contraband. This is evident from the results 

of the trash pull, which not only revealed evidence of drug possession and/or trafficking, but also 

conclusively established that the trash originated from the residence of 1073 Levona. Notably, 

Defendant contests neither the legality nor the results of the trash pull, but instead intimates only 

that the trash pull was insufficient to establish the required nexus between the location to be 

searched and the suspected criminal activity. Def. Mot. at 8 (Dkt. 20) (“The only 

information . . . establishing any relationship between 1073 Levona and the criminal activity at 

issue is the trash pull conducted at that location.”). 

However, the government correctly observes that the results of a trash pull, by itself, may 

suffice to establish probable cause to search the premises. See United States v. Lawrence, 308 

F.3d 623, 627 (6th Cir. 2002) (trash pull revealed wrappers with cocaine residue, which 

“supplied sufficient probable cause for the search warrant.”); United States v. Patton, 411 

F. App’x 806, 809 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]hite substance which field-tested positive for cocaine, 

remnants of hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes, marijuana seeds and stems, and a plastic bag 

containing marijuana residue” found in trash sufficed for probable cause). Thus, the magistrate 

was justified in finding probable cause on that basis alone. 

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 Because the results of the trash pull were sufficient to establish probable cause, 

Defendant’s remaining arguments are immaterial. For instance, Defendant’s argument that the 

affidavit failed to adequately connect him to the residence at 1073 Levona is beside the point. 

Def. Mot. at 7-8. The relevant inquiry is whether there is a sufficient “nexus between the place 

to be searched and the evidence sought.” Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 594 (quoting United States v. 

Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336-337 (6th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

warrant sought evidence of controlled substances, which specifically included marijuana, and 

materials associated with the trafficking of such substances, see Search Warrant & Aff. at 1, ¶ 2, 

which was adequately connected to 1073 Levona by the discovery of marijuana residue in trash 

from that location. Where, as here, the affidavit establishes a sufficient connection between the 

location and the suspected criminal activity, additional facts tying the defendant to the same 

location are not constitutionally required. 

Nonetheless, Officer Thomson’s affidavit does establish a connection between Defendant 

and 1073 Levona. The affidavit referenced the TLO search, which revealed that Defendant has 

an electric bill and phone bill for the Levona property in his name. The affidavit further explains 

that the mother of Defendant’s child resides at the address and that a car that appeared to be the 

same one Defendant was driving at the time of Officer Peterson’s stop was also observed at the 

address. These facts make it reasonable to conclude that Defendant also resided, or at least 

maintained a presence, at the address. Therefore, the affidavit does establish a nexus between 

Defendant and the location that was searched. 

Similarly, the Court finds Defendant’s conclusory argument that the anonymous 911 tip 

was uncorroborated, and, therefore, could not contribute to the probable-cause determination to 

be unpersuasive. Def. Mot. at 7. According to the anonymous informant, a bag was thrown out 

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of a black Lexus, driven by a black male, while the driver was being pursued by law 

enforcement. The tip itself was corroborated by Officer Peterson’s actual recovery of the bag 

and its contents at the location described by the caller. The caller’s description of events was 

also corroborated by Officer Peterson, as she had been pursuing a black male driving a black 

Lexus who had fled in the middle of a traffic stop. Accordingly, the information was sufficiently 

independently corroborated so as to “‘reduce[ ] the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,’ 

thus providing ‘a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.’” Gates, 462 U.S. at 244-245 

(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960), overruled on other grounds by 

United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)). Consequently, the magistrate was permitted to 

consider the information provided by the anonymous tipster when evaluating the affidavit. 

 Defendant’s attempts to attack the sufficiency of the affidavit piecemeal fail to appreciate 

that affidavits are reviewed in a common-sense manner to determine “whether the totality of the 

circumstances supports a finding of probable cause,” and not in a hyper-technical fashion that 

engages in a line-by-line scrutiny. United States v. Woosley, 361 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004). 

The totality of circumstances presented by Officer Thomson’s affidavit reasonably warrants the 

conclusion that Defendant was engaged in drug trafficking activity, and that a search of 1073 

Levona would yield either contraband or evidence of such trafficking activity. The affidavit was 

amply supported by probable cause.6

 

6 Because the Court concludes that the affidavit was supported by probable cause, the Court also 

rejects Defendant’s cursory argument that “the warrant was unsupported by probable cause [and] 

any reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal.” Def. Mot. at 

9. The Court construes this statement as arguing that the “affidavit [is] ‘so lacking in indicia of 

probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,’” such that the 

good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. See United States v. Leon, 468 

U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611 (1975) (Powell, J. 

concurring in part)). Officer Thomson’s affidavit is not the “bare bones” affidavit that fails to 

identify “some connection, regardless of how remote it may have been, between the criminal 

activity at issue and the place to be searched.” Laughton, 409 F.3d at 750 (emphasis in original). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence and request for 

an evidentiary hearing (Dkt. 20) are denied.7

 

Dated: July 9, 2015 s/Mark A. Goldsmith 

 Detroit, Michigan MARK A. GOLDSMITH 

 United States District Judge 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record and 

any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on July 9, 2015. 

 s/Johnetta M. Curry-Williams 

 Case Manager 

 

Accordingly, even if the affidavit did fail to establish probable cause, the executing officers were 

not unreasonable in relying on it, and the good-faith exception would apply. 

7 Defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 

154, 155-156 (1978) (where a “defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false 

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by 

the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding 

of probable cause, . . . a hearing [must] be held at the defendant’s request.”) (emphasis added). If 

the challenged portion of the affidavit is not necessary to the probable-cause finding, an 

evidentiary hearing is not required. Id. at 171-172 (“[I]f, when material that is the subject of the 

alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the 

warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required.”). Here, the 

challenged portion of the affidavit — Ms. Bonner’s statement to Officer Thomson that 

Defendant’s name was on the Levona property utility bills — was not necessary to establish 

probable cause because the same information was secured from the TLO search.

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