1 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-2242 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

DAVID P. GAW, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 

[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch, Stahl, and Barron, 

Circuit Judges. 

William J. Cintolo, with whom Cosgrove Eisenberg & Kiley was 

on brief, for appellant. 

 Evan Rose, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, 

with whom Carmen M. Ortiz, United States Attorney, was on brief, 

for appellee. 

March 9, 2016 
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. David Gaw, an employee with the 

Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles ("RMV"), appeals from his 

conviction on two counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341, 1346, 

and one count of conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce 

by threats or violence, id. § 1951 ("Hobbs Act"). The convictions 

relate to an alleged scheme to sell automotive service station 

owners RMV licenses to perform state-mandated vehicle inspections. 

Gaw contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

convictions, but we reject this challenge. And because we also 

reject Gaw's other arguments for overturning the convictions, we 

affirm them. 

I. 

Gaw's convictions arise from allegations concerning his 

work as a field investigator with the RMV. In Massachusetts, 

automotive service station owners must obtain a license from the 

RMV in order to perform state-mandated vehicle inspections. See 

540 C.M.R. § 4.08. In 2008, the RMV placed a cap on the number of 

licenses that the RMV would issue to service stations to perform 

inspections of regular passenger vehicles. 

Because inspection licenses are generally not 

transferable, the cap matters a lot. Once the RMV hits the cap, 

a service station owner who seeks a license is seemingly out of 

luck. See id. § 4.08(1)(a)(2). The RMV, however, had an unwritten 

policy that allowed licenses to follow a station owner if the owner 
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merged the station into another that did not have a license. And 

this unwritten policy -- and the ambiguity about the rules, if 

any, that govern merger approvals -- figures prominently here for 

the following reason. 

In 2009, the RMV had hit the cap. The government alleges 

that Gaw and two others -- Simon Abou Raad, a service station 

owner, and Mark LaFrance, an RMV employee in charge of the vehicle 

inspection program -- developed a scheme to enrich themselves by 

taking advantage of the interaction between the cap and the 

unwritten merger policy. 

According to the government, the conspirators would 

identify service station owners who held licenses but were not 

doing a large inspection business. The conspirators would then 

either attempt to shut down those owners' service stations on 

technicalities or offer to buy their inspection equipment in the 

hope that the service station owners would agree to give up their 

licenses. 

If station owners who were approached in connection with 

this scheme agreed to give up their licenses, the government 

contended, the conspirators would then find a "buyer" for the 

license and draw up sham paperwork to make it appear that the 

station owner giving up its license was merging into the "buyer." 

In this way, the participants in the scheme were able to profit 
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from the unlawful transfer of licenses by selling them while 

disguising them as transfers effected pursuant to mergers. 

Due to his alleged involvement in the scheme, Gaw was 

indicted in the United States District Court for the District of 

Massachusetts on 16 counts of mail fraud and one count of violating 

the Hobbs Act. In addition to the Hobbs Act count, the government 

pursued three of the 16 mail fraud counts at trial: two relating 

to the sale of one license and one relating to the sale of another. 

At the conclusion of the evidence, Gaw moved for 

acquittal on all counts. The District Court denied the motion and 

the case then went to the jury. The jury returned guilty verdicts 

on two of the mail fraud counts, a not guilty verdict on the third 

mail fraud count, and a guilty verdict on the Hobbs Act count. 

Gaw then moved for acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 29. Gaw also moved for a new trial pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Both motions were denied. 

The District Court sentenced Gaw on each charge to one year and 

one day in prison, followed by a year of supervised release. The 

sentences were to run concurrently. 

On appeal, Gaw challenges the sufficiency of the 

government's evidence as to each of his convictions, argues that 

the District Court should have ordered a new trial, and contends 

that the cumulative error doctrine also requires that his 
- 4 - 

convictions be vacated. We address these arguments in turn, and 

we reject each one. 

II. 

We start with Gaw's challenge to the District Court's 

denial of his Rule 29 motion. Our review is de novo. United 

States v. Hatch, 434 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006). 

The question that we must resolve is whether "a rational 

factfinder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 

prosecution successfully proved the essential elements of the 

crime." Id. (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). 

"[T]his court need not believe that no verdict other than a guilty 

verdict could sensibly be reached, but must only satisfy itself 

that the guilty verdict finds support in a plausible rendition of 

the record." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In undertaking that review, we consider "the evidence in the light 

most amiable to the government," make "all reasonable inferences 

in its favor," and resolve all credibility disputes in favor of 

the verdict. Id. (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). 

Our sufficiency review is made more complicated here by 

virtue of the number of distinct theories of criminal liability 

the government pursued at trial. Thus, before we turn to what the 

record shows about the evidence, we briefly discuss the theories 

the government put into play. 
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As we have said, the government charged Gaw with 

violating the mail fraud statute and the Hobbs Act. And with 

regard to the mail fraud counts, the parties agree, the government 

charged Gaw both as a principal and as an aider and abettor. 

At trial, the government argued that Gaw could be 

convicted of each count of mail fraud under one theory -- known as 

the "money or property" theory -- either as a principal, or as an 

aider and abettor of either Mark LaFrance or Simon Abou Raad. The 

government also argued that Gaw could be convicted of each count 

of mail fraud under a second theory -- known as the "honest 

services" theory -- as either a principal or as an aider and 

abettor of LaFrance. There were thus, effectively, five theories 

of liability in play for each count of mail fraud. 

The government also argued that Gaw could have been 

convicted under either of two separate theories of Hobbs Act 

liability, known respectively as the "fear of economic loss" and 

"color of official right" theories. And, the government argued, 

Gaw could be convicted under either theory for conspiring with 

either Abou Raad or LaFrance. There were thus effectively four 

theories of liability in play as to that charge. 

The District Court, understandably, raised some concern 

that the broad array of theories would be too confusing to the 

jury. But, ultimately, the District Court allowed the government 

to proceed with all of these theories in presenting its case. 
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Gaw does not challenge that decision on appeal. Nor 

does he argue that the case was not in fact so presented. As a 

result, we must affirm each count if the evidence is sufficient 

for the jury to have convicted Gaw under any one of the relevant 

theories of liability presented to the jury as to that count. See 

United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 2006) ("The 

law is crystalline that, when the government has advanced several 

alternate theories of guilt and the trial court has submitted the 

case to the jury on that basis, an ensuing conviction may stand as 

long as the evidence suffices to support any one of the submitted 

theories."). 

As we shall explain, Gaw has failed to show that any of 

the counts must be reversed as to all of the theories that were 

presented to the jury for that count. In particular, he has not 

shown that his Hobbs Act conviction must be overturned for lack of 

sufficient evidence on the fear of economic loss theory. Nor has 

he shown that his mail fraud convictions must be overturned for 

lack of sufficient evidence on the theory that he aided and abetted 

LaFrance's honest services fraud. We thus affirm each of these 

convictions. 

A. 

We begin with Gaw's contention that there was 

insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy to commit 
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extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. We conclude that Gaw has 

failed to show on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to 

support this conviction. 

The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to "in any way or degree 

obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of any 

article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or 

attempt[] or conspire[] so to do." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Act 

further defines extortion as "the obtaining of property from 

another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or 

threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official 

right." Id. § 1951(b)(2). And with respect to the wrongful use 

of fear, "we have clarified that 'fear' can mean the 'fear of 

economic loss.'" United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 827 (1st 

Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 394 

(1st Cir. 1976)). 

In this case, the special verdict form shows that the 

jury found Gaw guilty of the Hobbs Act violation under both the 

color of official right and fear of economic loss theories. Gaw 

argues only that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of 

conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act under a color of official right 

theory. Therefore, we agree with the government that waiver 

provides a sufficient ground on which to uphold Gaw's Hobbs Act 

conviction. 
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"The 'color of official right' and 'fear' prongs provide 

alternative, independently sufficient grounds for finding 

extortion; thus, adequate proof of one obviates any need for proof 

of the other." United States v. Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d 69, 73 (1st 

Cir. 2006). Because Gaw makes no argument that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction of conspiracy to violate 

the Hobbs Act under a fear of economic loss theory, see United 

States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990), that conviction 

must be affirmed. See Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d at 73.1

 1 We note that, setting waiver aside, there was sufficient 

evidence for the jury to find Gaw guilty of conspiracy to commit 

Hobbs Act extortion under a color of official right theory. That 

is because the same evidence that supports Gaw's conviction for 

aiding and abetting LaFrance's honest services fraud -- which we 

discuss at length below -- would support his conviction for 

conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act extortion under color of official 

right. See United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 155-56 (1st 

Cir. 2013) ("Here, for the same reasons that we found the evidence 

sufficient to support the honest-services fraud convictions, we 

hold that the jury was presented with enough evidence to support 

[defendant]'s extortion [under color of official right] 

conviction."). From this record, the jury could rationally infer 

that Gaw "actively participate[d] in" LaFrance's commission of 

honest services mail fraud with "advance knowledge" of all of "the 

circumstances constituting the charged offense." Rosemond v. 

United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248-49 (2014). The jury could 

also rationally infer that there was a tacit agreement between Gaw 

and LaFrance to commit Hobbs Act extortion under color of official 

right. See United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 45-46 (1st 

Cir. 2007) ("A formal agreement is not required; rather, the 

agreement may be shown by a concert of action, all the parties 

working together understandingly, with a single design for the 

accomplishment of a common purpose." (internal quotation marks, 

brackets, and citations omitted)); United States v. MartinezMedina, 279 F.3d 105, 113-14 (1st Cir. 2002) ("The jury may infer 

an agreement circumstantially by evidence of, inter alia, a common 

purpose . . . overlap of participants, and interdependence of 
- 9 - 

B. 

We next turn to Gaw's sufficiency challenge to his two 

convictions for mail fraud. These convictions -- and thus the 

evidence that the government contends supports them -- relate to 

a single transaction: the transfer of an inspection license from 

one station owner, Frank Pignatare, to another, Michael Youssef, 

for $75,000. 

The government alleges that this transaction -- which we 

will refer to as the "Youssef transaction" -- was engineered by 

Gaw, Abou Raad, and LaFrance. The two mail fraud counts against 

Gaw stem from the fact that there were two separate mailings made 

with respect to that transaction. The indictment identifies those 

mailings as a "Forged Letter purportedly from 'F.P.'" mailed by 

Abou Raad to the RMV on December 24, 2012, and an "Application for 

Inspection Station Approval," which was mailed by the RMV to 

"'S.A.W.' Stoneham, MA" on January 7, 2013. The parties do not 

differentiate between the two counts of mail fraud on appeal. 

The indictment alleges that Gaw, Abou Raad, and LaFrance 

committed mail fraud "aided and abetted by each other." Thus, 

Gaw's mail fraud convictions may be upheld if the evidence suffices 

 

various elements in the overall plan."); United States v. Palmer, 

203 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2000) ("A conspiracy may be established 

through circumstantial evidence, and the government need only 

demonstrate a tacit understanding between the conspirators to 

prove its case."). 
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to show that he aided and abetted either Abou Raad's or LaFrance's 

mail fraud, even if the evidence is not sufficient to support a 

finding that Gaw was guilty of mail fraud as a principal. United 

States v. García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir. 2007). 

Finally, there are two types of mail fraud. Mail fraud 

may deprive the victim of money or property, as is usually the 

case, United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 723 (1st Cir. 1996), 

or mail fraud may deprive the victim of "honest services," as may 

occur in some special cases, 18 U.S.C. § 1346; see also United 

States v. Urciuoli, 613 F.3d 11, 12 n.1 (1st Cir. 2010). And the 

government presented each theory of mail fraud to the jury in 

pursuing its case against Gaw. 

Gaw contends that the evidence cannot support his mail 

fraud convictions under either of these theories, as either a 

principal or as an aider and abettor. We disagree. 

In reaching this conclusion, we are aware that Gaw argues 

that he could not have committed money or property mail fraud as 

either a principal or as an aider and abettor. He grounds this 

argument on his contentions that an RMV license cannot be 

considered "money or property" for the purposes of the statute, 

see Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 26 (2000), and that 

Youssef cannot be said to have been deprived of the money he paid 

to buy the license given that he was in on the scheme and thus got 
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exactly what he knew he was buying.2 But even if we were to 

conclude for those reasons that the evidence was insufficient to 

find Gaw guilty -- as either a principal or as an aider and 

abettor -- of money or property mail fraud, that would not 

necessitate overturning his mail fraud convictions. We would be 

required to overturn them only if there were also insufficient 

evidence to support finding Gaw guilty, on these two counts, of 

honest services mail fraud. Gaw, however, has failed to show that 

that is the case, as we will now explain. 

C. 

In an honest services mail fraud prosecution, the 

government must prove that an official received something of value 

in exchange for being influenced in the performance of an "official 

act." United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 152 (1st Cir. 

2013). Gaw argues that he cannot be found guilty as a principal 

because he did not enter into an agreement to be influenced in the 

performance of official acts in exchange for receiving something 

of value and because the acts that he did perform fall outside the 

 2 The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 

submitted an amicus brief that contends that the jury instructions 

on money or property fraud were erroneous because they would have 

allowed the jury to find Gaw guilty even without finding that he 

intended to deprive the victim of property. See United States v. 

Sandler, 750 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2014). Gaw does not adopt this 

argument regarding the jury instructions, and, in any event, 

because we decide the case on alternative grounds, we need not 

address it. 
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scope of honest services mail fraud, as those acts were "relatively 

straightforward task[s] that simply do[] not raise the specter of 

secretive, self-interested action, as does a discretionary, 

decision-making role." United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 

1076-77 (1st Cir. 1997). 

As the government points out, however, the evidence was 

sufficient to convict Gaw as an aider and abettor of LaFrance's 

honest services mail fraud. And we thus affirm the convictions 

for mail fraud on that separate basis. To see why we reach this 

conclusion, it helps to start with a brief recap of the elements 

of the crime. 

As we have explained before, "[t]he crime of mail fraud 

includes three elements: '(1) a scheme to defraud based on false 

pretenses; (2) the defendant's knowing and willing participation 

in the scheme with the intent to defraud; and (3) the use of 

interstate mail communications in furtherance of that scheme.'" 

United States v Soto, 799 F.3d 68, 92 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting 

United States v. Hebshie, 549 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2008) 

(alteration omitted)). Moreover, as we have also explained before, 

to prove that a defendant is liable as an aider and abettor, the 

government must prove "that: 1) the substantive offense was 

actually committed [by someone]; 2) the defendant assisted in the 

commission of that crime or caused it to be committed; and 3) the 

defendant intended to assist in the commission of that crime or to 
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cause it to be committed." United States v. Davis, 717 F.3d 28, 

33 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Rodríguez–Adorno, 695 

F.3d 32, 42 (1st Cir. 2012)); see also Rosemond v. United States, 

134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248-49 (2014) (the intent prong is satisfied 

when a defendant "actively participates in a criminal venture" and 

has "advance knowledge" of all of "the circumstances constituting 

the charged offense").

Gaw does not dispute a number of these elements with 

regard to aiding and abetting LaFrance's honest services mail 

fraud. He does not dispute that LaFrance helped engineer the 

Youssef transaction. Nor does Gaw dispute that LaFrance committed 

honest services mail fraud in doing so -- which is to say, Gaw 

does not dispute that LaFrance was paid in exchange for his role 

in undertaking official acts to effect a sham merger to facilitate 

the Youssef transaction. Nor, finally, does Gaw contend that he 

did not assist in, with the intent to further, the Youssef 

transaction that he concedes LaFrance committed honest services 

mail fraud in facilitating. In light of those concessions, Gaw's 

only contention that is potentially relevant to whether he aided 

and abetted LaFrance's honest services mail fraud is his general 

assertion that he lacked the requisite knowledge for him to be 

convicted. But that assertion does not help him here. 

The evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to find 

"that [Gaw] consciously shared [LaFrance]'s knowledge of" 
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Lafrance's honest services fraud, "the underlying criminal act." 

United States v. Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295, 311 (1st Cir. 2015) 

(quoting United States v. Bristol–Mártir, 570 F.3d 29, 39 (1st 

Cir. 2009)); see also Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1248-49 (to be 

convicted of aiding and abetting, a defendant must have "advance 

knowledge" of all of "the circumstances constituting the charged 

offense"). And that is because the record provides sufficient 

support for a rational jury to find that Gaw understood both that 

LaFrance was using his position in the RMV to further the Youssef 

transaction and that LaFrance was being paid to do so from the 

proceeds of the transaction. See McDonough, 727 F.3d at 152. 

D. 

As an initial matter, the record provides ample 

support -- in the form of testimony from others and recorded 

wiretaps -- for finding that Gaw participated intimately in 

furthering the entire Youssef transaction. Indeed, the record 

provides sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that it 

was Gaw who both identified Youssef as a potential buyer for the 

license and put Youssef in touch with Abou Raad. And, in fact, 

Gaw admits that he was paid $2,000 for his role. 

Moreover, the evidence directly supports finding that 

Gaw was in fact aware that LaFrance was involved in approving the 

Youssef transaction. In particular, the government put into 

evidence a recording of a wiretapped phone call in which Abou Raad 
- 15 - 

told Gaw that he would try to get paperwork to LaFrance without 

Michael Devaney, Gaw's immediate supervisor, knowing about it. 

The government argues -- and the evidence suggests -- that the 

paperwork mentioned in that call was related to effecting the 

Youssef "merger," and Gaw does not contend otherwise. 

Nor could Gaw argue that the record did not sufficiently 

support that conclusion, given a number of other recorded calls 

that the government introduced at trial. One of those calls was 

made the day after the call in which Gaw and Abou Raad spoke about 

Abou Raad getting the paperwork to LaFrance. On that call, Abou 

Raad talked to Youssef about making sure that Youssef had all of 

the necessary equipment to perform state-mandated vehicle 

inspections, for which he needed approval from LaFrance's 

department. On another of those calls, from about a week later, 

Abou Raad and Youssef discussed waiting to get "papers" from the 

RMV. And, finally, recorded phone calls introduced by the 

government support the conclusion that Gaw and Abou Raad had talked 

about Youssef's paperwork on three prior occasions within about 

two weeks leading up to the call in which Abou Raad and Gaw spoke 

about Abou Raad getting "paperwork" to LaFrance on the sly. 

Gaw does contend that he did not know that the merger in 

the Youssef transaction was fraudulent. But even assuming that 

such knowledge would be necessary for Gaw to be convicted of aiding 

and abetting LaFrance's honest services mail fraud, the jury could 
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reasonably have concluded that Gaw did know that the merger was 

fraudulent. As we have noted, the government introduced evidence 

to show that Gaw knew Abou Raad was trying to get the Youssef 

paperwork to LaFrance without Devaney -- Gaw's supervisor -- 

knowing about it. In the same call that Abou Raad and Gaw discussed 

Abou Raad getting paperwork to LaFrance on the sly, moreover, Gaw 

told Abou Raad that he had been joking with LaFrance about "merger" 

being the "new word" in the RMV vocabulary. And, as the wiretaps 

showed, Gaw even told Youssef to hide Gaw's involvement in the 

transaction. This evidence suffices to support a finding by the 

jury that Gaw understood that the merger was fraudulent. See 

United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1989) ("His 

attempts to hide the truth, or cast it in a false light, were 

competent proof of guilty knowledge."). 

Other record evidence rounds out the picture of Gaw's 

knowledge of LaFrance's role. The government introduced a 

recording of a call in which Gaw told Abou Raad that he spoke to 

LaFrance about the overall scheme (though with no mention of the 

Youssef transaction in particular), and that LaFrance had told Gaw 

that "as long as the guy that owned the business, his name is on 

the paperwork, they can do any fucking thing they want." And, 

further, the government introduced yet another recording of a call 

in which Gaw indicated that he knew of LaFrance's involvement in 

the Youssef transaction itself. In that call, Gaw told Abou Raad 
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that he should collect the money from Youssef because LaFrance had 

just called Gaw and told him to go by Youssef's station and that 

once he did, Youssef would be open for business. 

Simply put, there was a great deal of evidence pertaining 

to both Gaw's intimate knowledge of the Youssef transaction as a 

whole and Gaw's knowledge of LaFrance's involvement in both that 

same transaction and the overall sham merger scheme. In light of 

that evidence, the record supports the reasonable inference that 

Gaw knew what Gaw does not dispute -- that LaFrance was using his 

position with the RMV to further the effort to effect a sham merger 

in connection with the Youssef transaction. 

That leaves only the question whether the evidence also 

supports the conclusion that Gaw knew LaFrance was performing his 

role in the Youssef transaction in return for payment from the 

proceeds of the scheme. But the record shows that the jury could 

rationally infer from the evidence that Gaw possessed just such 

knowledge. 

The record provides overwhelming support for the 

conclusion that Gaw understood that he would himself be paid by 

Abou Raad for assisting with the Youssef transaction. In addition 

to the evidence from recorded calls that showed Gaw expected that 

he would be paid by Abou Raad for that transaction, the government 

also introduced a recording of a wiretapped call that took place 
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after the Youssef sale was completed in which Gaw and Abou Raad 

discussed making money via similar sham mergers going forward. 

Specifically, Abou Raad stated in that call, "We can 

make, we can make lot [sic] of money if we . . . have the buyer. 

We don't want the buyers, we want the sellers. That's where we 

can make fucking five thousand apiece. You know what I mean?" 

Gaw then responded, "[y]ep," at which point Abou Raad continued, 

"So we need the sellers, not buyers we, we don't make much. We 

need the sellers. That's where we can control the shit." 

In light of this evidence, it would hardly be an 

unreasonable leap for the jury to conclude that Gaw knew that 

LaFrance was being similarly paid for his role in the Youssef 

transaction as well. The evidence provided support for a rational 

jury finding that Gaw was intimately involved in an effort to 

facilitate a sham merger so that he could be paid. The evidence 

also showed that those with whom he spoke in carrying out the 

Youssef transaction were performing their role in order to be paid 

from the proceeds of the sale. Furthermore, the evidence supports 

the inference that Gaw knew that LaFrance was in on the same 

transaction and was providing the necessary approval of the 

paperwork. It thus would be quite reasonable for a jury to 

conclude that Gaw knew that LaFrance, too, was performing his role 

in the Youssef transaction in exchange for money from the proceeds 

of the sale -- as, Gaw concedes, LaFrance actually was. See United 
- 19 - 

States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992) (explaining 

that "jurors are neither required to divorce themselves from their 

common sense nor to abandon the dictates of mature experience" and 

that "factfinders may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 

based on shared perceptions and understandings of the habits, 

practices, and inclinations of human beings"). 

E. 

As we have already pointed out, Gaw challenges only one 

element of aiding and abetting liability. He does not argue that 

LaFrance did not in fact commit honest services mail fraud. Nor 

does he argue that he did not assist in its commission. Nor does 

he argue that he did not intend to help LaFrance. The only 

contention Gaw arguably does make is that he lacked the requisite 

knowledge of the crime that he assisted LaFrance in committing. 

But, as we have shown, the evidence supports the reasonable finding 

that Gaw did know that LaFrance was taking money in exchange for 

performing official acts to effectuate a fraudulent merger in 

furtherance of the Youssef transaction. See McDonough, 727 F.3d 

at 152. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient for a rational jury 

to find "that [Gaw] consciously shared [LaFrance]'s knowledge of 

the underlying criminal act." Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d at 311. 

To be sure, much of the evidence concerning Gaw's 

knowledge of LaFrance's commission of honest services fraud is 

circumstantial, rather than direct. But "[t]he law is long since 
- 20 - 

settled that the prosecution may prove its case without direct 

evidence of a defendant's guilty knowledge so long as the array of 

circumstantial evidence possesses sufficient persuasive power." 

United States v. O'Brien, 14 F.3d 703, 706 (1st Cir. 1994). 

Therefore, "taking the evidence and reasonable 

inferences in the light most helpful to the prosecution," United 

States v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2015), we 

conclude that the evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to 

have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gaw aided and abetted 

LaFrance's honest services fraud. Accordingly, Gaw's mail fraud 

convictions must be affirmed. 

III. 

We next address Gaw's assertion that the District Court 

erred in denying his motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 33. Gaw first contends that the motion should 

have been granted because at trial the District Court improperly 

excluded certain evidence that Gaw intended to use to support a 

good faith defense. Gaw next argues that the District Court should 

have granted him a new trial because the evidence weighed so 

heavily against the verdict. 

We "review the [D]istrict [C]ourt's denial of a Rule 33 

motion for 'manifest abuse of discretion.'" United States v. 

Flores-Rivera, 787 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States 

v. González–González, 258 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2001)). We 
- 21 - 

identify no such abuse, and we thus reject each of Gaw's 

contentions. 

A. 

Gaw argues that the District Court erred in refusing to 

allow him to introduce into evidence "the RMV's Code of Conduct, 

regulations and other state law evidence." He contends that this 

evidence would have supported the conclusion that he believed paid 

referrals of buyers and sellers of licenses were lawful and thus 

would have supported his contention that he lacked the requisite 

intent to have committed the crimes. 

We review such evidentiary decisions by district courts 

only for abuse of discretion, United States v. Peake, 804 F.3d 81, 

96 (1st Cir. 2015), and we see none here. Gaw contends that "if 

[he] believed that he could make paid referrals to Abou Raad, he 

could not simultaneously possess the required willful intent to 

violate the statutes under which he was charged." But even 

assuming that that is the case, Gaw must still show how the code 

of conduct that he contends was improperly excluded was relevant 

to whether he possessed the requisite criminal intent. 

His brief, however, does not cite to the actual document, 

explain what it is, or argue that Gaw even knew about it at the 

relevant time, let alone that he actually relied on it in taking 
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the steps to facilitate the Youssef transaction that he took.3 

Cf. Urciuoli, 613 F.3d at 15 ("Urciuoli claims that the class 

exception was still relevant to his defense that he (Urciuoli) 

acted in good faith because he knew of the class exception . . . ." 

(emphasis added)).4 Given that the District Court ruled that Gaw 

could admit evidence of state law or RMV codes of conduct so long 

as he could show that he had known of them, we cannot see how the 

District Court abused its discretion in making the evidentiary 

 3 His brief quotes at length from Section 7.01 of the "code 

of conduct" that he contends should have been admitted into 

evidence: "The Commonwealth seeks to give employees the maximum 

freedom possible to engage in outside employment or business 

activities consistent with their responsibilities to the 

Commonwealth. However, the extremely sensitive mission of the 

Commonwealth and its employees necessitates certain restrictions. 

Employees may engage in outside employment or business activity 

provided such activity is not prohibited by this Code or by any 

statute, regulation or departmental order. If employees plan to 

engage in outside employment or business activity, they must give 

prior written notice to their appointing authority of the planned 

employment or activity." It also quotes Section 7.02: "Employees 

are generally not required to submit written notice before engaging 

in outside activities which are not considered to be employment or 

business." 

4 Gaw also contends that the District Court erred by not 

"provid[ing]" the jury with what he terms a "state law 

explication." But Gaw did not object to the jury instructions 

that the District Court gave, and he makes no developed argument 

on appeal as to how the demanding plain error standard that thus 

applies could possibly be met. See United States v. Colon, 744 

F.3d 752, 757 (1st Cir. 2014). In fact, his briefs do not make 

clear what instructions should have been given to the jury that 

was not. We thus reject the argument as waived. See Zannino, 895 

F.2d at 17. 
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ruling that it did. Accordingly, we reject Gaw's evidentiary 

challenge to the denial of his new trial motion. 

B.

Gaw also contends that the District Court erred in not 

granting him a new trial for an additional reason. He contends 

that the District Court "did not weigh the preponderance and 

exercise its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial." 

But the record shows otherwise. 

In rejecting the new trial motion, the District Court 

wrote: "After careful consideration of the arguments in light of 

the trial evidence, I conclude that the jury was correctly 

instructed as to the law and its verdict was adequately supported 

by evidence introduced at trial." Moreover, we will overturn the 

denial of a motion for a new trial "predicated on the district 

court's evaluation of the weight of the evidence," only if it is 

"quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous 

result." United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 486 (1st 

Cir. 2005) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). That 

is simply not the case here. 

Our review of the evidence supporting Gaw's mail fraud 

convictions shows that the jury did not reach a seriously erroneous 

result. See id. And Gaw develops no argument as to why it was 

seriously erroneous for the jury to convict him of a Hobbs Act 

violation under a fear of economic loss theory of liability. Thus, 
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as with his sufficiency challenge, Gaw has waived any argument 

that he was entitled to a new trial on his Hobbs Act conviction. 

IV.

As should be clear by now, Gaw's final contention -- 

that his convictions must be vacated pursuant to the doctrine of 

cumulative error -- cannot succeed. For while "[i]ndividual 

errors, insufficient in themselves to necessitate a new trial, may 

in the aggregate have a more debilitating effect," United States 

v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1993), "cumulativeerror analysis is inappropriate when a party complains of the 

cumulative effect of non-errors." United States v. Stokes, 124 

F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1997). And, for the reasons already given, 

that is the situation here. See United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 

797 F.3d 45, 79 (1st Cir. 2015). 

V. 

For the foregoing reasons, Gaw's convictions are 

affirmed.