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THE ROLE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN INNOVATION 

AND JOB CREATION: 

THE SBIR AND STTR PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011 

Serial No. 112–10 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan 

VACANCY 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL D. TONKO, New York 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

HON. BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona, Chair 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN, 

Tennessee 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

DAVID WU, Oregon 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Hearing Date 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Benjamin Quayle, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Statement by Representative David Wu, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

Witnesses: 

Dr. Sally Rockey, Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National Institutes of Health 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 10 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Dr. Donald Siegel, Dean and Professor, School of Business, University at 

Albany, State University of New York 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Mr. Mark Crowell, Executive Director and Associate Vice President, Innovation Partnerships and Commercialization, University of Virginia 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 24 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 26 

Mr. Doug Limbaugh, Chief Executive Officer, Kutta Technologies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31 

Ms. Laura McKinney, President and Chief Executive Officer, Galois, Inc. 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 35 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 37 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Dr. Sally Rockey, Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National Institutes of Health ...................................................................................................... 60 

Dr. Donald Siegel, Dean and Professor, School of Business, University at 

Albany, State University of New York ............................................................... 68 

Mr. Mark Crowell, Executive Director and Associate Vice President, Innovation Partnerships and Commercialization, University of Virginia .................. 70 

Mr. Doug Limbaugh, Chief Executive Officer, Kutta Technologies ..................... 74 

Ms. Laura McKinney, President and Chief Executive Officer, Galois, Inc. ........ 84 
Page

IV 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Material Submitted by Representative David Wu, Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science, Space, 

and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................... 92 

Material Submitted by Representative John P. Sarbanes, Subcommittee on 

Technology and Innovation, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 

U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................................ 96 
(1) 

THE ROLE OF SMALL BUSINESS IN 

INNOVATION 

AND JOB CREATION: THE SBIR AND STTR 

PROGRAMS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION, 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin Quayle 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 
3 

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

The Role of Small Business in Innovation and Job 

Creation: 

The SBIR and STTR Programs 

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2011

2:00 P.M.–4:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

1. Purpose 

On Thursday, March 31, the Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation of the 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will hold a hearing to examine the 

role of the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small Business 

Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs in promoting innovation. Witnesses will discuss their experience with the SBIR and STTR Programs and will provide advice 

on areas of potential improvement as the Committee considers reauthorization of 

these programs. 

2. Witnesses 

Dr. Sally Rockey is the Deputy Director for Extramural Research at the National 

Institutes of Health. 

Dr. Donald Siegel is Dean and Professor at the School of Business, University at 

Albany, State University of New York, and a Member of the research team for the 

Committee for Capitalizing on Science, Technology, and Innovation, National Research Council of the National Academies. 

Mr. Mark Crowell is the Executive Director and Associate Vice President for Innovation Partnerships and Commercialization at the University of Virginia. 

Mr. Doug Limbaugh is the Chief Executive Officer of Kutta Technologies. 

Ms. Laura McKinney is the President and Chief Executive Officer of Galois, Inc. 

3. Brief Overview 

The hearing will examine the effectiveness of the SBIR and STTR Programs in 

promoting small business innovation and job creation. Witnesses will describe 

whether the programs are achieving their defined objectives, whether the current 

structure and size of the programs are appropriate, and whether eligibility requirements should be adjusted. 

4. Issues for Examination 

The Committee will examine several aspects of the SBIR and STTR programs including: whether the SBIR and STTR Programs are effectively promoting innovation 

and job creation; whether firms that are majority-owned by venture capital operating companies should be eligible to apply for program funding; whether the current extramural research set aside of 2.5 percent for SBIR programs is adequate; 

whether the current guidelines on award sizes is appropriate and to what extent 

agencies should have flexibility in determining award sizes; whether there is significant geographic concentration among award recipients and, if so, what accounts for 

this concentration; whether there is evidence to suggest that a significant number 

of companies receive multiple SBIR awards with unusually low commercialization 

rates; and whether the management and coordination of the program across the federal government needs to be improved. 

5. GAO and NRC Reviews of the SBIR and STTR Programs 

The GAO has conducted multiple studies of the SBIR and STTR programs since 

their inception assessing: rates of commercialization; effectiveness of SBIR and 

STTR activity in meeting agency R&D needs; small business participation in gov-
4 

1 U.S. General Accountability Office, Observations on the Small Business Innovation Research 

Program, GAO–05–861T, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accountability Office, 2005. 2 U.S. General Accountability Office, Small Business Innovation Research: Agencies Need to 

Strengthen Efforts to Improve the Completeness, Consistency, and Accuracy of Awards Data, 

GAO–07–38, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accountability Office, 2006. 3 National Research Council of the National Academies An Assessment of the SBIR Program, 

Washington, DC, The National Academies Press, 2008. 4 Ibid. 

5 Ibid. 

6 J. O. Flender and R. S. Morse, The Role of New Technical Enterprise in the U.S. Economy, 

Cambridge, MA: MIT Development Foundation, 1975, and David L. Birch, ‘‘Who Creates Jobs?’’ 

The Public Interest, 65:3–14, 1981. 

ernment R&D; geographical concentration of award funding; and ability of agencies 

to effectively evaluate the SBIR and STTR programs. 

In June 2005, the GAO submitted congressional testimony, which found that the 

SBIR program has helped ‘‘enhance the role of small businesses in federal R&D.’’ 1

However, an October 2006 GAO study found that ‘‘agencies need to strengthen 

[their] efforts to improve the completeness, consistency, and accuracy of awards 

data’’ to better assess the effectiveness of the program in achieving its defined objectives. 2

As part of the 2000 reauthorization of the SBIR program, Congress directed the 

National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation the SBIR program. The NRC report, published in 2008, found 

the SBIR program to be ‘‘sound in concept and effective in practice’’ while also recognizing areas of potential improvement. The NRC found that the ‘‘SBIR program is 

making significant progress in achieving the congressional goals for the program,’’ 

though it also noted that more regular evaluations are needed, since ‘‘insufficient 

data collection, analytic capability and reporting requirements, together with the decentralized character of the program mean there is limited ability to make connections between program outcomes and program management and practices.’’ 3

As part of its assessment, the NRC conducted surveys of SBIR and STTR award 

recipients. The Phase II Survey found that ‘‘34 percent of NIH projects surveyed 

generated at least one patent, and just over half of NIH respondents published at 

least one peer-reviewed article.’’ 4

According to the NRC Firm Survey, over 20 percent of companies indicated that 

they were founded entirely or partly because of an SBIR award. On average, companies that responded to the survey reported adding 29.9 full-time equivalent employees since receipt of their SBIR award. Comprehensive data on commercialization 

rates is inconsistent across federal agencies, but respondents to the survey ‘‘indicate 

that just under half of the projects do reach the marketplace.’’ 5

6. Background 

SBIR 

Congress passed the Small Business Innovation Development Act (P.L. 97–219) 

in 1982 to increase participation of small high-technology businesses in federally 

funded research and development activity. The Act established the SBIR program 

within the major federal research and development (R&D) agencies. Research has 

suggested that small businesses are both highly innovative and engines of significant job creation. 6

The original objectives of the SBIR program include: 

• Stimulation of technological innovation in the small business sector; 

• Increased use of the small business sector to meet the government’s R&D 

needs; 

• Additional involvement of minority and disadvantaged individuals in the 

process; 

• Expanded commercialization of the results of federally funded R&D. 

• The 1992 SBIR reauthorization placed greater emphasis on the objective of 

commercialization of SBIR projects. 

Current law requires that every federal department with an extramural R&D 

budget of $100 million or more establish and operate an SBIR program. Eleven federal departments have SBIR programs, including the Departments of Agriculture, 

Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Transportation; the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and the National Science Foundation. Under 

the program, each qualifying federal department is mandated to set aside 2.5 per-
5 

7Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 60, Tuesday, March 30, 2010, 15756 

8Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 60, Tuesday, March 30, 2010, 15756 

cent (doubled from 1.25 percent in the 1992 reauthorization) of its applicable extramural R&D budget to support mission-related work conducted by small companies. 

Agency SBIR efforts are broken down into three phases. In the first phase, 

awards up to $150,000 for six months (increased from $100,000 as of March 30, 

2010 under a Small Business Administration (SBA) Policy Directive 7) are provided 

to evaluate a concept’s scientific or technical merit and feasibility. The project must 

be of interest to and coincide with the mission of the supporting organization. 

Projects that demonstrate potential after the initial endeavor may compete for 

Phase II awards of up to $1,000,000 lasting one to two years (increased from 

$750,000 under a March 30, 2010 SBA Policy Directive 8) to perform the principal 

R&D. Phase III funding, directed at the commercialization of the product or process, 

is expected to be generated in the private sector. Federal dollars may be used if the 

government perceives that the final technology or technique will meet public needs, 

though this funding must come from outside the SBIR Program. 

The SBA created broad policy and guidelines under which individual departments 

operate SBIR programs. The agency monitors and reports to Congress on the conduct of the separate departmental activities. 

Criteria for eligibility in the SBIR program include companies that are independently owned and operated; not dominant in the field of research proposed; for profit; 

the employer of 500 or fewer people; the primary employer of the principal investigator; and at least 51 percent owned by one or more U.S. citizens or lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens. Subsidiaries of SBIR-eligible companies are also eligible to participate as long as the parent company meets all SBIR requirements. 

The SBIR program has been reauthorized several times since its creation and was 

scheduled to terminate on September 30, 2008. While the program has not been specifically reauthorized since then, it has been extended by several bills, most recently 

by P.L. 112–1, which extends the program through May 31, 2011. 

STTR 

The Small Business Technology Transfer Program (STTR), created by P.L. 102– 

564 and reauthorized several times through fiscal year 2009, is a small business 

program that provides federal R&D funding for research proposals that are developed and executed cooperatively between a small firm and a scientist in a nonprofit 

research organization, and fall under the mission requirements of the federal funding agency. 

Up to $100,000 in Phase I financing is available for one year; Phase II awards 

of up to $750,000 may be made for two years. Federal departments with annual extramural research budgets over $1 billion must set aside of 0.3 percent for STTR 

programs. Currently, the Departments of Energy, Defense, and Health and Human 

Services, NASA, and NSF participate in the STTR program. 

STTR-eligible small business partners must be American-owned and independently operated, be for-profit, and must have no more than 500 employees. Nonprofit 

research institution partners must be located in the U.S., and must meet one of 

three definitions: a nonprofit college or university; a domestic nonprofit research organization; or a federally funded R&D center (FFRDC). 

While the STTR Program has not been reauthorized since fiscal year 2009, it has 

been extended by several bills, most recently by P.L. 112–1, which extends the program through May 31, 2011. 

7. 110th and 111th Congressional Hearings 

The House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology held two hearings in the 

110th Congress and one hearing in the 111th Congress to examine SBIR and STTR 

programs and to analyze the success of the programs in meeting their defined objectives. 

8. SBIR/STTR Discussion Draft Reauthorization 

For purposes of discussion, draft legislation to reauthorize the SBIR and STTR 

programs has been supplied to witnesses and Members of the Subcommittee prior 

to the hearing. Among other things, the draft would reauthorize both programs for 

three years; increase Phase I and Phase II award sizes for both programs; allow for 

greater participation of venture-capital backed firms in the SBIR program; and enhance data collection for the programs. 
6 

Chairman QUAYLE. The Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation will come to order. Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to 

today’s hearing entitled, ‘‘The Role of Small Business in Innovation 

and Job Creation: The SBIR and STTR Programs.’’ In front of you 

are packets containing the written testimony, biographies, and 

truth-in-testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. I would now 

like to recognize myself for five minutes for an opening statement. 

Good afternoon. I would like to welcome you again to today’s 

hearing where we will be examining the Small Business Innovation 

Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs. 

The SBIR Program was signed into law by President Reagan in 

1982, to help spur innovation and increase small business participation on federal research and development activity. Since its inception, this competitive grant program has awarded over $23 billion in SBIR awards for more than 100,000 projects across the Nation and has helped spawn familiar companies such as Qualcomm, 

Sonicare, and Symantec. 

SBIR and STTR award winners have also created equipment 

critical to agencies such as parts for the Mars Rover for NASA or 

a unique cockpit airbag system to protect Army helicopter pilots at 

the Department of Defense. In Tempe, Arizona, Kinetic Muscle has 

created innovative therapy robots for patients suffering from stroke 

or traumatic brain injury. 

These systems are being adapted for use at home, lowering their 

cost, and allowing patients to receive the intensive, repetitive therapy that is often needed for meaningful recovery. 

In my own district, Kutta Technologies has created a unique subterranean communication device for the coalmining industry. As 

this week marks the one-year anniversary of the Upper Big Branch 

Mine disaster in West Virginia where we lost 29 miners, we are 

cognizant of how such technologies can make a difference to so 

many people. 

Today 11 federal agencies provide funding to small businesses 

through SBIR, and five agencies provide funding through STTR. 

Grant recipients have contributed to the country’s scientific and 

technical knowledge, generating thousands of patents and a wealth 

of peer-reviewed articles. 

These small businesses have expanded innovation, helped grow 

our economy by creating thousands of jobs, and are assisting participating federal agencies to fulfill their mission. SBIR and STTR 

are unique in that they are examples of federal programs that have 

largely been successful and have received bipartisan support since 

their creation. 

The National Research Council’s review of SBIR found the program to be, ‘‘sound in concept and effective in practice’’ but also 

identified ways the program can be improved. For instance, our 

ability to effectively evaluate the programs is hampered by insufficient data collection and a lack of common measurement criteria 

among participating federal agencies. 

Improving these assessment tools is crucial to ensure the Federal 

Government is getting the greatest return on its investment. This 

is particularly necessary in today’s budget environment. 

It is also important to examine if the current funding set-asides 

for the programs are appropriate and whether the eligibility cri-
7 

teria for these programs should be expanded to allow majorityowned venture capital companies to compete for awards. 

Finally, I want to address the issue of how we measure commercialization. It is vital for SBIR and SBIR–STTR awards to result 

in commercial technologies, but we must be mindful that some of 

these efforts are going to fail, and some companies will have to go 

back to the drawing board. If all projects are certain to succeed, 

then there is not sufficient justification for strong government involvement. 

While we look for ways to improve commercialization success, 

these programs must continue to support the innovators and entrepreneurs engaged in high-risk research and development. 

We have an excellent panel of witnesses before us who will discuss their experience with SBIR and STTR—I did that twice already—STTR Programs and provide advice on areas of potential 

improvements as the committee considers their reauthorization. 

We will hear perspectives from private small businesses, a federal 

agency, a university representative, and from a member of the National Research Council committee which conducted the most comprehensive review of the SBIR Program to date. 

I would like to extend my appreciation to each of our witnesses 

for taking the time and effort to appear before us today. Thanks 

again to our witnesses for their participation, and we look forward 

to hearing from you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quayle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN QUAYLE

Good afternoon. I’d like to welcome everyone to today’s hearing, where we will be 

examining the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small Business 

Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs. 

The SBIR program was signed into law by President Reagan in 1982 to help spur 

innovation and increase small business participation in federal research and development activity. Since its inception, this competitive grant program has awarded 

over $23 billion in SBIR awards for more than 100,000 projects across the nation, 

and has helped spawn familiar companies such as Qualcomm, Sonicare, and 

Symantec. SBIR and STTR award winners have also created equipment critical to 

agency missions, such as parts for the Mars Rover for NASA, or a unique cockpit 

airbag system to protect Army helicopter pilots at the Department of Defense. 

In Tempe, Arizona, Kinetic Muscles has developed innovative therapy robots for 

patients suffering from stroke, or traumatic brain injury. These systems are being 

adapted for use at home, lowering their cost, and allowing patients to receive the 

intensive repetitive therapy that is often needed for meaningful recovery. In my own 

district, Kutta Technologies has created a unique subterranean communication device for the coal mining industry. As this week marks the one year anniversary of 

the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster in West Virginia where we lost 29 miners, we 

are cognizant of how such technologies can make a difference to so many people. 

Today, 11 federal agencies provide funding to small businesses through SBIR, and 

five agencies provide funding through STTR. Grant recipients have contributed to 

the country’s scientific and technical knowledge, generating thousands of patents 

and a wealth of peer-reviewed articles. These small businesses have expanded innovation, helped grow our economy by creating thousands of jobs, and are assisting 

participating federal agencies to fulfill their missions. SBIR and STTR are unique 

in that they are examples of federal programs that have largely been successful, and 

have received bipartisan support since their creation. 

The National Research Council’s review of SBIR found the program to be ‘‘sound 

in concept and effective in practice,’’ but also identified ways it could be improved. 

For instance, our ability to effectively evaluate the programs is hampered by insufficient data collection and a lack of common measurement criteria among participating federal agencies. Improving these assessment tools is crucial to ensure the 

federal government is getting the greatest return for its investment. This is particularly necessary in today’s budget environment. 
8 

It is also important to examine if the current funding set asides for the program 

are appropriate, and whether the eligibility criteria for these programs should be 

expanded to allow majority-owned venture capital companies to compete for awards. 

Finally, I want to address the issue of how we measure commercialization. It is 

vital for SBIR and STTR awards result in commercial technologies, but we must be 

mindful that some of these efforts are going to fail, and some companies will have 

to go back to the drawing board. If all projects are certain to succeed, then there 

is not sufficient justification for strong government involvement. While we look for 

ways to improve commercialization success, these programs must continue to support the innovators and entrepreneurs engaged in high-risk research and development. 

We have an excellent panel of witnesses before us who will discuss their experience with the SBIR and STTR Programs, and provide advice on areas of potential 

improvement as the Committee considers their reauthorization. We will hear perspectives from private small businesses, a federal agency, a university representative, and from a member of a National Research Council committee, which conducted the most comprehensive review of the SBIR program to date. I’d like to extend my appreciation to each of our witnesses for taking the time and effort to appear before us today. 

Thanks again to our witnesses for their participation and we look forward to hearing your testimony. With that, I now recognize the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu, 

for his opening statement. 

Chairman QUAYLE. With that I now recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. Wu, for his opening statement. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I just want 

to note that the alphabet soup of federal acronyms is something 

that trips the tongue up frequently and does so to me also. 

And thank you very much for calling this very, very important 

hearing. I also want to thank the witnesses, some of whom have 

traveled a long distance to contribute to our discussion of this very 

important legislation, and I look forward to your testimony. 

As many of you know, a comprehensive reauthorization of the 

SBIR program is and has been my top priority. We got very close 

to getting it done in the last Congress. The Senate put together a 

compromise bill that reflected agreement between key players, 

which had eluded previous reauthorization efforts. 

Unfortunately, while that bipartisan bill passed the Senate by 

unanimous consent in the waning days of the last Congress, we 

were unable to get it over the finish line. In fact, it came down to 

the last day of the lame duck session. 

Now, as ranking member of this subcommittee, I remain as committed as ever to a long-term comprehensive reauthorization of this 

very important legislation, and I look forward to working with 

Chairman Quayle, who has taken the reins of this very important 

subcommittee, and with our colleagues on the Small Business Committee in the coming months to make that a reality. And I do hope 

that we get this done quickly, because this bill, I think, will be the 

first important jobs legislation done by this Congress, and it is important to get it done early in this Congress for the good of the 

American people. 

This is because our economy is continuing a long, incremental– 

but slow–recovery, and I think that it is absolutely vital to make 

this particular contribution. Small businesses are on the innovation 

frontline, developing new technologies that will lead to new products and services in the market, and more importantly, create highwage, private sector jobs and spur economic growth. 
9 

I truly believe that small businesses are the key to getting our 

economy back on track and maintaining the technological leadership of the United States in the future. The impact of a thriving 

small business sector cannot be overstated and must not be overlooked, and that is why it is so important that we find bipartisan 

consensus in this reauthorization. 

While the SBIR program is crucial to encouraging technological 

innovation by small businesses, it also plays an equally important 

role in meeting federal research and development needs, particularly in the national security sphere. 

Small businesses, represented by the two before us today, have 

been integral in driving research and development in areas that 

federal agencies cannot or do not perform, and thus, developing 

technologies that are directly responsive to national needs. 

We now have a public discussion draft of an SBIR reauthorization bill which closely mirrors the bill we passed in the last Congress, both the House and the Senate. It represents the common 

ground that I believe exists on this issue. 

I am eager to work with you, Chairman Quayle, in a bipartisan 

manner to get the bill ready for introduction, through the Committees of jurisdiction, and to the Floor of the House as quickly as possible. 

It is no secret that our constituents are looking to us for non-partisan jobs legislation. I think SBIR is our first and best foot forward. We should do everything we can to ensure that we don’t find 

ourselves in the same avoidable stalemate with the Senate we 

reached at the end of last year. I would like to believe we learned 

a lesson that endless waiting and jockeying benefits no one, least 

of all small business owners across America, and those looking for 

work, and that we can get our economy back on track to prosperity. 

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and 

I look forward, again, to the witnesses’ testimony. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wu follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MINORITY MEMBER DAVID WU

Thank you, Chairman Quayle, for calling this hearing. And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony and to what I hope 

will be a fruitful discussion about the role of the SBIR and STTR programs in promoting innovation. 

As many of you may know, a comprehensive reauthorization of the SBIR program 

was one of my top priorities while I was chair of this subcommittee. We got very 

close to getting it done at the end of last year. 

The Senate put together a compromise bill that reflected agreement between key 

players that had eluded previous reauthorization efforts. Unfortunately, while that 

bipartisan bill passed the Senate by unanimous consent, we were unable to get it 

over the finish line here in the House in the waning days of the 111th Congress. 

As ranking member on this subcommittee, I remain as committed as ever to a 

long-term, comprehensive reauthorization of this important program. I look forward 

to working with Chairman Quayle-who has taken the reins of this important subcommittee with skill and seriousness-and our colleagues on the Small Business 

Committee in the coming months to make that a reality. 

As our economy continues its long and incremental road to recovery, I believe it 

is vitally important that we do all that we can to support small businesses throughout the United States. 

Small businesses are on the innovation frontline - developing new technologies 

that will lead to new products in the market, create high-paying jobs, and spur economic growth. I truly believe that small businesses are key to getting our economy 

back on track and maintaining the technological leadership of the U.S. in the future. 

The impact of a thriving small business sector cannot be overstated and must not 
10 

be overlooked, and that is why it is so important that we find bipartisan consensus 

to reauthorize the SBIR program. 

While the SBIR program is critical to encouraging technological innovation by 

small businesses, it also plays an equally important role in meeting federal research 

and development needs, particularly in the national security sphere. Small businesses, represented by the two before us today, have been integral in driving research and development in areas that federal agencies cannot or do not, and thus 

developing technologies that are directly responsive to agency needs. 

Earlier this week, a discussion draft of a comprehensive reauthorization bill was 

released. My initial impression is positive. In many respects, it is very similar to 

the House bill we passed in the last Congress, and it appears to represent the common ground that I believe exists on this issue. 

I am eager to work with you, Chairman Quayle, in a bipartisan manner to get 

the bill ready for introduction, through the Committees of jurisdiction, and to the 

floor of the House as quickly as possible. 

It’s no secret that our constituents are looking to us for bipartisan jobs legislation. 

I think SBIR is our first and best foot forward. We should do everything we can 

to ensure that we don’t find ourselves in the same avoidable stalemate with the 

Senate we reached last year. I’d like to believe we learned a lesson that endless 

waiting and jockeying benefits no one, least of small business owners across America that can get our economy on track to prosperity. 

Thank you again Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing. And thank you again 

to the witnesses for being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. WU. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Wu. If there are members 

who wish to submit additional opening statements, your statements will be added to the record at this point. 

At this time I would like to introduce our witnesses, and then we 

will proceed to hear from each of them in order. Our first witness 

is Dr. Sally Rockey. Dr. Rockey is the deputy director of Extramural Research at the National Institutes of Health. Next we will 

hear from Dr. Don Siegel. Dr. Siegel is dean and professor at the 

School of Business at the University of Albany, State University of 

New York. Dr. Siegel served as a member of the research team for 

the National Research Council’s review of the SBIR Program and 

will be sharing the NRC’s perspective. 

Then we will hear from Mr. Mark Crowell. Crowell. 

Mr. CROWELL. Crowell. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Crowell. Sorry about that. Mr. Crowell serves 

as executive director and associate vice president for Innovation 

Partnerships and Commercialization at the University of Virginia. 

We are also privileged to hear from two businesses, two business 

leaders whose companies have benefited from the SBIR Program. 

First we will hear from Mr. Doug Limbaugh, who is the chief executive officer at Kutta Technologies based in Phoenix, Arizona, my 

home town. Finally we will hear from Ms. Laura McKinney, who 

is president and CEO of Galois, Incorporated. 

Thanks again to our witnesses for being here this morning. Now, 

as our witnesses should know, spoken testimony is limited to five 

minutes each. After all witnesses have spoken, members of the 

committee will have five minutes each to ask questions. 

I now recognize our first witness, Dr. Sally Rockey, deputy director of—for Extramural Research at the National Institutes of 

Health, to present her testimony. 

STATEMENT OF DR. SALLY ROCKEY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR 

EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 

Ms. ROCKEY. Good afternoon. 
11 

Chairman QUAYLE. Your mic, please. 

Ms. ROCKEY. Good afternoon, and thank you for having me 

today. It is really an opportunity for me to talk to you about the 

National Institutes of Health’s Small Business Innovation Research 

and Small Business Technology Transfer Programs and the role 

they play in stimulating innovation and our economy. 

Among the 11 federal agencies that participate in the SBIR Program, the NIH is one of the largest funders of this program, and 

we, of course, as you know, are the largest Federal supporter of 

biomedical research. And the SBIR/STTR Programs play a very 

critical component that feeds the innovation pipeline resulting in 

today’s medical advances. 

The NIH SBIR/STTR Programs are ideally suited for creating research opportunities for U.S. small businesses to stimulate technological innovation. Part of a complex innovation system, these programs provide dedicated funding for small businesses to conduct 

early stage research and development to explore the feasibility of 

innovative ideas that may eventually result in products or services 

that lead to better health for everyone. 

Our program is one of the means by which the NIH Institutes 

and Centers accomplish their research and development goals, and 

a key feature of the SBIR/STTR Program is that it is focused on 

commercialization of the research results, and that is very key. 

Thus our program serves to supplement much of the more basic 

and applied research that NIH also supports. 

The NIH SBIR/STTR Program supports projects in areas such as 

drug discovery, medical devices, which is a large component of our 

program, biosensors, nanotechnologies, imaging, bioengineering, behavior research, health services, and technologies to reduce health 

disparities. 

Investigator-initiated ideas are the cornerstone of how NIH usually supports research in our research portfolio, and the SBIR Program is also in this mix. So, thus, we solicit applications on specific 

projects and topics, but we encourage small businesses to propose 

their own innovative ideas where—that are relevant to the mission 

of the NIH, so that those closest to the technology highway can 

drive the innovation. 

The NIH in accordance with the current statute must set aside 

2.5 percent of its extramural research and development budget for 

SBIR and .3 percent for STTR. As you know, it is a two-phase program. The first phase is a feasibility project, and the second phase 

is a much longer continued research phase. 

The overall set-aside for NIH activities in 2010 was $690 million, 

including $616 million for SBIR and $74 million for STTR. It supported almost 700 phase one awards and 250 phase two awards to 

small businesses. Applications go through a very rigorous peer-review process, very much like all of our NIH applications that—and 

our funding decisions are based on the rating that it gets through 

the technical review, when it aligns with areas of high program relevance, program desire to balance among research areas, available 

funds, and of course, in the case of SBIR, its commercial potential. 

The number of applications and new firms participating in the 

program was on a downward trend between 2004 and 2009, however, the number of applications has increased dramatically in 
12 

2010, as did applications to other NIH Programs. Thus, the award 

phase, the award success rate of the SBIR Program in 2010 for the 

first time in almost six years was actually lower than our other 

NIH Programs. 

Since its inception in 1982, we have invested more than $5 billion at NIH over 19,000 projects to over 5,000 small businesses. 

You are going to hear more from the NRC about their study, but, 

of course, this is—the program is seen as a source of economic vitality and is especially important as a source of new employment. 

In looking at job growth for SBIR awardees since the receipt of 

their award, the NRC found that the employment gain in the long 

term was about, almost 30 full-time equivalent jobs. That was in 

the long term and for these businesses during the project they were 

able to hire 2.7 full-time equivalents and retain 2.2. That was just 

during the course of that particular project, so that does have much 

of an impact on the economy. 

NIH is continually focusing on ways to address the needs of a diverse small business community, different industry sectors—because we deal with many—and diverse product outcomes. NIH attributes the success where we have seen it about 50 percent, we 

calculate about 50 percent of our awards result in commercialization, and the effectiveness of this program is attributed to a number of factors, one of which is the very flexible approach that we 

have to the program, which adapts, helps us adapt to changing 

science and research. 

Some of the examples of this flexibility include the ability to propose research projects as I mentioned from the small businesses 

themselves that have the most potential, the ability for the applicant to resubmit an unfunded application so if they are not funded 

the first time, they can come back in, the ability to fund phase one 

and phase two awards at budgets that may exceed the established 

guidelines when the science proposed warrants such a deviation to 

produce a successful outcome. And I will point out that the SBIR 

median award size for 2010 was $199,000 for phase one and $1.1 

million for phase two. 

In addition, we have developed programs to help companies address funding gaps between phase one and phase two and help 

them negotiate the period between discovery and commercialization. For example, we have what is called the Phase One, Phase 

Two Fast Track and the Phase Two Competing Renewal Award 

Program that accelerate research. 

In particular, Phase Two B, Competing Renewal allows existing 

SBIR phase two awardees to receive a second additional increment 

of funding to continue the project while navigating the regulatory 

process, which is highly complex and time consuming. 

Additionally, we manage a suite of technical assistance programs, namely the Niche Assessment Program and the Commercialization Assistance Program, and if we have time, I can explain 

to you more about them. 

For many——— 

Chairman QUAYLE. Dr. Rockey, if you could wrap it up in 30 seconds or less so we can get as many people done before we get called 

to votes, that would be really appreciated. Thank you. 
13 

Ms. ROCKEY. Okay. I just want to mention about venture capital. 

For many biomedical technology companies, while this is an important source, it is impossible to really take product to market with 

the amount of funds that are provided by the SBIR Program. 

Therefore, venture capital can be very important, and the NRC 

studies of SBIR noted that the synergies between this funding and 

venture capital are useful, and therefore, even small businesses 

benefiting from venture capital funding may seek SBIR funding as 

a means to exploring this idea. So we are interested in the idea 

that venture capital can be included. 

So I thank you very much, and I will be happy to answer any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Rockey follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. SALLY ROCKEY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES

Good afternoon, Chairman Quayle and members of the Subcommittee. My name 

is Dr. Sally Rockey. I am the Deputy Director for Extramural Research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), an agency of the Department of Health and 

Human Services. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the NIH Small Business 

Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, and the role they play in stimulating innovation and our economy. Among 

the 11 Federal agencies that participate in the SBIR program, the NIH is one of 

the largest funders of this program, and the largest Federal supporter of biomedical 

research. The SBIR/STTR program is a critical component that feeds the innovation 

pipeline resulting in today’s medical advances. 

Importance of the SBIR/STTR Program at NIH: Igniting Imaginations 

and Spurring New Discoveries 

The NIH SBIR/STTR programs are ideally suited for creating research opportunities for U.S. small businesses to stimulate technological innovation. Part of a complex innovation system, these programs provide dedicated funding for U.S. small 

businesses to conduct early-stage research and development (R&D) to explore the 

feasibility of innovative ideas that may eventually result in products or services that 

will lead to better health for everyone. The NIH SBIR/STTR programs are one 

means by which NIH Institutes and Centers (ICs) accomplish their R&D objectives. 

A key feature that sets SBIR/STTR apart from other NIH programs is a focus on 

commercialization of the results of research. Thus, the programs serve to supplement the more basic and applied research programs of NIH. 

Types of Research NIH Supports Under SBIR/STTR 

Examples of the types of research that NIH supports through the SBIR/STTR programs include, but are not limited to: drug discovery, medical devices, biosensors, 

nanotechnologies, proteomics, imaging, bioengineering, behavioral research, health 

services, and other technologies that reduce health disparities. Investigator-initiated 

ideas are the cornerstone of the NIH research portfolio, including projects supported 

by the SBIR program. Thus, while we solicit projects on specific topics, we primarily 

encourage small businesses to propose their own innovative research ideas that are 

relevant to our mission as a way to have those closest to the technology highway 

drive innovation. 

NIH SBIR/STTR Program Overview 

The NIH, in accordance with statute, must set aside 2.5 percent of its extramural 

research and development budget for SBIR program and 0.3 percent for the STTR 

program. The overall set-aside for NIH SBIR and STTR activities in FY 2010 was 

$690 million, including $616 million for SBIR and $74 million for STTR that supported 681 new Phase I and 246 new Phase II SBIR projects to small businesses 

working in many different technology areas across the country. Once all applications 

go through a rigorous and competitive two-tiered peer review process, funding decisions are based on several factors: 1) ratings from the scientific and technical evaluation process; 2) areas of high program relevance; 3) program balance among areas 

of research; 4) available funds; and 5) the commercial potential. 
14 

1 National Institutes of Health, National Survey to Evaluate the NIH SBIR Program: Final 

Report, July 2003 2 National Research Council Phase II Survey, An Assessment of the SBIR Program At the National Institutes of Health, 2009 

The number of SBIR applications and new firms participating in the program was 

on a downward trend between fiscal years 2004 through 2009. However, the number 

of applications increased in FY 2010, as did applications for most NIH grants, likely 

due to the resubmission of applications that were submitted for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds but not initially funded. As a result, the award success rate in FY 2010 for SBIR programs was lower than for the NIH research line 

for the first time in five years. The FY 2010 combined success rate-the percentage 

of reviewed grant applications that receive funding-for the SBIR and STTR programs was at 17 percent, which was below the success rate of 20.6 percent overall 

for NIH Research Project Grants (RPGs). 

Overall, the SBIR/STTR programs have complemented NIH’s mission to advance 

science while reducing the burden of illness on public health. 

Employment Effects on NIH SBIR Awardees 

Since the program’s inception in 1982, the NIH has invested more than $5 billion 

in more than 19,000 projects to over 5,000 small businesses. Past studies of the 

SBIR program conducted by the NIH 1 and the National Research Council (NRC) 2

have shown that small businesses are seen as sources of economic vitality and are 

especially important as a source of new employment. In looking at job growth of 

SBIR awardee firms since the receipt of their award, the NRC found the mean employment gain was 29.9 full time employees (FTEs) from before obtaining the SBIR 

grant. In addition, respondents estimated as a result of their SBIR projects their 

companies were, on average, able to hire 2.7 FTEs, and to retain 2.2 FTEs that 

might not otherwise have been retained. Although the employee size limit for firms 

receiving an SBIR award is 500, the median size of companies receiving NIH SBIR 

awards is actually relatively small: 10 employees. Sixty percent were found to have 

15 or fewer employees at the time of the NRC survey. This data suggest that the 

SBIR program is associated with positive employment effects on small business job 

creation and growth. 

Program Flexibility Is Key: One Size Does Not Fit All 

NIH is continually focused on ways to address the needs of a diverse small business community, different industry sectors, and diverse product outcomes. NIH attributes the success and effectiveness of its program to several factors, the most significant of which is a flexible and proactive approach that adapts to the changing 

nature of biomedical and behavioral research while maintaining a highly competitive and effective program. 

Examples of program flexibility include the ability to propose research projects in 

fields that have the most biological potential; the ability for an applicant to resubmit an unfunded application; and the ability to fund Phase I and Phase II awards 

at budgets that may exceed the established guidelines when the science proposed 

warrants such a deviation to produce successful outcomes. The SBIR median award 

size in FY 2010 was $199,000 for Phase I and $1,120,000 for Phase II projects. For 

STTR, the median award size was $178,000 for Phase I and $1,112,000 for Phase 

II. 

In addition, we have developed programs to help companies address funding gaps 

between Phase I and Phase II and programs to help them negotiate the period between discovery and commercialization. For example, the Phase I/Phase II FastTrack and Phase II B Competing Renewal award programs are aimed at accelerating research projects with great potential to produce products and launching 

them forward into the next R&D stage of development. In particular, the Phase II 

B competing renewal allows existing SBIR phase II awardees to receive additional 

funds to continue the project while navigating the regulatory process which often 

can be a complex and time-consuming process. Additionally, we manage a suite of 

technical assistance programs, namely the Niche Assessment Program and the Commercialization Assistance Program (CAP), that provide a market opportunity analysis and tailored business mentoring to address very specific needs of selected SBIR 

companies. Thus we help companies grow into sustainable businesses. Additionally, 

we have developed a Performance Outcomes Data and Systems (PODS) tool for internal use by NIH program staff, which integrates all data about SBIR and STTR 

awards, success stories, and tracking data of companies that graduated from our 

CAP program all into one searchable platform. 
15 

For many biomedical technology companies, the SBIR program is an important 

source of seed funding for unproven, early-stage ideas that dilutes the risk other investors are not initially willing to bet on. However, a venture capital, angel investor, 

foundation, or other financing strategy is ultimately the only way that innovative 

products will enter the marketplace. Research and development in public health and 

biotechnology is characterized by high and intense capital needs to turn an idea into 

a product (e.g., it takes an average of $1.2 billion to bring a drug to the market). 

This usually requires long development times (i.e., 5–12 years), compliance with 

strict regulations, exceptionally high ‘‘burn rates’’ of capital, and a real need for investment by venture capital companies, some of which are or are not majorityowned by individuals. Often, the necessity for multiple rounds of venture financing 

to fund the extensive and essential clinical research is the only plausible way to 

commercialize a product. Individual firms or the SBIR program, alone, are not available to provide the average $8 million per deal currently characterizing venture 

funding agreements as found by the NRC study of 2009 that evaluated the NIH 

SBIR program. It is important to keep in mind that while venture capital sources 

are extremely scarce following the recession, it is nevertheless an option a company 

should be able to pursue as it fits their business strategy without the fear of being 

excluded from our programs. 

The NRC’s study of the SBIR program noted that the synergies between SBIR 

funding and venture capital are useful, and their study underscored the notion that 

the innovation process often does not follow a linear path. So, even small businesses 

benefiting from venture funding may well seek SBIR funding as a means of exploring a new idea, or for example, a new drug candidate. Keeping the pipeline full of 

new ideas is important, because in today’s high-risk biomedical research environment, especially in areas such as drug development, drug discovery, and therapeutics, the reality is that fewer than one percent of the innovative, promising 

projects reach the marketplace. 

Simply stated, one size does not fit all. 

Flexibility is critical at a time when science is changing rapidly, becoming more 

complex, and more interdisciplinary. 

Throughout the SBIR program’s history, small businesses including those companies with venture capital funding have applied for and received SBIR funding in 

areas that help to advance our mission. The NRC’s study found no evidence that 

participation of companies with multiple venture capital ownership was harmful to 

the program or that other small businesses have ever been crowded out by the participation of small businesses that are majority-owned by venture capital companies. 

Program Accomplishments: Bringing Ideas To Life 

The SBIR program seeks to support the most scientifically promising projects for 

which private funds are not traditionally available. 

The examples noted below demonstrate that tangible scientific benefits can result 

from a small investment in early-stage ideas with viable, commercial potential. 

• Martek Global Services, a Maryland company that studied the effects of DHA, 

an omega-3 fatty acid important for healthy eye, brain, and heart development, 

grew into a global leader by developing Life’sDHATM, a supplement contained 

in infant formulas, products for pregnant and nursing women, and food and 

beverage products sold worldwide. The company was recently acquired for $1.1 

billion by a Dutch company and this year was inducted into the Small Business 

Administration’s SBIR Hall of Fame. 

• The Sonicare Power Toothbrush is a widely used and dentist recommended consumer home care oral hygiene device effective in reversing gingivitis that has 

to date grossed over $1.5 billion in sales. NIH funding allowed the company to 

create a $300 million business and over 500 new jobs. 

Examples such as these demonstrate the value of investing in early-stage ideas 

and underscores why the NIH SBIR/STTR programs are important to our mission 

and to the entire innovation process. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, I want to reemphasize the NIH’s commitment to supporting small 

businesses, maintaining the integrity of SBIR/STTR programs, and ensuring that 

technology development will help improve the health and extend the lives of all people. We are looking to small businesses, primarily through these programs, to stimulate technological innovation, help us face new challenges, and to produce not only 

new knowledge, but also tangible benefits that touch the lives of every individual. 

We are hopeful that our continuing outreach efforts and actions to modernize the 
16 

SBIR/STTR programs will be helpful in that regard. Finally, we continue to believe 

strongly that flexibility within the SBIR program is essential to achieving greater 

successes in these programs. We look forward to the reauthorization of this critical 

program. This concludes my statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions 

you may have. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Great. Thanks, Dr. Rockey, and the chair 

now recognizes Dr. Don Siegel, dean and professor at the School of 

Business at Albany. 

STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD SIEGEL, DEAN AND PROFESSOR, 

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY AT ALBANY, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 

Mr. SIEGEL. Thank you. I am a professor, so I have to have 

Power Point slides. I am also an academic economist, and Ronald 

Reagan once said that an economist is someone who upon observing that something works in practice wonders whether it works in 

theory. 

And like many economists I was inspired by the late Milton 

Friedman, and I know that sounds a little strange to use his name 

because I am going to be advocating government intervention, but 

as you can see on the next slide Friedman said there were four 

ways to spend money. He said you can spend your own money on 

yourself, which you do very wisely, you can spend your own money 

on others you know personally. Now, a visit to the department 

store on the day after Christmas tells you that that isn’t always 

done wisely. 

You can spend other people’s money on yourself, which you do 

quite lavishly when you are on an expense account, and then he 

would laugh and say, well, then there is a fourth category, and that 

is when you spend other people’s money on people you don’t know, 

and he would laugh and say that is what government does. 

Now, the lesson that I learned from that adage is that it is important to evaluate and assess government programs. We need accountability, and I ask you to think about different realms of public 

policy. Let’s think about education, social policy, technology, and 

now entrepreneurship programs. 

In education and social programs we have rigorous evaluation. 

Indeed, evaluation is built into the design of most programs. Unfortunately, when it comes to science and technology and now more 

recently entrepreneurship programs, there is very limited evaluation, and I think that is disappointing. Since we know that innovation and entrepreneurship are key sources of economic growth, we 

need to learn more about how these programs are impacting the 

economy. 

Now, I am going to assume that you know, like an economist, I 

am going to make some assumptions and assume that you know 

about the program. What you may not know is that it took Congress 20 years to actually ask the NRC to evaluate the program, 

which NRC did. 

Now, here is some important points about evaluating programs. 

Let us say technology programs. It is very important not just to collect statistical data but to have qualitative work, field research, 

interviews, case studies. This is a very, very complex program. You 

need to have multiple indicators of success, research success, commercialization, job creation, and so on. 
17 

The timeframe of analysis is critical. You have to be able to analyze the program over time, not just at one point in time but over 

time. You have to have multiple indicators, and those indicators 

will vary depending on the unit of observation. From an evaluation 

standpoint it is important to do a very rigorous econometric analysis and also to have a control group, which we do in science but 

is a little hard to do in this realm. 

Now, I am very pleased to report that the NRC SBIR evaluation 

has all of these elements and more. It was a very rigorously-done 

study, consisting of basically surveys of projects, of firms, surveys 

that were designed in consultation with program managers, with 

users of the program, with even people who were skeptical about 

the program. 

And so this is what led to the study and the key findings of the 

study are that the program is effective. It is meeting its Congressional objectives, stimulating technological innovation, encouraging 

participation by minorities and women. We could do a better job on 

that. I will get back to that in a few minutes. Providing support 

for small innovative companies and resolving some of the research 

questions that agencies want answered. 

What does success mean? Job and new firm creation, enabling 

federal agencies to advance their missions, creation of new products, intellectual property that firms can commercialize to make 

money, and limited success in financial markets. Forty-seven percent of SBIR projects reach the marketplace, which is a very remarkable stylized fact. 

The committee found that SBIR’s flexibility is a key strength in 

meeting the missions of multiple diverse agencies. The only area 

where significant improvement is required is increasing the participation and success of women and minorities. 

So what does the committee recommend? That the program 

should be continued, flexibility should be preserved, innovation and 

experimentation across agencies should be encouraged, award sizes 

should be increased. It is important to reduce the cycle time between the application of a grant and the award, to get the technologies out the door and in the marketplace. Increasing, as I said 

before, the success of women and minorities, and increasing management funding for SBIR, which is a very important aspect of the 

program. 

However, in my view the most important recommendation of the 

committee is that it is important to conduct, as I said before, rigorous, regular evaluations of the program. It is vital that the program be analyzed over time, that we not just have a snapshot of 

it but that we have a so-called longitudinal or dynamic analysis of 

changes in the program over time. 

That is why the committee is now doing a second study, analyzing the important problem of helping companies get over the socalled Valley of Death, to help them reach the marketplace, how to 

increase participation by women and minorities, how to leverage 

university-industry partnerships, which are very important in this 

program, how to streamline the application process, and more importantly learning from some of the interesting state-level programs that have been designed to stimulate both innovation and 

entrepreneurship. 
18 

I close on a personal note. Academic studies of SBIR, many of 

which have been based on NRC data, clearly indicate that involvement with universities enhances the probability of successful commercialization. No matter how you measure that. We need to understand that connection. 

We also need to understand the connection between SBIR and 

our national labs, which are huge players in science and technology. The national labs, for example, in California are bigger 

than the University of California. 

We also need to know what the role is of property-based institutions like incubators, accelerators, and science and technology 

parks where there has been substantial public investment, but, 

again, very little analysis or evaluation. 

Again, I think the most important point is that I think it is important to continue support for the NRC’s efforts to scrutinize this 

program. There is no one else that can do it, and I thank you for 

your time. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Siegel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD S. SIEGEL, DEAN AND PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF

BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY AT ALBANY, SUNY 

My name is Donald Siegel and I am Dean of the School of Business at the University at Albany, SUNY. I also serve as President of the Technology Transfer Society, 

a non-profit organization dedicated to identifying and disseminating best practices 

in technology commercialization. The Society hosts an annual conference, linking 

academics, practitioners, and policymakers, and also publishes the Journal of Technology Transfer, the only academic journal devoted to the public policy and managerial implications of technology commercialization. I am a co-editor of this journal. 

For the past 15 years, I have studied technology transfer to existing firms and 

start-up companies, resulting from research activity at universities, federal laboratories, incubators, and science/technology parks. I was trained as academic economist, which means that I am not very practical. President Reagan once said that 

an economist is someone, who upon observing that something works in practice, wonders whether it works in theory. Therefore, in the remainder of my testimony, 

I will provide both theoretical and empirical support for this worthy program. 

In 2003, I was asked to join a team of researchers commissioned by the National 

Research Council to conduct a Congressionally-mandated evaluation of the Small 

Business Innovation Research Program (henceforth, SBIR) across federal agencies. 

At first, I was quite skeptical. Like many economists, I was greatly influenced by 

the late Milton Friedman. I mention this because of Friedman’s famous adage regarding the four ways to spend money. First, you can spend your own money on 

yourself, in which case, the funds are spent quite wisely. Next, you can use your 

own money to purchase goods or services for others whom you know, such as buying 

someone a Christmas gift. In this instance, your ability to spend astutely is limited 

by your ability to match the recipient’s preferences. A quick visit to a department 

store on the day after Christmas illustrates the difficulties of successfully completing that mission. A third method of expenditure occurs when we spend other 

people’s money on ourselves, which transpires when we are on an expense account. 

In this case, we have little incentive to economize, since others are footing the bill. 

The final case is spending other people’s money on other people (people we do not 

know personally). According to Friedman, this is exactly what politicians do and 

thus, he was highly skeptical regarding the ability of government to spend its funds 

wisely. The lesson I learned from this adage is that government programs should 

be rigorously evaluated, since they may not always be meeting their objectives (e.g., 

spending the taxpayers money wisely). 

Despite my inherent skepticism regarding the effectiveness of government programs, I was buoyed by the fact that the NRC had convened a group of scholars 

who could actually conduct the type of systematic evaluation that was warranted 

for this particular government program. This was quite a challenging assignment 

for us, but one that is extremely vital for accountability to the taxpayers. Please 

note that a fundamental rationale for government intervention in the marketplace 

is the existence of a ‘‘market failure.’’ The SBIR Program, in theory, addresses two 

types of market failures: (1) innovation market failure (for early-stage technologies) 
19 

and (2) market failure with respect to the provision of financial capital for new enterprises seeking to commercialize early-stage technologies. Based on comprehensive 

evidence collected by the NRC team, I am convinced that SBIR is alleviating these 

market failures and additional study will help us further understand how to make 

this program even more effective. 

SBIR and the Phase 1 NRC SBIR Study 

First, let me provide some specific information about the program. SBIR is designed to provide financial assistance to firms during the initial stages of their development. It was established in 1982 as a ‘‘set-aside’’ program. In its current 

version, SBIR requires eleven federal R&D funding agencies with extramural research programs to allocate 2.5 percent of their extramural research budgets to fund 

through a peer-review process R&D in small (less than 500 employees) firms and 

organizations. 

SBIR awards consist of three phases. Phase I awards fund the firm to undertake 

proof of concept; that is, to research the feasibility and technical merit of a proposed 

research project. A Phase I award lasts for six months (maximum $150,000). Phase 

II awards extend the proof of concept to a technological product/process that has a 

commercial application (maximum $1,000,000). A Phase II Award is granted to only 

the most promising of the Phase I projects based on scientific/technical promise, the 

expected value to the funding agency, the firm’s research capability, and the commercial potential of the resulting innovation. The duration of the award is a maximum of 24 months and generally does not exceed $750,000. Approximately 40 percent of the Phase I Awards continue on to Phase II. Phase III involves private funding to the firm for the commercial application of a technology; no financial award 

from SBIR is made in Phase III. 

The first phase of the NRC study assessed the SBIR program at five federal agencies, the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Energy 

(DoE), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). These five agencies constitute 

approximately 96 percent of SBIR program expenditures. Specifically, the NRC committee was charged by Congress with evaluating whether the Program was advancing four key societal objectives: (a) stimulating technological innovation; (b) increasing commercialization of innovation in the private sector; (c) using small business 

to meet federal research and development needs; and (d) fostering and encouraging 

participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation. 

The committee was also asked to assess the effectiveness of managerial practices, 

with respect to agency SBIR programs. That is, the committee attempted to determine whether there are ‘‘best practices’’ in certain agency SBIR programs that could 

be adopted by other agencies. 

To accomplish these objectives, the committee employed sophisticated quantitative/statistical and qualitative analyses. It is important to note that the use of 

qualitative methods is highly warranted, given the complex nature of the program 

and the inability to capture all of its nuances with purely statistical data. A large 

and diverse team of expert researchers conducted extensive NRC-commissioned surveys and case studies. In addition, agencies were asked to provide program data and 

documents. The committee also conducted extensive interviews with program managers, program participants, agency ‘‘users’’ of the program, as well as program 

stakeholders. I am confident that the NRC study is, by far, the most comprehensive 

assessment of SBIR ever or more generally, of any technology-based program designed to stimulate entrepreneurship. 

Key Findings/Recommendations of the Phase 1 NRC SBIR Study 

The NRC committee concluded that the program was indeed advancing the goals 

of stimulating technological innovation, increasing commercialization of innovation 

in the private sector, using small business to meet federal agency R&D needs, and 

stimulating participation by minority and disadvantaged persons in technological innovation. Table 1 summarizes the goals, proxies for achieving those goals, and key 

outcome indicators the committee used to assess whether the SBIR was accomplishing these objectives. 

As shown in Table 1, the evidence clearly indicates that the program has been 

successful in achieving these goals. Success has occurred along several dimensions: 

job and new firm creation, enabling government agencies to advance their missions 

(e.g., the development of simulation software for Navy Seals, which has saved lives 

and costly equipment), creation of new products and various forms of intellectual 

property, and success in financial markets. The only area where significant improvement is needed is increasing participation by minorities and disadvantaged people 
20 

in the technological innovation. This is especially true for minority participation, 

which has actually decreased over time. 

The NRC Committee issued a series of recommendations. First and foremost, the 

SBIR program should be preserved because it is effective. Given that program flexibility (across federal agencies) is a strength, such flexibility should be preserved. 

The committee commended SBA, which oversees the eleven SBIR programs, for its 

flexibility in exercising its oversight responsibilities. There was also a strong desire 

to encourage innovation and experimentation across agencies, while preserving the 

basic program structure (i.e., the three phase approach of the SBIR program). Another key recommendation was to readjust (increase) award sizes, which have not 

been increased since 1995. 

There were also several recommendations relating to improvements in program 

processes (i.e., managing the program). The most important of these recommendations is the need to shorten the cycle time from application to award (which will 

ultimately, accelerate technology commercialization). It is important to note that 

processing periods for awards vary substantially by agency, which has a significant 

effect on recipient companies. Agencies should closely monitor and report on cycle 

times for each element of the SBIR program: topic development and publication, solicitation, application review, contracting, Phase II application and selection, and 

Phase III contracting. Agencies should also specifically report on initiatives to shorten the decision cycle. The committee also stressed to need to increase participation 

and success by women and minorities in the SBIR program. They identified a set 

of tactics to accomplish that strategic goal, in including improve data collection and 

analysis of factors that may account for the lower success rates of woman- and minority-owned firms, as compared with other firms, in receiving Phase I awards. Finally, the NRC team also stressed the importance of increasing management funding for SBIR, e.g., by increasing the set-aside to provide for program management 

and evaluation. 

From my perspective (given my concern regarding accountability and evaluation 

of government programs), by far the most important committee recommendation 

was emphasizing the need to conduct regular, rigorous systematic evaluations of the 

program. This will require direct annual reports to Congress by program managers 

on the state of the SBIR program at their agency. The program should be evaluated 

internally, i.e., within each agency and agencies should be encouraged to develop 

interoperable standards for data collection and dissemination. Most importantly, 

there is also a strong need for comprehensive, periodic external evaluations of the 

program by a non-partisan organization, such as NRC. 

Objectives of Current NRC SBIR Study 

The NRC is currently engaged in a second phase of the SBIR study, which is highly critical, given that it will enable us to generate a second ‘‘snapshot’’ of the program (through extensive surveys and case studies). Evaluation must always be an 

ongoing process and analyzing changes in the SBIR program over time will allow 

the NRC team to develop better recommendations for improving the program. In 

sum, a second phase of the SBIR study provides will facilitate a ‘‘longitudinal’’ analysis, rather than a simple ‘‘cross-sectional’’ analysis, which is both more rigorous 

and more relevant. 

Building on the previous study, the NRC committee is currently assessing several 

important research questions: (1) how the program can be modified to enhance the 

probability of successful commercialization programs, including the use of ‘‘gap 

funding mechanisms’’ to address the ‘‘valley of death’’ problem, (2) identifying strategies to encourage participation by minorities and women-led firms in SBIR; (3) how 

to use existing university-industry partnerships to leverage SBIR; (4) new approaches to streamlining the application and grant/contract awarding processes; and 

(5) what we can learn from innovative state-level technology commercialization programs and how those can be leveraged at the federal level. 

Although these are all important research questions, my own research underscores the importance of identifying best practices in university-industry partnering 

and synergies with SBIR programs. As noted in Siegel and Phan (2005), universities 

have recently devoted more attention to the entrepreneurial dimension of technology 

transfer. This has induced the creation of numerous university-based spinouts and 

connections to local start-up companies founded by academic entrepreneurs or their 

students. This is important since two recent academic studies (Link and Ruhm 

(2009); Siegel and Wessner (2011)), based on data collected during the Phase I NRC 

study clearly demonstrate that a university connection to an SBIR project substantially increases the likelihood of successful commercialization. Note that in this context (see Siegel and Wessner (2011), ‘‘success’’ in the marketplace resulting from 

SBIR projects includes numerous performance/commercialization indicators, such as: 
21 

• Sales to date of products, processes, and services from the project 

• Expected future sales 

• New employees hired as a result of the SBIR project 

• Patents 

• Copyrights 

• Trademarks 

• Domestic/international licensing agreements 

Need for Additional NRC Studies of SBIR 

Innovation and entrepreneurship are important determinants of economic growth. 

The SBIR Program was established because there was a strong bi-partisan consensus that, in the absence of government intervention, there is under-investment 

in early-stage research with commercial promise in a free market economy. The 

NRC study clearly demonstrates that the SBIR Program is effectively addressing 

this problem and significantly improving the performance of small, technology-based 

firms. 

The quality of the analysis and usefulness of the recommendations provided by 

the NRC team raises an important issue relating to government accountability. Let’s 

consider three types of government programs: social programs, educational initiatives, and technology programs. Typically, educational and social programs are rigorously evaluated. Indeed, it is quite common for evaluation to be built into the design of an educational or social program. Analysis of these programs has yielded important insights for policymakers, resulting in such important changes as welfare 

reform, which had broad bi-partisan support. 

However, despite wide-spread agreement that innovation and entrepreneurship 

constitute sources of our global competitive advantage, technology programs are almost never carefully evaluated. I have always found that rather strange. Given the 

connection inherent in SBIR between innovation and entrepreneurship, it is the 

most important government program in this realm. Thus, I believe that SBIR needs 

to be carefully scrutinized on an on-going basis, under the auspices of the NRC. If 

we are serious about evaluation and accountability, we will continue to support the 

NRC’s efforts to scrutinize this important program. 

References 

• Audretsch, David, Albert Link, and John T. Scott (2002). Public/Private Technology Partnerships: Evaluating SBIR–Supported Research, Research Policy, 31, 

145–158. 

• Link, Albert N. and Christopher J. Ruhm (2009). Bringing Science to Market: 

Commercializing From NIH SBIR Awards, Economics of Innovation and New 

Technology, 18, 381–402. 

• Link, Albert N. and John T. Scott. (2010). Government as entrepreneur: Evaluating the commercialization success of SBIR projects. Research Policy 39, 589– 

601. 

• Shrader, Rod and Donald S. Siegel (2007). Assessing the Relationship Between 

Human Capital and Firm Performance: Evidence From Technology-based New 

Ventures,’’ Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 31(6), 893–907. 

• Siegel, Donald S. and Charles Wessner (2011). ‘‘Universities and the Success of 

Entrepreneurial Ventures: Evidence from the Small Business Innovation Research Program,’’ Journal of Technology Transfer, forthcoming. 

• Siegel, Donald S. and Philip Phan (2005). Analyzing the Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer: Implications for Entrepreneurship Education, in 

Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation, and Economic Growth, 

edited by Gary Liebcap, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science/JAI Press, 16: 1–38. 

• Siegel, Donald S., Charles Wessner, Martin Binks, and Andy Lockett (2003). 

Policies Promoting Innovation in Small Firms: Evidence From the U.S. and 

U.K. Small Business Economics, 20(2): 121–127. 
22 
23 
24 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Dr. Siegel, and as you heard from 

all the bells and whistles we have been called to vote, so I hope 

that you guys will have the patience to stick around, but this subcommittee will recess until 10 minutes after the last vote. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman QUAYLE. The chair now recognizes—but first thanks 

for your patience. Sorry about that interruption, but the chair now 

recognizes Mr. Mark Crowell, Executive Director and Associate 

Vice President for Innovation Partnerships and Commercialization 

at University of Virginia for five minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK CROWELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

AND ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT FOR INNOVATION PARTNERSHIPS AND COMMERCIALIZATION, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 

Mr. CROWELL. Thank you very much, Chairman Quayle and 

Ranking Member Wu. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the subcommittee on this very important topic. My written testimony contains many hopefully useful details about the research 

environment at the University of Virginia and about our engagement with SBIR and STTR-funded projects. In the interest of time, 

however, I want to immediately launch into answering the questions that you posed to me in your letter inviting me to testify 

today. 

The first question you asked me to address was to provide my 

views on the role of the university in the SBIR and STTR Programs and how it relates to university technology transfer. As a 24- 

year veteran directing technology transfer offices, including, Mr. 

Chairman, at Duke and at UNC, I would say that—I know you are 

a Duke alum. I would say that our friends in the venture capital 

industry remain important partners in our innovation and commercialization efforts. 

But at the same time I recognize that their reality involves 

shorter return horizons, higher levels of risk avoidance, and the 

need to invest higher dollar amounts to accelerate innovations toward the market, therefore, placing most venture capitalists much 

further downstream than where university deals tend to be. 

The availability of SBIR and STTR funding to help de-risk such 

start-up companies in preparation for downstream venture capital 

investment is more important than ever to those of us who are 

charged with creating start-up companies around university inventions. 

I would like to for a second provide a quick example of how SBIR 

and STTR funding has helped to accelerate the amazing growth, 

opportunity, and potential societal benefit around research developed at UVA. Adenosine Therapeutics was founded in 1999, based 

on research in UVA’s School of Medicine. The company’s development pipeline including—included promising compounds for treating cancer, diabetes, CNS diseases, and other afflictions. 

In less than nine years—rocket speed in the drug development 

world—Adenosine was acquired by a larger company, Clinical 

Data. Its battle-tested CEO remained in Charlottesville and is now 

a serial entrepreneur, being the CEO of a new UVA start-up that 

just landed $4.1 million in venture capital. The company maintains 
25 

a significant presence in Charlottesville, even as this growth has 

occurred, and several of their promising compounds are nearing 

market approval. 

We are serious at UVA about starting more companies like Adenosine to commercialize our research, and we need tools like SBIR 

and STTR to continue to be successful. 

The second question you asked me to address focuses on my 

views of the current percentage of funding allocated to the SBIR 

and STTR Programs and whether venture capital-backed small 

companies should be eligible to participate in the programs. At the 

University of Virginia we strongly support current funding for the 

SBIR and STTR Programs. 

That being said, we also believe that there is no compelling justification or need to increase the percentage of the set-aside 

amounts. A closed review of success rates within phase one SBIR 

and STTR grants will reveal that the funding success for these 

grants is equal to and in many cases higher than success rates for 

equally—for other equally important grants for basic research. 

Any increase in the current SBIR and STTR set-aside would 

come at the expense of other peer-reviewed basic and applied research, the seed corn for the innovation pipeline. So we would caution against increasing the set-aside percentages. 

We also support the eligibility of companies backed with significant venture capital investments to apply for funding under the 

SBIR and STTR Programs. Companies which have secured substantial venture backing by definition would have undergone significant due diligence evaluation by investors and could be assumed to be on a more certain path to success. Depriving such 

promising companies an opportunity to compete for sources of coinvestment of de-risking capital seems contrary to public—to commonsense and public policy. So we recommend removing any restrictions on the ability of such companies to apply. 

The final question I was asked to address concerns what recommendations I would make to improve these programs. The maximum per award funding amounts allowed under phase one and 

phase two awards should be increased to reflect renewed importance of this initiative, as well as to reflect the effects of inflation 

over the years. 

In our view, phase one awards should be at least $150,000. 

Phase two should be $a million. We also would recommend incorporating sufficient flexibility in determining the precise award 

amount so that SBIR and STTR Program officers would have the 

freedom to increase each award up to 20 percent of the published 

cap on exceptional circumstances and high-impact opportunity are 

deemed to be represented in a particular funding award. 

In another area, restrictions related to conflict of interest should 

be examined, and where feasible, flexibility should be added to 

make it easier for researchers with disclosed and manageable conflicts of interest to participate in SBIR and STTR-backed companies. 

Further, we would encourage that additional flexibility would be 

built into the SBIR and STTR Programs by developing a way to enable agencies to use a portion of these funds to directly support additional proof of concept work. Europe has recently launched just 
26 

such a program, and I think it is important that we here in the 

U.S. find a way to fill this existing funding gap in the innovation 

pipeline relating to a lack of proof of concept funds. 

UVA is one university which has recently demonstrated tremendous success and impact in doing so through the Coulter 

Translational Partnership with audited results indicating tremendous success and return on investment of these very proven concept funds that I am advocating. 

Before closing I would like to point out that my written testimony contains other suggestions for improvements in these programs, including a modest suggestion for setting aside some funds 

for more rigorous and consistent evaluation and assessment of the 

type that Dr. Siegel has just recommended. 

I would like to thank the subcommittee, especially the chair and 

the ranking member, for your support of these programs, particularly during these tough budgetary times. We understand that 

funding is greatly constrained, and I hope you will agree that innovation and commercialization of university research serve the public good while promoting the creation of new products, new companies, and new jobs. 

SBIR and STTR funding has proven to be tremendously effective 

in fueling these activities, and we at the University of Virginia and 

throughout the university community are highly indebted for your 

support. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crowell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF W. MARK CROWELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND ASSOCIATE

VICE PRESIDENT, INNOVATION PARTNERSHIPS AND COMMERCIALIZATION, UNIVER- SITY OF VIRGINIA, CHARLOTTESVILLE

Chairman Quayle and Ranking Member Wu, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the House Science, Space and Technology Committee’s Subcommittee on 

Technology and Innovation on the important topic of the SBIR and STTR programs—and their role in facilitating the formation and growth of small businesses 

which, in turn, create jobs and help grow the innovation economy. 

My name is Mark Crowell, and I am the Executive Director and Associate Vice 

President for Innovation Partnerships and Commercialization at the University of 

Virginia. Founded by Thomas Jefferson in 1819, the University of Virginia is committed to its founder’s ideal of developing leaders who are well-prepared to help 

shape the future of the nation through our initiatives in education, discovery and 

innovation advancement. In fiscal year 2010 the University received research 

awards totaling over $375.34 million from all sources (federal and state agencies, 

industry and private foundations). Of this amount, $276.47 million, or 73 percent, 

came from federal grants and contracts. I should also point out that the University 

of Virginia has been a partner on approximately 32 SBIR or STTR awards since the 

program’s inception; over the last five years, we have partnered on about eighteen 

(18) awards for a total of more than $5.7 million. The program is becoming increasingly important to us in our efforts to translate innovations and discoveries developed at our institution into new businesses and products. 

The first question you asked me to address was to provide my views on the role 

of the university in the SBIR and STTR programs—and how it relates to technology 

transfer. I have been a director of technology transfer since 1987—at Duke University, at North Carolina State University, at the University of North Carolina at 

Chapel Hill, at the Scripps Research Institute, and now at U.Va. In the decade prior 

to September 11, 2001, it seemed that if the university had a patent application on 

file, a preliminary business plan, and an interested faculty inventor, it was possible 

to land a reasonable Series A round of venture funding. Today, our friends in the 

venture capital industry remain important partners in our innovation and commercialization efforts, but anyone involved in innovation-based business development 

knows that shorter term return horizons, higher levels of risk-avoidance, and the 

need to invest at higher levels to accelerate innovations toward the market have 

moved most venture capitalists much further downstream than where most univer-
27 

sity deals tend to be. The availability of SBIR and STTR funding to help launch and 

grow companies, to facilitate important collaborations between such start-ups and 

universities, and to de-risk such start-up companies in preparation for the downstream venture capital investors is more important than ever in universities’ efforts 

to launch, grow and sustain new ventures to commercialize their research discoveries and to connect their innovation pipeline in ways which help to create wealth 

and generate new jobs. 

Perhaps a brief word about how universities benefit from SBIR and STTR funding 

would be helpful before proceeding. It is important to note that universities may not 

apply for SBIR or STTR funding; applicants must be companies. SBIR applicants 

may partner or subcontract less than one-third of the work to a university or other 

entity; STTR requires applicant companies to team with a not-for-profit research institution, and partnering and commercialization arrangements must be worked out 

in advance. Up to 60% of the work can be subcontracted, and the principal investigator can be from the partnering research institution. Under both programs, and especially under STTR, universities are able to participate in a very meaningful and 

strategic way as the small company develops its research and development strategy 

for commercializing their technology. 

I’d like to provide examples of how SBIR and STTR funding has helped to accelerate amazing growth, opportunity, and potential societal benefit around research 

developed at U.Va. Adenosine Therapeutics was founded in 1999 based on research 

emanating from U.Va.’s School of Medicine. The company’s development pipeline included promising compounds for treating cancer, diabetes, CNS diseases, arthritis, 

and COPD. In less than nine years—rocket speed in the drug development world— 

Adenosine was acquired by a larger, public company, Clinical Data, Inc. The Company maintains a significant presence in Charlottesville even as this growth has occurred. Several of Adenosine’s promising compounds are now in various stages of 

FDA testing and pre-market approval, including a potential best-in-class coronary 

vasodilator for cardiac stress testing. Adenosine was the recipient of numerous 

SBIR/STTR awards beginning in 2000 through 2007. We have no doubt that this 

funding significantly accelerated the development of the technologies, the growth of 

the company, the value to the company’s investors, and the pace of introducing to 

the market potential life-saving and life-enhancing treatments. 

Another example is Directed Vapor Technologies International, Inc. (DVTI). The 

company was formed in 2000 to capitalize on U.Va. patents associated with the creation of a new coating method, Directed Vapor Deposition (DVD), a novel physical 

vapor deposition tool for applying coatings to high performance materials (such as 

turbine engines, batteries, and liquid crystal displays) which allow them to be made 

faster, cheaper, and with less waste. This new small business operates a 6,000 sq. 

ft. manufacturing facility in Albemarle County, VA, and maintains its relationship 

with the University and the region, often hiring interns, recent graduates and alumni. Development of the technologies behind DVTI was supported by grants from the 

National Science Foundation and the Department of Defense, including numerous 

SBIR/STTR awards. 

For Adenosine, DVTI, and other high growth potential companies we are prepared 

to launch, support, and nurture, SBIR and STTR funding is extremely important 

to U.Va.’s efforts to help launch start-up companies. Like many universities across 

the country, the University of Virginia takes seriously its role in translating research results into products, companies, and jobs. The SBIR and STTR programs 

are key weapons in our arsenal. And as venture capital moves further down-field, 

and as companies large and small increasingly look to universities to be their source 

of innovation, it is more important than ever that we continue to have access to 

tools like SBIR and STTR funding. The President referred to the innovation imperative as our Sputnik moment; the Congress and our governors are focusing more and 

more on innovation-based economic development and job creation; and universities 

like U.Va. are ready to answer the call. But, we need help to bridge the valley of 

death, and SBIR and STTR funding has been and remains a critical resource for 

us. 

A second question you asked me to address focuses on my views of the current 

percentage of funding allocated to the SBIR and STTR programs; and whether venture-capital backed small companies should be eligible to participate in the programs. At the University of Virginia, we strongly support funding for the current 

SBIR and STTR programs. That being said, we also believe there is no compelling 

justification or need for increasing the percentage set aside amounts. A close review 

of success rates within the Phase 1 SBIR and STTR grants will reveal that the 

funding success rates for these grants is equal to, and in many cases—such as with 

NIH funding—higher than the success rates for other equally important grants for 

basic research. Any increase in the current SBIR and STTR set-aside would come 
28 

at the expense of other peer-reviewed basic and applied research—the seed corn for 

the innovation pipeline. 

We are particularly concerned about shifting funding away from basic research 

and into the SBIR and STTR programs at a time when we are likely to see flat, 

if not declining funding for basic scientific research programs as the Congress looks 

to address the growing budget deficit. While basic research is an essential piece of 

the innovation process, the long-term horizon of most scientific research performed 

at universities is viewed by industry as too risky for significant private sector investment. This is why the continued federal support for basic scientific research is 

vital. As the Congressional Joint Economic Committee has stated, ‘‘Despite its value 

to society as a whole, basic research is underfunded by private firms precisely because it is performed with no specific commercial applications in mind.’’ 

We also support the eligibility of companies backed with significant venture capital investments to apply for funding under the SBIR and STTR programs. Companies which have secured substantial venture backing, by definition, will have undergone significant due diligence evaluation by investors and could be assumed to be 

on a more certain path to success. In today’s financial climate, sharing risk and 

leveraging investments are a market reality for even the most promising start-up 

companies. Depriving promising companies an opportunity to compete for sources of 

co-investment or de-risking capital seems contrary to common sense and public policy, and we recommend removing any restrictions on the ability of such companies 

to apply. Further, companies which traditionally have the need for much greater 

amounts of funding—such as biopharmaceutical companies—are particularly disadvantaged if there is a disconnect between SBIR/STTR-backed companies and venture capital backed companies. 

In fact, a publication by BIO, the Biotechnology Industry Association, states that 

almost 33% of companies that brought biotherapies to market between 1982 and 

2005 had SBIR funding. In this era of intense focus on innovation-based economic 

development, it would be wise to remove or revise this restriction so that more fastgrowth, job-creating companies can benefit from SBIR and STTR funding. 

The final question I was asked to address concerns what recommendation I would 

make to improve the SBIR and STTR programs. We note that the Association of 

American Universities (AAU), which represents 61 leading U.S. research universities including U.Va., along with other organizations, has recommended more rigorous evaluations of the SBIR and STTR programs. We support this recommendation and therefore support the recommendation made by the National Research 

Council to increase the amount of the current set aside percentage by .03 to .05 percent of total program funding, with the increase to be directed for program assessment and management. This could be a critical component in continuing to improve 

and to fine tune the program for future growth and impact given the renewed emphasis on innovation and economic development in the national discussion. 

Maximum per award funding amounts allowed under SBIR/STTR Phase I and 

Phase II awards should be increased as well to reflect renewed importance on this 

initiative, as well as to reflect the effects of inflation over the years. Phase I awards 

should be at least $150,000, and Phase II should be $1 million. We also would recommend incorporating sufficient flexibility in determining the precise award 

amounts so that SBIR/STTR program officers would have the freedom to increase 

each award up to 20% of the published cap when exceptional circumstances and 

high impact opportunity are deemed to be represented in a particular funding 

award. 

Restrictions related to conflict of interest should be examined and, where feasible, 

flexibility should be added that make it easier for researchers with disclosed and 

manageable conflict of interest to participate in SBIR/STTR-backed start-up companies. Consistent with efforts to encourage, recognize and reward faculty interest in 

research commercialization, onerous conflict of interest policies which discourage 

faculty from working with industry or developing innovative technologies should be 

examined. U.Va. and other universities have policies which focus on identifying and 

avoiding completely unacceptable and unmanageable conflicts, but which allow 

other conflicts to exist under appropriate management and monitoring committees 

and related mechanisms, especially where the potential benefit to society or to the 

institution from the proposed activity is deemed to be significant and consistent 

with other institutional priorities. Many institutions have in fact published policies 

and manuals for managing conflict of interest in the application and performance 

of SBIR and STTR projects; federal agencies administering SBIR and STTR initiatives should identify, incorporate and disseminate what they consider to be best 

practices in managing conflicts of interest in SBIR/STTR-based projects. 

Finally, we would encourage that additional flexibility be built into the SBIR and 

STTR programs. In particular, I would like to recommend that the STTR program 
29 

be modified in a way that would enable agencies to use a certain proportion of these 

funds to directly support additional proof-of-concept work at universities. Specifically, we would encourage the Committee to consider allowing agencies to use a portion of STTR funds to support new demonstration projects that would support proofof-concept grants to universities and their faculty members. Europe has recently 

launched just such a program, and I think it is important that we here in the U.S. 

also find a way to fill this existing funding gap in the innovation pipeline relating 

to a lack of proof-of-concept funds. Using a proportion of the STTR set aside as the 

mechanism by which to address this matter seems totally appropriate, especially if 

there were a decision made to increase the percentage STTR set aside. 

It is important to note that the flexibility we are seeking is aimed mainly at allowing agencies such as the NIH and NSF to devote a proportion of their STTR 

funds for even earlier stage proof-of-concept research or prototype development research, the type of research that is best conducted in the settings where discoveries 

and innovations perceived to have commercial application are first developed, as opposed to later stage product development or for more applied pre-commercial research. Such funding should be allocated only after rigorous evaluation by carefully 

assembled panels of local experts in translational and proof-of-concept research— 

this is key to scaling success to the national level. Among the criteria for awards 

under this initiative should be the demonstrated willingness and capability of a university in engaging project management boards comprised of industry, start-up, venture capital, technical, financial, and business/market experts. Additionally, successful applicants for this funding should be required to prove their willingness and 

agility in managing translational projects stressing market-relevant milestones, in 

conducting rigorous oversight and management of such projects, and in their willingness to withdraw funding from projects failing to reach essential milestones so 

that funding can be re-allocated to projects with more potential. U.Va. is one university which has recently demonstrated tremendous success and impact in undertaking such proof-of-concept research, with audited results indicating tremendous 

success in return on investment of such funds. 

We attribute U.Va.’s success in proof-of-concept research to the now nationally 

well-known Coulter process, involving a very diverse review board, in-person final 

review sessions, milestone-driven projects, quarterly reporting that is simple yet effective in re-directing projects, the ‘‘will to kill’’ projects or re-direct funds if insurmountable obstacles occur, and excellent networking to the venture capital and private sector. The Coulter program projects have generated a 5–1 overall return on 

investment (ROI) in new follow-on funding, and 42–1 ROI for the top ten percent 

of portfolio projects. The key differentiators of this process as we employ it at U.Va. 

versus most prior proof-of-concept funding mechanisms is the in person diligence on 

the involved people and ideas, dedicated project manager, the diverse composition 

of the board, the urgency of quarterly reviews and re-direction of projects, and will 

to re-direct funds as results emerge. 

In closing, I would like to make a brief point about the patent reform legislation 

recently passed by the Senate (S. 23) and currently under consideration in the 

House. While not directly related to SBIR and STTR funding, patent reform is also 

critically important to universities seeking to translate their inventions into new 

products, new businesses, and new jobs. We strongly support the recently passed 

S. 23, but we are concerned about two provisions of the draft bill under consideration by the House Judiciary Committee: (1) greatly expanded prior user rights and 

(2) a lowered threshold for the initiation of inter partes review. Just as we believe 

that the SBIR and STTR programs are essential programs for helping universities 

facilitate the launch and growth of small companies, we also strongly believe that 

a predictable patent system which minimizes uncertainty for companies and investors is critical. The expanded prior user rights in the proposed House legislation 

would disadvantage universities, even with its university carve-out, and would create unpredictable, uneven, and anti-innovation impacts. As just one example—university researchers often publish their research results before filing for patents. 

While the grace period in S. 23 and prior House patent reform bills would protect 

inventors from others patenting their inventions, expanded prior user rights would 

have the opposite effect—i.e., competitors might be incentivized to perfect a competing trade secret product that would then be immune from infringement of the 

eventual valid university patent. We therefore respectfully urge this Subcommittee 

to work with the House Judiciary Committee on this currently pending patent reform legislation—and especially on the prior user rights provision it contains—as a 

way of continuing to improve federal policy promoting the successful launch and 

growth of innovation-based start-up companies. 

I would like to thank the Subcommittee, and especially the Chair and the Ranking Member, for your support of the SBIR and STTR programs in these tough budg-
30 

etary times. While we understand that funding is greatly constrained, I hope that 

you agree that innovation and commercialization serve the public good while promoting the creation of new products, new companies, and new jobs. SBIR and STTR 

funding have proven to be tremendously effective in fueling these activities, and we 

at the University of Virginia, and throughout the university community, are highly 

indebted for your continued support of these programs. 

Thank you again for the invitation to testify. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Crowell. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Doug Limbaugh, CEO of Kutta 

Technologies, for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DOUG LIMBAUGH, CHIEF EXECUTIVE 

OFFICER, KUTTA TECHNOLOGIES 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. Thank you, Chairman Quayle, Ranking—Congressman Wu, and all other committee members for having me 

here to testify in regards to the SBIR reauthorization. I am the 

CEO and co-owner of Kutta Technologies. We have been in business since 2001. My business partner and I, Matthew Savoca, 

started in a 10 by 10 corner of my house back in 2001. We rapidly 

grew to about 12 employees, so imagine 12 employees in your 

house. Imagine customers calling and wanting to come to town and 

visit you at the same time that didn’t know you were that small, 

and imagine your parents deciding they wanted to pay you a visit 

also. 

We turned that into a positive with my mom cooking food for everybody and talking to them and telling them—and your parents 

like to brag about you, telling them all about me and some stories 

that I didn’t want them to hear. 

But I digress, but I want to get back on track, because we have 

been in business—we didn’t start doing SBIRs until 2003. Since 

then we have won 13 phase one grants, 11 phase two grants, for 

a total of $8.5 million in funding. 

Additionally, we have received over—just about $20 million in 

DOD sales and commercialization. That will also continue to—that 

number will continue to grow as some of our products become inserted into DOD program records in the future. 

One also thing that I want to emphasize, we employ over 24 engineers and scientists within our company. Not a big number but 

all those engineers and scientists when you look at the average 

wage is over $100,000 a year. We provide full healthcare benefits, 

401K, and profit sharing, and we never have a shortage of people 

knocking on our doors wanting to come to work for our small business because we do such cool things. And that is as a result of our 

SBIR-based technology. 

Also, we achieved one of our strategic goals this year of winning 

a Tibbetts Award for excellence in the SBIR Program. That gave 

me an opportunity to talk to a lot of other small businesses in the 

community and also will be part of my recommendations to the 

panel what I learned from those meetings and also from firsthand 

experience. 

I also just want to talk briefly about some of the game-changing 

technologies that we have created at Kutta. Mainly we have invented a new, revolutionary new way to control UAVs, and our 

technology will be inserted into a DOD program of record at the 

end of this year or the beginning of next year, and it will totally 
31 

change the way the Army and the Armed Forces use UAVs on the 

battlefield. It will revolutionize it, it will also provide better, more 

accurate, and timely information to soldiers on the battlefield and 

also reduce, we believe, a number of deaths and wounded in action 

due to improvised explosive devices. 

We also as Chairman Quayle expressed in his opening testimony, 

we also have invented a revolutionary new way for coalmining communications. After the Sago incident happened in 2006, the MSHA, 

Mine Safety Health Administration, did a demonstration and 

looked at ten different technologies. By far we had the best technology that was created out of a $70,000 phase one grant. 

At that time they didn’t realize the communications that we 

could provide in the mining industry were even possible. Now 

today we are getting over 6 miles of non-line-of-sight communication in a coalmine with our technologies. It is being sold to the biggest U.S. coal companies here in the United States, and we are exporting that to India, China, and around the world. 

My main recommendations for the SBIR panel are obviously 

shortening the time to award. Everybody has that. Everybody suffers from the fact that it takes so long to get notified and then also 

get the contract for the phase one. I would say that it is more important to shorten the time of award for a phase two because you 

already have the work, and sometimes just waiting a long time to 

get that phase two award can be very detrimental to a small business just starting out that doesn’t have cash flow, doesn’t have the 

expertise or the assets in order to acquire short-term loans or lines 

of credit from the business. 

Other main recommendation is within the DOD a more-centralized contracting process. There is a lot of folks in the DOD and the 

contracting departments that don’t understand SBIRs, see them as 

a tax on their organization, and would just like to get rid of them 

altogether. 

The other big thing that I want to emphasize before my time is 

up is be very careful about allowing venture capitalism, and this 

may be where I differ from other panel members. I think that venture capitalism could also be very detrimental to the small business and intent of the SBIR Program as it started in the sense that 

what would—the way I look at it and the way many of my colleagues in the business look at it, especially within the DOD, is, 

what would prevent a large prime contractor from setting up a VC 

shell company and basically gobbling up all the SBIRs, just loading 

them up and then transition to the technology? 

I also think that you will end up spending more money, the DOD 

especially will end up spending more money on technology created 

out of the SBIR than if it wasn’t funded by VCs. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Limbaugh follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DOUG LIMBAUGH, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, KUTTA

TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 

Thank you for selecting me to provide a written statement on behalf of Kutta 

Technologies, Inc. regarding the SBIR Program. The following written statement 

provides a summary of Kutta’s history and how the SBIR program significantly 

changed our small business for the better. The second part of this testimony summarizes how Kutta’s SBIR innovations have contributed to the nation, our 
32 

warfighters, coal miners, and first responders. The last part of the statement identifies several items in particular that can make a great program even better. 

In June of 2001, my business partner Matthew Savoca and I quit our engineering 

jobs at Honeywell to start Kutta—an aviation engineering consulting business. We 

both put $5,000 into the company to buy used computers, monitors, printers, chairs, 

etc., and two very cheap four-legged plastic desks—the kind that barely have 

enough strength to hold the old desktop monitors of that day. We did not start in 

the garage. Instead we moved into a small 10 foot by 10 foot bedroom in my house. 

I did not charge the company rent because we could not afford it. Within a couple 

of weeks we landed our first consulting job. Things were going well, but we all know 

what happened on September 11, 2001. Needless to say our nation went through 

a rough patch and so did the aviation business. Also, outsourcing engineering services overseas by large American companies started to become a fad and slow the 

rapid growth of our consulting company. As many small entrepreneurs do in the 

United States every day, we learned from these tough lessons, adapted and overcame adversity. We determined that we needed more diversification in our company. 

We decided to become a product-based business. We wanted to control our own destiny and we wanted to create innovative technology that would make an impact in 

America and around the world—we turned to the SBIR program. Since 2001, we 

grew our two person company to nearly 45 employees. Because of the success we 

were having in the SBIR program, we decided to sell the consulting business to 

focus on our SBIR products. Since 2003, Kutta has won 13 Phase I grants and 11 

Phase II grants for a total of $8.5M in funding. Additionally, we have received 

$19.4M in DoD sales and product commercialization of these SBIRs. We currently 

provide direct employment to 24 engineers and scientists with an average yearly 

salary in excess of $100K a year, with full health-care benefits, 401(k), and profit 

sharing. In 2011 we achieved one of our strategic goals of winning a prestigious 

Small Business Association (SBA) Achievement award, the SBIR Tibbetts Award, 

for excellence in achieving the mission and goals of the SBIR program. 

However, achieving this level of success was not without its challenges. After several unsuccessful attempts at writing a winning SBIR proposal, we became aware 

of a state program from the Arizona Department of Commerce called the AZ FAST 

program. The program allowed us to hire a grant writing specialist who helped us 

write better proposals and win SBIRs. In June of 2003, we won our first SBIR 

Phase I grant from the U.S. Army. The SBIR started as a Phase I in 2003, subsequently transitioned to Phase II, and is now in Phase III. This one SBIR alone has 

generated over $4 million dollars in commercial sales and over $8 million in Department of Defense (DoD) sales. It will have even more of an economic impact when 

it becomes inserted into a DoD Program of Record (POR) in the near future. 

Besides the significant economic impact, the technology will revolutionize the way 

the U.S. Army utilizes unmanned aerial drones. With our new Bi-Directional Remote Viewing Terminal (BDRVT) technology, front-line warfighters will be able to 

safely take control of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) and task the UAS to survey 

roads and borders for potential ambushes and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 

track enemy combatants while they flee a scene, and provide over watch capabilities 

to ground troops—all with a few simple inputs on a touchscreen panel. All of this 

will be demonstrated in the Army’s manned unmanned system integration concept 

(MUSIC) demonstration in September of this year. It is not hard to envision this 

simple and easy-to-use device being used not only by our nation, but also by allied 

nations and along our borders—another commercialization avenue that we are exploring. 

This technology would not have become a reality if the U.S. Army’s Aviation Applied Technology (AATD) did not have the vision for the product. With a Phase I 

and Phase II SBIR from AATD, we worked diligently to shape the vision and build 

a prototype to show that it was possible. It then took the Program Management Unmanned Aerial Systems (PM UAS) division of the Army to recognize the innovation 

and provide the funding to insert it into the UAS war fighting machines. This SBIR 

did not fall into the ‘‘valley of death’’ (the struggle to bring a product to market after 

a SBIR Phase II)—the new, highly-competitive, Commercialization Pilot Program 

(CPP) prevented that. MILCOM Venture Partners and the PM SBIR office within 

the DoD provided the bridge funding to move the product from a Phase II prototype 

into a mainstream product and reduce the risk of further procurement by PM UAS. 

That is, the CPP provided the infusion of funding to refine the product and reduce 

the risk for acquisition into the Army’s supply chain. This was a winning program 

for everyone. The Warfighter receives a new innovation, the taxpayers save money 

by selecting Kutta instead of a large prime contractor, Kutta employs engineers, and 

our employees thrive on creating the innovation—not to mention the fact that it allows the Army to break the stove-piped and proprietary nature of many military 
33 

systems. This is a success that we share with our nation, the taxpayers, and our 

Army sponsors; for without them we would not be here today. 

Furthermore, our enemy’s tactics and creativity are unencumbered by the fair and 

formal procurement found in America, and our enemy’s tactics can be very disruptive. Our enemies are becoming more adept at utilizing commercial off the shelf 

(COTS) technologies (e.g. cell phones to explode IEDs) and our defense budgets are 

shrinking. It is a known fact that small, entrepreneurial companies can innovate 

much faster than the large business. The DoD budgets may shrink, but our nation 

will still need ways to quickly adapt to our enemy’s ever changing tactics. Therefore, 

to counter the fast-moving and evolving tactics of our enemies, I believe the DoD 

needs the SBIR program more than ever to out-innovate our enemies in a cost efficient manner. 

I am also compelled to discuss another success story that has even much more 

far ranging impacts throughout the world than Kutta’s UAS controller technology. 

As many of you may recall on January 2, 2006, an underground coal blast occurred 

in Sago, West Virginia. After the blast, 13 miners survived for nearly two days. 

Eventually, all of the miners except one survivor, Randal McCloy, were overcome 

by poisonous methane gas. The outcome of the MSHA investigation showed that 

those miners could have survived if they had a two-way communication device and 

if rescuers had known where the miners were located. The U.S. queried the DoD 

for technology that could fill this capability gap in the mining industry. To our 

knowledge, we were the only company in the United States working to solve a similar subterranean communication problem for the Army. We had also just completed 

a successful SBIR Phase I grant and were patiently waiting to receive our Phase 

II award—a wait of about 6 months. We were between the Phase I and Phase II 

contract stages, and we had no funding. However, the Mine Safety Health Administration (MSHA) wanted to conduct an independent survey of underground communication technology. They selected Kutta and nearly 10 other technologies for their 

evaluation. We were confident that our technology would work, and luckily we had 

enough of our own funds to refine our Phase I prototype three weeks prior to the 

scheduled MSHA evaluation. The results of MSHA’s independent test showed that 

our $70,000 SBIR Phase I prototype exceeded everyone’s expectations. We demonstrated wireless two-way, non line-of-sight (i.e. around corners), voice communication over two-miles in the underground mine. This was over six times further than 

any other wireless communication technology tested and the signal could have traveled further. In fact, our production quality radios today can provide wireless, nonline of sight, two-way communication in a mine at over six miles. After these tests, 

MSHA realized that post-accident communication and tracking was possible. These 

results prompted a call from the late Congressman George Norwood. Congressman 

Norwood was acting as the Chairman of the House and Education Labor Committee 

at the time and was excited about our technology. Subsequently, Congress passed 

the MINER Act and President Bush signed it into law. The MINER Act appropriated $10 million dollars to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 

Health (NIOSH) to foster research into underground mine post-accident technologies 

(e.g. communications, tracking, rescue chambers, etc.). Kutta worked with NIOSH 

to receive $2.1 Million in funding to transition the SBIR Phase I prototype into a 

prototype for coal mines. The Army provided SBIR Phase II Plus funding of $500K 

for a total of $2.6 Million in funding. Although the NIOSH and Army collaboration 

was successful, it still only produced a prototype system for the miners. Kutta, using 

its own funds, spent nearly $2 Million additional dollars to bring the product to 

market. To this day, we are the only MSHA approved post-accident communication 

device available to the mining industry. Furthermore, it is the most economical twoway wireless communication device available to the mining industry. We have received orders from the largest underground coal companies in the U.S. and are currently exporting our technology worldwide. 

Moreover, last year we discovered that this technology could be used by first responders to solve challenging situations where communications is not available in 

high-rise buildings and subterranean environments—a large problem experienced by 

first responders in the 9/11 disaster. We demonstrated wireless interoperable communications to the Fire Department of New York in a subway tunnel and in a highrise building. FDNY was astonished by the capabilities of the system. However, neither FDNY nor Kutta have enough funds to modify the mining product for the first 

responders, although we are both trying to find a way. Furthermore, we demonstrated the capability to Border Patrol to communicate within border tunnels and 

to map the tunnels on the surface. The Border Patrol agents liked the technology, 

but they too do not have the budget to purchase the system. Lastly, the U.S. Army’s 

911th Technical Rescue crew received two demonstrations of our technology and 

they were amazed with its ease of use and its capabilities. They have been working 
34 

for nearly six months through their procurement process to purchase two of our systems. I mention these struggles to illustrate how difficult it is to bring a new product to market. Marketing and selling products takes just as much time and money 

as does building the prototype (Phase II Objective). 

I believe it in the best interest of all SBIR-based companies, as well as those in 

Congress and the President, to review Mr. Glover’s report on the SBIR program as 

recorded in his February 11th testimony. This report not only provides the quantitative justification for the SBIR program, it makes a strong case for increasing the 

funding for the program. When you listen to the President’s State of the Union address about small business innovators, when you look at the state of unemployment 

in our nation, and you consider the fact that small business in the biggest employer 

and the largest catalyst for new innovations, the SBIR program is the program that 

is too valuable to fail. Why wouldn’t taxpayers want a Government program that 

has a positive Return on Investment (ROI) and not a negative? 

Obviously the SBIR program, as fathered by Roland Tibbetts, is a resounding success for our country. I firmly believe that without the SBIR program, innovation in 

this country would be stifled, fewer jobs would be created, and our taxpayers would 

be paying much more to acquire state-of-the-art military capabilities. However, just 

as it is good business to continuously improve a product, so to should our government look to improve the SBIR program. The following are specific suggestions for 

consideration that I offer from first-hand experience within the program. 

Recommendation 1: Reduce the time for award notification (win or lose) to less 

than 60 days for a Phase I and a Phase II SBIR. 

Rationale: A company can make better business decisions regarding resource allocation if they know if they won or lost as opposed to waiting for months on end to 

find out the result. Waiting puts a financial toll on the company and an emotional 

toll on those employees that put their hearts and souls into writing the proposals. 

Giving the companies a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ as soon as possible allows them to make more 

informed decisions sooner rather than later. 

Recommendation 2: Allow the Phase I to be recognized as a grant. 

Rationale: Allowing the Phase I to be recognized as a grant would simplify contracting and prevent lengthy negotiations regarding IP and Statements of Work. It 

will reduce the overhead of the contracting agency and speed the flow of money to 

a small business. 

Recommendation 3: Reduce the time for contract negotiation and award to 45 days 

from receiving award notification of a Phase II. 

Rationale: Funding for a small startup company working under an SBIR grant is 

vital. Small startups have a harder time acquiring a short term line of credit or a 

loan from a bank. Furthermore, a Phase I grant might be the only source of income 

to the startup company. If the company has to wait 4 to 6 months to receive funding 

for the next phase, it could be highly detrimental to them. From a business perspective, time to market can be critical. Allowing the small company to build a prototype 

and start its marketing efforts earlier could also increase commercialization success. 

Recommendation 4: Within the DoD, create a more centralized contracting process 

that allows funding to be provided to the small companies in a more expedited manner. 

Rationale: Although the SBIR program has been around since 1982, the program 

does not garner much affinity to those in DoD contracting departments. Many times 

the SBIR program is seen as a tax to them and requires them to administer a contract that they know little about or have had little training on how to handle. Having a centralized contracting team at PM SBIR to administer contracts or provide 

guidance to contracting officers would streamline the award process. 

Recommendation 5: Educate contract representatives and encourage other government organizations to utilize the sole source SBIR Phase III processes to provide 

contract vehicles for small business. 

Rationale: Establishing a contract with an acquisition authority in the DoD is 

very difficult. Therefore, commercialization with the acquisition arm of the DoD is 

stifled. This problem is compounded by the fact that the contracting officers in the 

acquisition offices are not familiar with SBIR contracts since SBIRs are mostly administered by the Research and Development of the DoD. Contract officers in acquisition inherently shy away from SBIRs because of lack of understanding and they 

sometimes wrongly question that a SBIR Phase III satisfies the Federal Acquisition 

Regulations (FARs) for competition. That leaves the contracting officers with few options: one, to not acquire the technology; two, to rebid or open the technology for 

other offers’, which cost the government time and money; and three, find an existing 

contract mechanism to role the technology into. When option number three is invoked, the small business has to typically deal with a large prime contractor. Typically, these prime contractors already have an established relationship with the ac-
35 

quisition authorities and an existing contract vehicle is in place and the technology 

can be acquired. On the surface that may sound good and in some cases it works 

out great. However, this places a small company in a very precarious situation. That 

is, negotiating intellectual property, payable terms, and complex DoD contracts with 

multi-billion dollar companies with terms that are always more favorable to the 

large firms than the small one. It also introduces mark ups and overhead which cost 

the government more money. 

Recommendation 6: Consider establishing a competitive SBIR Phase III program 

for SBIR Phase II winners that focuses on marketing only (not technical development). 

Rationale: Most SBIR funding and the newly added Commercialization Pilot Program are still focused on technology enhancements and technology maturation. It 

would be useful if a competitive SBIR process was started by the Department of 

Commerce. The program should be open to all SBIR Phase II winners across the 

SBIR landscape. However, the proposal should be structured more like a sales and 

marketing proposal for the product—not a technically oriented proposal. Providing 

funds to market and advertise a SBIR-generated product would increase commercialization. 

Recommendation 7: Within the DoD, be very careful in allowing Venture Capital 

based companies into the system. 

Rationale: VC funding for primarily DoD-based SBIR companies would encourage 

small business to concentrate more on commercial benefits and may not be in direct 

alignment with DoD goals. Furthermore, large conglomerate VC firms are entrenched with the government and may work the system to have SBIR’s written to 

focus on their company’s strength rather than the innovation needed for the 

warfighter. It also makes it very difficult for small, startup companies to compete 

with VC-funded companies, and appears to defeat the intent of the SBIR program. 

Recommendation 8: Raise the total allocation to SBIR R & D budget 

Rationale: The SBIR program creates jobs and does so more efficiently than universities. It also creates new products—products that can be sold nationally and 

internationally. New products create new jobs across the workforce spectrum (e.g. 

accounting, shipping, manufacturing, marketing, engineering, travel, etc.). It’s a nobrainer. If you want new jobs, the SBIR program will deliver. It always has and 

it always will because it is aligned with America’s core economic principles of fair 

competition and free markets. 

Based on our experience and based on the quantitative statistics related to the 

SBIR program, the program is a tremendous government success and it returns 

more tax revenue than is used to fund it. It also creates sustainable, high-paying 

jobs in critical areas of technology that make America more competitive throughout 

the world. A reauthorization of the SBIR program is absolutely vital for our nation 

to remain competitive, to provide jobs for highly-educated engineers and scientists, 

to invent new technologies rapidly and efficiently, and to reduce our trade deficit. 

I firmly support the SBIR program for all its benefits. And, if you really want to 

prime a job creation engine, I implore you to find a way to re-authorize the SBIR 

and to re-authorize it with additional funding. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Limbaugh. 

The chair now recognizes our final witness, Ms. McKinney, who 

is the president and CEO of Galois, Incorporated. I will recognize 

you for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LAURA MCKINNEY, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, GALOIS, INC. 

Ms. MCKINNEY. Good afternoon, Chairman Quayle, Ranking 

Member Wu, and Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear to you today to testify about the role that the SBIR Program 

has played in Galois’ business and its effectiveness in promoting innovation. 

Let me begin by thanking the Members of the Committee for promoting policies that assist the growth and innovative contributions 

of small businesses in this country. You are to be commended for 

your support to programs such as SBIR. 

My testimony is based solely on what Galois knows directly. Our 

experiences may be unique or may generalize. We acknowledge the 
36 

excellent work of the National Research Council and others who 

bring a broader viewpoint about what might best apply in the larger context and community. 

Galois is a 10-year-old small business located in Portland, Oregon. Our mission is creating trustworthiness in critical systems. 

We transform computer science research into practice to address 

urgent problems with safety and security software. 

You can think of Galois as a vital part of the supply chain that 

takes relatively new research technology up the hill through feasibility proof and operational demonstration stages. Galois’ roots 

were in a 1990s Air Force research project undertaken by the Oregon Graduate Institute, a technical research-focused graduate 

school. This project and the visionary leadership of the Air Force 

program managers provided a model for many of the elements necessary to achieve technology transition. 

However, despite the emphasis on transition, superior technology, and a viable implementation, the results failed to reach deployment and bring operational value. There was one critical link 

missing that prevented the ultimate deployment of this system; a 

commercially-motivated entity to bring the mature prototype into 

use. Despite significant interest and commitment, the effort was 

simply outside the mission of OGI as an educational research institute. It was a source of significant frustration to many team members that this valuable technology was essentially abandoned. 

When an opportunity arose several years later with a similarlystructured research effort with the intelligence community, Dr. 

John Launchbury, the founder and CEO, used the lessons learned 

under the project with Galois, and we founded the company based 

on a mission with technology transition as a focus. The results of 

that intelligence community project are in operational use today. 

Galois’ revenues are generated through collaborative research 

projects, transition support, and licensing of technologies to product 

companies. Approximately 17 percent of current Galois revenues 

are from SBIR, making the SBIR Program a modest but highly-leveraged part of our business. 

For Oregon with its geographic challenges, the SBIR Program 

enhances access to U.S. government agencies with operational 

needs, leading to results and further funding both within and outside of the SBIR Program. The frequent release of new SBIR topics 

from government agencies enables Galois to survey areas of work 

that would serve critical emerging needs. 

The SBIR Program enables research transition across government agencies. Results generated under the sponsorship of one government agency are applied to problems elsewhere. The SBIR Program encourages quality operational research which is distinct in 

pace and focus from the kind of research done within labs and at 

universities. 

There is a dynamic ebb and flow of small companies which have 

to respond rapidly to emerging needs and emerging techniques. To 

compete a company has to excel on the quality and relevance of its 

ideas. In areas such as cyber security, Galois brings global research 

leverage to national problems. Galois has grown transition and 

commercialization skills through interactions with the Navy TAP, 
37 

the National Research Council, and the DHS Commercialization 

Office. 

Galois is recommending the following improvements with the 

view to making an excellent program stronger. We believe in the 

current approach to success metrics, particularly that failure is one 

expected outcome. This makes it possible to try riskier approaches 

that bring more significant value. 

Second, that phase three is measured by a monetary investment 

which helps ensure that SBIRs overall are yielding value. However, 

there is an alternative way to bring substantial value to the Nation; through open-source technology as exemplified by goggled android mobile phone platform. Consequently, Galois recommends an 

augmentation of the phase three success metrics to include evaluation of open source transition. 

In addition, Galois endorses and supports increasing the phase 

one award size in tandem with the economy, providing approaches 

for accelerating the pace and transition between the phases, increasing support for the technical points of contact, linking programs of record more closely with the SBIR Program, and providing incentives for prime contractors to evaluate and use SBIRdeveloped technologies. 

Galois believes the SBIR Program is successful both for fostering 

the innovation and jobs engine of small businesses and for nurturing breakthrough technologies to the benefit of the government 

and wider economy. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before this committee, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McKinney follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. LAURA MCKINNEY, PRESIDENT AND CEO, GALOIS, INC. 

Good afternoon Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Wu, and Members of the 

Committee. It is an honor to appear before you today to testify about the role that 

the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program has played in Galois’ business, and its effectiveness in promoting innovation. 

My name is Laura McKinney, and I serve as CEO of Galois, Inc., and as a member of Galois’ Board of Directors. 

Let me begin by thanking the Members of this Committee for your work in promoting policies that assist the growth of small businesses in this country. Small 

businesses are known to be a significant engine of innovation, and your role in promoting policies that have fostered innovation and created jobs in the U.S. is to be 

commended. The SBIR program is one such example. 

For this testimony, the subcommittee requested the following information: 

1) Description of Galois’ awards and experience with the SBIR program. 

2) Discussion of how Galois’ SBIR-funded work has impacted our community and/ 

or the nation. 

3) Recommendations for improvements to the program. 

We have addressed all three of the questions in the following testimony. I am able 

to speak from the perspective of Galois’ specific experiences with the SBIR and 

STTR programs. It is my desire to share our story with as much depth and fidelity 

as possible, recognizing that it will naturally have its parochial limits. When we 

give recommendations, we do so based solely on what we know directly, and in recognition that our experiences may either be unique or may generalize. We acknowledge the excellent work of the National Research Council and others who bring a 

broader viewpoint to sort out what might best apply in the larger context and community. 

Overview 

Galois is a 10-year-old small business located in Portland, Oregon. Galois’ mission 

is creating trustworthiness in critical systems. Our approach is to transform computer science research into practice to address urgent problems with safety and se-
38 

curity software. Think of Galois as a vital part of the supply chain that takes relatively new research technology up the hill through feasibility proof and operational 

demonstration stages. 

Galois employs over 30 people, most as employees and some under contract. We 

are a mix of researchers with world-recognized expertise paired with highly-skilled 

engineers whose practical experience converts research ideas into viable implementations. Among the 24 permanent technical staff, almost 60% hold a Ph.D., another 

25% hold an MS, and five are former university professors. All are specialists in 

computer science, with emphasis on formal methods and high assurance techniques 

in software. Galois draws its expertise from a global community, with degrees represented from many first rank U.S. universities as well as overseas schools such as 

Oxford, Cambridge, and UNSW in Sydney. 

The primary problem domains we address include those motivated by needs in 

cybersecurity, such as high assurance architectures, cross-domain information exchange, cryptography, and secure embedded devices. Galois’ customers include the 

intelligence community, Navy, NASA, Army, Air Force, DARPA, DOE, Raytheon, 

and General Dynamics, plus other companies in the industrial and commercial sectors. Some of Galois’ partnerships and relationships include Rogue River Research 

(Ashland Oregon), Portland State University, Oregon State University, defense contractors such as DRS, commercial entities in the cybersecurity domain such as OK 

Labs, and small businesses such as Dornerworks. 

Galois’ revenues are generated through collaborative research projects, transition 

support, and licensing of technologies to product companies. Approximately 17% of 

current Galois revenues are through SBIR Phase-I and Phase-II contracts and 

grants, making the SBIR program a modest but highly leveraged part of our business. In particular, the SBIR program is a critical enabler that allows Galois to bring 

maturing research results developed under long-term initiatives to bear on immediate needs. We combine emerging software techniques and tools with inventions to 

meet specific operational requirements. Often we partner with both academia and 

solution providers to make this possible. Thus a primary contribution for Galois is 

magnifying the investment in research results funded under one government agency 

to a broader government and commercial community. 

The technology transition gap between universities and industry 

Galois, Inc., had its roots in an Air Force research project undertaken in the 90s 

by the Oregon Graduate Institute. This project, and the visionary leadership of the 

Air Force management in guiding its progress, provided a model for many of the 

elements necessary to achieve technology transition. However, despite all the emphasis on transition, superior technology, and a viable implementation, the results 

failed to reach deployment and bring operational value. Ultimately Galois was 

founded in response to the technology transition lessons learned under this effort. 

This background is worth examining in some detail, as it demonstrates the critical 

role that companies like Galois can play, as they inhabit the R&D space between 

Universities and large industrial and commercial concerns. 

As background, the Oregon Graduate Institute was a research-focused, graduate 

school that flourished due to the excellence of the researchers and their ability to 

provide compelling research results. The Oregon Legislature chartered OGI in 1963 

to provide graduate-level training and expertise to the state’s rapidly expanding 

high-tech industry. ‘‘During the 1990s the school awarded over one thousand graduate degrees, offered hundreds of continuing education seminars and workshops, and 

secured more than $100 million in largely federally-funded research. In 2001, OGI 

merged with Oregon Health Sciences University.’’ (Quoted from the OGI web site). 

One of the projects in the 90s was a multi-year, multi-million dollar grant to improve the production and reliability of message passing systems within the U.S. Air 

Force. The Air Force sponsors were committed to seeing that the research resulted 

in tangible and direct benefits. To enable the academic group to better meet the expectations of an operationally-focused customer, they assigned an advisor in addition to the program management oversight. 

The project ultimately delivered a mature prototype message-passing system. In 

a controlled software engineering experiment against an existing operational solution, the system was proven to significantly improve both the productivity of the engineers that code the messages and reduce the number of errors encountered. Potential value to the Air Force included increased capability to produce new message formats, with lower failures, in response to changing mission needs. 

The researchers and the Air Force advisor worked together to add rigorous project 

management, to complement researchers with highly-skilled engineers, to educate 

the team about the Air Force mission and current solutions, and to structure the 
39 

project with a tangible demonstration of value as its goal. This research community 

learned new approaches in terms of scope, rigor and perspective. 

However, there was one critical link that was missing that prevented the ultimate 

deployment of this system, and that was a commercially-motivated entity to take 

this mature prototype and bring it into use. Despite significant interest and commitment to do so, the effort was simply outside of the mission of OGI as an educational 

research institute. It was a source of significant frustration to many team members 

that this valuable technology was essentially abandoned. 

Galois’ inception 

In 1999, Dr. John Launchbury, an OGI professor, was approached by a research 

group within the intelligence community to address a critical problem in the specification of cryptographic algorithms. Some of the elements of this work drew on the 

research results from the prior Air Force project and elsewhere. 

Significantly, both the OGI professor and the government realized that in order 

for this initiative to be successful, the research and development needed to be done 

within an entity that could nurture the system through to actual use. John 

Launchbury took the lessons learned from OGI and founded Galois, which has since 

grown steadily and strongly, winning multiple Oregon business awards and honors, 

including John Launchbury’s selection as finalist for Entrepreneur of the Year in 

2002 by the Portland Business Journal. 

Cryptographic specification became the first project for Galois as well the inspiration for Galois’ name, which is in honor of Evariste Galois, a 17th century French 

mathematician who invented the theory underlying cryptography before dying in a 

politically-motivated duel at the age of 21. The result of the ensuing ten-year Galois 

partnership with the intelligence community is the Cryptol language and tools, 

which are in operational and commercial use today. 

For Cryptol, Galois was able to complete the transition by itself from research 

through to operational deployment and support because its target user group was 

small and sophisticated. However, Galois leadership understood early on that larger 

operational deployments of emerging technology would need to be done by partners 

who had both the operational expertise, scope of capability and mission knowledge 

to make it happen. Galois believes that its mission imperative, unlike academia, is 

to locate, assess and work with such partners until the technology has been fully 

transitioned. 

In the early to mid 2000s, building on its base of technical skills, Galois grew by 

extending its research initiatives to problem areas outside of cryptography. Galois 

was leveraging the excellence of its researchers and its independence from the academic mission to bring a new technology transition offering to research agencies in 

the government. 

Galois participated in a research project under the Navy PMW 160 office to improve cross-domain information exchange. This project produced specific technologies that could be used in a significant number of different devices in both safety and security domains. However, challenges exist to deployment within these 

areas, chief of which is the amount of up-front investment required to bring a solution into use. Deployment of such devices is gated by various government certification processes such as TSABI and SABI, which can take from 12–24 months to 

complete. As a consequence, the existing solutions are aging and require substantial 

government investment to remain viable, even as they fall behind in meeting mission need. 

Galois recognized that any deployment partner would need to see a large market 

potential prior to engaging in such an effort. As a result, Galois started nurturing 

partnerships in earnest at this point, readying the field for deployment opportunities. 

Galois’ history with SBIR 

While working with the Navy, Galois became aware of the SBIR program, and 

had submitted and won an early Phase-I grant with the Air Force. During the period between the win and receiving the contract, the technical point of contact 

changed. Galois was naive about the structure of the SBIR program, and failed to 

respond to this shift in technical leadership with a change in the research initiative. 

As a consequence, we were not responsive to the new needs of the program office 

and were not awarded the Phase-II. This was an education to Galois about the differences between interacting with research agencies on long-term contracts and the 

pace and intent of the SBIR program. 

However, Galois saw the potential for the SBIR program to motivate the investment necessary to bring capabilities to market by linking the technology to specific 

operational needs. Galois had also written several SBIR Phase-I proposals that aug-
40 

mented the Trusted Services Engine (TSE), a cross-domain information sharing device, which had been previously developed with Navy funding. One of these, CrossDomain Document-Based Collaboration in a Multi-Level Secure Environment, resulted in Phase-II funding through the Navy, Phase-III funding through the intelligence community, transition of technology to a venture-backed startup and multiple operational deployment opportunities that are still in motion. 

Because Galois is so aligned with the structure and intent of the SBIR program, 

we have increased our participation and written and won an increasing number of 

Phase-I grants and contracts, and have been moving some of those into Phase-II efforts. All of these involve taking research results from our longer-term initiatives, 

combining them with specific innovations that are responsive to operational needs, 

and producing new capabilities that are mature enough to see deployment in the 

short term. 

Galois perspective on technology transition 

Galois defines successful technology transition as the realization of significant 

new capability within existing problem domains through the application of revolutionary techniques that change the state of the practice. Technology transition is 

hard. It can take many, many years for a revolutionary technology to move from 

research into successful deployment. Based on our experience, Galois believes the 

following: 

Expect the unexpected in technology transition. It is extremely difficult 

to predict when and where the ultimate value of technology invention will be 

realized. Technologies may require long-term nurturing until the conditions are 

ripe. 

Relevance and value comes from being strongly connected with the 

mission and needs of operational entities. Innovation happens where technology evolution meets operational challenge. 

Technology transition comes incrementally, and is built through a series of contributions by an entire eco-system of collaborators. It is exactly the breadth and diversity of the customers and the funding mechanisms 

that enable a healthy system. The missions of academia, technology transition 

agents such as Galois, and operational solution providers are different, complementary and essential to ultimate success. The variety of government funding approaches are also essential and valuable: funding from fundamental research through university grants, through bespoke applied research including 

SBIR initiatives, together with maturation and readiness investment, all contribute to eventual success. 

Impact of the SBIR Program 

The SBIR program has had a significant impact on many dimensions of Galois’ 

business. The following describes these, with evidence drawn from some of our SBIR 

contracts. We also draw general lessons from other relevant engagements that we 

are not at liberty to discuss in this forum. 

Impact: SBIRs at Galois have enabled Oregon access to 

broader U.S. government business 

One major benefit of the SBIR program to Portland and to Oregon is the enhanced access to relationships with U.S. government agencies, particularly those 

with operational needs. These relationships lead both to valuable results and further funding opportunities within and outside of the SBIR program. 

It has been our experience that building a good government-focused research program requires ready access to people within relevant agencies. These relationships 

provide deep insights into the emerging problems as well as experience about how 

to navigate the government bid and procurement process. Despite valuable potential, without these government relationships, businesses will stumble by failing to 

be truly responsive to needs or by missteps in bids and procurement. Most often, 

they are just ‘late to the table’ and miss opportunities. 

Oregon is challenged geographically, both in distance and time zone, in identifying 

and cultivating close connections with agencies. Oregon does not have a rich community of former government workers from which to draw knowledge and experience. The Congressional Record of the Senate, vol. 148, no. 120, from Sept 20, 2002, 

records Senator Wyden as alluding to the same challenge: 

‘‘Technology workers and managers from my home State of Oregon have inspired 

me with their technical skills and their passion to put their talents to work serving 

America. The Portland area is home to one of the Nation’s largest concentration of 
41 

cybersecurity vendors in the country. Portland now boasts a remarkable cluster of 

small and large companies actively working to make America’s portion of cyberspace a safer place.’’ 

He then went on to mention Galois (called Galois Connections in 2002) directly: 

‘‘Galois Connections designs and develops high confidence software for 

critical and demanding applications. Its clientele includes the National Security Agency.’’ 

And then indirectly: 

‘‘It is essential to eliminate the road-blocks American innovators face. A 20-person 

company in Beaverton, OR shouldn’t have to devote precious resources to hiring lobbyists, making multiple trips to see different people in different agencies, and pursuing expensive and, frankly, frequently obsolete certifications.’’ 

The SBIR program is very helpful in this regard. It offers a level playing field. 

Successful Phase-I work can be the springboard for relationships that lead to future 

work outside of the SBIR umbrella. Further, the contracting process is straightforward and cognizant of the limitations of small business. Galois has been able to 

increase its breadth and diversity through SBIR participation. 

For example, in November of 2009 Galois was awarded a Phase-I SBIR to provide 

Active Defense against Code Injection Attacks by Air Force Research Laboratory 

(AFRL), as part of their Software Protection Initiative (SPI). That single Phase-I 

award gave us the opportunity to build relationships with the broader cyber defense 

community, and a better understanding of the pressing problems they face in trying 

to secure cyberspace. This exposure has been instrumental in our success in building solutions that speak to the needs of both government and private industry. As 

a result, our initial Phase-I engagement has turned into multiple opportunities to 

develop, and eventually field, critical national security capabilities, such as 

run≥time monitoring solutions that make UAVs more reliable and robust against 

software-based attacks. And we are particularly excited about the fact that these opportunities have a strong commercial component to them; we’re actively involved 

with adoption partners to make the technology transition for these solutions a success, with benefits to both government agencies and private firms. 

Impact: Galois SBIRs have provided technology and market 

opportunities for new ventures 

In 2005, Galois won the aforementioned SBIR Phase-I award, Cross-Domain Document-Based Collaboration in a Multi-Level Secure Environment. The Navy had recognized the need for online collaboration, including with the multiplicity of coalition 

partners, and called for research on the topic. Inspired by the success of Wikipedia 

(which was only a few years old at the time), Galois saw the potential for wiki technology to act as a vehicle for collaborative data sharing. The insight was notable. 

Fully a year later, in April 2006, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI) Intelligence Community Enterprise Services (ICES) announced Intellipedia, 

which is an online system for collaborative data sharing within the intelligence community (IC). Intellipedia consists of three wikis running on JWICS, SIPRNet, and 

Intelink-U, containing data at classification levels from Top Secret (TS) to Sensitive 

But Unclassified (SBU). 

Galois’ approach was to layer wiki technology on top of the Trusted Services Engine (TSE). Through successful Phase-I and Phase-II efforts, the cross-domain wiki 

technology was developed and demonstrated to multiple audiences within the DoD 

and IC, receiving Phase-III development funding from sources outside the SBIR program. Additionally, multiple conversations took place between Galois and 

Intellipedia staff, where each side shared ideas and insights. 

In 2007, Galois connected with a Boston startup, KnowledgeBanking Systems 

(KSys). KSys were developing an enterprise information solution based on shared 

wikis, and were challenged by how to control when and when not to allow information to be shared. In a supply chain, companies need to have access to information 

about where their products or components will be used, and also need information 

from their suppliers, but they should not have access to information from their competing companies, not even to know who they are. KSys licensed the wiki technology 

from Galois, and worked with both government and industry to ensure that the solution they were building would be appropriate for their needs. KSys was about to 

close a major round of funding when the capital markets closed down with the banking crisis of 2008. 

Impact: SBIR projects expose companies like Galois 

to real and current needs 
42 

One benefit of the frequent release of new SBIR topics from government agencies 

is that we as a private corporation are able to see what areas of work would serve 

critical, timely needs. The constant input that we receive through the SBIR program 

allows us to guide our research direction in order to not only answer the needs that 

we hear via SBIR solicitations in the present, but anticipate the needs that will 

arise in the near future. 

Our current set of SBIR projects reflects this. For example, recent trends in mobile phone technology have pushed commercial products such as Android-based 

phones into security-critical environments. One of our DARPA-funded SBIR PhaseI projects (FUSE: Inter-Application Security for Android) leverages our existing research capabilities in program security analysis, and targets it specifically towards 

the Android mobile platform. Another example is the rise of scientific collaboration 

over large distances that heavily utilize Internet-based tools to share data and computing resources. We have successfully executed a Phase-I project and started a 

Phase-II project with the Department of Energy (Grid 2.0: Collaboration and Sharing on the Grid) to apply our expertise in building high assurance authentication 

and identity management software to this specific problem in computational science. 

In both cases, the SBIR program has allowed us to take our broad research capabilities and apply them to specific application areas that answer timely, critical national needs. 

Impact: SBIR support programs have built Galois 

commercialization capability 

Galois has benefited from participation in several SBIR support resources, and especially from those that focus on transition and commercialization. 

Prime among these is the Navy’s Transition Assistance Program, or TAP, which 

gave Galois substantial new and useful understanding and capability in commercialization. The program is voluntary for Navy Phase-II winners, and requires a 

commitment in time and money from the company to participate. Over a year’s time 

and under advisor guidance, Galois learned or improved capabilities in how to 

evaluate a particular market, assess a venture partner, write a business plan, 

produce marketing collateral that is informative to defense industry primes, and 

present at an industry-focused conference. Each of these skills has been reused and 

deepened since that experience. Of particular note, the Dawnbreaker advisor provided baseline criteria for examining venture opportunities, which Galois applied 

immediately to the KSys opportunity. This information facilitated the development 

of that commercialization effort. 

Beyond the Navy TAP, there are several other national SBIR conferences held annually. These provide coaching on proposal writing, on the SBIR process itself, on 

building a good commercialization plan, among other things. These conferences also 

provide the opportunity to meet with prime contractors, and learn from fellow SBIR 

entrepreneurs. 

Galois discovered a couple years ago, during web trawling, the excellent National 

Research Council in-depth studies of the SBIR program. The NRC findings and recommendations have transformed our understanding of the SBIR program, how the 

various agencies differ in their approaches to it, how to improve our chances of success of winning Phase-Is and IIs (particularly with regards to commercialization). 

Another great example is the DHS’ Commercialization Office, led by the nation’s 

first Chief Commercialization Officer, Thomas Celluci. That office augments DHS’ 

SBIR program by helping DHS SBIR TPOCs provide detailed operational requirements and a conservative market potential (across all DHS procurement), supporting the commercialization process, actively courting the private sector, and establishing public-private partnerships. Small businesses gain insights into how commercialization plans are assessed, which milestones and metrics will apply during 

execution, and into the needs of large government programs e.g., through CONOPS 

(Concept of Operations). 

We have found, time and again, however, that there is no substitute for an engaged TPOC who is able to help the small business navigate the challenges of the 

SBIR program itself, and of the potential for application within the government. 

Impact: SBIRs have enabled research developed for one agency 

to spread in impact to other agencies 

One of the primary benefits of the SBIR program is its unique ability to promote 

research transition across government agencies. Through participants such as 

Galois, emerging research results generated under the sponsorship of one government agency have the potential to have immediate application across the government. 
43 

For example, the Cross-Domain RSS Processor and Router SBIR Phase-I from the 

Navy led to technology discussions and demonstrations with the intelligence community. Furthermore, the key ideas developed in the project became the core of the 

SBIR Phase-IGrid 2.0: Collaboration and Sharing on the Grid project with the Department of Energy and the Open Science Grid. Grid 2.0, now in Phase-II, is an effort to increase secure collaboration capabilities for scientists who require a lot of 

computational and storage resources. Its goal is to remove technical barriers to secure collaboration, including developing means of trusting digital identities among 

a global set of scientists from different institutions. 

Impact: Galois SBIR work has brought global cybersecurity research 

capabilities to bear on national needs 

The SBIR program fosters a dynamic ebb and flow of small companies, which 

have to respond rapidly to emerging needs, and even more, to emerging techniques. 

Phase-I SBIR proposals often have 30–50 competitors. 

To compete, a company like Galois has to excel on the quality and relevance of 

its ideas. Unsurprisingly, therefore, within its technical domain, Galois has been 

motivated to draw together researchers with an international reputation. 

The Association for Computing Machinery, the world’s largest educational and scientific computing society, confers the designation ‘‘ACM Fellow’’ to a select number 

of ACM members whose accomplishments have distinguished themselves by outstanding technical and professional achievements in information technology. This 

year, Dr. John Launchbury, the founder and chief scientist of Galois, received this 

very high technical honor. 

Beyond Dr. Launchbury, we have internationally recognized leaders in the fields 

of formal methods and their application to security issues (Dr. John Matthews, Dr. 

Joe Hurd, Dr. Joe Hendrix, Dr. Levent Erk’’), in safety critical embedded systems 

(Dr. Lee Pike), in scientific computing and high performance computing (Dr. Matthew Sottile), and in all aspects of functional programming language design and implementation (Dr. Don Stewart, Isaac Potoczny-Jones, Dr. Iavor Diatchki, Dr. Andy 

Adams-Moran). Our researchers serve on editorial boards, program committees, academic steering committees, and give several invited talks per year. 

This is just a small selection of the Galois researchers. The quality and international reputation of the staff make it possible for Galois researchers to bring the 

world’s expertise to bear on research problems that influence SBIR work directly 

benefiting the U.S. government and, more broadly, other entities within the U.S. 

economy. 

Additionally, the strength of our reputation within our technical domain allows 

us to attract notable speakers to our weekly public seminar series. These seminars 

draw participants from the many other companies in the Portland software community, as well as having a strong online following. 

Recommendations 

Galois has benefited substantially from its participation in the SBIR program, 

which we believe is valuable, structurally sound and strong. That said, we do have 

some thoughts about possible adjustments to meet emerging challenges. Most of 

these recommendations are targeted at incremental changes that we believe are in 

response to changing external conditions. 

Recommendation: Augment success metrics for Phase-III 

to include open source 

Galois recommends that Phase-III success metrics should be augmented to include 

evaluation for open source release of capabilities. 

Galois strongly believes in the current SBIR approach to success metrics. We 

deeply appreciate that the SBIR success metrics are applied with failure as one expected outcome. This makes it possible for Galois and others to try riskier approaches that may bring more significant value, rather than focusing on ‘‘sure bets.’’ 

Galois also strongly endorses the Phase-III monetary metric as critical and sound 

for ensuring that SBIR investments overall are yielding value. 

However, since the advent of the SBIR program in the 80s, there has been a new 

vector introduced that brings substantial value to the nation: open source software. 

Open source software has made tangible changes in the way computer vendors do 

business over the last decade. In previous decades, major computer vendors commonly used proprietary system software on their products. While many of these proprietary systems still exist, many vendors have moved to offering open source, 

Linux-based solutions as either the preferred option or as an officially supported 

one. This is true of high performance computing platforms, for example, which are 

in use in many areas of the government for scientific and defense applications. 
44 

The move to open source is driven by the economic benefits that vendors gain 

from open platforms: contributions by the community at large can have tangible impacts on their specific products and user community with minimal investment as 

a consumer of these technologies. Open source has also had a strong impact on the 

security of software systems for users everywhere. The open source Firefox web 

browser is a clear example of this, where the transparency, open design, and rapid 

response to security flaws has made it a strong alternative to proprietary web 

browsers that have historically been less secure or less transparent about the quality of their security. Similarly, the Android mobile platform is a very visible example 

of an open source technology changing the business world. The smart phone market 

has been revolutionized by the presence of an open platform upon which vendors 

can build products that integrate with a broad third-party application developer 

community. 

Open source challenges traditional paths towards commercialization of software, 

but the trends as accepted by both consumers and large computing businesses are 

clearly turned in a direction that favors open source development. For some of our 

SBIR customers, the most cost-effective and sensible method for providing a capability is not through transition to a commercial venture, but rather through an open 

source release that then indirectly enables business growth in providing additional 

functionality. This is particularly true of infrastructure improvements, that are best 

leveraged when widely available. 

While Galois has been writing commercialization cases for Phase-I and Phase-II 

SBIRs that outline this strategy, we do so at odds with the SBIR metrics. This puts 

both our customers and ourselves at some evaluation risk, despite the fact that this 

is the most viable strategy. We’d like to see alignment of the metrics in support of 

the open source release, while ensuring that the metrics stay credible through an 

independent valuation of the open source release to ensure it is ‘‘for real.’’ 

Recommendation: Incrementally increase Phase-I award size to enable 

better assessment of results in consideration of Phase-II 

Galois recommends increasing the Phase-I award size in tandem with inflation or 

other economic measures to ensure that it remains sufficient for proposers to accomplish tangible results sufficient to make assessments about Phase-II. 

At the 2010 Phase-I levels, Galois was often faced with a difficult choice. Should 

we submit a proposal that had a riskier profile, knowing that we might not have 

sufficient runway to test some ideas? Or should we wait, losing this chance to bring 

results? Upon selection, we also faced hard choices about how to allocate the activities between testing and maturing the technology versus communicating those results to the client. 

Since the relative value of the Phase-I award level has dropped significantly since 

the inception of the SBIR program, we’d like to see it restored to its original intended level. Increasing the Phase-I award in this way will enable better evaluation 

and decisions for investment of Phase-II dollars. 

Recommendation: Accelerate Phase-I to Phase-II to meet 

the pace of software technology change 

The pace of software technology change has increased tremendously since the 

SBIR program began. Consequently, Galois would like to see new approaches for accelerating the transition between the phases, including optionally shortening PhaseI performance periods and setting more aggressive evaluation timelines for PhaseII awards, at least within our problem domain areas. 

In our experience, there is a gap from three to six months between Phase-I and 

Phase-II. During this period, non-research technologies can become obsolete, requiring rework just to achieve baseline capabilities again. Needs have remained unmet 

during the gaps, exacerbating operational difficulties. Additionally, commercial market opportunities expire without the potential influence from SBIR results that may 

have yielded substantially better value. 

Recommendation: Provide more support to Technical Points of Contact 

in the administration and guidance in SBIRs 

The Technical Point of Contact (TPOC) plays a critical role in whether SBIR research is able to realize value to the government. They interpret and assess the government needs to the SBIR performers, guide the performers during the execution 

of the SBIR in administrative mechanics, set priorities and standards for delivery, 

and build the relationship with the small company. 

Galois has had widely varying experience with TPOCs. Some have been extraordinary in their commitment to the SBIR results and to enabling Galois to produce 

relevant results. Others have been earnest but have lacked experience in one or 
45 

more important dimensions of execution. Some TPOCs have a wealth of specific experience to share and can directly convey the needs of their agency. Others are more 

indirect, and take a more administrative stance in management. A rare few are 

openly unhappy about this accountability. And all of the TPOCs seem to be trying 

to fit in the SBIR work amongst multiple other priorities. 

Prospects for success have been best for Galois when the investment of time and 

the level of commitment are high. In fact, these are often the same relationships 

that continue beyond the initial introduction through SBIR to enable Galois to extend and expand its contribution to larger agency needs. 

Recommendation: Encourage TPOCs to provide connections with 

interested acquisition programs 

In recent SBIR rounds, some SBIR agencies have listed Programs of Record along 

with some of the topic description, indicating where the need comes from or where 

a successful SBIR project might transition. This has been very helpful in identifying 

real customer need. We recommend linking Programs of Record more closely with 

the SBIR program, to greatly improve chances of a successful transition. 

We recommend that TPOCs should be encouraged to introduce SBIR companies 

to Program Managers early in Phase-I, so that a SBIR project can be guided by the 

Acquisition Programs’ needs. This will also foster a closer working relationship between TPOCs and Programs. 

We recommend that Acquisition Programs should be incentivized to work with the 

SBIR companies working on topics that are relevant to the program. This may require a modification to how Programs of Record are assessed during execution. Programs are by nature very conservative as a response to their very strict success criteria, so have a strong incentive not to include the risky outcomes of SBIR projects 

within the Program, yet a successful innovation could dramatically increase the impact and effectiveness of the Program. 

Recommendation: Provide incentives to prime contractors 

to incorporate useful SBIR advances into their offerings 

Understanding advanced technology requires a prime contractor’s better people to 

serve as ?technology acceptors’. Very typically those people are tied up on major procurements or ongoing projects, and may not be accessible or available to consider 

potentially valuable new technologies. Providing appropriate incentives for prime 

contractors to assess and utilize emerging SBIR results, particularly those deemed 

of interest by Programs, might accelerate the uptake of new technologies. 

In conclusion 

Let me underline a point I made earlier: each of these suggested improvements 

are offered with a view to making an excellent program stronger. In my view the 

SBIR program is immensely successful, both for fostering the innovation and jobs 

engine of small businesses, and for nurturing breakthrough technologies to the benefit of the government and wider economy. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before this Committee. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Ms. McKinney, and thanks to all 

the witnesses for your testimony today, and thanks again for your 

patience. 

I want to remind the members that the committee rules limit 

questioning to five minutes, and at this point I will now open the 

round of questioning and recognize myself for five minutes. 

And my first question is to Dr. Siegel. I really like the fact that 

you mentioned Milton Friedman in your testimony today. I enjoy 

his work, and that kind of gets me to one of my big questions is 

we talk about expanding where VC-controlled companies can be 

available for SBIR grants. Now, as you stated, you know, we want 

the Federal Government only to be in the marketplace to distort 

the marketplace only when there has been a market failure. 

Now, is it accurate to say that there is no market failure for certain companies when they do have VC funding because they have 

been able to go to the private marketplace for that rather than 
46 

some smaller businesses who haven’t been able to get that VC 

funding? 

Mr. SIEGEL. I would say that Friedman would say that the ability of a firm to attract venture capital funding is an indicator that 

it is an efficient company. You know, there is an equity aspect to 

this program, and there is an efficiency aspect to it, and what venture capitalists do very effectively is help sort capital investment 

and target those capital investments that will generate the highest 

returns to them. Okay. 

But in this context we are talking about technology-based programs. These also generate—I don’t care about the returns to venture capitalists. I care about the returns to society. So there is— 

it is efficient, and in fact, I teach entrepreneurship, and when I 

teach the students, I tell them that your ability to attract venture 

capital funding is a major indicator of success, number one. Number two, in certain sectors it is required to reach the marketplace. 

You really need that additional investment. 

And it is a very, very small pool of investment. I think there is 

a myth that this is a large, broad market. It is a very small, narrow sectorally-focused in many ways market, and I think it is a 

very, very efficient institution, and we shouldn’t try to—and it is 

private. So you like that. Right? 

Chairman QUAYLE. Exactly. That is what I was saying is—— 

Mr. SIEGEL. Yeah. 

Chairman QUAYLE. ——if they have been able to in the early 

rounds of financing been able to get VC backing, do we then allow 

and expand? I understand the arguments for the fact that VCbacked or owned companies probably will have greater commercialization in effect because, you know, like you said, the VCs already have gone through the companies. 

But don’t shake your head. I haven’t finished yet. So but then 

do we allow the Federal Government then to provide those 

fundings in the later phases that you are talking about, or is that 

actually distorting the market when the Federal Government 

shouldn’t be involved in that? 

Mr. SIEGEL. I don’t think it is distorting the market, and I think 

these are going to be the homeruns frankly. These are going to be 

the companies that are going to have the largest impact on the 

economy, and that is why—that is what we need to look at in the 

long run is what is the economic impact in terms of job creation 

and that—you want to be leveraging the public investment by involving them and, you know, again, then they reach the private 

capital market. You know, they go public. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Uh-huh. 

Mr. SIEGEL. I mean, that is an indicator of success. That is what 

we want. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Okay. 

Mr. SIEGEL. From a societal standpoint. Not from greed. You 

know, I am all in favor of greed, believe me, but from thinking 

about it from a societal standpoint. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Okay. Okay. Thank you. Then Dr. Rockey, I 

want to talk to you about there has been a lot of talk within your 

testimony as well is that we need to have improved communication 

between, you know, program officers, venture capitalists, outside 
47 

sources so that people can get the outside sources of funding for 

commercialization success. 

Now, the PODS Program that you guys have at NIH, integrates 

all the data from SBIR and STTR, awards the success stories, and 

basically it is one searchable platform basically. Right? 

I was just wondering could PODS be a tool that is used to improve outreach and networking opportunities for small businesses 

and outside funding sources? 

Ms. ROCKEY. Well, thanks for that question. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Could you push your mike again? 

Ms. ROCKEY. No one has ever accused me of not being able to 

talk, but that doesn’t work too well here. The PODS Program right 

now is in a—it is in its beta form. So it is really designed to be 

an internal process to do exactly the things that you had suggested 

to help us among—at the NIH to have the program officers and 

others involved with the SBIR Program really understand what is 

happening with these businesses, where they have commercialized, 

what has worked for success, et cetera. 

So we do feel, and we are working with SBA on this particular 

system because we think this is a way to have accountability for 

the program and also to set up as you say, these networks to be 

able for us to understand the networks and where there is areas 

of opportunities for these businesses to help them along. 

And it also helps us for best practices to understand which companies have worked, which companies have found success, how 

have they found success, et cetera. So we have great expectations 

that the POD Program will help us in managing the SBIR Program 

overall. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Okay. Thank you, and Mr. Limbaugh, along 

those lines with that PODS Program, I know you have dealt with 

the DOD—— 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. Uh-huh. 

Chairman QUAYLE. ——in some contact. Have you seen similar 

programs at DOD or other agencies that you have dealt with? 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. Yes, we have. We have seen similar things within 

the Air Force and the Army where you can go onto a web portal 

and search for technologies that you have been working for. I don’t 

know how successful that has been in helping commercialized technologies. I think it is still of onus of running a small business to 

really go out and find a customer or your current program managers that you are dealing with. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Do you think those types of programs would 

be able to help you and businesses like you to go out and have commercialization success? 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. We do use that tool. I just would say that we 

haven’t had a lot of success with it, but that is—I think the tool 

is useful. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Okay. Thank you very much. 

The chair now recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Wu. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Before I make a 

unanimous consent request, I just want to say that I am going to 

enjoy working with you, Mr. Chairman, on this subcommittee very, 

very much. After all this time I am finally not the most theoretical 

person here, and you know, perhaps you will take it back, in addi-
48 

tion to that economist, Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes 

and, you know, we are going to have fun here. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to include in the hearing record a written statement from Puralytics, a small business 

from Oregon that is pioneering an innovative new water purification technology, and is a recipient of SBIR grants from the U.S. 

Army and the National Science Foundation. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix II:] 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much. Let me start by asking of all the 

witnesses and this is aimed at my Congressional colleagues, the 

answer I hope to be useful vis-a-vis my Congressional colleagues. 

How important is it that we enact a long-term comprehensive reauthorization of the SBIR and the STTR programs? 

And the question is how important is speed because we came this 

close in December, and it is either now or six months from now or 

maybe the next Congress. How important is speed? 

Ms. ROCKEY. So I will be point out during this course of uncertainty over the past couple of years with the reauthorization, it has 

had an impact on our—the SBIR community because of this uncertainty, and I had mentioned to Mr. Quayle earlier that—to Chairman Quayle that during the time of reauthorization there is a lot 

of questions on whether or not the program would still exist. 

In some ways that generated more applications because there 

were individuals who were afraid that the program would go away, 

and so they quickly submitted applications. But the program for 

NIH is extraordinarily vital as it does provide that later piece of 

the pipeline to get things to commercialization. 

So for us having a program where it is stable, where we have a 

long-term reauthorization that has some—provided some flexibility 

for us is of utmost importance. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Yeah. I would just echo that and say it is vital. 

Mr. CROWELL. I would say it is vital that we do it and that we 

do it fast. As the universities are looked to, for example, more and 

more to help stimulate local economic development and job growth, 

this is a tool that is extremely effective in helping us achieve that 

goal. 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. We are waiting on a couple phase two awards 

that probably would benefit from a quick reauthorization. 

Ms. MCKINNEY. Likewise. 

Mr. WU. Terrific. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Rockey, and this is really for the benefit of Chairman 

Quayle’s colleague from Arizona, who commendably is consistent in 

his opposition to earmarks, and his concern is that there are earmarks in the SBIR program, and I have defended this program on 

the Floor in floor debate, maintained to him that these are all peer 

reviewed based on merit, et cetera. 

Dr. Rockey, you first. Anyone else who wants to follow on, if the 

chairman permits a little additional time, could you further address the peer review, merit review process and whether this is in 

any way a Congressionally-directed award program or not? 

Ms. ROCKEY. So I would say that NIH as a whole has been free 

of earmarks. The SBIR Program along with other programs within 

NIH all go through a very extraordinarily vigorous peer review 
49 

process. The small businesses as well as the regular research programs with our academic partners. It is a two-phase program, excuse me. A two-phase peer review that looks at technical merits as 

well as aligning the applications with the priorities of the institutes 

and centers. 

In the case of small business, on top of that there is an assessment of the potential for commercialization, and virtually all our 

applications go through this rigorous process. So the outcome of the 

application is based on its quality, its technical quality, its alignment with strategic goals, and as well with potential for commercialization. 

Mr. SIEGEL. To the best of my knowledge there are no earmarks 

in the SBIR Program. 

Mr. CROWELL. I will just say very quickly that the peer review 

in my view is one of the strengths in terms of leveraging not just 

VCs but quite a number of states to put up matching funds where 

they have no additional peer review process of their own. They 

trust this process so much. 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. I think it is true that the SBIR and STTR is not 

earmarked per se, but there are a lot of small businesses within 

the DOD community that get earmarks for their technology, and if 

you are competing with a company . . . 

Mr. WU. That is post-SBIR. 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. Post-SBIR. 

Mr. WU. Thank you. 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. Yes. Post-SBIR. 

Mr. WU. Important to be clear. 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. Okay. Post-SBIR that really upsets, can upset 

the competitive balance when you are competing against another 

company that just got a $1, $2 million earmark. 

Ms. MCKINNEY. We have not in our experience ever seen any 

kind of pre-selection or earmark in any of the evaluations that we 

have been party to or observed, and I have actually been quite impressed with the rigor and dispassion that happens in the course 

of the evaluating. 

Mr. WU. Thank you very much, and thank you very much, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, and now the chair recognizes the 

gentlelady from Illinois, Mrs. Biggert. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this excellent subcommittee hearing. I think that the witnesses have been really good, and I think it is something that we 

all need to address if we are going to be able to find the innovation 

and the creativity to create the jobs that are so important to the 

private sector. You are going to create them, not us. 

But as a member representing a national lab and dozens of 

healthcare and energy spin-off companies, I know how valuable the 

SBIR and STTR Programs are to local job creation, and as we work 

to reauthorize and reform SBIR, I don’t want us to take our eye 

off the ball in terms of positive economic affects the SBIR and 

STTR Programs have on our economy, and so I have a couple of 

questions. 

In your opinion is the current 2.5 and the .3 percent set-aside 

from a federal agency’s extramural research and development 
50 

budget an appropriate amount for SBIR and STTR Programs respectively? And what would be the effect of either an increase or 

a decrease in the set-aside amounts? 

Dr. Rockey. 

Ms. ROCKEY. So currently the Administration is reviewing the 

issue of the—regarding any increase to the program, and one of the 

nice things, though, about the SBIR, STTR Program is because it 

is a set-aside, as the size of the agency increases, so does the 

amount available for the SBIR Program. 

As an example, the NIH went through a doubling from 1998, to 

2003, and during that time the small businesses programs doubled 

as well. So, however, NIH is expected to have flat budgets for the 

future, and the current set-aside will compete with the scarce resources needed for all of the NIH Programs in effect. 

So we have to take them into consideration. I think Mr. Wu will 

remember that in 2009, I testified before this same committee and 

answered the question by saying that the current levels are appropriate to meet the mission of the NIH and to support innovation 

in the small business community. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Siegel. 

Mr. SIEGEL. I would say the NRC does not have an official position on this, but some universities—— 

Mrs. BIGGERT. I think this is just your opinion. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Yeah. Some universities might oppose that because 

they would view it as a zero sum gain. They would say that some— 

if a higher percentage of the research budget at the agency is going 

to this program, it would be taking away from initiatives and programs that they would be using the money for. So that would be 

one concern that some universities would have. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you. Mr. Crowell. 

Mr. CROWELL. I am glad that Dr. Siegel listened to my testimony. I think officially we do believe the overall amount of the setaside in both programs is probably appropriate and would have a 

concern not just in deluding our research funding but from an innovation management point of view. The basic science is funded by 

the rest of the budget. This is what provides the seed corn for the 

innovation work later on. So that is a very real concern that we 

have. 

That being said, to try to be a little more responsive and a little 

more granular, I personally—I can’t say this is UVA’s position, I 

personally would be interested at looking at the STTR percentage 

to see if the flexibility or the wall between the two programs might 

be made a little more—the barrier maybe lowered and made it earlier for—the STTR Program makes it so much easier for a university to participate in developing early stage technology with commercial potential. So if there was some way to add flexibility to 

change the relative balance of the set-asides to make more STTRlike procedures apply to the whole pool or a larger piece of the pool, 

we would be very supportive of that. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Limbaugh. 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. I think increasing the amounts to SBIR companies would actually be of benefit, not only from an innovation and 

product development standpoint, you get more innovations, I think 

you will see a better increase in jobs from that funding. I think the 
51 

free market is better at taking money and actually creating jobs 

and creating products, creating patents and exporting technology. 

So I would be in favor of increasing the award amounts or the 

set-aside to small business. 

Ms. MCKINNEY. I think if you look at the performance within the 

small business community in terms of innovation and its impact 

and use that as a guiding point. If you really want to increase the 

level of innovation looking to the community that is doing that I 

think is the best place to go. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Just following up on that, Mr. Limbaugh, you, in 

your testimony you said that venture capital was not such a great 

idea, and would that create—it doesn’t—it limits the innovation 

and creativity. Correct? 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. It can, could possibly do that in the sense that 

if VCs, at least we, our company plays mostly in the Department 

of Defense world, and I have talked to a lot of small businesses 

that kind of play in that community, and we are just fearful of like 

the large primes setting up a shell company, shell VC company, 

and then basically gobbling up all the SBIRs and basically being 

as a conduit to get that—those research dollars into their hands as 

opposed to into the small business hands. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. Okay. I guess my time has expired. 

Mr. WU. Would the gentlelady yield for just one second based on 

that point? 

Is the gentleman, Mr. Limbaugh, are you aware whether that 

has ever happened historically? 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. I don’t think that has ever—I don’t know if it has 

happened historically ever. I guess what I am also thinking is that 

from a small business standpoint there is nothing that prevents a 

company nowadays that has a phase two technology and starting 

another company and getting VC funding to back that other company if it is such a great idea. Why not wait until, you know, the 

phase two or whatever for VCs, after—before they can kind of 

step—you spin it off or whatever to create that new technology and 

have venture capital play at that level. 

Mrs. BIGGERT. If I might reclaim my time, which I don’t have, 

I think that this happens more or just in a small business that creates something, and the venture capital comes in and then they decide that they can better run the company, and it has taken over 

and pretty soon the people that have been the creators are no 

longer there. 

I don’t—but that doesn’t happen in this situation. 

I yield back. 

Chairman QUAYLE. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

New Mexico, Mr. Lujan, for five minutes. 

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I very 

much appreciate the conversation and the hearing, and again, 

thank you as well. Like Ms. Biggert, I also share a passion for our 

national labs, New Mexico having two of them, one in my district. 

And as we engage in this conversation, please don’t misunderstand my wanting to concentrate on the STTR program as not supporting SBIR. I think that they are good programs, and they are 

strong programs, but with that, I am very interested in technology 

transfer, and myself and a few colleagues are having a conversa-
52 

tion. Mr. Wolfe has been willing to work together to develop a tech 

transfer caucus, and we are quickly understanding through the 

conversations that we have with our colleagues, with our constituents, with experts, small business owners, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists, and everyone that is part of that process, that you 

have to include the aspect of commercialization and maturation. 

You have to look to see what needs to be done from a seed perspective and understand where these ideas come from and often 

times how disappointing it is when we have these great ideas that 

can’t make it out the door from behind the wall of some of our institutions to get into the hands of entrepreneurs. And to see what 

we can do when our entrepreneurs have these fabulous ideas to get 

behind that wall and use that computing capacity, that modeling 

capacity, to have that breakthrough of whatever it may be, which 

is why I am so very passionate about CRADAs, Cooperative Research and Development Agreements, which we saw as a success 

in the 1990s, but saw it deteriorate over years as funding disappeared. 

We are looking to see what we can do to encourage that kind of 

relationship. We were encouraged with the announcement just last 

week by Secretary Chu for the Start Up America Initiative where 

the idea is to make it easier to license technologies through DOE’s 

national labs through reducing fees as well as reducing paperwork. 

We need to do more. That is a good step, but we want to hear 

from you on what that more is. 

So with that being said, as, you know, we talk about STTR and 

I am glad that the last question was asked pertaining to the level 

of funding because when we look at .3 percent associated with 

funding with STTR and I would be glad if someone could show me 

a recent study associated with the program, all that I was able to 

find was a 2001 GAO report which was used for the 2001 reauthorization of the program. But that report was based off of phase two 

projects from ’95, to ’97, the first three years that such awards 

were made. 

So we haven’t had a good look to see if this program is working. 

Same reason why I think that CRDA’s have disappeared. There 

wasn’t a good look to see the success associated with them, truly 

evaluating that program to take out what was bad and truly accelerate and reward what was good, respecting very much and agreeing that the best thing we can do with these dollars is see what 

we can do to get these ideas in the hands of small businesses, of 

the smartest people we have in America, and what I like to think 

as ingenuity as part of the human soul in this great Nation of ours. 

What can we do to make that happen? And so I apologize for 

using so much of my time with describing that and talking about 

this with the passion that we all have for it, and quite honestly, 

Mr. Chairman, I am saddened that this hearing is not full of people. When we talk about getting the economy back on track in this 

great Nation of ours, unleashing the capacity in our universities 

and in our national labs and combining that with the ingenuity of 

our small businesses, we should be able to quickly accelerate what 

we are able to do to get the economy turning again. 

And, Mr. Chairman, rather than I think engaging in questions 

now, I will see if there is a second round of questions and I will 
53 

wait to ask a few questions then, but I will simply add this. Not 

understanding the constraints of requesting unanimous consent to 

submit a book to the record but with that being said, I will do my 

best to see what approvals we need to be able to do that or at least 

maybe get some excerpts out of it. 

I was recently engaged in a conversation with a few people 

around manufacturing and tech transfer, and someone that works 

with Dow Chemical gave me a book that their CEO, Andrew 

Liveris, wrote, and it is called, ‘‘Make it in America: The Case for 

Re-Inventing the Economy.’’ And it also lays out the foundation 

that we have to reestablish our manufacturing base in this great 

Nation of ours which will help spur innovation as well, because I 

certainly believe we need to be doing more to invent things here 

in this country. 

But we also have to do more to be able to manufacture them, so 

that when you have those manufacturers, people that are building 

it on that assembly line, and you are looking to see how you can 

make that product stronger and smarter, that is what we should 

be doing. 

And although people may not think of this as high tech or tech 

transfer, but all these smart phones that we walk around with 

today, in 2008, if my numbers are correct, 1.2 billion phones were 

sold worldwide. Not a one was built in the United States. We see 

what has happened to smart phones from 2008 to 2011, and to 

make sure that we are pushing that ingenuity here at home is why 

you are so important to this debate. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me for going over the 

time, but I look forward to this questioning and developing the policy around this because this is going to be one of the key drivers 

of what makes this economy strong and makes America stronger 

than what it is today. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Lujan. 

The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. 

Sarbanes, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very important hearing. I want to echo the comments of my colleague in terms 

of how critical is it that we have these kinds of programs and resources and the opportunity for partnerships to support American 

manufacturing and not to view that as some afterthought in terms 

of our economic strength but really as the main event. I think you 

all probably appreciate that implicitly. 

Before I forget, I do have a letter. I talked to your staff, Mr. 

Chairman, about entering this in the record, and so I would ask 

unanimous consent. This is a letter from executives of the U.S. 

Small Biotech Medical Device Association, and they have a number 

of members in Maryland. Maryland was actually a driving force in 

establishing this particular coalition of small biotech business coalition. They have a letter they would like to enter into the record. 

Without objection I would like to do that. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Without objection. 

[The information appears in Appendix II:] 

Mr. SARBANES. Appreciate it. 

I wanted to ask the panelists, both the businesses that are here 

and the other experts, to speak if you would to the—well, first of 
54 

all, to the businesses, have you ever utilized any of the federal labs 

through SBIR from opportunities that you have pursued? If so, why 

and how? If not, were there any reasons you didn’t pursue that 

kind of partnership? 

And then from others on the panel, maybe you could just speak 

to the opportunities through SBIR for small businesses to do that 

kind of partnering and what the, you know, what the process involved in that is. 

And start here. 

Mr. LIMBAUGH. We have not used any national labs in our research and development at Kutta. However, maybe there is a general feel within the small business community working with the 

national labs could be expensive, and small businesses don’t have 

a lot of capital to work with them. 

And a lot of times if you are working under a SBIR, you know, 

you have to disclose that you are working with a government entity. I don’t know how well that would work, and I don’t—I would 

like to see the statistics on how many small businesses team with 

the national labs because I know—I don’t think there is probably 

that many. 

But that is my own personal opinion. 

Mr. SARBANES. Ms. McKinney, do you have a perspective on it? 

Ms. MCKINNEY. So we collaborate with folks at the national labs 

and research initiatives. I don’t think we have ever officially done 

it under the auspices of the SBIR Program. 

However, lots of the applications that we have are of interest to 

that community, so we target deployments into the research in the 

DOE. So I would just have an experience directly under the SBIR 

Program with partnering with them. 

Mr. SARBANES. Do any of the others on the panel have a perspective in terms of partnering with the federal labs or pursuing that 

as part of an SBIR initiative? 

Mr. CROWELL. I will just say very quickly that as a person who 

has spent his career in universities, I can’t think of an example 

where we have collaborated on SBIR project. 

I will also tell you, however, that I sit on the Commercialization 

Advisory Board at Los Alamos and was just on a telephone call this 

morning with the federal laboratory consortium talking about this 

very issue, and we were talking about getting a group of people together to begin to develop a mechanism to expose Los Alamos and 

potentially other labs more aggressively to this mechanism. 

Mr. SIEGEL. Yes. In my written testimony I noted that the NRC 

needs to study the relationship between SBIR and the federal labs 

because the federal labs are the last frontier of technology transfer. 

The universities have been studied to death, but the labs are actually in many ways bigger and more important potentially for the 

economy. 

So I—my sense is that the labs currently do not have enough incentives to work through this program, and I think that is a major 

problem that maybe can be addressed through some legislation, but 

we certainly need to study this, and I think the NRC can do that. 

Mr. SARBANES. Dr. Rockey. 

Ms. ROCKEY. I would just like to mention that at NIH we had 

through our office of technology transfer we have what is called the 
55 

Pipeline to Partnership. This is a website that allows small businesses as well as NIH-licensed technologies to marry up, and obviously people can peruse this website and try to find places where 

they have, could have relationships. 

NIH, of course, our intramural program is a beneficiary oftentimes of the products and services that are provided by the small 

businesses. We also have, and some of our institutes have targeted 

SBIR Programs where for the—in order to meet the mission of the 

particular institute such as the National Cancer Institute, they will 

target particular priority areas in the SBIR Program to fund small 

businesses to provide technologies and services that we in our 

NIH—and the federal labs can use as well. 

Mr. SARBANES. Well, I appreciate that. I am out of time, but I 

just would observe it is interesting to hear you speak of it as kind 

of the last frontier, and I assume you all would be supportive of 

efforts through the reauthorization to try to enhance the partnerships that occur there between the federal labs and these SBIR 

business initiatives. 

Thank you. Yield back. 

Chairman QUAYLE. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

Illinois, Mr. Lipinski, for five minutes. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and Ranking Member Wu for holding this hearing today, and I also want to 

congratulate you on being chair of this subcommittee. We were 

both at Duke together, although I was a graduate student, you 

were an undergrad at the time, but we both shared some time 

there together, and I don’t know if I should admit I got there before 

you did, and I left there after you left. But I was in grad school. 

SBIR and STTR are critical programs because they are an essential link between our country’s tremendous advances in basic research and creating jobs that we need, as we have heard, the last 

two members have asked important questions on—about that. 

But generally speaking the concern that I have is that American 

research innovations are turning into products that are manufactured in Japan and China. So I would like to talk about how SBIR 

and STTR can help to solve this problem. 

And I want to start with Dr. Rockey. Last year you testified that 

the NIH SBIR projects achieved an impressive 50 percent success 

rate for commercialization. And in your testimony you discussed 

several factors that NIH considers in reviewing SBIR applications 

and selecting its awardees. And commercial potential is one of 

those. 

So I have two questions on this. First, can you just expand on 

how you define commercial potential and what factors you use to 

assess the commercial potential of a project? And second, do you 

look at the potential of a project to create jobs, especially manufacturing jobs here in America? 

Ms. ROCKEY. Thank you very much for that question. So we do 

assess commercial, the potential commercialization. We look at 

such things as the value of the project. We look at the company 

itself, the markets that are potential—available for this particular 

idea or project, intellectual property, and what is potentially there 

for protection, financial plans, et cetera. 
56 

Because this is oftentimes early stage, we don’t necessarily look 

at what the economic impact as far as jobs will be, but our desire 

is that with commercial and because we are a knowledge-based society here at NIH and the biomedical research, the biomedical market is so dependent on this knowledge base, that it is an economic 

driver, and thus, by supporting projects that will eventually lead 

to commercialization, we will result in helping the economy thrive. 

Now, again, one thing I would remind you that, of course, these 

are U.S. companies, and the SBIR program, it is a requirement 

that they be U.S. companies. But the issue about manufacturing is 

a different issue, and as often more long-term issues for all of us 

here. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Is there any way to look, to try to make any determinations about the potential future for whether this is going to be 

an American-made manufactured project? Is there any way to do 

that? 

Ms. ROCKEY. I think for the—yeah. So we have a cap program. 

Our CAP Program is the Commercial Assistance Program. This is 

a program that we provide a number of companies with up to 

$4,000 of technical assistance to look at markets, and in that they 

are encouraged to seek manufacturing opportunities in the U.S. 

So we do at least try to drive them towards that. Whether or not 

we are ultimately successful, again, we will have to see the outcome of what the product is that they are producing, but we do try 

to drive them towards U.S. manufacturing. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. In the remaining time I have I want to turn to Dr. 

Crowell. I know that top research universities in the U.S., including several in Illinois, have spun off numerous start-ups, and many 

of them are increasingly looking at economic development as part 

of their core mission. 

I just want to ask, what does the University of Virginia do to create jobs locally and regionally, and how do SBIR and STTR programs help this? 

Mr. CROWELL. Thank you for the question, and good to see you 

again after we made our UNC, Duke connection last summer, so 

I thought I would just keep the rivalry going here. 

The University of Virginia, like many universities, is undertaking an effort to identify technology or innovation assets that 

have the potential for building a small company to begin to commercialize that asset base. I would say that the processes we have 

in place for understanding technologies that are more ready to license to an existing company are rather set. We know how to do 

that very well. What we have been doing is investing in our business development capacity, our ability to understand markets, to 

undertake some of the same types of evaluation that Dr. Rockey 

just mentioned. And when we think we have a platform technology 

capable of attracting investment and building a company, we really 

devote an awful lot of resources and time to help do that. 

We network effectively and aggressively with local investors, 

with local commercial real estate providers, with state agencies, 

with not-for-profit foundations. We are looking to piece together 

through SBIR, STTR, venture capital, private foundations, state 

funds, sometimes local economic development funds, everything we 

can do to create an entrepreneurial ecosystem in which we can 
57 

plant the seed for this new company and watch it grow and help 

sustain that growth over time. 

We realize that some may get acquired and move away. An example I gave in my testimony was one where it was acquired, it 

did maintain the significant presence in Charlottesville, but one of 

the things I would argue is that one of the most lasting effects of 

that was it maintained the CEO who built that company in Charlottesville, who has just become the CEO of a new company that 

just landed $4.5 million in venture funding. 

So we are creating serial entrepreneurs within the culture where 

we believe the benefit from this investment, whether the companies 

end up moving to other states or not, but there is an awful lot of 

return to the region from this activity and this investment. 

Mr. SIEGEL. I would like to chime in and say that entrepreneurship is flowering at universities. There are more courses and programs in entrepreneurship, and there is more student-based ventures that are emerging at universities. And even we have now 

alumni commercialization funds. 

So I think one reason why universities have been very receptive 

to this is they tried the large licensing deals with pharmaceutical 

companies, and they are moving as somebody who studies tech 

transfer at universities, they are moving more in the direction of 

promoting entrepreneurship. That is why this program is very attractive to them, but frankly, they are also viewing it from an opportunistic standpoint. In my current job I am basically an extortionist in the sense that—don’t put that in the record. But I deal 

with donors, and I can tell you that the donors that I deal with and 

the stakeholders in the community want to support entrepreneurial 

activity at the university, including faculty and student-based 

start-up companies. 

So I think—and there is an economic spillover associated with 

that activity, and they see that benefit, but they also see the monetary benefit as I do. 

Mr. LIPINSKI. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman QUAYLE. The chair now recognizes Mr. Lujan for one 

very short, very succinct, and very clear question. 

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Chairman, we have quickly learned how to ask 

compound questions in Congress. What I would ask is this, and Mr. 

Chairman, I will be submitting a question to Mr. Crowell as well 

to respond to the record. 

Thank you very much for what you do at Los Alamos National 

Lab in encouraging the opening of those doors. 

Specifically to those of you that have experience with engaging 

our national labs, do you believe that there is some positive aspect 

of tying tech transfer, maturation, commercialization, and job creation to the metrics for full contracted payment for those that are 

engaged with our national labs, both DOE and DOD, which will not 

add one penny to the deficit. 

Mr. CROWELL. I would like to jump in and say absolutely. It 

gives me an opportunity, however, to say, and this was also the 

subject this morning with my federal lab consortium colleagues on 

the phone call, I would at the same time require those labs to take 

a close look at their policies which inhibit, dis-incentivise, or create 

roadblocks. I have helped Los Alamos spin a company out within 
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the last 9 months in the plant biotechnology area. I would say to 

you that if we had to go through that every time at the University 

of Virginia or other universities where I have worked, our success 

rate would be about half of what it is. 

So I think there are some—there is some culture building to do, 

there is definitely some policies, some incentives to look at to create 

a road forward where they could be major players. The talent and 

the seed corn is there. They have too many obstacles in front of 

them that some—the rest of us don’t have to deal with. 

Mr. SIEGEL. I would say that what we also need to do is collect 

more data from the federal labs. One of the most interesting organizations is the one that Mark ran for a while called the Association of University Technology Managers, and they started collecting 

data from universities on various metrics like patenting, licensing, 

start-ups, and all those kinds of measures of—that lead to economic growth and development. 

And we are not doing that currently. The FLC is not doing that, 

and I think we should, you know, try to find some institution that 

would, maybe NRC, that would collect those data so that we could 

evaluate, and once you evaluate people, once you start collecting 

those metrics, there is competition, and people want to, you know, 

do better along those dimensions. It is natural. 

Mr. LUJAN. Mr. Chairman, if anyone else has a response, please 

submit it in writing. I want to be respectful of the time, and I yield 

back my time. Thank you. 

Chairman QUAYLE. Without objection. 

I want to thank the witnesses for their very valuable testimony 

and for their patience today. 

The members of the subcommittee may have additional questions 

for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to those in writing. The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and statements from members. The witnesses are excused. 

Thank you all for coming, and this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(59) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses of Dr. Sally Rockey, Deputy Director for Extramural Research, National 

Institutes of Health 
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Responses by Dr. Donald Seigel, Dean and Professor, School of Business, University 

at Albany, State University of New York 

Questions from the Honorable Benjamin Quayle 

Q1. In your testimony you mention the National Research Council’s recommendation 

regarding the importance of conducting regular, rigorous systematic evaluations of 

the SBIR program, and you call for the development of interoperable standards for 

data collection and dissemination. What do you think is the best way to develop these 

standards? 

A1. The best way to develop these standards is to convene a group of ‘‘users’’ of 

the program, program managers at the federal agencies, and academic experts of 

the SBIR program. It is important to note that perspectives on the use and importance of the data will vary across these groups. For example, program managers will 

want to collect data that allows them to determine whether the program is advancing agency goals. ‘‘Users’’ will be concerned about response burden. Policy-makers 

and academics will use the data to address braoder issues, such as how to make 

the program more effective. I am confident that the NRC can provide guidance to 

agencies on how to develop these standards 

Q2. The NRC recommends a number of different practices that agencies can employ 

to shorten award cycles. Are there any recommendations that can be implemented immediately to shorten these cycles now? 

A2. One recommendation is to expand the National Cancer Institute’s SBIR Phase 

II Bridge Award pilot program. This is a three-year, milestone driven grant (up to 

$1 million per year for three years), which requires matching funding from angel 

or venture capital investors or larger firms. Another attractive aspect of the Bridge 

program is that many reviewers are employed at venture capital firms, pharmaceutical companies, and successful small firms. 

It would also be useful if agencies (e.g.) adopted the SBIR review practices of the 

NSF. NSF Program Officers disaggregate grant applications by technical subject 

matter, choose reviewers with technical and business expertise as reviewers, and 

then include themselves on the review committee, to manage the review process. 

Permitting Program Officers to participate in the review process would accelerate 

the review process and also make it more predictable. It would also generate more 

useful interaction between the applicant and the SBIR program staff. 

Question from the Honorable David Wu 

Q1. As you are currently aware, last year, the Small Business Administration increased the standard limit for awards to $150,000 for Phase I and $1,000,000 for 

Phase II. Do you believe these standard limits are appropriate, or would you recommend that they be increased further? 

A1. I believe that these standard limits are appropriate ($150,000 for Phase I and 

$1,000,000 for Phase II). 

Questions from the Honorable Randy Neugebauer 

Q1. What effects do you believe would result from allowing majority-owned venture 

capital businesses to compete for SBIR funding? Will it result in a decrease in competitive Phase I applicants? 

A1. I support allowing majority-owned venture capital businesses to compete for 

SBIR funding. That is because I am convinced it will enhance the overall effectiveness of the SBIR program, in terms of job creation and economic impact. It will result in only a small decrease in competitive Phase I applicants and the efficiency 

gains more than make up for the loss of ‘‘equity.’’ 

Q2. How heavily do small businesses rely on the SBIR and STTR award programs 

for research and development funding? What overlap exists, if any, with any federal 

programs with similar goals and objectives? 

A2. Small businesses are highly reliant on these programs for R&D funding. This 

program is somewhat unique, so there is only a slight overlap with other federal 

programs with similar goals and objectives. 
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Questions from the Honorable Chip Cravaack 

Q1. There has been a great deal of discussion about the role of venture capital in 

both the SBIR and STTR programs. What do you think will be the impact of changing the current venture capital requirements on the program? Do you believe this will 

lead to an increase in rhe quality of applicants into the program? 

A1. I am opposed to any restriction, pertaining to the program, on firms in which 

venture capital firms have a controlling interest (i.e., the 2002 Small Business Administration policy directive). The proposed compromise (which I presume you are 

referring to), which eases the restrictions on the involvement of venture-backed 

firms is a step in the right direction and will certainly lead to an increase in the 

quality of applicants. 

Q2. I like the concept of allowing small businesses to compete for federal research 

dollars. After all, small business is the backbone of our economy. Can you discuss 

the economic impact of this program and if you feel Congress should allow a greater 

share of R&D funds to be targeted at small firms? 

A2. The NRC committee I served on clearly documented that the SBIR program 

has a strong impact on the American economy. Having said that, I do believe the 

current ‘‘set-aside’’ for SBIR is optimal. Allocating a higher share of federal R&D 

(from federal agencies) to small firms would penalize universities and large firms. 

Although it is clear that small firms create most of the new jobs, it is less clear that 

small firms are more efficient in R&D than large firms (the empirical evidence on 

the question of whether there are ‘‘economies of scale’’ I R&D is inconclusive). 

Q3. As Members of Congress, we all have a responsibility to ensure that tax dollars 

are being spent wisely. Do you believe that Congress should demand more accountability from the SBIR program in terms of its reporting data collection requirements? 

If so, in what ways? 

A3. As stated in my testimony, I strongly advocate accountability for the SBIR 

programs (and all government programs). The best way to ensure this is to allow 

the NRC to evaluate the program on a systematic basis and ensure that sufficient 

data are collected to allow for a rigorous evaluation. 

Q4. There have been several suggestions to shorten the award cycles in the program. 

Do you have any administrative concerns about this type of change? If so, what are 

these concerns? 

A4. I have no concerns about shortening award cycles. We need to accelerate the 

time lag between research/discovery and commercialization. We have to stay ahead 

of our foreign competitors. 

Questions from the Honorable Ben R. Luja ́n 

Q1. Do you believe that there is some positive aspect to tying a national laboratory’s 

performance on technology transfer, technology maturation, commercialization, and 

job creation to the payments given to the operating contractor of each national laboratory for good performance? What metrics for technology transfer, technology maturation, commercialization, and job creation would you recommend? 

A1. I applaud your suggestion. The national laboratories are the ‘‘last frontier,’’ 

with respect to technology transfer. Most academic studies of technology transfer 

focus on universities, yet the national labs are even more important for certain 

types of early-stage research. For example, there has been considerable study of the 

effects of the Bayh-Dole Act, with little analysis of the impact of the StevensonWydler Act and the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (my recent paper is 

a notable exception). 

The first step is to collect better data on commercialization activies at federal 

labs. While there is an extensive AUTM survey of university technology transfer offices, there is no corresponding survey for technology transfer offices at federal labs. 

The metrics I would use are those in the AUTM survey, patents, licenses, sponsored 

research, and start-ups. I would try to construct broader measures of economic 

impanct, such as job creation. NRC would be an ideal institution for spearheading 

the collection and analysis of such data, under the auspices of FLC. 
70 

Responses of Mr. Mark Crowell, Executive Director and Associate Vice President for 

Innovation Partnerships and Commercialization at the University of Virginia 

Questions from the Honorable Benjamin Quayle 

Q1. In your testimony, you recommended that the programs provide flexibility to 

allow researchers with ′′manageable′′ conflict of interests to participate. Can you provide an example of a manageable conflict of interest? To what extent do you see university conflict of interest policies as inhibiting active academic involvement in SBIR 

or STTR projects? How might dissemination of best practices in managing conflicts 

of interest improve this problem? 

A1. An example of a manageable conflict of interest would be a scenario where 

a university inventor who co-founded a start-up company (and who thus would have 

founder’s equity in that company) would be able to be the PI on an SBIR or STTR 

subcontract from the applicant company back into this university laboratory. While 

this is a per se conflict, I see such a scenario as exceedingly healthy and, in fact, 

as one of many reasons that start-up companies represent an excellent path to market for university discoveries. Many universities would allow this; some would not; 

and most have some degree of angst and ongoing concern about whether a scenario 

of this sort would represent a manageable conflict. 

Another more challenging—but still manageable—conflict of interest might be a 

scenario where a start-up company would like to lease available space in a university facility to establish ‘‘company facilities’’ in order to qualify as an SBIR or STTR 

applicant. In some cases, the conflict of interest inherent in such a situation could 

inhibit the university from leasing space to such a company. Tax regulations could 

also inhibit the ability of universities to allow start-up companies an opportunity to 

lease university facilities which otherwise are available. 

I believe that best practices in conflict of interest management exist for managing 

scenarios of the types outlined above, and that these ′′case studies′′ of manageable 

conflict of interest should be made available to universities participating in SBIR 

or STTR programs. Many conflict of interest policy statements at universities are 

predicated on guidelines or policy issues promulgated at by federal agencies such 

as NIH. A proactive statement by Congress, or issued as policy guidance by NIH 

or other federal agencies funding SBIR and STTR programs, indicating support for 

entrepreneurially focused (but still robust) conflict of interest guidelines could be a 

tremendous boost for institutions to more aggressively seek to manage properly disclosed conflicts of interest. 

Questions from the Honorable David Wu 

Q1. As you are certainly aware, last year, the Small Business Administration increased the standard limit for awards to $150,000 for Phase I and $1,000,000 for 

Phase II. Do you believe these standard limits are appropriate, or would you recommend they be increased further? 

A1. I believe these amounts are generally appropriate but as stated in my testimony, I believe that program officers should have the freedom to increase any 

award up to 20% beyond the published cap when exceptional circumstances and 

high impact opportunity are deemed to be represented in a particular funding 

project. 

Q2. In your testimony, you recommend that the STTR program be modified in a way 

that would enable agencies to use a certain proportion of these funds to directly support additional proof-of-concept work at universities, including demonstration 

projects that would support proof-of-concept grants to universities and their faculty 

members. Can you tell us more about your proposal and how it might be implemented? 

A2. I highly recommend that $10 to 20 million be identified within one or more 

federal agencies’ existing set aside amount for SBIR/STTR and made available to 

fund a three-to-five year pilot ‘‘proof-of-concept’’ initiative at multiple universities— 

at $1 million per year per university. Among the criteria for these awards should 

be the demonstrated willingness and capability of a university in engaging project 

management boards comprised of industry, start-up, venture capital, technical, financial, and business/market experts. The review process for such funding should 

be high-touch and market focused, with corporate partner input and development 

milestones being key components for initial and ongoing funding. Such funding 

should be allocated after rigorous evaluation by carefully assembled panels of experts in translational and proof-of-concept research. Among the criteria for awards 
71 

under such an initiative should be the demonstrated willingness and capability of 

a university in engaging project management boards comprised of industry, startup, venture capital, technical, financial, and business/market experts. Additionally, 

successful applicants for this funding should be required to prove their willingness 

and agility in managing translational projects stressing market-relevant milestones, 

in conducting rigorous oversight and management of such projects, and in their willingness to withdraw funding from projects failing to reach essential milestones so 

that funding can be re-allocated to projects with more potential. 

Questions from the Honorable Randy Neugebauer 

Q1. What effects do you believe would result from allowing majority-owned venture 

capital businesses to compete for SBIR funding? Will it result in a decrease in competitive Phase 1 applicants? 

A1. I believe that allowing majority-owned venture capital-backed businesses to 

compete for SBIR funding will increase the quality of applications—and the impact 

and return on investment of such funding. As I stated in my written testimony, venture capital-backed companies have undergone extensive due diligence and a market-based valuation; I see no reason why the federal government would not want 

to support such companies and to speed their ability to grow and accelerate the development of their product(s). I also see no reason or evidence to suggest that there 

would be a decrease in competitive Phase 1 applications; in fact, I would predict 

that this change would result in an increase in quality Phase 1 applicants. 

Q2. How heavily do small businesses rely on the SBIR and STTR award programs 

for research and development funding? What overlap exists, if any, with any other 

federal programs with similar goals and objectives? 

A2. From my perspective as a university business development officer, I would 

suggest that SBIR and STTR award programs are extremely important to many university start-up companies. I don’t have statistics on how many of our start-ups pursue such funding, but I would suggest that it is at least 35-50% of such companies— 

and growing fast. It is often perfectly-placed funding for a start-up company—initial 

capital desperately needed to advance the innovation toward initial commercially 

relevant proof-of-concept milestones, enabling many companies to launch with critically important momentum rather than languishing while investment capital is 

raised. It also offers many small companies an opportunity to leverage the investment provided by initial investors, again, accelerating the pace of proof-of-concept 

work and innovation. There really isn’t any overlap that I see or know of with other 

federal programs with similar goals or objectives. 

Questions from the Honorable Chip Cravaak 

Q1. There has been a great deal of discussion about the role of venture capital in 

both the SBIR and STTR programs. What do you think will be the impact of changing the current venture capital requirements on the program? Do you believe this will 

lead to an increase in the quality of applicants into the program? 

A1. I fully support revising the guidelines for SBIR and STTR to allow venture 

capital-based companies to compete for funding—and believe this will lead to an increase in the number and quality of applicants. Please see my answer to Congressman Neugebauer’s question on this subject. 

Q2. I like the concept of allowing small businesses to compete for federal research 

dollars. After all, small business is the backbone of our economy. Can you discuss 

the economic impact of this program and if you feel Congress should allow a greater 

share of R&D funded to be targeted at small firms? 

A2. I believe that SBIR and STTR have been tremendously successful and should 

be continued. I also strongly support revising the programs to allow a portion of the 

set aside funds to support commercially relevant proof-of concept research which is 

essential to conduct before deciding whether to form a start-up company. I would 

be pleased to see increased funding to support these programs, but NOT at the expense of cutting current federal funding available for basic research. As noted in my 

written testimony, the success rates for Phase 1 SBIR and STTR grants is equal 

to, and in many cases, higher than the success rates for other equally important 

grants for basic research. Any increase in the current SBIR and STTR set-aside 

would come at the expense of other peer-reviewed basic and applied research—the 

seed corn for the innovation pipeline—so I recommend against increasing the set 

aside percentages. 
72 

Q3. As Members of Congress, we all have a responsibility to ensure that tax dollars 

are being spent wisely. Do you believe that Congress should demand more accountability from the SBIR program in terms of its reporting and data collection requirements? If so, in what ways? 

A3. I do not recommend that Congress demand more accountability than currently 

exists in terms of reporting and related compliance requirements. This would seem 

counter-intuitive, in fact, and would divert attention of both funding officers and 

grant recipients. However, I believe that increased accountability and quality could 

and should be made part of the program by incorporating more private sector expertise on review panels, and by adhering to newly refined review and monitoring criteria which ensure that market-relevant and commercially-oriented milestone selection and monitoring are a requirement of SBIR and STTR awards. 

Q4. There have been several suggestions to shorten the award cycles in the program. 

Do you have any administrative concerns about this type of change? If so, what are 

these concerns? 

A4. I am not familiar with such suggestions and the rationale for them—so don’t 

have an opinion that allows me to provide a direct answer to this question. But 

since I am recommending for a more rigorous review process, for certain changes 

in review criteria, and advocating for a new demonstration ‘‘proof-of-concept’’ activity with SBIR/STTR, I am disinclined to recommend shorter award cycles. Such a 

change would seem to require more administrative oversight and bureaucratic activity—and thus it’s hard to see how this change would increase the quality, quantity, 

and impact of SBIR and STTR projects. 

Questions from the Honorable Ben R. Luja ́n 

Q1. Do you believe that there is some positive aspect of tying a national laboratory’s 

performance on technology transfer, technology maturation, commercialization, and 

job creation to the payments given the operating contractor for each national laboratory for good performance? What metrics for technology transfer, technology maturation, commercialization, and job creation would you recommend? 

A1. I do believe such criteria would be extremely useful and impactful—provided, 

however, that attention is paid to enhancing the technology transfer capacity, resources, and environment within federal laboratories. Federal labs are treasure 

troves of outstanding science—and I have no doubt that much potential exists to leverage far more innovation impact from the great science and tremendous investment which is made in the research at such facilities. 

From my experience, however, I believe that federal labs have far more hurdles 

to overcome in seeking to identify, protect, and translate importance discoveries into 

new products, services and businesses. Their technology transfer staffs are often 

small and inexperienced. Their policy environment and tolerance for conflicts of interest and commitment is established in a way which makes it extremely difficult 

for entrepreneurial scientists and technology transfer personnel to spin off start-up 

companies. In fact, in some cases, it seems that entrepreneurial scientists who wish 

to pursue such a path with their discoveries are almost required to leave the lab 

because of the way in which the conflict of interest is perceived. Other practices also 

exist which slow transaction time and creates obstacles, real and imagined, and 

which disincentivize investors, entrepreneurs and business development officers 

from doing deals with labs or from doing multiple deals with labs. 

Notwithstanding the above, there are examples of remarkable entrepreneurial activity in federal labs. I am most familiar with the technology transfer division at 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, which has an entrepreneur-in-residence program; 

an entrepreneurial leave initiative; a relationship with a venture group through 

from which the lab obtains start-up counseling and early stage investment possibilities; an external commercialization advisory board (on which I sit as a member); and 

a long history of partnering with existing companies through licensing, CRADAs 

and related activities. And yet even Los Alamos, with its strong initiatives and success stories, struggles with more bureaucracy and related obstacles than a typical 

university would have to face. 

I strongly support establishing incentives and metrics tying in performance in 

technology transfer to laboratory evaluation and performance payments, but believe 

this should include a robust effort to assess policies which make success for labs in 

carrying out these activities much more challenging than most universities have to 

face. 

Possible metrics could include: number of invention reports; number of transactions with business and industry; companies launched and successful in raising 

early institutional, SBIR, or other peer-reviewed or market-based investment, in-
73 

cluding amount of investment capital raised; patent strength indices (measuring citations of a labs patents in patent applications from other applicants); success by 

the lab or its commercial partners in hitting market-relevant regulatory or commercial development milestones related to product(s) based on lab research; potentially, 

jobs created in start-up companies; new commercial or investment partners signing 

confidentiality agreements, CRADAs, options, or related agreements; and others. 

Q2. In your testimony, you specifically recommend that conflict of interest restrictions 

be examined and steps be taken to make it easier for researchers with disclosed and 

manageable conflicts of interest to participate in the SBIR and STTR start-up companies. Can you talk about this further and make specific suggestions about what 

should be done to improve the situation for both universities and national laboratories? 

A2. Conflict of interest restrictions can interfere with the ability of entrepreneurial scientists and their institutions to move aggressively toward a commercialization opportunity for a given technology—especially in the case of start-up 

companies. In the case of universities, scientists with a significant financial interest 

in a start-up company (which they likely all will have because they typically receive 

founder’s equity) sometimes are prevented from accepting research funding from the 

company, from consulting with the company, or from licensing further discoveries 

to the company. An additional layer of obstacles often exists at federal labs, where 

these conflicts may be more sensitive, tolerance thresholds lower, and absolute prohibitions of certain conflicts more numerous. Institutions themselves are also often 

seen as having conflicts—the institution may hold equity in the company via the license agreement and may stand to receive substantial royalties if the company is 

successful, and thus may encounter rules or barriers which prevent it from offering 

space, providing initial access to critical equipment (on terms other outside parties 

could obtain), conducting further research, and related company support activities. 

I am very sensitive to conflict of interest and have certainly witnessed behaviors 

which provide clear examples of why conflict of interest policies are needed. But I’ve 

also witnessed far more examples of breakthrough products, new start-up companies, and academic-industry partnerships which had the potential to change the 

world and to create enormous economic impact as well. Conflict of interest policies 

should not stand in the way of such opportunities unless there is a compelling public interest requiring such a policy—an example, in my opinion, would be a policy 

(which most universities with medical schools have) preventing a professor with a 

significant financial interest in a company development a new drug or device from 

conducting clinical trials of that product. 

Instead, conflict policies should be predicated on a regular and full disclosure 

within the institution; on a disclosure outside the institution (such as in publications) when the conflict is of a certain level or type; and on the creation of conflict 

of interest management plans for the vast majority of such conflicts where regular 

oversight and monitoring can allow the activity to take place in an open and reasonably objective way. Management mechanisms which can mitigate against conflicts 

(real and perceived) could include a regular interview by a conflict of interest management committee to make sure that normal academic milestones are being 

achieved (grants, publications, student progress toward degrees, etc.); full disclosure 

of conflicts on an institution website and on publications; independent documentation of scientific and technical reasons for supporting a start-up company’s initial 

need to use a university lab or specialize core facility; an independent management 

or pre-determined formula for holding and liquidating institutional equity in startup companies; and others. 

Finally, at many institutions, and perhaps including federal labs most of all, conflict of interest may be more of a perception than a reality. Such conflicts still require full disclosure and proper management—but they also require a robust and 

strategic communication strategy on the part of the institution’s management. If 

creating spin-off companies, commercializing products, and partnering with industry 

on their research challenges are indeed a key component of the missions of research 

institutions in today’s economy—and I believe they are—then acknowledging that 

engagement in these activities is likely to create conflicts of interest is a message 

which institutional leadership should address on a regular basis. Acknowledging the 

reality of conflicts, the success of management mechanisms, and the importance of 

innovation and commercialization should mitigate many problems and encourage 

more scientists and outside partners to interact and partner with more confidence 

and success. 
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Responses of Mr. Doug Limbaugh, Chief Executive Officer of Kutta Technologies 
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Responses of Ms. Laura McKinney, President and Chief Executive Officer of Galois, 

Inc. 
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Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL SUBMITTED STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE DAVID WU, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, 

SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY REPRESENTATIVE JOHN P. SARBANES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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