No. 02-1674 & Consolidated Cases 

IN THE 

	
	







———— 

MITCH MCCONNELL, et al., 

Appellants, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Appellees. 

———— 

On Appeal from the 

United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

———— 

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 

THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS 

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES 

———— 

LAWRENCE M. NOBLE * 

PAUL SANFORD 

1101 14th St. NW Suite 1030 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 857-0044 

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Amicus Curiae 

August 5, 2003 

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001 


	


	




	


	
 

	

	  

		

 
		
  


 		
  

 	

 
 
 

	



 

 


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 ———— 

No. 02-1674 & Consolidated Cases 

———— 

MITCH MCCONNELL, et al., 

Appellants, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Appellees. 

———— 

On Appeal from the 

United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

———— 

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 

THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS 

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES 

———— 

INTEREST OF AMICUS 1 

The Center for Responsive Politics (“CRP” or “The 

Center”) is a non-partisan, non-profit 501(c)(3) research 

organization that has systematically tracked the patterns in 

U.S. federal elections since the late 1980s. The Center was 

founded in 1983 by two U.S. Senators—Republican Hugh 

Scott of Pennsylvania and Democrat Frank Church of Idaho. 

1 This brief is filed with the consent of all parties. Amicus certifies that 

no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor has any 

person nor entity, other than Amicus or its counsel, made a monetary 

contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
2 

Its purpose is to track the flow of money to federal candidates 

and political parties, analyze money’s impact on public 

policy, and make this information available to the public. 

The Center’s funding comes primarily from foundations, and 

it accepts no contributions from for-profit corporations or 

labor unions. 

Nearly from its inception, the Center has played a unique 

role in the world of money and politics, converting the raw 

data collected by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 

from federal candidates, parties and political action 

committees, and creating from it easy-to-understand profiles 

of candidates, industries, and the money that flows to 

Congress. CRP’s data is widely used and respected by news 

organizations, the academic community, and by political 

professionals from all points in the ideological spectrum. 

This amicus brief is presented as an informational resource 

to the Court to show the impact, growth and patterns of socalled “soft money” giving. It contains an analysis of campaign contributions based on data compiled from reports filed 

by political party soft money committees with the Federal 

Election Commission, and an analysis of the sources of those 

contributions by industry, organization and individual donor. 

The source material for that analysis was the actual 

FEC database of nearly 224,000 itemized contributions over 

$200 given by individuals, corporations and other 

organizations during the 12 years when soft money 

contributions were required to be disclosed by the national 

party committees.

2

 That period ran from January 1, 1991 

through Election Day 2002. As such, this brief is intended to 

provide a factual framework to the arguments made by the 

defendants in this case. 

2 An explanation of the Center’s methodology in categorizing 

contribution data by industry is contained in the Appendix. 
3 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

The ability of the parties to seek unlimited soft money 

contributions, exempt from the limitations imposed on hard 

money giving, led both the Democratic and Republican 

parties to rely ever more heavily on these large donations to 

fund their operations and election-related activities. Though it 

was originally claimed to be used exclusively for “nonfederal” party building purposes, soft money was increasingly used by the parties to directly influence the outcome of 

federal elections. In fact, the giving patterns and trends 

unequivocally support the conclusion that these soft money 

contributions were being given to influence federal elections. 

The giving patterns among organizational donors reveal a 

politically pragmatic approach, with most organizations 

delivering money to both sides during the same election 

cycle. This suggests organizational contributions have been 

used not as a reflection of a consistent political philosophy, 

but as a way to attain influence with political leaders from 

both parties. 

The parties’ reliance on these large donations created the 

appearance, at the very least, that these donations bought 

access to government officials and unduly influenced important governmental policy decisions. This is an outcome this 

Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) held was within 

Congress’ authority to regulate when it upheld the contribution limits imposed by Congress in the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform 

Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) merely cuts the connection between 

the ever-increasing flow of soft money and the national party 

committees and federal officeholders and candidates. 
4 

ARGUMENT 

I. ESCALATION OF “SOFT MONEY” FUNDRAISING 

Though the FEC first allowed “soft money” contributions 

to the political parties in the late 1970s, the extent of their 

effect on national party finances remained hidden from public 

view until 1991. That was when an FEC rule 3

 requiring full 

disclosure of the contributions became effective. 

Once it became visible, the extent of soft money's 

increasingly important role in party fundraising became fully 

apparent. At the same time, the dollars collected in the parties' 

soft money accounts began to accelerate sharply. In the 1992 

election cycle, the Democratic and Republican national party 

committees (including the Democratic and Republican 

National Committees and both parties’ House and Senate 

fundraising committees) raised a combined total of $86.1 

million. By the 2000 cycle the total rose to nearly half a 

billion dollars, a level that was matched in the most recent 

cycle, even though there was no presidential election held. 

The following charts illustrate the trends behind those 

summary numbers in several ways. 

3

 11 CFR § 104.8(e) (1991). 
5 

Total Soft Money Receipts of National Party 

Committees, 1991-2002 

$86 $102 

$262 $224 

$495 $496 

91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 

Totals in Millions Source: Federal Election Commission 4 

Historically, the biggest leaps in soft money fundraising 

have occurred in election cycles when presidential campaigns 

took place. From 1994 to 1996 the amount of soft money 

raised by the parties more than doubled, as illustrated in the 

chart above. It doubled again in 2000. During mid-term 

election cycles, the fundraising levels remained close to 

where they had been in the previous presidential election 

cycle. Even in mid-term cycles, however, the pace of soft 

money fundraising doubled every four years. 

The trend of contribution spikes during presidential 

election cycles is even more pronounced when the soft money 

that went to the Democratic and Republican National 

Committees is isolated as shown in the chart below. The chart 

does not include money that went to the parties’ 

congressional campaign committees. 

4 Party Committees Raise More than $1 Billion in 2001-2002, FEC 

Press Release, March 20, 2003. 
6 

Soft Money Receipts of Democratic & 

Republican National Committees 

$67 $89 

$215 

$132 

$303 

$208 

91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 

Totals in Millions Source: Federal Election Commission 

Notably, both parties were able to raise roughly equal 

amounts of soft money during the period such contributions 

were legal and disclosed. The chart below shows the 

breakdown by party. 

Soft Money Raised by National Parties 

1991-2002 

$0 

$50 

$100 

$150 

$200 

$250 

$300 

91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 

Totals in Millions 

Dems 

Repubs 

Source: Federal Election Commission 

This relative parity in soft money fundraising sharply 

contrasts with the disparity between the parties in raising hard 

money. Republicans have long held the advantage in those 

contributions, as is clear in the following chart. In the most 
7 

recent election cycle, for example, the Democratic federal 

party committees raised just $217 million in hard money 

contributions, less than half the $442 million raised by 

the Republicans. 

Hard Money Raised by National Parties 

1991-2002 

$0 

$100 

$200 

$300 

$400 

$500 

91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 

Totals in Millions 

Dems 

Repubs 

Source: Federal Election Commission 

Raising money quickly is more easily accomplished if the 

donors write big checks rather than small ones. As 

competition between the parties grew ever more contentious 

throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the new century, 

party fundraisers grew ever more reliant on collecting sixfigure (or larger) donations through their soft money 

committees. This was especially true of the Democratic Party, 

which for years had lagged far behind the Republicans in its 

ability to raise hard money contributions. 

The chart below shows each party’s reliance on soft money 

during the past six election cycles. The figures include only 

funds collected by the Democratic and Republican National 

Committees, and each party’s two congressional committees. 
8 

Percentage of Party Funds Raised through 

Soft Money, 1991-2002 

18% 

27% 

36% 37% 

47% 

53% 

35% 36% 

32% 

25% 

18% 16% 

91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 

Dems 

Repubs 

Source: Federal Election Commission 

The Democrats’ heavy reliance on soft money to fill the 

party’s coffers did act as a counterbalance to the longstanding 

Republican advantage in collecting contributions from small 

donors. This trend was never so obvious as in the 2001-2002 

cycle, when the party collected an unprecedented spate of 

large contributions from a relative handful of wealthy 

individual donors. Some 22 individuals gave soft money 

donations of $1 million or more in the 2002 election cycle – 

more than twice as many as had given in all previous election 

cycles. Of those 22 donors, 17 gave exclusively to the 

Democrats. 

TOTAL NAME CITY DEMS REPUBS 

$9,280,000 Saban, Haim Los Angeles, CA 100 % 0 % 

$7,390,000 Echaner, Fred Chicago, IL 100 % 0 % 

$6,700,000 Bing, Stephen L. Los Angeles, CA 100 % 0 % 

$3,288,786 Kirsch, Steven T. 

Los Altos Hills, 

CA 100 % 0 % 

$2,255,250 Schwartz, Bernard L. New York, NY 100 % 0 % 

$2,021,000 Corzine, Jon S. Summit, NJ 100 % 0 % 

$1,930,000 Simon, Bren & Melvin Carmel, IN 100 % 0 % 

$1,835,000 Angelos, Peter G. Baltimore, MD 100 % 0 % 
9 

TOTAL NAME CITY DEMS REPUBS 

$1,815,000 O'Quinn, John M. Houston, TX 100 % 0 % 

$1,500,000 

Arnall, Dawn & 

Roland E. Orange, CA 33 % 67 % 

$1,450,000 Abraham, S. Daniel 

West Palm 

Beach, FL 100 % 0 % 

$1,295,000 Lindner, Carl H. Cincinnati, OH 10 % 90 % 

$1,205,000 Kushner, Charles Florham Park, NJ 100 % 0 % 

$1,180,000 

Sussman, S. Donald & 

Laurie Greenwich, CT 96 % 4 % 

$1,053,000 Gund, Louise L. Berkeley, CA 100 % 0 % 

$1,040,000 Hindery, Leo J. Sunnyvale, CA 100 % 0 % 

$1,035,000 Johnson, Robert L. Washington, DC 100 % 0 % 

$1,020,000 Wasserman, Casey Los Angeles, CA 100 % 0 % 

$1,000,000 Alles, Malini 

Los Altos Hills, 

CA 100 % 0 % 

$1,000,000 Farmer, Richard T. Cincinnati, OH 0 % 100 % 

$1,000,000 Fulton, Stanley E. Las Vegas, NV 0 % 100 % 

$1,000,000 Willis, Ernest M. Arlington, VA 100 % 0 % 

Overall, these giving patterns—with their direct correlation 

to federal elections—demonstrate that the soft money now 

banned by BCRA was being sought in connection with, and 

to influence, federal elections. As shown below, this connection is even more stark when contributions to the parties’ 

Senate and House fundraising committees are analyzed. 

II. “Non-Federal” in Name Only 

The cyclical nature of the fundraising by the RNC and 

DNC reflects the connection between soft money and 

presidential races. Soft money receipts increased during each 

presidential cycle, stayed about the same for the next midterm election, and then increased again for the next 

presidential election. While this is strong evidence of the 

connection between soft money and federal elections, one 

element of the parties’ soft money fundraising was not 
10 

subject to the cyclical patterns that affected contributions to 

the Democratic and Republican National Committees, but 

followed a very different trajectory of its own. That exception 

is well worth noting, for it even more clearly illustrates a 

crucial distinction between the theory of soft money and 

actual practice. 

The exception is in soft money collected by the political 

parties’ four congressional fundraising committees – the 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), 

the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the 

National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) and 

the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC). 

Fundraising for these groups has been going in one direction 

only: up. The chart below shows their combined soft money 

revenues between 1991 and 2002. 

Soft Money Receipts to Party Congressional 

Com m itte e s, 1991-2002 

$20 $18 

$74 

$108 

$212 

$288 

91-92 93-94 95-96 97-98 99-00 01-02 

Totals in Millions 

Source: Federal Election Commission 

By their own admission, these campaign committees have 

an unambiguous purpose: to elect members of their own party 

to the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. 

The committees’ own Web sites state this explicitly. 
11 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee: 

The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 

works to promote issues of importance to the 

Democratic Party and is the only national party 

committee whose principal mission is to elect Democrats 

to the House of Representatives.5 

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee: 

The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 

(DSCC) is the national committee of the Democratic 

Party formed to elect Democratic members of the United 

States Senate.

6 

National Republican Congressional Committee: 

The NRCC is a political committee devoted to 

increasing the 229-member Republican majority in the 

U.S. House of Representatives.7 

National Republican Senatorial Committee: 

It is our sole responsibility to make sure that Republican 

Senate candidates are elected to the United States 

Senate.8 

These four committees exist to elect members of Congress 

from their respective parties. Despite the fact that “soft 

money” was supposed to be used for non-federal party5 Mission statement of the Democratic Congressional Campaign 

Committee <http://www.dccc.org/about/>. 

6 Mission statement of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign 

Committee <http://www.dscc.org/information/about/>. 

7 Mission statement of the National Republican Congressional 

Committee <http://www.nrcc.org/nrcccontents/issuesagenda/overview. 

shtml>. 

8 Mission statement of the National Republican Senatorial Committee 

<http://www.nrsc.org/nrscweb/aboutus/>. 
12 

building activities 9, these committees formed soft money 

committees of their own and raised unlimited contributions. 

From 1991-2002, these four committees have collected a 

combined $1.014 billion dollars in soft money 

contributions.10 The money came from an array of 

corporations, trade associations, individuals and interest 

groups with business before Congress—interests that clearly 

saw benefits in linking their Capitol Hill lobbying efforts with 

large contributions. 

These congressional committees have not been the only 

ones setting up soft money committees to affect federal 

elections. In recent election cycles, even candidates for 

federal office have gotten into the soft money business, 

establishing joint fundraising committees to raise hard money 

for their own campaigns and, at the same time, soft money for 

their party to spend on their behalf. The practice first attracted 

widespread attention in the early stages of Hillary Rodham 

Clinton’s 2000 U.S. Senate campaign in New York.

11 

Mrs. Clinton’s “New York Senate 2000” committee was 

established to collect soft money contributions for both the 

New York Democratic Party and the Democratic Senatorial 

Campaign Committee (DSCC), while proceeds to her “New 

York Democratic Victory 2000 Non-Federal” committee 

were to benefit the Democratic National Committee.

12 

9 See FEC Advisory Op. No. 1979-17 and 11 C.F.R. §§ 102.5, 106.5 

(2002). 

10 See FEC Press Release, supra note 4. 

11 See John M. Broder, Democrats Able to Circumvent Contribution 

Limit, New York Times, December 22, 1999, at A1; see also Susan B. 

Glasser, Clinton Taps Big Donors for Special N.Y. Account; ‘Soft Money’ 

Builds Party’s Senate Fund, Washington Post, January 4, 2000, at A1. 

12 See Robert Zausner, Loophole Helps Clinton Exceed Donation Limit, 

Philadelphia Inquirer, June 15, 2000, at A28. 
13 

An article in the Bureau of National Affairs’ Money & 

Politics Report of December 6, 1999 explained how the 

arrangement worked: 

Perhaps not coincidentally, the DSCC transferred 

$100,000 to the New York State Democratic Party for 

TV ‘issue ads’ promoting Hillary Clinton. The ads, 

which began airing in November, were paid for with 

unregulated soft money and did not explicitly call for a 

vote for Clinton. However, they were criticized by 

Republicans, who suggested they broke campaign 

finance laws because they were improperly coordinated 

with the Clinton campaign.13 

While the committee was careful not to explicitly 

guarantee that the money raised would directly benefit the 

First Lady’s Senate campaign—but would be spread by the 

DSCC to other Senate races—donors were undoubtedly 

aware that Mrs. Clinton would be very grateful for their 

contributions, and the bigger the better. Indeed, news reports 

emerged in early 2000 about a $300,000 contribution 

received by New York Senate 2000 that appeared to be aimed 

at lobbying Mrs. Clinton’s husband, the President.14 

The contributions were given by two women from 

Westport, Connecticut—Francine Goldstein and Sandra 

Wagenfeld—who had an abiding interest in a decision by the 

European Commission whether to allow older jets equipped 

with “hush kits” to land at European airports. Ms. Goldstein 

owned the company that manufactured the kits, and President 

Clinton reportedly met with the president of the European 

Commission to urge him to permit the landing of airplanes 

13 Kenneth P. Doyle, Fund-Raising Unit Linked to Mrs. Clinton 

Provided $200,000 in Soft Money to DSCC, BNA’s Money & Politics 

Report (December 6, 1999) <http://pubs.bna.com/>. 

14 See Sheila Kaplan, Gary Cohen, Of Perks and the Purse, U.S. News 

& World Report, January 24, 2000, at 21. 
14 

equipped with those kits.15 This scenario raises at least the 

appearance that the two donors’ real intention was to lobby 

the administration to revise its trade policy with the European 

Commission in a way that would financially benefit them. 

When Mrs. Clinton’s opponent at the time, New York City 

Mayor Rudy Giuliani, learned of the new soft money “joint 

fundraising” committee, his initial reaction was to lambaste it 

as a perversion of the campaign finance laws. Later, his 

opinion changed and he set up a similar committee of his 

own.16 In all, at least 10 Democratic and Republican Senate 

candidates collected contributions through soft money 

joint fundraising committees in 2000, as did 11 more in the 

2002 campaign.17 Other Senate candidates accomplished 

15 Id. 

16 See Giuliani Victory Committee letter to FEC Reports Analysis 

Division, May 3, 2000 (“The Giuliani Victory Committee is the joint 

fundraising representative of which the Friends of Giuliani Exploratory 

Committee and the National Republican Senatorial Committee are the 

only joint fundraising participants”). 

17 In 2000, joint fundraising soft money committees were established 

by the campaigns of Republicans John Ashcroft in Missouri (Ashcroft 

Victory Committee), Conrad Burns in Montana (Burns Victory 

Committee), Rudy Giuliani in New York (Giuliani Victory Committee), 

Slade Gorton in Washington (Gorton Victory Committee), Rod Grams in 

Minnesota (Grams Victory Committee), Orrin Hatch in Utah (Hatch 

Victory Committee), and Rick Santorum in Pennsylvania (Santorum 

Victory Committee). In the 2002 campaign, they were set up by 

Republicans Lamar Alexander in Tennessee (Alexander Victory 

Committee), Ron Coleman in Minnesota (Coleman Victory Committee), 

Elizabeth Dole in North Carolina (Dole Victory Committee), Tim 

Hutchinson in Arkansas (Hutchinson Victory Committee), Mitch 

McConnell in Kentucky (McConnell Victory Committee), Bob Smith in 

New Hampshire (Bob Smith Victory Committee), Gordon Smith in 

Oregon (Gordon Smith Victory Committee), Ted Stevens in Alaska 

(Stevens Victory Committee), and George Voinovich in Ohio (Voinovich 

Victory Committee). Additional committees in other states were also 

established, but did not report collecting any funds. 
15 

the same effect by establishing so-called “527 committees” 

that reported only to the Internal Revenue Service, not to 

the FEC.18 

As with the Clinton campaign, there was little pretense 

among the other committees that these donations would be 

supporting the parties generally. Rather, the candidates made 

it quite clear that they were grateful for the donations—which 

were dozens of times larger than the $2,000 maximum that 

could legally be donated in hard money directly to their 

campaigns.19 The Democratic candidates generally named 

their committees after the state they were running in, setting 

up eight of them in 2000 and no fewer than 19 in 2002.

20 

Many Republican candidates took an even bolder approach, 

naming their soft money committees—as with the Santorum 

Victory Fund in Pennsylvania—directly after the candidates 

themselves.

21 

Were the donors under the impression that their soft 

money contributions would be used to support specific Senate 

races, rather than the party generally? CRP posed this 

question to Peter Buttenwieser, a major Democratic donor 

who invested heavily in several of those committees, including Michigan Senate 2000, a soft money committee set up 

18 See Mike Soraghan, ‘Soft’ Cash Dominates Senate Race, Denver 

Post, September 30, 2002, at A1. 

19 See Broder, supra note 11. 

20 Democratic Senate candidates setting up so-called 527 fundraising 

committees in 2000 included Mel Carnahan in Missouri, Hillary Clinton 

in New York, Dianne Feinstein in California, Ron Klink in Pennsylvania, 

Zell Miller in Georgia, Bill Nelson in Florida, Debbie Stabenow in 

Michigan and Bob Weygand in Rhode Island. In 2002 committees were 

set up to benefit the Democratic Senate candidates in Arkansas, Colorado, 

Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, 

Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 

Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. 

21 See note 17 supra. 
16 

for Debbie Stabenow’s campaign to defeat Republican 

incumbent Spencer Abraham. Buttenwieser’s response was 

published in Speaking Freely: Washington Insiders Talk 

About Money in Politics. 

CRP: When you give $100,000 to that joint 

fundraising committee, is it your expectation that 

money’s going to be used to elect her in that state? 

Oh yeah, I know exactly what it’s going to do. I 

literally know what it’s going to do. I mean, I’m sitting 

there with the professionals in a room, and I don’t know 

exactly what the ad’s going to look like, but I know what 

the ad’s going to try to do. So it’s a fairly educated wellinformed understanding. 

Now, if I send some money to [North Carolina Senate 

candidate] Erskine Bowles for that, and [Arkansas 

Senate candidate Mark] Pryor for that and [Colorado 

Senate candidate] Tom Strickland for that, I don’t know, 

‘cause I’m not in it very well. But when it comes to 

[New Hampshire Senate candidate Jean] Shaheen, I 

know. When it comes to [Maine Senate candidate] 

Chellie Pingree, I very much know, and when it comes 

to Mrs. Carnahan, I very much know . . .22 

What becomes apparent by examining the contributions 

themselves—even without talking with the donors—is that 

soft money contributions over the years became an 

increasingly important means of delivering huge contributions, many times over the legal limit, to benefit specific 

federal candidates. 

III. INDUSTRY TRENDS IN SOFT MONEY GIVING 

Not only did the national political party committees and 

federal candidates solicit soft money for federal elections, but 

22 LARRY MAKINSON, SPEAKING FREELY: WASHINGTON INSIDERS 

TALK ABOUT MONEY IN POLITICS 134-135 (2003). 
17 

the giving patterns of the donors make it clear that the money 

was being contributed to influence federal elections. Four 

industries—tobacco, pharmaceuticals, casinos/gambling and 

telecommunications services & equipment—gave more than 

half their campaign dollars from 1991-2002 in soft money. 

All four combined their soft money giving with intense 

lobbying efforts aimed at influencing federal government 

decisions in Washington. Together, they provide a revealing 

glimpse of the patterns and motivations typical of major soft 

money donors. 

A. TOBACCO 

For the tobacco industry, the big switch to soft money 

came in 1996, a time when the Clinton administration was 

making public its support of Food and Drug Administration 

proposals to regulate nicotine as a drug and restrict the 

marketing of cigarettes to minors.23 The industry’s 

contributions—both hard and soft—peaked in 1996, declined 

somewhat in 1998 and have held steady since that time. 

The dominant giver was Philip Morris, the largest tobacco 

company in the world and the second-biggest soft money 

donor of all, behind only the American Federation of State, 

County and Municipal Employees. In all, the firm delivered 

more than $12.3 million in soft money donations between 

1991 and 2002, 83 percent of it to Republican Party 

committees.

24 During the same period, RJR Nabisco, the 

number two tobacco giant, gave more than $4 million in soft 

money contributions, nearly 80 percent to Republicans. UST 

Inc, which specializes in smokeless tobacco, also gave 

slightly more than $4 million, with 88 percent going to the 

23 See Peter H. Stone, Some Hard Facts About Soft Money, National 

Journal, March 23, 1996, at 672. 

24 All the industry and corporate figures cited in this section were 

calculated by CRP from the FEC soft money database. 
18 

GOP. Loews Corp., whose diversified interests also include 

hotels, gave just over $2.5 million, with 56 percent to the 

Republicans. Brown & Williamson Tobacco gave slightly 

under $2.5 million, with 98 percent of its dollars delivered to 

the Republican Party. In this case, the industry clearly aligned 

itself, both politically and financially, with the Republican 

Party, which was seen as more sympathetic to the tobacco 

companies’ issues. Its lopsided giving left Democrats free 

to criticize the Republicans for their alignment with the 

tobacco industry, something many candidates did in their 

campaigning.

25 

Overall, tobacco industry contributions—both hard and 

soft combined—peaked in 1996 at $10.6 million. From that 

year until soft money ended in 2002 with the enactment of 

BCRA, more than 60 percent of tobacco’s contributions were 

given in soft money to the parties, rather than in hard money 

contributions to candidates. Indeed, as political contributions 

from tobacco companies came to be considered a political 

liability for many federal candidates and office-holders, the 

firms’ strategy of giving to the parties may have made 

practical political sense.

26 

25 See Mark H. Rodeffer, Dems Hit Coleman on Campaign Cash, 

NationalJournal.com (October 24, 2002) <http://nationaljournal.com/ 

members/adspotlight/2002/10/1024mnsen1.htm>; see also Meg Kinnard, 

Richardson Goes After Otter’s Politics, NationalJournal.com (September 

19, 2002) <http://nationaljournal.com/members/adspotlight/2002/09/0919 

brid1.htm>. 

26 See Stone, supra note 23. 
19 

SOFT MONEY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY, 

1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL TO DEMS TO REPUBS 

1992 $2,807,955 33% 

1994 $2,518,893 14% 

1996 $6,904,687 15% 

1998 $5,481,042 15% 

2000 $5,318,039 11% 

2002 $6,010,173 19% 

67% 

86% 

85% 

85% 

89% 

81% 

OVERALL TOBACCO INDUSTRY GIVING, 1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL 

SOFT 

MONEY 

HARD 

MONEY 

TO 

DEMS 

TO 

REPUBS 

1992 8 48% 52% 44% 56% 

1994 8 47% 53% 33% 67% 

1996 $10,580,141 65% 35% 19% 81% 

1998 8 64% 36% 21% 79% 

2000 8 62% 38% 16% 83% 

2002 9 65% 35% 22% 78% 

$5,876,97

$5,314,23

$8,614,58

$8,610,63

$8,929,50

B. PHARMACEUTICALS/HEALTH PRODUCTS 

Like Big Tobacco, the pharmaceutical industry is 

consolidated into a relative handful of giant corporations that 

are the dominant political players. Unlike tobacco, its 

contributions are still on the rise. Drug companies stepped 

into soft money with a relatively modest $2.3 million in the 

1992 election cycle, ranking 10th in soft money giving among 

all industries. By the end of the 2002 election cycle, the 

industry had moved up to 5th place and boosted its soft 

money contributions to more than $18.2 million. 

The top soft money contributors in the industry were Pfizer 

Inc., with $4.5 million in contributions (86 percent to 
20 

Republicans); Bristol-Myers Squibb, $4.2 million (84 percent 

to Republicans); Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers 

of America, the industry’s trade association, which gave just 

under $3.9 million (96 percent to Republicans), Eli Lilly & 

Co, giving just over $3 million (75 percent to Republicans), 

Schering-Plough, $2.3 million (85 percent to the GOP), and 

Pharmacia, $2.2 million (84 percent to the GOP). The 

industry also includes manufacturers of non-prescription 

health supplements—a segment that retains a very strong 

interest in keeping federal regulators out of its business.27 The 

top donor among that group was S. Daniel Abraham, who 

founded Slim-Fast Foods and Thompson Medical. Abraham 

and his company gave just under $2.4 million, with 93 

percent going to Democrats. Metabolife International, giving 

all its money through the company itself, donated $1.7 

million (60 percent to Democrats). 

In all, 14 companies from the Pharmaceutical and Health 

Products industry gave $1 million or more in soft money 

during the 12 years such contributions were disclosed. As 

the charts below show, drug firms’ soft money giving 

increased dramatically as issues of concern to the industry 

came before Congress. 

27 OpenSecrets.org (visited July 30, 2003) <http://www.opensecrets. 

org/industries/background.asp?Ind=H4600>; see also Louis Jacobson, 

Shawn Zeller, K Street for August 4, 2001, National Journal, August 4, 

2001, and Jeffrey Goldberg, Next Target: Nicotine, New York Times, 

August 4, 1996, at Section 6, Page 23. 
21 

SOFT MONEY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE PHARMACEUTICAL 

INDUSTRY, 1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL TO DEMS TO REPUBS 

1992 8 36% 

1994 7 32% 

1996 3 34% 

1998 1 34% 

2000 $15,462,572 31% 

2002 $18,206,604 18% 

$2,324,87 64% 

$2,170,25 68% 

$6,755,56 66% 

$6,233,78 66% 

69% 

82% 

OVERALL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY GIVING, 1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL 

SOFT 

MONEY 

HARD 

MONEY 

TO 

DEMS 

TO 

REPUBS 

1992 89 29% 71% 43% 57% 

1994 83 29% 71% 44% 56% 

1996 $13,665,104 49% 51% 34% 66% 

1998 $12,886,669 48% 52% 35% 65% 

2000 $26,660,336 58% 42% 31% 69% 

2002 $26,941,139 63% 37% 24% 75% 

$7,936,4

$7,565,8

C. CASINOS & GAMBLING 

Over the past 20 years, the casino and gambling industry 

has undergone a revolution in the United States. A generation 

ago, if someone wanted to legally bet in a casino he or she 

had two choices: Las Vegas or Atlantic City. Today, casinos 

operated by major corporations and by Indian tribes stretch 

from coast to coast. 

Most of the government decisions responsible for that 

revolution were made by state and local governments, and the 

full extent of political contributions made to those officials 

over the years has never been tallied. Even though the federal 

government has generally kept its hands off the gaming 

industry—with the exception of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
22 

which certifies tribes entitled to open casinos – millions of 

dollars have flowed to members of Congress and the national 

political parties from gaming interests. More than half that 

money—over $26 million between 1991 and 2002 – was 

given in soft money contributions to the Democratic and 

Republican parties. Overall, the industry’s largesse has been 

fairly evenly split between the parties, though a noticeable 

contrast can be seen between the corporate casinos—whose 

$18 million has gone two-to-one to Republicans—versus 

Indian casinos—whose $8 million has favored Democrats by 

a three-to-one margin. 

SOFT MONEY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE GAMING INDUSTRY, 

1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL TO DEMS TO REPUBS 

1992 8 63% 

1994 $1,492,469 45% 

1996 $4,111,041 56% 

1998 $4,155,350 35% 

2000 $7,670,413 55% 

2002 $8,544,926 39% 

$468,76 37% 

55% 

44% 

65% 

45% 

61% 

Like tobacco, and in recent years like the pharmaceutical 

industry, direct political contributions from the gaming 

industry to congressional and presidential candidates may 

sometimes cause political problems for the recipients if those 

industries are unpopular with voters.28 That may be one 

28 See Ryan Connors, Ferguson Hits Kennedy for Gambling Ties, 

NationalJournal.com (March 29, 2002) <http://nationaljournal.com/ 

members/adspotlight/2002/03/0329cfri1.htm>; see also Anonymous, 

Beasley Slams Politician Hodges, NationalJournal.com (Oct. 19, 1998) 

<http://nationaljournal.com/members/adspotlight/1998/10/1008db1.htm> 

and Timothy Boone, Accept Money, Make Excuses, Biloxi Sun Herald, 

July 20, 2003, at D3. 
23 

reason the gaming industry has invested so heavily in soft 

money, which goes to the parties instead. The industry’s 

tendency to give ample funds to both parties illustrates one of 

the fundamental verities about political contributions: by 

giving generously to both Democrats and Republicans, 

specific donors—or an entire industry—can often neutralize 

potential opposition, or at least ensure that their particular 

issue does not become a lightning rod seized by one party to 

attack the other. 

OVERALL GAMING INDUSTRY GIVING, 1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL 

SOFT 

MONEY 

HARD 

MONEY 

TO 

DEMS 

TO 

REPUBS 

1992 19 30% 70% 67% 33% 

1994 49 50% 50% 53% 47% 

1996 32 58% 42% 53% 47% 

1998 88 62% 38% 40% 60% 

2000 $12,426,660 62% 38% 55% 45% 

2002 $14,270,088 56% 44% 52% 48% 

$1,540,2

$2,984,2

$7,048,5

$6,694,4

Six gaming industry donors gave $1 million or more 

between 1991 and 2002, led by MGM Mirage, which gave 

just over $3 million (62 percent to Republicans). Other top 

donors included the Mandalay Resort Group ($1.8 million, 85 

percent to Republicans); International Game Technology 

($1.8 million, 65 percent to Republicans); the Mashantucket 

Pequot Tribe ($1.3 million, 63 percent to Democrats; Las 

Vegas casino executive Stanley Fulton ($1.2 million, 100 

percent to Republicans); and Harrah’s Entertainment, $1.1 

million, 58 percent to Democrats.) 

D. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES & EQUIPMENT 

In contrast to the other industries above whose soft money 

contributions came mainly from large corporations, the 

Telecommunications Services and Equipment industry’s 

biggest donor was not a company, but an individual: Bernard 
24 

Schwartz, head of Loral Space & Communications. Schwartz 

delivered more than $5.3 million in soft money between 1991 

and 2002, virtually all of it to the Democratic Party. His firm 

is currently restructuring under Chapter 11, as is the secondleading contributor on the list, Global Crossing.

29 

The political benefits Schwartz’s contributions produced 

for his company erupted into a scandal in 1998 that prompted 

a congressional investigation.30 At issue was a waiver granted 

by the Clinton administration for the transfer of sensitive 

satellite technology to the Chinese government—technology 

that could be used not only for commercial purposes, but for 

military purposes as well. The State Department had initially 

denied permission for the transfer on the grounds of national 

security. In February 1998, however, President Clinton 

overruled that decision, transferring responsibility to the 

Commerce Department, which then approved a waiver for 

Loral. Schwartz was the single biggest contributor to the 

Democratic Party in the 1996 election cycle, with more than 

$600,000 in soft money contributions. He gave another 

million dollars in the 1998 cycle, nearly $1.3 million in the 

2000 cycle, and over $2.2 million in 2001-2002. The incident 

remains a powerful example of the nexus between large 

political donations and significant government decisions that 

may directly benefit a donor. 

Global Crossing offers another illustrative case study. The 

firm’s plans to build undersea fiber-optic cables connecting 

the U.S. to Japan hit a snag in 1999 when a consortium of 

rivals—AT&T, MCI and Sprint—sought permission from the 

29 See J. Lynn Lunsford, Andy Pasztor, Anne Marie Squeo, Space 

Woes Zap Loral, Boeing, Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2003; and Dennis 

K. Berman, Yochi J. Dreazen, Global Crossing Deal May Hit Snag, Wall 

Street Journal, July 9, 2003. 

30 See John Mintz, China Aid Hurt U.S. Security, Panel Says, 

Washington Post, December 31, 1998, at A1. 
25 

Federal Communications Commission to build one of their 

own.31 Out of nowhere, Global Crossing emerged as a 

political powerhouse in Washington, thanks to a multimillion-dollar lobbying effort and $2 million in soft money 

contributions during the 1999-2000 election cycle. The 

money was split almost evenly between the two parties 

(Democrats got 52 percent), and it came both from the 

corporation and from three of its top executives: co-chairmen 

Gary Winnick and Lodwrick Cook and CEO Leo Hindery. 

The company disappeared from the political radar screen 

almost as quickly as it arose, filing for bankruptcy not long 

after Enron did and facing investigations for accounting 

irregularities. 

SOFT MONEY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE TELECOM 

SERVICES/EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY, 1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL TO DEMS TO REPUBS 

1992 6 30% 

1994 3 50% 

1996 0 71% 

1998 7 65% 

2000 $11,269,594 63% 

2002 2 57% 

$440,56 70% 

$591,20 50% 

$2,588,99 29% 

$2,638,88 35% 

37% 

$8,413,39 43% 

31 See U.S.-Japan Undersea Cable Project Focus of Probe, Bloomberg 

News, available in Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1999, at C3; see also 

AT&T Plan for Japan Cable Clears Hurdle, Bloomberg News, available 

in New York Times, July 10, 1999, at C3. 
26 

OVERALL TELECOM SERVICES/EQUIPMENT INDUSTRY GIVING, 

1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL 

SOFT 

MONEY 

HARD 

MONEY 

TO 

DEMS 

TO 

REPUBS 

1992 05 26% 74% 46% 54% 

1994 79 31% 69% 54% 46% 

1996 38 53% 47% 56% 43% 

1998 05 51% 49% 53% 46% 

2000 $18,220,484 62% 38% 56% 44% 

2002 $12,853,876 65% 35% 54% 46% 

$1,708,7

$1,759,1

$4,862,6

$5,199,6

E. THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED LABOR 

While most business groups have long supported the 

Republican Party in their campaign contributions, labor 

unions have for generations been a mainstay of financial 

support for the Democratic Party. They, too, were quick to 

adapt to the new regime of soft money contributions, as was 

obvious when the source of that money was first disclosed in 

the 1991-92 election cycle. In that cycle and the five to 

follow, unions delivered a total of just under $95 million. 

Ninety-eight percent of it went to the Democrats. 

SOFT MONEY CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ORGANIZED LABOR, 

1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL TO DEMS TO REPUBS 

1992 8 99% 

1994 8 99% 

1996 6 98% 

1998 $10,322,136 97% 

2000 $30,418,895 99% 

2002 $35,867,806 99% 

$4,319,23 1% 

$4,417,35 1% 

$9,546,68 2% 

3% 

1% 

1% 
27 

While the bulk of union dollars continue to flow to 

Democratic candidates in hard money through political action 

committees, the proportion of labor dollars delivered in soft 

money continued to rise with each new election cycle while 

soft money was legal—growing from just 8 percent of all 

labor money in 1992 to more than one dollar in every three in 

both the 2000 and 2002 cycles. 

OVERALL LABOR GIVING, 1991-2002 

ELECTION 

CYCLE TOTAL 

SOFT 

MONEY 

HARD 

MONEY 

TO 

DEMS 

TO 

REPUBS 

1992 $53,341,208 8% 94% 5% 

1994 $51,044,388 9% 96% 4% 

1996 $64,949,299 15% 85% 93% 6% 

1998 $60,859,967 17% 83% 92% 8% 

2000 $90,152,281 34% 66% 94% 6% 

2002 $96,529,105 37% 63% 93% 7% 

92% 

91% 

Even considering that the largest unions have millions of 

members nationwide, their impact as soft money donors is 

impressive. AFSCME, the American Federation of State, 

County and Municipal Employees, was the single biggest 

donor of soft money from 1991-2002, with more than $15.7 

million in contributions, all to the Democrats. Six other 

unions ranked in the top 20: the Service Employees International Union ($11.3 million); Communications Workers of 

America ($9.2 million); the Carpenters & Joiners Union ($7.1 

million); the American Federation of Teachers ($6.9 million); 

the United Food & Commercial Workers Union ($5.5 

million); and the National Education Association ($4.8 

million). Virtually all the money went to Democratic Party 

committees; the most bipartisan among them was the NEA, 

which gave 7 percent of its soft money to the Republicans. 
28 

CONCLUSION 

As the above analysis demonstrates, soft money 

contributions at the national level are directly related to 

federal election campaigns and the policy agendas of 

individuals, industries and groups. Those agendas, like the 

soft money contributions, are focused on decisions made by 

members of congress and the occupant of the White House. 

Contrary to the claim of some, these large soft money 

contributions are not primarily focused on state and local 

races or party building. These contributions are “non-federal” 

only in the sense that, prior to the BCRA, the FEC had 

declared them so. For all other intents and purposes, the 

donors and the recipients were linked in a soft money strategy 

that was aimed at helping elect Federal candidates to further a 

national agenda of the donors. 

Respectfully submitted, 

LAWRENCE M. NOBLE * 

PAUL SANFORD 

1101 14th St. NW Suite 1030 

Washington, D.C. 20005 

(202) 857-0044 

* Counsel of Record Counsel for Amicus Curiae 

August 5, 2003 
1a 

APPENDIX 

METHODOLOGY 

For this amicus brief the Center reviewed nearly 224,000 

itemized soft money contributions made to political party 

committees between January 1, 1991 and November 7, 

2002—the entire lifespan of disclosed soft money 

contributions to the national parties. This includes all 

contributions above $200 made by individuals, corporations, 

or other organizations. Wherever possible, the contributions 

were then coded by industry/interest group. For organizations, this classification was based on the company or 

association’s primary business interest, or in the case of 

ideological groups, the political issues it promotes. For 

individuals, the code was based on the donor’s 

occupation/employer, as reported by the recipient committee 

based on the disclosure by the donor. 

The codes used for business groups follow the general 

guidelines of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 

codes initially designed by the Office of Management and 

Budget, and later replaced by the North American Industry 

Classification System (NAICS), developed jointly by the 

U.S., Canada and Mexico. These groupings were adjusted as 

needed to make them more applicable to common political 

demarcations, such as jurisdictional divisions in the structure 

of congressional committees. For labor and ideological 

groups, the Center derived its own classification system. 

The system is hierarchical, divided into 13 broad sectors. 

Ten of these sectors reflect the world of business (such as 

defense, transportation, and health care). Labor has its own 

sector, as does the broad spectrum of ideological and singleinterest groups. 

At the more detailed level, the codes are broken down into 

more than 80 “industries”—for example air transport, 

insurance, and health professionals. Finally, the most detailed 
2a 

“category” level covers more than 400 specific groupings, 

from sugar growers to chiropractors, and from teachers 

unions to supporters of Israel. 

The Center has been using this coding system since 1988, 

updating it when needed as new industries and interest groups 

emerge. Over the years, the system has made possible a broad 

analysis of the billions of dollars of hard and soft money 

donations given to federal candidates and political parties. 

Using the classification system, the Center compiles 

contribution profiles for every member of Congress and every 

candidate for federal office who collects political contributions. A vast amount of this information is available at no cost 

on the Center’s Web site at http://www.opensecrets.org.