RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 24a0146p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MIKE GOVENDER HATCHET,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DANIEL W. ANDRADE, Director of Nashville Field 

Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; 

ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security; UR MENDOZA 

JADDOU, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 23-5920

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 3:20-cv-00693—William Lynn Campbell, Jr., District Judge.

Decided and Filed: July 3, 2024

Before: MOORE, MURPHY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Andrew P. Goldstein, Samuel S. Shirley, COLE LAW GROUP, P.C., Brentwood, 

Tennessee, for Appellant. Michael D. Ross, Katherine J. Shinners, UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Mike Govender Hatchet sought, on 

numerous occasions, an adjustment of his immigration status to that of lawful permanent 

>
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 2

resident. To do so, he applied for such discretionary relief, which was adjudicated by the United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). USCIS denied each of Hatchet’s 

applications, relying on facts that it found rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. 

Eventually, Hatchet challenged the agency’s actions in federal district court, claiming, in effect, 

that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record. But because Congress has stripped 

us of our ability to review such claims concerned with the facts found during discretionary-relief 

proceedings, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Adjustment of Status

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides various mechanisms for 

noncitizens to gain lawful permanent residence. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 

254 (6th Cir. 2009). Relevant here, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) sets forth statutory criteria that a 

noncitizen must satisfy in order to be eligible for an adjustment of status to lawful permanent 

resident:

The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United 

States . . . may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under 

such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment, 

(2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the 

United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa is immediately 

available to him at the time his application is filed.

One way that an immigrant visa may be “immediately available” to a noncitizen is 

through a familial relationship to a citizen, such as a spousal relationship. See 8 U.S.C. 

§§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining “immediate relatives”), 1154(a)(1)(A) (explaining the petitioning 

process for immediate relatives). Under § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), the immediate relative of the 

noncitizen must file a Form I-130 to petition on behalf of the noncitizen. Lockhart, 573 F.3d at 

254; 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). USCIS then investigates the petition and approves it if the petition 

establishes that the noncitizen is an immediate relative of a citizen. Lockhart, 573 F.3d at 254.

At that point, an immigrant visa is immediately available to the noncitizen, and they are 

ready to apply for adjustment of status for lawful permanent residence. Id. To apply for an 
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 3

adjustment of status, the noncitizen must file a Form I-485. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(3)(ii). If the 

noncitizen applies for an adjustment of status while in removal proceedings, an immigration 

judge considers the application. Id. § 1245.2(a)(1)(i). By contrast, if a noncitizen applies for an 

adjustment of status outside of the removal context, USCIS considers the application. Id.

§ 1245.2(a)(1).

A properly filed Form I-485 is then considered under “a two-step process.” Lockhart, 

573 F.3d at 254. First, the adjudicator considers whether the applying noncitizen has proven that 

they are statutorily eligible for an adjustment of status. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (a noncitizen 

must be “admissible . . . for permanent residence”). The noncitizen bears the burden of proving 

that they are both admissible, and, by the same token, not inadmissible. See, e.g., Ferrans v. 

Holder, 612 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2010). One manner in which a noncitizen may be statutorily 

inadmissible is if the adjudicator finds that the noncitizen has made certain misrepresentations. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (misrepresentations of material fact in connection with obtaining 

certain documents or admission), 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (misrepresenting oneself as a United States 

citizen).

Second, the adjudicator must exercise their discretion to adjust the noncitizen’s status, 

even if the noncitizen is statutorily admissible. Lockhart, 573 F.3d at 254. That is, even if the 

noncitizen is statutorily eligible for adjustment of status, the adjudicator may still deny relief if 

the adjudicator finds that the noncitizen does not “merit[] a favorable exercise of agency 

discretion.” Matovski v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 722, 739 (6th Cir. 2007); see also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 

533 U.S. 289, 307–08 (2001) (explaining the difference between eligibility for discretionary 

relief and the actual exercise of discretion to grant relief), superseded by statute on other 

grounds. Such exercise of discretion is “always ‘a matter of grace’” regardless of statutory 

eligibility for relief. Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022) (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 

308).

B. Hatchet’s Application

Hatchet claims to be a citizen of Sierra Leone who first arrived in the United States in 

2002 and sought asylum at the Texas border. R. 15-1 (2020 USCIS Decision at 1–2) (Page ID 
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 4

#135–36). Although Hatchet was not granted asylum, he was paroled into the United States. Id. 

at 2 (Page ID #136). Hatchet has a long history with the immigration system and has applied for 

discretionary relief on several occasions, but only USCIS’s most recent denials of an adjustment 

of status are relevant to this case.

On November 24, 2015, Hatchet married Lovelyne Emefesi, a United States citizen, who 

filed a Form I-130 on Hatchet’s behalf. Id. at 3 (Page ID #137). Hatchet then filed a Form I-485 

seeking an adjustment of status. Id. After requesting supplemental information, USCIS 

approved the Form I-130 but denied the Form I-485. Id. USCIS found that Hatchet was 

inadmissible because he had falsely claimed United States citizenship when seeking asylum in 

2002, although Hatchet argues that the immigration judge struck such finding on a previous 

occasion. Compare id., with R. 41-1 (Hearing Tr. at 7:25–8:1) (Page ID #311–12). On February 

26, 2019, Hatchet requested that USCIS reopen and reconsider this denial. R. 15-1 (2020 USCIS 

Decision at 3) (Page ID #137). USCIS reopened Hatchet’s case, but again denied relief, this 

time finding that Hatchet made a misrepresentation by failing to disclose prior removal 

proceedings during an interview. Id.

Hatchet then filed a complaint in federal district court in August 2020. R.1 (Compl.) 

(Page ID #1–26). Hatchet brought various claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, 

including that USCIS acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. ¶¶ 52–89 (Page ID #16–

25). In October 2020, however, USCIS sua sponte reopened Hatchet’s application for 

adjustment of status. R. 15-1 (2020 USCIS Decision at 3) (Page ID #137). USCIS conducted an 

interview with Hatchet on November 6, 2020, but subsequent to that interview USCIS again 

denied Hatchet’s application. Id. at 3–4 (Page ID #137–38). Specifically, USCIS first found that 

Hatchet was statutorily ineligible due to prior misrepresentations about (1) his children during an 

application Hatchet made while in a prior marriage, which would have led to the discovery of the 

fact that Hatchet was in an adulterous relationship; and (2) his citizenship status, which USCIS 

previously cited. Id. at 5 (Page ID #139). USCIS also found that it should not exercise 

discretion in Hatchet’s favor for a variety of reasons. Id. at 6–7 (Page ID #140–41).
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 5

C. Procedural History

After USCIS’s most recent denial, Hatchet filed an amended complaint in district court. 

R. 28 (Am. Compl.) (Page ID #218–46). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 14, 2022, 

R. 38 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #264–65), arguing, among other things, that the Supreme 

Court’s recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet’s claims were not subject to judicial 

review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute, R. 39 (Defs.’ Mem. at 7–12) (Page ID #272–77). 

The district court ultimately agreed with defendants’ position and dismissed Hatchet’s amended 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. R. 43 (Op. at 4–7) (Page ID #327–30). Hatchet 

timely filed his notice of appeal on October 17, 2023. R. 46 (Not. of Appeal) (Page ID #334–

35).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lovely v. 

United States, 570 F.3d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 2009).

B. Patel and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

As a general matter, federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction. See, 

e.g., United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2014). Because our subject-matter 

jurisdiction derives principally from statute, in certain circumstances Congress may strip us of 

jurisdiction to review claims that would otherwise fall within our purview. See, e.g., Cooper 

Butt ex rel Q.T.R. v. Barr, 954 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2020). In the federal immigration system, 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) is one such statute. It provides, in part, that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) . . . except 

as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, 

decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have 

jurisdiction to review—(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under 

section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or (ii) any other 

decision of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the 

authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in [their] discretion 

. . . .
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 6

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Subparagraph (D) preserves “review of constitutional claims or 

questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” Id.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D).

The Supreme Court recently addressed the effect of 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) in the 

removal context in its decision in Patel. The Patel Court held that 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s 

plain language, including its stripping of jurisdiction over “any judgment regarding the granting 

of relief under” specified statutory provisions, means that federal courts are without jurisdiction 

to review both discretionary and nondiscretionary judgments related to the granting of relief, 

including factual findings. 596 U.S. at 338–39 (alteration in original). This plain-language 

analysis is reinforced by subparagraph (D), which preserves review of “‘constitutional claims’ or 

‘questions of law.’” Id. at 339 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D)). “[I]f Congress made such 

questions an exception, it must have left something within the rule.” Id. (alteration in original). 

According to the Court, that something includes fact findings. Id.

In reaching this result, the Court expressly rejected arguments that sought to preserve 

review of nondiscretionary judgments made as part of the ultimate decision to grant relief like an 

adjustment of status. Id. at 340–41. Because such nondiscretionary findings, like credibility 

determinations, are still “judgment[s],” and given that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not by its 

own terms limit nonreviewability to “discretionary judgments,” the Court reasoned that any kind 

of judgment not preserved by subparagraph (D) is nonreviewable. Id. at 341–42. Likewise, the 

Court explained that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s stripping of review goes beyond review of 

“second-step decision[s]”—that is, the decision whether to exercise discretion to grant relief—to 

sweep in findings made as part of “first-step decisions”—such as initial eligibility 

determinations. Id. at 343–44.

Finally, the Court in Patel acknowledged that its holding would have broad implications 

for review of discretionary-relief decisions. See id. at 344–36. But those implications did not 

weigh in favor of a different result. For one, courts would be unable to “review . . . some factual 

determinations made in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made 

elsewhere in removal proceedings.” Id. at 344. The Court reasoned, however, that this likely 

stemmed from “Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary 
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 7

relief.” Id. at 345. Second, the Court recognized that its decision could potentially insulate 

USCIS denials of discretionary relief from review, given that such decisions are made “outside 

of the removal context.” Id. Although that question was not squarely before the Court, in dicta 

the Court noted that “foreclosing judicial review unless and until removal proceedings are 

initiated would be consistent with Congress’ choice to reduce procedural protections in the 

context of discretionary relief.” Id. at 346. Such policy concerns did not call for a different 

interpretation of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text. Id.

C. Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) Strips Jurisdiction Over Hatchet’s Claims

Hatchet’s appeal raises precisely the issue that was not squarely addressed in Patel but 

that the Court nevertheless discussed in dicta: whether, outside of the removal context, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes review of fact findings made by USCIS in discretionary-relief 

decisions, including eligibility determinations. Specifically, Hatchet seeks review of USCIS 

factual findings concerning Hatchet’s statutory eligibility for adjustment of status. See, e.g., 

Appellant Br. at 16–17. Because Patel’s logic applies with equal force to review of USCIS 

discretionary-relief decisions made outside of the removal context, we hold that we lack subjectmatter jurisdiction to review the fact findings at issue in this case and affirm the district court’s 

dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

First, we deal with the same text that the Supreme Court held prevents judicial review of 

fact findings in the removal context save for those issues preserved by subparagraph (D). 

Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252 is titled “Judicial review of orders of removal,” this court and the 

Supreme Court have recognized that the statute applies outside of the removal context. See, e.g., 

CDI Info. Servs., Inc. v. Reno, 278 F.3d 616, 619–20 (6th Cir. 2002). Indeed, § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s 

plain text reinforces the point: it explicitly states that it applies “regardless of whether the 

judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies to Hatchet’s claims, because he has sought an adjustment of 

status under § 1255, even if that request for discretionary relief occurred outside of the removal 

context.
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 8

Once 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies, it is clear that we (and other federal courts) 

lack jurisdiction to review Hatchet’s claims. Hatchet fundamentally attacks fact findings made 

as part of USCIS’s first-step eligibility determination, particularly with respect to allegedly 

erroneous findings related to whether he may have made misrepresentations as part of prior 

applications or when seeking asylum. But as the Court explained in Patel, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) 

precludes our review of fact findings made as part of “first-step” nondiscretionary-eligibility 

decisions. 596 U.S. at 338–39, 343–44. Although Patel did not conclusively decide this issue as 

the decision pertained to § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)’s application in the removal context, all nine justices 

effectively recognized that judicial review of fact findings would be foreclosed in the exact 

scenario presented by Hatchet’s case. Id. at 345 (noting that the holding in Patel would likely 

preclude judicial review in the case of discretionary-relief decisions made outside of the removal 

context when § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) applies); id. at 363 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining that 

outside of the removal context “individuals who could once secure judicial review to correct 

administrative errors at step one in district court are now . . . likely left with no avenue for 

judicial relief”). Because the statutory language applies with full force here as it did in Patel, the 

plain language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes review of USCIS’s fact findings pertaining to the 

eligibility determination in Hatchet’s case.1

1Hatchet’s case fundamentally concerns fact issues, not legal or constitutional claims. See, e.g., R. 28 (Am. 

Compl. ¶ 74 (Page ID #239) (“[USCIS’s] [d]ecision gets the facts wrong, misconstrues what actually occurred and 

arrived at conclusions that are clearly contrary to the evidence in the record.”). By its own terms, Patel applies only 

to review of fact issues, because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) plainly preserves review of legal and constitutional 

questions when raised in the removal context. 596 U.S. at 347 (“Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts 

found as part of discretionary-relief proceedings under § 1255 and the other provisions enumerated in 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).”). Our circuit, however, has previously made clear that § 1252(a)(2)(D) does not prevent district 

courts from considering certain questions even when raised outside of petitions for review, despite subparagraph (D) 

referring to “a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals.” See, e.g., Hosseini v. Johnson, 826 

F.3d 354, 359 n.6 (6th Cir. 2016) (“A more compelling reading of the explicit exception [in subparagraph (D)] is 

that it ‘does not withdraw district court jurisdiction that derives from other sources,’ but rather it merely ‘clarifies 

that review of legal and constitutional questions are possible on a petition for review.’” (quoting Mejia Rodriguez v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d 1137, 1145 n.15 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)); see also Jama v. Dep’t of 

Homeland Sec., 760 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 2014). No doubt, Patel circumscribed the claims that are reviewable in 

federal courts, and our previous distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary determinations is no longer 

tenable. But what remains reviewable or not outside of the removal context is still an open question, because Patel

does not speak to anything beyond fact questions. See, e.g., Doe v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 22-

11818, 2023 WL 2564856, at *3 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023) (per curiam) (explaining that a due-process challenge 

would be reviewable under subparagraph (D) despite being raised in a complaint filed in district court). For today’s 

purposes, we need not go further than decide that Patel bars federal-court review of USCIS’s factual determinations.
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 9

Finally, every circuit court to have considered this issue post-Patel has held that 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) precludes, at a minimum, judicial review of fact findings related to 

discretionary-relief decisions made outside of the removal context. E.g., Abuzeid v. Mayorkas, 

62 F.4th 578, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“To avoid dismissal of their case, appellants seek to confine 

Patel’s holding to petitions for review of removal orders . . . . [W]e see no basis for the 

distinction that appellants attempt to draw.”); Britkovvy v. Mayorkas, 60 F.4th 1024, 1029 (7th 

Cir. 2023) (“While Patel does not resolve the question presented in this appeal, its reasoning 

supports the conclusion that judicial review is unavailable.”); Mendoza v. Mayorkas, No. 23-

20043, 2023 WL 6518152, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2023) (per curiam) (“[T]he denial of 

[plaintiff’s] status adjustment under § 1255 triggers § 1252(a)(2)(B)’s bar for judicial review.”); 

Doe v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 22-11818, 2023 WL 2564856, at *3 (11th Cir. 

Mar. 20, 2023) (per curiam) (“The District Court did not err in determining it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] complaint because the plain text of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) 

indicates that ‘no court’ has jurisdiction in any judgment regarding the granting of relief under 

§ 1255.”); cf. Shaiban v. Jaddou, 97 F.4th 263, 266 (4th Cir. 2024) (applying Patel’s logic to 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)).

Hatchet’s arguments to the contrary are easily dismissed, as every argument asks us 

simply to disagree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court with respect to the same statutory 

language. To do so, however, Hatchet must provide us with some reason why Patel does not 

effectively control the outcome here. Hatchet has not done so. Hatchet first mounts textual 

arguments for why § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not apply to “nondiscretionary eligibility 

determinations.” Appellant Br. at 23. But as discussed, Patel clearly said that the “any 

judgment” language in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) is broad enough to cover such determinations. 596 

U.S. at 343–44 (rejecting this distinction). Hatchet next makes what is in essence a clearstatement argument, suggesting that Congress would have spoken in clearer terms if it had 

wanted to preclude judicial review. Appellant Br. at 27 (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)–(i)). 

Yet Hatchet’s case concerns § 1255, as in Patel, and the Supreme Court’s decision sweeps in all 

of the provisions referred to in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) in any event. Seeking to avoid Patel

altogether, Hatchet turns to a different sort of argument, suggesting that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does 

not apply outside the removal context. That argument, however, ignores both our precedent, 
No. 23-5920 Hatchet v. Andrade et al. Page 10

CDI Information Services, 278 F.3d at 619–20, and the provision’s plain language, 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B) (noting that the provision applies “regardless of whether the judgment, decision, 

or action is made in removal proceedings”). Finally, Hatchet invokes the presumption of 

reviewability under the APA and the requirement that Congress speak clearly when it wishes to 

overcome such presumption or take away judicial review. See, e.g., Appellant Br. at 32. The 

Patel Court, however, explicitly held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) is so clear with respect to its 

jurisdiction-stripping effect that “we have no reason to resort to the presumption of 

reviewability.” 596 U.S. at 347.

At bottom, Hatchet in his briefing asks us to disagree with the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 

Appellant Br. at 37 (“[T]he Court ignored its own precedent [in Patel] that long recognized a 

distinct difference between decisions to grant discretionary relief and the associated underlying 

eligibility determinations.”); id. at 42 (“Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Patel [C]ourt’s 

declination to employ the strong presumption of judicial review of agency action 

mischaracterized said presumption as an interpretive tool of last resort.”). But we are not at 

liberty to ignore the Supreme Court. And to the extent that Hatchet relies on pre-Patel caselaw 

that is either inconsistent with Patel or at odds with its logic, Patel governs. Accordingly, we 

hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and 

because Hatchet’s arguments are entirely fact-bound, we agree that the district court properly 

dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.