ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED: MARCH 30, 2015 AT 9:30 AM

No. 14-5281

___________

In the

United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia Circuit 

LAURA HOLMES, ET. AL,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

On questions certified by the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia under 52 U.S.C. § 30110

Plaintiffs’ Principal Brief

Allen Dickerson 

CENTER FOR COMPETITIVE POLITICS

124 S. West Street, Suite 201

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Telephone: 703.894.6800

Facsimile: 703.894.6811

adickerson@campaignfreedom.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs

January 12, 2015

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................ iii

GLOSSARY..................................................................................................................vi

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT......................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES .........................................................................................1

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ....................................................................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...........................................................................................4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT....................................................................................6

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................8

I. Standard of Review ....................................................................................8

II. Federal contribution limits are structured so that some contributors may 

give $5,200 to a single candidate for use in the general election, yet 

Plaintiffs may not. This does not prevent quid pro quo corruption, and 

consequently violates the First Amendment ..............................................8

A. To pass constitutional muster, limits on contributions—structural, 

quantitative, or otherwise—must be “closely drawn” to a 

sufficiently important governmental interest...................................8

B. This governmental interest is limited to preventing actual or 

apparent quid pro quo corruption...................................................11

C. Congress has established that a contributor may give $5,200 to a 

single candidate for use in the general election. The FEC cannot 

demonstrate an anti-corruption interest in requiring Plaintiffs to 

give half of that $5,200 before the primary ...................................13

i. Congress and the Supreme Court have determined that 

contributions of $5,200 from one contributor to one 

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candidate do not cause actual or apparent quid pro quo 

corruption.............................................................................15

ii. As recently as last Term, the Supreme Court reiterated that 

Plaintiffs’ desired contributions do not threaten actual or 

apparent quid pro quo corruption ........................................17

III. The asymmetrical contribution limit is unconstitutional as applied, 

because it operates to deny Plaintiffs equal protection of the laws..........19

A. Plaintiffs are similarly situated to other contributors.....................20

B. The right to associate by making political contributions is a 

fundamental freedom, which is threatened by the law’s 

asymmetrical outcomes for Plaintiffs and those similarly 

situated ...........................................................................................21

C. The bifurcated contribution limit fails Fifth Amendment 

scrutiny...........................................................................................24

D. Ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs will neither upend nor destabilize 

the federal campaign finance regime .............................................28

CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................30

CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH AND COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) .............................................................................23

Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce,

494 U.S. 652 (1990).................................................................................24

* Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976)........................ 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 21, 23, 24, 28

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

473 U.S. 432 (1985).................................................................................28

* Davis v. FEC,

554 U.S. 724 (2008).........................................................10, 12, 17, 22, 23

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,

533 U.S. 431 (2001).................................................................................10

FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm.,

459 U.S. 197 (1982)...................................................................................9

Goland v. United States,

903 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1990)....................................................................8

Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,

440 U.S. 173 (1985)...........................................................................28, 29

McConnell v. FEC,

540 U.S. 93 (2003)...................................................................................11

* McCutcheon v. FEC

134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) ........................ 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 22, 24, 26

* Authorities upon which Plaintiffs chiefly rely are indicated with an asterisk.

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New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,

440 U.S. 568 (1979).................................................................................28

News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC,

844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988) .................................................................19

* Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC,

528 U.S. 377 (2000).........................................................10, 11, 12, 13, 21

Nordlinger v. Hahn,

505 U.S. 1 (1992).....................................................................................20

Randall v. Sorrell,

548 U.S. 230 (2006)...................................................................................9

* Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC (In re Anh Cao),

619 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2010)......................................................................8

* Riddle v. Hickenlooper,

742 F.3d 922 (10th Cir. 2014) ...............................................21, 25, 26, 27

United States v. Windsor, 

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) .............................................................................19

Wisc. Right to Life v. FEC,

546 U.S. 410 (2006).................................................................................13

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356 (1886).................................................................................20

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1331................................................................................................1

28 U.S.C. § 2201................................................................................................1

28 U.S.C. § 2202................................................................................................1

52 U.S.C. § 30101(1)(A)................................................................................3, 4

* 52 U.S.C. § 30110.........................................................................1, 2, 3, 8, 22

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52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A) .........................................................................3, 10

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(6)...........................................................................3, 4, 10

REGULATIONS

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(2)......................................................................................4

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(2)(ii).................................................................................4

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(3)(i)(A) ............................................................................5

* 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(3).............................................................................3, 14

11 C.F.R. § 100.2 ..............................................................................................4

78 Fed. Reg. 8530 ..........................................................................................3, 4 

OTHER AUTHORITIES

147 Cong. Rec. S. 2542...................................................................................22

Congressional Candidates and Committees, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

(June 2014), http://www.fec.gov/pdf/candgui.pdf...............................5, 26

Details for Committee ID: C00503110, Itemized Individual Contributions–

SCOTT PETERS FOR CONGRESS, FEC Campaign Finance Disclosure 

Portal, http://www.fec.gov/fecviewer/CandCmteTransaction.do..............6

Details for Committee ID C00414318, Itemized Individual Contributions–

LOEBSACK FOR CONGRESS, FEC Campaign Finance Disclosure 

Portal, http://www.fec.gov/fecviewer/CandCmteTransaction.do..............6

Public Disclosure Division, “2014 Congressional Primary Dates and Candidate 

Filing Deadlines for Ballot Access,” FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

(2014), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2014/2014pdates.pdf................4, 17

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GLOSSARY 

BCRA Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 

81 (formerly codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., now recodified 

in sections of 52 U.S.C.

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act

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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The district court had jurisdiction because this action requested a declaratory 

judgment that certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 

as applied to Plaintiffs, are unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331; 2201, 2202. Under 52 U.S.C. § 30110 (formerly 2 U.S.C. § 

437h),

1 the district court had jurisdiction to make necessary findings of fact and

certify constitutional questions to this en banc Court. Plaintiffs properly invoked 52 

U.S.C. § 30110 because they are eligible to vote in an election for President of the 

United States.

2 The district court certified questions on November 17, 2014. This 

Court has jurisdiction to consider those questions under 52 U.S.C. § 30110. Plaintiffs

file this brief pursuant this Court’s January 8, 2015 order.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Plaintiffs wished to give $5,200 to their preferred candidates for use during 

the 2014 general election. They were prohibited from doing so by federal law. 

Meanwhile, contributors to the opponents of Plaintiffs’ preferred candidates were 

permitted to contribute $5,200 for each of those opponents’ use during that same 

general election. In the words of the district court: “if a party candidate has no 

1 Effective September 1, 2014, the provisions codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57 were 

transferred to 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30146. This case was filed in before that date, 

thus, citations below were to Title 2. Plaintiffs now adopt the updated codification.

2 See, e.g., Holmes Decl., ¶ 5 (JA 25); Jost Decl., ¶ 5 (JA 28).

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opposition in the primary election, an individual can contribute $2,600 for the 

primary campaign and $2,600 for the general election campaign and the candidate 

can use both amounts ($5,200) in the general election campaign alone.” JA 60.

Plaintiffs argue that this violates their rights under the First and Fifth 

Amendments. As certified by the district court, the questions before this Court are:

1. When federal law limits individual contributors to giving $2,600 

to a candidate for use in the primary election and $2,600 to a 

candidate for use in the general election and denies Plaintiffs the 

ability to give $5,200 to a candidate solely for use in the general 

election, does it violate Plaintiffs’ rights of freedom to associate 

guaranteed by the First Amendment, U.S. Const. amend, I? 

2. When federal law limits individual contributors to giving $2,600 

to a candidate for use in the primary election and $2,600 to a 

candidate for use in the general election and denies Plaintiffs the 

ability to give $5,200 to a candidate solely for use in the general 

election, does it violate Plaintiffs’ rights to Due Process, in the 

context of equal protection of the law, guaranteed by the Fifth 

Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V? 

JA 62-63.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

The pertinent statutes and regulations related to this case are as follows:

The Commission, the national committee of any political party, or any 

individual eligible to vote in any election for the office of President may 

institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United 

States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be 

appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of this 

Act. The district court immediately shall certify all questions of 

constitutionality of this Act to the United States court of appeals for the 

circuit involved, which shall hear the matter sitting en banc.

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52 U.S.C. § 30110.

* * * * *

(a) Dollar limits on contributions.

(1) Except as provided in subsection (i) and section 315A [52 USCS 

§ 30117], no person shall make contributions—

(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with 

respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, 

exceed $2,000; [...]

(6) The limitations on contributions to a candidate imposed by paragraphs (1) 

and (2) of this subsection shall apply separately with respect to each election, 

except that all elections held in any calendar year for the office of President 

of the United States (except a general election for such office) shall be 

considered to be one election.

52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A); 30116(a)(6)

* * * * *

(1) The term "election" means--

(A) a general, special, primary, or runoff election;

52 U.S.C. § 30101(1)(A)

* * * * *

The $2,000 limit was indexed to $2,600 before the 2014 general election. FEC Price 

Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist 

Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 8532 (Feb. 16, 2013).

* * * * *

(c) Permissible transfers. The contribution limitations of 11 CFR 110.1 and 110.2 

shall not limit the transfers set forth below in 11 CFR 110.3(c) (1) through (6) – [...]

(3) Transfers of funds between the primary campaign and general election 

campaign of a candidate of funds unused for the primary;

11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(3)

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

FECA limits monetary contributions to federal candidates. Individuals may 

give $2,600 to a candidate per election, with “election” defined to include “general, 

special, primary, or runoff” contests for federal office. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(1)(A); 11 

C.F.R. § 100.2 (defining “election”); FEC Price Index Adjustments for Contribution 

and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. 

Reg. 8530, 8532 (Feb. 16, 2013) (indexing contribution limit). Consequently, a 

separate contribution limit applies to primary and general election contests. 52 

U.S.C. § 30116(a)(6) (“the limitations on contributions to a candidate imposed by 

paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall apply separately with respect to each 

election...”). If an individual wishes to give to a candidate for both the primary and 

general elections, she may give a total of $5,200.

Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC’) is the federal agency 

charged with administering, interpreting, and enforcing FECA, including its perelection contribution limit. JA 58; see 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(2) (explaining how to 

determine whether a contribution was earmarked for a specific election). Nonearmarked contributions are presumed to be for the “next election.” 11 C.F.R. § 

110.1(b)(2)(ii). But money earmarked for the primary election and given before that 

election takes place may be “redesignated,” and used for the general election. 

Congressional Candidates and Committees, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION at 

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21 (June 2014), http://www.fec.gov/pdf/candgui.pdf (“Nevertheless, the campaign 

of a candidate running in the general election may spend unused primary 

contributions for general election expenses”). By contrast, a contribution earmarked 

for an election that has already taken place may only be used to retire outstanding 

debts from that prior election. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(3)(i)(A). Consequently, a 

contributor who gives $5,200 in earmarked contributions the day before a primary 

election may functionally give $5,200 for general election purposes. E.g., JA 60. But 

if she sought to contribute the same amount the day after the primary, she would be 

limited to a single $2,600 contribution.

Plaintiffs Laura Holmes and Paul Jost are a married couple residing in Miami, 

Florida. JA 60. Holmes and Jost each wished to associate with a candidate in the 

2014 general election by means of campaign contributions. JA 60-61. Ms. Holmes 

contributed $2,600 to Carl DeMaio, a general election candidate for California’s 

52nd Congressional District. JA 60 Mr. Jost contributed $2,600 to Dr. Mariannette 

Miller-Meeks, a general election candidate for Iowa’s Second Congressional 

District. JA 61. Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost did not give to either candidate during the 

primary; instead, each wished to give an additional $2,600 to their preferred 

candidates after each candidate won his or her primary. JA 61.

Neither of the candidates Miller-Meeks and DeMaio challenged faced 

opposition from within their own party at the primary stage. Nevertheless, both were 

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considered to have “participated” in a primary election for purposes of collecting 

contributions. JA 61. Thus, Plaintiffs wanted to structure their contributions so that 

they could associate with their preferred candidates to the same extent as 

contributors to their preferred candidates’ opponents.3 See JA 59 (“[t]he total amount 

that an individual may contribute to a particular candidate during a full election cycle 

depends on the number of elections in which that candidate runs. For example, if the 

candidate runs in both a primary and a general election, an individual may contribute 

a total of $5,200—$2,600 for the primary campaign and $2,600 for the general 

election campaign”). Federal law denied them the opportunity to do so.

On October 20, 2014, the district court issued its Memorandum Opinion and 

Order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. JA 41. Subsequently, 

on November 17, 2014, it certified facts and questions of law to this Court. JA 57.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Consider two individuals, Adam and Briana, who each seek to contribute in a 

Congressional election. Adam supports the incumbent, who faces no primary 

3 Incumbent Representatives Scott Peters and David Loebsack—Mr. DeMaio’s and 

Dr. Miller-Meeks’ respective opponents—each received $2,600 general election 

contributions from supporters who also gave $2,600 for the primary. Details for 

Committee ID: C00503110, Itemized Individual Contributions–SCOTT PETERS 

FOR CONGRESS, FEC Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal, 

http://www.fec.gov/fecviewer/CandCmteTransaction.do (visited Aug. 19, 2014); 

Details for Committee ID C00414318, Itemized Individual Contributions–

LOEBSACK FOR CONGRESS, FEC Campaign Finance Disclosure Portal, 

http://www.fec.gov/fecviewer/CandCmteTransaction.do (visited Aug. 19, 2014).

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challenger, and Briana does not. Adam gives $5,200 before the primary election to 

the unchallenged incumbent, earmarking $2,600 for the primary and $2,600 for the 

general election. Briana waits out the challenging party’s primary before 

contributing, because she wants her money to be used to fight the incumbent rather 

than in an intraparty squabble. The result is that the incumbent can legally use all of 

Adam’s $5,200 contribution for general election purposes, while Briana can only 

give $2,600 to the challenging party’s nominee for that same general election. 

The Plaintiffs in this case closely mirror Briana in this example. While 

Congress may limit the amount a particular individual gives to a particular candidate, 

its discretion in doing so is not limitless. Lacking “a scalpel to probe” such questions, 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (per curiam), courts will generally defer to 

the legislature’s judgment of the permitted contribution amount. But courts do not 

rotely defer to any type of restriction the state chooses to impose. It is improper for 

contribution limits to be artificially divided in ways that are not tailored to the 

prevention of quid pro quo corruption or that provide advantages to certain types of 

candidates. Such schemes violate, respectively, the First and Fifth Amendments.

This is such a case. Congress has stated that an individual may give $5,200 to 

a candidate for both the general and primary elections, reasoning that such 

contributions are insufficient to corrupt the receiving candidate. Congress then 

conditioned that noncorrupting contribution on the timing of the gift: at least half 

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must be given before the primary election, even if only by a day, and even if the 

entire $5,200 is used for the general election. Conversely, the entire $5,200 may not 

be given after the primary election, even if only by a day, and even though the same 

$5,200 will be used for the same general election. The conditional timing of this 

noncorrupting contribution violates both common sense and the Constitution.

ARGUMENT

I. Standard of Review

This Court reviews questions certified under 52 U.S.C. § 30110 de novo. See, 

e.g, Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC (In re Anh Cao), 619 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 

2010); Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1990).

II. Federal contribution limits are structured so that some 

contributors may give $5,200 to a single candidate for use in the 

general election, yet Plaintiffs may not. This does not prevent quid 

pro quo corruption, and consequently violates the First 

Amendment.

A. To pass constitutional muster, limits on contributions—

structural, quantitative, or otherwise—must be “closely 

drawn” to a sufficiently important governmental interest.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the government may limit individual political

contributions. Buckley v. Valeo, the touchstone campaign finance case, facially 

upheld such restrictions. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley first distinguished between 

limits on expenditures and limits on contributions, noting that both “implicate 

fundamental First Amendment interests.” Id. at 23. Nevertheless, on their face,

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“contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech because they 

‘permit[ ] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do[ ] 

not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.’” 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at

21) (alterations original).

While contribution limits are not subject to strict scrutiny, it has long been 

recognized that government “action which may have the effect of curtailing the 

freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; FEC 

v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982) (both citing NAACP v. Ala. 

ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)). As a result, Buckley placed the 

burden of persuasion upon the state, holding that “even a significant interference 

with protected rights of political association [including contribution limits] may be 

sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs 

means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” 

424 U.S. at 25 (citations and quotation marks omitted) (alterations supplied). 

When ensuring that contribution limits are “closely drawn,” a measure of 

judicial deference is appropriate as regards the dollar amount of such limits. See, 

e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (Breyer, J., plurality op.) (“In 

practice, the legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments, as 

legislators have particular expertise in matters related to the costs and nature of 

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running for office. Thus ordinarily we have deferred to the legislature’s 

determination of such matters”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); FEC v. 

Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001) (“[T]he dollar 

amount of the limit need not be ‘fine tun[ed]’...”) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 

Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000)) (alterations original); cf. Davis v. FEC, 

554 U.S. 724, 737 (2008) (“When contribution limits are challenged as too 

restrictive, we have extended a measure of deference to the judgment of the 

legislative body that enacted the law”) (citations omitted). 

This deference concerning the level of a contribution limit, however, does not 

allow legislative body to limit political association in arbitrary or unconstitutional 

ways. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri clarified that “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence 

needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up 

or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.” Id. at 391. This 

ratcheted scale is particularly illuminating here, where the bifurcation of the federal

limit—and not the limit itself—is challenged. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A) and 

30116(a)(6). Nixon v. Shrink Missouri is a classic example: it considered the 

existence of contribution limits, and whether they were set at an appropriate level. 

That was not a “novel” question. The issue in Plaintiffs’ case—bifurcation of a total 

contribution to a single candidate for use in the general election—does not merely 

reflect Congress’s judgment that there ought to be a limit on the amount of money 

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an individual may give a candidate. Rather, it regulates the manner in which the base 

limit—the amount and existence of which Plaintiffs do not contest—must be given. 

This question is novel, at least as applied to federal law.

To determine whether it is constitutional to bifurcate the individual-tocandidate contribution limit, this Court “must assess the fit between the stated 

governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective.” 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. at 1445. In other words, the means—the bifurcated 

limit—must be “closely drawn” to the end—the prevention of quid pro quo 

corruption. Id. at 1446; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 144-45 (2003) 

(contribution limits subject to “‘heightened judicial scrutiny,’” as they impinge upon 

protected expression and association) (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 391).

B. This governmental interest is limited to preventing actual or 

apparent quid pro quo corruption.

The Supreme Court has held that there is only one governmental interest 

sufficient to justify contribution limits: preventing actual or apparent quid pro quo 

corruption. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; see also Shrink 

Missouri, 528 U.S. at 388. Just last term, the Court restated the contours of this 

interest. The Chief Justice’s historical summary of this standard—and its present 

application—bears repeating: 

In a series of cases over the past 40 years, we have spelled out how to 

draw the constitutional line between the permissible goal of avoiding 

corruption in the political process and the impermissible desire simply

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to limit political speech. We have said that government regulation may 

not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who 

support him or his allies, or the political access such support may 

afford. Ingratiation and access...are not corruption. They embody a 

central feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates who 

share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be 

expected to be responsive to those concerns. 

Any regulation must instead target what we have called quid pro quo 

corruption or its appearance. That Latin phrase captures the notion of a 

direct exchange of an official act for money. The hallmark of corruption 

is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors. Campaign 

finance restrictions that pursue other objectives, we have explained, 

impermissibly inject the Government into the debate over who should 

govern. And those who govern should be the last people to help decide 

who should govern. 

McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441-1442 (citations and quotation marks omitted) 

(emphasis original).

Consequently, it is beyond dispute that contribution limits must target this 

understanding of quid pro quo corruption. This is where “closely drawn” scrutiny 

comes in: a contribution limit must be closely drawn to the government’s interest in 

preventing actual or apparent quid pro quo arrangements—dollars for favors. 

Otherwise, it is unconstitutional. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462. Moreover, the 

government bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular law is “closely 

drawn” to this interest. E.g., Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 392 (referring to 

“government’s burden to justify limits on contributions.”)4 To accomplish this, it

4 In fact, strict scrutiny may apply to a differential limit. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 

739 (2008) (applying strict scrutiny to a differential contribution limit that forced 

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must offer more than a naked assertion of a “corruption” interest. Shrink Missouri, 

528 U.S. at 392 (citing and discussing Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. 

FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996) (opinion of Breyer, J.)). “In the First Amendment 

context, fit matters.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456.

This is particularly so in an as applied case like this one. See, e.g, Wisconsin

Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411-12 (2006) (in upholding a BCRA 

provision against a facial attack, the Supreme Court “d[oes] not purport to resolve 

future as-applied challenges.”) Again, Plaintiffs do not dispute that “[e]ven a 

significant interference with protected rights of political association may be 

sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs 

means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In the Plaintiffs’ 

case, however, the FEC has not—and cannot—meet this burden.

C. Congress has established that a contributor may give $5,200 

to a single candidate for use in the general election. The FEC 

cannot demonstrate an anti-corruption interest in requiring 

Plaintiffs to give half of that $5,200 before the primary.

Courts may lack a “scalpel to probe” the propriety of an exact dollar amount 

at which a contribution limits is set.

5 Nevertheless, both Congress and the Supreme 

candidates to “choose between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered 

political speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations”).

5 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.

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Court have recognized that a contribution of $5,200 from a contributor to a candidate 

does not threaten actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption. Moreover, even if 

requiring contributors to structure their contributions in a certain way did further the 

governmental interest in avoiding such corruption, the bifurcated limit is poorly 

tailored to that end given the specifics of Plaintiffs’ desired contributions. This is 

precisely why Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge is novel: they do not challenge the 

amount they may give to candidates, merely when and how they must give it.

According to the district court, “neither Congress nor McCutcheon approved 

contributions of $5,200 in a single election” JA 48. Yet precisely those contributions 

are allowed here—not for Plaintiffs, but for supporters of those who opposed 

Plaintiffs’ preferred candidates. Contributors to David Loebsack and Scott Peters 

could (and did) give each of these candidates $5,200 to spend in the general election.

N. 3, supra. Plaintiffs wished to give the same amount to those legislators’ 

opponents, for the same general election. Because of federal law, they could not.

If anything, the facts of this case emphasize that Buckley did not contemplate 

a situation like the Plaintiffs’—where (1) FECA itself is creating an unfair

advantage, and (2) that unfair advantage belongs to certain contributors over others. 

Indeed, the redesignation provision which allows for this asymmetrical treatment of 

contributors, 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(3), was not addressed by the Buckley Court.

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More importantly, the only governmental interest at issue is the prevention of 

quid pro quo corruption. One cannot corrupt an abstract concept such as an 

“election,” or enter into a quid pro quo with a particular portion of the calendar. 

What may be corrupted is a candidate. From that standpoint, a limit on how much 

money may be given to candidates may well further Congress’s legitimate interest. 

But no additional work is being done by artificially bifurcating that limit, especially 

where, in the not-uncommon instance of a candidate facing little or no primary 

opposition, that bifurcation is itself illusory. 

i. Congress and the Supreme Court have determined 

that contributions of $5,200 from one contributor to 

one candidate do not cause actual or apparent quid pro 

quo corruption.

The bifurcated limit is not tailored because it prevents Plaintiffs and those 

similarly situated from giving the full, non-corrupting contribution amount at the 

time they feel is most critical in the electoral cycle. If a contributor wishes to fully 

associate with a candidate who must run in a competitive primary, the bifurcated 

limit forces that contributor to associate with the candidate during a primary election. 

This is so even for contributors who simply wish to support candidates in the general 

election (when, after all, one’s representatives are actually elected) along party lines.

This evidences a lack of tailoring. As the Supreme Court has noted in the 

contribution limit context, “[s]uch distinctions in degree become significant...when 

they can be said to amount to differences in kind.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (citations 

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omitted). Like the aggregate limit on individual contributions considered in 

McCutcheon, “[a]t that point, the limits deny the individual all ability to exercise his 

expressive and associational rights by contributing to someone who will advocate 

for his policy preferences,” a “clear First Amendment harm[].” Id. at 1448-49.

Constitutional tailoring is particularly absent where, as here, both Mr. DeMaio 

and Dr. Miller-Meeks faced opponents who were essentially unopposed during their

respective primaries, and who were permitted by federal law to use primary election 

contributions for general election expenses. The only difference between Plaintiffs’

desired contributions and contributions to these opponents is that supporters of the 

latter would have made their contributions just one day earlier. There is no anticorruption interest furthered by requiring contributions to be given earlier in the 

election cycle. In both cases, the candidate receives the same amount of money from 

the same contributor for the same election.

Moreover, issues continue to develop during a campaign. For example, it may 

be only after the primary that a scandal involving a candidate is revealed, or that a 

candidate reveals hitherto unknown beliefs that might cause a donor to wish to 

associate with another candidate. Perhaps most obviously, one knows in advance 

that an unchallenged primary candidate will advance to the general election, but will 

not know which challenged candidate will do so. Contributors should be permitted 

to structure their contributions to take account of these obvious facts.

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Furthermore, primaries are at different times in various states. E.g., Public 

Disclosure Division, “2014 Congressional Primary Dates and Candidate Filing 

Deadlines for Ballot Access,” FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (2014), 

http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2014/2014pdates.pdf. Contributors should not be 

prevented from supporting their chosen candidates simply because it is difficult to 

follow this schedule.

On the other side of the ledger, there can be no cognizable government interest 

in encouraging only contributors to candidates without primary opponents to put a 

full $5,200 toward the general election. This harms donors like the Plaintiffs. See 

Davis, 554 U.S. at 750 (contribution limit unconstitutional under the First 

Amendment which “ha[d] the effect of enabling [Plaintiff’s] opponent to raise more 

money and to use that money to finance speech that counteracts and thus diminishes 

the effectiveness of” other candidate speech).

ii. As recently as last Term, the Supreme Court reiterated 

that Plaintiffs’ desired contributions do not threaten 

actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.

Because this case involves a limit upon the amount an individual may give to 

a particular candidate, the Supreme Court’s recent McCutcheon decision is 

particularly relevant. McCutcheon discussed both types of contribution limits 

applicable to individuals: base limits (which cap the amount an individual 

contributor can give to any one candidate) and aggregate limits (which cap the total 

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amount an individual may give to all candidates, parties, and PACs). 134 S. Ct. at 

1443. As noted previously, the Court evaluated the aggregate limits under closelydrawn scrutiny. Id. at 1456.

While McCutcheon’s consideration of the aggregate limits is beyond the 

scope of this case, its discussion of the base limits is instructive. The Court 

considered the total limit on any one individual’s contributions to any one candidate 

without respect to the distinction between primary and general elections. Id. at 1448 

(“if all contributions fall within the base limits Congress views as adequate to protect 

against corruption. The individual may give up to $5,200 each to nine candidates”); 

1451 (“under the dissent’s view, it is perfectly fine to contribute $5,200 to nine 

candidates but somehow corrupt to give the same amount to a tenth”). Thus, the 

Court clarified what Congress had already found in setting the base limit at $5,200: 

this is the dollar amount at or below which—when given by an individual to a 

candidate—there is no threat of actual or apparent corruption. That is, McCutcheon 

reiterated that “Congress’s selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that 

contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption.” 

Id. at 1452. Thus, preventing Plaintiffs’ desired contributions—a total of $5,200 to 

any given candidate during a general election—does not further an anti-corruption 

interest. By drawing the line at $5,200, Congress implicitly found that contributions 

of that size, at least, pose no cognizable risk of corruption.

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In sum, Buckley nowhere reviewed the per-election element of the base 

contribution limits. Neither did any subsequent case. How can the same $5,200 be 

more corrupting if given the day after the primary election rather than the day before, 

especially in light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in McCutcheon? While it is true 

that Congress has the authority to set contribution limits, and courts owe some 

deference to the amount of such limits, none of the Commission’s possible 

arguments satisfactorily answers this question. There is no anti-corruption interest 

served by bifurcating the federal limit, and consequently no constitutional excuse 

for forcing Plaintiffs to bifurcate their contributions.

III. The asymmetrical contribution limit is unconstitutional as applied, 

because it operates to deny Plaintiffs equal protection of the laws.

As applied to Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost, the bifurcated contribution limit 

works an outcome so asymmetrical as to be unconstitutional. This unequal treatment 

infringes upon the “liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause...against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws.” United 

States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013); News Am. Publ’g, Inc. v. FCC, 844 

F.2d 800, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Although the Equal Protection Clause appears only 

in the [Fourteenth] Amendment, which applies only to the states, the Supreme Court 

has found its essential mandate inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment[,] and therefore applicable to the federal government”); see also JA 50 

(citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 

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Accordingly, Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost will prevail on their equal protection 

claim if they are similarly situated to other contributors, and the bifurcated limit

unconstitutionally infringes upon their Fifth Amendment rights. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 

118 U.S. 356, 373-374 (1886) (equal protection doctrine’s “broad and benign 

provisions” render invalid any law which may “itself be fair on its face and impartial 

in appearance, yet...is applied...so as practically to make unjust and illegal 

discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights”).

A. Plaintiffs are similarly situated to other contributors.

The Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is designed to prevent 

“governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all 

relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (citation 

omitted). Here, the government has implicitly classified contributors based upon

whether or not their preferred candidate faces a primary challenger. It also classifies 

contributors based upon whether they give money to a campaign committee for the 

general election by a particular (arbitrary) date.

In 2014, the only difference between the Plaintiffs and contributors to the their 

preferred candidates’ general election opponents was that a contributor to 

Congressman Loebsack or Congressman Peters could give $5,200 solely for use in 

the general election. Mr. Jost and Ms. Holmes were denied that same ability. 

“Contributors to the legislative race were alike in all respects because no relevant 

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distinctions existed between an individual wanting to donate money to [David 

Loebsack] and another individual wanting to donate to [Loebsack]’s opponent.”

Riddle v. Hickenlooper, 742 F.3d 922, 926 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks

omitted). This will remain the case in future elections where Plaintiffs and those 

similarly situated seek to associate with general election candidates for federal 

office. JA 62 (“Plaintiffs’ complaint is not mooted by the November 4, 2014 election 

inasmuch as the same limitations would apply to their contributions in the next 

federal election in which they wish to contribute to a candidate”).

B. The right to associate by making political contributions is a 

fundamental freedom, which is threatened by the law’s 

asymmetrical outcomes for Plaintiffs and those similarly situated.

The First Amendment’s protective scope encompasses the freedom to 

associate, which the Supreme Court has long considered a “basic constitutional 

freedom” that “lies at the foundation of a free society.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25

(citation and quotation marks omitted). This is black letter law. E.g., Shrink 

Missouri, 528 U.S. at 386 (limits on the right to contribute implicate “the 

constitutional guarantee” of associational liberty, which “has its fullest and most 

urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office”) (citing 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-16, (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 

(1971))). Indeed, just last Term, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]here is no right 

more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing political 

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leaders...[such as by] contribut[ing] to a candidate’s campaign.” McCutcheon, 134 

S. Ct. at 1440-41. While the Court has yet to weigh in on the specific question 

presented here—hence the need for the unusual review process of 52 U.S.C. § 

30110—it has determined that where contribution limits work asymmetrical effects, 

they threaten fundamental freedoms and may be unconstitutional.

In 2008, Davis v. FEC considered a BCRA provision commonly called the 

“millionaire’s amendment,” which permitted candidates facing a self-financed 

opponent to raise money in increments triple the normal base limit. 554 U.S. at 729,

738. Before BCRA’s enactment, observers noted that the provision’s inevitable 

effect would be asymmetric treatment in favor of a specific class of candidate—in 

that case, incumbents. 147 Cong. Rec. S. 2542 (Statement of Senator Chris Dodd: 

“this is what I could call incumbency protection”). The Davis plaintiff, a selffinanced Congressional candidate, raised both First and Fifth Amendment 

objections. 554 U.S. at 744, n. 9. Ultimately, Davis prevailed—though the Court did 

not reach his Fifth Amendment claim—on the ground that such an asymmetric 

outcome offends the Constitution. Id. at 738 (“We have never upheld the 

constitutionality of a law that imposes different contributions for candidates who are 

competing against each other, and we agree with Davis that this scheme 

impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his own money for 

campaign speech”). 

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Similarly, in Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, the 

Supreme Court struck down an Arizona public financing regime under the First 

Amendment based, in part, upon its asymmetric effect. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2819 (2011). 

Arizona’s system provided for “a publicly financed candidate” to “receive roughly 

one dollar for every dollar spent by an opposing privately financed candidate” or 

independent group supporting such a candidate. Id. at 2813. Relying on “the logic 

of Davis” the Court rejected this approach as unconstitutional. Id. at 2818. In its 

opinion, the Court also pointed to a further asymmetry: some Arizona districts, 

including its state House districts, elected more than one candidate. Consequently, 

“each dollar spent by the privately funded candidate would result in an additional 

dollar of campaign funding to each of that candidate’s publicly financed opponents.” 

Id. at 2819 (emphasis supplied). The Court stated that, in such circumstances, 

candidates would be required “to fight a political hydra of sorts.” Id.

This was equally (if not especially) true for independent groups which, in 

speaking about candidates, would trigger direct cash payments to those candidates’

opponents. Id. (“spending one dollar can result in the flow of dollars to multiple 

candidates the group disapproves of”). These passages can only be read to express 

the Court’s concern—explicitly raised in both Buckley and Davis—that governments 

might impermissibly burden political association and expression by advantaging 

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some over others. This violates the First Amendment, as explained above. It also 

falls far short of the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.

Indeed, the Court’s concern that contribution limits may cause Fifth 

Amendment injury stems from Buckley itself. Buckley merely considered a facial 

challenge to FECA’s contribution limits, and did not consider the effects of separate 

limits for primary elections. 424 U.S. at 35 (“the impact of the Act’s $1,000 

contribution limitation on major-party challengers and on minor-party candidates 

does not render the provision unconstitutional on its face”). The Court left the door 

open for subsequent challenges where those limits work “invidious 

discriminat[ion].” Id. at 31, n. 33. This was particularly important given that, because

FECA was necessarily designed by incumbents, it was possible that “the Act, 

[might] on its face appear[] to be evenhanded” but this appearance “may not reflect 

political reality.” Id.; see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441-42 (“[T]hose who govern 

should be the last people to help decide who should govern”) (emphasis original).

C. The bifurcated contribution limit fails Fifth Amendment 

scrutiny.

If a statute implicates a right “fundamental to our constitutional system, 

statutory classifications impinging upon that right must be narrowly tailored to serve 

a compelling governmental interest.” Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 

494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990) (citing Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 

101 (1972); overruled on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310. But 

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as the district court determined in its opinion denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a 

preliminary injunction, “[t]he Supreme Court...has not addressed the scrutiny 

applicable to a challenge to restrictions on political contributions under an equal 

protection rubric.” JA 50. At least one federal Court of Appeals has determined that 

Buckley’s “closely drawn” scrutiny applies in the equal protection context, just as in 

the First Amendment context. Riddle, 742 F.3d at 928 (“For the sake of argument, 

we can assume that this form of intermediate scrutiny applies when contributors 

challenge contribution limits passed on the...Equal Protection Clause rather than the 

First Amendment”); id. at 931 (Gorsuch, J, concurring) (“In the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s equal protection context, the Supreme Court has clearly told us to 

apply strict scrutiny not only to governmental classifications resting on certain 

inherently grounds (paradigmatically, race) but also governmental ‘classifications 

affecting fundamental rights’”) (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).

6

Even if Fifth Amendment challenges do not require strict scrutiny, the 

bifurcated contribution limit is still invalid because it is not closely drawn to a 

6 Before the 2014 election, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in district court. 

The district court agreed with the reasoning of the Riddle majority, and also noted 

that the U.S. District Courts of the District of Maine and the District of Columbia 

had also “applied the same ‘closely drawn’ scrutiny to equal protection challenges.” 

JA 50-51 (citing Riddle; Woodhouse v. Me. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & 

Election Practices, 2014 U.S. Dist LEXIS 117926 at 18 (D. Me. Aug. 22, 2014);

Wagner v. FEC, 901 F. Supp. 2d 101, 112-113 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated on other 

grounds, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).

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sufficiently important governmental interest. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445-1446 

(“Because we find a substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated 

objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under 

the ‘closely drawn test.’ We therefore need not parse the differences between the 

two standards in this case”). Indeed, as demonstrated supra, the government cannot 

show that bifurcation of the $5,200 contribution is “a means [closely drawn] to 

achieve...the stated governmental objective” of fighting quid pro quo corruption. Id.

While neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has reached the merits of any 

contributor’s equal protection challenge to an asymmetrical contribution limit, the 

Tenth Circuit has. Riddle, 742 F.3d at 930. While Riddle contemplated a slightly 

different factual posture, it addressed a parallel constitutional claim, where a

contribution limit that operated asymmetrically violated the guarantee of equal 

protection. The case involved a Colorado law permitting uncontested major party 

candidates to receive contributions for the primary and general elections—just as 

federal law permits now. Id. at 924 (Contributions for both elections allowed “even 

when there is only one candidate seeking the nomination” of a major party). These 

primary and general election contributions could—as in the federal system—all be 

spent in the general election. Id. at 926; Congressional Candidates and Committees, 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION at 21 (“Nevertheless, the campaign of a candidate 

running in the general election may spend unused primary contributions for general 

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election expenses”). But candidates seeking the nomination of other, non-major 

parties, could receive primary contributions “only when multiple candidates vie for 

the nomination.” Id. at 926. Other candidates who did not run in a primary—such as 

independent or write-in candidates—were also barred from accepting primary 

election money. Id. at 927.

The Riddle plaintiffs, like Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost, sought to contribute the 

full primary and general election amounts to a general election candidate (in Riddle, 

a write-in candidate). The Tenth Circuit found no cognizable anti-corruption interest 

in “creat[ing] a basic favoritism between candidates vying for the same office,” and 

determined that Colorado’s asymmetric scheme violated the U.S. Constitution’s 

requirement that citizens be treated equally under the law. Id. at 929, 930. 

Specifically, the Tenth Circuit determined that because “[a]fter the primary, a 

supporter of [the write-in candidate] could give” half as much money for the general 

election as other candidates, “the statute treated contributors differently based on the 

political affiliation of the candidate being supported. And by treating the contributors 

differently, the statute impinged on the right to political expression.” Id. at 927.

Plaintiffs challenge a statute that in operation causes a Fifth Amendment harm 

comparable to the one identified in Riddle. As in Riddle, where the contribution limit

distinguished between two types of candidates, the primary/general election

bifurcation works a similar effect. Colorado’s statute created different contribution 

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limits for those who ran in a primary election and those who did not. Similarly, the 

federal scheme does not distinguish between those candidates who must face 

significant primary challengers and those who do not. While “on its face” the 

bifurcated scheme does not appear discriminatory, the disparate impact in favor of 

candidates who do not face a primary challenge—and their supporters—is the clear 

“political reality.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31 n. 33. 

Thus, a “fundamental principle: [that] the State must govern impartially” is at 

risk. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). Unless the 

government has a “closely drawn” justification for allowing some contributors to 

give $5,200 for the general election, while prohibiting other candidates from doing 

the same, the bifurcated limit fails the Fifth Amendment analysis.

D. Ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs will neither upend nor 

destabilize the federal campaign finance regime.

It bears repeating that the Plaintiffs do not bring a facial challenge to FECA’s 

contribution limits. Such challenges have long been foreclosed. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

30. Indeed, in the equal protection context, it is “the preferred course of 

adjudication” to strike down a law only as it applies to those unconstitutionally 

burdened. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) 

(zoning ordinance invalid insofar as it necessitated a special permit for a particular 

group home for the mentally handicapped). Simply because “the distinction between 

[primary and general]...elections undoubtedly is valid for some purposes does not 

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resolve whether it is valid as applied here.” Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist 

Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 (1985) (striking down “Illinois Election 

Code...insofar as it requires independent candidates and new political parties to 

obtain more than 25,000 signatures in Chicago”).

Ruling for Plaintiffs would not lift the contribution limits, and would do no 

more than allow Ms. Holmes and Mr. Jost to do what contributors to Congressmen 

Loebsack and Peters were already permitted to do in 2014 —write $5,200 checks 

with the knowledge that they will be used to further a general election campaign. 

This is, all things considered, a rather modest result, and one that would eliminate 

the unequal treatment of similarly situated Americans seeking to exercise their

fundamental right to associate.

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CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that this Court find the bifurcated 

contribution limit unconstitutional as applied to them and their desired contributions.

Respectfully submitted this 12th day of January, 2015,

/s/ Allen Dickerson 

Allen Dickerson (D.C. Cir. No. 54137) 

Center for Competitive Politics 

124 S. West Street, Suite 201 

Alexandria, VA 22314

(703) 894-6800 

adickerson@campaignfreedom.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH AND COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation set 

forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 7,089

words, according to a word count by Microsoft Word 2010, excluding the parts of 

the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). 

This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a proportionallyspaced typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in Times New Roman 14-point font.

Dated: January 12, 2015 /s/ Allen Dickerson

Allen Dickerson

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USCA Case #14-5281 Document #1531480 Filed: 01/12/2015 Page 38 of 39
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________________________________

) 

HOLMES, et al. )

) 

Plaintiffs, )

) 

v. ) No. 14-5281 

) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) CERTIFICATE OF FILING

) AND SERVICE

Defendant. ) 

____________________________________) 

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of January, 2015, I electronically filed 

the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Brief and Appendix with the Clerk of the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit using the Court’s CM/ECF 

system, and hand delivered 30 copies of the same to the Clerk’s office.

Service was made upon the following via CM/ECF:

Lisa J. Stevenson Kevin Deeley 

Deputy General Counsel – Law Acting Associate General Counsel 

Erin Chlopak Steve Hajjar 

Acting Assistant General Counsel Attorney 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650

/s/ Allen Dickerson 

Allen Dickerson

Counsel for Plaintiffs

USCA Case #14-5281 Document #1531480 Filed: 01/12/2015 Page 39 of 39