Present: All the Justices 

TOWN OF JONESVILLE, ET AL. 

v. Record Nos. 961738 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 and 962016 June 6, 1997 

POWELL VALLEY VILLAGE 

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LEE COUNTY 

Ford C. Quillen, Judge 

 In 1989, the Town of Jonesville (the Town) adopted a 

zoning ordinance establishing zoning classifications for the 

entire town and procedures for enforcing the ordinance. In 

1990, pursuant to the ordinance, Powell Valley Village Limited 

Partnership applied for, and received, a zoning permit to 

construct low and moderate income residence apartments on land 

it owned in the Town. The Town amended its zoning ordinance in 

1993 by requiring a special use permit for buildings with more 

than six residential units. In 1994, Powell Valley Village 

Limited Partnership and its general partner, Hunt & Associates 

of Virginia, Inc. (collectively "the Housing Group") applied 

for a building permit based on its 1990 zoning permit. Jack 

Collins, the county building inspector charged with enforcing 

the state building code and town ordinance, ultimately denied 

the building permit stating that the Housing Group had to 

"resubmit" the apartment project for zoning approval. 

 The Housing Group filed this action seeking a declaratory 

judgment that it had a vested right in the 1990 zoning permit 

or, alternatively, that the 1989 zoning ordinance and "all 

amendments thereto" were void because the Town had not adopted 
a comprehensive plan prior to adoption of the ordinance. The 

Housing Group's pleadings also contained a petition for 

issuance of a writ of mandamus to require the county building 

inspector to issue a building permit. Following discovery, the 

Housing Group filed a motion for summary judgment on its 

declaratory judgment count. The trial court, after considering 

the briefs and arguments of counsel, granted the Housing 

Group's motion for summary judgment, holding that when the 1989 

ordinance was adopted the Town had not adopted a comprehensive 

plan pursuant to Code §§ 15.1-446.1 and -490 and, therefore, 

"the zoning ordinance was void ab initio." At a subsequent 

hearing on the Housing Group's petition for mandamus, the trial 

court granted the petition and ordered the county building 

inspector to issue the building permit upon payment of the 

building permit fee. We awarded appeals to the Town and the 

county building inspector from both orders and combined the 

appeals for review. 

 The Town and the county building inspector raise a number 

of assignments of error on appeal relating to the trial court's 

orders granting the declaratory judgment and the petition for a 

writ of mandamus. Many of the issues are interrelated and, for 

convenience and clarity, will be considered in categories. 

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 

 Relying on Gayton Triangle Land Co. v. Board of 

Supervisors of Henrico County, 216 Va. 764, 222 S.E.2d 570 

(1976), and Phillips v. Telum, Inc., 223 Va. 585, 292 S.E.2d 

311 (1982), the Town argues that the Housing Group had to 
exhaust its administrative remedies before it could file a 

declaratory judgment action or a petition for mandamus.1 

Because the Housing Group did not appeal the county building 

inspector's March 1994 decision denying the building permit to 

the board of zoning appeals, the Town argues, the trial court 

should have dismissed this action. 

 As a general rule, administrative remedies must be 

exhausted before a court will take cognizance of a zoning 

dispute. Board of Supervisors of Henrico County v. Market 

Inns, Inc., 228 Va. 82, 86, 319 S.E.2d 737, 739-40 (1984). In 

Gayton Triangle, the landowner sought a declaratory judgment 

that a rezoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to 

its property. In holding that the landowner had failed to 

exhaust its administrative remedies, the Court reasoned that 

the restrictive rezoning could have been remedied by a variance 

granted by the board of zoning appeals and until that body 

acts, "it cannot be said that the zoning power [had] been fully 

and finally applied." 216 Va. at 767, 222 S.E.2d at 573. 

Similarly, in Phillips, the contract purchaser of land sought a 

writ of mandamus when it was denied a building permit because 

the county planner determined that the proposed use was not 

permitted in the zoning district. We held that the applicant 

could not file a petition for a writ of mandamus because the 

 

 1

 1This assertion was initially raised in the Town's 

special plea to dismiss. The trial court did not directly rule 

on the plea, but the decision of the trial court implicitly 

ruled on the issue and denied the plea. Lowry v. Noell, 177 

Va. 238, 241, 13 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1941). 
board of zoning appeals had the power to interpret the zoning 

ordinances and, in a case involving ordinance interpretation, 

the applicant must "exhaust administrative remedies by 

appealing to the appropriate board of zoning appeals before 

resorting to court action." 223 Va. at 589, 292 S.E.2d at 314. 

 In this case, the Housing Group challenged the validity of 

the ordinance based on the Town's failure to comply with 

§§ 15.1-446.1 and -490. The authority of zoning administrators 

and boards of zoning appeals is prescribed by statute. Board 

of Zoning Appeals of James City County v. University Square 

Assocs., 246 Va. 290, 294, 435 S.E.2d 385, 388 (1993). No 

statute confers the authority to rule on the validity of zoning 

ordinances upon zoning administrators or boards of zoning 

appeals. While zoning administrators and boards of zoning 

appeals must necessarily interpret zoning ordinances to execute 

their responsibilities, that obligation does not give rise to a 

power to declare these ordinances invalid. That is a 

determination within the sole province of the judiciary. See

Holland v. Johnson, 241 Va. 553, 555-56, 403 S.E.2d 356, 357-58 

(1991). Thus, in this case, unlike Gayton Triangle and 

Phillips, there was "no administrative remedy equal to the 

relief sought" which the Housing Group could have acquired. 

Board of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 

133, 216 S.E.2d 199, 205 (1975); see also Notestein v. Board of 

Supervisors of Appomattox County, 240 Va. 146, 153, 393 S.E.2d 

205, 209 (1990). Accordingly, the Housing Group was not 

required to appeal the county building inspector's 
determination or to apply for a new zoning permit under the 

zoning ordinance as amended in 1993. 

 II. The Validity of the 1989 Zoning Ordinance 

 Municipalities in Virginia can only exercise those powers 

expressly or impliedly granted to them and only in the manner 

prescribed by the General Assembly. Board of Supervisors of 

Fairfax County v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455-

56 (1975). Failure to abide by the statutory prescriptions for 

the adoption of an ordinance renders the ordinance void ab 

initio. City Council of Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Assocs.

Partnership, 245 Va. 371, 378, 429 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1993). 

 In 1975, the General Assembly enacted legislation which 

required all governing bodies in the state to adopt a 

comprehensive plan by 1980. § 15.1-446.1. Such plans must be 

reviewed every five years. § 15.1-454. Section 15.1-490 

requires that zoning ordinances be drawn with "reasonable 

consideration for" the comprehensive plan. Matthews v. Board 

of Zoning Appeals of Greene County, 218 Va. 270, 277 n.1, 237 

S.E.2d 128, 132 n.1 (1977). 

 The Town asserts that its 1989 zoning ordinance "comports 

with every requirement of a comprehensive plan except that it 

does [not] have a label that calls it a comprehensive plan." 

Relying on cases from other jurisdictions and the provisions of 

§ 15.1-446.1 which allow a comprehensive plan to include a 

zoning ordinance, the Town argues that the contents of the 

document should determine whether the document is a 

comprehensive plan and, in this case, the Town satisfied the 
comprehensive plan requirement when it adopted the 1989 zoning 

ordinance. The record, however, does not support the Town's 

contention. 

 A comprehensive plan, as described by the General 

Assembly, is general in nature and serves as a guide for the 

coordinated development of the territory to meet the present 

and future needs of the community and promote the general 

welfare of its citizens. § 15.1-446.1. It is a studied plan 

for zoning, adopted after consideration of public comment. Id.

 Prior to its adoption, a local governing body must conduct 

studies covering a wide range of factors including existing 

land use and development, trends and growth, population, 

employment and economic factors, public facilities, 

transportation facilities, and housing needs. § 15.1-447. The 

local planning commission must hold public hearings on the 

proposed comprehensive plan, § 15.1-448, and if approved by the 

planning commission, the governing body, after public hearing 

and notice, may adopt, amend, or disapprove the plan. § 15.1-

450. 

 The zoning ordinance in this case, while a comprehensive 

zoning regulation, does not contain a number of the elements 

required to be included in a comprehensive plan under § 15.1-

446.1, such as "long-range recommendations for the general 

development of the territory covered by the plan" and 

indications of "where existing lands or facilities are proposed 

to be extended, widened, removed, [or] relocated." 

Furthermore, the record in this case does not indicate that any 
of the studies required by § 15.1-447 were conducted or that 

the planning commission considered, held hearings, or 

recommended the plan to the governing body in accordance with 

§ 15.1-448.2 Accordingly, we conclude that the 1989 zoning 

ordinance, as amended, did not constitute a comprehensive plan 

under § 15.1-446.1. 

 Allowing a municipality to adopt a zoning ordinance 

without considering a comprehensive plan, because it does not 

have such a plan, would permit manipulation of the zoning 

statutes and condone violation of §§ 15.1-446.1, 

-454, and -490. A comprehensive plan provides a guideline for 

future development and systematic change, reached after 

consultation with experts and the public. "[T]he Virginia 

statutes assure [landowners] that such a change will not be 

made suddenly, arbitrarily, or capriciously but only after a 

period of investigation and community planning." Board of 

Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 

655, 658, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1974). While the Town is 

correct in its arguments that neither the statutes nor our 

prior cases specifically require a local government to enact a 

comprehensive plan before it enacts a zoning ordinance, 

considering all relevant statutes as we must, Board of 

Supervisors of King & Queen County v. Cox, 155 Va. 687, 707, 

156 S.E. 755, 761 (1931), we conclude that §§ 15.1-446.1 

through -498 reflect a legislative prescription for local 

 

 2 2 The Town does not argue that it was prevented from 

introducing such evidence. 
zoning actions which, after 1980, required the adoption of a 

comprehensive plan prior to the adoption of a zoning ordinance. 

III. Remedy 

A. Declaratory Judgment Action 

 The Town urges that, even if the trial court was correct 

in declaring the ordinance void ab initio, it nevertheless 

erred in failing to suspend its order to allow the Town 

sufficient time to take appropriate legislative action. The 

Town argues that the result of the trial court's action is to 

leave the Town without any zoning regulations. Under these 

circumstances, the Town suggests that the procedure adopted in 

Board of Supervisors of James City County v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128, 

216 S.E.2d 199 (1975), should be adopted here. In Rowe, James 

City County's entire zoning ordinance was declared 

unconstitutional but, because the effect of the trial court's 

decree "was to leave the land unzoned," the case was remanded 

to the trial court with instructions to enter an order 

suspending the decree for a period of time during which further 

legislative action could be considered. Id. at 148, 216 S.E.2d 

at 215. Such a procedure, the Town adds, is also consistent 

with this Court's decision in Potomac Greens, in which, after 

declaring an amendment to a zoning ordinance of the City of 

Alexandria void ab initio for failure to comply with certain 

notice requirements, the Court directed that the decision 

"shall operate prospectively only, and shall not affect other 

amendments enacted prior to our decision in this case." 245 

Va. at 378, 429 S.E.2d at 229. 
 We agree with the Town's assertion concerning the 

prospective nature of the decision and direct that the holding 

in this case -- that adoption of a comprehensive plan is a 

prerequisite to the adoption of a zoning ordinance -- is 

limited to the instant case and shall operate prospectively 

only. See also Perkins v. County of Albemarle, 214 Va. 416, 

418, 200 S.E.2d 566, 568 (1973). We disagree, however, that 

suspension of the decision in this case is consistent with, or 

required by, our previous cases. 

 The relief awarded in Rowe was based on facts materially 

different from the facts in this case. In Rowe, the trial 

court declared a zoning amendment, which rezoned an area of the 

county from a B-1 to a B-2 classification, unconstitutional. 

The effect of this decision was to leave unzoned territory that 

previously had been zoned. Thus, the decision did not return 

the territory to the same zoned status it held prior to the 

enactment of the unconstitutional zoning amendment. 216 Va. at 

148, 216 S.E.2d at 215. In the instant case, prior to 1989, 

the Town had no zoning ordinance at all. Therefore, the effect 

of the decision of the trial court is to return the territory 

to the same unzoned status it held prior to the enactment of 

the void ordinance. See Matthews v. Board of Zoning Appeals of 

Greene County, 218 Va. at 283, 237 S.E.2d at 135-36. 

 In Potomac Greens, while we directed that our decision 

apply prospectively only and that it not affect other 

amendments to the city's zoning ordinance, we held that the 

zoning amendment at issue was void ab initio and could not be 
enforced by the City of Alexandria. 245 Va. at 378, 429 S.E.2d 

at 228. Likewise, the Town's 1989 zoning ordinance challenged 

in this case, including "all amendments thereto," is void ab 

initio and may not be enforced by the Town. Accordingly, under 

the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court was not 

required to suspend the effective date of its decision until 

the Town could take further legislative action. 

B. Mandamus 

 The Town also argues that the trial court erred in issuing 

a writ of mandamus because the issuance of the building permit 

was not a ministerial function, the building permit fee had not 

been paid, and the county building inspector had no authority 

to issue the permit. These arguments are not well taken. 

 The record is clear that the county building inspector 

denied the building permit for the sole reason that the Housing 

Group did not have a zoning permit under the Town's zoning 

ordinance. When the trial court's decision eliminated this 

requirement, issuing the building permit was "'no longer 

discretionary but ministerial and mandatory.'" Phillips, 223 

Va. at 591, 292 S.E.2d at 314 (quoting Planning Commission of 

Falls Church v. Berman, 211 Va. 774, 777, 180 S.E.2d 670, 672 

(1971)). Additionally, the trial court conditioned the 

issuance of the writ upon the Housing Group's payment of the 

building permit fee. 

 Finally, we reject the Town's argument that the county 

building inspector had no authority to issue the permit once 

the ordinance was declared invalid. The county building 
inspector is charged with enforcing the Virginia Uniform 

Statewide Building Code (the Building Code) in Lee County. The 

Building Code requires issuance of a permit prior to 

construction of any building to insure that the proposed work 

conforms to the requirements of the Building Code. U.S.B.C. 

§§ 105.1, 109.1 (1994). Towns such as Jonesville, with 

populations of less than 3,500, may elect to administer the 

Building Code; however, if the town does not so elect, the 

county in which the town is located is responsible for the 

administration and enforcement of the Building Code. Code 

§ 36-105. There is nothing in the 1989 zoning ordinance or the 

record in this case which indicates that the Town has elected 

to undertake the responsibility of administering or enforcing 

the Building Code. Therefore, the county building inspector 

has the authority to issue the permit in this case. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 

judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed.