### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Re m an de d by S upr em e Co ur t N ove m be r 30, 200 5
THOM AS PO STON STU DD AR D v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for DyerCounty

No. C02-61 LeeMoore , Judge

No. W2005-02707-C CA-R M-P C - F iled Fe bruary 6, 2006

This case is before us after rema nd by

the Tenne ssee Supr em e Court. The def endant, who w as indicted on three counts of ra pe of a child, a Class A fe lony , pled g uiltyto o n e co u n t of ince st, a Class C felony , in exchang e for a neg otiated eig ht-y ear

senten ce as a R an g e I I , multipl e off ender

. On dir e c t app e a l, this c ou rt orig ina lly

va c a te d th e jud g me nt of c on vic tio n o n th e g ro un ds that in c e st is not a lesser- included off ense of rape , without reac hing the meri t s of the de fendant’s sentenc ing issues. Thomas Poston S tuddard v. State, No. W20 0 3

- 0 1 2 1 0

- CC A-R3-PC, 2004 WL370259 (Tenn. Cr im. Ap p. F e b. 27 , 2 00 4) , p e rm . to app e a l g rant ed (Ten n. S ept. 7, 20 04 ). Ou r s up re me c ou rt , howeve r, conc luded that the trial c ourt had jurisdiction to accep t the def endant’ s g uiltyplea a nd
rema nded the c ase to this court for consideration of t he defenda nt’s sentenc ing issues. St uddard v. State, __ S.W .3d __, 2005 WL 319 2 2 7 9 (T en n
. 2005). F ollowing our revie w, we a ffirm the jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., d el i v er ed t h e opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

J im W . Horne r, District Public Defe nder, and H. Tod Taylor, Assistant District Publi c De fende r, for the appe llant, Thomas Poston S tuddard. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Ge n er al and Reporte r; J . Ross Dy er, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; and C. Phi llip Bivens, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP INION ON REMAND

F AC TS

Th e de fe nd a nt, Th oma s Po sto n Stud da rd , wa s ind ic te d by the Dy e r Cou nty Gr a nd Jury wi th three counts of ra

pe of a child, a Class A fe lony . Pursuant to his neg otiated plea a g ree ment, on Aug ust 22, 2002, he pled g uilty to one count of ince st, a Class C felony , in exchang e for an ag ree dT he defendan t made a mot i on, pur s uan t t o T enn es s ee R ul e of Ap pel l at e Procedur e 14, t hat t hi s cour t cons i der 1

as pos t

-j u dg men t f ac t s h i s be i n g de n i ed par ol e on M ar ch 8, 2004, a n d hi s appe al of t h i s de t er mi n at i on be i n g de n i ed on A ugust 12 , 20 0 4

. T he co urt grant ed t he m o t i o n and wi l l co nsi d er t hese fact s i n i t s d et erm i nat i o n of t hi s m at t er. -2- sen te n c e o f e ig h t y e ar s a s a Ra n g e I I , mu lt ip le o f f e n d e r in th e D e p ar tm e n t o f Co rr e c tion. On Dec ember

20, 2002, the def

endant f iled a pro s e mo ti o n f

o r c o rr e c ti o n o r r e d u c ti o n of sentenc e, pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal P roce dure 35. In his acc ompany ing me morandum of law , the de fe nd a nt a lle g e d h is p le a a g re e me nt f

a ile d to sti pu la te that hi s par ole wa s con tin g e nt u po n h is
c omp le tio n o f a m a nd a tory se xua l of fe nd e r p ro g ram a ndthat hi s tria l c ou ns e l ha d mi sin fo rm e d h im of the a c tua l ti me he woul d b e re qu ir e d to se rv e by te lli ng him

he wo uldbe e lig ibl e fo r p aro le in
app ro xima te ly fo urte e n mon ths

. Th e de fe nd a nt a sse rt e d that the int e re st of jus tic e re qu ir e d that hi s se nte nc e be re du c e d to c on fo rm wi th his e xpe c ta tio n at the tim e he e nte re d in to h is p le a a g re e me nt. Following the appointment of c ounsel, the defe ndant filed a n amende d motion for reduc tion of sentenc e on Fe bruary 26, 2003. I n his amended motion, he a lleg ed, int e r a lia , that he did not learn until after his convic tion and incar cer ation t h at , b ef ore he could re ceive parole , he wa s require d under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-503( c) to obtain certification from a psy chiatrist or psy cholog ist that to a reasona ble deg ree of m ed i ca l certainty he would not commit further sexual
assa u l ts if relea sed fr om confineme nt. The def endant a sked that the trial c ourt dec lare the
certification requir ement unconstitutional as a violation of his equal protection rig hts and, in the interest of justice, r educe his sentence to probation for the rema inder of his e ight- y ear term. At the April 11, 2003, hea ring on the def

endant’ s motion, Marla Martin, a se v en t ee n -y ear hearing office r with the parole board, te stified that the ce rtification re quirement of T ennesse e Code Annotated se ction 40-35-503( c) w as applica ble only to i n d i v iduals who had c ommitt ed sexual offe nses. She said she ha d seen only two certifications during her y ear s on the parole board. She added, how ever , that in neither of those two instan ce s d i d t h e individuals invol ved make parole

. Martin testified par ole was a privileg e for

which prisoner s had to qualify

. Dr. Ann Mc Spadden, a psy cholog ist, testified she was e mploy ed with a p ri vate he althcar e company that contra cted with the De partment of Corr ection and w as fa miliar with the sexual offe nder c ertification statute, having persona lly cer t ified individuals in the past. She testified the standard f

or ce rtification wa s “extremely d i fficult” and virtually impossibl e to meet without treatment. She said the s exual offe nder counseling prog rams conducted through the D epartment of Correc tion were only

availableat certain instituti ons, with the most critical, initial stage of the p r o g r a mo f

f e r e d o n l y a tD e B e r

r y S p e c i a l N e e d s F a c i l i t y. A c c o r d i n g t o D r
. M c S p a d d e n ’ s t e s t i m o n y, of fe nd e rs are pla c e d o n th e waiti ng lis t f or the c ou ns e lin g pr og rams w hil e inc arc e rate d at th e ir
re sp e c tiv e fa c ili tie s a nd tr a ns fe rr e d to the app ro pria te fa c ili ty wh e n a sp a c e be c ome s a va ila ble , w ith priority g iven to those individuals with two y ear s or l ess remaining on the ir exist ing se ntence s. Dr. Mc Spa dd e n te sti fi e d p ub lic sa fe ty wa s th e re a so n f

or the c e rt if ic a tio n r e qu ir e me nt. 1

The de fendant testified he did not know about the c ertification requireme nt at th e t i m e he ple d g uil ty

a nddid no t le arn un til a ft e r his inc arc e ratio n that th e se xua l of fe nd e r t re a tme nt p ro g rams-3-

we re n o to f

f e r e d a te a c h p r i s o n f

a c i l i t y , o r t h a tp r i o r i t y

f o r t h e p r o g r a m s w a s g i v e n t o i n d i v idu a ls with less than two y ear s remaining on their sentenc es. The de fendant s ai d he had be en under the impression he would be e ligible for parole , with good be havior, a fter se rving only fourtee n months of his sentenc e. He testified his h ea l t h h ad declined during his inca rce ration, as he had bee n s c h e d u l e d f

o r g a l l b l a d d e r

s u r g e r y o v e r a ye a r

p r e v i o u s l y

b u th a d n o tb e e n g i v e n t h e s u r g e r y
. In addition, he was suf

fering f rom Hepatitis C for which he was not re ceiving any treatment. The defe ndant also testified that his seve nty -five- y ear -old mother, who c are d for his childre n and wa s rec eiving kidney

dialy sis treatment three times a wee k, neede d his assistance at home.

At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court de nied the def endant’ s motion, finding there
we re no g ro un ds to s up po rt a re du c tio n in sen te nc e a nd the c e rt if ic a tio n re qu ir e me nt did no t vi olate the de fe nd a nt’ s e qu a l pr ote c tio n o r d ue pr oc e ss rig hts :

All rig ht, ge ntlemen. Fir st moti on is filed under Rule 35 seeking a re duction of se nte nc e . T he Cou rt do e s not thin k und e r – tha t unde r Rule 35 the re ’s a ny ba sis fo r r e du c tio n o f the se nte nc e
. Th e Cou rt no te s that the de fe nd a nt wa s c ha rg e d w ith t hree Class A Fe lonies involving ra pe of a child. He plea d [si c] to one count of incest, a Class C Fe lony

as a Multipl e R ang e I I

Offe nder. The issue of par ole or wh e the r o r n ot p aro le ’s g ranted is no t so me thi ng that th is C ou rt ha s a ny a uth ority
over or has anything to do with. It’s strictly with the Tenne ssee De partment of Correc tions [ sic]. An d it is a discretionary function. The issue that y ou raise, constitutional iss ue, the Court fe els that the Preston [v. B radle y , No. 96-6545, 1997 WL 594986 (6th Cir. Sept. 25, 1997)] case is on point. The statute or the proc edure has bee n decla

red c onstitut ional and also it ’s clea r in this case and there are numerous Section 1983 Civil Rights ca ses that ar e filed on a reg ular ba sis in Feder al Di stric t Co urt a ndso me in S ta te Cou rt that th e iss ue of

pa ro le or wh e the r pa

ro le is g rante d or no t g rante d do e s no t c re a te a lib e rt y int e re st that trig g e rs the du e pr oc e ss clause

. So, y our Motion will be denied.
AN AL YSI S

The de fendant contends the trial c ourt err ed in deny ing his motion to reduc e his sentenc e and arg ues that the c ertification requireme nt of Tenne ssee Code A n n o tated sec tion 40-35-503(c ) violates his equal protec tion right s b ec au s e it applies only to sex ual offe nders. The State arg ues the trial
c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d th e de fe nd a nt’ s motio n af te r co nc lud ing that the c e rt if ic a tio n s ta tut e c omp orts with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendme nt. We ag ree with the State.

A trial court is authorized to r educe a sentenc e under Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 (b ) u po n a

fi nd ing that th e se nte nc e sh ou ld b e re du c e d “ in the int e re st o f j us tic e .” Sta te v. Ho dg e s, 81 5 S. W.2 d 1 51 , 1 54 (T e nn . 1 99 1) . H ow e ve r, wh e n th e se nte nc e re su lte d f ro m a ple a

a g re e me nt, a s in thi s c a se , th e sc op e of Rul e 35 (b ) i s li mit ed to tho se situatio ns in w hic h “ un fo re se e n, po st--4-

se nte nc ing de ve lop me nts wo uldpe rm it m od if ic a tio n o f a

se nte nc e in the int e re st of jus tic e .” State v. McDona ld, 893 S.W .2d 945, 947 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (footnote omit ted). Appellate re view of a tria l court’s ruling on a R ule 35(b) motion is under a n abuse of discretion standa

rd. State v. Irick, 861 S.W.2d 375, 376 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

The defe ndant arg ues that beca use the Fourteenth Amendment to the Uni t ed S t ates Constit ution provides that “no state sha ll make or enfor ce any law which shall abridge the privileg es or immuniti es of c itiz ens of the U nited States,” and Te nnessee Co d eAnnotated se ction 40-35-503( b) de fi ne s p aro le a s a

“ privi le g e ,” th eS t at eo f

Te nn e sse e ha s c re a te d a

c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d in te re st in parole. U nder his ana ly sis, parole is there fore a fundamental rig ht, making the certification
r e q u i r e m e n to f

T e n n e s s e e C o d e A n n o t a t e d s e c t i o n 4 0

- 3 5

- 5 0 3 ( c ) s u b j e c t t o s tr i c t j u d i c i a l s c ru t i n y, wi th the bu rd e n on th e S tat e to s ho w a c omp e lli ng g ov e rn me nta l in te re st anda me a ns na

rr ow ly ta ilo re d to me e t th a t in te re st. Th e de fe nd a nt a c kn ow le dg e s th e S tate ha s a c omp e lli ng int e re st i n pu bl ic saf e ty bu t arg ue s th a t th e c e rt if ic a tio n r e qu ir e me nt, wh ic h is lim ite d to se xua l of fe nd e rs , is not sufficiently

narr owly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny . The de fendant further arg ues that eve n if strict scrutiny

does not apply , the State ca nnot show a rational ba sis for treating se x ual offe nders differ ently

from inmates c onvicted of othe r ty pes of f elonies for

which public s af

et y would be an issue.

Con tr ary

to th e de fe nd a nt’ s a

rg ume nt, pa

ro le ha s n e ve r b e e n a

fu nd a me nta l r ig ht i n Tenne ssee. See State v. Tester , 879 S.W .2d 823, 828 (Tenn. 1994). Our supreme court has obser ved that fede ral law define s fundamenta l rig hts as “those liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” rights that a re “ implicit i n the conc ept of orde red liberty ,” and rights that a re “explicitly or implicitl y

g uaranteed by

the Constitut ion.” Planned Pare nthood of Middle Tenne ssee v
. S u n d q u i s t , 3 8 S

. W

. 3 d 1 , 1 1

- 1 2 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0 ) ( c i t a t i o n s a n d i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

. In Gre enholtz v. I nmates of Ne braska Penal and Correc tional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. C t. 2100, 21 04, 60 L . Ed. 2d 668 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that “[t] here is no constitutional or inherent rig ht of a c onvicted per son to be con d i t ionally rele ased be fore the expiration of a valid sentenc e.” While we agre e with the def endant that the G ree nholtz Court
rec og nized that a state could, throug h its statutory scheme , cre ate a liberty interest in pa role prote cted by due proc ess g uarantees, we disag ree th at T en n es s ee ha s done so. The statute upon w hich the de fe nd a nt r e lie s, Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d se c tio n 4 0- 35 -5 03 (b ), sp e c if ic a lly state s th a t pa

ro le is
a privi le g e a ndno t a

ri g ht. Th e statut e re a ds in p e rt ine nt p art : (b) Release on parole is a privileg e and not a rig ht, and no inmate convic ted sh a ll b e g rante d p aro le if

the bo ardfi nd s th a t: (1) The re is a substantial risk that t h e d ef endant will not conform to the
c on dit ion s o f the re le a se pr og ram; (2) The rele ase f

rom custody at the time w ould depre ciate the seriousness of the crime of which the defe ndant stands convicte d or promote disrespec t for the law ;-5- (3 ) T he re le a se fr om c us tod y a t th e tim e wo uld ha ve a

su bs ta nti a lly

a dv e rs e eff ect on institutional discipli ne; or (4) The defe ndant’s continued c orre ctional treatment, medical c ar e or vocational or

other tra ining in the inst itution wil l substantiallyenhanc e the d ef en d an t ’s capa city

to lead a la w-a

biding life when g iven re lease status at a later time.
( c ) N o p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d o f a s e x c r i m e s h a l l b e r e l e a s e d o n p ar ole un le ss a psy chiatrist or lice nsed psy cholog ist designated as a health ser vice pr ovider ha s examined and eva luated such inmate and ce rtifi ed t h at, t o a re asonable medical
certainty , the inmate does not pose the likelihood of c ommitt ing se x ual assaults upon rele ase f rom confine ment. The e x amination and e v al u at i on shall be provided by ps y c hiatr ist s or lic e ns e d psy c ho log ist s des ig nate d as h e a lth se rv ic e pr ov ide rs wh os e services ar e co n trac ted or funde d by the depa rtment of cor

rec tion or the board of parole s. The boar d shall consider any such o t h er ev aluation by a psy chiatrist or licensed psy cholog ist desig nated as a health service provider w hich may be provide d by the def endant.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-503(b) -(c ) (2003)

. Both the U nited States and Tenne ssee Constitutions g uarantee c itiz ens t he equal protec tion of the la ws . B ro wn v. Ca mpb e ll Co un ty B d. of Ed uc ., 91 5 S. W.2 d 4 07 , 4 12 (T e nn . 1 99 5) , c e rt

. denied, 517 U.S. 1222, 116 S. Ct. 1852, 134 L . Ed. 2d 952 (1996); Te ster, 879 S.W.2d at 828. “Equa l protection re quires that all per sons in sim ilar circ umstances be tre ated a like[.] ” State v. Smo ky Mo un ta in S e c re ts, I nc ., 93 7 S. W.2 d 9 05 , 9 12 (T e nn . 1 99 6) . S tr ict scr utiny is r e qu ir e d in analy zing an e qual protec tion challeng e only when the c lassification at issue interf ere s with a fundame ntal rig ht or operates to the particula r disadvanta g e of a suspect cla ss. Tester, 879 S.W.2d at 829. Since neither

situation ex ists her e, we analy ze the sexual off ender certification requir ement under the reduc ed scr

utiny standard, w hich employ s the rational ba sis test.

The strict scr

utiny test “imposes upon those cha lleng ing the constitutionalit y of a statute the g reatest burden of

proof.” Br own, 915 S.W.2d at 413 (citing Te nnes s ee S m all School Sy s. v. McWherter , 851 S.W .2d 139, 153 (Tenn. 1993)). The Br own court de fined the te st by quoting f rom Te ste r a s f

oll ow s:

“ Th e c on c e pt of e qu a l pr ote c tio n e sp ou se d b y the fe de ra l a ndou r s ta te constitutions guar antee s that all persons similarly circ u mstanced sha ll be treated alike. Converse ly , things whic h ar e d iffer ent in fac t or opinion are not r equire d by
e ith e r c on sti tut ionto b e tr e a te d the sa me
. Th e ini tia l di sc re tio n to de te rm ine wh a t is differ ent and what is the same resides in the leg islatures of the States, and leg islatures
are g iven consider able latitude in d et er m ining what gr oups are differ ent and what g roups ar e the sa me. I n most instances the judicial inquiry into the leg islative choice-6-

is lim ited to whether the classifications have a reasona b l e r el a tionship t o a le git im ate sta te inte re st .”

I d. at 413-14 (quoting Tester , 879 S.W .2d at 828) (interna l quotations omitted). The B rown c ourt we nt o n to de sc ri be the bu rden th at mu st be o ve rc ome in o rd e r t o s ho w that a statut e is
un c on sti tut ion a l un de r the re du c e d s c ru tin y te st:
Thus , if a r e a s o n ab le b a s is e xis ts f o r th e d if f e r e n c e in tr e a tm e n t u nder the statut e , o r i f any

se t of fa c ts c a n r e a so na

bly be c on c e ive d to jus tif y it, the statut e is
c on sti tut ion a l. E qu a l pr ote c tio n do es not r e qu ir e abs olu te e qu a lit y . N or do e s it mandate tha t ev ery one shall re ceive the same a dvantag es. Unless the individual
c ha lle ng ing the statut e s c a n e sta bli sh that t

h ed i f f e re nc e s a re un re a so na

ble , th e statut e must be upheld.

I d. at 414 (c itations omi tted).

Ou r L egi slature, whic h is give n “‘c onsiderable latitude in determining what g roups ar e differ ent and what gr oups are the same,’ ” id. at 413-14 ( quoting Te ster, 879 S.W.2d at 828), has obviouslydetermined that public safe ty conce rns nec essitate that sexua l o ff enders be tre ated dif fe re ntl y fr om o the r o ff

e nd e rs by re qu ir ing that, i n o rd er to b e g rante d p aro le , th e y ob ta in
c e rt if ic a tio n fr om a me nta l he a lthc are pr of e ssi on a l th a t to a

re a so na ble de g re e of

me dic a l c e rt a inty the y do no t pres entth e li kel ih oo d o f com mi tt in g furt her s ex ual ass aul ts if rel ease d fr om con fi nem ent. As the def

endant c oncede s, the State has a leg itimate interest in protec ting the public f rom furthe r sexual assaults from sexual offende rs. We note that i n the unpubl ished fede ral case c ited by the trial court in its de cision, the Six th Circ uit Court of Appea ls c oncluded that Tenne ssee’ s sexual offende r statute does not deny

equal pr otection rig hts to sexual offe nders: “Further, T ennesse e’s r equire ment that sex off

ender s participate in a treatment pr og ram befor e being elig ible for parole p asses c on sti tut ion a l muste r und e r the Eq ua l Prot e c tio n Claus e , be c a us e the po lic y a ndla w a

re ratio na lly related to the state’s g oal of promoting public safe ty .” Preston, 1997 WL 594986, at *1. We ag ree it w a s r e a so na

ble fo r the L e g isl a tur e to tr e a t sexua l off e nd e rs dif fe re ntl y ba se d on th e natur e of the ir offe nses and its conc erns f or public saf

ety , and ther efor e conc lude that the def endant’ s equal pr ote c tio n c la im i s w ith ou t me ri t.
We further conclude that the t rial court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing the defe ndant’s motion to reduce his sente n ce
. The fa ct that the def endant did not learn of the sexual offe nder require ments for pa

role until after

sentenc ing or that his or his mother’s he alth has dete riorate d since the tim e of

his g uil ty ple a , d o n ot co ns titute the ty pe of “ un fo re se e n, po st- se nte nc ing de ve lop me nts ” that “ would permit modification of a sentenc e in the i ntere st of j ustice.” Mc Donald, 893 S.W.2d at 947.-7- CO NC LU SION

Ha v i n g re v i ewe d the re cord and applicable law, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s de nial of the de fendant’s motion to reduce his sente nce. A ccor dingly , we a ffi rm the judgme nt of the trial court.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE