No. 02-___ 

IN THE 

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———— 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, AND ASSOCIATED 

BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC. et al., 

Appellants, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al., 

Appellees. 

———— 

On Appeal from the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia 

———— 

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 

OF THE “BUSINESS PLAINTIFFS,” 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, AND ASSOCIATED 

BUILDERS AND CONTRACTORS, INC. 

———— 

Of counsel 

STEPHEN A. BOKAT 

NATIONAL CHAMBER 

LITIGATION CENTER, INC. 

1615 H Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20062 

(202) 463-5337 

JAN AMUNDSON 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 

OF MANUFACTURERS 

1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20004 

(202) 637-3055 

JAN WITOLD BARAN 

Counsel of Record, 

THOMAS W. KIRBY


LEE E. GOODMAN


CALEB P. BURNS


WILEY REIN & FIELDING LLP


1776 K Street, N.W. 


Washington, D.C. 20006 


(202) 719-7000 


Counsel for Appellants Chamber of 

Commerce of the United States, 

National Association of 

Manufacturers, Associated 

Builders and Contractors, Inc. 

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 

1. Whether the “electioneering communications” provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) 

(§§ 201, 203, 204, and 311), violate the right of business 

corporations and those who wish to hear their independent 

speech and associate with them under the First Amendment. 

2. Whether the “coordination” provisions of BCRA 

(§§ 202 and 214) violate the First Amendment rights of 

business corporations and those who wish to hear their speech 

and associate with them. 

(i) 
ii 

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 

The Appellants here, Plaintiffs in two of the eleven cases 

consolidated in the district court, represent the interests of 

American business and business corporations. The Appellants are the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, the 

National Association of Manufacturers, and the Associated 

Builders and Contractors, Inc. They are referred to herein as 

the “Business Plaintiffs.” 

• The Chamber of Commerce of the United States 

(“Chamber”) is the world’s largest not-for-profit 

business federation. Founded in 1912, the Chamber 

represents over 3,000,000 businesses and business 

associations. The Chamber is a corporation, as are many 

of its members and supporters, and it is exempt from 

taxation under § 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code. 

• The National Association of Manufacturers (“NAM”) is 

the oldest and largest broad-based industrial trade 

association in the United States. Its membership 

comprises 14,000 companies and 350 member associations, meaning that NAM represents about 18 million 

individuals. Like many trade associations, NAM is 

incorporated and is exempt from taxation under 

§ 501(c)(6). 

• The Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. (“ABC”) 

represents more than 23,000 contractors and related 

firms in the construction industry, both unionized and 

non-unionized, who share the view that work should be 

awarded and performed on the basis of merit, regardless 

of labor affiliation. ABC is funded primarily by 

membership dues and is exempt from taxation under 

§ 501(c)(6). ∗

∗ The Associated Builders and Contractors Political Action Committee 

(ABC PAC) and the U.S. Chamber Political Action Committee (U.S. 

Chamber PAC) will participate in this appeal as Appellees. 
iii 

The Appellees here, who collectively were Defendants in 

the district court, fall into two categories: the Government 

Defendants, comprising the Federal Election Commission 

(“FEC”), the Federal Communications Commission, and the 

United States of America; and the Intervenor Defendants, 

comprising Senator John McCain; Senator Russell Feingold; 

Representative Christopher Shays; Representative Martin 

Meehan; Senator Olympia Snowe; and Senator James Jeffords. They are referred to collectively herein as Defendants. 

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 

1. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 

America is a non-profit, non-stock corporation, exempt from 

taxation under I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). 

2. The National Association of Manufacturers is a nonprofit, non-stock corporation, exempt from taxation under 

I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). 

3. The Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. is a nonprofit, non-stock corporation, exempt from taxation under 

I.R.C. § 501(c)(6). 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED.......................................... i 

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS............................ ii 

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............. iii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................... vii 

OPINIONS BELOW...................................................... 1 

JURISDICTION ............................................................ 1 

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND 

STATUTORY PROVISIONS ................................... 1 

INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 4 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................................... 7 

Legal Background...................................................... 7 

BCRA’s Electioneering Communications Provision.. 8 

BCRA’s Coordination Provision ............................... 10 

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE 

SUBSTANTIAL ........................................................ 15 

I. BCRA’S ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT BUSINESS CORPORATIONS’ PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF ISSUES AND CANDIDATES 

THAT DOES NOT USE EXPLICIT WORDS 

TO EXPRESSLY ADVOCATE THE 

ELECTION OR DEFEAT OF A CLEARLY 

IDENTIFIED FEDERAL CANDIDATE 

VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT ........ 15 

A. 	 Buckley Holds That Campaign Finance 

Regulation Cannot Regulate Discussions 

Of Issues And Candidates That Do Not 

Contain Express Advocacy.......................... 16 

(v) 
vi 

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 

Page 

B.	 The Broadening Construction Imposed On 

The Backup Definition Of Electioneering 

Communication Was Not A Permissible 

Or Effective Cure For The Provision’s 

Vagueness .................................................... 18 

II. BCRA’S OVERBROAD AND VAGUE 

COORDINATION PROVISIONS ARE 

INFLICTING FIRST AMENDMENT HARM 

THAT MUST BE REMEDIED NOW .............. 20 

A. 	Before BCRA, The FEC And The Courts 

Had Correctly Recognized That Preservation Of Core First Amendment Values 

Required That Coordination Be Construed 

To Require An Element Of Agreement ....... 22 

B.	 By Rejecting The Constitutionally Mandated Requirement That Some Agreement 

Exist To Justify Treating Otherwise Independent Spending As A Contribution, 

BCRA’s Coordination Provisions Violate 

The First Amendment .................................. 24 

C. The Vagueness Challenge Is Justiciable...... 26 

1. 	 The Business Plaintiffs And Thousands 

Of Other Similar Entities Are Suffering 

Immediate And Ongoing First Amendment Injury............................................. 27 

2. 	The FEC’s Regulations Do Not Prevent Review ........................................... 28 

3. 	The Vagueness Of The Coordination 

Provisions Has Not Been Cured ............ 30 

CONCLUSION.............................................................. 31 

APPENDICES ............................................................... 1a 
vii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

CASES Page 

Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)....... 27 


Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)...................... passim 


Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Com­


mittee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)................... 11, 23 


CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)..................... 16 


Chamber of Commerce of the United States v.


Moore, 288 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 2002)...............7, 17, 18 


FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45


(D.D.C. 1999) .................................................... passim


FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) .... 19 


FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 


U.S. 238 (1986).................................................. passim 


Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 627 F.2d 375 (D.C. 


Cir. 1980) ........................................................... 29 


Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 


(1987)................................................................. 25 


United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715


(1966)................................................................. 29 


United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) .... 16 


Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United


States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) ....... 27 


CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, REGULATIONS 

Constitution of the United States First Amendment.................................................................... passim 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. 

L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81.............................. passim 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 


U.S.C. § 431 et seq.


2 U.S.C. § 434.................................................... 1 


2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(1) ......................................... 14 


2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(2) ......................................... 14 


2 U.S.C. § 438(e) ............................................... 31 

viii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 

Page 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)......................................... 10 


2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)......................................... 10 


2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B).................................... 


2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i)................................ 10, 23 


2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) ............................................. 10 


I.R.C. § 501(c)(6)............................................... ii, iii 


11 C.F.R. § 109.21(a)(2).................................... 30 


11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1).................................... 30 


11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e)......................................... 30 


MISCELLANEOUS 

13A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 3532.3 (2d ed. 1984) .............. 26 


65 Fed. Reg. 76,146 (Dec. 6, 2000)...................10, 12, 24 


147 Cong. Rec. S2704, 06-08, 10, 12-13 (daily


ed. Mar. 22, 2001).............................................. 19 


Statement For The Record By Commissioner 


Bradley A. Smith In FEC MUR 4624 (Nov. 6,


2001) .................................................................. 25 


2 
OPINIONS BELOW 

The district court’s opinions are not yet reported. See App. 

3a. As ordered by the Court, appellants are cooperating to 

prepare a single printed set of opinions. The district court’s 

Order staying the effect of its decision and the accompanying 

Memorandum Opinions are reprinted at App. 4a-20a. 

JURISDICTION 

The district court entered judgment on May 2, 2003. 

Appellants filed timely notice of appeal on May 7, 2003. 

Appellants’ notice of appeal is reprinted at App. 1a-2a. This 

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 403(a)(3) of BCRA. 

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND 

STATUTORY PROVISIONS 

1. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 

(“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002), is 

reprinted at App. 22a-85a. The two provisions on which this 

statement focuses are the following: 

Electioneering Communications 

Section 201(a) of BCRA amends the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (“FECA”) by 

adding the following to 2 U.S.C. § 434 as part of subsection (f): 

(3) ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS.—For 

purposes of this subsection— 

[PRIMARY DEFINITION] 

(A) IN GENERAL.—(i) The term “electioneering communication” means any broadcast, cable, or satellite 

communication which— 

(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal 

office; 

(II) is made within— 
2 

(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff 

election for the office sought by the candidate; or 

(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party 

that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the 

office sought by the candidate; and 

(III) in the case of a communication which refers to a 

candidate for an office other than President or Vice 

President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. 

[BACKUP DEFINITION] 

(ii) If clause (i) is held to be constitutionally insufficient 

by final judicial decision to support the regulation 

provided herein, then the term “electioneering 

communication” means any broadcast, cable, or satellite 

communication which promotes or supports a candidate 

for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that 

office (regardless of whether the communication 

expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) 

and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning 

other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific 

candidate. 

Coordination 

Section 214(a) of BCRA amended FECA, 2 U.S.C. 

§ 441a(a)(7)(B), by inserting after existing clause (i) and 

before the former clause (ii)—redesignated as clause (iii)— 

the following new clause (ii): 

(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a 

candidate or candidate’s authorized committee ) in 

cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the 

request or suggestion of, a national, State, or local 

committee; and 

Section 214(b), (c), and (d) of BCRA provide as follows: 

(b) REPEAL OF CURRENT REGULATIONS.—The 

regulations on coordinated communications paid for by 

persons other than candidates, authorized committees of 
3 

candidates, and party committees adopted by the Federal 

Election Commission and published in the Federal 

Register at page 76138 of volume 65, Federal Register, 

on December 6, 2000, are repealed as of the date by 

which the Commission is required to promulgate new 

regulations under subsection (c) (as described in section 

402(c)(1)). 

(c) REGULATIONS BY THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.—The Federal Election Commission shall promulgate new regulations on coordinated 

communications paid for by persons other than candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and party 

committees. The regulations shall not require agreement 

or formal collaboration to establish coordination. In 

addition to any subject determined by the Commission, 

the regulations shall address— 

(1) payments for the republication of campaign 

materials; 

(2) payments for the use of a common vendor; 

(3) payments for communications directed or made 

by persons who previously served as an employee of a 

candidate or a political party; and 

(4) payments for communications made by a person 

after substantial discussion about the communication 

with a candidate or a political party. 

(d) MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION OR EXPENDITURE FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 316.— 

Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act 

of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is amended by striking 

“shall include” and inserting “includes a contribution or 

expenditure, as those terms are defined in section 301, 

and also includes”. 

2. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution is 

reprinted at App. 21a. 
4 

INTRODUCTION 

The success and vitality of American business, and of the 

corporations by which most of America’s business is 

conducted, are critical to the welfare and happiness of the 

American people and to the security and stability of our 

nation. Corporations are primary employers, providing jobs, 

salaries, healthcare, retirement, and other benefits to most 

Americans; they produce much of our nation’s goods and 

wealth; and their stock and other securities are central to 

retirement and investment plans. Business corporations are 

profoundly affected by federal policy, legislation, and executive activity on a wide range of issues, ranging from tort 

reform to taxes, intellectual property to import controls, 

employment standards to environmental protection. As a 

result, all Americans, including American voters and government officials, as well as workers, retirees, investors, and 

consumers, have a vital (if not always fully appreciated) 

interest in hearing what corporations have to say about the 

key issues of the day. At the same time, American corporations have a compelling need to communicate their views 

and concerns to Americans, including federal and political 

party officials. The First Amendment’s fundamental rule that 

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 

speech, or the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” protects the rights of 

corporations to speak on public issues and of Americans 

generally to hear that speech. And this protection has its 

fullest and most urgent application to speech at election time 

when Americans are most focused on policy issues and are 

assessing candidates in light of policy positions. 

The Business Plaintiffs who join in this Jurisdictional 

Statement—the Chamber, NAM, and ABC—are three of the 

major incorporated associations through which American 

business and business corporations communicate with Americans and American government officials. Although the 

Business Plaintiffs do not always concur with one another on 
5 

matters of public policy, they speak with one voice—and in 

concord with such non-traditional allies as the AFL-CIO—in 

urging this Court to strike down portions of BCRA that 

directly violate their ability to speak, associate, and petition 

for policy purposes. 

First, BCRA’s so-called “electioneering communication” 

provisions should be reviewed and struck down in their 

entirety, and this Court should reaffirm its holdings that the 

“express advocacy” standard limits the scope of speech that 

may be restricted by campaign finance legislation, as well as 

fixing the clarity and precision with which any such standard 

must be defined. The district court properly rejected BCRA’s 

Primary Definition of “electioneering” that would broadly 

forbid any corporation or union to broadcast any reference to 

a candidate during the 30 days before a federal nominating 

event or the 60 days before a federal election.1 But it erroneously crafted an overbroad and vague Backup Definition 

under which corporations and unions may never spend 

treasury funds to broadcast any statement that may be deemed 

to “promote or support” or “attack or oppose” a candidate for 

federal office. 

The Backup Definition, created by District Judge Leon 

with the concurrence of District Judge Kollar-Kotelly by 

deleting key narrowing language, was not and would not have 

been authorized by Congress. And, in his May 19, 2003, 

opinion on the stay applications, even Judge Leon now 

recognizes that the standard he crafted fails to provide the 

“guidance” that the First Amendment requires, though he 

hopes that the FEC someday may save it by adopting 

1 In the case of candidates for Congress, a candidate could be mentioned if the speaker were assured that the broadcast could not be received 

by 50,000 persons in the relevant district or state. As to presidential 

candidates, the ban was nationwide and continued throughout the 

nominating year, beginning thirty days before the Iowa caucus in January. 
6 

clarifying regulations. But most fundamentally, by regulating 

speech that does not contain explicit words that expressly 

advocate the election or defeat of clearly identified candidates, the backup standard is constitutionally overbroad 

under this Court’s holdings in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 

(1976), and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 

U.S. 238 (1986) (“MCFL”). 

Second, the Court should review and strike down BCRA’s 

overbroad and vague provision that speech may be deemed 

“coordinated” with a candidate, campaign, or political party, 

and hence condemned as an unlawful contribution, even if 

there is no “agreement or formal collaboration” with the 

candidate concerning the speech. 

A narrow and clear definition of coordination is vital 

because the Business Plaintiffs and their policy allies—as 

well as many other participants in the federal legislative and 

policy process—meet almost daily with members of Congress 

and other federal and political party officials to develop 

policy initiatives and strategies, often on a long-term basis. 

Most members of Congress are candidates during most of 

their tenure, and many will become publicly identified with 

the issues they advance. If coordination can be alleged and 

found on something less than agreement, or if the standard 

otherwise is vague, the Business Plaintiffs will be forced to 

choose between associational activities that are essential to 

effective policy making and their core right to speak freely to 

the public on issues of public concern. This problem has bite 

right now because dealings with legislators, officers, or 

political parties today may foreclose speech in months to 

come. Because the Business Plaintiffs must decide now 

and on an ongoing day-to-day and minute-to-minute basis 

which contacts and discussions to engage in, they are 

constitutionally entitled to a narrow and clear standard of 

coordination that requires an element of agreement. 
7 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Legal Background 

In Buckley v. Valeo this Court held that campaign finance 

regulation is constitutionally confined to a narrow category of 

speech that employs explicit words such as “vote for” or 

“support” to expressly advocate the election or defeat of 

clearly identified candidates. 424 U.S. at 43-44, 79-80. Any 

attempt by campaign finance statutes to reach beyond such 

explicit and express advocacy to less pointed discussions 

of issues and candidates is constitutionally overbroad and 

forbidden. Id. at 42. Also forbidden in this area of exceptional First Amendment sensitivity is any standard enforced 

by criminal sanction that fails to provide objective, bright-line 

guidance as to what is permitted and what is forbidden. Id. at 

41. These holdings were expressly reaffirmed in MCFL, and 

have been uniformly understood by the U.S. courts of appeals 

to set First Amendment standards that limit federal and state 

campaign finance law and regulation.2 

Those who value regulation above freedom repeatedly 

have asserted that Buckley and MCFL did not understand, and 

could not have intended, the speech that would be unregulated under the express advocacy standard. But Buckley 

stressed that it did not “naively underestimate the ingenuity 

and resourcefulness” of persons subject to campaign finance 

regulation. Id. at 45. It simply was not willing to open a 

large or ill-defined loophole in the core prohibitions of the 

First Amendment. Accordingly, Buckley made explicit that: 

“So long as persons and groups eschew expenditures that in 

express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 

identified candidate, they are free to spend as much as they 

want to promote the candidate and his views.” Id. at 45. 

2 See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, 288 F.3d 

187 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 536 (2002) (collecting 

authority). 
8 

Reassured by this Court’s explicit recognition of their First 

Amendment right to independent advocacy, and limited in 

other avenues of speech and association, Americans of all 

points of view increasingly began to speak out about issues 

and candidates during the periodic intervals when public 

policy and officials are of greatest public interest – election 

season. Distressed by this robust and uninhibited public 

discussion, which often questioned the policies of incumbents 

and advanced the views of historically under funded 

challengers, Congress moved to suppress as much such 

activity as possible through the complex provisions of BCRA. 

This Statement focuses on two areas that BCRA regulates: 

“electioneering communications” and “coordination.” 

BCRA’s Electioneering Communications Provisions 

In BCRA Congress sought to expand the scope of regulated speech far beyond express advocacy to so-called “sham 

issue ads,” by creating and defining a new concept— 

“electioneering communications.” BCRA’s Primary Definition of electioneering communication included any broadcast 

speech occurring 30 days before a nominating event or 60 

days before an election that “refers to a clearly identified 

candidate for federal office,” provided that if the communication refers to a congressional candidate, it “can be 

received by 50,000 or more persons” in the district or state to 

be represented. BCRA § 201(a). References to a candidate 

for President or Vice-President were included as electioneering communications without regard to who or how many 

persons could receive them. Other provisions of BCRA then 

restricted electioneering communications in various ways. 

BCRA §§ 201, 202, 204. For example, corporations and 

unions were flatly forbidden to spend their treasury funds for 

any electioneering communication. BCRA § 203. 

The Primary Definition of electioneering communication 

was sweeping and Draconian. If an incumbent President who 

was seeking reelection moved to nationalize the steel mills or 
9 

seize the railroads or take over the nation’s docks during an 

election year, the affected corporations and unions could not 

lawfully make any broadcast that referred to the President. 

Similarly, members of Congress would be shielded from any 

broadcast reference during much of any year in which they 

sought reelection or election to other federal office. And, 

ironically, during critical periods corporations could not have 

referred to the very bills that sought to curtail their First 

Amendment freedoms since the bills’ popular names, “McCain-Feingold” and “Shays-Meehan,” refer to candidates. 

Aware that the Primary Definition was highly problematic, 

Congress took the extraordinary step of enacting a “Backup 

Definition.” It provided that if the Primary Definition “is 

held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial 

decision,” then electioneering communication means 

any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which 

promotes or supports a candidate for office, or attacks or 

opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of 

whether the communication expressly advocates a vote 

for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive 

of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to 

vote for or against a specific candidate. 

BCRA § 201(a). The Backup Definition explicitly rejects the 

express advocacy test adopted in Buckley. It does not depend 

on who receives the speech or when it occurs except to the 

extent that shifting circumstances may affect the judgment of 

whether the speech “promotes or supports” or “attacks or 

opposes” a candidate. 

A majority of the three-judge court held that the Primary 

Definition was constitutionally overbroad and invalid. Per 

Curiam Op. at 8. Judge Kollar-Kotelly disagreed. Id. Defendants have appealed that ruling and the Business Plaintiffs 

will defend it, but it is not the subject of this Statement. 

The district court’s treatment of the Backup Definition was 

more complex. Judge Henderson flatly rejected it; Judge 
10 

Kollar-Kotelly embraced it without separate comment; and 

Judge Leon initially held that part could be severed and saved 

so that any speech that “promotes or supports” or “attacks or 

opposes” a Federal candidate is restricted. Henderson, J., Op. 

at 219; Kollar-Kotelly, J., Op. at 476; Leon, J., Op. at 93-95. 

However, on May 19, in ruling on various motions for stay, 

Judge Leon acknowledged that the words “promote,” “support,” “attack,” and “oppose” in the Backup Definition do not 

provide sufficient “guidance” for speakers. See App. 19a. 

He said that the fault lay with the FEC, which had not 

adopted regulations to define those terms. Id. 

BCRA’s Coordination Provision 

BCRA’s second strategy for reducing speech about issues 

and candidates was to alter and expand FECA’s provisions 

relating to “coordination.” BCRA § 214(a) imposed a new 

substantive ban on coordination with political parties, as well 

as with candidates and campaigns. BCRA §§ 214(b) and (c) 

rejected a narrowing construction that a thoughtful U.S. District Court opinion had held to be constitutionally required, 

FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999), 

and that the FEC had ratified by regulation. See 65 Fed. Reg. 

76,146 (Dec. 6, 2000) (formerly codified at 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.23). The combined effect of the three clauses of § 214 

was to resurrect and intensify the constitutional issues that 

had seemed to be well on their way to resolution. 

A summary of the history of the coordination concept is 

useful. Under FECA, spending for speech that was “coordinated” with a candidate or campaign was deemed a regulated “contribution” to the campaign. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) 

(7)(B)(i). Some speakers, such as individuals and PACs, 

could make limited contributions and others, such as corporations and labor unions, were forbidden to make any 

contribution at all. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1), (2); 441b(a). 

However, the cost of creating and broadcasting a meaningful 

ad typically would exceed most applicable contribution limits 
11 

(excluding those of political parties). Thus, a charge of 

spending for coordinated speech translated directly into a 

charge of making unlawful criminal contributions. 

Such charges have proved easy to make and hard to dispel. 

Our democratic system of government requires persons active 

in shaping public policy and legislation to have ongoing 

contact with members of Congress (most of whom are 

candidates for reelection), as well as other candidates for 

federal office and their political parties. For example, the 

Business Plaintiffs and thousands of similar groups had (and 

have) daily contacts with candidates or party representatives 

in a wide range of circumstances. 

Because coordination was not narrowly, objectively, and 

precisely defined, persons and groups who sometimes speak 

on public issues faced a dilemma. They had to either (i) 

curtail communication and strategizing with those who shape 

public policy and legislation to preserve their right to speak 

freely, or (ii) curtail speech on issues or candidates that a 

policy critic, political opponent, or skeptical government 

enforcer might assert to be coordinated. Obviously, chilling 

contacts with federal officers interfered with fundamental 

First Amendment rights to petition, associate, and speak. 

And, chilling independent speech about public issues and 

candidates (subject to restrictions on express advocacy by 

corporations and labor unions) also strikes at the heart of the 

First Amendment. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-47; Colo. 

Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 

616 (1996). 

Matters came to a head in the late 1990s with a series of 

FEC enforcement actions directed at supposedly coordinated 

speech. For example, the FEC launched a massive proceeding against a group of pro-business associations, including the 

Business Plaintiffs, known as The Coalition who had joined 

together to respond to a $35 million ad campaign by the AFLCIO. See generally Henderson, J., Op. at 134-37. After years 
12 

of litigation, the U.S. district court for the District of 

Columbia in Christian Coalition ruled that, under the principles of Buckley, coordination had to be narrowly defined to 

require an element of agreement or formal coordination. The 

FEC elected not to appeal and, instead, promulgated 

regulations to codify the district court’s constitutional holding. See 65 Fed. Reg. 76,146 (Dec. 6, 2000) (formerly 

codified at 11 C.F.R. § 100.23). Based on the narrowed and 

clarified definition of coordination, the FEC then terminated 

its proceeding against The Coalition, as well as a parallel 

proceeding against the AFL-CIO.3 

BCRA sought to expand the restrictions on coordination in 

two ways. First, § 214(a) of BCRA added a new provision 

under which expenditures coordinated with a “national, State, 

or local committee of a political party, shall be considered 

contributions made to such party.” Because other provisions 

of BCRA and FECA forbid corporate and labor union 

contributions to such political committees, this provision 

makes problematic any contacts, discussions, or information 

exchanges with representatives of political party committees, 

including most of the leadership in Congress. 

Second, § 214(b) and (c) of BCRA repealed the FEC’s 

coordination regulations that had been enacted to codify the 

constitutional holding that agreement is required, ordering the 

FEC to adopt new regulations that “shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination.” 

3

 The district court opinions of Judges Kollar-Kotelly and Leon contain 

findings dealing not with the question of whether the activities of The 

Coalition were coordinated with candidates but, instead, with whether the 

ads of The Coalition had the subjective purpose of influencing the election 

or defeat of candidates. Many of these findings rest on a report of the 

FEC General Counsel that was compiled without the participation of The 

Coalition, based on information that was not disclosed to The Coalition, 

and that was not itself adopted by the Commission. At an appropriate 

time, the Business Plaintiffs will respond to those findings, demonstrating 

that they are factually and legally unfounded. 
13 

However, the statutory provisions under which spending for 

speech that is coordinated with a candidate, campaign, and 

now with a party, is deemed a contribution remain selfenforcing, whether or not regulations are adopted. In fact, 

new FEC regulations took effect after this case had been 

submitted and, indeed, after the date that the district court had 

indicated its opinion would issue. Per Curiam Op. at 166 

n.98 (discussing 60 day congressional review period). The 

new regulations do not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination. 

These changes raised two related but distinct issues: 

overbreadth and vagueness. All of the judges reached the 

merits of the overbreadth issue, but they differed on its 

resolution. Judge Henderson concluded that, in the absence 

of an agreement of some kind with a candidate, campaign, or 

party, there is no basis for depriving independent speech of its 

independent status. Henderson, J., Op. at 252-56. Thus, she 

held that the coordination provisions were overbroad. Id. at 

256. Judges Leon and Kollar-Kotelly, however, believed that 

other factors, such as a candidate’s unilateral suggestion or 

concern expressed during consultation, would mean that a 

candidate would value independent speech to such an extent 

that it could be regulated as a contribution. Per Curiam Op. at 

152-54. 

Finding the coordination provisions overbroad, Judge 

Henderson had no need to focus on the issue of vagueness. 

But Judges Leon and Kollar-Kotelly did have to deal with 

that issue. They agreed that the First Amendment compels a 

clear definition of coordination. However, they said that the 

FEC’s new coordination regulations might provide such 

clarity, and they ruled that BCRA § 403(a) did not give them 

jurisdiction to examine those regulations. Id. at 148-49, 167.4 

4

 The objection of Judges Leon and Kollar-Kotelly was that they lacked 

jurisdiction to evaluate the FEC coordination regulations. Accordingly, 

they raised no issue about the adequacy of the briefing, nor did they 
14 

Thus, they held that the vagueness issue was non-justiciable 

until the Business Plaintiffs first pursue a challenge to the 

FEC’s new regulations before a single district judge under the 

Administrative Procedure Act. Id. 

Judges Leon and Kollar-Kotelly did not explain why 

the jurisdiction over an entire “action” granted by BCRA 

§ 403(a) does not permit the court to evaluate the meaning or 

validity of regulations that are offered as a defense to a claim 

that a provision of BCRA is overbroad or vague. They did 

not discuss the practical fact that, because BCRA § 403 gives 

the special court it creates the exclusive power to entertain 

constitutional challenges to the statute, a judge in an APA 

action could not even grant preliminary relief against the 

coordination provisions of the BCRA. Nor did they explain 

how their refusal to decide this issue conforms to BCRA 

§ 403’s command that the constitutional issues be resolved as 

quickly as possible. Judge Henderson, by contrast, correctly 

ruled that “piecemeal and delayed review of [Plaintiffs’] 

constitutional claims [concerning coordination] would defeat 

BCRA’s mandate that judicial consideration of such claims 

‘shall be . . . expedite[d] to the greatest possible extent.’” 

Henderson, J., Op. at 255 n.160. 

request any supplemental briefing regarding the newly promulgated 

regulations. They also suggested that the FEC’s advisory opinion process 

negated ripeness. Per Curiam Op. at 149. 

The FEC is allowed up to 60 days to respond to an advisory opinion 

request. 2 U.S.C. § 437f(a)(1). An expedited 20-day response time is 

provided for if the advisory opinion request is made within 60 days of an 

election. Id. § 437f(a)(2). However, this expedited process is only available to candidates, and unavailable to the entities that are regulated by the 

electioneering communication provision. At the same time, issue ads are 

crafted and revised to speak to the moment. It is not unusual for revisions 

to be made during final taping or editing within hours of airing the ads. 
15 

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE SUBSTANTIAL 

The two issues that the Business Plaintiffs present—the 

constitutionality of the judicially modified and expanded 

Backup Definition of electioneering communication and of 

the coordination provisions—lie at the heart of BCRA. The 

fundamental disagreements among the three district court 

judges as to both issues are powerful evidence that they are 

substantial, as is the district court’s decision to stay all of 

those rulings pending review by this Court. Indeed, Congress 

demanded such a special court, provided for expedited litigation and appeal procedures, and adopted a Backup Definition of electioneering communication, precisely because it 

knew that BCRA was in serious tension with the constitutional holdings of this Court. 

I. BCRA’S ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT BUSINESS 

CORPORATIONS’ PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF 

ISSUES AND CANDIDATES THAT DOES NOT 

USE EXPLICIT WORDS TO EXPRESSLY 

ADVOCATE THE ELECTION OR DEFEAT OF 

A CLEARLY IDENTIFIED FEDERAL CANDIDATE VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 

Both the Primary and Backup Definitions of electioneering 

communication seek to impose campaign finance regulation 

on independent speech that does not use explicit words to 

expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate. Both definitions rest on the false 

premise that Buckley and MCFL imposed the express 

advocacy standard only to cure vagueness and not to protect 

issue advocacy from impermissible regulation. This is 

wishful thinking. In fact, both opinions held that, in our 

democracy, speech about issues and candidates cannot be 

suppressed unless its explicit wording expressly advocates an 

electoral outcome. 

But even if Congress theoretically could enact a sufficiently clear alternative to the express advocacy standard, 
16 


the judicially modified and expanded Backup Definition 

crafted by Judge Leon with the acquiescence of Judge KollarKotelly cannot stand. To begin with, there is no authority for 

the courts to broaden speech regulation to cure ambiguity; the 

practice is to narrow so that what is restricted is within 

Congress’s intent. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 

U.S. 675, 680 (1985) (narrowing must not “trench upon the 

legislative powers”); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 

(1986) (narrowing does not allow “perverting the purpose of 

a statute”). Certainly, broadening is not proper where, as 

here, Congress specifically indicated that one or the other of 

two alternative standards should be employed, and that is 

even truer where, as here, the judicially eliminated language 

was the heart of the provision. But beyond that, the 

broadening construction adopted by Judges Leon and KollarKotelly does not solve the vagueness problem. To the 

contrary, Judge Leon himself recognized in his stay opinion 

that words such as “promote,” “support,” “attack,” and “oppose” do not provide the “guidance” that the First Amendment requires. See App. 19a. 

In sum, there are substantial reasons for rejecting the entire 

concept of regulating electioneering communications and for 

rejecting the broadening construction of the Backup 

Definition adopted by the district court here. 

A. Buckley Holds That Campaign Finance Regulation Cannot Regulate Discussions Of Issues 

And Candidates That Do Not Contain Express 

Advocacy. 

Buckley analyzed two statutory provisions for narrow 

tailoring and clarity. The first provision regulated speech 

“relative to” a candidate. 424 U.S. at 41-43. The Court 

found that other portions of the FECA narrowed the “relative 

to” phrase to speech “advocating the election or defeat of a 

candidate.” Id. at 42. But that was not a constitutionally 

adequate standard, both because of vagueness and because 
17 

“the distinction between discussions of issues and candidates 

and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often 

dissolve in practical application,” so that “discussions of 

issues and candidates” might be burdened. Id. Buckley held 

that these “constitutional deficiencies” could be avoided 

“only by reading [relative to] as limited to communications 

that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat 

of a candidate.” Id. at 43-44. In other words, the express 

advocacy standard was adopted to avoid burdening what we 

now call “issue ads.” 

The second phrase analyzed by Buckley was “for the 

purpose of . . . influencing” the nomination or election of a 

candidate. Id. at 79. Like the first provision, this phrase had 

the “potential for encompassing both issue discussion and 

advocacy of a political result.” Id. at 79. But Buckley already 

had ruled that speech short of express advocacy may not be 

subjected to campaign finance regulation. Accordingly, “[t]o 

insure that the reach of [the phrase] is not impermissibly 

broad,” this Court construed it to reach only express 

advocacy. Id. at 79-80 (emphasis added). 

MCFL confirmed that the express advocacy sets the 

permissible scope of speech restrictions in campaign finance 

statutes. Justice Brennan, who had some familiarity with 

Buckley, explained for the Court that the express advocacy 

standard was adopted “to avoid problems of overbreadth.” 

479 U.S. at 248. It achieved this objective, as well as curing 

vagueness, by preventing regulation of discussion of issues 

and candidates that did not employ explicit words of express 

advocacy. Id. at 248-49. 

The U.S. courts of appeals uniformly have understood 

Buckley and MCFL to set the constitutional limits of campaign finance regulation, rather than merely one way to 

clarify particular statutory language. Most recently in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, the Court of 

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stressed “Buckley’s emphasis on 
18 

(1) the need for a bright-line rule demarcating the government’s authority to regulate speech and (2) the need to 

ensure that regulation does not impinge on protected issue 

advocacy.” 288 F.3d at 193. 

Because the Primary and Backup Definitions, however 

construed, subject fully protected speech to such regulation, 

the entire electioneering communications concept should be 

struck down. 

B. 	The Broadening Construction Imposed On The 

Backup Definition Of Electioneering Communication Was Not A Permissible Or Effective 

Cure For The Provision’s Vagueness. 

Once the district court majority struck down the Primary 

Definition of electioneering communication, they had to 

confront the Backup Definition, which encompassed speech 

that “promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or 

attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of 

whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or 

against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no 

plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or 

against a specific candidate.” BCRA § 201(a). Judge Leon 

agreed with Judge Henderson that, as written, the Backup 

Definition was invalid. Per Curiam Op. at 8. However, he 

attributed this invalidity to vagueness in the final clause 

which narrowed the definition to speech which also is 

“suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation 

to vote” for or against a specific candidate. Leon, J., Op. at 

93-95. Judge Leon decided to sever that provision, thus 

broadening the Backup Definition to restrict all speech that 

“supports,” “promotes,” “opposes,” or “attacks” a candidate 

for federal office. Id. That holding was mistaken on many 

grounds. First, as discussed above, there is no authority for 

curing vagueness by broadening a speech restriction Congress 

intended to be more narrow. Nor is it permissible to sever the 
19 

heart of a provision and leave peripheral matters standing. 

Yet this is what occurred here. 

The backup definition originated with Senator Specter, 

who introduced it on the floor of the Senate. 147 Cong. Rec. 

S2704 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2001). He explained that Congress 

should respect the constitutional holdings of the federal 

courts, and that the only federal appellate opinion to interpret 

Buckley to reach speech that lacked explicit words of 

advocacy was, in his view, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 

FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987). Id. at S2706. 

He construed Furgatch, with some support from its text, to 

permit regulation of speech that lacked explicit words of 

express advocacy, but that suggested no other plausible 

meaning but an exhortation to vote in a particular way. Id. 

He said that his amendment “would take the Furgatch 

language and add it as an additional definition.” Id. During 

the subsequent debates, he repeatedly referred to what 

became the Backup Definition as the Furgatch standard, e.g., 

id. at S2707-08, S2710, S2712-13, and stressed his view that 

the proviso was what made the Backup Definition 

constitutionally precise. Id. This debate expressly addressed 

the issue of severability. Senator Spector explained; “we 

have Snow-Jeffords [the Primary Definition], or Furgatch, 

and if one of them measures up, then the statute survives.” 

Id. at S2713. At no point did he or any other Senator ever 

place any weight on the “support,” “promote,” “oppose,” or 

“attack” language that the district court proposes to impose as 

the entire definition or suggest that they desired any such 

standard in the absence of the Furgatch language. 

Moreover, the severed judgment is even more vague than 

the full Backup Definition, requiring speakers to predict 

whether speech will be perceived to “support” or “oppose” a 

candidate. Consider, for example, the statement that “Candidate X voted to support the war in Iraq.” In some circles 

that may be high praise; in other circles it may be a serious 

attack. Moreover, the perception of that statement might vary 
20 

sharply with rapidly developing external circumstances. On 

days when the matters in Iraq were going well, the statement 

might be perceived differently than on days when a severe 

sandstorm and concerns about extended supply lines dominated the news. The whole point of Buckley’s demand for 

explicit words of express advocacy was to provide an 

objective standard independent of circumstances or listener 

perceptions. Thus, in his opinion concerning a stay, Judge 

Leon belatedly acknowledged that his broadened Backup 

Definition does not provide the “guidance” that the First 

Amendment requires, though he expressed the hope that future FEC regulations might cure the problem. See App. 19a. 

Judge Leon’s suggestion that speakers avoid uncertainty by 

not referring to candidates, Leon, J., Op. at 95, proposes the 

injury for which vagueness is condemned. No doubt this 

practical consideration was behind Judge Leon’s belated 

recognition that, in fact, the modified Backup Definition is 

unconstitutionally vague and should not be given effect. 

II. 	BCRA’S OVERBROAD AND VAGUE COORDINATION PROVISIONS ARE INFLICTING 

FIRST AMENDMENT HARM THAT MUST BE 

REMEDIED NOW. 

The district court’s divided ruling concerning BCRA’s 

“coordination” provisions also presents a substantial issue for 

review. The dispute is not over the basic concept. No one 

questions that spending may be sufficiently coordinated with 

a candidate, campaign, or party, that it functions as a contribution and, hence, should count against contribution limits. 

Buckley so held. 424 U.S. at 46. Instead, the key dispute is 

over how broadly the coordination net may reach without 

impermissibly burdening core First Amendment rights to 

speak, petition, and associate. A related but distinct dispute is 

the extent to which BCRA § 403 permits an evaluation of 

FEC regulations that are offered in defense of a provision that 

is alleged to be unconstitutionally vague. Defendants clearly 
21 

perceived the coordination issue as substantial and directed a 

great deal of their discovery efforts to exploring when and 

how possible coordinating contacts occur. 

All members of the district court agreed that the First 

Amendment requires that coordination be narrowly and 

precisely defined. As to whether the BCRA’s definition is 

overbroad, the judges disagreed. Judge Henderson concluded 

that BCRA’s coordination provisions were unconstitutionally 

overbroad because they permitted coordination to be established without the constitutionally essential element of agreement. Henderson, J., Op. at 252-53. She also held overbroad 

the provision that mere “consultation” without agreement 

could establish coordination. Id. at 253-56. Accordingly, she 

did not focus on the issue of vagueness. 

Judges Leon and Kollar-Kotelly disagreed that the First 

Amendment requires that coordination be based on an 

element of agreement or that mere consultation could not be 

an adequate basis for finding coordination. Per Curiam Op. at 

149-54. They took the view that, if other factors showed that 

a candidate or political party highly valued independent 

speech, it could be regulated as a contribution even if there 

were no element of agreement. Id. at 152-54. They further 

ruled that Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge was not justiciable 

since the FEC had promulgated regulations dealing with 

coordination and, in their view, BCRA § 403(a) did not 

give them jurisdiction to evaluate those regulations. Id. at 

148-49, 167. 

Simply stated, Judge Henderson was right to reach and 

decide the matter by holding the coordination provisions to be 

unconstitutional. Only an element of agreement can convert 

independent speech into a contribution. Alternatively, BCRA 

§ 403(a) gives the Court adequate authority to examine the 

new FEC regulations and determine whether they are 

sufficient to cure the vagueness challenge. 
22 

A. 	Before BCRA, The FEC And The Courts Had 

Correctly Recognized That Preservation Of 

Core First Amendment Values Required That 

Coordination Be Construed To Require An 

Element Of Agreement. 

As “issue ads” became more common during the 1990s, so 

did charges that the ads had been coordinated with candidates 

or campaigns so that spending on the ads would constitute 

unlawful contributions. Because only political parties had 

contribution limits high enough to finance meaningful speech 

—individuals were limited to $1,000 and corporations and 

labor unions were not allowed to contribute at all—such 

charges were potent weapons. 

The basic problem was, and is, that in our democratic 

system, government and policy is developed through ongoing 

contact and cooperation with legislators, most of whom are 

candidates most of the time, executive officials serving the 

President and Vice-President who often are candidates, and 

political party representatives. Through this process public 

needs are identified, possible solutions are formulated, laws 

and regulations are drafted and critiqued, and advocacy 

strategies are devised and implemented. Ad hoc alliances and 

coalitions are formed to pursue shared objectives. The 

process can take years, or even decades, during which 

repeated elections will occur. This entire process involves 

speech, association, and petitioning activities that are at the 

core of the First Amendment. 

Participants in this process also have and often exercise 

their right to speak publicly about issues and candidates. Not 

surprisingly, they often talk about the issues that they have 

been pursuing through the processes just described. And the 

natural and most effective time for such public speech is 

when Americans otherwise are focused on issues of public 

policy and governance—during election campaigns. 
23 

The FECA provided that any speech made “in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion 

of” a candidate or campaign was deemed coordinated. 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). For most of the 1990’s, no 

judicial decision or FEC regulations imposed a narrowing 

construction, and FEC statements suggested an expansive 

reading. As a result, during the mid- to late-1990s, the FEC 

pursued a number of massive enforcement proceedings based 

on broad constructions of coordination. 

One of these coordination-based proceedings was MUR 

4624, in which the FEC targeted “The Coalition,” an ad hoc 

group of pro-business interests, including the Business 

Plaintiffs, that raised and spent about $5 million during 1996 

to produce and broadcast ads responding to a $35 million ad 

campaign of the AFL-CIO. See generally Henderson, J., Op. 

at 134-37. The complaint premised the charge of coordination on press reports that a Congressman had given a public 

speech saying that the business community should find some 

way to respond to the AFL-CIO and on the fact that 

representatives of the Business Plaintiffs and similar groups 

met regularly with members of Congress, including the one 

who gave the speech, in the Thursday Group to strategize in 

support of the legislative agenda popularly known as the 

Contract with America. In that proceeding, hundreds of thousands of sensitive documents were demanded, dozens of intrusive depositions were taken, and significant legal expenses 

were incurred. 

In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. 

FEC, this Court said that “simply calling an independent 

expenditure a ‘coordinated expenditure’ cannot (for constitutional purposes) make it one,” 518 U.S. at 621-22, and that 

speech not made “pursuant to any particular or general 

understanding with a candidate” was not coordinated, id. U.S. 

at 614, though the latter point was not developed. The 

constitutional issues raised by FECA’s broad coordination 

provision first received full judicial consideration in FEC v. 
24 

Christian Coalition. Drawing on Buckley and related cases, 

the district court held that the right to spend money on one’s 

own speech could be classified and limited as a contribution 

only if there was sufficient agreement with a candidate or 

campaign that the speech actually functioned as a 

contribution. 52 F. Supp. 2d at 83-92. 

The FEC acquiesced in the Christian Coalition narrowing 

construction and issued regulations to codify it. 65 Fed. Reg. 

76,146 (Dec. 6, 2000) (formerly codified at 11 C.F.R. 

§ 100.23). Then, because neither the complaint against The 

Coalition nor its massive investigation disclosed any agreement between The Coalition and any candidate or campaign, 

the FEC dismissed the complaint, closing that proceeding and 

other similar proceedings. The burdens of the investigation, 

including the intrusiveness of the inquiry as well as the cost 

and disruption, had led members to withdraw their support, 

and The Coalition closed down. Henderson, J., Op. at 136. 

However, the FEC’s recognition that an element of agreement 

is necessary to transform independent speech into a contribution was a useful and important step in narrowing and 

clarifying the coordination provisions. 

B.	 By Rejecting The Constitutionally Mandated 

Requirement That Some Agreement Exist To 

Justify Treating Otherwise Independent Spending As A Contribution, BCRA’s Coordination 

Provisions Violate The First Amendment. 

BCRA §§ 202 and 214 attempt to classify spending on 

independent speech, which cannot constitutionally be limited, 

as contributions, which are tightly limited, in the absence of 

the agreement necessary to justify that result. This broadened 

definition of coordination applies both to FECA’s limitation 

on candidate contributions and BCRA’s new limitation on 
25 

coordination with political parties, even where no candidate is 

involved.5 

Section 214(a) pointedly defines “coordination” with a 

political party by using the same language—“cooperation, 

consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion 

of”—that FECA had used with respect to candidates and 

campaigns and that Christian Coalition had held unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. To underscore the insistence on the broad statutory definition of coordination, rather 

than the narrowing construction adopted in Christian 

Coalition and written into the FEC’s regulations, § 214(b) 

repeals those regulations. And lest there be any thought that 

the broad statutory definition might again be construed to 

require agreement, § 214(c) specifies that any new FEC 

regulations “shall not require agreement or formal collaboration to establish coordination.” 

Settled principles require that these related clauses be 

understood as a whole. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 

U.S. 41, 51 (1987). Taken together, they reject the narrowing 

construction of “coordination” adopted by Christian Coalition and the FEC regulations based on that construction and 

reaffirm that coordination extends to any speech “in 

cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request or 

suggestion of” a candidate or campaign, whether or not there 

is any agreement. Moreover, because § 214(c) also rules out 

5 Section 202(a) provides that spending on an “electioneering communication” may be coordinated. The reason for so specifying is that it is 

obvious that not all spending coordinated with a candidate is the functional equivalent of a contribution. For example, a member of Congress 

who technically is a candidate may support a local library fund, and other 

fund supporters may coordinate speech saying “Give to the Library.” 

There is a strong view, most forcefully advocated by FEC Commissioner 

Smith, that coordinated spending on speech may be deemed a contribution 

to a campaign only if the speech contains express advocacy. Statement 

For The Record By Commissioner Bradley A. Smith In FEC MUR 4624 

(Nov. 6, 2001) (available from the FEC’s public file). 
26 

“formal collaboration” (emphasis added) as a standard, its 

failure to apply any similar limiting term to “agreement” 

shows that the term is used comprehensively. No element of 

agreement, formal or informal, express or implied, can be 

required. Instead, the standard is acting in “cooperation, 

consultation, or concert with,” or at “the request or suggestion 

of” a candidate, campaign, or political party. 

All three members of the district court reached the 

overbreadth issue. The majority concluded that excluding 

agreement did not create overbreadth. Per Curiam Op. at 

149-54. However, Judge Henderson correctly concluded that 

BCRA’s overbreadth violates the First Amendment. Henderson, J., Op. at 248 (BCRA’s coordination provisions are 

overbroad because “many of the expenditures BCRA defines 

as ‘coordinated’ are not ‘disguised contributions’”). If speech 

is not the product of some agreement with a candidate, 

campaign, or party, then it is not functionally a contribution. 

The speech is independent and cannot constitutionally be 

limited. Id. Nor can mere “consultation,” so long as it does 

not rise to the level of agreement, convert fully protected 

independent speech into a functional contribution. Id. at 246-

50. The same reasoning would apply to a mere “suggestion” 

that does not lead to some element of agreement. Because of 

this plain and congressionally mandated overbreadth without 

regard to vagueness, BCRA’s coordination provisions are 

unconstitutional. 

C. The Vagueness Challenge Is Justiciable. 

Because First Amendment values are so important, the 

courts strain to find that arguable First Amendment claims are 

justiciable. 13A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 3532.3 (2d ed. 1984). That policy applies 

with special force where, as here, the violations involve the 

basic processes by which our democracy functions, our laws 

are formed, and our leaders are selected. Recognizing as 

much, BCRA § 403(a) directs the court to “expedite to the 
27 


greatest possible extent” the resolution of any action “to 

challenge the constitutionality of any provision” of BCRA. 

Thus, if such a challenge meets the constitutional minima for 

exercise of the judicial power, it should be held justiciable. 

The basic constitutional requirement for exercise of the 

judicial power is a genuine case or controversy presented by a 

plaintiff with standing. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United 

States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000). Those 

requirements are met here. Moreover, to the extent that 

prudential ripeness concerns apply here, a pre-enforcement 

challenge to a statute is ripe where it is justified by the 

“hardship to the parties of withholding [judicial] consideration,” or where further agency action will not affect the 

dispositive statutory analysis. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 

U.S. 136, 149 (1967). In this case an injured Plaintiff presents a clear controversy, considerations of hardship mandate 

a decision now, and Defendants have not shown that the FEC 

regulations cure the vagueness of the coordination provision. 

1. 	 The Business Plaintiffs And Thousands Of 

Other Similar Entities Are Suffering Immediate And Ongoing First Amendment 

Injury. 

BCRA’s vague and overbroad definition of coordination 

has bite right now because the Business Plaintiffs and 

thousands of similar entities deal with members of Congress, 

government officials, and representatives of political parties 

on a daily basis. Henderson, J., Op. at 255. Similarly, the 

Business Plaintiffs and other similar entities regularly 

participate in funding independent speech on issues of concern to them. Leon, J., Op. 329-44 (examples of “genuine” 

issue ads during pre-election periods). As each potential 

contact with a candidate, campaign, or party official arises, 

the Business Plaintiffs must decide whether to proceed with 

the contact and accept resulting limits on future speech or to 
28 

decline the contact to preserve future speech rights. Either 

way, core First Amendment rights are at stake. 

Judges Leon and Kollar-Kotelly do not deny the dilemma 

but say that they see no reason why it is more acute now than 

before. Per Curiam Op. at 146. In part they are right. The 

situation created by BCRA does resemble the situation during 

the 1990s, though it is worse because (i) the concept of 

coordination now also applies to political parties and “electioneering communications,” and (ii) the Business Plaintiffs 

then at least had the argument that agreement is an essential 

element of coordination, an argument BCRA rejects. More 

fundamentally, however, the vague and overbroad standard 

that prevailed in the 1990s caused serious injury to the 

Business Plaintiffs, and the threat of similar injury is chilling 

First Amendment activity now. Henderson, J., Op. at 255; 

Leon, J., Op. at 329-45 (examples of ongoing issue speech). 

2. 	 The FEC’s Regulations Do Not Prevent 

Review. 

Nearly 10 months after the complaints were filed, the FEC 

issued regulations defining BCRA’s concept of “coordination.” Per Curiam Op. at 166 n.98. Nearly 2 months after 

the case was submitted—and after the Court had indicated it 

would issue its ruling—those regulations became final. Id. 

District Judges Leon and Kollar-Kotelly then ruled that the 

vagueness challenges were non-justiciable because the 

regulations theoretically might have provided a cure and 

BCRA § 403(a) did not allow them to evaluate the regulations 

to determine whether or not that had occurred. Per Curiam 

Op. at 148-49, 167. That was error. 

Defendants’ claim that the new regulations cure the obvious facial vagueness of the coordination provisions is a 

matter of defense that can and should be resolved in this 

action. BCRA § 403(a) gives the three-judge district court 

jurisdiction of any “action” brought to “challenge the constitutionality of any provision” of BCRA. Surely the power 
29 


to decide such an action includes the power to evaluate 

defenses offered in opposition to a constitutional challenge to 

a provision of BCRA. Indeed, under United Mine Workers v. 

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), a grant of jurisdiction 

generally encompasses all logically related components of a 

dispute. 

Thus, there is no basis for the ruling that the regulations 

can only be evaluated in a proceeding before a single judge 

under the Administrative Procedure Act. Moreover, such a 

proceeding would be seriously impractical. Because BCRA 

§ 403(a) assigns exclusive jurisdiction over such issues to a 

three-judge court, a single judge court could not consider the 

validity of the statute. Thus, the validity of the regulations 

would have to be fully litigated first, and then a separate 

action would have to be brought to challenge the statute. 

What would happen if new regulations were adopted while 

the second statutory challenge was under way is anyone’s 

guess, but clearly the situation would be unfair and 

impractical. More importantly, it is contrary to the command 

of BCRA § 403(a) that constitutional challenges to the statute 

be resolved swiftly. Henderson, J., Op. at 255 n.160.6 

6

 The Per Curiam Opinion’s reliance on Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 

627 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1980), is unfounded. Per Curiam Op. at 161-66. 

There a corporation and its PAC challenged as vague a provision permitting them to “solicit” hourly employees only twice a year. Id. at 382. 

Plaintiffs alleged “that their behavior has thus far conformed to the 

statutory mandate [and] make no allegation of an intention imminent or 

otherwise to violate the statute, and the [FEC had] no cause to commence 

enforcement, nor even to threaten enforcement, of the challenged statutory 

provisions.” Id. at 382-83. Instead, the case presented a long-term issue 

with no present impact. On those facts, the court concluded that, because 

there was no “urgency of decision,” id. at 388, and the FEC’s advisory 

opinion process “offer[ed] a prompt means of resolving doubts with 

respect to the statute’s reach,” id. at 384, that could “be pursued at little 

risk to the rights asserted,” id. at 386, the doctrine of ripeness counseled 

“against constitutional adjudication on a barren record.” Id. at 385. Here, 
30 


3. 	 The Vagueness Of The Coordination Provisions Has Not Been Cured. 

Buckley holds that restrictions on political speech concerning public issues and candidates that threaten criminal 

penalties must be exceptionally clear, precise, and objective. 

424 U.S. at 41. The express advocacy standard illustrates 

what is required. Id. at 39-40. BCRA’s definition of coordinated speech as speech made “in cooperation, consultation, 

or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of” a candidate, campaign, or party falls woefully short of the required 

standard. 

Even the quickest glance at the FEC’s coordination 

provisions reveals that the vagueness of the statute has not 

been cured, or even seriously addressed, in critical respects. 

For example, 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1) continues to include as 

“coordinated” any independent speech “at the request or suggestion of a candidate or an authorized committee, political 

party committee, or agent.”7 And 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(e) 

emphasizes that this standard must not be understood to 

require any element of agreement. Accordingly, so far as 

appears, whenever a candidate, campaign, or political party 

expresses any desire or suggestion relating to possible 

independent speech, that speech then becomes problematic. 

Surely something much narrower was intended, but that 

simply demonstrates the vagueness of the regulation. 

by contrast, the record is clear that the Business Plaintiffs and many 

similar entities engage in a wide variety of contacts with legislators and 

other federal and party officials that, if not properly structured and 

limited, will preclude independent issue advocacy in the future. Thus, the 

problem is urgent, the advisory process offers no plausible assistance, and 

the case is before this Court on a full record and under a statutory mandate 

of prompt resolution. 

7

 The speech also must satisfy certain vague and overbroad content 

standards, such as constituting an “electioneering message.” 11 C.F.R. 

§ 109.21(a)(2). 
31 

Importantly, BCRA’s coordination provisions are selfenforcing. Whether or not valid regulations exist, if a 

Business Plaintiff makes an expenditure that is “coordinated,” 

a corporate contribution results, a political opponent may file 

a complaint and, if the FEC does not pursue the matter with 

satisfactory vigor, may seek judicial review. While 

compliance with a regulation is a defense, 2 U.S.C. § 438(e), 

violation of a vague regulation leaves the speaker exposed to 

full penalties. 

Because the Business Plaintiffs and thousands of similar 

entities interact with federal legislators, officials, and political 

parties on almost a daily basis, these vague and self-executing 

provisions, backed up by criminal sanctions, force them to 

hedge and trim and steer clear of fully protected activity. 

This is unconstitutional. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should note probable 

jurisdiction. 

Of counsel 

STEPHEN A. BOKAT 

NATIONAL CHAMBER 

LITIGATION CENTER, INC. 

1615 H Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20062 

(202) 463-5337 

JAN AMUNDSON 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 

OF MANUFACTURERS 

1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20004 

(202) 637-3055 

Respectfully Submitted, 

JAN WITOLD BARAN 

Counsel of Record, 

THOMAS W. KIRBY


LEE E. GOODMAN


CALEB P. BURNS


WILEY REIN & FIELDING LLP


1776 K Street, N.W. 


Washington, D.C. 20006 


(202) 719-7000 


Counsel for Appellants Chamber 

of Commerce of the United 

States, National Association of 

Manufacturers, Associated 

Builders and Contractors, Inc. 
1a 

APPENDIX A 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-0582 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

(and related cases) 

———— 

SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDEFLAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-0751 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDEFLAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

NOTICE OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES 

Notice is hereby given that the following plaintiffs in these 

cases hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the United 

States from any and all adverse rulings incorporated in, antecedent to or ancillary to the final judgment of the three-judge 

district court entered in this action on May 2, 2003: Chamber 

of Commerce of the United States, National Association of 

Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber Political Action Committee, 
2a 

Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., and Associated 

Builders & Contractors Political Action Committee. 

This appeal is taken pursuant to section 403(a)(3) of the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

155, 116 Stat. 81, 114. 

Respectfully Submitted, 


Jan Witold Baran (Bar No. 233486) 


Thomas W. Kirby (Bar No. 915231) 


Lee Goodman (Bar No. 435493) 


WILEY REIN & FIELDING LLP 


1776 K Street, NW


Washington, DC 2006 


(202) 710-7000 


Counsel for Chamber of Commerce of the United 

States, Nationa1 Association of Manufacturers, U. S. 

Chamber Political Action Committee, Associated 

Builders and Contractors, Inc, and Associated 

Builders & Contractors Political Action Committee 

Stephen A. Bokat, Esq. 


General Counsel 


United States Chamber of Commerce 


and U.S. Chamber Political Action Committee


1615 H Street, NW


Washington, DC 20062 


Counsel for the Chamber of Commerce of the 

United States and the U.S. Chamber of Political 

Action Committee 

Jan Amundson, Esq, 


National Association of Manufacturers 


1331 Pennsylvania Ave., NW


Washington, D.C. 20004- 1790 


Counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers 
3a 

APPENDIX B 

Opinions of the District Court 

Appellants are cooperating to prepare a single printed set 

of opinions to be referenced by all jurisdictional statements. 

The opinions of the district court can also be found on the 

Internet at http://lsmns2o.gtwy.uscourts.gov/dcd/mcconnell2002-ruling.html. 
4a 

APPENDIX C 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-581 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-633 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

EMILY ECHOLS, a minor child, by and through her next 

friends, TIM AND WINDY ECHOLS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 
5a 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-751 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-753 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 


Civ. No. 02-754 (CKK, KLH, RJL)


———— 


AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS 

OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 
6a 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-781 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

CONGRESSMAN RON PAUL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-874 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al. 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-875 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 
7a 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-877 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-881 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

REPRESENTATIVE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

ORDER 

(May 19, 2003) 

For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opinion of 

Circuit Judge Henderson and District Judge Kollar-Kotelly, 

from which District Judge Leon concurs in part and dissents 

in part, it is this 19th day of May, 2003, hereby 

ORDERED that the Government Defendants’ Motion for 

Stay of Final Judgment Pending Appeal to the Supreme Court 

of the United States [#327] is GRANTED; it is further 

ORDERED that the Intervening Defendants’ Motion to 

Stay Injunction Pending Appeal [#322] is GRANTED; it 

is further 
8a 

ORDERED that the NRA Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay 

Pursuant to Rule 62(c) [#317] is DENIED AS MOOT; it 

is further 

ORDERED that Plaintiff ACLU’s Motion for Stay 

Pursuant to Rule 62(c) [#325] is DENIED AS MOOT; and it 

is further 

ORDERED that this Court’s May 1, 2003, Final Judgment 

is STAYED pending final disposition of these actions in the 

Supreme Court of the United States. 

All three judges concur that it is hereby 

ORDERED that Certain of the Madison Center Plaintiffs’1 

Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal [#321] is DENIED; it 

is further 

ORDERED that Plaintiff AFL-CIO’s Motion for an 

Injunction Pending Appeal [#319] is DENIED; it is further 

ORDERED that the NRA Plaintiffs’ Motion for an 

Administrative Stay, Pending Adjudication of Their Motion 

to Stay Pursuant to Rule 62(c) [#318] is DENIED AS MOOT; 

it is further 

ORDERED that the Government Defendants’ Emergency 

Motion for Temporary Stay of Final Judgment Pending 

Consideration of Motion for Stay of Final Judgment Pending 

Appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States [#326] is 

DENIED AS MOOT; it is further 

1 For purposes of this motion, the Madison Center Plaintiffs include the 

National Right to Life Committee, Inc., National Right to Life 

Educational Trust Fund, Club for Growth, Inc., and Indiana Family 

Institute, Inc. 
9a 

ORDERED that Certain of the Madison Center Plaintiffs’2 

Motion to Convene an Open Hearing on their Motion for an 

Injunction Pending Appeal [#328] is DENIED 3

; and it is 

further 

ORDERED that the Madison Center Plaintiffs’ Motion to 

Alter or Amend the Judgment [#316] is DENIED AS MOOT. 

SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Karen Lecraft Henderson 

United States Circuit Judge 

/s/ Colleen Kollar-Kotelly 

United States District Judge 

/s/ Richard J. Leon 

United States District Judge 

2 For purposes of this motion, the Madison Center Plaintiffs include the 

National Right to Life Committee, Inc., National Right to Life 

Educational Trust Fund, Club for Growth, Inc., and Indiana Family 

Institute, Inc. 

3 As all three judges have signed this Order, the Court has complied 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) and does not need to issue this 

order by sitting in open court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c). 
10a 

APPENDIX D 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-581 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-633 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

EMILY ECHOLS, a minor child, by and through her next 

friends, TIM AND WINDY ECHOLS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 
11a 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-751 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-753 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 


Civ. No. 02-754 (CKK, KLH, RJL)


———— 


AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS 

OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 
12a 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-781 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

CONGRESSMAN RON PAUL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-874 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al. 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-875 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

CALIFORNIA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 
13a 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-877 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

———— 

Civ. No. 02-881 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

———— 

REPRESENTATIVE BENNIE G. THOMPSON, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(May 19, 2003) 

Presently before the Court are a number of motions to stay 

all or part of this Court’s May 1, 2003, Final Judgment. On 

May 7, 2003, the NRA Plaintiffs moved, pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c), to stay this Court’s decision 

with respect to Title II pending review by the Supreme Court. 

NRA Mem. at 1. On May 8, 2003, this Court issued an Order 

requiring that any other motions requesting to stay all or part 

of this Court’s May 1, 2003, Final Judgment Order be filed 

by noon on Friday, May 9, 2003. McConnell v. FEC, No. 

02cv582 (D.D.C. May 8, 2003) (briefing order). The Court 

also required that any and all oppositions to the motions for 

stay be filed by noon on Monday, May 12, 2003, and that any 
14a 

and all replies to the motions for stay be filed by noon on 

Wednesday, May 14, 2003. Id. 

In accordance with that schedule, on May 9, 2003, Plaintiff 

ACLU filed a stay motion joining Plaintiff NRA’s request to 

stay this Court’s decision with respect to Title II. ACLU Mot. 

at 3. The NRA and ACLU stay motions have been opposed 

by the Madison Center Plaintiffs,1 who along with the AFLCIO Plaintiffs have each moved for injunctive relief 

requesting that the Court not restore any definition of 

“electioneering communication.” Madison Center Mem. at 1; 

AFL-CIO Mem at 2. The Madison Center Plaintiffs and the 

AFL-CIO Plaintiffs’ motions have been opposed by the 

Government Defendants2 and Intervenor Defendants.3 

The Government Defendants and Intervenor-Defendants 

also move pursuant to Rule 62(c) to stay the Court’s entire 

Final Judgment pending disposition of the parties’ appeals to 

the Supreme Court of the United States. Gov’t Mem. at 4; 

Intervenor Defs.’ Mem. at 1. These motions are opposed by 

certain of the McConnell Plaintiffs,4 who argue that the 

1 Madison Center Plaintiffs include the National Right to Life 

Committee, Inc., National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund, National 

Right to Life PAC, Libertarian National Committee, Inc., Club for 

Growth, Inc., Indiana Family Institute, Inc., U.S. Representative Mike 

Pence, Alabama Attorney General William H. Pryor, Barret Austin 

O’Brock, and Trevor M. Southerland. 

2 The Government Defendants include the Federal Election 

Commission, the United States of America, the United States Department 

of Justice, John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States, and the 

Federal Communications Commission. 

3 The Intervenor Defendants include Senator John McCain, Senator 

Russell Feingold, Representative Christopher Shays, Representative 

Martin Meehan, Senator Olympia Snowe, and Senator James Jeffords. 

4 These McConnell Plaintiffs include Senator Mitch McConnell, 

Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., Representative Bob Barr, Center for 

Individual Freedom, National Right to Work Committee, 60 Plus 

Association, Inc., U.S. d/b/a Pro English, and Thomas McInerney. 
15a 

Court’s Final Judgment with respect to Sections 201(5), 213, 

318, and 504 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

(“BCRA”), the positions unanimously struck down by the 

three judge court, should not be stayed. McConnell Opp’n at 

3. These McConnell Plaintiffs also contend that the Court’s 

ruling with regard to Title I should not be stayed. Id. at 3-4. 

These McConnell Plaintiffs join the NRA and ACLU in 

requesting, however, that the Court’s Title II ruling be stayed. 

Id. at 4-6. Defendants’ motions are also opposed by Plaintiff 

National Association of Broadcasters which requests that the 

Court not stay its ruling with regard to Section 504 of BCRA. 

NAB Mem. at 5. Plaintiff National Association of 

Broadcasters takes no position with respect to any of the other 

stay requests. Id. at 1. Similarly, Plaintiffs in Civil Action 

Number 02-633, the Echols Plaintiffs, oppose Defendants’ 

motions, particularly with respect to staying the Court’s 

ruling on Section 318 of BCRA. Echols’ Opp’n at 2. 

Additional oppositions to the Government Defendants and 

Intervenor Defendants’ motions have been filed by 

Republican National Committee Plaintiffs5

 and Plaintiffs 

California Democratic Party and California Republican 

Party,

6

 opposing the stay motions only with respect to staying 

this Court’s ruling on Title I of BCRA. CDP/CRP Opp’n at 2; 

RNC Opp’n at 1. The Madison Center Plaintiffs and the AFLCIO also each oppose these motions and argue, as discussed 

supra, that the Court should not reinstate either definition of 

electioneering communication. 

5 The Republican National Committee Plaintiffs include the 

Republican National Committee, the Republican Parties of Colorado, 

New Mexico, and Ohio, Dallas County (Iowa) Republican County Central 

Committee, and Michael Duncan. 

6

 Joining the CDP and CRP in opposing these motions are Yolo County 

Democratic Central Committee, Art Torres, Santa Cruz Republican 

Central Committee, Shawn Steel, Timothy Morgan, Barbara Alby, and 

Douglas R. Boyd, Sr. 
16a 

Two motions for “administrative” stays filed by the NRA 

Plaintiffs and the Government Defendants (joined by the 

Intervenor Defendants) are also pending before this Court. 

These requests are to stay all (Defendants’ position) or part 

(NRA’s position) of the Court’s ruling until the Court can 

make a ruling on the present Rule 62(c) motions. Given that 

the Court is ruling on the Rule 62(c) motions in the attached 

order, the administrative stay requests are denied as moot. 

After due consideration of the motions, the oppositions, 

and replies, the relevant case law, and the pertinent Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is satisfied that a stay 

should be granted pending final disposition of these eleven 

actions in the Supreme Court of the United States. This 

Court’s desire to prevent the litigants from facing potentially 

three different regulatory regimes in a very short time span, 

and the Court’s recognition of the divisions among the panel 

about the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of 

BCRA, counsel in favor of granting a stay of this case. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (“Findings 

of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions 

of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion. . . .”), 

the Court deems no further discussion necessary to resolve 

these motions. 

/s/ Karen Lecraft Henderson 

United States Circuit Judge 

/s/ Colleen Kollar-Kotelly 

United States District Judge 
17a 

RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge, dissenting in part and 

concurring in part: Because the moving parties have failed to 

demonstrate irreparable injury and because granting a stay to 

this Court’s judgment in its entirety will violate the First 

Amendment rights of various political parties, donors, broadcasters, interest groups, and minors, I respectfully dissent in 

part from, and concur in part in, my colleagues’ decision. 

After months of painstaking analysis, this Court found unconstitutional, in whole or in part, nine of the twenty 

provisions of BCRA challenged by the plaintiffs. Four of 

those provisions were struck down unanimously (i.e., 201(5), 

213, 318, and 504), and four were struck down in their 

entirety (i.e., 213, 318, 504, and new FECA Section 323(d)). 

While our reasoning may have differed in some instances, at 

least two members of this Court in each instance found that 

the unconstitutional section of the statute (or its subpart) 

unjustifiably infringed upon the constitutional rights of one or 

more of the various parties’ impacted by the BCRA campaign 

finance regime. Indeed, because “the loss of First Amendment freedom for even minimal periods of time 

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury,” Elrod v. 

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 374 (1976), the moving parties’ 

arguments must be scrutinized by this Court with extreme 

care to ensure that they meet the high standards for this 

“extraordinary remedy.” Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. 

Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1985).7

 In my 

7

 The Court will only grant a stay pending appeal if the moving parties 

can “show (1) that [they] have a substantial likelihood of success on the 

merits; (2) that [they] will suffer irreparable injury if the stay is denied; 

(3) that issuance of the stay will not cause substantial harm to other 

parties; and (4) that the public interest will be served by issuance of the 

stay.” United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 314 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 

2003) (citing Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, 

Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). These factors must be weighed 

against one another, and the mere presence of one factor does not dictate 

an outcome for or against the stay. See Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 
18a 

judgment, their arguments, for the most part, cannot 

withstand such scrutiny. 

With regard to Title I, two members of this Court found 

that the defendants could not justify Congress’s sweeping soft 

money restrictions in new FECA Sections 323(a) and 323(b) 

that require political parties to fund nonfederal and mixedpurposed activities with only federal money. Such 

restrictions, in our judgment, placed an impermissible burden 

on the associational rights of parties and their donors. Thus, 

every day these BCRA provisions remain in effect donors are 

restricted from using donations to amplify their voices 

through their political parties, thereby suffering irreparable 

injury. It is difficult to fathom how granting a stay on these 

Title I provisions could possibly be in the public interest, or 

be justified by the relatively minor inconvenience to the FEC 

of having to reinstate, for the most part, its all-too-familiar 

pre-BCRA rules. Moreover, the defendants’ argument that 

this Court’s judgment is “likely to create the appearance or 

fact of corruption” by allowing political parties and others to 

raise and use nonfederal funds (i.e., soft money) is similarly 

unavailing. Gov’t Mot. for Stay at 9, 13-14. As long as soft 

money cannot be used for federal purposes, which is after all 

the majority holding of this Court, the risk of actual or 

apparent corruption is nonexistent. Simply stated, the public 

interest is much better served by protecting the public’s First 

Amendment freedoms and by ensuring that the political 

parties and other participants in the public arena are free to 

play their traditional roles in the electoral process unimpeded 

by unconstitutional restraints. 

With regard to Title II, I similarly do not believe the 

moving parties have demonstrated sufficient irreparable 

harm, alone, to warrant a stay—particularly as to Sections 

F.3d 1313, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1998); CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift 

Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
19a 

201(5) and 213 which were unanimously struck down by this 

Court. However, I do believe that the FEC’s unfortunate 

failure to promulgate regulations for the backup definition, as 

it did for the primary definition,8 has sufficiently deprived the 

parties of guidance regarding the contours of the backup 

definition to warrant a stay of the primary definition portion 

of our judgment on Section 201. Doing so, at this time, is 

palatable since the primary definition does not take effect as a 

practical matter until thirty days before the first primary 

election and will therefore not immediately injure the 

plaintiffs. Unlike my colleagues, however, I would limit that 

stay to the period of time necessary for the FEC to issue 

regulatory guidance on the backup definition, and thereby 

minimize the negative consequences of reinstating the 

primary definition. 

Finally, with respect to Sections 318 and 504, which are 

conceptually distinct from Titles I and II and were also struck 

down unanimously by this Court, the moving parties have not 

even attempted to demonstrate that irreparable harm will 

occur if the judgments as to these sections are not stayed; nor 

could they have done so, credibly. To me, including these 

flawed sections in a statute-wide stay would be like a 

fisherman retaining whatever the ocean yields to a net with 

undersized mesh. It increases his “catch,” but the public 

interest dictates against it. Suffice it to say, continuing such 

8 Some commenters on the proposed FEC regulations argued that “the 

period between a final decision in [this] litigation and the 2004 elections 

is likely to be too short to permit the commission to complete a 

rulemaking [on the backup definition] in time to provide guidance, if the 

operative definition is invalidated. They further argued that the [backup] 

definition’s application to the entire election cycle, and not just the 30- or 

60-day periods to which the current definition is limited, exacerbates the 

timing issue.” Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65190, 

65191 (Oct. 23, 2002). Without regard to these concerns, the FEC decided 

that promulgating regulations for the backup definition was “premature.” 

Id. 
20a 

unconstitutional restrictions on minors and demanding such 

unconstitutional record production from broadcasters is, in 

my judgment, inconsistent with both the public interest and 

the spirit of the First Amendment. 

/s/ Richard J. Leon 

RICHARD J. LEON 

United States District Judge 
21a 

APPENDIX E 

United States Constitution 

Amendment I 

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 

the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the 

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 

for a redress of grievances. 
22a 

APPENDIX F 

UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAWS 

107th Congress—Second Session 

Convening January, 2002 

PL 107-155 (HR 2356) 

March 27, 2002 

BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002 

An Act To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 to provide bipartisan campaign reform. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

“Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002”. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents of this 

Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

TITLE I—REDUCTION OF SPECIAL INTEREST 

INFLUENCE 

Sec. 101. Soft money of political parties. 

Sec. 102. Increased contribution limit for State committees of 

political parties. 

Sec. 103. Reporting requirements. 

TITLE II—NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN 

EXPENDITURES 

Subtitle A—Electioneering Communications 

Sec. 201. Disclosure of electioneering communications. 

Sec. 202. Coordinated communications as contributions. 
23a 

Sec. 203. Prohibition of corporate and labor disbursements for


electioneering communications. 


Sec. 204. Rules relating to certain targeted electioneering 


communications. 


Subtitle B—Independent and Coordinated Expenditures 

Sec. 211. Definition of independent expenditure. 


Sec. 212. Reporting requirements for certain independent


expenditures. 


Sec. 213. Independent versus coordinated expenditures by


party.


Sec. 214. Coordination with candidates or political parties. 


TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS 

Sec. 301. Use of contributed amounts for certain purposes. 


Sec. 302. Prohibition of fundraising on Federal property.


Sec. 303. Strengthening foreign money ban. 


Sec. 304. Modification of individual contribution limits in


response to expenditures from personal funds. 


Sec. 305. Limitation on availability of lowest unit charge for 


Federal candidates attacking opposition. 


Sec. 306. Software for filing reports and prompt disclosure of 


contributions. 


Sec. 307. Modification of contribution limits. 


Sec. 308. Donations to Presidential inaugural committee. 


Sec. 309. Prohibition on fraudulent solicitation of funds. 


Sec. 310. Study and report on clean money clean elections 


laws. 

24a 

Sec. 311. Clarity standards for identification of sponsors of 


election-related advertising.


Sec. 312. Increase in penalties. 


Sec. 313. Statute of limitations. 


Sec. 314. Sentencing guidelines. 


Sec. 315. Increase in penalties imposed for violations of 


conduit contribution ban. 


Sec. 316. Restriction on increased contribution limits by taking


into account candidate’s available funds. 


Sec. 317. Clarification of right of nationals of the United States 


to make political contributions. 


Sec. 318. Prohibition of contributions by minors. 


Sec. 319. Modification of individual contribution limits for


House candidates in response to expenditures from personal 


funds. 


TITLE IV—SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE 


Sec. 401. Severability.


Sec. 402. Effective dates and regulations. 


Sec. 403. Judicial review. 


TITLE V—ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 


Sec. 501. Internet access to records. 


Sec. 502. Maintenance of website of election reports. 


Sec. 503. Additional disclosure reports. 


Sec. 504. Public access to broadcasting records. 

25a 

TITLE I—REDUCTION OF SPECIAL 

INTEREST INFLUENCE 

SEC. 101. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Title III of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended 

by adding at the end the following: 

“SEC.323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 

“(a) NATIONAL COMMITTEES.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—A national committee of a 

political party (including a national congressional campaign 

committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or 

direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer of 

funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are 

not subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting 

requirements of this Act. 

“(2) APPLICABILITY.—The prohibition established 

by paragraph (1) applies to any such national committee, any 

officer or agent acting on behalf of such a national committee, 

and any entity that is directly or indirectly established, 

financed, maintained, or controlled by such a national 

committee. 

“(b) STATE, DISTRICT, AND LOCAL COMMITTEES.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph 

(2), an amount that is expended or disbursed for Federal 

election activity by a State, district, or local committee of a 

political party (including an entity that is directly or indirectly 

established, financed, maintained, or controlled by a State, 

district, or local committee of a political party and an officer or 

agent acting on behalf of such committee or entity), or by an 

association or similar group of candidates for State or local 

office or of individuals holding State or local office, shall be 
26a 

made from funds subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and 

reporting requirements of this Act. 

“(2) APPLICABILITY.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding clause (i) 

or (ii) of section 301(20)(A), and subject to subparagraph (B), 

paragraph (1) shall not apply to any amount expended or 

disbursed by a State, district, or local committee of a political 

party for an activity described in either such clause to the 

extent the amounts expended or disbursed for such activity are 

allocated (under regulations prescribed by the Commission) 

among amounts— 

“(i) which consist solely of contributions subject to the 

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act 

(other than amounts described in subparagraph (B)(iii)); and 

“(ii) other amounts which are not subject to the 

limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act 

(other than any requirements of this subsection). 

“(B) CONDITIONS.—Subparagraph (A) shall 

only apply if— 

“(i) the activity does not refer to a clearly identified 

candidate for Federal office; 

“(ii) the amounts expended or disbursed are not for the 

costs of any broadcasting, cable, or satellite communication, 

other than a communication which refers solely to a clearly 

identified candidate for State or local office; 

“(iii) the amounts expended or disbursed which are 

described in subparagraph (A)(ii) are paid from amounts which 

are donated in accordance with State law and which meet the 

requirements of subparagraph (C), except that no person 

(including any person established, financed, maintained, or 

controlled by such person) may donate more than $10,000 to a 

State, district, or local committee of a political party in a 

calendar year for such expenditures or disbursements; and 
27a 

“(iv) the amounts expended or disbursed are made 

solely from funds raised by the State, local, or district 

committee which makes such expenditure or disbursement, and 

do not include any funds provided to such committee from— 

“(I) any other State, local, or district committee of 

any State party, 

“(II) the national committee of a political party 

(including a national congressional campaign committee of a 

political party), 

“(III) any officer or agent acting on behalf of any 

committee described in subclause (I) or (II), or 

“(IV) any entity directly or indirectly established, 

financed, maintained, or controlled by any committee 

described in subclause (I) or (II). 

“(C) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT OF 

NATIONAL PARTIES, FEDERAL CANDIDATES AND 

OFFICEHOLDERS, AND STATE PARTIES ACTING 

JOINTLY.—Notwithstanding subsection (e) (other than 

subsection (e)(3)), amounts specifically authorized to be spent 

under subparagraph (B)(iii) meet the requirements of this 

subparagraph only if the amounts— 

“(i) are not solicited, received, directed, transferred, or 

spent by or in the name of any person described in subsection 

(a) or (e); and 

“(ii) are not solicited, received, or directed through 

fundraising activities conducted jointly by 2 or more State, 

local, or district committees of any political party or their 

agents, or by a State, local, or district committee of a political 

party on behalf of the State, local, or district committee of a 

political party or its agent in one or more other States. 

“(c) FUNDRAISING COSTS.—An amount spent by a 

person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are 

used, in whole or in part, for expenditures and disbursements 
28a 

for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject 

to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of 

this Act. 

“(d) TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS.—A national, 

State, district, or local committee of a political party (including 

a national congressional campaign committee of a political 

party), an entity that is directly or indirectly established, 

financed, maintained, or controlled by any such national, State, 

district, or local committee or its agent, and an officer or agent 

acting on behalf of any such party committee or entity, shall 

not solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations to— 

“(1) an organization that is described in section 501(c) 

of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from 

taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted 

an application for determination of tax exempt status under 

such section) and that makes expenditures or disbursements in 

connection with an election for Federal office (including expenditures or disbursements for Federal election 

activity); or 

“(2) an organization described in section 527 of such 

Code (other than a political committee, a State, district, or local 

committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign 

committee of a candidate for State or local office). 

“(e) FEDERAL CANDIDATES.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—A candidate, individual holding 

Federal office, agent of a candidate or an individual holding 

Federal office, or an entity directly or indirectly established, 

financed, maintained or controlled by or acting on behalf of 1 

or more candidates or individuals holding Federal office, shall 

not— 

“(A) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend 

funds in connection with an election for Federal office, 

including funds for any Federal election activity, unless the 
29a 

funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting 

requirements of this Act; or 

“(B) solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend 

funds in connection with any election other than an election for 

Federal office or disburse funds in connection with such an 

election unless the funds— 

“(i) are not in excess of the amounts permitted with 

respect to contributions to candidates and political committees 

under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of section 315(a); and 

“(ii) are not from sources prohibited by this Act from 

making contributions in connection with an election for 

Federal office. 

“(2) STATE LAW.—Paragraph (1) does not apply to 

the solicitation, receipt, or spending of funds by an individual 

described in such paragraph who is or was also a candidate for 

a State or local office solely in connection with such election 

for State or local office if the solicitation, receipt, or spending 

of funds is permitted under State law and refers only to such 

State or local candidate, or to any other candidate for the State 

or local office sought by such candidate, or both. 

“(3) FUNDRAISING EVENTS.—Notwithstanding 

paragraph (1) or subsection (b)(2)(C), a candidate or an 

individual holding Federal office may attend, speak, or be a 

featured guest at a fundraising event for a State, district, or 

local committee of a political party. 

“(4) PERMITTING CERTAIN SOLICITATIONS.— 

“(A) GENERAL SOLICITATIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an individual 

described in paragraph (1) may make a general solicitation of 

funds on behalf of any organization that is described in section 

501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from 

taxation under section 501(a) of such Code (or has submitted 

an application for determination of tax exempt status under 
30a 

such section) (other than an entity whose principal purpose is 

to conduct activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 

301(20)(A)) where such solicitation does not specify how the 

funds will or should be spent. 

“(B) CERTAIN SPECIFIC SOLICITATIONS.— 

In addition to the general solicitations permitted under 

subparagraph (A), an individual described in paragraph (1) 

may make a solicitation explicitly to obtain funds for carrying 

out the activities described in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 

301(20)(A), or for an entity whose principal purpose is to 

conduct such activities, if— 

“(i) the solicitation is made only to individuals; and 

“(ii) the amount solicited from any individual during 

any calendar year does not exceed $20,000. 

“(f) STATE CANDIDATES.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—A candidate for State or local 

office, individual holding State or local office, or an agent of 

such a candidate or individual may not spend any funds for a 

communication described in section 301(20)(A)(iii) unless the 

funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting 

requirements of this Act. 

“(2) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN COMMUNICATIONS.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an individual 

described in such paragraph if the communication involved is 

in connection with an election for such State or local office and 

refers only to such individual or to any other candidate for the 

State or local office held or sought by such individual, or 

both.”. 

(b) DEFINITIONS.—Section 301 of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431) is amended by adding at 

the end thereof the following: 
31a 

“(20) FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘Federal election 

activity’ means— 

“(i) voter registration activity during the period that 

begins on the date that is 120 days before the date a regularly 

scheduled Federal election is held and ends on the date of the 

election; 

“(ii) voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or 

generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an 

election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the 

ballot (regardless of whether a candidate for State or local 

office also appears on the ballot); 

“(iii) a public communication that refers to a clearly 

identified candidate for Federal office (regardless of whether a 

candidate for State or local office is also mentioned or 

identified) and that promotes or supports a candidate for that 

office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office 

(regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates 

a vote for or against a candidate); or 

“(iv) services provided during any month by an 

employee of a State, district, or local committee of a political 

party who spends more than 25 percent of that individual’s 

compensated time during that month on activities in 

connection with a Federal election. 

“(B) EXCLUDED ACTIVITY.—The term 

‘Federal election activity’ does not include an amount 

expended or disbursed by a State, district, or local committee 

of a political party for— 

“(i) a public communication that refers solely to a 

clearly identified candidate for State or local office, if the 

communication is not a Federal election activity described in 

subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii); 
32a 

“(ii) a contribution to a candidate for State or local 

office, provided the contribution is not designated to pay for a 

Federal election activity described in subparagraph (A); 

“(iii) the costs of a State, district, or local political 

convention; and 

“(iv) the costs of grassroots campaign materials, 

including buttons, bumper stickers, and yard signs, that name 

or depict only a candidate for State or local office. 

“(21) GENERIC CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY.—The term 

‘generic campaign activity’ means a campaign activity that 

promotes a political party and does not promote a candidate or 

non-Federal candidate. 

“(22) PUBLIC COMMUNICATION.—The term ‘public 

communication’ means a communication by means of any 

broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, 

magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or 

telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of 

general public political advertising. 

“(23) MASS MAILING.—The term ‘mass mailing’ means a 

mailing by United States mail or facsimile of more than 500 

pieces of mail matter of an identical or substantially similar 

nature within any 30-day period. 

“(24) TELEPHONE BANK.—The term ‘telephone bank’ 

means more than 500 telephone calls of an identical or 

substantially similar nature within any 30-day period.”. 

SEC. 102. INCREASED CONTRIBUTION LIMIT FOR 

STATE COMMITTEES OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 

Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)) is amended— 

(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “or” at the end; 

(2) in subparagraph (C)— 
33a 

(A) by inserting “(other than a committee 

described in subparagraph (D))” after “committee”; and 

(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting 

“; or”; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

“(D) to a political committee established and 

maintained by a State committee of a political party in any 

calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $10,000.”. 

SEC. 103. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 

(a) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—Section 304 of the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) is 

amended by adding at the end the following: 

“(e) POLITICAL COMMITTEES.— 

“(1) NATIONAL AND CONGRESSIONAL 

POLITICAL COMMITTEES.—The national committee of a 

political party, any national congressional campaign committee 

of a political party, and any subordinate committee of either, 

shall report all receipts and disbursements during the reporting 

period. 

“(2) OTHER POLITICAL COMMITTEES TO 

WHICH SECTION 323 APPLIES.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any other 

reporting requirements applicable under this Act, a political 

committee (not described in paragraph (1)) to which section 

323(b)(1) applies shall report all receipts and disbursements 

made for activities described in section 301(20)(A), unless the 

aggregate amount of such receipts and disbursements during 

the calendar year is less than $5,000. 

“(B) SPECIFIC DISCLOSURE BY STATE AND 

LOCAL PARTIES OF CERTAIN NON-FEDERAL 

AMOUNTS PERMITTED TO BE SPENT ON FEDERAL 

ELECTION ACTIVITY.—Each report by a political 
34a 

committee under subparagraph (A) of receipts and 

disbursements made for activities described in section 

301(20)(A) shall include a disclosure of all receipts and 

disbursements described in section 323(b)(2)(A) and (B). 

“(3) ITEMIZATION.—If a political committee has 

receipts or disbursements to which this subsection applies from 

or to any person aggregating in excess of $200 for any calendar 

year, the political committee shall separately itemize its 

reporting for such person in the same manner as required in 

paragraphs (3)(A), (5), and (6) of subsection (b). 

“(4) REPORTING PERIODS.—Reports required to be 

filed under this subsection shall be filed for the same time 

periods required for political committees under subsection 

(a)(4)(B).”. 

(b) BUILDING FUND EXCEPTION TO THE 

DEFINITION OF CONTRIBUTION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 301(8)(B) of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(8)(B)) is 

amended— 

(A) by striking clause (viii); and 

(B) by redesignating clauses (ix) through (xv) as 

clauses (viii) through (xiv), respectively. 

(2) NONPREEMPTION OF STATE LAW.—Section 403 of 

such Act (2 U.S.C. 453) is amended— 

(A) by striking “The provisions of this Act” and 

inserting “(a) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (b), the 

provisions of this Act”; and 

(B) by adding at the end the following: 

“(b) STATE AND LOCAL COMMITTEES OF 

POLITICAL PARTIES.—Notwithstanding any other provision 

of this Act, a State or local committee of a political party may, 

subject to State law, use exclusively funds that are not subject 
35a 

to the prohibitions, limitations, and reporting requirements of 

the Act for the purchase or construction of an office building 

for such State or local committee.”. 

TITLE II—NONCANDIDATE CAMPAIGN 

EXPENDITURES 

Subtitle A—Electioneering Communications 

SEC. 201. DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING 

COMMUNICATIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 304 of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434), as amended by section 

103, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

subsection: 

“(f) DISCLOSURE OF ELECTIONEERING 

COMMUNICATIONS.— 

“(1) STATEMENT REQUIRED.—Every person who 

makes a disbursement for the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications in an aggregate amount in 

excess of $10,000 during any calendar year shall, within 24 

hours of each disclosure date, file with the Commission a statement containing the information described in paragraph (2). 

“(2) CONTENTS OF STATEMENT.—Each statement 

required to be filed under this subsection shall be made under 

penalty of perjury and shall contain the following information: 

“(A) The identification of the person making the 

disbursement, of any person sharing or exercising direction or 

control over the activities of such person, and of the custodian 

of the books and accounts of the person making the 

disbursement. 

“(B) The principal place of business of the person 

making the disbursement, if not an individual. 
36a 

“(C) The amount of each disbursement of more 

than $200 during the period covered by the statement and the 

identification of the person to whom the disbursement was 

made. 

“(D) The elections to which the electioneering 

communications pertain and the names (if known) of the 

candidates identified or to be identified. 

“(E) If the disbursements were paid out of a 

segregated bank account which consists of funds contributed 

solely by individuals who are United States citizens or 

nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as 

defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20))) directly to this account 

for electioneering communications, the names and addresses of 

all contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of 

$1,000 or more to that account during the period beginning on 

the first day of the preceding calendar year and ending on the 

disclosure date. Nothing in this subparagraph is to be 

construed as a prohibition on the use of funds in such a 

segregated account for a purpose other than electioneering 

communications. 

“(F) If the disbursements were paid out of funds 

not described in subparagraph (E), the names and addresses of 

all contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of 

$1,000 or more to the person making the disbursement during 

the period beginning on the first day of the preceding calendar 

year and ending on the disclosure date. 

“(3) ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION.—For 

purposes of this subsection— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—(i) The term ‘electioneering 

communication’ means any broadcast, cable, or satellite 

communication which— 
37a 

“(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for 

Federal office; 

“(II) is made within— 

“(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff 

election for the office sought by the candidate; or 

“(bb) 30 days before a primary or preference 

election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has 

authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the 

candidate; and 

“(III) in the case of a communication which refers to 

a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, 

is targeted to the relevant electorate. 

“(ii) If clause (i) is held to be constitutionally 

insufficient by final judicial decision to support the regulation 

provided herein, then the term ‘electioneering communication’ 

means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which 

promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or 

opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the 

communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a 

candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible 

meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a 

specific candidate. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be 

construed to affect the interpretation or application of section 

100.22(b) of title 11, Code of Federal Regulations. 

“(B) EXCEPTIONS.—The term ‘electioneering 

communication’ does not include— 

“(i) a communication appearing in a news story, 

commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of 

any broadcasting station, unless such facilities are owned or 

controlled by any political party, political committee, or 

candidate; 

“(ii) a communication which constitutes an expenditure 

or an independent expenditure under this Act; 
38a 

“(iii) a communication which constitutes a candidate 

debate or forum conducted pursuant to regulations adopted by 

the Commission, or which solely promotes such a debate or 

forum and is made by or on behalf of the person sponsoring the 

debate or forum; or 

“(iv) any other communication exempted under such 

regulations as the Commission may promulgate (consistent 

with the requirements of this paragraph) to ensure the 

appropriate implementation of this paragraph, except that 

under any such regulation a communication may not be 

exempted if it meets the requirements of this paragraph and is 

described in section 301(20)(A)(iii). 

“(C) TARGETING TO RELEVANT ELECTORATE.—For purposes of this paragraph, a communication 

which refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office 

is ‘targeted to the relevant electorate’ if the communication can 

be received by 50,000 or more persons— 

“(i) in the district the candidate seeks to represent, in 

the case of a candidate for Representative in, or Delegate or 

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress; or 

“(ii) in the State the candidate seeks to represent, in the 

case of a candidate for Senator. 

“(4) DISCLOSURE DATE.—For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘disclosure date’ means— 

“(A) the first date during any calendar year by 

which a person has made disbursements for the direct costs of 

producing or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess of $10,000; and 

“(B) any other date during such calendar year by 

which a person has made disbursements for the direct costs of 

producing or airing electioneering communications aggregating in excess of $10,000 since the most recent disclosure date 

for such calendar year. 
39a 

“(5) CONTRACTS TO DISBURSE.—For purposes of this 

subsection, a person shall be treated as having made a 

disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the 

disbursement. 

“(6) COORDINATION WITH OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Any requirement to report under this subsection 

shall be in addition to any other reporting requirement under 

this Act. 

“(7) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE 

CODE.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to 

establish, modify, or otherwise affect the definition of political 

activities or electioneering activities (including the definition 

of participating in, intervening in, or influencing or attempting 

to influence a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition 

to any candidate for public office) for purposes of the Internal 

Revenue Code of 1986.”. 

(b) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION.—The Federal Communications Commission shall compile and maintain any information the 

Federal Election Commission may require to carry out section 

304(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as added 

by subsection (a)), and shall make such information available 

to the public on the Federal Communication Commission’s 

website. 

SEC. 202. COORDINATED COMMUNICATIONS AS 

CONTRIBUTIONS. 

Section 315(a)(7) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)) is amended— 

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); 

and 

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following: 

“(C) if— 
40a 

“(i) any person makes, or contracts to make, any 

disbursement for any electioneering communication (within 

the meaning of section 304(f)(3)); and 

“(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with a candidate 

or an authorized committee of such candidate, a Federal, State, 

or local political party or committee thereof, or an agent or 

official of any such candidate, party, or committee; 

such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a 

contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering 

communication or that candidate’s party and as an expenditure 

by that candidate or that candidate’s party; and”. 

SEC. 203. PROHIBITION OF CORPORATE AND 

LABOR DISBURSEMENTS FOR ELECTIONEERING 

COMMUNICATIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 316(b)(2) of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(2)) is 

amended by inserting “or for any applicable 

electioneering communication” before, “but shall not 

include”. 

(b) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION.—Section 316 of such Act is amended by adding at 

the end the following: 

“(c) RULES RELATING TO ELECTIONEERING 

COMMUNICATIONS.— 

“(1) APPLICABLE ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATION.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘applicable 

electioneering communication’ means an electioneering 

communication (within the meaning of section 304(f)(3)) 

which is made by any entity described in subsection (a) of this 

section or by any other person using funds donated by an entity 

described in subsection (a) of this section. 

“(2) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the 

term ‘applicable electioneering communication’ does not 
41a 

include a communication by a section 501(c)(4) organization 

or a political organization (as defined in section 527(e)(1) of 

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) made under section 

304(f)(2)(E) or (F) of this Act if the communication is paid for 

exclusively by funds provided directly by individuals who are 

United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20))). For 

purposes of the preceding sentence, the term ‘provided directly 

by individuals’ does not include funds the source of which is 

an entity described in subsection (a) of this section. 

“(3) SPECIAL OPERATING RULES.— 

“(A) DEFINITION UNDER PARAGRAPH (1).— 

An electioneering communication shall be treated as made by 

an entity described in subsection (a) if an entity described in 

subsection (a) directly or indirectly disburses any amount for 

any of the costs of the communication. 

“(B) EXCEPTION UNDER PARAGRAPH (2).— 

A section 501(c)(4) organization that derives amounts from 

business activities or receives funds from any entity described 

in subsection (a) shall be considered to have paid for any 

communication out of such amounts unless such organization 

paid for the communication out of a segregated account to 

which only individuals can contribute, as described in section 

304(f)(2)(E). 

“(4) DEFINITIONS AND RULES.—For purposes of this 

subsection— 

“(A) the term ‘section 501(c)(4) organization’ 

means— 

“(i) an organization described in section 501(c)(4) of 

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from taxation 

under section 501(a) of such Code; or 
42a 

“(ii) an organization which has submitted an 

application to the Internal Revenue Service for determination 

of its status as an organization described in clause (i); and 

“(B) a person shall be treated as having made a 

disbursement if the person has executed a contract to make the 

disbursement. 

“(5) COORDINATION WITH INTERNAL REVENUE 

CODE.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 

authorize an organization exempt from taxation under section 

501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to carry out any 

activity which is prohibited under such Code.”. 

SEC. 204. RULES RELATING TO CERTAIN TARGETED 

ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS. 

Section 316(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441b), as added by section 203, is amended by 

adding at the end the following: 

“(6) SPECIAL RULES FOR TARGETED 

COMMUNICATIONS.— 

“(A) EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY.— 

Paragraph (2) shall not apply in the case of a targeted 

communication that is made by an organization described in 

such paragraph. 

“(B) TARGETED COMMUNICATION.—For 

purposes of subparagraph (A), the term ‘targeted 

communication’ means an electioneering communication (as 

defined in section 304(f)(3)) that is distributed from a 

television or radio broadcast station or provider of cable or 

satellite television service and, in the case of a communication 

which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or 

Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. 

“(C) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this 

paragraph, a communication is ‘targeted to the relevant 
43a 

electorate’ if it meets the requirements described in section 

304(f)(3)(C).”. 

Subtitle B—Independent and Coordinated Expenditures 

SEC. 211. DEFINITION OF INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE. 

Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (2 U.S.C. 

431) is amended by striking paragraph (17) and inserting the 

following: 

“(17) INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURE.—The term 

‘independent expenditure’ means an expenditure by a person— 

“(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of 

a clearly identified candidate; and 

“(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation 

with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the 

candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a 

political party committee or its agents.”. 

SEC. 212. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN 

INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 304 of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434) (as amended by section 

201) is amended— 

(1) in subsection (c)(2), by striking the undesignated matter 

after subparagraph (C); and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

“(g) TIME FOR REPORTING CERTAIN 

EXPENDITURES.— 

“(1) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $1,000.— 

“(A) INITIAL REPORT.—A person (including a 

political committee) that makes or contracts to make 

independent expenditures aggregating $1,000 or more after the 
44a 

20th day, but more than 24 hours, before the date of an election 

shall file a report describing the expenditures within 24 hours. 

“(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS.—After a person 

files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an 

additional report within 24 hours after each time the person 

makes or contracts to make independent expenditures 

aggregating an additional $1,000 with respect to the same 

election as that to which the initial report relates. 

“(2) EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $10,000.— 

“(A) INITIAL REPORT.—A person (including a 

political committee) that makes or contracts to make 

independent expenditures aggregating $10,000 or more at any 

time up to and including the 20th day before the date of an 

election shall file a report describing the expenditures within 

48 hours. 

“(B) ADDITIONAL REPORTS.—After a person 

files a report under subparagraph (A), the person shall file an 

additional report within 48 hours after each time the person 

makes or contracts to make independent expenditures 

aggregating an additional $10,000 with respect to the same 

election as that to which the initial report relates. 

“(3) PLACE OF FILING; CONTENTS.—A report under 

this subsection— 

“(A) shall be filed with the Commission; and 

“(B) shall contain the information required by 

subsection (b)(6)(B)(iii), including the name of each candidate 

whom an expenditure is intended to support or oppose.”. 

(b) TIME OF FILING OF CERTAIN STATEMENTS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 304(g) of such Act, as added 

by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the 

following: 
45a 

“(4) TIME OF FILING FOR EXPENDITURES AGGREGATING $1,000.—Notwithstanding subsection (a)(5), the 

time at which the statement under paragraph (1) is received by 

the Commission or any other recipient to whom the 

notification is required to be sent shall be considered the time 

of filing of the statement with the recipient.”. 

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—(A) Section 

304(a)(5) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(5)) is amended by 

striking “the second sentence of subsection (c)(2)” and 

inserting “subsection (g)(1)”. 

(B) Section 304(d)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434 

(d)(1)) is amended by inserting “or (g)” after “subsection (c)”. 

SEC. 213. INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED 

EXPENDITURES BY PARTY. 

Section 315(d) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(d)) is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (1), by striking “and (3)” and inserting “, 

(3), and (4)”; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

“(4) INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED EXPENDITURES BY PARTY.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—On or after the date on 

which a political party nominates a candidate, no committee of 

the political party may make— 

“(i) any coordinated expenditure under this subsection 

with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any 

time after it makes any independent expenditure (as defined in 

section 301(17)) with respect to the candidate during the 

election cycle; or 

“(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 

301(17)) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle 

at any time after it makes any coordinated expenditure under 
46a 

this subsection with respect to the candidate during the 

election cycle. 

“(B) APPLICATION.—For purposes of this 

paragraph, all political committees established and maintained 

by a national political party (including all congressional 

campaign committees) and all political committees established 

and maintained by a State political party (including any 

subordinate committee of a State committee) shall be 

considered to be a single political committee. 

“(C) TRANSFERS.—A committee of a political 

party that makes coordinated expenditures under this 

subsection with respect to a candidate shall not, during an 

election cycle, transfer any funds to, assign authority to make 

coordinated expenditures under this subsection to, or receive a 

transfer of funds from, a committee of the political party that 

has made or intends to make an independent expenditure with 

respect to the candidate.”. 

SEC. 214. COORDINATION WITH CANDIDATES OR 

POLITICAL PARTIES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 315(a)(7)(B) of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)(B)) is 

amended— 

(1) by redesignating clause (ii) as clause (iii); and 

(2) by inserting after clause (i) the following new clause: 

“(ii) expenditures made by any person (other than a 

candidate or candidate’s authorized committee) in cooperation, 

consultation, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, 

a national, State, or local committee of a political party, shall 

be considered to be contributions made to such party 

committee; and”. 

(b) REPEAL OF CURRENT REGULATIONS.—The 

regulations on coordinated communications paid for by 

persons other than candidates, authorized committees of 
47a 

candidates, and party committees adopted by the Federal 

Election Commission and published in the Federal Register at 

page 76138 of volume 65, Federal Register, on December 6, 

2000, are repealed as of the date by which the Commission is 

required to promulgate new regulations under subsection (c) 

(as described in section 402(c)(1)). 

(c) REGULATIONS BY THE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION.—The Federal Election Commission shall 

promulgate new regulations on coordinated communications 

paid for by persons other than candidates, authorized 

committees of candidates, and party committees. The 

regulations shall not require agreement or formal collaboration 

to establish coordination. In addition to any subject 

determined by the Commission, the regulations shall address— 

(1) payments for the republication of campaign materials; 

(2) payments for the use of a common vendor; 

(3) payments for communications directed or made by 

persons who previously served as an employee of a candidate 

or a political party; and 

(4) payments for communications made by a person after 

substantial discussion about the communication with a 

candidate or a political party. 

(d) MEANING OF CONTRIBUTION OR EXPENDITURE 

FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 316.—Section 316(b)(2) 

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 

441b(b)(2)) is amended by striking “shall include” and 

inserting “includes a contribution or expenditure, as those 

terms are defined in section 301, and also includes”. 
48a 

TITLE III—MISCELLANEOUS 

SEC. 301. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR 

CERTAIN PURPOSES. 

Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 

U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by striking section 313 and 

inserting the following: 

“SEC.313. USE OF CONTRIBUTED AMOUNTS FOR 

CERTAIN PURPOSES. 

“(a) PERMITTED USES.—A contribution accepted by a 

candidate, and any other donation received by an individual as 

support for activities of the individual as a holder of Federal 

office, may be used by the candidate or individual— 

“(1) for otherwise authorized expenditures in connection 

with the campaign for Federal office of the candidate or 

individual; 

“(2) for ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in 

connection with duties of the individual as a holder of Federal 

office; 

“(3) for contributions to an organization described in 

section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; or 

“(4) for transfers, without limitation, to a national, State, 

or local committee of a political party. 

“(b) PROHIBITED USE.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—A contribution or donation 

described in subsection (a) shall not be converted by any 

person to personal use. 

“(2) CONVERSION.—For the purposes of paragraph (1), 

a contribution or donation shall be considered to be converted 

to personal use if the contribution or amount is used to fulfill 

any commitment, obligation, or expense of a person that would 
49a 

exist irrespective of the candidate’s election campaign or 

individual’s duties as a holder of Federal office, including— 

“(A) a home mortgage, rent, or utility payment; 

“(B) a clothing purchase; 

“(C) a noncampaign-related automobile expense; 

“(D) a country club membership; 

“(E) a vacation or other noncampaign-related trip; 

“(F) a household food item; 

“(G) a tuition payment; 

“(H) admission to a sporting event, concert, 

theater, or other form of entertainment not associated with an 

election campaign; and 

“(I) dues, fees, and other payments to a health club 

or recreational facility.”. 

SEC. 302. PROHIBITION OF FUNDRAISING ON FEDERAL PROPERTY. 

Section 607 of title 18, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following: 

“(a) PROHIBITION.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—It shall be unlawful for any person 

to solicit or receive a donation of money or other thing of value 

in connection with a Federal, State, or local election from a 

person who is located in a room or building occupied in the 

discharge of official duties by an officer or employee of the 

United States. It shall be unlawful for an individual who is an 

officer or employee of the Federal Government, including the 

President, Vice President, and Members of Congress, to solicit 

or receive a donation of money or other thing of value in 

connection with a Federal, State, or local election, while in any 
50a 

room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by 

an officer or employee of the United States, from any person. 

“(2) PENALTY.—A person who violates this section 

shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned not more than 

3 years, or both.’; and 

(2) in subsection (b), by inserting “or Executive Office of 

the President” after “Congress”. 

SEC. 303. STRENGTHENING FOREIGN MONEY BAN. 

Section 319 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 

(2 U.S.C. 441e) is amended— 

(1) by striking the heading and inserting the following: 

“CONTRIBUTIONS AND DONATIONS BY FOREIGN 

NATIONALS”; and 

(2) by striking subsection (a) and inserting the following: 

“(a) PROHIBITION.—It shall be unlawful for— 

“(1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make— 

“(A) a contribution or donation of money or other 

thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to 

make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, 

State, or local election; 

“(B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a 

political party; or 

“(C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or 

disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the 

meaning of section 304(f)(3)); or 

“(2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 

paragraph (1) from a foreign national.”. 
51a 

SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES 

FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. 

(a) INCREASED LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS.—Section 

315 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 

441a) is amended— 

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “No person” and 

inserting “Except as provided in subsection (i), no person”; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

“(i) INCREASED LIMIT TO ALLOW RESPONSE 

TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS.— 

“(1) INCREASE.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), if 

the opposition personal funds amount with respect to a 

candidate for election to the office of Senator exceeds the 

threshold amount, the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) (in this 

subsection referred to as the ‘applicable limit’) with respect to 

that candidate shall be the increased limit. 

“(B) THRESHOLD AMOUNT.— 

“(i) STATE-BY-STATE COMPETITIVE AND FAIR 

CAMPAIGN FORMULA.—In this subsection, the threshold 

amount with respect to an election cycle of a candidate 

described in subparagraph (A) is an amount equal to the 

sum of— 

“(I) $150,000; and 

“(II) $0.04 multiplied by the voting age population. 

“(ii) VOTING AGE POPULATION.—In this subparagraph, the term ‘voting age population’ means in the case 

of a candidate for the office of Senator, the voting age 

population of the State of the candidate (as certified under 

section 315(e)). 
52a 

“(C) INCREASED LIMIT.—Except as provided 

in clause (ii), for purposes of subparagraph (A), if the 

opposition personal funds amount is over— 

“(i) 2 times the threshold amount, but not over 4 times 

that amount— 

“(I) the increased limit shall be 3 times the applicable limit; and 

“(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply 

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a 

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit 

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate 

may accept such a contribution; 

“(ii) 4 times the threshold amount, but not over 10 

times that amount— 

“(I) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable 

limit; and 

“(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply 

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a 

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit 

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate 

may accept such a contribution; and 

“(iii) 10 times the threshold amount— 

“(I) the increased limit shall be 6 times the applicable limit; 

“(II) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply 

with respect to any contribution made with respect to a 

candidate if such contribution is made under the increased limit 

of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate 

may accept such a contribution; and 

“(III) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to 

any expenditure by a State or national committee of a political 

party shall not apply. 
53a 

“(D) OPPOSITION PERSONAL FUNDS 

AMOUNT.—The opposition personal funds amount is an 

amount equal to the excess (if any) of— 

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from 

personal funds (as defined in section 304(a)(6)(B)) that an 

opposing candidate in the same election makes; over 

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds made by the candidate with respect to the election. 

“(2) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS 

UNDER INCREASED LIMIT.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph 

(B), a candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall 

not accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not 

make any expenditure, under the increased limit under 

paragraph (1)— 

“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the 

opposition personal funds amount under section 304(a)(6)(B); 

and 

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to 

the aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted and 

party expenditures previously made under the increased limits 

under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds 110 

percent of the opposition personal funds amount. 

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN 

OPPOSING CANDIDATE.—A candidate and a candidate’s 

authorized committee shall not accept any contribution and a 

party shall not make any expenditure under the increased limit 

after the date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a 

candidate to the extent that the amount of such increased limit 

is attributable to such an opposing candidate. 
54a 

“(3) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The aggregate amount of 

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s 

authorized committee under the increased limit under 

paragraph (1) and not otherwise expended in connection with 

the election with respect to which such contributions relate 

shall, not later than 50 days after the date of such election, be 

used in the manner described in subparagraph (B). 

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS.--A 

candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee shall return 

the excess contribution to the person who made the 

contribution. 

“(j) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL 

LOANS.—Any candidate who incurs personal loans made 

after the effective date of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

of 2002 in connection with the candidate’s campaign for 

election shall not repay (directly or indirectly), to the extent 

such loans exceed $250,000, such loans from any contributions made to such candidate or any authorized committee of 

such candidate after the date of such election.”. 

(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM 

PERSONAL FUNDS.—Section 304(a)(6) of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(6)) is 

amended— 

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (E); and 

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: 

“(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE 

FROM PERSONAL FUNDS.— 

“(i) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL FUNDS.—In this subparagraph, the term ‘expenditure from personal funds’ means— 
55a 

“(I) an expenditure made by a candidate using 

personal funds; and 

“(II) a contribution or loan made by a candidate 

using personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the 

candidate’s authorized committee. 

“(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT.—Not later than 

the date that is 15 days after the date on which an individual 

becomes a candidate for the office of Senator, the candidate 

shall file a declaration stating the total amount of expenditures from personal funds that the candidate intends to make, 

or to obligate to make, with respect to the election that will 

exceed the State-by- State competitive and fair campaign 

formula with— 

“(I) the Commission; and 

“(II) each candidate in the same election. 

“(iii) INITIAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 24 

hours after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes or 

obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from 

personal funds in excess of 2 times the threshold amount in 

connection with any election, the candidate shall file a 

notification with— 

“(I) the Commission; and 

“(II) each candidate in the same election. 

“(iv) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION.—After a 

candidate files an initial notification under clause (iii), the 

candidate shall file an additional notification each time 

expenditures from personal funds are made or obligated to be 

made in an aggregate amount that exceed $10,000 with— 

“(I) the Commission; and 

“(II) each candidate in the same election. 
56a 

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours after 

the expenditure is made. 

“(v) CONTENTS.—A notification under clause (iii) or 

(iv) shall include— 

“(I) the name of the candidate and the office sought 

by the candidate; 

“(II) the date and amount of each expenditure; and 

“(III) the total amount of expenditures from personal funds that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, 

with respect to an election as of the date of the expenditure that 

is the subject of the notification. 

“(C) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF 

EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS.—In the next regularly scheduled report after the date of the election for which a candidate 

seeks nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, 

the candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall 

submit to the Commission a report indicating the source and 

amount of any excess contributions (as determined under 

paragraph (1) of section 315(i)) and the manner in which 

the candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee used 

such funds. 

“(D) ENFORCEMENT.—For provisions providing for the enforcement of the reporting requirements under 

this paragraph, see section 309.”. 

(c) DEFINITIONS.—Section 301 of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by section 

101(b), is further amended by adding at the end the following: 

“(25) ELECTION CYCLE.—For purposes of sections 

315(i) and 315A and paragraph (26), the term ‘election 

cycle’ means the period beginning on the day after the 

date of the most recent election for the specific office or 

seat that a candidate is seeking and ending on the date of 

the next election for that office or seat. For purposes of 
57a 

the preceding sentence, a primary election and a general 

election shall be considered to be separate elections. 

“(26) PERSONAL FUNDS.—The term ‘personal funds’ 

means an amount that is derived from— 

“(A) any asset that, under applicable State law, at 

the time the individual became a candidate, the candidate had 

legal right of access to or control over, and with respect to 

which the candidate had— 

“(i) legal and rightful title; or 

“(ii) an equitable interest; 

“(B) income received during the current election cycle of the 

candidate, including— 

“(i) a salary and other earned income from bona fide 

employment; 

“(ii) dividends and proceeds from the sale of the 

candidate’s stocks or other investments; 

“(iii) bequests to the candidate; 

“(iv) income from trusts established before the 

beginning of the election cycle; 

“(v) income from trusts established by bequest after the 

beginning of the election cycle of which the candidate is the 

beneficiary; 

“(vi) gifts of a personal nature that had been customarily received by the candidate prior to the beginning of the 

election cycle; and 

“(vii) proceeds from lotteries and similar legal games 

of chance; and 

“(C) a portion of assets that are jointly owned by 

the candidate and the candidate’s spouse equal to the 

candidate’s share of the asset under the instrument of 
58a 

conveyance or ownership, but if no specific share is indicated 

by an instrument of conveyance or ownership, the value of 1/2 

of the property.”. 

SEC. 305. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF LOWEST UNIT CHARGE FOR FEDERAL CANDIDATES 

ATTACKING OPPOSITION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 315(b) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S. C. 315(b)) is amended— 

(1) by striking “(b) The charges” and inserting the 

following: 

“(b) CHARGES.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The charges”; 

(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following: 

“(2) CONTENT OF BROADCASTS.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of a candidate 

for Federal office, such candidate shall not be entitled to 

receive the rate under paragraph (1)(A) for the use of any 

broadcasting station unless the candidate provides written 

certification to the broadcast station that the candidate (and any 

authorized committee of the candidate) shall not make any 

direct reference to another candidate for the same office, 

in any broadcast using the rights and conditions of access 

under this Act, unless such reference meets the requirements of 

subparagraph (C) or (D). 

“(B) LIMITATION ON CHARGES.—If a candidate for Federal office (or any authorized committee of such 

candidate) makes a reference described in subparagraph (A) in 

any broadcast that does not meet the requirements of 

subparagraph (C) or (D), such candidate shall not be entitled to 

receive the rate under paragraph (1)(A) for such broadcast or 
59a 

any other broadcast during any portion of the 45-day and 60-

day periods described in paragraph (1)(A), that occur on or 

after the date of such broadcast, for election to such office. 

“(C) TELEVISION BROADCASTS.—A candidate meets the requirements of this subparagraph if, in the case 

of a television broadcast, at the end of such broadcast there 

appears simultaneously, for a period no less than 4 seconds— 

“(i) a clearly identifiable photographic or similar image 

of the candidate; and 

“(ii) a clearly readable printed statement, identifying 

the candidate and stating that the candidate has approved the 

broadcast and that the candidate’s authorized committee paid 

for the broadcast. 

“(D) RADIO BROADCASTS.—A candidate 

meets the requirements of this subparagraph if, in the case of a 

radio broadcast, the broadcast includes a personal audio 

statement by the candidate that identifies the candidate, the 

office the candidate is seeking, and indicates that the candidate 

has approved the broadcast. 

“(E) CERTIFICATION.—Certifications under 

this section shall be provided and certified as accurate by the 

candidate (or any authorized committee of the candidate) at the 

time of purchase. 

“(F) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this 

paragraph, the terms ‘authorized committee’ and ‘Federal 

office’ have the meanings given such terms by section 301 of 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431).”. 

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 315(b) 

(1)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 

315(b)(1)(A)), as amended by this Act, is amended by inserting 

“subject to paragraph (2),” before “during the forty-five days”. 
60a 

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this 

section shall apply to broadcasts made after the effective date 

of this Act. 

SEC. 306. SOFTWARE FOR FILING REPORTS AND 

PROMPT DISCLOSURE OF CONTRIBUTIONS. 

Section 304(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 

following: 

“(12) SOFTWARE FOR FILING OF REPORTS.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall— 

“(i) promulgate standards to be used by vendors to 

develop software that— 

“(I) permits candidates to easily record information 

concerning receipts and disbursements required to be reported 

under this Act at the time of the receipt or disbursement; 

“(II) allows the information recorded under subclause (I) to be transmitted immediately to the Commission; 

and 

“(III) allows the Commission to post the information on the Internet immediately upon receipt; and 

“(ii) make a copy of software that meets the standards 

promulgated under clause (i) available to each person required to file a designation, statement, or report in electronic 

form under this Act. 

“(B) ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.—To the 

extent feasible, the Commission shall require vendors to 

include in the software developed under the standards under 

subparagraph (A) the ability for any person to file any 

designation, statement, or report required under this Act in 

electronic form. 
61a 

“(C) REQUIRED USE.—Notwithstanding any 

provision of this Act relating to times for filing reports, each 

candidate for Federal office (or that candidate’s authorized 

committee) shall use software that meets the standards 

promulgated under this paragraph once such software is made 

available to such candidate. 

“(D) REQUIRED POSTING.—The Commission 

shall, as soon as practicable, post on the Internet any 

information received under this paragraph.” 

SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. 

(a) INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL LIMITS FOR 

CERTAIN CONTRIBUTIONS.—Section 315(a)(1) of the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)) 

is amended— 

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “$1,000” and 

inserting “$2,000”; and 

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “$20,000” and 

inserting “$25,000”. 

(b) INCREASE IN ANNUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON 

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS.—Section 315(a)(3) of the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)) 

is amended to read as follows: 

“(3) During the period which begins on January 1 of 

an odd-numbered year and ends on December 31 of the next 

even-numbered year, no individual may make contributions 

aggregating more than— 

“(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to 

candidates and the authorized committees of candidates; 

“(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of which not more than $37,500 may be attributable to 

contributions to political committees which are not political 

committees of national political parties.”. 
62a 

(c) INCREASE IN SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN 

COMMITTEE LIMIT.—Section 315(h) of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(h)) is amended 

by striking “$17,500” and inserting “$35,000”. 

(d) INDEXING OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS.—Section 

315(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 

441a(c)) is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (1)— 

(A) by striking the second and third sentences; 

(B) by inserting “(A)” before “At the beginning”; 

and 

(C) by adding at the end the following: 

“(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in any 

calendar year after 2002— 

“(i) a limitation established by subsections (a)(1)(A), 

(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (b), (d), or (h) shall be increased by the 

percent difference determined under subparagraph (A); 

“(ii) each amount so increased shall remain in effect for 

the calendar year; and 

“(iii) if any amount after adjustment under clause (i) is 

not a multiple of $100, such amount shall be rounded to the 

nearest multiple of $100. 

“(C) In the case of limitations under subsections 

(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and (h), increases shall only be 

made in odd-numbered years and such increases shall remain 

in effect for the 2-year period beginning on the first day 

following the date of the last general election in the year 

preceding the year in which the amount is increased and 

ending on the date of the next general election.”; and 

(2) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking “means the 

calendar year 1974” and inserting “means— 
63a 

“(i) for purposes of subsections (b) and (d), calendar 

year 1974; and 

“(ii) for purposes of subsections (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), 

(a)(3), and (h), calendar year 2001”. 

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this 

section shall apply with respect to contributions made on or 

after January 1, 2003. 

SEC. 308. DONATIONS TO PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURAL COMMITTEE. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 5 of title 36, United States 

Code, is amended by— 

(1) redesignating section 510 as section 511; and 

(2) inserting after section 509 the following: 

“§ 510. Disclosure of and prohibition on certain 

donations 

“(a) IN GENERAL.—A committee shall not be 

considered to be the Inaugural Committee for purposes of this 

chapter unless the committee agrees to, and meets, the 

requirements of subsections (b) and (c). 

“(b) DISCLOSURE.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than the date that is 

90 days after the date of the Presidential inaugural ceremony, 

the committee shall file a report with the Federal Election 

Commission disclosing any donation of money or anything of 

value made to the committee in an aggregate amount equal to 

or greater than $200. 

“(2) CONTENTS OF REPORT.—A report filed 

under paragraph (1) shall contain— 

“(A) the amount of the donation; 

“(B) the date the donation is received; and 
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“(C) the name and address of the person making 

the donation. 

“(c) LIMITATION.—The committee shall not accept 

any donation from a foreign national (as defined in section 

319(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 

U.S.C. 441e(b))).”. 

(b) REPORTS MADE AVAILABLE BY FEC.—Section 

304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 

434), as amended by sections 103, 201, and 212 is amended by 

adding at the end the following: 

“(h) REPORTS FROM INAUGURAL COMMITTEES.—The Federal Election Commission shall make any 

report filed by an Inaugural Committee under section 510 of 

title 36, United States Code, accessible to the public at the 

offices of the Commission and on the Internet not later than 48 

hours after the report is received by the Commission.”. 

SEC. 309. PROHIBITION ON FRAUDULENT SOLICITATION OF FUNDS. 

Section 322 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 

(2 U.S.C. 441h) is amended— 

(1) by inserting “(a) IN GENERAL.—” before “No person”; 

and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

“(b) FRAUDULENT SOLICITATION OF FUNDS.—No 

person shall— 

“(1) fraudulently misrepresent the person as speaking, 

writing, or otherwise acting for or on behalf of any candidate 

or political party or employee or agent thereof for the purpose 

of soliciting contributions or donations; or 

“(2) willfully and knowingly participate in or conspire 

to participate in any plan, scheme, or design to violate 

paragraph (1).”. 
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SEC. 310. STUDY AND REPORT ON CLEAN MONEY 

CLEAN ELECTIONS LAWS. 

(a) CLEAN MONEY CLEAN ELECTIONS DEFINED.— 

In this section, the term “clean money clean elections” means 

funds received under State laws that provide in whole or in part 

for the public financing of election campaigns. 

(b) STUDY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Comptroller General shall 

conduct a study of the clean money clean elections of Arizona 

and Maine. 

(2) MATTERS STUDIED.— 

(A) STATISTICS ON CLEAN MONEY CLEAN 

ELECTIONS CANDIDATES.—The Comptroller General 

shall determine— 

(i) the number of candidates who have chosen to run 

for public office with clean money clean elections including— 

(I) the office for which they were candidates; 

(II) whether the candidate was an incumbent or a 

challenger; and 

(III) whether the candidate was successful in the 

candidate’s bid for public office; and 

(ii) the number of races in which at least one 

candidate ran an election with clean money clean elections. 

(B) EFFECTS OF CLEAN MONEY CLEAN 

ELECTIONS.—The Comptroller General of the United States 

shall describe the effects of public financing under the clean 

money clean elections laws on the 2000 elections in Arizona 

and Maine. 

(c) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date of 

enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
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States shall submit a report to the Congress detailing the results 

of the study conducted under subsection (b). 

SEC. 311. CLARITY STANDARDS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF SPONSORS OF ELECTION-RELATED 

ADVERTISING. 

Section 318 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 

(2 U.S.C. 441d) is amended— 

(1) in subsection (a)— 

(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)— 

(i) by striking “Whenever” and inserting “Whenever a 

political committee makes a disbursement for the purpose of 

financing any communication through any broadcasting 

station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, 

mailing, or any other type of general public political 

advertising, or whenever”; 

(ii) by striking “an expenditure” and inserting “a disbursement”; 

(iii) by striking “direct”; and 

(iv) by inserting “or makes a disbursement for an electioneering communication (as defined in section 304(f)(3))” 

after “public political advertising”; and 

(B) in paragraph (3), by inserting “and permanent street 

address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address” after 

“name”; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

“(c) SPECIFICATION.—Any printed communication 

described in subsection (a) shall— 

“(1) be of sufficient type size to be clearly readable by 

the recipient of the communication; 
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“(2) be contained in a printed box set apart from the 

other contents of the communication; and 

“(3) be printed with a reasonable degree of color 

contrast between the background and the printed statement. 

“(d) ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS.— 

“(1) COMMUNICATIONS BY CANDIDATES OR 

AUTHORIZED PERSONS.— 

“(A) BY RADIO.—Any communication described 

in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) which is transmitted 

through radio shall include, in addition to the requirements of 

that paragraph, an audio statement by the candidate that 

identifies the candidate and states that the candidate has 

approved the communication. 

“(B) BY TELEVISION.—Any communication 

described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) which is 

transmitted through television shall include, in addition to the 

requirements of that paragraph, a statement that identifies the 

candidate and states that the candidate has approved the 

communication. Such statement— 

“(i) shall be conveyed by— 

“(I) an unobscured, full-screen view of the 

candidate making the statement, or 

“(II) the candidate in voice-over, accompanied 

by a clearly identifiable photographic or similar image of the 

candidate; and 

“(ii) shall also appear in writing at the end of the 

communication in a clearly readable manner with a reasonable 

degree of color contrast between the background and the 

printed statement, for a period of at least 4 seconds. 

“(2) COMMUNICATIONS BY OTHERS.—Any 

communication described in paragraph (3) of subsection (a) 

which is transmitted through radio or television shall include, 
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in addition to the requirements of that paragraph, in a clearly 

spoken manner, the following audio statement: ‘________ is 

responsible for the content of this advertising.’ (with the 

blank to be filled in with the name of the political committee or 

other person paying for the communication and the name of 

any connected organization of the payor). If transmitted 

through television, the statement shall be conveyed by an 

unobscured, full- screen view of a representative of the 

political committee or other person making the statement, or 

by a representative of such political committee or other person 

in voice-over, and shall also appear in a clearly readable 

manner with a reasonable degree of color contrast between the 

background and the printed statement, for a period of at least 4 

seconds.”. 

SEC. 312. INCREASE IN PENALTIES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (A) of section 

309(d)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 

U.S.C. 437g(d)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows: 

“(A) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits 

a violation of any provision of this Act which involves the 

making, receiving, or reporting of any contribution, donation, 

or expenditure— 

“(i) aggregating $25,000 or more during a calendar 

year shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or 

imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both; or 

“(ii) aggregating $2,000 or more (but less than 

$25,000) during a calendar year shall be fined under such title, 

or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both.”. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by this 

section shall apply to violations occurring on or after the 

effective date of this Act. 
69a 

SEC. 313. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 406(a) of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 455(a)) is amended by 

striking “3” and inserting “5”. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by this 

section shall apply to violations occurring on or after the 

effective date of this Act. 

SEC. 314. SENTENCING GUIDELINES. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The United States Sentencing 

Commission shall— 

(1) promulgate a guideline, or amend an existing 

guideline under section 994 of title 28, United States Code, in 

accordance with paragraph (2), for penalties for violations of 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related 

election laws; and 

(2) submit to Congress an explanation of any guidelines 

promulgated under paragraph (1) and any legislative or 

administrative recommendations regarding enforcement of the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related election 

laws. 

(b) CONSIDERATIONS.—The Commission shall provide 

guidelines under subsection (a) taking into account the 

following considerations: 

(1) Ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy 

statements reflect the serious nature of such violations and the 

need for aggressive and appropriate law enforcement action to 

prevent such violations. 

(2) Provide a sentencing enhancement for any person 

convicted of such violation if such violation involves— 

(A) a contribution, donation, or expenditure from a 

foreign source; 

(B) a large number of illegal transactions; 
70a 

(C) a large aggregate amount of illegal contributions, 

donations, or expenditures; 

(D) the receipt or disbursement of governmental funds; 

and 

(E) an intent to achieve a benefit from the Federal 

Government. 

(3) Assure reasonable consistency with other relevant 

directives and guidelines of the Commission. 

(4) Account for aggravating or mitigating circumstances 

that might justify exceptions, including circumstances for 

which the sentencing guidelines currently provide sentencing 

enhancements. 

(5) Assure the guidelines adequately meet the purposes of 

sentencing under section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States 

Code. 

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE; EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO 

PROMULGATE GUIDELINES.— 

(1) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Notwithstanding section 402, 

the United States Sentencing Commission shall promulgate 

guidelines under this section not later than the later of— 

(A) 90 days after the effective date of this Act; or 

(B) 90 days after the date on which at least a majority 

of the members of the Commission are appointed and holding 

office. 

(2) EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE 

GUIDELINES.—The Commission shall promulgate guidelines under this section in accordance with the procedures set 

forth in section 21(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1987, as 

though the authority under such Act has not expired. 
71a 

SEC. 315. INCREASE IN PENALTIES IMPOSED FOR 

VIOLATIONS OF CONDUIT CONTRIBUTION BAN. 

(a) INCREASE IN CIVIL MONEY PENALTY FOR 

KNOWING AND WILLFUL VIOLATIONS.—Section 309(a) 

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U. S.C. 

437g(a)) is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (5)(B), by inserting before the period at 

the end the following: “(or, in the case of a violation of 

section 320, which is not less than 300 percent of the amount 

involved in the violation and is not more than the greater of 

$50,000 or 1,000 percent of the amount involved in the 

violation)”; and 

(2) in paragraph (6)(C), by inserting before the period at 

the end the following: “(or, in the case of a violation of section 

320, which is not less than 300 percent of the amount involved 

in the violation and is not more than the greater of $50,000 or 

1,000 percent of the amount involved in the violation)”. 

(b) INCREASE IN CRIMINAL PENALTY.—Section 

309(d)(1) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 437g(d)(1)) is amended by 

adding at the end the following new subparagraph: 

“(D) Any person who knowingly and willfully commits a 

violation of section 320 involving an amount aggregating more 

than $10,000 during a calendar year shall be— 

“(i) imprisoned for not more than 2 years if the amount 

is less than $25,000 (and subject to imprisonment under 

subparagraph (A) if the amount is $25,000 or more); 

“(ii) fined not less than 300 percent of the amount 

involved in the violation and not more than the greater of— 

“(I) $50,000; or 

“(II) 1,000 percent of the amount involved in the 

violation; or 
72a 

“(iii) both imprisoned under clause (i) and fined under 

clause (ii).”. 

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.--The amendments made by this 

section shall apply with respect to violations occurring on or 

after the effective date of this Act. 

SEC. 316. RESTRICTION ON INCREASED CONTRIBUTION LIMITS BY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT 

CANDIDATE’S AVAILABLE FUNDS. 

Section 315(i)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(i)(1)), as added by this Act, is amended 

by adding at the end the following: 

“(E) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE’S CAMPAIGN FUNDS.— 

“(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of determining the 

aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds under 

subparagraph (D)(ii), such amount shall include the gross 

receipts advantage of the candidate’s authorized committee. 

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE.—For 

purposes of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts advantage’ 

means the excess, if any, of— 

“(I) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross 

receipts of a candidate’s authorized committee during any 

election cycle (not including contributions from personal funds 

of the candidate) that may be expended in connection with the 

election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 of the 

year preceding the year in which a general election is held, 

over 

“(II) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross 

receipts of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee 

during any election cycle (not including contributions from 

personal funds of the candidate) that may be expended in 

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 and 
73a 

December 31 of the year preceding the year in which a general 

election is held.”. 

SEC. 317. CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT OF NATIONALS 

OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE POLITICAL 

CONTRIBUTIONS. 

Section 319(b)(2) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (2 U.S.C. 441e(b)(2)) is amended by inserting after 

“United States” the following: “or a national of the United 

States (as defined in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act)”. 

SEC. 318. PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY 

MINORS. 

Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 

U.S.C. 431 et seq.), as amended by section 101, is further 

amended by adding at the end the following new section: 

“PROHIBITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY MINORS 

“SEC. 324. An individual who is 17 years old or younger 

shall not make a contribution to a candidate or a contribution 

or donation to a committee of a political party.”. 

SEC. 319. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES IN 

RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL 

FUNDS. 

(a) INCREASED LIMITS.—Title III of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by 

inserting after section 315 the following new section: 

“MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS FOR HOUSE 

CANDIDATES IN RESPONSE TO PERSONAL FUND 

EXPENDITURES OF OPPONENTS 
74a 

“SEC. 315A. (a) AVAILABILITY OF INCREASED 

LIMIT.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (3), if the 

opposition personal funds amount with respect to a candidate 

for election to the office of Representative in, or Delegate or 

Resident Commissioner to, the Congress exceeds $350,000— 

“(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) with respect to 

the candidate shall be tripled; 

“(B) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply with 

respect to any contribution made with respect to the candidate 

if the contribution is made under the increased limit allowed 

under subparagraph (A) during a period in which the candidate 

may accept such a contribution; and 

“(C) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any 

expenditure by a State or national committee of a political 

party on behalf of the candidate shall not apply. 

“(2) DETERMINATION OF OPPOSITION PERSONAL 

FUNDS AMOUNT.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.--The opposition personal funds 

amount is an amount equal to the excess (if any) of— 

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from 

personal funds (as defined in subsection (b)(1)) that an 

opposing candidate in the same election makes; over 

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from 

personal funds made by the candidate with respect to the 

election. 

“(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE’S CAMPAIGN FUNDS.— 

“(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of determining the 

aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds under 

subparagraph (A), such amount shall include the gross receipts 

advantage of the candidate’s authorized committee. 
75a 

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE.—For purposes of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts advantage’ means 

the excess, if any, of— 

“(I) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross 

receipts of a candidate’s authorized committee during any 

election cycle (not including contributions from personal funds 

of the candidate) that may be expended in connection 

with the election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 

of the year preceding the year in which a general election is 

held, over 

“(II) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross 

receipts of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee 

during any election cycle (not including contributions from 

personal funds of the candidate) that may be expended in 

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 and 

December 31 of the year preceding the year in which a general 

election is held. 

“(3) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER 

INCREASED LIMIT.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph (B), a 

candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall not 

accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not make 

any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph 

(1)— 

“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the 

opposition personal funds amount under subsection (b)(1); and 

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to 

the aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted and 

party expenditures previously made under the increased limits 

under this subsection for the election cycle, exceeds 100 

percent of the opposition personal funds amount. 

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING 

CANDIDATE.—A candidate and a candidate’s authorized 
76a 

committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall 

not make any expenditure under the increased limit after the 

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate 

to the extent that the amount of such increased limit is 

attributable to such an opposing candidate. 

“(4) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

“(A) IN GENERAL.—The aggregate amount of 

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s 

authorized committee under the increased limit under 

paragraph (1) and not otherwise expended in connection with 

the election with respect to which such contributions relate 

shall, not later than 50 days after the date of such election, be 

used in the manner described in subparagraph (B). 

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS.—A candidate or a 

candidate’s authorized committee shall return the excess 

contribution to the person who made the contribution. 

“(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.— 

“(A) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM 

PERSONAL FUNDS.—In this paragraph, the term 

‘expenditure from personal funds’ means— 

“(i) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal 

funds; and 

“(ii) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using 

personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the 

candidate’s authorized committee. 

“(B) DECLARATION OF INTENT.—Not later than the 

date that is 15 days after the date on which an individual 

becomes a candidate for the office of Representative in, or 

Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress, the 

candidate shall file a declaration stating the total amount of 
77a 

expenditures from personal funds that the candidate intends to 

make, or to obligate to make, with respect to the election that 

will exceed $350,000. 

“(C) INITIAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 24 

hours after a candidate described in subparagraph (B) makes 

or obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from 

personal funds in excess of $350,000 in connection with any 

election, the candidate shall file a notification. 

“(D) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION.—After a candidate files an initial notification under subparagraph (C), the 

candidate shall file an additional notification each time 

expenditures from personal funds are made or obligated to be 

made in an aggregate amount that exceeds $10,000. Such 

notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours after the 

expenditure is made. 

“(E) CONTENTS.—A notification under subparagraph 

(C) or (D) shall include— 

“(i) the name of the candidate and the office sought by 

the candidate; 

“(ii) the date and amount of each expenditure; and 

“(iii) the total amount of expenditures from personal 

funds that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, with 

respect to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is 

the subject of the notification. 

“(F) PLACE OF FILING.—Each declaration or notification required to be filed by a candidate under subparagraph 

(C), (D), or (E) shall be filed with— 

“(i) the Commission; and 

“(ii) each candidate in the same election and the 

national party of each such candidate. 

“(2) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS.—In the next regularly scheduled report after 
78a 

the date of the election for which a candidate seeks nomination 

for election to, or election to, Federal office, the candidate or 

the candidate’s authorized committee shall submit to the 

Commission a report indicating the source and amount of any 

excess contributions (as determined under subsection (a)) and 

the manner in which the candidate or the candidate’s 

authorized committee used such funds. 

“(3) ENFORCEMENT.—For provisions providing for the 

enforcement of the reporting requirements under this subsection, see section 309.”. 

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 315(a)(1) of 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a), as 

amended by section 304(a), is amended by striking “subsection 

(i),” and inserting “subsection (i) and section 315A,”. 

TITLE IV—SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATE 

SEC. 401. SEVERABILITY. 

If any provision of this Act or amendment made by this Act, 

or the application of a provision or amendment to any person 

or circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder 

of this Act and amendments made by this Act, and the 

application of the provisions and amendment to any person or 

circumstance, shall not be affected by the holding. 

SEC. 402. EFFECTIVE DATES AND REGULATIONS. 

(a) GENERAL EFFECTIVE DATE.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in the succeeding provisions of this section, the effective date of this 

Act, and the amendments made by this Act, is November 6, 

2002. 

(2) MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. 

—The amendments made by— 

(A) section 102 shall apply with respect to contributions made on or after January 1, 2003; and 
79a 

(B) section 307 shall take effect as provided in 

subsection (e) of such section. 

(3) SEVERABILITY; EFFECTIVE DATES AND 

REGULATIONS; JUDICIAL REVIEW.—Title IV shall take 

effect on the date of enactment of this Act. 

(4) PROVISIONS NOT TO APPLY TO RUNOFF 

ELECTIONS.—Section 323(b) of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (as added by section 101(a)), section 

103(a), title II, sections 304 (including section 315(j) of 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as added by section 

304(a)(2)), 305 (notwithstanding subsection (c) of such 

section), 311, 316, 318, and 319, and title V (and the 

amendments made by such sections and titles) shall take effect 

on November 6, 2002, but shall not apply with respect to 

runoff elections, recounts, or election contests resulting from 

elections held prior to such date. 

(b) SOFT MONEY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL 

PARTIES.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except for subsection (b) of such 

section, section 323 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 (as added by section 101(a)) shall take effect on 

November 6, 2002. 

(2) TRANSITIONAL RULES FOR THE SPENDING 

OF SOFT MONEY OF NATIONAL POLITICAL 

PARTIES.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding section 

323(a) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (as 

added by section 101(a)), if a national committee of a political 

party described in such section (including any person who is 

subject to such section under paragraph (2) of such section), 

has received funds described in such section prior to November 

6, 2002, the rules described in subparagraph (B) shall apply 

with respect to the spending of the amount of such funds in the 

possession of such committee as of such date. 
80a 

(B) USE OF EXCESS SOFT MONEY FUNDS.— 

(i) IN GENERAL.—Subject to clauses (ii) and 

(iii), the national committee of a political party may use the 

amount described in subparagraph (A) prior to January 1, 

2003, solely for the purpose of— 

(I) retiring outstanding debts or obligations that 

were incurred solely in connection with an election held prior 

to November 6, 2002; or 

(II) paying expenses or retiring outstanding 

debts or paying for obligations that were incurred solely in 

connection with any runoff election, recount, or election 

contest resulting from an election held prior to November 6, 

2002. 

(ii) PROHIBITION ON USING SOFT MONEY 

FOR HARD MONEY EXPENSES, DEBTS, AND 

OBLIGATIONS.—A national committee of a political party 

may not use the amount described in subparagraph (A) for any 

expenditure (as defined in section 301(9) of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431(9))) or for 

retiring outstanding debts or obligations that were incurred for 

such an expenditure. 

(iii) PROHIBITION OF BUILDING FUND 

USES.—A national committee of a political party may not use 

the amount described in subparagraph (A) for activities to 

defray the costs of the construction or purchase of any office 

building or facility. 

(c) REGULATIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph 

(2), the Federal Election Commission shall promulgate 

regulations to carry out this Act and the amendments made by 

this Act that are under the Commission’s jurisdiction not later 

than 270 days after the date of enactment of this Act. 
81a 

(2) SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES.—Not 

later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the 

Federal Election Commission shall promulgate regulations to 

carry out title I of this Act and the amendments made by 

such title. 

SEC. 403. JUDICIAL REVIEW. 

(a) SPECIAL RULES FOR ACTIONS BROUGHT ON 

CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.—If any action is brought 

for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the constitutionality of any provision of this Act or any amendment 

made by this Act, the following rules shall apply: 

(1) The action shall be filed in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia and shall be heard 

by a 3-judge court convened pursuant to section 2284 of title 

28, United States Code. 

(2) A copy of the complaint shall be delivered promptly 

to the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary 

of the Senate. 

(3) A final decision in the action shall be reviewable 

only by appeal directly to the Supreme Court of the United 

States. Such appeal shall be taken by the filing of a notice of 

appeal within 10 days, and the filing of a jurisdictional 

statement within 30 days, of the entry of the final decision. 

(4) It shall be the duty of the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of 

the United States to advance on the docket and to expedite to 

the greatest possible extent the disposition of the action 

and appeal. 

(b) INTERVENTION BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.—In any action in which the constitutionality of any 

provision of this Act or any amendment made by this Act is 

raised (including but not limited to an action described in 

subsection (a)), any member of the House of Representatives 
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(including a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to the 

Congress) or Senate shall have the right to intervene either in 

support of or opposition to the position of a party to the case 

regarding the constitutionality of the provision or amendment. 

To avoid duplication of efforts and reduce the burdens placed 

on the parties to the action, the court in any such action may 

make such orders as it considers necessary, including orders to 

require intervenors taking similar positions to file joint papers 

or to be represented by a single attorney at oral argument. 

(c) CHALLENGE BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.— 

Any Member of Congress may bring an action, subject to the 

special rules described in subsection (a), for declaratory or 

injunctive relief to challenge the constitutionality of any 

provision of this Act or any amendment made by this Act. 

(d) APPLICABILITY.— 

(1) INITIAL CLAIMS.—With respect to any action 

initially filed on or before December 31, 2006, the provisions 

of subsection (a) shall apply with respect to each action 

described in such section. 

(2) SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS.—With respect to any 

action initially filed after December 31, 2006, the provisions of 

subsection (a) shall not apply to any action described in such 

section unless the person filing such action elects such 

provisions to apply to the action. 

TITLE V—ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 

SEC. 501. INTERNET ACCESS TO RECORDS. 

Section 304(a)(11)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act 

of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(11)(B)) is amended to read as 

follows: 

“(B) The Commission shall make a designation, 

statement, report, or notification that is filed with the 

Commission under this Act available for inspection by the 

public in the offices of the Commission and accessible to the 
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public on the Internet not later than 48 hours (or not later than 

24 hours in the case of a designation, statement, report, or 

notification filed electronically) after receipt by the 

Commission.”. 

SEC. 502. MAINTENANCE OF WEBSITE OF ELECTION 

REPORTS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Federal Election Commission 

shall maintain a central site on the Internet to make accessible 

to the public all publicly available election-related reports and 

information. 

(b) ELECTION-RELATED REPORT.—In this section, 

the term “election-related report” means any report, 

designation, or statement required to be filed under the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971. 

(c) COORDINATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES.— 

Any Federal executive agency receiving election-related 

information which that agency is required by law to publicly 

disclose shall cooperate and coordinate with the Federal 

Election Commission to make such report available through, or 

for posting on, the site of the Federal Election Commission in a 

timely manner. 

SEC. 503. ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE REPORTS. 

(a) PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES.—Section 304(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 is amended by striking “the following reports” and all 

that follows through the period and inserting “the treasurer 

shall file quarterly reports, which shall be filed not later than 

the 15th day after the last day of each calendar quarter, and 

which shall be complete as of the last day of each calendar 

quarter, except that the report for the quarter ending December 

31 shall be filed not later than January 31 of the following 

calendar year.”. 
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(b) NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF A POLITICAL 

PARTY.—Section 304(a)(4) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(4)) 

is amended by adding at the end the following flush sentence: 

“Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a national committee 

of a political party shall file the reports required under 

subparagraph (B).”. 

SEC. 504. PUBLIC ACCESS TO BROADCASTING 

RECORDS. 

Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 

315), as amended by this Act, is amended by redesignating 

subsections (e) and (f) as subsections (f) and (g), respectively, 

and inserting after subsection (d) the following: 

“(e) POLITICAL RECORD.— 

“(1) IN GENERAL.—A licensee shall maintain, and 

make available for public inspection, a complete record of a 

request to purchase broadcast time that— 

“(A) is made by or on behalf of a legally qualified 

candidate for public office; or 

“(B) communicates a message relating to any 

political matter of national importance, including— 

“(i) a legally qualified candidate; 

“(ii) any election to Federal office; or 

“(iii) a national legislative issue of public 

importance. 

“(2) CONTENTS OF RECORD.—A record maintained under paragraph (1) shall contain information 

regarding— 

“(A) whether the request to purchase broadcast time 

is accepted or rejected by the licensee; 

“(B) the rate charged for the broadcast time; 
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“(C) the date and time on which the communication 

is aired; 

“(D) the class of time that is purchased; 

“(E) the name of the candidate to which the 

communication refers and the office to which the candidate is 

seeking election, the election to which the communication 

refers, or the issue to which the communication refers (as 

applicable); 

“(F) in the case of a request made by, or on behalf of, 

a candidate, the name of the candidate, the authorized 

committee of the candidate, and the treasurer of such 

committee; and 

“(G) in the case of any other request, the name of the 

person purchasing the time, the name, address, and phone 

number of a contact person for such person, and a list of the 

chief executive officers or members of the executive 

committee or of the board of directors of such person. 

“(3) TIME TO MAINTAIN FILE.—The information 

required under this subsection shall be placed in a political file 

as soon as possible and shall be retained by the licensee for a 

period of not less than 2 years.”. 

Approved March 27, 2002.