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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to 

national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

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• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics 

having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of 

special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of 

conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.
FORECASTING ZERO:

U.S. NUCLEAR HISTORY AND THE

LOW PROBABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

Jonathan Pearl

November 2011

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications 

enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them 

to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.
ii

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 632 Wright Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5046. 

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This project was facilitated by the generous financial and institutional support of the Stanton Foundation, Council on Foreign 

Relations, and the United States Institute of Peace. A special debt 

of gratitude is due to George Quester and Shibley Telhami for 

their guidance at all stages of this project. The author additionally wishes to thank Mohammed M. Hafez, Jane Pearl, Richard 

Pearl, Amandine Weinrob, and Guy Ziv for their advice and support. Special thanks also are due to Benoît Pelopidas, whose invitation to present on the panel “Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation 

and Disarmament: Theory and Policy” at the 2010 International 

Studies Association conference provided the initial impetus for 

this project, as well as to all the members of that panel for their 

constructive feedback. Needless to say, the opinions expressed 

herein, as well as any omissions or errors, are the sole responsibility of the author.

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ISBN 1-58487-516-X
iv

FOREWORD

Over the past few years, a vigorous debate about 

the wisdom and mechanics of nuclear disarmament 

has emerged around the world, particularly in the 

United States. Washington’s current wave of support 

for disarmament was ignited unexpectedly in 2007 by 

a bipartisan group of national security experts. Calls 

for the elimination of nuclear weapons have existed 

for almost as long as the weapons themselves. But 

these developments, coupled with President Barack 

Obama’s clear support for disarmament and the successful ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, have left American supporters of abolition 

feeling as if the scales may finally be weighted in favor 

of their goal—even though they acknowledge that it 

will not be easily achieved.

In his monograph, Jonathan Pearl challenges the 

notion that the probability of nuclear disarmament is 

increasing. He argues that, contrary to popular belief, 

there is little new about the current push for disarmament, buttressing his claim with a historical overview 

of the nuclear age that highlights important similarities between past and present disarmament efforts. 

Building on this historical analysis, Pearl surveys the 

current political-strategic context, one that is marked 

by continuing proliferation, various forms of conflict, 

and significant conceptual and structural barriers to 

abolishing nuclear weapons. It is far from certain, 

Pearl provocatively concludes, whether Washington’s 

current pro-disarmament efforts will produce meaningful or lasting results.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

this monograph as an important contribution to the 

debate over nuclear disarmament. Whether readers 
v

are disarmament supporters or skeptics, Pearl’s contribution will serve as an important reference point for 

debates on this critical subject.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JONATHAN PEARL is a Ph.D. candidate in government and politics at the University of Maryland. 

During 2010-11, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security 

Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace. Mr. Pearl has previously worked at the 

RAND Corporation, and as a foreign policy advisor to 

former U.S. Senator Christopher J. Dodd. In 2008, he 

was a Nuclear Scholar at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS), and he presently sits on 

the Board of Advisors for CSIS’s Project on Nuclear 

Issues. Mr. Pearl’s current research focuses on nuclear 

disarmament, proliferation, civil nuclear cooperation, 

nuclear arms control, and strategic stability. His work 

has been published by the Council on Foreign Relations, CSIS, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 

among other national and international media outlets. 

He holds an MA in government and politics from the 

University of Maryland and a BA in music from Florida Atlantic University.

ix

SUMMARY

When four luminaries of U.S. policymaking—Cold 

Warriors, all—penned a 2007 op-ed calling for global 

nuclear disarmament, a shock wave emanated through 

the policy community in Washington and abroad.1

Had age or the stress of public life finally taken its 

toll on these elder statesmen? How could the goal of 

disarmament be practically achieved? Was their plea, 

in fact, a cynical ploy to strengthen a conventionally 

dominant United States? Were not communist sympathizers, naïve world government types, or a periodically randy anti-nuclear movement the only ones who 

took disarmament seriously? Perhaps most important, 

did their statement reflect a convergence of sentiment 

in the United States in favor of abolition? Might the 

United States abolish nuclear weapons in our lifetime? 

President Barack Obama’s open support for nuclear abolition and his efforts to decrease the number 

and role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security 

policy have led many to believe that the United States 

will one day shed its nuclear arsenal. Yet the future of 

U.S. nuclear weapons policy is uncertain. Contrary to 

popular belief, the general approach being advanced 

today by the Obama administration is strikingly similar to mainstream proposals of the past 65 years: arms 

control and nonproliferation now, disarmament at an 

undetermined point in the future. Meanwhile, numerous factors continue to militate against abolition, including a growing Pakistani arsenal and new sources 

of instability in the Middle East. Indeed, just as the 

perceived need for abolition may be growing, so may 

the difficulty of achieving it.

This monograph draws upon history and the present context to argue that observers should temper 
x

their expectations about the prospects for U.S. nuclear 

disarmament. The first section traces the rise, decline, 

and rebirth of disarmament as a central focus of U.S. 

policy, from the immediate postwar period to the fall 

of the Soviet Union. The second section examines 

the steady decline of support for disarmament in the 

post-Cold War era from 1991-2007. The third section 

explores the period from 2007 to 2009, during which 

disarmament gained significant political traction 

among American elites. The fourth section addresses 

the Obama administration’s nuclear policy, juxtaposing the President’s lofty goal of disarmament with the 

remaining obstacles to its achievement. The fifth section provides conclusions reached by the author. 

ENDNOTE - SUMMARY

1. George P. Schultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. 
1

FORECASTING ZERO:

U.S. NUCLEAR HISTORY AND THE

LOW PROBABILITY OF DISARMAMENT

AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM: NEW TRICK 

OR OLD PONY? (1945-91)

Limited Dissent for a Wartime Project.

The first half of the 20th century was replete with 

disarmament initiatives, including the Versailles 

Treaty, the Five-Power Treaty on Naval Disarmament, 

and the World Conference on Disarmament. Indeed, 

“[a]lmost every advance in weaponry, from the crossbow to the bomber, has been accompanied by calls for 

the weapon’s abolition.”1

 In this sense, nuclear weapons have fared similarly to their predecessors.

Anti-nuclear weapon sentiment in the United 

States extends back at least as far as the days of the 

Manhattan Project. Some physicists, including German refugee Max Born, were so disgusted by the 

thought of atomic weapons that they refused to work 

on the Project at all. Others such as Leo Szilard joined 

the wartime effort but hoped that nuclear weapons 

would be used only as a deterrent against a potential 

Nazi nuclear weapon.

By contrast, key U.S. policymakers warmed early 

to the prospect of gaining a decisive military tool. 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the initiation 

of the Manhattan Project and was allegedly committed to using the bomb once ready, and President Harry S. Truman would eventually order the attacks on 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. The Franck Committee’s 1945 report, which warned of the consequences 

of nuclear use against Japan, and entreaties against 
2

nuclear use by leading scientists during the Roosevelt 

and Truman administrations, did little to derail this 

pro-nuclear wartime mood in Washington.2

To be sure, there was some disagreement in policy 

circles over the need to drop atomic weapons on Japan, 

including from then-General Dwight Eisenhower.3

 Yet 

there was little dissent over whether the United States 

should develop and possess them. Secretary of War 

Henry Stimson suggested that the bomb constituted a 

“royal straight flush” in favor of U.S. power. Secretary 

of State James Byrnes concurred that “the bomb might 

well put us in a position to dictate our terms at the end 

of the war.” By May 1945, 1 month prior to release of 

the Franck Commission report, a decision had been 

made to use the bomb against Japan.4

Support for the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was widespread in the immediate aftermath of 

those attacks. Following the war, more than 86 percent 

of Americans polled viewed the attacks as legitimate.5

With the exception of pacifists, some religious figures, 

and a few scientists, objections to the use and continued possession of nuclear weapons after the war appear to have been subsumed by a general desire to 

ensure a rapid Allied victory, as well as by hopes of 

favorably shaping the postwar global order.6

Shaping the Post-War World.

Interestingly, this same desire to shape the postwar world, in combination with a growing realization 

that nuclear technology was likely to spread, may have 

helped generate the first serious U.S. endorsement of 

disarmament. Thus, at the same time that President 

Truman was setting the stage for America’s nuclear 

arms buildup, he and his administration were also at-
3

tempting to establish domestic and international institutions to address the problem of nuclear control.7

Until 1949, the goal of disarmament was front and 

center among the Truman administration’s nuclear 

policy initiatives. In November 1945, Truman, along 

with British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Canadian Prime Minister William King, issued a joint 

communiqué explicitly supporting the “elimination 

of atomic energy for destructive purposes.”8

 Shortly 

after the establishment of the United Nations Atomic 

Energy Commission (UNAEC) on January 24, 1946, 

the same Secretary of State James Byrnes, who had expressed support for the bomb during the war and who 

was attempting to diplomatically leverage the U.S. 

nuclear monopoly to gain advantage over the Soviets, 

created a special advisory committee charged with 

composing a report on atomic energy control. That 

committee’s findings, better known as the AchesonLilienthal report, was to be submitted by the U.S. Government to the UNAEC. Presented to Secretary Byrnes 

in March, Acheson-Lilienthal did not set a date for 

U.S. nuclear disarmament, but it did express strong 

support for this goal.9

Yet Truman feared U.S. disarmament, absent guarantees that the Soviet Union’s bomb-making potential 

would be neutered. In the shadow of chilling relations with the Soviets, he appointed Bernard Baruch 

as the American delegate to the UNAEC 1 day before 

Acheson-Lilienthal was to be submitted to it. Baruch 

proceeded to alter key elements of Acheson-Lilienthal 

in a way that addressed Truman’s fears. He presented 

UNAEC with a plan that would have guaranteed U.S. 

disarmament, but only after the effective establishment of international controls. The Soviets rejected the 

plan, on the basis that it would have formally legiti-
4

mized a temporary U.S. nuclear monopoly. When Baruch’s plan failed during a UNAEC vote on December 

30, 1946, the first era of U.S. disarmament efforts came 

to a close.10 Indeed, serious efforts toward nuclear 

abolition would not return to the international agenda 

until late in the Cold War.11

Three Important Shifts Move the United States 

Away from Disarmament.

Though the intervening years were not marked by 

the complete absence of pro-disarmament sentiment 

in the United States, three important developments 

undermined the practical hopes of achieving abolition 

after the failure of the Baruch plan. First, the political situation changed. By 1949, the Truman Doctrine 

had been issued and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been established to contain and 

counter the Soviet threat. In the shadow of growing 

antagonism and rapidly declining trust between the 

United States and the Soviets, the disarmament agenda was increasingly appropriated for propagandistic 

purposes, all but guaranteeing that no serious progress could be made toward the goal. Limited American 

efforts to advance disarmament by the newly elected 

Eisenhower administration were quickly rebuffed by 

Soviet leaders, whose intense focus on secrecy led 

them to reject the American insistence on conducting 

on-site verifications. Moscow instead insisted on complete disarmament without verification.12

Second, the birth of the nuclear arms race in 1949 

dramatically altered the security situation. Thus, while 

the United States would enjoy a significant nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union for many years to come 

and while perceptions of a rapidly growing nuclear 
5

threat prompted President Eisenhower to call for the 

elimination of “atomic materials for military purposes,” the emergence of a new and formidable enemy 

gave impetus to a growing perception in Washington 

that a political victory against communism required 

military strength, not disarmament.13 Along these 

lines, the Eisenhower administration rejected Truman’s distinction between nuclear and conventional 

weapons, embarking instead on an ultimately unsuccessful decade-long campaign to legitimize nuclear 

weapons as weapons like any other.14 The 1950s also 

saw the implementation of Eisenhower’s “New Look” 

policy which, driven by economic and military considerations, increased America’s reliance on nuclear 

arms. These developments are captured well in Eisenhower’s October 1953 doctrinal guidance that “[i]n 

the event of hostilities, the United States will consider 

nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other 

munitions.”15

The third major change that undermined disarmament efforts was what seems to have been an emerging consensus among U.S. elites that America needed 

to refocus its attention on two more proximate and 

pressing matters: controlling an emerging arms race 

with the Soviets, and containing the global spread of 

atomic energy technology.16 The shift toward arms 

control was particularly consequential, since there is 

a fundamental tension between policies centered on 

arms control and those centered on disarmament. By 

definition, disarmament changes the nature of the 

military balance, whereas most forms of arms control 

(e.g., arms reductions, limitations, and test bans) are 

directed at stabilizing an existing situation. This may 

be in part why Thomas Schelling once quipped that 

“. . . hardly anyone who takes arms control seriously 
6

believes that zero is the goal.”17 At any rate, creating a 

stable balance between the United States and the Soviet Union became an overriding concern of American 

policymakers throughout the next several decades. 

Some hoped that by stabilizing this balance and 

regulating nuclear energy transfers, the stage might 

be set for a gradual transformation of East-West relations and, eventually, disarmament.18 But this goal 

remained consistently out of reach over the coming 

decades.

From Kennedy to Carter: The Rise of Arms Control.

U.S. officials continued to offer rhetorical and personal support for disarmament throughout the arms 

buildups of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, for example, 

President John Kennedy argued before the UN General Assembly that: 

The weapons of war must be abolished before they 

abolish us. . . . Men no longer maintain that disarmament must await the settlement of all disputes—for 

disarmament must be a part of any permanent settlement. And men may no longer pretend that the quest 

for disarmament is a sign of weakness—for in a spiraling arms race, a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.19

By 1962, Kennedy had resumed disarmament negotiations with the Soviets, authorizing a three-step disarmament plan that would founder during the 1962-63 

Geneva disarmament conference.20 Indeed, there is no 

doubt that Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, 

as well as leading members of their administrations 

such as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, harbored military and 
7

moral opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and 

that they feared nuclear war.21 Perceiving that continued increases in nuclear arms would produce little in 

the way of security gains, these policymakers took actions to stem the U.S.-Soviet arms race and establish 

international nonproliferation controls—efforts that 

led to the ratification of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1972 Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks (SALT-I) under President Richard 

Nixon.22 Article VI of the NPT embodied a commitment by nuclear-weapon states to work toward the 

elimination of their arsenals.

Notwithstanding policymakers’ personal sentiments and incremental progress toward establishing 

greater nuclear controls, however, the prospects for 

disarmament became more remote during the 1960s 

and 1970s. First, Article VI of the NPT contained no 

metrics or timetable for disarmament. Second, Kennedy’s 1962 disarmament proposal focused far more 

on near-term arms limitations than on eventual disarmament, and SALT-I similarly focused on stabilizing 

the East-West arms competition instead of eliminating 

the weapons. These facts demonstrated that the logic 

of arms control and nonproliferation, not of disarmament, had come to dominate the nuclear narrative 

among the superpowers. Third, perceptions of the 

structural situation prompted policymakers to build 

their arsenals to absurdly high numbers. Only one 

year before conclusion of the NPT, for example, the 

U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile had reached its peak 

of 32,000 warheads.23 Any expressions of support for 

disarmament by U.S. policymakers during these years 

must be viewed in the context of these stunning increases, in both the quantity and quality of America’s 

arsenal.
8

Not even the occasional burst of popular support 

for disarmament was enough to force the government’s hand. To be sure, the disarmament movement 

enjoyed some successes: It helped push the U.S. Government toward adopting a nuclear test moratorium 

in 1958, and toward ratifying the Partial Test Ban 

Treaty (PTBT) and the NPT. Indeed, the disarmament 

movement arguably helped create the structural conditions for the administrations of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Gerald Ford, and 

Jimmy Carter to pursue various arms control initiatives.24 The movement was similarly instrumental in 

opposing the B-1 bomber and the so-called neutron 

bomb,25 and contacts between disarmament advocates 

and presidential candidate Jimmy Carter clearly influenced Carter’s policy positions before he assumed 

office.26 Evidence of this can be found in an October 

1976 article of Carter’s in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, in which he explicitly links the legitimacy of 

nonproliferation efforts to progress toward disarmament. Carter wrote:

I believe we have little right to ask others to deny 

themselves such weapons for the indefinite future unless we demonstrate meaningful progress toward the 

control, then reduction and, ultimately, elimination of 

nuclear arsenals.27

But the impact of the popular disarmament movement that had begun in 1945 was often constrained 

by popular fear of the Soviets and suspicions that the 

disarmament agenda was a communist plot—particularly with respect to its ultimate goal.28 With the 1979 

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the end of détente, the 

1979 Iranian Revolution, and the taking of American 

hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, even the lim-
9

ited arms control achievements that the movement 

had helped bring about became suspect. Such events 

reminded Americans of the dangers beyond their 

shores and helped usher into office a tough-talking, 

anti-SALT President who would at first increase EastWest tensions but ultimately help place disarmament 

back on the U.S. agenda as a primary policy goal.

A Reagan-era Rebirth for Disarmament.

It is both ironic and not at all so that by the end of 

Ronald Reagan’s tenure, disarmament had regained a 

prominence on the U.S. agenda not seen since the failure of the Baruch Plan. The irony of the matter rests in 

the fact that when Reagan assumed office, his administration dragged the previous 2 decades of nuclear 

weapons policy decidedly rightward. Rather than attempting to rekindle an arms control process left teetering after the failure of SALT-II, Reagan up-ended 

the principle of strategic parity enshrined in the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and SALT-I by launching his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). He placed 

a particular focus on strategic modernization efforts, 

including pursuit of the MX Peacekeeper and Trident 

missiles, the B-1 strategic bomber, and cruise missile 

programs. The Reagan administration also changed 

the doctrinal thrust of nuclear weapons, planning to 

include not only deterrence but the fighting of both 

limited and prolonged nuclear wars. In fact, both he 

and his subordinates insisted in 1981 that any efforts 

to pursue arms control would have to wait until new 

weapons programs had progressed enough to give 

the United States leverage in negotiations.29

The return of disarmament during Reagan’s tenure 

was also ironic because in moving away from arms con-
10

trol and deterrence, he unwittingly tapped into public 

fears about nuclear war that led to a shift in the political opportunity structure. This shift, in turn, ended up 

placing pressure on the Reagan administration to seek 

far-reaching accord with the Soviets on nuclear matters. The tenor and substance of his administration’s 

early nuclear policies, for example, provoked considerable public unease and led to a previously unseen 

outpouring of support for anti-nuclear protests in the 

United States and Europe. With millions of people 

demonstrating in European capitals against proposed 

NATO nuclear deployments, the “nuclear freeze” 

movement gained momentum in the United States.30

Popular culture became increasingly sympathetic to 

abolitionist sentiment through such publications as 

Jonathan Schell’s The Fate of the Earth and the National 

Conference of Catholic Bishops’ October 1982 moral 

critique of deterrence policy.31 Elite doubts about the 

efficacy of deterrence and utility of nuclear weapons 

also began to emerge with greater force.32 Such developments produced reluctance in Congress, even 

among some Republicans, to fund Reagan’s defense 

programs, unless progress was made on the arms control front. By late 1982, public and congressional pressure led Reagan to initiate Strategic Arms Reduction 

Talks (the practical successor to SALT-II) and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) discussions.33 These 

initiatives were much farther reaching than the SALT 

agreements because their goal was, for the first time, 

a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the superpower rivals.

Yet, the return of disarmament during Reagan’s 

tenure is not entirely ironic. President Reagan long 

held anti-nuclear sentiments, after all, beliefs that 

were rooted in his liberal past and religious convic-
11

tions.34 Thus, despite offering justifications of his administration’s early hawkish policies, as early as 1982 

one also finds Reagan suggesting in a radio address 

that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 

fought.”35 He would repeat and expand upon this sentiment in a direct appeal to the Soviet people during 

his 1984 State of the Union address. Directly suggesting his desire for abolition, Reagan said:

People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane 

policy, for your country and for mine, to preserve our 

civilization in this modern age: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value 

in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to 

make sure they will never be used. But then would it 

not be better to do away with them entirely?36

By the October 1986 U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit, 

Soviet Premier Gorbachev had also expressed support 

for eliminating all nuclear weapons, publicly presenting an ambitious plan to achieve this goal in 15 years. 

Gorbachev’s heartfelt support of abolition, which he 

pursued at the summit, struck a chord with Reagan, 

lowering some of the trust-related structural barriers 

to cooperation, and resulting in perhaps the first serious discussion of the subject since the failure of the 

Baruch Plan.37 Both leaders attempted to capitalize on 

the moment. Indeed, were it not for disagreements 

over the implications of the ABM Treaty for SDI, Reagan and Gorbachev might have reached an agreement 

to mutually disarm, an outcome that just days before 

the summit had been all but unthinkable among U.S. 

policymakers.38 Although a formal agreement eluded the leaders at Reykjavik, Reagan and Gorbachev 

reached an oral agreement that their two countries 

should eliminate all nuclear weapons, with Reagan 
12

saying that “It would be fine with me if we eliminated 

all nuclear weapons,” and Gorbachev replying that 

“We can do that.”39

SHAPING A NEW WORLD ORDER, OR SHAPED 

BY IT? FROM REYKJAVIK TO ROGUE STATES

Looking back on Reykjavik, two things become 

clear. First, President Reagan spontaneously presided 

over and almost secured an agreement on nuclear 

disarmament. This highlights the tremendous importance of elite agency in what tends to be the highly bureaucratic realm of nuclear weapons policy.40 Second, 

with public support for disarmament at an all-time 

high, with a mobilized public, with elites increasingly 

questioning the practical utility of nuclear weapons 

and the efficacy of deterrence strategy, and with U.S.-

Soviet relations thawing, the structural situation was 

changing favorably for disarmament. Many of the obstacles that had prevented serious movement in that 

realm seemed to be fading away. The new phase of 

arms control marked by deep reductions (e.g., the INF 

and Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty41), effectively “broke the back of the nuclear arms race.”42

One might even say that “the nuclear Cold War effectively ended in October 1986.”43 The goal of abolition 

appeared to be within reach.

New Risks and Uncertain Priorities in the 

Post-Cold War World (1991-2001).

For a brief period of time, it appeared that U.S. 

and Soviet leaders were reaching for this goal. Dramatic arms reductions captured headlines. The two 

superpowers’ intermediate-range nuclear forces were 
13

completely eliminated through the 1987 INF treaty. 

The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, 

reciprocal but unilateral arms reductions, resulted in 

the withdrawal from service by the United States and 

the Soviet Union/Russia of as many as 17,000 tactical 

nuclear weapons. Ratified in 1991, the START-I treaty 

prompted not only further reductions, but increased 

transparency. Gone were the days when a paranoid 

Soviet state refused to accept verification, a point that 

had decades before dealt a mortal blow to disarmament. 

Perhaps most consequentially, the Soviet Union 

had crumbled, dividing into 15 sovereign states. The 

Warsaw Pact’s demise soon followed, and a lonely 

Russia entered a prolonged phase of economic decline and social instability. Further, by the end of the 

George H. W. Bush administration, a revolution in 

military affairs—specifically, the development of advanced conventional capabilities—had provided the 

United States with an overwhelming conventional 

military advantage against all potential adversaries.44

Such developments left the United States in an unparalleled position of global dominance, one in which it 

could begin to shape a “new world order.”45

Part of this new world order could have included 

a movement toward nuclear disarmament. Many of 

the cards seemed to be in place—decades of presidential support, continued commitment to Article VI, 

increasing fears of proliferation, the collapse of the 

Soviet threat and a relatively weak Russia, and an invigorated anti-nuclear movement. But the other shoe 

never dropped. Why, with the end of the Cold War, 

did disarmament largely fall off the political radar? 

Why did the Soviet collapse on the heels of Reykjavik 

fail to bring abolition to its logical conclusion?
14

One might offer numerous explanations for why 

disarmament stalled in the early 1990s, but at least five 

factors stand out. First, as the Soviet Union crumbled, 

U.S. policymakers turned to a variety of other matters—including the 1991 Gulf War, the Madrid peace 

conference, the reunification of Germany and, eventually, the expansion of NATO. Second, in the absence 

of an arms race, the popular movement that had swept 

the world during the 1980s largely lost its urgency. 

Third, fears of nuclear war with the Soviet Union 

transformed over time into fears of “loose nukes” and 

horizontal proliferation, all of which centered on the 

concern that “rogue” states or terrorist organizations 

would acquire nuclear weapons. This led to a gradual 

shift in U.S. policy focus away from arms reductions 

and disarmament, a shift that was perhaps best embodied by the elimination of the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as an independent entity in April 1999, when the nearly 40-year old ACDA 

was fully merged into the U.S. Department of State.46

Though U.S. officials continued to speak periodically 

about disarmament as a long-term goal, there were no 

well-structured or concerted efforts by them in the decade after the Cold War to achieve this goal. Indeed, 

by late 2005, another round of government reorganization had not only merged the State Department’s 

Bureau of Arms Control with its Nonproliferation 

Bureau, but it had even resulted in the removal of the 

words “arms control” from the name of the Department’s newly created Bureau of International Security 

and Nonproliferation.

Fourth, initial attempts to adapt the U.S. nuclear 

posture to meet new threats encountered heavy bureaucratic resistance, which ultimately resulted in a 

perpetuation of the status quo.47 Finally, U.S. policy-
15

makers grew increasingly divided over how the sole 

remaining superpower should define and address the 

new international strategic context, as well as the role 

that America’s nuclear weapons should play in this 

context. Were nuclear weapons still relevant for deterring past or emerging adversaries? Were they still relevant to extended deterrence commitments? Were they 

useful for dissuading states or terrorists from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?48

With the new millennium approaching, President Bill 

Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, poignantly observed that “the administration and Congress have not yet agreed on a common post-Cold 

War strategy for responding to [the development and 

proliferation of advanced nuclear weapons].”49

Thus, as Janne Nolan has argued, “. . . it is now 

a cliché in Washington that the end of the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union was not necessarily 

good news.”50 The predictable days (or at least they 

seemed so in retrospect) of the bipolar rivalry had 

ended. In their place had arrived strategic uncertainty. 

While arms control would enjoy some success during 

the Bush and Clinton administrations (e.g., START-I, 

the Lisbon Protocol, the Open Skies Treaty, the Agreed 

Framework, and START-II), and while the NPT was 

indefinitely extended in 1995, the United States would 

neither reach nor ratify many agreements after the 

early 1990s. Instead, in the absence of strong public 

interest in arms control or disarmament, uncertainty 

of how to adapt to the post-Cold War world, and with 

congressional and bureaucratic resistance to arms 

control initiatives and growing suspicion of Russia, 

initiatives such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

(CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), 

and a third round of START floundered.51 A nuclear 

posture review launched by President Clinton in 1993 
16

and completed in 1994 seemed to reflect this trend. 

Rather than reducing America’s reliance on nuclear 

weapons, 

The decisions that emerged from the 1993-94 Nuclear 

Posture Review. . . reinforced the operational and political importance of nuclear weapons. Taken together, 

these decisions ratified a triad of nuclear forces, with 

diminished but still large numbers of strategic forces; 

renewed the U.S. commitment to initiate the use of 

nuclear weapons against existing and potential new 

adversaries; and granted political approval for targeting plans to develop nuclear options against regional 

and nonnuclear contingencies.52

A 1997 Presidential Decision Directive providing 

guidance for nuclear weapons employment (PSS/NSC 

60), the first such directive in over 15 years, similarly 

called for retaining a wide range of survivable nuclear options—from the ability to inflict overwhelming 

damage against enemy assets to more graduated options.53

Although U.S. policy failed to come into greater 

fundamental accord with broad disarmament goals, 

some American elites expressed a contrary view. Seeing the evolving situation differently, they believed 

that the Soviet collapse made abolition more, not less, 

important. A panel of experts brought together by 

the Stimson Center in Washington, DC, for example, 

argued in a 1995 report that the growing proliferation threat necessitated abolition on national security 

grounds. The recommendations of this panel, however, largely fell on deaf ears—even though its members included General Andrew Goodpaster and Paul 

Nitze, neither of whom could be considered shrinking 

national security violets.54 A similar fate would befall 

a paper authored by the well-respected chairman of 
17

the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin, as 

well as a formal statement in favor of abolition by 58 

generals and admirals, including 16 from the United 

States.55

To be sure, the United States had not suddenly 

lost its formal or rhetorical commitment to the goal of 

disarmament. The NPT’s Article VI commitment was 

still in place, after all, and President Clinton from time 

to time highlighted it as the overarching U.S. goal. In 

March 2000, Clinton argued that: 

Remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament has occurred since the end of the Cold War. . . . The United 

States is committed to the ultimate elimination of all 

nuclear weapons. Achieving this goal will be neither 

easy nor rapid. Accordingly, the United States rededicates itself to work tirelessly and expeditiously to 

create conditions that will make possible even deeper 

reductions in nuclear weapons, and ultimately their 

elimination.56

But Clinton’s assertion that the CTBT and other 

initiatives were steps toward disarmament is colored 

both by the lack of his articulation of a far-reaching 

disarmament strategy and the reality of a Nuclear 

Posture Review (NPR) and a Presidential Decision 

Directive (PDD) that maintained the centrality of 

nuclear weapons in U.S. security planning. Clinton’s 

“lead and hedge” strategy against the possibility of 

a resurgent Russia or threats elsewhere, and his continuation of the Bush administration’s policy of “calculated ambiguity,” were practical manifestations of 

this continued centrality for nuclear weapons in U.S. 

policy.57 Secretary of Defense William Cohen went so 

far as to suggest, in an interview with the Washington 

Post, that those who believed the end of the Cold War 
18

opened the door for a swift move toward U.S. nuclear 

abolition had no home in the Clinton administration.58

Disarmament Continues its Retreat (2001-09).

That the Clinton administration was not prepared 

to rush toward disarmament did not make it exceptional in the annals of American history. But this is 

exactly the point. While many U.S. administrations 

have expressed a desire for abolishing nuclear weapons, none has been willing to race toward the goal 

(not even when the structural conditions seemed most 

permissive), and almost none have articulated a clear 

view of and demonstrated a sustained commitment 

to disarmament—the George W. Bush administration 

perhaps least of all. Staffed by critics of traditional 

arms control approaches and abolition opponents, 

the Bush administration took a highly skeptical view 

toward international treaties and institutions generally.59 The ascendant view in the halls of Washington, 

DC, in January 2001 was that treaties were not worth 

the paper they were written on, since states willing 

to sign treaties were often willing to take the actions 

required by them even in their absence. Further, this 

viewpoint held that American power could and should 

be used to further its foreign policy objectives. Those 

who would follow along were welcome; those who 

would not were “against us” and should be shunted 

aside.60 These natural inclinations were exponentially 

magnified in the aftermath of the attacks of September 

11, 2001 (9/11), which led administration officials to 

treat terrorism as the primary U.S. national security 

threat. Indeed, to the extent that the Bush administration focused on nuclear issues after 9/11, its efforts 

were primarily directed toward lowering the proba-
19

bility that a terrorist organization or a state sponsor of 

terrorism would acquire nuclear weapons, rather than 

toward concluding arms control agreements. None of 

this augured well for abolition.

These attitudes and events resulted in some significant departures from previous administrations’ 

nuclear policies. One obvious departure was the Bush 

administration’s disdain for old-style arms control 

treaties, with their intrusive and extensive verification 

provisions and strict limits on U.S. flexibility. Along 

these lines, the administration decided in 2001 to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to free itself from 

the legal shackles impeding development of a national 

missile defense (NMD) system—a reversal of 30 years 

of nuclear policy that contributed to significant deteriorations in U.S.-Russian relations.61 The CTBT, widely 

thought to be a cornerstone of disarmament efforts, 

was left in legislative limbo—opposed both for its formality and lingering concerns about verifiability. In 

place of such agreements, a concerted effort was made 

to shift course in favor of less onerous treaties and informal agreements. Thus, while the Bush administration did conclude one significant arms reduction treaty with Russia in terms of numerical reductions—the 

2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)—

the agreement contained no verification provisions 

of its own.62 The 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI), although an important initiative in its own right, 

was not a treaty at all, but an informal agreement by 

interested parties to stem the illegal flow of materials 

that could be utilized in WMD programs.63

Supporters of Bush-era policy might counter that 

the SORT Treaty led to large reductions in strategic 

forces, and that the Bush administration actually reduced the U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons through 
20

its enumeration of the so-called “new triad” in the 

2001 NPR and 2006 National Security Strategy, which 

integrated nuclear and advanced conventional forces 

for the purposes of deterrence.64 These points could 

be used to suggest that, in effect, the Bush administration continued the move toward deep reductions, and 

that the unfavorable optics of the situation were due 

to partisan political posturing.65 There is a measure of 

truth to such statements. There was little new, after 

all, about President Bush’s emphasis on the centrality 

of nuclear weapons for hedging against current and 

future threats.66 Moreover, the move toward greater 

integration of advanced conventional capabilities in 

the U.S. deterrent did represent a diversification of 

U.S. deterrence policy.67 But one should not take this 

line of argument too far.

Creating an expanded role for the U.S. conventional arsenal and reducing the overkill capability of 

U.S. nuclear forces is not akin to advocating abolition, 

even though some Bush administration officials occasionally alluded to it as such.68 Such actions notwithstanding, therefore, the Bush administration evinced 

a clear move away from established disarmament 

goals. This is particularly evident when one reviews 

developments at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 

where the United States not only distanced itself from 

the 1995 and 2000 Conference decisions on disarmament (e.g., the “thirteen steps”) but intervened to have 

removed from a UN summit document references to 

nonproliferation and disarmament.69 The move away 

from abolition is also evident in the Bush administration’s rejection of verification provisions in arms control treaties. It is widely accepted, after all, that intrusive verification and tough enforcement are necessary 

components of any move toward zero.70 Simply put: 

no verification, no disarmament.
21

The Bush administration even endeavored to rewrite nonproliferation rules by dividing proliferators 

into two groups—those who could be trusted with 

their nuclear weapons (India) and those who must 

be isolated or attacked for their real or suspected actions (Iraq, Iran, and North Korea). Although the 

United States and India jointly pledged in June 2005 

to support nonproliferation, for example, the nuclear 

deal with India advanced by the Bush administration 

contained no provisions to constrain India’s military 

nuclear program.71 While it is eminently reasonable to 

suggest that a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein would 

have posed a far greater threat than does a nucleararmed India, the relevant point here is that the Bush 

administration seemed to consider disarmament a 

priority only insofar as it pertained to “rogue” states 

and the possibility of terrorist acquisition of nuclear 

weapons.72 If there was a general lack of concern vis-àvis Indian nuclear weapons, one might ask, could U.S. 

disarmament have been a priority?

A NEW CENTER OR A RETURN TO 

NORMALCY? THE FOUR HORSEMEN RIDE 

TO TOWN

Thus, with the Bush administration entering its 

final years, disarmament seemed further away than 

ever. Moreover, by 2007, the post-Cold War world had 

undergone some dramatic shifts that made structural 

conditions decidedly less favorable for abolition, even 

as they made abolition itself more urgent. North Korea had built and tested its own nuclear weapons. Iran 

continued to defy International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and United Nations (UN) Security Council 

demands, and was increasingly suspected of pursuing 
22

a weapons program. The United States had further reified the role of nuclear weapons in its national security 

strategy and had pushed ahead with missile defense 

plans to counter Iran and North Korea, providing an 

incentive for Russia—which was already relying more 

heavily on nuclear weapons for certain missions—to 

further increase this reliance.73 At the same time, the 

START-I agreement was nearing expiration, with no 

successor in sight, and the NPT seemed to be crumbling under the weight of violations by Iran and North 

Korea and circumventions with respect to India. Finally, with the United States strategically hobbled by 

wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and with its influence 

declining globally, American leaders no longer appeared to be in a position to reshape the world dramatically according to their desires, even should they 

again decide to pursue disarmament.

It was in this context that former Secretaries of 

State George Schultz, William Perry, and Henry Kissinger, along with former Senator Sam Nunn, published their 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed calling for 

a world without nuclear weapons.74 Their statements 

have not necessarily been unique as an example of bipartisan support for abolition, since such support has 

never divided evenly along partisan lines.75 More interesting is that these former Cold Warriors appear to 

have had a significant change of heart with respect to 

the nuclear question, and that their arguments are, unlike most previous efforts, gaining political traction in 

the United States. Not content to write opinion pieces, 

the so-called “four horsemen” have been actively engaging in efforts to build institutional and elite-level 

support for disarmament. Their boldness has helped 

not only to reintroduce abolition into the mainstream 

(albeit still as a long-term goal) but to set off a fire-
23

storm of debate among American elites about how to 

get to “global zero.”

One interesting question that suggests itself here 

concerns why the “gang of four’s” efforts have been so 

consequential in elevating discussions of abolition in 

the United States. This is not the first time that hawkish 

foreign policy and security luminaries have endorsed 

abolition.76 A possible answer is that by 2007 the perceived urgency of disarmament had again grown, as 

nuclear weapons spread to troublesome actors and 

fears mounted that they would continue to spread—

perhaps even into the hands of terrorists. Indeed, if 

one examines the logic behind the so-called gang of 

four’s calls for abolition, a prime motivator seems to 

be that new nuclear states and terrorists may not be 

deterrable. With the threat of proliferation to such actors ever-present in a nuclear armed world, the four 

argue that nuclear weapons have become more of a 

liability than an asset for the United States.77 Concerns 

over a recalcitrant Russia, the expiration of START-I 

verification provisions, and the weakening of the NPT 

may have similarly contributed to increasing the saliency of the pro-abolition argument among political 

elites. Perhaps the newfound excitement of elites over 

abolition also reflects a certain post-reactionary desire 

to correct course after the Bush administration’s deviations from long-established norms. 
24

FORECASTING THE U.S. NUCLEAR FUTURE: 

YES WE CAN (EVENTUALLY?)

The Obama Administration: Pledges and Actions.

It is commonly believed that the election of President Barack Obama has come at an opportune time, 

given the increasing pro-abolition sentiment of the 

past few years. Obama has consistently offered clear 

rhetorical support for a nuclear-free world—a deep 

conviction that he has held since his undergraduate 

days at Columbia University.78 His most complete 

articulation of this vision was during an April 2009 

speech at Hradcany Square in Prague, where he said 

that “today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a 

world without nuclear weapons.”79

In addition to this personal commitment, one 

might also note that several leading Obama administration officials have publicly endorsed the vision of 

a nuclear-free world, including Robert Einhorn, Rose 

Gotemoeller, and Ivo Daalder.80 Obama’s combination 

of presidential statements and his choice of officials 

for top nuclear-related posts are perhaps the clearest 

indication that abolition has returned to the American 

political mainstream.81 Indeed, the fact that disarmament is again a mainstream concept in the United 

States becomes particularly evident when one considers that during the 2008 presidential campaign, both 

then-Senator Obama and Senator John McCain—who 

agreed on little else—openly supported a prudent, 

step-wise movement toward disarmament.82

President Obama’s words have been backed up 

with pledges to pursue several initiatives aimed at 

bringing disarmament closer to reality. Progress seems 
25

to be evident on multiple fronts. In September 2009, the 

President chaired a UN Security Council summit that 

unanimously approved the vision of a world without 

nuclear weapons.83 The United States and Russia recently concluded a START follow-on agreement, New 

START, which mandates bilateral warhead and stockpile reductions and renews mechanisms for verification. The 2010 NPR, which was released in April 2010, 

reduces somewhat the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 

strategy and foreign policy; indeed, throughout the 

deliberations over the NPR, the administration privately insisted on this outcome.84 Also, in April 2010, 

the White House hosted a Nuclear Security Summit 

that brought together senior officials from 47 nations 

and won commitments for enhancing the safety and 

security of nuclear material, as well as for preventing 

nuclear smuggling and terrorism. Approximately 60 

percent of national commitments made at this summit have been completed, and a follow-up summit is 

scheduled for 2012 in the Republic of Korea.85

Finally, the Obama administration’s April 2010 

conclusion of the New START agreement with Russia provided a strong foundation for reinvigorating 

the nonproliferation regime, which had been severely 

stressed after a decade of proliferation and political 

disagreements. Indeed, although state parties to the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) had agreed in 

1995 to extend the agreement indefinitely, the coming 

decade placed such strain on the nonproliferation regime that by 2005 the NPT Review Conference was 

unable to produce a final consensus document, due 

to disagreement over how to handle issues such as 

Iranian nuclear malfeasance and a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Non-nuclear weapon states 

(NNWS) had also become deeply skeptical that nucle-
26

ar weapon states (NWS) were working in good faith to 

eliminate their nuclear arsenals, leading them to oppose strengthened nonproliferation activities without 

progress toward disarmament. 

With the April 2010 signing of New START—the 

first new U.S.-Russian arms reduction treaty in nearly 

a decade—progress toward disarmament appeared to 

be restarted. Partly because of this progress, the 2010 

NPT Review Conference was successful in producing 

a final document that included, among other things, a 

recommitment by NPT parties to the nonproliferation 

regime and an action plan on nonproliferation. Some 

believe that this positive outcome at the 2010 Review 

Conference had the ancillary benefit of strengthening 

the Obama administration’s hand in dealing with both 

the Iranian and North Korean portfolios.86

Continuity, Not Revolution.

Despite this progress, however, the current prodisarmament zeitgeist is not as revolutionary as it is 

sometimes portrayed. To be sure, nuclear disarmament debates in the United States may now be occurring in more detail and in a more sustained way than 

at most points in the past. But the step-wise, decadeslong process advanced today by most advocates—one 

that begins with formalized arms reductions, a fissile 

material production cutoff, a comprehensive test ban, 

control over the nuclear fuel cycle, intense verification 

and enforcement, and gradual delegitimization of 

weapons possession, and that ends with abolition—is 

in many respects the very same approach that has been 

offered since the dawn of the nuclear age.

Moreover, previous presidents have enjoyed arms 

control and nonproliferation successes, and have 
27

viewed their efforts as paving the way toward abolition. Yet, a variety of factors—from structural barriers to a lack of sustained political will—have impeded 

progress toward that goal. Many of these factors continue to obstruct the path toward abolition. Indeed, 

few mainstream proponents in the United States speak 

of abolition as achievable anytime in the foreseeable 

future. “I’m not naïve,” said the President in Prague, 

“This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not 

in my lifetime.”87 If one makes the reasonable assumption that, by modern standards of life expectancy, 

President Obama could live at least another 40 years, 

it becomes clear that the timeline envisioned by mainstream abolition supporters may be quite long—50, 

60, 70, perhaps even 100 years or more. 

Given all that might change in the interim, can 

“such grand schemes . . . be carried forward by reasonable people making demonstrable progress at a 

steady pace”?88 Perhaps. Abolition is not on its face 

unachievable, and the United States is not predestined 

to sit atop a nuclear-armed world. Yet, numerous and 

significant roadblocks to abolition linger. One might 

divide these roadblocks into two broad categories: 

conceptual and structural. 

Guarding Your Optimism: Conceptual Roadblocks 

to Disarmament.

The conceptual roadblock to disarmament might 

be best illustrated by paraphrasing the classic film Dr. 

Strangelove. Simply put, the United States has learned 

to “love the bomb.” Or better, one might describe it as 

a love-hate relationship, one in which: 
28

Nuclear weapons are presented both as terrifying objects that could destroy the nation in half an hour and 

as the ultimate guarantors of our security. Nuclear 

weapons are terrifying, but deterrence keeps us safe.89

In short, Americans hate the bomb for what it can 

do to us and to innocent people worldwide, but we 

cherish it as the mainstay of our national security.90

Learning, or perhaps more accurately, realistically 

planning and preparing to live without nuclear weapons, will be an important step toward abolition. Yet, 

this is a step that U.S. policymakers, including those 

in the Obama administration, have yet to take. This 

shortfall is reflected in the open-source literature on 

the subject, in which abolition proponents explore 

every conceivable question related to reaching global 

zero but are generally silent on how to achieve what 

may be the most difficult task of all—maintaining 

strategic stability while moving from low numbers to 

zero, as well as after arriving at zero.91 Where these 

proponents do address the topic, they tend to suggest 

that, ultimately, what will be needed for “global zero” 

is a world in which the nature of international political 

relations is dramatically changed from what currently 

exists.92 Such proposals can at times seem a bit fantastical, even for abolition supporters.

Indeed, the words and actions of the Obama administration suggest that nuclear deterrence will remain a 

cornerstone of U.S. national security for the foreseeable future, just as it has been for decades. Despite 

partisan attacks to the contrary, Obama is not a Pollyanna President.93 He has stated unequivocally and 

in multiple venues, for example, that “As long as these 

weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, 

secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, 
29

and guarantee that defense to our allies.”94 Vice President Joe Biden has similarly argued that this commitment will extend, “for as long as nuclear weapons are 

required to defend our country and our allies.”95 Their 

words have been backed up by actions; most recently, 

the administration has sought large funding increases 

for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex—a move that 

enjoyed bipartisan support from leading national security experts, including the so-called “gang of four” 

and the members of the Strategic Posture Commission, 

a bipartisan panel headed by former Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger and William Perry.96

Other administration officials have similarly emphasized the continuing importance of America’s nuclear deterrent. In July 2009, Undersecretary of State 

for Arms Control Ellen Tauscher argued that while we 

need an “updated nuclear posture” that “more accurately reflect[s] the threat environment. . . . We must 

do this while continuing to deter any nuclear armed 

adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies.”97

It should be noted that Undersecretary Tauscher’s 

comments were offered at a symposium on deterrence 

at the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska. 

Also revealing is the language of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a document that simultaneously asserts that “new, tailored regional deterrence 

architectures” will permit “a reduced role for nuclear 

weapons in our national security strategy,” and insists 

that: 

Until such time as the Administration’s goal of a world 

free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission of the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and 

effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United 

States, and on our allies and partners.98
30

Even the strongest mainstream advocates of deep 

reductions and abolition seem to accept that the United States will need to maintain its nuclear deterrent 

for some time to come. Writers Hans M. Kristensen, 

Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich posit that:

While the ultimate goal is nuclear abolition, a minimal deterrence doctrine creates a stable resting spot 

that minimizes the salience and danger of remaining 

nuclear weapons and allows all the world’s nuclear 

powers to come into a stable equilibrium before moving to the last step of denuclearization.99

In short, mainstream abolition supporters may not 

be conceptually prepared for a nuclear-free world, 

even if it is technically possible to reach zero. Serious planning for maintaining security in a world with 

small numbers, and for doing so in a world with no 

nuclear weapons, must occur before the United States 

moves in that direction.100 The ascendance of such discussions in the public sphere will be a better indication 

that the United States and the world are advancing 

significantly toward nuclear disarmament than talk 

of a second New START agreement, tactical weapon 

reductions, or movement toward ratifying the FMCT 

and CTBT.

Guarding Your Optimism: Structural Roadblocks to 

Disarmament.

While conceptual roadblocks provide partial insight into the U.S. nuclear future, structural roadblocks are at least as important to consider in this 

respect. During the Cold War, numerous structural 

barriers blocked the path toward disarmament. Even 
31

when the key structural barrier of East-West competition disintegrated with the end of the Cold War and 

the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, others 

took its place. What one finds today is a complex web 

of structural barriers to abolition, some of which have 

long pedigrees, some of which are relatively new. 

While structural permissiveness does not guarantee 

policy outcomes, these barriers will also need to be 

addressed if serious U.S. movement toward abolition 

is to be realized.

One such barrier is a byproduct of the material and 

human support afforded to the American nuclear infrastructure. Nuclear weapons-related programs continue to receive appropriations that dwarf a variety 

of other federal programs. In 2008, the United States 

spent more than $52.4 billion on nuclear weapons 

programs; Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey 

write:

By way of comparison, the 2008 nuclear weapons and 

weapons-related “budget” exceed[ed] all anticipated 

government expenditures on international diplomacy 

and foreign assistance ($39.5 billion) and natural resources and the environment ($33 billion). It is nearly 

double the budget for general science, space, and technology ($27.4 billion), and it is almost 14 times what 

the U.S. Department of Energy has allocated for all 

energy-related research and development.101

Reinforcing this commitment, the Obama administration has consistently supported increased funding for the U.S. nuclear complex and deterrent.102 This 

budgetary support has been complemented by efforts 

to incentivize job assignments related to the nuclear 

deterrent, particularly in the wake of concerns that the 

nuclear weapons infrastructure is decaying, and of security fears emanating from high-profile mishaps of 
32

the past few years, including the unauthorized flight 

in 2007 of six nuclear-armed cruise missiles from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air 

Force Base in Louisiana.103

Such efforts are largely aimed at ensuring the credibility and security of America’s nuclear arsenal, an entirely reasonable objective so long as the United States 

possesses and relies on nuclear weapons. Yet, they 

may also have negative consequences with respect to 

abolition, including leading to a further entrenchment 

of the nuclear mission in U.S. security policy. The bureaucracies supported and reified by today’s decisions 

are likely to prove resilient in the future as attempts 

are made to advance broad changes in nuclear policy 

such as abolition.104 The case of the 1994 NPR is a good 

example of how bureaucracies are adept at resisting 

change.105 Unsurprisingly, the Obama administration 

encountered significant bureaucratic resistance by “elements within the Department of Defense (DoD) and 

other agencies,” during the writing of the 2010 NPR.106

A second structural barrier is the lack of public 

mobilization in favor of abolition. Unlike in previous decades, the most recent push for abolition is an 

elite-level phenomenon.107 Gone are the days where 

millions marched in European capitals, and a “ban 

the bomb” movement swept the United States. The 

outrage, fear, and sense of urgency that drove public involvement in the nuclear issue—from the 1950s 

to the early 1990s—largely faded with the Cold War. 

Polling over the past 6 years underlines this shift. In 

2007, only 38 percent of Americans (and 31 percent of 

Russians) agreed when asked if “our goal should be 

to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons through 

an international agreement, while developing effective systems for verifying all countries are eliminating 

theirs too.”108
33

While this polling was conducted before the latest 

push for abolition reached full stride, its results are 

still noteworthy. Since the question asked hews closely 

to abolition proponents’ current proposals, including 

those of the Obama administration, the results demonstrate, at a minimum, the lack of public accord on 

what our nuclear future should be. Consider also that 

when asked the same question in 2004, 55 percent of 

Americans responded affirmatively that disarmament 

should be the end goal. This precipitous decline, coupled with minimal public interest in ratification of the 

New START Treaty in 2010, suggests that American 

political leaders are not likely to face much domestic 

pressure to act on disarmament over the coming years. 

The absence of such pressure is important, because 

research demonstrates that popular mobilization has 

been an important facilitator of substantive agreements on nuclear weapons use and possession—one 

that influences politicians through direct pressure by 

changing the political opportunity structure in which 

they operate.109

Indeed, it is hard to overstate the importance of 

domestic politics as a structural roadblock to disarmament, as was evidenced by the bitter debates over ratification of New START. Much to the surprise of the 

Obama administration and expert analysts, Senator 

Jon Kyl (R-AZ), the Republican point man on nuclear 

arms issues, led a protracted effort in opposition to 

the Treaty, despite having been granted many concessions by the administration. Moreover, whatever the 

ultimate reason for Senator Kyl’s opposition—whether political or technical—legislative efforts continue in 

Congress to place limitations on New START implementation and delay reductions, efforts that could undermine the Treaty if enacted into law.110 To be sure, 
34

the New START debates placed arms control back on 

the national stage and to an extent may have educated 

a new generation of congressional staff about these issues, but the lingering efforts in opposition to New 

START suggest that any follow-on arms control initiatives, let alone initiatives that would substantially advance the goal of disarmament, are likely to face stiff 

resistance on Capitol Hill.

Another structural barrier to Washington’s decision to disarm is related to the conditions set by American policymakers for moving forward with abolition. 

Like others before him, President Obama clearly states 

that the United States will retain its deterrent “so long 

as there is a country with nuclear weapons.”111 The 

2010 QDR insists that the DoD nuclear mission will be 

sustained “[u]ntil such time as the Administration’s 

goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved.”112

The “gang of four” argues that “as we work to . . . 

realize the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, we recognize the necessity to maintain the safety, 

security, and reliability of our own weapons.”113 One 

cannot help but think that this “you first” approach is 

strikingly similar to the Baruch plan’s insistence that 

the United States will disarm only once others have 

done so. Yet, a U.S. nuclear monopoly is not likely to 

be any more acceptable to other states in the future 

than it was to the Soviets in the late 1940s. 

These issues point to a fourth structural roadblock. 

Put in the interrogative: If U.S. disarmament depends 

on the disarmament of others, will those others disarm? Despite the increased talk about abolition over 

the past several years in Western capitals, global trend 

lines do not match the rhetoric. Russia is arguably increasing, not decreasing, its reliance on nuclear weapons; some observers believe that Moscow is in the pro-
35

cess of increasing its nuclear arsenal. While Russian 

representatives deny this accusation, it nonetheless 

proved a major stumbling block at last year’s Global 

Zero talks in Paris.114 In the Middle East, Iran’s blatant 

defiance of UN Security Council and IAEA demands 

underscores suspicions that it is pursuing a military 

nuclear capability. Faced with a potential nucleararmed Iran and surrounded by largely hostile states, 

Israel is unlikely to disarm. More than 10 other Middle 

Eastern states are currently pursuing nuclear energy 

agreements with suppliers, cooperation that may be 

driven in part by fears of Iran and that could lead to 

future proliferation.115

A similar situation obtains elsewhere. Indo-Pakistani relations have improved somewhat over the 

past several years, but the two states remain adversaries and show no signs of reaching a groundbreaking 

nuclear or political accord. Reportedly, Pakistan has 

nearly doubled its nuclear arsenal over the past few 

years and continues to increase its production of fissile material. As a result, Islamabad may soon become 

the world’s fifth largest nuclear power, ahead of Great 

Britain.116 In East Asia, North Korea has already tested 

two weapons and, while it seems to be holding off on a 

third test, six-party efforts to promote a denuclearized 

Korean peninsula remain deadlocked. Even France, 

which is situated in peaceful and prosperous Western 

Europe, remains skeptical about disarmament. At the 

2010 Paris disarmament talks, French Foreign Ministry Secretary General Pierre Sellal coyly offered that 

“France’s nuclear deterrent has protected our country 

very well for many years.”117

What events would be required to bring these 

states closer to disarmament? The potential list is long 

and notoriously difficult to achieve, including a halt 
36

to NATO expansion and U.S. involvement in Russia’s 

“near-abroad,” Arab-Israeli peace, and resolution of 

the Kashmir conflict. With respect to North Korea and 

Iran, the question is at least as complex, and would 

involve denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and 

bringing Iran into full compliance with IAEA and UN 

Security Council demands. Aside from the resolution 

of all of these conflicts, successful abolition might also 

require the establishment of an international norm 

against nuclear possession to undermine the legitimacy of those who may in the future seek to acquire 

or retain nuclear arsenals. The key point here is simply that a structural context favorable to disarmament 

looks little like the world in which we live today. 

When discussing structural roadblocks to disarmament, one must also consider the role of the so-called 

power paradox. This concept describes a situation in 

which a huge conventional military advantage makes 

nuclear disarmament possible and perhaps even preferable for the United States, however, that same conventional advantage may simultaneously make other 

states less likely to disarm.118 When weaker states look 

through the lens of the power paradox, they may see 

U.S. advocacy for disarmament as a cynical “ploy” 

aimed at consolidating American power rather than 

as a means toward establishing a safer world.119 A 

forceful push for disarmament, in the context of overweening U.S. conventional dominance, could thus 

bring about an equally strong anti-disarmament reaction from states seeking to hedge against U.S. power.

Even if agreement is reached among states to move 

in tandem toward zero, there remains the challenge 

of establishing effective verification and enforcement 

of disarmament. Many states may be unwilling to accept intrusive verification inspections or, after accept-
37

ing them, seek to circumvent them or renege on their 

commitments. North Korea’s withdrawal from the 

NPT and the international community’s impotence in 

dealing with it are particularly illustrative here, but so 

is the case of the United States under the Bush administration, since it not only withdrew from the ABM 

Treaty but willingly let agreements with important 

verification provisions expire. Provided that verification concerns are overcome, the challenge of enforcement will remain. To make restrictions effective, it 

must be possible to punish violators, but setting up an 

effective mechanism for doing so remains a difficult 

endeavor. One analyst has insisted that enforcement 

is “perhaps the greatest challenge in nuclear disarmament,” noting that the difficulties associated with enforcement are highlighted by the cases of Iraq, North 

Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria.120

Verification and enforcement are important not 

only with respect to the elimination of nuclear arsenals 

but to the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and 

technologies that can facilitate proliferation. International agreement on strong measures to secure the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear materials generally would 

help to create a solid basis on which the United States 

and others could move toward disarmament. Yet, the 

challenges here are long-standing and substantial. The 

FMCT remains trapped in the UN Conference on Disarmament, even though there are efforts underway to 

find alternative venues for its consideration. The CTBT 

is unlikely to be ratified by all the states necessary for 

it to come into force at any point in the foreseeable future. Securing nuclear materials and preventing proliferation will likely also require internationalization 

of the nuclear fuel cycle, making the Additional Protocol (AP) a condition of nuclear supply, and banning 
38

the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) 

technologies to any state that does not already possess 

them. Notwithstanding some progress on multilateral 

fuel cycle facilities, nuclear suppliers remain divided 

over whether to require the AP as a precondition for 

all types of nuclear assistance. Proposals to ban ENR 

transfers are even more divisive, with few besides the 

United States supporting them, and with Washington 

itself divided over the idea.

One must also consider the impact of future cases 

of proliferation on U.S. behavior, as well as the impact 

of these actions on the prospects for disarmament. 

The case of Iraq in 2003 is instructive here. While a 

majority of Americans were supportive of moves toward general nuclear disarmament during the initial 

period in which charges of WMD possession were 

leveled against Saddam Hussein, they seemed also to 

have been inclined to respond to this perceived threat 

through the use of military force, particularly in the 

wake of the 9/11 attacks and the history of conflict 

with Hussein’s Iraq. Leaving aside the debate about 

the Bush administration’s motivations for going to 

war in Iraq in 2003, the relevant point here is that aggressive responses to proliferation may heighten the 

salience of the power paradox—both in the target 

state and among observers—by highlighting the extent of U.S. conventional military superiority and the 

security fears of weaker U.S. adversaries. By extension, these responses also may make achieving disarmament more difficult. Consider, for example, that in 

December 2003, Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi announced his decision to relinquish all elements of Libya’s WMD program. In spring 2011, the United States 

and NATO launched military action against Gaddafi’s 

forces in Libya under the banner of protecting civil-
39

ian life. Future proliferators are likely to give careful 

consideration to the question of whether, if Gaddafi 

had retained his WMD program, NATO might have 

refrained from taking these actions. At the same time, 

there may also be risks to inaction in the face of weapons proliferation since, if proliferation is tacitly accepted, it may gradually weaken the nonproliferation 

regime and undermine one of the key institutional 

requirements for successful abolition. 

A final structural roadblock to U.S. disarmament 

that must be considered is Washington’s continued 

reliance on nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of its 

national defense, including its extended deterrent 

commitments to allies. This is more than a conceptual 

problem, because so long as nuclear weapons provide 

the central backstop for direct and extended deterrence, it will be practically impossible to eliminate 

them. Barring a dramatic reduction in the need for 

deterrence strategies, therefore, a prerequisite to U.S. 

disarmament will be the deployment of conventional 

alternatives that assuage fears about nuclear drawdowns held by U.S. policymakers and their allies, 

without antagonizing potential peer competitors such 

as Russia and China or exacerbating the power paradox.121 The activation of the U.S. Global Strike Command in August 2009 represents some progress in the 

integration of advanced conventional capabilities in 

America’s deterrent posture. Conventional Prompt 

Global Strike (PGS) may eventually help pave the way 

for a deep reduction in America’s reliance on nuclear 

weapons; indeed, as other states reduce their nuclear 

arsenals, the efficacy of conventional capabilities for 

deterrence is likely to grow. But this efficacy will depend on foreign space- and cyber-warfare capabilities, 

since the effectiveness of PGS depends in large part on 
40

the security of computer networks and the availability 

of satellite guidance, and it is precisely those capabilities that are emerging as the major new threats to U.S. 

national security.

CONCLUSION

One might draw two tentative conclusions about 

America’s nuclear future based on the present study. 

First, the Obama administration’s advocacy of nuclear 

abolition and its efforts to move down this path are significant, but President Obama’s support for disarmament is hardly a radical break from the past. Indeed, 

Obama’s approach to the issue is overwhelmingly 

cautious in nature, reflecting as it does a widely shared 

view among American policymakers that, although 

disarmament is in the long-term American interest, it 

must not be pursued at the expense of near-term national security requirements. Moreover, substantial 

roadblocks remain on the path toward abolition. Some 

of these roadblocks will be particularly daunting to 

overcome and may require a dramatic evolution in the 

conduct and nature of international political relations. 

Thus, it is highly unlikely that Washington will make 

any bold moves toward global zero in the foreseeable 

future. A more probable outcome is that the Obama 

administration will continue to move in step-wise motion toward the long-term goal of abolition, a goal that 

the President acknowledges will not be achieved in 

our lifetimes.

The second broad conclusion one can draw is that 

history is an unpredictable handmaiden of events. 

Throughout the U.S. nuclear past, support for abolition as well as the barriers to it have ebbed, flowed, 

and transformed. Ironically, when the barriers to 
41

disarmament seemed lowest, political and popular 

enthusiasm for this goal largely dissipated. It may 

therefore be the case that when disarmament is most 

needed, it is least possible, and when it is most possible, it is least desired. Whether this trend will hold in 

the future, and what can be done to militate against it, 

remain open questions. If future administrations are 

less committed to nuclear disarmament, if elite and 

public support for abolition fails to coalesce, and if the 

strategic context shifts in unexpected ways, the current push for disarmament could be derailed.

What does the future hold for the abolitionist 

agenda? From American shores, the mission has regained prominence. But the answer is as unclear as it 

ever was.

ENDNOTES

1. Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International Arms 

Control: Issues and Agreements, 2nd Ed., Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 1984, p. 81. 

2. Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of 

the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 2009, pp. 2-4; Blacker and Duffy, pp. 95-96. The 

Franck Committee’s warnings included the possibility of an arms 

race with the Soviets and an inability to control the further spread 

of nuclear weapons once used. See James Franck et al., “Report 

of the Committee on Political and Social Problems, Manhattan 

Project ‘Metallurgical Laboratory’ of the University of Chicago,” 

Franck Report, June 11, 1945, available from www.nuclearfiles.org/

menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/scientific/franck-report.htm. 

3. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, p. 6; Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International 

Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005; Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear NonUse,” International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999.
42

4. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, p. 4. 

5. Paul Boyer, Fallout: A Historian Reflects on America’s HalfCentury Encounter with Nuclear Weapons, Columbus, OH: Ohio 

State University Press, 1998, p. 25. 

6. Lawrence S. Wittner, One World or None: A History of the 

World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953, Vol. 1: The 

Struggle against the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 

1993. On the shaping of the post-war order according to U.S. preferences, see G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic 

Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.

7. Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” p. 17. On how Truman administration actions contributed to a nuclear arms buildup, see Blacker and Duffy, pp. 96-99; David Alan Rosenberg, “The 

Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 

1945-1960,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1983. 

8. Harry S. Truman, C. R. Attlee, and W. L. Mackenzie King, 

“Declaration on Atomic Energy by President Truman and Prime 

Ministers Attlee and King,” United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 1504, November 15, 1945, available from 

www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/post-war/451115b.html. The language of 

the communiqué was drafted by Vannevar Bush, then the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. See Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” p. 20. 

9. Large parts of this document were reportedly written by 

the former scientific head of the Manhattan Project, turned nuclear critic, Robert Oppenheimer. See Blacker and Duffy, p. 96; 

David Lilienthal et al., “A Report on the International Control of 

Atomic Energy,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 16, 1946, available from honors.umd.edu/HONR269J//

archive/AchesonLilienthal.html; U.S. Department of State, “The 

Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946,” U.S. Department of 

State Office of the Historian, Timeline of U.S. Diplomatic History, 

1945-1952, nd. 

10. “The Acheson-Lilienthal & Baruch Plans, 1946.” 
43

11. George Perkovich and James M. Acton, eds., Abolishing 

Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, p. 83. 

12. George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, “Reykjavik Revisited: Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” World Security 

Institute Policy Brief, September 2007, p. 4; Blacker and Duffy, pp. 

99-101. 

13. The U.S. stockpile grew to about 200 in 1949, and drastically increased after the drafting of NSC 68 in 1950. Although the 

Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, at the time of 

Stalin’s death the Soviets had only about 50 atomic bombs, a 17-

to-1 disadvantage in favor of the United States. Yet, by 1953, each 

nation had developed the hydrogen bomb, and by 1955, each had 

the long-range bombers to deliver them. See Paul Rogers, “Learning from the Cold War Nuclear Confrontation,” in Alan P. Dobson, ed., Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War, Brookfield, UK: Ashgate, 1999, pp. 205-206; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now 

Know: Rethinking Cold War History, New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1997, pp. 102-103. 

14. Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” pp. 18, 23-26; 

Blacker and Duffy, pp. 99-101; Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Address 

by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of 

America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly,” December 8, 1953, available from www.iaea.org/

About/history_speech.html. 

15. McGeorge Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs, 

Vol. 48, No. 1, 1969, p. 246. 

16. Lawrence Freedman, “A New Theory for Nuclear Disarmament,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2009, p. 

14; Bunn and Rhinelander, p. 4; William Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment,” International Affairs, 

Vol. 83, No. 3, 2007, p. 435. See also the Fall 1960 Daedalus special 

issue on arms control.

17. Thomas C. Schelling, “What Went Wrong with Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2, 1985/86, p. 226. 
44

18. Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment,” p. 437. 

19. John F. Kennedy, “Address Before the General Assembly 

of the United Nations,” September 25, 1961, available from www.

jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03UnitedNations09251961.htm.

20. Bunn and Rhinelander, p. 4. 

21. Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb,” p. 29. 

22. Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin T. Loeb, Stemming the 

Tide, Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1987, p. 197; Blacker and 

Duffy; Morton H. Halperin, “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: 

Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration,” World Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1972; Bundy; Robert S. McNamara, “Mutual Deterrence,” San Francisco, CA, September 18, 

1967, available from www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml.

23. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “US Nuclear 

Warheads, 1945-2009,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 

4, 2009, p. 73. 

24. Jeffrey Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policies, Cambridge, 

UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Blacker and Duffy, p. 115; 

Barry Blechman, “Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1980, pp. 114-115. One must 

also take into consideration, however, that Johnson, Nixon, and 

Carter-era decisions to pursue arms control were made so in large 

part because administration officials thought the arms race destabilizing and were looking for ways to contain the Soviet threat. 

See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd 

Ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 338, 59-60; William Burr, “Sino-American Relations, 1969: The Sino-Soviet Border War and Steps Toward Rapprochement,” Cold War History, 

Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001; Michael Krepon, “Moving Away From MAD,” 

Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2001, p. 82; Arnold Horelick, “US-Soviet 

Relations: The Return of Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, 

No. 3, 1984, pp. 523-525. 
45

25. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, pp. 112-140; Lawrence S. 

Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear 

Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present, Vol. 3 of The Struggle 

Against the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, 

pp. 440-445. 

26. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition.

27. Jimmy Carter, “Three Steps Toward Nuclear Responsibility,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 32, No. 8, 1976, p. 11. 

28. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, p. 112. 

29. Schelling, p. 225; Blacker and Duffy, p. 272; Blechman, 

“Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future?” 

30. Knopf; John Lofland, Polite Protesters: The American Peace 

Movement of the 1980s, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 

1993; Robert Kleidman, Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test 

Ban, and the Freeze, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993.

31. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth, New York: Knopf, 

1982; National Conference of Catholic Bishops, “The Challenge of 

Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, a Pastoral Letter on War 

and Peace,” Washington, DC, United States Catholic Conference, 

May 3, 1983.

32. David S. Yost, “The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1990; Edward Luttwak, “An Emerging Post-Nuclear Era,” Washington Quarterly, 

Vol. 11, No. 1, 1988; Robert S. McNamara, “The Military Role of 

Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1983. 

33. Blacker and Duffy, p. 273.

34. Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear 

Weapons, New York: Random House, 2005.

35. Ronald Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation on Nuclear 

Weapons,” April 17, 1982, available from www.presidency.ucsb.

edu/ws/index.php?pid=42414.
46

36. Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the 

Congress on the State of the Union,” Washington, DC, January 25, 1984, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.

php?pid=4020.5.

37. Some key structural barriers would arguably collapse in 

1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

38. As a pre-Reykjavik memo from Secretary of State George 

Schultz to Reagan suggests, the United States did not expect that 

the summit would lead to an agreement at all, but rather that it 

would prepare the ground for a follow-up summit. See George 

Schultz, “Memorandum to the President, Subject: Reykjavik,” 

October 2, 1986, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB203/index.htm. 

39. Nikolai Sokov, “Reykjavik Summit: The Legacy and a Lesson for the Future,” NTI Issue Brief, December 2007, available from 

www.nti.org/e_research/e3_95.html; Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold 

War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991, 

New York: Poseidon Press, 1991, p. 202.

40. See, for example, Janne Nolan, An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security After the Cold War, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

41. While work on START-I progressed during the Reagan 

administration, the agreement came into force under George H. 

W. Bush.

42. Michael Krepon, “Ban the Bomb. Really,” The American Interest, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2008, p. 90.

43. Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment,” p. 438.

44. Mary Kaldor, New Wars, Old Wars: Organized Violence in 

the Global Era, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

45. Eli Corin, “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control,” NTI Issue Brief, 2004, available 

from www.nti.org/e_research/e3_41a.html; Freedman, The Evolution 
47

of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 407-408. A brief point of clarification is in 

order here: President George H. W. Bush’s famous reference to a 

“new world order” actually occurred in September 1990, prior to 

the Soviet collapse. Accordingly, he envisioned the Soviet Union 

as playing a role in this order. See ibid., p. 408. I use the term here 

in a slightly different sense.

46. Susan B. Epstein, “State Department and Related Agencies: FY2001 Appropriations,” CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 13, 2001.

47. Nolan.

48. Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, Chap. 9; Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, pp. 409-410; Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear 

Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Threats,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000; Nolan, pp. 1-5.

49. Madeleine Albright, “A Call for American Consensus: 

Why Our Arms Control Leadership is Too Important to Risk in 

Partisan Political Fights,” Time, November 22, 1999. Albright was 

here specifically addressing the Senate’s rejection of the CTBT. A 

potential alternative explanation for CTBT rejection not accounted for here is the extent to which a Republican Congress sought 

to deny President Clinton a political victory as he struggled with 

scandal at home.

50. Nolan, p. 2.

51. Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment,” pp. 438-440; Nolan, Chap. 5. If one considers that START 

II, though ratified during Clinton’s term, was actually signed by 

President George H. W. Bush, this gap in progress is even more 

striking.

52. Nolan, p. 87.

53. The text of this document, as well as the 1994 NPR, remains highly classified. See “PDD/NSC 60, Nuclear Weapons 

Employment Policy Guidance,” Washington, DC: U.S. National 

Security Council, November 1997, available from fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd60.htm.
48

54. See Andrew J. Goodpaster et al., “An Evolving US Nuclear Posture,” Second Report of the Steering Committee, Project 

on Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, DC: 

Henry L. Stimson Center Report, December 1995, available from 

www.stimson.org/pdf/Report19.pdf. Nitze would later echo his support for abolition in a New York Times op-ed. Nitze wrote: 

The technology of our arsenals is such that we can achieve 

accuracies of less than three feet from the expected point 

of impact. The modern equivalent of a stick of dynamite 

exploded within three feet of an object on or near the 

earth’s surface is more than enough to destroy the target. In view of the fact that we can achieve our objectives 

with conventional weapons, there is no purpose to be 

gained through the use of our nuclear arsenal. To use it 

would merely guarantee the annihilation of hundreds of 

thousands of people, none of whom would have been responsible for the decision invoked in bringing about the 

weapons’ use, not to mention incalculable damage to our 

natural environment . . . in the long term . . . it is the presence of nuclear weapons that threatens our existence.

See Paul Nitze, “A Threat Mostly to Ourselves,” New York 

Times, October 8, 1999, available from www.nytimes.com/1999/10/28/

opinion/a-threat-mostly-to-ourselves.html?pagewan%20ted=1.

55. “Statement on Nuclear Weapons by International Generals and Admirals,” 5 December 1996, http://www.nuclearfiles.

org/menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/military/statement-by-international-generals.htm; Les Aspin, “From Deterrence to Denuking: Dealing with Proliferation in the 1990s,” Shaping a Nuclear 

Policy for the 1990s: A Compendium of Views, Report of the Defense 

Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session 

Washington, DC, GPO, 1993.

56. Bill Clinton, “Statement by the President,” Office of the 

Press Secretary, The White House, March 6, 2000, available from 

www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd44/44clin.htm.

57. See William J. Perry, Brent Scowcroft, and Charles D. Ferguson, “US Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Independent Task Force 
49

Report No. 62, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 

2009, p. 16; Nolan, pp. 59-62. One might also note the words of 

Edward Warner, Assistant Secretary of Strategy and Defense during President Clinton’s second term: 

. . . reductions will continue to be a primary objective of 

the United States. However, for the foreseeable future, 

we will continue to need a reliable and flexible nuclear 

deterrent—albeit at lower force levels. . . . Our nuclear 

posture contributes substantially to our ability to deter 

any future hostile political leadership with access to 

nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction 

against the United States, its forces abroad, its allies, and 

friends.

See Edward Warner, “Testimony before the Senate Armed 

Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,” April 1, 1998, available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-60-dd1402.htm.

58. However, it is also possible that Cohen’s statement was 

influenced by domestic political considerations.

59. See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “Still on a Cold War Footing,” 

Washington Post, October 31, 1997. These officials included John 

Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security; Stephen Cambone, who held various posts in the 

Department of Defense (DoD) starting in January 2001; Robert 

Joseph, who served at both the National Security Council and Department of State; and Keith Payne, who served in the DoD.

60. Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment,” pp. 439-440.

61. Dimitri Simes, “Losing Russia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

86, No. 6, 2007; “Russian General Calls Americans ‘Evil’,” UPI, 

November 13, 2007, available from www.upi.com/NewsTrack/

Top_News/2007/11/13/russian_general_calls_americans_evil/6480/; 

Keith Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record 

Straight,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2005; Charles 

L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the 

Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” International Security, 

Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001; U.S. Department of State, “ABM Treaty Fact 
50

Sheet,” December 13, 2001, available from www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/

fs/2001/6848.htm; Condoleeza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, 2000, p. 59.

62. One counterargument that has been offered with respect 

to this point is that while the SORT Treaty had no verification 

provisions, these were already provided for under the START 

agreement and, as such, were unnecessary. The first half of this 

argument is stronger than the second, since START-I was set to 

expire in December 2009 absent conclusion of a START follow-on, 

and no real effort was made by the Bush administration to negotiate such a deal.

63. Krepon, “Ban the Bomb,” pp. 91-92.

64. The “new triad” consists of nuclear (the old triad) and precision non-nuclear strike forces, passive and active defenses (e.g., 

missile defense, intelligence, and warning systems), and a revitalized defense infrastructure (e.g., the means to produce weapons 

and detections systems). See “Nuclear Posture Review,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2001, available from www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf.

65. Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review.”

66. See James R. Schlesinger et al., “Report of the Secretary 

of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, 

Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission,” Washington, 

DC, December 2008, pp. 7-8. One of the 2001 NPR’s goals was 

to strengthen the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, which 

the Bush administration viewed as essential to nuclear nonproliferation. See Samuel W. Bodman and Robert M. Gates, “National 

Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century,” Washington, 

DC, 2008, available from www.defense.gov/news/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf; Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review,” p. 146.

67. Some have suggested, however, that increased U.S. conventional capabilities might actually increase the incentives of 

weaker states to acquire and maintain nuclear arsenals.

68. Stephen Rademaker, “Statement on Confronting Today’s 

Threats, in the First Committee of the General Assembly,” New 
51

York, United States Mission to the United Nations, October 3, 

2005, p. 4, available from www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/dos/

dos100305rademaker.pdf.

69. Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment”; John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, “The 2005 NPT Review 

Conference: Mission Impossible?” The Nonproliferation Review, 

Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005.

70. See Perkovich and Acton; Patricia Lewis, “Verification, 

Compliance, and Enforcement,” in Perkovich and Acton. This rejection, a type of inversion of the Reagan-era mantra “trust but 

verify,” is particularly interesting because of its internally contradictory nature; at once, it suggests that trust is the bedrock of 

agreements, while also suggesting that verification is worthless 

because one cannot trust one’s partners.

71. Walker, “Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment”; Sharon Squassoni, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: 

Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, October 4, 2006.

72. William C. Potter, “India and the New Look of US Nonproliferation Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, 

2005, p. 343.

73. Dmitri Trenin, “Russian Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” in Barry Blechman, ed., Russia and 

the United States, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009.

74. See Schultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” See 

also George P. Schultz et al., “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2010; George P. Schultz et al., 

“Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 

2008.

75. A particularly intense contrast of two hawkish figures visà-vis the nuclear question is evident between William F. Buckley 

and Paul Nitze. Buckley would famously scribe that he preferred 

the “chance of being dead” to “the certainty of being Red.” Nitze, 

however, held a moral revulsion toward nuclear weapons, one 

that both early on and late in life led him to prefer a conventional 
52

force buildup to a nuclear one. See Nitze, “A Threat Mostly to 

Ourselves”; William F. Buckley, “On Dead-Red,” National Review, November 17, 1962. See also Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the 

Bomb.” 

76. See, for example, Goodpaster et al. 

77. Schultz et al., “Toward a Nuclear-Free World”; Schultz et 

al., “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons. 

78. William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Obama’s Youth 

Shaped His Nuclear-Free Vision,” New York Times, July 5, 2009, 

available from www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/05nuclear.html; 

William Walker, “President-Elect Obama and Nuclear Disarmament: Between Elimination and Restraint,” Paris, France: Institut 

Français des Relations Internationales, Winter 2009.

79. Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama, 

Hradcany Square,” Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

80. Ido Daalder and Jan Lodal, “The Logic of Zero: Toward a 

World Without Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 6, 

2008; Schultz et al., “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” 

81. James Acton, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Technological Restraint,” Survival, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2009.

82. Perry, Scowcroft, and Ferguson, pp. 18-19.

83. Louis Charbonneau and Matt Spetalnick, “U.N. Calls 

for Nuclear Disarmament, Obama Presides,” Reuters, September, 24 2009, available from www.reuters.com/assets/

print?aid=USTRE58M0VN20090925.

84. Paul Richter, “Obama’s Nuclear-Free Vision Mired 

in Debate,” Los Angeles Times, January 4, 2010, available from 

www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-obama-nuclear4-

2010jan04,0,1799502.story. 
53

85. “Nuclear Security Summit 1 Year Anniversary,” Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, April 11, 

2011, available from armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/

articles/nuclear_security_summit_1_year/.

86. Deepthi Choubey, “Understanding the 2010 NPT Review 

Conference,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 3, 2010; Paul K. Kerr et al., “2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference: Key Issues and Implications,” CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service, May 3, 2010; William C. Potter et al., “The 2010 

NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus,” CNS Special Report, Washington, DC: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 17, 2010.

87. Obama. 

88. Freedman, “A New Theory for Nuclear Disarmament,” p. 

22.

89. Hugh Gusterson, “Narrating Abolition,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2009, p. 15.

90. Ibid. 

91. See Freedman, “A New Theory for Nuclear Disarmament,” p. 26. The problems of nuclear blackmail and virtual arsenals are but two concerns when one plans strategy at extremely 

low numbers of nuclear weapons or in a nuclear-free world. 

92. Perkovich and Acton; Cf. Frank Miller, “Disarmament and 

Deterrence: A Practitioner’s View,” in Perkovich and Acton.

93. See, for example, Jon Kyl and Richard Perle, “Our Decaying Nuclear Deterrent,” Wall Street Journal, June, 30 2009, available from online.wsj.com/article/SB124623202363966157.html.

94. Obama. 

95. Joseph Biden, “The President’s Nuclear Vision,” Wall 

Street Journal, January 29, 2010, available from online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704878904575031382215508268.html.
54

96. “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 

2012: ‘Department of Energy’,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Energy, 2012, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/

files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/energy.pdf; Martin Matishak, “Nuclear Agency Officials Warn Against Proposed Spending Cuts,” 

Global Security Newswire, March 31, 2011, available from www.

globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110331_3274.php; “Obama to 

Seek $5B Nuclear-Weapon Complex Spending Boost,” Global Security Newswire, January 29, 2010, available from gsn.nti.org/gsn/

nw_20100129_1187.php; Martin Matishak, “Obama Requests $11 

Billion for Nuclear Agency,” Global Security Newswire, February 

2, 2010, available from gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100202_8450.php; 

Schultz et al., “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent”; William J. 

Perry et al., “America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, May 

2008.

97. Ellen Tauscher, “Remarks to U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium, U.S. Strategic Command,” Omaha, Nebraska, July 30, 2009, available from www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0907/

doc11.htm.

98. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, DC: US 

Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 14, available from www.

defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. 

99. Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich, 

“From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear 

Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Occasional Paper No. 7, Washington, DC: Federation of American 

Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council, April 2009, 

pp. 15-18.

100. There are a limited number of efforts in this direction, 

including James Acton’s work on stability at low numbers. See 

James Acton, Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security, Vol. 417, Adelphi Paper, New 

York: Routledge, 2011.

101. Stephen I. Schwartz and Deepti Choubey, Nuclear Security Spending: Assessing Costs, Examining Priorities, Washington, 

DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009, pp. 6-7.
55

102. “Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 

2012: ‘Department of Energy’”; Matishak, “Nuclear Agency Officials Warn Against Proposed Spending Cuts”; “Obama to Seek 

$5B Nuclear-Weapon Complex Spending Boost”; Matishak, 

“Obama Requests $11 Billion for Nuclear Agency.” 

103. Schultz et al., “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent”; 

Perry et al., “America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United 

States”; James R. Schlesinger et al., “Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I: 

The Air Force’s Nuclear Mission,” December 2008; Schlesinger et 

al., “Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear 

Mission.”

104. Matthew Evangelista, “Nuclear Abolition or Nuclear 

Umbrella? Choices and Contradictions in Proposals for ‘Global 

Zero’,” Unpublished Manuscript, July 2009, p. 7; Janne E. Nolan 

and James R. Holmes, “The Bureaucracy of Deterrence,” Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 1, 2008; Graham Allison and 

Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 

Crisis, 2nd Ed., New York: Longman, 1999.

105. Indeed, career DoD officials actively sought to exclude 

arms control “weirdos” from the process of crafting the 1994 

NPR. See Nolan and Holmes, “The Bureaucracy of Deterrence,” 

p. 42; Nolan. 

106. “Clashes Seen Over Obama’s Disarmament Goals,” Global Security Newswire, January 4, 2010, available from gsn.nti.org/

gsn/nw_20100104_2405.php. 

107. Lawrence Freedman, “Nuclear Disarmament: From 

a Popular Movement to an Elite Project, and Back Again?” in 

Perkovich and Acton; Krepon, “Ban the Bomb.”

108. See Steven Kull et al., “Americans and Russians on International Security and Arms Control Questionnaire,” PIPA/

Knowledge Network, January 2008, p. 9, available from www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/cissm_jan08_quaire.pdf. More recently, the 
56

general public showed tepid interest—at best—over the fate of 

New START, despite months of intense political fights over ratification.

109. Ibid.; Knopf; David Cortright, Peace Works: The Citizen’s 

Role in Ending the Cold War, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993; David 

S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American 

Politics, Boulder, CO: Praeger, 1990.

110. Kingston Rief, “House Armed Services Committee Toys 

With American Security,” Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control & Nonproliferation: Nukes of Hazard, May 12, 2011, available 

from nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2011/5/12/15843/5281.

111. Broad and Sanger.

112. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, p. 14.

113. Schultz et al., “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent.”

114. Angela Charlton, “Disarmament Talks Strained Over 

Mideast, Russia,” The Washington Post, February 2, 2010; “Disarmament Summit Focuses on Russia, Middle East,” Global Security 

Newswire, February 3, 2010; Martin Matishak, “U.S. Should Embrace Using Nukes for Nuclear Threat Only, Experts Say,” Global 

Security Newswire, January 25, 2010, available from gsn.nti.org/siteservices/print_friendly.php?ID=nw_20100125_3469; Trenin.

115. Acton, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Technological Restraint.” 

116. Alexander H. Rothman and Lawrence J. Korb, “Pakistan 

doubles its nuclear arsenal: Is it time to start worrying?” Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists, 2011.

117. Charlton, “Disarmament Talks Strained Over Mideast, 

Russia”; Isabelle Lasserre, “Désarmement nucléaire: Paris résiste 

à ‘l’option zéro’” (“Nuclear Disarmament: Paris Resists ‘Zero 

Option’”) Le Figaro, February 3, 2010, available from www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/02/03/01003-20100203ARTFIG00443-desarmement-nucleaire-paris-resiste-a-l-option-zero-.php; Natalie Nougayrède, “Paris réticent face à l’élimination de l’arme nucléaire” 
57

(“Paris Reluctant to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons”) Le Monde, February 4, 2010, available from www.lemonde.fr/organisations-internationales/article/2010/02/02/paris-reticent-face-a-l-elimination-de-larme-nucleaire_1300050_3220.html.

118. This paradox has been noted by a wide array of former 

policymakers, including William Cohen, Keith Payne, and Mikhail 

Gorbachev. See “U.S. Military Power Could Hinder Nuclear Disarmament Goals,” Global Security Newswire, April 17, 2009, available from www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090417_5439.

php; Payne, p. 146; Nolan, p. 2.

119. Evangelista, pp. 3-4.

120. Lewis. 

121. The confidence of allies in U.S. extended deterrent guarantees is critical if one accepts the conventional wisdom that these 

guarantees have helped convince states such as Japan to forego 

nuclear weapons, a topic of debate that is beyond the scope of 

this article. With respect to conventional prompt global strike antagonizing potential peer competitors or weaker states, one of the 

key issues to consider is the difficulty of distinguishing between 

defensive conventional global strike forces and offensive nuclear 

forces.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Mr. Jonathan Pearl

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil