Filed 12/29/23 P. v. Johnson CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEO PLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLARK LORENZO JOHNSON

, Defendant and Appellant. B318816

( Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA485308 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Henry J. Hall , Judge. Affirmed

. Nancy L. Tetreault , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta , Attorney General, Lance E. Winters , Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey , Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd

, Deputy Attorney s General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________________2 I NTRODUCTION
Defendant Clark Lorenzo Johnson was convicted of trafficking three minors for commercial sex acts and attempting to kidnap two sex workers, one of whom he also attempted to traffic. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by denying his six requests to substitute appointed counsel; his counsel provided constitutionally defective representation by failing to object to testimony by the prosecution ’ s human trafficking expert; and the
evidence is in sufficient to support one of the trafficking
convictions. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND By amended information dated August 12, 2021

, defendant was charged with two counts of attempted human trafficking ( Pen

. Code

, § 664/ 236.1, subd. ( b ); counts 1

– 2 ) ; one count of attempted kidnapping (§ 664/207, subd. ( a ); count 3); and three
counts of human trafficking of a minor to engage in a commercial

sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)( 1 ) ; count s 4

– 6 )

. 1 The information also alleged defendant ha d sustain ed one prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)

– ( i ), 1170.12, subds. (a)

– (d).) Defendant pled not guilty and denied the allegation.
A lthough defendant sought a speedy trial, proceedings were delayed for over a year due to the Covid

- 19 pandemic. Aft er a jury trial at which he testified on his own behalf, defendant was found guilty of all counts

. In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury
found the strike allegation true. The court denied defendant ’ s motion to dismiss the prior
strike under section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero)

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.3

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and sentenced him to an aggregate term o f
36 years in prison. T he court selected count 5 (§ 236.1
, subd. ( c )( 1 )) as the principal count and imposed the middle term
of 8 years, doubled to 16 years for the prior strike. The court imposed consecutive terms of 4 years , 8 months

— one

- third the
midterm of 7 years , doubled for the strike prior

— for counts 1 and

2 (§ 664/ 236.1, subd

. ( b )) and consecutive terms of 5 years

, 4 months

— one

- third the midterm of 8 years, doubled for the strike prior

— for counts 4 and 6 (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)). T he court stayed sentence on count 3 (§ 664/207, subd. (g)) under
section 654. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Princess, L.M., and Madison Work as Prostitutes Sometime around Thanksgiving 2019, high school students
Madison M. , Princess W. , L.M. , and Raven drove from San Diego to Los Angeles in a stolen, red Volkswagen Jetta

. All of the girls
were minors. A pimp named S.B. may have also been in the car.
Once Madison, Princess, and L.M. arrived in Los Angeles, they spent several days working for S.B. as p rostitutes. 2 But
Madison soon left Princess and L.M. behind and began working
for defendant , who went by the name Payso

. Not long after Madison ’ s departure, Princess and L.M. spotted her with defendant in a gray car. S oon thereafter,
Princess and L.M. decided to work for defendant. Princess made

2 It is not clear what became of Raven once the girls reached Los Angeles. Defendant was not charged with any offense related to Raven, and it does not appear that she performed sex work under his direction

. Only Princess testified at trial.4

the switch from S.B. to defendant because she wanted to stay
with Madison. Defendant was in charge of Princess, L.M., and Madison between approximately November 2 9 and December 4, 2019.
Princess estimate d t hat she saw about 10 clients during this period. All three girls would give defendant the money they earned performing sex work. The prosecution introduced a photograph of Princess and
L.M. caption ed “ King Payso ’ s Bitch

, ” with a moneybag symbol. Another photograph of Princess was captioned, “ Making money
moves Bitch. ” It also included a moneybag.
2. December 4, 2019 A rrest s On December 4, 2019, at 3:37 a.m., police saw defendant driving the stolen Volkswagen Jetta

. Princess and L.M. were
also in the car. Princess was wearing glittery brown shorts and a tight shirt. L.M. was wearing a black shirt, black jacket, and black thong underwear

— but nothing else. Defendant and the two girls were taken into custody

. ( Princess later admitted a joyriding allegation (Veh. Code, § 10851) in the San Diego juvenile court. ) A search of the car revealed $1,700 in cash. Police also recovered a red Skytel mobile phone from the front seat and an
iPhone from the back seat. They subsequently extracted the

content s of both phones. The Skytel username was kingpaycasso@kingpaycasso; it contained a photograph of defendant. The phone was logged in to the Instagram account king.paycasso. Many of the messages in
the account were addressed to “ Daddy ” and discussed arrangements for sex work.
The iPhone had the usernames Bitchdusse and Princess5

Waggs. The call log contained numerous calls to King Paycasso. The phone contained a photo of defendant with the words “ Smack
Man ” and “ King Paycasso. ” Ther e was also a photograph of the stolen Jetta. The windshield was fogged over, and “ Daddy ” and

“ Payso ” had been written in the condensation.
3. February 12, 2020 A rrest On February 12, 2020, Los Angeles Police Department
D etective Vanessa Rios and her partne r were monitoring Figueroa Boulevard between 65th Street and 66th Street. Other undercover units were nearby. The area, known as “ the blade, ” is one of the largest prostitution tracks in Los Angeles.
Rios observed sex workers standing on different corne rs. One of the workers, C.T.

, was at the corner of 66th Street and Denver Avenue, waving down cars. Rios saw a car spe e d down 66th Street, stop quickly, then reverse. Defendant was in the passenger seat. Defendant yelled at C.T., “ Bitch, this is pimping. ” C.T. tried to walk away without looking at him. Then defendant yelled, “ Bitch, there ’ s some pimping going on here ” and

“ you ’ re out of pocket. ” He continued: “ You in the pocket, bitch. You in the pocke t. ” Rios testified that this meant C.T. had another pimp and was ignoring defendant. C.T. walked away,
but defendant ’ s car cut her off by driving on the sidewalk. C.T. walked the other direction because she thought defendant was going to rob and kidnap her. The car left C.T. behind and
continued north. Detective Rios followed. This time, defendant jumped out of the car, chased a prostitute later identified as Jane Doe , and tried to grab her

. Defendant yelled, “ faggot bitch, you ’ re mine. ” Rios expla ined this was a derogatory term to refer to someone who is not following the rules and is acting “ out of pocket. ” Defendant aggressively6

chased Doe, who fled between two parked cars. He rushed towards her, grabbed her right hand, and pulled her towards
h im. Believing Doe was going to be kidnapped, Rios and her partner got out of their car to intercede . Doe fled on foot, and
defendant left by car ; he was eventually apprehended. Following his arrest, defendant made three phone calls from jail, which wer e recorded and played for the jury. In one of the calls, defendant said he had “ caught one of these cases before ” and believed the only way he would be convicted was if a witness

were to “ tell ” on him. He believed “ there ’ s nobody to tell on me ” because the police had intervened. In the second call, defendant
reiterated his belief that “ there ’ s no one to testify aga inst me. ” The other caller agreed: “ If they don ’ t have a victim, bro, it ’ s a D

. A

. reject. ” Defendant explained his strategy: “ I ’ m going to go speedy trial. This month. ” In the third call, defendant asked an unidentified person to provide information from defendant ’ s Instagram account, which was under the name “ The Real King Payso. ”
4. Defendant ’

s Testimony Defendant testified on his own behalf. He explained that at the time of his December 2019 arrest, he had only known Princess for a few days. They first met at a nail salon on December 1, 2019, and went to a hookah lounge later that evening. Defendant communicated with Princess through social media. He used the name King Paycasso on social
media because he was an art lover who had worked at The Broad

m useum

. The evening of December 4, 2019, Princess had invited defendant to a party in downtown Los Angeles. Princess
introduced him to L.M. th at evening. They went to the party in7

Princess ’ s car, but Princess asked defendant to drive because she had been drinking.
Defendant did not know that the Jetta was stolen. He testified that the Skytel phone recovered from the front passenger seat was not his, but admitted that he had used it to log on to his Instagram account. He also denied ownership of the
iPhone recovered from the back seat.
Defendant denied that Princess and L.M. worked for him as prostitutes. He denied ever meeting Madison.
Defendant testified that on February 12, 2020, he saw his
friend ’ s sister near 66th Street and Denver Avenue and stopped to say hello. He told the woman that her brother was looking for her, but she ignored him and turned away. Concerned, d efendant got o ut of the car and tried again to tell the woman that her brother was looking for her. He denied trying to kidnap her. He denied ever trying to persuade or kidnap anyone into prostitution.
When defendant was arrested, he was on probation for driving a c ar without the owner ’ s consent and on parole for residential burglary. He also admitted a prior conviction for human trafficking of a 13

- year

- old.
Defendant was convicted of crimes related to all five women. The jury convicted him of three counts of human trafficking of a minor as to L.M., Princess and Madison ; attempted human trafficking of C.T.; and attempted human trafficking and attempted kidnap ping of Jane Doe.
DISCUSSION Defendant contends that the trial court erred, individually and cumulatively, by denying his six requests to substitute appointed counsel; that counsel provided constitutionally8

defective representation by failing to object to testimony by the prosecution ’ s human trafficking expert; and that the evidence is constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction for trafficking Madison.

1. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying t he
Marsden Motions Defendant made six req uests for substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 ( Marsden )

— the first after nearly a year of Covid

- 19

- related delays, and five others during
his trial six months later

. The record reveals defendant ’ s increasing frustration with his circumstances and the way in
which his case was proceeding

— frustration often directed at his lawyer. Frustration aside , the record does not support that the attorney

– client relationship was so broken that constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel was likely to result. We conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the
motions. Rather

, the trial court consistently displayed patience, empathy, and determination to protect defendant ’ s constitutional rights during oft en

- heated proceedings

. 1.1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review Indigent criminal defendants have a constitutional right to

court

- appointed trial counsel. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335.) But a defendant does not
have an absolute right to more than one appointed attorney. ( Marsden

, supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) The court must appoint
substitute counsel when the defendant has shown the first attorney is not providing adequate representation or the
defendant and the attor ney have become embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict that makes ineffective legal representation likely to result. ( People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 693, 6969

( Smith ) .) 3

“ [W]hether to permit a defendant to discharge his appointed counsel and subst itute another attorney during the
trial is within the discretion of the trial court

. . . . ” ( Marsden

, supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 123.) When a defendant seeks to discharge appointed counsel and asserts inadequate representation, the

court must allow the defend ant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney ’ s inadequate performance. ( Id. , at pp. 123

– 125; People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 572 .)

“ It is the very nature of a Marsden motion, at whatever stage it is made, that the trial court must determine whether counsel has been providing competent representation. ” ( Smith

, supra , 6 Cal.4th at pp. 694

– 695.) “ ‘ Depending on the nature of the grievances related by defendant, it may b e necessary for the court also to question his [or her] attorney. ’ [Citation.] [But]

‘ inquiry into the attorney ’ s state of mind is required only in those situations in which a satisfactory explanation for counsel ’ s conduct or attitude toward his client i s necessary in order to determine whether counsel can provide adequate representation. ’ ” ( People v. Winn (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 859, 870.) Typically, once the court has afforded the defendant a
reasonable opportunity to express his concerns , the decision to
relieve counsel rests within the court ’ s discretion. ( People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587, 623 [ “ If the court holds an adequate hearing, its ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion ” ] .) Accordingly, we review both the adequacy of a M arsden

3 We discuss the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel in section 2, post

.10

hearing and the court ’ s denial of a Marsden motion for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 488.) “ ‘ Denial
is not an abuse of discretion “ unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantiall y impair the
defendant ’ s right to assistance of counsel. ” ’ ” ( People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 500, cert. denied sub nom. Ng v. California (2023) 143 S.Ct. 750.)
1.2. First Marsden Hearing Defendant ’ s Marsden motions are best understood against
the backdro p of the Covid

- 19 pandemic. Defendant was taken into custody on February 12, 2020. At the end of March, he was held to answer and denied bail. On April 20, he was arraigned. Defendant thought the case against
him was weak because no victims would be available to testify

, and he believed such testimony was legally necessary

. His strategy was to assert his right to a speedy trial and proceed as quickly as possible. The matter was duly set for a pretrial conference within the statutory period. Things were proceeding

apace. But then the Covid

- 19 pandemic hit. Defendant ’ s pretrial hearing date was vacated, and he remained in county jail. Over the next year, as his detention continued, defenda nt ’ s case was several times delayed

. 4 In November 2020, the court noted that defendant had
been “ adamant about not waiving time. ” By February 16, 2021, defendant had become frustrated that his appointed attorney was not visit ing him in the jail. Based o n th e transcript s from that

4 Defendant does not argue on appeal that the delays violated his constitutional right to a speed y trial.11

day and the two court dates that followed, it appears counsel resisted going to the jail in person until the prosecution presented a concrete plea offer. Counsel had been attempting to communicate with defendant by phone in the interim. Things came to a head on March 30, 2021. The court
announced that another Covid

- 19 directive had been issued and
defendant ’ s trial would have to be continued yet again. At that point, defendant requested his first Marsden hearing. Defendant explained : “ I ’ ve been incarcerat[ed] about a year
and it ’ s

— quite frankly, I ’ m just, like, my communication ’ s not there. ” Plea negotiations had seemed like they were starting to

pro gress, but “ I don ’ t know if my counsel would really like to see eye to eye on the entire situation I asked about. ” Defendant wanted counsel to come to the jail to answer his questions

, and he
was frustrated that the only in

- person meetings occurred in

cou rt. Counsel explained to the court that he had set up multiple telephone conversations with defendant and had sent his investigator to meet with defendant at the jail , but defendant
often could not be located. Counsel believed “ the problem that is happe ning is not a lack of communication. It ’ s [ that defendant] wants to hear something from me that I won ’ t tell him because
I ’ m bound

. . . to give a truthful evaluation of his case. And I am. ”
The court expressed sympathy toward defendant . It explained that visiting the jail had always been difficult

— “ but this is the worst year we ’ ve ever had bar none. And we are not done with it yet

, unfortunately. ” The court stressed that counsel had an obligation to give defendant an honest evaluation of h is

case , and that an effective lawyer will not sugarcoat the bad parts of a criminal case.12 With that, the court had reached the crux of the matter. Defendant replied: “ Absolutely. I completely understand that.
And I ’ ve been very patient. I want to g o home to my family.

. . . That ’ s the whole reason why I want a speedy trial. I understand the issues, but they have obligations, and I pled not guilty. ” Defendant was not happy with the prosecution ’ s plea offer and wanted his lawyer to understand “ the case I ’ m being charged for is trumped up ” and to “ tell the D.A. my point of view. ” Ultimately, defendant wanted to be released from jail.
After suggesting that both defendant and his attorney

rem ain patien t and act with mutual understanding, t he court

o rdered them to speak face

- to

- face after the hearing. Although the court did not formally rule on defendant ’ s Marsden motion
that d ay, defendant argues that on six occasions, including this hearing, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Marsden
relief

. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the way it conducted the first Marsden hearing or any implied ruling that day not to substitute counsel. As a general matter, the “ ‘ number of times one sees his attorney, and the way
in whic h one relates with his attorney, does not sufficiently establish incompetence. ’ ” ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1192 ( Cole ).)
1.3. Second Marsden Hearing When defendant and his attorney returned to court about a month later, in May 2021, counsel expl ained that he had been speaking with defendant on the phone and planned to meet with him in person at the jail as soon as the prosecution could provide
a firm plea offer. But concerns about Covid

- 19 persisted

, and the delays continued through the spring and summer

. On August 3,13

2021, the court acknowledged defendant still had no interest in settling or waiving statutory time, and a trial date was set. The case was finally called for trial on September 7, 2021, but before the first p rospective jurors could be sworn, defendant requested another Marsden hearing

. Defendant explained:

“ Your Honor, I ’ d like to bring to the court ’ s attention or
awareness that I ’ m here fighting for my innocence. My counsel

, [ Defense Attorney], has called me dumb, stupid, used words [such] as ‘ you people, ’ to intimidate me. Your Honor, [Defense Attorney ] is telling me it ’ s my fault [I ’ ll be] sitting in prison serving a life sentence while I profess my innocence and try to
communicate with him. ” Defendant informed the court that
counsel said he would visit the jail in person bu t had “ never showed ” and “ the majority of the time, he has no consultation
with me. ” The court first explained that defendant was not facing a
life sentence. Then, the court turned to counsel for a response. Counsel replied: “ I have never used the word[s] ‘ dumb ’ or ‘ stupid ’ in my conversations with the defendant. ” Counsel also denied using “ you people. ” He had, however, “ tried to convey to him the
seriousness of the case

, and

, in my opinion, the extreme odds against him on this case, and to tell him everything about what ’ s going to happen because I feel I ’ m obligated to do that. ” Turning to defendant ’ s other concerns : “ As far as communications with the defendant, I have seen him in jail. My investigator has seen him in jail. I ’ ve had conference calls that he has not appeared at, but when there ’ s not been a conference
call

, and the n ext time we were in court, I spent a tremendous amount of time going over everything wit h him. ”
Counsel concluded: “ There ’ s nothing more I can go over14

with him. It ’ s his choice to go to trial or not. It is my choice to accurately make sure that he understands the consequences of what will happen. And yes, I agree this is not a life case , but looking at his age and the amount of years he could face, I have said, ‘ This could be the rest of your life in prison. ’ ”
The court treated the motion as one under Marsden and
denied it . The court explained that although it had “ heard

annoyance, ” it had not “ heard anything that suggests that Mr. [Attorney] is not performing the functions of counsel. ” Nor was the court persuaded that counsel had be littled defendant : “ I ’ ve never heard Mr. [Attorney] refer to any defendant as ‘ dumb, ’

‘ st upid, ’ or ‘ those people, ’ any of that kind of thing. Lord knows
he ’ s represented people on heavy cases in the past. ”
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the way it conducted the second Marsden hearing or its
decision not to s ubstitute counsel. Although counsel may have been frustrated that defendant would not accept hard truths
about his situation

— and defendant may have been frustrated
based on his belie f that his attorney was not wholeheartedly
convinced of his innocence

— tho se frustrations appear nothing
more than the frequent give and take of the attorney

– client relationship in criminal cases. They do not reflect an
irreconcilable conflict. Nor was the court required to credit defendant ’ s name

calling allegations. “ T o the extent there was a credibility question between defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court

was ‘ entitled to accept counsel ’ s explanation. ’ ” ( Smith

, supra , 6 Cal.4th at p. 696 .) B ecause the court found defendant ’ s allegations were not credible, it was not required to inquire expressly into counsel ’ s attitude towards his client. (See, e.g.,15

People v. Winn

, supra , 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 870 [inquiry into
counsel ’ s state of mind required only where such inquiry is

nec essary to determine whether counsel can provide adequate representation].)
1.4. Third Marsden Hearing On September 9, 2021, the jury was empaneled and testimony began. Trial proceeded smoothly until September 14, when a dramatic outburst in open court led to a third Marsden hearing. After the court explained the schedule to the seated jurors and the prosecutor prepared to call his first witness, defendant interjected: “ I would like to address the court. ” The court told him to wait, but defendant continued: “ I cannot and will not continue working with Mr. [Attorney]. ” As the court tried to quiet defendant, usher the jury out, and gain control over the situation, defendant offered a litany of complaints, including
counsel ’ s failure to visit and refusal to as k certain questions: “ I

can ’ t deal with it. I want him to ask a simple question

, and he
doesn ’ t ask those questions for me. ”
The court promptly cleared the courtroom

. The court began by admonishing defendant to stop talking when instructed to be quiet and advising him that his outburst did not help him with the jury. Defendant responded: “ I ’ m sorry, but I have

— I take

— I

can ’ t do it no more. I continue to ask certain things, and I can ’ t get straightforward answers. Every time he talk[s] to me, he got attitude with me. He laughs in my face. He told me I ’ m going to
lose. I ’ m not dealing with him. “I’m prepared

— man, I can’t. I’d rather do this by myself i f
that’s t he case

. I want someone to fight for my life. And he16

laughing with the District Attorney. I’d rather study myself if I have to. I can’t do this. I’m trying. He didn’t even come back
there and talk to m e. I’m not about to keep dealing with this.”
Wh en the court asked what counsel had not done, defendant replied: “ A variety of different things. ” P ressed for specifics, defendant responded that counsel ’ s cross

- examinations were too brief and tracked the prosecutor ’ s questions too closely

. Counsel ref

used to ask the questions defendant thought were important

— “ He didn ’ t bring up most of the different things that I
write down and I ’ m asking him to say, and he ’ s not even saying
them ”

— and defendant was concerned the opportunity was slipping away. For exam ple, defendant explained that when

cross

- examining a witness the previous day, counsel had not
elicited testimony that defendant lacked knowledge the Jetta had
been stolen. T he court reminded him that counsel had indeed brought out the information defendant sought , and the court provided specific examples of how counsel had done so

. Defendant replied : “ I ’ m

— Your Honor, I

— the only thing I know is the way that he

— he

— he makes it seem. It just

— two months of him being my counsel is j ust

— this is not my first time. Like I told you, he called me dum[b] before, and he already told

me, ‘ You ’ re going to lose. ’ He ’ s not

— I don ’ t want him. I ’ ll do it myself. ”
The court found defendant ’ s request for self

- representation was involuntary, the n explained that although counsel was not bombastic, his style was effective; he had covered all the issues. 5

5 Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal or argue the court erred by denying his request to represent himself. (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 ( Faretta ).)17

The court had observed defendant passing notes to counsel and

saw counsel explain that the information defendant sought was inadmissible. The c ourt assured d efendant that a number of issues had broken his way during the trial, and concluded he had

not received ineffective assistance of counsel

. Although the court
did not address defendant ’ s complaints that counsel had called
him names and was too pessimistic about the likelihood of an acquittal, the court had adequately investigated

— and rejected

— those concerns at the previous Marsden hearing.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the way it conducted the third Marsden hearing or its
decision not to substitute counsel. (See Cole

, supra , 33 Cal.4th at

p. 1192 [ complaints concerning “ tactical disagreements

. . . do not by themselves constit ute an ‘ irreconcilable conflict ’ ” ]; People v.
Hines ( 1997 ) 15 Cal.4th 997 , 1026 [w he re defendant ’ s dissatisfaction was based on attorney ’ s in

- court performance, court could rely on its personal observations to evaluate
defendant ’ s complaints].)
1.5. Fourth Marsden Hearing As soon as defense counsel appeared in court the following morning, he informed the court that defendant wanted to bring a fourth Marsden motion. This time, d efendant was upset that defense counsel had not shown him evidence from the Skytel mobile phone b efore the prosecutor introduced it at trial. Counsel acknowledged that technical problems had prevented him from sharing certain screenshots with defendant in advance; the discover y had been provided on the eve of trial, and defendant did not want to agre e to another delay

. Counsel explained, however, that the issue did
not affect either counsel ’ s trial preparation or defendant ’ s ability18

to participate in his defense because defendant was aware of the phone ’ s contents. 6 When questioned, d efendant could not explain what he would have done differently if he had seen the screen shots in
advance because “ it happened so quickly. ” As with the dispute

over cross

- examination, defendant seemed mostly concerned that the evidence would cause the jury to believe he had participated
in “ the robbery that I had nothing to do with. That wasn ’ t my vehicle. So it ’ s, like, how did I

— how can evidence that has nothing to do with a robbery or me be basically turned in on me, used against me, when the car

— it ’ s not my car. I t ’ s not my belongings. ” Defendant had not been charged with robbery or anything related to the stolen Jetta, and the court explained, as it had the day before, that counsel had been laying a foundation to argue that the phone did not belong to defendant. The court found no violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel and denied
the motion.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the way it conducted the fourth Marsden hearing or its
decision not to substitute counsel.
1.6. Fifth Marsden Hearing On September 21, during the prosecutor ’ s closing argument, defendant brought his fifth Marsden motion. Again,

6 Defendant complains that the court did not ask counsel “ if his conduct regarding this evidence resulted from a negative attitude toward appellant and the case. ” Because counsel had already provided an explanation, which the court apparently accepted, it was not required to inquire further on that point.19

defendant focused on mobile

- phone

- related cross

- examination. And again, he objected to receiving late discovery. Counsel provided a detailed explanation of his decision not to bring a witness back for further cross

- examination , a strategy the court agreed was sound given the equivocal state of the evidence

. Defendant also raised concerns about one of the jurors, who defendant believed had been asleep the day before

. It is not clear
how or if this complaint related to the Marsden motion, since
counsel had moved for a mistrial on that basis when it happened

, but t he court assured defendant it had been watching the juror
like a hawk. Finally, d efendant asserted his right to represent himself
under Faretta

, supra , 422 U.S. 806

— but when he acknowledged he was not prepared to proceed with closing argument, the court denied the request as untimely. The court observed: “ So we ’ re not continuing the case or delaying it. I understand exact ly why you want it, and it ’ s not going to happen. ”
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the way it conducted the fifth Marsden hearing or its
decision not to substitute counsel. “ ‘ When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is “ captain of the ship ” and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for
the defendant. ’ ” ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729.)

“ Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an ‘ irreconcilable conflict. ’ ” ( Id

. at pp. 728

– 729.)
1.7. Sixth Marsden Hearing Later that day, after the jurors began deliberations, defendant brought his sixth Marsden motion. This time, he

wa nted to make an additional record about the sleeping juror.20

Because this concern did not involve a conflict with counsel , we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion as to either the way it conducted the sixth Marsden hearing or its decision not to
substitute counsel.
1.8. Cumulative Error Even when no single error is prejudicial, aggregate prejudice from multiple errors may render a trial fundamentally
unfair

. A “ series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by a ccretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error. ” ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844 .) Defendant contends his six Marsden hearings “ showed
an escalation in the irreconcilable differences between [defendant] and his appointed counsel, and the total breakdown of their attorney

– client relationship. ” Starting with the second motion, each was more or less a repetition of earlier motions

, and each time defendant raised the

same or similar problems he had with counsel. The mere fa ct that defendant made, and the court denied, repeated Marsden
motions does not by itself establish irreconcilable conflict or
cumulative error where none otherwise exists. ( People v.
Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 293 ; see People v. Ng

, supra , 13 Cal.5th at pp. 481, 495

– 496, 498

– 499 [no abuse of discretion
where court denied 37 Marsden motions] .)
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant contends Detective Rios exceeded the permissible scope of expert testimony because she offered opinions on ultimate facts that were within the jurors ’ common knowledge. Since trial counsel ’ s failure to object forfeits the issue on appeal, he argues he received constitutionally defective
assistance of counsel. We are not persuaded.21 2.1. Challenged Evidence
Rios testified as the prosecution ’ s human trafficking expert.
Rios testified that on t he night of February 12, 2020, she saw defendant speeding; he yelled out the passenger window,

“ Bitch, this is pimping. ” Rios testified that by using this terminology, defen dant was identifying himself as a pimp and trying to catch a prospective prostitute by calling her a bitch. Rios then heard defendant yell, “ Bitch, you in the pocket. You in the pocket. ” Rios understood this to mean that C.T. was following the rules of the game. Rios also testified that C.T. did not make eye contact with defendant, which indicated she worked for another pimp. After leaving C.T., defendant yelled, “ Faggot bitch, you ’ re mine ” and attempted to grab Jane Doe. In Rios ’ s experience, “ faggot bitch ” was a derogatory term for a prostitute who was out of pocket and not following the rules of the game. Defendant contends this testimony exceeded the proper scope of expert testimony by applying definitions to defendant ’ s actual
conduct and conclud ing the conduct was that of a pimp engaged in human trafficking. Rios was also shown text messages and photographs from the Skytel phone seized from the Jetta. She explained that the names, words, and symbols in the messages referred to prostitution activ ities. Defendant contends Rios exceeded the bounds of permissible expert opinion by reading the messages aloud to the jury, interpreting what they meant based on the definitions she had provided earlier in her testimony, and positing that defendant posted the messages in furtherance of his pimping and human trafficking activities.
2.2. Defendant forfeited his challenge to the evidence. The rules of evidence are not self

- executing. We may not22

reverse a judgment or verdict based on “ the erroneous admission
of evidence unless: [¶] (a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion[.] ” (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) This rule exists to give the trial court a concrete legal proposition to pass on, to allow the proponent of the evidence an opportunity to cure the defect, and to prevent abuse. ( People v. Partida (2005)
37 Cal.4th 428, 434.) Defendant concedes trial cou nsel did not object to Rios ’ s testimony on the ground he now asserts , thereby forfeiting his challenges to it on appeal, but argues that failure
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
2.3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Under either the federal or st ate C onstitution, the

“ benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel ’ s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. ” ( Strickland v . Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 686 ( Strickland ).) To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel

, defendant must satisfy two requirements. ( Id

. at pp. 690

– 692.) First, he must show his attorney ’ s conduct was “ outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. ” ( Strickland

, supra , 466 U.S. at p. 690.) Then, he must demonstrate the deficient performance was prejudicial

— i.e., there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel ’ s failings, the result of the proceeding would have been diff erent. ( Id . at p. 694.) “ It is not sufficient to show the alleged errors may have had some
conceivable effect on the trial ’ s outcome; the defendant must
demonstrate a ‘ reasonable probability ’ that absent the errors the23

result would have been different. ” ( People v. Mesa (2006)

144 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1008.) Typically, if “ the record does not shed light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject
the claim on a ppeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no satisfactory explanation. ” ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.) These arguments should instead be raised on collateral review. ( Peo

ple v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266

– 267.) Defendant argues counsel had no conceivable tactical basis not to object because he “ did object to the testimony of Detective Rios as beyond her area of expertise. ” He posits that this shows
counsel “ w anted to keep out this evidence. ” U nlike the objections counsel actually offered, however, o bjecting on the ground s now advanced would not necessarily have led to wholesale exclusion of the testimony.
D efense counsel could have reasonably expected that objecting would instead prompt the prosecutor to elicit the same information by asking detailed hypotheticals tracking the facts of
the case

— an approach that would only highlight the evidence to the jurors

. ( People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1048 [expert may testify in response to hypothetical question that relates to ultimate issue to be decided by the jury but cannot testify that a
defendant ’ s actions establish his criminal intent].)
Because we can discern that defense counsel may have had a plausible tactical reason not to object, we conclude defendant
has not established on this record that he received constitutionally inadequate representation.24

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Trafficking Madison ( C ount 6) Defendant was charged in cour t 6 with human trafficking of Madison for purposes of pimping. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).) A criminal defendant may not be convicted of a crime unless the prosecution proves every fact necessary for conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14 th Amends.; see Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364; People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566.) D efendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for trafficking Madison

. We disagree.
3.1. Standard of Review In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59

– 60.) “ The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict

— i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value

— such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ” ( Pe ople v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
deduce from the evidence

. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) W e may not reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary
conflicts ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181) , and we must accept all logical inferences the jury might have drawn from the evidence, even if we would have concluded otherwise ( People
v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 242).25 The same standard applies where the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.) “ ‘ Although it is the jury ’ s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant ’ s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ’ [Citation.] Simply put, if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury ’ s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. ” ( People v. F

arnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 143.)
In sum , “ reversal for insufficient evidence ‘ is unwarranted
unless it appears “ that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support ” ’ the jury ’ s verdict. ” ( People v. Zamudio

, supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)
3.2. Elements of Sex Trafficking To convict defendant of trafficking Madison for a commercial sex act (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(1)), as charged in count 6, the prosecution was required to prove:

◦ Defendant caused, induced, or persuaded
Madison to e ngage in a commercial sex act

— or intended to do so ;

◦ When defendant acted, he intended to commit the
crime of pimping (§ 266h ) ; and

◦ When defendant did so, Madison was under 18 years of age. (§ 236.1, subd. (c); see CALCRIM No. 1244.) To prove the second

e lement

— that defendant intended to commit pimping

— the prosecution had to prove :26 ◦ Defendant knew Madison was a prostitute; and

◦ The money or other proceeds Madison earned as a prostitute supported defendant, in whole or in part; or

◦ Defendant asked for payment or received payment for soliciting prostitution customers for
Madison. (§ 266 h ; see CALCRIM No. 115 0

. )
3.3. Substantial evidence supports defendant ’ s conviction for trafficking Madison

. Defendant concedes substantial evidence supports his
convictions f

or trafficking Princess and L.M. (counts 4 and 5) but
contends the evidence is constitutionally inadequate to support his conviction for trafficking Madison (count 6)

. He argues that unlike Princess and L.M., Madison “ had a level of autonomy and
leadershi p in the business arrangement

. . . . ” We are not persuaded

. First, convictions for trafficking non

- testifying minor
victims often rest on circumstantial evidence. ( See People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 487

– 488 [three testifying victims offered substantial evidence defendant encouraged eight

non

- testifying victims to engage in prostitution where defendant assisted the women with prostitution

- related activities].) In this case, only Princess testified. Madison did not. Although
Princess’s testimony often lacked detail, it would have been reasonable for the jury to infer from it that Madison, Princess,
and L.M. had similar relationships with defendant. The girls traveled together from San Diego to Los Angeles sometime after
Novem ber 25, 2019

. Princess identified herself, L.M., and Madison in several photographs taken during the period the27

three women were in Los Angeles making money working as prostitutes. When they arrived, they spent a couple of days working as prostitutes for S.B. After Madison left to work for
defendant , t he other two girls followed her because they wanted to stay together

. Defendant was in charge of th re e of them between approximately November 2 9 and December 4, 2019. Taken together, the three girls spent about 10 days in Los Angeles ; d uring that time, all three worked for S.B. for a couple of days, and all three worked for defendant for about a week. It
is reasonable to infer from this timeline that Madison worked for defendant for only a day or so longer than the others. Based on this inference, the jury could reasonably deduce that Madison ’ s relationship with defendant was not appreciably different or
more autonomous than his relationship with the other two girls. Second, the jury could infer from Princess ’ s testimony that
defendant had facilitated Madison ’ s prostitution. ( People v.
Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 980, 989 [intent to influence may be inferred from acts of assistance].) Princess testified that she
first encountered defendant when sh e saw defendant driving
Madison around. Princess also testified that she gave her earnings to defendant because she had seen Madison do so.
Madison was a “ girl[ ] in the group ” and one of her “ wifies ” because they worked for the same person. The jury co uld reasonably infer from this conduct that defendant taught
Madison how to behave and thereby caused her to engage in sex
work

. (§ 236.1, subd. (c).) Finally, the jury could have used defendant ’ s prior sex

trafficking conviction as evidence that he had a propensity to
commit

— and did commit

— sex trafficking of Madison. “ Evidence of prior criminal acts is ordinarily inadmissible to show a28

defendant ’ s disposition to commit such acts. [Citation.] However, the Legislature has created exceptions to this rule in cases involving sexual offenses

. . . . ” ( People v. Reyes (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 246, 251.) Evidence Code section 1108 “ allows
evidence of the defendant ’ s uncharged sex crimes to be introduced in a sex offense prosecution to demonstrate the
defendant ’ s disposition to commit such crimes. ” ( People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1009.) Here, the jury heard evidence that defendant had previously been convicted of trafficking a 13

- year

- old girl. The
court admitted into evidence the transc ript of the preliminary hearing at which defendant was held to answer

. 7 According to the transcript, defendant taught the victim “ the ways of being a prostitute. ” Defendant picked the victim up from her house and drove her to Figueroa Boulevard , where he would give her condoms, set prices for various sex acts, and tell her how many acts to perform. When the victim completed her quota, defendant would pick her up, and the victim would pay him a portion of her earnings. The jury was instructed under Evidence Code section 1108
that if it concluded “ defendant committed the uncharged offense, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or incline d to comm i t sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit human trafficking of a minor for a commercial sex act

. . . as charged in
Count [ ]

. . . Six

. . . . ” To be sure, as defendant stresses, the evidence against him

7 The transcript was admitted at defense counsel ’ s request.29

was stronger as to Princess and L.M because it included incriminating text messages and photographs recovered from the phones in the stolen Jetta

— evidence that did not directly pertain

to count 6

. T aken as a wh ole

, the evidence

— al though perhaps less persuasive than that for the other counts

— wa s constitutionally sufficient to support defendant ’ s conviction for

count 6

. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN

, P. J.
I CONCUR:

MOOR , J.The People v. Clark Lorenzo Johnson

B318816

BAKER, J., Concurring

I join the opinion for the court with the exception of its reliance on Evidence Code section 1108 propensity evidence to
conclude substa ntial evidence supports defendant and appellant Clark Johnson’s (defendant’s) conviction of human trafficking in count six. I believe substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction on that count without need to rely on a judgment that he has a gener al propensity to commit sex offenses.

BAKER, J.