2

Shays I within the meaning of this Court’s rules because the two cases “involv[e] the 

same parties and relat[e] to the same subject matter”—namely, the Commission’s 

continuing failure to promulgate lawful regulations governing coordinated 

communications, Federal election activity, and solicitations by federal officeholders and 

candidates at state party fundraising events, as required by the opinions and judgment in 

Shays I and by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 

107-155, 116 Stat. 81. See LCvR40.5(a)(4); see also ¶¶ 16-19 below. 

3. BCRA’s principal purpose is to ban “soft money”—funds not subject to 

the contribution limits, source prohibitions, and disclosure requirements of federal law—

from federal elections and the federal political process. The passage of BCRA reflects 

Congress’s determination that the growing use of soft money over the past generation has 

led to corruption and the appearance of corruption in federal elections and in the federal 

political process. By stemming the flow of soft money, BCRA was intended to help 

restore the confidence of the American people in their government and political system. 

BCRA was upheld in all material respects by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC, 

540 U.S. 93 (2003). 

4. In response to the decisions and judgment in Shays I, the Commission held 

additional rulemaking proceedings during 2005 and 2006 on the rules challenged in this 

action, along with other rules remanded to the FEC by this Court in Shays I. With respect 

to the rules challenged in this action, the Commission failed to address adequately the 

questions and instructions of this Court and the D.C. Circuit in Shays I, failed to 

promulgate new rules that comply with BCRA and the Shays I mandate, and failed to 

explain adequately and justify its actions. The challenged regulations thwart and 
3

undermine the purposes of BCRA by allowing soft money to continue to flow into federal 

elections and the federal political process. Specifically: 

(a) In response to Shays I, the Commission has amended the “content 

standards” of its coordination regulations to shrink the scope of the rules 

even further in many respects and thus to authorize even more coordinated 

activity, not less. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21. Among many other flaws, 

whereas the previous rules authorized what the D.C. Circuit labeled “a 

coordinated communication free-for-all” during all but the final 120 days 

before a primary or general election, 414 F.3d at 100, the amended rules 

reduce the pre-election window to only 90 days in House and Senate 

races. The Commission also retained and expanded the “gap period” 

between Congressional primaries and the general election window, 

thereby authorizing a coordination “free-for-all” during much of the 

election year in many States. Although the Commission closed the 

election-year “gap period” in Presidential races, it retained the 120-day 

pre-primary window that was invalidated in Shays I. During all other 

periods of the election cycle outside of these windows, candidates, 

political parties, and outside spenders continue to have a complete “safe 

harbor,” 337 F. Supp. 2d at 58, to engage in massive and unregulated 

coordinated communications so long as they avoid the republication of 

campaign materials or “express advocacy.” 11 C.F.R. 109.21(c). Yet 

McConnell’s “unmistakable lesson” is that express advocacy is a 

“functionally meaningless” standard that “has not aided the legislative 
4

effort to combat real or apparent corruption.” 540 U.S. at 193-94. The 

Commission’s amended coordination regulations fail to satisfy the D.C. 

Circuit’s central requirement—that any “content standard” used in 

regulating coordinated communications must “rationally separate[] 

election-related advocacy from other activity falling outside FECA’s 

expenditure definition.” 414 F.3d at 100, 102. 

(b) The Commission’s narrow definitions of “voter registration activity” and 

“get-out-the-vote activity” (“GOTV activity”), both of which are types of 

“Federal election activity,” will permit state and local parties to continue 

to fund activities that influence federal elections with substantial amounts 

of soft money. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2)-(3); see also Shays I, 337 F. 

Supp. 2d at 101-07. As interpreted by the Commission, the rules exempt 

from BCRA’s soft money restrictions many voter registration and GOTV 

activities that are likely to have a substantial effect on federal elections. 

See id.; Ad. Op. 2006-19. That result is entirely incompatible with 

BCRA’s language, structure, and purpose. 

(c) The Commission’s decision to authorize unbridled solicitations by federal 

candidates and officeholders at state, district, and local party fundraising 

events permits federal officeholders and candidates to directly and overtly 

solicit soft money, contrary to BCRA’s language and purpose. See 11 

C.F.R. § 300.64(b). Moreover, the Commission has failed to explain why 

a complete carve-out is necessary in this one particular context, given that 

federal officeholders and candidates are permitted to attend other types of 
5

events, including fundraising events, but not to solicit soft money 

contributions. See 70 Fed. Reg. 37,547, 37,653 (June 30, 2005); see also 

Shays I, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 92-93 (holding that, in its original Explanation 

and Justification (“E&J”), the FEC failed to explain “how examining 

speech at fundraising events implicates constitutional concerns that are not 

present when examining comments made at other venues”). 

5. For the reasons set forth more fully below, this Court should invalidate the 

Commission’s revised Sections 109.21, 100.24(a)(2)-(3), and 300.64(b) because they are 

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, [and] otherwise not in accordance with 

law”; “in excess of [the FEC’s] statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations”; and were 

adopted “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), (c), 

(d). 

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

6. This action arises under the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), 2 

U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq., as amended by BCRA; the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 

5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. This Court 

has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

7. Venue is proper in the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) 

because the defendant is a United States agency and because a substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to these claims occurred in this District. 

III. PARTIES, STANDING, AND RIPENESS 

8. Plaintiff Christopher Shays is a Member of the United States House of 

Representatives from the 4th Congressional District of the State of Connecticut. 

Representative Shays was elected in 1987 and reelected in 1988 and every two years 
6

thereafter. He is a candidate for reelection in November 2006. Representative Shays was 

a principal House sponsor of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. He also was a 

plaintiff in Shays I. 

9. Plaintiff Martin Meehan is a Member of the House of Representatives 

from the 5th Congressional District of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 

Representative Meehan was elected in 1992 and has been reelected every two years 

thereafter. He is a candidate for reelection in November 2006. Representative Meehan 

was a principal House sponsor of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. He also was a 

plaintiff in Shays I. 

10. Defendant United States Federal Election Commission is a federal agency 

created pursuant to FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 437c. BCRA requires the FEC to promulgate 

regulations to implement its provisions, including on the subject of coordinated 

communications, Federal election activity, and solicitations made at state party 

fundraising events. 

11. This Court and the D.C. Circuit already have determined that plaintiffs 

have Article III and prudential standing to challenge the Commission’s regulation of 

coordinated communications, Federal election activity, and solicitations made at state 

party fundraising events. See Shays I, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 38-47, aff’d, 414 F.3d at 83-95. 

Those determinations are preclusive with respect to the identical standing issues in this 

action. As in Shays I, plaintiffs are United States citizens, elected Members of Congress, 

candidates for reelection to Congress, voters, recipients of campaign contributions, 

fundraisers, and members of national and state political parties. Each plaintiff faces 

personal, particularized, and concrete injury in the event that the revised Sections 109.21, 
7

100.24(a)(2)-(3), and 300.64(b) are allowed to stand. 

12. In particular, as federal officers and as candidates for federal office, 

plaintiffs and their campaign opponents are regulated by FECA and BCRA and are 

among those whom BCRA seeks to insulate from the actual or apparent corrupting 

influence of special interest soft money. In the following ways, each of these regulations 

creates an “illegal structuring of [the] competitive environment” that inflicts cognizable 

harm on plaintiffs and their supporters. Shays I, 414 F.3d at 85; see also id. at 87. 

(a) The revised coordinated communications regulations injure plaintiffs by 

continuing to provide a “safe harbor” to their electoral opponents and 

opposing political parties to engage in unregulated coordination of 

political advertising with outside spenders. The rules authorize plaintiffs’ 

opponents and supporters of their opponents to evade contribution limits 

and reporting requirements and to circumvent the prohibition on 

expenditures of corporate and union treasury funds, thus influencing 

federal elections in which the plaintiffs are candidates. 

(b) The “Federal election activity” regulations injure plaintiffs by permitting 

the state and local party committees that support plaintiffs’ opponents to 

evade the restrictions BCRA places on the use of soft money to fund 

activities that influence federal elections. 

(c) The Commission’s decision to authorize unrestricted soft-money 

solicitations by federal officeholders and candidates at state, district, and 

local fundraising events enables plaintiffs’ opponents (and other federal 

officeholders and candidates who support plaintiffs’ opponents) to attend 
8

such party fundraisers and solicit soft money “without restriction or 

regulation.” 11 C.F.R. § 300.64(b). 

13. Plaintiffs also have informational standing to challenge the Commission’s 

coordinated communication regulations. Whether a communication constitutes a 

“coordinated” expenditure determines whether it is subject to FECA’s “contribution” 

disclosure requirements. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8), 434(b). Because plaintiffs, in their 

capacities as voters, candidates, and elected officeholders, have self-evident interests in 

obtaining full disclosure of campaign-related contributions and expenditures, they have 

informational standing to challenge the revised Section 109.21’s continued authorization 

of candidates, parties, and outside spenders to hide information that is required by law to 

be disclosed. 

14. In denying the Commission’s post-judgment motion for a stay in Shays I,

this Court determined that the Commission’s unlawful BCRA regulations “constitute[] a 

daily injury to both [plaintiffs’] interests and the clearly articulated intent of Congress,” 

and that plaintiffs suffer “significant, irreparable injury” from the absence of effective 

BCRA-implementing regulations. 340 F. Supp. 2d at 52. This Court also found that the 

Commission’s unlawful rules irreparably harm the public interest. See id. at 53-54. The 

Commission did not appeal these determinations, which are preclusive with respect to the 

identical injury and public interest issues in this action. 

15. Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Commission’s revised versions of 11 C.F.R. 

§§ 109.21, 100.24(a)(2)-(3), and 300.64(b) are ripe for all the reasons set forth in the 

prior opinions of this Court and the D.C. Circuit in Shays I. As with the challenge to the 

earlier regulations, this complaint presents purely legal challenges that are fit for 
9

immediate review, and the plaintiffs would suffer substantial hardship if judicial review 

of the regulations were delayed. See 337 F. Supp. 2d at 47-50; 414 F.3d at 95-96. The 

courts’ prior determinations on these issues are preclusive with respect to the identical 

ripeness issues in this action. This Court’s concerns about ripeness with respect to the 

rules defining “Federal election activity” have now been resolved, as the Commission has 

further clarified the scope of Sections 100.24(a)(2)-(3). See 337 F. Supp. 2d at 100, 105; 

see also Ad. Op. 2006-19; ¶¶ 56-57 below. 

IV. RELATED CASE STANDARDS 

16. Shays I was dismissed by this Court with prejudice, and the Commission 

has exhausted its appeals in that case. See LCvR 40.5(a)(4). 

17. This action involves the identical parties, identically aligned, as in Shays I. 

See id. 

18. This action “relat[es] to the same subject matter” as Shays I. Id. Although 

Shays I challenged a number of BCRA regulations in addition to the coordinated 

communication, Federal election activity, and state party fundraiser provisions that are 

the subject of this complaint, the regulations challenged here were among the lead issues 

in plaintiffs’ challenge in Shays I, in this Court’s opinion, and, with regard to Section 

109.21, in the D.C. Circuit’s affirmance. The coordination, Federal election activity, and 

state party fundraiser issues here obviously “relate[] to” the coordination, Federal election 

activity, and state party fundraiser issues in Shays I; the central question in this case is 

whether the Commission has repaired the unlawful defects in those regulations that were 

identified by this Court and the D.C. Circuit in Shays I. There is a substantial, and often 

complete, overlap between the legal and factual issues in this case and those in Shays I 

regarding the legality of the Commission’s rules on coordination, Federal election 
10

activity, and state party fundraisers.

19. Treating this action as a “related case” to Shays I would significantly 

advance the purposes underlying this Court’s related case rule. The interests of judicial 

economy will be served if the Court that decided Shays I decides this case, because the 

primary issue here is whether the Commission complied with the mandate of Shays I. 

This Court already is familiar with the governing statutes, with the events that led to 

BCRA’s enactment, with the Commission’s implementing regulations, and with the flaws 

in those regulations identified in Shays I.

V. THE REVISED VERSION OF THE COORDINATION REGULATIONS, 

11 C.F.R. § 109.21, VIOLATES FECA, BCRA, AND THE APA. 

20. The Commission adopted its revised coordination rules on April 7, 2006. 

The revised coordination rules were transmitted to Congress on June 2, were published in 

the Federal Register on June 8, and took effect on July 10, 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. at 

33,190.

21. The coordination regulations challenged in this action mark the third time 

in less than six years that the Commission has promulgated unlawful regulations 

governing coordinated communications. 

22. The Commission’s first set of unlawful coordination regulations. In 

December 2000, the Commission adopted rules that significantly narrowed the scope of 

the regulations that traditionally had governed coordinated communications. See 11 

C.F.R. § 100.23 (2001); see also 65 Fed. Reg. 76,138 (Dec. 6, 2000). Those regulations 

required interactions rising to the level of “collaboration or agreement” between a 

candidate and outside spender in order to trigger coverage by the coordination rules. 11 

C.F.R. § 100.23(c)(2)(iii) (2001). Congress repealed those regulations in March 2002 
11

pursuant to Section 214 of BCRA because they were “far too narrow to be effective in 

defining coordination in the real world of campaigns and elections and threaten[ed] to 

seriously undermine the soft money restrictions contained in” BCRA. 148 Cong. Rec. 

S2145 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. McCain). This Court and the 

Supreme Court both upheld Congress’s repeal of the 2000 regulations and instructions for 

new rulemaking in opinions emphasizing the need for a realistic, functional approach in 

regulating coordinated communications. See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 

252-57 (D.D.C. 2003) (per curiam), aff’d, 540 U.S. 93, 217-24 (2003). 

23. The Commission’s second set of unlawful coordination regulations. In 

response to Congress’s repeal of the 2000 coordination regulations and instructions for 

developing new rules, the Commission adopted another set of deeply flawed coordination 

regulations in December 2002. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2003); see also 68 Fed. Reg. 421 

(Jan. 3, 2003). Breaking sharply with three decades of agency and judicial precedent, the 

Commission for the first time ever granted candidates, political parties, and outside 

spenders what it called a “safe harbor,” allowing them to engage in coordinated political 

advertising exempt from all federal contribution limits, source prohibitions, and 

disclosure requirements during most of each election cycle, so long as the advertising 

avoided “express advocacy” or the republication of campaign materials. See 68 Fed. 

Reg. at 430 n.2. Under the new Section 109.21, heightened coordination standards 

governed only during the final 120 days before an election; all other periods of the 

election cycle were in essence subject only to the express advocacy standard—a standard 

that Congress and the courts have found to be “functionally meaningless.” McConnell,

540 U.S. at 193; Shays I, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 57 n.26 and 414 F.3d at 100. 
12

24. This Court held in September 2004 that 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 “r[an] 

completely afoul of [the] basic tenet of campaign finance law” that coordinated 

communications, like contributions, have great value to candidates, and that failing to 

regulate such communications accordingly “create[s] an immense loophole that would 

facilitate the circumvention of [federal] contribution limits, thereby creating ‘the potential 

for gross abuse.’” Shays I, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 63, 65 (quoting Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 

164, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The D.C. Circuit “reach[ed] the same result, though for 

slightly different reasons,” concluding that Section 109.21 authorized “a coordinated 

communication free-for-all for much of each election cycle.” 414 F.3d at 98, 100. The 

D.C. Circuit further held that “time, place, and content” standards may be used in 

fashioning appropriate coordination regulations, but that “the Commission must establish, 

consistent with APA standards, that its rule rationally separates election-related 

advocacy from other activity falling outside FECA’s expenditure definition.” Id. at 99, 

102 (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit concluded that the Commission’s Explanation 

and Justification for Section 109.21 fell far short of that requirement, and the court gave 

detailed instructions for the Commission to follow on remand. See id. at 99-102. 

25. The Commission’s third set of unlawful coordination regulations. 

Notwithstanding this Court’s detailed instructions for reasonable expedition, see 340 F. 

Supp. 2d at 52-54, the Commission inexcusably delayed even beginning its remanded 

coordination rulemaking until December 14, 2005—fifteen months after this Court’s 

September 2004 final judgment. The Commission has now promulgated a revised 

version of 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 that once again violates the substantive requirements of the 

federal campaign finance statutes and the procedural requirements of the APA. This 
13

revised version of Section 109.21 constitutes “strike three” for the Commission in its 

attempts to regulate coordinated political advertising, and produces precisely what this 

Court warned against in 2004: unlawful agency action that “seeks to thwart the very 

essence of the wide-sweeping system of reform enacted by Congress for another 

interminable period of years.” Shays I, 340 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 

26. The FEC’s revised version of Section 109.21 thwarts and undermines the 

language and Congressional purposes of the governing campaign finance statutes, the 

APA’s requirements for reasoned decisionmaking, and the mandate of this Court in Shays 

I as affirmed by the D.C. Circuit. 

A. Revised Section 109.21 Continues To Apply a “Functionally 

Meaningless” Content Standard During Most of Each Election Cycle, 

Indeed, to an Even Larger Part of the Congressional Election Cycle 

than Did the Previous Version of the Rule. 

27. The most significant flaw in revised Section 109.21 is that it continues 

impermissibly to carve large areas of coordinated political advertising out from 

regulatory control based on certain “bright-line” content standards. Until adopting these 

“content standards” in late 2002, the Commission had always recognized that any general 

public political communication made for the purpose of influencing a federal election 

must be subject to the governing coordination regulations without reference to any socalled “bright-line” content restrictions. The Commission has historically recognized that 

political advertising may attempt to influence federal elections in a variety of ways 

throughout an election cycle, and that communications that in fact attempt to influence 

the outcome of a federal election must be subject to the coordination regulations 

irrespective of any narrow time frame test or other bright-line rules.

28. Like the original version of Section 109.21 struck down in Shays I, the 
14

revised version continues to provide that political advertising and other public 

communications that seek to influence the outcome of a federal election are subject to the 

coordination provisions only if one or more of the following “content standards” is met: 

(a) The communication qualifies as an “electioneering communication” under 

11 C.F.R. § 100.29. 

(b) The communication disseminates “campaign materials prepared by a 

candidate, the candidate’s authorized committee, or an agent of any of the 

foregoing,” with certain exceptions not material here. 

(c) The communication “expressly advocates the election or defeat of a 

clearly identified candidate for Federal office.” 

(d) The communication (i) is a public communication; that (ii) refers to a 

political party or to a “clearly identified” candidate for federal office; (iii) 

“is publicly distributed or otherwise publicly disseminated” within a 

certain time frame—for Presidential candidates, the period beginning 120 

days prior to a Presidential primary and ending on the day of the general 

election, and for Congressional candidates, within 90 days of a primary, 

convention, or general election (as compared with the previous 120-day 

window); and (iv) is directed at voters in the jurisdiction of the clearly 

identified candidate, or to voters in a jurisdiction in which one or more 

candidates of the party appear on the ballot.

11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(1)-(4). 

29. These “content standards” perpetuate and exacerbate nearly all of the 

loopholes identified by this Court and the D.C. Circuit in Shays I. See 337 F. Supp. 2d at 
15

56-66; 414 F.3d at 97-102. The rule invalidated in Shays I provided for a “content” 

standard that included advertisements naming a candidate and run within 120 days of an 

election. In response to the decisions in Shays I invalidating that rule as contrary to law 

because it was not sufficiently inclusive, the FEC’s new rule provides for an even shorter

90-day period with regard to House and Senate races. For Congressional races, the new 

rule also retains the election-year “gap period” that begins on primary night and runs until 

the general election window begins. During this “gap period,” coordinated advertising is 

subject to no meaningful regulation at all. Although the new rule closes the election-year 

gap period in Presidential races, it retains the 120-day pre-primary window struck down 

in Shays I. Thus, coordinated Presidential campaign advertising continues to have a “safe 

harbor” more than 120 days before a State’s primary or caucus, so long as the ads avoid 

express advocacy or republication. 

30. The revised Section 109.21 purports to authorize brazen violations of 

federal campaign finance statutes. Under the revised rule, for example, a candidate may 

write a proposed advertisement touting his virtues or attacking his opponent(s) and then 

persuade a corporation or union to saturate the airwaves with the advertisement using its 

corporate or union treasury funds, so long as the advertisement is run outside the preelection window and avoids any express advocacy. Thus, in a State that holds an April 

primary for nominations to federal office, Congressional candidates will be able to 

engage in blatant and unregulated coordination of advertising with outside spenders up 

until the January before the primary (i.e., 90 days before the primary), and again between 

the April primary and early August (i.e., 90 days before the November general election). 

As evidence in the administrative record demonstrates, these are often crucial periods in 
16

which candidates, political parties, and special interest groups seek to communicate with 

the electorate. The Commission’s loopholes create an immense incentive for candidates 

and political parties to engage in massive, unregulated coordination with corporations, 

unions, wealthy individuals, and interest groups—free from any contribution limitations, 

source restrictions, or even disclosure requirements—during these periods. 

31. Similarly, under revised Section 109.21, a candidate or party will continue 

to be able to engage in massive, open, and unregulated coordination with corporate and 

union spenders at any time—even on the eve of a primary, convention, or general 

election—so long as the coordinated advertisements and other communications do not 

“refer[] to a political party” or to a “clearly identified” candidate for federal office. Such 

advertisements and communications, by emphasizing issues and playing upon themes of 

concern to a candidate, may influence the outcome of an election even without 

mentioning a candidate or party by name. Under both the original and revised Section 

109.21, even if there were evidence that a candidate was writing such “issue ads,” 

scheduling their air times to run adjacent to the candidate’s own campaign advertisements 

on the same themes, and soliciting corporations and unions to run the ads using their 

general treasury funds for the purpose of helping his campaign, such activities would 

entirely escape regulation or restriction because they do not satisfy any of the 

Commission’s “content standards.” 

32. There is no acceptable justification for these continued loopholes. 

Coordinated communications that are “for the purpose of influencing any election for 

Federal office,” 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A)(i), are subject to FECA throughout the election 

cycle; otherwise, there would be no authority for the Commission to regulate express 
17

advocacy and the republication of campaign materials during the entire cycle. 

Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the Commission on remand must provide 

“some cogent explanation” for “deeming these two categories adequate by themselves to 

capture the universe of electorally oriented communication outside the [pre-election] 

window.” 414 F.3d at 100 (emphasis added). The Commission has entirely failed to 

explain how the “functionally meaningless” express advocacy standard, McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 193, coupled with a prohibition against the republication of campaign materials, 

could possibly meet this requirement. 

B. The Commission Made Arbitrary and Capricious Use of CMAG Data 

in Attempting To Justify Its Revised Coordination Rules. 

33. The Commission’s Explanation and Justification for revised Section 

109.21 attempts to excuse the lack of any effective “content standard” outside the preelection windows by arguing that candidates’ own advertising purchases demonstrate that 

ads run outside of these periods have “little” or “minimal” value to candidates, “and 

therefore do not present the potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption that 

BCRA and [FECA] intend to prevent.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,194, 33,196. The 

Commission relies almost exclusively on a set of data that it licensed from TNS Media 

Intelligence/CMAG (“CMAG”) regarding television advertising spots run by 

Presidential, Senate, and House candidates during the 2004 campaign. The Commission 

added these data into the administrative record at the eleventh hour, after the written 

comment period had closed and after it had held public hearings on proposed revisions to 

Section 109.21; it issued a Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“SNPRM”) 

that gave interested parties only five business days to respond to the new CMAG data. 

See 71 Fed. Reg. 13,306 (Mar. 15, 2006) (“Comments must be received on or before 
18

March 22, 2006.”). Even putting to one side the Commission’s improper procedures, see 

¶¶ 37-38 below, the CMAG data do not support, and in many respects undermine, the 

revised Section 109.21.

34. The CMAG data demonstrate the obvious—that the vast majority of 

television advertisements run by candidates are run in the months immediately leading up 

to an election. Just because most candidate TV advertisements are run during this period, 

however, does not mean that the advertisements run earlier in the election cycle are 

insubstantial. See Shays I, 414 F.3d at 102 (asking whether “substantial election-related 

communication” occurs outside the Commission’s pre-election window). The 

Commission acknowledges, for example, that 8.56% of all candidate TV ads run in 2004 

House races included in the CMAG data set were run outside its new 90-day pre-election 

window. Similarly, 8.44% of all candidate TV ads run prior to the 2004 Presidential 

primaries/caucuses included in the CMAG data set were run outside the Commission’s 

120-day pre-election window in Presidential contests. Even under the Commission’s 

impermissibly restrictive analysis, see ¶¶ 35-36 below, figures like these translate into 

thousands of TV ads and millions of dollars of advertising expenditures that are no longer 

subject to regulation under the coordination rules (so long as they avoid republication or 

express advocacy). The Commission fails to justify why such spending should be 

dismissed as “insubstantial” and unworthy of regulation, and it fails to give any 

persuasive reason to believe that the existence of its “safe harbors” will not result in the 

flow of more advertising dollars to those periods outside the regulatory windows. See 

Shays I, 414 F.3d at 102 (“perhaps [the] most important question” is whether candidates 

and their supporters would “simply shift” coordinated spending outside the windows).
19

35. The Commission’s reliance on the 2004 CMAG data is arbitrary and 

capricious in a number of additional respects, including but not limited to the following:

(a) The CMAG data address only TV ads, and there is no evidence in the 

record to draw conclusions about how many campaign ads are run outside 

the 90- and 120-day windows by means of other types of “public 

communications”—including radio ads, newspaper ads, direct mail, or 

phone banks, all of which are subject to the coordination rules. There is 

no basis in the CMAG data, or otherwise in the record, for the 

Commission to conclude that there is only an insignificant amount of 

campaign activity in these other media outside the Commission’s preelection windows. 

(b) The CMAG data focus only on candidate ads, not on ads run by political 

parties and outside groups. Yet the administrative record includes many 

examples of election-related ads run by parties and outside groups 

extolling the virtues of favored candidates and attacking disfavored 

candidates, representing the expenditure of millions of dollars, run outside 

the Commission’s 90- and 120-day windows. In the best known example, 

the Democratic National Committee is reported to have spent $18 million 

in soft money on TV ads attacking Senator Bob Dole and extolling 

President Clinton during the summer and fall of 1995, long before the 

Commission’s 120-day pre-primary window would have kicked in. The 

record contains many other examples of party and interest group 

advertising during 1999 and 2003 as part of the early maneuvering in the 
20

2000 and 2004 campaigns, respectively—all of which the Commission 

ignored in its E&J, and all of which would have been freed of any 

functionally meaningful regulation under the Commission’s revised rules. 

(c) The CMAG data, in gross, do not control for different kinds of campaigns. 

Even if it were true that candidates (or parties, or outside groups) do not 

engage in substantial early advertising in most races, they often do so in 

certain races, such as highly competitive Senate races with national 

dimensions (e.g., the 2004 Daschle re-election campaign, the 2006 

Santorum re-election campaign, etc.). There is no basis in the CMAG 

data, or otherwise in the record, for the Commission to conclude that such 

campaign advertisements, clustered in highly competitive races, are 

rendered insignificant or insubstantial simply because they constitute a 

small percentage of total advertisements run nationwide. 

(d) The CMAG data presented by the Commission understate early 

advertising expenditures by presenting data only for media markets 

contained fully within a single battleground state. This selection process 

excludes many important multi-state media markets, such as Philadelphia, 

Pittsburgh, Denver, Reno, Cincinnati, Green Bay, Spokane, and many 

others. The actual number of advertisements and amount of spending 

outside the pre-election windows is thus certainly much greater than 

suggested by the Commission’s limited data set. 

(e) The Commission’s data set on House and Senate primaries contains no ads 

by 2004 House or Senate candidates aired in 2003, yet the record 
21

demonstrates that many such ads were aired, often eight to ten months 

before the primary. These omissions render the Commission’s preprimary Congressional data set meaningless.

(f) The Commission attempts to use the CMAG data to demonstrate that ads 

run outside of its chosen time frames have “little” or “minimal” value to 

candidates, and thus “do not present the potential for corruption or the 

appearance of corruption” justifying regulation. 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,194, 

33,196. The Commission nevertheless applies its coordination regulations 

to any ads run outside the time frames that either contain express advocacy 

or republish a candidate’s own campaign materials. The Commission 

thereby concedes that some ads run outside the time frames do have value 

to candidates and thus do present a risk of corruption or the appearance of 

corruption if they are coordinated. The question then becomes whether 

the Commission is correct that early coordinated ads are “valuable” to a 

candidate only where they contain express advocacy or republish his own 

campaign materials. The Commission offers no explanation or 

justification for believing this is so; nothing in the CMAG data suggests 

this might be so; and such a position conflicts with the opinions in 

McConnell and Shays I, with the legislative history of BCRA, and with 

evidence in the administrative record in this case.

36. The Commission received many examples of advertising aired by 

candidates, political parties, and outside groups during the “safe harbor” periods 

established by revised Section 109.21. These examples included ads run in the 1996, 
22

2000, and 2004 Presidential election cycles, sometimes 9-12 months before the first 

caucus or primary. These examples also included many early ads run in 2004 and 2006 

House and Senate races. For example, the administrative record demonstrates that, 

during the present election cycle, the National Republican Senatorial Committee 

launched its first TV ads against Democratic Senator Robert Byrd in July 2005, more 

than nine months before West Virginia’s May 2006 primary election; that the Montana 

Democratic Party launched TV attacks against Republican Senator Conrad Burns in 

August 2005, ten months before the June 2006 primary; and that Americans for Job 

Security made a half-million dollar ad buy in November 2005 touting the virtues of 

Republican Senator Rick Santorum, nearly half a year before the Pennsylvania primary. 

These and many other examples add up to thousands of ads and millions of dollars in 

expenditures in clear support of, or opposition to, named federal candidates. The 

Commission dismissed all of this evidence on the grounds that there was no evidence of 

actual coordination behind any of these advertisements, but that reasoning misses the 

point. The point is that these ads demonstrate that candidates, political parties, and 

outside spenders have repeatedly recognized the value of early advertising by running 

thousands of such ads and spending millions of dollars on them, often six months to a 

year before the primary or caucus. Accordingly, these ads belie the Commission’s claim 

that early public communications are of “little” or “minimal value” to candidates.

C. The Commission Failed To Provide Adequate Opportunity for Parties 

To Comment on the CMAG Data, in Violation of the APA. 

37. The Commission did not publish the original Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking (“NPRM”) to amend the coordination rules until December 14, 2005—

fifteen months after this Court’s final decision in Shays I. 70 Fed. Reg. 73,946. Three 
23

months after publication of the NPRM, two months after interested parties had submitted 

comments on the NPRM, and seven weeks after witnesses had testified at a hearing on 

the proposed rule, the FEC sua sponte added into the administrative record the enormous 

new CMAG database that it had recently licensed, and published the SNPRM to invite 

comment on the data. 71 Fed. Reg. at 13,306. The Commission allowed only five 

business days for comment. See ¶ 33 above.

38. The CMAG data included many thousands of pages of underlying data, 

summarized in over thirty pages of charts. Given the volume and complexity of the 

CMAG data, the unreasonably short comment period significantly impaired the ability of 

interested parties to analyze and comment on those data, and the public was therefore 

denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the rulemaking process. The 

brevity of the comment period is particularly egregious in this case given the 

Commission’s fifteen-month delay in issuing the original NPRM on the coordination 

question. The Commission’s failure to afford interested parties a meaningful 

“opportunity to participate in the rule making” violates the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).

D. The Commission Has Failed To Demonstrate Why Spending Will Not 

Simply Shift to the Unregulated Periods Outside the Pre-Election 

Windows. 

39. The Commission has failed to provide an acceptable response to what the 

D.C. Circuit called “perhaps [the] most important” question—“to the extent electionrelated advocacy now occurs primarily within 120 days, would candidates and 

collaborators aiming to influence elections simply shift coordinated spending outside that 

period to avoid the challenged rules’ restrictions?” Shays I, 414 F.3d at 102. The 

Commission’s only response to this query was to argue that, since the CMAG data show 

that candidates themselves place “little” or “minimal” value on early advertising, “there 
24

is little risk that coordinated activity presents the risk or appearance of corruption.” 71 

Fed. Reg. at 33,196. For all of the reasons set forth above, this misreads the CMAG data 

and ignores the substantial record evidence of early advertising by candidates themselves, 

especially in high-profile, hotly contested races.

E. The Commission’s Closing of the Presidential “Gap Period” but Not 

the Congressional “Gap Period” Is Arbitrary and Capricious. 

40. Section 109.21 originally created a “gap period” for Presidential, House, 

and Senate races in the many States that hold primary elections more than 120 days 

before the general election. For example, in a State with an April primary, no effective 

coordination rules were in place from primary night until early the following July (i.e.,

120 days before the November general election). The rule authorized a “coordinated 

communication free-for-all” during this gap period. Shays I, 414 F.3d at 100.

41. In its revised Section 109.21, the Commission has closed such electionyear “gap periods” in Presidential races, but not in House or Senate races. The 

Commission contends that the CMAG data demonstrate that ads run during these gap 

periods in House and Senate races are of little or no value to candidates, and that there is 

thus no need to regulate coordinated communications containing non-express advocacy 

during these periods. The Commission’s reliance on the CMAG data for this proposition 

is arbitrary and capricious, and ignores the record evidence showing that ads are often run 

during these election-year “gap periods” in Congressional as well as Presidential races.

F. The Revised “Conduct Standards” Will Exacerbate Circumvention of 

FECA and BCRA, and Are Not Adequately Explained or Justified by 

the Commission. 

42. The revised common vendor/former employee provisions. Although not 

part of this Court’s review in Shays I, the Commission undertook in the 2006 rulemaking 
25

to modify those provisions of the 2002 coordination regulations that addressed the 

potential for coordination between an outside spender and common vendors and former 

employees of campaigns. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(4)-(5). As revised, the regulations 

apply for a drastically shorter period than the 2002 rules provided, the result of which is 

to increase opportunities for circumvention of federal campaign finance laws. 

43. Section 214(c) of BCRA specifically instructs the Commission to “address 

. . . payments for the use of a common vendor . . . [and] payments for communications 

directed or made by persons who previously served as an employee of a candidate or a 

political party.” In response to this statutory directive, the Commission in 2002 adopted a 

common vendor rule, former 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(4), providing that the “conduct 

prong” of the coordination rules would be met if (1) the person paying for the 

communication contracted with a commercial vendor to create, produce, or distribute the 

communication; (2) the commercial vendor had provided one or more specified types of 

services to the clearly identified candidate or her opponent during the “current election 

cycle” (which began on “the first day following the date of the previous general election 

for the office or seat which the candidate seeks” and ended “on the date on which the 

general election for the office or seat that individual seeks is held,” 11 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)); 

and (3) the commercial vendor used or conveyed to the person paying for the 

communication information about the campaign plans, projects, or needs of the identified 

candidate or party committee that was material to the creation, production, or distribution 

of the communication and which the vendor obtained from work done for the candidate 

or party committee when working for the person paying for the communication. 

44. Similarly, the Commission’s 2002 “former employee” rule, former 11 
26

C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(5), provided that the conduct prong would be met if the party paying 

for the communication was employing a person who was a former employee of the 

identified candidate within the current election cycle, and the former employee conveyed 

information material to the communication regarding the campaign plans, projects, or 

needs of the identified candidate obtained from work done for the candidate when 

working for the person paying for the communication. 

45. The Commission’s 2006 coordination rule, instead of strengthening 

prohibitions on coordination with common vendors and former employees, significantly 

shortens the period of time in which the regulation is applicable. Rather than continuing 

to apply the coordination prohibition during the current election cycle, new Sections 

109.21(d)(4) and (5) provide that the regulation is only effective during a period of 120 

days beginning on the last day that goods or services were provided to the candidate. See 

also 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,204. This is a significant weakening of the regulation, especially 

in the case of Senate campaigns, in which the former regulation covered a six-year period 

and in which it now covers only 120 days. 

46. The Commission’s reasons for drastically reducing the temporal limit are 

arbitrary and capricious. The Explanation and Justification provides, in a purely 

conclusory manner, that since “information that is central to the common vendor and 

former employee conduct standards . . . does not remain ‘material’ for long periods of 

time during an election cycle,” then “[t]he more appropriate temporal limit for the 

common vendor and former employee conduct standards is 120 days.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 

33,204. The Commission fails to explain why it chose the 120-day period rather than a 

period of any other duration. 
27

47. The Commission’s new safe harbor for “firewalls.” The Commission in 

its revised rules has for the first time created a “firewall” standard enabling an 

organization to avoid the coordination rules so long as its coordination takes place behind 

an asserted “firewall.” The new rule established by 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(h) creates a 

“rebuttable presumption” that coordination has not occurred where “a commercial 

vendor, former employee, or political committee has designed and implemented an 

effective firewall.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,206. This rule gives rise to new opportunities to 

circumvent BCRA’s coordination rules. Indeed, in the 2002 rulemaking, the Commission 

itself considered and rejected this provision because it found that “[w]ithout some 

mechanism to ensure enforcement, [such] private arrangements are unlikely to prevent 

the circumvention of the rules.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 436-37. The Commission failed in its 

Explanation and Justification for the revised rules to explain adequately its decision to 

adopt a rule that it explicitly rejected just three years ago. 

48. The firewall provision creates a safe harbor that is applicable to all of the 

conduct standards found in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d). See 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,206. The 

presumption that coordination has not occurred arises so long as the firewall is “designed 

and implemented to prohibit the flow of information about the candidate’s . . . plans, 

projects, activities, or needs between those employees or consultants providing services 

for the person paying for the communication and those employees or consultants who 

currently provide, or previously provided, services” for the identified candidate (or her 

opponent). Id. The revised rule, however, does not require a complete firewall. Rather, 

it allows “common leadership” of an organization to operate on both sides of the wall, id. 

at 33,207, thus permitting, for instance, the head of an organization to communicate both 
28

with those employees in the organization working directly with a candidate and those 

employees who are spending money for the organization on behalf of that candidate in a 

purportedly “independent” capacity. Moreover, the revised rule “does not dictate specific 

procedures required to prevent the flow of information referenced in new 109.21(h),” id. 

at 33,206, and the Commission provides no further guidance as to what effective 

implementation of such a firewall would look like. Instead, the Commission relies 

exclusively on its decision in the EMILY’s List Matter Under Review (“MUR”), FEC 

MUR 5506 (“EMILY’s List”), which provided that, because EMILY’s List asserted that 

it had a “policy” of barring its employees who handled advertising buys from interacting 

with federal candidates and party committees, as well as “‘with others within EMILY’s 

List regarding specified candidates or officeholders,’” it was presumed that coordination 

had not taken place and no further inquiry would be made. 71 Fed. Reg. at 33,206 

(quoting MUR 5506 (EMILY’s List), First General Counsel’s Report at 6-7). 

49. Because EMILY’s List offered no specific details regarding its 

implementation of the firewall, and because the Commission has provided no further 

guidance, the rule is an open invitation to coordinate. Under the new rule, a vendor, such 

as a media consultant, can work simultaneously for a candidate and an outside spender, 

so long as the vendor asserts it has a firewall “policy.” The outside spender (advised by 

the common vendor) can engage in unlimited “independent” expenditures promoting the 

candidate served by the same media consultant without that spending being considered 

coordinated. Similarly, a political committee (such as EMILY’S List) can work closely 

in coordination with a candidate while simultaneously claiming the right to make 

unlimited “independent” expenditures promoting that candidate, so long as the committee 
29

asserts it has a firewall “policy.” Both of these results undermine and contravene 

Congress’s purpose in enacting BCRA’s coordinated communications provisions. 

VI. THE REVISED VERSIONS OF THE REGULATIONS DEFINING 

“FEDERAL ELECTION ACTIVITY,” 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(A)(2)-(3), 

VIOLATE BCRA AND THE APA. 

50. Following this Court’s decision in Shays I, the Commission adopted 

revised “Federal election activity” rules on February 9, 2006, and transmitted those 

revised rules to Congress the next day. The revised rules were published in the Federal 

Register on February 22, 2006, and took effect on March 24, 2006. See 71 Fed. Reg. 

8926.

51. BCRA prohibits state parties from using unregulated soft money to 

influence federal elections by defining certain campaign activities conducted by state, 

district, and local parties as “Federal election activity,” and by requiring that such activity 

be funded with hard money, or with a mixture of federal and Levin funds. See 2 U.S.C. 

§§ 431(20), 441i(b). Congress enacted these provisions to end the widespread 

circumvention of FECA that occurred when national parties and federal officeholders and 

candidates channeled soft money to state parties to be spent to influence federal elections. 

In furtherance of that goal, Congress defined as “Federal election activity” those 

activities that it deemed most likely to influence federal elections. 

52. “Voter registration activity” and “get-out-the-vote activity” are types of 

“Federal election activity.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A). Activities determined to be outside 

the definitions of “voter registration” and “get-out-the-vote” activity—and therefore 

outside the definition of “Federal election activity”—can be funded by state and local 

parties, in whole or in part, with soft money. Accordingly, the scope given to the 

definitions of “voter registration” and “get-out-the-vote” by the FEC largely determines 
30

the reach and effectiveness of BCRA’s “Federal election activity” provisions. 

53. Following the enactment of BCRA, the FEC first promulgated regulations 

defining “voter registration” and “get-out-the-vote” activity in its 2002 rulemaking. See 

11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2)-(3) (2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 49,066 (July 29, 2002). In Shays I, this 

Court reviewed those regulations and invalidated certain aspects of them after finding 

that the Commission had not provided adequate notice of the narrow approach taken in 

the final rules, as required by the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). See 337 F. Supp. 2d at 101, 

106. 

54. This Court also considered substantive challenges to these regulations in 

Shays I. In particular, it considered plaintiffs’ contention that the definitions of “voter 

registration” and “get-out-the-vote” activities violated BCRA because those terms 

included only activities that “by individualized means . . . assist” voters to register or 

vote. Plaintiffs argued that the Commission had historically included within the meaning 

of these terms efforts to encourage (as well as to assist) registration and voting, and that 

Congress intended BCRA’s “Federal election activity” provisions to be similarly 

encompassing. This Court concluded that these challenges were not ripe for review 

because “the exact parameters of the Commission’s regulation [we]re subject to 

interpretation.” 337 F. Supp. 2d at 100. Nonetheless, this Court cautioned that if the 

regulations were not given a sufficiently encompassing interpretation they might well 

“‘unduly compromise[] the Act.’” Id. (quoting Orloski, 795 F.2d at 164) (voter 

registration activity); see also id. at 105 (GOTV activity). 

55. In February 2006, after providing notice and opportunity for comment, the 

FEC re-promulgated Sections 100.24(a)(2)-(3), leaving intact the limitation that only 
31

activities that “assist” voters by “individualized means” may constitute “voter 

registration” or “get-out-the-vote” activity. The Commission did revise the definition of 

“GOTV activity” to eliminate an exception for associations of state and local candidates 

invalidated by this Court in Shays I, and to remove a provision that suggested that 

“GOTV activity” only includes activities conducted within 72 hours of an election, see 71 

Fed. Reg. at 8929-31, which this Court called into question in Shays I, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 

103-04. The Commission did not revise the definition of “voter registration activity.” 

See 71 Fed. Reg. at 8927-29.

56. Under the current rules, “[v]oter registration activity means contacting 

individuals by telephone, in person, or by other individualized means to assist them in 

registering to vote.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2). Similarly, “[g]et-out-the-vote activity 

means contacting registered voters by telephone, in person, or by other individualized 

means, to assist them in engaging in the act of voting.” Id. § 100.24(a)(3). In examples 

provided in the Explanation and Justification for the new rules and in a subsequent 

Advisory Opinion, the Commission has very narrowly interpreted the scope of the 

“individualized means” and “assist[ance]” requirements contained in these definitions. 

See 71 Fed. Reg. at 8929; Ad. Op. 2006-19. In so doing, the Commission has 

dramatically limited the scope of BCRA’s “Federal election activity” provisions.

57. The Commission further substantially limited the scope of the 

“individualized means” requirement in Advisory Opinion 2006-19, which it issued after 

the effective date of the re-promulgated rules. In that Opinion, the Commission 

concluded that a form letter or a pre-recorded, electronically dialed telephone call that 

provides information to voters, such as the date of the election or location of a polling 
32

place, but that does not contain information tailored specifically to a given recipient, is 

not an “individualized means” of assistance and thus does not constitute “get-out-thevote-activity” within the meaning of BCRA. Ad. Op. 2006-19. Although that Opinion 

was issued specifically in regard to the scope of GOTV activity, there is no basis to 

believe that the term “individualized means” would have a different meaning in the 

context of “voter registration activity,” given the substantial similarity of the terms’ 

definitions and statutory purpose. By effectively reading into both definitions a 

requirement that a communication be tailored to each individual recipient in order to fall 

within the regulation’s requirement to “assist” by “individualized means,” the 

Commission has removed from regulation many of the most far-reaching and substantial 

voter registration and GOTV activities. Under the Commission’s construction, a state 

party can send out multiple direct mailings to every potential voter in the state urging 

them to register and vote, and can blanket the State with automated telephone calls 

exhorting recipients to get out to vote, without being deemed to be engaged in voter 

registration or GOTV activity. Thus, the more people that a communication is intended 

to reach, the less likely it is that the communication will constitute “Federal election 

activity” and be subject to BCRA’s soft money restrictions—a result entirely at odds with 

BCRA’s purpose. 

58. The Commission’s examples in its E&J of what constitutes “voter 

registration activity” also demonstrate that it has construed narrowly Section 

100.24(a)(2)’s “assist[ance]” requirement. In the Commission’s first example, a local 

political party staff member “provides voter registration forms and answers questions 

about completing and submitting the forms[, and] also accept[s] completed forms and 
33

mail[s] them to the appropriate agency.” 71 Fed. Reg. at 8929 (emphasis added). In the 

second example, a “State party committee conducts a phone bank contacting possible 

voters. The party staff making the calls encourages the individuals to register to vote, 

provides information about how to register to vote, and offers to mail registration forms 

with a prepaid postage envelope to the individuals.” Id. (emphasis added). If providing 

voter registration forms and information that helps individuals to register were enough to 

constitute “assist[ance],” the additional actions included by the FEC at the end of each 

example would be entirely superfluous. The Commission’s inclusion of the additional 

actions therefore suggests that the provision of registration forms or information about 

registering is insufficient to constitute “assist[ance].” The stringent assistance 

requirement suggested by the Commission substantially limits the meaning of “voter 

registration activity.” 

59. By so narrowly defining the “individualized means” and “assist[ance]” 

requirements of Sections 100.24(a)(2)-(3), the Commission has invited state and local 

parties to fund substantial amounts of activities that influence federal elections with soft 

money—a result that is entirely inconsistent with BCRA’s purpose. As this Court 

suggested might happen in Shays I, the narrow scope the Commission has given to 

BCRA’s “Federal election activity” provisions through these rules is contrary to and 

unduly compromises the Act. See 337 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (citing Orloski, 795 F.2d at 

164). 

60. The Commission also failed to provide notice in the NPRM for either the 

original or the revised rule that it might in its final rulemaking limit the scope of “voter 

registration” and “get-out-the-vote” activities in this manner. See 67 Fed. Reg. 35,654 
34

(May 20, 2002); 70 Fed. Reg. 23,068 (May 4, 2005). Because the interpretation of the 

“individualized means” requirement adopted by the Commission could not have been 

anticipated by interested parties during either of the comment periods, those parties were 

effectively denied opportunity to offer comments that could persuade the agency to 

modify its rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(d); see also Shays I, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 100-01, 

106.

VII. THE REGULATION GOVERNING SOLICITATION AT STATE PARTY 

FUNDRAISING EVENTS, 11 C.F.R. § 300.64(B), CONTINUES TO 

VIOLATE BCRA AND THE APA. 

61. The Commission issued a revised Explanation and Justification for the 

state party fundraiser exception on June 23, 2005, which was published in the Federal 

Register on June 30, 2005. See 70 Fed. Reg. 37,649.

62. BCRA provides that federal candidates and officeholders shall not “solicit, 

receive, direct, transfer, or spend” soft money. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e). Notwithstanding that 

prohibition, candidates and officeholders may “attend, speak or be a featured guest” at a 

state party fundraising event without violating the solicitation ban. Id. § 441i(e)(3). Title 

11 C.F.R. § 300.64(b) implements the exception to BCRA’s solicitation ban and provides 

that federal candidates and officeholders may attend, speak at, and solicit funds at such 

events “without restriction or regulation.” The Commission first promulgated this rule in 

July 2002. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49,064, 49,108 (July 29, 2002). The rule allows federal 

candidates and officeholders not only to attend, speak, and be a featured guest at a state 

party fundraising event, but also to solicit soft money without limit or restriction. 

63. In Shays I, this Court held that the Commission’s decision to allow federal 

officeholders and candidates to solicit for soft money at state party fundraisers “without 

restriction or regulation” was arbitrary and capricious. 337 F. Supp. 2d at 88. The Court 
35

concluded that the FEC failed to give reasons in its Explanation and Justification for why 

the concerns raised by a rule that permitted candidates to attend state party fundraisers 

but not to solicit soft money at such events would be “in any way more vexing in the 

context of state political party fundraisers than they are outside of such venues where 

nonfederal money solicitation is almost completely barred.” Id. at 92. The 

Commission’s revised E&J for the rule suffers from the same fatal defect this Court 

identified in Shays I. See 67 Fed. Reg. 49,108. 

64. In its new E&J, the Commission insists that distinguishing between 

solicitations, on the one hand, and informational speech, on the other, “at a State party 

fundraising event is more difficult than in other contexts,” and that it would therefore “be 

especially intrusive for the Commission to enforce the alternative proposed rule,” but it 

fails to explain why that distinction is more difficult in the state party fundraiser context. 

See 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,652. Indeed, several arguments the FEC makes in its E&J serve to 

undermine that very point. First, many of the precedents and comments to which the 

Commission cites speak of the difficulty in general of distinguishing solicitations from 

informative or persuasive speech, rather than to the unique difficulty of making that 

distinction in the state party fundraiser context. See id. Second, the Commission 

endeavors to distinguish the Hatch Act, which permits a federal employee to “give a 

speech or keynote address at a political fundraiser . . . as long as the employee does not 

solicit political contributions,” see 5 U.S.C § 7323; 5 C.F.R. § 734.208(b), but it fails to 

explain why Section 300.64(b) could not similarly “provide[] clear guidance to speakers 

to distinguish permissible speech,” as the Hatch Act does. 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,653. 

Indeed, the Commission does nothing to distinguish the Hatch Act from BCRA. Id. 
36

Finally, the Commission suggests that the unique difficulty encountered in the state party 

fundraiser context arises largely from “Federal officeholders’ and candidates’ unique 

relationship to, and special identification with, their State parties,” but it fails to explain 

that special relationship or why it makes any difference in this case. Id. at 37,652. 

65. The Commission’s continued failure to provide a reasoned basis for 

Section 300.64(b)’s broad exemption of solicitations made by federal officeholders and 

candidates at state party fundraisers fails to meet the APA’s requirements for reasoned 

decisionmaking, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), as well as the mandate of this Court in Shays I that 

the Commission explain why this broad exemption is uniquely necessary in the state 

party fundraising context, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 92.

66. Section 300.64(b) is contrary to the language, structure, and underlying 

purposes of Title I of BCRA.

VIII. LEGAL BASES FOR CHALLENGING THE COMMISSION’S REVISED 

REGULATIONS 

67. This Court should not afford deference to the FEC in reviewing the 

revised 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21, 100.24(a)(2)-(3), and 300.64(b). The regulations are 

contrary to the plain text of FECA and BCRA, the clear intent of Congress, the agency’s 

own historic practices and interpretations, and governing judicial precedents. The 

regulations also contravene BCRA’s purpose of reducing opportunities to circumvent the 

federal campaign finance regime and are therefore unreasonable interpretations of the 

statute. 

68. In addition, the regulations described above are in excess of the FEC’s 

statutory jurisdiction, authority and right, and accordingly are invalid pursuant to 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(c). 
37

69. The revised regulations also are not reasonably supported by the 

Commission’s explanations and justifications, and the Commission has failed to offer any 

rational reasons for its rejection of alternative approaches to the regulations. The 

regulations are therefore arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise 

not in accordance with law, and, as such, are invalid pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a). 

70. The FEC also failed to give adequate notice of some of the rules it 

adopted, and it failed to articulate a rational basis for its decision to adopt these 

regulations which, in many cases, are inconsistent with past positions and interpretations 

taken by the Commission. For these and other reasons, the FEC’s regulations described 

above are invalid pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c) and 706(2)(d). 

71. Finally, the FEC failed on remand to follow the binding standards and 

instructions set forth in the opinions of this Court and the D.C. Circuit, and failed 

adequately to address the questions and concerns set forth in the Shays I decisions. 

IX. REQUESTED RELIEF

72. Plaintiffs request the following relief: 

 A. That the Court declare that the revised 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21, 

100.24(a)(2)-(3), and 300.64(b) are contrary to law, arbitrary and capricious, and 

otherwise unlawful; 

 B. That the Court enjoin the operation of 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.21, 

100.24(a)(2)-(3), and 300.64(b) until such time as those regulations have been corrected 

to comply with governing federal campaign finance statutes; 

 C. That the Court order the Commission to commence expedited 

rulemaking proceedings and to adopt appropriate interim regulations to govern during the