UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER M. ANSPACH, 

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 14-13135

v. 

Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

OPINION AND ORDER 

Plaintiff Christopher M. Anspach (“Plaintiff”) brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§405(g), challenging a final decision of Defendant Commissioner denying his application for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under the

Social Security Act. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #16]. 

Defendant did not file a motion for summary judgment, but instead, filed a Motion to

Remand to the administrative level for further fact-finding [Doc. #21]. Plaintiff declines to

stipulate to a remand for further fact-finding, arguing that he is entitled to a remand for

benefits. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion to Remand [Docket #21] is

GRANTED, remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment [Docket #16] is DENIED as to the request for an award of benefits

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and DENIED as MOOT as to the request to remand for further administrative proceedings. 

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 29, 2011, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging disability as ofJune

26, 2005 (Tr. 227-233, 234-239). After the initial claim denial, Plaintiff requested an

administrative hearing, held on February 6, 2013 in Mount Pleasant, Michigan (Tr. 125). 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Tammy A. Thames presided. Plaintiff, represented by

attorney Michael J. Plowman, testified (Tr. 129-143), as did Vocational Expert (“VE”)

Richard Riedl (Tr. 144-147). On April 5, 2013, ALJ Thames found that Plaintiff was not

disabled. Id. (Tr. 120). On July 11, 2014, the Appeals Council denied review (Tr. 1-7).

Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on August 14, 2014. 

 BACKGROUND FACTS

Plaintiff, born February 25, 1976, was 37 at the time of the administrative decision

(Tr. 120, 227). He graduated from high school and worked previously as a car washer,

dishwasher, inspector, and laborer (Tr. 275). He alleges disability as a result of social

anxiety, Attention Deficit HyperactivityDisorder (“ADHD”), insomnia,socialrage, and Post

Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) (Tr. 274). 

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff offered the following testimony:

He graduated from high school and attended two semesters of college (Tr. 129, 131). 

He completed a program in graphics communications (Tr. 129). The longest he had ever

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held a job was three years (Tr. 130). His last job, involving graphics communication and

screen printing, ended in 2010 (Tr. 130). He was discharged from the graphics job after four

days because he “destroyed too many shirts from not paying attention” and failed to perform

his job “correctly” (Tr. 131). His attempt to find work through Michigan Rehabilitation

Services was unsuccessful and his case was closed in 2011 (Tr. 131). He currently lived with

his grandfather and his girlfriend (Tr. 131). He received state disability assistance (Tr. 132). 

His girlfriend was also on disability (Tr. 132). 

Plaintiff was uncomfortable “being around people for extended periods of time” (Tr.

132). He experienced social anxiety including nervousness, sweating and fear (Tr. 133). He

coped with anxiety by removing himself from the stress-inducing situations (Tr. 133). He

had not found a medication that improved his symptoms of anxiety (Tr. 133). He was treated

for ADHD when he was a child and had been prescribed Ritalin (Tr. 133). He was diagnosed

with Asperger’s Syndrome in 2010 (Tr. 133). He treated the condition with counseling (Tr.

133). Symptoms of the condition included the obsessive need to finish a project before

focusing on anything else and concentrational problems when performing repetitive work

(Tr. 134-135). His biweekly counseling involved working on “behavioral traits,” “focus,”

and dealing with PTSD as a result of growing up in a high crime area (Tr. 136). He was

unable to interact with his friends for more than six hours, after which time he experienced

“nervousness” and “restlessness” (Tr. 137). He averaged four hours of sleep each night (Tr.

138). He and his girlfriend “ate out” around three times a month (Tr. 138). He left the house

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only to grocery shop and attend doctors’ appointments (Tr. 139). 

Plaintiff believed that he was unable to work full time because he was “a

perfectionist,” was “always worried” that he would not “do a good enough job,” and he lost

concentration easily (Tr. 139). He also experienced severe depression around three times a

week, at which time he would not communicate with others (Tr. 139). He had been with his

girlfriend for two years (Tr. 140). In his first semester of college, he did not experience

problems understanding the material and received A’s and B’s (Tr. 140). However, he would

sit in the back of the classroom to distance himself from others (Tr. 140). He did not

experience problems following simple instructions but might forget “steps” of a multi-step

task (Tr. 141). 

In response to questioning by his attorney, Plaintiff reiterated that he did not sleep

more than four hours a night and was “physically tired” during the day (Tr. 142). He

experienced problems following social cues (Tr. 142). 

B. Medical Evidence1

1. Treating Records

July, 2005 records by Gratiot County Community Mental Health Services state that

Plaintiff enjoyed video games, riding his bike, fishing, swimming, and shopping at the mall

(Tr. 331). He exhibited a normal thought process (Tr. 332). Notes sent to treating physician

Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s assessment of the physical conditions. As 1

such, the discussion is limited to records pertaining to his treatment for psychological

problems. 

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James K. Hall, M.D. state that Plaintiff was diagnosed with agoraphobia (Tr. 359). Plaintiff

was assigned a GAF of 50 to 55 (Tr. 332, 347, 376, 575). Plaintiff was prescribed an 2

increased dose of Zoloft (Tr. 360). August, 2005 records state that Plaintiff experienced

depression, insomnia, suicidal ideation, and social anxiety (Tr. 334). Plaintiff reported five

previous suicide attempts (Tr. 334). He denied hallucinations (Tr. 334). He currently

worked part-time as a car part inspector, but noted that he had quit or been terminated from

several jobs after failing to get along with coworkers (Tr. 335). He was assigned a GAF of

45 (Tr. 336, 340, 380, 579). The same month, Dr. Hall opined that Plaintiff was disabled due

to a “crowd phobia” (Tr. 358, 372, 470). September, 2005 counseling notes state that he

anticipated traveling to the Philippines to marry his girlfriend (Tr. 586). 

An October, 2005 treatment summary states that Plaintiff experienced reduced

symptoms of depression with a medication change and therapy (Tr. 361). Plaintiff reported

that he would “need to be considering other options” if the “disability thing doesn’t work

out” (Tr. 643). In an October, 2005 “employment planning checklist,” Plaintiff denied

physical limitations, stating that he wanted to work outside, and avoid jobs where he became

bored (Tr. 341, 582). The following month, Plaintiff told his counselor that he was not upset

when his application for disability was denied, stating it was “‘no big deal . . . I only wanted

2

A GAF score of 41-50 indicates "[s]erious symptoms ... [or] serious impairment in

social, occupational, or school functioning," such as inability to keep a job. Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders--Text Revision (“DSM-IV-TR”), 34 (4 ed. 2000). th

A GAF score of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms OR moderate difficulty in social,

occupational, or school functioning. DSM-IV-TR at 34. 

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it for an income while I got things together . . . now I’ll just have to figure out how to find

a job I can stand which will pay the bills . . .” (Tr. 647)(punctuation in original). In

December, 2005, Plaintiff admitted that he declined several job opportunities that were

inconsistent with his long-termgoals (Tr. 652). January, 2006 records state that Plaintiff was

currently taking Zoloft and had a GAF of 55 (Tr. 468). Plaintiff reported in March, 2006 that

he was actively seeking employment (Tr. 660). In July, 2006, Plaintiff was enrolled in a

program to obtain training and procure employment (Tr. 598). 

In September, 2006, mental health discharge records note a GAF of 65 and no need 3

for follow-up services (Tr. 581). The same month, Plaintiff sought emergency treatment

after injuring himself “throwing a frisbee and football” (Tr. 425). In March, 2010, Troy

Novak, PA-C opined that Plaintiff did not experience any mental limitations (Tr. 448). In

June, 2010, Gregg J. Stefanek, D.O. noted the conditions of depression, ADHD, insomnia,

and anxiety (Tr. 441-442). He noted that Plaintiff’s affect was “appropriate” and that he

followed directions well (Tr. 438, 442). 

March, 2011 treating notes by Troy Novak note Plaintiff’s reports of vertigo for the

past three months and a January, 2011 emergency room visit at which time Plaintiff was

prescribed Antivert (Tr. 413, 702). Treating notes state that “labs, EK and CT were all

normal” (Tr. 702). Novak found that the vertigo was “positional” (Tr. 702). He refused to

3

GAF scores in the range of 61-70 indicate "some mild [psychological] symptoms or

some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning." DSM-IV-TR at 32. 

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prescribe medicine for ADHD (Tr. 703). Dr. Stefanek’s June, 2011 records note Plaintiff’s

report of semiweekly depression as a result of financial problems (Tr. 411, 704). 

In August, 2011 Plaintiff sought renewed treatment with Gratiot CountyCommunity

Mental Health Services (Tr. 487-490). Intake records note an unremarkable appearance,

coordination, behavior, orientation, affect, mood, and judgment (Tr. 490-491, 607-608). His

limitation in interpersonal relationships and activities of daily living were deemed mostly

moderate (marked limitations in developing relationships), but “marked” as to educational

and employment issues (Tr. 492, 609). He was assigned a GAF of 46 due to depression,

“problems with primarysupport group,” and occupational problems (Tr. 493, 610). October,

2011 counseling records state that Plaintiff did not “seem to have any concerns about the fact

that he is both applying for disability while also applying for monies which would help him

start his own business” (Tr. 673). Social worker Eileen Wells noted that she was “not

successful” in getting Plaintiff to address the “inconsistencies” in the two goals (Tr. 673). 

In February, 2012, Dr. Stefanek’s notes state that Plaintiff believed that he was

disabled because of right shoulder pain, ADHD, and insomnia (Tr. 714). In March, 2012,

Plaintiff told social worker Wells that he would use his anticipated DIB award money to start

a business (Tr. 679). March and July, 2012 records state a diagnosis of mild to moderate

sleep apnea (Tr. 541-542). In April, 2012, Dr. Stefanek stated that he concurred with Dr.

Mike’s finding of disability due to Asperger’s Syndrome (Tr. 719). Plaintiff was encouraged

to exercise and diet (Tr. 560). He sought treatment for anxiety in July, 2012 (Tr. 567). In

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August, 2012, he sought treatment for vertigo (Tr. 529). A CT of the head was unremarkable

(Tr. 535-536). The same month, therapy notes state that he relied on friends and family for

support (Tr. 624). He did not exhibit any unusual behaviors (Tr. 628-629). 

2. Non-Treating Records

In February, 2008, Janette S. Caputo Ph.D. performed a consultative psychological

examination on behalf of the SSA, noting Plaintiff’s report of depression, social anxiety, 

anxiety in crowded places, sleep difficulties, racing thoughts, and unsuccessful relationships

with women (Tr. 382). Plaintiff reported that he had “a dozen or so friends” (Tr. 385). Dr.

Caputo observed that Plaintiff was “socially appropriate and very pleasant” (Tr. 385). She

noted good judgment and mathematical skills (Tr. 387). She assigned him a GAF of 38 with

a fair prognosis, noting diagnoses of major depression, “severe with psychotic features,” and

social phobia (Tr. 388). She found that he could handle his own benefit funds (Tr. 388). 

A July, 2009 psychological evaluation byRobert Cooper, MA/LLP states that Plaintiff

appeared adequately groomed and friendly (Tr. 395). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,

Third Edition (“WAIS-III”) revealed an average IQ (Tr. 395-397). May, 2011 notes by a job

procurement service state that Plaintiff was provided with, but did not follow through on

multiple job leads (Tr. 399-401). 

In November, 2011, Dr. Caputo reexamined Plaintiff on behalf of the SSA, noting

Plaintiff’s claims that symptoms of ADHD, insomnia, chronic suicidal depression, social

anxiety and PTSD had worsened in recent years (Tr. 478). He also reported an Obsessive

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Compulsive Disorder (“OCD”) characterized by the need to put “everything . . . in its place”

(Tr. 479). He attended a “trading card game tournament” on Friday nights (Tr. 479). He

reported “temporary vertigo with loud sounds” (Tr. 479). He socialized with friends and

shared the household chores with his girlfriend (Tr. 481). Dr. Caputo diagnosed him with

depression, ADHD, and OCD, assigning hima GAF of 49 (Tr. 483). She found that he could

manage his own benefit funds (Tr. 483). 

In January, 2012, Joseph DeLoach, Ph.D. completed a non-examining assessment of

the treating and consultative findings, noting the diagnoses of social anxiety, ADHD,

insomnia, social rage, and PTSD (Tr. 151). He found mild restriction in activities of daily

living, and moderate limitation in social functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace

(Tr. 158). Dr. DeLoach found Plaintiff’s allegations of disability “partially credible,” noting

Plaintiff’s good academic history and conservative psychological treatment (Tr. 159). 

In February, 2012, Edward J. Mike performed a one-time consultative examination

at the recommendation of Dr. Stefanek, noting Plaintiff’s poor hygiene and reports of

traumatic childhood events (Tr. 502, 618). Dr. Mike diagnosed Plaintiff with Asperger’s

Syndrome, PTSD, depression, and anxiety and found him“socially alienated” (Tr. 506, 623). 

He assigned him a GAF of 50 (Tr. 506). 

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3. Material Submitted After the April 5, 2013 Administrative Decision4

In February, 2013, Plaintiff was referred to neurosurgeon David D. Udehn, M.D. after

an MRI showed abnormalities (Tr. 764). Plaintiff reported about two episodes each year of

nausea, vomiting, and blackouts since the Spring of 2010 (Tr. 764-765). A neurological

exam was unremarkable (Tr. 767-768). April, 2013 treating records note Plaintiff’s report

of side effects from Celexa (Tr. 745). The same records note an “abnormal MRI” earlier the

same year (Tr. 750). The same month, Plaintiff reported recent lightheadedness and

headaches (Tr. 750). Dr. Stefanek’s August, 2013 treating notes state that an MRI of the

brain was negative for abnormalities (Tr. 742). 

C. Vocational Expert Testimony

VE Richard Riedl characterized Plaintiff’s past work as a dishwasher/kitchen helper

as unskilled and exertionally medium (Tr. 144). ALJ Thames then posed the following set 5

4

Where the Appeals Council denies a claimant's request for a review of an application

based on material submitted after the administrative decision, the district court cannot

consider that new evidence in deciding whether to “uphold, modify, or reverse the ALJ's

decision.” Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 696–696 (6th Cir.1993). Sentence six of 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) states that the court “may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before

the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence

which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into

the record in a prior proceeding ...” (emphasis added). Plaintiff did not rely on the newly

submitted evidence in support of his motion for summary judgment or provide “good cause”

for failure to timely submit the evidence. However, Defendant concedes that the newer

material contains grounds for remand for consideration of the condition of vertigo. 

Defendant’s Brief at 4, Docket #21. 

5

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a-d) defines sedentary work as “lifting no more than 10 pounds

at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small

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of hypothetical limitations to the VE, describing a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s age,

education, and work experience: 

[Consider a hypothetical individual . . . with the following limitations: having

the physical capacity to performwork at all exertional levels; having the ability

to understand, remember and carryout simple instructions, and performsimple

tasks with no production-rate pace work, but rather goal-oriented work; and no

more than occasional interaction with the public or coworkers. Would an

individual with these limitations be capable of performing any of the

claimant’s past work? (Tr. 145). 

The VE testified that given the above limitations, the individual would be unable to perform

any of Plaintiff’s past relevant work, but could perform the exertionally medium, unskilled

work of a laundry laborer (3,100 positions in the lower peninsula of Michigan); cleaner

(11,000); or automobile detailer (5,500) (Tr. 146). The VE stated that if the same individual 

were unable to follow simple instructions, required frequent supervision, or, needed to take

“frequent, unscheduled rest breaks,” all work would be precluded (Tr. 146). 

D. The ALJ’s Decision

Citing the medical records, ALJ Thames found that Plaintiff experienced the severe

impairments of “major depressive disorder, [PTSD] . . . social phobia, [ADHD]

predominantly hyperactive-impulsive type, and [OCD]” but that none of the conditions met

or equaled any impairment listed in 20 CRF Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 97-98). 

tools; light work as “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or

carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds;” medium work as “lifting no more than 50

pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds;” and

that exertionally heavy work “involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds. 

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She found that Plaintiff experienced mild limitation in daily living and moderate limitation

in social functioning and concentration, persistence, or pace (Tr. 99-100). The ALJ found

that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) for work at all exertional

levels with the following limitations: 

[Plaintiff] has the ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple

instructions and perform simple tasks with no production rate pace work, but

rather goal oriented work. He must have no more than occasional interaction

with the public (Tr. 102). 

Citing the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff was unable to perform his

past relevant work, he could work as a laundry laborer, cleaner, or auto detailer (Tr. 119-

120). 

The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s allegations of disability, noting that he was able to

ride his bike, fish, swim, shop, care for his cat, perform household chores, and handle the

finances of his disabled girlfriend (Tr. 113). She cited an occupational counselor’s

observation that Plaintiff was not “motivated” to find employment (Tr. 114). She assigned

“considerable weight” to Dr. DeLoach’s findings and adopted Dr. Caputo’s assessment “[t]o

the extent it [was] consistent” with the RFC (Tr. 115). She accorded “little weight” to the

opinions of Drs. Hall, Mike, and Stefanek on the basis that their findings were not consistent

with the treating and consultative records (Tr. 116). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court reviews the final decision of the Commissioner to determine

whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Sherrill v. Secretary of

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Health and Human Services, 757 F.2d 803, 804 (6 Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is more th

than a scintilla but less that a preponderance. It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,

305 U.S. 197, 229, S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed.126 (1938)). The standard of review is deferential and 

“presupposes that there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which decision makers can go either way,

without interference from the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6 Cir. th

1986)(en banc). In determining whether the evidence is substantial, the court must “take into

account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Wages v. Secretary of Health

& Human Services, 755 F.2d 495, 497 (6 Cir. 1985). The court must examine the th

administrative record as a whole, and may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of

whether it has been cited by the ALJ. Walker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,

884 F.2d 241, 245 (6 Cir. 1989). th

 FRAMEWORK FOR DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS

 Disability is defined in the Social Security Act as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). In

evaluating whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner is to consider, in sequence,

whether the claimant: 1) worked during the alleged period of disability; 2) has a severe

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impairment; 3) has an impairment that meets or equals the requirements of an impairment

listed in the regulations; 4) can return to past relevant work; and 5) if not, whether he or she

can perform other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a). The Plaintiff has

the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at

step five to demonstrate that, “notwithstanding the claimant's impairment, he retains the

residual functional capacity to perform specific jobs existing in the national economy.” 

Richardson v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir.1984).

ANALYSIS

In response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Defendant filed a motion

to remand for further fact-finding for consideration of whether the condition of vertigo

created work-related impairments. Docket #21. Plaintiff declined to stipulate to a remand

for further fact-finding, arguing instead that he is entitled to a remand for benefits. Plaintiff’s

Response, Docket #22. He argues generally that the evidence overwhelmingly supports a

disability finding. First, he contends that Dr. DeLoach’s non-examining findings, citing by

the ALJ in support of the administrative determination, do not reflect the totality of medical

evidence. He argues further that while the ALJ ostensibly assigned “considerable weight”

to Dr. Caputo’s consultative opinion, the RFC does not reflect the bulk of Dr. Caputo’s

findings. 

Plaintiff’s request for a remand for benefits on this record is unwarranted. He

contends that Dr. DeLoach’s findings do not accurately reflect the treating records created

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before the January, 2012 non-examining assessment. However, as noted by the ALJ, the

records created prior to Dr DeLoach’s evaluation contain substantial evidence that Plaintiff

could perform a significant range of work. As early as October, 2005, Plaintiff stated that

an earlier denial of benefits was “no big deal” because he “only wanted it for an income

while [he] got things together . . .” (Tr. 647). The same month, Plaintiff reported reduced

symptoms of depression with a medication change and therapy (Tr. 361). In September,

2006, Plaintiff’s psychological limitations were deemed mild (Tr. 581). In June, 2010, Dr.

Stefanek noted that Plaintiff followed directions well and had an appropriate affect (Tr. 438,

442). October, 2011 counseling records note that Plaintiff intended to use his anticipated

DIB funds to start his own business (Tr. 673). 

Plaintiff notes that Dr. DeLoach did not have benefit of an Asperger’s Syndrome

diagnosis made by an examining source in March, 2012 (Tr. 506). He is correct that

generally, “updated” medical records are to be accorded more weight than older ones. See

Hamblin v. Apfel, 7 Fed.Appx. 449, 451, 2001 WL 345798, *2 (6th Cir. March 26, 2001)

(affirming an ALJ's rejection of an “outdated” opinion on the basis that another physician had

performed a more recent appraisal with contradicting findings). However, the ALJ did not

err in discounting Dr. Mike’s non-treating diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome, noting that the

diagnosis “was made based on [Plaintiff’s] self-reported subjective complaints, rather than

objective findings, the treating records, or Plaintiff’s previous statements to others” (Tr. 116). 

Further, the treating records created after January, 2012 generally do not support the finding

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that Plaintiff was disabled by psychological conditions or that the conditions worsened after

Dr. DeLoach made his recommendation. Plaintiff again stated in March, 2012 that he

intended to use his disability payments to fund a business (Tr. 679). August, 2012 treating

records state that Plaintiff did not exhibit any unusual behaviors (Tr. 628-629). While

Plaintiff contends that Dr. DeLoach did not have benefit of the later records showing 

abnormal MRI findings, the more recent records show that the imaging studies were made

in response to Plaintiff’s report of physical rather than psychological symptoms. 

Likewise, the ALJ’s partial adoption of Dr. Caputo’s November, 2011 assessment

does not provide grounds for remand. Plaintiff faults the ALJ for adopting Dr. Caputo’s

opinion “[t]o the extent it is consistent with the assessed residual functional capacity” (Tr.

115). While Plaintiff argues that Dr. Caputo’s findings ought to have been adopted in full, 

the ALJ permissibly concluded that Dr. Caputo’s finding that “impulsive behaviors” would

preclude gainful employment (Tr. 115) were contradicted by other portions of the record

showing that Plaintiff’s disinterest in finding a job, rather than psychological problems, were

responsible for his spotty employment history. The ALJ cited a vocational counselor’s

finding that Plaintiff was not motivated to find work (Tr. 114) and December, 2005 records

stating that Plaintiff rejected a job offer because “he believed it was in his best interests to

be selective” (Tr. 114). As noted above, Plaintiff’s plan to use his future disability funds to

finance a business startup stands at odds with his claim that he was disabled from all work. 

Because the evidence supporting a disabilityfinding is not “overwhelming,” a remand

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for an award of benefits is not appropriate. Faucher v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir.1994). The Court notes however that while the

psychological treating records do not justify a remand for benefits, the ALJ is directed to

consider whether the present records, along with newer evidence of possible physical

restriction, support a disability finding. 

 CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Remand [Docket #21] is GRANTED,

remanding the case for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket #16] is DENIED as to the request for an

award of benefits and DENIED as MOOT as to the request to remand for further

administrative proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/R. Steven Whalen 

R. STEVEN WHALEN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Dated: September 30, 2015

Certificate of Service

I certify that a copy of this document was served upon parties of record on

September 30, 2015 via electronic or postal mail. 

/s/C. Ciesla 

CASE MANAGER

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