2021 IL App (1st) 182285-U

No. 1-18-2285 

Order filed September 23, 2021 

Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

RAMON DELGADO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 89 CR 2894

Honorable 

Matthew E. Coghlan, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice Martin concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant failed to make the requisite prima facie showing of prejudice to obtain 

leave under the cause and prejudice test to file his fourth successive postconviction 

petition where the eighth amendment protection under the United States 

Constitution prohibiting the imposition of life sentences upon juvenile defendants 

absent consideration of their youth and attendant characteristics did not apply to 

defendant because he was 22 years old when he committed the offenses. 

¶ 2 In 1992, defendant Ramon Delgado was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder 

following a jury trial and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the 
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possibility of parole. This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. People v.

Delgado, 282 Ill. App. 3d 851 (1996). 

¶ 3 This appeal follows the denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a fourth successive 

postconviction petition. In this appeal, he contends he sufficiently demonstrated cause and 

prejudice for leave to file his petition because his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional as 

applied to him under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution where he was 

22 years old when he committed the offense, and his drug addiction played a substantial role in his 

crime. 

¶ 4 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.1

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 In January 1989, defendant fatally stabbed two individuals. The evidence presented to the 

jury showed that, prior to the offense, defendant, the two victims, and another individual, who was 

the daughter of one of the victims, were smoking cocaine in the victims’ apartment. Defendant 

became angry and accused the others of stealing his cocaine. The police were called, and defendant 

left the apartment. Defendant, however, returned, saying that he wanted to apologize and make it 

up to the others by getting more cocaine from his house. One victim and her daughter drove 

defendant to his house, where instead of more cocaine he obtained a kitchen knife and concealed 

it underneath his coat. When he returned to the car, he told the others that he “got it,” and they 

drove back to the victims’ apartment. Once inside the apartment, defendant took the knife from 

his coat and stabbed the two victims. Defendant subsequently provided incriminating statements 

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), 

this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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to the police and an assistant state’s attorney. At the trial, defendant testified that he stabbed the 

victims in self-defense or acted under the unreasonable belief that he needed to use self-defense. 

The jury found defendant guilty of the first-degree murder of the two victims. 

¶ 7 Defendant waived a jury for the death eligibility determination and sentencing, and the 

death penalty hearing was convened. The trial court found him eligible for the death sentence 

because he was convicted of killing two people and the State had proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he was 22 years old at the time of the offense. 

¶ 8 In aggravation, the state presented evidence regarding defendant’s prior offense of 

attempted theft of a jewelry store. Specifically, about 10 days before defendant committed the 

murders at issue here, he unsuccessfully tried to break into a jewelry store by striking the plate 

glass window with a tire iron. An off-duty police officer pursued defendant first by car and then 

on foot into a nearby alley. After the officer displayed his badge and handgun, defendant lunged 

for the officer’s gun. Both the officer and defendant slipped, and the gun accidently discharged, 

striking defendant in the leg. Defendant was arrested and released on bail. 

¶ 9 In mitigation, the defense presented the testimony of defendant’s high school internship 

manager, a college counselor, a coworker, a mitigation specialist, and a teacher at the jail to show 

that defendant’s initial success at school and work was derailed when his concerns about his ability 

to financially support himself and his child caused him to struggle, leave college and turn to illegal 

drug use. In allocution, defendant said that he was raised by a wonderful family but his illegal drug 

use destroyed his life. He also expressed remorse to the victims’ families for his crime. The court 

found sufficient mitigating factors to preclude the imposition of the death penalty and imposed the 

mandatory alternate, a life sentence. 
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¶ 10 On direct appeal, defendant argued that he was improperly denied a jury instruction on 

second-degree murder based on provocation and the trial court improperly admitted the medical 

examiner’s testimony regarding cocaine found in the victims’ bodies. Delgado, 282 Ill. App. 3d at

852. In 1996, we affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence. Id. at 859.

¶ 11 In 1997, Defendant filed his initial petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction 

Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996)), and a subsequent supplemental 

petition. He asserted a number of allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, including trial 

counsel’s failure to properly raise the defense of voluntary intoxication and present readily 

available evidence sufficient to establish that defense. The trial court summarily dismissed 

defendant’s petition and supplement as without merit, and this court affirmed that dismissal in 

1999. People v. Delgado, No. 1-97-2954 (1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 

23). 

¶ 12 In 2001, defendant filed his first successive postconviction petition, claiming that his 

natural life sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to present evidence of voluntary intoxication. The trial court summarily 

dismissed defendant’s first successive postconviction petition, and this court affirmed that decision 

in 2002. People v. Delgado, No. 1-01-3456 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 

23). 

¶ 13 In 2003, defendant filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment 

(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)), arguing that his natural life sentence exceeded the statutory 

maximum authorized by law. The trial court sua sponte dismissed defendant’s petition as untimely 

under section 2-1401(c). In 2005, this court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s 
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section 2-1401 petition. People v. Delgado, 1-03-1874 (2005) (unpublished order under Supreme 

Court Rule 23). 

¶ 14 In 2011, defendant filed his second successive postconviction petition, again claiming his 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the defense of voluntary intoxication and present 

readily available evidence sufficient to establish that defense. Defendant also filed a motion to add 

missing pages and exhibits from his initial postconviction petition, including his medical records 

and doctors’ reports, which he claimed were not considered by the trial court prior to the dismissal 

of his initial postconviction petition. In June 2012, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition 

as frivolous and patently without merit and also found that defendant failed to satisfy the cause 

and prejudice test. The court found that defendant’s claims were barred by the doctrine of 

res judicata and trial counsel’s decision to pursue a theory of self-defense over a theory of 

voluntary intoxication did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also 

found that there was little evidence to support a claim of voluntary intoxication, so even if that 

theory of defense had been presented, it was unlikely to succeed. In 2013, this court affirmed the 

dismissal of defendant’s second successive postconviction petition. People v. Delgado, 2013 IL 

App (1st) 122368-U. 

¶ 15 Meanwhile, in December 2012, defendant requested leave to file his third successive 

postconviction petition, which alleged that his trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective. 

Defendant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present the defenses of druginduced intoxication, diminished capacity, and temporary insanity. Defendant also claimed again 

that pages of his initial postconviction petition, which supported his alleged chronic drug use, were 

missing and not considered by the trial court. 
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¶ 16 In 2013, the trial court denied defendant leave to file his third successive postconviction 

petition based on his failure to satisfy the cause and prejudice test. In summarily dismissing his 

petition, the trial court stated that defendant’s ineffective counsel claims had been adjudicated and 

dismissed a total of four times, so defendant suffered no prejudice from the alleged missing pages 

in his initial petition. Moreover, defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to present the

suggested defenses of drug induced intoxication, diminished capacity, and temporary insanity 

because those defenses would not have been viable where defendant had testified at the trial that 

he smoked cocaine prior to the murder and stabbed the victim in self-defense after the victim came 

after him with a knife when petitioner accused him of stealing his cocaine. Likewise, appellate 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that issue on appeal. Finally, defendant’s claim of 

ineffective counsel against his first attorney, who withdrew from representing defendant, was not 

clear and merely stated the facts surrounding counsel’s withdrawal from representation. In 2016, 

this court affirmed the dismissal of defendant’s third successive postconviction petition. People v. 

Delgado, 2016 IL App (1st) 131741-U.

¶ 17 In 2018, defendant sought leave to file the instant fourth successive postconviction petition, 

citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and claiming that his life sentence violated the 

eighth amendment. Defendant alleged that he was 22 years and 4 months of age at the time he 

committed the two murders and recent research in neurobiology and developmental psychology 

has shown that the brain development of young adults was more similar to that of adolescents than 

fully mature adults. Specifically, young adults and adolescents were less future-oriented, more 

susceptible to peer pressure, and more volatile in emotionally charged settings. Defendant also 

argued that his drug addiction and depression played a substantial role in his crime and, even 
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though some of those mitigating factors were presented to the trial court at his death penalty 

hearing, “they were not available to be considered before imposing a mandatory natural life 

sentence.” In support of his petition, defendant submitted one page of the sentencing hearing and

several medical records from two hospitals and one medical center. The medical records showed 

that defendant received treatment for stabbing himself and was diagnosed with PCP dependence 

and depression.

¶ 18 On August 31, 2018, the trial court denied defendant leave to file this fourth successive 

postconviction petition. The trial court found that defendant demonstrated cause under Miller

because that case and its progeny were not available when he filed his earlier postconviction 

petitions. However, the court found that he failed to demonstrate prejudice because Illinois 

precedent held that Miller did not apply to adult offenders. Finally, the court acknowledged that

defendant did not advance a claim under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois 

Constitution but nevertheless addressed that issue and distinguished defendant’s case from cases 

where the defendants were not the sole offender and their participation in the offenses were limited. 

¶ 19 Defendant timely appealed. 

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him leave to file his fourth

successive postconviction petition because he satisfied the cause and prejudice test and his petition 

raised a viable claim that his natural life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him under the 

eighth amendment of the United States Constitution.2

 He asserts that the law in effect at the time 

2 Defendant’s appeal does not include a claim that his sentence is unconstitutional under the 

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
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of his sentencing gave the trial court only the binary choice to sentence him to either death or life 

imprisonment and thereby prevented the court from considering his status as an emerging adult 

offender. According to defendant, that binary choice resulted in the imposition of his life sentence 

without the consideration of the transient qualities of his youth or a specific finding that he was 

irreparably incorrigible. He argues that the evolving legal standards concerning the sentencing of 

adolescents and emerging adults afford him the opportunity to file his successive petition and 

develop the record to support his as-applied charge.

¶ 22 Defendant cites People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45, to support his assertion that 

emerging adult petitioners like him have a right to plead as-applied challenges to their sentences 

under the eighth amendment and Miller. According to defendant, in Harris, the Illinois Supreme 

Court explicitly identified postconviction proceedings as the proper vehicle for an as-applied 

constitutional challenge to a defendant’s sentence. Moreover, because an as-applied challenge 

depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the person raising the challenge, the substantive 

analysis of defendant’s claims should await this court’s remand, where counsel can be appointed 

and the claims can be developed. 

¶ 23 Defendant argues that he should be allowed to file this successive postconviction petition 

because he satisfied the cause and prejudice test. Specifically, he asserts that he demonstrated 

cause because the cited legal authority supporting his claim—i.e, Miller, which held that the eighth 

amendment prohibits sentencing laws mandating life in prison without the possibility of parole for 

juvenile offenders, and the cases following Miller—were not available during his prior 

proceedings. He also asserts that he demonstrated prejudice where his life sentence arguably 
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violates Miller because a mandatory life sentence was imposed on him without consideration of 

the impact of his still-developing young adult brain and drug addiction on his thought processes. 

¶ 24 The Act provides a statutory remedy to criminal defendants who claim that substantial 

violations of their constitutional rights occurred at trial. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 510

(1991). The Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition (People v. Flores, 

153 Ill. 2d 264, 273 (1992)), providing that any claim not raised in the original or amended petition 

is subject to the doctrines of res judicata and waiver (725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2016); People v. 

Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d 530, 535 (2003)). However, the filing of a successive postconviction 

petition may be allowed where the proceedings on the initial petition were fundamentally deficient. 

Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 273-74. Specifically, the waiver provision can be lifted and a successive 

petition can be considered on the merits if it either meets the cause and prejudice test of section 

122-1(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016)), or its consideration is necessary to prevent 

a fundamental miscarriage of justice because the defendant shows a claim of actual innocence 

(People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 459 (2002)).

¶ 25 A defendant seeking to file a successive postconviction petition must first obtain leave of 

court. People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill. 2d 150, 157 (2010). Here, defendant seeks leave to file his fourth 

successive postconviction petition under the cause and prejudice test of section 122-1(f) of the 

Act, which provides:

 “Only one petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without 

leave of the court. Leave of the court may be granted only if a petitioner 

demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial postconviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure. For purposes of this 
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subsection (f): (1) a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor that 

impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial postconviction proceedings; and (2) a prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating that 

the claim not raised during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings so infected 

the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” 725 ILCS 

5/122–1(f) (West 2016).

We review de novo the denial of a defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction 

petition (People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 50), and may affirm the denial on any ground of 

record (People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 129 (2003)).

¶ 26 A defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition satisfies the 

section 122-1(f) cause and prejudice requirement if the motion adequately alleges facts 

demonstrating cause and prejudice. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 34. Moreover, the cause 

and prejudice test for successive petitions involves a higher standard than the frivolous or patently 

without merit standard applied to first-stage postconviction petitions. Id. ¶ 35. A defendant seeking 

leave to file a successive petition must submit enough in the way of pleadings and documentation 

to allow a circuit court to make an independent determination on the legal question of whether 

adequate facts have been alleged for a prima facie showing of cause and prejudice. Id. 

¶ 27 If a defendant fails to adequately allege cause and prejudice, the circuit court does not reach 

the merits of his successive petition because the cause and prejudice test is a procedural 

prerequisite to obtaining that review. People v. Welch, 392 Ill. App. 3d 948, 955 (2009). “If the 

court determines that cause and prejudice have been adequately alleged and allows the petition to 

be filed, it advances to the three-stage process for evaluating postconviction petitions. During this 
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process, the State would have an opportunity to seek dismissal of the petition on any grounds, 

including the defendant’s failure to prove cause and prejudice for not having raised the claims in 

the initial postconviction petition.” People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 26.

¶ 28 Our supreme court has held that “leave of court to file a successive postconviction petition 

should be denied when it is clear, from a review of the successive petition and the documentation 

submitted by the petitioner, that the claims alleged by the petitioner fail as a matter of law or where 

the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further 

proceedings.” Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant 

cannot establish prejudice to obtain leave to file his fourth successive postconviction petition 

because his claims are not legally cognizable. 

¶ 29 The eighth amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments” and applies to the states 

through the fourteenth amendment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, 

¶ 18. The United States Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment prohibits (1) capital 

sentences for juveniles who commit murder (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005)), 

(2) mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses (Graham v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010)), and (3) mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder 

(Miller, 567 U.S. at 489). People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 16. 

¶ 30 In Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, the Supreme Court stated that “children are constitutionally 

different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” The lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense 

of responsibility of children leads to “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Children are also more vulnerable to negative influences 

and outside pressures, have limited control over their own environment, and “lack the ability to 
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extricate themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings.” Id. Their character is not as wellformed as an adult’s, their traits are “less fixed” and their actions are “less likely to be evidence of 

irretrievable depravity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Miller requires sentencing courts 

in homicide cases to “take into account how children are different, and how those differences 

counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at 480. In Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016), the Supreme Court found that Miller applies retroactively.

¶ 31 The Illinois Supreme Court interpreted Miller to apply to discretionary life sentences, 

finding that “[l]ife sentences, whether mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile defendants are 

disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, unless the trial court considers youth and its 

attendant characteristics.” People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 40. Before a trial court may 

sentence a juvenile defendant to life without parole, the court must consider several factors, 

including his age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, 

impetuosity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences, his family and home environment, 

his degree of participation in the homicide, and his prospects for rehabilitation. Id. ¶ 46.

¶ 32 Defendant contends that Harris, 2018 IL 121932, gives him the right to plead in a 

postconviction petition an as-applied constitutional challenge to his life sentence under the eighth 

amendment and Miller. We conclude, however, that Harris, which was a direct rather than a 

collateral appeal, does not support defendant’s contention. 

¶ 33 In Harris, the 18-year-old defendant challenged his sentence as unconstitutional in (1) an 

as-applied challenge under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, and 

(2) a facial challenge under the eighth amendment. See 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 34-48, 49-61. 

Regarding his proportionate penalties clause challenge, which the defendant raised for the first 
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time on appeal, he argued that the sentencing statute that resulted in him receiving a mandatory 

minimum aggregate sentence of 76 years’ imprisonment was unconstitutional as applied to his 

specific circumstances because he had no prior criminal history and had several other attributes 

that reflected his rehabilitative potential. Because the defendant did not raise this as-applied 

challenge in the trial court, an evidentiary hearing was not held on his constitutional claim and the 

trial court did not make any findings of fact on his specific circumstances. Id. ¶ 40. Furthermore, 

because the defendant was an 18-year-old adult, Miller did not apply directly to his circumstances. 

Id. ¶ 45. Accordingly, the supreme court found that the defendant’s as-applied proportionate 

penalties clause claim was premature because the record did not “contain evidence about how the 

evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development that helped form the basis for the 

Miller decision applie[d] to [the] defendant’s specific facts and circumstances. Id. ¶ 46. 

The supreme court stated that the record needed to be developed and the defendant’s claim was 

more appropriately raised in another proceeding, such as a proceeding under the Act. Id. ¶ 48. 

This portion of Miller’s analysis under the proportionate penalties clause hardly supports 

defendant’s assertion here that he is entitled to file a fourth successive postconviction petition to 

raise an as-applied challenge under the eighth amendment.

¶ 34 Regarding Miller’s analysis of the defendant’s facial challenge to his sentence under the 

eighth amendment, the court ruled that this challenge failed because (1) the defendant, as an 

18 year old, fell on the adult side of the line that marks the age of 18 as the present line between 

juveniles and adults, (2) the Supreme Court in Roper, 543 U.S. at 574, drew the line at age 18 

because society has drawn that line between childhood and adulthood for many purposes, and 

(3) the supreme court agreed with the decisions of federal and state courts of appeal, including this
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court, that repeatedly rejected claims to extend Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older. Harris, 

2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 60-61. 

¶ 35 Defendant attempts to evade this holding in Harris by labeling his eighth amendment 

challenge to his mandatory alternative sentence of natural life an as-applied rather than a facial 

challenge. However, 

“facial and as-applied constitutional challenges are not interchangeable. An asapplied challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional as it applied 

to the challenging party’s specific circumstances. [Citation.] In contrast, a facial 

challenge requires the challenging party to establish that the statute is 

unconstitutional under any possible set of facts. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 52. 

Here, the trial court’s discretion in sentencing defendant was limited by statute to determining 

whether to impose the death penalty or the mandatory alternate sentence of life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole. The court found sufficient mitigating factors to preclude the 

imposition of the death penalty and imposed the mandatory alternate, a life sentence. That alternate

life sentence was mandated by the legislature; thus, any constitutional violation in this case was 

necessarily committed, not by the trial court when the sentence was applied, but by the legislature 

when the sentencing statute was enacted. See id. ¶¶ 70-73 (Burke, J., concurring). Consequently, 

“defendant’s claim cannot be an as-applied challenge” (Id. ¶ 71), and his eighth amendment 

challenge to his natural life sentence fails because he was 22 years old when he murdered the two 

victims and the Miller protections afforded to juveniles do not extend to defendants aged 18 years 

and older. Id. ¶ 61.
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¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 38 Affirmed.