FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DOE, an individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General; CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, 

official and personal capacity as 

Director of the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation; UNITED STATES 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-56063

D.C. No.

2:20-cv-03434-

CJC-AGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 3, 2021

Pasadena, California

Filed November 9, 2021
2 DOE V. GARLAND

Before: Mark J. Bennett and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit 

Judges, and David A. Ezra,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Ezra

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for 

failure to state a claim of an action alleging that the 

continued online public availability of the government’s 

press releases relating to Appellant’s guilty plea and 

subsequent sentencing violated his statutory and 

constitutional rights.

Between 2007 and 2011, the Department of Justice and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued press releases 

disclosing Appellant’s role in the mortgage fraud crimes 

with which he and his coconspirators were charged. The 

press releases included Appellant’s name, age, and the 

charges against him, as well as some limited employment 

history. What Appellant takes issue with is not that these 

notices were published in the first place, but that they remain 

publicly available on both the DOJ and FBI websites to this 

day.

* The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the 

District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
DOE V. GARLAND 3

The panel held that Appellant’s Privacy Act claim was 

barred by the Act’s two-year statute of limitations, which 

begins to run when a cause of action arises. Citing Oja v. 

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2006), the panel held that, while information may be 

repeatedly accessed long after publication, the “single 

publication rule” provides that the statute of limitations runs 

only from the date of original dissemination. The panel 

rejected Appellant’s assertion that equitable tolling should 

be applied to save the claim.

The panel held that Appellant failed to state a 

constitutional right to privacy claim because the information 

contained in the press releases did not implicate his privacy 

rights under the Constitution; while individuals may have a 

constitutional privacy interest in certain, highly sensitive 

information, Appellant simply did not have such an interest 

in the information at issue in this case.

Rejecting the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual 

punishment claim, the panel held that the district court 

applied the correct test in determining whether the press 

releases were punitive in purpose or effect and did not err by 

denying Appellant the opportunity to amend his complaint. 

As to Appellant’s claim brought under the Administrative 

Procedure Act, the panel held that the claim was based on 

the constitutional right to privacy claim, and any argument 

to the contrary was forfeited. Finally, the district court did 

not err by denying Appellant leave to amend his complaint 

to reflect further fact development because the proposed 

amendment would have been futile.
4 DOE V. GARLAND

COUNSEL

Richard G. Novak (argued), Law Offices of Richard G. 

Novak, Pasadena, California; Donald Jay Ritt (argued) and 

Tiffany W. Tai, Ritt Tai Thvedt & Hodges LLP, Pasadena, 

California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Daniel A. Beck (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; 

David M. Harris, Chief, Civil Division; Tracy L. Wilkison, 

Acting United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s 

Office, Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

EZRA, District Judge:

Press releases describing federal convictions remain 

archived but publicly available on government websites long 

after initial publication. In this case, Appellant John Doe 

alleges that government press releases relating to his guilty 

plea and subsequent sentencing violate his statutory and 

constitutional rights. The district court found, however, that 

Appellant failed to state a claim for relief on any of the 

grounds he asserted. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

In 2007, Appellant John Doe1 (“Appellant”) was charged 

with and pled guilty to several mortgage fraud related 

crimes. Appellant’s prison sentence and supervised release 

concluded in 2014 and 2017, respectively, and the district 

1 Appellant is utilizing the pseudonym John Doe in the instant 

litigation.
DOE V. GARLAND 5

court determined on December 2, 2019, that Appellant 

satisfied his restitution obligations on or about October 24, 

2012.

Between 2007 and 2011, the Department of Justice 

(“DOJ”) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 

issued press releases disclosing Appellant’s role in the 

mortgage fraud crimes with which he and his coconspirators 

were charged (“Press Releases” or the “Releases”). The 

Releases include Appellant’s name, age, and the charges 

against him, as well as some limited employment history. 

What Appellant takes issue with is not that these notices 

were published in the first place, but that they remain 

publicly available on both the DOJ and FBI websites to this 

day. In 2017, Appellant filed a motion in his criminal case 

to compel the DOJ to remove public access to the Releases 

(“Motion to Compel”). However, the Motion to Compel was 

ultimately unsuccessful on jurisdictional grounds.

On April 13, 2020, Appellant filed the instant civil action 

against Appellees the DOJ, the FBI, William P. Barr in his 

official capacity as Attorney General of the United States 

and in his personal capacity, and Christopher A. Wray in his 

official capacity as Director of the FBI and in his personal 

capacity (collectively “Appellees”). Appellant alleges the 

Press Releases’ availability violates the Privacy Act, 

separation of powers, his constitutional right to privacy, and 

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Appellant also 

alleges the “digital punishment” he has suffered as a result 

of the Releases’ continued availability amounts to cruel and 

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

The district court ultimately found Appellant failed to 

state a claim on any of his grounds for relief and dismissed 

the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6). On appeal, Appellant contends the district court
6 DOE V. GARLAND

erred by dismissing each of his claims and by denying him 

the opportunity to amend his complaint. This Court now 

affirms.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state 

a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Puri v. Khalsa,

844 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017). In reviewing a district 

court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint, we apply an 

abuse of discretion standard. Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 

981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s 

Privacy Act, constitutional right to privacy, separation of 

powers, cruel and unusual punishment, and APA claims.

The Privacy Act claim is barred by the statute of limitations, 

which was not equitably tolled. The press releases do not 

implicate any constitutional right to privacy and are neither 

punishment nor cruel and unusual. The APA claim is based 

on the constitutional right to privacy claim, and any 

argument to the contrary was forfeited. And finally, 

Appellant’s proposed amendment would have been futile.

I. Privacy Act

The Privacy Act imposes a two year statute of 

limitations, which begins to run when a cause of action 

arises. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5). Even where information 

violating the Act remains continuously available to the 

public after initial publication, it can give rise to only one 

cause of action. Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, while information may be 

repeatedly accessed long after publication, the “single 
DOE V. GARLAND 7

publication rule” provides that the statute of limitations runs 

only from the date of original dissemination. Id.

Online information, like that at issue in this case, does 

pose some Privacy Act challenges not shared by its printed 

counterparts. However, this Court held in Oja that the single 

publication rule nevertheless applies. Id. at 1133 

(acknowledging the unique characteristics of online media 

but holding parallels to printed information necessitate 

finding the single publication rule applicable to both). 

Appellant’s emphasis on the continued availability of the 

Press Releases is therefore misplaced; original 

dissemination—not present availability—is the relevant 

inquiry under Oja.

The most recent original dissemination in this case 

occurred in 2011—more than eight years before Appellant 

filed his Privacy Act claim. And it is clear from the record 

that Appellant had actual knowledge of the Press Releases 

for years. In fact, Appellant “expended significant effort” in 

2017 to ascertain when the Releases would cease being 

available to the public and even filed a Motion to Compel 

the DOJ to eliminate public access to them. Yet, despite 

Appellant’s apparent awareness of and dissatisfaction with 

the Releases’ continued availability, he waited until April 

2020 to file his Privacy Act claim.

Appellant argues, however, that no violation occurred 

until the Press Releases became irrelevant or untimely within 

the meaning of the Privacy Act. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(g)(1)(C). In other words, Appellant admits the 

Releases did not violate the Privacy Act when originally 

posted, but contends they became irrelevant and untimely 

when the district court found Appellant had made all his 

restitution payments in December 2019. Were Appellant 
8 DOE V. GARLAND

correct, his Privacy Act claim, filed just a few months later 

in April 2020, would be timely.

Because his claim arose before 2019, we need not decide 

in this case whether Appellant is correct that a special statute 

of limitations rule applies to Privacy Act claims based on the 

irrelevance or untimeliness of information.2 Appellant 

argues here that he was not “injured” by the Press Releases 

until December 2019, but his argument is contradicted by his 

own efforts to have them removed in 2017. In fact, in his 

2017 Motion to Compel, Appellant alleged the very thing he 

does in this case—that the DOJ’s failure to remove the 

Releases amounted to a Privacy Act violation. Thus, while 

Appellant now argues there was no Privacy Act violation 

until December 2019, he argued the DOJ had already 

violated his rights under the Act in a motion filed two years 

earlier. Appellant’s own actions show that his claim arose 

before 2019.

We reject Appellant’s argument that the press releases

became irrelevant and untimely as soon as the district court 

declared he had satisfied his restitution obligations. Such a 

holding would be especially arbitrary considering, according 

to the order, Appellant actually made his final restitution 

payment in 2012, not 2019.

Alternatively, Appellant argues equitable tolling should 

be applied to save his untimely Privacy Act claim. However, 

equitable tolling applies only if a litigant (1) has been 

2 While we refrain from deciding the issue here, it is worth noting 

that the rule Appellant proposes would result in “endless retriggering of 

the statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of 

defendants”—the exact result this Court sought to avoid when it 

extended application of the single publication rule to online information 

in Oja. 440 F.3d at 1131–32 (quotations omitted).
DOE V. GARLAND 9

diligently pursuing his rights, and (2) failed to timely file 

because some “extraordinary circumstance” stood in his 

way. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 

577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). To satisfy the second element, 

the litigant must show that the extraordinary circumstance

claimed made it impossible to file on time. Booth v. United 

States, 914 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2019). Even assuming 

Appellant’s 2017 attempts to have the Press Releases 

removed amounted to “diligently pursuing his rights” as 

required by the first element, nothing stood in the way of 

Appellant simultaneously filing his Privacy Act claim. In 

fact, when asked during oral argument whether Appellant 

could have filed his Privacy Act claim in 2017 (at or near the 

same time as his Motion to Compel) Counsel for Appellant 

admitted it would have been possible for him to do so.

Because Appellant’s Privacy Act claims were filed after 

the statute of limitations had run and equitable tolling is 

inapplicable, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

Appellant’s Privacy Act claim.

II. Constitutional Right to Privacy

The “precise bounds” of the constitutional right to 

privacy are uncertain. In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 

(9th Cir. 1999). The Constitution protects certain conduct 

related to “marriage, procreation, contraception, family 

relationships, and child rearing and education.” Paul v. 

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). However, in Whalen v. 

Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court also identified 

the somewhat elusive interest in “avoiding disclosure of 

personal matters” as a privacy interest protected by the 
10 DOE V. GARLAND

Constitution.3 Id. at 599. Here, Appellant argues Appellees 

have violated his right to the latter, and that the district court 

erred by holding there is no informational right to privacy. 

This is not, however, what the district court held. Rather, the 

district court held Appellant did not have a privacy interest 

in the type of information disclosed in the Press Releases. 

We affirm.

As explained in the district court’s dismissal order, the 

Supreme Court held in Davis that government disclosure of 

an “official act such as an arrest” does not implicate the 

constitutional right to privacy. 424 U.S. at 713. Since Davis, 

circuit courts have found other similar disclosures 

constitutional as well. See, e.g., Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 

620, 626–27 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the details of a prior guilty plea, as 

such matters are, by their very nature, within the public 

domain); Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 

1995) (“[G]overnment disclosures of arrest records, judicial 

proceedings, and information contained in police reports do 

not implicate the right to privacy.” (citations omitted)); see 

also Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) 

(holding expunged criminal record disclosure 

constitutional).

While analogous to the examples of other non-private 

information above, the information disclosed in this case is 

easily distinguished from what this Court has found may 

3 While the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of an 

“informational” privacy right in Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599, and Nixon v. 

Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977), the Court 

merely assumed without deciding that such a right is protected by the 

Constitution in National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. 

Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011).
DOE V. GARLAND 11

implicate a constitutional right to privacy. For example, in 

Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir.

2004), this Court held a statutory provision requiring 

abortion providers to disclose unredacted medical records—

including full medical histories—and ultrasound prints with 

patient identifying information violated patients’ 

informational right to privacy. Id. at 552–53. The Court has 

also acknowledged the “indiscriminate public disclosure” of 

social security numbers “may implicate the constitutional 

right to informational privacy.” Crawford, 194 F.3d at 958, 

960 (emphasis added) (finding no constitutional violation 

despite SSN disclosure).

While individuals may have a constitutional privacy 

interest in certain, highly sensitive information,4 Appellant 

simply does not have such an interest in the information at 

issue in this case. Tellingly, Appellant never challenged the 

constitutionality of the Press Releases at the time they were 

published. And he cites no authority supporting his claim 

that a press release, after being available for years, can 

somehow transform into an unconstitutional disclosure 

simply because it is now “stale.”

The only authority Appellant does cite in support of this 

position relates to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) 

privacy exemptions, not a constitutional right to privacy. 

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of 

the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (considering extent to which 

FOIA Exemption 7(C) prevents disclosure of expansive law 

enforcement records about a private citizen); Am. Civil 

Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (considering extent to which FOIA Exemption 7(C) 

4 In Tucson Woman’s Clinic, we characterized patient identifying 

ultrasound prints as “very sensitive” information. 379 F.3d at 553.
12 DOE V. GARLAND

prevents disclosure of docket numbers, case names, and 

presiding courts). Such authority is not helpful to 

Appellant—“[t]he question of the statutory meaning of 

privacy under the FOIA is, of course, not the same as the 

question whether . . . an individual’s interest in privacy is 

protected by the Constitution.” Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. 

at 762 n.13.

Appellant has failed to state a constitutional privacy right 

claim because the information contained in the Press 

Releases does not implicate his privacy rights under the 

Constitution. Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal is 

affirmed.

III. Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Separation of 

Powers

For Appellant to succeed on his cruel and unusual 

punishment claim, the Press Releases, by remaining 

available, must amount to criminal punishment. See Wilson 

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (“[T]he Eighth 

Amendment . . . bans only cruel and unusual punishment.”). 

Similarly, Appellant’s separation of powers claim relies on 

his contention that the executive branch is punishing him by 

maintaining the Releases.

The district court found Appellees did not post the Press 

Releases with the intent to punish, and Appellant does not 

challenge that finding. Rather, Appellant takes issue with 

the district court’s holding that the Releases are not punitive 

in effect. Specifically, Appellant argues the district court 

(1) applied the wrong test in deciding the punitive effect 

question, and (2) should have permitted further fact 

development or allowed him to amend his complaint before 

concluding the Press Releases were nonpunitive. We find 

the district court did not err on either of the grounds 
DOE V. GARLAND 13

Appellant asserts because his claims are foreclosed by the 

Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 

(2003). Although Smith considered only the Ex Post Facto 

Clause, courts employ its test for punishment in the Eighth 

Amendment context. See, e.g., Millard v. Camper, 971 F.3d 

1174, 1181–84 (10th Cir. 2020); Does 1–7 v. Abbott, 

945 F.3d 307, 313–15 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2019); United States 

v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 263–66 (4th Cir. 2013).

In Smith, the Supreme Court held that the maintenance 

of an online sex offender registration and notification system 

was nonpunitive. Id. at 105. According to the Smith Court, 

the initial inquiry is whether the government’s objective in 

implementing the allegedly punitive mechanism was to 

punish. Id. at 92. If intended to punish, the mechanism is 

punitive. Id. at 92. But if the government intended to 

advance a nonpunitive objective, the question becomes 

whether the government action was so punitive in effect that 

it amounts to punishment despite a lack of punitive intent. 

Id. at 92. The Smith Court cautioned, however, that because 

intent to impose a nonpunitive mechanism is ordinarily 

afforded deference, “only the clearest proof” will transform 

what was intended to be nonpunitive into a criminal penalty. 

Id. at 92 (citation omitted). The Court then identified a 

number of “useful guideposts” for analyzing the potentially 

punitive effects of government action. Id. at 97 (citation 

omitted).

The factors especially relevant here are whether the 

mechanism at issue (1) is “regarded in our history and 

traditions as a punishment;” (2) “imposes an affirmative 

disability or restraint;” (3) “promotes the traditional aims of 

punishment;” (4) has a rational connection to a nonpunitive 
14 DOE V. GARLAND

purpose;” or (5) “is excessive with respect to this purpose.”5 

Id.

The Smith outcome itself shows that Appellees’ Press 

Releases are not punitive government action in the 

traditional sense. In Smith, the Court found a sex offender 

registry nonpunitive even though it—like the press releases 

in this case—made offense details publicly available long 

after criminal punishment concluded. Id. at 91. The press 

releases Appellant complains of are analogous to the registry 

considered in Smith, and the ways they are distinguishable 

mostly hurt rather than help him. For example, the registry 

at issue in Smith disclosed not only an offender’s conviction 

details, but also his “address, photograph, physical 

description, . . . place of employment, date of birth,” and 

detailed vehicle information. Id. at 91 (citation omitted). 

The Court nevertheless found the registry was nonpunitive. 

Id. at 105. Additionally, failing to provide updated 

information for the registry in Smith led to the possibility of 

criminal prosecution, something Appellant does not face 

here. Id. at 101–02.

Also similar to the registry in Smith, the Press Releases 

do not impose an affirmative disability or restraint because 

Appellant is permitted to move freely and to “live and work 

as other citizens, with no supervision.” Id. at 101 (finding 

no affirmative disability or restraint even where sex 

5 While there are two additional factors, they both relate to what 

circumstances or behaviors trigger application of the challenged 

government action. Because Appellant merely challenges the passive 

maintenance of archived press releases in this case, the remaining two 

factors are of little weight. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105.
DOE V. GARLAND 15

offenders were required to notify authorities after growing a 

beard, borrowing a car, or seeking psychiatric treatment).

Third, the Press Releases do not advance the traditional 

aims of punishment. According to Appellees, release of 

information is intended to “administer justice and promote 

public safety[,]” as well as to serve “the right of the public 

to have access to information about the [DOJ].” It is true 

that deterrence is one purpose of punishment. But “[a]ny 

number of governmental programs might deter crime 

without imposing punishment.” Id. at 102 (“To hold that the 

mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions 

‘criminal’ . . . would severely undermine the Government’s 

ability to engage in effective regulation.” (quoting Hudson, 

522 U.S. at 105)).

As to the fourth factor, the Smith Court found that public 

safety—one of the purposes advanced by the sex offender 

registry—was both legitimate and nonpunitive. Id. at 102–

03. According to the Court, the registry advanced public 

safety by “alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in 

their community.” Id. at 103 (quotations omitted). 

Similarly, the press releases at issue in this case foster public 

safety6 and system transparency—both purposes the 

Supreme Court deemed legitimate and nonpunitive in Smith. 

Id. at 99, 102–03. Thus, the fourth factor also weighs in 

favor of finding the Releases are nonpunitive in effect.

Finally, the Releases are not excessive with respect to 

their nonpunitive purpose—they highlight only “accurate 

information about a criminal record,” most (if not all) of 

which is already public. Id. at 98–99 (noting that “our 

6 As the district court noted, the Press Releases may “alert the public 

to the risk of doing business with someone convicted of mortgage fraud.”
16 DOE V. GARLAND

criminal law tradition insists on public indictment, public 

trial, and public imposition of sentence”).

Because the Press Releases’ continued availability is not 

punishment at all, it cannot amount to cruel and unusual 

punishment under the Eighth Amendment. However, even 

if we found Appellant was being punished, that punishment 

would not be the type of government action forbidden by the 

Eighth Amendment. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (“[O]nly 

those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of 

life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of 

an Eighth Amendment violation.” (citations and quotations 

omitted)). Appellees’ continued publication of truthful 

information about Appellant’s guilty plea simply does not 

rise to that level.

The district court applied the correct test for determining 

whether the Press Releases were punitive in purpose or 

effect. Further, we hold the district court did not err by 

denying Appellant the opportunity to amend his complaint. 

While Appellant argues the expert declaration of Professor 

Langeson establishes Appellant suffers from “affirmative 

disability or restraint” as a result of the Releases’ continued 

availability, this argument is foreclosed by caselaw. 

Specifically, because Appellees’ action “imposes no 

physical restraint, . . . [it] does not resemble the punishment 

of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative 

disability or restraint.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 100.

IV. Administrative Procedure Act

Appellant’s APA claim is based on alleged violations of 

his constitutional right to privacy. Because the district court 

found Appellant had failed to state a constitutional right to 

privacy claim, it found the APA claim must also be 

dismissed. Similarly, because we affirm the district court’s 
DOE V. GARLAND 17

holding that Appellant failed to state a constitutional right to 

privacy claim, we also affirm on this issue.

While Appellant now argues for the first time on appeal 

that his APA claim was not based solely on his constitutional 

privacy claim, he never advanced such an argument before 

the district court in either his complaint or response to 

Appellee’s motion to dismiss. Thus, he has forfeited his 

argument that his APA claim is based on anything other than 

alleged constitutional right to privacy violations. See

Momox-Caselis v. Donohue, 987 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 

2021) (“Generally, we do not consider arguments raised for 

the first time on appeal.”); Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 

1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

V. Leave to Amend

“A district court acts within its discretion to deny leave 

to amend when amendment would be futile . . . .” Chappel 

v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Appellant claims he should have been permitted to amend 

his complaint to reflect further fact development, including 

conclusions from Professor Langeson’s declaration. 

However, as explained above, such amendment would not 

have saved his claim from dismissal. Therefore, because the 

proposed amendment would have been futile, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant leave 

to amend.

AFFIRMED.