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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Case No: 14-20568 

v Hon. Victoria A. Roberts 

SYED IBRAHIM HUSSAIN, 

 Defendant. 

 / 

ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

On December 27, 2017, this Court issued an order denying Syed Ibrahim 

Hussain’s (“Hussain”) motion to vacate sentence brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

(Doc. # 91). Hussain filed a Notice of Appeal (Doc. # 93). The United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit asks this Court to determine whether to grant or deny a 

certificate of appealability. 

For the reasons stated below, that certificate of appealability is DENIED 

I. Legal Standard 

Hussain may not proceed on appeal unless he first obtains a certificate of 

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. Proc. 22(b). Such a certificate may 

be issued only upon a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

To demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether, or agree that, the petition or motion to vacate sentence 

“should have been resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were 
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adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 483-84 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). When a district court 

rejects a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate 

that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims to be debatable or wrong. Id.

II. Background 

In December 2013, during plea negotiations, the Government sent Hussain’s 

counsel an email stating that if Hussain pled guilty to the charged offenses, the 

Sentencing Guidelines range would be 51 to 63 months with no mandatory minimum. 

The email also stated that Hussain would be required to register as a sex offender, and 

that if Hussain did not accept this offer, the Government would charge him under a 

different child pornography statute that carried a mandatory minimum five years 

imprisonment. 

In October 2014, Hussain pled guilty to extortion by interstate communication, 18 

U.S.C. § 875(b), and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). He 

entered into a written plea agreement for the two charged offenses, but with a 

Sentencing Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. In June 2015, Hussain filed a motion 

for a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining process, 

claiming that the December 2013 email was an offer, and that he was not told there was 

a deadline to accept or reject the offer. During a July 2015 hearing on the motion, the 

Court ruled that the email was not an offer because it did not contain material terms 

such as a factual basis, an agreement on the charges or the Sentencing Guideline 
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range, an agreement to register as a sex offender, or an agreement to plead guilty. The 

Court denied Hussain’s motion without prejudice. 

After sentencing, Hussain filed an amended § 2255 motion to vacate his 

sentence. In his motion to vacate, Hussain argued that his counsel was ineffective 

during the plea negotiation process. Specifically, Hussain claimed that his counsel “did 

not explain the process of plea negotiation” to him, causing him to not realize that a 

“plea offer” indicated in an email from the Government would expire. However, as the 

Court noted in its order denying Hussain’s petition, that email was not a plea offer, and 

Hussain cannot show “a reasonable probability [he] would have accepted the earlier 

plea offer had [he] been afforded effective assistance of counsel,” or that “the plea 

would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing 

to accept it.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012). 

In its order denying Hussain’s § 2255 motion, the Court stated that under the “law 

of the case” doctrine, “findings made at one point in the litigation become the law of the 

case for subsequent stages of the same litigation.” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 

1419, 1421 (6th Cir. 1994). The Court noted that since it had previously ruled that the 

December 2013 email was not a formal plea offer, that ruling is the law of the case. 

Therefore, Hussain could not prevail on his § 2255 motion because he could not show 

that the trial court would have accepted the email as a plea, or that that the prosecution 

would have stipulated that the email was a plea offer, as required by Frye. 

III. Analysis 
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A court may not issue a certificate of appealability unless “the [petitioner] has 

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Cooey v. Coyle, 289 

F.3d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). To establish 

this, “the mere allegation of a constitutional wrong, such as deprivations of the right to 

effective counsel, is insufficient; the petitioner must make a substantial showing of such 

an error in order to present an appeal.” United States v. Smith, 235 F. Supp. 2d 418, 

432 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 

For the reasons stated by the Court in the order denying the § 2255 motion, the 

Court denies Hussain a certificate of appealability. He fails to make a substantial 

showing that he was deprived of the effective assistance counsel. 

IV. Conclusion 

Hussain’s § 2255 arguments are based on an incorrect assumption that the 

Government’s email was a plea offer. The issues presented in his § 2255 motion are not 

debatable, and do not deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Carter v. United 

States, 160 F. Supp. 2d 805, 816 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Hussain is not entitled to a 

certificate of appealability.

IT IS ORDERED. 

 S/Victoria A. Roberts 

 Victoria A. Roberts 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: April 19, 2018