IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________________

)

INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, )

a Colorado nonprofit corporation, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 1:14-cv-1500-CKK-PAM-APM

v. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant. ) 

__________________________________________)

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF FREE SPEECH DEFENSE AND

EDUCATION FUND, FREE SPEECH COALITION, U.S. JUSTICE

FOUNDATION, GUN OWNERS FOUNDATION, NATIONAL RIGHT

TO WORK COMMITTEE, U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS LEGAL

DEFENSE FUND, DOWNSIZE DC FOUNDATION, DOWNSIZEDC.ORG,

CONSERVATIVE LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, AND

POLICY ANALYSIS CENTER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF

Mark Fitzgibbons William J. Olson (D.C. Bar No. 233833)

 9625 Surveyor Court Herbert W. Titus

 Suite 400 Jeremiah L. Morgan (D.C. Bar No. 1012943)

 Manassas, VA 20110 John S. Miles (D.C. Bar No. 166751)

Co-Counsel for Amici Curiae William J. Olson, P.C.

 FSDEF and FSC 370 Maple Ave. W., Ste. 4

 Vienna, VA 22180-5615

Michael Connelly (703) 356-5070

 United States Justice Foundation Counsel for Amici Curiae

 932 D St., Suite 2

 Ramona, CA 92065-2355

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae

 U.S. Justice Foundation

Dated: June 24, 2016

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 1 of 25
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

ARGUMENT

I. BCRA FORCED DISCLOSURE RULE VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT

ANONYMITY PRINCIPLE AS EXPLAINED AND APPLIED IN MCINTYRE V. OHIO

ELECTIONS COMMISSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

A. Mrs. Margaret McIntyre and the Independence Institute: Anonymity in

Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

B. The McIntyre Anonymity Principle Explained. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

C. The First Amendment Anonymity Principle Applied to BCRA.. . . . . . . . . . . 9

D. There Is No Good Reason Not to Apply the Anonymity Principle Here.. . . . 10

E. The McIntyre Anonymity Rule Should Prevail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

II. THE BCRA FORCED DISCLOSURE RULE VIOLATES THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS,

AS EXPRESSED IN TALLEY V. CALIFORNIA.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

III. THE EFFORT BY CONGRESS TO REQUIRE SPEAKERS IN THE PUBLIC POLICY

ARENA TO SELF-IDENTIFY IS BEST UNDERSTOOD AS INCUMBENTS PURSUIT OF

THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 2 of 25
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CONSTITUTION

First Amendment.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, passim

STATUTES

26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

52 U.S.C. § 30104(f).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7, 22

52 U.S.C. § 30109. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, passim

REGULATIONS

11 C.F.R. § 100.29. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CASES

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 20, 21

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, passim

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 11, 12

MISCELLANEOUS

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1769).. . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 14

Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? (Univ. Chi. Press: 2014). . . . . . . . . 14

James C. Miller, III, Monopoly Politics (Hoover Institution Press: 1999).. . . . . . . . . 17, 19

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 3 of 25
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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae Free Speech Defense and Education Fund, U.S. Justice Foundation, Gun

Owners Foundation, U.S. Constitutional Rights Legal Defense Fund, Downsize DC

Foundation, Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund, and Policy Analysis Center are

exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code

(“IRC”). Free Speech Coalition, National Right To Work Committee, and DownsizeDC.org

are exempt from federal income taxation under IRC Section 501(c)(4). 

Each organization participates in the public policy process and has filed numerous

amicus curiae briefs in federal and state courts. Many of these amici filed an amicus curiae

brief in the present case when it was before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on 2

the issue of entitlement to a three-judge district court. 

 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief amicus curiae. No party’s 1

counsel authored the brief in whole or in part. No party or party’s counsel contributed money

that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. No person other than these amici

curiae, their members or their counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing

or submitting this brief.

 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens United, Citizens United Foundation, U.S. 2

Justice Foundation, Free Speech Coalition, Free Speech Defense and Education Fund, and

Conservative Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of Appellant and Reversal (April

15, 2015), http://www.lawandfreedom.com/site/election/Ind%20Inst%20CU%20

amicus%20brief.pdf.

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 4 of 25
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STATEMENT

This lawsuit concerns the constitutionality of the compulsory “electioneering

communications” disclosure provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

(“BCRA”), as applied to the radio broadcast of an issue ad by the Independence Institute, a

nonprofit corporation exempt from federal income taxation under IRC Section 501(c)(3). The

ad in question was written to encourage the people of Colorado to exercise their right to

petition the government, urging their two sitting United States Senators to vote in favor of a

bill — the Justice Safety Valve Act — then pending in Congress. The electioneering

communications disclosure requirement includes disclosure of the names and addresses of

certain donors to the organization.3

BCRA imposed an all-out ban on corporations and unions engaging in so-called

“electioneering communications,” which are certain advertisements that mention the name of a

federal candidate during a window of time before an election, regardless of whether the ad

actually constitutes “electioneering” — i.e., advocating for or against a federal candidate. 

Although the Supreme Court rebuffed the first facial challenge to BCRA’s electioneering

communications ban in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), it later ruled that the ban was

 The FEC has interpreted the donor disclosure requirement to apply to those donors 3

who contribute for the purpose of electioneering communications. There is a pending lawsuit

challenging this interpretation. The plaintiff (an incumbent member of the U.S. House of

Representatives) in that lawsuit claims that the disclosure requirement should apply to all

donors to the organization, regardless of the donors’ intentions. See Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support at 9 n.3. Many of these amici filed an

amicus brief in the first appeal of that lawsuit. See Van Hollen v. FEC, Brief Amicus Curiae

of Free Speech Coalition, et al. in Support of Appellants and Reversal.

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 5 of 25
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unconstitutional as applied to genuine issue ads in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S.

449 (2007) (“WRTL II”).

In 2010, in a suit brought by Citizens United, an IRC section 501(c)(4) nonprofit

organization, the Supreme Court decided that the electioneering communication prohibition

was unconstitutional as applied to a corporation engaged in an electioneering communication. 

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). However, in the same case, the Court

upheld BCRA’s disclosure and reporting requirements for such electioneering communications.

The Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) has taken the position that Independence

Institute’s proposed issue ad is an electioneering communication because it meets all four

criteria in the statute and the FEC’s regulation. First, incumbent Senator Mark Udall, one of

the two Senators referred to in the ad, was a candidate for reelection. Second, the ad was 4

scheduled to be broadcast within 60 days of a general election. Third, the ad was targeted to

the relevant electorate. Fourth, the expenditure for the ad exceeded $10,000. See 52 U.S.C.

§ 30104(f)(3); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29. 

Because the ad qualifies under BCRA as an “electioneering communication,” it is

subject to BCRA’s disclosure rules. These reporting requirements include making a public

filing with the FEC of the names and addresses of certain donors who gave an aggregate of

$1,000 or more to the ad sponsor since the first day of the preceding calendar year.

On September 2, 2014, Independence Institute filed suit in the U.S. District Court for

the District of Columbia seeking a ruling that, as applied to its genuine issue ad, the BCRA

 Independence Institute states that it would like to do similar ads in the future. 4

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 6 of 25
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disclosure requirement unconstitutionally abridged its freedom of speech. The Institute urged

this Court to limit the Citizens United mandatory disclosure ruling to its facts. Pointing out

that the electioneering communication involved in Citizens United was “‘unambiguously

campaign related,’” whereas the Institute’s proposed communication was a genuine issue ad,

the Institute urged Colorado’s two Senators to support a specific bill. See Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support at 7-8. Only by happenstance was one of

the two U.S. Senators from Colorado then a candidate for reelection. 

The Institute claims that, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), “the Court held that

the reporting and disclosure requirements ... survived ‘exacting scrutiny’ so long as they were

construed to reach only that speech which is ‘unambiguously campaigned related,’” thereby

strictly protecting genuine issue ads. Plaintiff’s Motion at 15-16 (quoting N.M. Youth

Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 676 (10th Cir. 2010)) (emphasis added). Otherwise, the

Institute asserts, the disclosure mandate of the names and addresses of donors supporting

genuine issue ads would transgress an unbroken, 60-year line of jurisprudence acknowledging

that “‘[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial

ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.’” Id. at 26 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama,

357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 7 of 25
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ARGUMENT

I. BCRA FORCED DISCLOSURE RULE VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT

ANONYMITY PRINCIPLE AS EXPLAINED AND APPLIED IN MCINTYRE V.

OHIO ELECTIONS COMMISSION

A. Mrs. Margaret McIntyre and the Independence Institute: 

Anonymity in Action. 

On April 27, 1988, a woman named “Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons

attending a public meeting ... to discuss an imminent referendum on a proposed school tax

levy.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995). Some of her

leaflets identified her as the author, while others “purported to express the views of

“CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS.” Id. The leaflets read, in part, as follows:

VOTE NO

ISSUE 19 SCHOOL TAX LEVY

***

WASTE of tax payers dollars must be stopped. 

 Our children’s education and welfare must come first.

WASTE CAN NO LONGER BE TOLERATED.

PLEASE VOTE NO

ISSUE 19

THANK YOU. 

CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS

Helped by a friend and her son, Mrs. McIntyre managed to leaflet the automobiles in

the school parking lot, only to be confronted by a school district official who advised that her

actions did not “conform to the Ohio election laws.” Id. at 338. “Undeterred, Mrs. McIntyre

appeared at another meeting on the next evening and handed out more of the handbills.” Id.

At first, the levy was defeated. After it later passed, the school official who had confronted

Mrs. McIntyre filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission (“OEC”), charging her

with a violation of an Ohio law which provided, in relevant part, as follows:

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 8 of 25
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“No person shall write, print, post, or distribute ... a notice, placard, dodger,

advertisement ... or any other form of general publication which is designed to

... promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence the voters in any

election ... through flyers, handbills, or other nonperiodical printed matter,

unless there appears on such form of publication in a conspicuous place ... the

name and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary

of the organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is

responsible therefor.” [Id. at 338, n.3.]

The Commission found that Mrs. McIntyre had violated the statute and fined her $100.

Fast forward a quarter century.

In 2014, the Independence Institute, a Colorado-based nonprofit corporation organized

under IRC Section 501(c)(3), with a strong track record in research and education on matters

of public policy, wished to produce a radio advertisement urging Colorado voters to contact

their two Senators to support the Justice Safety Valve Act, allowing federal judges discretion in

the sentencing of nonviolent offenders. The text of the radio ad included the following:

Independence Institute

Radio :60

“Let the punishment fit the crime”

***

Unfair laws tie the hands of judges, with huge

increases in prison costs that help drive up the debt.

***

Fortunately, there is a bipartisan bill to help fix the problem — 

the Justice Safety Valve Act, bill number S. 619.

***

Call Senators Michael Bennet and Mark Udall at 202-224-3121.

Tell them to support S. 619 ....

Paid for by Independence Institute, I2I dot org.

Not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee.

Independence Institute is responsible for the content of this advertising.

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 9 of 25
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Before running the ad, Independence Institute realized that the radio communication

would cost an excess of $10,000 and, thus, would be treated by the FEC as an “electioneering

communication,” since it referred to a person who was a candidate for federal election in

Colorado and the ad would be run in Colorado, thereby triggering the BCRA disclosure

requirements set forth in 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f), which reads in pertinent part as follows: 

Every person [here, the Independence Institute] who makes a disbursement for

the direct costs of producing and airing electioneering communications in an

aggregate amount in excess of $10,000 during any calendar year shall ... file

with the Commission a statement [that includes] the names and addresses of all

contributors who contributed an aggregate amount of $1,000 or more to the

person making the disbursement.... [52 U.S.C. § 30104(f).] 

There can be substantial civil penalties imposed for failure to file the electioneering

communication notices required by 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1). First, there is a maximum civil

penalty of “the greater of $5,000 or an amount equal to any contribution or expenditure

involved in such violation....” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a). For a “knowing and willful violation,”

the civil penalties increase to “the greater of $10,000 or an amount equal to 200 percent of any

contribution or expenditure involved in such violation.....” And criminal penalties may also be

imposed for a knowing and willful violation of any provision of the Federal Election Campaign

Act which involves the making, receiving, or reporting of any contribution, donation, or

expenditure. Indeed, such a violation involving an expenditure: 

(i) aggregating $25,000 or more during a calendar year shall be fined under title

18, or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both; or

(ii) aggregating $2,000 or more (but less than $25,000) during a calendar year

shall be fined under such title, or imprisoned for not more than 1 year, or both. 

[52 U.S.C. § 30109.]

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B. The McIntyre Anonymity Principle Explained.

In a 1995 opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed the order of

the Ohio Elections Commission requiring Mrs. McIntyre to pay the $100 fine. McIntyre at

357. Relying primarily upon Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), the Court found the

Ohio forced-identity disclosure law to be a violation of the First Amendment principle of

anonymity. McIntyre at 341-43. After a brief review of the history of the freedoms of speech

and of the press, Justice Stevens (as had Justice Black before him in Talley) concluded that the

decision whether to disclose the identity of the author, the publisher, or anyone else associated

with the decision to speak out belongs, as a constitutional matter, not to the civil authorities,

but to the speaker himself: “[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions

concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom

of speech protected by the First Amendment.” McIntyre at 342. Indeed, Justice Stevens

continued: 

Anonymity ... provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to

ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not

like its proponent. Thus, even in the field of political rhetoric, where “the

identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to

persuade,” ... the most effective advocates have sometimes opted for

anonymity. [Id. at 342-43.]

In sum, the McIntyre ruling stands for the fixed principle that a law which requires the

public disclosure of the identity of the author, publisher, distributor, circulator, or sponsor of a

communication advocating support or opposition to a government policy is unconstitutional

because such a law divests editorial control vested in the people by the freedoms of speech and

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 11 of 25
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the press, to the exclusion of the government. See id. at 348, citing Miami Herald Publishing

Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). As Chief Justice Burger wrote in Miami Herald: 

[T]he Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because

of its intrusion into the function of editors.... The choice of material to go into

a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the ... content of the

paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials — whether fair or

unfair — constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. [Id. at 258.]

C. The First Amendment Anonymity Principle Applied to BCRA. 

Like Mrs. McIntyre’s handbills issued in the name of the Concerned Parents and

Taxpayers, the advertisement proposed by the Independence Institute does not provide the

names and addresses of the persons on whose behalf the Institute is acting. Like the Ohio law

which prohibited the circulation of any handbill without naming the person responsible for the

content of the handbill, BCRA would require the disclosure of the names and addresses of the

Institute’s major donors, the persons ultimately responsible for the proposed advertisement. 

This Court should strike down the BCRA law as applied to the Independence Institute, the

same as the Supreme Court did to the Ohio forced disclosure law as applied to Mrs. McIntyre. 

As observed in McIntyre, “the [anonymous] speech in which Mrs. McIntyre engaged —

handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint — is the essence of

First Amendment expression (id. at 347).” Likewise, the politically controversial viewpoint

speech proposed by the Independence Institute is equally the essence of such First Amendment

expression. Indeed, as Justice Stevens exclaimed in his McIntyre opinion: “No form of

speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre’s.” Id. at 347

(emphasis added).

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D. There Is No Good Reason Not to Apply the Anonymity Principle Here.

In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Independence

Institute emphasizes that forced disclosure of the names of the Institute’s major donors violates

their “associational privacy.” Plaintiff’s Motion at 11-13. But the right of the people to

associate together for a common cause also enhances their ability to persuade others by

presenting a united front behind the Institute’s policy positions. See Plaintiff’s Motion at 26. 

See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). Oftentimes, individuals associate

with one another, designating some brave souls to lead the way, leaving the tactics, priorities,

and strategies in the hands of others. Forced disclosures upend these tactical decisions, and

might even cause divisions and dissension within the ranks, eroding the effectiveness of the

association in reaching its policy goals. 

Additionally, the Institute expressed concern about how the strength of the

government’s purported interest in a more fully informed people is carefully circumscribed,

contending that whatever “informational interest” the government has is “‘narrowly limited’

... to ‘spending that is unambiguously campaign related.’” See Plaintiff’s Motion at 14. 

Relying on the anonymity principle, however, Justice Stevens flat out stated that, “Ohio’s

informational interest is plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure

requirement.” McIntyre at 349. Not only did Justice Stevens find the OEC’s informational

interest a weak reed, but more importantly, he found that “the identity of the speaker is no

different from other components of the document’s content that the author is free to include or

exclude.” Id. at 348.

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 13 of 25
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To be sure, Justice Stevens did concede that the state’s informational interest, if

coupled with a disclosure requirement governing campaign expenditures, could justify the

mandatory disclosure of campaign donors in the interest of combating “quid pro quo”

corruption. McIntyre at 356. But that is not the case here. As the Institute’s motion ably

points out, the ad contains no unambiguously campaign-related speech, and is an electioneering

communication in name only — there being no electioneering in fact. See Plaintiff’s Motion at

13-16, 38.

E. The McIntyre Anonymity Rule Should Prevail.

Mrs. McIntyre’s leaflet activity opposing a local school board tax levy may appear

pedestrian when compared with the Independence Institute’s polished radio ad addressing

national criminal sentencing policy. But the constitutional rule of anonymity applies equally to

both. Paraphrasing Justice Stevens’ observation in McIntyre: “Urgent, important, and

effective speech [like that of the Independence Institute] can be no less protected than impotent

speech [like that of Mrs. McIntyre], lest the right to speak be relegated to those instances when

it is least needed.” See McIntyre at 347. The rule of anonymity applies across the board

regardless of the importance of the policy issue at stake, or of the likely impact of the

communication involved. See id. at 348-49. 

II. THE BCRA FORCED DISCLOSURE RULE VIOLATES THE FREEDOM OF

THE PRESS, AS EXPRESSED IN TALLEY V. CALIFORNIA.

As noted above, Talley v. California — the primary precedent upon which McIntyre

rests — traced the anonymity principle back to the freedom of the press. See McIntyre at 341-

42. As Justice Black observed in Talley:

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The obnoxious press licensing law of England, which was also enforced on the

Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the names of

printers, writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature

critical of the government. The old seditious libel cases in England show the

lengths to which government had to go to find out who was responsible for

books that were obnoxious to the rulers. John Lilburne was whipped, pilloried

and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to get evidence to convict

him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in England. [Id. at 64-

65.]

To be sure, BCRA does not employ the literal historic rack and screw, but as the Institute has

demonstrated, “[o]nce triggered, BCRA’s electioneering communication disclosure system is

burdensome.” See pp. 9-10. Continuing, the Institute points out that the reporting burdens are

especially heavy when applied to small organizations, leaving them with “an unconstitutional

choice: either stay silent on issues important to its mission or violate the privacy rights of its

donors and comply with heavy administrative burdens.” Id. at 10. 

Like the English licensing system condemned in Talley, the BCRA disclosure mandate

imposes a form of censorship, with the heaviest burden falling on those organizations that do

not have the wherewithal to pay both the administrative costs in addition to the cost of the

distribution of the advertisement. And, as Talley points out, “‘[l]iberty of circulating is as

essential to [the freedom of expression] as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the

circulation, the publication would be of little value.’” Id. at 64. It is no wonder then that

“[b]efore the Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or

distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by Englishcontrolled courts.” Id. at 65.

But there is an even greater principle at stake here than assessing costs and benefits, as

modern courts are wont to do, in deciding whether a law unconstitutionally “burdens” a First

Case 1:14-cv-01500-CKK-PAM-APM Document 40 Filed 06/28/16 Page 15 of 25
13

Amendment right. Concurring in the judgment in McIntyre, Justice Thomas faulted the

majority for not asking the right question: “whether the phrase ‘freedom of speech, or of the

press,’ as originally understood, protected anonymous political leafletting.” Id. at 359

(Thomas, J., concurring). With that introduction, Justice Thomas dove into early American

history, zeroing in on the “most famous American experience with freedom of the press, the

1735 Zenger trial, [noting that it] centered around anonymous political pamphlets.” Id. at 361. 

As Justice Thomas retold the story, the seditious libel charge against Zenger, a printer, was

that he “refused to reveal the anonymous authors of published attacks on the Crown Governor

of New York.” Id. The jury refused to convict, “set[ting] the colonies afire” and

“signif[ying] at an early moment the extent to which anonymity and the freedom of the press

were intertwined in the early American mind.” Id. at 361.

The American jury’s mind undoubtedly was shaped by events in England in the 1600’s. 

As chronicled by Sir William Blackstone in the fourth volume of his Commentaries on the

Laws of England published in 1769, “[t]he art of printing, soon after it’s [sic] introduction,

was looked upon ... as merely a matter of state, and subject to the coercion of the crown” (id.

at 152, n.a):

It was therefore regulated ... by the king’s proclamations, prohibitions, charters

of privilege and of licence, and finally by the decrees of the court of

starchamber; which limited the number of printers, and of presses which each

should employ, and prohibited new publications unless previously approved by

proper licensers. [Id.]

Even after the “demolition of this odious jurisdiction [the Star Chamber] in 1641,” Blackstone

acknowledged, it was not until 1694 that “the press became properly free ... and has ever since

so continued.” Id.

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By the time that Blackstone published the last volume of his Commentaries, he wrote

without reservation that “[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free

state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications....” Id. at 151. The

essence of the liberty, Blackstone continued, was that “[e]very freeman has an undoubted right

to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of

the press.” Id. at 151-52. Thus, he concluded: “To subject the press to the restrictive power

of a licenser ...is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make

him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and

government.” Id. at 152.

Although Blackstone did not specifically identify the anonymity principle, can there be

any doubt that a law requiring the disclosure of the identity of an author of a book, or the

publisher of a political pamphlet, or the financial sponsor of a radio ad as a precondition of

circulating the book, handing out of the leaflet, or the running of a radio ad would run afoul of

the no-licensing principle undergirding the freedom of the press? Yet, that is what the Ohio

law did in McIntyre, and what BCRA does here. Indeed, BCRA authorizes the FEC to review

the Independence Institute’s radio ad to ascertain whether it is a genuine issue ad, or a

subterfuge electioneering communication subject to the FEC’s jurisdiction and, hence, subject

to its disclosure mandate. If that is not censorship, what is? Like the Star Chamber before it,

the FEC functions as a licenser of the press, requiring those who use the broadcast media

either to comply voluntarily with FEC regulations, or to risk civil sanction or criminal

prosecution for violation of the FEC’s rules. See Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law

Unlawful? at 258 (Univ. Chi. Press: 2014).

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As reflected in the most recent cases addressing the First Amendment freedoms of press

and speech, lawyers and judges have abandoned the constitutional text and history, only to be

sucked up by a quagmire of precedents that not only transcend the text, but practically

obliterate it. Instead of looking at the historical meaning of the text, litigants and judges

wrestle with the meaning of such terms as “exacting scrutiny,” hoping to discover whether

there is a “‘substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently

important governmental interest.’” Plaintiff’s Motion at 6-7 (emphasis added). These are not

constitutional terms. Indeed, they are not even legal terms with any fixed meaning. Rather,

they are subjective policy considerations that yield political decisions, not legal judgments. 

Although a search of the constitutional text — the actual law involved in this case — may be a

difficult one, as Justice Thomas’s McIntyre concurrence admits, the very integrity of the oftexpressed view that “we are a government of laws, not men,” is at stake. As Chief Justice

Marshall emphasized in Marbury v. Madison, “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and

limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.” 

Id., 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). If it is within the “province and duty of the judicial department

to say what the law is,” how can courts discharge that function if they ignore the text, context,

and history of the words ratified by the people as the “superior, paramount law” — this

Constitution?

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III. THE EFFORT BY CONGRESS TO REQUIRE SPEAKERS IN THE PUBLIC

POLICY ARENA TO SELF-IDENTIFY IS BEST UNDERSTOOD AS

INCUMBENTS PURSUIT OF THEIR OWN SELF-INTEREST.

This case challenges a statute cleverly crafted by incumbent legislators to discourage

the public, including nonprofit organizations, from communicating with the constituencies of

those Representatives and Senators about their official acts, political positions, and votes in

Congress. In this case, the communication which the government seeks to severely limit

included important information about an important policy issue and related legislation before

Congress. Unable to impose an obviously unconstitutional complete ban on communications

which would rile up their constituents, BCRA invents a category of communications that

incumbents find particularly meddlesome, labels them as “electioneering communications,”

and then regulates those communications to the point that few would want to venture into that

minefield. 

Compliance with these rules requires a detailed understanding of obscure and complex

statutory and regulatory terms which often have counter-intuitive definitions, including

“clearly identified candidate,” “publicly distributed shortly before election,” “targeted to the

relevant electorate,” “exemptions,” as well as rules on “when to file,” “disclosure date,”

“where to file,” and “content of disclosure.” Among the exemptions from these rules are 5

“[e]xpenditures or independent expenditures that must otherwise be reported to the

Commission...” Id. Therefore, it is important to note that this statute and these rules were

 The FEC Brochure describing its rules for electioneering communications is now 5

online at http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/electioneering.shtml (published October 2006;

updated January 2010). 

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designed to control organizations which are not political committees, and therefore, which are

not necessarily familiar with even the basics of FEC recordkeeping and reporting. In this

sense, they are a trap for the unwary. The motion of the Independence Institute rightfully

focuses on the “burdens” of compliance with the electioneering communication restrictions,6

but the problem is so much more serious than that. 

First, the regulatory scheme that Congress employed is shaped in such a way as to vest

in incumbent Congressmen and Senators a type of trademark protection over the use of their

names. Thus, the first ingredient of an electioneering communication is communication “that

‘refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.’” Id. The term “candidate” is used

to make it appear that the law applies equally to both incumbents and challengers. However, it

would be the rare — if not nonexistent — electioneering communication that would

commandeer large amounts of money to ask the public to let their views be known on a bill

before Congress to a challenger who cannot vote on the matter. Laws like BCRA are written

by incumbents, not challengers, and this law, like all campaign finance laws, was written by

incumbents for the benefit of incumbents. The electioneering communications law severely 7

limits the use of an incumbent’s name in broadcast ads during the time of year that most

Americans are paying the most attention to the activities of their elected officials in the period

before elections. Protected by the trademark on their name provided by the electioneering

 See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion at 8-10. 6

 Former Federal Trade Commission Chairman James C. Miller’s book Monopoly

7

Politics summarizes it this way: “More than two decades of research has concluded that the

major effect of the 1974 reforms was to help incumbents ward off challengers.” J. Miller,

Monopoly Politics, (Hoover Institution Press, 1999) at 89. 

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communications rules, incumbents are free to use this period before an election to legislate

while interest groups are largely muzzled. 

Second, the electioneering communications rules were actually calculated to deter

communications about issues presently before Congress. The issue ads which the law targets

are generally designed to urge the public to contact incumbents and let them know how they

feel about pending legislation or an important policy issue. Without receiving public pressure,

incumbents decide how to vote based on their own independent political calculus, without any

meddlesome input from the electorate to which they have no desire to be accountable. The

law’s specific benefit to incumbents is to prevent public input to Congress — known as

“grassroots lobbying.” To the extent that the criminal restrictions on electioneering

communications chills grassroots lobbying, that serves the purposes of the incumbent nicely. 

Third, for those who nevertheless decided to run ads, the rules on electioneering

communications require nonprofit organizations to disclose the names of their major donors, so

that powerful members of Congress can have a complete list of the names and addresses of

those relatively wealthy persons who would dare to meddle in their states and districts. Of

course, since an overwhelming number of Senators and Representatives who seek re-election

achieve that goal and will continue to wield governmental power, this discourages dissenting

voices from expressing their opinions. Congressmen have one overriding objective: reelection. And they have one secondary goal: preventing their constituencies from pressuring

them in how to vote, which causes at least some voters to be annoyed with them. Accordingly,

incumbents have designed campaign finance laws and the rules on electioneering

communications to benefit incumbents and allow them to be able to vote and act as they please,

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with as little interference from their constituencies as possible. See generally J. Miller,

Monopoly Politics, pp. 89, 127-29. The public rationale for laws like BCRA is always highsounding — that “the people” might be better able to evaluate the message by knowing who is

communicating — but this is subterfuge. Just as King George wanted to know the name of the

person identified as “An Englishman” who published Common Sense, Senators McCain and

Feingold wanted to know who would dare to communicate with their constituents about their

activities in Washington, D.C. 

Fourth, the rules on electioneering communications are not true campaign finance laws

at all. They regulate issue ads with neither express advocacy, nor the functional equivalent of

express advocacy. They are restrictions on grassroots lobbying — not electioneering. They

regulate efforts by the public, including nonprofit organizations like Independence Institute, to

put pressure on Congressmen to vote a particular way in their capacity as legislators. These

communications do not address them in their capacity as candidates. Yet these politicians take

full advantage of the fact that incumbents wear both hats, purporting to enact campaign finance

laws, but really seeking to restrict grassroots lobbying. Grassroots lobbying is considered a

powerful tool, more effective than direct lobbying, because it generates public pressure, and it

is often said that “Congress does not see the light until it feels the heat.” The electioneering

communications rules were designed to protect incumbents from that heat. This supposed

connection to elections is a fraudulent justification for the rules on independent expenditures,

as those rules were designed for a very different purpose than to fight quid pro quo corruption. 

The right to criticize and petition government anonymously is not new — it is a right

that traces its ancestry in the United States to the 1735 trial of printer and government critic

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John Peter Zenger, and to Thomas Paine’s decision in 1775 to publish the pamphlet Common

Sense under the pseudonym, “An Englishman.” When incumbent Congressmen establish rules

governing how the American people can communicate about legislators’ behavior, the courts

owe Congress no deference. Rather, courts have a duty to the Constitution to strike down such

laws which punish legitimate political discourse. 

The motion of Independence Institute repeatedly invokes the term “informational

interests” of the U.S. Government, arguing that the government’s interests are not as

compelling with respect to issue advocacy as they are with campaign spending. See, e.g.,

Plaintiff’s Motion at 13, 17. Certainly this is true. But these amici suggest that the interests

that Congress was pursuing in the enactment of BCRA were not wholesome, not beneficial to

the interests protected by the First Amendment, and actually were in pursuit of a wholly

illegitimate interest of members of Congress — the desire to shield themselves from political

criticism and pressure in their official votes. And, this has a secondary effect well known to

members of Congress — if the public knew their views, then someone would disagree, and

votes would be lost. Better for the incumbent that the grassroots lobbying never occur. 

These illicit Congressional interests can be seen in the government’s defense of the

facial challenge to BCRA leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell v. Federal

Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). There, the government’s briefs before the threejudge court revealed that “the inducements of money” must be eliminated from the shaping of

public policy so that the true “national interest” may be served. Brief of Defendants at 1. 

Without grassroots lobbying, members of Congress have greater latitude to determine exactly

what that “national interest” is on their own. The government defended the restrictions on

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21

electioneering communications against overbreadth charges, stating only that they “may place

incidental regulatory burdens on a tiny percentage of genuine issue advocacy that might be

broadcast in proximity to federal elections.” Br. at 163. Of course, if that was all such

restrictions did, the ads would not have been regulated — as the regulations would provide no

benefit to incumbents. And the government explained that, since the electioneering

communications restrictions represented the “judgment that Congress came to only after many

years of deliberation over the constitutionality of the statutory provisions,” “‘considerable

deference’” to these laws was justified. Id. But when members of Congress enact legislation

to immunize themselves from public criticism and input, they should be entitled to no

deference whatsoever. As Justice Kennedy explained in his dissent in McConnell, “Our

precedents teach, above all, that Government cannot be trusted to moderate its own rules for

suppression of speech.” McConnell at 288. 

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff Independent Institute’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and

an injunction should issue against the Federal Election Commission’s enforcement of 52

U.S.C. § 30104(f) and related Commission regulations governing electioneering

communications by nonprofit organizations. 

Respectfully submitted, 

 /s William J. Olson 

Mark Fitzgibbons William J. Olson (D.C. Bar No. 233833)

 9625 Surveyor Court Herbert W. Titus

 Suite 400 Jeremiah L. Morgan (D.C. Bar No. 1012943)

 Manassas, VA 20110 John S. Miles (D.C. Bar No. 166751)

Co-Counsel for Amici Curiae William J. Olson, P.C.

 FSDEF and FSC 370 Maple Ave. W., Ste. 4

 Vienna, VA 22180-5615

Michael Connelly (703) 356-5070

 United States Justice Foundation Counsel for Amici Curiae

 932 D St., Suite 2

 Ramona, CA 92065-2355

Co-Counsel for Amicus Curiae

 U.S. Justice Foundation

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