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66–620 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 112–151 

A TICKING TIME BOMB: COUNTERTERRORISM 

LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE 

TO PREVENT THE FORT HOOD ATTACK 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

OF THE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 15, 2011 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

GORDON N. LEDERMAN, Associate Staff Director and Chief Council 

for National Security and Investigations 

CHARLES F. MARTEL, Counsel 

SEAMUS A. HUGHES, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LUKE P. BELLOCCHI, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

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C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 2 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 21 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 27 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 29 

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2011 

Hon. Charles E. Allen, Former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for 

Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer .................................. 3 

General John M. Keane, USA, Retired, Former Vice Chief of Staff of the 

U.S. Army ............................................................................................................. 5 

J. Philip Mudd, Senior Global Adviser, Oxford Analytica .................................... 8 

Samuel J. Rascoff, Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School 

of Law .................................................................................................................... 12 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Allen, Hon. Charles E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32 

Keane, General John M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 41 

Mudd, J. Philip: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Rascoff, Samuel J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

APPENDIX 

‘‘A Ticking Time Bomb, Counterterrorism Lessons From the U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack,’’ A Special Report by 

Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman, and Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member, 

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

February 2011 ...................................................................................................... 59 

American Civil Liberties Union, prepared statement ........................................... 130 

Responses to post-hearing Questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Allen ........................................................................................................... 136 

Mr. Keane .......................................................................................................... 139 

Mr. Mudd .......................................................................................................... 141 

Mr. Rascoff ........................................................................................................ 143 

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A TICKING TIME BOMB: COUNTERTERRORISM 

LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S 

FAILURE TO PREVENT THE FORT 

HOOD ATTACK 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2011 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:47 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Begich, Collins, Brown, and 

Johnson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Two weeks ago, Senator Collins and I 

issued this report based on our bipartisan staff investigation. It 

was, as we have indicated, into the Fort Hood massacre that left 

13 innocent people dead and 32 others, including Sergeant 

Lunsford, wounded. 

Our report—titled ‘‘A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood 

Attack’’—concluded, painfully, that the attack at Fort Hood was 

preventable. The Department of Defense (DOD) missed several opportunities to reprimand and discharge Army Major Nidal Hasan 

for his growing and surprisingly open embrace of violent Islamist 

extremism, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) neglected to investigate him thoroughly after it learned that Hasan, 

a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, after all, was communicating 

with a suspected terrorist already the subject of a major FBI 

counterterrorism investigation. 

More broadly, our investigation uncovered a troubling lack of 

awareness among some U.S. Government officials about violent 

Islamist extremism, the ideology that inspires it, its manifestations, and how best we can prevent and confront it. 

Today we are going to hear reactions to our report’s findings and 

recommendations and discuss how our government must proceed if 

it is to prevent future homegrown terrorism broadly and the loss 

of innocent American life at the hands of violent Islamist extremists. 

I want to particularly recognize, welcome, and, again, honor all 

those members of the victims’ families, and Sergeant Lunsford, who 

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are here today and also to welcome our panel of witnesses. They 

are really an extraordinary group of people with wide-ranging and 

long experience. 

Charlie Allen was the first Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer and 

before that for a long time had been a top counterterrorism official 

at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 

Phil Mudd is a former long-time CIA analyst and was the first 

Deputy Director for National Security at the FBI as post-September 11, 2001, made itself into the lead U.S. Government agency 

for counterterrorism purposes. 

We are really honored to have Jack Keane with us, retired Vice 

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army and four-star general, to discuss the 

military’s response to this challenge. 

And Samuel Rascoff, Assistant Professor of Law at the New York 

University School of Law and former director of the intelligence 

analysis unit of the New York Police Department (NYPD), will 

bring the other perspective of local government and academia to 

the discussion. 

Because we are starting late, I am going to ask that the rest of 

my statement be included in the record. 

And I will now call on Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin my remarks by also expressing my personal thanks 

to the family members and victims who have traveled from afar to 

be with us today. As I told them in our meeting prior to this hearing, they were the ones who kept us going throughout this investigation, even though at times we met with obstacles and a lack of 

cooperation. And meeting with you today redoubles our determination to ensure that the recommendations in our report will become 

a reality. 

About a half a day, about 4 hours, that was the amount of time 

that the Washington Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) spent determining whether a military officer in communication with a 

known terrorist suspect amounted to a national security threat. 

Underlying threat information was not shared with the Department of Defense. Additional investigative actions were not taken, 

even when the JTTF responsible for the lead called the investigation ‘‘slim’’ and pressed for more action. 

This hasty decision to close the investigation cost the government 

its last, best chance to identify the violent radicalization of Major 

Nidal Hasan, the last, best chance to potentially prevent the November 2009 massacre at Fort Hood. 

But well before this failure by the FBI, the Department of Defense itself had enough information regarding Hasan’s violent 

radicalization to have disciplined or discharged him under current 

personnel and extremism policies. Hasan’s extremist actions at 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center were well known to his supervisors and colleagues, and his poor medical performance was also 

evident. Yet the Department took no action—laying the foundation 

for the FBI’s cursory investigation which relied, in part, on Hasan’s 

inadequate and misleading officer evaluations. 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Allen appears in the Appendix on page 32. 

Our report’s conclusion is alarming. It is a call to action. The Department of Defense and the FBI collectively had sufficient information to have detected Major Hasan’s radicalization to violent 

Islamist extremism, but they failed to act effectively on the many 

red flags signaling that he had become a potential threat. 

I, too, am going to submit the rest of my statement for the record 

since we are starting late, but I just want to make four quick 

points. 

First, the Administration still is refusing to acknowledge that 

violent Islamist extremism is the ideology that fuels attacks. 

Second, the FBI cannot go it alone. Its Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces have been successful and deserve credit for thwarting plots 

against our country, but they risk becoming another intelligence 

stovepipe. 

Third, detecting and disrupting homegrown terrorism will require a sustained leadership effort from the Attorney General, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and active coordination across Federal, State, and local 

lines. 

Fourth and finally, the U.S. Government must develop and implement an effective strategy to confront the violent Islamist ideology that fuels terrorism. 

Again, as I met with the families today, they renewed my personal commitment and I know that of the Chairman and all the 

Members of this Committee. They deserve no less than our steadfast commitment to achieving the goals that we have set out in our 

report. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Now we will go to the witnesses. Mr. Allen, great to welcome you 

back. I think we are calling on you first, as we usually do, based 

on seniority. And may I say you look great. I have not seen you 

in a while, so welcome back. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. CHARLES E. ALLEN,1 FORMER UNDER 

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR INTELLIGENCE 

AND ANALYSIS AND CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER 

Mr. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Collins. It is great to appear before this distinguished Committee 

again. I have a longer statement for the record that I would like 

to be entered into the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, it will be. 

Mr. ALLEN. The focus today, of course, is on the murder of 12 

servicemen and one Department of Defense civilian at Fort Hood 

by Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major and a psychiatrist. But 

beyond that event, I think there is the broader issue of the potential growth of violent ideological Islamist extremism in our homeland, and Senator Collins just referenced that. 

I found the section of the Committee’s special report on violent 

Islamist extremism to be in accord with views that I have held 

since 1998 when I was at the CIA working against al-Qaeda and 

the global spread of Islamist extremism, along with Mr. Mudd. It 

delineates the ideology of violent Islamist extremism—and that of 

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al-Qaeda its affiliates and others—from the belief in the religion of 

Islam and its practice. And that is very important. 

I am concerned, however, by the details in the report on the deference given Major Hasan by his superiors at the Department of 

Defense as he repeatedly persisted in studying Islamist extremism 

in ways that suggested he endorsed under some circumstances violent acts, including suicide operations. 

As this Committee is well aware, the United States has successfully continued very relentless efforts under two Administrations to 

disrupt, dismantle, defeat, and destroy al-Qaeda, and it has been 

remarkably successful. The new factor, however, that has come to 

the fore over the last 2 years is a surge in homegrown extremism 

here in the United States. The growth of extremism, especially 

among young American Muslims, in 2009 and 2010 is very disturbing. According to a RAND Corporation study published in 

2010, there were 46 publicly reported cases of radicalization and 

recruitment to jihadist terrorism between September 11, 2001, and 

December 31, 2009. But 13 of these cases occurred in 2009, up from 

an average of about four cases a year from 2002 to 2008. And the 

individuals charged with involvement in terrorism were primarily 

self-inspired, self-motivated. And with few exceptions, they were 

not directed by al-Qaeda ‘‘central’’ or by al-Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula. 

One cannot overstate the power of the Internet in fueling the 

growth of this radicalization. It is the primary means by which alQaeda markets its messages to hundreds of Web sites, commanding 

Muslims to kill or support the killing of U.S. citizens to defend 

Islam, which we know is a false statement. 

Anwar al-Awlaki in his latest video, which I think was on November 9, 2010, had one simple message, and it was very direct: 

‘‘Kill Americans.’’ 

Turning to the Committee’s report, I agree strongly with the 

Committee’s views in praising the work of the military, the FBI, 

and intelligence agencies, in disrupting and preventing attacks. 

And I think the Committee is accurate in its judgment that there 

is a need for a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to 

countering radicalization and homegrown terrorism across all agencies, including Federal, State, and local. If we are going to keep the 

country safe, I think we have to have a unified intelligence effort. 

We have talked about an integrated national intelligence enterprise to deal with domestic terrorism, but I think we are far from 

one where we have firm resolution. There is no unified national intelligence collection plan or not even a set of recognized national 

intelligence requirements relating to domestic terrorism. There are 

fault lines across the Federal, State, and local governments and the 

information sharing and building of trust among counterterrorism 

authorities. 

For example, the FBI is the country’s primary domestic intelligence agency that has the responsibility to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism. It is a radically different agency from what 

existed on September 11, 2001, it really has improved. It has established the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, over a hundred of those. 

It has established Field Intelligence Groups in each of the FBI’s 56 

field offices. But it is not clear to me that the analysts are as well 

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1The prepared statement of General Keane appears in the Appendix on page 41. 

integrated into FBI investigations and operations as they should 

be, and it is especially important that they are not integrated with 

special agents in pursuing leads where there may be suspicious activity but no immediate predicate for investigation. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its intelligence 

arm has yet to realize its full potential at the State and local level. 

It must do more to enrich its relationship not only with the fusion 

centers but with local police departments. Local police departments 

are not yet fully utilized as part of the overall national intelligence 

effort, even though they are well positioned to combat homegrown 

terrorism. They know their neighborhoods, and they are very diverse. 

It seems to me the lessons from Fort Hood are pretty clear. DOD 

needs to have both a doctrine and strategy for dealing effectively 

with the potential for Islamist extremism within our military services, and I believe this can be done while ensuring that military 

personnel have full freedom of religion, regardless of faith. 

Both DOD and the FBI also had sufficient information between 

them, if it had been acted upon—to have taken actions to prevent 

the attack by Major Hasan. However, neither had a total view of 

the potential threat posed by Nidal Hasan. More importantly, the 

DOD officer assigned to the JTTF never had access to all of the 

sensitive information involving Major Hasan’s communications 

with a ‘‘suspected terrorist.’’ 

It is essential that personnel assigned to the JTTFs from other 

agencies, such as DOD, have ‘‘systems high’’ clearances if they are 

to perform their jobs. Failure to share information and excessive 

compartmentation have contributed to American casualties in the 

struggle against terrorism, there are some examples of that in the 

past. 

I think the FBI is on its way to transformation, changing the Bureau’s culture. But I believe the transformation is incomplete. It 

needs to move even more to become an intelligence-driven organization from its case-driven model that it has prided itself on over 

the years. I also believe that the JTTFs decentralized model has to 

be re-examined to ensure that FBI Headquarters’ counterterrorism 

leadership is more directly involved in potential terrorism leads 

that could pose risks and the need for more intelligence colleague. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Allen, for an excellent opening statement. 

General Keane, a pleasure to welcome you back. Thank you for 

all your service to our country and for coming forward to talk about 

this current challenge. 

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE,1 USA, RETIRED, 

FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE U.S. ARMY 

General KEANE. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, 

and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about the most significant threat to the security of the American people that I have seen in my lifetime—radical, violent Islamist extremism. I commend this Committee and 

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the leadership of Senators Lieberman and Collins for their ongoing 

work in identifying this dangerous ideology and developing ways to 

protect against it. 

My heart goes out to the family members of our murdered soldiers and civilian, and those who are here today. I hope you can 

find some satisfaction in the excellent work done by this Committee. 

The most recent work of the Committee on this challenge to our 

national security is its investigative report on the Fort Hood massacre that took place on November 5, 2009. That report puts the 

key issue front and center and confirms what many of us feared 

after the attack. Self-radicalized violent Islamist extremists are not 

just here in America; they have penetrated the U.S. military, which 

is one of the last places you would expect to find people so violently 

opposed to this country and its citizens. 

I would like to discuss my two reactions to this much needed and 

comprehensive report. First, I am shocked and disappointed by 

what this report reveals about the failure of the Department of Defense to come to grips with violent Islamist extremism and the danger it presents to our troops. Second, I wholeheartedly endorse the 

report’s recommendations for reform in DOD to better protect 

against this threat. 

I will start with my first reaction—just how unacceptable the 

Army’s failure to deal properly with Hasan’s radicalization to violent Islamist extremism was. I reach this conclusion with sadness. 

I was proud to serve in the Army, and while I did, I was involved 

in helping the Army devise policies to protect against racial extremism that turned deadly at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where I 

commanded. And I know the military is full of people at all ranks 

who are dedicated to the protection of the men and women in service. But this time, some of those people—including Hasan’s superiors and colleagues—failed to do what was needed to root out a dangerous extremist. 

I agree with the report’s conclusion that Hasan’s open displays 

of violent extremism was a violation of military rules calling for 

good order and discipline. A list of things Hasan said and did in 

that report, when you add them up, shows he was an extremist 

who had no place in our armed services. 

I want to caution here that I know that our military includes 

thousands of brave and patriotic Muslim Americans who serve this 

country with honor. Some have given their lives in service to our 

country. When Hasan concluded that Muslim Americans might 

commit fratricide, he was not talking about them, but he was giving a warning about himself. As the report states, Hasan’s extremism was not a secret. The officer who assigned him to Fort Hood 

told commanders there, ‘‘You’re getting our worst.’’ 

What should have Hasan’s military superiors done? They should 

have been able to put the information together and conclude that 

Hasan believed the same things that the violent Islamist extremist 

enemies of this country believe, and that meant he should have 

been out of the military. 

But instead of removing Hasan, his superiors promoted him, 

graduated him from his residency and fellowship, assigned him to 

Fort Hood, and even approved him for deployment to the conflict 

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in Afghanistan. Instead of moving Hasan out, his Army commanders moved him up. This is exactly the opposite of what responsible officers should have done. 

The report describes a series of reasons given by the Army for 

failing to deal properly with Hasan. I do not find any of those reasons credible. A pair of related reasons is that some of Hasan’s superiors believed his views were not problematic, and others actually believed he provided valuable insight into Islamist extremism. 

This was a terrible misjudgment because the truth was that 

Hasan’s views were problematic precisely because he was an extremist. It is hard to understand why senior officers did not see 

that. 

So why did Hasan’s superiors fail to take the action that was 

necessary? That brings me to my second reaction to the report, 

which is my agreement with the report’s recommendations about 

changing military policies and training to identify the threat of violent Islamist extremism among service members and to require 

that it be reported and dealt with. 

When I testified at a hearing before this Committee at the beginning of the investigation, I said this: ‘‘It should not be an act of 

moral courage for a soldier to identify a fellow soldier who is displaying extremist behavior; it should be an obligation.’’ This is as 

true today as it was then. Unfortunately, the report reveals that 

the military to this day still does not have policies and training 

which identify what violent Islamist extremism is and what our 

men and women should do when they see it. 

I know a lot of good people in the military have reviewed the 

Fort Hood attack to determine lessons learned, and some of their 

work and recommendations do move us forward. But we have to directly address the threat we face exactly, and that threat is violent 

Islamist extremism. Over a year after the Fort Hood attack, this 

direct and honest step still has not been taken by the military. Instead, the military avoids labeling our enemy for what it is, rather 

subsuming it under ambiguous terms such as ‘‘extremism’’ or trying to call it something completely different such as ‘‘workplace violence.’’ That is not acceptable because it leaves our service members vulnerable to more attacks from these extremists. 

Clarity is all the more important here because of the complexity 

of dealing with someone like Hasan, who commingles dangerous extremism with religion. Unless service members clearly understand 

the difference between legitimate religious observance and dangerous extremism, everyone in the military is in an unfair position. 

The reason is that service members are understandably reluctant 

to interfere with the practice of religion and that they are, rightly, 

trained by the military to respect religious observance. But that 

should never mean that violent Islamist extremism should be tolerated. The Department of Defense’s failure to identify the enemy 

clearly causes service members at all ranks to avoid dealing with 

extremists properly, just as they avoided the need to deal with 

Hasan. 

The lack of clarity is also deeply unfair to the thousands of Muslims who serve honorably in the U.S. military. If service members 

clearly understand the difference between their religion and the 

dangerous radicalism of violent Islamist extremism, the patriotic 

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1The prepared statement of Mr. Mudd appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

Muslims in our armed services will be protected against unwarranted suspicion. In fact, it was just that sort of awful, untrue 

stereotype about Muslim soldiers that Hasan believed and promoted in his statements. The best way to defeat that stereotype is 

to educate our service members about the difference between the 

legitimate, peaceful observance of Islam, which is respected and 

protected, and the violent Islamist extremism which should lead to 

reporting, discharge, and law enforcement intervention. 

I endorse the changes that this report recommends because they 

do what needs to be done to fix the problems I have described. 

They are necessary to make, and they are not hard to make. 

I know from experience that the changes this report recommends 

could be made and implemented in a month or two if DOD chose 

to do so. That sort of urgency is necessary because our men and 

women in the military are vulnerable to a known danger and because DOD has an equal responsibility to protect its thousands of 

brave and patriotic Muslim-American service members from unwarranted suspicion by colleagues who have never been trained 

about what violent Islamist extremism is and how it differs from 

the peaceful exercise of Islam. 

I welcome this Committee’s hard work to protect them, and I 

hope that DOD will act immediately to follow the recommendations 

in this investigative report, and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, General Keane. Excellent statement, and it means a lot to our Committee to have your 

support of the recommendations and the findings. 

Next, Phil Mudd, we welcome you back, another familiar face. 

We thank you again for your service and welcome your statement 

now. 

TESTIMONY OF J. PHILIP MUDD,1 SENIOR GLOBAL ADVISER, 

OXFORD ANALYTICA 

Mr. MUDD. Thanks for having me, Senator. I do not really have 

a statement. I just wanted to have a conversation with the Committee about what I think about this and—I have been out of the 

business for 10 months—what my friends talk about when they 

speak about this. There are 13 people are dead and we talk about 

this a lot. 

There has been a lot of complaining among my friends. They do 

not like the tone, they do not like the title. Others say we need a 

lot of accuracy in here, we ought to focus on the accuracy. I have 

heard other sides, including staff, say we did not get full cooperation. 

I would like to put that aside and say, Look, it is an honor to 

be here. I know families are behind me. Thirteen people are dead, 

and 32 are injured. I am not going to focus on what I heard in 

terms of bitching and moaning from my friends. I want to talk 

about what we should do. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Great. 

Mr. MUDD. I think we should start by focusing on the problem 

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cause we are 10 years in. When I was sitting at the threat table 

in 2001, 2002, and 2003, you were talking about looking at a point 

target in a place like Pakistan and saying, do we understand the 

point target well enough tactically to figure out if they are going 

to send somebody to Chicago? That is Jose Padilla. So you could 

focus on an intelligence target overseas and in essence look for the 

point where that intelligence target was focusing in the United 

States. 

Flip that on its head right now and think now we have to look 

for people in the United States who might be motivated by people 

overseas, but in essence we are looking for a needle in a haystack 

because the overseas guys are not sending people here anymore. 

They are relying on the ideology of the revolution, to motivate 

someone here. So what we have to do is say, how do we get down 

from 20,000 people, or 50,000 or 1,000, to in the future find the 

Major Hasans? So that is the premise I am going at this with. 

What I would like to do is to offer some suggestions in seven or 

eight areas that relate to things like field operations, that relate 

to coordination among agencies, State and locals, and I have talked 

to some of them about this at the FBI, CIA, and DHS. But every 

one of the seven or eight comments I have relates to this question 

of how do you find people in the field when you cannot presume 

anymore that point targets overseas, that is, al-Qaeda leadership, 

will give you the clues you need to solve the problem. 

The fundamental transformation I am talking about is getting 

CIA intelligence or the National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence 

to penetrate al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan versus getting 

State and locals or a JTTF or a fusion center in Amarillo, Texas, 

to tell you something is wrong here that we would never have seen 

overseas. 

A couple of broad categories I mention: When I think about this 

as a manager, you think about how do people operate in the field; 

how do we train them; what kind of guidance do we give them; how 

does headquarters operate to drive them; and what kind of policy 

background you have in terms of training when they enter service—especially in dealing with this as a metastasized threat and in 

dealing with this after conversations with friends in the Middle 

East and Europe—who are, by the way, facing the same things and 

talking about the same problems. 

I want to end with a couple comments specifically about the 

Internet because I think that is the biggest problem we have here, 

both operationally and in terms of guidance and legislation. 

In terms of field operations, as I said, I want to step through 

seven or eight ideas. Each of these, I will offer a specific comment 

about a way ahead that you could look at over 90 to 120 days with 

your staff. I do not want to just lay a problem at your doorstep. 

I want to give you a solution. 

We have a metastasized threat where you cannot just focus on 

a Federal group or a federally led group like a JTTF. You have to 

focus on State and locals. You have something like 17,000 or 18,000 

police departments. There is not a lot of staff on JTTFs. We need 

to understand how we can get information from these State and 

locals up. 

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So point one, I think there needs, 10 years in, to be a conversation about coordination among JTTF, State and locals, and—we 

have not mentioned this yet—fusion centers. Fusion centers are out 

there. There are 70-plus. They operate differently. They are 

charged with looking for these needles in haystacks. I would argue 

more specifically that you talk to people like the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the major city chiefs, and talk 

to them in conjunction with DHS and the FBI and say if the threat 

is changing but we are still driving the leads down from Washington and operating in relatively small centers like JTTFs, do we 

need to change that concept and what are your ideas from the people who see this problem in the streets—that is, State and local enforcement. 

I would argue second that you have to think about staffing there. 

I know there are a lot of discussions on the Hill about budget cuts. 

You understand the linkage between cutting off staffing for cops 

and cops’ willingness to participate in Federal task forces. That is 

sort of a one-to-one correlation. The cops I talk to understand budgetary issues, but they are saying with a lot of violent crime, it is 

going to be increasingly difficult for us to participate in these intelligence-sharing programs like fusion centers and JTTFs if we have 

fewer and fewer cops to go on the streets. Believe me, behind the 

scenes when we have a beer, they are not complaining about what 

you have to do here; they are just saying we live in a reality. And 

police chiefs are saying, ‘‘I might have to pull back from task 

forces.’’ 

We also should look at joint training. CIA trains human intelligence (HUMINT) officers; FBI trains HUMINT officers; FBI 

trains investigators; the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) trains 

analysts; CIA trains analysts; FBI trains analysts; fusion centers 

train analysts. Unbelievable. I would argue that we take a city approach. You take a city like Houston, Dallas, or Los Angeles. Los 

Angeles is a good example because they have a terrific counterterrorism program in the police out there. And say, should we think 

about training in a different way—that is, hugely expensive. Bring 

people back to a training facility near Washington, put them together with a problem set of how do you find extremism—and have 

a standard process by which police, analysts, FBI agents, CIA officers, and DHS officers are sitting down saying, when we face a 

problem, here is how we are going to train to attack the problem 

and get out of this, having analysts and operations in an information-sharing world train separately. So that is the second or third 

thing I would ask the staff to do. 

Let me shift quickly to talk about things like ideology, which is 

a problem I talked about, again, in the Middle East and Europe. 

We have a problem of extremism. Extremism is not a Federal violation, but it is the precursor for what we saw that led to the murder 

of 13 people. I would argue that Members of the Committee might 

want to talk to other places who have longer experience dealing 

with hate speech, places like Western Europe—I am talking about 

the Germans, the Dutch, the Swedes, and the Brits. The Australians are having this problem. We have to think about not just 

why one person murdered 13 people. We have to think about how 

we take hate speech and indications of violence on the Internet and 

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boil that down to find one person and what indicators we can use. 

I am not talking about psychology. I am literally talking about 

technical tools to boil that down. But part of that has to be comfort 

from this side of the street to say that is OK, because people like 

me are very nervous about this. They saw the PATRIOT Act debate 

last week. They see people saying you are getting too intrusive in 

our lives. And, meanwhile, they are getting the message to be more 

intrusive as you look on the Internet. Very problematic for a practitioner. 

I will close quickly, but a couple other things. 

First, as I close, a bit of an off-the-wall comment, but we are 

looking for needles in haystacks, and a lot of these are coming from 

new communities that are nervous about working with security 

services. I would bring in DHS and say when we are bringing new 

people in for things like swearing them in to this country, do we 

have a conversation with them about how to be comfortable with 

your national security apparatus; what numbers can you call; what 

protection you have when you call someone. I think we ought to 

have a quick conversation—this is sort of the royal ‘‘we,’’ but I am 

suggesting your staff look into this—about how we talk systematically to new immigrants about how they can help integrate in this 

society and prevent further isolation of their communities in the 

event there is another attack, because this is bad for all of us, and 

I think most of them would understand it is bad for their communities. They are just nervous about talking to the Federal Government. 

I think similarly we should have an imam training program. I 

know this is government intruding into religion, but we are behind 

the curve on this. Countries overseas are doing this. I am not suggesting that we train imams about how to teach people about religion. I am suggesting that, similar to what I am talking about with 

immigrants, we have a conversation with them—and people overseas have already done this—to say this is how we need help, this 

is the message you should give to a kid who is considering violence, 

this is who to call, this is what protections you have—because a lot 

of them will say, ‘‘I am not going to call if the kid is just going to 

get picked up.’’ 

My last point is about the Internet. We need to go from an ocean 

to a drop of water, because the number of people who are involved 

in this Islamist violent revolution is in the tens or hundreds of 

thousands. So to find people like Hasan, you are going to go from 

10,000 or 20,000 people to one. I would suggest we consider looking 

at the legislation and regulations that guide how people—people 

like in the jobs I used to have—look at the Internet and how they 

investigate potential violent activity on the Internet. Look at the 

laws and regulations, and then ask people on the other end, people 

like me, in a perfect world when you had no legislation, no regulations, what would you do? Characterize that air gap and say, are 

we comfortable giving people guidance to cover that air gap? Because I suspect—I am not sure about this—that you will find that 

air gap is wider than you think. 

But, again, it is an honor to be here. It is really an honor because 

I used to be here because of the position I held, and now you inH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

12 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Rascoff appears in the Appendix on page 48. 

vited me because maybe I know something. And I know the families are behind me, and it is really a privilege, so thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Having heard your testimony, Mr. Mudd, 

we made the right move in inviting you because you clearly do 

know a lot. Your testimony was very helpful, and particularly the 

specific recommendations you made, which I would like to come 

back to. 

I do want to put an exclamation point around something you 

said, and it builds on the numbers that Mr. Allen and General 

Keane also talked about, which is that—and this is why we really 

ought to talk about this directly. When we talk about violent 

Islamist extremists, we are talking about a very small number of 

people in the Muslim-American community. I think Mr. Allen’s 

numbers said something like 46 cases since September 11, 2001, although the escalation was to 13 cases in 2009. 

Mr. ALLEN. In 2009. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, that was the number from September 11, 2001, through 2009. So that is a very small number of 

cases. 

On the other hand, of course, it does not take too many people 

to do a terrible amount of damage, as we saw at Fort Hood, 13 

dead, 32 injured, some quite seriously. So it puts our challenge in 

context, but I think it also ought to encourage us to just be very 

direct about who is the enemy and who is not the enemy, and to 

enlist, as I think you are suggesting, members of new American 

communities and the Muslim-American community to join us in 

this effort to find the drops of water in the ocean, if you will. 

Mr. MUDD. I know it is not time to respond, but I would quickly 

say my sense is most members of the community do not know, and 

I include both family and—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MUDD. I watched hundreds of investigations, particularly at 

the Bureau, but a few like this at CIA. And I know there are a lot 

of questions about community participation and cooperation with 

law enforcement, and I think there is some fair criticism to be 

made. But I think mostly they do not know. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Our final witness is Mr. Rascoff. You 

have been before us before—I guess you were before us when you 

were with the NYPD. Thanks from being here today. 

TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL J. RASCOFF,1 ASSISTANT PROFESSOR 

OF LAW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 

Mr. RASCOFF. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. 

I am truly honored for the opportunity to testify today about aspects of the exceedingly important report that the Committee recently issued examining the failures that led to the Fort Hood tragedy and making structural recommendations to ensure that such 

an incident will not be repeated. 

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my written statement be entered into 

the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection. 

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13 

Mr. RASCOFF. Thank you. 

And let me also say that I am humbled to be addressing you in 

the presence of a courageous survivor of the attack as well as relatives of the brave women and men who lost their lives on that 

truly awful day. 

My goal this morning is to elaborate on three findings in the report, with an eye to making constructive suggestions. 

First, I would like to say something about certain challenges to 

the achievement of meaningful collaboration or what I will call 

‘‘jointness’’ on the Joint Terrorism Task Force. 

Second, I would like to comment about the proper role of the FBI 

as an intelligence agency in relation to domestic counterterrorism 

generally, and specifically as it pertains to the homegrown threat. 

And, third, I would like to offer some preliminary thoughts on 

the proper organization of American counter-radicalization and on 

some lessons learned from the British experiment, with similar 

strategies and programs. 

Let me just say at the outset that the issues that I am going to 

be talking about and that I have written about for the Committee 

all grow out of the work that I do as a law professor focused on 

issues of intelligence and counterterrorism, but certainly also are 

informed by my practical experience as the founding head of the 

NYPD’s intelligence analysis arm. 

On the question of jointness in the JTTF, let me begin by saying 

what many of us already know, which is that the JTTF has clearly 

served as an indispensable facet of domestic counterterrorism from 

well before September 11, 2001. The JTTF recently marked its 

30th birthday and, if anything, has only become that much more 

significant in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. So any account 

of what we have done right in counterterrorism in this country over 

the last decade would have to assign a prominent role to the institution of the JTTF. And yet, as the report properly observes, there 

are aspects of the JTTF, and specifically with this question of 

jointness to which the JTTF naturally and justifiably aspires, that 

remain ill defined. 

What is the proper role of detailees from local police departments, let us say, or other Federal agencies on JTTFs? Are those 

detailees best thought of in the way of liaison between the FBI and 

the astonishing variety of institutional actors who have a role to 

play in counterterrorism? 

Perhaps the real significance of detailees is the different perspectives that they bring to bear on the work of the JTTF itself? Or 

for that matter, and for a host of reasons that I am happy to get 

into during the question-and-answer period, do detailees effectively 

end up becoming viewed by their FBI managers as only so many 

extra personnel to whom those habitually strapped leaders can 

turn to perform tasks that might otherwise have fallen to FBI special agents? 

In my view, the most significant contribution that the report 

makes in this area is in pointing out that the answers to many, if 

not all, of these critical questions remain elusive. On the whole, I 

think it is fair to say, JTTFs remain dominated by the strategic 

outlook of the FBI and only imperfectly function as clearinghouses 

for domestic counterterrorism information and for the disparate 

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14 

perspectives on terrorism that are brought by Federal and local 

agencies. 

On the question of intelligence and homegrown terrorism, I think 

this is, if anything, a more significant area in which jointness is 

lacking, and that is because on the JTTF, as part of the FBI’s investigative work, the Bureau is playing at its core strength. When 

we turn to the intelligence mission, by contrast, and specifically to 

the enterprise of domain management—which is an innovation in 

the FBI that my colleague Mr. Mudd had an enormously important 

role in debuting—what we are really talking about is FBI agents 

understanding the environment in which they work. 

Now, to my mind, domain management represents a clear case 

where the Bureau and where the Federal Government more generally ought to be leveraging much more effectively the know-how 

of local police officers who, after all, know their terrain intimately, 

have lived and worked in their communities more or less their 

whole lives, and have a distinctive leg up, I would say, on their 

Federal counterparts when it comes to that kind of anthropological 

understanding of the world in which they operate. 

On counter-radicalization, I wholeheartedly endorse the report’s 

conclusion that we need a national strategy. We need a national 

strategy that is headquartered in the White House; that is in a 

sense orchestrated by elements of Federal Government, such as the 

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—and this is the nub— 

and a strategy that devolves most of the heavy lifting when it 

comes to the implementation of counter-radicalization to local actors. And when I say local actors, I mean to suggest police and 

other local officials, but even more so, local non-governmental entities. Why is that? Lessons learned from the United Kingdom and 

from other countries that have experimented with counterradicalization suggest that effectiveness only comes when communities themselves become engaged with the enterprise of counterradicalization. So if we are going to succeed and if we are going to 

avoid some of the intensely knotty political and, in some sense, policy issues that have dominated the conversation about counterradicalization in the United Kingdom, I think we are going to need 

to lean heavily on our own communities, and specifically our Muslim communities, to play a key role in moving the agenda on 

counter-radicalization. 

Let me conclude by saying that the report admirably calls attention to a range of lessons that ought to be internalized from the 

Fort Hood tragedy. I am particularly encouraged by the report and 

by this Committee’s ongoing involvement in issues relating to the 

design and implementation of a domestic counterterrorism architecture that is suited to the emerging threat environment. 

I look forward to answering your questions, and I thank you for 

your time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Professor Rascoff. 

Since I first met you when you clerked here for Justice David 

Souter, I believe, and I just called you ‘‘Sam,’’ it is a pleasure for 

me now to refer to you as ‘‘Professor.’’ It is actually quite noteworthy in its way that you are a professor who has focused at a 

law school on these issues, and that is important as well. 

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15 

We will do 7-minute rounds of questions. Excellent opening statements and very helpful to us. 

General Keane, let me come back to ask you to speak just a little 

bit more about the perplexing part of the results of the investigation about the the army’s handling of Major Hasan, which is, I kept 

asking myself as we went over the findings, why were his superiors 

not dealing directly with his open expressions of violent Islamist 

extremism? Put aside for a moment whether he was a good psychiatrist or some evidence that they were pushing him along and 

promoting him when he really was not that good. But was this 

some kind of exaggerated political correctness in the superiors? 

Was it that it was just easier to move him along rather than creating a bureaucratic problem? Or was it something else? 

General KEANE. It has been my experience in dealing with racial 

extremism when I first confronted that as a result of the two murders at Fort Bragg that the normal thing that happens when people use speech that is so abhorrent to most of us, the natural thing 

is to pull away from it because you have great difficulty identifying 

with it in terms of your own values, and in this case even in terms 

of the military’s values. And I saw that with racial skinheads. The 

tendency was for the soldiers to pull away from it, and in those 

cases, the chain of command failed to act on the hate speech and 

on behavior as well. 

I think much the same has taken place here. People have a tendency to pull away from it. They know they are hearing something 

that they do not agree with and do not identify with. And what is 

particularly problematic is this is a military organization, and we 

have responsibilities to act on behavior or conduct that is not in 

keeping with the good order and discipline of our organizations. 

And that is the thing that is most troublesome, responsible officers 

hearing that pulled away from it and decided not to confront it because they were uncomfortable and were giving up their responsibilities as officers to deal with this. 

I also think that Hasan, in the environment he was operating in, 

had certain tolerances and privileges that probably would not have 

existed if he was in a normal warfighting organization. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. How do you mean? 

General KEANE. He was an officer, a doctor, and a psychiatrist. 

And I think that gave him certain tolerances that contributed to 

this. That does not excuse the officers in not confronting them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General KEANE. But I do think it probably contributed to a certain degree. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think you are right. If I am not mistaken, he was the only Muslim psychiatrist in the army. Is that 

correct? 

There was one other. So that in that sense, they may have wanted to defer to him as a resource, but obviously with tragic consequences. 

Incidentally, the families who are here quite rightly focused Senator Collins and me in our discussion before the hearing on people 

being held accountable for their behavior in these cases. And I 

know we have talked to people at the Department of Defense. They 

say they do not want to act on these cases until the legal proH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

16 

ceedings against Hasan are over. But it is really important that the 

people who acted negligently—and I know we all have the clarity 

of hindsight here, but that they be held accountable. And we are 

going to stay on that until that happens. 

Let me ask you this question and maybe ask a few others to get 

involved in it. In this strange, to me, unwillingness to describe the 

enemy as what it is here, violent Islamist extremism, I mean, the 

9/11 Commission Report, the Kean-Hamilton report, had a conclusion that really rings out so clearly. The enemy—I am paraphrasing, of course, here—is not just al-Qaeda, they said; and it is 

certainly not the religion of Islam. It is a politicized ideology, a corruption of the religion, which is violent Islamist extremism. I believe that is the literal word they used for it. 

I think that there are still some people in the Executive Branch 

of government who believe that—incidentally, notwithstanding the 

fact that we have been fighting the manifestations of that ideology 

at considerable loss of life and national treasure in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. We refuse to call it that here. I think some 

people in the Administration feel that if we do so it will compromise our relationship with the broader Muslim world outside of 

America and, to some extent, with the Muslim-American community. And I wonder if you, General Keane, Mr. Allen, or any of the 

others want to comment on that conclusion. 

General KEANE. Well, first of all, I find it outrageous that 10 

years after September 11, 2001, we still have difficulty identifying 

this for what it is and are unwilling to name it. That is profoundly 

disappointing. 

And as a soldier, I mean, the first place you start with is who 

your enemy is. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General KEANE. And what are their motivations and what are 

they trying to accomplish? And you have to come to grips with that 

if you are expecting in any way, shape, or form to be successful 

against them. So that is stunning in and of itself. 

The issue that we get into here because the ideologues have used 

religion to fuel their belief system and somehow we are unwilling 

to confront it because it is associated with a religion is such an insult to the Muslims who find this ideology abhorrent themselves. 

They do not identify with this. They are outraged by that ideology. 

It is against everything that they stand for, and it translated into 

this horrific behavior that we saw at Fort Hood. Muslims inside the 

military and Muslims outside of it do not identify with this. They 

want it to be separated from them. 

And coming to grips with what it is helps provide them the separation that they so desperately need. It helps to remove the veil of 

suspicion and mystery that may surround it. Helping to educate 

people about the ideology and how abhorrent it is and what it 

stands for is something that is certainly needed. And in this case 

in the military, I am absolutely convinced that training and education programs are necessary, must be mandated for the whole 

chain of command to participate in, much as we did with racial extremism. And I believe in my heart that will also find some protection for the Muslim soldiers who are in the military to avoid the 

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stereotyping that grows out of this and the unwillingness of people 

to confront it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. My time is actually up. Mr. 

Allen. 

Mr. ALLEN. I would just like to say that I think Mr. Mudd hit 

it right. It is the ideology. You have it right, Mr. Chairman. And 

the Internet is fueling it, and when Mr. Mudd talks about not just 

dozens but hundreds, if not thousands, are listening to this extremist virulent message day after day after day, it is infecting a small 

segment of American-Muslim society. And for us not to call it what 

it is and deal with it directly I think only exacerbate long-term our 

problems here in the homeland. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Agreed. Mr. Mudd. 

Mr. MUDD. Senator, let me be quite specific. It is the difference 

between what we do and what we say. We have a problem with violent Islamist ideology in this country. That is a problem. We should 

not say this, and I would discourage you from ever using the word 

‘‘terrorism’’ or ‘‘Islamist’’ in a speech. Let me tell you why. My job 

is to kill the adversary ideologically. Operationally they are just 

trying to inspire people, their revolutionary movement. So operationally you can take people out of the streets. Ideologically you 

are hoping that the revolution dies over time because people start 

to say there is no message here, this is nihilistic, there is no future. 

Three years ago, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second in charge of alQaeda, had his one and only Internet interview, not live but he 

took questions. The first question he chose to respond to came from 

North Africa. It was from an engineer, I believe, or a teacher. And 

the question was about explain, Mr. Zawahiri, why you kill so 

many innocent Muslims. 

Now, why does he choose to take this question? Why does he 

choose—and, again, it was not live, so al-Qaeda put this one at the 

top of the hopper. If you look at research post-September 11, 2001, 

across the Islamic world—and Pew Research does some pretty good 

work—most of these countries—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, 

North Africa, going into Southeast Asia—have experienced the 

murder of innocents by al-Qaeda. You remember the horrific murder at a wedding in Jordan a few years ago, just a horrible thing. 

And the murders that led, I think, to the uprising against incoming 

Islamists in Iraq, I do not think the surge was the only thing that 

resulted in some success. There were a bunch of Iraqis saying, 

‘‘Why are they killing us? We may not like the Americans, but we 

sure as heck do not like some Sunni coming from Yemen shooting 

us up.’’ 

I think what Zawahiri is realizing is that people who he needs 

to recruit are losing interest in the movement not only because 

they do not see a future, but because too many locals have died. 

They cannot defend the accusation of murder in their own communities. They can defend being terrorists. 

So to close this circle, as someone who wants to kill the ideology, 

I think we ought to call them what they hate to be called. They 

liked to be called terrorists. They liked to be called Islamist radicals and revolutionaries. They hate to be called murderers. And 

that is what they are. 

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Chairman LIEBERMAN. I am unconvinced. I am going to call them 

all of those things because I think that is what they are. They are 

violent Islamist extremists and they are murderers and they are 

terrorists. 

Mr. MUDD. No, I agree that is what they are. I am just saying 

don’t give them what they want. Let us fight about this—no, I am 

just kidding. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was an extraordinarily interesting exchange that you just had with Mr. 

Mudd. From my perspective, particularly when we are dealing with 

the military, the refusal to distinguish violent Islamist extremism 

from the peaceful, protected exercise of the Muslim religion sends 

exactly the wrong message because it implies that they cannot be 

distinguished. And it does lead to suspicion being cast upon peaceful, patriotic, law-abiding, courageous Muslim members of our 

armed forces. 

So I see it a little bit differently because I think the Administration needs to be clear about who our enemy is as much as who it 

is not in order to protect the vast majority of peaceful Muslims. 

And that is why I think defining for our military exactly the way 

the general did, when confronted with the white supremacists at 

Fort Bragg, is very helpful in allaying misplaced suspicion. But 

your point is a fascinating one, nonetheless, and I appreciate your 

making it. 

I want to talk about the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. This model 

was created to ensure that information was shared, and I remember when the JTTFs were first created, I was very upset that there 

was not one in Portland, Maine, and I went to the FBI and I said, 

‘‘We have to have one in Portland, Maine.’’ After all, two of the terrorists began their journey of death and destruction on September 

11, 2001, from Portland, Maine. And, interestingly—and to get 

back to a point that two of our witnesses made—at first the police 

chief in Portland did not want to participate because he did not 

want to devote an officer full time to a JTTF and lose that officer 

from the street. 

I want to get back to that point, but to me, the most perplexing 

aspect of this case is that the army was never notified about 

Hasan’s communications with a known terrorist suspect, a known 

murderer and planner. That to me is just inconceivable. After all, 

think about the name of the task force. It is the Joint Task Force. 

Both those words—all three of those words imply a sharing of information and personnel. And yet the information was not communicated to the army. 

First let me start with the general. If that information had been 

communicated to the army, to Hasan’s superiors, given all else they 

knew, do you think action would have been taken? 

General KEANE. It is probably likely that something would have 

been done because if that came through intelligence circles, then 

into the Criminal Investigation Division, they would come down 

and start talking to the chain of command and saying, ‘‘Look, we 

have information on this major who is dealing with an extremist. 

What have you got on this guy?’’ And they would start having a 

conversation saying, Oh, yes, we have this, this, this, and that. I 

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think that probably would have been a call to some kind of action 

on the part of the chain of command. Particularly from that external source, it would have been enough motivation to get Major 

Hason’s superiors over their reluctance to confront what they were 

facing. I think it is likely that something would have been done. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Allen, when we talked to the FBI about 

why that information was not shared, at first they said there were 

legal impediments. Then later they said they were worried about 

compromising the integrity of their investigation of the suspect in 

Yemen. Then they said that they were concerned that the ‘‘least intrusive means’’ language was somehow a barrier to sharing that information. 

Were there means by which the FBI could have passed on the 

information about Major Hasan to the military, to DOD, without 

revealing the source of the threat information? 

Mr. ALLEN. In my view, yes. Pursuing a suspected terrorist 

abroad, there are a lot of ways to do that and there is a lot of information. Clearly sources and methods on how this information involving Major Hasan was collected is very crucial. But in my view, 

that information should have been absolutely made available in its 

fullest, as required, to the appropriate authorities who have security clearances at the level required within the Department of Defense. 

This was not the first time we have let compartmentation, restricted handling as we called it at the CIA, result in casualties or 

contribute to casualties. And we, in my view, cannot afford to do 

this. The JTTF model, in my view, needs to be looked at again. It 

may not be the right model for the 21st Century and where we are 

today with the growth of extremism here in our country. 

So I think your point is well taken. My opinion is that this 

should not have been a problem, and an individual representing 

the Department of Defense—and I spent some years in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense so I know what it is like—should have 

had the system high clearances and accesses so that this could 

have been pursued appropriately with intelligence and security authorities within the Department of the Army. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Mudd, I was intrigued by your discussion of where do we go 

from here because that is really important to be our focus. Should 

we rethink the very structure of the JTTFs? You talked about having people trained together. I thought that was an excellent idea. 

But do we have this backwards? I mean, perhaps should it be that 

we are embedding FBI agents in the fusion centers more or with 

big-city police departments? Do we have the structure right? And, 

Mr. Rascoff, I am going to ask you the same question. 

Mr. MUDD. Mr. Rascoff, please just say what I say, OK? And 

then we will be OK. [Laughter.] 

I would ask the question a bit differently, if I could. There is a 

difference between a success in investigative activity out of a relatively small Joint Task Force, and I think anybody in the national 

security arena, if they had seen this picture 10 years ago, if they 

said the biggest tragedy we will face—I know it is brutal, but there 

are 13 people dead, people in this country would have said, ‘‘You 

are nuts.’’ So investigatively I think many people would say this 

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has been successful when we have a point target that comes into 

the sites, ensuring that point target—that is, a case—does not explode something in a shopping mall. 

The question we have, to get back to where I started, is: How do 

you take the mass of a revolutionary movement in this country, a 

bunch of people, angry kids in cities like we saw here with the Virginian kids going to train in Pakistan. We have seen it up and 

down the East Coast and the West Coast. I think the question 

should be not whether we reconsider the JTTFs. It is a good investigative organ. I think we ought to agnostically go and talk to the 

International Association of Chiefs of Police, fusion centers, and 

say: Forget about investigations. If we are trying to sort through 

the massive data—it might be organized crime data because that 

is a big problem or child porn data, which is the most troubling 

thing I saw at the FBI. How do we go and not just investigate— 

JTTFs are pretty good at that—but collectively sort through this 

and train to sort through this and get around now an apparatus 

where you have fusion centers that all have their own approaches, 

you have JTTFs, and you have major city departments that have 

their own capabilities that are most remarkable, which is at NYPD. 

I would get away from critiquing the JTTFs, I would say, and just 

agnostically and say how do we hunt needles in haystacks and how 

do we do it more efficiently. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Rascoff. 

Mr. RASCOFF. I would tend to agree that the conversation ought 

to—— 

Senator COLLINS. Did you have any choice? [Laughter.] 

Mr. RASCOFF. I would tend to agree that we ought to be thinking 

not just about tweaks to the institution of the JTTF, but Senator 

Collins, following your question, we ought to be thinking more comprehensively about the possibility of needing new kinds of institutions and new models for marrying up Federal and local know-how 

in this area. And it occurs to me that one kind of union that we 

ought to be thinking seriously about is a union between analysts 

within the FBI and seasoned veteran local law enforcement officials. What particular form that union takes, I do not know. I could 

imagine it being lodged within the JTTF. I could imagine it taking 

a new form altogether. But I think the concept that is important 

is somehow fusing the knowledge that is reposed within our local 

police departments already—we do not have to re-create that 

knowledge—and making sure that the FBI has the benefit of that 

knowledge by virtue of its kind of analytic talent. 

Senator COLLINS. I know my time has expired. Just one final 

comment. We still have a lot of cultural barriers to overcome here, 

and even if we change the structure, if we do not change the willingness to disseminate and analyze information and continue the 

work that Director Robert Mueller is doing in transforming the 

FBI, then there is this tendency to still just keep the information 

closely held. And that was one of the problems here. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

It is a pleasure for the first time call on Senator Johnson for 

questioning. 

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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Collins. I certainly appreciate your earlier warm welcome, and I just 

want to let you know I realize how important the work is of this 

Committee—so I requested to be on this Committee. The defense 

of our homeland is a top priority of our Nation, so I look forward 

to working with you. 

I would like to offer my condolences to the victims and the families of the victims. I hope we all understand that the men and 

women that step up to the plate and defend our Nation are the finest among us. And, again, I am eternally grateful. 

General Keane, I would like to start the questioning with you. 

First of all, thank you for your service, sir. You mentioned in your 

earlier testimony that it would be an act of moral courage to step 

forward. Can you explain what you meant by that? 

General KEANE. Well, what I was saying is that, in the absence 

of clear policy guidance about this ideology and what it stands for, 

and the fact that it is associated with a religion, people draw away 

from it. What we need is policy guidance that removes the fact that 

you have to have an act of moral courage to do something about 

it. A soldier who sees this kind of ideology manifesting itself in 

speech, who is informed, trained, and educated on it, has an obligation to report it. That should be unequivocal. That is not true 

today. There is no guidance like that today. What the soldier does 

know and what all leaders know is that anything against the good 

order and discipline of an organization, whether it is misbehavior, 

conduct, speech, etc., something should be done about that. 

But because of this ideology and the complexity of it, we need 

education and training on it, just as we did on something in this 

country that was known for hundreds of years dealing with race 

and racial extremism. We published a pamphlet in the 1990s on 

that subject because we were invaded by skinheads inside the military who were using the military for their own purposes to gain 

training, etc. And we had never confronted that before specifically. 

And we conducted training throughout the entire chain of command, from soldier to general, on what this racial extremism was, 

what its manifestation was, and what we would do about it. And 

anybody who saw it or heard it had an obligation to report it. That 

is what I mean. Take that burden off of the soldier, the sergeant, 

or the officer. Make it an obligation to report it and it is a duty 

to report it, and give them the tools to understand it. 

Senator JOHNSON. You said the officers were probably uncomfortable. Was there something more going on there, though? Was there 

a fear of reprisal and harm to their future careers? Is there that 

thing going through the military? 

General KEANE. I would suspect that the association of Islamist 

extremism with a religion is part of the problem, and that is why 

the education and training is necessary to clearly delineate what 

it is, and that we are separating the ideology from this great religion of the world, and unburdening the people in terms of the confrontation in dealing with it. I think that is certainly part of the 

issue here in terms—you have to scratch your head and say why, 

after repeated occurrences of this kind of expression, something 

was not done about it. 

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22 

Understand this, Senator. This is the U.S. military, we trump 

people’s rights when they take the oath to the Constitution. You do 

not have the right to free speech. You do not have the right to 

speak against the chain of command. You do not have the right to 

speak against the President of the United States. We can take action against that. You do not have the right to privacy. You do not 

have the right to assemble with groups of other people when you 

feel like it. Those things are denied service people because what 

comes first is the mission and the good order and discipline of an 

organization to be able to perform effectively, to be able to accomplish that mission. So everybody who has taken an oath understands that. And yet we are still unwilling to confront that behavior and that speech. 

Senator JOHNSON. Have there been military careers ruined because people step forward and complain against somebody that it 

might be politically incorrect to complain about? 

General KEANE. I have not seen it. I mean, in the organizations 

that I have been associated with all of my life, if we have somebody 

that does not reflect the values and character of the organization, 

we do something about it and counsel them, if we can. If you cannot correct that behavior, you are probably going to separate that 

person. That is the reality of it. 

Senator JOHNSON. You can see I am just puzzled why nobody reported it. 

Mr. Mudd, I was very interested in your comment about the 

Internet and the gap—I believe what you were talking about is the 

gap between what you would like to do and what you are allowed 

to do. Can you speak to that and tell me what you mean? 

Mr. MUDD. Sure. I would characterize it maybe not ‘‘like to’’ but 

‘‘could do.’’ Again, I talk to a lot of security service colleagues 

around the world, and a lot are more aggressive than we are. The 

Internet is sort of a stateless entity, but we are probably more conservative than most security organizations in how we deal with it. 

What I am saying is if you are looking at a situation like 

radicalization on the Internet, you find a note of radicalization— 

clearly we have that out of the Arabian Peninsula in this case. You 

might say to yourself, OK, I want to conduct activity to look for 

words of violence to sort through these tens of thousands of people 

who might be in contact with this individual, and then start to 

neck it down. I am most interested in people who are also pinging 

other known Web sites and the frequency with which they are 

pinging those Web sites. All these are indicators. You might say I 

want to know people who travel overseas, in particular to places I 

am worried about. Let me name Pakistan and Yemen as two places 

I would be deeply concerned about. 

I mean, I could go on and on about it, but the point is think 

about what I just said. That is a good way to boil down an ocean 

over time to a cup and then to a drop. None of those is a Federal 

violation, and some are directly involved in free speech to conduct 

preventive intelligence operations in the United States. 

Let me close with one point. I was re-reading this morning the 

Church Committee reports from the 1970s. They were very critical 

of the domestic intelligence architecture for being preventive and 

looking at things that were not Federal violations. So you are talkH605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

23 

ing about why the military might be a little nervous. I am telling 

you, the people who live in my business know where we are going 

to be in a year when we go down this road. We are going to be in 

front of another committee. 

I will close on a personal note. I was involved at CIA operations 

between 2002 and 2005 that were supported by the Department of 

Justice, briefed to the Congress, and told by the White House this 

is the policy of the United States; and I lost a job over it because 

I could not get in front of this Committee for a confirmation hearing. That is the way this town works. And, by the way, my life is 

better because of it. [Laughter.] 

But my point to illustrate this personally is that this town 

changes frequently. Unless you provide guidance, people are going 

to say, ‘‘I ain’t getting kicked a second time by the mule, because 

the first time I learned my lesson.’’ 

Senator JOHNSON. Is it guidance or is it legislation that is required? 

Mr. MUDD. That is a good question. I do not know. I am not a 

believer in overlegislating, so I would probably say get the work 

done on the analysis and see whether guidance is clear enough. If 

there is something in black and white on a piece of paper that is 

going to give people a level of comfort that they are not going to 

get attacked in a year or two because they made a mistake—and 

there are going to be mistakes, because you are going to go from 

10,000 to one, and the 200, when you are getting near the end of 

that neck, you are going to say, I have a right to get on that Web 

site. I want to see through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

request why you are looking at me, and I have a lawyer now. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Johnson. Excellent questions. 

There is a vote going off in about 5 minutes. Maybe we each can 

ask one question. At least I have one I would like to ask, which 

is: One of the big takeaways from the report, apart from the infuriating specifics, was this question of how do we develop a broader 

counter-homegrown radicalization strategy to prevent the needles 

from appearing in the haystack? Or if they do, how do we find 

them before they hurt somebody? And this obviously involves law 

enforcement and intelligence, but presumably goes beyond that. 

There is not an easy way at this point in our governmental apparatus to organize this. I just wanted to quickly invite any of you, 

do you have any thoughts about how we might achieve the establishment of this kind of counter-radicalization strategy in our country? Mr. Allen. 

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and I think this is extremely 

hard and is going to take time. But I think we have to begin. We 

formed a Director of National Intelligence in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). You all made 

further legislation, the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Implementation Act. There is a lot there that can and should be done, 

starting at the very local level and involving Federal, State, and 

local. 

We do not have, as I said in my written statement, a national 

intelligence collection plan that relates to domestic terrorism. 

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24 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. A very important point. 

Mr. ALLEN. We do not have the minimal essential needs on what 

we should be collecting within the law and authorities. I started an 

experiment over at Homeland Security as the Under Secretary— 

and Mr. Mudd may be right; he was better off not to spend 3 years 

doing what I tried to do—to develop the minimal essential requirements. We did a prototype, went out and talked to five fusion centers and with local police, and we developed a beginning set of 

what really do you want, not what comes down but what as a partner do we require with local law enforcement, with the fusion centers, and with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. So there has to be 

a unified approach. 

There are a lot of authorities there. What I would like to see 

from the Administration and from the Director of National Intelligence, as well as the Department of Homeland Security and, of 

course, the Department of Justice, all involved in building a unified 

intelligence architecture for domestic terrorism. We are not there. 

We have pieces of it, but it is not unified. I meet with informed law 

enforcement officers, former FBI officials, with the informal group 

that is led by a RAND Corporation specialist, and we have talked 

about this at length. And I believe your Committee is well aware 

of this. 

But we are in the early stages of this. We need to move on. There 

is a sense of urgency, it seems to me, given the fact that we are 

talking about not a handful but perhaps dozens of young people 

who could be influenced—Americans, American born or naturalized 

Americans, legally permitted Americans—who are going to engage 

in extremism and terrorist acts if we do not start working this as 

a unified approach in a domestic intelligence enterprise. And, very 

regrettably, we are not nearly where we should be. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I want to yield to Senator Collins in a 

minute. Mr. Rascoff, do you have a thought? 

Mr. RASCOFF. What I would like to add to Mr. Allen’s observation, Mr. Chairman, is this: I think we ought to be thinking about 

two groups of institutional actors that historically have not really 

played a role in the national security business. I think under the 

banner of a kind of whole-of-government approach, we ought to be 

thinking about Federal agencies that are not really part of our national security team, departments like the Department of Education, which has recently begun to kind of dip its toe in the water 

in the area of counter-radicalization. The Department of Education 

and other welfare-state type agencies will have a critical role to 

play. 

The second group I would like to mention are grass-roots organizations, local schools, local religious organizations. These sorts of 

non-governmental organizations who are close to the ground, I 

think, are going to have a critical role to play. So counterradicalization has to come from a White House strategy. There has 

to be leadership from the top. But I think we need to see a new 

range of institutional actors in Federal Government and local actors, specifically local non-governmental actors, getting into the 

business. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Very helpful. Let me yield to 

Senator Collins. 

H605-41331-79W7 with DISTILLER

25 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Brown was hoping to return and obviously has not been 

able to and I am sure will be submitting some questions for the 

record. But I just want the General, in particular, to know that he 

intended to ask about officer performance evaluations and to express his concern, which I also share, that it seems inconceivable 

to us that Major Hasan received these glowing performance evaluations, which the FBI relied on in part to terminate its review, despite his troubling and erratic personal behavior, but also evidence 

that he was not a very good physician. As you quoted one of his 

superior officers as saying to the people at Fort Hood, ‘‘You are getting our worst.’’ 

And that whole area I believe that our Committee or the Armed 

Services Committee does need to pursue. And I suspect that there 

is a problem with grade inflation, for lack of a better term, in these 

evaluations, because I know personally that whenever we have a 

detailee from the military and it comes to the end of that person’s 

time with us, my staff always says that I have to give them the 

highest evaluations, or it will hurt their career, even if they were 

not as good as previous officers. 

So I think there is something wrong with the evaluation system 

if it allowed Major Hasan to be promoted time and time again in 

the face of increasingly erratic and troubling behavior and also 

poor performance. So on behalf of Senator Brown and myself, I 

wanted to express those views. 

Let me just end by thanking all of you for being here today. I 

told the Chairman that I thought that this was the best possible 

panel that we could have had, and that each of you added so much. 

You all have served in public life and have done so much to help 

secure our country. I am grateful for that. And, again, I want to 

close by thanking the family members and the sergeant and his 

wife for being here. You are why we pursued this investigation, 

and I want to once again assure you that we realize that our job 

is not finished. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Just a final thought. As the new kid on the 

block here, I just wanted to say this was extremely helpful, very 

informative, and I just want to thank all four of you for your service. And, again, the victims and their families, thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator. I would just echo what 

Senator Collins has said. You have been a really excellent panel, 

both insightful and you have made some specific recommendations, 

which we will follow up on. 

The bottom line here is that the results of our investigation were 

both deeply troubling and really infuriating. And Senator Collins 

and I are intent that this report not just stay on the shelf. The fascinating thing to us was that the key Federal agencies involved, 

about whom we were critical in the report, essentially said when 

the report was issued, that the report makes some good points and 

that they are working on it. 

Sometimes that is the pathway to nothing else happening, and 

this is just too important, as the testimony of the four of you has 

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made clear. So we are going to stay on this until we are sure that 

the awful gaps that have been revealed in policy and behavior in 

the report are closed and that the problems that resulted are, to 

the best of our ability, solved. 

The record of the hearing will remain open for 15 days for additional questions and answers. Again, I thank the four witnesses. I 

thank the families. We are going to have you back. Your reward 

for coming—your punishment for coming today is that we are going 

to invite you back and have the honor of listening to your testimony on this matter. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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