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57–939 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 111–1089 

GULF COAST CATASTROPHE: ASSESSING 

THE NATION’S RESPONSE TO THE DEEPWATER 

HORIZON OIL SPILL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 17, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Senior Counsel 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Professional Staff Member 

JASON T. BARNOSKY, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

JOHN C. DETTLEFF, Minority U.S. Coast Guard Detailee 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 4 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 15 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 17 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 39 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 42 

WITNESSES 

MONDAY, MAY 17, 2010 

Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 

and Rear Admiral Peter V. Neffenger, Deputy National Incident Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security .............. 6 

Lamar McKay, Chairman and President, BP America, Inc. ................................ 26 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

McKay, Lamar: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53 

Napolitano, Hon. Janet A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Joint prepared statement with Admiral Neffenger ....................................... 44 

Neffenger, Rear Admiral Peter V.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Joint prepared statement with Secretary Napolitano ................................... 44 

APPENDIX 

Posters submitted by Senator Lieberman ............................................................. 61 

Letters submitted by Secretary Napolitano .......................................................... 67 

Responses to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record from: 

Secretary Napolitano ........................................................................................ 70 

Admiral Neffenger ............................................................................................ 100 

Mr. McKay ........................................................................................................ 111 

(1) 

GULF COAST CATASTROPHE: ASSESSING THE 

NATION’S RESPONSE TO THE DEEPWATER 

HORIZON OIL SPILL 

MONDAY, MAY 17, 2010 

U.S. SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Pryor, Landrieu, Collins, and 

McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good afternoon. The hearing will come to 

order. 

We convene today to assess the private and public sector response to what is rapidly and ominously becoming the worst oil 

spill in America’s history. We do so as part of this Committee’s responsibility to oversee the operations of government and in this 

case specifically the incident management operations of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Coast Guard 

(USCG). 

We are not here to determine how the explosion of the oil rig 

known as Deepwater Horizon happened. Nor do we seek to determine which elements of the well failed and who is responsible for 

that. Those are critically important questions, but other congressional committees, Executive Branch agencies, and private groups 

have already begun to explore those questions. 

Our focus today is on preparedness and response—the preparedness and response of our government and the private businesses involved to this accident and oil spill after they occurred. Were the 

oil companies and government agencies prepared for a deep-water 

blowout like this one? And how have they performed in response? 

Those are the big questions that we hope to begin to answer this 

afternoon. 

We owe it to the American people to learn from this catastrophe 

not only so that we can do everything we can to prevent anything 

like it from happening again but also having in mind our focus on 

preparedness and response so that we can guarantee that if it does 

happen again, the oil companies and the government will not be 

left to scurry about trying to figure out how to stop the oil gushing 

2 

into the Gulf, like firefighters trying to extinguish fires already 

burning and consuming a neighborhood. Instead, hopefully they 

will have learned lessons from this spill and will be much better 

prepared to respond quickly. 

Under the Homeland Security Act and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, the Secretary of Homeland Security is charged 

with coordinating the Federal response to major disasters. 

The Secretary is further charged with coordinating the activities 

of the private sector and non-governmental players in response to 

a disaster and must ensure that disaster information is gathered 

and disseminated to the public, and public and private sector officials. The U.S. Coast Guard is specifically responsible for managing 

a marine oil spill clean-up. 

A host of other agencies of our government—the Minerals Management Service (MMS) within the Department of Interior, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also have critical 

responsibilities in this kind of crisis. 

And, of course, the private sector companies involved here have 

enormous obligations under law. In fact, much of the actual cleanup is being conducted by contractors BP has hired to respond to the 

spill. And as provided by law, the private companies responsible for 

the spill will pay for the clean-up, regardless of who is actually carrying out the response. 

We know that the oil companies’ Oil Spill Response Plans must 

be filed and approved by the Minerals Management Service for 

wells and by the U.S. Coast Guard for drilling vessels or rigs before 

any drilling can begin. This afternoon, we are going to ask whether 

BP has adequate incident management and response plans in place 

ahead of time to guide their response efforts. Did the MMS require 

such adequate incident management and response plans? Did the 

plans specifically cover the consequences of a blowout and oil gushing 5,000 feet under water. 

We also want to know what plans were in place to guide the 

Coast Guard and other Federal agencies involved in the response. 

What capabilities did the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Department of Defense, and other agencies make available in the 

early days of the oil spill? Did they act quickly enough? And what 

response capabilities will be made available as the disaster continues? 

We are also going to ask whether our government was forced to 

over-rely on the oil company’s expertise and information here? Did 

the government have knowledge of the disaster independent of 

what BP was telling it? 

I would say myself that I have spent, since this accident and 

spill, some time studying what the law requires of the oil drilling 

companies and our government and what should be in the response 

plans that were filed and approved by the U.S. Coast Guard and 

the Minerals Management Service for the Deepwater Horizon well. 

And I must say that I emerge with an unsettling tentative conclusion and questions that I hope can be answered today by our witnesses. 

There is one set of witnesses that are not here, and I must say 

that is from MMS. I regret that the MMS leadership has chosen 

3 

not to appear before our Committee today because really they need 

to be asked the same questions I am going to ask Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and BP, because MMS, as I mentioned, must 

approve or reject the Oil Spill Response Plans for wells, which is 

where this accident occurred, before those wells can be drilled. The 

Secretary of the Interior, the department in which MMS is housed, 

will first appear tomorrow before its committee of original jurisdiction, the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. But I do want 

to say here this afternoon that, if appropriate and constructive, our 

Committee will ask the Secretary and/or leadership of the MMS to 

appear before us at a later date. 

But here in brief is some of what I have concluded tentatively 

based on my own inquiry and the questions I believe most need to 

be answered by our witnesses. BP was required to submit an Oil 

Spill Response Plan to the MMS. Under the law, this plan can be 

regional or specific to a particular well and rig. Almost 10 years 

ago, in December 2000, BP filed only a Regional Response Plan, 

and the MMS accepted it without asking for more. So BP satisfied 

its legal requirement. Was it adequate? And should MMS have 

asked for more? That regional plan was mostly recently revised on 

June 30 of last year. 

Should the government have been satisfied with only a Regional 

Response Plan instead of one for each well, and a Regional Response Plan that was filed almost a decade ago? 

Second, and more important, did our government, through the 

Minerals Management Service, require an Oil Spill Response Plan 

adequate to the widest range of possible dangers, including the failure of a blowout preventer? It sure appears that they did not. 

The response plan which BP filed and which was approved by 

the Minerals Management Service, as required, included an appendix which identifies worst-case spill scenarios and proposed methods for responding. Under MMS regulations, the plan must address 

an uncontrolled blowout at a well’s highest capacity for at least 30 

days. And in its plan, BP foresaw such a worst-case scenario for a 

deep-water blowout resulting in more than 250,000 barrels of crude 

oil being discharged every day. As people who have been following 

this crisis know, that is much more than is actually being discharged in this horrific spill occurring in the Gulf today. The estimates range from a low of 5,000 barrels daily to a high of 100,000 

barrels daily. 

But here is the problem, as I see it and want to ask about it. In 

its proposed Oil Spill Response Plan approved by the Minerals 

Management Service, BP said it could use booms and skimming 

vessels and dispersants to counter or collect more than 490,000 

barrels a day. But that was, as I see it, mostly from the surface 

where booms and skimming vessels and dispersants are mostly effective. As far as I can tell, those methods do not effectively deal 

with the enormous accumulation of oil forming now underwater in 

the Gulf, reportedly as large as 10 miles long, 3 miles wide, and 

300 feet thick. Was that a foreseen consequence of a deep-water 

well blowout? And if it was, why didn’t MMS of the Department 

of Interior require that oil companies have a better plan for responding to that consequence? 

4 

And perhaps most important, in the approved BP response plans, 

there appears to be in the end total reliance on the blowout preventer as the last line of defense, as if a blowout preventer could 

not fail. But blowout preventers have failed in the past, none with 

anywhere near the consequences of this one, but they have failed. 

And no plans were filed or requested for what to do to control and 

stop a spill if a blowout preventer in deep water failed, as it did 

in the current case. So I want to ask, why not? 

What can be done to prevent another failure of a blowout preventer in deep water or control the spill more quickly and effectively if it does? 

Until those questions are answered satisfactorily, I do not see 

how our government can allow any new deep-water wells to be permitted and drilled. And I say that with regret because I know how 

important offshore American oil is to our Nation’s energy independence. But the U.S. Government has a responsibility for protecting 

the public safety that is more important, and that responsibility, I 

fear, was not fulfilled in this case prior to the accident occurring. 

The result is the human, environmental, and economic catastrophe 

we are now witnessing in the Gulf. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, as we begin this oversight hearing into what is 

certainly an environmental catastrophe and what is likely to be an 

economic disaster, let us also remember what a personal tragedy 

this incident is for the families of the 11 workers who lost their 

lives after the explosion rocked and then sank the Deepwater Horizon oil drilling platform nearly 4 weeks ago. 

We know when this catastrophe began, but none of us knows 

when it will end. Today, 27 days after the fatal explosion and fire, 

oil continues to gush from the wellhead nearly a mile below the 

surface of the Gulf of Mexico. 

Despite recent successful efforts to siphon off a portion of the oil 

spewing from the broken pipe, the waters of the Gulf are slowly becoming a sea of crude oil. The expanding plume is menacing the 

fragile ecosystems in the Gulf, potentially damaging a vast array 

of sea life, the environment, and the futures of Americans who live 

and work along the Gulf Coast. 

NOAA has estimated that each day some 5,000 barrels of oil are 

flowing into the waters of the Gulf, but recent estimates from experts place that number as high as 70,000 barrels. Hundreds of 

Federal officials, Coast Guard personnel, scientists, engineers, and 

officials from British Petroleum search for solutions to fix this urgent problem: How do we turn off this faucet of oil that is stuck 

open nearly a mile under the water? 

In the recent weeks, we have learned much about the explosion, 

fire, and challenging response efforts, but there are still far too 

many unanswered questions. 

At today’s hearing, we will ask what the government and industry could have done differently to avoid this catastrophe. We will 

ask how the continuing damage to the Gulf of Mexico can be mitigated and how the spill can eventually be stopped. 

5 

As the Coast Guard Commandant has noted, the technological 

feats and ingenuity needed to stop this leak have parallels to the 

April 1970 rescue mission for Apollo 13. 

In responding to this catastrophe, our Nation faces a similar 

Herculean engineering task, but this time in a deep ocean environment that is dark, cold, and unforgiving. 

There are some 90 rigs drilling in the Gulf right now, providing 

1.7 million barrels of oil a day, or nearly one-third of total U.S. production. 

According to the Federal Minerals Management Service, only 0.7 

percent of active drilling platforms are searching for oil in waters 

deeper than 1,000 feet, yet more than 50 percent of all leases are 

in those deep waters. Clearly, oil companies believe there is much 

promise in deep-water drilling; therefore, there could be a rapid expansion in this area in coming years. In light of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, we must examine whether we need special requirements for drilling operations in these challenging conditions. And 

until we figure out what went wrong, I believe the Administration 

is correct in calling for a halt to the approval of further drilling in 

deep waters. 

MMS has the responsibility for reviewing and approving Oil Spill 

Response Plans for drilling conducted by offshore rigs like the 

Deepwater Horizon. We need to explore what level of preparedness 

MMS requires of companies seeking to drill in this hazardous environment. 

For the Coast Guard to effectively perform its role in marine environmental protection, it must work closely with the MMS and 

with the private sector in order to be prepared for a worst-case scenario. 

To that end, I was surprised to learn that there currently exists 

no requirement for MMS to share Oil Spill Response Plans with 

the Coast Guard. 

How can that be? It seems to me that mandating concurrent 

Coast Guard approval of these plans is a common-sense change 

that we should make immediately. 

Today, we will also hear more about the Department of Homeland Security’s coordination of the response to the spill. The Federal Government and the private sector have committed substantial resources to respond to this spill, and these efforts will certainly continue. But concerns have been raised regarding the adequacy and timeliness of resources committed to this effort in the 

initial days of the blowout. 

Furthermore, with the Administration’s proposed $75 million cut 

in the Coast Guard’s budget, it is a question in my mind whether 

the Coast Guard can continue to maintain sufficient capabilities to 

respond to this and future disasters, along with performing its 

myriad other missions. Surely, this catastrophe should prompt the 

Administration to reconsider that ill-conceived budget cut. It is always the Coast Guard, whether it is Hurricane Katrina, the crisis 

in Haiti, or the oil spill in the Gulf Coast region that is always first 

to respond, and the last thing we should be doing is reducing the 

number of Coast Guard uniformed personnel by more than 1,000 

individuals, as the Administration’s budget proposes. 

6 

1The joint prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano and Admiral Neffenger appears in the 

Appendix on page 44. 

Finally, the private sector must accept responsibility for this failure in modern engineering, and we need to take a close look at the 

liability caps to see whether they still are adequate. 

This oil spill, when it finally does conclude, will be recorded as 

an epic catastrophe whose impacts are likely to be felt for a long 

time to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

We will go right to Secretary Napolitano. Secretary, it says the 

obvious that you have one of, in my opinion, the toughest jobs in 

America. I thank you for what you do every day, and I appreciate 

your willingness to come before this Committee of oversight of 

original jurisdiction over your Department for this testimony this 

afternoon. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. JANET A. NAPOLITANO,1 SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; AND REAR ADMIRAL PETER V. NEFFENGER, DEPUTY NATIONAL INCIDENT 

COMMANDER, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Collins and Members of the Committee. I look forward to this opportunity to testify about the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, some of your questions are probably better directed at the Department of Interior or for British Petroleum itself, but I will be testifying about what happened, what 

the original response was, and how we coordinated the ongoing response. Rear Admiral Peter Neffenger is here to answer any questions of a technical nature that I am not myself able to answer, although I must say I have learned, as we all have, a lot about oil 

spills over the last 4 weeks. 

I want to begin by thanking the men and women of the Coast 

Guard who have been at this event from its beginning. They have 

worked swiftly, they have worked tirelessly in response to what, as 

Senator Collins rightly noted, is one of the most devastating environmental disasters this Nation has ever faced. And I also would 

like to express my own sympathies to the families of the workers 

who were killed in the initial explosion. It was a terrible human 

tragedy, even as we continue to deal with the environmental outflow from it. 

It is a constantly evolving situation. The Federal Government 

has brought all resources to bear to limit the spills, environmental, 

economic, and public health impacts, and ensure that communities 

and natural resources of the Gulf Coast are restored and made 

whole by British Petroleum. 

DHS, as you noted, is the principal coordinating agency. I believe 

this may be the first time that the Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 5 (HSPD–5) has actually been overlaid on the National 

Response Framework, enabling us to coordinate across the many 

7 

Federal agencies and to do the interagency consultation and involvement necessary for this spill. 

We are literally working 24/7 in close coordination with our State 

and local partners to ensure the efficient deployment of response 

assets, personnel, and equipment, and the impact to date bespeaks 

of their extensive efforts. 

First, I would like to give you a quick update on the current status as of the time I left the National Advisory Council (NAC), and 

then I would like to give you some detail on the original response 

because it is of some important interest to many of you. 

More than 17,000 personnel are currently in the Gulf Coast region conducting response activities. In addition, more than 2,100 

volunteers have been trained to help deal with any potential effects 

of oil onshore. More than 750 vessels are currently responding to 

the spill. They include skimmers, tugs, barges, and recovery vessels 

that assist in containment and clean-up efforts. This is in addition 

to dozens of aircraft, remotely operated vehicles, and other assets 

being deployed. 

We have deployed 1.7 million feet of boom to date, and we have 

another 1.9 million feet of boom in the supply chain. Aircraft are 

constantly monitoring the integrity of the boom and are directing 

pollution response teams to make necessary adjustment to the 

lines. 

We are able, with these supplies, to ensure that we can respond 

within 24 hours or 5 miles of oil hitting shore, whichever would be 

sooner. Let me just say that the boom is set up and deployed in 

staging areas so that it can be deployed within 24 hours or 5 miles 

of oil, whichever would be sooner. 

More than 6.6 million gallons of oily water have been recovered. 

Approximately 625,000 gallons of dispersant have been applied. 

This includes approximately 45,000 gallons applied sub-sea, a 

method that has been approved by the National Response Team 

(NRT) and for the first time. 

Seventeen staging areas are currently set up to protect vital 

shoreline. We have approved the use of up to 17,500 National 

Guard members; more than 1,350 are currently deployed. 

All shipping channels and ports remain open in the Gulf Coast 

region. There are no reported delays or closures to shipping. No 

vessels have required cleaning or decontamination, but our teams 

are on standby if such a need arises. 

Drilling has commenced on both relief wells, which will relieve 

pressure and permanently stop the flow of oil. Yesterday BP attempted another test to contain some of the oil leaking from the 

riser by inserting a small pipe into it carrying oil directly up to the 

surface to a colleague vessel. 

As of this morning, BP reports the pipe is recovering some oil 

and gas; there is no confirmation yet on the rate of flow. MMS and 

BP are monitoring this test closely today and adjusting pressures 

to achieve the highest concentrations of oil being brought to the 

surface. 

Now, it is important to note that even if this effort is successful, 

it will not change our posture. We will continue to bring all resources to bear until the well is tapped, the oil is cleaned up, and 

the claims are paid. 

8 

That said, we are also actively exploring other methods to mitigate the spill’s impact. Right now, Federal scientists are continuing 

to provide oversight and expertise to BP as they move forward with 

other strategies to contain the spill and stop the flow of oil. And 

this weekend, BP staged equipment for a technique called the top 

kill, which will pump heavy fluids into the well in an attempt to 

stop the flow of oil. This operation is expected to start at the end 

of this week. 

Now, as I said earlier, the response to this incident began immediately and has remained constant and strong over the past 4 

weeks. When the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon occurred late 

at night on Tuesday, April 20, the Coast Guard was first on the 

scene with two cutters and aircraft, beginning a large-scale searchand-rescue effort. By the morning, 115 crew members were accounted for. 

On April 21, we named Rear Admiral Mary Landry the Federal 

on-scene coordinator, stood up the regional response team, which is 

compromised of Federal, State, and local representatives, and 

launched an interagency investigation. In other words, from April 

21, we were already beginning to bring resources to bear in an 

intergovernmental way to this tragedy. 

On the morning of Thursday, April 22, the oil rig sank, with 

700,000 gallons of diesel fuel onboard. This prompted the immediate activation of the National Response Team, which includes the 

leadership across the Federal Government from the White House 

to DHS to the EPA and the Departments of Defense, Commerce, 

and Interior. I lead the NRT as the principal Federal official responsible for coordinating the Federal response. 

That same day, President Obama convened a principals meeting 

about the incident. At this time, there were no apparent oil leaks, 

but 100,000 gallons of dispersants were prepositioned. We also initiated intergovernmental calls to provide updates on the situation 

to potentially affected communities along the Gulf Coast. 

On Friday, April 23, the sunken rig was found on the ocean floor, 

with an oil sheen estimated at 8,400 gallons nearby. No oil leak 

was apparent, but the NRT convened in order to plan ahead in case 

the situation deteriorated and continued to preposition vessels and 

dispersants and hundreds of thousands of feet of boom in preparation for such a worst-case scenario. 

The next day, Saturday, April 24, BP found the first two leaks 

and alerted the Federal Government. The first three equipment 

staging locations were stood up at Venice, Louisiana; Biloxi, Mississippi; and Pensacola, Florida. And additional personnel and vessels were deployed to the area. We began to actually move additional boom there the next day. 

On Wednesday, April 28, the first controlled burn operation was 

conducted, and it was successful. Later that day, BP discovered an 

additional leak from the oil well. By this time, the discovery of the 

third leak, we had already mustered 50 response vessels; roughly 

150,000 feet of boom had been deployed; we had applied 56,000 gallons of dispersants; and we had over 1,000 personnel working the 

scene. 

9 

On Thursday, April 29, I designated the events a Spill of National Significance, which built on the operational and policy coordination already underway from the beginning of this response. 

Now, by this day, we had 70 vessels already on scene, 1,100 personnel, and more boom and dispersant at the ready. On May 1, we 

announced that Admiral Thad Allen, the outgoing Commandant of 

the Coast Guard, would serve as the National Incident Commander. 

Now, let me briefly describe the ongoing response activities. We 

are doing everything we can to ensure that vital response assets, 

personnel, and equipment are efficiently and effectively deployed 

and utilized. I have visited each of the affected States to see that 

response efforts are underway and firsthand, meeting with governors, mayors, first responders, and impacted communities. 

We are working closely with State and local governments every 

step of the way on joint response plans and through the command 

centers. We have daily calls with governors, mayors, and Members 

of the Congress. We are overseeing BP, the responsible party, in its 

efforts to stop the leak at its source, reduce the spread of oil, protect the shoreline, and mitigate damages. 

Drilling relief wells, which will relieve pressure and permanently 

stop the flow of oil, as I mentioned is underway. The Federal Government has mobilized its best scientists and industry experts to 

work with BP to identify other strategies for sealing the well, and 

the President has tasked the Department of Energy to provide expertise on that front. 

Above the surface, we continue to conduct controlled burns, skim 

oil, and apply chemical dispersants to reduce the amount of oil and 

break up the slick far offshore. We are deploying boom to protect 

shoreline and wildlife in all the Gulf States that could be affected 

and immediately dispatching clean-up teams when oil, generally in 

the form of tar balls, reaches the shore. 

We are keeping the public engaged and making sure that people 

who want to volunteer for clean-up, for helping to deploy boom, or 

in other ways can help. And we are ensuring that British Petroleum, as the responsible party, is paying the costs of the clean-up 

and compensating the individuals, communities, and businesses 

that have suffered already as the result of this spill. 

Actually, beginning today, their claims can actually be filed online, an access point we have been urging BP to make available for 

the past few weeks. So far, over 16,000 claims have been filed by 

affected individuals and businesses. BP has paid out over $9.6 million. It has not yet denied a claim. 

Looking ahead, the Administration will continue the strong response that we have sustained since April 20. We will mobilize 

every available resource to protect the environment, the economy, 

and public health in the Gulf Coast region, with all hands on deck. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to be with you 

today. I will be happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Secretary. We 

will do a 7-minute round of questions. 

I appreciate very much the response efforts, really quite enormous, that you have described, Secretary Napolitano, that the government is involved in and that BP is involved in. But I want to 

10 

go back again to some of the questions I raised in my opening 

statement, and this really goes to preparedness uniquely for a 

problem with a deep-water well. Madam Secretary, it may end up 

that this is technical stuff and you want the Admiral to respond— 

let me just speak as somebody who has been watching this. As you 

watch, and as we watch the company and the government, trying 

desperately to figure out how to close this well to stop this spill in 

the Gulf, we obviously have to conclude that people were not prepared to do it, were not prepared to deal with this kind of problem. 

In fact, as the company said, quite honestly, they had capped wells 

before, perhaps some that had a failure of the blowout preventer 

(BOP), but never at this depth. 

So why shouldn’t the Committee, I, or anybody in this country 

conclude that, in fact, we were not prepared, either the government 

or the company, by demand of the permitting authorities, to deal 

with this kind of blowout of a deep-water well? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Let me divide it, if I might, Mr. Chairman, into before the blowout and after the blowout. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think before the blowout, it is clear that 

there was an assumption that a BOP would never fail, and that 

plans were submitted to the MMS, which is part of the Department 

of Interior, based on that assumption. And I have read some of the 

same materials that you have. 

But from the point of view of an explosion and a spill, there have 

been extensive plans prepared under the National Response 

Framework. There are area contingency plans which are put together. They include intensive input from State, localities, and parishes. There are Regional Response Plans. Then there is the National Response Framework. 

Those plans not only exist but are exercised on a regular basis. 

Indeed, I think there was an Area Response Plan for an oil-related 

incident just in March off the coast of Maine, Senator Collins, and 

there was a national exercise with the exact premise of this, which 

is a major spill in the Gulf Coast. That was done in 2002, and Admiral Allen was the national commander for that exercise, and, indeed, he is the national incident commander here. 

So to the extent that before spill there was overreliance perhaps 

on the BOP, that will become more clear as the investigation proceeds. Post-spill, though, there was an extensive planning exercise 

framework in place. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. But isn’t it true that—and, Admiral, 

I welcome you to come in on this—those kinds of drills were not 

really to deal with a blowout in a deep-water well? In other words, 

there was a lot of work done, and there has been enormous effort 

at response, and I think it has really had an effect on the water 

on the surface. But now we have two enormous problems that I do 

not believe, unless you can convince me otherwise, that we were 

ready to deal with, and the company was not either, which is: 

What do you do when a deep-water well blows? And then what do 

you do about the oil under the water that is now accumulating in 

this massive plume? 

11 

Admiral does the Coast Guard—I know you do a lot of drills. 

How do you train for dealing with the consequences of a deep-water 

well explosion? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Mr. Chairman, we do not drill this specific 

scenario, no. And what the Secretary was referring to was the Spill 

of National Significance exercise that we do every 3 years throughout the country. 

We do, however, drill for massive oil releases, and in this case, 

we did drill in 2002 for a massive oil release from a wellhead discharge in the Gulf of Mexico, although it was not at all like this 

specific scenario. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And was it as deep as this well? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. No, sir, it was not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And as Senator Collins said, my understanding is that increasingly in the Gulf and elsewhere we are 

using deep-water wells. Is that true based on what you know? We 

are deep-water drilling? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I do not know the exact number of 

deep-water wells. I know that it is some 1 percent of all the wells 

that are out there, and I guess I would have to refer to MMS for 

the exact number. But there is an increasing amount of activity in 

the deeper parts of the outer continental shelf, yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I know that the Coast Guard—and correct 

me if I am wrong—has responsibility for approving Oil Spill Response Plans that come from what is called the vessel or what I 

would call the rig, that is on the surface of the water. And the Minerals Management Service at the Interior Department has to approve the plans for a spill from a well, at no matter what depth. 

But I wanted to ask you two things. One is, going back to something I said in my opening statement, does it make sense that BP 

was unable to file just a Regional Response Plan, which presumably would cover both deep-water and more shallow water wells, as 

opposed to a specific response plan for each well, particularly the 

deep-water wells? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I can tell you that in our case we require specific response plans per vessel that we think might have 

the potential to discharge—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK, that is very important. So you have 

a different approach than MMS does on that. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Yes, sir, we do. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is important. 

Let me just ask you finally, because my time is winding down— 

I think the Secretary said it correctly, and I agree with her from 

what I have looked at. There was total reliance put on this blowout 

preventer, but in the end, like so much in life, it is a piece of equipment and they fail. In fact, there was some evidence, as I said, that 

the blowout preventers had failed in the past—not a large number, 

and never with a spill of this kind. But because the Coast Guard 

has responsibility for marine oil spills, what do you think should 

be done to try to have a level of preparedness that allows for the 

possibility—which may be rare, but as we see now in the Gulf, consequences are enormous of a failure of a blowout preventer? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, Senator, I think that this spill raises 

a lot of questions like that at which we are going to have to take 

12 

a good, hard look. Clearly, this is beyond what we anticipated being 

something that could happen. We certainly never anticipated an 

ongoing release of this magnitude over this period of time. So I 

think that is a very real question that has to be addressed. 

I think at a minimum we are going to have to go back and look 

at our planning factors for future revisions of our various contingency plans. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Madam Secretary, I know that you are 

working with Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar and maybe one or 

two others on this short-term study that the President has asked 

you to do, and I am sure you probably were doing it already. I hope 

that you will take a close look at the special requirements for protection that it seems to me we now have all learned have to apply 

to deep-water drilling, including the blowout preventers, that I fear 

were not applied by MMS before. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. If I might, Mr. Chairman, with every incident that occurs, lessons are learned, and I think that is one of 

the reasons why the President has been so very clear that further 

deep-water drilling permits are going to be stopped until this can 

be investigated and assurances can be gained that things have 

been changed so that we do not have a duplication of the Deepwater Horizon incident. And I think, prudence would dictate that 

would be what would happen. 

And so I think we are all working together to say, all right, what 

happened here? What powers should MMS have had that it did not 

have? What powers did it have that it did not exercise? Was there 

overreliance on the BOP? What happened with the BOP? I think 

that perhaps there may be a few lawyers that get involved in some 

of that as the litigation happens. But I think the President was absolutely right last Friday to say this is not about who is responsible 

for paying. Our work is to make sure that this well is capped, to 

make sure that it is cleaned up, to make sure that oil is prevented 

from hitting landfall, and when it does, that it is cleaned up, that 

all claims are paid, and that they are done so promptly. And, to 

me, that is the definition right now of this response and when we 

will declare the response over. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman mentioned the divided responsibility for approval 

of the Oil Response Plans between MMS and the Coast Guard. In 

my statement, I raised the question of why wouldn’t you require 

the Coast Guard to have some sharing of information with the 

MMS such that the Coast Guard would be responsible for some 

sort of concurrent approval of the plan. It does not make a lot of 

sense at first blush to have one agency responsible for approving 

the plan if it is above the water, for the vessel, and a different 

agency—in a different Department even—responsible if the plan 

applies to the wellhead. Has there been any thought to at least 

broadening the Coast Guard’s responsibility in this area, Madam 

Secretary? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator Collins, I think there will be a 

lot of different things looked at as to who has what authorities and 

what authorities need to be adjusted in light of this. And speaking 

13 

for myself right now, I think that is one of the legitimate questions 

or authorities that we need to be looking into. 

Senator COLLINS. Admiral Neffenger. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I would concur with the Secretary. I think 

that, moving forward, we need to look at whether or not there 

needs to be a definitive statement with respect to that concurrent 

review. 

As you know, we do currently have memoranda of understanding 

with the MMS which would allow us to review those plans, but 

there is no requirement to do so. 

Senator COLLINS. Admiral, this catastrophe is the first spill to be 

classified as a Spill of National Significance since that term was 

first coined in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989. During the intervening 20-plus years, some have expressed the concern 

that because our Nation, fortunately, has not been forced to respond to a major oil spill in such a long time, we have lost the expertise and institutional knowledge that is necessary for a quick 

and effective response. And, indeed, in 2004, when the Coast Guard 

did an exercise in this area, the After Action Report had some troubling conclusions, and I want to read from that. 

The After Action Report concluded that, ‘‘Oil spill response personnel did not appear to have even a basic knowledge of the equipment required to support salvage or spill clean-up operations. 

There was a shortage of personnel with experience to fill key positions. Many mid-level spill management staff had never worked on 

a large spill, and some had never been involved in an exercise.’’ 

I know that there have been two subsequent exercises since 

2004, including the one hosted by the State of Maine this spring, 

for which the After Action Report has not yet been written. But 

what is your assessment of the expertise that we have today in 

government and in the industry to deal with a major spill? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, Senator, I think you are referring to 

the 2004 drill in Los Angeles, Long Beach Harbor. I was actually 

the unified commander for that exercise, and those were my recommendations that you just read that came out of that. So I took 

that very seriously—— 

Senator COLLINS. So you tend to agree with them. [Laughter.] 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I did at the time. I absolutely did. 

And as a result of that, though, we actually did a lot of work to 

improve our ability. And, in fact, if you look at the subsequent 

Spills of National Significance exercises as well as the intervening 

periodic annual and triennial exercises that we do, we have rolled 

a lot of those lessons learned into that so that we could improve 

that capability. 

It is true that we have not had a major spill, but that does not 

keep you from training effectively to prepare for that. 

Senator COLLINS. Do we have that expertise now? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, clearly, if you are actually cleaning 

up oil, there is an expertise that you develop that cannot be developed any other way. 

I think we have capability now, and we have a lot of people who 

have looked at this over an extended period of time, and you have 

capability also in the private industry with respect to the oil spill 

response organizations, and they are required to maintain experVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:38 Oct 26, 2011 Jkt 057939 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57939.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14 

tise. And you still have a number of ongoing smaller spills every 

single year that do provide an opportunity for training people and 

responding. 

So I do believe that we have the capability, and in the case of 

this spill, I have been very impressed—I spent quite a bit of the 

last 2 weeks down in the Gulf, both flying over the area of the spill 

as well as visiting the incident command post and watching the onscene operations, and I have been very impressed with what I have 

seen. 

Senator COLLINS. Madam Secretary, you mentioned in your 

statement the Federal resources that have been brought to bear in 

this catastrophe and the fact that the Coast Guard was on the 

scene immediately. As you know, there have been some questions 

about whether resources were adequately and quickly deployed to 

deal with this catastrophe. After all, I assume when the Coast 

Guard was first on site, its mission was search and rescue. It was 

not at that point, and understandably so, focused on containing the 

spill. 

What is your assessment of the resources, the adequacy and the 

timeliness of the resources that British Petroleum and its partners 

brought to the task in those initial days? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I thought you were going to ask a different question. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, I thought of asking you whether you were 

satisfied with the Federal response, but I have a feeling I know 

what the answer to that would be, so I decided to ask you about 

the private sector response. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, yes, and that is one of the reasons 

why I wanted to give you really the tick-tock of the Federal response, because recognizing that the explosion occurred late on the 

evening of April 20, then on April 22, the rig sinks; on April 24 you 

begin first seeing signs of leaking oil; and then on April 28 is when 

you had signs of the third leak from the riser. So this was an evolving spill as we were going along that first week after the explosion. 

I would like to, if I might, reserve judgment on the adequacy of the 

private sector response. 

I will say that British Petroleum leadership, both the American 

head of British Petroleum and the international head, were in 

Washington very quickly. They were immediately assuming responsibility as the responsible party, which they should and should 

have. They have been in the command centers and in the staging 

areas. They have been working in terms of clean-up and hiring, for 

example, local fishermen to help deploy boom and the rest. 

Whether the exact hours around the explosion and sinking of the 

rig they should have had more or different equipment there or 

more or different kinds of expertise there, it would be premature 

of me to say. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator McCain, and then Senator Landrieu, in order of appearance. Good afternoon. 

15 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Thank you for being here, Madam 

Secretary and Admiral. Maybe, Madam Secretary, to lift this up a 

little bit, what is your best-case scenario and worst-case scenario 

about this crisis right now? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, obviously, we would like to see the 

insertion pipe continue to work and lift oil off the surface. We 

would like to see when and if the top kill methodology is deployed, 

that it works and that oil immediately begins to be lifted off of the 

sea floor as opposed to rising to sea surface, and we would like, as 

they are drilling the relief well, that they hit it the first time. In 

other words, when you drill these deep-water wells, my understanding is you do not necessarily hit the place you need to hit the 

first time. That would be a best-case scenario. 

We, on the other hand, have from the beginning not planned our 

response based on numbers or based on was it 5,000 barrels or 

25,000 barrels. Our response is geared to what is necessary to fight 

the oil on the sea, to prevent the oil from hitting land, and if it hits 

land, to clean it up immediately. 

Senator MCCAIN. Worst-case scenario? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Worst-case scenario is that we will be at 

this for quite a while. 

Senator MCCAIN. And where do you think we are in either scenario? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, the riser tube is in right now, and 

if it begins to lift oil, as it looks promising that it is, and they are 

able to do the junk fill, that would happen by the end of the week. 

But in terms of drilling of the relief well, I think we are some 

weeks away, well into the summer. I think there is a BP witness 

after me. You might ask him. 

Senator MCCAIN. And where is your level of optimism? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I am just taking it day by day, and I 

think that is what we need to do. I think we need to just say, look, 

we are in the middle of this crisis; we are not at the beginning. We 

have been at it a month, almost, but we are not near the end, as 

well. And in my view, our job is to just keep moving and just keep 

assembling, deploying, preparing, cleaning, and keeping track of 

what we are spending because ultimately the taxpayers should not 

have to bear this cost. 

Senator MCCAIN. And you have dispatched 17,000 National 

Guard troops to help with the clean-up and other efforts that need 

to be made in the Gulf of Mexico. Is that right? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. There have been up to 17,000 that have 

been authorized. I believe there are about 1,000 or so that are actually working right now. 

Senator MCCAIN. And what do you expect? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. It depends on whether we continue to see 

oil reaching the shore. We are going to have to start rotating people in and out in terms of doing air flights over the boom, monitoring it, and replacing it, because it does not last forever out 

there. It gets broken. We are going to need to replace people in 

terms of staffing the forward operating centers and the like. So I 

think over the course of the summer, we will see a number of the 

Guard deployed in those kinds of capacities, sir. 

16 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, if you will indulge me, we think we have 

another crisis on the U.S. Southern Border. I sent you a letter back 

in March, and you sent me a return letter back on April 9—well 

over a month ago, in response to our request that the National 

Guard be sent to the Arizona-Mexico border. And I quote from your 

response: ‘‘The National Guard has the potential to contribute additional capabilities and capacities to assist law enforcement agencies 

in their border security and law enforcement missions. The use of 

the Guard to support civilian law enforcement efforts is one of the 

many options being considered in the Administration’s overall border security strategy. I will keep you informed as our force multiplication along the Southwest Border continues.’’ 

Do you have now in the intervening month anything to keep me 

informed about? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I do, actually, because we have been 

working the Southwest Border issue constantly and hard. But let 

me, if I might, Senator—and we will give your staff, if we have not 

already, I apologize, a more extensive briefing. And I am going to 

use as my start date the date of the murder of Rob Krentz, who 

was the rancher down there in Douglas, Arizona. 

We have increased flight hours 50 percent over the Tucson sector 

since the day of that murder. We have 24/7 coverage there, and we 

continue to increase on both the fixed and rotor-wing aircraft that 

we are applying—just on the Tucson sector. I am not talking about 

the rest of the border. 

We have moved—and I will give you exact numbers—mobile surveillance—— 

Senator MCCAIN. I do not mean to interrupt, Madam Secretary, 

but I know all those things are going on. I want to know about 

whether you are going to send the National Guard to the border 

or not? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Let me, if I might, give you one other 

thing that we have added in addition to numbers, and that will be 

starting at the end of this month. But we are beginning again the 

process of interior repatriation of everybody that we pick up. 

But with respect to the Guard, those requests, as you know, involve the Department of Defense, they involve the Department of 

Homeland Security, and they involve the White House. That request and that analysis remains in that interagency process. 

Senator MCCAIN. And do we have any idea as to when that decision might be made? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would like it to be made as soon as possible, but I cannot give you a date certain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, meanwhile, people’s homes are being violated, and families cannot take their kids to the bus stop. You are 

very familiar with the issue because you yourself asked for the National Guard to go to the Arizona-Mexico Border back in 2006. So 

I do not know what it takes for us to get a decision on it. This is 

a longstanding request—in fact, it was originally requested back in 

2009. I think the citizens of Arizona have the right to know whether the National Guard will be sent or not. So I would hope you 

would expedite that process, at least telling us whether or not they 

are going to be deployed. 

17 

Finally, if I might ask, have you had a chance to review the new 

law—S. 1070, that was passed by the State of Arizona? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I have not reviewed it in detail. I certainly know of it, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you are not prepared to make a judgment 

on it? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, as you know and are well 

aware, that is not the kind of law I would have signed. 

Senator MCCAIN. And for what reason? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Because I believe that it is a bad law enforcement law. I believe it mandates and requires local law enforcement—or puts them in a position many do not want to be placed 

in. When I was dealing with laws of that ilk, most of the law enforcement organizations in Arizona at that time were opposed to 

such legislation. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I would be pleased, maybe in writing, to 

hear what specific aspect of the law would impede or harm law enforcement considering the majority of law enforcement in Arizona 

strongly supports this legislation. And, unfortunately, the President of the United States portrayed the law’s effect as preventing 

people from going out for ice cream without being harassed. This 

is one of the more outrageous statements I have ever heard. And 

now our own Attorney General has, after condemning the law, said 

that he had not even read it. 

This is an important issue not just in Arizona but around this 

country. I would hope that we would at least have a decision on 

whether the National Guard is going to be sent to the border. And 

I would like to have specifics, if you get time. I know it is not in 

your area of expertise anymore, but I know as the former governor 

of Arizona you have a significant interest in Arizona’s border security. So I ask that your writing state the particular aspects of this 

law that you find objectionable. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator McCain. 

Senator Landrieu, thanks for being here. Once again, unfortunately, you have come to one of these inquiries—as you did so often 

during the Hurricane Katrina investigations—with a real personal 

interest on behalf of your State. So I appreciate that you are here. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My job is made 

somewhat easier because of the work that you and the Ranking 

Member have done, and I mean that sincerely. 

I thank you and Senator Collins for calling this hearing. I have 

actually encouraged the calling of hearings in a variety of different 

committees because obviously the people that I represent would 

like answers. They are extremely concerned, everyone in the State, 

along the Gulf Coast, particularly those along the coastal communities, Madam Secretary. So I want to begin, Mr. Chairman, by 

saying that I hope that we will get answers to the questions that 

you asked in your opening statement, and I thought that they were 

excellent and right on point. 

Second, Madam Secretary, I want to thank you for your multiple 

visits to Louisiana over the last several months before this incident 

18 

happened, working on the last incident that occurred, as well as 

your time focused on this one, and the many senior-level officials 

that have been on the ground from the Coast Guard to the Interior 

Department to NOAA to EPA. You all have not just sent your midmanagers or your newly appointed directors, but your Cabinet officials have been there and continue to be. And I get good feedback 

from Republican and Democratic local officials because of that, and 

I want to on their behalf express our thanks. 

I would say that the people in Louisiana are very interested in 

a couple of important questions, some of which you hit. When will 

this uncontrolled flow be stopped? Is everything being done that 

can possibly be done? When and how will claims be paid? Will they 

be transparent? Will they be adequate? What are the long-term impacts to our fisheries? Which is a multi-billion-dollar industry as 

you know. And how can this industry be made safer for the future? 

I am not going to ask you to respond to all four of those now, but 

in writing, I would like some response. 

I would like, Mr. Chairman, to put some things in perspective for 

this situation. I think it is important. I did this at the oversight 

hearing of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, I did 

this at the oversight hearing for the Committee on Environment 

and Public Works, and I would like to do it today. 

There are 42,645 wells that have been drilled in State and Federal waters in the Gulf of Mexico alone. The first deep well was 

drilled 31 years ago—not last week. The first deep well was 31 

years ago in 1979. From that time until 2008, there have been 

2,239 deep-water wells drilled averaging approximately 133 wells 

per year. 

Getting to your point, Ranking Member Collins, in 1990, you are 

correct, only 4 percent of the oil coming from the Gulf was from the 

deep-water wells, only 4 percent. But today 60 percent of the oil 

coming from the Gulf comes from deep water and ultra deep water. 

The record will show that from 1947 to 2009 only 175,000 barrels 

have been spilled out of 16 billion produced. That is about onethousandth of 1 percent of total production. 

So until this happened, the record was pretty good. The problem 

is this blowout is putting more oil in the water in 11⁄2 days than 

has been put in this water in the last decade. That is startling to 

those of us that are fairly familiar with the industry, and we are 

extremely concerned and want it to be safer. 

So I support the President’s 30-day look. I most certainly support 

tighter controls over deep-water wells and would say to this Committee, we pioneered this technology in the Gulf of Mexico. We did. 

It is important that we get this right because it has a major impact 

on how these wells are drilled around the world. If ours are safe, 

most other countries’ will be safe, and we have an obligation not 

just to ourselves but to the people of the planet, actually. 

So let me ask a couple of things because I am extremely interested in how much money our government has spent on research 

and development either through Homeland Security, EPA, NOAA, 

or the Interior Department. Do you have a record for your own 

agency—you will not have it for other agencies—Madam Secretary, 

do you know if any money and, if so, what the dollar amount or 

what percentage is spent on response to a catastrophe like this? 

19 

And if you do not have that exact number, could you give it to me 

in writing and maybe comment generally on if you think Homeland 

Security is doing what it needs to do to be better prepared or prepared for an incident like this? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, as I said earlier, you learn from 

every incident. You begin with the plans, and you exercise the 

plans. But then as any incident coordinator or commander will tell 

you, you have to work the problem at that point. You have to go 

at it. And that is what we have been doing. 

I will tell you, we are accumulating within the Department of 

Homeland Security the costs that we are expending. In our Department’s response, that includes the Coast Guard. It will not be an 

insignificant sum. And we have asked through the NRT that the 

other Federal agencies keep track of the costs that they are expending. 

Since we are really in the middle of a response, as I indicated 

to Senator McCain, I think it would be premature to give you an 

estimate of that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. I just want to restate on this. I know 

that we do not have the full estimate of what the costs are going 

to be, and I am assuming that BP if going to step up, as they have 

said, and cover all of these costs for individuals, for businesses, and 

for the government at every level. And I know that they have been 

forthcoming with some of the requests from our governors, $25 million in authority, up to $1 million for some of the counties, which 

has been impressive. But we may need more than that. 

But it is the research and development dollars in these major 

agencies that I am wondering, considering this industry, just the 

industry for bonuses and severance have contributed $165 billion 

to the Federal Treasury since 1955—$165 billion. What percentage 

of our budgets and their budgets—I am going to be asking them— 

are going to research and development on specifically safety, equipment, new technology, and clean-up? Because we may need, I suggest, to invest more money to make sure this never happens again. 

So we are going to try to collect that data, Mr. Chairman, and 

my time has expired. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Landrieu. 

Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

and Senator Collins for leading the effort on this. 

Let me, if I may, Madam Secretary, start with you, and talk 

about the Stafford Act. Typically, a disaster happens, and the governors make requests. But I am assuming that you have already 

done quite a bit of work with the governors to understand the 

scope and the nature of their request. Could you give us just a little outline on what you think this next few weeks might look like 

down there? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, well, we have representatives of the 

governors in all of the various command centers down there, as 

well as we have a daily call with the governors. And we are working with them now on what the claims process should be for States 

and localities. 

20 

We are very cognizant of long-term economic damages that might 

pertain such as to some of the fisheries down there that have been 

closed by NOAA already. And so we are working our way through 

that. 

As you know, Senator, this is not a Stafford Act situation. This 

comes under another statute altogether, and the difference is huge, 

because under the Stafford Act the taxpayers of the United States 

pay for the response. Under this one, the responsible party is going 

to pay. And so we are in the process of making sure there is a good 

and easy procedure for those claims to be made. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Let me ask Rear Admiral Neffenger, I know 

that in other circumstances, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), for example, might just burn through resources 

very rapidly on a major disaster. Is that true with your agency in 

how you are dealing with this? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, as the Secretary mentioned, we are 

spending money every day to manage this response. But as she 

also mentioned, what the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 provides is an 

ability to reach into the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, the emergency fund of that, to fund some of those initial response actions. 

There is an initial $50 million available. We can take a one-time 

transfer of another $100 million into that emergency fund, which 

we have done. We have asked for it, and it has been granted. So 

that provided $150 million to the Federal Government for its response actions, and that is primarily paying for Coast Guard activities at this point. 

Senator PRYOR. And I know in this Committee we have talked 

about the Coast Guard before and how you guys just do great work, 

we saw it down on the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina, and we 

have seen it many times. We recognize that in many ways you are 

underresourced, and you have a backlog of older ships that you are 

trying to update or replace. 

Has the fact that you have been hampered from a budgetary 

sense—can you see that in how you are able to respond to this? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Our budget situation has not hampered our 

response initially to this. I mean, obviously, for any agency a longterm sustained response to something of this magnitude becomes 

a challenge, and that would be the case no matter how many people you have. 

I think, as the Secretary said, sustainability is one of the critical 

concerns that we are looking at right now. How do you do this if 

it were, in fact, to go on for some extended period of time? 

We have quite a force surging to that area right now. At some 

point we have to look to what impact and risk position we take 

throughout the rest of the country as we pull those resources from 

other parts of the country. 

Senator PRYOR. And I know that your office as well as FEMA 

and many other Federal, State, and local agencies try to anticipate 

various disasters and run through exercises and game them out to 

try to understand what all would happen. Were you able to do this? 

Have you been doing this in years past with a major oil event like 

this? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, every 3 years, somewhere in the 

country we do what we call a Spill of National Significance exerVerDate Nov 24 2008 14:38 Oct 26, 2011 Jkt 057939 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57939.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
21 

cise, and that is a full-scale deployment exercise where we simulate 

a massive oil discharge of some sort. The most recent one was up 

in the Northeast, off the coast of Portland, Maine, where we did a 

Spill of National Significance, simulating a large tanker oil spill. 

The one that Senator Collins referred to earlier was one in which 

I had participated in 2004 off the southern coast of California— 

again, simulating a tank ship rupturing and spilling a lot of oil. So 

we do actually exercise for massive oil discharges periodically 

throughout the country. 

And then in every Captain of the Port zone or Federal on-scene 

coordinator zone where there is an area contingency plan, there is 

a cycle of exercises that are required to be conducted on an annual, 

biennial, and triennial basis. So I would say that we exercise quite 

a bit, although those full-scale exercises are every 3 years, and they 

are not necessarily in every zone every 3 years. 

Senator PRYOR. But it sounds like those exercises have paid off 

for you in how you have been able to respond to this. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I think they have. Clearly, the response that we were able to mount to this bill is a significant improvement over what you might have seen 20 years ago prior to the 

Exxon spill, before we had this program in place. There is a robust 

exercise oversight program that we have called the Preparedness 

Response Exercise Program (PREP), and they manage this program 

throughout the country, and they watch the results. Then there is 

a lessons learned process for feeding what we learn from those exercises, such as those—my words are coming back to me—coming 

from 2004. And we try to feed that into the way in which we would 

actually respond. 

As you might guess, it is more or less effective depending upon 

how well we can feed that in, but we think that we have a pretty 

robust exercise program, and it is one that connects Federal, State, 

and local officials, resource trustees, and the private sector to the 

extent that they can participate so that you at least talk the same 

language and spend time together pre-need, if you will. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. And thank you very much for your 

answers, and, Mr. Chairman, again, I would like to note that in our 

Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness 

and Integration, we are actually having a hearing in the near future about this and go into more detail about what State, local, and 

the private sector have been doing for this. But thank you very 

much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Pryor. I appreciate 

that your Subcommittee is doing that. 

Madam Secretary, Admiral, I want to ask you if you would stick 

with us and we will do a second short round of no more than 5 

minutes apiece. 

As I hear the questions back and forth, it seems to me that certainly post-Exxon Valdez, the government and the oil industry 

have worked together to get very good at dealing with a major spill 

at the surface. But I still remain to be convinced, one, that we did 

enough to prevent this deep-water accident in the well from occurring; and, two, that we are ready to deal with the unbelievable consequences of it underwater. 

22 

In that regard, I wanted to ask both of you this question. We 

have been reading in the media in the last few days that there are 

scientists who have essentially discovered and are reporting giant 

deep-sea plumes of oil in the Gulf as a result of this accident, one 

of which measured 10 miles long, 3 miles wide, and 300 feet thick 

in spots. 

What are we capable of doing to try to break that up? And if we 

do not, what is going to happen to it? In other words, the consequences here for the environment, obviously the Gulf’s environment, are potentially very severe. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Indeed, Mr. Chairman. I think, first of 

all, we have to be careful right now about what is being assumed 

about the undersea plume and not. I think the head of NOAA this 

afternoon put out a statement saying that some of those early reports that had been made were not based on observation and had 

not been verified and confirmed, certainly by some of the other 

work that was being done. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is important for us to hear. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. But, obviously, we need to continue to 

watch the undersea plume, to the extent one develops, in addition 

to the top of the sea spill. So that process is being looked at with 

a consortium of government scientists who continue to look at what 

is going on underneath the surface of the ocean, what is happening 

there. And, again, I think NOAA Director, Dr. Jane Lubchenco, 

really responded very strongly to some of these early statements 

that had not been verified and seem inaccurate. 

Now, the EPA has approved the undersea use of dispersants. 

And as I mentioned in my statement, this is very novel. It is being 

done in a very controlled way because every time we do something 

like that, you have to explore the environmental trade-offs that are 

being made. But EPA has a very rigorous protocol for how that will 

be done and the continuous monitoring that will happen. And so 

those undersea dispersants are being injected and have been injected over the last days. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate hearing that. And, again, it 

seems to me that we are experimenting because this is something 

unprecedented and I think unanticipated—by the regulatory process, anyway, the one that the Minerals Management Service imposed on the companies prior to granting permission on this well. 

Admiral, let me ask you insofar as the Coast Guard obviously 

has supervision over marine oil spills. Isn’t there a danger that 

these enormous plumes will be taken by the current and move far 

away from the actual source of the spill now, and that could have 

very wide ranging and bad environmental effects? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Mr. Chairman, I think you are referring to 

the out-of-pocket current that is being talked about. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. I know that we have been watching that 

very carefully. NOAA is helping us to model the location. Currently, it shows to be somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 to 50 

miles from the southern edge of the spill. So we are watching that 

carefully, and as a result of that, we are preparing for potential impacts on the southern Florida coast and actually around the southern Florida coast. 

23 

But I will say that the other piece of that is it is likely the kind 

of oil that will get picked up in the loop current and will be heavily 

weathered oil. You are likely to see things like tar balls forming 

on the beaches. It is a little easier to manage as they come ashore. 

They come ashore in ways in which it is relatively easy to clean 

up. This is not saying that this is a good thing. It is just that I 

think that it will be a more manageable piece that we will deal 

with there than what we are currently looking at out in the Gulf. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you just quickly, and then we 

will go for a final word to the Secretary. Have you encountered any 

underwater sea plumes of oil of the dimensions being discussed 

here in your experience with the Coast Guard? 

Admiral NEFFENGER. No, sir. This is the first time I have seen 

a leak at this depth and that poses these kinds of complexities. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I was just going to mention that in respect to the loop current, the numbers are as the Rear Admiral 

said in terms of distance. We are monitoring it very closely. But 

we are actually treating it as if it were its own coastline. In other 

words, that if we were to see that the oil really was beginning to 

move toward the loop current, we would begin doing some things 

by way of dispersant and booming, whatever, as if the loop current 

itself were a piece of the coast. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. My time is up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Admiral to follow up on the Chairman’s line of questioning, one 

of the concerns that I have is that no one seems to really know 

what to do when you have a spill this big, a failure this deep underwater. And when we follow the events in the press of the various ways that are being used to try to contain the spill and plug 

the well, the impression that you get is that there is no protocol 

for handling a blowout of this nature. 

Is that a correct impression? I am not talking about containing 

the oil and trying to prevent it from getting to the shore. We clearly have plans, protocols, and procedures for that. I am talking 

about plugging the well. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I understand that perception. I will 

tell you that I have been involved with this now since May 3. That 

is when I was named as a deputy to Admiral Allen. And the very 

first trip that I made to the Gulf was to Houston to talk to the BP 

engineers and the scientists who were working on the solutions. 

I would say that in the end there is a technological solution to 

this, and we are seeing that begin to play out. I think initially it 

was trying to determine what actually was going on down there, 

and, again, it is because there is no human access to the site. It 

is 5,000 feet below the surface, and everything we are seeing is 

through the lens of a remotely operated vehicle. So that makes it 

challenging just to initially assess what you actually have going on. 

And so I think the complexity is that you have a blowout preventer that failed to operate as it was designed. We do not know 

why that happened. That will take some time to determine that. 

It may ultimately not be determined until we can get that to the 

surface. The second piece is you have this very complicated 5,000 

24 

feet of riser laying like spaghetti across the sea floor on which 

there were a number of different leaks. That was complicating the 

determination as to how best to approach it. And then a lack of understanding as to what the pressures might be inside there. 

So I think it takes time to accumulate the knowledge necessary 

to know what the next step forward was. If you had that thing on 

the surface and this were happening on the surface, I think you 

would have seen a much more rapid ability to come to a closure 

on it. It is the distance below the surface that makes it so challenging. 

Senator COLLINS. The relief well has been held out as the ultimate solution if everything else fails, whether it is the top hat or 

the straw-like approach with the riser pipe that we are trying right 

now. Is the relief well a sure thing? It is going to take a long time 

to bring it about, but has this been done before? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is probably a question you might 

want to address to the BP witnesses. 

Senator COLLINS. I will, but I would like to know the Admiral’s 

opinion on that. 

Admiral NEFFENGER. Well, I will qualify it by saying I am not 

a petroleum engineer or a geologist, but I will say that in talking 

to those who are, they have done relief wells before—and I would 

concur with the Secretary that is a good line of questioning for BP. 

But the top kill, the technology that they are using to shut in the 

well, pumping fluid into it, is a tested method. They have used that 

many times. In fact, it is a traditional method for closing in a well 

for which you have no trouble, when you are just done with it. 

When you are done with the well, you pump this fluid in. So I understand that is a regular method for doing so, particularly for a 

blowout. 

As far as a relief well, I do know that it will be a challenge— 

and the Secretary alluded to the challenge—as you try to intersect 

a very small well bore from a distance of 18,000 feet. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, just one comment. As you know, the President’s budget did include $200 million for the civilian criminal 

trials of Guantanamo Bay detainees in major urban areas of the 

United States. Since the Coast Guard keeps coming to the rescue 

over and over and over again, and since it is very difficult to find 

anyone who agrees with the plan to try Guantanamo Bay detainees 

in major cities, doesn’t it make sense for the Administration to submit a revised budget that fully restores the money cut out of the 

Coast Guard using those funds? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator Collins, I will be happy to transmit that message to the White House. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. It sounds like the beginning of a meeting 

of minds. I hope. 

Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, could you comment, if you do not mind, on a 

letter that I understand you received from BP regarding the question that you asked them about their intention to fulfill their obligations? I have a copy of that letter. It is a public record. But 

25 

would you comment about your understanding of what they wrote, 

which is pretty clear? ‘‘We are prepared,’’ they say, ‘‘to pay above 

$75 million on these claims, and we will not seek reimbursement 

from the U.S. Government or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Of 

course, we reserve our right to recover what we pay from other parties that may be responsible.’’ 

You asked for the letter, you received it, so what is your understanding of their response? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. My understanding is that they are going 

to pay all legitimate claims, and by legitimate, I think they mean 

non-fraudulent claims and without respect to any cap, whether or 

not it applies. But they seek their right to recover contributions or 

likewise from other entities such as Transocean. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me ask you this about claims, because 

there are obviously now thousands of individuals and businesses 

that are concerned. Some have already been directly affected. Some 

are thinking they may be affected, and because there is so much 

uncertain about the situation—we do not know how long it will go 

on—it is important, I think, for us to try to be as clear as we can 

be about how people might actually receive assistance. 

My reading of the Oil Pollution Regulations Act indicates that 

the trust fund may not reimburse claimants for the costs they incur 

in preparing and filing their claim, collecting documentation, or 

paying accountants to verify lost wages. 

Now, I know your office is trying to make this process as simple 

as possible, and I have been told by BP that they are trying to 

make it as simple as possible. But I am wondering if you can comment on the availability for technical assistance under the existing 

claims regime. In other words, it is clear people cannot be reimbursed for an accountant they might have to hire to get their documentation in order. They cannot be reimbursed for X, Y, and Z. We 

are trying to keep people from being out-of-pocket for anything. 

So are you familiar with how these claims are actually being 

paid, how the office that reports to you is monitoring them? Can 

you give any comment? And do you maybe support some additional 

resources to help people? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, indeed, Senator Landrieu, and again 

this goes to the continual and evolving nature of this, and some of 

the questions that are being posed today are evolving answers as 

well. But there is a claims process. There are 800 numbers. There 

are rollover numbers if you cannot get through on that. BP has 

now opened up a way to file a claim on the Internet. 

The issue you raise, well, how does somebody get reimbursed? 

Let us say you own a small business, and you have had to now hire 

somebody to come in and get your records together about what lost 

profits you have had because you were not able to stay open during 

this season. Those are the kinds of issues that we will now begin 

working through. 

We have some great people on the ground there working through 

these issues in the unified command center. You are right, they do 

report to me. They are some of the same people who helped us with 

cleaning up the remaining Hurricane Katrina claims that were 

there when I came into office. And so those are the kinds of things 

that we are working our way through. They are the kinds of things, 

26 

1The prepared statement of Mr. McKay appears in the Appendix on page 53. 

I would suggest, if your constituents are asking you, that you 

should forward those questions to us so that we know, hey, this 

question has arisen out there, what is the answer? If there is not 

an answer that we can shoot to you, it means that we have not 

thought our way through it yet, and it will give us the prompt to 

do it. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I say that, and I thank you, and I will 

submit it, because we found this to be very helpful in providing 

some grant assistance to nonprofits and others on the ground assisting fishermen and small businesses because the documentation 

is important. You have to verify your claims are legitimate. But if 

you do that to some of these businesses, it costs them money to 

prepare those documents. So we just want to make sure we do not 

put businesses along the Gulf Coast at any more of a disadvantage 

than they already are. 

They also need help applying for aid from other government programs like the Small Business Association (SBA) loans, and this is 

money that has been appropriated. So I thank you for your comments. My time has expired. But I will forward on those requests 

to you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Landrieu. 

Senator Pryor has indicated he has no further questions, so, Secretary Napolitano and Admiral Neffenger, I thank you for your testimony today. We all have a lot of work to do together. I appreciate 

what you are doing now to contain the spill, and particularly, Secretary, what you are doing with Secretary Salazar to come up with 

a reform package, is the best way I can think about it, to make 

sure that we better prepare for a deep-water accident and spill of 

this kind and do everything we can to both prevent it and be better 

prepared to respond to it. But for now, thank you very much for 

what you are doing every day. 

We will now call to the stand as our second panel Lamar McKay, 

who is Chairman and President of BP America. 

Mr. McKay, good afternoon. I appreciate your being here. I appreciate the fact that you have been here the whole afternoon. You 

heard both the questions and the answers and the testimony of 

Secretary Napolitano and Admiral Neffenger, and we would welcome your testimony at this time. 

TESTIMONY OF LAMAR MCKAY,1 CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT, 

BP AMERICA, INC. 

Mr. MCKAY. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member 

Collins, and Members of the Committee, my name is Lamar 

McKay, and I am Chairman and President of BP America. 

We have experienced a tragic set of events. Nearly 1 month ago, 

11 people were lost on the Deepwater Horizon rig and 17 others 

were injured. My deepest sympathies go out to the families and the 

friends who have suffered such a terrible loss. 

Those in the Gulf Coast communities are being severely impacted 

by this, and their livelihoods are being terribly impacted every day. 

I have seen the response firsthand, and I have talked with the 

men and the women on the front line. There is a deep, steadfast 

27 

resolve to do everything we humanly can to stop this, to stop the 

leak, to contain the spill, to fight it offshore, to fight it at the shoreline, to clean it up, and to deal with the economic impacts that it 

has caused and will cause. 

Now, as a responsible party under the Oil Pollution Act, we, BP, 

will carry out our responsibilities to mitigate this environmental 

damage and the economic impacts of the incident. Our efforts are 

part of a unified command that was established within hours of the 

incident, and it provides a structure for our work with the Department of Interior, the Department of Homeland Security, other Federal agencies, as well as State and local governments. We have 

pledged our commitment to work with President Obama and members of his cabinet, the governors, congressional members, State 

agencies, and local communities of Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. We appreciate the leadership, direction, 

and resources that they are all providing. 

I want to underscore that the global resources of BP are committed to this effort and have been from the outset. Nothing is 

being spared. Everyone understands the enormity of what lies 

ahead and is working to deliver an effective response—at the wellhead, on the water, and on the shoreline. 

Before I describe our around-the-clock efforts in response to the 

events, I want to reiterate our commitment to find out what happened. There are really two key lines of inquiry here. First is what 

caused the explosion and fire onboard the Transocean Horizon rig. 

And, second, why did the rig’s blowout preventer, the key fail-safe 

mechanism, fail to shut in the well and release the rig? 

We are cooperating with the joint investigation by the Department of Homeland Security and the Interior Department as well as 

the investigations by Congress. In addition, BP has commissioned 

an internal investigation whose results we plan to share so that we 

all learn from these terrible events. 

In the meantime, we cannot draw any conclusions before all the 

facts are known. We will continue full speed ahead with our investigation, keeping all lines of inquiry open until we find out what 

happened and why. At the same time, we are fully engaged in the 

response to the devastating events. 

Now, our sub-sea efforts to stop the flow of oil and secure the 

well are advancing on several fronts. Our immediate focus is on a 

riser insertion tube that we have talked about just prior. This involves placing a tapered riser tube into the end of the existing 

damaged riser, which is a primary source of the leak, until a watertight closure is achieved. The gas and oil then flows under its own 

pressure up the riser tube to the Enterprise drillship on the surface. 

We successfully tested and inserted the tube into the leaking 

riser, capturing some oil and gas. Although the test was temporarily halted when the tube was dislodged, we have since successfully reinserted the tube. We are now in the early stages of stabilizing the system to process oil and gas onboard the Discover Enterprise, and that is 5,000 feet above on the water’s surface. 

Now, an additional effort is known as a top kill. This is a proven 

industry technique for capping wells that have been used—it has 

been used worldwide, although never in 5,000 feet of water. It uses 

28 

a tube to inject a mixture of multi-sized shredded fibrous materials 

directly into the blowout to clog the flow. This procedure is ongoing, and the attempt could take 1 to 2 weeks. 

We have also developed a modified containment dome strategy. 

As you know, initial efforts to place a large containment dome over 

the main leak point were suspended because of a build-up of methane hydrates, which are essentially like ice crystals. This prevented 

a successful placement of the dome over the spill area. 

A second smaller containment dome, which is being called the 

top hat, is being readied, if needed, and it is actually on the sea 

bottom. It is designed to mitigate the formation of large volumes 

of hydrates. 

It is important to note, however, that the technology has never 

been used at this depth. We are working to address the remaining 

technological and operational challenges should we need it. 

We have also tested injecting dispersant directly at the leak on 

the sea floor under the Environmental Protection Agency and Coast 

Guard approvals. Dispersant acts by separating the oil into small 

droplets that can break down more easily through natural processes before it reaches the surface. Sonar testing and aerial photographs show encouraging results. The unified command, supported 

by the EPA and other agencies, has approved additional sub-sea 

application subject to ongoing protocols. 

We also began the drilling of the first of two relief wells on Sunday, May 2, and as of May 16, this well had reached approximately 

9,000 feet below sea level. A second drillship has arrived on site 

and yesterday began drilling a second relief well. The entire relief 

well operation could take approximately 3 months. 

Finally, we have succeeded in stopping the flow from one of the 

three existing leak points on the damaged well. While this may not 

affect the overall flow rate, it should reduce the complexity of the 

situation to be dealt with on the seabed. 

Now, on the open water, we have a fleet of more than 750 response vessels that has been mobilized. In addition to using approved biodegradable dispersants at the leak point, we are also attacking the spill with dispersants pre-approved by the EPA and 

Coast Guard for the surface, applied using planes and boats. 

To protect the shoreline, we are implementing what the U.S. 

Coast Guard has called the most massive shoreline protection effort 

ever mounted. Approximately 1.7 million feet of boom are now deployed, with more than 1.9 million additional feet available. Seventeen staging areas are now in place, and more than 15,000 volunteers have come forward to offer their services. To ensure the rapid 

implementation of State contingency plans, we have provided $25 

million to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. 

Now, we recognize that beyond the environmental impacts, there 

are also economic impacts on many of the people who rely on the 

Gulf for their livelihood. BP will pay all necessary clean-up costs 

and is committed to paying all legitimate claims for other loss and 

damages caused by the spill. 

We are expediting interim payments to individuals and small 

business owners whose livelihood has been directly impacted by the 

spill: The men and women who are temporarily unable to work. 

Today we have paid out over $13 million to claimants, mostly in 

29 

the form of lost income interim payments. We intend to continue 

replacing the lost income for as long as the situation warrants. 

We are responding to claims as quickly and as efficiently as possible. Starting this week, we will have in place an online claimsfiling system, and our call center is open 24 hours a day, 7 days 

a week. We have 12 walk-in claims offices open in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida, and we will open at least five more 

this week. 

They are staffed by nearly 700 people with almost 350 experienced claims adjusters working in the impacted communities. We 

will continue adding people, offices, and resources for as long as required. 

We are striving to be responsive and fair. We are taking guidance from the established regulations and other information provided by the U.S. Coast Guard, which handles and resolves these 

types of claims. 

Now, tragic as this accident was, we must not lose sight of why 

BP and other energy companies are operating offshore, including in 

the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf provides one in three barrels of oil 

produced in the United States, and it is a resource our economy requires. 

BP and the entire energy industry are under no illusions about 

the challenge we face. We know that we will be judged by our response to this crisis. We intend to do everything in our power to 

bring this well under control, to mitigate the environmental impact, and to address economic claims in a responsible manner. No 

resource available to this company will be spared. I can assure you 

that we and the entire industry will learn from this terrible event 

and emerge from it stronger, smarter, and safer. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I 

stand ready to answer your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. McKay. I appreciate your 

statement. 

I know that the company has been doing everything that it has 

been asked to do, in some sense more, since the accident occurred. 

But I want to come back to the line of questioning that worries me 

as we try to learn from what has happened. 

The fact is that in recent years BP and other energy companies 

have been increasingly drilling for oil in deep water. And as BP 

representatives have indicated, including yourself, I think, in this 

crisis, deep water does present a different set of challenges than 

from other offshore oil drilling. Yet as I look at this process, it 

seems to me that the Minerals Management Service did not ask 

enough of you and the other oil companies doing deep-water drilling, and the companies did not do enough themselves, including 

BP, to prepare for an accident just like the one that has occurred. 

Very briefly, by way of background, there was a 2005 study, referred to in the media the other day, by Jerome Schubert and Samuel Noyanaert, actually financed, at least in part, by BP—maybe 

you are familiar with it—that said that ‘‘Blowouts will always happen no matter how far technology and training advance.’’ 

Another press report, which I have not confirmed but I believe 

is correct, says that blowout preventers have failed in as many as 

30 

14 other accidents since 2005, although obviously none as consequential as this. 

So the Minerals Management Service required an Oil Spill Response Plan. But as I look at it, it mostly seems to be a plan related to effects on the surface, and although in one part of it you 

were required to address the effect of an uncontrolled blowout resulting in oil flowing for 30 days from deep water—although I do 

not think at this depth—there is nothing in the plan that I see that 

addresses the critical question about how you stop the leak at 

5,000 feet under the water. 

As you look back at this now, as your company has been jolted— 

even though it is a massive company, its economic strength has 

been threatened by this accident. Why wasn’t more done as more 

deep-water drilling was done to deal with the consequences of an 

accident if it occurred at that depth? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, this, as you know, is a unique and unprecedented event. The Oil Spill Response Plans that are required by 

regulation are extensive, and that forms the foundation of the surface spill response plan, and I can talk about that in detail if you 

would like. 

In the sub-sea, as you rightly point out, there are no major regulations requiring the sub-sea intervention plans. I think as we look 

at this accident in hindsight, I think we will need to look at what 

type of sub-sea intervention capability is planned or could be available. 

What I would like to say is the sub-sea intervention resources 

that have been brought to bear are tremendous. We have three 

deep-water rigs working simultaneously in an unprecedented situation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree with that, and I do not fault you 

on the resources you brought. I think you brought everything you 

possibly could. But, to me, the tragedy of this is that when that 

dome was first lowered over the leak and it was rendered ineffective by the gas hydrates forming at such low temperatures and 

high pressure, it struck me that if you had been asked by our government or chose yourself to test that system before an actual 

blowout, you would have known that the gas hydrates would form 

and that would be ineffective. 

So we have been watching—and you must feel as much distress 

as the rest of us—this scurrying around to try to find a way to 

close the leak at that depth. And I just feel that either the government should have demanded—I speak here as part of the Federal 

Government—or the Minerals Management Service should have 

demanded before giving the permit that there be plans to deal with 

this kind of explosion, or you should have in your own economic 

self-interest done it yourself. 

Mr. MCKAY. Could I comment on that? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Please. 

Mr. MCKAY. The work that is going on has simultaneous paths 

to try to get this under control. You mentioned the cofferdam or the 

hydrates. We knew hydrates could be a problem. That was something that we could try to get it to work, because this fluid is very 

specific, and you do not know until you try it. 

31 

I would just say that one of the complicating factors in this situation is that we have a blowout preventer that should have worked; 

we have manual intervention on that blowout preventer that did 

not work; and, unfortunately, we have a lower marine riser package on top of it that did not release. So where in many blowout situations—and you have mentioned 14, but around the world there 

have been more, especially onshore—you can get on top of the 

blowout preventer. This specific situation has a riser and leaks 

along the riser. It is a very unique situation. 

I do think the point is right, though. I do think that understanding sub-sea intervention capability and having a plan is a 

model. Where are the resources? Where do you get them? How can 

the industry respond? I do agree that I think that is going to need 

to be looked at. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I appreciate it, and I certainly agree 

that is the case. Do you also agree that too much reliance was put 

on the blowout preventer here? I am not an expert at this, obviously. I have studied it now since this has happened. I know more 

than I knew before. But, as I say, a blowout preventer is a piece 

of equipment. Equipment sometimes fails, particularly operating in 

unusual environments, and 5,000 feet under the water surface was 

one of them. 

So as you look back at it, did you and the government put too 

much faith in the blowout preventer as the last line of defense? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, it is one of several lines of defense, and it is 

what is considered the fail-safe mechanism when you get into an 

emergency situation. There are other lines of defense that have to 

fail before you get there, like the hydrostatic head of the mud, the 

cement and casing, and then well control procedures, and the blowout preventer is considered to be the methodology when you get in 

trouble to shut the well in and release that rig and let it get away. 

I cannot comment on too much reliance until we know what has 

happened. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. A final question, and then I will yield to 

Senator Collins. On the relief wells being dug, I understand that— 

this is quite remarkable, really. There are two of them, and there 

are two ways to get to where the problem is way under the surface 

of the water to see essentially which gets there first. 

This is the same question asked of the Coast Guard on the first 

panel. Do you have a high degree of confidence that this is—if everything else fails before then—the one method of stopping the leak 

that will work? 

Mr. MCKAY. We do have a high level of confidence that the relief 

wells will permanently secure the well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And is that based on previous experience 

with such relief wells? 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes, relief wells are used to control blowouts and 

permanently seal wells, and, yes, we do have a high degree of confidence. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Of course, the ominous note here—I appreciate hearing that—is that, as you said quite openly and directly, it could take 3 months. So if all else fails, this well could 

be pouring oil into the Gulf until—do you count from the day of the 

32 

accident or the day the relief well drilling started? It must be the 

day it started. 

Mr. MCKAY. Yes. Roughly 3 months to drill each relief well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, so this could take us until the end 

of July or early August. 

Mr. MCKAY. It could, yes. Of course, we are doing everything we 

can, and there are many things we are doing to try to stop it ahead 

of that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood, so let us hope and pray that 

one of those works a lot sooner than July or August. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. McKay, I know that BP is trying everything it can think of to stop this well from gushing, but it feels like 

you are making it up as you go along, that no one really knows 

what will plug this well, what will stop the oil from gushing, particularly since this is so complex because you are dealing with a 

leak in the riser pipe, and other locations so it is not one source 

of leaking. 

What I am trying to better understand is the response plan. I do 

not doubt at all that you are throwing everything possible at this 

problem, that you have extremely talented engineers that are 

working night and day, and that you are fully cooperating with the 

government. But I am concerned that it seems that no one had 

really planned for this particular scenario. Is that accurate? Is that 

perception correct? 

Mr. MCKAY. Let me first say this is an industry effort. It is not 

just BP. We have over 90 companies working just in the Houston 

office to try to get the interventions that we have talked about 

done. 

There was not a response plan per se for an individual blowout 

with a riser on the seabed. The resources that are brought—relief 

wells are conventional and the plan for relief wells was not submitted, but it was available to be worked up very quickly. 

The other options that we are pursuing, the first and foremost 

was to get that blowout preventer closed, get it to actuate. We had 

to do that in a situation where it has never been done before, and 

we have run into some issues with the blowout preventer that did 

not allow that actuation to happen. 

While we were doing that, we were pursuing containment and 

collection systems—the first one being the cofferdam that did not 

work very well—relief wells, and the surface responses that we 

planned, as well as a way to kill the well from the top, from the 

blowout preventer. 

Now, one thing the Admiral mentioned earlier I just want to 

highlight because he is right. It has taken awhile to, in effect, see 

inside that blowout preventer and understand pressures. We have 

used gamma rays and pressure probes, anodes, to understand what 

is happening in that blowout preventer. Then we can delineate and 

reduce risk for the next set of interventions. 

So, unfortunately, we are as frustrated as anyone. It has taken 

time. But, believe me, the risk analysis around every single intervention is extremely important, and we are being diligent about 

that. It is transparent as well. So everyone is seeing exactly what 

we are doing. 

33 

So I would say we are not scrambling around. No, I cannot say 

there was a plan to hit all these different intervention methods. 

But those were triggered from day one, pretty much, to get going 

on all these parallel paths as quickly as we possibly can. 

Senator COLLINS. Now, BP did file a Regional Response Plan for 

the Gulf of Mexico, and in that plan, the worst-case scenario that 

you present for offshore drilling is when a highest capacity well experiences an uncontrolled blowout volume of 250,000 barrels per 

day. So that is way more even than this terrible blowout. So what 

is different? Is it the depth of the water? And this plan, although 

it envisioned even greater volume, was it in shallow water? What 

is the difference? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, the response plan that you mention contemplates worst-case scenarios, and the planning itself envisions 

what resources are available in the Gulf Coast region, how would 

they be organized, how would they be deployed, details about who 

would be called when, and how the resources would be brought to 

bear. That plan, that model, is the foundation, whether it was a 

higher-rate volume or the current one, and we are enacting that 

plan with the Coast Guard and Homeland Security and other agencies, NOAA, as you have heard. 

That plan has formed the basis of what we are doing, and that 

plan has been robust, and I think it is the largest effort ever 

mounted. And I think it is having a big impact on what is happening with the spill. 

Senator COLLINS. But did that plan speak to how you contain the 

oil once it is spilled as opposed to how you stop the oil? 

Mr. MCKAY. No. I am sorry. That particular plan under current 

regulation is more a Surface Spill Response Plan. You are correct, 

yes. 

Senator COLLINS. That is my point, because it seems like we are 

now in a scenario that was not envisioned. 

Mr. MCKAY. I think what I would say is we are learning a lot 

through this, and I do think we are going to have to revisit what 

plans mean in terms of intervention and the ability to contain or 

deal with something when it happens. 

Senator COLLINS. I am told that two countries, at least—Norway 

and Brazil—require a back-up mechanism to communicate with 

blowout preventer that is known as an acoustic switch and that is 

not required by U.S. regulations. One, would that have helped in 

this case? And, two, should it be required? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think in answer to the first question, we do not 

think so because we had three triggering systems for the blowout 

preventer and then manual intervention. So the acoustic device is 

essentially another triggering device. 

Obviously, it will need to be looked at through the investigations 

to see if that could add some positive redundancy into the system. 

I do not know, but I do not believe in this case it would have made 

a difference. 

Senator COLLINS. Do you think that U.S. regulations should be 

reformed to require this as a back-up, even if it would not have 

helped in this situation? 

34 

Mr. MCKAY. I think the regulations should be looked at, and anything that would make this a lower probability event and safer 

should be looked into. 

Senator COLLINS. There has been a report that the battery on the 

blowout preventer was dead. Have you confirmed that to be the 

case? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, the blowout preventer, the rig, the riser, the 

drill pipe, and all of treatment equipment are property of 

Transocean, so I am not familiar with the condition of the batteries. Obviously, I think multiple investigations will look into that. 

Senator COLLINS. So you do not know whether or not that is accurate? 

Mr. MCKAY. I do not know. 

Senator COLLINS. Are there other special requirements that 

MMS should impose on companies that are drilling in deep water 

that are different from the requirements for shallow-water drilling? 

Mr. MCKAY. There are extensive regulations around deep water, 

very extensive. 

Senator COLLINS. But are there additional ones that you think 

we should take a look at? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, we are, of course, learning with this, and we 

are going to share everything we learn with industry and the government. But I do think some of the topics that should be looked 

at we have already talked about, sub-sea intervention capability 

and plans, testing blowout preventers in enhanced ways, maybe 

extra redundancy, as we mentioned, in various systems. Those are 

the questions that are being asked, and the investigations will, of 

course, help us understand what happened. And I am confident we 

will figure out what happened. That is a very important thing, and 

I am confident of that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I would like to, if I may, Mr. Chairman, submit Senator 

Landrieu’s questions for the record. She had to slip out. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection, we will forward them 

to the witnesses. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I do have some questions, Mr. McKay, and if you covered this in 

your opening statement, I missed it. But does BP yet have an estimate of the cost to the company? 

Mr. MCKAY. No. 

Senator PRYOR. And the law says that BP is the responsible 

party, and you have confirmed that today, and I appreciate that. 

And you mentioned that you will pay for the clean-up and all legitimate claims. That sounds good and I love that, but a year from 

now, will we be sitting here either in this Committee or through 

constituent services like Senator Landrieu has, and learn of industries that are not covered by this indirect losses, things like that? 

Tell me your intention. 

Mr. MCKAY. Our intention is to cover all legitimate claims associated with this incident. We have been very clear that BP resources 

are behind this. We have been clear in writing to accept our duties 

as a responsible party. We have formally accepted that. We intend 

35 

to fully live up to that. We intend to stick with this. We are being 

what I think is fair, responsive, and expeditious about how we are 

addressing claims now. We intend to continue that. So our intention is exactly as stated. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask about what might be the definition 

of a legitimate claim, but it also might be subject to argument, and 

that would be, say, a seafood restaurant that gets its food from the 

Gulf. If this is so disruptive to them, would they qualify for a legitimate claim? 

Mr. MCKAY. We would look to the guidance under the Oil Pollution Act, and the Coast Guard has acted for years in terms of determining legitimacy of claims and the reach of claims, and we will 

look to that for guidance. 

Senator PRYOR. And I understand that the way these drilling 

platforms work out in the Gulf is that BP’s name is the big name, 

but there are lots of subcontractors and lots of other companies involved with this operation. Will BP be looking to those companies 

as well or the individuals look to those companies separately? Tell 

us how that works. 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, let me just say very clearly: We are concentrating on two things. First is to get this leak stopped and get it 

cleaned up; and, second, we as a responsible party are going to deal 

with economic impacts. We will put blame, liability, and those kind 

of things over to the side. That is not our concern right now. 

Senator PRYOR. And let me ask about the environmental damage 

that this spill will cause. Like Senator Lieberman said a few moments ago, there are these reports about plumes of oil underwater. 

To me, that is counter intuitive because I thought oil was lighter 

than water and it would go to the surface. Can you tell us about 

that? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, I am not familiar with the details of the 

claims. I do understand NOAA put out a press release today questioning exactly what that means. Let me just explain. This oil does 

disperse naturally as it is rising in the water column, so not all of 

it makes it to the surface, and it does disperse. Those particles are 

very small, and they disperse through the currents and through the 

water column and gradually dissipate. 

So I think what we are interested in is if someone has data on 

a plume in terms of extent, density, or anything else, we want to 

get that data. But right now I think we ought to be cautious in 

terms of defining what plumes are out there and how they are behaving. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. You mentioned something just in passing 

in your testimony about sonar. Can you actually use sonar to determine where the oil is in the water? 

Mr. MCKAY. To a certain extent. We have used it at the sub-sea 

leak point, and it has been indicative and instructive in terms of 

when we put the sub-sea dispersant in, and you can tune it to different sizes of particles, and, yes, it is helpful. 

Now, I do not know in a dispersed system, but certainly right at 

the leak point it has been helpful, yes. 

Senator PRYOR. And also the dispersing agents you are talking 

about, there have been some reports that these might be more toxic 

than the oil. Could you comment on that? 

36 

Mr. MCKAY. The dispersants that are being used on the surface 

and sub-sea—the surface ones were pre-approved and the sub-sea 

ones are very similar. Those are biodegradable. They are less toxic 

than the oil itself. And just to let everyone know, one of the good 

things about sub-sea, we believe the efficiency of the dispersant, 

the amount of dispersant used per volume of oil contact, it is quite 

a bit lower than surface dispersant use. 

Senator PRYOR. I do have a concern—and I know a lot of others 

do as well—about the impact this will have on sea creatures, things 

like coral and sponges that apparently are filters for the ocean, and 

apparently these will not survive in an oil-type environment. Do 

you have any estimate yet on what we are looking at here? 

Mr. MCKAY. No, we do not, but there is a process to understand 

that, and that is through NOAA as the lead Federal trustee, which 

does the study that we pre-fund and are participating in to understand what is called the Natural Resources Damage Assessment, 

and that includes baselining as well as potential damage assessment. 

Senator PRYOR. It is easy for us to think of oil that washes up 

on the shore, and on the beaches. But is that the way oil does down 

on the sea floor? Does it cling to the sea floor? 

Mr. MCKAY. Some oil, as I understand it—and I am not an expert, but some of the oil will drop to the bottom and be biodegraded. Some will potentially make it to the shore. This particular oil is a very light oil, so as it is weathered either on the surface or in the currents, it goes to an emulsion, then it can turn into 

tar balls. So what we have seen, where we have seen anything at 

all, are emulsions, or tar balls. 

Senator PRYOR. And are there ways to collect those out on the 

water? 

Mr. MCKAY. In the water? I cannot say. I do not know. 

Senator PRYOR. But is it safe to say that the environmental consequences of this spill may go on for years? 

Mr. MCKAY. I think we do not know the length of the consequences, but what we do know is we will be working with the 

Federal agencies to understand, monitor, and deal with those consequences. 

Senator PRYOR. I do hate to ask this next question, but I think 

we need to ask it, and that is, what would the effects of a hurricane be? What would happen to all this oil in a hurricane? 

Mr. MCKAY. Well, we are obviously aware of when hurricane season is upon us, and we are doing everything we can to obviously 

get this stopped before then. Should a hurricane occur, it is difficult 

to project, but we will be dealing with it in the best way we can 

with moving resources out of the way and dealing with any of the 

impacts if oil was put ashore. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Chairman, I have one last question in this 

round. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Senator PRYOR. But it sort of follows with that last question, and 

that would be: To date, what percentage of the oil has been recaptured? Do you have a chart here that shows different ways to either get rid of the oil or recapture the oil? What percentage of it 

have we been successful in getting rid of to date? 

37 

Mr. MCKAY. I do not have a number, but I think it is a relatively 

small percentage. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Pryor. 

Mr. McKay, thanks. I appreciate your testimony. I appreciate all 

you are trying to do. I must say that in terms of big lessons learned 

here, I end up this hearing where I began it, which is that oil companies have been doing a lot more deep-water drilling, and you are 

doing it to respond to a demand, and in a real sense, our economy 

and people individually are all benefiting from the production of oil 

from offshore, in American territory; but that we went ahead and 

did that without proper preparation for how to respond if there was 

an accident that deep under the water. And this has been—to call 

it a wake-up call just understates it. It is a horrific wake-up call 

for the country, for the Gulf, and for you as a company. And I wish 

that you had done more to prepare for this, but I must say, as a 

Member of the U.S. Senate, I hold the Federal Government responsible for continuing to issue permits for deep-water drilling without 

demanding that the companies who receive those permits be prepared to deal with the effects of an accident, an explosion, to be 

better prepared to stop the leak underwater than obviously you are 

now because you never had to do this before, and also to deal with 

the environmental consequences and be prepared not only to stop 

the leak but to deal with the accumulation of oil at those depths 

in a way that it is not clear to me that we are able to do. 

So those are the big lessons learned. They are painful lessons for 

everybody, including your company. I must say, just to restate 

what I said before, I hope and pray that everything you are trying 

to do to stop this oil well from pouring oil into the Gulf works. I 

hope one of those things works so we do not have to wait the 3 

months until the relief well hopefully will work. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make one final 

comment. All of us have raised some tough questions today. We are 

obviously extremely concerned about the crisis and the long-term 

implications. But in the interest of fairness, I do want to acknowledge that BP and Mr. McKay have fully cooperated with our inquiry, and have not tried to get out of testifying today. And, sadly, 

that stands in sharp contrast with the government agency, the 

MMS, which refused to come testify today. So I think it is only fair 

to acknowledge, unhappy though we are with the situation we are 

in with the Gulf, that Mr. McKay has fully cooperated with our inquiry. Thanks for bringing that up, Senator Collins. I agree. I appreciate your cooperation, and I do not appreciate the failure of 

MMS to come. 

Secretary Salazar will testify tomorrow before the Senate Energy 

Committee. I understand the prerogative the agency has to go before its Committee of jurisdiction first. I hope the Committee Members will ask him some of these questions about the conduct of the 

Minerals Management Service in issuing permits and what kinds 

of demands they make for Oil Spill Response Plans. I also want to 

restate the intention of Senator Collins and me to call the Minerals 

Management Service before our Committee at some appropriate 

38 

time in the not too distant future to answer those questions if they 

are not answered tomorrow. 

In the meantime, I thank you. 

Mr. MCKAY. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The record of this hearing will remain 

open for 15 days for the submission of additional statements and 

questions. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m, the Committee was adjourned.] 

(39) 

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