No. 09-50296 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

______________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

PIERCE O’DONNELL, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

______________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California 

D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00872-SJO-1 

Hon. S. James Otero, United States District Judge 

______________________ 

MOTION FOR A STAY OF ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE OF 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE PIERCE O’DONNELL

______________________ 

 GEORGE J. TERWILLIGER III 

 DANIEL B. LEVIN

 WHITE & CASE LLP 

 701 Thirteenth Street, NW 

 Washington, DC 20005 

 Telephone: (202) 626-3628 

 Facsimile: (202) 639-9355 

 E-mail: gterwilliger@whitecase.com 

 

 Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 

 Pierce O’Donnell

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. ii 

I. Introduction....................................................................................................1 

II. Argument........................................................................................................2 

A. Standard for Granting Motion.....................................................................2 

B. Defendant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari 

 Will Present Substantial Questions..............................................................3 

1. The Panel Opinion’s Interpretation of Section 441f 

 Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent Regarding 

 Statutory Interpretation. ...........................................................................3 

a. Statutory Interpretation Should Not Render 

 Other Provisions of the Statute Superfluous.............................................3 

b. The Panel Opinion Conflicts with Supreme Court 

 Precedent Regarding Due Process and the Rule of Lenity. .....................5 

2. The Panel Opinion Conflicts with Supreme Court 

 Precedent Regarding Interpretation of Statutes 

 Criminalizing Political Speech..................................................................6 

C. Absent a Stay, Defendant Would Suffer 

 Irreparable Harm and the Balance of Equities 

 Favors Granting a Stay. ................................................................................8 

III. Conclusion ....................................................................................................10 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Supreme Court of the United States 

Araneta v. United States, 478 U.S. 1301 (1986)..................................................9, 10

Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)...........................................................................8

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)..........................................................................7 

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 

130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010)..........................................................................................5 

Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 

523 U.S. 26 (1998)................................................................................................4 

McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).........................................................6 

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 

510 U.S. 1309 (1994)............................................................................................2 

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) ................................................................7, 8 

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)...........................................................5

Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) ......................................................6

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).................................................................4 

United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948)................................................................8 

United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).........................................................7

United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008)............................................................6 

Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

444 U.S 620 (1980)...............................................................................................7 

United States Courts of Appeals 

Al-Marbu v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 2008) ................................................2

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Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1975).........................................................9

United States v. Pete, 525 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2008)..................................................2 

United States District Courts 

Greene v. Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Cal. 1986).............................................10

Statutes 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (2000) .................................................................................4, 5 

2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. II 2000).......................................................................5 

2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1) (2000) .....................................................................................5 

2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (Supp. II 2000) .......................................................................5 

2 U.S.C. § 441f (Supp II 2000)........................................................................ passim 

Federal Court Rules 

S. Ct. R. 10(c).............................................................................................................3 

Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2)(A).......................................................................................1 

Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2)(B) .......................................................................................8 

9th Cir. R. 41-1 ..........................................................................................................1 

State Statutes 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6102(a)..............................................................................9 

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I. Introduction 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(d) and 9th Circuit Rule 

41-1, Defendant-Appellee Pierce O’Donnell brings this motion for a stay of 

issuance of the mandate for a period of 90 days so that he may prepare and file a 

petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. A certiorari 

petition by Defendant would present substantial and meritorious questions arising 

from the panel’s decision, including: (1) whether the Ninth Circuit interpreted 

provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) in accordance with 

Supreme Court precedent concerning statutory interpretation; (2) whether the panel 

opinion applied Fifth Amendment due process principles and the rule of lenity as 

required when interpreting a criminal statute; and (3) whether the panel opinion 

followed Supreme Court precedent concerning interpretation of statutes 

criminalizing otherwise constitutionally-protected political speech. Fed. R. App. 

P. 41(d)(2)(A).

 Good cause exists for a stay, Defendant would be irreparably harmed absent 

a stay, and the balance of equities favors the granting of a stay. This motion is 

meritorious and not for the purposes of delay. 9th Cir. R. 41-1.

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II. Argument 

A. Standard for Granting Motion 

This Court has held: 

A [motion to stay a circuit court mandate] must show that 

the certiorari petition would present a substantial 

question and that there is good cause for a stay. [Fed. R. 

App. P.] 41(d)(2)(A). See also 9th Cir. R. 41-1 (stating 

that a stay of the mandate pending petition to the 

Supreme Court “will not be granted as a matter of course, 

but will be denied if the Court determines that the 

petition for certiorari would be frivolous or filed merely 

for delay.”). 

United States v. Pete, 525 F.3d 844, 851 n.9 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 To satisfy the “substantial question” and “good cause” requirements, a party 

seeking a stay must show that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that the 

Supreme Court will grant certiorari; (2) there is at least a fair prospect that it will 

reverse this Court’s decision; and (3) assuming the correctness of the moving 

party’s position, there is a likelihood of irreparable harm if a stay is not granted. 

See Al-Marbu v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 497, 498-99 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Planned 

Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1310 (1994) (Souter, J., 

in chambers) (“The conditions that must be shown to be satisfied before a Circuit 

Justice may grant such an application are familiar: a likelihood of irreparable 

injury that, assuming the correctness of the applicants’ position, would result were 

a stay not issued; a reasonable probability that the Court will grant certiorari; and a 

fair prospect that the applicant will ultimately prevail on the merits[.]”).

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B. Defendant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari Will Present 

Substantial Questions. 

 Supreme Court Rule 10 provides that certiorari may be granted when “a 

United States court of appeals has decided an important question of federal law . . . 

in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.” S. Ct. R. 10(c). The 

panel’s holding in this case conflicts with Supreme Court precedent in three ways. 

First, the panel opinion conflicts with precedent requiring that statutes be 

interpreted as a whole and, in particular, in a manner that avoids rendering 

statutory provisions superfluous and that recognizes that when Congress uses 

different language in different sections it intends them to have different meanings. 

Second, the panel opinion ignores precedent prohibiting criminal punishment 

under statutes that do not provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed and 

requiring application of the rule of lenity in interpreting ambiguous statutes. Third, 

the panel opinion ignores First Amendment precedent requiring narrow 

construction of statutes criminalizing otherwise protected speech.

1. The Panel Opinion’s Interpretation of Section 441f 

Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent Regarding 

Statutory Interpretation. 

a. Statutory Interpretation Should Not Render Other 

Provisions of the Statute Superfluous.

 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that a statute’s language must be 

interpreted in light of other sections of the statute. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss 

Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 36 (1998). Various sections of a statute 

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should be construed in concert so that “no clause, sentence or word shall be 

superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001).

 The panel opinion’s interpretation of Section 441f1

 of the FECA renders 

substantial portions of Section 441a(a)(8), as well as portions of numerous other 

FECA provisions, superfluous. Section 441f proscribes the “mak[ing] of a 

contribution in the name of another person,” while Section 441a(a)(8) regulates 

“contributions” made “either directly or indirectly” or “which are . . . directed 

through an intermediary or conduit.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(8), 441f. Under the 

panel’s interpretation, “contributions” as used in Section 441f includes direct and 

indirect contributions, and conduit contributions. However, if that interpretation is 

correct, then Section 441a(a)(8) would not have to use the terms “directly or 

indirectly” or “conduit” when describing the types of contributions it regulates. As 

a result, Section 441a(a)(8)’s use of those terms—a substantial portion of that 

provision—is superfluous under the panel’s opinion.2

 Additionally, the use of certain language in one section of a statute but not in 

another demonstrates congressional intent that those statutes be read differently. 

 

1

 “Section 441f” refers to 2 U.S.C. § 441f (Supp. II 2000); “Section 441a(a)(8)” 

refers to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (2000). 

2

 A number of other FECA provisions also use the terms “directly or indirectly” to 

describe contributions or payments and, under the panel’s opinion, portions of 

those sections would also be superfluous. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. II 

2000); 2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)(1) (2000); 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (Supp. II 2000). 

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Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717-18 (2010); Russello v. 

United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[I]t is generally presumed that Congress 

acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion and exclusion.”). The 

panel’s opinion ignores this fundamental principle of statutory construction by 

using the same interpretation for “contribution” in both Sections 441f and 

441a(a)(8) even though Congress purposefully used different language in each 

section.

b. The Panel Opinion Conflicts with Supreme Court 

Precedent Regarding Due Process and the Rule of 

Lenity. 

 The panel opinion conflicts with Supreme Court holdings by failing properly 

to apply an analysis of Fifth Amendment due process principles when interpreting 

a criminal statute.

 Due process principles require that a criminal statute clearly proscribe 

certain conduct before the government may punish a person for engaging in that 

conduct. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). Specifically, the 

rule of lenity, grounded in these due process principles, requires that “when there 

are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to 

choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.” 

Id. at 359-60. Ambiguities in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of 

Defendant: “Under a long line of our decisions, the tie must go to the defendant. 

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The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of 

the defendants subjected to them. . . . We interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in 

favor of defendants, not prosecutors.” United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514, 

519 (2008) (plurality op.) (citations omitted); see also Skilling v. United States, 130 

S. Ct. 2896, 2932 (2010) (“ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes 

should be resolved in favor of lenity”) (citation omitted).

 The panel opinion’s lengthy discussion of the statute, which resorts to 

extrinsic sources that are only appropriate to aid in interpreting ambiguous statutes, 

demonstrates that Section 441f is ambiguous. When faced with such ambiguity, 

Supreme Court precedent requires courts to apply the rule of lenity and interpret 

the statute in favor of the defendant. By failing to consider adequately other 

rational interpretations of Section 441f, such as Defendant’s, the panel opinion 

exposes Defendant to potential criminal punishment under an ambiguous statute. 

In such a case, the proper analysis required application of the rule of lenity.

2. The Panel Opinion Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent 

Regarding Interpretation of Statutes Criminalizing Political 

Speech. 

 The panel opinion ignores important First Amendment principles related to 

the FECA. The Supreme Court has held that campaign finance activities are 

constitutionally protected political activity. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 

720, 725 (1990) (“Solicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First 

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Amendment.”) (citations omitted). Associating with others for purposes of 

financially supporting an election campaign involves core First Amendment 

interests, and providing financial support to a candidate and a campaign are forms 

of protected political speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 24-25 (1976). 

Thus, control and limitation of political contributions “‘implicate fundamental First 

Amendment interests,’ namely, the freedoms of ‘political expression’ and ‘political 

association.’” Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 246 (2006) (plurality op.) (quoting 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15, 23); see Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 

444 U.S 620, 633 (1980) (“Our cases long have protected speech even though it is 

in the form of . . . a solicitation to pay or contribute money.”) (alterations to 

original and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the panel opinion 

should have analyzed whether Section 441f is a closely drawn statute based on a 

carefully considered record establishing a sufficiently important government 

interest necessary to justify such a restriction. Randall, 548 U.S. at 247. Here, 

despite Section 441f’s restriction on constitutionally protected speech, the panel 

opinion omits any such analysis and creates a chilling effect on such protected 

speech. 

 Supreme Court precedent required that the panel apply a narrow 

interpretation of Section 441f to avoid constitutional infirmities, especially in the 

federal campaign contribution context. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330-31 

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(1988) (“It is well settled that federal courts have the power to adopt narrowing 

constructions of federal legislation. Indeed, the federal courts have the duty to 

avoid constitutional difficulties by doing so if such a construction is fairly 

possible.”) (citation omitted); see e.g., United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 123-24 

(1948) (narrowly interpreting a limitation on certain political expenditures by labor 

unions in a predecessor statute to the FECA to affirm the dismissal of an 

indictment on the grounds that it failed to state a crime, thereby avoiding 

discussion of constitutional infirmities found by the district court). 

C. Absent a Stay, Defendant Would Suffer Irreparable Harm and 

the Balance of Equities Favors Granting a Stay. 

 The requested stay is for a maximum of 90 days (unless good cause to 

extend it is shown or a petition for certiorari is filed). Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2)(B). 

Absent a stay, Defendant would face irreparable injury and the balance of equities 

favors Defendant.

 If the mandate issues, Defendant would face imminent prosecution. Being 

obligated to defend oneself in a criminal proceeding predicated on a statute that 

fails to provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed, and/or is otherwise 

unconstitutional, constitutes irreparable injury. Cf. Araneta v. United States, 478 

U.S. 1301, 1304-05 (1986) (Burger, C.J., in chambers) (granting a stay of a district 

court’s contempt order because forcing defendants to testify could result in 

defendants facing substantial possibility of prosecution in foreign court). The 

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resulting reputational damage would also cause Defendant irreparable injury, even 

if he were eventually acquitted. See Richey v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.10 

(5th Cir. 1975) (discussing the reputational effects of an indictment founded upon 

illegal evidence: “[A] wrongful indictment is no laughing matter; often it works a 

grievous, irreparable injury to the person indicted. . . . In the public mind, the blot 

on a man’s escutcheon, resulting from such a public accusation of wrongdoing, is 

seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently the public 

remembers the accusation, and still suspects guilt, even after an acquittal.”). 

 Furthermore, a conviction would result in the immediate suspension of 

Defendant’s legal license. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6102(a). Such a ban 

constitutes irreparable harm because Defendant would be unable to pursue his 

profession and would suffer economic and reputational damage. Cf. Greene v. 

Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 554, 563 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (loss of income and loss of 

reputation constituted irreparable injury when doctor sought to enjoin government 

from providing public notice of his suspension from Medicare). 

 The record does not indicate that the Government would be prejudiced by 

further delay. See Araneta, 478 U.S. at 1304-05 (noting that denial of stay 

resulting in potential prosecution constituted harm to defendant, but delay was not 

harmful to government). The potential irreparable harm to Defendant thus 

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outweighs any potential harm to the Government or the public, and the balance of 

equities favors the granting of the stay. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to stay the mandate pending a petition 

for certiorari by Defendant should be granted. 

Dated: December 7, 2010 Respectfully submitted, 

 s/ George J. Terwilliger III 

 GEORGE J. TERWILLIGER III 

 DANIEL B. LEVIN

 WHITE & CASE LLP 

 701 Thirteenth Street, NW 

 Washington, DC 20005 

 Telephone: (202) 626-3628 

 Facsimile: (202) 639-9355 

 E-mail: gterwilliger@whitecase.com 

 

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee 

 Pierce O’Donnell

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO 

 CIRCUIT RULES 35-4 AND 40-1 

 Pursuant to Circuit Rules 35-4 and 40-1, I certify that the attached motion 

for a stay of issuance of the mandate is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 

14 points or more, and contains 2,050 words, exclusive of the cover, table of 

contents, table of authorities, certificate of counsel, this certificate of compliance, 

and proof of service, according to the word count feature of Microsoft Word used 

to generate this brief. 

s/ George J. Terwilliger III 

GEORGE J. TERWILLIGER III 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on December 7, 2010, I electronically filed the 

foregoing MOTION FOR A STAY OF ISSUANCE OF THE MANDATE OF 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE PIERCE O’DONNELL with the Clerk of the Court 

for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate 

CM/ECF system. 

 I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and 

that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system. 

s/ George J. Terwilliger III 

GEORGE J. TERWILLIGER III 

WHITE & CASE LLP 

701 Thirteenth Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20005 

Telephone: (202) 626-3628 

Facsimile: (202) 639-9355 

E-mail: gterwilliger@whitecase.com 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 

Pierce O’Donnell

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