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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. CRIMINAL NO. 14-CR-20561

HON. PAUL D. BORMAN

WILLIE QUAWN BROWN,

Defendant,

_________________________________/

United States’ Response Opposing

the Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release or Request for Home 

Confinement

Defendant Brown is a former violent gang member (“Bloods”) whose criminal 

history began at age 12 (PSR, ¶ 62, 65). His criminal history includes felony 

convictions for drug possession, drug trafficking, malicious destruction of property, 

assault with intent to do great bodily harm, assault with a dangerous weapon and 

home invasion-3rd degree. In this case, he was convicted of possession of a stolen 

firearm. The facts involved a drive-by shooting into an unoccupied vehicle in the 

City of Ypsilanti. Brown was identified as the shooter. During a search of his home, 

Michigan State Troopers recovered a loaded Keltec 9mm gun, which was identified 

through ballistic testing as the gun used in the car shooting (PSR, ¶12). Brown was

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sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release (ECF No. 20, 

Page ID.70).

Brown began serving his current sentence on May 18, 2015. He now moves for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). His motion should be 

denied.

Brown does not qualify for compassionate release. Although Brown’s heightened 

risk from Covid-19 based on his asthma, obesity, type II diabetes, hypertension and 

myocardial infarction qualifies as an “extraordinary and compelling reason[s]” for 

release under § 1B1.13(1)(A) & cmt. n.1(A), Brown is not otherwise eligible for 

release (Exhibit 1). Brown’s offense and his prior criminal history make him a 

danger to the community, which precludes release under USSG § 1B1.13(2). In this 

case, Brown was convicted of possession of a stolen firearm, which he used in a 

shooting incident. He was under parole supervision at the time of the shooting (PSR, 

§ 51). His criminal history includes other crimes involving violence and damage to 

property. On more than one occasion he has absconded from parole (PSR, ¶ 41,42). 

And the § 3553(a) factors—which the Court must also consider under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)—likewise do not support release. Brown has only served 5 years, 

3 months(approximately 63 months) of his 92-month sentence. Release prior to the 

expiration of his sentence would not promote respect for the law or provide just 

punishment for the offense. Brown’s conduct in firing a gun into an unoccupied 

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vehicle was a dangerous and violent act which could have caused great harm to 

others. Brown has completed only two education courses while in prison and has 

failed to enroll in a practical life skills class, which will assist in his transition back 

into the community. Further, he has not obtained any vocational training to enable 

future employment. These factors, combined with his disciplinary record while in 

prison, have resulted in his designation of high-risk recidivism by the BOP (Exhibits

2, 6). This suggests that Brown’s release at this time would be premature and the 

public would not be protected from Brown’s further crimes.

The Bureau of Prisons has also taken significant steps to protect all inmates, 

including Brown, from Covid-19. Since January 2020, the Bureau of Prisons has 

implemented “a phased approach nationwide,” implementing an increasingly strict 

protocol to minimize the virus’s spread in its facilities. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 

829, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020). And the Bureau of Prisons has assessed its entire 

population to determine which inmates face the most risk from Covid-19, pose the 

least danger to public safety, and can safely be granted home confinement. As of 

September 11, 2020, this process has already resulted in at least 7668 inmates being 

placed on home confinement. See BOP Covid-19 Website. At least 116 of those 

inmates are from the Eastern District of Michigan. Especially given the Bureau of 

Prisons’ efforts—and “the legitimate concerns about public safety” from releasing 

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inmates who might “return to their criminal activities,” Wilson, 961 F.3d at 845—

the Court should deny Brown’s motion for compassionate release. 

Background

Brown has an extensive criminal history involving violence and drugs, which

began in 1995, at the age of 12, when he was arrested for assault and battery and has 

continued through his arrest in this case at age 32. Between 1995 and 1999, he 

appeared in the Washtenaw County (Michigan) Juvenile Court and incurred 

adjudications for six misdemeanors and two felonies. He was also cited on numerous 

occasions for status offenses and probation violations (PSR, ¶ 62). In November 

2000, Brown began a long string of criminal activity incurring convictions for 

possession of cocaine (PSR, ¶ 28); felony fleeing and eluding-3rd degree and 

possession of marijuana (PSR, ¶ 34); felony possession of cocaine; felony 

delivery/manufacture of cocaine (PSR, ¶ 40); assault with intent to do great bodily 

harm; felony possession with intent to deliver on school property or library – cocaine 

(PSR, ¶ 42); assault with intent to do great bodily harm (PSR, ¶ 45); use of cocaine 

(PSR, ¶46); assault and battery (PSR, ¶ 48) and assault with a dangerous weapon,

home invasion-3rd degree (PSR, ¶ 49). Brown also had several other arrests for 

assault and drug charges (PSR, ¶ 56-59).

In this case, Brown fired shots into an unoccupied vehicle in the City of Ypsilanti. 

During a search of his home, Michigan State Troopers recovered a loaded Keltec 

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9mm gun, which was used by Brown in the car shooting. Brown was charged with 

felon in possession of a firearm following three serious felony offenses, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) and §924(e) and felon in possession of ammunition 

following three serious felony offense convictions (ECF No.1, Page ID. 1). The 

charge carried a mandatory minimum period of imprisonment of 180 months. Brown 

was detained pending trial. On February 4, 2015 Brown entered his guilty plea to a 

first superseding information charging possession of a stolen firearm, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. 922(j) (ECF No. 17, Page ID. 40). Brown was sentenced to 92 months’ 

imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release (ECF No. 20, Page ID.70).

Brown began serving his prison sentence on May 18, 2015, and is currently 

incarcerated at Canaan USP. He is 37 years old, and his projected release date is 

January 9, 2022. His underlying medical conditions are asthma; obesity; type II 

diabetes; hypertension and myocardial infarction. Brown has moved for 

compassionate release, citing his medical conditions and the Covid-19 pandemic. 

On May 4, 2020, Brown requested compassionate release and/or release to home 

confinement based upon his medical conditions and concerns of Covid (Exhibit 3). 

On May 9, 2020, his request was denied (Exhibit 4). On or about May 27, 2020, 

Brown filed a Request for Administrative Remedy with the BOP again seeking 

compassionate release or home confinement. His request for an administrative 

remedy was denied. On June 1, 2020, Brown requested compassionate release based 

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upon Covid and his medical conditions (Exhibit 5). On June 16, 2020, his request 

was denied on the basis that his medical conditions do not meet the criteria for 

release (Exhibit 5). Brown filed a pro se motion with this court on July 9, 2020 

(ECF No. 21, Page ID. 76). On September 2, 2020, a supplemental brief was filed 

on his behalf by counsel (ECF No. 24, Page ID. 174). 

Argument

I. The Bureau of Prisons has responded to Covid-19 by protecting inmates 

and increasing home confinement. 

A. The Bureau of Prisons’ precautions have mitigated the risk from 

Covid-19 within its facilities. 

The Bureau of Prisons has reacted quickly to confront Covid-19’s spread within 

its facilities. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020). For over 

almost a decade, the Bureau of Prisons has maintained a detailed protocol for 

responding to a pandemic. Consistent with that protocol, the Bureau of Prisons began 

planning for Covid-19 in January 2020. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 833–34.

On March 13, 2020, the Bureau of Prisons started modifying its operations to 

implement its Covid-19 Action Plan and minimize the risk of Covid-19 transmission 

into and inside its facilities. Id.; see BOP Covid-19 Modified Operations Website. 

Since then, as the worldwide crisis has evolved, the Bureau of Prisons has repeatedly 

revised its plan. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 834. To stop the spread of the disease, the 

Bureau of Prisons has restricted inmate movement within and between facilities. Id.

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When new inmates arrive, asymptomatic inmates are placed in quarantine for a 

minimum of 14 days. Id. Symptomatic inmates are provided with medical evaluation 

and treatment and are isolated from other inmates until testing negative for Covid19 or being cleared by medical staff under the CDC’s criteria. Id.

Within its facilities, the Bureau of Prisons has “modified operations to maximize 

physical distancing, including staggering meal and recreation times, instating graband-go meals, and establishing quarantine and isolation procedures.” Id. Staff and

inmates are issued face masks to wear in public areas. See BOP FAQs: Correcting 

Myths and Misinformation. Staff and contractors are screened for symptoms, and 

contractors are only permitted to access a facility at all if performing essential 

service. Wilson, 961 F.3d at 834. Social visits have been suspended to limit the 

number of people entering the facility and interacting with inmates. Id. But to ensure 

that relationships and communication are maintained throughout this disruption, the 

Bureau of Prisons has increased inmates’ telephone allowance to 500 minutes per 

month. Legal visits are permitted on a case-by-case basis after the attorney has been 

screened for infection. 

Like all other institutions, penal and otherwise, the Bureau of Prisons has not 

been able to eliminate the risks from Covid-19 completely, despite its best efforts. 

But the Bureau of Prisons’ measures will help federal inmates remain protected from 

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Covid-19 and ensure that they receive any required medical care during these 

difficult times.

B. The Bureau of Prisons is increasing the number of inmates who are 

granted home confinement. 

The Bureau of Prisons has also responded to Covid-19 by increasing the 

placement of federal prisoners in home confinement. Recent legislation now 

temporarily permitsthe Bureau of Prisons to “lengthen the maximum amount of time 

for which [it] is authorized to place a prisoner in home confinement” during the 

Covid-19 pandemic. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES 

Act) § 12003(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281, 516 (Mar. 27, 2020). The 

Attorney General has also issued two directives, ordering the Bureau of Prisons to 

use the “various statutory authorities to grant home confinement for inmates seeking 

transfer in connection with the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.” (03-26-2020 Directive 

to BOP, at 1; accord 04-03-2020 Directive to BOP, at 1). The directives require the 

Bureau of Prisons to identify the inmates most at risk from Covid-19 and “to 

consider the totality of circumstances for each individual inmate” in deciding 

whether home confinement is appropriate. (03-26-2020 Directive to BOP, at 1). 

The Bureau of Prisons’ efforts on this point are not hypothetical. Over 7668

federal inmates have been granted home confinement since the Covid-19 pandemic 

began, and that number continues to grow. BOP Coronavirus FAQs. As the Sixth 

Circuit recently stressed, these efforts show that “[t]he system is working as it 

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should”: “A policy problem appeared, and policy solutions emerged.” United States 

v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 2020). 

This policy solution is also tailored to the realities of the Covid-19 pandemic. As 

the Attorney General’s directives have explained, the Bureau of Prisons is basing its 

home-confinement decisions on several factors: 

1.) Each inmate’s age and vulnerability to Covid-19;

2.) Whether home confinement would increase or decrease the inmate’s 

risk of contracting Covid-19; and

3.) Whether the inmate’s release into home confinement would risk 

public safety.

(03-26-2020 Directive to BOP; 04-03-2020 Directive to BOP). These criteria 

account for justifiable concerns about whether inmates “might have no safe place to 

go upon release and [might] return to their criminal activities,” as well as “legitimate 

concerns about public safety.” Wilson, 961 F.3d at 845.

The Bureau of Prisons, after all, cannot open its facilities’ gates indiscriminately 

and unleash tens of thousands of convicted criminals, en masse. See id. It must focus 

on the inmates who have the highest risk factors for Covid-19 and are least likely to 

engage in new criminal activity. This is true not just to protect the public generally, 

but to avoid the risk that a released defendant will bring Covid-19 back into the jail 

or prison system if he violates his terms of release or is caught committing a new 

crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(5); 34 U.S.C. §60541(g)(2). 

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The Bureau of Prisons must also balance another important consideration: how 

likely is an inmate to abide by the CDC’s social-distancing protocols or other Covid19-based restrictions on release? Many inmates—particularly those who have been 

convicted of serious offenses or have a lengthy criminal record—been already 

proven unwilling to abide by society’s most basic norms. It is thus important to 

evaluate “how . . . released inmates would look after themselves,” Wilson, 961 F.3d 

at 845, including whether a particular inmate would adhere to release conditions and 

social-distancing protocols during the pandemic. If a prisoner would be unlikely to 

take release conditions or Covid-19 precautions seriously, for instance, he would 

also be far more likely than the general public to contract and spread Covid-19 if 

released. 

Finally, the Bureau of Prisons’ home-confinement initiative allows it to marshal 

and prioritize its limited resources for the inmates and circumstances that are most 

urgent. For any inmate who is a candidate for home confinement, the Bureau of 

Prisons must first ensure that his proposed home-confinement location is suitable for 

release, does not place him at an even greater risk of contracting Covid-19, and does 

not place members of the public at risk from him. It must assess components of the 

release plan, including whether the inmate will have access to health care and other 

resources. It must consider myriad other factors, including the limited availability of 

transportation right now and the probation department’s reduced ability to supervise 

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inmates who have been released. All of those decisions require channeling resources 

to the inmates who are the best candidates for release. 

Those types of system-wide resource-allocation decisions are difficult even in 

normal circumstances. That is why Congress tasked the Bureau of Prisons to make 

them and has not subjected the decisions to judicial review. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) 

(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a designation of a place of 

imprisonment under this subsection is not reviewable by any court.”); United States 

v. Patino, No. 18- 20451, 2020 WL 1676766, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2020) (“[A]s 

a general rule, the Court lacks authority to direct the operations of the Bureau of 

Prisons.”). It is especially true now, given the Bureau of Prisons’ substantial and 

ongoing efforts to address the Covid-19 pandemic.

II. The Court should deny Brown’s motion for compassionate release.

Brown’s motion for a reduced sentence should be denied. A district court has “no 

inherent authority . . . to modify an otherwise valid sentence.” United States v. 

Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). Rather, a district court’s authority 

to modify a defendant’s sentence is “narrowly circumscribed.” United States v. 

Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 753 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008). Absent a specific statutory 

exception, a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 

imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Those statutory exceptions are narrow. United States 

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v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2001). Compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) is equally narrow.

First, compassionate release requires exhaustion. If a defendant moves for 

compassionate release, the district court may not act on the motion unless the 

defendant files it “after” either completing the administrative process within the 

Bureau of Prisons or waiting 30 days from when the warden at his facility received 

his request. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 

(6th Cir. 2020). And as the Sixth Circuit recently held, this statutory exhaustion 

requirement is mandatory. Alam, 960 F.3d at 832–36.

Second, even if a defendant exhausts, he must show “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” for compassionate release, and release must be “consistent 

with” the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

As with the identical language in § 3582(c)(2), compliance with the policy 

statements incorporated by § 3582(c)(1)(A) is mandatory. See Dillon v. United 

States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010); United States v. Jackson, 751 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 

2014). To qualify, a defendant must have a medical condition, age-related issue, 

family circumstance, or other reason that satisfies the criteria in USSG 

§ 1B1.13(1)(A) & cmt. n.1, and he must “not [be] a danger to the safety of any other 

person or to the community,” USSG § 1B1.13(2).

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Third, even if a defendant is eligible for compassionate release, a district court 

may not grant the motion unless the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support release. 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); USSG § 1B1.13. As at sentencing, those factors require 

the district court to consider the defendant’s history and characteristics, the 

seriousness of the offense, the need to promote respect for the law and provide just 

punishment for the offense, general and specific deterrence, and the protection of the 

public. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Brown has requested compassionate release/home confinement based upon 

Covid and his medical conditions. His request was denied by the BOP (Exhibits 4, 

5). 

A. Brown is not eligible for compassionate release under the

mandatory criteria in USSG § 1B1.13. 

Congress tasked the Sentencing Commission with “describ[ing] what should be 

considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for [a] sentence reduction” under 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), as well as developing “the criteria to be applied and a list of specific 

examples” for when release is permitted. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). The compassionaterelease statute thus permits a sentence reduction only when “consistent with” the 

Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Because the Sentencing Commission fulfilled Congress’s directive in USSG 

§ 1B1.13, compliance with that policy statement is mandatory for any defendant 

seeking compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has 

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already reached the same conclusion for compliance with USSG § 1B1.10 under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on the statutory language there. Dillon v. United States, 

560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). And the statutory language in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is identical 

to the language in § 3582(c)(2). Compare § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring that “such a 

reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission”), with § 3582(c)(2) (same). When Congress uses the same language 

in the same statute, it must be interpreted in the same way. United States v. Marshall, 

954 F.3d 823, 830 (6th Cir. 2020). In both contexts, then, the Sentencing 

Commission’s restraints “on a district court’s sentence-reduction authority [are] 

absolute.” United States v. Jackson, 751 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 2014)(citing Dillon, 

560 U.S. 817); accord United States v. Saldana, 807 F. App’x 816, 819–20 (10th 

Cir. 2020).

The First Step Act did not change that. It amended only who could move for 

compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). It did not amend the substantive 

requirements for release. Saldana, 807 F. App’x at 819–20. Section 1B1.13 remains 

binding. 

Section 1B1.13 cabins compassionate release to a narrow group of nondangerous defendants who are most in need. That policy statement limits 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” to four categories: (1) the inmate’s medical 

condition; (2) the inmate’s age; (3) the inmate’s family circumstances; and (4) other 

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reasons “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons,” which the Bureau 

of Prisons has set forth in Program Statement 5050.50. USSG § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. 

The Covid-19 pandemic does not, by itself, qualify as the type of inmate-specific 

condition permitting compassionate release. The Bureau of Prisons has worked 

diligently to implement precautionary measures reducing the risk from Covid-19 to 

Brown and other inmates. See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 833–34 (6th Cir. 

2020). Thus, “the mere existence of Covid-19 in society and the possibility that it 

may spread to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate 

release, especially considering BOP’s statutory role, and its extensive and 

professional efforts to curtail the virus’s spread.” Raia, 954 F.3d at 597; cf. Wilson, 

961 F.3d at 845.

Brown’s medical records, however, establish that he has asthma; obesity; type II 

diabetes; hypertension and myocardial infarction - medical conditions, which the 

CDC has confirmed are risk factors that place a person at increased risk of severe 

illness from Covid-19. See CDC Risk Factors (as updated). Given the heightened 

risk that Covid-19 poses to someone with those medical conditions, Brown has 

satisfied the first eligibility threshold for compassionate release during the 

pandemic. See USSG § 1B1.13(1)(A) & cmt. n.1(A).

But Brown remains ineligible for compassionate release because he is a danger 

to the community. Section 1B1.13(2) only permits release if a “defendant is not a 

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danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 

U.S.C. §3142(g).” As with the other requirements in § 1B1.13, this prohibition on 

releasing dangerous defendants applies to anyone seeking compassionate release. 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (requiring that release be “consistent with” § 1B1.13); 

United States v. Kincaid, 802 F. App’x 187, 188 (6th Cir. 2020) (confirming that a 

released defendant must “not represent a danger to the safety of any other person or 

the community”). Although a court must also evaluate the defendant’s 

dangerousness when balancing the § 3553(a) factors, dangerousness alone is a per 

se bar to release under USSG § 1B1.13(2). United States v. Knight, No. 15-20283, 

2020 WL 3055987, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2020); United States v. Oliver, No. 

2:17-cr-20489, 2020 WL 2768852, at *7 (E.D. Mich. May 28, 2020).

An evaluation of dangerousness under § 3142(g)—which § 1B1.13(2) references 

for its dangerousness determination—requires a comprehensive view of community 

safety, “a broader construction than the mere danger of physical violence.” United 

States v. Cook, 880 F.2d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Indeed, even 

when considering pretrial detention under §3142(g), “[t]he concept of a defendant’s 

dangerousness encompasses more than merely the danger of harm involving 

physical violence.” United States v. Williams, No. 20-1413, 2020 WL 4000854, at 

*1 (6th Cir. July 15, 2020) (citing United States v. Vance, 851 F.2d 166, 169–70 (6th 

Cir. 1988)). That reasoning applies even more strongly post-judgment, when the 

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defendant’s presumption of innocence has been displaced by a guilty plea or jury’s 

verdict and when “the principle of finality” becomes “essential to the operation of 

our criminal justice system.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). 

Section 1B1.13(2) is thus a significant hurdle to release. It bars the release of 

violent offenders. It bars the release of most drug dealers, “even without any 

indication that the defendant has engaged in violence.” United States v. Stone, 608 

F.3d 939, 947–48 & n.6 (6th Cir. 2010)(“[D]rug trafficking is a serious offense that, 

in itself, poses a danger to the community.”); Knight, 2020 WL 3055987, at *3. It

bars the release of defendants whose offenses involved minor victims or child 

pornography. See United States v. McGowan, No. 20-1617, 2020 WL 3867515, at 

*3 (6th Cir. July 8, 2020). It also bars the release of many “non-violent” offenders, 

such as defendants who were involved in serial or significant fraud schemes or 

otherwise present a danger to the community in some respect. 

Adhering to § 1B1.13(2) is especially important given the current strain on 

society’s first responders and the rise in certain types of crime during the Covid-19 

pandemic. Police departments in many cities have been stretched to their limits as 

officers have either contracted Covid-19 or been placed in quarantine. Some cities, 

including Detroit, have seen spikes in shootings and murders. Drug overdoses are 

skyrocketing. There are real risks to public safety right now, and those risks will 

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only increase if our community is faced with a sudden influx of convicted

defendants. 

Because Brown’srelease would endanger the community, § 1B1.13(2) prohibits 

reducing his sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Brown has an extensive 20 year 

criminal history, which includes multiple convictions for violent crimes. His 

criminal history score at the time of his sentencing was 20, placing him in criminal 

history category VI, the highest category possible (PSR, ¶ 52). Brown was on parole 

at the time of his arrest. He has a pattern of parole and probation violations. Brown 

has been determined by the BOP to present a high risk of recidivism, partially based 

upon his history of violence and his prison disciplinary record (Exhibits 2, 7). His 

release prior to the expiration of his sentence would endanger public safety. Brown 

is not eligible for compassionate release. 

B. The factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) strongly weigh against 

compassionate release. 

Even when an inmate has shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and 

demonstrated that he is not dangerous, he is still not entitled to compassionate 

release. Before ordering relief, the Court must consider the factors set forth in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determine that release is appropriate. See United States v. 

Knight, No. 15-20283, 2020 WL 3055987, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2020) (“The § 

3553(a) factors . . . weigh against his request for compassionate release.”); United 

States v. Austin, No. 15-20609, 2020 WL 2507622, at *3–*5 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 

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2020) (holding that the “[d]efendant’s circumstances do not warrant compassionate 

release . . . under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”); United States v. Murphy, No. 15-20411, 

2020 WL 2507619, at *6 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2020) (denying compassionate 

release because “the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors do not favor release”); 

see also United States v. Kincaid, 802 F. App’x 187, 188–89 (6th Cir. 2020) 

(upholding a district court’s denial of compassionate release based on the § 3553(a) 

factors). So even if the Court were to find Brown eligible for compassionate release, 

the § 3553(a) factors should still disqualify him. 

The nature and circumstance of the offense committed by Brown heavily weigh 

against his release. On February 8, 2014, Brown shot up an unoccupied vehicle, 

which was parked in Ypsilanti, MI. Brown as the shooter (PSR, ¶ 10). Law 

enforcement went to Brown’s apartment, and after searching the premises, found the 

loaded gun and ammunition. Subsequent ballistic testing verified that it was the 

same gun used in the vehicle shooting incident (PSR, ¶12). Brown’s conduct 

evidences a complete disregard for the safety of others and respect for the property 

of others. While the motive or intention of the shooting was not discerned, the act 

itself was dangerous and jeopardizes public safety. 

The second §3553 factor which greatly weighs against Brown’srelease is his own 

history and characteristics. Brown’s criminal history has been detailed above, and 

includes numerous convictions for violent offenses. Despite serving short terms of 

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state jail time, his pattern of criminal conduct has continued. He has violated terms 

of his parole and probation, often by engaging in new criminal conduct (PSR, 

¶41,42). While in federal custody he has been sanctioned for possessing drugs and 

alcohol by possessing a greeting card that contained amphetamines (Exhibit 2). 

Brown has not established a pattern of compliance, even while imprisoned. It is 

unlikely that he would do so if released. This factor gains new importance during 

the Covid pandemic, as rules and medical protocols have been issued by the federal 

government and the state government to control the spread of the virus. See, e.g. 

Executive Order 2020-147: Masks (July 10, 2020)(executive order in Michigan 

mandating masks in indoor and outdoor contexts). Releasing Brown at this time 

would jeopardize both his own health, and the health of the general public. 

Additional §3553 factors which weigh against Brown’s release are the need for 

the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for 

the law and provide just punishment for the offense. 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A); 18 

U.S.C. §3553 (a)(2)(A). Brown was given a very favorable plea agreement by the 

government. By pleading guilty to possession of a stolen firearm, he avoided the 

possibility of a mandatory minimum sentence as an armed career offender. Brown 

was sentenced to 92 months, the bottom of the applicable guideline range of 92-115 

months (PSR, ¶ 79). His projected release date is January 9, 2022 (Exhibit 6). To 

grant him a further reduction in his sentence at this time, would not serve the goal of 

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reflecting the seriousness of his criminal conduct, promoting respect for the law or 

providing just punishment for the offense. 

Release of Brown at this time would not afford adequate deterrence to criminal 

conduct and protect the public from further crimes by Brown. 18 U.S.C. 

§3553(a)(2)(B) and (C). A reduction in his sentence at this time, would undermine 

its deterrent effect. Deterrence is important considering Brown’s age of 37. While 

advanced age may be considered a deterrent to future and further criminal activitythat is not the case here. Brown is still relatively young. If Brown were to commit 

another felony, especially one involving violence or guns, he may be imprisoned for 

the remainder of his natural life. Brown’s behaviors constitute a continued risk to 

public safety and health, which weigh against compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. 

§3582(c)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2)(C). 

Brown simply does not have the extraordinary and compelling circumstances to 

warrant his early release. His medical conditions are not exceptional, and are being 

managed in prison. The facility at which he is presently housed Canaan, USP, is 

located in Waymart, PA. The facility houses 1,150 total inmates. Only 1 inmate has 

tested positive for the virus. Four staff have recovered. This low number is likely 

due to the extensive precautions undertaken by the Canaan facility to mitigate the 

spread of Covid. Because there has been only one infected individual at the Canaan 

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facility, Brown’s risk of exposure is too speculative to render the circumstances 

extraordinary and compelling.

C. The Court should decline Brown’s request for a recommendation 

that he be granted home confinement. 

The Court should also deny Brown’s request for a judicial recommendation to 

the Bureau of Prisons that he finish his sentence under home confinement. Even 

assuming the Court has the authority to grant such a recommendation, Brown is not 

a strong candidate for it. His extensive criminal history, pattern of parole and 

probation violations and misconduct while in prison, demonstrate that he could not 

be trusted to abide by home confinement conditions if release. The BOP has 

designated him as having a “high risk recividism level” (Exhibit 7). Brown’s record 

thus suggests that his release into home confinement would quickly spiral into 

additional criminal conduct.

In addition, his proposed plan of residing with his fiancée and two small children

in Ypsilanti, hardly seems appropriate (ECF No. 24, Page ID. 188). Brown has a 

dangerous and violent criminal past. He proposes future employment with a lawn 

care service or Federal Express, however, claims to have had a “grave deterioration 

of his health” (ECF No. 24, Page ID.188) and says that his body “has broken down 

since he was incarcerated in this case” (ECF No. 24, Page ID. 186) . 

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III. If the Court were to grant Brown’s motion, it should order a 14-day 

quarantine before release.

If the Court were inclined to grant Brown’s motion despite the government’s 

arguments above, the Court should order that he be subjected to a 14-day quarantine 

before release.

Conclusion 

Brown’s motion for compassionate release pursuant to §3582(c)(1)(A) should 

be denied.

MATTHEW SCHNEIDER

United States Attorney

s/Susan E. Fairchild (P41908) 

Assistant United States Attorney

211 W. Fort St., Suite 2001

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 226-9577

E-mail: susan.fairchild@usdoj.gov

Dated: September 14, 2020

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 14, 2020, I electronically filed the 

foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system.

Todd Shanker, Attorney for Defendant Brown

s/Susan E. Fairchild (P41908) 

Assistant United States Attorney

211 W. Fort St., Suite 2001

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 226-9577

E-mail: susan.fairchild@usdoj.gov

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