Oral Argument Not Yet Scheduled 

No. 08-5526 

________________________________ 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

________________________________ 

UNITY08, 

Appellant, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Appellee. 

________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 

Civil Action No. 1:07-cv-00053-RWR 

The Honorable Richard W. Roberts 

________________________________ 

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 

________________________________ 

J. Scott Ballenger 

(D.C. Bar No. 465252) 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 

555 Eleventh Street, NW 

Suite 1000 

Washington, DC 20004-1304 

Telephone: (202) 637-2200 

Fax: (202) 637-2201 

Alexandra A.E. Shapiro 

(D.C. Bar No. 438461) 

Marc E. Isserles (D.C. Bar No. 476018) 

MACHT, SHAPIRO, ARATO & 

ISSERLES LLP 

The Grace Building 

1114 Avenue of the Americas 

45th Floor 

New York, NY 10036 

Telephone: (212) 479-6724 

Fax: (212) 202-6417

Attorneys for Appellant 

DATED: July 20, 2009 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page 

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii

GLOSSARY............................................................................................................ vii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................1

ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................4

I. UNITY08’S CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE ..................................................4

A. This Case Is Not Moot ..........................................................................4

1. Unity08 Has A Clear And Definite Intent To Resume 

Election Activities For The 2012 Presidential Election If 

The Decision Below Is Reversed................................................5

2. This Case Falls Under The “Capable Of Repetition” 

Exception To The Mootness Doctrine........................................9

B. AO 2006-20 Is Subject To Judicial Review........................................11

1. FECA Does Not Preclude Judicial Review Of AO 2006-

20...............................................................................................11

2. AO 2006-20 Is Reviewable “Final Agency Action” ................12

II. UNITY08 IS NOT A “POLITICAL COMMITTEE”...................................15

A. AO 2006-20 Is Not Entitled To Chevron Deference ..........................15

B. The Major Purpose Of Unity08 Was To Create A Different 

Type Of Political Organization, Unassociated With Any 

Candidate.............................................................................................16

C. A Political Committee Is A Group Whose Major Purpose Is 

The Nomination Or Election Of A Particular Candidate....................18

D. Unity08’s Activities Create No Risk Of Corruption Or Its 

Appearance..........................................................................................25

E. Unity08’s Disbursements For Activities Related To Acquiring 

Ballot Access Were Not “Expenditures” ............................................28

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................30

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ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

CASES 

* Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 

387 U.S. 136 (1967).......................................................................................12 

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 

208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000).....................................................................13 

Bennett v. Spear, 

520 U.S. 154 (1997).......................................................................................12 

Branch v. FCC, 

824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987)...........................................................................9 

* Buckley v. Valeo, 

424 U.S. 1 (1976)...............................................................................15, 18, 19 

California Medical Association v. FEC, 

453 U.S. 182 (1981).................................................................................26, 27 

Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 

452 F.3d 798 (D.C. Cir. 2006).......................................................................12 

Center for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 

449 F.3d 655 (5th Cir. 2006) ...........................................................................9 

* Chamber of Commerce v. FEC, 

69 F.3d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1995)...........................................................................2 

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 

467 U.S. 837 (1984).......................................................................................15 

Church of American Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 

334 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................8 

* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks. 

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iii

Page(s) 

City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 

531 U.S. 278 (2001).........................................................................................7 

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 

461 U.S. 95 (1983).........................................................................................11 

Clark v. City of Lakewood, 

259 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2001) ...........................................................................7 

Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 

414 U.S. 441 (1974).......................................................................................23 

County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 

440 U.S. 625 (1979).........................................................................................9 

Davis v. FEC, 

128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008)...................................................................................27 

Dolls, Inc. v. City of Coralville, 

425 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D. Iowa 2006)............................................................7 

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction 

Trades Council, 

485 U.S. 568 (1988).......................................................................................15 

* FEC v. GOPAC, Inc., 

 917 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1996)..............................................................21, 22 

* FEC v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League 

 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1981).....................................................18, 20, 22, 29 

FEC v. Malenick, 

310 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2004).........................................................18, 21 

FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 

470 U.S. 480 (1985).......................................................................................29 

FEC v. Ted Haley Congressional Committee, 

852 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1988) .......................................................................27 

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iv

Page(s) 

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 

127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).....................................................................................9 

General Electric Co. v. EPA, 

290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002).......................................................................13 

Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. Ontario v. U.S. EPA, 

912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990).....................................................................14 

Honig v. Doe, 

484 U.S. 305 (1988).......................................................................................10 

* Johnson v. FCC, 

829 F.2d 157 (D.C. Cir. 1987).......................................................................10 

Kucinich v. Texas Democratic Party, 

563 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2009) .........................................................................11 

Lubin v. Panish, 

415 U.S. 709 (1974).......................................................................................29 

MedImmune v. Genentech, 

549 U.S. 118 (2007).......................................................................................12 

Meyer v. Grant, 

486 U.S. 414 (1988).......................................................................................28 

Moore v. Ogilvie, 

394 U.S. 814 (1969).........................................................................................9 

Munsell v. Department of Agriculture, 

509 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2007).........................................................................7 

Norman v. Reed, 

502 U.S. 279 (1992).........................................................................................9 

PETA v. Gittens, 

396 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2005).......................................................................11 

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v

Page(s) 

Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 

509 U.S. 43 (1993).........................................................................................11 

Rosario v. Rockefeller, 

410 U.S. 752 (1973).......................................................................................10 

Shays v. FEC, 

424 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D.D.C. 2006)...............................................................10 

Skysign International, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu, 

276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002) .........................................................................8 

Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 

219 U.S. 498 (1911).........................................................................................9 

Storer v. Brown, 

415 U.S. 724 (1974)...................................................................................9, 10 

United States Defense Commission v. FEC, 

861 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1988) ....................................................................13, 14 

United States v. Goland, 

959 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992) .......................................................................27 

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

2 U.S.C. §431(2) ......................................................................................................19 

2 U.S.C. §431(2) ......................................................................................................19 

2 U.S.C. §431(16) ....................................................................................................24 

5 U.S.C. §701(a)(1)..................................................................................................11 

11 C.F.R. §100.15 ....................................................................................................24 

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Page(s) 

OTHER AUTHORITY 

AO 1980-3................................................................................................................24 

AO 2004-9................................................................................................................24 

72 Fed. Reg. 5595 (Feb. 7, 2007) ............................................................................25 

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vii

GLOSSARY

AO Advisory Opinion 

FEC Federal Election Commission 

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act 

USDC U.S. Def. Comm’n v. FEC, 861 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1988) 

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Unity08 is a political organization with a unique mission. It seeks to create a 

platform for broader, bipartisan participation in politics in order to change the tone 

and focus of the current political system. To achieve that goal, it will “nominate” 

candidates for President and Vice-President. But that “nomination” process is 

unlike the nomination process of any other political organization on the American 

political scene. 

Although Unity08 intends to obtain ballot access for a Unity08 ticket and to 

hold an online convention in which candidates will be nominated (by ordinary 

Americans), Unity08 itself would have no association with an identified candidate 

for federal office at any point in the process. Unlike a conventional political party, 

Unity08 always intended to walk away from the process altogether once the 

“nominees” were selected as candidates—leaving them to form their own 

committees to campaign for them. Unity08 is a political organization using 

traditional election tools in an entirely non-traditional way. It seeks to create the 

structural conditions for the selection of someone to become the next President and 

Vice-President. But it has no stake or interest in deciding who those people will 

be, and never learns the identity of those people until its work is completed. 

Unity08 demonstrated in its opening brief that, under Buckley’s “major 

purpose” test, as interpreted by this Court in Machinists, an organization like 

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Unity08 is not subject to regulation as a “political committee.” In an advisory 

opinion issued in 2006, the FEC disagreed. As a direct result of that advisory 

opinion, and the contribution limits that govern “political committees,” Unity08 

could not achieve its goals for the 2008 election. 

The FEC says that this Court cannot even reach the merits because the case 

is moot and that FEC advisory opinions are unreviewable. The FEC would have 

this Court believe that Unity08 never intended to participate in any election other 

than the 2008 presidential election, and that it essentially went “out of business” in 

2008 once the FEC issued its advisory opinion. That is false. Unity08 never 

limited its objectives to the 2008 election, has never closed its doors (though it has 

suspended its operations due to the FEC’s unconstitutional advisory opinion), and 

has every intention of participating in the 2012 presidential election—if the 

advisory opinion is reversed. The FEC made it impossible for Unity08 to fulfill its 

mission by requiring it register as a “political committee,” and now claims that the 

case is “moot” because Unity08 is not today actively at work. That is not 

justiciability; it is a cynical game of administrative “gotcha.” 

The FEC also argues that its advisory opinion is unreviewable because 

Congress in FECA intended to foreclose judicial review of such actions, and 

because they are not “final.” But the FEC has identified no evidence that Congress 

intended to foreclose judicial review of FEC advisory opinions. As to finality, the 

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FEC determined in its advisory opinion that Unity08 “must register” as a “political 

committee.” That is a mandatory agency determination that imposed real-world, 

consequences on Unity08, and it plainly satisfies this Court’s finality precedents. 

On the merits, the FEC and its amici suggest that the entire campaign 

finance regime would crumble if Unity08—a political organization with a 

decidedly unique mission—did not register as a “political committee.” That is 

absurd. They conjure up the prospect of “massive corruption” and the “massive 

evasion of FECA’s contribution limits.” But these arguments erroneously presume 

that Unity08 is just like any other political party, and that all political parties must 

subject themselves to FECA regulation even before they formally nominate a 

“candidate.” Unity08 is fundamentally different. By design, Unity08 will never

support or oppose any particular, identified candidate for federal office. Under 

Buckley’s “major purpose” test and Machinists, Unity08 is not a “political 

committee” because there is simply no risk that its activities will lead to corruption 

or the appearance of corruption. Because any effort to regulate Unity08 as a 

“political committee” would violate the First Amendment, this Court should 

reverse. 

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ARGUMENT

I. UNITY08’S CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE 

A. This Case Is Not Moot 

As a consequence of the FEC’s determination that Unity08 must be 

registered as a “political committee” and would not be permitted to accept 

contributions from individuals exceeding $5,000, Unity08 determined that it would 

not be able to raise the approximately $15 million it needed to achieve its goals for 

the 2008 presidential election. See Peter Ackerman Affidavit ¶4 (Unity08-Ex. 1), 

attached hereto. Accordingly, Unity08 declared in January 2008 that it was 

“scal[ing] back” its operations and “suspend[ing]” its ballot access project” (FECEx. 1 at 2, attached to FEC’s Brief (“FBR”)), and would focus its energies instead 

on overturning AO 2006-20 in this litigation so that Unity08 (and perhaps other, 

similar movements) could achieve its goals at a later time (id. at 3). 

The FEC now seeks to insulate AO 2006-20 from judicial review on the 

specious ground that Unity08’s temporary suspension of its ballot access 

operations—which the FEC’s administrative ruling brought about—somehow 

makes the case moot. But Unity08 remains a viable movement with a clear and 

definite intent to participate in the 2012 presidential election. Regardless, this 

Court retains jurisdiction under the “capable of repetition” exception to mootness. 

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1. Unity08 Has A Clear And Definite Intent To Resume 

Election Activities For The 2012 Presidential Election If 

The Decision Below Is Reversed. 

The FEC argues that this case is moot because of Unity08’s purported 

“permanent cessation of activity” (FBR-14) and “disclaime[r] [of] any intention of 

participating in any election other than the 2008 presidential race” (FBR-15). That 

is incorrect. 

The FEC cites (without quoting) a single statement in Unity08’s AO 

requests. Unity08 said that it “does not intend to promote, attack, support, or 

oppose the candidates of the major parties for public office in the 2006 elections on 

the federal, state or local level, and it does not intend to support or oppose 

candidates for Congress or State and local elections at any time.” JA-159; see also

JA-198 (same in supplemental request). That statement does not even address 

Unity08’s plans with respect to future presidential races, and certainly is not a 

“specific disavowal” of intention to participate in such races. 

The FEC’s reliance on Unity08’s assertion that it did not intend to become a 

“permanent political party” (JA-435) is similarly misleading. Unity08 never 

intended to be a permanent political party—but that does not mean it foreswore the 

possibility of participating in presidential elections after 2008. The documents that 

the FEC quotes show that Unity08 considered the possibility of playing a role 

beyond the 2008 election, and merely hoped that such a role would not be 

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necessary if its objectives could be accomplished in 2008. See JA-435 (“It is not 

our intention to become a permanent third party. That might happen, but it is our 

hope that after the 2008 election of a Unity Ticket representing both current 

parties, that they both would get the message and move back toward the middle 

where they belong. In that case, responsive ... Unity08 will not need to be 

permanent.”) (emphasis added). 

Regardless of what Unity08 may have said before the 2008 election, the 

relevant question is whether Unity08 has a current intention to participate in a 

future presidential election. The FEC claims that Unity08 “closed its doors” and 

“ceased its operations” in January 2008. But its citations prove the opposite. 

Unity08’s website states that, “given the volatility of the present situation, we’re 

forced to scale back—not cease—our operations and suspend our ballet access 

project .... But we’re not closing our doors.” FEC-Ex. 1 at 2-3 (emphasis added). 

Unity08 has suspended its ballot access activities and election-related efforts 

while it litigates this case, and has not engaged in any material fundraising or 

spending since January 2008. See FEC-Ex. 1. But it remains a viable political 

organization with a clear and definite intent to participate in the 2012 presidential 

election. Unity08-Ex. 1 ¶2 (“If Unity08 is successful in this litigation, Unity08 has 

a clear and definite intent to resume its activities—renamed ‘Unity12’—for the 

2012 presidential election. The ‘Unity’ mission remains as critical today for the 

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2012 presidential election as it was in 2006 for the 2008 presidential election.”); id.

¶6 (“If the FEC ruling is reversed, Unity12 stands ready and fully intends to carry 

on the work that Unity08 began.”). 

The FEC relies (at 16) upon City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 

531 U.S. 278, 283-85 (2001), and Munsell v. Department of Agriculture, 509 F.3d 

572, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 2007), but those cases were moot because the plaintiff 

completely ceased its operations and expressed no clear intent to resume them if 

the challenged action were reversed. City News, 531 U.S. at 281-83 (challenge to 

city’s denial of license became moot after store withdrew application for license, 

closed its business, and neither “pursued[] nor currently expresse[d] an intent to 

pursue a license”); Munsell, 509 F.3d at 581-83 (finding suit against USDA moot 

where plaintiff corporate entity divested itself of meat processing operation, was 

no longer regulated, and had no “clear” or “definite” plans to reenter that business). 

By contrast, Unity08 remains “open” and has a clear and definite plan to 

resume its activities for the 2012 presidential election if it prevails here. E.g.,

Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1012 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(distinguishing City News and holding that expiration of business’s license did not 

moot controversy where entity expressly stated its intention to return to business if 

challenged ordinance were overturned); Dolls, Inc. v. City of Coralville, 425 F. 

Supp. 2d 958, 985-86 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (challenge to licensing and zoning 

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ordinances not moot where business closed at former location and could not 

construct a new business under existing ordinances, yet expressed intent to 

reopen); see also Church of Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334 F.3d 

676, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (case not moot where group that had ceased holding 

rallies stated clear intent to hold another rally if fee requirement were struck 

down). 

Moreover, Unity08 suspended its activities because of the FEC’s 

administrative ruling. It would be perverse to permit the FEC effectively to shut 

down a nascent political movement as a result of a constitutionally-suspect 

interpretation of FECA, and then insulate its action from review because the 

agency has shut down the group’s activities. Skysign Int’l, Inc. v. City & County of 

Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2002) (no mootness where plaintiff 

alleged that “challenged ordinance itself is what caused it to cease operations, and 

that the removal of that obstacle would put it back in business”).1

 

 

1

 The FEC’s amici argue that Unity08’s claims are moot because they “relate 

exclusively” to the 2008 election. Amici’s Br. (“ABR”)-7. But AO 2006-20 

addresses whether Unity08 would be required to register as a “political committee” 

if it engaged in the planned activities for the 2008 election—a requirement that 

persists to this day and has prevented Unity08 from engaging in the fundraising 

necessary to effectuate its goals. 

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2. This Case Falls Under The “Capable Of Repetition” 

Exception To The Mootness Doctrine 

In any case, Unity08’s appeal is not moot because it falls within the “capable 

of repetition” exception to mootness. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 

S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2007); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 

(1979); S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). 

 This Court has held that “controversies that arise in election campaigns are 

unquestionably among those saved from mootness under the exception for matters 

‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 41 n.2 

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969)). The FEC’s 

argument that an election cycle is too long to qualify under this exception fails 

under well-settled law establishing that “[c]ontroversy surrounding election laws 

... is one of the paradigmatic circumstances in which the Supreme Court has found 

that full litigation can never be completed before the precise controversy (a 

particular election) has run its course.” Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 

449 F.3d 655, 661 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 

(1992); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974)). This Court has likewise 

held, in the context of a four-year presidential election, that a case was not moot 

where its issues, “and their effects on minor-party candidacies, will persist in 

future elections, and within a time frame too short to allow resolution through 

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litigation.” Johnson v. FCC, 829 F.2d 157, 159 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 

Shays v. FEC, 424 F. Supp. 2d 100, 111 (D.D.C. 2006).

Unity08 intends to participate in future elections if it wins this case. 

Regardless, a plaintiff can satisfy the “capable of repetition” exception to mootness 

in the election context by demonstrating that the issue being litigated could affect a 

similar organization in the future. Thus, in Johnson v. FCC, this Court held that a 

controversy surrounding the 1984 presidential election was not moot under the 

“capable of repetition” exception without regard to whether the candidates had any 

intention of running again. 829 F.2d at 159 n.7 (reasoning that “[t]he issues 

properly presented, and their effects on minor-party candidacies, will persist in 

future elections, and within a time frame too short to allow resolution through 

litigation”); see Storer, 415 U.S. at 737 n.8 (case was not moot even though 

election was over because effects of issues on independent candidacies would 

persist in future elections); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973) 

(applying similar rule); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 335-36 (1988) (Scalia, J., 

dissenting) (recognizing that the Court had “dispens[ed] with the same-party 

requirement” in the context of election law disputes).2

 Because the issues that 

 

2

 In two recent election law disputes the Supreme Court found that the 

“capable of repetition” exception was satisfied because the particular plaintiff was 

likely to be subject to the challenged law in a subsequent election cycle. FBR-18 

n.6. But the Court did not suggest that a case should be dismissed as moot where a 

plaintiff in an election case cannot make that showing. It therefore left undisturbed 

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Unity08 raises could easily affect a similar organization in the future, the “capable 

of repetition” exception applies. 3 

B. AO 2006-20 Is Subject To Judicial Review 

1. FECA Does Not Preclude Judicial Review Of AO 2006-20 

The FEC argues that AO 2006-20 is unreviewable because Congress in 

FECA intended to “preclude judicial review” over such decisions. 5 U.S.C. 

§701(a)(1). However, “there is a ‘well-settled presumption favoring interpretations 

of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action,’ and [courts] will 

accordingly find an intent to preclude such review only if presented with ‘clear and 

convincing evidence.’” Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63-64 

(1993) (citations omitted). The FEC is unable to point to any such evidence. 

The FEC admits that FECA is silent on whether advisory opinions are 

reviewable. But it asserts that review is precluded because FECA contains two 

provisions specifically creating a private right of action, but no express cause of 

action for challenging advisory opinions. FBR-21-22. However, as the Supreme 

 

its long line of precedent holding that an election case survives mootness where it 

is “capable of repetition” with respect to other, similarly-situated parties. See 

Kucinich v. Tex. Democratic Party, 563 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 2009). 

3

 The FEC also argues that the “capable of repetition” exception does not 

apply because Unity08 could assert its claims as a defense in a subsequent 

enforcement action (FBR-19), but its cases hold only that the availability of an 

affirmative claim for monetary damages would prevent an otherwise moot 

injunction claim from “evading review.” See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 

U.S. 95, 109 (1983); PETA v. Gittens, 396 F.3d 416, 425 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same). 

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Court has explained, “‘[t]he mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should 

not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others. The right to review 

is too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of 

legislative intent’”; the interpretive question is always “phrased in terms of 

‘prohibition’ rather than ‘authorization’ because ... judicial review of a final 

agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is a 

persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.” Abbott Labs. 

v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). That a statute specifically authorizes 

post-enforcement judicial review does not establish Congress’s intent to preclude 

pre-enforcement review. The whole point of Abbott Laboratories and the 

Declaratory Judgment Act is that individuals should not have to expose themselves 

to civil or criminal penalties to obtain judicial review of agency interpretations. 

See MedImmune v. Genentech, 549 U.S. 118, 128-29 (2007). 

2. AO 2006-20 Is Reviewable “Final Agency Action” 

Actions are “final,” and therefore reviewable under the APA, if they “‘mark 

the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process’ and either determine 

‘rights or obligations’ or result in ‘legal consequences.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. 

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)). The FEC admits that the first prong 

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is met because “the issuance of an advisory opinion marks the conclusion of 

FECA’s advisory opinion process.” FBR-23. 

The FEC suggests, however, that AO 2006-20 does not determine Unity08’s 

“rights or obligations” or result in “legal consequences.” Elsewhere in its brief, the 

FEC treats its advisory opinions as binding precedent. FBR-30-32. Regardless, 

the FEC’s ability to later change its mind does not itself render an advisory opinion 

non-final. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 

2000). 

Additionally, this Circuit, unlike the Second Circuit, does not require agency 

action to be formally binding to be reviewable. Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 

377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Circuit’s cases “make clear that an agency 

pronouncement will be considered binding as a practical matter if it either appears 

on its face to be binding, or is applied by the agency in a way that indicates it is 

binding”) (citation and quotation omitted); cf. U.S. Def. Comm’n v. FEC, 861 F.2d 

765, 770-72 (2d Cir. 1988) (“USDC”) (cited at FBR-24-25) (requiring that the 

advisory opinion be formally binding for finality). AO 2006-20 appears on its face 

to be binding because its language is unconditional as to what would happen 

should Unity08 make more than $1,000 in expenditures: “Unity 08 must register 

with the Commission by filing a statement of organization within ten days after 

becoming a political committee, and it will be subject to the provisions of the Act 

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and Commission regulations applicable to political committees.” JA-58 (emphasis 

added). AO 2006-20 is also practically binding because as a result of the opinion, 

and the strict contribution limits that registration would require, Unity08 was 

effectively thwarted from achieving its goals. JA-15-16, 35; see Her Majesty the 

Queen ex rel. Ontario v. U.S. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“To 

determine finality, courts must decide ‘whether the agency’s position is definitive 

and whether it has a direct and immediate ... effect on the day-to-day business of 

the parties challenging the action.’”) (citation omitted) (omission in original). 

Moreover, the FEC has given no indication that it will ever change the 

position it took in AO 2006-20, which was adopted after an extensive 

administrative process—including Unity08 twice supplementing the record, two 

public hearings, public comments, and two extensions of the statutory time limit 

for rendering a decision. JA-155-240. The AO was not tentative and did not 

suggest that more facts were necessary or might lead to a different conclusion. 

There is absolutely no indication that the FEC can “later be convinced to change its 

mind.” USDC, 861 F.2d at 772. By contrast, in USDC, the advisory opinion was 

“particularly inappropriate for judicial resolution” because the FEC was “engaged 

in a rulemaking proceeding which could alter the very regulations applied in” the 

challenged advisory opinion as a result of a new Supreme Court decision. Id. 

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AO 2006-20 speaks in mandatory terms about Unity08’s obligation to 

register as a “political committee” and caused Unity08 to suspend all of its efforts. 

Consequently, it is a reviewable final agency action. 

II. UNITY08 IS NOT A “POLITICAL COMMITTEE” 

Unity08 demonstrated that, under settled law of the Supreme Court and this 

Circuit, it is not a “political committee” under FECA. In response, the FEC and its 

amici offer a series of rhetorically overblown reasons why Unity08 must be 

regulated under FECA in order to prevent “massive corruption” and a “massive 

evasion of FECA’s contribution limits.” The “parade of horribles” that the FEC 

and its amici identify is pure fiction. 

A. AO 2006-20 Is Not Entitled To Chevron Deference

The FEC argues broadly that AO 2006-20 should be upheld because it is a 

“reasonable construction” of FECA—implying that the whole of its AO is entitled 

to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But the 

FEC’s interpretation of Buckley’s “major purpose” test, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 

1, 79 (1976)—the main question on appeal—implicates core constitutional 

protections, and is thus not entitled to any deference. Chamber of Commerce v. 

FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (FEC is not entitled to Chevron deference 

where its interpretation of word burdened First Amendment rights); Edward J. 

DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 

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16

575 (1988) (Chevron deference does not apply “where an otherwise acceptable 

construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems”). In one 

sentence in its brief, the FEC concedes that this is the law. FBR-29 (“The question 

of whether regulating Unity08 as a political committee would be constitutional 

under Buckley’s major purpose test is a matter of law that this Court reviews de 

novo.”). Because AO 2006-20 is premised on the FEC’s construction of the 

“major purpose” test, it cannot be upheld as a “reasonable construction” of the 

FECA.4

 

B. The Major Purpose Of Unity08 Was To Create A Different Type 

Of Political Organization, Unassociated With Any Candidate 

The FEC’s argument is built around the false premise that Unity08’s 

objectives and activities are similar, for statutory and constitutional purposes, to 

traditional political parties or political action committees. The FEC simply ignores 

or refuses to engage with the important features that make Unity08 wholly unlike 

those groups. 

Unity08 was never intended to be a political party, and its “major purpose” 

was never to promote the nomination or election of any particular candidate or 

candidates for office. Unity08’s goal was to create an open-source platform for 

 

4

 The FEC does argue that its construction of “expenditures”—unlike “major 

purpose”—is entitled to Chevron deference (FBR-27-29), but that argument is 

premised entirely on its contention that Buckley and its progeny do not impose any 

constitutional limits on how the term “expenditures” is applied to Unity08. See 

Unity08’s Brief (“UBR”)-35-37 and infra at 28-29). 

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broader, bipartisan participation in order to change the tone and focus of political 

issues and to promote a new bi-partisan approach to politics focusing on the center 

of the political spectrum. UBR-6. 

Unity08 sought to pursue its goals through a two-phase plan focused on 

changing the electoral process. The first phase involved obtaining ballot access for 

a Unity08 ticket in the 37 states that allowed an organization a ballot position 

without an associated candidate. The second phase involved using technology to 

create an online nomination convention whereby any person could register as a 

delegate to vote for candidates for President and Vice-President. No individuals 

would even declare themselves as candidates for Unity08’s nomination until that 

convention was held, at which point Unity08’s own purpose and activities would 

have been completed. At no time during either of these two phases would Unity08 

have been affiliated in any way with any candidate, nor would it have sought to 

promote the nomination or election of any particular candidate. UBR-6-7. 

Unity08 essentially intended to walk right up to the point at which it would 

have become a traditional political party, and then step away. By the time any 

particular candidate was identified and chosen, Unity08’s planned work would 

have been complete. Compl. ¶13 (JA-13); Baily Decl. ¶42 (JA-32). Unity08 never 

intended to actively campaign for any candidates; it always expected that the 

eventual candidates would form their own political committees and comply with 

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FECA’s requirements. UBR-8-9. That the group’s founders expressed the hope or 

goal that the eventual Unity08 nominees would go on to win the election (FBR-6, 

36-37) does not alter the analysis; Unity08 never intended to pursue that goal in 

any fashion subject to regulation under FECA. 

C. A Political Committee Is A Group Whose Major Purpose Is The 

Nomination Or Election Of A Particular Candidate 

A “political committee” under 2 U.S.C. §431(4)(a) must be an organization 

“under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination 

or election of a candidate,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79, that receives contributions or 

make expenditures in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year. UBR-19. To 

satisfy the major purpose test of the political committee determination, the 

activities and disbursements of an organization must support and relate to an 

actual, specific person. UBR-20-26; see also FEC v. Malenick, 310 F. Supp. 2d 

230, 234-37 (D.D.C. 2004). As this Court explained in FEC v. Machinists NonPartisan Political League, this limitation is essential because the FEC is 

constitutionally entitled to regulate political speech only for the narrow and 

specific purpose of preventing actual corruption or the risk of corruption, which is 

not present “where a group’s activities are not related in any way to a person who 

has decided to become a candidate.” 655 F.2d 380, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

1. The FEC claims that a “candidate” must be “clearly identified” only 

in the context of “express advocacy.” FBR-33. However, both the controlling 

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19

case law and the plain language of FECA require that a “candidate” be an actual 

person in all contexts, not just the “express advocacy” context. First, Buckley 

states that “political committee” must be construed narrowly under the First 

Amendment to “only encompass organizations that are under the control of a 

candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a 

candidate.” 424 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added). Clearly, an organization can only be 

“under the control of” an actual person, and not a placeholder. And the Court 

could not have meant an identifiable person when it referred to “a candidate” in the 

“under the control” context but meant something different (i.e., a person who may 

be identified later) when it used the same precise phrase (“a candidate”) later in the 

same sentence when referring to nomination or election. The statutory language 

lends further support to this conclusion. FECA defines “candidate”—the term that 

Buckley used to define the boundaries of the “major purpose” exception—as “an 

individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to Federal office.” 2 

U.S.C. §431(2) (emphasis added). The definition also refers to a “person” and “his 

or her” activities, signifying that “candidate” must mean an actual, particular 

person—not a placeholder, as the FEC suggests. Id. §431(2)(B) (emphasis added). 

Second, in Machinists this Court expressly endorsed Unity08’s reading of 

Buckley. The Court quoted the “major purpose” passage from Buckley, and 

explained that it narrowly construed “political committee” to be limited to groups 

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presenting “‘the actuality and potential for corruption,’” which is not present 

“where a group’s activities are not related in any way to a person who has decided 

to become a candidate.” 655 F.2d at 391-92 (citation omitted). The Court further 

held that groups that “aim to produce some day a candidate acceptable to them, but 

[who] have not yet succeeded” are not “promoting a ‘candidate’ for office, as 

Congress uses that term in FECA.” Id. at 392. And the Court quoted the very 

language in Buckley that the FEC contends does not require a specific, identifiable 

candidate (the major purpose language) to support its holding that “candidate” 

means a specific person. Id. & n.24 (quoting statutory definition of candidate). 

The FEC attempts to distinguish Machinists on the ground that a draft group 

“has exhausted its only purpose” once it convinces the candidate to run, whereas 

Unity08’s “whole purpose ... [was] at least to nominate its ‘unity ticket’ for federal 

office.” FBR-40-41. This misunderstands the role of the word “nominate” in the 

statute and in the major purpose test. A group whose goal is to help a particular 

person secure the nomination of a party is certainly a political committee. But one 

merely seeking to ensure that someone is nominated is not a political committee. 

The FEC’s logic would, for example, subject to regulation a group formed to 

ensure that the Democratic convention is not disrupted by protests or terrorism, so 

that someone would secure the Democratic nomination. To the extent that Unity08 

was working toward the “nomination” of a candidate, its purposes were similarly 

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abstract and do not remotely implicate the “actuality and potential for corruption” 

associated with support for particular candidates at the heart of the major purpose 

test. 

Third, district courts in this Circuit have understood Machinists to require a 

showing that the group in question is supporting a particular, identified candidate. 

In FEC v. GOPAC, Inc., the court held that although the group supported future 

hopeful candidates for federal office, GOPAC’s major purpose activity did not 

“constitute support for an actual, particular federal candidate or candidates.” 917 

F. Supp. 851, 864 (D.D.C. 1996) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Malenick, the 

court held that because the major purpose of the group at issue “was the 

nomination or election of specific candidates,” the organization was a political 

committee. 310 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (emphasis added). 

The FEC claims that GOPAC is distinguishable because that group did not 

provide direct support to federal candidates, and it dismisses the district court’s 

analysis of the major purposes test as dictum. FBR-39. However, the GOPAC

court’s extensive analysis of both Buckley and Machinists—and its rejection of the 

FEC’s argument that the major purpose test was so broad as to cover any group 

engaging in “partisan politics or “electoral activity”—belies that characterization. 

E.g., 917 F. Supp. at 859 (“Circuit precedent indicates ... that even if the 

organization’s major purpose is the election of a federal candidate or candidates, 

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22

the organization does not become a ‘political committee’ unless or until it makes 

expenditures in cash or in kind to support a ‘person who has decided to become a 

candidate’ for federal office.” (citing Machinists, 655 F.2d at 392)); id. (noting that 

the court relied on Buckley and subsequent D.C. Circuit cases to deny a motion to 

dismiss in order to afford the FEC an opportunity to address “‘the controlling 

relevant legal question ... [of] whether, at the times in question, the organization’s 

‘major purposes ... [was] the nomination or election’ of an identified candidate or 

candidates for federal office”) (initial emphasis added) (alterations in original). 

The FEC also argues that GOPAC “provided no direct support to federal 

candidates,” whereas Unity08 “planned to give its presidential ticket—at a 

minimum—a $10 million gift in the form of ballot access.” FBR-39 (footnote 

omitted). But ballot access is a benefit that the major parties get for free. Merely 

trying to equalize the playing field between major party candidates and 

independent candidates does not constitute electioneering on behalf of independent 

candidates. Unity08 could have pursued exactly the same goals, for example, by 

lobbying for the liberalization of ballot access laws in the 37 states to make it 

substantially easier for independent candidates to get on the ballot. That approach 

would have been far too slow and expensive to bear fruit in time for the 2008 

election, but presumably even the FEC would have conceded that such a group 

cannot be regulated as a “political committee.” Unity08’s objectives were 

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similarly agnostic as to the identity of the particular candidates who would 

ultimately be benefited, and hence it did not have as a major purpose the 

nomination or election of any particular candidate. 

Any interpretation of FECA that would render structural efforts to level the 

playing field, like Unity08’s, subject to FECA’s strict limitations would raise very 

serious constitutional problems of discrimination against independent candidates 

and minor parties. See UBR-38-40; cf. Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 

U.S. 441, 449 (1974) (holding ballot access restriction that discriminated against 

minor party unconstitutional because it violated “‘basic constitutional’” “‘right to 

associate with the political party of one’s choice’” (citation omitted)). 

2. The FEC argues that “[t]he whole point of a nomination process is to 

identify which candidate an organization will support” and that if Unity08 does not 

qualify as a political committee, “all political parties ... would be constitutionally 

exempt from regulation as political committees in each election cycle until they 

had nominated their candidates for political office.” FBR-41; see also ABR-18. 

This argument is a red herring because political parties are subject to FECA 

without regard to Buckley’s “major purpose” test so long as they have (at any time) 

actually obtained ballot access for a candidate, so anything this Court says about 

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that test could not exempt the major parties from regulation at any point.5 The 

Supreme Court crafted the “major purpose” test because the term “political 

committee—unlike the term “political party”—is defined by reference to campaign 

“expenditures” and “contributions.” The test winnows out groups not defined 

elsewhere in the statute that might otherwise be caught in the net of the vague and 

overbroad language of §431(4)(A) and does not exempt otherwise regulated 

entities from FECA’s ambit. 

Regardless, the major parties (and many political action committees) always 

intend to campaign for the election of a particular individual at some point, even 

before that individual is identified. Unity08, by contrast, never would have 

supported the nomination or election of any particular person. There is a world of 

difference between an intent to support the election of a particular person (even if 

not yet identified) and an abstract intent to support the nomination or election of 

someone while remaining forever indifferent to who that person is. 

3. The FEC’s amici cite AO 2003-23 (Nov. 7, 2003) for the proposition 

that an organization need only support a candidate who can be identified by office, 

party, or election cycle for any campaign finance laws to apply. ABR-22-23. But 

AO 2003-23 deals with specific earmarking rules that are wholly unrelated to the 

issues in the present case. WE LEAD, an organization that was already registered 

 

5

 2 U.S.C. §431(16) (defining “political party”); 11 C.F.R. §100.15 (same); 

AO 2004-9; AO 1980-3. 

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as a political committee, collected earmarked contributions and forwarded them to 

the presumptive Democratic nominee or to the Democratic National Committee if 

the presumptive nominee was not named by a particular time. At issue was 

whether contributors to WE LEAD were allowed under earmarking rules to make 

those contributions to WE LEAD, not whether WE LEAD was a “political 

committee.”6

D. Unity08’s Activities Create No Risk Of Corruption Or Its 

Appearance 

The FEC’s overblown rhetoric is divorced from logic, common sense, and 

the facts about Unity08. Allowing a group like Unity08 to collect contributions 

exceeding the $5,000 limit that applies to political committees certainly will not 

“create an opportunity for massive corruption.” FBR-42. A donor to a true 

political party or PAC knows that his or her donation will be used directly to 

campaign for the nomination and/or election of some particular person—who will 

then be beholden to the donor. A donor to Unity08, by contrast, knows that his or 

her donation would be used solely to create an open source platform for greater 

participation but specifically would not be used to campaign in any way for the 

actual election of whatever person ultimately took advantage of that platform. To 

 

6

 The FEC’s amici also argue (FBR-13-14) that Unity08’s registration under 

26 U.S.C. §527 means it is a political committee, but the FEC itself has 

specifically declined to treat 527 status as a proxy for determining political 

committee status. See 72 Fed. Reg. 5595 (Feb. 7, 2007). 

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the extent the Unity08 nominee would be indebted to Unity08’s contributors in 

some abstract sense, the same could be said for a group that devotes itself to 

securing changes in ballot access laws that would make any independent candidacy 

easier to run. Certainly independent candidates would be grateful for such abstract 

and impersonal support, but it is a far cry from the kinds of corruption-inducing 

linkages that the Supreme Court has found to be constitutionally sufficient to 

justify FECA’s harsh contribution limits. 

The FEC says that corruption of the political process exists where 

contributions are not directly connected to a candidate of the contributor’s 

choosing, and that this type of corruption is a compelling reason to justify 

constitutional restrictions on Unity08. FBR-45-48 (citing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 

453 U.S. 182 (1981)). But unlike Unity08, the group in California Medical was 

already a political committee that supported specific, actual candidates. The 

Supreme Court’s observation that contributions earmarked for administrative 

expenses could effectively be redirected into direct candidate support (FBR-46) 

must be understood in that context. If a donor offers to pay all the administrative 

expenses of the Democratic Party, obviously that would enable the party to shift 

other funds into direct campaign expenditures. There are no such “fungible 

money” concerns with Unity08, because the organization had no plans to 

participate in campaigning at all. 

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Moreover, the FEC fails to take into account more recent Supreme Court 

precedent explicitly rejecting California Medical’s reasoning that equalization of 

the political voices is a compelling interest. 453 U.S. at 198 n.19. For example, in 

Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008), the Court recognized that “the interest 

‘in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the 

outcome of elections’” is insubstantial because “‘the concept that government may 

restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 

voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.’” (citation omitted); see 

also id. (“rejecting as ‘antithetical to the First Amendment’ ‘the notion that the 

government has a legitimate interest in restricting the quantity of speech to 

equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections’”) (citation omitted). On 

June 29, 2009, the Supreme Court also requested rehearing and briefing in Citizens 

United v. FEC, No. 08-205, because it is specifically considering whether to 

overrule Austin and the parts of McConnell v. FEC based on the same reasoning 

the FEC argues here, regarding the equalizing of voices in the political process. 

Supreme Court Order in Pending Case (June 29, 2009). 

The other two cited cases are inapposite. United States v. Goland, 959 F.2d 

1449, 1453 (9th Cir. 1992) (FBR-48-49), held that a contributor could not evade 

prosecution for making excessive contributions directly to an actual candidate

merely because the candidate did not know the contributor’s identity. And in FEC 

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v. Ted Haley Congressional Committee, 852 F.2d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(FBR-48), the court held that a post-election contribution to a person who was no 

longer a “live” candidate but needed to retire campaign debt could be regulated 

because otherwise a candidate could “‘run[] their campaigns at a deficit and then 

collect[] contributions after the election.’” (Citation omitted.) Those postcampaign contributions raised a definite potential for a corrupt, quid pro quo prearrangement. Here, Unity08 planned to be involved only at the pre-campaign stage 

and would never be affiliated with any candidate with whom there could have been 

any arrangement creating a risk of the appearance of corruption. 

E. Unity08’s Disbursements For Activities Related To Acquiring 

Ballot Access Were Not “Expenditures” 

Spending to achieve ballot access is not a FECA “expenditure” under the 

First Amendment unless done in support of an identified candidate. UBR-35-37. 

The FEC claims that ballot access activities are not constitutionally protected and 

cites as support two of its prior advisory opinions, which it claims did not involve 

actual, specific candidates. FBR-31-32. But the notion that Unity08’s spending 

for ballot access was merely non-communicative administrative work unworthy of 

First Amendment protection (FBR-34) contravenes controlling authority. The 

Supreme Court has held that this type of work, which included petitioning for 

ballot access, is constitutionally protected. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 

(1988) (“The circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the 

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29

expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the 

proposed change ... [and] involves the type of interactive communication 

concerning political change that is appropriately described as ‘core political 

speech.’”) (emphasis added); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974) (“[T]he 

process of qualifying candidates for a place on the ballot may not constitutionally 

be measured solely in dollars.”); UBR-38-40. 

The requestors in the FEC’s two prior advisory opinions were named 

individuals. The FEC asserts that they were not “candidates” because the one in 

AO 1994-05 had not yet spent enough money, and the one in AO 1984-11 was 

asking when he would become eligible for certain matching funds available to 

presidential candidates. FBR-31-32. So what? In each case, the groups were 

already affiliated with an actual person who would be a candidate during the ballot 

access process, raising a risk of corruption or its appearance. Unity08’s spending 

for ballot access was unrelated to a particular person and therefore raised no such 

risks. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (“‘The 

absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate 

... alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for 

improper commitments from the candidate.’”) (citation omitted); accord

Machinists, 655 F.2d at 392. 

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30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment of the 

district court and remand these proceedings with a direction to grant Unity08’s 

motion for summary judgment. 

DATED: July 20, 2009 Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ J. Scott Ballenger 

Alexandra A.E. Shapiro 

(D.C. Bar No. 438461) 

Marc E. Isserles 

(D.C. Bar No. 476018) 

MACHT, SHAPIRO, ARATO & 

ISSERLES LLP 

The Grace Building 

1114 Avenue of the Americas 

45th Floor 

New York, NY 10036 

Telephone: (212) 479-6724 

Fax: (212) 202-6417 

J. Scott Ballenger 

(D.C. Bar No. 465252) 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 

555 Eleventh Street, NW 

Suite 1000 

Washington, DC 20004-1304 

Telephone: (202) 637-2200 

Fax: (202) 637-2201 

 

Attorneys for Appellant

Case: 08-5526 Document: 01215953331 Page: 38
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

In accordance with Circuit Rule 32(a) and Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure 28.1 and 32(a)(7), the undersigned certifies that the accompanying brief 

has been prepared using 14-point Times New Roman typeface, and is doublespaced (except for headings and footnotes). 

 The undersigned further certifies that the brief is proportionally spaced and 

contains 6,990 words exclusive of the certificates required by Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 28(a)(1) and Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), table of contents, table of 

authorities, glossary, signature lines, and certificates of service and compliance. 

The undersigned used Microsoft Word to compute the count. 

DATED: July 20, 2009 Respectfully submitted, 

 

 /s/ J. Scott Ballenger 

 J. Scott Ballenger 

 

Case: 08-5526 Document: 01215953331 Page: 39
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of July, 2009, I filed eight (8) paper 

copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant and also electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the Court’s CM/ECF system, which 

will send notification of the filing, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 25(c)(1)(D) a copy will be served via electronic mail to the following: 

Thomasenia P. Duncan, Esq. 

David Brett Kolker, Esq. 

Kevin Deeley, Esq. 

Adav Noti, Esq. 

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

tduncan@fec.gov 

dkolker@fec.gov 

kdeeley@fec.gov 

anoti@fec.gov 

I further certify that I caused two (2) copies of the foregoing to be served via 

first-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon the following: 

Thomasenia P. Duncan, Esq. 

David Brett Kolker, Esq. 

Kevin Deeley, Esq. 

Adav Noti, Esq. 

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

Case: 08-5526 Document: 01215953331 Page: 40
Tara Malloy 

Joseph G. Hebert 

Campaign Legal Center 

1640 Rhode Island Ave., NW 

Suite 650 

Washington, DC 20036 

Fred Wertheimer 

Democracy 21 

1875 I Street, NW 

Suite 500 

Washington, DC 20006 

Donald J. Simon 

Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse, Endreson & Perry, LLP 

1425 K. Street, NW 

Suite 600 

Washington, DC 20005 

 /s/ J. Scott Ballenger 

J. Scott Ballenger (DC Bar No. 

465252) 

LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 

555 Eleventh Street, NW 

Suite 1000 

Washington, DC 20004-1304 

Telephone: (202) 637-2200 

Fax: (202) 637-2201 

scott.ballenger@lw.com 

Case: 08-5526 Document: 01215953331 Page: 41