RENDERED: MAY 26, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-0640-MR

CHARLES ROBERSON APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 18-CR-00372

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Charles Roberson1appeals pro se from the Hardin Circuit 

Court’s order entered on May 11, 2022, which denied his Kentucky Rule of 

Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 post-conviction motion for relief from judgment. 

We affirm.

1 The briefs and multiple filings in the trial court record refer to the Appellant as “Charles 

Roberson Jr.” However, the notice of appeal only listed his name as “Charles Roberson”; thus 

that is the name we must use. 
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On April 26, 2018, Roberson was indicted for murder in the death of 

Xedric “C.J.” McNeil along with two counts of criminal attempt to commit

murder, one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, and one count of 

tampering with physical evidence. The charges arose from a verbal altercation 

between Roberson and McNeil during a social gathering on February 4, 2018,

which escalated and resulted in Roberson firing multiple gun shots at McNeil and 

into the vicinity of three other individuals.

A jury trial was scheduled for February 4, 2019, during which voir 

dire was conducted before Roberson opted to accept an offer to plead guilty to

amended charges of first-degree manslaughter and three counts of first-degree

wanton endangerment. The tampering with physical evidence charge was 

additionally dismissed in return. Roberson was later sentenced to 18 years on 

April 4, 2019, in accordance with the plea agreement.

On January 24, 2022, Roberson filed a post-conviction motion

asserting he unknowingly and unintelligently entered into his plea agreement due 

to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Roberson argued his trial 

counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence and properly investigate,

pursue, and advise him of an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense and 

imperfect self-defense. The trial court denied the motion on March 9, 2022,

because Roberson failed to attach a signed verification to the motion pursuant to 
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RCr 11.42(2), and the motion was refiled with a proper verification on March 21, 

2022. The Commonwealth filed a response on May 2, 2022, and on May 11, 2022,

the trial court denied Roberson’s motion on the merits without an evidentiary 

hearing. This appeal followed.

An RCr 11.42 movant must satisfy the two-pronged test laid forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 

674 (1984), by demonstrating that his or her counsel was inadequate, and counsel’s 

errors prejudiced the case. See also Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39 

(Ky. 1985). When involving entry of a guilty plea, the movant must prove there 

was a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficiency, he or she would not 

have pled guilty and would have proceeded to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 

59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985); accord Phon v. Commonwealth, 

51 S.W.3d 456 (Ky. App. 2001). A reviewing court “must be highly deferential” 

of counsel’s performance, and “the defendant must overcome the presumption that 

counsel provided a reasonable trial strategy.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 253 

S.W.3d 490, 498-99 (Ky. 2008). 

Before addressing the arguments before us, we must first note that, 

along with some formatting errors, Roberson’s brief fails to provide a preservation 

statement for the claims he raises, and it does not include a word-count certificate 

since it exceeds by three pages the limit required by Kentucky Rule of Appellate 
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Procedure (RAP) 31(G)(2). However, the Commonwealth has asserted no 

objection, and due to the relatively short length of the record and the clear nature 

of the claims, we elect to ignore the deficiencies and review under the normal 

Strickland analysis as opposed to manifest injustice. See Hallis v. Hallis, 328 

S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010).

On appeal, Roberson again asserts he entered into an unknowing and 

unintelligent plea agreement due to trial counsel’s errors, the first of those errors

being trial counsel’s failure to seek suppression of evidence. Roberson maintains

that the shooting occurred in a parking lot outside an apartment unit located at 300 

Diecks Drive #7, and officers made entry into the apartment before a search 

warrant, predicated on a faulty affidavit, was later granted.

The trial court ruled that Roberson failed to identify “anything 

specific gathered” pursuant to the warrant which would have been used to convict 

him at trial. We agree with this rationale. RCr 11.42(2) mandates a motion to

“state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the 

facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds.” Facts must be pled 

with “particularity” otherwise “the trial court cannot tell whether an evidentiary 

hearing is necessary.” Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Ky. 2012). 

Failure to satisfy this specificity requirement mandates a summary dismissal. RCr 

11.42; Roach, 384 S.W.3d at 140. The only mention of any evidence that
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Roberson alleges was unlawfully obtained was in reference to cell phones seized at 

the scene, but Roberson fails to articulate what exactly was contained on these 

phones and how suppression would have secured a more favorable outcome for his 

case. Furthermore, as the Commonwealth argues, there is a question as to whether 

Roberson would have had proper standing to invoke suppression because he 

indicates in his brief he did not reside at the apartment unit searched, and multiple 

cell phones, which presumably did not all belong to him, were seized. See Ordway 

v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Ky. 2011) (citation omitted) (“A 

defendant bears the burden of establishing standing to challenge a Fourth 

Amendment search.”). Roberson does not otherwise articulate what expectation of 

privacy he maintained in what was searched or seized. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 

448 U.S. 98, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980).

Turning to the only remaining claim of error, Roberson argues that 

trial counsel failed to sufficiently investigate, pursue, and advise him regarding an

EED defense and imperfect self-defense. This claim is directly and conclusively 

refuted by the record, and we further affirm the trial court’s summary denial which 

was also predicated on this reasoning. See Cawl v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 

214, 218 (Ky. 2014) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is not required when the record 

refutes the claim of error or when the allegations, even if true, would not be 

sufficient to invalidate the conviction.”) (emphasis in original). 
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During the final pretrial conference on January 29, 2019, trial counsel 

explicitly informed the trial court in Roberson’s physical presence that he intended 

to pursue a self-defense claim. Trial counsel stated it was the defense’s belief that

McNeil was armed on the night of his death and that an eyewitness would testify 

McNeil had fired a gun at the apartment located at 300 Diecks Drive #7

approximately two weeks prior to his death. It was further stated that this witness 

would additionally testify he informed Roberson of this incident. On the first, and 

ultimately the only, scheduled day of trial, trial counsel asked questions during voir 

dire concerning the jury pool’s attitude toward firearm rights and self-defense. 

Roberson later accepted a plea offer after the jury was sworn. The 

plea agreement forms, along with a very thorough plea colloquy conducted by the 

trial court, provide the most conclusive refutation observable within the record. 

See Ford v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Ky. 1970). The 

Commonwealth’s plea offer bears Roberson’s handwritten signature, and the 

stipulated facts contained therein clearly state Roberson caused the death of 

McNeil “under circumstances in which he acted under the influence of extreme 

emotional disturbance as defined by KRS 507.020.” In the moments just after

entry of the plea, the prosecutor indicated they were presented with evidence which 

supported an EED defense and self-defense. Specifically, the prosecution 
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mentioned there was evidence that would support a claim McNeil “provoked”

Roberson into firing at him.

Roberson’s trial counsel signed a “certificate of counsel” contained 

within the motion to enter the guilty plea which verified he “fully discussed” the 

charges and “any possible defenses” with Roberson and that he believed Roberson

understood. During the colloquy, trial counsel further stated he discussed the 

possible outcomes of proceeding to trial, and when asked by the trial court, 

Roberson affirmed he told his trial counsel “everything he knew” about his 

charges. Roberson also signed the motion to enter the guilty plea, which along 

with his own verbal acknowledgments, denied he was in any way mentally

impaired or that he was being “influenced” or “forced” to enter into the agreement

“against [his] will.”

The trial court informed Roberson of his trial counsel’s duties, such as 

his duty to investigate the case and pursue defenses “including in this particular 

case the claim of self-protection which you all have talked about.” The signed plea 

agreement and the colloquy demonstrate Roberson acknowledged and understood, 

by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right to present evidence and a defense at a 

jury trial. The trial court further informed Roberson that by pleading guilty, he

was indicating he was satisfied with his attorney’s performance and “there [was] 

nothing else out there that [he] want[ed] any attorney to do that might have 
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changed [his] mind or made a difference about [his] decision to enter this guilty 

plea.” Immediately thereafter, Roberson affirmed he was satisfied with his trial 

counsel’s services, and the trial court read over and explained the terms of the 

Commonwealth’s plea offer he signed.

“[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and the 

prosecutor at [an original plea hearing], as well as any findings made by the judge 

accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral 

proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 

L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977). “Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong 

presumption of verity.” Id. at 74, 97 S. Ct. at 1629. Roberson has provided no 

discussion as to why this plea colloquy and the entry of his plea should be called 

into doubt. Roberson only makes general assertions that trial counsel failed to 

investigate and discuss his defenses, and he cites various alleged facts and 

circumstances he maintains would have advanced an EED defense and selfdefense. But Roberson presents nothing more specific such as a claim that these 

alleged facts and circumstances were specifically unknown either to him or trial 

counsel, or were otherwise undiscussed, before the entry of his plea. See

Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74, 97 S. Ct. at 1629 (“The subsequent presentation of 

conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, 

as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible.”). 
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Regardless, the record demonstrates some of the alleged exculpatory information 

Roberson discusses in his brief, relating to McNeil being armed and threatening on 

the night of the shooting, were referenced or alluded to either by trial counsel or 

the prosecution before or during entry of the plea as previously discussed.

Thus, due to insufficient pleadings and the conclusiveness of the 

record, Roberson has failed to satisfy the deficiency prong under the Strickland

analysis, and it is therefore unnecessary to undertake any additional discussion 

relating to the prejudice prong. The Hardin Circuit Court’s summary denial of 

Roberson’s RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing was proper, and we 

affirm.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Charles Roberson, pro se

Wheelwright, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Matthew F. Kuhn

Solicitor General

Rachel A. Wright

Assistant Solicitor General

Frankfort, Kentucky