1

U.S. Department of Transportation FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION



# Regulatory E valuation Safety Management System for Certificated

Airports

Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

(14 CFR Part 139)



# Esther Barto Jose Castedo Nicole Nance

Office of Aviation Policy and Plans Regulatory Analysis Division, APO

- 3002 TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 1

I. The Proposed Rule

................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 4

II. Backgrou nd

................................ ................................ ................................ ....................... 5

III. The Evolution of SNPRM

................................ ................................ ................................ . 6

IV. Costs and Benefits

................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 9

A. Baseline

................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 9

1. Baseline Costs

................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 9 2. Baseline Benefits

......... ................................................................. . ........ 1 1

B

. Costs

................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 1 3

1. SMS Manual and Implementation Plan

................................ ................................ ......... 1 6 2. New Sta ffing Requirements......

............................................................. . .1 8 3. New Materials/Equipment

................................ ................................ ............................. 22 4. Training

................................ ................................ ................................ .......................... 2 3 5. Recording Potential Hazards

......... ........................................................ .. 30 6. Documenting SRM and Reporting Safety Information

......... .................. . ...... 3 1 7

. Cost of Compliance

................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 3 4

C

. Benefits

................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 37

1. Benefit Model and Assumptions

................................ ................................ .................... 4 2 2. Effectiveness

............................................................... ............... 4 4 3

. Results for E ach D atabas e

......................................................... .... 4 8 4

. Sensitivity Analysis

................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 5 6 5

. Benefit

- Cost Comparison

................................ ................................ ............................... 5 7

V. NPRM Comment s and FAA response

................................ ................................ ................. 5 8

APPENDIX 1 : Accident History

................................ ................................ .............................. 6 8

APPENDIX 2: Aircraft Values

................................ ................................ ................................ .. 9 13

APPENDIX 3: Airport Groupings

................................ ................................ ............................ 9 3

APPENDIX 4: Benefits

................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 1 1 5
APPENDIX 5: Pilot Study Participate Breakout

................................ ................................ ... 1 22
APPENDIX 6: Compilation of Pilot Study Documentation

................................ .................. 1 231 

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A safety management s ystem (SMS) is a formalized approach to managing safety, which includes an organization

- wide safety policy, formal methods of identifying potential hazards, formal methods for analyzing and mitigating potential hazar ds, and an organization

- wide emphasis on promoting a safety culture. SMS for airports is comprised of four key components : Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management (SRM), Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. These components will help airports effectively integrate the formal risk control procedures into normal operational practices
, thus improving safety at airports throughout the U.S. air transportation system that host air carrier operations. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that all certificated airports be covered by the SMS requirements. Based on comments and information gathered from the FAA SMS pilot studies , it
became evident that applying SMS across all certificated airports was not practical. In response, the FAA revised its assumptions used to ca lculate overall costs associated with this proposal.
The FAA also reviewed additional accident and incident databases to obtain more accurate assumptions of benefits derived from an SMS. These additional databases included the FAA
Accident and Incident D atabase (AIDS), NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), the FAA’s Wildlife Strike Database, and FAA’s Runway Incursion Database. Using these revised cost and benefit estimates, the FAA explored various alternatives to determine how to apply an SMS requirement to a group of airports whose benefits justify its
costs and harmonizes with international standards . The FAA focused on airports with the highest passenger enplanements and largest total operations so that safety benefits would flow to
the ove rwhelming majority of aircraft operations in the United States. The FAA also focused on incorporating airports with international passenger operations to ensure conformity with international standards and recommended practices. The FAA considered multipl e alternatives
for which part 139 certificate holders would be required to implement an a irport SMS. The FAA analyzed the following alternatives:

 All Part 139 airports (as originally proposed in the NPRM );

 Airport operators holding a Class I airport opera ting certificate (AOC) ;

 Certificated airports i dentified by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as a port of entry (under 19 CFR § 101.3), designated international airport (under2 19 CFR § 122.13), landing rights airport (under 19 CFR § 122.14), or as a user fee airport (under 19 CFR § 122.14) (also referred to collectively throughout this
document as “international airports”);

 Large, M edium, and S mall hub airports (as identified in the N ational Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) ) 1 and cert ificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations ; and

 Large, Medium, and Small hub airports (as identified in the NPIAS), certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations, and international airports Although an airport may belong in more than one classification
, the analysis first removed multiple airport listings, and then summed benefits across unique airports (see table A.7
in Appendix 3 for airport classifications). The goal of analyzing these alternatives is to adop t an alternative only upon a reasoned
determination that its benefits justify its costs while harmonizing with international standards

. While the FAA is proposing a preferred alternative, each alternative presents various trade

- offs of interest to the pub lic.
T he following table shows benefits and costs of the alternative s over 10 years

.

Comparison of Costs and Benefits over 10 years (2014 Dollars)

Base Case All Class I International L, M, S and >100K ops Preferred

alternative: L, M, S, >100K ops, and In ternational Benefits $382,987,281 $368,096,671 $360,907,166 $356,128,301 $370,788,457 Costs $471,104,787 $341,021,606 $215,010,997 $163,760,850 $238,865,692 Net Benefits

- $88,117,506 $27,075,065 $145,896,169 $192,367,451 $131,922,764 PV Benefits (7%) $ 233,282,770 $224,210,033 $219,830,291 $216,919,352 $225,850,869 PV Costs (7%) $307,842,595 $223,584,687 $141,796,001 $108,819,973 $157,496,312 PV Net Benefits (7%)

- $74,559,825 $625,346 $78,034,290 $108,099,379 $68,354,557 PV Benefits (3%) $307,499,272 $295,542,114 $289,769,378 $285,932,407 $297,704,052

1 The FAA’s use of the term hub airport is different than that of airlines, which use the term to denote an airport with significant connecting traffic by one or m ore carriers. The FAA ’s authorizing statute defines L arge hubs as those airports that each account for 1 percent or more of total U.S. passenger boardings (U.S. passenger enplanements)

. M edium hubs are defined as airports that each account for between 0. 25 percent and 1 percent of total U.S. passenger boardings

. S mall hubs are defined as airports that enplane 0.05 percent to 0.25 percent of total U.S. passenger boardings

.3

PV Costs (3%) $389,440,320 $282,304,199 $178,432,284 $136,340,226 $198,211,977 PV Net Benefits (3%)

- $74,559,825 $625,346 $78,034,290 $108,099,379 $68,354,557 Mitigation Costs: Not quantified, estimate s not included. Given the range of mitigation actions possible, it is difficult to quantify potential benefits.

The estimated costs of this rule do not include the costs of mitigations that operators could incur as a result of conducting the risk analy sis proposed in this rule. Given the range of mitigation actions possible, it is difficult to provide a quantitative estimate of both the costs and benefits of such mitigations. We anticipate that operators will only implement mitigations where
benefits of doing so exceed the costs of the mitigations. In order for the estimated benefits to exceed the costs of the rule, the mitigation costs must be below $68.4 million over 10 years (discounted at 7%). The FAA requests comment on this assumption, as well as data regarding costs and benefits associated with any mitigations implemented through a voluntary SMS

program. After evaluating the estimated costs and benefits of each alternative, the FAA’s preferred
altern ative, which is proposed in the SNPRM, is to require SMS implementation for (i) Large, Medium, and Small hub certificated airports, (ii) certificated airports with more than 100,000 total operations, or (iii) certificated airports accepting international aircraft operations.
This alternative covers 268 airports across Classes I, II, III, and IV. The airports that comprise this preferred alternative account for over 98% of all passenger enplanements in the
U.S . While simply applying the proposed requirement to Large, Medium, and Small hub
certifica ted airports would account for most of this traffic, many critical airports within the U.S. system would not be included because they do not meet those enplanement thresholds. Simply accounting for airports with higher passenger enplanements fails to ackn owledge the many other complex certificated airports that have significant levels of total aircraft operations. Therefore, to ensure that these busy airports are included in the proposal, the preferred alternative includes airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations based on their operations data submitted through FAA Form 5010

- 1, Airport Master Record available on August 1, 2012. The FAA acknowledges that data submitted through FAA Form 5010

- 1 may
include estimates for airports that do not h ave an air traffic control tower. While more definitive data may be available through the FAA’s air traffic control tower counts, this information may4

not be readily available, may not be accessible to the public, and does not account for certificated
air ports that do not have an air traffic control tower. The pool of airports characterized as Large, Medium, and Small hub airports or certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations is large, but still does not completely account for a ll certificated airports able to receive international traffic. In order to
harmonize w ith the intent of the International Civil Aviation Organization ( ICAO ) SMS standards, the preferred alternative includes certificated airports accepting international

o perations. These airports together correspond with the intent of ICAO Annex es 14 and 19
standards.



### I. T he Proposed Rule

This proposed rule would only require an SMS be developed, implemented, maintained,
and adhered to at any certificated airport:

 Classif

ied as a Small, Medium, or Large hub airport in the NPIAS;

 Identified as an international airport; or

 Identified as having more than 100,000 total annual operations (according to best
available data).
The goal of this proposal is to improve the safety of their airfield environment (including
movement and non

- movement areas)

. The FAA is issuing this proposed rule under the authority described in Subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44706, “Airport operating certificates.” SMS includes an organizat ion

- wide safety policy , formal methods for identifying hazards, analyzing and mitigating risks, and promotion of safety culture. When applied, SMS will improve safety by addressing underlying organizational issues that may result in accidents and
incidents

.



### II. B ackground
A. What is a Safety Management System ?5

SMS is a systematic and proactive approach to managing safety. SMS allows airports to discover and address safety issues before a noncompliant or unsafe condition r esults. Historically, the approach to a viation safety was based on analysis of past accidents and introduction of corrective actions to prevent the recurrence of those events. 2 SMS, however, concentrates on controlling the development stages of safety management rather than solely relying on i nspection and remedial actions. In its most general form, SMS is a set of decision

making processes and procedures that an airport w ould use to plan, organize, direct, and control its everyday activities in a manner that enhances safety.
I n 2001
, ICAO ad opted a standard in Annex 14 that requires all member countries to establish SMS requirements for airport operators. The FAA supports conformity of U.S. aviation safety regulations with ICAO standards and recommended practices

. Th e proposed rule meets
the intent of the ICAO standard in a way that complements existing airport safety regulations in 14 CFR part 139. The philosophy behind SMS for airports is that each airport can develop a management system to meet its own unique operating environment. Many ai rports already have functional occupational safety programs in place that have reporting, inspection, and training requirements. Airports can use these programs as a foundation for their operational SMS. For
th e se reasons, th e FAA proposes requirements tha t allow airports the maximum amount of flexibility to develop and achieve safety goals. Accordingly, this proposed rule would prescribe only the high level components and airports would be responsible for developing these components into operational proces ses and procedures. SMS for airports would be comprised of four key components; Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management (SRM), Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. These four SMS components would offer a n effective blueprint in managing and reducing the o perational risks and are described below

. Safety Policy : Under safety policy, the certificate holder would establish a policy which, among other things , defines the certificate holder’s safety objectives, establishes a safety policy statement, defines th e certificate holder’s management responsibilities and accountabilities for safety issues, and identifies and communicates the organization’s structure for handling safety
issues. The certificate holder also would be required to designate an accountable e xecutive to act on its behalf for the implementation and daily operation of the SMS.

2 http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp_rpt_001a.pdf6

Safety Risk Management : Under SRM
, the certificate holder would develop processes to identify hazards that may impact the airport’s operations. The certificate holder w ould use these processes to systematically analyze those hazards and their risks, as well as proactively mitigate risk

. The certificate holder must retain any documentation developed through these processes to assist in trend and root cause analysis.
S afety Assurance : Under safety assurance, the certificate holder would develop and implement processes to monitor the safety performance of its SMS. Additionally, the certificate
holder would establish and maintain a hazard reporting system that provides reporters confidentiality when communicating safety issues to the system. The certificate holder’s staff
would regularly update the accountable executive on pertinent safety information such as the certificate holder’s performance with regard to its safet y objectives, safety critical information, the status of any ongoing mitigation established through safety risk management, and the status of implementing the SMS. Safety Promotion : Under safety promotion, the certificate holder would identify

managers a nd staff employees responsible for oversight and implementation of the SMS and
would provide them training on their responsibilities and SMS implementation. For all other individuals with regular access to the movement and non

- movement areas of the airfie ld, the
certificate holder would develop and distribute hazard a wareness and reporting orientation materials, ensuring those individuals are made aware of hazards and how to report them to the certificate holder’s hazard reporting system. The certificate holder would then keep records of training provided and hazard awareness materials for 24 calendar months. The certificate holder
also would develop processes and procedures to communicate important safety information that ensures that all persons authori zed access to the movement and non

- movement areas are aware of the SMS and their safety roles and responsibilities. Feedback would be provided to individuals using the airport’s hazard reporting system and lessons learned relevant to airport employees or stakeholders would be communicated.

III. The Evolution of the SNPRM

The FAA has determined that a n SMS would improve safety at certain p art 139 certificated airports. The FAA reached this conclusion based on detailed study of ICAO’s7

Annex es 14 and 19 requirem ents, review of NTSB’s recommendations, and the airport SMS pilot studies. The FAA expects a irports to benefit from increased communication, training, and reporting. Since SMS is scalable, airport characteristics, such as size, organizational and

governan ce structures, type of air carrier operations, and number of operations, are factors that
affect a certificate holder’s version of SMS. In an effort to allow for scalability of SMS in the
NPRM , the FAA estimated the expected compliance cost by the number o f enplanements/ operations and by classes established for p art 139 airport operating certificates.
Under p art 139, certificate holders are grouped into four classes based on the type of air carrier operations served and the number of passenger seats per air craft. The airport classifications by air carrier operations are listed in the chart below.

Type of Air Carrier Operation 3 Class I Class II Class III Class IV
Scheduled Large Air Carrier Aircraft (30+ seats) X
Unscheduled Large Air Carrier Aircraft (30+ seats) X X X
Scheduled Small Air Carrier Aircraft (10

- 30 seats) X X X

Using revised cost and benefit estimates, the FAA explored various alternatives to determine how to apply an SMS requirement to a group of airports that maximized benefit s

r elative to cost s. The FAA focused on airports with high passenger traffic and large numbers of operations so that safety benefits would flow to the overwhelming majority of aircraft operations. The FAA also focused on incorporating airports with internat ional passenger operations to

ensure conformity with international standards and recommended practices. To that end, the FAA developed the following alternatives for additional analysis:

 All Part 139 airports;

 Airport operators holding a Class I AOC ;

 Cert i fi cated i nternational airports;

 Large, M edium, and S mall hub airports and certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations ; and

3 http://www.faa.gov/ airports/airport_safety/part139_cert/?p1=classes8  Large, Medium, and Small hub airports, certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations , and certificated international airports.
Because the FAA chose to analyze various alternatives based on classifications outside the scope of the NPRM (e.g., hubs or int ernational status instead of AOC class), it relied on the
best available information t o develop the list of affected airports under each combination. To identify those airports classified as L arge, M edium, or S mall hubs, the FAA relied on the 2011

- 2015 NPIAS , current at the time of this anal ysis. Similarly, the FAA used annual operations data reported by airport through FAA Form 5010

- 1, Airport Master Record. The FAA relied on data obtained from Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations (See § § 101.3, 122.13, 122.14, 122.15) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to identify c ertificated airports authorized to accept international traffic. After evaluating the estimated costs and benefits of each alternative, the FAA’s preferred
alternative is to require SMS implementation for L arge, M edium, and S mall hub certificated airports , certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations, and certificated airports accepting international aircraft operations. An airp ort can be a part of multiple alternatives . For example, Hartsfield

- Jackson Atlanta International Airpor t ( ATL ) which is a Large hub airport, has m ore than 100,000 total annual operations, accepts international traffic
, and is also a Class I airport

. Therefore
, ATL would appear in all five of the alternatives. Table A.7 in Appendix 3 denotes how each of the 544 part 139 airports , current at the time of this analysis, is classified.

IV. Costs and Benefits

The objective of this analysis is to evaluate the costs and benefits of implementing a n SMS
for each of the following altern atives :

 All Part 139 airports ;

 Airport operators holding a Class I AOC ;

 Certificated i nternational airports ;

 Large, M edium, and S mall hub airports and certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations ; and9

 L arge, M edium, and S mall hub airports, certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations, and certificated international airports

. The analysis described in this regulatory evaluation is based on the following assumptions:

 Estimated costs and benefits are presented in 2014 dollars.

 Potential costs and benefits are estimated over a 10

- year period from 2016 through 2025

.

 Benefits of SMS implementation would begin to accrue in 2018 up to 2025

.

 Costs to airports would begin to accrue in 2016

.

 The present value discount rate s of 7 percent and 3 percent are applied as required by the Office of Management and Budget. 4

A. Baseline
1. Baseline Costs

Under Part 139, airports comply with the regulation through self

- certification 364 days out of the year and then the F AA comes in on the 365 th day to verify compliance. The airport typically uses a checklist that is very prescriptive and allows for little deviation. While airports currently
maintain an FAA

- approved Airport Certification Manual (ACM), employ resources an d staffing to maintain compliance with their ACM and Part 139, train their staff, and record information
like self

- inspection results, an SMS would require proactive safety management through the identification and analysis of hazards. Think of these proac tive activities like closing the loop on safety. While an airport is currently required to conduct and report on daily self

- inspections, under an SMS the airport
would develop processes to identify hazards, analyze hazards, and mitigate identified risk. The FAA expects more information being reported than has been in the past. An example we often use with industry involves self

- inspection and foreign object debris (FOD). Under today’s Part 139 requirements, if an airport identifies FOD on a taxiway duri ng its self

- inspection, the vehicle operator usually picks up the FOD and disposes of it. Documenting issues such as these under an SMS can help airport management to know whether they have repetitive safety issues on the airfield. Similarly, most airpor ts today do not have reporting systems that are available to all

4 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a

- 4.pdf10

personnel with access to the airfield. With so few operations staff compared to other entities with personnel on the ramp and airfield areas, many more safety issues may be identified that t he airport can take action on before they result in injury, damage, or fatalities.
The FAA learned through the pilot studies that proactive safety management really was a new activity for airports. While many of these airports had experience with risk mana gement through their human resources and insurance departments, few employed these similar practices within their operational environments. The Reg ulatory Eval uation for the proposed rule was based on the experiences and responses of the pilot study airpor ts and takes into consideration any similar activities that airports currently employ for compliance with Part 139 like record keeping, training, and staffing. This information has been supplemented by comments received from the NPRM. The following table compares the baseline to the costs of the regulation.

Factors Baseline SNPRM

Manual Airport maintains an FAA

approved Airport Certification Manual (ACM) (see §139.201). Airports would develop their implementation plan and amend their ACM and/or create S MS manuals.

Staffing Airport provides sufficient and qualified personnel to comply with the requirements of its ACM and Part 139 (see §139.303(a)). Some a irports would need additional full

- time and/or part time employees to oversee SMS implementation

.

Eq uipment A irport provides sufficient equipment for personnel to comply with the requirements of its ACM and Part 139 (see §139.303(b)). The FAA assumes that some of the airports would need new software, hardware or promotional material to establish and prom ote a hazard reporting system and to identify, analyze, and mitigate hazards when appropriate.11

Training Airport trains all persons who access movement areas and safety areas and perform duties in compliance with requirements in the ACM and Part 139 (see § 139.303(c))

. All airports would need to add SMS t r aining and SMS e

- learning for managers and safety staff.

Recordkeeping Potential Hazards Airport maintains records for self

inspections, accidents and incidents, and Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) as required under its ACM and Part 139 (see §139.301). Airports do not have hazard reporting systems for reporting of hazards by all individuals with access to the airfield

. All airports would add hazard reporting systems.

Documenting SRM and reporting safety inform ation Airports do not document SRM nor are required report safety information to their leadership

. Airports would document SRM and report safety information.

Mitigation Costs (Unquantified) Airports are under no obligation to analyze or mitigate safety is sues/hazards beyond prescriptive technical requirements in Part 139. Airports would p roactively identify and analyze safety hazards, mitigating when appropriate.

2. Baseline Benefits The baseline is not simply the current situation, but an assessment o f what would likely happen in the absence of the rule. Historically , the airport industry waited for the FAA to issue prescriptive regulations and corrective actions typically based on analysis of past accidents. In the absence of the rule (i.e., baselin e costs), safety will only gradually improve as a result of FAA initiated or recommended safety measures. SMS, however, would expedite safety improvement due to proactive airport actions. It concentrates on controlling the development stages of safety man agement rather than solely relying on FAA inspection and remedial actions. In its most general form, SMS is a set of decision making processes and procedures that an airport would use to plan, organize, direct, and12

control its everyday activities in a man ner that enhances safety. The proactive approach to hazard identification and analysis of accidents, incidents, and other reported or collected data at each individual airport through an SMS would likely reduce these incidents.
Because this baseline is an assessment of what would likely happen in the next 10 years, we took into account other rules that will come into effect during this period. Of the accidents evaluated in this rule, 35 overlap with at least one other rule. The FAA has evaluated the
hist orical accidents in context of the other rulemakings such that the sum of the accident prevention probabilities for each accident across all these rules will not exceed one. Of the 35 overlapping accidents, only in one does its sum exceed one (DCA07FA037) . See the following
table for details.



### Accident Prevention Probabilities for Overlapping Accidents

Date NTSB # Part 121 SMS FDR FOQ Airport SMS Total 12/3/2008 CEN09LA093 0.2 0.2 0.40 9/7/2008 DEN08LA151 0.2 0.2 0.40 1/13/2008 SEA08LA061A 0.2 0.2 0.40 1/13/2008 SEA08LA061B 0.2 0.2 0.40 4/12/2007 DCA07FA037 0.9 0.15 0.4 1.45 12/23/2006 ANC07LA008 0.2 0.2 0.40 11/7/2006 CHI07LA021A 0.2 0.2 0.40 11/7/2006 CHI07LA021B 0.2 0.2 0.40 6/8/2006 CHI06LA161 0.2 0.4 0.60 5/12/2006 NYC06LA114 0.2 0.4 0.60 12/14/2005 ATL06LA024 0.2 0.2 0.40 8/20/2005 CHI05LA238 0.2 0.4 0.60 8/8/2005 IAD05LA118A 0.2 0.4 0.60 8/8/2005 IAD05LA118B 0.2 0.4 0.60 7/8/2005 CHI05LA179 0.2 0.2 0.40 6/7/2005 DCA05MA070 0.2 0.15 0.2 0.55 3/11/2005 CHI0 5FA077 0.2 0.4 0.60 1/8/2005 DEN05LA048 0.2 0.4 0.60 10/27/2004 NYC05LA013 0.2 0.4 0.60 10/25/2004 DFW05LA010 0.2 0.2 0.40 4/1/2004 NYC04LA099 0.2 0.4 0.60 3/15/2004 CHI04LA086 0.2 0.4 0.60 2/24/2004 CHI04LA077 0.2 0.2 0.40 12/14/2003 ATL04LA053 0.2 0.2 0.4013

9/12/2003 NYC03LA199 0.2 0.2 0.40 8/1/2003 ATL03LA124 0.2 0.2 0.40 6/2/2003 DEN03LA096 0.2 0.2 0.40 5/20/2003 LAX03LA167 0.2 0.4 0.60 10/24/2002 CHI03FA014 0.2 0.4 0.60 7/21/2002 NYC02LA146 0.2 0.2 0.40 7/2/2002 FTW02LA199 0.2 0.4 0.60 1/20/2002 NYC02LA056 0.2 0.2 0.40 2/3/2001 NYC01LA075A 0.2 0.2 0.40 2/3/2001 NYC01LA075B 0.2 0.2 0.40 12/27/2000 NYC01LA076 0.2 0.4 0.60

We removed the DCA07FA037 accident from the benefit analysis because its sum e xceeds one.

B

. Costs To better understand how SMS could change the existing airport baseline, t he FAA funded airport pilot stu dies to evaluate the usefulness, applicability, and implementation of SMS in an airport environment. Since 2007, rou ghly 30 certificated airports of varying size and complexity operating with a Class I, II, III, or IV AOC participated in the studies. (See Appendix 5 for a breakout of the types of airports that participated.) The first and second studies
focused on con ducting a gap analysis and developing an SMS m anual and i mplementation p lan. The third study was a proof

- of concept study that included three airports of varying size and operations . The last study, also referred to as the SMS Implementation Study, had 1 4 of the airports that participated in earlier studies implementing portions of their SMS m anual. (See Appendix 6 for a compilation of pilot study documentation .) As discussed in the NPRM, the pilot study participants noted that Part 139 compliance
does n ot constitute an SMS . While certificate holders currently maintain FAA

- approved ACMs, provide, train, and equip personnel, and maintain records to document self

- inspections, accidents and notices to airmen, these activities do not address the risk managem ent, assurance, confidential reporting, and safety data management inherent to SMS. However, the pilot studies revealed that airports may use these existing requirements to serve as building blocks for developing and implementing their SMS , thus enhancing scalability

.14

To calculate some of the costs and benefits associated with SMS, the FAA followed

- up with pilot study participants for the Initial Regulatory Evaluation. The FAA later follow ed

- up with the Implementation Study airports

. The FAA

- funded studie s likely resulted in upward biased estimates since the FAA established the deliverables required and allowed the airports various means for developing those deliverables. Similarly, the FAA established maximum funding levels for each study. A irports
had an incentive to use all available FAA funds. The airports also did not have knowledge of FAA's proposed requirements while establishing their SMS programs since most of the studies occurred before the FAA published the NPRM. Examples of differences betwee n study deliverables and the proposed rule include the gap analysis and SMS m anual. The first two studies required a gap analysis and creation of a separate SMS manual, and all of the pilot study airports gave cost estimates for a separate SMS
manual. In reviewing the findings of the first two studies, the FAA found that while a gap analysis could be helpful to an airport in developing its SMS, it could be completed in a variety of ways
, and it was not a required activity to complete implementation. Ther efore, the proposed rule does not require a gap analysis. Similarly, minimum compliance with the rule would require only an addition to the Airport Certification Manual (ACM) and not a separate SMS m anual.
Bec au se SMS was not required under part 139, the FAA required pilot study airports to keep their SMS deliverables separate from their ACM so that the FAA would not have to include review of those items during its periodic inspection. The FAA also found that many pilot study airports extended applicabil ity of their SMS program to the terminal environment and integrated other regulatory compliance programs , such as occupational health and safety
, into their SMS development

. The FAA is unable to estimate the size of this compliance cost bias. Therefore, the pilot study responses are the foundation of the costs in this revised regulatory evaluation. The costs of implementing a n SMS for each group of airports are the following:

Costs Over 10 Years

Costs All Class I International L, M, S and >100K ops Pref erred

alternative: L, M,15 S, >100K ops, and International Undiscounted $471,104,787 $341,021,606 $215,010,997 $163,760,850 $238,865,692 Present value (7%) $307,842,595 $223,584,687 $141,796,001 $108,819,973 $157,496,312 Present value (3%) $389,440,320 $2 82,304,199 $178,432,284 $136,340,226 $198,211,977

The FAA determined that the following factors represent the compliance costs of this SNPR M : 1. SMS Manual and Implementation Plan ; 2. New Staffing Requirements ; 3. New Equipment and Materials ; 4. Training ; 5. Recording Potential Hazards ; and
6. Documenting SRM and Reporting Safety Information

. In addition, the FAA also received comments questioning whether the cost of mitigations should have been included. The purpose of SMS is to analyze hazards, assess the risk those
ha zards present to the system, and develop appropriate mitigations to address the risk. Mitigations that might be developed will depend on the nature of the hazard and resulting risk that the hazard may present to the airport operator’s unique operational e nvironment. These mitigations could range from increased communication with staff via email safety bulletins, to changes in operational procedures, additional training, etc.
Given the range of mitigation actions possible, it is difficult to provide a qu antitative estimate of both the costs and benefits of such mitigations. We anticipate that operators will only implement mitigation where benefits of doing so exceed the costs of the mitigation. In
order for the estimated benefits to exceed the costs of the rule, the mitigation costs must be below $68.4 million over 10 years (discounted at 7%). The FAA requests comment on this assumption, as well as data regarding costs and benefits associated with any mitigation implemented through a voluntary SMS progr am.

1. SMS Manual and Implementation Plan16

The proposed rule would require certificate holders to document the structure of their SMS
, and t his sect ion focuses on the cost of this documentation and the cost of creating an implementation plan

. Certificate hold ers have the option of either developing and maintaining a separate SMS Manual in addition to the ACM or incorporating these SMS requirements directly
into the ACM. However
, under the pilot studies all airports were required to create a separate
manual wh ich is the basis of the costs below. The proposal would also require development of an implementation plan. The implementation plan serves as a tool to help the certificate holder implement the various components and elements of SMS. The manual and implem entation plan
costs are combined.
An a irport ’s characteristics determine the size and scope of both the implementation plan
and the manual. At large r airports, these documents could be fairly detailed and complex. The average cost per airport was calcula ted by taking the average cost per manual from the pilot study airports. For the purpose of this analysis, t he Large, Medium and Small Hub airports were
classified as l arge airports
, while all other airports were classified as s mall airports. In general, large airports typically have dedicated Operations and Maintenance staff, equipment and more complex operations. Small airports are typically run by a small staff having multiple responsibilities and these airports may receive support and equipment from their municipalities to maintain compliance with part 139.
A vailable data from pilot study participants suggests that the average cost for the implementation plan and the manual was about $ 225,800 5 (about $209,400 in 20 09 dollars) for
l arge airports . For small airports, impl emen tation plan and manual cost was about $ 124,500 (about $ 115
, 500 in 20 09 dollars)

. 6 T he a verage cost by airport was then multiplied by the number of airports in each airport group . T otal cost equals the sum of costs for large and al l other airports then adjusted by the GDP deflator to 2014 dollars

. For the purpose of this analysis the FAA assumes an inspector would require 16 hours for a large airport and 4 hours for a small airport to review the implementation plan in the first ye ar. Additionally, an inspector would require on average 8 hours per airport for both large and small airports to review the manual in the second year. An inspector would be tasked to read, analyze,

5 The SMS document cost s that are in the paperwork analysis are included in the manual and implementation costs.
6 The FAA provided AIP f unding for these studies which ranged from $36,000 to $200,000.17

and coordinate an SMS implementation plan at an hourly wa ge of $ 66.76

. 7 In general, it is
assumed the FAA’s evaluat ion of a large airport’s implementation p lan will take more time and
effort than the SMS Manual because of the complexity of their operations and organizations

. An inspector would review these pla ns to verify the certificate holder provided a detailed proposal on how they will meet the SMS requirements and a schedule for implementing SMS . The inspector will also have to evaluate existing programs, policies, or procedures if the certificate
holder intends to use these for compliance with the SMS requirements. By ensuring a thorough review of the certificate holder’s implementation plan, the FAA hopes to catch any potential compliance issues early, before the certificate holder spends time and money setting up their SMS programs. The cost for implementation and manual development will be amassed over 24 months.
A ll costs associated with the development of the implementation plan , established by this schedule, are expected to accrue in 2016 . A ll cos ts associated with the development of SMS
documentation will take place by 2017

. Half of the costs would take place in 2016 and the remaining half would take place in 2017

. The FAA consider ed recurring costs associated with updates to the manual

. The FAA
estimates that it will take 12 hours for a clerical employee at an hourly rate of $ 19.41 to update
the SMS manual
, and it will take an inspector 1.25 hours to review the revised SMS manual. Using the preceding information, The FAA estimates the following cost for the manual and implementation plan :

7 The FAA assumes a GS

- 13 step 5 for the inspector. The compensation information comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.18

2. New Staffing Requirements
M any pilot study airports mentioned additional staff ing to oversee SMS and manage
several of the more complex aspects of implementation. They believed existing staff would be
overwh elmed by the additional workload, which would require airports to identify, collect, track,19

and analyze data
, plus monitor progress and promote safety. Accordingly, the FAA accounted for the additional personnel. Over 75% of the total costs are the additio nal personnel costs.
There were 3 1 airports reported in Appendix A of the Technical Report , which parti cipated in the SMS pilot studie s . These airports were asked about the number of full

- time and part

- time employees currently working on SMS during the pi lot stud ies

. Fifty percent of airports reported
the current use of one full

- time employee
, 35% reported n o additional full

- time staffing, and 15% reported using two full

- time employees. Separately
, 61% reported not requiring a part

- time employee
, 15 % rep orted requiring one part

- time employee , 8% reported requiring two part

- time employees, 8% reported three part

- time employees, and lastly 8% required reporting four part

time employees. 8 These percentages were applied to the number of airports in each alt ernative
for an estimated number of full

- time and part

- time employees.
I nformation from the Initia l Regulatory Evaluation and follow

- up with some of the pilot study participants provides details on the type of staffing. The most common positions , reported by pilot study airports, were a n SMS manager /coordinator
, a safety specialist or auditor
, an executive, and a data analyst

. Salary and compensation information for these positions comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The salaries for these B LS job titles , under the air transport category, were used to represent the industry titles listed above: General and Operations Manager ( 11

- 1021 ) for the SMS manager ; Operations Research Analysts (15

- 2031)
for the data analyst ; Management Occupations (11

- 0000) for the executive ; and Airfield Operations Specialist (53

- 2022) for the safety specialist/auditor.
T he FAA employed the annual mean or average wage for these occupations

. S alaries
, including benefits
, are about $ 137,859 annually for an SMS manager
, about $ 96,972 for an operations research analyst, about $ 61,976 for an airfield operations specialist
, and about $ 131,280 for a general and operations manager

. 9 Many of these positions would spend less than
20 hours a week on SMS ; h owever , all p ositions would be permanent

. C onsequently
, these salaries are recurring annual costs that an airport w ould incur for the life of the program. These personnel costs would begin in 2018 after the safety manual and initial training is completed.

8 http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/media/smsPilotTechReportMay2011.pdf
, page 11. 9 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ ecec.nr0.htm , Relative importance of employer costs for employee compensation, March 2013 that additional employer compensation per employee is roughly 3 5 % of an employee’s salary20

A irports reported tha t employees that worked part

- time on SMS spent between one and twenty hours a week on SMS with an average of eight hours a week. The eight hours a week was appli ed to all part

- time staff

. Using the preceding information, t he FAA estimates the follow ing annual costs for staffing :2122

3. New Materials/Equipment

The SNPRM would require airports to establish a hazard reporting system, and to identify,
anal yze , and mitigate hazard s when appropriate. Based on this proposed requirement
, a irports
indicated the need for new equipment and materials to store, track , and analyze data and to promote safety. E quipment can be placed into one of the t hree categories: software , hardware,
and promotional material.
Two out of eight ( 2 5 percent ) pilot study airports asser ted that they would need very little
in terms of new equipment or material. For example, one of the airports mentioned that all management personnel have computers, cell phones, radios, email, and GIS software, which
should be sufficient to meet its oblig ations. By multiplying 2 5 % by the tot al number of airports
, the FAA estimates th e number of airports that will choose similar no cost options for equipment

. For the remaining a irports
, the FAA retained the cost of software data from the Initial Regulato ry Evaluation. Several pilot study a irports provided information on two companies whose software packages include the following options: a data warehouse, a hazard reporting system, a training suite, and an audit module

. These software packages can be cu stomized for an airport for roughly $ 23,500 ( $21,800 10 in 20 09 dollars)

. The software also has recurring costs associated with licensing and IT support or maintenance

. The fee for this support is calculated at 25% of the fee for the systems, suites, modu les, etc. equaling about $ 5,900 ( $ 5,500 in 20 09 dollars) per airport

. This information was collected in 2009 and was adjusted by the GDP deflator to reflect
2014 dollars

. The initial purchase of software w ould take place in 2018 with recurring cost s
star ting in 2019 and continuing until 2025

. S ome of the larger airports also described upfront new hardware required to house the data and provide training. Examples of hardware, as provided by the pilot study airports
, include laptops, printer s , and camera s. Initially
, the FAA assessed cost s for hardware

. H owever, after receiving more information from pilot study airports
, the FAA determined that airports already

own ed items that could be used to help comply with the proposal . For example, a n airport
shou ld already have vehicles to respond to wildlife issues and safety issues on the airport to comply with existing part 139 operations.

10 Reported in the NPRM from INTELEX, www.intelex

- exchange.com , 200923

The proposal would also require airports to promote safety

. Each airport has the ability to determine the best way to pr omote safety
, offering a variety of possible methods of safety promotion. This can range from stickers, to slogans, to posters , to newsletters following up on safety issues, to SMS briefing materials

. To estimate cost s associated with this proposal
, the
F AA followed up with Class I pilot study airports

. Based on the responses, we updated the average cost to $ 2,110 for every other year beginning in year 3 ( up from $100 in the Initial Regulatory Evaluation )

. Costs for promotional material would recur ever y other year given the constant need to foster an airport operating environment that encourages safety

. Using the preceding information, t he FAA estimates the following annual costs for the new materials/equipment : Total New Material/Equipment Costs

* C osts for promotional material recurs every other year
4. Training

In the NPRM , the FAA proposed formal safety training for all airport employees with
access to the movement and non

- movement areas. However, the FAA envisioned that greater
benefits could be ac hieved if the training requirement were applied to all individuals with access
to the movement and non

- movement areas and welcomed comment on the alternative option. The goal was to keep employees aware of current safety measures while also keeping them

a ware of (or on the lookout for) potential safety problems to reduce the number of accidents or incidents on the airfield. For the initial regulatory evaluation, the FAA estimated the costs associated with a proposed requirement on airport employees and no t the broader training requirement for all individuals accessing these areas. C ommenters stated that the alternative proposed training requirement s were cumbersome, time consuming, and excessively costly. In light of these comments and lessons learned fr om the pilo t studies, the SNPRM instead propose s

a two

- pronged approach to training

. First, the certificate holder would provide comprehensive SMS training specific to the individual's role and responsibility in implementation and24

maintenance of the SMS

. Second, training would include hazard awareness and hazard reporting

awareness orientation for all other individuals with access to the movement and non

- movement

areas

. While the pilot study airports reported higher estimates for the number of employees it planned to train, the FAA analyzed each airport's responses to better estimate training that complies with the supplemental proposal. This analysis produced an average of 10 employees requiring comprehensive SMS training. ( These 10 employees would consi st of at least one airport manager or executive, mid

- level supervisor, operations or maintenance personnel, and
clerical staff

)

. However, the FAA found that using one average for all airports in the preferred alternative failed to adequately account for the smaller, less complex airports with fewer employees. For a small airport, the FAA assumes 3 employees, on average, would receive comprehensive SMS training at the airport. These 3 employees would consist of one airport manager, one or two operations or maintenance personnel
, and clerical staff. Therefore, the FAA used two averages when costing training and used information provided by the smaller pilot study airports to determine the second average.
T he FAA expects certificate holders to provide trai ning appropriate to the individual’s role in the certificate holder’s SMS. Persons with responsibilities for implementation or oversight of
the certificate holder’s SMS would be required to receive training specific to their roles and responsibilities. F or example, those persons responsible for analyzing hazard reports to
determine action should be properly trained in safety risk management and hazard assessment procedures. Individuals, including staff and/or managers, with responsibility for daily overs ight of the SMS should be trained in all requirements of the SMS. The FAA estimates that on
average , either 3 or 10 employees per airport would require this type of training. For costing purposes, the FAA used a $ 180 training fee per employee in year 2 and $90 every other year (beginning in year 4) , which includes both managers and employees. 11 For large airports, we estimate that one airport manager or executive, two mid

- level supervisors, five maintenance personnel, and two clerical staff members will incur this training fee. For small airports we estimate that one airport manager, one maintenance personnel and a clerical staff

11 Accessed on February 21, 2012 at http://www.omniairgroup.com./sms_pricing.html

. SMS e

- Learning for personnel and managers (discounted at 50% of published rates)

.25

member will incur the training fee. Additionally, the FAA determined that 3 hours will be needed in year 2 and 1.5 hours eve ry other year (beginning in year 4) for the training time of
both these managers and employees

. We assume no travel costs for the training as it will be delivered electronically.
T hree certificate holders stated that the Initial Regulatory Evaluation did not account for
the attrition rate and lost productivity during training. The FAA is not including an attrition rate in this analysis because the number of employees requiring training significantly decreased compared to the number covered by the NPRM’s proposed training requirements and there i s no bas i s to determine that attrition rate for the estimated 3 or 10 employees per airport

. Additionally, concerning the lost productivity, we added training time for both managers and employees to account for th e opportunity cost of the training. Using the preceding information,

t he FAA estimates the following training costs :2627

For costing purposes, the FAA estima tes that it would take five minutes to update an employee’s training record every other year

. The FAA estimates that 3 employee training records would be updated at a small airport and 10 employee training records would be updated at a large airport. A clerical position ( occupation code 43

- 6014) would be tasked with updating the training records at an hourly wage of $ 19.41

. Salary and compensation information for the clerical position comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates the following annual updating of training
record costs:28

N ote: The sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding.
H azard awareness and reporting awareness orientation also would be required for all
other individuals with access to the movement and non

- movement areas. It would take an SMS manager 8 hours in the second year to develop and 2 hours beginning in the fourth year to update the hazard awareness orientation at each airport. The FAA estimates that there would be on average 50 tenants at a large airport and 10 tenants at a small airport. The FAA estimates that updating distribution logs would require 1529

minutes and 5 minutes at large and small airports, respectively. A clerical staff member would be tasked with updating the distribution logs. Using the preceding information, the FA A estimate s the following development and updating of hazard awareness orientation as well as updating of the distribution logs :30

5. Recording Potential Hazards
The SNPRM would require airports to establish a hazard reporting system. Based on this requirement, the FAA estimates 15 minutes to record one potential hazard a week

. Therefore, t he31

FAA estimates 52 potential hazards (one per week) would be recorded annually. A clerical position would be tasked with recording the potential hazard

. Using the preceding i nformation, the FAA estimates the following annual recording of potential hazards costs:

6. Documenting SRM and Reporting Safety Information The SNPRM would require airports to document SRM. Based on this requirement, the
FAA estimates 30 minutes a week t o document SRM . Therefore, the FAA estimates 5232

documents annually beginning in the third year . A clerical staff member would be tasked with recording the potential hazard. Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates the following annual documenti ng of SRM costs:33

The SNPRM would require airports to report safety information under SA. Based on this requirement, the FAA estimates 1 hour to report safety information. Therefore, the FAA estimates 2 documents annually beginning in the third year. F or the purposes of establishing a wage rate, the FAA used the operations research analyst position for reporting the airport’s safety information. Using the preceding information, the FAA estimates the following annual recording of safety information cos ts:34

7. Costs of Compliance The following table s show the costs for each of the alternatives, which include: SMS

m anual and implementation plan, staffing, new materials/equipment, training, updating training
records
, and hazard recording. The preferred alternative has es timated costs of $ 238.9 million ( $ 157.5 million when discounted at seven percent and $198.2 million when discounted at three percent )

.353637

C

. Benefits The objective of SMS is to proactively manage safety, to identify pot ential hazards or
risks
, and to implement measures that mitigate those risks. The FAA envisions a certificate holder being able to use the components and elements of SMS to enhance its ability to identify safety issues and spot trends before they result i n a n incident or accident. Airports have already seen benefits from increased communication, training, and reporting. A functioning SMS w ould help a certificate holder ensure that individuals know how to report hazards. Proactive processes

w ould help ce rtificate holders analyze those reported hazards or other changes to the airport environment which could increase safety risks, while reactive processes such as evaluations and investigations w ould analyze near

- misses, incidents, and accidents after they o ccur to determine root causes and seek future mitigations. These efforts could in turn prevent future accidents and incidents thereby reducing the direct and indirect costs of incidents and accidents. Further, this data and analysis w ould put a certifica te holder in a unique position to share lessons learned with the many individuals and tenants that access the movement and non

- movement areas of the airport, thereby possibly preventing similar hazards or future incidents and accidents. In the Initial Regu latory Evaluation, the FAA identified 57 National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accidents, 18 insurance claims, and 15 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigations to affirm its rationale and compute derived benefits of an airpo rt SMS. However, limiting analysis to only those accidents, especially to those meeting the NTSB’s reporting and investigation threshold, fails to account for many other accidents and incidents occurring on airports. Under SMS, the FAA would expect a cert ificate holder to evaluate and analyze a broader pool of events occurring on the airport in addition to reported hazards. Therefore, for this revised analysis, the FAA pooled additional sources of incident and accident data all resulting in damage to airc raft or operational facilities/equipment on airport s

. While the FAA recognizes that this new pool does not cover all events (e.g., near misses or other less costly incidents) occurring on the airport or potential reported hazards, it accounts for the

most costly incidents and accidents reported to the FAA or NTSB. These new pools include FAA’s Aviation Accident/Incident Database (AIDS), the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), and the FAA’s Runway Incursion Database. Under an SMS and its Safety Assura nce program, the FAA anticipates that a certificate holder would analyze the variety of accidents and incidents occurring on the airport, not just38

those investigated by the NTSB. The certificate holder would identify root causes, proactively identify haza rds, and implement mitigations where appropriate. This holistic approach would help the certificate holder better understand and implement its role in applying defenses through mitigations or controls to prevent accidents before they occur. Using this exp anded rationale, the FAA explored additional reporting sources to identify accidents and incidents where the certificate holder’s actions or the airport environment
contributed to the accident or incident. The FAA also reviewed accidents and incidents whe re the FAA believes the certificate holder ha d some control to prevent the accident or incident from occurring, but less control than others
, like the air carrier or fixed

- base operator. For example, while a ramp accident caused by an improperly trained a ir carrier employee directly relates to an air carrier’s operations, the certificate holder has some control or role in the ramp area to defend against accidents like these including oversight and licensing of drivers with unescorted access to the airport. Similarly, if a certificate holder is aware of systemic incidents occurring in the airport environment, it may be able to take action to prevent future incidents or accidents or
share lessons learned with all t enants. To clarify the FAA’s use of these d atabases, the following section identifies an example
from each of these databases.

NTSB
Accident No: DEN07IA069 On February 16, 2007, a Frontier Airlines A319 sustained a fractured windshield due to impact with foreign object debris (FOD). During the co urse of the afternoon, at that same airport, 14 other aircraft experienced 26 similar fractured windshields. The examination revealed that the impact markings on all 26 windshields were the result of impact with FOD. This accident, and especially some of the 14 others that afternoon, may have been prevented through an airport’s Safety Assurance and SRM processes and procedures. Under SMS, the certificate holder would have a hazard reporting system ( See § 139.402(c)(2)) and enhanced communication networks/p rocedures for reporting immediate safety issues ( See § 139.402(d)(5)) such as FOD in
the movement and non

- movement areas. Airport employees and tenants, including air traffic control, would receive hazard reporting materials ( See § 139.402(d)(1)) making the m aware of the reporting system and how to make a report.39

Hazard reports would trigger hazard identification and analysis ( See § 139.402(b)(1) and (2)) . A certificate holder would have processes and procedures in place to quickly complete this
identificat ion and analysis to determine how to proceed. Unlike more complex analysis which would typically be required for analysis of activities such as construction or future changes in operations
, in this case, the quantity and location of reported FOD would tri gger immediate action and mitigation. While it is expected that the first hazard report would result in action by the certificate holder, should multiple reports be made to the certificate holder’s hazard reporting system the airport would have additional data to later determine root causes ( See § 139.402(c)(1))

.

OSHA Nr: 310468418/Report Id: 0830500 On August 6, 2007, a rubber removal contractor’s employee was operating a truck

mounted high pressure water sprayer to remove rubber contamination on the runwa y. After completing the evening’s work, the employee exited the cab of the truck to determine the remaining work and was struck by one of two airport

- operated wire brush sweepers that sweep up the rubber residue. While the wire brush sweeper vehicle made an abrupt turn
, the employee was wearing dark clothes and not wearing a reflective vest. While this accident was reported through the O SHA , the event still represents potential operational safety issues on the airport. Under SMS, the FAA would expect th e certificate holder to conduct proactive hazard identification and analysis ( See §§ 139.402(b)(1) and (2)) on construction activities and major operational or maintenance procedures. Through formal SRM analysis and documentation the certificate holder wou ld make updates to those procedures and activities as necessary. Many of the pilot study airports found that safety communications ( See § 139.402(d)(5)) through Safety Promotion increased vigilance during construction activities and operations/maintenance procedures. These airports included additional communications, procedures, and training, resulting from hazard identification and analysis, to remind employees and contractors of operational safety during these activities ( See § 139.402(b)(2)(v))

. Reactive ly, an event such as this would be evaluated or investigated under the certificate holder’s Safety Assurance processes to identify hazards and root causes ( See § 139.402(c)(1)) . Mitigations40

would be put in place to avert future similar accidents and the ce rtificate holder could communicate lessons learned to employees, contractors, and tenants through its Safety Promotion processes ( See § 139.402(d)(5))

.

AIDS Report No: 20081215855079I On December 15, 2008, during taxi to the ramp after a normal landing, th e flight crew of
a Northwest Airlines DC

- 9 had difficulty distinguishing the boundaries of the ramp and ramp marking due to compacted snow. The aircraft left the ramp and ended up on a non

- paved area of compacted snow. While the ramp was cleared of snow before the flight’s arrival, airport personnel pushed the snow past the ramp boundary, causing an illusion that the ramp area was larger than it actually is. Some of the pilot study airports used the hazard identification and analysis tools ( See §§ 139.402 (b)(1) and (2)) under SRM to proactively review their winter operations procedures before the snow season. The FAA anticipates that other certificate holders would choose similar triggers which w ould help identify hazards such as the one that caused this event. Potential mitigations such as enhanced communications with employees or contractors before snow removal operations or additional inspections before air carrier operations would be put in place before the beginning of the snow season ( See § 139.402(b )(2)(v))

. Similarly, a certificate holder would reactively evaluate or investigate such an event using its Safety Assurance processes to identify hazards and root causes ( See § 139.402(c)(1)) . The results of those activities would either trigger SRM proces ses ( See § 139.402(b)) or communications ( See § 139.402(d)(5)) to employees, contractors, or tenants under Safety Promotion.

ASRS Report No: 643094 In January 2005, a small aircraft’s wing struck a tree on a visual approach to Runway 31L. On the evening of the event, ramp lighting was illuminated to work on a jet being prepared for delivery. The pilot claimed the ramp lighting obscured the VASI lighting, causing a low approach into the runway.41

Under SMS, the certificate holder would evaluate or investigate such an event using its Safety Assurance processes to identify hazards and root causes ( See § 139.402(c)(1))

. Mitigations would be put in place where necessary ( See § 139.402(b)(2)(v)) . In this case, the airport could work with tenants to identify areas o f the airport where lighting would not affect the runway environment. The FAA would also expect a certificate holder to periodically review accident and incident databases such as ASRS for events occurring on their airport which may have not been reported through the certificate holder’s hazard reporting system ( See § 139.402(c)(1)) . Such
data would provide valuable actionable information which the certificate holder could analyze for hazards and institute mitigations ( See §§ 139.402(b)(1) and (2)) to preven t future similar

occurrences.

RI Database
Event Id: 2480 On June 17, 2004, an unmanned catering truck crossed Runways 22R and 22L in the vicinity of Taxiway R and came to a stop after hitting a runway sign. F our arrivals for Runway
22L were sent around w ith the closest on 2.5 mile final. Three departures were held but none
had been cleared for takeoff. Under SMS, an event like this would be evaluated or investigated using the Safety Assurance processes (See §§139.402(c)(1) and (2))

. C ertificate holders are currently required to establish procedures for access to the movement areas of the airport, identify consequences of

non

- compliance, and ensure that each employee, tenant, or contractor is trained on these procedures (See §139.239)

. SMS would provide a more formalized approach to analyzing these events to determine root cause and the effectiveness of existing procedures. The FAA would expect a certificate holder to follow its procedures for non

- compliance and communicate with employees and tenants an y lessons learned using Safety Promotion processes. The FAA would also expect the certificate holder to change ineffective procedures based on these analyses (See §139.402(b)(2)(v))

. The benefits of implementing a SMS for each group of airports are the fo llowing:
Benefits Over 10 Years42

Benefits All Class I International L, M, S and >100K ops Preferred alternative:

L, M, S, >100K ops, and International Undiscounted $382,987,281 $368,096,671 $360,907,166 $356,128,301 $370,788,457 Present value (7%) $233,28 2,770 $224,210,033 $219,830,291 $216,919,352 $225,850,869 Present value (3%) $307,499,272 $295,542,114 $289,769,378 $285,932,407 $297,704,052

To calculate the benefits
, we considered the following six databases :

 N ational Transportation Safety Board Avia tion Accident/Incident Database (NTSB) ;

 FAA Wildlife Strike Database ;

 A viation Accident/Incident Database (A IDS ) ;

 A viation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) ;

 Occupational Safety and Health Administration ( OSHA ); and

 R unway Incursion Database (RI)

.

1. Benefi t Model and Assumptions We developed a model to estimate the benefits of the SNPRM . The relationships of the model may be summarized as follows:

Benefits = (Fatalities + Serious injuries + Minor injuries + Aircraft + Out

- of

- service + Investigation ) × Ef

fectiveness

W here:
Fatalities = Fatality costs ; Serious injuries = Serious injury costs; Minor injuries = Minor injury costs; Aircraft = aircraft damage cost;
Out

- of

- service = out

- of

- service cost; Investigation = investigation cost; and
Effectiveness = effectiveness measure. In the benefit model, we assumed that:43

 The rule would take effect in 2016

.

 The baseline value of a statistical life (VS L) for 2014 i s $ 9. 4 million. 1

 VSL in future years were estimated to grow by 1. 03 percent pe r year before discounting to present value.

 The value of a serious injury is $ 9 87
, 0 00

. 2

 The value of a minor injury is $2 8,200

. 3

 Because in the AIDS, ASRS, and RI databases, the type of injury was not specified, we assumed all injuries were minor.

 Bene fits are delayed to 201 8 since airports have 2 years for implementation.

 We valued destroyed aircraft at an average replacement cost of aircraft potentially affected by this rule
, and we valued aircraft with substantial damage at an average
restoration cos t of aircraft potentially affected by this rule, which we estimated at about 13% of the replacement cost. We valued aircraft with minor damage at about 5% of the replacement cost.

 For the ASRS database, we assumed minor damage for all accidents since ther e is no
consistent data available for severity of aircraft damage.

 The FAA estimated that the daily loss of an aircraft being out of service 4 is roughly 7% of the value of the aircraft multiplied by days out of service divided by 365 days (opportunity cost of capital). The FAA contacted industry for information on repair times for both minor and substantial aircraft damage. Although there is a substantial amount of variability in repair times alone, based on the severity of the damage and the availability of parts, a range was given by several of these contacts. The FAA chose to use the lower estimates, given the nature of the accidents on airports and the range of aircraft types. For minor damage
, the minimum was 3 days and for substantial damage the mi nimum was 30 days.

1 Office of the Secretary of Transporta tion Memorandum, " Guidance on Treatment of the Economic Value of a Statistical Life in U.S. Department of Transportation Analyses
, ” June 2015

. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Out of service costs were not calculated for the Safety Management Systems for Certificate Hold ers Operating under 14 CFR part 121 final rule even though they could have been added to benefits.44

 NTSB accident investigation costs for 2014 for GA aircraft are estimated at about $ 40,440 per accident, and about $ 542,000 per accident for passenger or cargo aircraft.

2. Effectiveness

Holistic Approach

In the NPRM’s Initial Regulator y Evaluation, the FAA identified 57 NTSB accidents, 18 insurance claims, and 15 OSHA investigations to affirm its rationale and compute derived benefits of an airport’s SMS. However, limiting analysis to only those accidents, especially to those meeting t he NTSB’s reporting and investigation threshold, fails to account for the many other accidents and incidents occurring on airports. Under an SMS and its Safety Assurance program, the FAA anticipates that a certificate
holder would use all available data in cluding past incident/accident findings, confidential hazard reports, runway incursion investigations, and wildlife strike reports to proactively analyze the safety risks for accidents and incidents which could occur on the airport. The certificate holder would identify root causes, proactively identify hazards, and implement mitigations where appropriate. This holistic approach will help the certificate holder better understand and implement its role in applying mitigations or controls to prevent acciden ts before they occur. We also anticipate airports employing a higher level of safety vigilance in the non

- movement area. Since existing part 139 requirements do not apply to the non

- movement area, the rule would extend formalized safety regulation to area s not previously regulated by the FAA. Based on comments to the NPRM, we’ve identified a failure of many certificate holders to take appropriate ownership or control over these areas that have experienced many accidents or incidents resulting in damage, i njuries, and fatalities. The industry even acknowledges its lack of regulatory oversight, standardization, and control. An SMS will require the certificate holder to exert control over the area by establishing a confidential hazard reporting system, deve loping processes to proactively identify safety issues, and implementing processes to identify hazards, assess safety risks, and institute mitigations when appropriate. Using this expanded rationale, the FAA canvased additional reporting sources to identif y accidents and incidents where the certificate holder’s SMS processes or changes to airport45

environment could prevent a past accident or incident. The FAA also pooled accidents and incidents where we believe the certificate holder has some control to pre vent the accident or incident from occurring, but lesser than other tenants like an air carrier or fixed base operator. In general, an airport operator’s actions will have less impact than actions required by an air carrier
or aircraft manufacturer. For example, while a ramp accident caused by an improperly trained air carrier employee directly relates to an air carrier’s operations, the certificate holder has some control in the ramp area to mitigate such accidents including oversight and licensing of dr ivers having unescorted access to the airport. Similarly, if a certificate holder is aware of systemic incidents occurring in the airport environment, they can take action to prevent future incidents or
accidents or share lessons learned with other tenant s.

Source of Accident Data

The FAA’s Office of Accident Prevention, Investigation, and Analysis (AVP) and the Technical Center in Atlantic City provided the original pool of accident/incident data. W e expect airports to evaluate and analyze a broader po ol of events on the airport as part of their Safety Assurance and SRM activities. Therefore, we decided to include accidents and incidents from other publicly accessible databases including FAA’s Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), NASA’s Aviation Safet y Reporting System (ASRS), and th e Runway Incursion
Database. The FAA also decided to include the Wildlife Strike Database since strike reports also present a good source of data to help proactively identify new safety hazards and/or monitor existing wild life hazard management controls. The AIDS database contains incident data records for all categories of civil aviation. Incidents are events that do not meet the aircraft damage or personal injury thresholds contained
in the NTSB definition of an accident . The database is publicly accessible through FAA’s Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing ( ASIAS ) System webpage 5

. ASRS is a voluntary, confidential, and non

- punitive incident reporting system. Pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendant s, maintenance technicians, ground personnel, and others involved in aviation operations can support reports to ASRS when they are involved in, or

5 www.asias.faa.gov46

observe, an incident or situation in which they believe aviation safety was compromised. The database is pub licly accessible through FAA’s ASIAS website. (Dates are provided by month and year instead of day, month, and year.) FAA’s Office of Runway Safety is responsible for determining whether an occurrence at an airport is a runway incursion and/or surface inc ident. Incidents selected for analysis represent those events that resulted in fatality, injury, or aircraft damage. The database is publicly accessible through FAA’s ASIAS website. Terms like airport, runway, taxiway, ramp, apron, and foreign object deb ris/damage were
used to search the NTS B, AIDS, and ASRS databases. The FAA searched the Runway Incursion database using terms like injury and damage. The FAA Wildlife Strike Database contains records of reported wildlife strikes since 1990. Strike report ing is voluntary. Reports are typically submitted by airlines, airports, pilots, and
other sources. T he original data pool included all reported strik es at certificated airports. The
FAA then removed airports with a certain level of USDA presence since they likely already have continuous monitoring efforts in place. We also removed reports of singular events at certificated airports since a singular wildlife strike may not provide useful data for an airport to take action upon or aid in continuous monit oring. The airport safety and SMS experts from the FAA’s Office of Airport Safety and Standards (AAS) analyzed the accidents and incidents for their applicability and assigned effectiveness ratings based on review of the applicable events. FAA executive l eadership and management were briefed, provided examples of applicable accidents and incidents, and agreed to this approach since this proposal included many more benefits associated with events from other databases, not just NTSB which has been the norm i n past rulemakings. AVP’s technical support of other rulemakings typically focuses on air carrier and aircraft expertise and looks only at NTSB accidents. Since the airport community is not well represented or reflective of an air
carrier and aircraft fo cus and the majority of benefits for this proposal are from non

- NTSB sources, AAS conducted the analysis for this rulemaking.

Methodology47

AAS used a Joint Implementation Monitoring Data Analysis Team (JIMDAT)

- like method because many of the issues in the se accidents are not well defined in the probable cause or contributing factors statements. This methodology was developed jointly by the aviation industry and FAA. The JIMDAT

- type scoring system is based on AAS evaluating each safety enhancement against each accident in the set, to determine how effective the enhancement would be at removing the condition if it puts the enhancement in place. The effectiveness rating can be viewed qualitatively in terms in terms of “high”, “medium”, or “low” probability t hat the accident would have been prevented by the enhancement.
Numerical values are assigned corresponding to each of these qualitative assessments based on the consensus collective expert judgment of AAS team members. The level and percentage of
effecti veness criteria follows:

5

- >0.9 effectiveness. The proposed requirement directly addresses the causal factors and would prevent the accident in the future.
4

- 0.6 to 0.9 effectiveness

— “High”. The proposed requirement directly addresses the majority of the causal factors and would probably prevent or is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.
3

- 0.4 to 0.599 effectiveness

— “Medium”. The proposed requirement directly addresses one
of several causal fac tors and is likely to reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.
2

- 0.2 to 0.399 effectiveness

— “Low”. The proposed requirement indirectly addresses one of several causal factors and is likely reduce the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.
1

- <0.2 effectiveness. The proposed requirement is likely to have reduced the risk of the respective accident, given the circumstances that prevailed.

We chose the low end of the ranges for th e effectiveness rating (i.e., 0.2 for “low”, 0.4 for “medium”, and 0.6 for “high”) because the baseline case implies that safety is gradually improving over time. SMS at its core is a management system and can only partially contribute to the prevention o f accidents. Since this is a SNPRM
, the FAA request s48

comment from industry on our new effectiveness rating and the use of alternative accident
and incident databases. The following table show s the distribution of the effectiveness criteria for the differe nt databases. Scoring Count
Effectiveness Criteria Wildlife AIDS NTSB ASRS OSHA RI > 0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 to 0.9 , "High" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 to 0.599
, "Medium" 0 239 83 42 8 2 0.2 to 0.399
, "Low" 749 173 48 3 7 2 <0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0

749 412 131 45 15 4

W ildlife
As shown in the table, for the Wildlife database, the FAA believes that a 21 percent effectiveness reflects the certificate holder’s ability to prevent the accident or incident using its
SMS. SMS monitoring, root cause analysis, and proactive haza rd identification and mitigation, if applied to an airport’s existing wildlife management program, would reduce the number of costly damaging wildlife strikes. Based on a previous study including results published in the annual report “Wildlife Strikes to Civil Aircraft in the United States,” the FAA concludes that between 2001 and 2009 reported damaging wildlife strikes declined by 21 percent. The FAA attributes this decrease to increased vigilance through improved awareness of wildlife hazards and
devel opment of wildlife hazard assessments. The FAA believes that continuous monitoring using the elements of an SMS program would have similar effects in decreasing the number of damaging wildlife strikes. Monitoring allows timely and cost effective mitigati on which would result in reducing or eliminating the attractiveness of natural and artificial habitats providing food, water, and cover for hazardous wildlife. It also provides essential data a certificate holder would use to conduct trend analysis, proac tive risk assessment, and targeted mitigation. Therefore, the FAA concludes that integration of monitoring and risk assessment through the49

integration of wildlife activities and SMS programs would result in the reduction in damaging
strikes.

3. Results for each Database Under an SMS and its Safety Assurance program, the FAA anticipates that a certificate holder would analyze the variety of accidents and incidents occurring on the airport, not just those investigated by the NTSB. The FAA canvased additional reporting sources to identify accidents and incidents where the certificate holder’s actions or the airport environment
contributed to the accident or incident. The FAA also included accidents and incidents where the
FAA believes the certificate holder ha s some control to prevent the accident or incident from occurring, but lesser than others like the air carrier or fixed base operator. D uplicate records were removed. While the following discussion summarizes the quantified benefit results for each databas e, A ppendix 4 has a more detailed analysis by database. These benefits are based on the effectiveness of preventing past accidents and incidents multiplied by the value of social benefits of reduced injuries, fatalities, and equipment as discussed earlier

. 3.1. National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Accident/Incident Database (NTSB)
Benefits over 10 Years The NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident Data System contains information collected during an NTSB investigation of an accident or incident involving civil aircraft within the U.S.
, its territories and possessions, and in international waters. 6 Requiring SMS implementation at all part 139 certificated airports would yield an estimated $ 63.5 million ($ 38.7 million when discounted at seven percent and $5 0.9 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. Limiting that scope to only Class I airports would yield
about $ 6 2

. 7 million ( $ 38.2 million when discounted at seven percent and $50.4 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. Interna tional airports would yield an estimated $5 8.2
million ($ 35.5 million when discounted at seven percent and $46.7 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. For Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports and airports with more than 100,000 total annu al operations
, estimated benefits are about $5 9.0 million ($ 35.9 million when discounted at seven percent and $47.3 million when discounted at three percent )

. Lastly,

6 http://www.asias.faa.gov/pl s/apex/f?p=100:24:0::NO :::50

for the preferred alternative, Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports
, airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations
, and international airports, estimated benefits are about $ 60.2
million ($ 36.6 million when discounted at seven percent and $48.3 million when discounted at three percent )

. 3.2. FAA Wildlife Strike Database Benefits over 1 0 Years Proactive identification and mitigation of wildlife hazards is essential for maintaining airport safety. Under SMS, a certificate holder would be required to conduct proactive hazard identification and mitigation in its movement and non

- movement a reas. Enhanced reporting through the airport’s hazard reporting system, data collection and analysis through Safety Assurance, and formalized risk assessment and SRM all contribute to a continuous monitoring program that can be used for proactive wildlife hazard identification and mitigation. Together, these actions supplement existing wildlife management practices and could lead to a decrease in harmful and damaging wildlife strikes at airports across the country. Many airports with wildlife hazard mana gement programs currently engage in some form of continuous monitoring. However, without a wildlife biologist on

- site to analyze hazard data and implement mitigations, certificate holders are not able to quickly react to changes in wildlife
hazards despit e continuous monitoring . The tools available under an SMS, when combined with an airport’s wildlife hazard management program
, would ensure a more rigorous and formal methodology to continuous monitoring that affords a data

- driven and risk

- based approach. The connection between continuous monitoring of wildlife hazards and SMS is not a new concept. In fact, numerous airports that participated in the FAA’s SMS p ilot s tudies incorporated proactive wildlife hazard identification and mitigation into their SM S programs. Through formalized SRM procedures, these airports identified wildlife hazards, measured the risks associated with the outcomes of those hazards, and took mitigation when appropriate. Additionally, some airports gathered and tracked wildlife m etrics that would later be used in trend analysis and future SRM analyses. Industry also noted the importance of wildlife management and SMS. In 2009, researchers with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Wildlife Services published “Safety M anage ment S ystems: H ow U seful W ill the FAA National Wildlife Strike Database (NWSD) B e?” The researchers proposed the use of the NWSD for prioritizing wildlife risks through SRM. The researchers also proposed the use of statistics in the database for51

benchmar king and evaluating each airport specific wildlife program
, which would be consistent with the continuous monitoring and evaluation under Safety Assurance. The Airports Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) recently published findings for its project titled “Applying an SMS Approach to Wildlife Hazard Management.” This report
introduces and guide s airports in the application of a risk

- based approach to wildlife hazard management and provide s additional steps for integrating SMS practices into existing wildl ife

programs. Analysis of wildlife strike reports (either at the local or system level) provides invaluable, actionable information for airport operators. Collection and tracking of additional metrics such as wildlife sightings and incidents would furthe r enhance this actionable information. Wildlife strike reports typically identify species and location of strikes at an airport (and therefore possible attractant locations or travel corridors), time of strike, seasonality of strike, and phase of flight w hen the strike occurred. A certificate holder could use this data to locate and mitigate hazardous species, reduce wildlife strikes by modifying aircraft arrival/departure paths and times, and provide updated wildlife notices to pilots. This information would aid in identifying wildlife attractants allowing for easy, targeted, and cost

- efficient mitigation. Certificate holders could also use these reporting networks and databases to assist in hazard analysis. For example, a certificate holder could quer y the NWSD to identify the number of strikes on its airfield or other regional airports over a specified period of time to better analyze trends. The database provides a key tool for prioritizing wildlife risks and objective benchmarks
of the effectivenes s of an airport’s wildlife mitigation program and Wildlife Hazard Management Plan ( WHMP )

. The FAA Wildlife Strike Database contains records of reported wildlife strikes since 1990. Strike reporting is voluntary. Therefore, this database only represents th e information we have received from airlines, airports, pilots, and other sources. 7 The FAA queried the NWSD for strikes reported between January 1, 2001 and February 28, 2010. Of those reports collected within the ten

- year period, the FAA removed all events occurring over 3000 feet above ground level or with no elevation reported. The FAA also removed all reports for airports receiving USDA services with labor hours totaling greater than

7 http://wildlife.faa.gov/52

or equal to 0.5 staff years. The FAA believes that airports rec eiving wildlife management services equal to or greater than 0.5 staff years already have continuous monitoring programs in place that include a more formalized, data

- driven approach and therefore, would realize fewer
benefits under SMS.
The FAA then remo ved all strike reports for airports reporting only a singular strike over
the 10

- year period. The FAA believes that airports that have experienced multiple strikes over time may benefit from continuous monitoring

. Under SMS, multiple strike reports affor d an airport additional data that can be used for proactive risk assessment and monitoring. Under SMS, c ontinuous wildlife monitoring would allow an airport operator to identify changes in wildlife composition, numbers, attractants, and travel corridors. Continuous monitoring also would identify changes to the airport environment that could affect the presence of wildlife. Under SMS, s trikes or wildlife activity would be reported either through the airport’s hazard reporting syste m or other existing sour ces (e.g ., daily part 139 inspections , NWSD). The certificate holder would then use these reports for safety assurance processes such as investigations, trend analysis, or program evaluations. Many certificate holders would also identify thresholds assoc iated with wildlife activity for triggering more formalized risk analysis under SRM. For example, a certificate holder could classify wildlife sightings or incidents under its SMS as hazards that would trigger formalized safety risk assessment under SRM. Similarly, a certificate holder could identify more definitive triggers such as strikes or activity involving

zero

- tolerance species and requiring immediate formalized risk analysis and mitigation. Data collected through rep orting, as well as the NWSD
, w ould assist the airport by incorporating quantitative analysis for risk assessment. Potential mitigations could include monitoring, review of the WHMP, and revision of the Wildlife Hazard Assessment ( WHA )

. The certificate holder could use this informatio n to quickly and efficiently implement

m itigation techniques. Continuous monitoring through Safety Assurance would enhance airport safety because the frequent hazard identification and mitigation should reduce the likelihood of
wildlife strikes. Addition ally, continual monitoring should decrease the time, effort, personnel hours, and money spent on mitigation because hazards would be identified before they pose a high risk. Reporting, analysis, and mitigation together compose a continuous monitoring

prog ram that should prevent similar wildlife strikes and could prevent other wildlife activities on the airport.53

As noted in appendix table A.2, from 2001 to 2010 there w ere 563 minor aircraft damage d ( valued at $2 ,300 to $3. 7 million per aircraft ) , 185 subst antial aircraft damage d (valued at $4 1,900 to $9. 6 million per aircraft)
, and 1 destroyed aircraft valued at $3 22,400 . The FAA assigned a 21 percent accident prevention probability to this database and delayed benefits to
201 8 since airports would have 2 y ears for implementation. Over the five alternatives, the cost
avoidance of aircraft damage costs ranges from $ 18 9 million to $ 206 million . Out

- of

- service costs are estimated at about $ 570,000 to $ 617,000

. Requiring SMS implementation at all part 139 cert ificated airports would yield an
estimated $ 206.9 million ($12 6. 0 million when discounted at seven percent and $166.1 million
when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. Limiting that scope to only Class I airports would yield about $1 95.1 million ( $ 118 .9 million when discounted at seven percent and $156.7 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. International airports would yield an estimated $1 9 3.6 million ( $ 117.9 million when discounted at seven percent and $155.4 million when
discounted at three percent ) in benefits. For Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports and airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations
, estimated benefits are abo ut $1 89.8 million ( $ 115.6 million when discounted at seven percent and $152.4 million when disc ounted at three percent ). Finally
, for the preferred alternative, Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports
, airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations, and international airports, estimated benefits are about $ 200.5 million ( $ 122.2 million when d iscounted at seven percent and $161.0 million when discounted at three percent ).

3.3. Aviation Accident/Incident Database (AIDS) Benefits over 10 Years

The AIDS database contains incident data records for all categories of civil aviation.
Incidents are events that do not meet the aircraft damage or personal injury thresholds contained
in the NTSB definition of an accident. 8 As noted in appendix table A.3, f rom 2000 to 2010 there were 21 minor injuries and 31 aircraft incurred substantial damage ( value d at $ 41 ,900 to $9 .6 million per aircraft) while 364 sustained minor damage (valued at $2 ,300 to $ 3.7 million per aircraft)

. The FAA assigned a 20 percent or 40 percent accident prevention probability to this database and delayed benefits to 201 8 since airports w ould have 2 years for implementation.

8 http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:12:0::NO :::54

Over the five alternatives, the cost avoidance s would include casualty costs rang ing from $ 128,5 00 to $ 137,4 00 ; aircraft damage costs rang ing from $ 70.2 million to $ 74.9 million; out

- of

service costs rang ing from $ 138 ,600 to $ 141,400 ; and investigation costs rang ing from $ 209,300 to $ 281,000

. T he FAA estimates that r equiring SMS implementation at all part 139 certificated airports would yield an estimated $7 5.5 million ( $ 46.0 million when discounted at seven percent and $60.6 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. Limiting that scope to only Class I airports would yield about $ 73.2 million ( $ 44.6 million when discounted at seven percent and $58.7 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. International airports would yield an estimated $ 72.7 million ( $ 44.3 million when discounted at seven percent and $58.4 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. For Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports and airports with more than 100,000 tot al annual operations estimated benefits are abo ut $ 70.6 million ($ 43.0 million when discounted at seven percent and $56.7 million when discounted at three percent ). Finally
, for the preferred alternative, Large, Medium
, and S mall hub airports
, airports wit h more than 100,000 total annual operations, and international airports,
estimated benefits are about $ 73.4 million ($ 44.7 million when discounted at seven percent and $58.9 million when discounted at three percent ).

3.4. Aviation System Reporting System (ASR S) Benefits over 10 Years The ASRS is a voluntary, confidential
, and non

- punitive incident reporting system. Pilots, air traffic controllers, flight attendants, maintenance technicians, ground personnel, and others involved in aviation operations can sub mit reports to the ASRS when they are involved in, or observe, an incident or situation in which they believe aviation safety was compromised. 9 As noted in appendix table A.4, f rom 2001 to 2011 there were 2 injuries and 29 aircraft incurred damage (we as sumed minor damage valued at $ 1 9,400 to $ 3. 7 million per aircraft ). The FAA assigned a 20 percent or 40 percent accident prevention probability to this database and delayed benefits to 201 8 since airports would have 2 years for implementation. Over the fi ve alternatives, the cost avoidance s include : casualty costs of $ 13,300 (there were 45 accidents);

9 http://www .asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:19:0::NO :::55

aircraft damage costs
, rang ing from $9

. 8 million to $ 10.5 million; and out

- of

- service costs

rang ing from $8 ,600 to $9 ,300

. T he FAA estimates that r equirin g SMS implementation at all part 139 certificated airports would yield an estimated $ 10.5 million ($ 6.4 million when discounted at seven percent and $8.5 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. Limiting that scope to only Class I airports wo uld yield about $ 10.5 million ($ 6.4 million when discounted at seven percent and $8.4 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. International airports would yield an
estimated $9. 8 million ( $ 6.0 million when discounted at seven percent and $7. 9 million when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. For Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports and airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations
, estimated benefits are abo ut $ 10.2 million ($ 6.2
million when discounted at seven percent and $8 .2 million when discounted at three percent ). Lastly, for the preferred alternative, Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports
, airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations, and international airports, estimated benefits are about $ 10.2 million ($ 6. 2 million when discounted at seven percent and $8.2 million when discounted at three percent ).

3.5. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Benefits over 10 Years OSHA’s Fatality and Catastrophe Investigation Summaries (also known as Accident
In vestigation Summaries) contain inspection reports developed after a fatality or catastrophe. Each summary provides descriptions of the incident, general events leading up to the incident, and causal factors. The database is searchable using various param eters including the standard industrial classification (SIC)

. 10 The FAA pulled 10

- years of reports from four SIC’s:

 4213

– Trucking, Except Local;

 4512

– Air Transportation, Scheduled;

 4513

– Air Courier Services; and,

 4581

– Airports, Flying Fields, and A irport Terminal Services.

The FAA reviewed each summary for relevance to the safety of aircraft/airport operations
in the movement and non

- movement areas of the airfield. All accidents used for this analysis represent operational safety issues.

10 https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.html56

Requiring SMS implementation for any of the five alternatives would yield an estimated $ 26.6 million ($ 16.2 million present v alue) in benefits. The re were 15 OSHA accidents that occurred at airports that were in all of the alternatives. As noted in appendix table A. 5, from 2001 to 20 11 there were 11 fatalities and 4 minor injuries

. The FAA assigned a 20 percent or 40 percent accident prevention probability to this database and delayed benefits to 201 8 since airports have 2 years for implementation. Over the
five alte rnatives, the cost avoidance of casualty costs would be $ 26.6 million ( there were 15
accidents )

.

3.6. Runway Incursion (RI) Database Benefits over 10 Years The FAA Office of Runway Safety is responsible for determining whether an occurrence

at an airport is a runway incursion and/or surface incident. Only surface events at airports with an operating air t raffic c ontrol t ower are recorded and classified as runway incursions and
surface incidents. 11 Incidents selected for this analysis represent those surface events resulting
in fatality , injury, or aircraft damage. As noted in appendix table A.6, from 2001 to 2011
, there was 1 injury

. The FAA assigned a 20 percent or 40 percent accident prevention probability to this database and delayed
benefits to 201 8 since airports would have 2 years for implementation. Requiring SMS implementation at all part 139 certificated airports would yield an
estimated $ 7,000 ($ 4,200 when discounted at seven percent and $5,600 when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. Limitin g that scope to only Class I airports , or Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports and airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations would yield an
estimated $ 5,700 ($ 3,500 when discounted at seven percent and $4,600 when discounted at three percent ) in benefits. International airports and t he preferred alternative of Large, Medium
, and Small hub airports and airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations and international airports would yield an estimated $ 6,600 ($ 4,000 when discounted at seven percent and $5,300 when discounted at three percent ) in benefits.

11 http://www.asias.faa.g ov/pls/apex/f?p=100:28:0::NO:28 ::57

4. Sensitivity Analysis The FAA considered a sensitivity analysis of the effects of using alternative VSL values as shown in the following 2 tables.
For the low alternative value of $5.2 million and the high alternative value of $1 3 .0 million, the last three airport groups continue to show a positive difference between benefits and

costs.

Comparison of Costs and Benefits over 10 years using VSL of $5.2 Million

Low case All Class I I nternational L, M, S and >100K ops L, M, S, >100K

ops, and International Benefits $368,928,248 $354,045,556 $347,014,423 $342,397,895 $356,887,797 Costs $471,104,787 $341,021,606 $215,010,997 $163,760,850 $238,865,692 Net Benefits

- $102,176,539 $13,023, 950 $132,003,426 $178,637,045 $118,022,105 PV Benefits (7%) $224,747,677 $215,679,751 $211,396,148 $208,583,768 $217,411,924 PV Costs (7%) $307,842,595 $223,584,687 $141,796,001 $108,819,973 $157,496,312 PV Net Benefits (7%)

- $83,094,918

- $7,904,936 $69 ,600,147 $99,763,795 $59,915,612 PV Benefits (3%) $296,227,774 $284,276,962 $278,631,200 $274,924,377 $286,559,525 PV Costs (3%) $389,440,320 $282,304,199 $178,432,284 $136,340,226 $198,211,977 PV Net Benefits (3%)

- $83,094,918

- $7,904,936 $69,600,147 $ 99,763,795 $59,915,612

Comparison of Costs and Benefits over 10 years using VSL of $13 .0 Million

High case All Class I International L, M, S and >100K ops L, M, S, >100K

ops, and International Benefits $395,037,884 $380,140,485 $372,815,226 $367,897,225 $382,703,308 Costs $471,104,787 $341,021,606 $215,010,997 $163,760,850 $238,865,692 Net Benefits

- $76,066,903 $39,118,879 $157,804,229 $204,136,375 $143,837,615 PV Benefits (7%) $240,598,566 $231,521,708 $227,059,553 $224,064,144 $233,084,256 PV Costs (7%) $307,842,595 $223,584,687 $141,796,001 $108,819,973 $157,496,312 PV Net Benefits (7%)

- $67,244,029 $7,937,021 $85,263,552 $115,244,171 $75,587,944 PV Benefits (3%) $317,160,562 $305,197,956 $299,316,386 $295,367,867 $307,256,502 PV Costs (3%) $389 ,440,320 $282,304,199 $178,432,284 $136,340,226 $198,211,977 PV Net Benefits (3%)

- $67,244,029 $7,937,021 $85,263,552 $115,244,171 $75,587,94458

5. B enefit

- Cost Comparison The following table shows a comparison of benefits and costs (excluding benefits and costs of mitigations) for each alternative :

Comparison of Costs and Benefits over 10 years (2014 Dollars)

Base Case All Class I International L, M, S and >100K ops Preferred

alternative: L, M, S, >100K ops, and International Benefits $382,987,281 $368, 096,671 $360,907,166 $356,128,301 $370,788,457 Costs $471,104,787 $341,021,606 $215,010,997 $163,760,850 $238,865,692 Net Benefits

- $88,117,506 $27,075,065 $145,896,169 $192,367,451 $131,922,764 PV Benefits (7%) $233,282,770 $224,210,033 $219,830,291 $2 16,919,352 $225,850,869 PV Costs (7%) $307,842,595 $223,584,687 $141,796,001 $108,819,973 $157,496,312 PV Net Benefits (7%)

- $74,559,825 $625,346 $78,034,290 $108,099,379 $68,354,557 PV Benefits (3%) $307,499,272 $295,542,114 $289,769,378 $285,932,407 $ 297,704,052 PV Costs (3%) $389,440,320 $282,304,199 $178,432,284 $136,340,226 $198,211,977 PV Net Benefits (3%)

- $74,559,825 $625,346 $78,034,290 $108,099,379 $68,354,557 Mitigation Costs: Not quantified, estimates not included. Given the range of mitig ation actions possible, it is difficult to quantify potential benefits.

Although the preferred alternative is not the most cost beneficial alternative, it is the FAA’s preferred alternative for two reasons

. First, t he se airports account for approxim ately 98% of all passenger enplanements in the U.S . While s imply applying the proposed requirement to
L arge, M edium, and S mall hub certificated airports would account for most of this traffic, many critical airports within the U.S. system would not be inc luded and yet have over 100,000 aircraft operations. Theref

ore, to ensure that busy airports such as these are captured in this proposed requirement, the preferred alternative would include airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations.
Secon d, t he pool of airports characterized as L arge, M edium, and S mall hub airports
, or certificated airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations is large, but still does not completely account for all certificated airports able to receive internatio nal traffic. In order to fully harmonize with the intent of international SMS standards, the FAA alternative includes59

certificated airports

. T he FAA also proposes all certificated airports hosting international operations meet the proposed requirement. The FAA preferred alternative has benefits of $3 70.8
million ($225.9 million when discounted at seven percent and $297.7 million when discounted at three percent ) , whic h exceed the estimated cost s of $2 38.9 million ($157.5 million when
discounted at seven percent and $198.2 million w hen discounted at three percent ).

V. NPRM C omments and FAA Response
Comment:
Three certificate holders stated that the Initial Regulatory Evaluation did not account for the cost of attrition on training and training records an d lost productivity during training. FAA Response: The FAA is not including an attrition rate in this analysis because the number of employees requiring training significantly decreased compared to the number covered by the NPRM’s proposed training requ irements

. Thus, t here is no basis to determine an attrition rate for
the estimated maximum 10 employees per airport. Additionally, concerning the lost productivity, the training period is short enough to be of negligible impact on yearly productivity.
Comment:
One certificate holder commented that the legal cost associated with discoverable
material was not included in the cost of the rule. FAA Response: These legal costs were not included in the Initial Regulatory Evaluation as they are outside t he scope of th e proposal

. We do not include this type of cost in the regulatory evaluation supporting the SNPRM for the same reason.
Comment:
Seven certificate holders disputed the labor rates. FAA Response:
Labor rates were taken from the Bureau of L abor Statistics for aviation and are representative industry salaries.
Comment: Several commenters stated that the FAA failed to include mitigation costs. FAA Response :60

As discussed and acknowledged in both the SNPRM and this Regulatory Evaluation, t he estimated costs of this rule do not include the cost of mitigations that operators could incur as a result of conducting the risk analysis proposed in this rule. Given the range of mitigation actions possible, it is difficult to provide a quantitative es timate of both the costs and benefits of such mitigations. We anticipate that operators will only implement mitigations where benefits of doing so exceed the costs of the mitigations. In order for the estimated benefits to exceed the costs of the rule, t he mitigation costs must be below $68.4 million over 10 years (discounted at 7%). The FAA requests comment on this assumption, as well as data regarding costs and benefits associated with any mitigations implemented through a voluntary SMS program.
Comme nt:
One consultant stated that the benefits derived in the regulatory evaluation were for the airline industry and not necessarily the airports that are incurring the direct cost.
FAA R esponse : Based on OMB Circular A

- 4
, the FAA is responsible for calc ulating the societal benefits of a regulation
, which includes
, but is not limited to
, the benefits to airports.
Under an SMS , an airport will have reporting, analysis, and communications systems that will enable it to influence not only actions directly r elated to airport operations but also events that may not be directly in their control but still in the airport environment . For example, while a ramp accident caused by an improperly trained air carrier directly relates to an air carrier’s operations, an airport has some control in the ramp area to defend against accidents like these including oversight and licensing of drivers with unescorted airfield access. Similarly, if a certificate holder is aware of systemic incidents occurring in the airport
envir onment, they may be able to take action to prevent future incidents or accidents or share
lessons learned with other tenants. For example, if an airport operator becomes aware of a hazard in one tenants apron that has the potential to be a hazard in anoth er tenants operating area, the airport will have tools in place under their SMS where these hazards would be reported, analyzed and communicated with other tenants.

Comment:
Six certificate holders and two trade associations stated that costs were undere stimated. For example, one certificate holder stated that the cost of initial SMS planning, data collection,61

documentation, and implementation process es were underestimated. It estimate d planning, data collection, documentation, and implementation to be no less than $400,000 for its airport and
i nitial training costs expected to exceed $300,000.
FAA R esponse : The FAA used information from pilot study participants both before and after the Initial Regulatory Evaluation to estimate costs and could not va lidate the cost estimates provided above.
Comment:
One trade association commented that this rule would have a cost on other industries such as carriers and maintenance companies in addition to a negative

- cost benefit ratio in present
value terms.
FAA R esponse : The proposed rule only directly impacts airports ; however
, the FAA did acknowledge a negative present value cost

- benefit ratio for airports in the Initial Regulatory Evaluation. The preferred alternative in the SNPRM is cost beneficial.
Commen t:
Another trade association mentioned that
, with this range
, benefits could be above or
below costs.
FAA R esponse : The FAA acknowledges that benefits in the Initial Regulatory Evaluation could be above
or below cost. The preferred alternative in the S NPRM is cost beneficial.
Comment:
One certificate holder disputes the minimal cost option under the guise that this is different than what was reported by the pilot study airports.
FAA R esponse : In response to comments and lessons learned from the pilot studies, the SNPRM analysis
revises c osts to be consistent with the p ilot s tudy participant responses. Comment:
One certificate holder stated that additional training would be required on the non

movement areas , and this is an area that is not currently regulated by airports. Several commenters, including two certificate holders, were concerned that training all individuals with62

access to the airside on SMS and operational safety includes a larger number of non

- airport employees that were not included in this analysis.
FAA R esponse : In response to comments and lessons learned from the pilot studies, the SNPRM modifies the training requirement to a two

- pronged approach to training: (i) comprehensive SMS training specific to individuals with direct SMS res ponsibilities ; and
, (ii)
, for the majority of staff , only hazard awareness and reporting awareness orientation. Hazards can occur in the movement and
the non

- movement area, therefore the FAA believes there is value in hazard awareness orientation and repor ting to support the proactive identification and mitigation of hazards. The proposal includes a hazard awareness orientation for individuals accessing the non

- movement areas which should minimize the burden on the certificate holder for providing this ori entation.
Comment: Several commenters disputed the time required for training. For example, one certificate
holder stated that it believed 45 minutes per employee would be necessary to provide training and to ensure that the employee demonstrates accepta ble levels of competency.
FAA R esponse : The training proposed in the SNPRM is only required for individuals with direct SMS responsibilities. That training is estimated to take 3 hours annually.
Comment:
Two certificate holders reported the need for additional staffing such as a program manager, an assistant program manager, an administrative assistant
, or management and other staffing resources required from various levels of the organization.
FAA R esponse : The FAA reevaluated staffing requiremen ts based on the FAA SMS Pilot Studies Technical Report May dated May 2011 , which are discussed in the “ Staffing Section ” of this
document.
Comment: To compute the time required to update employee training records for the Paperwork Reduction Act analysis, the FAA estimated that there were 72,800 employees for all 562 certificated airports (at the time of the NPRM). One certificate holder argued that the FAA

“ significantly underestimated the number of employees” and that the 72,800 employees “would63

translat e to an average of 129 employees per airport.” The certificate holder further stated that its certificated airports alone had 67,000 individuals with access to the movement or non

movement areas that would need to receive training.
FAA R esponse : The FAA did not use the total number of employees at an airport in the SNPRM
evaluation since only those airport employees with direct SMS responsibilities would require comprehensive SMS training

. All other employees
, which are t he majority of the staff
, only

req uire hazard awareness and reporting awareness orientation.
Comment:
Four certificate holders stated that the FAA did not include the cost of hiring a consultant.
FAA R esponse : The majority of airports hired consultants to develop their SMS and those co sts, where applicable, are included in the development costs. However, for implementation and continuous monitoring, airports reported using existing staff or hiring new staff. Therefore, ongoing
consultant costs were not included.
Comment:
One certificat e holder stated that the FAA underestimated additional staffing for development and implementation of an SMS.
FAA R esponse : The FAA included the total cost reported by pilot study participants for development, implementation, and continuous operation of an SMS. This cost included staffing for all three stages. Comment: Many commenters , including three certificate holders and two trade associations, reported an additional burden on small airports that they believe was not included on the Initial Regula tory Evaluation. FAA Response : The FAA reevaluated the impact on airports by different groupings to assess the burden on smaller airports. Based on this analysis
, the FAA changed the scope of the SNPRM to affect only L arge, M edium, and S mall hub airport s, airports with more than 100,000 total annual operations
, and airports accepting international traffic. T his applicability still advances the64

FAA’s safety goals by targeting airports with over 9 8 % of all passenger enplanements. Because
the SNPRM limits the applicability of SMS requirements , many of the smaller airports are no longer included in the preferred alternative, thereby reducing the overall burden to smaller airports. The SNPRM further clarifies the scalability of SMS which the FAA believes mi tigates the burden on smaller airports and is discussed in “ Regulatory Flexibility Determination ” section
of the SNPRM

. Comment:
One certificate holder disputes the definition of a small airport by operation and class. FAA Response : The FAA maintains t hat the number of operations and class help determine the size of an airport , which is discussed in the “ Regulatory Flexibility Determination ” section of the SNPRM

. For the purposes of this analysis, certain costs were also evaluated based on the size and complexity of operations which ties to the scalability of the proposed requirements. The FAA categorized all Large, Medium, and Small hub airports as “large airports” in this analysis and all other certificated airports as “small airport s .”
Comment:
T wo trade associations disputed the accidents selected for benefits. FAA Response : The FAA reevaluate d all accident s in response to comments. A detailed list of accidents and their possible SMS related mitigation are provided in Appendix 1

. Comment:
One trade association disputed the FAA’s use of numerous accidents and incidents in calculating the benefits of airport SMS. In its comments, the assoc i ation argued its point using three specific accidents : 1. NTSB Accident Number CHI04LA077: On February 2 4, 2004, a Saab

- 340B sustained substantial damage when it struck an unoccupied airplane while it was being pushed back for taxi at Detroit Metropolitan/Wayne County Airport. NTSB cited the probable cause as the tug operator’s failure to maintain visual lo okout and follow procedures. Contributing factors included the nighttime conditions on the ramp.
2. NTSB Accident Number DCA05MA070: On June 7, 2005, a mobile belt baggage loader
was driven under and struck an Embraer EMB

- 170 at Reagan National Airport. Th e65

driver of the baggage loader was fatally injured and the aircraft received minor damage. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was the inexperience of the baggage loader driver.
3. NTSB Accident Number IAD05CA019: On November 29, 2004, th e right winglet of an
Embraer EMB

- 135BJ collided with a parked airplane while the crew taxied the aircraft to the ramp area at Cleveland

- Hopkins International Airport. While standard operating procedures required a marshaller to assist the flight crew wit h parking, the flight crew taxied behind the parked airplane when a marshaller did not arrive. The accident report
noted that there were no non

- movement area boundary markings and that the ramp had been repaved 36 days prior to the accidents. With no mar kings present, there were no visual cues for taxiing along a designated path, and no edge markings or edge lighting to define the edge of the usable pavement. The NTSB noted the lack of ramp markings as a contributing factor in the accident. FAA Response: The FAA confirms that the three accidents identified by the association were included in the Initial Regulatory Evaluation. The FAA reviewed all of the accidents used in the Initial Regulatory Evaluation
, including these three
, to consider their applica bility based on the revised proposal.
The association argued that NTSB Accident Number IAD05CA019 “involved decisions very, very far from the purview of an airport’s operator safety responsibilities.” While the FAA agrees that this accident is a direct r esult of the flight crew’s improper decision to taxi without a marshaller, the NTSB cited airport conditions as a contributing factor. Therefore, actions by the airport operator could have decreased the likelihood of the accident occurring. Under SMS, ch anges in airport operations would trigger the certificate holder’s SRM processes to proactively identify hazards and put mitigations in place (See §§139.402(b)(1) and (2)) . Repaving in the movement or non

- movement area is a change in airport operations; i t could disrupt existing procedures, signage, and markings. In this case, proactive analysis would likely identify pilot confusion as a potential hazard (See §139.402(b)(ii)) during the period between paving and painting. Potential mitigations to reduce the risk associated with pilot confusion include Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), procedure changes, and temporary markings, signage, or lighting (See §139.402(b)(v)) . The certificate holder’s Safety Promotion program would also66

help to better proactively comm unicate these actions and include tenants in airport changes (See §139.402(d)(5))

. Additionally, under SMS, a certificate holder would investigate accidents and
incidents under its Safety Assurance activities to identify hazards and gain lessons learned ( See §139.402(c)(1)) . Using this information, it would incorporate lessons learned into future operational changes.
The association argued that NTSB Accident Number CHI04LA077 “involved a pushback operator who failed to follow proper airline procedures an d lost visual contact with the wing walker...clearly the airline had an adequate policy in place which is under the scope of the airline’s internal safety program, a policy that would not have fallen into the scope of a Part 139
SMS.” The association also a rgued that NTSB Accident Number DCA05MA070 “involved the fatal injury of a belt loader operator...this accident might have been prevented through an airline’s SMS program, but we cannot see how it would have been addressed via an airport’s SMS program.” Whi le the FAA agrees that the primary causes of these accidents lie with the airline, actions by the certificate holder in either accident could have decreased the likelihood of the accidents occurrence. Similarly, actions by the certificate holder in respon se to these
accidents could decrease the likelihood of future accidents. In CHI04LA077, the NTSB cited the dark night conditions on the ramp as a contributing factor to the accident. The certificate holder and/or airport owner has overarching responsibil ity for the ramp area. Under SMS, an accident such as this would be investigated using the certificate holder’s Safety Assurance processes to identify hazards and gain lessons learned (See §139.402(c)(1)) . In this case, the certificate holder may decide that the hazards and risks associated with the dark area of the ramp can be mitigated through airport

- initiated actions (e.g., lighting or limiting access during night hours). The certificate holder’s Safety Promotion

program would also help it communicat e these lessons learned and mitigations to other tenants engaged in similar activities in the ramp area therefore decreasing the likelihood of similar
accidents (See §139.402(d)(5))

. Airports will also establish hazard reporting systems (See §139.402(c)(2 )) where individuals with access to the airfield will be able to report safety issues such as inoperable or missing lighting; where the certificate holder is able to take action before
the accident even occurs. In DCA05MA070, the certificate holder is res ponsible for maintaining access to its
airfield environment (See §139. 329) . A certificate holder would usually institute driver67

credentialing, training programs, and rules and regulations to oversee access by tenants and airport employees. Again, a certi ficate holder’s Safety Assurance processes would trigger investigation and the identification of hazards to gain lessons learned (See §139.402(c)(1)) . The certificate holder’s Safety Promotion program would help it communicate those lessons learned
to oth er tenants engaged in similar activities on the airfield, potentially decreasing the likelihood
of similar accidents (See §139.402(d)(5))

. Unlike the Initial Regulatory Evaluation where the FAA analyzed all of the applicable
NTSB accidents in similar term s, the SNPRM acknowledges that there are accidents, like CHI04LA077 and DCA05MA070, where the certificate holder played a lesser role in the cause
of the accident
, or their actions could have added additional controls to mitigate the accident or
decease th e likelihood of the accidents occurrence. In these cases
, the FAA is using a lower
effectiveness to account for the benefit of SMS relative to the accident.
Another trade association also argued the FAA’s use of two accidents it says the agency
used “to set the basis for establishing the SMS program on all part 139 airports.” The association references “the Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701 and the Cessna 310R aircraft accidents.”
Since the association did not provide additional details regarding its cited a ccidents, the FAA believes the “Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701” accident refers to NTSB Accident Number DCA05MA003. On October 14, 2004, Pinnacle Airlines Flight 3701, a Bombardier CL

- 600, crashed into a residential area approximately 2.5 miles south of Je fferson City Memorial Airport (JEF). The NTSB determined the probable cause based on multiple factors including the pilots’ unprofessional behavior, failure to prepare for emergency landing in a timely manner, and improper management of the double engine failure checklist. The Initial Regulatory Evaluation did not include NTSB Accident Number
DCA05MA003. It is not included in this analysis. The FAA searched the NTSB aviation accident database to determine whether any of the
accidents cited in the Initial Regulatory Evaluation included a “Cessna 310R”. Using the period between 1/1/2004 and 12/31/2008 and the search criteria of Make: Cessna and Model: 310R, the FAA was unable to match the query results with the list of NTSB accidents cited in the Initial
R egulatory Evaluation. Therefore, the FAA is unable to respond to the association ’ s comment regarding the “Cessna 310R” aircraft accident.6869 Appendix 1 : A ccident H istory707172737475767778798081828384858687888990 ASRS data is only re corded by month and year.9192 A ppendix 2: Aircraft Values

Table 1

- 1 above was developed by APO to update the 2003 values from Table 5

- 1 of Economic Values for Evaluation of FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions . The U.S. fleet
and aircraft valu es we used were current as of winter 2011 and were updated to 2014 using the
GDP deflator

. Replacement values for air carriers were derived from proprietary databases developed by the Airliner Price Guide 1 and Aircraft Bluebook Price Digest 2

. Both provid ed the market values for each airplane model by year of manufacture.

1 Airliner Price Guide, 568 Waterloo Road, Suite 102, Warrenton, VA 20186.
2 Aircraft Bluebook Price Digest, 9800 Metcalf Avenue, Overland Park, KS 66212.93

The updated summary of values for passenger and all cargo air carrier aircraft are shown
in Table 1

- 1. The first column shows the airplane group. The second column shows the 2 011

ma rket value values.94 Appendix 3: Airport Groupings

Since the FAA chose to analyze various alternatives based on classifications not defined
in current part 139 (e.g., hubs or international status instead of AOC class), it relied on the best currently av ailable information to develop the list of affected airports under each combination. To identify those airports classified as L arge, M edium, or S mall hubs, the FAA relied on the
2011

- 2015 NPIAS , current at the time of this analysis. The FAA’s use of the term hub airport is
different from that of airlines, which use it denote an airport with significant connecting traffic by one or more carriers. The FAA defines large hubs as those airports that each account for 1 percent or more of total U.S. passenger e nplanements. Medium hubs are defined in statute as airports that each account for between 0.25 percent and 1 percent of total U.S. passenger enplanements. Small hubs are defined as airports that enplane 0.05 percent to 0.25 percent of total U.S. passenge r enplanements. Similarly, the FAA relied on annual operations data reported by airport through FAA
Form 5010

- 1, Airport Master Record to obtain those airports with over 100,000 operations . The
FAA relied on data obtained from the CBP and Title 19 CFR § § 101.3, 122.13, 122.14, and
122.15
, to identify certificated airports authorized to accept international traffic.95969798991001011021031041051061071081091 10111112113114115116 Appendix 4: Benefits117118

FAA Wildlife Strike Database , Wildlife119

Aviation Accident/Incident Database , AIDS120

Aviation Safety Reporting System, ASRS121

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA122

Runway Incursion Database, RI123 Appendix 5 : Pilot Study Participant Breakout

Pilot Study Participants by Part 139 AOC C lass

Class I Class II Class III Class IV

First and Second Study 20 3 2 6

Proof of Concept 2 0 0 1
Implementation Study 11 1 0 2

Pilot Study Participants by NPIAS Category

Large Hub Medium

Hub Small

Hub Non

- Hub Commercial

Service Reliever General Avi ation

First and Second Study 5 6 4 9 1 4 2

Proof of Concept 1 0 0 1 0 1 0

Implementation Study 3 4 1 4 0 1 1

Pilot Study Participants by International Categorization

International Not International
First and Second Study 20 11
Proof of Concept 1 2
Implementation Study 8 6124 Appendix 6 : Compilation of Pilot Study Documen t ation

Publications
Airports Cooperative Research Program. (2009). ACRP Report 1, Safety Management Systems for Airports, Volume 2: Guidebook . Washington, DC: Transportation Rese arch Board.
Airports Cooperative Research Program. (2012). ACRP Synthesis 37, Lessons Learned from Airport Safety Management Systems Pilot Studies . Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board.
Airports Cooperative Research Program. (2014). ACRP Synt hesis 58, Safety Reporting Systems at Airports . Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board.
Airports Cooperative Research Program. (2015). ACRP Report 131, A Guidebook for Safety Risk Management for Airports . Washington, DC: Transportation Researc h Board.
Airports Cooperative Research Program. (2013). Legal Issues Related to Developing Safety Management Systems and Safety Risk Management at U.S. Airports, Legal Research Digest 19

. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board.

Federal Aviation Administration. (2008). Airport SMS Pilot Project 1 Findings. Presentation to the AAAE/MITRE/ACI

- NA Safety Management System for Airports Conference, available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/external/pilot_studies/medi a/1st_sms_pilot_present.pdf

. Federal Aviation Administration. (2011). Report on Airport Safety Management Sys tems (SMS) Pilot Studies, available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/media/smsPilotTechReport May2 011.pdf

. Federal Aviation Administration. (2012). Part 139 Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation Study: November 2011 Roundtable Meeting Summary, available at http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/external/pilot_studies/medi a/part139SMSImplementationStudyRoundtable.pdf

. Individual Airport SMS Documents

Availabl e at http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_safety/safety_management_systems/external/pilot_studies/docu mentation/

Austin

- Bergstrom Intl , TX

– Statement of Work, Gap Analysis, Draft SMS Manual, SMS Manual, SRM Training Presentation, SRM Decision Report Template

Baltimore

- Washington Intl, MD

– SMS Manual125

Boeing Field, WA

– SMS Manual
Cheyenne Regional, WY

– Draft Risk Matrix Definition, Dra ft Risk Analysis and Assessment Guidance, SRM Process, November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Concord Regional, NC

– SMS Implementation Plan, Gap Analysis, Draft SMS Manual, SMS Manual, Management Commitment (Safety Policy)

Dallas

- Fort Worth Intl, TX

– Statement of Work, November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation

Detroit Metro

- Wayne County, MI

– Gap Analysis, SMS Manual
Dubuque Regional, IA

– SMS Manual Volume 1, SMS Manual Volume 2, November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Fort Worth Alliance, TX

– Gap Analysis

Hartsfield

- Jackson Atlanta Intl, GA

– Implementation Study Findings, Implementation Pilot Study Final Report
Indianapolis Intl, IN

– November 2011 SMS Implementa tion Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Jacksonville Intl, FL

– Gap Analysis, Implementation Study, SMS Manual, November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Kona Intl at Keahole, HI

– Gap Analysis, SMS Management Plan, SMS Manu al
Ohio State University Airport, OH

– November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Pittsburgh Intl, PA

– November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Sacramento Intl, CA

– Gap Analysis, Gap Analysis Matr ix, Injury and Illness Prevention Plan
San Antonio Intl, TX

– November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Santa Maria Public, CA

– Gap Analysis, SMS Draft Management Plan, SMS Manual

Seattle

- Tacoma Intl, WA

– Assurance Plan, Data Collection and System Review, Minimum Standards, Non

- Punitive Program and Legal Authority, SMS Roles and Responsibilities, Safety Policy Guide, Self

Inspection Program, Training and Orientation, November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Pr esentation
South Bend Regional, IN

– Monthly Progress Reports, Safety Risk Assessment Report, Safety Risk Assessment Documentation, November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation126

Southern Illinois, IL

– Gap Analysis, Risk Matrix, SM S Manual, Safety Risk Assessment, November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation
Talladega Municipal, AL

– Gap Analysis, SMS Manual
Tallahassee Regional, FL

– November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation

To ledo Express, OH

– November 2011 SMS Implementation Study Roundtable Meeting Presentation