UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

MARAS BOJAJ, 

 Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-cv-13262 

 v. DISTRICT JUDGE GEORGE CARAM STEEH 

COMMISSIONER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

_________________________/ 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Maras Bojaj seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security’s determination that he is not entitled to social security benefits for his physical and 

mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 18) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 19). Plaintiff has also filed a response to Defendant’s Motion. (Docket no. 21.) The 

motions have been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Docket no. 4.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a 

hearing pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and 

Recommendation. 

I. RECOMMENDATION

 For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 18) be GRANTED IN PART and Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 19) be DENIED. It is further recommended that this matter be remanded 

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pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for proper consideration and discussion of Dr. 

Chung’s March 10, 2012 opinion in accordance with the treating physician rule, and a 

reevaluation of the other medical opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental RFC in light of the 

reassessment of Dr. Chung’s opinion. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 

with a protective filing date of November 7, 2011, alleging that he has been disabled since July 

23, 2009, due to severe depression, hypertension, asthma, and schizophrenia. (TR 141-42, 153, 

157.) The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s claims initially on January 17, 2012, 

and again upon reconsideration on March 26, 2012. (TR 64-76.) Plaintiff subsequently 

requested a de novo hearing and amended his alleged onset date to December 1, 2009. (TR 84, 

198-99.) On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a representative and testified at the 

hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Timothy C. Scallen. (TR 33-63.) In a February 

20, 2013 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because he was 

capable of performing his past relevant work as well as a significant number of jobs in the 

national economy. (TR 19-28.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision (TR 

6-10), and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed cross 

motions for summary judgment, which are currently before the Court. 

III. HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE

Plaintiff (docket no. 18 at 4-10), Defendant (docket no. 19 at 4-8), and the ALJ (TR 23-

27) each set out a detailed, factual recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record and the 

hearing testimony. Having conducted an independent review of Plaintiff’s medical record and 

the hearing transcript, the undersigned finds that there are no material inconsistencies between 

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these recitations of the record. Therefore, the undersigned will incorporate these factual 

recitations by reference. Additionally, the undersigned will include comments and citations to 

the record as necessary throughout this Report and Recommendation. 

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

alleged onset date of December 1, 2009, and that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe 

impairments: asthma and major depressive disorder. (TR 21.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff 

suffered from non-severe impairments of minimal degenerative joint disease of the shoulder, 

degenerative disc disease, and hypertension controlled with medication. (TR 21-22.) Next, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of an 

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (TR 22-23.) The ALJ then 

found that Plaintiff had the following RFC: 

[C]laimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at 

all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: frequent 

climbing of stairs and ramps; frequent climbing of ropes, ladders and scaffolds; 

frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling; avoid concentrated exposure 

to unprotected heights, moving machinery; avoid even moderate exposure to 

extreme hot and cold, as well as dust, fumes and gasses; simple routine repetitive 

tasks[,] no interaction with the public, occasional interaction with coworkers. 

(TR 23-26.) Subsequently, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was capable of performing his past relevant work as a machine operator and a significant number 

of other jobs in the national economy. (TR 26-27.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not 

disabled under the Social Security Act at any time from December 1, 2009, through the date of 

the ALJ’s decision. (TR 27-28.) 

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V. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting 

that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which 

the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”).

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B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant 

past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding 

“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to 

perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 

1987). This “substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in 

response to a hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the 

claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] 

(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

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evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter 

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the 

decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is 

reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 

WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). 

 Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be reversed and remanded for further 

consideration under sentence four because “the ALJ’s opinion weight analysis and 

accompanying credibility determination” were improper. (Docket no. 18 at 2, 11-18.) 

 1. The ALJ’s Assessment of the Medical Opinions 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred because he never mentioned Plaintiff’s treating 

psychiatrist, Dr. Tai Chung, M.D., by name and did not consider any of the regulatory factors or 

cite to objective medical evidence in rejecting Dr. Chung’s opinion. (Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiff 

further argues in his Response to Defendant’s Motion that the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Chung’s 

opinion was highly conclusory in violation of the explanatory requirement of the treating source 

rule. (Docket no. 21 at 2-3.) 

It is well settled that the opinions of treating physicians are generally accorded substantial 

deference. In fact, the ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion complete deference if it is 

supported by clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence and it is not inconsistent with the other 

substantial evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). When an ALJ 

determines that a treating source’s medical opinion is not controlling, he must determine how 

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much weight to assign that opinion in light of several factors: (1) length of the treatment 

relationship and the frequency of examination; (2) nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship; (3) supportability of the opinion; (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a 

whole; (5) specialization of the treating source; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). 

 There is no per se rule that requires an articulation of each of the six regulatory factors 

listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

11-CV-11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2012) (citing Tilley v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010)). An ALJ’s failure to discuss the requisite 

factors may constitute harmless error (1) if “a treating source's opinion is so patently deficient 

that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the opinion 

of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or (3) “where the 

Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural safeguard of 

reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation.” Nelson v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 

F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

 The Commissioner requires its ALJs to “always give good reasons in [their] notice of 

determination or decision for the weight [they] give [a] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Those good reasons must be “supported by the evidence in 

the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the 

weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that 

weight.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). The 

district court should not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has failed to identify the 

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weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and provide good reasons for that weight. See 

Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court has made clear that ‘[w]e do not 

hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given 

to a treating physician's opinion and we will continue remanding when we encounter opinions 

from ALJ's that do not comprehensively set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a treating 

physician's opinion.”) (citing Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009)). 

Dr. Chung, a psychiatrist with Macomb County Community Mental Health, treated 

Plaintiff for his mental impairments from December of 2010 through September of 2012. (TR 

225-69, 325-88.) The parties do not dispute that Dr. Chung was Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. 

On March 10, 2012, Dr. Chung completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire 

regarding Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations. (TR 350-53.) Dr. Chung diagnosed Plaintiff 

with moderate to severe recurring depression and opined that his prognosis was fair with 

treatment. He also identified several of Plaintiff’s symptoms, including apathy, suicidal 

thoughts, persistent disturbances of mood and affect, difficulty thinking or concentrating, 

emotional withdrawal or isolation, and impaired memory. Dr. Chung then opined that Plaintiff 

was unable to meet competitive standards in fifteen of the sixteen categories of mental abilities 

and aptitudes needed to perform unskilled work, such as remembering, understanding, and 

carrying out short and simple instructions; maintaining attention and regular attendance; 

completing a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically-based 

symptoms; and dealing with work stress or changes in a routine work setting. 

In his decision, the ALJ briefly summarized Dr. Chung’s treatment records and provided 

the following assessment of Dr. Chung’s opinion: 

[A]lthough two separate mental residual functional capacity assessments were 

completed and submitted into evidence, the undersigned gives little weight to 

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either one because both assessments are far too extreme in their limitations and 

wholly inconsistent with the overall medical evidence. In fact, each assessment 

opined that the claimant has either no useful ability to function or is unable to 

meet competitive standards in every category of unskilled work. Such limitations 

are much more extreme than those indicating in any other treatment records. As 

such, the undersigned gives little weight to the assessments (Exhibit 10F/26 and 

12F).1

(TR 25.) 

The ALJ’s generic assessment of Dr. Chung’s opinion does not comply with the treating 

physician rule. Of particular concern is that nowhere in the ALJ’s decision does the ALJ note or 

acknowledge that Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Chung for several months; in fact, Dr. Chung is not 

mentioned anywhere in the ALJ’s decision by name or otherwise. Accordingly, it is not clear 

whether the ALJ considered, or even recognized, that one of the mental residual functional 

capacity assessments that he ultimately rejects was the treating-source opinion of Dr. Chung, 

Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist. This lack of clarity in the ALJ’s assessment is further evidenced 

by the ALJ’s failure to analyze the regulatory factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) 

in determining the weight to give to Dr. Chung’s opinion or to provide good reasons for his 

decision to accord it little weight. Remand is warranted on this basis. 

Defendant argues that the ALJ did not err in his consideration of Dr. Chung’s opinion 

because Dr. Chung’s opinion is inconsistent with his treatment notes, is inconsistent with the 

opinions of the state agency consultative psychologist and the state agency reviewing 

psychologist, and is of little evidentiary value because it mostly consists of check-marked 

answers to form-based questions. (Docket no. 19 at 9-15.) Defendant’s argument is inapposite, 

as the ALJ made no such findings, and it is the ALJ’s determination that is in question, not 

Defendant’s post-hoc rationalization. See Christephore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-13547, 

 

1

 The other mental RFC assessment to which the ALJ refers was completed by Samuel Klein, M.D., of Macomb 

County Community Mental Health on January 24, 2013. (TR 389-93.) 

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2012 WL 2274328, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2012) (Roberts, J.) (“[I]t is not the Court’s job to 

conduct a de novo review of the evidence or to rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision. The Court must 

ensure both that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and that his decision is supported by 

substantial evidence. Moreover, it is the ALJ’s rationale that is under review, not defense 

counsel’s.”). Thus, Defendant’s post-hoc rationalization cannot cure the strong presumption that 

the ALJ did not assess Dr. Chung’s opinion as that of a treating source. Additionally, the 

circumstances necessary under Nelson for the ALJ’s error to be rendered harmless do not exist 

here. See Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 407-08, 409 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, 

it is recommended that this matter be remanded for proper consideration and discussion of Dr. 

Chung’s March 10, 2012 opinion in accordance with the treating physician rule. While such an 

order may ultimately be an exercise in formality, such a discussion is necessary for the Court to 

engage in meaningful appellate review. 

Next, Plaintiff asserts that, instead of relying on Dr. Chung’s opinion, the ALJ incorrectly 

accorded significant weight to the opinions of the non-examining State agency doctors, Jerry 

Csokasy, Ph.D., who made the initial disability determination, and William McCollum, M.D., 

who reviewed and affirmed the initial disability determination. (Docket no. 18 at 17-18; TR 64-

76, 274.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reliance on these opinions is problematic because they 

are not based on review of the complete case record, particularly Dr. Chung’s treatment notes 

and opinion. (Docket no. 18 at 17-18; docket no. 21 at 4 (citing Blakely, 581 F.3d at 409; Fisk v. 

Astrue, 253 F. App’x 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2007).) Apparently, Dr. Csokasy only had access to Dr. 

Chung’s treatment notes through November 2011; he did not have access to Dr. Chung’s 

treatment notes dated December 2011 through September 2012, or to Dr. Chung’s March 10, 

2012 opinion. (TR 65-66, 68.) Dr. McCollum presumably had access to the same record 

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evidence as Dr. Csokasy, but this is not specified in the record. Nevertheless, the ALJ found that 

their opinions were consistent with the entire record, including all of Dr. Chung’s treatment 

notes, and afforded them significant weight. (TR 25-26.) The ALJ made this finding, however, 

without properly evaluating Dr. Chung’s opinion as that of a treating source. Accordingly, upon 

remand, once the ALJ has properly reassessed Dr. Chung’s opinion, the ALJ should then 

reevaluate the other medical opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental RFC, including those of the 

state agency doctors, in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and SSR 96-6p. 

2 The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility2

Lastly, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination. (Docket no. 18 at 14-18.) 

“[A]n ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight 

and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness’s 

demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Comm’r, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). But 

credibility assessments are not insulated from judicial review. Despite the deference that is due, 

such a determination must nevertheless be supported by substantial evidence. Id. An ALJ’s 

credibility determination must contain “specific reasons . . . supported by the evidence in the 

case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any 

subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the 

reasons for that weight.” SSR 96–7p. “It is not sufficient to make a conclusory statement that 

‘the individual’s allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not) 

credible.’” Id. “[T]he adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s allegations 

to be credible” and may also find the statements credible to a certain degree. Id.

 

2

 Although the ALJ’s credibility assessment may change upon remand, the undersigned will address the ALJ’s 

current credibility assessment. 

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 Further, to the extent that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements are not substantiated 

by the objective medical evidence in the record, the Regulations explicitly provide that “we will 

not reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or 

about the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work solely because the available 

objective medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2), 

416.929(c)(2). The ALJ must consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, 

duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s pain or other symptoms, (3) precipitating and 

aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken 

to alleviate pain or other symptoms, (5) treatment, other than medication, for symptom relief, (6) 

any measures used to relieve the symptoms, and (7) functional limitations and restrictions due to 

the pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3); see also Felisky v. 

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying these factors). 

 Here, the ALJ considered and discussed Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and other subjective 

complaints in conjunction with the record evidence, and he found that Plaintiff’s allegations were 

not entirely credible. (TR 23-26.) In reaching this determination, the ALJ reasoned that the 

objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s allegations, even though Plaintiff may 

have minimized or was not totally forthcoming with his issues. For example, the ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff’s medical records documented trouble with memory and paranoia, but not of a disabling 

nature. Additionally, the ALJ pointed out Plaintiff’s stated abilities to drive, shop, handle 

money, socialize, and function without reminders. The ALJ also acknowledged that Plaintiff had 

been receiving treatment from Macomb County Community Mental Health since December 

2010 and that he repeatedly presented for treatment as alert, tidy, pleasant, engaging, and in no 

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apparent distress. The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff’s depression medication caused dizziness, 

but Plaintiff’s symptoms admittedly improved with the medication. 

As discussed above, the ALJ provided specific reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s 

credibility in his decision, many of which apply the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1529(c)(3). Thus, the ALJ’s decision is sufficiently specific to make clear to Plaintiff and to 

the Court the weight that he gave to Plaintiff’s statements and the reasons for that weight. The 

ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility is supported by substantial evidence and should not be 

disturbed; Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied in this regard. 

VI. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated herein, the Court should GRANT IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (docket no. 18) and DENY Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 19). This matter should be remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

for proper consideration and discussion of Dr. Chung’s March 10, 2012 opinion in accordance 

with the treating physician rule, and a reevaluation of the other medical opinions regarding 

Plaintiff’s mental RFC in light of the reassessment of Dr. Chung’s opinion. 

REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but must act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided 

for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with 

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specificity will not preserve all objections that a party might have to this Report and 

Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to Rule 72.1(d)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan, a copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. 

 Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the 

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than five (5) pages in length 

unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the Court. The response shall address 

specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections. 

Dated: October 19, 2015 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon counsel 

of record on this date. 

 

Dated: October 19, 2015 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager

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