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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEPHEN HOEFT,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 14-13970

HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant.

 /

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [#12]

I. BACKGROUND

On October 15, 2014, Plaintiff Stephen Hoeft (“Hoeft”) filed a Complaint 

against Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) alleging Violations of the 

American With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Michigan Persons with 

Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”) (Count I), and Retaliation in Violation 

of Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (“WDCA”) (Count II). 

(Doc # 1) Ford filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 22, 2015. (Doc # 

12) The Motion was fully briefed. (Docs # 14-21) The Court held a hearing on 

November 18, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN 

PART AND DENIES IN PART Ford’s Motion.

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Hoeft began working for Ford as an assembler, hi-lo driver, and repairman at 

the Saline plant in 1994. In 2002, Hoeft sustained a back injury requiring two 

surgeries in 2002 and 2004. Each time he had a surgery he filed for worker’s 

compensation. In 2008, Hoeft was transferred to the Dearborn truck plant to work 

as a floor associate. On November 5, 2008, Hoeft sustained another back injury

while on the job, requiring him to go on medical leave from November 2008 

through May 2010. On May 24, 2010, Hoeft returned to work with the following 

restrictions: “no prolonged bending and twisting, no lifting over 25 pounds, and a 

sit and stand option.” (Doc # 14) 

Due to his restrictions, Hoeft was unable to perform his job as a floor 

associate, and he was given a plant greeter position. The greeter position 

accommodated Hoeft’s restrictions, and he continued to receive his regular hourly 

rate of pay and maintained his “floor associate” classification. In early 2011, Hoeft 

took approximately nine months of medical leave for various reasons. The greeter 

position was eliminated in 2011. Hoeft was then assigned a job in the Human 

Resources (“HR”) department as a clerk doing data entry, filing, making copies,

and assisting with mail delivery and supplies. The clerical position accommodated 

Hoeft’s restrictions, and he continued to receive his regular hourly rate of pay and 

maintained his “floor associate” classification. Ford claims that this position was 

created specifically to accommodate Hoeft. 

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According to a Declaration of Steve Wilcox (“Wilcox”), Labor Relations 

Manager at the Dearborn plant, and the deposition testimony of Jenny Torony 

(“Torony”), HR Manager at the Dearborn plant, in 2013, Ford’s finance 

department instructed the Dearborn plant to remove 167 positions, two of which 

had to be removed from the HR department, as part of a budgetary rebalancing 

task. (Doc # 12-3, Pg ID 250; Doc # 17, Pg ID 347-48) Wilcox and Torony assert 

that they decided to eliminate two light-duty clerical positions that had been 

created to allow employees who could not perform their regular duties to work and 

earn a full paycheck because these positions were not necessary to the functioning 

of the HR department. (Doc # 12-3, Pg ID 251) 

Wilcox and Torony decided to eliminate Hoeft’s position and T.G.’s 

position. T.G. was an hourly employee with restrictions that were not due to a 

work-related injury. Id. There was another light-duty position that was not 

eliminated, which was occupied by P.R.. Id. P.R. was an hourly employee who 

had been injured in a fall at work and also had work restrictions. Id. P.R. had been 

working in this position since 2010, and Ford maintains that the duties that P.R.

was performing provided more value to Ford than the duties that Hoeft and T.G. 

were performing. Id. at 251-52. Ford claims that Wilcox and Torony made the 

decision to eliminate these two positions in the first quarter or early in the second 

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quarter of 2013, and that they set an approximate date of April 15, 2013 for Hoeft’s 

position to be eliminated. Id. at 252. 

Torony became Hoeft’s supervisor in mid-January 2013. Hoeft filed for 

medical leave due to depression in April 2013. Ford contested whether his 

depression was work-related. As a result of the dispute, Hoeft hired an attorney 

and filed a worker’s compensation claim in June 2013. From April 2013 to August 

2013, Hoeft was on leave. In August 2013, Hoeft attempted to return to work, at 

which time Torony informed him that there was no work available for him in the 

HR department. Hoeft claims that Torony told him on August 6, 2013 that she had 

no work for him because he made a false worker’s compensation claim against her 

that he got hurt in HR. (Doc # 16, Pg ID 329) 

Hoeft was placed back on leave on August 7, 2013, which is what his doctor 

had ordered prior to him attempting to return to work. Hoeft is currently on 

medical leave, has continued to receive worker’s compensation benefits, and is 

eligible to return to work at Ford if there is a job available that meets his 

restrictions.

Hoeft claims that Ford violated the ADA and PWDCRA when it eliminated 

his clerical position despite the fact that he had been cleared to work after Ford 

ordered him to undergo an independent medical evaluation in August 2013. Hoeft 

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further claims that Ford retaliated against him in violation of the WDCA for hiring

an attorney and filing a worker’s compensation claim in June 2013. 

Ford argues that it did not violate the ADA or PWDCRA because it created 

Hoeft’s clerical position to temporarily accommodate Hoeft’s restrictions, 

something not required under the ADA or PWDCRA. Ford further argues that it 

did not violate the WDCA because the decision to eliminate Hoeft’s position was 

made at least a month before Hoeft hired an attorney to help him with his worker’s 

compensation claim. Ford maintains that it has reasonably accommodated Hoeft 

since 2008, that it had a legitimate reason for eliminating his clerical position, and 

that there is no evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory animus against Hoeft.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 250-57 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the case 

based on the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact 

is genuine if on review of the evidence, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the 

nonmoving party. Id. 

The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

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If the movant meets this burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the 

pleadings and . . . designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial.” Id. at 324. The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the 

nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that party’s 

case. See Muncie Power Prods., Inc. v. United Tech. Auto., Inc., 328 F.3d 870, 

873 (6th Cir. 2003). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of 

the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the 

jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

“Conclusory allegations do not create a genuine issue of material fact which 

precludes summary judgment.” Johari v. Big Easy Restaurants, Inc., 78 Fed. 

App’x 546, 548 (6th Cir. 2003).

When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the 

evidence and all inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 

1986). The Court “need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider 

other materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court’s function at 

the summary judgment stage “is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth 

of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Failure to Accommodate Claim

Hoeft argues that Ford failed to reasonably accommodate him by not 

maintaining him in a light-duty clerical position. Hoeft claims that his clerical 

position was permanent and not temporary. He further claims that this 

accommodation was still possible in August 2013 and would not have created an 

undue burden for Ford. 

Ford argues that it reasonably accommodated Hoeft for years, granting him 

medical leave totaling nearly five years since November 2008, as well as providing 

him with light-duty work that comported with his medical restrictions when such 

work was available. Ford further argues that Hoeft’s clerical position was lightduty “make work” created especially for Hoeft in order to accommodate his 

restrictions, and Ford was not obligated to continue this accommodation 

indefinitely when such an accommodation would not have been required under the 

ADA or PWDCRA in the first place.

The ADA and PWDCRA “share the same purpose and use similar 

definitions and analyses,” and Michigan courts “have relied on the ADA in 

interpreting the PWDCRA.” Chiles v. Mach. Shop, Inc., 238 Mich. App. 462, 472 

(1999). For purposes of this Motion, the analysis under each is the same.

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“[C]laims premised upon an employer’s failure to offer a reasonable 

accommodation necessarily involve direct evidence (the failure to accommodate) 

of discrimination.” Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 

2007). When the plaintiff bases his claim upon direct evidence, the Sixth Circuit 

analyzes the claim under the following framework:

(1) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he or she is 

disabled. (2) The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that he or 

she is “otherwise qualified” for the position despite his or her 

disability: (a) without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an 

alleged “essential” job requirement eliminated; or (c) with a proposed 

reasonable accommodation. (3) The employer will bear the burden of 

proving that a challenged job criterion is essential, and therefore a 

business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an 

undue hardship upon the employer.

Id. at 869. “In performing a reasonable-accommodation analysis under the ADA, 

it is the plaintiff’s duty to propose an accommodation that is objectively reasonable 

to employers generally, and then the burden shifts to the employer to show that the 

accommodation would impose an undue burden with regard to the specific 

situation.” Wardia v. Justice & Pub. Safety Cabinet Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 509 

Fed. App’x 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2013). 

A “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA may include “reassignment 

to a vacant position.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (emphasis added). However,

the ADA does not require an employer to displace a co-worker in order to 

accommodate a disabled worker. Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 

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(6th Cir. 1998). Where the plaintiff claims that he should have been 

accommodated by reassignment to another position, the plaintiff must identify the 

specific job he seeks and demonstrate that he is qualified for that position. 

VeuCausovic v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-15488, 2013 WL 317937, at *7 (E.D. 

Mich. Jan. 28, 2013).

“The ADA does not require an employer to create a new position to 

accommodate a disabled worker or . . . create a permanent light-duty post when 

none previously existed.” Brown v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., 14 Fed. App’x 

482, 488 (6th Cir. 2001). Employers are not obligated to convert a temporary

light-duty position created for a recuperating employee into a permanent position. 

Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 730 (6th Cir. 2000); see 

also Breier v. ITT Auto., Inc., 98 Fed. App’x 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that 

employer is not required to make light-duty position it created into permanent 

position); Norsworthy v. Kroger Co., 202 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that 

employer is not required to keep employee in a specially-created, temporary 

position indefinitely). As the court explained in VeuCausovic,

[t]hat Defendant Ford accommodated Plaintiff . . . by first placing him 

on a number of paid leaves of absence and then finding a light-duty 

clerical job for him in its accounting office, which he held for eight 

years, does nothing to establish Plaintiff’s current ADA claim. While 

an employer should show patience when an employee first falls sick, 

if an employer bends over backwards to accommodate a disabled 

worker[,] it must not be punished for its generosity by being deemed 

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to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching an 

accommodation.

VeuCausovic, 2013 WL 317937, at *6.

Hoeft has not met his burden to demonstrate a reasonable accommodation 

that would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his employment, 

“including the existence of a vacant positon for which he is qualified.” Selecki v. 

Gen. Motors, No. 13-CV-11300, 2015 WL 1286961, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 

2015) (internal quotations omitted). Even assuming, without deciding, that Hoeft’s 

clerical position was permanent and not temporary “make work,” Hoeft has failed 

to come forward with any evidence showing that Ford had an available clerical 

position in August 2013. At his deposition, Hoeft testified that he was unaware of 

any available position at Ford that he could perform, and that he hadn’t done 

anything to obtain a job in a different Ford plant. (Doc # 12-2, Pg ID 160) Hoeft 

points to two positions, but both were occupied by other employees, P.R. and 

Team Leader Tom Buchanan. Ford was not required to displace P.R. or Buchanan 

in order to further accommodate Hoeft. Torony testified that she was not aware of 

any available positions in August 2013. (Doc # 21-3, Pg ID 498) She also 

testified that Hoeft’s case was considered on more than one occasion at monthly 

case management meetings for the purpose of attempting find work for him within 

his restrictions. Id. at 500-01, 504.

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Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hoeft, Ford 

accommodated Hoeft with nearly five years of paid leave and light-duty greeter 

and clerical positions when available. It is undisputed that Ford continues to 

accommodate Hoeft with medical leave in lieu of termination, and Hoeft is eligible 

to return to work if there is a job available that meets his restrictions. “[A] leave of 

absence constitutes a reasonable accommodation.” Selecki, 2015 WL 1286961, at 

*5 (citing Tubbs v. Formica Corp., 107 Fed. App’x 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2004)).

The Court grants Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the failure to 

accommodate claim.

B. Disability Discrimination Claim

Hoeft seems to also argue that the decision to eliminate his light-duty 

position constituted disability discrimination. Ford responds that Hoeft cannot 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that even if he could, Ford had a 

legitimate business reason for eliminating the position—the rebalancing task

during which two HR positions were eliminated due to budgetary constraints.

At the prima facie stage, Hoeft would have to show the following in order 

for this discriminatory discharge claim to survive summary judgment: (1) that he 

is disabled; (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the position with or without 

reasonable accommodation; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment decision; 

(4) that Ford knew or had reason to know if his disability; and (5) that either the 

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position remained open, he was replaced by a non-disabled person, or similarly 

situated non-disabled employees were treated more favorably. See Deister v. AAA 

Auto Club of Michigan, 91 F. Supp. 3d 905, 918 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff’d sub nom.

Deister v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 647 Fed. App’x 652 (6th Cir. 2016).

Hoeft cannot establish the fifth prong of his prima facie case. It is 

undisputed that his clerical position was eliminated and did not remain open. 

Hoeft was not replaced by a non-disabled person. Hoeft has failed to show that 

similarly situated non-disabled employees were treated more favorably. Hoeft 

points only to P.R. and claims that P.R. was treated more favorably because he was 

given and allowed to remain in a clerical position similar to Hoeft’s. P.R., 

however, is also disabled; like Hoeft, P.R. had been previously injured on the 

job—a fact that Hoeft acknowledges and is undisputed. 

The Court grants Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment on any disability 

discrimination claim.

C. Retaliation Claim

Hoeft claims that Ford retaliated against him by eliminating his clerical 

position and placing him on a “no work available” status after he hired an attorney 

in June 2013 to help him with his worker’s compensation claim. 

Ford argues that Hoeft cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation 

because the decision to eliminate his position was made at least a month before 

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Hoeft allegedly hired his attorney. Ford further argues that, even if Hoeft has 

established a prima facie case, Ford had a legitimate reason for eliminating the 

light-duty clerical position. Ford asserts that Hoeft has presented no evidence that 

this legitimate reason is a pretext.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Michigan’s Worker’s 

Disability Compensation Act (“WDCA”), an employee who has suffered a workrelated injury must present evidence showing that: (1) the employee asserted a 

right to worker’s compensation benefits, (2) the employer knew that the employee 

asserted his right to worker’s compensation benefits, (3) the employer took an 

employment action adverse to the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection 

between the plaintiff’s assertion of his right to worker’s compensation benefits and 

the adverse employment action. Dortman v. ACO Hardware, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 

812, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Chiles, 238 Mich. App. at 470.

When a plaintiff circumstantially establishes a rebuttable prima facie case of 

retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its adverse employment action. If the defendant produces a 

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 

the defendant’s reason is a pretext for retaliation. A plaintiff can establish that the 

employer’s proffered reason is pretextual by demonstrating that the reason (1) had 

no basis in fact; (2) was not the actual factor motivating the decision; or (3) was

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insufficient to justify the decision. See Cuddington v. United Health Servs., Inc., 

298 Mich. App. 264, 277 (2012).

Hoeft has established a prima facie showing of retaliation under the WDCA. 

Hoeft suffered from depression, which he claims is work-related, and he filed for 

WDCA benefits for his leave from April 2013 to August 2013 through his attorney

in June 2013. Ford does not dispute that it knew that Hoeft engaged in this 

protected conduct, or that it took an employment action adverse to Hoeft. Ford 

argues instead that Hoeft cannot show that his worker’s compensation claim and 

the elimination of his clerical position are causally connected. 

Ford asserts that the decision to eliminate his position was made at least a 

month before Hoeft allegedly hired his attorney. However, it is undisputed that 

Hoeft was not informed of this decision until August 6, 2013 during the 

conversation with Torony. Hoeft testified that Torony told him that she had no 

work for him because he made a false worker’s compensation claim against her 

that he got hurt in HR. (Doc # 16, Pg ID 329) Torony testified that she could not 

recall whether she discussed Hoeft’s worker’s compensation claim during that 

conversation with him; she only remembered telling him that she had no work for 

him. (Doc # 17, Pg ID 352-53) Torony also testified that she remembers Hoeft 

was on medical leave in April 2013 and remembers there was “some disagreement 

with worker’s comp, whether it was personal or occupational.” Id. at 378-79. She 

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testified that worker’s compensation representative Michalein Robertson had 

provided her with this information. Id. at 379. Torony further testified that there 

exists one “rebalance document that would have the elimination of the positions,” 

id. at 368, but there is nothing further in the record regarding the content or date of 

this document. The Court finds that, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Hoeft, there remains a question of material fact regarding when the 

decision to eliminate Hoeft’s clerical position was made. The Court concludes that 

Hoeft has sufficiently established a causal connection between his worker’s 

compensation claim through his attorney and the elimination of his clerical 

position at this stage, as well as a prima facie showing of retaliation under the 

WDCA. 

Ford has in turn provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for 

eliminating Hoeft’s position. Ford claims that the finance department ordered the 

Dearborn plant to eliminate two positions in HR as part of a budgetary rebalancing 

task affecting 167 positions. Ford points to a comparator, P.R., to show that it kept 

another disabled worker in the HR department because his work added more value 

to the company. 

The Court turns to examining whether Hoeft has sufficiently established that 

Ford’s proffered reason is pretextual. Hoeft argues that Torony’s statement that 

she had no work for him because he made a false worker’s compensation claim 

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against her that he got hurt in HR, along with the context in which it was made, 

raises a genuine issue of material fact as to Ford’s retaliatory motivation. Ford 

argues that Torony’s alleged statement is at most a stray remark that does not 

indicate animus for the exercise of worker’s compensation rights, but rather, for 

false claims. 

In discrimination cases, courts examine statements allegedly showing 

employer bias by considering “whether the comments were made by a decision 

maker or by an agent within the scope of his employment; whether they were 

related to the decision-making process; whether they were more than merely 

vague, ambiguous, or isolated remarks; and whether they were proximate in time 

to the act of termination.” Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1330 

(6th Cir. 1994); see also Rose v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 703 F.2d 225, 227-28

(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 939 (1983), rev’d in part on other grounds 

sub nom. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).

Hoeft testified that Torony told him on August 6, 2013 that she had no work 

for him specifically because he made a false worker’s compensation claim against 

her that he got hurt in HR. (Doc # 16, Pg ID 329) Torony testified that she was 

the one who decided to eliminate Hoeft’s clerical position. (Doc # 17, Pg ID 348) 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hoeft, Torony’s alleged 

comment was made by a decision maker. It was also related to the decision2:14-cv-13970-DPH-MJH Doc # 25 Filed 03/31/17 Pg 16 of 18 Pg ID 567
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making process, since it was allegedly made in the context of Torony explaining 

why she no longer had any work available for Hoeft. Hoeft does not identify any 

other retaliatory statements by Torony or anyone else at Ford, so the alleged 

comment was isolated. Ford claims that the alleged statement at most shows 

animus toward false statements. However, the Court finds that, viewed in the light 

most favorable to Hoeft, the alleged statement communicates that the reason why 

there was no longer any work available for Hoeft was because he made a worker’s 

compensation claim. The alleged statement was made on August 6, 2013, at the 

time that Ford first communicated to Hoeft that the company no longer had work 

available for him. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that a reasonable 

juror could conclude that retaliation was a motive for eliminating Hoeft’s clerical 

position.

The Court denies Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the retaliation

claim.

D. Failure to Engage in Interactive Process Claim and ADA 

Retaliation Claim

In his Response, Hoeft raises the argument that Ford failed to engage in the 

interactive process. Also in his Response, Hoeft asserts an ADA retaliation claim. 

These were not claims asserted in his Complaint, and the Court declines to review 

them. Courts are not required to address allegations first raised in summary 

judgment motions. See City of Columbus, Ohio v. Hotels.com, L.P., 693 F.3d 642, 

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650 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The district court did not err in declining to address [a new] 

claim because it was raised for the first time in response to the [defendants’] 

motion for summary judgment.”)

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc # 12) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART as to the retaliation claim under the Michigan Worker’s Disability

Compensation Act only. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is set for a Final Pretrial 

Conference on June 6, 2017 at 2:00 p.m.. All parties with authority to settle must 

appear at the conference. The Proposed Joint Final Pretrial Order under Local 

Rule 16.2 must be submitted by May 30, 2017.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the jury trial is set for July 11, 2017 at 

9:00 a.m.

Dated: March 31, 2017 s/Denise Page Hood

Chief, U.S. District Court

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of 

record on March 31, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/LaShawn R. Saulsberry

Case Manager

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