J-A18045-18

2018 PA Super 312

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

** Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

v.

JEFFREY PETER THOMPSON,

 Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 4087 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered November 17, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000964-2005

BEFORE: STABILE, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.* and STRASSBURGER, J.**

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 26, 2018

Jeffrey Peter Thompson (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order 

denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

We provide the following background. On October 6, 2006, Appellant 

entered into a negotiated guilty plea agreement, wherein he pleaded guilty to 

one count each of second-degree murder and robbery for murdering sixteenyear-old Gregory Paschall.1

 Appellant was sentenced pursuant to the 

negotiated plea agreement to life in prison without the possibility of parole

(LWOP).

2

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1 Appellant was 37 years old at the time.

2

In exchange for the guilty plea, the Commonwealth agreed not to pursue the 

death penalty.
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Appellant filed pro se his first petition pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, on October 2, 2009. The PCRA 

court appointed counsel, who filed a petition to withdraw pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). The PCRA court granted 

counsel’s petition to withdraw and dismissed that petition as being filed 

untimely. This Court affirmed that decision on January 5, 2011. See 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 23 A.3d 1075 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(unpublished memorandum). On June 20, 2014, Appellant filed a second 

PCRA petition, which was once again dismissed as being filed untimely. This 

Court affirmed that decision on July 31, 2015. See Commonwealth v. 

Thompson, 125 A.3d 466 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum).

On October 20, 2017, Appellant filed pro se a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. In that petition, he claimed that his LWOP sentence violates the Eighth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, 10/20/2017, at 2. Specifically, he relies upon the United States 

Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Id. In 

Miller, the Supreme Court held that the application of LWOP sentences to 
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individuals who were juveniles at the time they committed homicides was 

unconstitutional.3 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479. 

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Appellant recognizes that he 

was not a juvenile at the time he committed the murder, but argues that he 

is an adult offender suffering from a mental disability, and is therefore akin to 

a juvenile, i.e., one who is less culpable in committing a crime. Thus, he 

argues that the Eighth Amendment prevents him from being sentenced to an 

LWOP sentence. Accordingly, Appellant requested that the trial court grant 

him a hearing and find that his “sentence is unconstitutional and his continuing 

confinement illegal.” Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10/20/2017, at 11.

On November 14, 2017, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Before we address Appellant’s claims on appeal, we consider the trial

court’s conclusion that Appellant’s request for relief falls outside the purview 

of the PCRA. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/2018, at 9 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9543(a)(2)(i)) (concluding that because Appellant has not argued that “his 

sentence was illegal at the time it was imposed” or that “there has been a 

violation of the Constitution of the Commonwealth or United States which so 

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3

In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), the United States 

Supreme Court determined that Miller announced a new substantive rule of 

law that applies retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736. 
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undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of 

guilt or innocence could have taken place,” Appellant’s claims fall outside the 

purview of the PCRA).

[B]oth the PCRA and the state habeas corpus statute 

contemplate that the PCRA subsumes the writ of habeas corpus in 

circumstances where the PCRA provides a remedy for the claim. 

... [W]e have held that the scope of the PCRA eligibility 

requirements should not be narrowly confined to its specifically 

enumerated areas of review. Such narrow construction would be 

inconsistent with the legislative intent to channel post-conviction 

claims into the PCRA’s framework, and would instead create a 

bifurcated system of post-conviction review where some postconviction claims are cognizable under the PCRA while others are 

not. 

Instead, this Court has broadly interpreted the PCRA 

eligibility requirements as including within its ambit claims ... 

regardless of the “truth-determining process” language ... from 

[s]ection 9543(a)(2)(i). See Commonwealth v. Liebel, [] 825 

A.2d 630 ([Pa.] 2003) (holding that claim challenging counsel’s 

effectiveness for failing to file a petition for allowance of appeal is 

cognizable under PCRA); Commonwealth ex. rel. Dadario v. 

Goldberg, [] 773 A.2d 126 ([Pa.] 2001) (holding that claim 

alleging counsel’s ineffectiveness during the plea bargaining 

process is cognizable under the PCRA); Commonwealth v. 

Chester, [] 733 A.2d 1242 ([Pa.] 1999) (holding that claim 

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of 

capital case is cognizable under the PCRA); Commonwealth v. 

Lantzy, [736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999)] (holding that claim alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file an appeal is 

cognizable under the PCRA).

Commonwealth v. Hackett, 956 A.2d 978, 985-86 (Pa. 2008) (some 

citations omitted). In other words, the fact that Appellant’s claim here does 

not implicate the truth-determining process does not mean that it could not 

be subject to the PCRA. Instead, the focus of a court considering a petition is 

on the remedy being sought by the petitioner. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6503(b) 
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(“The writ of habeas corpus shall not be available if a remedy may be had by 

post-conviction hearing proceedings authorized by law.”) (emphasis added).

In this case, Appellant is seeking a hearing to determine whether his 

sentence should be reduced or he should be discharged. See Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, 10/20/2017, at 11. Such relief is clearly contemplated by 

the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9546(a) (“If the court rules in favor of the 

petitioner, it shall order appropriate relief and issue supplementary orders as 

to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence or 

other matters that are necessary and proper.”).

Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Commonwealth, see

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7, that the PCRA was the proper vehicle to examine 

this petition. Thus, we now consider Appellant’s petition as a PCRA petition. 

Generally, a PCRA petition must be filed within one year from the 

date a judgment becomes final. There are three exceptions to this 

time requirement: (1) interference by government officials in the 

presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an 

after-recognized constitutional right. When a petitioner alleges 

and proves that one of these exceptions is met, the petition will 

be considered timely. A PCRA petition invoking one of these 

exceptions must be filed within 60 days of the date the claims 

could have been presented. The timeliness requirements of the 

PCRA are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court 

cannot hear untimely petitions. 

Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Because Appellant’s filing is well-outside of the one-year timeframe 

provided in the PCRA, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to entertain 
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Appellant’s petition unless he pleaded and offered proof of one or more of the 

three statutory exceptions to the time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). 

Appellant failed to do so, and therefore the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to 

entertain Appellant’s untimely-filed petition. Based on the foregoing, we 

affirm the order of the PCRA court.4

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/26/2018

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4 “[W]e may affirm the PCRA court’s decision on any basis.” Commonwealth 

v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2014).