IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER,

Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-1778-RCL

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

STATEMENT OF INTEREST 

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK 

Acting Assistant Attorney General 

ERIC WOMACK

Assistant Branch Director 

ZACHARY A. AVALLONE

Trial Attorney 

United States Department of Justice 

Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 

1100 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005 

Tel: (202) 514-2705

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Pursuant to the Court’s December 21, 2020 Order, ECF No. 19, the Department of Justice 

(“Department”) respectfully files this Reply in support of its Statement of Interest (“Reply”) on 

behalf of the United States. 

As the Court noted in its Order, three more Commissioners were confirmed to the Federal 

Election Commission (“the Commission”), bringing the total to six.1 The Commission now has

enough Commissioners to authorize its General Counsel to appear and defend this case or to ask 

the Department of Justice to appear and defend this case on the Commission’s behalf. See 52 

U.S.C. § 30107(a)(6) & (a)(8). Should the Commission seek to appear in this case, the Department 

would defer to the arguments and positions taken by the Commission.

However, because the Court has directed the United States to reply to Plaintiff’s Response 

to the Statement of Interest of the United States of America (“Response”), ECF No. 18, the 

Department respectfully submits this reply in support of its Statement of Interest on behalf of the 

United States.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff Campaign Legal Center (“CLC”) has failed to show that it has suffered a concrete 

and particularized injury traceable to the Commission’s alleged delay in acting on its 

administrative complaint. This is, after all, a case solely about that delay. See Compl. at 2, ECF 

No. 1 . CLC seeks a declaration that the Commission’s delay was unlawful and an order requiring 

the Commission to act on CLC’s administrative complaint. Id. at 14. CLC does not ask the Court 

to rule on the legal arguments of its administrative complaint, does not ask the Court to rule that 

any third party violated the Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. (“FECA”), 

 1 FEC Press Release “Shana Broussard, Sean Cooksey, Allen Dickerson sworn in as 

Commissioners” (Dec. 18, 2020) available at https://www.fec.gov/updates/shana-broussard-seancooksey-allen-dickerson-sworn-commissioners/. 

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and does not seek relief requiring the disclosure of any information. Id. To show standing, CLC 

must therefore demonstrate how the additional time it has taken the Commission to consider its 

administrative complaint has caused it to suffer a concrete and particularized injury. And it must 

show how any alleged harm caused by the purported delay will be remedied by a court ordering 

the Commission to act on CLC’s administrative complaint. Thus, the important question here is 

whether CLC has articulated harm arising from the delay itself. 

CLC’s Response ignores that question entirely. Instead, CLC acts as though the 

Commission has already denied its administrative complaint. As a result, CLC’s Response focuses 

on inapposite authority from cases where the Commission had already dismissed plaintiffs’ 

administrative complaints, where plaintiffs subsequently challenged those dismissals in federal 

court, and where the requested remedy would require disclosure of the sought-after information. 

The difficulty with ignoring the nature of this case as one of delay, rather than denial, is 

that it sheds no light of CLC’s assertion of standing in this specific context. Indeed, CLC seems 

not to contest the fact that the Commission’s delay in taking action on Plaintiff’s administrative 

complaint is insufficient alone to confer standing. Plaintiff does not dispute that under binding 

Circuit precedent, Section 30109(a)(8)(A) “does not confer standing; it confers a right to sue upon 

parties who otherwise already have standing.” Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). Thus, as courts in this Circuit have held, the “FEC’s failure [to] act

within the 120-day period of [§ 30109(a)(8)(A)] . . . did not . . . confer standing.” Judicial Watch, 

Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41, 48 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted).

Since delay alone is not enough to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must plead an actual 

harm from the delay that will be remedied by an order forcing the Commission to act on its 

administrative complaint. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” requires a 

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“concrete and particularized” injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Thus, 

in the present context, to assert an injury from delay sufficient for standing, Plaintiff must show 

concrete and particularized harm arising from an inability to access the sought-after information 

while the Commission considers the administrative complaint. CLC must also show how forcing 

the Commission to consider its complaint is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’” to 

redress any harm from the delay. Id. at 561. 

CLC does not plead any harm arising from the Commission’s delay. While it describes its 

work at a high level, Compl. ¶¶ 8–12, nothing in the complaint describes the harm it has suffered

from waiting for the Commission to act on its administrative complaint. CLC also makes no effort 

to explain how the requested relief of ordering the Commission to act on its administrative 

complaint without knowing how the Commission will ultimately rule would be “likely” to remedy 

any alleged harms—as opposed to “merely ‘speculative[.]’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

2

In another recent case, CLC’s failure to plead harm from delay resulted in dismissal. 

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. FEC, No. 18-CV-0053 (TSC), 2020 WL 2735590, at *2 (D.D.C. May 26, 

2020) appeal docketed, No. 20-5159 (D.C. Cir. June 9, 2020). CLC surprisingly does not attempt

to distinguish that case in its Response even though the parallels are striking. After waiting a year 

for the FEC to act on its administrative complaint, CLC sued the FEC “arguing that the delay 

violated [§ 30109(a)(8)(A)’s] 120-day rule[.]” Id. at *1. The court dismissed the case for lack of 

standing because the delay alone was not sufficient for standing and CLC did not plead any injury 

from the delay. Id. at *2.

 2 While the Statement discussed potential arguments that CLC could have raised about an 

informational injury arising from the delay, Statement at 7, ECF No. 16, CLC’s complaint alleges 

the fact of delay—but no harm—and CLC’s Response does not ask the court to infer any harm 

specifically arising from the alleged delay. If CLC had alleged any harm arising from the delay, 

it must satisfy standing standards described in the Statement. See id.

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CLC does not explain how this current case is any different or requires a different result.

Instead, CLC argues that it “is injured by a denial of its statutory right to information.” Response 

at 6 (emphasis added). But, of course, CLC has not been denied any information—it submitted an 

administrative complaint to the Commission and is waiting for the Commission to act. The 

Commission has not denied or dismissed the administrative complaint. As such, rather than 

“ignor[ing] . . . binding Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit decisions” like FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 

11, 21 (1998) and Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 354 (D.C.

Cir. 2020), the United States did not address them because they do not control the outcome here. 

Response at 6. The courts in those cases analyzed standing after the Commission denied an 

administrative complaint—not where a party filed a lawsuit to spur the Commission into action.

Akins, 524 U.S. at 18 (“The FEC consequently dismissed respondents’ complaint.”); Campaign 

Legal Center and Democracy 21, 952 F.3d at 354 (“The Federal Election Commission dismissed 

three administrative complaints alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act's 

disclosure requirements.”). 

Finally, Plaintiff does not dispute that if it lacks standing, the Court did not have 

jurisdiction to enter judgment against the Commission. Plaintiff here suffered no cognizable 

injury, lacks Article III standing, and is thus not entitled to default judgment. The Court should 

vacate the default judgment and dismiss the case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and those in the Statement of Interest, the Department 

respectfully suggests that plaintiff has failed to establish standing to sue and that the Court should 

vacate its default judgment, dismissing this case in its entirety.

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Dated: January 4, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

JEFFREY BOSSERT CLARK 

Acting Assistant Attorney General 

ERIC WOMACK

Assistant Branch Director 

/s/ Zachary A. Avallone

ZACHARY A. AVALLONE 

(D.C. Bar No. 1023361) 

Trial Attorney 

United States Department of Justice 

Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 

1100 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005 

Tel: (202) 514-2705

Email: zachary.a.avallone@usdoj.gov

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 4, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing document 

with the Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system which will send a notice of electronic 

filing to attorneys who have appeared in this case.

/s/ Zachary A. Avallone

Zachary A. Avallone

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