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S. HRG. 112–87 

TWO NEW SUDANS: A ROADMAP FORWARD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 14, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

FRANK G. LOWENSTEIN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, opening statement .............. 5 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3 

Lyman, Hon. Princeton N., U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, U.S. Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Elnail, Bishop Andudu Adam, Episcopal Bishop of the Diocese of Kadugli, 

Sudan, prepared statement ................................................................................. 30 

Enough Project, prepared statement ...................................................................... 30 

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(1) 

TWO NEW SUDANS: A ROADMAP FORWARD 

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Coons, Udall, Lugar, and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. Thank you all 

very much for being here this morning. 

Ambassador Lyman, it is a great privilege to welcome you back 

to the committee. We appreciate enormously the work that you are 

doing as the President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, and I want to just 

thank you personally. 

I’ve had a chance to see you working in many meetings that we 

have had together there in Sudan, and I have been extraordinarily 

impressed by your steady, calm, tireless commitment to working 

under difficult circumstances to make progress. It’s the essence of 

good diplomacy, and I really congratulate you and thank you. 

I thank the President and the NSC and all of the folks, including 

Secretary Clinton, who have been engaged in this effort. They have 

done a terrific job of laying out a roadmap, living up to it, nurturing the process, and staying committed, when a lot of people 

thought it might have been impossible. 

And I know that 6 months, 9 months ago, even a year ago, when 

we were working with General Gration and yourself, there were a 

lot of doubters as to whether or not a referendum could ever take 

place. And I think that it was the good efforts of a lot of folks who 

came together and stayed steady, and our allies in that effort. The 

Norwegians, others, the British, have been particularly committed 

to this. And I think it shows what can happen when people stay 

focused and put their energy into things. 

So we welcome you here this morning to discuss a remarkable 

and a rare event that took place last week, the birth of a new 

nation, the Republic of South Sudan. 

Six months ago when the referendum that set this in motion I 

had the privilege of being in Juba with you, Ambassador, and others, and General Gration, and it was really impressive. It was a remarkable event. I had the privilege of speaking in the cathedral 

with President Kiir. 

2 

Millions of southern Sudanese stood in line for hours to cast 

their votes for independence. And I remember coming out of one of 

the voting places, and I had a sense of, gosh, some of these people 

are going to walk away, their lines are so long, and they can’t wait 

that long to vote. So I went up to them, and I said, you know, I 

hope you will be patient and wait to vote. And so help me, two or 

three people in good English just turned around to me and said, 

‘‘Senator, we have been waiting for 56 years. We can wait a few 

more hours.’’ They didn’t mind it. 

And last Saturday, as a result, 51⁄2 decades of waiting came to 

an end. And today, even as we are here now having this hearing, 

events are taking place in New York at the United Nations, and 

South Sudan becomes the 193rd member. 

We should recognize, and I know you do, Mr. Ambassador, that 

while only one country is joining the community of nations, the reality is that two nations emerged on July 9—the newly independent South and the greatly changed North. 

Both of these nations are fragile, and they will remain that way 

until they reach an agreement that allows them to live separately 

but work together. 

Sudan and South Sudan share more than a poorly defined border 

and a bloody history. They share traditions of migration that must 

be respected. They share trade routes that need to be reopened. 

And they share a mutual interest in not merely avoiding a return 

to all-out war but in crafting a lasting and genuine peace. 

Abyei is at the heart of this conflict and of any lasting resolution. 

Tomorrow, international peacekeepers will begin to arrive there, 

and I hope that they can pave the way for the return of the tens 

of thousands of displaced Ngok Dinka who call Abyei home, and for 

a resolution that addresses the needs of the Misseriya migrants as 

well. 

Abyei is one crisis point. Southern Kordofan is another. And once 

again, we are hearing chilling reports of serious human rights 

abuses by government forces. There are new and serious allegations of mass graves, shells are falling in the Nuba Mountains, and 

people in need have been cut off from humanitarian relief. 

Sudan must not go down this road again. Southern Kordofan 

needs the United Nations monitoring mission, and both sides need 

to agree and abide by a cease-fire. If atrocities are occurring, they 

must stop and there must be accountability. 

Despite these grave worries, there are also positive signs. Sudan 

was the first country to recognize the South as an independent 

state. And it is worth pausing to acknowledge that fact, not just because it suggests hope for the relationship between North and 

South, but for the relationship between Sudan and the United 

States as well. 

Because of the successful January referendum, President Obama 

initiated a review of Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Completion of that process rests on the review itself, as 

well as the resolution of all the major issues outstanding from the 

comprehensive peace agreement, including Abyei. And obviously, 

this process will not go forward if gross human rights violations are 

taking place. 

3 

Finally, the true transformation of the United States-Sudanese 

relationship runs through Darfur. 

Khartoum needs to reject its recent return to old destructive patterns and recognize that reform can bring with it a new relationship with the international community, including the United 

States. I very much would like to see that happen, but wishful 

thinking will not bring it about. It is actions by the GOS that will 

make that happen. 

We are also entering a new relationship with South Sudan. 

Along with President Salva Kiir, we hope that July 9 will mark, 

as he said, in his words, ‘‘a new beginning of tolerance, unity, and 

love,’’ in which cultural and ethnic diversity can be a source of 

pride and strength, not parochialism and conflict. 

South Sudan bears the scars of wars in many forms, including 

roads, schools, and hospitals that were never built. They provide 

their own sense of permanent scarring. 

It must also overcome internal corruption and internal rebellions. 

But as they have already showed the world, the people of South 

Sudan are capable of rising to the challenge. 

America has stood with the peoples of Sudan throughout these 

struggles. We helped to broker the CPA. We have provided billions 

of dollars in humanitarian assistance. Our representatives, including Ambassador Lyman, are working tirelessly, as I said, to bring 

the parties together. And we must remain involved until there is 

a lasting peace in the region. 

I would remind people that the war that took place there was the 

longest war in Africa’s history, and it cost over 2 million lives. The 

last thing that we want to do is go backward. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in welcoming back to the committee our distinguished 

witness, who has a long record of service to our country and an unsurpassed depth of experience in African affairs. 

On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was declared by 

its elected government to be independent of the Republic of Sudan. 

This is a rare modern milestone and one that follows decades of 

violent oppression and conflict. The people of South Sudan have realized their dream of independence and deserve recognition for the 

sacrifice and commitment they made to achieve it in the face of 

enormous odds. 

The people of the United States, from Government officials to religious and academic communities, to young citizens, have had a 

profound impact in elevating the importance of resolving this 

deadly conflict. There is a prospect for new life and economic and 

social development in South Sudan. 

Nonetheless, violence remains a real prospect for millions along 

the borders of these two newly defined countries. Each country’s respective security forces are continuing to engage in the three disputed areas along their common border, and there remains untold 

suffering, scarcity, and tension within both countries as well. 

4 

It falls to the leaders of each country to acknowledge the challenges and begin to respond fairly and clearly to the needs of the 

people and to build upon an inclusive vision of a stable and productive future. 

The challenges are daunting. Both Sudan and South Sudan represent widely diverse populations with a history of often violent 

competition. Khartoum will continue to govern many regions in the 

north that bridle at the harsh yoke of the Omar al-Bashir government. 

Darfur remains unresolved, a region with millions displaced as 

a result of genocide, and the eastern provinces continue to suffer 

atrocities. In South Sudan, the leaders in Juba must learn how to 

govern and empower a new country with few common ties other 

than a common enemy. 

That enemy will remain a threat, as it was through proxy militias during the decades of war. The prospect of civil war across the 

south looms if the oil becomes a source of intertribal conflict rather 

than the means to build a better country. 

Oil, the primary source of income for both countries, could also 

be a bitter disappointment if, as many experts believe, it is limited 

and diminishing. South Sudan will initially join Sudan near the top 

of the list of the world’s failed states and both must cooperate if 

they are to realize the hope of leaving this ignominious listing. 

While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 achieved the 

independence celebrated last weekend in Juba, there has been little 

progress in concluding the essential agreements between the north 

and south also required by the CPA, such as wealth-sharing and 

border demarcation. The new country has limited governance capacity, weak and nonexistent government institutions, and heavy 

reliance on outside donors. High capital costs limit prospects for 

private investment. 

These factors increase the likelihood of competition among ethnic 

tribes and diminish the odds for near-term stability and growth. 

While the United States should maintain its critical interest in 

a stable and productive South Sudan as well as a more responsible 

and responsive Republic of Sudan, it is evident these countries 

must begin to deliver for themselves. The United States has played 

a prominent role so far, from Senator Danforth’s efforts at concluding the CPA to Secretary Powell’s efforts to stop the genocide 

in Darfur, to Secretary Clinton’s recent direct engagement at the 

U.N. on an Abyei peacekeeper agreement. 

Now the administration must clearly define and limit its responsibilities and expectations associated with a long-term relationship 

with this nascent nation. The heavy burdens that now fall upon the 

people of both Sudans should be tempered, when and where appropriate, by the international community. 

Neighbors like Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda must help integrate 

the new country into the region while balancing emergent threats 

such as the approaching famine in the Horn of Africa and the 

human calamity in Darfur, which still lacks a viable peace process. 

I thank Ambassador Lyman for his decades of dedicated diplomacy. I look forward to hearing from him how the international 

community can assist in this effort across both Sudans and how the 

5 

United States roadmap has worked to date and prospects for its 

continuation. 

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling the hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks a lot, Senator Lugar. 

Normally, we just have the openings of both the Chair and the 

ranking member, but today we are going to make an exception to 

that rule. 

Senator Isakson has taken a great interest in this area, this region, as well as in this issue, and he has taken time to travel there. 

And, therefore, it is my pleasure to recognize Senator Isakson for 

an opening. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I thank the Chair. 

And I want to do two things in particular. First, I want to thank 

Princeton Lyman for his dedicated service to this area and to this 

cause, and acknowledge that in the last 10 years, between the 

Bush administration and the Obama administration, there than 

five special envoys, beginning with Mr. Danforth. And their work 

really has brought about the comprehensive peace agreement, culminating in the peaceful election that took place to create the independent Nation of the South Sudan. And I thank you very much 

for your commitment to that. 

The second thing I wanted to is really acknowledge what the 

chairman said in his remarks with regard to the admonition to the 

North regarding the removal of state-sponsor of terrorism status. 

That is a process that is predicated on good behavior, and it is 

predicated on us being sure that there is no more violence and continuing atrocities taking place in that part of the world. That is an 

important component part of the overall deal that we made to 

bring about a peaceful election, which took place. 

So I thank the Chair very much for pointing that out. I thank 

Princeton Lyman for his service, and I look forward to his testimony today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Isakson. 

Mr. Ambassador, it is our pleasure to welcome you, and I look 

forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PRINCETON N. LYMAN, U.S. SPECIAL 

ENVOY FOR SUDAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry, 

Ranking Member Senator Lugar, two giants of leadership. It is a 

very great privilege to be here. 

Senator Isakson, who has taken such a great interest in Africa 

all the time you have been on this committee, it is really a privilege to be here. Thank you for the very kind words. 

I have to say I have never worked on an issue in which there 

has been so much sustained support from the administration, from 

the President, the Vice President, the National Security Council, 

the Secretary, this committee, people in the House, people in the 

public. It makes an extraordinary amount of difference. 

6 

It’s a high priority for the United States and the United States 

public and all branches of our Government, and that makes a tremendous difference in the work we try to do. 

So thank you very, very much for all you are doing. 

I would like to submit a full statement for the record, if that’s 

all right? 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be placed in the record 

as if read in full. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you. 

I agree that one of the first things to recognize is that one of the 

fundamental objectives of the comprehensive peace agreement was 

for the people of South Sudan to have a choice as to whether to 

stay within one state or separate. They were able to make that 

choice, as you pointed out, in January. And on July 9, they were 

able to achieve their independence. 

And it was an extraordinary event, and it was a privilege for me 

to be there, a very happy event. There must have been over 

100,000 people at that ceremony, and it was quite moving. 

I think all who have been working on this for decades, Senator 

Isakson is quite correct, over many administrations, over many 

people in and out of government, they can take a great deal of satisfaction from what has happened in that regard. 

Nevertheless, as you have all pointed out, the past few months 

have not been free of conflict and they haven’t been free of tension. 

The parties failed to reach agreement before July 9 on some of the 

most important issues that they face to have a full and productive 

relationship. And then we had crises in the disputed area of Abyei, 

as you pointed out, and now an ongoing conflict causing many 

deaths and abuses and displacing over 70,000 people in Southern 

Kordofan. 

We had to focus a lot of our efforts in the last few weeks on those 

two crises to keep them from derailing the entire peace process. So 

the entire relationship between the two countries after July 9 is 

going to be one that is not yet free of tension and not free from the 

threat of future conflict. The next few weeks will be very critical 

in this regard. 

They must follow through, first of all, on the agreement you mentioned, Senator Kerry, on Abyei, an agreement that allows an enhanced peacekeeping force to come into Abyei, mainly of Ethiopian 

troops, and the withdrawal of Sudanese Armed Forces that took 

over Abyei a few weeks ago. 

We can’t have a political solution to Abyei while it’s being occupied by one side militarily. That process is just getting underway, 

and it must be implemented. 

They also have not resolved one of the most important economic 

issues between them, and that is the financial relationships related 

to the oil sector. And I fear that if they don’t come to some resolution by the end of July, we could have a serious confrontation over 

that issue. Threats from each side to shut down the oil flow are not 

helpful, and they only raise the specter of confrontation. 

Now this is a difficult issue for the South to deal with, because 

they see any final resolution of how to share the resources from oil 

as linked to the solution for Abyei and some of the other unresolved issues, and the timetables now are not in sync. 

7 

So what we are urging is that by the end of July, at least they 

reach an interim agreement to keep the oil relationships going and 

set up a very firm timetable on dealing with Abyei and the remaining issues, like disputed border areas. 

They both face problems inside their countries, as you have 

indicated. We are very concerned about the situation in Southern 

Kordofan. 

Fighting broke out there, and as you well know, Southern 

Kordofan is a state in the North. It was heavily involved in the 

civil war. People there fought on the side of the South but they’re 

from Southern Kordofan. And there are elements of the SPLA, the 

Southern People’s Liberation Army, which come from Southern 

Kordofan. And the CPA calls for a political process called popular 

consultations, in which their political rights would be addressed, 

and their grievances. 

Now fighting broke out there June 5 between the Sudanese 

Armed Forces and these SPLA units. The issues are complex. They 

are political. They are security. 

We’re very concerned by very critical allegations of targeted and 

ethnic-based killings and other gross human rights abuses. As you 

said, Senator Kerry, these abuses must end, there must be an investigation, and perpetrators held accountable. 

The two sides on June 28 signed a framework agreement covering both Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. And it is a promising 

agreement in that it provides for talks on both the political and the 

security issues. But unfortunately, President Bashir has now raised 

objections to portions of that agreement, and that puts the negotiations at risk. 

Without those talks, without parallel political as well as security 

talks, the chances of ending the hostilities and reaching the thousands of people in need are, frankly, slim. So we hope these talks 

will resume very shortly. 

In the meanwhile, we call on the Government of Sudan, which 

so far has resisted in allowing for a U.N. presence to remain in 

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, because we need that presence 

not only to monitor what’s happening but to help in humanitarian 

activities. 

Now, the situation in Darfur, which you have all mentioned, remains a very serious problem as well. This week, in fact probably 

today, the Government and one of the armed groups, the Liberty 

and Justice Movement, the LJM, are expected to sign a peace 

agreement or a protocol around the peace agreement. But one other 

major group, JEM, Justice and Equality Movement, is at best on 

the fence, and most of the others did not take part in the Doha 

peace process at all. 

What we have emphasized to the Government of Sudan is that 

signing an agreement with the LJM is a positive step, but it has 

to continue to negotiate and be ready to negotiate with the other 

armed movements. They can’t say, well, now we’ve done it and the 

other armed movements either sign this or they’re outside the 

process. 

We’re also concerned that several of the other armed groups are 

not very interested in Darfur so much as they are interested in 

broad change in Sudan, and are fighting on that basis, which 

8 

makes it almost impossible for them to come and be part of a 

Darfur-based political process. And we have urged them to come to 

the table and negotiate around the issues of Darfur. 

Also, to look ahead, we need to engage the people of Darfur. They 

deserve as much of a right to participate much more greatly in 

determining not only the process of peace, but their future. 

But the conditions aren’t right yet for carrying out a Darfurbased political process. So we have set forth a list of conditions that 

we think are very important to create what we call an enabling environment, so that you can have a Darfur-based process. It means 

lifting the state of emergency; it means freeing political prisoners; 

it means allowing for freedom of movement and expression; better 

for rights for UNAMID, et cetera. And we hope to pursue those 

with the A.U., the U.N., and the Government of Sudan in order to 

make it possible to have such a Darfur-based process. 

Now let me turn to the issue you also all raised, which is our relationships with the Government of Sudan in Khartoum. Sudan 

needs to end its isolation in the international community. It has to 

secure relief from an estimated $38 billion of debt. It has to obtain 

access to the international financial institutions. It has to create an 

environment that will attract private investment. 

None of those things can happen when it’s engaged in constant 

conflict and under sanctions not only from us but from others. 

We have told Khartoum, as you have pointed out, Senator Kerry, 

that we are prepared to help, and we’ve laid out a roadmap to normalize our bilateral relations. And the President followed through 

after the referendum on January 9 to open up some licenses and 

to initiate a process of reviewing Sudan’s designation as a state 

sponsor of terrorism. And that review is continuing. 

But we can’t move forward, as all of you have pointed out, with 

improved bilateral relations, as we have said in the roadmap, if the 

Government of Sudan does not fulfill its obligations from the CPA. 

And that isn’t just the position of the United States. It’s also the 

view of other members of the international community and of international creditors. 

The negotiations, of course, require readiness on the part of both 

parties to take what are often very difficult political decisions. So 

we will be working with both the NCP and the SPLF to encourage 

a commitment to reaching agreement on all outstanding issues as 

soon as possible. 

Now, South Sudan, again as you have all pointed out, faces enormous governance and development challenges. Antigovernment 

militia are causing havoc in parts of the country. And the Government needs to respond, both politically and militarily, to these 

challenges, so that legitimate local or ethnic grievances are not 

ignored. 

There is also a staggering lack of infrastructure and educational 

levels on which to build development. The Government of South 

Sudan will depend heavily on international support as well as its 

own resources to address these challenges. 

We have strong ties of South Sudan, and they go back many decades. And we are committed to continuing that partnership and 

helping them meet those challenges. But we are not going to be 

alone. 

9 

The U.N. is inaugurating a major program helping the Government in a variety of areas. Other donors are coming in, in various 

aspects of economic and security assistance. 

But we’ve told the leaders in Juba that to succeed, they must 

work to build an effective democratic and inclusive government 

that embodies South Sudan’s diversity, respects humans rights, 

and delivers services with transparency and accountability. 

And I’m very pleased that President Kiir in his inaugural address spoke to those very same issues at the ceremony in Juba. 

The challenges ahead are great, but the historic occasion last 

Saturday offers a new beginning for the people of both South 

Sudan and Sudan. And it’s now up to the leaders and people of 

both to turn this moment of promise into lasting peace. 

Over the coming months, the Obama administration’s engagement will be unwavering, and we will be a steadfast partner to all 

those in Sudan and South Sudan who seek a better future of peace 

and prosperity. 

Thank you, and I’m more than happy to answer questions. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PRINCETON LYMAN

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here to discuss the historic 

achievement symbolized by South Sudan’s independence and the opportunities and 

challenges ahead as Sudan and South Sudan seek to define their future relationship 

with each other and the international community. 

I will discuss below the many tasks and challenges that lie ahead. But first we 

should recall that a fundamental objective of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement was to provide the people of southern Sudan a choice whether to continue 

within one country or to separate. The people made that choice in January, voting 

for separation, and the independence of South Sudan was achieved July 9 without 

major conflict and with the recognition of the Government of Sudan. All those, in 

the Congress, among the many public organizations and advocates, the government 

entities and individuals over two administrations, all those who worked for this over 

many years should take pride and joy in this achievement. 

I was in Juba last Saturday for South Sudan’s independence ceremony. It was a 

very moving occasion. As President Obama said in his statement recognizing South 

Sudan, the day reminded us ‘‘that after the darkness of war, the light of a new 

dawn is possible.’’ Tens of thousands of people endured sweltering heat for hours 

to celebrate the birth of their new nation. Sudan was the first country to recognize 

South Sudan’s independence. This was a historic achievement that represents a new 

beginning for the people of South Sudan as well as those of Sudan. 

Mr. Chairman, this achievement was far from inevitable. Just a year ago, the 

peace process between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Movement was stalled. Many doubted whether it would be possible to have an ontime, peaceful referendum for Southern Sudan and whether the Government of 

Sudan would ever accept the results. A return to open conflict seemed very possible. 

During that time, President Obama committed to reenergizing the peace effort, 

and since then, we have intensified our diplomatic engagement with the CPA parties as well as our partners in the African Union, IGAD, Europe and the United 

Nations. The President himself, the Vice President and his entire national security 

team have been involved in this effort around the clock. We are grateful for the support that this committee and you in particular, Mr. Chairman, have given to this 

effort. We also appreciate the efforts that so many Americans have made to keep 

a spotlight on the situation in Sudan. 

Over the last year, the leaders of Sudan and South Sudan have demonstrated 

their capacity to work together on the major task of separation and to overcome 

great odds in their search for peaceful completion of the CPA. Nevertheless, this period has also been marked by armed clashes along the border, a crisis in Abyei, and 

fighting currently under way in the northern state of Southern Kordofan. Several 

critical issues regarding relations between the two states that were to be negotiated 

10 

by July 9 have not been resolved. Thus the situation remains fraught with serious 

threats to peace. The two states must work to rekindle the spirit of cooperation that 

was so evident after the referendum of January 9 and which was promised again 

by the two leaders in the ceremony of July 9. 

The CPA parties have made some progress in their negotiations over the past few 

months, but as I indicated above some of the most important issues namely oil, 

Abyei and citizenship remain unresolved. How these outstanding issues are managed over the near term will define the future relationship between Sudan and 

South Sudan. At the IGAD summit on July 4, President Bashir and President Kiir 

committed to continue negotiations beyond July 9. We are urging the parties to 

quickly return to the negotiating table in the coming days and set a firm deadline 

for completing this unfinished business. The parties should work with the support 

of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to finalize mutually beneficial arrangements, in particular, oil revenues, citizenship, Abyei, and 

their shared border. Allowing these issues to linger without resolution for too long 

could destabilize the future relationship between Sudan and South Sudan. 

Of particular importance is the contentious issue of Abyei. After months of rising 

tensions and a buildup of forces by both sides, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) 

forcefully took over the disputed area of Abyei in May. An estimated 100,000 people 

were forced to flee their homes. After weeks of intense negotiations, the parties 

signed an agreement on June 20 outlining temporary arrangements for Abyei, to include the establishment of a new U.N. peacekeeping force in Abyei and the redeployment of all Sudanese military forces from the area. Secretary of State Clinton met 

with the parties in Addis Ababa during these talks and played an important role 

in finalizing this deal. We then led efforts in the U.N. Security Council to quickly 

secure a resolution authorizing this new peacekeeping force, which will consist of 

up to 4,200 Ethiopian peacekeepers. 

The violence that flared in Abyei cannot be allowed to return and jeopardize the 

larger peace. It is critical that the parties move forward with genuinely implementing this agreement over the coming weeks as they continue to work toward a 

final arrangement on Abyei. The Ethiopian peacekeepers have begun deploying to 

Abyei. The SAF and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) must follow through 

with their commitment to withdraw their forces. Conditions must be put in place 

to allow those displaced from Abyei to voluntarily return home in safety and dignity 

as soon as possible. Enormous damage was done to homes and other structures in 

Abyei and much was looted during the SAF takeover. Considerable assistance will 

therefore be needed for those returning home. We are working closely with the Ethiopian peacekeeping force, the United Nations humanitarian agencies, and our own 

USAID to arrange support for a safe, voluntary return. At the same time, as part 

of their negotiations, the parties need to resolve Abyei’s final status. Negotiations 

on this matter were delayed by the SAF takeover of the area and the extensive negotiations for assuring the departure of military forces from there. This delay was 

costly. It will take weeks for the Ethiopian forces to be fully deployed and some time 

for the displaced to feel it safe to return. 

Negotiations on the oil sector are equally important, but they must move on a 

quicker timetable. By the end of July, there has to be an understanding of how oil 

will be marketed and sold and to what extent the SPLM will provide some tapering 

off of reductions of income to the north. Agreement is made more difficult, however, 

because the SPLM does not want to make such a decision without final agreements 

on Abyei, the border, and perhaps some other issues. We are thus faced with conflicting timelines. In this situation, it is imperative that if there is no final resolution of oil revenue distribution, there must be an interim agreement by the end of 

July. Each side has claimed it is ready to shut down the oil flow if there is no agreement, positions that if acted upon would only hurt both sides and above all the people of all Sudan. Thus this issue demands action very soon. 

Mr. Chairman, beyond their negotiations with each other, Sudan and South 

Sudan must also work to establish peace within their respective borders. Despite 

their separation, both countries have significant diversity and must decide how they 

will manage that diversity over the coming years. 

Most immediately, we remain deeply concerned about the situation in the northern border state of Southern Kordofan, an area that is home to tens of thousands 

of SPLA fighters. The people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile were promised 

in the CPA that their political interests would be addressed in a process of popular 

consultations. Unfortunately, those consultations have not occurred in Southern 

Kordofan. Tensions increased in Southern Kordofan following the state’s heavily 

contested elections in May. The SPLM refused to accept the results of the election 

in which the sitting Governor was declared the winner. It was in this atmosphere 

that the Government of Sudan issued an order to the SAF to dissolve the Joint InteVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:39 Sep 19, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\071411-BB.TX
11 

grated Units and forcibly disarm SPLA units that remained in the state. On June 

5, intense fighting broke out between the SAF and SPLA forces in the state. To 

date, the fighting has continued, with the SAF carrying out aerial bombardments 

of SPLA areas. We are extremely concerned by credible allegations of targeted and 

ethnic-based killings and other gross human rights abuses. These abuses must end, 

an investigation must be conducted, and perpetrators must be held accountable. The 

U.N. estimates that 73,000 people have been displaced by the fighting, and critical 

access and resupply routes for humanitarian agencies have been blocked. 

Negotiations over Southern Kordofan began in Ethiopia in late June under the 

auspices of the AUHIP. The Government of Sudan and the SPLM-North signed a 

framework agreement on June 28 outlining new political and security arrangements 

for Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. This agreement has the advantage of 

calling for addressing political issues at the same time as security ones, which is 

indispensable for reaching an agreement to cease hostilities and lay the groundwork 

for a longer term settlement. Unfortunately, President Bashir has raised problems 

with the framework agreement, which puts negotiations at risk. We continue to call 

on the parties to return to the negotiating table, to recognize the need to address 

both political and security issues, and to agree on a cessation of hostilities which 

would allow unfettered humanitarian access. Despite the opposition of Khartoum, 

we also continue to call on the Government of Sudan to accept a continued U.N. 

presence in the two states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile to support a cessation of hostilities, humanitarian access, and the establishment of new security arrangements. We believe, and we know that much of the international community 

agrees, that it is in their interest to do so. The Security Council has expressed its 

readiness to authorize continued U.N. operations if Khartoum consents. 

Within Sudan, we also remain deeply concerned about the security and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Clashes continue to occur in North and South Darfur between the Government of Sudan and an alliance of Darfur rebel groups, notably the 

Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. The SAF continues to use aerial bombardments as well as proxy militias as part of its military 

strategy against the movements, thereby resulting in civilian casualties. Conflict 

and widespread insecurity impact the humanitarian situation negatively and hamper humanitarian organizations from carrying out their activities in the deep field. 

The GOS continues to obstruct access of U.N.-African Union peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations struggle to obtain visas and travel permits from the GOS, 

which undermine the effectiveness and independence of humanitarian efforts. We 

have consistently pressed the Government of Sudan to provide full and unfettered 

access for aid workers and peacekeepers, in order to deliver humanitarian assistance across Darfur. Our own humanitarian staff is only able to access Darfur with 

high level visits. Otherwise, operational access is simply not possible. Although 

there has been some limited IDP resettlement in West Darfur and a significant increase in seasonal IDP returns for cultivation, around 2 million Darfuris overall remain in IDP camps. Approximately 70,000 additional persons have been displaced 

since December 2010. 

We have invested considerable efforts in pushing the Government of Sudan and 

the armed movements to commit to serious negotiations in Doha. Two of Darfur’s 

rebel groups, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Justice and 

Equality Movement (JEM) have participated in the Doha negotiations. The LJM 

may sign a peace agreement with the Government of Sudan this week; however 

LJM has little military strength on the ground. Negotiations between JEM and the 

Government of Sudan have been suspended since early May, and JEM is currently 

reconsidering its position on the results of the Doha process. We have emphasized 

to the Government of Sudan that an agreement with the LJM would be a positive 

step toward peace, but that it must continue to negotiate with the other armed 

movements. We also will be applying pressure on the nonnegotiating armed movements to return to peace talks. 

The position of the armed movements is also of concern. Several of them insist 

that they do not wish to negotiate on Darfur so much as on changes to the regime 

in Khartoum, and in some cases are determined to pursue that objective through 

fighting in and beyond Darfur. This position does not permit realistically peace talks 

with the Government of Sudan. We will also continue to encourage the nonnegotiating armed movements to return to peace talks on Darfur. While the Doha process 

has now come to an end, other venues can be developed if talks are possible. In this 

regard, we are currently consulting with the AU, the U.N. and our international 

partners on a way forward after Doha that builds on progress achieved in Doha and 

leads to a more comprehensive settlement. 

Any successful peace process must engage not only the armed movements, but 

also the people of Darfur. The U.N. and the AU have put forward the initiative of 

12 

a Darfur Political Process, through which Darfuris would express their views on the 

way forward for a political settlement. However, we feel strongly that the current 

security and political environment would not lend itself to a credible or legitimate 

peace process in Darfur. For this reason, we will be coordinating with the AU and 

the U.N. on the necessary enabling conditions that we believe must be in place before the United States will support a Darfur-based process. 

Mr. Chairman, Sudan needs to end its isolation in the international community 

and secure a more prosperous future for its people. It has a historic opportunity to 

do so with the completion of the CPA. Sudan faces an uncertain economic future 

as it adjusts to a significant loss of oil revenue and continues to shoulder nearly 

$38 billion of debt. Undoubtedly, Sudan is in need of debt relief, access to the resources of the International Financial Institutions, and a sustainable climate for private investment. Provided Sudan fulfills its obligations under the CPA, the United 

States is prepared to help. 

We have laid out a roadmap to normalize our bilateral relations and taken initial 

steps in that direction. In February, following a successful referendum, the President began the process of reviewing Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Last month, the President dispatched Deputy National Security Advisor 

John Brennan to Khartoum to discuss this review and to demonstrate our commitment to this process. Additionally, we have been actively involved in the World 

Bank technical working group to review the process for Sudan’s debt relief. We have 

also approved licenses for several American companies wishing to participate in agricultural development in the north. 

However, we can only move forward with improved bilateral relations, as outlined 

in the roadmap, if the Government of Sudan fulfills its obligations under the CPA 

and demonstrates its commitment to peace within its borders and with its neighbors. A failure to reach a cessation of hostilities will negatively impact this process. 

U.S. Government action to lift remaining U.S. economic sanctions and to request 

legislative assistance with the removal of applicable foreign assistance restrictions 

also will be dependent on Sudanese actions in Darfur. We will expect to see concrete 

actions on humanitarian access, freedom of movement for UNAMID peacekeepers, 

engagement in peace talks, an end to the use of proxy militias and targeting of civilians, and an improvement in justice and accountability so the reign of impunity in 

Darfur does not continue. This is not just the position of the United States. It is 

also the view of other members of the international community and international 

creditors. 

Mr. Chairman, the Government of South Sudan will also depend on international 

support as it seeks to address its many challenges. South Sudan has some of the 

lowest development indicators in the world, and its people have high expectations 

that their lives will improve with independence. Many of its people also remain vulnerable to the activity of armed militias in the border states of Unity, Jonglei, and 

Upper Nile to the North, and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the state of 

Equatoria regions to the south. The United States has provided significant support 

for South Sudan over the years, and we will remain a steadfast partner as South 

Sudan seeks to peacefully meet these challenges. The strong ties between our peoples go back many decades, and we want to continue to build on that partnership. 

Over 15 countries have offered capacity building assistance to the GOSS. Following the Troika development ministers’ visit in May, USAID is working closely 

with the AU, U.N., ADB, EU, India, China, South Africa, Uganda and others to ensure that the ROSS has a viable human capital plan in place to build capacity for 

key functions in Juba and state governments. This builds upon the work USAID has 

done over the last 7 years in the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of South 

Sudan, health, education, and agriculture. USAID is working with partners to scale 

up to ensure that stop gap measure along with medium to long term capacities are 

being addressed. The United States, the U.N., the U.K., and other donors will focus 

on building a human rights culture throughout the GOSS, including the SPLA. All 

the donors will help in economic development. The United States plans in particular 

to make a major effort in agricultural production, which can help the vast majority 

of South Sudanese and for which there is much promise. 

To succeed and to sustain international support, the Government of South Sudan 

must demonstrate its commitment to building an effective, democratic and inclusive 

government that embodies South Sudan’s diversity, respects human rights and delivers services with transparency and accountability. The eyes of the world will indeed be on South Sudan in the weeks and months ahead. The government must deliver on its commitment to a broad-based, inclusive process to write its permanent 

constitution. The government must also put in place safeguards to prevent corruption and avoid the pitfalls that have befallen many other oil-producing nations. 

President Kiir made a strong statement in his inaugural address on these very 

13 

issues. The United States will work with other international partners to provide advice and support for the government to help him implement those pledges. 

Mr. Chairman and other members of the committee, the challenges ahead are 

great, but the historic occasion last Saturday offers a new beginning for the people 

of South Sudan and Sudan. Now it is up to the leaders and people of South Sudan 

and Sudan to turn this moment of promise into lasting peace. We will continue to 

assist them in this hard work. Over the coming months, the Obama administration’s 

engagement will be unwavering, and we will be a steadfast partner to all those in 

Sudan and South Sudan who seek a better future of peace and prosperity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. That 

was very helpful and very comprehensive. I appreciate it. 

Let me begin by asking you on the Southern Kordofan issue, first 

of all, do you have any evidence at this point or hard information 

with respect to the scale of the abuses? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I don’t have hard information on the scale, 

but it’s very credible allegations of very gross human rights abuses. 

Let me say something more about this, because I have raised 

with the Sudan Government. They have a pattern of fighting their 

wars in a way that invites gross violations of human rights. We’ve 

seen this historically, and we saw it in Abyei, and we are now seeing it in Southern Kordofan. The army comes in and then is followed by and supports militias, the people’s defense forces, the 

PDFs, and other groups, who come in and loot and kill, and do all 

of these things. 

And I said to the Government of Sudan, this is not the way an 

army in the 21st century fights wars. There are human rights principles, and they don’t follow them. And as long as they do that, 

they are always going to be subject to the harshest criticism and 

sanctions for what happens. This is not the way to fight a war, 

even when you’re fighting a war. 

Now what’s happening in Southern Kordofan is that it has raised 

some very fundamental issues for both sides, fundamental political 

issues, because what the political issues in Southern Kordofan and 

Blue Nile raise, and in Darfur, is how is the Government of Sudan 

going to be structured and operated now with the secession of the 

South. Is it going to be a government that recognizes diversity, that 

decentralizes authority and opportunities for wealth, or is it going 

to be highly centralized and trying to force these issues? That is 

what is really issues raised in Southern Kordofan. 

For the SPLM there, headed by the former deputy governor, 

Abdul Aziz, these are the fundamental issues they fought for during the civil war. They’re not prepared to be disarmed or have their 

forces integrated into a single Sudanese Army until they know 

these political issues are being addressed. 

The other side, the Government, says, wait a minute, we can’t 

have two armies in one country, so we have to disarm you first. 

And that’s not tenable in this situation. 

That’s why the agreement that they signed to deal with the political issues as well as the security issues was so critical. And we’ve 

got to get them back to that agreement, and to get those talks 

underway. Otherwise, we’re not going to get either side to agree to 

a cessation of hostilities and be able to open up the door to humanitarian aid. 

The CHAIRMAN. You’re talking about the SPLM–North. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Right. 

14 

The CHAIRMAN. The Kadugli agreement. 

Well, Mr. Ambassador, to whatever degree that it is helpful, and 

since I have relationships with a lot of those folks built over these 

last few years, I hope you will convey—and I will be speaking, 

actually, with President Kiir later this morning. But I think it’s 

important to log some calls to the North also, to emphasize that 

everything that was talked about in the roadmap and all of the 

transitional components that they are hopeful can be affected as we 

go forward, with respect to their economy and debt in the future, 

depend on, as you said and we said, but I want to reemphasize it, 

it depends on their behavior and what happens in these next weeks 

and months in terms of accountability. 

And so I hope, to the degree they’re listening to this hearing or 

to any of our other comments, it’s not a matter of dictation; it’s a 

matter of living up to international standards of behavior and their 

promises, their own promises. 

So this is going to be a critical component of their own ability 

to succeed. I know there’s a lot of turmoil in the NCP, a lot of questions about the future politics of the North, which is why I mention 

that they are also a new nation now. They’re going to have to figure out a constitution and other components that meet with this 

new situation. 

But we will back you up, and I want them to know that, to the 

nth degree in your efforts to create accountability here and to move 

us to a new standard. And I think that is absolutely critical. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any sense of how rapidly or where 

we would stand with respect to getting a cease-fire, restoring a 

monitoring presence, or perhaps reestablishing humanitarian aid? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I wish I could be more optimistic on this, 

Senator, quite frankly, because I have talked extensively to both 

sides on this. I’ve talked to Abdul Aziz. I’ve talked to Malik Agaar, 

the leader of the SPLM-North. I’ve talked with the Government 

about it. 

I think until we get those political talks going, it’s going to be 

hard for them to agree on the security side. 

Now, what we have pressed for—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Until you get? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Until we get political talks or a process 

going, it’s going to be very hard. 

And they differ with how to deal even with a cease-fire or the 

security side. 

What we have pressed hard for is, on the humanitarian front, 

that they have got to allow for more help for the people who are 

being killed, displaced, et cetera. And so one of the things we have 

proposed is how about a humanitarian pause, a 72-hour pause. 

That has happened in other conflict situations, where you can get 

in food, get in medicine. Both sides have said they are open to that. 

We are going to kind of press that, if they can’t reach a broader 

cessation of hostility agreement. 

But I’m hoping that the talks are going to start very soon, and 

that they clarify these objections to the framework agreement and 

get started. And we’ll continue to press on that, and particularly 

15 

if we can’t get a longer cessation of hostilities, try and get a period 

where we can get help to the people who need it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that among the leaders in the 

North, there may be any doubts or reservations about how the 

United States may behave here? Are our cards on the table sufficiently? Do they have confidence in the roadmap still, I guess as 

a way to say it? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think there are elements in the Government who do not have confidence in the roadmap. Every once in 

a while, we hear that publicly. I hear it a lot privately, because 

they think we’ve moved the goalposts or they accuse us of moving 

goalposts. And there’s a coterie of people who continue to argue inside the Government that don’t trust the United States, don’t base 

your policies on that roadmap, et cetera. 

But I think we have made some progress in that regard. And we 

have stuck to the roadmap, we have not added new conditions. 

You’ve made it very clear, as you said in your opening statement 

and subsequently, the conditions were the same ones that you 

talked to when you came out. 

And we have done our part, and they’ve got to do theirs. So we 

keep making that point. I think more and more, there are people 

in the Government who do realize it. But it’s still an argument 

inside the Government, ‘‘Oh, the U.S. will never do this.’’ And it 

becomes an excuse, if you will, for them following other policies. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think you made an important point that we 

need to think more about and perhaps examine more here, and 

that’s the Doha process and the Darfur issue itself. 

I gather that even this morning, it is possible that they may have 

signed that agreement in Doha. Do you know if they did? 

Ambassador LYMAN. You know, I haven’t had a report. It was 

supposed to be 4 o’clock their time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Right. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Forgive me, I was just told they didn’t sign. 

I knew there were some outstanding issues still. 

The CHAIRMAN. If they did sign it, or when they do sign, if they 

contemplate signing, it still leaves us with the same problem, and 

that’s an important one, which is that JEM and two major factions 

of the SLA, the Abdul Wahid and the Minni Minawi factions, are 

not there. And as you appropriately stated, they have a different 

agenda. And I think we all are going to have to think carefully 

about how you measure it. 

One of the things I heard repeatedly from people over there is, 

look, you can’t hold us to the Darfur Accountability Act, which requires a complete settlement in Darfur before you do certain things 

with us, if the players in Darfur aren’t choosing to be part of the 

process. And if their goal is our overthrow, that is different from 

the struggle that took place in terms of the genocide in the 2000s; 

2004 and 2005. 

And I think that’s, frankly, a legitimate position. I think it is fair 

to say that if those groups have a different agenda, and they’re behaving differently, and they’re going to do their own thing, not to 

mention some of the other groups which are kind of criminal enterprises, to put it bluntly, I think we have to think very carefully 

about the makeup of those groups. 

16 

I wonder if you would comment on that. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Senator, it is exactly as you say, and we 

have said to those groups very candidly that you can’t expect the 

government to come to the table to talk about your overthrowing 

the regime. And we said something else. We said if you’re interested in change in Sudan, why don’t you demonstrate that by getting change in Darfur and becoming a political part of the process. 

And we’ve pressed them very hard on this. 

I think they are also, some of them, watching as to what happens 

in Southern Kordofan, and between the North and the South as to 

whether there is going to be a great deal of instability, and how 

that affects their calculations. 

So I think if we’re successful in containing the situation in 

Southern Kordofan, improving the North-South relations, it may 

help change the calculations as to where they should go. 

But we’ve been very clear on that. And you’re right, the government has a legitimate complaint, if these groups are not prepared 

to talk about Darfur and engage in a peace process. So we will continue to press them on that, and your point is quite, quite valid. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to ask you to discuss for just a moment the role of the 

United States as we go forward, not only in the Republic of South 

Sudan but also in the Republic of Sudan, including Darfur and the 

three contested areas, in this respect: Will the international community join us in large measure, or will the United States again 

be the default lead donor in stabilization and nation-building 

efforts? 

Furthermore, if your response is that the international community will join, can you identify some of the players? Which countries 

are likely to be involved in joining with us or already have, for that 

matter? 

This is of considerable interest, I think, to many Americans who 

take a look at the challenges ahead and understand our interests 

in a humanitarian way, but also ask who else in the world will provide assistance. 

So, describe if you can, that context. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Oh, I’m glad you raised that, Senator. 

Up to now, we’ve had a large degree of international involve- ment. Other donors have contributed roughly $700 million a year 

to Southern Sudan and humanitarian activities in Sudan. Of 

course, others carry three quarters of the peacekeeping budgets for 

UNAMID, for the new mission in the South, for the new mission 

in Abyei. 

But I want to take it to another point that you mentioned, because I just met, before I left Khartoum, with the representatives 

of most of the European countries, and we were asking that very 

question. How should we organize ourselves now when the CPA is 

formally over even though the issues, several issues, remain? How 

should we organize ourselves now to continue to have a major role 

in bringing about peaceful resolution of these issues? 

And we’re talking about a number of ideas of how to create or 

re-create, if you will, this kind of group of international companies, 

all of which committed to this peace process. 

17 

We also have the African Union, of course. It has the mandate 

to oversee the negotiations on North-South, and we work very 

closely with Thabo Mbeki and his colleagues on that. 

But we need to think now in this new situation exactly how to 

do that. And I’ll come back to you, because we’ve agreed to think 

altogether about this, get together again in a couple of weeks, and 

think about exactly that: How do we keep up not just the donor 

program, all of which are very important, but politically, how do we 

act together in the consistent way on the issues we’ve been just 

talking about? 

Senator LUGAR. It may be obvious to all of us listening today, but 

underline why it is important that indeed the international community, as opposed to just the United States, play a key role here. 

Additionally, please describe the feelings in the North, the South, 

and Darfur with regard to international participation. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, it’s very important, and others have 

special contributions to make that are extremely important. 

The British have played a major role in security sector reform in 

the South. They have connections in the North that we don’t have, 

that we can draw on. The Dutch are extremely knowledgeable 

about all the Arab tribes along the border. The Norwegians play a 

major role in sorting out the issues of oil and advising both sides 

how to treat the oil sector. The E.U. has its own set of sanctions, 

its own set of responsibilities. 

And so working together, it reinforces the political impact that 

we can all have, and also, of course, sharing the burden of resources. 

I want to mention two other countries that play a major role, and 

that’s China and Russia. And I’ve been in touch with both of them 

about their role. 

China, as you now, is a major investor in the oil sector in Sudan. 

And we have urged them to play a very important role on issues 

with President Bashir and others on Southern Kordofan, on resolving the issues on oil. 

Now China understands that they have important investments in 

both the North and the South, because the oil industry in which 

they’re heavily invested is in both the North and South. 

So they are picking up rapidly their relations in the South, and 

stability becomes very important to them. So we look to them to 

play a very important role in this regard. 

I met yesterday with the Deputy Foreign Minister from Russia, 

because although they are not as heavily invested, they’re arms 

suppliers to Sudan. They’re, of course, a member of the P5, and 

how they play their role with us in the Security Council is extremely important. 

So getting them as well as our Western European friends on the 

same wavelength becomes very important, so that the messages 

that various parties are receiving in Khartoum are consistent. 

Senator LUGAR. You specifically mentioned China. I would note 

that a good number of Americans have observed that throughout 

all the problems in Darfur, with the charge of genocide and crimes 

against humanity by the government of President al-Bashir duplicating their behavior in the south, China has certainly realized 

that some very bad things were happening, but obtaining oil from 

18 

Sudan remained its first priority. This priority was perceived as so 

dominant that, despite diplomatic overtures by the United States 

or others’, the Chinese were not particularly forthcoming. 

What is likely to change in the current situation? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, I think two things: One, the emergence of South Sudan as independent country, which has 75 percent of the oil. So if oil is one of their interests, than having not 

only a positive relationship with South Sudan but also stability and 

no confrontations over oil, no turning off the pipeline or turning off 

the oil-pumping center, which each side would do, might do, in a 

confrontation. 

And it also means they have to balance their relationships in 

Khartoum and Juba. They’re not inclined to trade one for another, 

but they do realize that they need to have good relations with both. 

And that gives them a stake in seeing some of these conflicts resolved and not having instability or conflict between the two. And 

we talk about that a lot together. 

Senator LUGAR. Last year the United States spent approximately $1.5 billion, including $1⁄2 billion for peacekeeping, in the Sudan. 

What is your estimate on whether there will be requests by the administration for more than $1.5 billion in the coming year? 

Can you give us any benchmarks? Our whole budgetary situation, as you recall, is tense elsewhere, but Sudan is important. 

What would you predict in this area? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, I realize that we have one of the largest combination of peacekeeping operations in Sudan as anyplace 

in the world. We have the combined U.N.–EU force in Darfur, and 

we have a new mission in South Sudan, which is not so much 

peacekeeping. It’s partly peacekeeping, but it’s a lot of assistance 

to creating a viable government and system in the South. And now 

we have the special force an Abyei, without which we would not 

have been able to get the Sudanese Armed Forces to withdraw. 

I don’t see any major additional activities. The Government of 

Sudan has said we don’t want a continuation of the U.N. in the 

North. But there is a role and not a heavy role in helping monitor 

the border that is under discussion. But it’s not another big mission, et cetera. 

So I don’t see any major new mission requirements. But I can’t 

say that the ones we have will diminish in the near future until 

some of these big issues are resolved. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

Senator Isakson. 

Excuse me—Senator Isakson, and then we’ll go to Senator Udall. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be brief. 

My impression when I was in Khartoum, as far as their view of 

Darfur, was they were pretty much content to fight a surrogate 

war in Darfur, because it was far enough removed from Khartoum 

where they didn’t feel any real pressure to do so. 

But you made an interesting comment a second ago, talking 

about how the JEM and the SLA are watching Southern Kordofan 

and what is happening there. Because of its proximity geographically, if the North continues the alleged or apparent atrocities that 

we have had some evidence of from satellites and others, that 

19 

changes that paradigm a lot and runs a greater risk of a new war 

in the North, does it not? 

Ambassador LYMAN. That’s exactly the risk, and it’s exactly the 

one that the Government needs to avoid. 

They don’t want a war in the North. They complain about what 

they think is an attempt to create a new, as I say, a new CPA between the southern part of Sudan and the rest of it. But the fact 

is that if they don’t address those basic political issues in Southern 

Kordofan and Blue Nile and Darfur, et cetera, they will have problems, serious problems in Southern Kordofan and Darfur, armed 

problems. 

So, yes, these are linked. They are linked in the sense that the 

Government in Khartoum—and they’ve said as much—needs to 

think through what kind of a new constitution they need, what 

kind of a new political set of relationships they need. But they 

haven’t indicated just exactly where they’re coming out, and they’re 

being challenged forcefully to make those decisions, and hopefully 

not make them with just a military response. 

Senator ISAKSON. So the North, which is interested in self-preservation first and foremost, in terms of the Government, runs a risk 

if they continue in Southern Kordofan, first with the removal from 

state sponsor of terrorism, because if they continue, that will be a 

violation of that, plus they run a risk of an expansion of hostilities 

against them. Is that not correct? 

Ambassador LYMAN. That is really a very major risk. 

Senator ISAKSON. Hopefully that will be a motivating factor for 

them to improve. 

Ambassador LYMAN. I hope so. 

Senator ISAKSON. Have they done better with NGOs in Darfur? 

I know there was a lot of manipulation of visas and entrance in 

and out. 

Ambassador LYMAN. It’s very uneven. It’s still not fully satisfactory. UNAMID has better access than it had before, but it’s not 

perfect. 

We still run into some problems with the NGOs, and it’s one of 

those conditions, as we said, for having a Darfur-based political 

process, because it reflects a lack of openness and movement. So 

we continue to work on those all the time. 

Senator ISAKSON. So the number you mentioned, the conditions 

aren’t right yet for a Darfur agreement. The main condition is that 

Khartoum is not ready to be a player in doing that. Is that correct? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think Khartoum is not yet ready to create 

an atmosphere of real freedom inside Darfur, so you could have a 

real political process there. 

We’ve had occasions in the past where people speak up and then 

they are arrested. They just released some political prisoners yesterday, but there are more. 

So people have to feel that if they speak out in some kind of a 

domestic political process, they’re not going to be harassed or jailed 

or something. And that’s something you don’t just do overnight. 

You prove it by creating an atmosphere that people can watch it 

and see it happen. But we don’t have that yet. They have to lift 

the state of emergency. They said they will. We’ll see. 

20 

But until you have that environment, it’s hard to say you can 

have a really effective Darfur-based political process. 

Senator ISAKSON. They are somewhat masters of their own destiny, if they just wake up and realize that. 

Ambassador LYMAN. They are. They are. I mean, they have these 

armed movements who are fighting. But they have a lot of opportunity to create an environment that is very different in Darfur. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, as I said in my opening remarks, thank 

you very much for your service and thanks for being here today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Isakson. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Senator Kerry. 

And I also want to thank you, Ambassador Lyman, for your 

service. 

South Sudan, one of the critical issues is education. And as 

you’re very, very aware, it’s one of the least educated countries in 

the world, with one of the highest rates of illiteracy. I am wondering, are there any plans to increase the amount of U.S. volunteers to go to South Sudan? Would it help our relations and 

strengthen our relationship with them by encouraging young Americans to volunteer to help teach the next generation? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Senator, I’m glad you raised that, because 

you’re exactly right. It’s one of the highest illiteracy rates, and it’s 

going to be a major drag on development. 

We do have a lot of NGOs and a lot of church-related activity, 

including Sudanese churches, which are providing the bulk of 

health and education services right now. 

We have had some discussion of whether we can bring the Peace 

Corps to South Sudan. You have to be sure that the living conditions are possible and the other things there, so we’ll look at that 

and other ways for NGOs and young people to volunteer, because 

I think there’s a real opportunity. 

One of the areas is that teachers who are coming back to South 

Sudan from the North have been teaching in Arabic. And so 

English language training is going to be very important, even for 

teachers who are trained as teachers, but need now to operate in 

the South where Arabic is not going to be the major language. 

So there are a lot of opportunities of the kinds that you mentioned. And we’ll pursue them, and I’ll let you know what happens 

there. 

Senator UDALL. You mentioned the Peace Corps. Are you doing 

an evaluation to see if the conditions are right to have the Peace 

Corps there? 

Ambassador LYMAN. There’ve been some discussions of it, and I’ll 

check with the Peace Corps what the next plan is. Of course, we 

had to wait until the South was independent. 

But I’ll check with the Peace Corps and see what their current 

thinking was. One of our Peace Corps officials, Dick Day, was in 

fact at the ceremony in Juba, so there’s been some discussion back 

and forth, and I’ll check on what the status is. 

Senator UDALL. You mentioned the lack of education being a 

drag on development. One of the other issues is this issue of susVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:39 Sep 19, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\071411-BB.TX
21 

tainability and land use and those kinds of use of natural resources. 

And I’m wondering what we’re doing as a country to ensure that 

sustainable development practices are put in place, so that there 

will be cropland there viable for future generations. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, we have been fortunate, and I appreciate the congressional support on this. We have been able to draw 

on the Bureau in the Department, the Conflict Reconstruction and 

Stability, the CRS Bureau, to provide a lot of the surge capacity 

for the African Bureau to deal with the Sudan. 

And one of the things that they have been doing is providing expert teams that go out to all the states in the South and look at 

what are the issues out in those areas. Land is an important issue, 

land ownership, land management, et cetera, especially as hundreds of thousands of people who had left the South are coming 

back. Local corruption questions are important. 

And that information is leading us and the U.N. to structure our 

programs to reach out to the state and county level, and urge the 

Government to deal with those issues out there because those could 

be sources not only of injustice but of instability. 

So issues of land, issues of access, opportunities, et cetera, these 

are important issues. And we’re getting a handle on them, and 

we’re trying to build up the capacity of the Government to deal 

with it. 

Senator UDALL. And then also, I think infrastructure is currently 

lacking in South Sudan. And if South Sudan is going to achieve 

some economic freedom, then it will need to be able to bring goods 

to market. What needs to be done to improve transportation and 

to create the infrastructure needed so that farmers can sell their 

crops outside the country? 

Ambassador LYMAN. When you fly over South Sudan, you don’t 

see hardly any roads. The USA is building a major road down to 

the Uganda border and a couple other roads. But we’re hoping 

other donors are going to come in more heavily on infrastructure. 

We’re going to do a lot on agriculture and health and education. 

But we’re hoping the World Bank will come in heavily, the 

Chinese, and others, because exactly right: We’re going to do a lot 

in agriculture, but if there are no roads for people to market their 

commodities, it won’t have the right result. 

So we’re going to look to other donors to do more in the infrastructure area. 

Senator UDALL. Great. Thank you very much, and thank you for 

your service again. 

And I see Senator Coons is here, so I will yield my time. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Lugar, I’d also like to thank Chairman Kerry as well as 

Senator Lugar for their leadership. 

And I join my colleagues in thanking Ambassador Lyman and all 

the dedicated people who have worked so hard to make South 

Sudan achieve independence. 

Less than a year ago, it looked unlikely that independence day 

would ever come for South Sudan, and it not only came, it came 

on time, and through a peaceful and free and fair referendum. 

22 

And while we all celebrate the establishment of South Sudan as 

the 54th nation in Africa, I remain concerned, as I know many of 

my colleagues do, about the path forward, particularly the NorthSouth border and in Darfur. And that’s why Senators Isakson, 

Durbin, Wicker, and I will soon introduce a resolution welcoming 

independence and congratulating the people of South Sudan, and 

calling on the governments of both Sudan and South Sudan to 

peacefully resolve the many outstanding issues, including final status of Abyei, division of oil revenues, citizenship, and the current, 

as you detailed, very troubling conflict in South Kordofan. 

The recent violence in Abyei and Southern Kordofan, and the displacement of many, many people, remind us of the very real human 

toll of conflict. And that’s why both the international community 

and the United States, in my view, must continue their sustained 

efforts to urge peaceful resolution to the difficult, ongoing challenges that South Sudan will face in order to become a stable and 

peaceful nation. 

I know, Ambassador, you already discussed the current situation 

in Abyei, but I’d be interested in what you believe to be the outlook 

for a final agreement or referendum, and I would be interested in 

what became of President Mbeki’s plan. 

He and I met, and we discussed this a number of months ago. 

What became of his proposal on Abyei that would, I had hoped, 

have the backing of the international community? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

What happened is that, as you know, Thabo Mbeki, as part of 

this A.U. high-level panel, was to develop a proposal back to the 

two Presidents on Abyei. And our timetable got derailed by the 

military takeover of Abyei. And even though the government said, 

‘‘Well, we can have a political solution while we’re occupying it,’’ 

nobody felt that that was a situation that was tenable. So we were 

diverted, basically, and lost weeks in working through a way for 

the withdrawal of Sudanese troops and introducing peacekeepers. 

The feeling now is we’ve got to get those peacekeepers there, the 

Sudanese troops out, and begin to get the displaced, which is about 

100,000 people, back in. And then that will be a better atmosphere 

for bringing a final solution idea to the table. 

And unfortunately, what that does is delay this for weeks and 

maybe a couple months. I’m very bothered by that, but I understand the logic of it. And it impacts on the other negotiations, resolving the oil issues, et cetera. 

But the advice of most of the people working on this, people who 

are close to it, and I’ve talked to people on both sides and others 

involved, is we need to make sure that Abyei is demilitarized and 

that people feel safe, and then we can deal with this issue. 

So it’s been delayed, and I’m bothered by it. And that’s why I 

said earlier I think we ought to have a very firm timetable for addressing it, because otherwise it just lingers as a source of conflict. 

Senator COONS. You mentioned the peacekeeping mission. 

There’s actually, if I understand correctly, three distinct peacekeeping missions across a very wide area. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Right. 

23 

Senator COONS. And I’m concerned about coordination, sustainability, the quality of the troops in some of the peacekeeping 

missions. 

What sort of work is being done to coordinate around supply 

lines, logistics, the quality and sustainability of the troops engaged? And for how long do you think they might continue operations or continue to be necessary? 

Ambassador LYMAN. This is an issue where our colleagues in the 

U.S.–U.N. have been very concerned about as well. We have three 

different missions right now. 

There is talk of creating a special envoy who will work on some 

of these issues from the U.N. It hasn’t been finalized, but it’s one 

way to try and have someone who is dealing with all of that. But 

I think right now we’re going to have to rely on the leadership in 

the U.N. on the ground to do this. 

The peacekeeping operation going into Abyei responds to a point 

you just made, that is the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. 

The peacekeeping operation that was in Abyei was not effective. If 

it had been, we might not have had the crisis we had. 

So we turn to a country we knew would put in peacekeepers who 

would carry out their mandate vigorously, and that’s the Ethiopians. But it took us a long time to work that out. 

And I think they’re going to be there for at least months and 

maybe longer until we get a resolution. 

The mission in the South is a big mission. It’s going to be there 

for a while. UNAMID, if we can get Darfur settled, that will be 

wonderful, but that’s going to take some time. 

So I can’t honestly put a timetable on when these missions will 

end. But I think this issue of coordination is very much on the 

mind of the U.N. and our U.S.–U.N. people. And as they work that 

through more, I will get back to you on some of their ideas on it. 

Senator COONS. And last, I know you already addressed, in response to Senator Lugar, some concerns about China and their 

role. But I would be interested in whether you can elaborate on 

where you see the interests of the United States and China overlapping with regards to Sudan and South Sudan, and are there 

examples of China playing a constructive role? 

What advice would you have for us? We’re going to have a hearing on the role of China in Africa within the next few months, and 

I’m concerned about better understanding what constructive role 

they might be able to play or be asked to play in South Sudan. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, I think China is already a vigorous 

player in Africa. They’ve got important commercial as well as political interests. Some of them correspond and overlap with ours. 

Sometimes we’re in competition. 

In Sudan, I think it took a long time before we got on the same 

page on Darfur; a long time. But now, as I mentioned earlier, now 

that South Sudan is independent, they have a stake in resolving 

the oil issues and stability, and having a good relationship with 

both. 

I expect them to develop a fairly substantial presence in South 

Sudan. I’m hoping they will contribute to the infrastructure areas 

as well as other training. We look to them, and we’ve discussed this 

together with the Chinese, in their contacts with President Bashir 

24 

and others in the North to press hard for the points we were just 

discussing earlier about resolving issues like Southern Kordofan 

differently. 

The Chinese and the Russians stood with us in the P5 and in the 

U.N. Security Council to urge the North to keep a U.N. presence 

in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. 

So I think we’re getting closer with them, in terms of shared interest there. And I think that’s an opportunity for us to see them 

making an even bigger contribution. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank you 

for your service as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ambassador, our relationship right now with 

the North, with Sudan, is both caught up and controlled by, as you 

know, a number of overlapping laws that have been passed over 

the course of about 10 years. But obviously, as of last Saturday, the 

map has been completely redrawn. 

In looking at the map, I see that you are currently able to do certain kinds of work in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. But 

you’re not allowed to do it along the rest of the border. 

But obviously, the relations between Sudan and South Sudan 

aren’t limited to those areas now. And particularly, there’s this 

cuteness of delivery I think on our part, both to the South and the 

North, to South Sudan and the North. 

So my question is, as you know, our staff has been working on 

trying to figure out how we might adjust some of these laws, which 

I think personally it is important to do for a lot of different reasons, not the least of which I think we’re constrained in our ability 

to deliver to the North unless we do. 

So would you comment on whether or not you think it would be 

helpful, for instance, for you to have the legal authority to work on 

a peace empowerment zone that stretches across the entire border, 

rather than have certain sections carved out the way it is now? 

Ambassador LYMAN. There’s a lot of attraction to that idea, Senator, because the border area is where a very large portion of the 

population on both sides live, and there are a number of 

flashpoints there. There are some disputed border areas. There is 

going to be questions of crossing borders of mutual development, et 

cetera. 

And I think it’s an area where we can make a significant contribution. If we had the ability to work wherever we thought, that 

would help alleviate both pressures and real humanitarian needs. 

I think it would be wise. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can you share with us sort of a sense of the kind 

of projects that you think might facilitate a more lasting peace? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think, you know, part of the tension that 

arises is in the migration from North to South, access to water, 

access to pasturage, et cetera. 

What we had talked about in some cases, can you get joint development zones that transit North and South that would make people comfortable that everybody is developing equally from that kind 

of development? You would also ease some of the migration pressures, if you could develop better some of the pasturage and water 

above the line. We see that in Abyei and Southern Kordofan. 

25 

So those things would help alleviate some of the tension but I 

think equally important build cooperation, because you really want 

on the border cooperation between the governors on each side. And 

a lot of the governors are very interested in this. And perhaps programs that facilitated that, as well as conflict resolution, could be 

useful. 

The CHAIRMAN. What about legal authority to work in an area 

like food security or on democracy projects? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, I think on food security, I think 

Sudan, the Government of Sudan, is going to face a lot of very difficult economic challenges. They’re losing a lot of their oil income. 

But I think as somebody, maybe it was Senator Isakson, mentioned, or maybe it was you, Senator Lugar, that the oil doesn’t last 

that long anyway. The Norwegians predict a sharp decline for both. 

So the adjustment, the economic adjustments are going to be 

great. And food production is one of Sudan’s great potentials, if 

they would invest in it. 

Now, I think that our readiness and willingness to do so should, 

however, reflect the political relationship and their fulfillment of 

major issues like CPA and Southern Kordofan. But I think opening 

that possibility up is important for the people in Sudan, and it will 

be important for everyone because of the trade. 

The CHAIRMAN. Might we not provide you with some leverage in 

negotiation? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think it would be important in terms of 

demonstrating something we’ve tried to say over and over again, 

which is it’s in the interest of the United States to see two viable, 

successful states. Without that, there’s not going to be stability in 

either one. And that we don’t want Sudan, northern Sudan, to be 

in deep economic trouble anymore than we want southern Sudan 

to be. 

So, yes, I think it sends an important message to say that if you 

are moving in this direction, coming back into the international 

community, we’re very serious about the people of your country not 

going into economic turmoil. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let’s assume that you get an agreement, 

ultimately a sort of grand bargain that addresses Abyei, the borders, the other critical issues, including the apportionment of debt, 

would you not need some kind of legal change here or redress, in 

order to be able to address the issue of debt relief? 

Ambassador LYMAN. There are very clear restrictions, as you 

know, in the legislation on that. Debt relief is an extraordinarily 

important issue for the Government of Sudan, because under the 

agreement they have with the South, they have taken on the full 

burden of that $38 billion of debt on the conditions that the international community will eventually afford them debt relief and the 

South will support them in that politically. 

I think as we move forward, the President will need an understanding with Congress about those restrictions. Right now, it’s in 

a technical mode. That is, the World Bank is doing what they have 

to do, which is to gather all the detailed knowledge of the loans 

and reconcile the records of the creditors and noncreditors. But 

after that, it will start to move into serious—— 

26 

The CHAIRMAN. We need discussion. We need to address it, bottom line. 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think it’s going to be important. 

The CHAIRMAN. OK. 

Just a couple quick other questions. How would you say South 

Sudan Government is doing right now in terms of prioritizing its 

own governance agenda, its development agenda? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think it’s really still in very early stages. 

The USA is going to sponsor a conference here in September in 

which they are—it’s not a donors conference, it’s not a pledging 

conference. It’s a conference for them to come and present exactly 

that: What are their priorities in governance and development, and 

how can the private as well as public sector help? 

But I think they’re at early stages. They have really been focused 

so heavily on becoming independent. They are really moving from 

being a liberation army to being a government. And that transition 

isn’t entirely complete. 

They have to engage in a new constitution. They have an interim 

constitution. But they need to develop a constitution that brings 

much, much more popular participation into the process. 

So I would say they’re at early stages on a lot of those things and 

will need a lot of encouragement and help. 

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned the question of the army and its 

own transition. I guess they have a force of about 140,000 soldiers. 

But they’ve incorporated within those ranks a number of different 

armed groups. So my question is, I mean I don’t think that’s sustainable for the long term, both politically and otherwise, so what 

should their priority be for security reform? And how can we have 

an impact, or should we have an impact, with respect to that? 

Ambassador LYMAN. One of the ways in which they deal with 

some of these militia is to bring them in and incorporate them into 

the army, which means the army gets bigger. And it’s probably getting bigger before it gets smaller. 

The CHAIRMAN. Buy them out, in colloquial terms. 

Ambassador LYMAN. But also a great many members of the 

armed forces are illiterate and not trained for anything else. So 

just rushing into a demobilization process is not going to be good, 

because then these people will be out there with no way to make 

a living other than to join another militia. 

So what the Government has talked about, and we think is the 

right way to go, is a program which develops a lot of the skills 

within this military, build a much more professional Ministry of 

Defense and oversight, and then engages in a program of reduction 

and demobilization, where people go out with skills to be able to 

make a living. And so we are now working with others on this 

issue of security sector reform. And this is exactly the questions 

we’re working on them with. 

The CHAIRMAN. Final question. Some people have—well, up until 

now, I think we’ve provided nonlethal support, some military 

assistance in support of the transformation of their security sector. 

There are some, I won’t say it’s a huge debate, but there is some 

suggestion that now that they’re an independent nation, it may be 

time to consider the provision of lethal support, including air defense training, technology, et cetera. 

27 

Do you have any counsel to this committee with respect to that? 

Ambassador LYMAN. We have not made a decision to provide any 

lethal assistance. We are focused very heavily on the issues you 

first raised; that is, how do you develop this into a better organized, more professional national military force? So we have made 

no decisions on lethal assistance. 

If we do so or are contemplating it, I want to come back to the 

Congress and discuss that before we make a decision. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will welcome you back. We’re going to 

stay actively engaged and try to provide some transparency to this 

transition process, and hopefully that can be helpful and assist you 

in the process. And we’ll do it, obviously, in consultation with you, 

Ambassador. 

So again, I just want to thank you personally. I need to run to 

another thing. 

Senator Lugar, do you have more? 

Senator LUGAR. Ambassador—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just finish my thought. 

I just want to thank you again for the tremendous work and for 

working so closely with the committee, and we look forward to continuing that. Thank you. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you, Senator. We are very grateful 

for the interest you have taken on this. 

Senator LUGAR. Let me just carry forward a question many of us 

have raised about the lack of a South Sudanese constitution, as you 

try to fill in some of the absence of our understanding. 

Barring a constitution, there is at least a military force there. 

And it’s expanding as you have suggested. 

The ordinary observer of this would say essentially that the Government right now is the army or the military force. Is this true 

in the sense that there are generals who are leading the country? 

In other words, when trying to describe the executive authority in 

the country, do we simply look at it in terms of a military hierarchy at this point? 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, they do have an interim constitution, 

which President Kiir signed during the independence day ceremony. It’s supposed to be an interim constitution. It’s supposed to 

last—it doesn’t have a terminal date, which is one of the sources 

of great controversy. 

But the pledge is to have a much more broad-based process for 

developing a permanent constitution. This constitution that they’ve 

just signed centralizes power quite a bit in the Presidency. This is 

one of the sources of controversy when it was developed. 

Many of the leaders in the government are former generals who 

led the liberation struggle, including Salva Kiir himself, the President, and a number of the others, and they have a long history of 

having fought. But there are others who are what we would call 

technocrats, people who come with skills in those areas. 

But I think this is the transition from drawing heavily, as they 

understandably have, on their military leaders to fill these positions, and some of them are extraordinarily good, to building a 

broader-based government that makes a clear separation between 

the government and the military. And that’s going to be part of 

what security sector reform and constitutional reform should do. 

28 

Senator LUGAR. Is there a basis that, as we witness this process 

unfolding, we could observe 3 or 4 years from now that essentially 

this Government looks much like those governments involved in 

the so-called Arab Spring? And by that, I mean the presence of a 

strong man or woman, as the case may be, who is not prepared to 

give up authority, and is surrounded by a subservient military. 

And if so, what will be the debate in our country as to what we 

have supported or helped produce, in this case? 

Ambassador LYMAN. I think the challenge—I think we have to 

really stay very close to these issues with the Government in South 

Sudan, because it’s very tempting, when you’re the overwhelming 

political as well as military force in the country, to just run it as 

a quasi one-party state, and see any challenges to you as something to push back on. And that’s a challenge. 

And we have NDI there and other organizations that we want to 

work with them closely to not let them go down that path. They 

talk about it. They’re very conscious of it. They’re aware that this 

is going to be a big challenge for them. 

But I think we have to keep those issues in our dialogue. It’s 

political openness. It’s fairness to allowing new political forces to 

develop. It’s human rights culture. And I think that has to be on 

our agenda all the time. 

Senator LUGAR. Now we just touched upon oil and agriculture, 

but let me carry this a little bit further. One of the points often 

made about the recent Egyptian experience was not just simply the 

young people in Tahrir Square, but the fact that there were millions of people throughout the country who very much lacked food 

this year. With the price of wheat having doubled, and Egypt 

dependent upon us, the United States, for 52 percent or 55 percent 

of their wheat, the amount of so-called subsidies, money disbursed 

out into the countryside, was inadequate. And, therefore, a lot of 

the revolt really came from people who were hungry. 

Now here we’re dealing with a South Sudan that we hope will 

develop an agricultural base. That can be true in the North and the 

South, for that matter, Darfur aside. But there’s only limited evidence of this at least thus far. And furthermore, as the Norwegians 

have suggested, you mentioned this, the oil may run out. So a crucial question for South Sudan, even if they get it right constitutionally, is how are people going to make a living there? Are 

projects focused entirely on agriculture development? Or is there 

any potential industry of any sort? 

Ambassador LYMAN. The food problem is true of both the North 

and the South. Food prices have been rising. There’s been a weakening of the currency, the Sudanese pound, which has raised the 

price of imported food. The South, which is dependent on the food 

coming from the North, as well from the South, is also faced with 

very high prices on food. This is, in my view, a very situation that 

both countries really have to deal with. 

And the investments in Sudan, the northern part, have not kept 

pace in food and should have. 

In the South, you just don’t have a lot of organized production, 

because of the displacement in the war. When you fly over it, 

again, you look for farms. You don’t see very many. 

29 

Agriculture should absorb opportunities for most people. But 

there are mining opportunities. There are even some tourism opportunities, because they discovered a huge amount of wildlife 

along the Nile in the South. It’s that potential, but you have to develop all the infrastructure for it. 

But I think in the South, agriculture is going to be very critical, 

and it’s going to make people more self-sufficient and reliable. It’s 

going to cut down the need for food imports, which they now rely 

on heavily. And then there are, as I say, mineral, other mining 

and other opportunities. Industry, maybe, if the infrastructure 

improves. 

If they join the East African Union, which they’re talking about, 

or COMESA, it does open up the opportunity for a bigger trading 

area. But I think their ability to profit from that is going to depend 

on developing more infrastructure and capacity. 

Senator LUGAR. Now, maybe this is for another hearing at some 

point, but on the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just say thank you very much. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Oh, thank you very much, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. And I’ll see you on the trail. 

Ambassador LYMAN. OK, thanks. 

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. I’ll conclude in just a moment. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Oh, sure, any time. 

Senator LUGAR. Essentially, one of the dilemmas in the development of agriculture in many African countries, leaving Sudan out 

of it altogether, has been this disagreement between the United 

States and our European friends on so-called genetically modified 

seed or procedures. And there still is a debate in Brussels. 

The Gates Foundation and the Department of Agriculture have 

pointed out that if one is looking for the kinds of yield increases 

that have made agriculture a very different situation in the United 

States, so-called genetically modified seed and procedures present 

a very viable option. I’ve seen the results of this on our own farm, 

my dad getting 40 or 50 bushels to the acre of corn, whereas we’re 

now getting 170. 

And this is why, as we take a look at the international involvement in Sudan, I’m hopeful that somehow a humane streak will 

come over all of us, Europeans as well as the United States, 

because otherwise the possibility of getting the kinds of yields that 

are going to be required to support that population are pretty 

distant. 

Now leaving aside all the other reasons for conflict, the most essential reason people may fight is a lack of food and the threat of 

widespread starvation. So I’m not putting too grim a note on my 

final question, and I’m hopeful that in our delegation to South 

Sudan, there are people who will be able to convince our partners 

of our position on this matter. This is important with regard to not 

only South Sudan, but really all of the assistance we’re giving to 

all African countries presently. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, you touched on an issue on which I 

have rather strong feeling, but I don’t know what the U.S. Government position is. But frankly, I think that debate has not been fair 

to Africa. And Paul Collier, the author of ‘‘The Bottom Billion,’’ 

wrote an article in Foreign Affairs not long ago making the same 

30 

point that you did and which I agree with, is that there are opportunities in this technology for Africa that may be vital and essential, and they ought to have the opportunity to develop those. 

So I happen to feel that way, too. I’ll have to check with others 

to see where the U.S. Government is. 

But Raj Shah, our USAID administrator, told me that in his visit 

to southern Sudan, the technology that we could introduce today 

would have a dramatic effect on the yields in southern Sudan. He’s 

very optimistic that we can do that, and he’s very focused on it. I 

hope you get a chance to talk to him, because he came back enthusiastic. 

Also the Minister of Agriculture, Anne Itto, in South Sudan is 

terrific. And she’s heavily focused on these opportunities. 

Senator LUGAR. This is great news. Both Raj Shah and the new 

secretary of agriculture in South Sudan appear to be on the right 

track when it comes to benefiting of the people of the country as 

well as formenting some degree of peace. 

Well, I join the chairman once again in thanking you so much 

for your coming today. This has been a very important hearing, 

and you’ve given very important and encouraging testimony to us. 

Ambassador LYMAN. Well, thank you. It’s a great privilege always to be before you, Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. And I will conclude by saying the hearing is 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BISHOP ANDUDU ADAM ELNAIL, EPISCOPAL BISHOP

OF THE DIOCESE OF KADUGLI, SUDAN

It is devastating and saddening, as a church and community leader, to know that 

my people of Southern Kordofan—friends, brothers and sisters, children, my flock— 

have been killed mercilessly and are lying now in mass graves in Kadugli. To me, 

these people are not numbers and statistics but people I interact with in the market, in the church pews, in schools and villages. 

I ask the world, Open your eyes and your heart for the suffering of the people 

of South Kordofan, not only Christians, but my Muslim brothers and sisters who 

are facing the same. 

My sincere request to the United States and to the larger international community is to: 

Protect the Nuba people and stop the Sudan Armed Forces planes that are bombing the civilians. 

Send an effective peacekeeping force to monitor the situation, as serious new 

negotiations have to start to bring freedom and lasting peace for all marginalized 

people in Sudan. 

Send humanitarian organizations to bring food, medicine, and aid to the tens of 

thousands of displaced civilians. 

I hope that the sources of the evidence, the eyewitnesses, will be protected, and 

the evidence of mass graves preserved and fully investigated to seek justice for the 

slaughter of an untold number of civilians. 

At this the time, I call all marginalized people to unite for peace and reconciliation, to stop this state-sponsored ethnic cleansing campaign, and to show the 

strength and unity that comes from a respect for our diversity. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE ENOUGH PROJECT

Thank you Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar for holding today’s hearing at this critical moment for the two Sudans and allowing the Enough Project to 

submit this statement for the record. Through policy recommendations to the U.S. 

31 

Government and the building of a permanent constituency concerned with genocide 

and crimes against humanity, the Enough Project hopes to play a role in the international effort toward securing peace in both Sudans. This statement for the record 

urges Members of Congress to recognize the insecurity that prevails in Sudan after 

secession and that a change in current U.S. policy is needed to bring lasting peace. 

The U.S.’s current strategy incorrectly treats Sudan’s multiple conflicts as disparate 

crises and must shift to a more comprehensive approach that recognizes these conflicts as symptoms of the same crisis of governance in Sudan today. 

SUMMARY

Two new states—not one—joined the ranks of the international community on 

July 9, 2011, the day that marked the official independence of South Sudan from 

the remaining northern two-thirds of the country. Much attention has been focused 

on the obstacles that the new South Sudan will face. Less has been said of the fragility and potential for mass conflict that exists in what will be left of Sudan itself, 

and the policy changes needed to address this reality. 

Since its independence, Sudan has experienced more years of violence than peace. 

Decades of misguided government policies under multiple regimes have economically and politically favored the Arab Riverine people while trying to impose a singular Arab-Islamic identity over what is an ethnically, religiously, and culturally diverse population. In the process, many communities have been left aggrieved and 

disenfranchised, which on numerous occasions has triggered violent rebellion, particularly on Sudan’s peripheries. But instead of political reform or decentralization 

of power, Sudanese governments have consistently employed a strategy of divide 

and conquer, often accompanied by violent oppression. The consequences of these 

tactics were most vividly illustrated by the human devastation of the genocide in 

Darfur and the North-South civil war, and continue today in the Nuba Mountains. 

More generally, this strategy has resulted in a chronically unstable Sudanese state, 

a situation that secession does not change. 

The international community’s robust push for southern independence, while successful, has been the continuation of a longstanding piecemeal approach to Sudan 

that addresses the symptoms, rather than the root causes of the country’s conflicts. 

Such an approach, marked by multiple peacekeeping missions and peace talks, has 

not achieved lasting or comprehensive peace throughout all of Sudan. 

The international community must rethink its strategy vis-a-vis the North by 

pushing for a comprehensive approach that is inclusive of all of Sudan’s regions and 

addresses the national issues that lie at the heart of all of Sudan’s fissures. The 

fundamentally similar grievances that exist across Sudan’s peripheries must be addressed on the national level, starting with an inclusive constitutional process that 

brings talks taking place between the government and these peripheral communities 

into a single conversation. Without this necessary shift in policy, sustained peace 

and stability in both Sudans and the larger region will be impossible. 

Southern secession ushers in an opportunity to begin to do this. The confluence 

of heightened economic pressures and political energy represents a moment of political reconfiguration in Sudan which could force the ruling National Congress Party, 

or NCP, to rethink its strategy going forward. The international community should 

do the same. 

POCKETS OF INSTABILITY AND HUMAN INSECURITY ACROSS SUDAN

Even with the secession of the South, Sudan continues to be plagued by multiple 

conflicts within its borders, as well as the potential for new conflicts to emerge. The 

most volatile of these in recent years have been the conflicts in the western region 

of Darfur, and in the Nuba Mountains region of South Kordofan state. The eastern 

and far northern areas of Sudan have previously organized formidable opposition 

movements to the regime, but these regions have remained relatively calm in recent 

years. Given the divisions that Khartoum has sowed among its population and its 

precarious economic situation, there is a chance that the number of conflicts within 

the North could increase. 

Years after George W. Bush’s administration first called the governmentinstigated violence in Darfur a genocide, this western region of Sudan continues to 

experience insecurity. Between December 2010 and March 2011 alone, the U.N. recorded over 70,000 Darfuris who were newly displaced, while over 80 government 

aerial attacks against civilian targets have already been documented so far this 

year. With the abandonment of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, the continued 

failure of peace negotiations in Doha, and the further splintering and realignment 

of rebel groups, it does not appear that the violence suffered by civilians will end 

any time soon. 

32 

In June, fighting between government forces and northern fighters previously allied with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or SPLA, erupted in the border state 

of South Kordofan, following disputed elections and attempts by the northern Sudanese army to forcibly disarm the aggrieved fighters. Fighting, marked by indiscriminate air attacks, has spread throughout the state, displacing a reported 73,000 people. Reports coming from the ground indicate that government forces are targeting 

civilians along ethnic and political lines, committing summary executions, and conducting house-to-house searches for opposition sympathizers. Humanitarian access 

to vulnerable populations remains limited. 

Other budding flashpoints have the potential to erupt into new conflicts as fractures between communities historically aligned with Khartoum and the government 

have grown. For example, disillusion with the government has spread among the 

nomadic Misseriya, many of whom were employed by the Sudanese Government as 

militias during the North-South war. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement, or CPA, and the accompanying loss of government favor, left many 

Misseriya with a growing sense of abandonment and estrangement from the government. Recent reports of intense recruitment of Misseriya by the Justice and Equality Movement, or JEM, a Darfuri rebel group, signal the potential flashpoint that 

members of the Misseriya could pose should the perception of marginalization by 

the government prevail. 

Economic pressures on the North may result in the unraveling of a NCP-headed 

patronage system that has helped the party maintain power in its own and select 

constituencies’ hands. Cuts to the North’s expenditures means that support for the 

NCP may falter in some quarters—especially among those constituencies in the peripheries that have been NCP allies despite the regime’s treatment of their regions—and open up new sources of grievances to manage. Citing an incident in 

which a Darfur state governor threatened violence after the amount of federal 

money disbursed to his state had significantly been cut, the International Crisis 

Group offers this assessment: ‘‘[I]f the [NCP] loses the ability to provide benefits,’’ 

profiteers of the patronage system ‘‘could easily abandon it. (. . .) Disagreements over 

resource allocation of many kinds are becoming extremely divisive (. . .).’’ Other 

measures taken to soften the economic blow have also stirred up unrest. Austerity 

measures, such as cuts to key subsidies, led to scattered protests in early 2011. 

Khartoum’s faulty efforts at reinvigorating its agricultural sector as a means of generating non-oil revenue has in some cases led to increased dissatisfaction among 

farmers. 

SAME REGIME, SAME TACTICS

Sudan will continue to be governed under the same regime that views stoking the 

peripheral unrest as its preferred means of ensuring personal survival, and has 

overseen nearly perpetual violence against its own population. The actions and 

words of the Khartoum regime in recent months offer little indication that the leadership will move toward a more inclusive strategy that addresses current and future 

dissent with genuine engagement rather than oppression, violence, and co-optation. 

An undemocratic vision of Sudan 

In mid-December, President Bashir announced that if southern secession took 

place, Sharia would continue to be the source of law and that ‘‘there will be no time 

to speak of diversity of culture and ethnicity.’’ This vision of Sudan sits at odds with 

the patchwork of varying religions and tribes in the country and threatens the many 

minority communities who do not identify with or support Bashir’s version of an 

Arab-Islamist state. Bashir’s words suggest that the regime will continue to pursue 

policies that favor the NCP’s interpretation of political Islam and concentrate political, economic, and military power among the northern Riverine elite, further fueling the roots of conflict in Sudan. 

VIOLENT MANAGEMENT OF DISSENT

The Sudanese Government continues to silence political dissent using brutal tactics. Scattered protests since January across major cities in Sudan have been met 

with force by the regime’s omnipresent and sophisticated security apparatus. Arbitrary arrests and beatings are consistently employed to put an end to demonstrations; detainees have come forward to describe the severe psychological and physical 

torture committed by members of the government security services, including harsh 

beatings, electric shocks, sexual assault, and threats of those violent acts. The NCP 

defends its actions by invoking the state of emergency law, which is still in place 

in Darfur, Kassala, and Red Sea states, as well as the National Security Act, which 

was put in place in 2009. The state of emergency has been repeatedly used by the 

government as a means to arbitrarily arrest and detain people incommunicado, as 

33 

well as to ban gatherings and peaceful demonstrations that may be political in nature. The National Security Act grants sweeping powers to the National Intelligence 

and Security Services, or NISS, including to arbitrarily arrest and detain, and to 

search and seize. Together, they allow the government to effectively intimidate or 

silence those who might speak against it. 

Across Sudan’s restive regions, the regime also uses military means to respond 

to what are fundamentally social and political problems—even while peace processes 

remain an option. Indiscriminant air attacks, targeting of civilians based on political 

sympathies and ethnic affiliations, manipulation and obstruction of international 

humanitarian assistance, and the use of proxy militias to sow divisions between 

long coexisting communities, continue to be committed by Khartoum’s forces in 

Darfur and South Kordofan. In South Kordofan, serious allegations of a government 

policy of ethnic cleansing have emerged. 

POLITICAL MACHINATIONS

Khartoum continues to disingenuously engage in peace processes related to Sudan’s various conflicts, be it through the nonimplementation of agreements it has 

already signed or through the manner of its participation in currently ongoing talks, 

such as those regarding Abyei, post-referendum issues, Darfur, and the ‘‘Two 

Areas,’’ South Kordofan and Blue Nile. 

During the Darfur peace negotiations in Doha, Khartoum sent representatives 

lacking decisionmaking authority and put in place plans to domesticate the peace 

process, in order to manipulate the talks and undermine international involvement. 

At present, the NCP is pushing for the Liberty and Justice Movement, or LJM, to 

sign a draft document that has no hope of securing peace, but that will undoubtedly 

advance the government’s plans to push the international community out of the 

process. 

Despite ongoing negotiations to break the impasse on Abyei, the Sudanese regime 

forcibly occupied the region, strengthening its bargaining position vis-a-vis other 

post-referendum issues and creating an environment in which the holding of a referendum, or any other kind of negotiated resolution, would be impossible with the 

SPLM. Similarly, Khartoum allowed its military to engage in hostile actions against 

the northern sector of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, or SPLM–N, even 

though the CPA provisions for South Kordofan and Blue Nile had not been fulfilled 

and the African Union, or A.U., was already in the midst of negotiating the status 

of those fighters after secession. 

International mediators have often played into the hands of the NCP by allowing 

Khartoum to constantly change the rules of the game. In Darfur, for example, the 

government has been pushing for an internal ‘‘Darfur Political Process’’ as the only 

forum for talks despite the importance for negotiations to take place on neutral and 

secure ground. This idea has received support from some members of the international community, even though it remains incredibly impractical at this time. In 

talks on Abyei, the A.U. has consistently failed to press the NCP to make the necessary compromises, either on the definition of ‘‘Abyei resident’’ in order to hold the 

referendum, or when an exhaustive list of extra-CPA solutions were put on the 

table. Further, through its May invasion of the area, the government has successfully changed the conversation from the status of Abyei to the more immediate problem of securing SAF’s retreat, thus delaying negotiations on the most crucial issues. 

Khartoum’s political machinations are also well-documented in its management of 

the April 2010 elections, and its questionable involvement in the South Kordofan 

elections in May. In Darfur, long before the April elections, for example, the NCP 

had changed the political reality on the ground in Darfur by manipulating the census and registration processes, and redrawing electoral districts in its favor. 

A SITUATION IN FLUX

South Sudan’s secession will produce two fragile states that demand the continued attention of the international community. In the North, a period of political maneuvering is taking place alongside a number of critical processes that will help 

shape the state that Sudan becomes after secession. The international community 

should seize upon this window of opportunity—as the Sudanese leadership recalculates its relationship to its constituencies, its allies, its opponents, and the international community—to encourage the regime to engage in genuine dialogue with 

its population and move toward more inclusive governance, for the sake of its own 

stability and its future relationships with other countries. 

Post-secession economic woes and increasing political pressures have necessitated 

a rethink within the NCP. Economic pressures resulting from the loss of oil revenues associated with secession could lead Khartoum to greater engagement with the 

34 

West, resulting in greater international leverage over Khartoum’s actions. At the 

same time, hardliners within the NCP have reportedly strengthened relations with 

Eritrean officials, cooperating in the trafficking of weapons through eastern Sudan 

for financial compensation. Some of those routes reportedly end in Gaza and begin 

in Tehran, adding Iran to the list of parties disinterested in the normalization of 

Sudan’s relations with the larger international community, and especially the U.S. 

Politically, the NCP is also under pressure from some constituencies for its decision 

to let go of the South. A number of recent decisions made by the government—military invasion and occupation of Abyei, the sacking of former security advisor Salah 

Gosh, considered a moderate among Bashir’s top associates, and attacks in South 

Kordofan—suggest that at the moment the NCP is intent on appeasing hardliners 

in the party and the military. 

The South’s secession has also prompted political posturing by opposition parties 

in the North seeking to fill the open seats in government left by the SPLM. In early 

2011, a number of mainstream opposition parties came together as the National Coalition Front, or NCF, and called for a constitutional conference and a number of 

reforms, threatening regime change if those demands were not met. Although the 

coalition has issued the occasional public statement together, it has largely fragmented. In particular, the mainline opposition parties the Umma and the Democratic Union Party, or DUP, have entered into separate bilateral talks at the invitation of the NCP, undercutting the leverage that opposition unity might have posed, 

to the ire of other members. 

Dialogue between the Umma and the NCP appears to have yielded progress on 

a number of key issues. Despite this progress, however, it is unlikely that talks will 

result in any kind of dramatic reform or political transformation. The Umma and 

the DUP appear to be more interested in what share of the government they can 

acquire—which depends on cooperation with the NCP—than in any substantive 

changes to how Sudan is governed. The NCP’s main concern appears to be accommodating these parties just enough to quell their dissent while maintaining its grip 

on power. More radical change is dependent on clear alternative political agendas, 

which the traditional opposition parties appear to lack, as well as the space for voicing differing perspectives, which the government prevents. 

In January, it seemed that the revolutionary fervor that had hit Tunis and Cairo 

would spread to Khartoum. Sudanese youth led protests against the regime and opposition parties, in cities and universities across the North in a sign of growing frustration with the entire political status quo. Scattered protests against austerity 

measures instituted by the government, the conflict in Darfur, and government attempts to take land without compensation, have also taken place. Thus far, protests 

have had little traction, because government security forces have swiftly crushed the 

demonstrations. 

The government is also faced with militant groups on the periphery, such as those 

in Darfur and South Kordofan, who recognize the links between violence in their 

regions and broader government policies and are therefore incorporating calls for 

national reforms into their negotiating positions. For instance, the JEM has called 

for ‘‘the effective participation of Darfur and all other Regions of Sudan in decisionmaking’’ on wealth-sharing. Similarly, one of the principles listed in the framework 

agreement outlining the path to peace for South Kordofan is ‘‘[a] commitment to balanced development in all parts of Sudan with special attention to Blue Nile, South 

Kordofan, and other less developed areas.’’ This is followed by the assertion that 

the, ‘‘[p]arties shall work together toward an inclusive national process in the 

Republic of Sudan, aimed at constitutional reform.’’ 

RETHINKING SUDAN’S MULTIPLE PROCESSES

A number of political processes have been underway in recent years that have the 

potential to begin to address the root causes of Sudan’s perennial instability. These 

processes—popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, peace talks and 

civil society consultations for Darfur, and a constitutional review—are ideally 

forums in which the wider Sudanese public and the various levels of government 

can engage in a conversation on how the new Sudanese state should be run. Without international engagement, the likelihood that the government will participate 

in these processes genuinely or allow these processes to be inclusive and transparent, is slim. 

THE ‘‘TWO AREAS’’: SOUTH KORDOFAN AND BLUE NILE

Popular consultations in Blue Nile and South Kordofan are exercises meant to ascertain whether the citizens of the two states are satisfied with their peace protocol 

in the CPA. The protocol lays out how these two areas, recognized as unique terriVerDate Nov 24 2008 16:39 Sep 19, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 1ST\2011 ISSUE TEXT HEARINGS\071411-BB.TX
35 

tories, should be administered—including, among other items, how power and 

wealth are shared between the federal government and the two states, and how 

land is managed. If the consultations ultimately demonstrate that residents are dissatisfied with the provisions in place, the states’ legislative assemblies can renegotiate with the government the terms of the states’ relationship with the center. Consultations have stalled in Blue Nile and been upended by the return to war in South 

Kordofan, but they should continue after July 9 according to the framework agreement signed between the NCP and SPLM–N on June 28. 

Internationally supported negotiations at the political party level, between SPLM– 

N and the NCP, will also be ongoing. Aside from securing a cease-fire and political 

arrangements amenable to both parties in South Kordofan, talks will likely touch 

on the relationship between the two states and the center, and the role the SPLM– 

N is allowed to play in the constitutional review. 

DARFUR

Negotiations in Doha between rebel groups and the government have been ongoing since February 2009. The content of the talks have included, among other 

things, the level of political power given to the region on the national stage, the distribution of wealth, issues of justice and reconciliation, and issues affecting the displaced, such as their return, land, and compensation. Currently, only two rebel 

groups, JEM and LJM, out of a number of other groups engaged in fighting, are 

participating in the talks. In April, international mediators put forward a draft 

agreement that some observers believe is a weak document whose provisions will 

be unenforceable. The NCP is encouraging LJM to sign the agreement, while JEM 

has put forward its own draft document in response, which has been rejected by the 

NCP. 

At the same time, the Sudanese Government, the A.U., and the AU–U.N. Mission 

in Darfur, or UNAMID, are pushing for the continuation of the peace process inside 

Darfur, which would consist of consultations with Darfuri citizens without rebel representation. This comes in the wake of the All Darfur Stakeholders’ Conference, 

which brought approximately 500 Darfuri leaders to Doha to express their views 

and concerns about the peace process, and to gain their buy-in for the draft peace 

document. Although the participants were allowed the unique opportunity to publicly vent their frustrations, the government’s continuing control over stakeholder 

participation and its refusal to discuss Darfur in the context of wider Sudanese 

issues, suggest that the potential for the stakeholder conference to lead to significant change was limited from the outset and the potential for any internal process 

to bear fruit at this time is virtually negligible. 

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

The interim constitution that has governed Sudan since the signing of the CPA 

needs to be replaced with a permanent constitution. Under the CPA, the constitution should be the result of a review process that ‘‘provide[s] for political inclusiveness and public participation.’’ Among other key details, the language of the text 

should define the structure of the Sudanese Government, the source of legislation 

in the country (currently Sharia and customary law), citizenship, and the rights of 

the Sudanese population. The document should also touch deeply on those issues 

that have become important in discussions in the peripheries—including how to 

draw the administrative regions of Sudan (15 states or 6 regions), define the type 

of federalism or relationship that should be in place between states and the center, 

and lay out how wealth is distributed throughout the country. 

The process of drafting and approving the document is as crucial as the text of 

the constitution itself. Civil society groups representing all 15 states in the North 

have come together to collectively call for a ‘‘participatory, inclusive, and transparent constitution-making process’’ and a ‘‘nationally owned nationally respected 

constitution that reflects the needs and aspiration of the people of Sudan.’’ The coalition also highlighted the need for wide civic education to be conducted in order for 

dialogue to be substantive and genuinely participatory. A transparent, participatory, 

and inclusive Sudan-wide dialogue on its future constitution should be viewed as an 

important means of empowering the Sudanese people to decide the future of their 

state. 

In May, the government floated vague details of a constitutional review process 

during a U.N. meeting that appears to fall well short of the mark. During the meeting, government officials revealed that a ‘‘National Committee’’ for constitutionmaking would be created, consisting of 300 to 400 members nominated by the President. Political parties and civil society would be allowed to participate, though 

remarks by officials at the time suggest that the selection of who gets to participate 

36 

and with what degree of representation would be government-controlled. The committee would be charged with holding consultative meetings—likely only one per 

state—followed by a referendum on the final draft. Participants in the meeting 

predicted that the mandate of the committee would be very broad given officials’ 

preliminary descriptions, and noted that officials voiced skepticism over wider 

consultations with the public because of the financial costs. Officials proposed a 

4-month timeline, beginning after July 9, for the review. 

Thus far, opposition parties have mistakenly only focused on the content of the 

future constitution, rather than engaging with the government on the review process itself. Some parties have demonstrated no clear vision on an ideal process, and 

have appeared disorganized and vague in their response to the government’s proposed plans. 

Talks in Doha have, to some extent, led to a larger conversation about the need 

for national reform. However, the government, in response, has expressed its unwillingness to address these nationwide issues through its Darfur negotiations. Instead, 

it has pushed for a Darfur-based process that, even in its most perfect form, would 

not even begin to address the broader policies of Khartoum that led to regional unrest in the first place. 

The framework agreement signed between the NCP and the SPLM–N on June 28, 

stated that, ‘‘The Popular Consultations Process is a democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the people of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile and 

shall be complete and its outcomes fully implemented and fed into the constitutional 

reform.’’ While undoubtedly an encouraging sign, the document itself is simply a 

‘‘framework,’’ not a binding agreement. 

ONE PROCESS GOING FORWARD

The merits of holding separate tracks of negotiations on top of a national process, 

which in theory would address many of the same issues, should be reexamined. 

Fundamentally, grievances in Darfur, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan are based on 

questions of how power and wealth is distributed throughout Sudan, which in turn 

tie to questions of Sudanese identity and the relationship between the country’s diverse communities. These questions are not exclusive to Darfur, South Kordofan, or 

Blue Nile; they are national issues that can only be genuinely addressed at the national level. 

The plurality of processes, while seemingly all-encompassing, poses a challenge to 

the future of Sudan.The danger is that separate consultations will ultimately pit peripheries, all claiming pieces from the same pie, against each other. Additionally, 

discussing national issues with select regional actors has the potential to encourage 

other regions to agitate for their own unique relationship with the center. For example, discussions on wealth-sharing in South Kordofan and Blue Nile have reportedly 

piqued the interest of the state government in another northern state, Sennar, to 

negotiate a better wealth-sharing deal itself. This is especially threatening under 

the watch of a regime that has long mastered the art of sowing divisions between 

its various constituencies. 

The recognition that a national dialogue is needed to address the root causes of 

Sudan’s crises is not a new concept. In an effort to create a New Sudan, in 1986 

a large number of Sudanese political parties and civil society representatives issued 

a declaration that proposed a National Constitutional Conference, which would discuss questions of Sudanese nationality, religion, human rights, system of rule, and 

culture. More contemporary models are also worth examining. For example, the popular consultations that have taken place in Blue Nile could be replicated on a wider 

scale as a means to engage with the Sudanese public on the draft of a constitution. 

How talks in the peripheries can feed into, or are at least coordinated with a national process is a complicated task, one that will require the juggling of multiple 

agendas and personalities. On the one end, the processes in Darfur and the two 

areas could be completely scrapped in favor of a new, nationwide process that brings 

everyone to the table. On the other, the different tracks could continue to proceed 

in parallel, followed by last-minute efforts to reconcile and coordinate the resolutions of each. Another option that has also been proposed, is to continue the discussion on issues particular to the regions in regional talks, while separating out 

national questions for discussion at the national level. 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

The international community must be smarter in its engagement with Khartoum 

after July 9, shifting its strategy to one that reframes the country’s multiple conflicts as manifestations of the same disease: government policies that concentrate 

wealth and power at the center at the expense of the people on the peripheries. 

37 

While the United States has been a critical actor in the history of international diplomacy with Khartoum, Washington’s hand will be constrained in pushing for a national reconciliation process. As a result of its own policy that was unveiled in November 2010, the U.S.’s biggest points of leverage are tied to the implementation 

of the CPA and a resolution to the conflict in Darfur. U.S. officials have also shown 

reluctance toward the inclusion of national issues in the Darfur talks, citing doubts 

over rebel movements’ sincerity to push for a broader agenda, as well as the Sudanese government’s own unwillingness to discuss national issues in that context. 

Nevertheless, the U.S. can begin to engage in the peace processes for Darfur and 

the Two Areas as pieces of a necessary national process, rather than as end goals 

unto themselves. A strategic rethink beginning in the U.S. Special Envoy’s office is 

necessary to examine some critical questions: How does the U.S. approach Sudan 

as a whole? And how can the separate processes be sequenced to feed into a national 

process? 

In its public and private communications to Khartoum, as well as international 

actors with influence over the regime, it is important that the U.S. conveys its expectations of a participatory, inclusive, and transparent constitutional review process. Particular emphasis should be placed on the quality of the process, not just its 

outcome. Support for a constitutional review should be accompanied by U.S. and 

international pressure on Khartoum to create an environment conducive to genuine 

dialogue including greater respect for human rights. This pressure can and should 

be enhanced by U.S. support for and engagement with civil society and political parties, as well as its support for initiatives that foster independent media in Sudan, 

such as Radio Dabanga. 

The U.S. must continue its diplomatic response to the ongoing crisis, which should 

be centered around pressure on Khartoum to protect its civilians, and a push for 

a cease-fire in South Kordofan. Consistent with stated Sudan policy, steps toward 

normalization should be suspended absent progress on the ground. The expansion 

of targeted sanctions and other unilateral and multilateral consequences for individuals responsible for fomenting war in Sudan can and should form an integral component of this effort. Going forward, however, the deployment of such pressures— 

or any other diplomatic tools—must secure more than just another regional peace 

agreement; it should be used to advance the greater goal of laying the foundation 

for sustainable peace throughout the whole of Sudan. 

Æ