UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 1:14-cr-20427-2 

 

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

 United States District Judge 

KWAME AMIN MATHEWS, 

 Defendant. 

_________________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE 

RELEASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

Eight years ago, Defendant Kwame Amin Mathews pleaded guilty to one count of aiding 

and abetting the distribution of cocaine base. He was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment and 

three years’ supervised release. 

He has since filed his fifth motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(c)(1)(A), arguing COVID-19 and the First Step Act warrant a sentence reduction. 

As explained below, Defendant’s request will be denied because he has neither exhausted 

his administrative remedies nor demonstrated that the § 3553 factors warrant release. 

I. 

Defendant seeks a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)—a form of relief 

commonly referred to as “compassionate release.” A motion for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A) 

requires a two-part analysis. 

The first part is exhaustion. Defendants seeking compassionate release must request a 

reduction from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and then either (1) “fully exhaust all administrative 

rights” or (2) wait until “30 days [have elapsed] from the receipt of such a request by the warden.” 

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See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). This exhaustion requirement is a “mandatory claim-processing 

rule[]” that “must be enforced” if “properly invoked.” United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 834 

(6th Cir. 2020). 

The second part involves the Sixth Circuit’s three-step test: 

At step one, a court must find whether extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warrant a sentence reduction. At step two, a court must find whether such a 

reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 

Commission. At step three, § 3582(c)(1)(A) instructs a court to consider any 

applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction 

authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part under the particular 

circumstances of the case. 

United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1107–08 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). If any of § 

3582(c)(1)(A)’s three prerequisites are missing, then the court may deny compassionate release 

without addressing the other factors. United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021). 

II. 

A. 

The first issue is whether, before filing his motion, Defendant requested compassionate 

release from the BOP and then either (1) received a denial and fully exhausted his administrative 

remedies or (2) received no response but waited at least 30 days before filing his motion. See 18 

U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Defendant provides two reasons for compassionate release: (1) COVID-19 and (2) the First 

Step Act. See ECF No. 386. 

But he has not presented either argument to the BOP. See generally id. “This Court may 

consider arguments not presented to the BOP.” United States v. Hopkins, No. 1:18-CR-20166, 

2022 WL 187770, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2022) (collecting cases). But the purpose of § 

3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is to ensure that the BOP can consider an inmate’s request 

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first. See Alam, 960 F.3d at 835–36. The BOP has not yet had the opportunity to consider whether 

COVID-19 or the First Step Act justify releasing Defendant or reducing his sentence at this time. 

Neither reason is exigent enough to remove the BOP from the equation. See United States v. 

Curney, No. 1:15-cr-20314, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192581, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2021). 

Therefore, Defendant has not exhausted his administrative remedies, and his Motion will be denied 

without prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Hogg, No. 1:11-CR-20220, 2022 WL 851719, at *3 

(E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2022).

The next issue is whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify reducing 

Defendant’s sentence. Because he did not exhaust either reason, however, this Court will not 

address whether they are extraordinary or compelling. 

B. 

Ordinarily, this Court would decline to proceed to the issue of whether the § 3553 factors 

warrant release, because the lack of exhaustion is dispositive. See United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 

516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of 

the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others.”). 

But, to be thorough, this Court will consider the § 3553 factors: 

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 

provide just punishment for the offense; 

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 

(3) the kinds of sentences available; 

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of 

defendant as set forth in the guidelines... 

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(5) any pertinent policy statement... 

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar 

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

The burden is on Defendant to “make a compelling case as to why the . . . § 3553(a) analysis 

would be different if conducted today.” United States v. Sherwood, 986 F.3d 951, 954 (6th Cir. 

2021) (noting that “the district court’s initial balancing of the § 3553(a) factors . . . [is presumed 

to] remain[] an accurate assessment”). Defendant has not met his burden. 

Defendant was not entitled to release when the § 3553(a) factors were considered before. 

During his April 2015 sentencing hearing, this Court considered various § 3553(a) factors on the 

record, including the nature of his offense and circumstances. See ECF No. 149 at PageID.950–

53. In denying Defendant’s second motion for compassionate release, this Court again analyzed 

the § 3553 factors and found them to weigh against a sentence reduction. See ECF No. 327 at 

PageID.2194 (noting that “Defendant ha[d] only served 40% of his 151-month sentence” and that 

the underlying offense “was not his first drug-related offense”). That analysis satisfied the Sixth 

Circuit. See United States v. Mathews, 846 F. App’x 362, 369 (6th Cir. 2021) (unpublished). 

Defendant does not explain why those analyses were flawed or what, if anything, has 

changed since his last motion for compassionate release was denied. Further, Defendant has served 

approximately 60% of his 151-month sentence. See ECF No. 364 at PageID.2453. And his criminal 

history is just as serious as it was in June 2020, when his first motion for compassionate release 

was denied. 

Defendant merely asserts he should be released in December 2022 under the First Step Act. 

Not so. Defendant was sentenced as a career offender; the First Step Act did not change that 

definition. Mathews, 846 F. App’x at 369. Defendant adds that he takes “full responsibility for 

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[his] wrong decisions” and has “rebuilt [his] values” and will not end up in front of this Court 

again. ECF No. 386 at PageID.2546. Although Defendant’s aspirations are commendable, he has 

not demonstrated how his unmet goals outweigh the countervailing § 3553(a) analyses. 

Simply put, Defendant has not carried his burden. See Alyssa C. Hennig, Note, An 

Examination of Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Treatment of MDMA (“Ecstasy”), 1 BELMONT L.

REV. 267, 272 (2014) (“Section 3553(a)(2) requires that a defendant’s sentence be ‘sufficient, but 

not greater than necessary.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a))). So, his Motion will be denied. 

III. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF 

No. 386, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

Dated: September 29, 2022 s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

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