No. 235, October 2008 Strategic Forum 1

first is that Europe will be focusing on economic 

and social issues. The second is a lack of agreement among key European leaders.

One change that can result in better U.S.-

European relations is an end to tension between 

the United States and France. President Nicolas 

Sarkozy’s intention to return France to full NATO 

membership in 2009 provides the opportunity to 

restore relations. 

In short, Europe’s ability to work with (and 

influence) the United States is limited by its 

self-imposed weakness in international security, 

which is the logical consequence of the EU’s 

political structure and worldview. America may 

have no choice but to turn to Asia for support if 

it wishes to remain an international arbiter. Perhaps a different kind of relationship with a more 

activist China and India will be needed to manage global instability. If so, the Euro-American 

age will have come to a close. 

Reengaging Europe

In the face of economic and military difficulties, the next U.S. administration will likely 

return to a more multilateral foreign policy. It 

will look favorably on working with international 

organizations. It will focus on greater cooperation with allies. Above all, it will turn to Europe. 

But how will Europe respond when the 

next American President seeks to renew the 

Euro-American partnership? What will the policy implications be if Europe cannot respond to 

an American overture for real partnership? 

Europe has been our most important 

strategic partner since World War II and 

Facing a worsening economic situation 

and a war in Iraq that will be difficult to end—in 

short, grave overstretch—the next U.S. administration will seek to return to a more multilateral 

foreign policy and attempt to work closely with 

Europe. But Europe may not be willing or able 

to meet American expectations to play a larger 

role in international security.

Europe has not become a federal United 

States of Europe, as French statesman Jean 

Monnet hoped, and it has failed to achieve consensus on institutions. At least for the next year, 

the European Union (EU) will be trying to find a 

way around the June 2008 defeat of the Lisbon 

Treaty, the set of institutional reforms aimed at 

streamlining the work of the enlarged union. 

Without adequate institutions to formulate and 

implement a common foreign policy, the EU 

cannot make effective use of military force. And 

without greater capability, Europe—whether as 

the EU, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or as individual states—will 

punch below its weight. 

The EU has derived much of its influence 

from enlargement, but it seems to have lost its 

nerve over the possibility of Turkish membership. NATO expansion, meanwhile, has inflamed 

Russian resentments and helped to trigger the 

Georgian crisis. A more assertive Russia could 

divide Europe and complicate transatlantic ties; a 

threatening Russia could cement them. 

There are two further limitations to effective 

European action on the international level. The 

 Strategic Forum No. 235

October 2008

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

The Absence of Europe: Implications 

for International Security?

by Steven Philip Kramer

remains a central player in the world. The 

2003 Iraq War shook the foundations of U.S.-

European relations. Although dialogue has 

improved since 2003, we have not yet recovered the close friendship that existed previously. The George W. Bush administration 

is following a different policy toward Europe 

than it did in its first term, but only a new 

American President and a new political orientation can improve the political climate, 

making possible a constructive transatlantic 

dialogue and ultimately a new global project. A better relationship with Europe is not 

only an end in itself, but also an important 

means of managing the increasingly disorderly world in which we live. 

Renewing relations with Europe will 

require the United States to take into 

account European sensitivities and priorities. This will include a clear American 

willingness to put diplomacy first and 

the use of force only as a last resort—

as, for example, in the case of Iran. The 

Europeans would like us to deal with the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict from a more 

balanced point of view. They want the 

United States to address climate change as 

a priority, as they have done. There should 

be no reason why the United States cannot 

satisfy these European wishes, since these 

policies would be in our interest as well. 

It is not clear, however, that Europe will 

be able to respond even to an American initiative of which it approves. There are great 

limits to what Europe can do, and to what it 

wishes to do, globally. 
What Kind of Europe?

Jean Monnet’s vision for an integrated 

Europe had two main dimensions: to end 

Franco-German conflict and, with it, European 

wars; and to create a United States of Europe. 

The first goal has been achieved beyond all 

hopes. Western Europe has become a peace 

zone, and since the fall of the Soviet Union, the 

European Union (EU) has successfully incorporated the Warsaw Pact and Baltic countries. 

Old feuds, like those between Germany and 

Poland, and Hungary and its neighbors, have 

been defused. The EU is attempting to do the 

same thing in the Balkans. Although the problems there are notoriously difficult to resolve, 

some states, such as Croatia, are casting aside 

their traditional enmities and moving toward a 

Western orientation. 

But the EU is not now, and is unlikely 

to become, the United States of Europe. Was 

this ever a realistic possibility? Could the 

nations of Europe, with their diverse cultures 

and languages, have become a federal state? 

Would they have surrendered many of their 

key powers to a freely elected European government? At least in the 20 years following 

World War II, leaders seemed to take this possibility seriously. If Europe has not become 

federated, however, the blame should not 

be projected on the “periphery”: the United 

Kingdom, Scandinavian nations, and states of 

the former Soviet bloc. It lies rather with the 

ambivalence of the founders of federation—

above all, with France. 

The debate over the nature of Europe 

has been largely a Franco-French debate. Jean 

Monnet based European integration on a federal model. In the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle 

arrested movement toward federalism. Valery 

Giscard d’Estaing and François Mitterrand 

did not share de Gaulle’s discomfort with 

European integration and began to conceive 

of Europe as a vehicle for French influence 

in the world—a kind of France writ large—

but they wanted a Europe that was primarily 

intergovernmental, not federal. 

After its enlargement to include the former Warsaw Pact states, the EU needed to 

Dr. Steven Philip Kramer is Professor of National Security Studies in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

at the National Defense University. Comments or questions may be sent to the author at kramers@ndu.edu.

change its institutional structure. In 2004, 

d’Estaing presided over a constitutional convention that he unwisely compared to the one 

held in Philadelphia in 1787. What was produced at the convention was far less than a 

new founding document, far less than a real 

constitution. Nor did the document (not really 

a constitution but a compendium of treaties as 

modified) represent a people’s Europe. It was 

not achieved by popular means and would not 

be governed by them. Moreover, a system of 

European government that is not democratically elected will always suffer from a problem 

of legitimacy. The French and Dutch voters 

turned the constitution down.

After 2 years of travail, EU leaders thought they had rescued key institutional elements of this constitution in the 

Lisbon Treaty. This document was kept as 

far away as possible from the voters on the 

pretext that it did not really constitute a 

significant change to EU institutions. But 

Irish law required a referendum, and Irish 

voters turned it down. So another year will 

be spent on deciding whether the Lisbon 

Treaty can be resubmitted to the Irish 

electorate or whether Europe will have to 

live with the current institutional framework (created by the Nice Summit) that 

it is struggling to replace. The EU model 

seems to have reached the end of its effectiveness, but it cannot be changed either.

Without adequate institutions to formulate and implement a common foreign policy, the EU cannot make effective use of military force. And without greater capability, 

Europe—whether as the EU, through the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 

or as individual states—will punch below 

its weight. The United Kingdom and France 

have struggled to maintain state-of-theart militaries that can act independently or 

under NATO or EU command (but as the 

new French White Book on defense shows, 

France cannot sustain current defense spending and will decrease boots on the ground). 

Germany, Europe’s richest and most populous nation, has a small defense budget and 

an antiquated defense structure. Its passive 

resistance to defense spending minimizes 

Europe’s role in global security. The maintenance of systems of national—and in some 

cases, territorial—defense in the rest of 

Europe means that most of the money spent 

will do little to create real European capability. It used to be said that Europe spent 

60 percent of the American military budget and got 10 percent of its capability. That 

is not likely to change greatly. A new study 

from the International Institute for Strategic 

Studies (IISS) suggests ways to improve 

Europe’s ability to intervene globally. It 

points out that only 2.7 percent of all service 

personnel can deploy abroad on crisis management operations. It advocates better use 

of existing defense budgets, better procurement, and closer Franco-British cooperation 

as the backbone of European cooperation.1

But even under favorable circumstances, 

these changes would produce quantitative, 

not qualitative, improvement.

As the IISS report states, behind the 

issue of budgets and capabilities is the 

question of will. Robert Kagan has pointed 

out that Europe and America were diverging, the former moving in a Kantian direction, the latter in a Hobbesian.2

 According 

to Judy Dempsey, who chronicled Europe’s 

stumbling efforts to end Balkan conflict 

in the 1990s, the problem is not that the 

Europeans criticized the U.S. tendency to 

prefer hard power to soft power but that 

they are unwilling to accept that in some 

situations soft power alone is not sufficient. European efforts to apply soft power 

in Afghanistan have failed. Europeans 

were content so long as the United States 

without adequate 

institutions to formulate 

and implement a common

foreign policy, the EU 

cannot make effective 

use of military force

No. 235, October 2008 Strategic Forum 2
No. 235, October 2008 Strategic Forum 3

opposed creation of a vigorous European 

Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).3

 Now 

that the United States accepts its value, 

“Europeans are not intellectually—let 

alone militarily—prepared to go down that 

road.”4

 Taking into account Europe’s limited willingness to invest in hard power, one 

is struck by the almost mythic quality of 

the 20-year debate over ESDP, which proved 

so divisive to Europeans and so damaging 

to transatlantic relations even before Iraq. 

The Price of Enlargement

Another source of Europe’s weakness 

in global affairs is a result of “enlargement 

fatigue.” Much of the vaunted soft power 

of the EU stems from its attractiveness to 

surrounding states who aspire to membership. The prospect of membership helped 

consolidate democracy in Spain, Portugal, 

and Greece in the 1970s and in the states 

of the old Soviet bloc after the Cold War, 

and enabled the latter to weather the stressful transition to a market economy. It was 

the catalyst for resolution of longstanding 

rivalries and conflicts over minority rights 

and borders. The EU is attempting to do the 

same thing in the Balkans, an area that 

is notoriously difficult to reform. Recently, 

the EU played its cards well by leaving the 

door open to Serbian accession so as to 

favor Boris Tadic’s reelection as president of 

Serbia. His success then facilitated the capture of Radovan Karadzic, creating a virtuous circle that made further progress on 

membership possible. 

The EU has also paid an economic 

and political price for enlargement. Clearly, 

enlargement is directly responsible for the current institutional crisis. By admitting Cyprus 

before resolution of the communal question, 

the EU lost its leverage over the Greek Cypriot 

government, and Cyprus remains divided. 

Some of the new members have provided 

entrée into the EU for organized crime syndicates. There is a lot of unfinished business 

in the Balkans, and admitting Balkan states 

could further complicate the EU. 

Effective use of EU soft power to transform a nation through the prospect of 

membership has not played out according 

to plan with Turkey. The rules of the game 

were that membership would follow once 

chapter-by-chapter negotiations were successfully closed. For a long time, the EU 

did not negotiate membership with Turkey 

because of the Greek veto. Once that threat 

was withdrawn, the Recep Tayyip Erdogan 

government did a brilliant job of eliminating the EU’s alibis for postponement 

of membership negotiations by addressing issues of democracy and rule of law in 

Turkey and by playing a constructive role in 

the United Nations Cyprus negotiations. 

The EU formally opened talks with 

Turkey in 2005, but the rules of the game 

have since changed. Sarkozy has blocked 

negotiation of a series of crucial chapters. It 

is no longer the case that successful completion of negotiations will automatically result 

in Turkish membership. Leaders of several EU 

nations such as Germany, Austria, and France 

continue to oppose Turkish membership. 

The French erected barriers to Turkish membership by requiring a popular referendum 

on new EU members. (The French constitution has once again been changed, so that a 

3/5 vote of the National Assembly and Senate 

together can permit ratification of new EU 

members by a parliamentary vote rather than 

by referendum.) 

Initially, the Turkish population welcomed the prospect of joining the EU, and 

the government was able to use the leverage of membership to institute important 

but difficult reforms. But an increasing sense 

that the EU’s attitude was duplicitous and 

inspired by a reluctance to accept a majority 

Muslim nation into a Christian club moved 

Turkish opinion against EU membership. Of 

course, the Turks have not done themselves 

any favors, both in terms of their internal 

politics and their blocking of EU–NATO ties. 

Turkish membership would greatly 

change the meaning of “European,” giving 

it a more multicultural dimension. The EU 

would border on the Middle East and could 

assume a much larger role in stabilizing 

the region. Refusal to negotiate Turkish 

membership in good faith seems like a loss 

of nerve on the part of Europe and would be 

accompanied by a loss of influence as well. 

It is hard to imagine that Europe can be 

complete without including the New Rome 

as well as the Old. 

The process of NATO expansion has 

led to something worse than “enlargement 

fatigue.” NATO expansion was, perhaps for 

want of a better project, the major transatlantic venture of the post–Cold War period. 

Europe participated (with varying degrees 

of enthusiasm or reluctance), but the United 

States led. Russia saw NATO expansion as a 

new form of containment, which it probably 

was (in part). Russian concerns grew as the 

United States advocated NATO membership 

for Georgia and Ukraine. 

Russia’s use of force against Georgia 

has abruptly called the American bluff on 

enlargement. Georgian leaders must have 

believed that, official American comments to 

the contrary, the United States would come to 

their aid if an effort to recover Ossetia led to 

a Russian military reaction. But the United 

States was not willing to take any kind of 

military action on behalf of Georgia and did 

not even send American forces to Tbilisi to 

“protect” American citizens, thereby demonstrating a commitment to Georgia’s survival 

as an independent nation. 

Georgia is not a NATO member. But 

would NATO and the United States have 

acted differently if it was? And if not, what 

is the value of NATO membership? What 

does this mean for Ukraine and other former Soviet republics, or even for former 

Warsaw Pact states? Suddenly, many nations 

are feeling insecure. 

Russia has won a huge tactical victory 

that will make other former Soviet republics think twice about seeking closer ties with 

the United States and NATO. It is possible that 

they will heed this lesson and seek ways to 

accommodate a resurgent Russia. Conversely, 

heavy-handed Soviet behavior in the 1940s 

brought on the Cold War and inspired the 

U.S. policy of containment, and it is not 

obvious that such a policy today is in the 

long-term Russian interest. Nor is supporting independence for minority groups in the 

much of the vaunted 

soft power of the 

EU stems from its 

attractiveness to 

surrounding states who 

aspire to membership
No. 235, October 2008 Strategic Forum 4

that cooperation is necessary but no longer 

sufficient. At a minimum, there needs to be 

agreement between the “big three”—France, 

Germany, and the United Kingdom—and 

it is important for other large states such as 

Italy, Spain, and Poland to be on board. The 

problem is that there is not much convergence among the big three leaders, and their 

domestic political bases are shaky. 

The major policy differences occur 

between Sarkozy and German Chancellor 

Angela Merkel—above all due to Sarkozy’s 

support for European protectionism and his 

persistent criticism of the independence of the 

European Central Bank, both articles of faith 

of German policy. Sarkozy riled Merkel by 

proposing a Mediterranean initiative without 

prior discussion with the Germans; it was to 

be financed by the EU but would not include 

the northern states. But there is also a lack 

of personal warmth between the two leaders. The United Kingdom has never been willing to cast its lot fully with the EU, but without British support, the EU can no longer be 

governed. Although British Prime Minister 

Gordon Brown has shown himself to be less 

Euroskeptic than many had feared, he is 

hardly full-throated in his commitment. Nor 

is it obvious that the United Kingdom is comfortable with the new French ardor for NATO 

and the tradeoffs that might be implied.

Sarkozy has low popularity ratings; his 

personal style diverges from the norms of the 

Fifth Republic. The unity of Merkel’s Grand 

Coalition could be the victim of approaching 

elections. Brown’s precarious grasp of office will 

make him even less forthcoming about Europe, 

whereas a Tory government could foster turmoil. David Cameron, the British opposition 

leader, has promised to pull Tory members of 

Parliament out of the European People’s Party 

and might well attempt to renegotiate Britain’s 

relations with the EU. Italian premier Silvio 

Berlusconi’s return to office will not facilitate 

EU cooperation. These factors will contribute to 

a divided EU whose members will focus mostly 

on their own political problems.

Working with France

One change that can result in better 

U.S.-European relations and strengthen our 

ability to cooperate internationally even without an increase in EU hard power is an end 

indubitable interest of the Russian Federation. 

Was Russia thinking strategically or tactically? Perhaps there will be no winners from 

the Georgian crisis.

How will Europe respond to a more 

assertive Russia? At this point, it is too early 

to tell. A more assertive Russia could divide 

Europe and complicate transatlantic ties; 

a threatening Russia could cement them. 

But one thing is certain: the Russian question has reemerged as a major concern for 

Europe and America.

Europe Divided? 

There are two further limitations to 

effective European action in the face of looming global challenges. The first is that Europe 

will be inwardly focused: on a sluggish economy, the crisis of the welfare state, and immigration and the assimilation of immigrants, 

especially Muslims. The second constraint—

a very serious one—is a lack of convergence 

among key European leaders.

All politics is local politics, and most 

European politics still occurs within the 

national framework. European nations are 

preoccupied with issues having little to do 

with international security or the institutional processes of European governance. The 

issues are similar in most countries: chronically slow economic growth exacerbated by 

the current recession; relatively high unemployment and a rigid labor market; an aging 

population and low birth rates, often resulting in negative growth of the native population; an extensive welfare state that can no 

longer be afforded but that is politically hard 

to reduce; and fear of immigration, especially 

Muslim immigration (although in general, 

immigration has been greatly reduced), and 

the problem of assimilating Muslim populations who are often marginalized economically and socially. It is hard to convince voters that more money should be spent on 

defense when there is no obvious threat, when 

European leaders have preached the superiority of soft power over hard, and when the 

public is reluctant to get involved in shooting wars such as Afghanistan. The less capability a country has, the less chance of having to use it.

In the past, Franco-German cooperation was the key to an effective EU. Today, 

to the poisonous conflict between the United 

States and France. President Sarkozy’s intention to return France to full membership in 

NATO in 2009 provides an opportunity for the 

United States and France to resolve a 40-yearold quarrel. 

Since Charles de Gaulle withdrew French 

forces from NATO’s integrated military command in the 1960s, the French leadership 

tended to see NATO as an instrument of 

American hegemony in Europe. The United 

States, in turn, perceived France as an obstacle to transatlantic unity. After the end of 

the Cold War, two conflicting theses emerged 

on the global role of Europe. The AngloAmerican vision considered NATO as the 

major instrument of Western security cooperation. The French view was that the EU had its 

own interests and should have its own foreign 

policy and the military instruments for implementing it through ESDP (at least for peacekeeping operations). A zero-sum game situation was created in which NATO and ESDP 

were pitted against each other. What was 

good for ESDP was not good for NATO, and 

vice versa, and a low-intensity conflict raged 

between true believers on both sides. Although 

there was cooperation between the United 

States and France over concrete problems, the 

tone of the relationship was poisoned by this 

wearisome and demoralizing struggle. The 

debate, which often seemed to take place on 

the level of myth, obscured the fact that ESDP 

was a fairly modest enterprise useful mostly 

for peacekeeping. Reality corresponded to neither the grandiose aspirations of its proponents nor the existential fears of its critics.

Clearly, this kind of competition reached 

far beyond the limited military sphere and 

pervaded the whole U.S.-European relationship. For many in U.S. policy circles, France 

European nations are 

preoccupied with 

issues having little to 

do with international 

security or the 

institutional processes 

of European governance
No. 235, October 2008 Strategic Forum 5

was the enemy (the same was true inversely in 

Paris). The other side of the coin was the widespread feeling on both sides of the Atlantic that 

when a real crisis developed, the United States 

and France would work together and France 

could deliver concrete military assistance. That 

was the case in the Persian Gulf War and the 

Balkans crisis of the early 1990s. But the quarrel exploded in 2003 on the occasion of the 

Iraq War, provoking a full-scale transatlantic crisis and helping to defeat the proposed EU 

constitution. Both French and American interests were gravely compromised by this episode. 

France’s semi-detached position in NATO is the 

symbol of the ambivalence in its relationship 

with the United States, an ambivalence that 

both Sarkozy and today’s Bush administration 

would end. 

Sarkozy understands that France cannot 

build European defense cooperation against 

America. The United States now grasps 

that it is impossible to cooperate effectively 

with New Europe without including the Old 

Europe. It has become clear that ESDP and 

NATO are not incompatible but complementary. Entrenched bureaucracies on both sides 

of the Atlantic cannot be allowed to destroy 

French reintegration the way they did in 

1995–1997. Both France and the United States 

recognize the importance of hard power. If 

they cooperate, they might have a chance of 

moving the rest of Europe in that direction. 

The French return to NATO could also facilitate much closer defense cooperation between 

France and Britain, which would enable 

Europe to play a more effective role in international security. As Philip Stephens argued, 

Britain and France both want to maintain 

the capacity to project power within budgetary constraints.5

 Sarkozy’s pragmatism makes 

it possible for Britain to work with France 

without undermining NATO.

Although the French return to full 

NATO membership will not address the problems of European capacity, it will have significant political consequences by facilitating U.S.-European cooperation on many 

issues. One area in which this can take place 

is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 

The United States and France had relatively similar policies on Israeli-Arab issues 

until the Six-Day War in 1967, after which they 

diverged. The United States increasingly saw 

Israel as a strategic partner. On the pretext 

that Israel did not heed his advice and that it 

attacked Egypt when Gamal Abdel Nasser closed 

the Straits of Tiran, de Gaulle tilted French policy away from Israel. The real reason was that 

with the end of the Algerian war, de Gaulle saw 

an opportunity to improve relations with the 

Arab world. De Gaulle considered the United 

States as an Anglo-Saxon rival in the Middle 

East, just as France had perceived Britain as a 

rival (an all too successful one) before World 

War II. France’s “Arab policy” rigidified to the 

point that even presidential or prime ministerial efforts at rebalancing came to naught. 

The divergence between France and 

the United States over the Middle East was 

driven by different perceptions of interest and policy in the region, but there is 

no doubt that the competitive relationship between the two countries was at 

least a contributing factor. It is also not 

clear how much France actually benefited 

from its Arab policy. It certainly did little to achieve a settlement between Israel 

and the Palestinians since Israelis tended 

to see France as hostile. Perhaps Arab states 

felt that the United States was not an honest broker, but it was a superpower and thus 

its involvement was unavoidable. Sarkozy is 

personally more pro-Israeli than his predecessors and has made an effort to appear as 

a friend to Israel. If an end to U.S.-French 

conflict can help move both countries (and 

Europe) to a more balanced position and 

greater cooperation, they will have more 

success in managing and ultimately resolving the Palestinian issue. 

Implications for 

American Policy

What does a divided and weak Europe 

mean for the new American administration? 

For the sake of argument, let us assume that it 

shares much of the worldview of its European 

Allies. Assume it wants to put diplomacy first, is 

willing to talk to adversaries such as Iran and 

Cuba, will work assiduously for a two-state solution for Palestinians and Israelis, and will sign 

up to a serious post-Kyoto agreement on climate 

change. In short, it would be the kind of U.S. 

administration that Europeans could only have 

dreamed of over the past decade. 

What will Europe do when this administration asks for help in solving the Iraqi 

situation? Achieving a solution that leaves 

a stable Iraq in place but permits an 

American drawdown as soon as possible 

will surely be the number one U.S. priority. What will Europe do when its friends in 

Washington ask for more European forces 

in Afghanistan? And what if the United 

States does what many privately discuss in 

Europe and tests Iran by making a serious attempt to negotiate the nuclear question dossier—and the attempt fails? In 

short, hard power may be needed even by 

an American administration that prefers 

to use soft power, the effective use of which 

requires the threat of hard power. 

the French return to 

NATO could facilitate 

much closer defense 

cooperation between 

France and Britain, which 

would enable Europe to 

play a more effective role 

in international security

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

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INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Patrick M. Cronin

James A. Schear Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
No. 235, October 2008 Strategic Forum 6

Wednesday, July 9, 2008, International Institute for Strategic 

Studies, London.

2 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” Policy Review, 

no. 113 (June-July 2002).

3 The European Security and Defense Policy constitutes 

the instrument by which European states can put their forces 

under a European command to undertake humanitarian or 

peacekeeping operations. The idea of establishing the framework for European operation without American participation 

was propounded by the French and initially considered by the 

United States as an effort to undermine NATO. 

4 Judy Dempsey, “To be a global power, EU needs security plan,” International Herald Tribune, May 10–11, 2008.

5 Philip Stephens, “The Pressing Logic of Anglo-French 

Defence,” Financial Times, July 15, 2008.

One of the arguments for American unilateralism under the Bush administration 

was that our European allies had contributed 

little militarily in combined operations but 

demanded much in terms of political control—the “war by committee” argument. 

A failure of Europe to respond to American 

requests for support will ultimately lead to 

calls for unilateralism or for neoisolationism—that is, a diminished willingness to 

engage unless absolutely necessary. Neither is 

in U.S. or European interest. 

The problem is that Europe’s ability to 

work with (and influence) the United States 

is limited by its self-imposed weakness in 

international security and that this weakness 

is the logical consequence of the European 

Union’s political structure and worldview. 

In the future, America may have no choice 

but to turn to Asia for support if it wishes to 

remain an international arbiter. Perhaps a 

different kind of relationship with a more 

activist China and India will be needed to 

manage global instability. If so, the EuroAmerican age will have come to a close. 

Notes

1 See “European Military Capabilities, Rebuilding Armed 

Forces for Modern Operations,” transcript of press statement, 

The Caucasus: Charting a New Course

Eugene B. Rumer

(Institute for National Strategic Studies, 

Occasional Paper 6, forthcoming) 

Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for 

Civil-Military Relations

Patrick M. Cronin

(Strategic Forum No. 234, forthcoming)

Defense Transformation à la française and 

U.S. Interests

Leo G. Michel

(Strategic Forum No. 233, September 2008)

Energy Security in South Asia: Can 

Interdependence Breed Stability?

Joseph McMillan

(Strategic Forum No. 232, September 2008)

The Role of Medical Diplomacy in 

Stabilizing Afghanistan

Donald F. Thompson

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 63, 

May 2008)

International Partnerships to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Paul I. Bernstein

(Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper 6, 

May 2008)

Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq 

and Its Aftermath

Joseph J. Collins

(Institute for National Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 5, April 2008)

China’s Rising Influence in Asia: 

Implications for U.S. Policy

Ellen L. Frost, James J. Przystup, and 

Phillip C. Saunders

(Strategic Forum No. 231, April 2008)

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