UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT JAMISON, #526783,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 2:14-CV-13394

v. HONORABLE GERALD E. ROSEN

JOANNE E. HOLLY, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Michigan prisoner Robert Jamison (“Plaintiff”) has filed a pro se civil rights

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting that the defendants violated his

rights under federal and state by denying/saying they would deny him medical care

during a pre-sentence interview, including polygraph results in the pre-sentence report

without his consent, and filing a false arrest warrant. He asserts violations of the

Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and various provisions of Michigan

law, including the Polygraph Protection Act of 1981. He names the Lenawee County

Probation Department, probations officers Joanne E. Holly and Darlene Riggs, and

probation supervisor Larry D. Patton as the defendants in this action. He sues the

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 1 of 11 Pg ID 74
defendants in their personal and official capacities and seeks monetary damages. 

Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the fees and costs

for this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court is

required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a

defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 

The Court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against

government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A

complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

requires that a complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed.

2

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 2 of 11 Pg ID 75
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair notice

of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). While this notice pleading

standard does not require “detailed” factual allegations, it does require more than the

bare assertion of legal principles or conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rule 8

“demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it

tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 

(1) he was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal

Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a

person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57

(1978); Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009).

A. Claims Against the Lenawee County Probation Department

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against the Lenawee

County Probation Department are subject to dismissal because it is not a legal entity

3

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 3 of 11 Pg ID 76
subject to suit. Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person” who violates an

individual’s federal constitutional or statutory rights. It is well-established that county

agencies, departments, and jails are not legal entities amenable to suit under § 1983. 

See Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88, 89 (6th Cir. 2002); Coopshaw v. Lenawee Co.

Sheriff's Office of Lenawee Co., No. 05-CV-72569, 2006 WL 3298898, *6-7 (E.D.

Mich. Nov. 14, 2006) (citing cases); see also Petty v. County of Franklin, Ohio, et al.,

478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Harris, No. 1:08cv36, 2009 WL

277992, *10 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 5, 2009) (county probation department was not an

entity subject to suit). Plaintiff’s claims against the Lenawee County Probation

Department must therefore be dismissed.1

B. Claims Against Defendant Riggs

Plaintiff names probation officer Darlene Riggs as a defendant in this action. 

Plaintiff, however, does not allege any facts demonstrating her personal involvement

in the events giving rise to this action. It is well-settled that a plaintiff must allege the

personal involvement of a defendant to state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (Section

1983 liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious

 1The Court notes that Plaintiff sued the Lenawee County Probation Department in a similar

civil rights action before another judge in this district. The court dismissed that complaint in part

because the probation department is not a legal entity subject to suit. See Jamison v. Lenawee

Co. Probation Dept., No. 2:14-CV-13995, 2014 WL 6810409, *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 2014)

(Tarnow, J).

4

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 4 of 11 Pg ID 77
liability); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); see also Taylor

v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 69 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff must

allege facts showing that the defendant participated, condoned, encouraged, or

knowingly acquiesced in alleged misconduct to establish liability). Plaintiff does not

allege any facts to show that defendant Riggs engaged in unconstitutional conduct. 

Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to defendant

Riggs.

C. Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff alleges that one of the probation officers, presumably Joanne Holly,

the investigating agent, denied him proper medical care during a pre-sentence

interview by saying that he was being punished and was not deserving of medical

treatment. The United States Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

(1976). The deliberate indifference standard requires an inmate plaintiff to show that

prison official defendants acted with a reckless disregard of a known risk of serious

harm to the prisoner. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). A plaintiff

may establish deliberate indifference by a showing of grossly inadequate medical care. 

Terrance v. Northville Regional Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff makes no such showing. First, he alleges no facts to show that

5

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 5 of 11 Pg ID 78
defendant Holly (or any of the defendants) were, or are, responsible for his medical

care. Second, he alleges no facts to show that he was actually denied needed medical

care by the defendants or that he suffered any resulting injury while in custody. 

Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights claim. See, e.g., Lanier

v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523

U.S. 574, 588 (1998). Third, any allegations of verbal harassment or threats are

insufficient to state a civil rights claim under § 1983. Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950,

954-55 (6th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 746 F. Supp. 662,

667 (E.D. Mich. 1990); see also Miller v. Wertanen, 109 Fed. Appx. 64, 65 (6th Cir.

2004). Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under §

1983 as to this issue.

D. Pre-Sentence Report and False Arrest Complaint Claims

Plaintiff also alleges that probation officer Joanne Holly and supervisor Larry

Patton violated his due process rights by placing polygraph test results in his presentence report without his consent and by filing a false arrest complaint. To the

extent that Plaintiff seeks to challenge his state criminal proceedings and current

confinement, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

§ 1983. A claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner

challenging a condition of his imprisonment, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499

(1973), not the validity of continued confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

6

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 6 of 11 Pg ID 79
477, 486-87 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil

rights claim challenging his imprisonment if ruling on his claim would necessarily

render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason for his

continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This holds true

regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 487-89.

Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a state

prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief

sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state

conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that

action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” 

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005). The underlying basis for the holding

in Heck is that “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the

validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. Thus, to the

extent that Plaintiff challenges the validity of his sentence and/or an arrest complaint,

his claims concern the validity of his criminal proceedings. Such claims are barred

by Heck and must be dismissed.

Moreover, even if not barred by Heck, these claims must be dismissed. First,

there is no federal constitutional right to a pre-sentence investigation and report. 

7

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 7 of 11 Pg ID 80
Bridinger v. Berghuis, 429 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Allen v. Stovall,

156 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Therefore, the mere presence of hearsay

or inaccurate information in a pre-sentence report does not constitute a denial of due

process Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 216 (2d Cir. 1998).2

 Second, Plaintiff’s

claim regarding a false arrest complaint is purely conclusory. He provides no facts

to show that the defendants were responsible for preparing an arrest complaint or any

facts to show that any arrest complaint was false. As discussed supra, conclusory

allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights claim. Plaintiff thus fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to these issues.

E. State Law Claims

Plaintiff also asserts violations of several state laws in his complaint. To prevail

on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the defendant deprived the

plaintiff of a right protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States while

acting under the color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640. State laws

do not create federal constitutional rights actionable under § 1983. Wilson v. Morgan,

 2The Court notes that Plaintiff’s claims concerning his pre-sentence report are also likely

barred by res judicata. Plaintiff challenged the inclusion of polygraph results in his pre-sentence

report in habeas proceedings before another judge in this district. The court denied relief on that

claim finding that it concerned a perceived a violation of state law and failed to state a federal

due process claim. See Jamison v. Bergh, No. 14-CV-13658, 2014 WL 6810398, *2 (E.D. Mich.

Dec. 2, 2014) (Tarnow, J.). That finding has a preclusive effect in this action. See Reaves v.

Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 580 F. App’x 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2014) (adjudication of the

plaintiff’s claim in a prior habeas petition had preclusive effect in his civil rights action raising

the same claim); Hawkins v. Risley, 984 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).

8

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 8 of 11 Pg ID 81
477 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2007). Consequently, alleged violations of state law are

not cognizable under § 1983. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995);

Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertion that the

defendants violated various provisions of Michigan law thus fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted under § 1983.

A federal court, in its discretion, may agree or decline to hear pendent state

claims when all federal claims are dismissed. United Mine Workers v. Gibb, 383 U.S.

715, 725-26 (1966); Province v. Cleveland Press, 787 F.2d 1047, 1055 (6th Cir.

1986). Such discretion, however, has been characterized as minimal. Province, 787

F.2d at 1055. Only when there exists “overwhelming interests in judicial economy”

that outweigh the interest in avoiding needless state law decisions may a district court

exercise its discretion to decide pendent state claims. Id. No such interests exist in

this case. The Court therefore declines to retain jurisdiction over any state law claims.

F. Immunity

Lastly, the Court finds that the defendant probation officers and supervisor are

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity on Plaintiff’s claims for damages. Absolute

judicial immunity is extended to non-judicial officers who perform “quasi-judicial”

duties. Quasi-judicial immunity is granted to state officials when (1) their positions

are akin to that of judges; (2) the potential for vexatious lawsuits is great; and (3)

enough safeguards exist to protect the complainant’s constitutional rights. Purisch v.

9

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 9 of 11 Pg ID 82
Tenn. Tech. Univ., 76 F.3d 1414, 1422 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Bush v. Rauch, 38

F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (quasi-judicial immunity “extends to those persons

performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons

are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune”). Applying these

principles, courts have found that working as a probation official is a judicial function

protected from liability by quasi-judicial immunity. See Loggins v. Franklin Co.,

Ohio, 218 F. App’x 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (probation officer entitled to

quasi-judicial immunity when acting within the scope of duties as a probation officer);

Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App’x 773, 774 (6th Cir. June 7, 2005) (parole officers enjoy

absolute immunity from liability for actions taken in connection with their official

duties, such as the preparation of reports); Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir.

1994) (probation officers who prepare pre-sentence reports are closely associated with

the exercise of a judicial function and entitled to absolute immunity). Thus, to the

extent that Plaintiff’s claims arise from the probation officers actions in preparing presentence reports or taking other actions during court-related duties, the defendants are

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.

III. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted in his complaint and that the defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial

immunity for actions taken in connection with preparing pre-sentence reports. The

10

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 10 of 11 Pg ID 83
Court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the civil rights

complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Given this

determination, the Court also DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment.3

Lastly, the Court concludes that an appeal from this order would be frivolous

and cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Gerald E. Rosen 

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: January 13, 2015

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties

and/or counsel of record on January 13, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Julie Owens 

Case Manager, (313) 234-5135

 3Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is moot given the Court’s dismissal of the complaint. 

Moreover, a default judgment is inappropriate because the Court dismissed the complaint sua

sponte before service upon the defendants.

11

2:14-cv-13394-GER-RSW Doc # 10 Filed 01/13/15 Pg 11 of 11 Pg ID 84