PRESENT: All the Justices 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

v. Record No. 071419 OPINION BY 

JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 

CHRISTOPHER SHAWN ROBERTSON April 18, 2008 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this case, we consider the standard to be applied in 

determining whether a search is reasonable under the 

protective sweep and exigent circumstances exceptions to the 

Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for search of a person’s 

home. 

 Christopher Shawn Robertson (“Robertson”) was charged 

with violating Code § 18.2-308.2, possessing a firearm after 

having been declared delinquent while a juvenile over the age 

of fourteen for a crime that would have been a felony if 

committed as an adult. He was also charged with discharging a 

firearm within city limits, in violation of Danville City Code 

§ 40.3. Robertson filed a motion to suppress in the Circuit 

Court of the City of Danville. He contested the search of his 

home and sought to suppress the admission into evidence of a 

shotgun found in his home and photographs depicting spent 

shotgun shells found near the shotgun and holes in the ceiling 

of his home. The court denied the motion to suppress and 

convicted Robertson on both charges. 
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 Robertson appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the Court 

of Appeals, in a published opinion, reversed the circuit 

court’s judgment on the motion to suppress. Robertson v. 

Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 787, 645 S.E.2d 332 (2007). The 

Commonwealth appeals.

FACTS

On the afternoon of August 24, 2005, Robertson and his 

live-in girlfriend Tiffany Cobbs (“Cobbs”) returned from 

Robertson’s grandfather’s house after Robertson had, according 

to Cobbs, consumed at least “a fifth” of alcohol. The couple 

began arguing about their infant son who died in January 2005. 

After a lengthy argument, Robertson threatened to kill 

himself. Upon hearing this threat, Cobbs walked out of the 

house and called an emergency operator, “911.” While she was 

speaking to the 911 operator, Cobbs heard two gunshots fired 

in the house. As directed by the 911 operator, Cobbs remained 

outside and waited for the police officers to arrive. 

Responding to the 911 call, Officer Ernest Thompson 

(“Officer Thompson”) of the City of Danville Police 

Department, arrived on the scene at approximately 1:00 a.m. on 

August 25. Upon arrival, Officer Thompson interviewed Cobbs. 

Cobbs relayed to Officer Thompson that Robertson was alone in 

the house. Numerous members of the Danville Police 
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Department, including special weapons and tactics (“SWAT”) 

team members, surrounded the residence. An extended 

confrontation with Robertson ensued. 

A thirty-five minute videotape of that confrontation was 

placed into evidence at trial. The tape shows Robertson, 

visibly intoxicated and emotional, cursing at the officers 

from an open front window, breaking glass panes from the 

window, and repeatedly denying he had killed his son. 

Robertson claimed to have a shotgun in the house and admitted 

to firing the shotgun; however, no shots were fired while the 

police were present. The confrontation ended when police 

officers subdued Robertson with a “Taser” electric stun weapon 

as he was sitting on the windowsill with his legs hanging out 

of the window. After being stunned by the Taser, Robertson 

fell to the ground outside of his residence where he was 

placed into police custody. 

After being apprehended, Robertson told the officers, as 

had Cobbs, there “[a]in’t nobody else in the house.”* No one 

asked Cobbs or Robertson for permission to enter their home, 

and neither of them voluntarily consented to the police 

entering the dwelling. However, after Robertson was in 

*

 During the bench trial, the Commonwealth’s attorney 

conceded that Robertson was the only occupant at the time of 

the confrontation with police. 
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custody, police officers broke through the barricaded front 

door and entered the residence. Once inside the residence, 

officers seized a shotgun and took photographs. The shotgun 

and photographs were the subject of the motion to suppress. 

During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer 

Thompson confirmed that the SWAT team was on the scene, and 

went inside the house to secure the premises, after 

Robertson’s arrest, as “part of the procedures we do.” There 

was no testimony that any of the police officers had any 

belief or suspicion that anyone remained in the house 

following Robertson’s arrest. 

ANALYSIS

 The Commonwealth asserts that the Court of Appeals erred 

by holding that the police officers’ entry into Robertson’s 

home violated Robertson’s Fourth Amendment rights. The 

Commonwealth also argues that the Court of Appeals did not 

apply the appropriate appellate standard of review. 

A defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation 

of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and 

fact that an appellate court must review de novo on appeal. 

Cost v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 246, 250, 657 S.E.2d 505, 507 

(2008); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573, 570 S.E.2d 

836, 838 (2002); see Bolden v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 470, 
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561 S.E.2d 701, 704 (2002); McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 

483, 489, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); see also Ornelas v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 699 (1996). In making such 

a determination, an appellate court must give deference to the 

factual findings of the circuit court and give due weight to 

the inferences drawn from those factual findings; however, the 

appellate court must determine independently whether the 

manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the 

requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Bolden, 263 Va. at 470, 

561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 545; 

Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 

(2000); see Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 327, 568 

S.E.2d 695, 698 (2002). The defendant has the burden to show 

that, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, the circuit court’s denial of his 

suppression motion was reversible error. Bolden, 263 Va. at 

470, 561 S.E.2d at 704; McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545 S.E.2d at 

545; Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 

731 (1980). 

 Seizures of personal property from a private dwelling are 

generally considered unreasonable within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment unless accomplished pursuant to a judicial 

warrant. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983); 
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Robinson v. Commonwealth, 273 Va. 26, 34, 639 S.E.2d 217, 221 

(2007). There is an exception to this general rule when 

exigent circumstances exist. Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 

405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1985). Also, police officers 

are allowed to conduct a search of the immediate area to 

assure officer safety in the course of making an arrest. 

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). This is known as 

a “protective sweep.” Id. Exigent circumstances and 

protective sweeps constitute separate and distinct exceptions 

to the general rule. The Commonwealth claims that the Court 

of Appeals erred in failing to find either of those exceptions 

applicable in this case. 

 The Fourth Amendment permits the police to conduct a 

limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest 

when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief, 

based on specific and articulable facts, that the area to be 

swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the 

arrest scene. Buie, 494 U.S. at 337; see Megel v. 

Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 536 (2001). The rationale for the 

protective sweep exception is that a dangerous person could be 

hiding in the home and attack the officer. Buie, 494 U.S. at 

333. 
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In this case, Robertson was arrested outside of his home. 

Given the information provided to the police by Robertson and 

Cobbs, and the officers’ observations during their extended 

standoff with Robertson, once Robertson was arrested, there 

were no articulable facts to indicate that Robertson’s home 

harbored anyone posing a danger to the individuals present at 

the arrest scene. The protective sweep exception is not 

applicable in this instance where the officers broke through 

the barricaded door of Robertson’s home, after apprehending 

Robertson. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not err in 

ruling that the protective sweep exception does not apply in 

this case. 

The Commonwealth also claims that the Court of Appeals 

erred in failing to conclude that there were exigent 

circumstances justifying the police officers’ entrance into 

Robertson’s home. This Court has recognized factors that are 

relevant in determining if this exception is applicable: 

(1) [T]he degree of urgency involved and the time 

required to get a warrant; (2) the officers’ 

reasonable belief that contraband is about to be 

removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger 

to others, including police officers left to guard 

the site; (4) information that the possessors of 

the contraband are aware that the police may be on 

their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or 

involves violence; (6) whether officers reasonably 

believe the suspects are armed; (7) whether there 

is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of 

probable cause; (8) whether the officers have a 
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strong reason to believe the suspects are actually 

present in the premises; (9) the likelihood of 

escape if the suspects are not swiftly apprehended; 

and (10) the suspects’ recent entry into the 

premises after hot pursuit. 

Robinson, 273 Va. at 41-42, 639 S.E.2d at 226; Verez, 230 Va. 

at 410-11, 337 S.E.2d at 753. 

Here, the officers entered Robertson’s home after 

Robertson had been apprehended. Robertson and Cobbs had 

informed the police officers that there was no one else in the 

home, and perhaps more importantly, the officers’ observations 

during their extensive surveillance of the premises for an 

extended period of time, indicated that there was no one 

present in the home after Robertson’s arrest. Further, there 

was no reason to believe that contraband was about to be 

removed or destroyed, little danger to anyone left to guard 

the site, no likelihood of any suspect escaping, and no hot 

pursuit. Thus, there is no evidence of an exigency that 

justifies the officers’ breaking through the barricaded door 

of Robertson’s home without obtaining a warrant. The Court of 

Appeals, therefore, did not err in holding the exigent 

circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant 

requirement inapplicable. The officers’ search of Robertson’s 

home was in violation of Robertson’s rights under the Fourth 
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Amendment. Additionally, the Court of Appeals correctly 

applied the proper standard of review. 

 For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

is affirmed. 

Affirmed.