UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

______________________________________

)

COMBAT VETERANS FOR CONGRESS )

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE AND )

DAVID H. WIGGS, TREASURER, )

)

Appellants, ) No. 13-5358

)

v. ) FEC MOTION FOR

) SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

)

Appellee. )

______________________________________ )

APPELLEE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

Appellee Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) 

respectfully moves for summary affirmance of the district court’s decision granting 

summary judgment to the Commission and rejecting the claims of appellants 

Combat Veterans for Congress Political Action Committee (“CVCPAC”) and its 

treasurer David H. Wiggs, in his official capacity (collectively “CVC Parties”). 

(Memorandum Opinion (“Mem. Op.”) and Order, No. 11-cv-2168-CKK (D.D.C. 

Sept. 30, 2013) (Docket Nos. 30 and 31) (copy attached as Exhibit 1).) The district 

court correctly upheld the Commission’s administrative determinations that the 

CVC Parties violated 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) by filing federal campaign finance reports 

late and the agency’s assessment of penalties totaling $8,690. The CVC Parties’

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numerous complaints about the FEC’s straightforward determinations — including 

their frivolous central claim that the agency was required to impose penalties on a 

former CVCPAC treasurer in his personal capacity — lack merit. Because the 

parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant summary action and no benefit would 

be gained from further briefing and argument, this Court should summarily affirm 

the district court’s decision.

LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parties and the Federal Election Campaign Act

The Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-457 (“Act” 

or “FECA”), provides a comprehensive system for regulation of the financing of 

federal election campaigns. The Act, among other things, imposes extensive 

requirements for public disclosure of contributions and expenditures made or 

received by political committees in connection with federal elections. 2 U.S.C. 

§§ 432-434. 

 The Federal Election Commission is an independent federal agency with 

exclusive jurisdiction over the administration, interpretation, and civil enforcement 

of FECA. See generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(b)(1), 437d(a), 437g. Congress 

empowered the Commission to “formulate policy with respect to” the Act, 2

U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1), and authorized it to make “such rules . . . as are necessary to 

carry out the provisions” of the Act. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d(a)(8), 438(a)(8). 

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The Commission is authorized to make final determinations and assess civil 

penalties against committees and their treasurers for certain violations of the 

reporting provisions of FECA. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(A)-(B). Political 

committees, through their treasurers, must file periodic reports detailing the 

committee’s receipts and disbursements. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)-(b).

Combat Veterans for Congress PAC is a political committee under 2 U.S.C. 

§ 431(4). The Act requires each political committee to have a treasurer, who must 

be designated on the committee’s statement of organization filed with the FEC. 

2 U.S.C. §§ 432(a), 433(b)(4). The treasurer keeps records and files reports with 

the FEC on behalf of the committee. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(c), 432(d), 434(a)(1).

B. The Administrative Determinations Challenged in This Case

In 2010, CVCPAC and its treasurer filed quarterly reports with the 

Commission, as permitted by 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4)(A). (Mem. Op. at 6.) The 

CVCPAC report for the third calendar quarter (ending September 30, 2010) was 

due on October 15, 2010. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4)(A)(i). In addition, if CVCPAC

made a contribution or expenditure prior to the November 2010 general election, it

was required to file a 12-Day Pre-General Election Report, which was due on 

October 21, 2010. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4)(A)(ii). Finally, CVCPAC was 

required to file a 30-Day Post-General Election Report, which was due on 

December 2, 2010. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(4)(A)(iii). The CVCPAC treasurer was 

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required to file these reports electronically with the FEC before the respective 

statutory deadlines. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1); 11 C.F.R. §§ 104.1(a), 104.14. 

CVCPAC failed to meet these three deadlines, so the Commission sent nonfiler notices to CVCPAC and its treasurer for each report, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(b).1

 

(Mem. Op. at 6; AF#2199 at AR035; AF#2312 at AR073; AF#2355 at AR037.) 

The FEC’s Reports Analysis Division (“RAD”), which monitors the timeliness of 

such reports, prepared written recommendations to the Commission. (AF#2199 at 

AR001-AR008; AF#2312 at AR008-AR025; AF#2355 at AR001-AR020.)

In each matter, the staff recommendation was that the Commission find 

“reason to believe” that CVCPAC and its treasurer had violated 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)

by not filing the report by the respective statutory deadline and make a preliminary 

determination that the fine for the violation would be assessed at a specific amount 

in accord with the FEC’s fine schedule at 11 C.F.R. § 111.43. (Mem. Op. at 7-8;

AF#2199 at AR001-AR008; AF#2312 at AR008-AR025; AF#2355 at AR001-

AR020.) Pursuant to established procedures, the recommendations were circulated 

to the Commission on a no-objection basis (see FEC Directive 52 (Sept. 10, 2008), 

available at http://www.fec.gov/directives/directive_52.pdf), no Commissioners 

 1 Each report was the subject of a separate administrative fines matter, 

designated AF#2199, AF#2312, and AF#2355, and the Commission filed separate 

certified administrative records for each matter. (Docs. 14-16.) Citations “AF#__”

refer to the referenced administrative record. Citations “AR___” refer to the 

sequentially numbered pages in that record.

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objected, and the FEC Secretary and Clerk certified that the Commission had 

found reason to believe that CVCPAC and its treasurer violated 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) 

and had made preliminary determinations setting the penalty for each violation. 

(Mem. Op. at 7.)

When the Commission found reason to believe in AF#2199 in December 

2010, Michael Curry was the CVCPAC treasurer. (Mem. Op. at 7, 14-16.) Thus, 

he was named in the Commission’s determination. (Id.) On January 12, 2011,

David H. Wiggs became treasurer, and so he was substituted as a named 

respondent under the Commission’s policy on successor treasurers. (Id.) 

In AF#2312 and AF#2355, Wiggs was treasurer at the time of the Commission’s 

initial consideration and thus was named in the Commission’s March 2011 reasonto-believe determinations. (Id.)

In all three matters, CVCPAC’s Chairman Joseph R. John submitted written 

“challenges” to the FEC’s initial determinations on behalf of CVCPAC and its 

treasurer. (Mem. Op. at 8-9.) The Commission’s Reviewing Officer subsequently 

prepared recommendations to the Commission regarding final determinations in all 

three matters, and those recommendations also were provided to the respondents. 

(Id.) The respondents submitted a combined response, and the Reviewing Officer 

then submitted final recommendations to the Commission. (Id.)

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On October 27, 2011, the Commission unanimously adopted the Reviewing 

Officer’s recommendations and made final determinations that CVCPAC and

David H. Wiggs, in his official capacity as treasurer, had violated 2 U.S.C. 

§ 434(a). (Mem. Op. at 8-9.) The FEC assessed civil penalties in the amounts 

calculated at the reason-to-believe stage totaling $8,690. (Id.) Respondents were 

notified of these decisions as well as their options to pay the penalties or appeal the 

final determinations by filing suit pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(C)(iii). (Id.)

Instead, the CVC Parties submitted a letter to the Commission asserting new 

procedural and constitutional arguments and requesting an oral hearing. 

(Mem. Op. at 9.) The Commission’s staff recommended that the agency deny 

respondents’ requests for reconsideration. (Id.) The Commission unanimously 

adopted these recommendations and then notified respondents. (Id.) 

On December 7, 2011, the CVC Parties filed a timely petition for review of the 

Commission’s final determination. (Id.)

C. Proceedings Before the District Court

The CVC Parties petitioned the district court to set aside or modify the 

Commission’s three final administrative determinations and the fines 

totaling $8,690. (Mem. Op. at 1, 9.) The Commission filed certified 

administrative records, and the parties filed motions for summary judgment. (Id. 

at 1, 5 n.2, 9.) On September 30, 2013, the district court rejected all the CVC 

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Parties’ claims, denied the CVC Parties’ motion for summary judgment, and 

granted summary judgment to the Commission. (Mem. Op. and Order.) The CVC 

Parties appealed. (Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal, No. 11-cv2168-CKK (D.D.C. Nov. 26 and 29, 2013) (Docket Nos. 32 and 34).)

D. Standards of Review 

This Court’s review of the district court’s ruling is de novo. WildEarth 

Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Theodore 

Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2010)

(other citation omitted)); Inv. Co. Instit. v. CFTC, 720 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). Summary affirmance is appropriate where “[t]he merits of the parties’ 

positions are so clear as to warrant summary action,” Hassan v. FEC, No. 12-5335, 

2013 WL 1164506, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (per curiam), and “no benefit 

will be gained from further briefing and argument of the issues presented,” 

Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (granting 

summary affirmance).

ARGUMENT 

The district court properly upheld the Commission’s final determinations 

that Combat Veterans and David H. Wiggs, in his official capacity as treasurer, 

violated 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) by filing three disclosure reports late, rejecting

appellants’ claims that the FEC decisions were contrary to law under 5 U.S.C. 

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§ 706(2). The CVC Parties have now abandoned some of the objections made

below, but they still raise six issues on appeal. None has merit and this Court 

should summarily affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the 

FEC.

A. The District Court Correctly Held That the Commission Was Not 

Required to Hold the Former Treasurer of CVCPAC Personally 

Liable for the Committee’s Late Reports

The district court correctly rejected the CVC Parties’ claim that the FEC was 

required to impose personal liability for CVCPAC’s late reports on former 

treasurer Michael Curry. On appeal, the CVC Parties renew that claim. (CVC 

Parties’ Statement of Issues to be Raised on Appeal (“Statement of Issues”) 

(Doc. #1474725) at 2 (issues 2 and 3).) But there is no jurisdiction to consider the

claim as part of this challenge to the administrative fines imposed on CVCPAC

and its current treasurer in his official capacity. And even if jurisdiction existed, 

the claim would be frivolous because the FEC has broad prosecutorial discretion 

and is not required to take the unusual step of pursuing personal liability where the 

agency deems it unwarranted.2 

 2 The district court also correctly rejected the CVC Parties’ related claim that 

committees like CVCPAC could not be liable for their own late reports because the 

treasurers’ personal liability was allegedly exclusive. (Mem. Op. at 13-18.) The 

Court noted that CVCPAC “appointed Curry, and had the responsibility to 

supervise him, as its agent. It cannot now escape its statutory responsibilities when 

it failed to ensure that he was carrying out his duties.” (Id. at 17 (footnote 

omitted).) The CVC Parties have not raised that claim on appeal.

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The district court first held that “this suit is not the proper vehicle for [the 

CVC Parties] to challenge the Commission’s failure to take action against 

Mr. Curry.” (Mem. Op. at 18.) In particular, while “‘[j]udicial review is available 

under FECA to complainants dissatisfied with the FEC’s decision not to 

investigate . . .,’ such review is pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) which sets 

out a specific process for challenging FEC failures to act on a complaint.” (Id.

(quoting Nader v. FEC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 (D.D.C. 2010).) But here, the 

district court explained, the CVC Parties “‘do not contend that they filed a 

complaint against Mr. Curry pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1), which would 

entitle them to judicial review of FEC inaction on such complaint in this Court.’” 

(Id. at 18-19.) The CVC Parties indeed have not filed a written administrative 

complaint with the Commission, and filing such a complaint is a prerequisite to 

filing suit under section 437g(a)(8) to challenge the Commission’s failure to take 

enforcement action. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8) (suits limited to “part[ies] aggrieved by 

an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party under 

[2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1)]”); Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 558-559 (D.C. Cir. 1996); 

see Nat’l Republican Cong. Comm. v. Legi-Tech Corp., 795 F.2d 190, 193-194 

(D.C. Cir. 1986). The CVC Parties have alleged no other jurisdictional basis for 

judicial review of the Commission’s decision not to pursue Mr. Curry personally. 

This claim is thus frivolous.

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As the district court held, “‘even if this suit were the proper vehicle to 

challenge the Commission’s failure to pursue Mr. Curry in his personal capacity[,

the CVC Parties’] claims still lack merit. ‘The FEC has broad discretionary power 

in determining whether to investigate a claim, and whether to pursue civil 

enforcement under [FECA].’” (Mem. Op. at 19 (quoting Akins v. FEC, 736 F.

Supp. 2d 9, 21 (2010); citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)

(emphasis in original)).) Indeed, “the FEC enjoys ‘considerable prosecutorial 

discretion’ and ‘its decisions to dismiss complaints are entitled to great 

deference . . . as long as it supplies reasonable grounds.’” (Mem. Op at 19 

(quoting Nader v. FEC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 53, 65 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasis in 

original)).) See also Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 

475 F.3d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that “the Commission, like other 

Executive agencies, retains prosecutorial discretion” (quoting FEC v. Akins, 

524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998))). 

The Commission's policy in most circumstances is to impose liability for 

late reports on a committee and its treasurer, in his or her official capacity only. 

See FEC Statement of Policy Regarding Treasurers Subject to Enforcement 

Proceedings, 70 Fed. Reg. 3 (Jan. 3, 2005). The CVC Parties rely upon language 

from the Commission policy statement suggesting that in certain circumstances the 

Commission “‘will consider the treasurer to have acted in a personal capacity and 

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make findings accordingly’” (Statement of Issues at 2 (issue 3) (quoting FEC 

Statement of Policy, 70 Fed. Reg. at 3), but that is plainly a determination within

the FEC’s broad prosecutorial discretion. The district court correctly found that 

“the Commission considered Mr. Curry’s potential liability, and has supplied 

reasonable grounds for its failure to prosecute him in his personal capacity.” 

(Mem. Op. at 19.) The FEC’s General Counsel concluded that the facts did not 

warrant pursuing Curry because his actions were consistent with someone 

resigning from office: He had not prevented the filing of reports or the 

appointment of a new treasurer, and his contacts with the FEC’s RAD office did

not reflect a deliberate effort to obstruct the filings. (Id. at 19-20.)3 The district 

court therefore held that “[i]n light of the great deference accorded to the FEC’s 

decisions not to prosecute, the Court cannot conclude the agency abused its 

discretion in choosing not to pursue Mr. Curry in his personal capacity for willful 

 3 According to Appellants, on October 12, 2010, three days before 

CVCPAC’s first report — the October 2010 Quarterly Report — was due, Mr.

Curry indicated a desire to resign his position. (Amended Petition for Review of 

Federal Election Commission Determination and Complaint for Declaratory and 

Injunctive Relief, No. 11-cv-2168-CKK (D.D.C. June 25, 2012) (Doc. No. 20) 

¶ 20.) The record shows that Mr. Curry continued taking steps to prepare 

CVCPAC’s October 2010 Quarterly report, however, including initiating several 

communications with Commission staff, and he ultimately filed that report on 

November 21, 2010, thirty-seven days late. (Mem. Op. at 6.) CVCPAC’s attorney 

Dan Backer, designated on November 8, 2010 as assistant treasurer, filed the 

12-Day Pre-General Election and 30-Day Post-General Election reports on 

January 11, 2011, eighty-two and forty days late respectively. (Id.)

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or reckless failure to file reports.” (Id. at 20 (quoting Nader, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 65 

(“‘The FEC is in a better position than [Plaintiffs] to evaluate the strength of 

[Plaintiffs’] complaint, its own enforcement priorities, the difficulties it expects to 

encounter in investigating [Plaintiffs’] allegation, and its own resources’”)).)4

 

Thus, the Commission articulated a reasonable basis for its decision not to 

pursue Mr. Curry personally, and the CVC Parties’ claims have no merit. 

B. The District Court Correctly Rejected the CVC Parties’ Claims 

That the Administrative Fines Should Have Been Mitigated

The CVC Parties also appeal the district court’s decisions regarding their 

mitigation and “best efforts” defenses (Statement of Issues at 2-3 (issues 4 and 5).

But those claims are frivolous because the Commission simply followed its own 

administrative fines regulations and applied the published fines schedule. The 

CVC Parties’ fall-back argument that the Commission’s “best efforts” regulation is 

arbitrary and capricious (id. at 3 (issue 6)) also lacks merit. 

The FEC’s administrative fine regulations require that, to establish a “best 

efforts” defense, respondents must show that they were “prevented from filing in a 

timely manner by reasonably unforeseen circumstances that were beyond the 

control of the respondent” and that “respondent filed no later than 24 hours after 

the end of these circumstances.” 11 C.F.R. § 111.35(b)(3). The regulation lists

 4 In any event, as the district court noted, “such an action would not have 

absolved the [CVC Parties] of their own liability.” (Mem. Op. at 20 n.4.)

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circumstances that are considered “reasonably unforeseen and beyond the control 

of respondent,” including certain widespread Internet disruptions and disasterrelated incidents. 11 C.F.R. § 111.35(c). But the regulation states that situations 

that do not qualify include “[n]egligence” and “[i]llness, inexperience, or 

unavailability of the treasurer or other staff.” 11 C.F.R. § 111.35(d). 

The CVC Parties have never disputed that CVCPAC’s three disclosure 

reports were filed late or that the civil penalties assessed by the Commission were 

correctly calculated under the administrative fine schedule, 11 C.F.R. § 111.43. 

Instead, the CVC Parties claimed that the committee’s former treasurer, Mr. Curry, 

willfully refused to timely file the reports or permit CVCPAC to comply with the 

reporting requirements. At the administrative stage, however, the CVC Parties

initially conceded that this did not satisfy the requirements for the “best efforts” 

defense in the administrative fines context. (AF#2199 at AR0093; AF#2312 at 

AR097; AF#2355 at AR090.) Later, the CVC Parties claimed that the fines should 

be mitigated due to the alleged “misconduct and personal liability of the former 

treasurer,” and they challenged the FEC regulation directly. (Plaintiffs’ 

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 11-cv2168-CKK (D.D.C. June 7, 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ Supporting Memorandum”) 

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(Docket No. 18-1) at 32; see generally id. at 31-42.)5

The district court rejected the CVC Parties’ claims and held that the 

Commission’s decision not to mitigate the administrative fines was not arbitrary 

and capricious. (Mem. Op. at 22-24.) Agency action must be upheld as long as it 

has some rational basis. Id. at 22; see Verizon v. FCC, __ F.3d __, Nos. 11-1355 

and 11-1356, 2014 WL 113946, at *16 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2014); LaRouche’s 

Comm. for a New Bretton Woods v. FEC, 439 F.3d 733, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The 

district court correctly concluded that the Commission’s decision not to mitigate 

the penalties “easily satisfies” the “rational basis” standard since the Commission 

permissibly concluded that the CVC Parties’ claim did not establish unforeseen 

circumstances beyond the control of respondents as required by 11 C.F.R. 

§ 111.35(c). Instead, the CVC Parties’ arguments were based upon circumstances 

akin to those listed in 11 C.F.R. § 111.35(d), such as negligence. (Mem. Op. at 23 

(“Here, the Commission concluded that, pursuant to this regulation, [the CVC 

 5 Although the district court did not address this issue, the CVC Parties’ 

mitigation and “best efforts” claims also fail because they were waived. In 

addition to the administrative stage concession that their conduct did not qualify 

for the “best efforts” defense, the CVC Parties did not raise their mitigation claim 

until after the Commission had already made its final determinations, and they did 

not challenge until this litigation the definition of “best efforts” in 11 C.F.R. 

§ 111.35(b). (Mem. Op. at 9; Plaintiffs’ Supporting Memorandum at 31-42.) 

Thus, these claims have been waived. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 111.35(e), 111.38; Dakota 

Underground, Inc. v. Sec. of Labor, 200 F.3d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 2000). In any 

event, the CVC Parties cannot attack the facial validity of a regulation in a case 

brought under 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(C)(iii).

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Parties] did not qualify for mitigation or reduction of their fines.”).)

The district court also rightly rejected the CVC Parties’ facial challenge to 

the regulation, concluding that “[u]nder the highly deferential standard required 

here, the Court cannot conclude that the best efforts regulation is arbitrary and 

capricious on its face.” (Mem. Op. at 23.) The district court explained that 

“[t]he Commission has put forth a reasonable explanation for the narrowness of the 

rule,” namely that “if recklessness and negligence on the part of the treasurer – of 

the sort at issue here – were to qualify as ‘best efforts’, then the exception would 

swallow the rule, and almost all late filings would be excusable.” (Id. at 23-24 

(citation omitted).) The court below also correctly found reasonable the FEC’s 

rationale “that[] a committee’s negligence in managing its agent – its treasurer –

should not entitle it to claim it used its ‘best efforts’ to file its reports.” (Id.) 

In sum, the CVCPAC Parties cannot demonstrate that the district court erred 

when it rejected their mitigation and “best efforts” claims. 

C. The District Court Correctly Rejected the CVC Parties’ 

Challenges That Were Not Presented to the Commission

Finally, the CVC Parties appeal the district court’s rejection of their

complaints about the FEC’s voting procedures due to a failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. (Statement of Issues at 1-2 (issue 1).) The CVC Parties

claimed that the no-objection voting procedure the FEC employed for its 

preliminary “reason-to-believe” findings did not result in an “affirmative” vote of 

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four Commissioners as required by 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2), and they also questioned 

the signatures and wording on the ballots at the final determination stage. 

Plaintiffs’ Supporting Memorandum (Docket No. 18-1) at 14-20.

The district court properly declined to consider these claims because they

never were presented to the agency and were based upon documents not part of the 

administrative records. (Mem. Op. at 29-30.) The CVC Parties now appear to 

challenge the district court’s decision only with respect to the votes at the final 

determination stage (see Statement of Issues at 1), but in any event, the district 

court’s decision was correct. As the district court recognized, “[i]t is well 

understood that ‘a reviewing court usurps an agency’s function if it sets aside an 

administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives 

the agency of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the 

reasons for its action.’” (Mem. Op. at 29 (quoting Coburn v. McHugh, 

679 F.3d 924, 931 (D.C. Cir. 2012), which internally quotes Unemployment Comp. 

Comm’n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946)).) And as the district court 

noted, the documents the CVC Parties relied upon were not part of the 

administrative records. (Id. at 29-30.) “[T]he focal point for judicial review 

should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record 

made initially in the reviewing court.” (Id. (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 

142 (1973)).) Thus, the district court correctly declined to reach the CVC Parties’ 

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voting procedure claims.

CONCLUSION

This Court should summarily affirm the grant of summary judgment to the 

Commission because, as the district court held, the CVC Parties’ claims lack merit. 

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628)

Deputy General Counsel – Law

Kevin Deeley 

Acting Associate General Counsel

/s/ Harry J. Summers

Harry J. Summers

Assistant General Counsel

Robert W. Bonham III

Senior Attorney

January 27, 2014 FOR THE APPELLEE

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

999 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

______________________________________

)

COMBAT VETERANS FOR CONGRESS )

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE AND )

DAVID H. WIGGS, TREASURER, )

)

Appellants, ) No. 13-5358

)

v. ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

)

Appellee. )

______________________________________ )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 27, 2014, I electronically filed the 

Commission’s Motion for Summary Affirmance with the Clerk of the Court of 

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by using the 

Court’s CM/ECF system.

Service was made on the following counsel for Appellants through the 

CM/ECF system:

Dan Backer 

DB Capital Strategies PLLC

717 King Street, Suite 300 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

(202) 210-5431 

(202) 478-0750 (fax) 

dbacker@dbcapitolstrategies.com,

and

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Paul D. Kamenar

1629 K. Street, N.W., Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 603-5397

Paul.Kamenar@gmail.com.

/s/ Harry J. Summers

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

999 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20463

(202) 694-1650

hsummers@fec.gov

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