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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TEA PARTY LEADERSHIP FUND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Case No. 12-1707 (KBJ/AK)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This case was referred to the undersigned by the Honorable Ketanji Brown Jackson for 

resolution of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Discovery (“Pls.’ Mot.”) [13] and Defendant’s CrossMotion to Compel Responses to the Commission’s Discovery Requests (“Def.’s Cross-Mot.”) 

[16]. See 05/03/13 Referral to Magistrate Judge [33]. Plaintiffs moves to stay discovery on the

grounds that Defendant’s requests for discovery prior to the resolution of any dispositive motions 

are “burdensome, intrusive and unwarranted.” (Pls.’ Mot. [13] at 1.) Defendant moves to compel 

Plaintiffs’ responses to its discovery requests on the grounds that the information requested is not 

only relevant to the issue of jurisdiction but also necessary before Defendant can respond to any 

dispositive motion. (Def.’s Cross-Mot. [16] at 1-3.)

1

I. Background

The underlying action involves Plaintiffs’ challenge to a law imposing a six-month 

waiting period on newly formed multicandidate political committees before they are allowed to 

contribute a maximum of $5,000 per candidate per election. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A). On 

May 9, 2012, the Tea Party Leadership Fund (“TPLF”), one of the three plaintiffs in this case

(collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs”), registered as a non-connected Hybrid PAC with the 

Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Defendant”). Compl. [1] at ¶ 2. The two remaining 

 1 Currently pending before the trial court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [19] and Defendant’s CrossMotion to Continue to Allow for Discovery [20].

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plaintiffs in this case are Mr. John Raese (“Raese”), the 2012 Republican candidate for the 

United States Senate from West Virginia, and Mr. Sean Bielat (‘Bielat”), the 2012 Republican 

challenger for the House of Representatives from Massachusetts’ Fourth Congressional District. 

(Compl.[1] at ¶¶ 21-22.) TPLF made contributions of $2,500 to both Raese and Bielat leading up 

to the 2012 elections. (Id. at ¶ 5.) TPLF requested an advisory opinion from Defendant seeking 

permission to make political contributions in excess of $2,500, but not exceeding $5,000, prior to 

the end of the six-month waiting period (id. at ¶51); however, such request was denied by 

Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 14.) TPLF’s six-month waiting period, mandated by 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4), 

ended on November 9, 2012, three days following the 2012 elections. (Pls.’ Mot. at 5.)2 In their 

Complaint, Plaintiffs collectively argue that the six-month waiting period infringes on their 

constitutional rights to associate and speak freely and it does not fulfill its intended purpose of 

preventing corruption of candidates and circumvention of other statutory contribution limits 

imposed on political committees. (Compl. [1] at ¶ 68).

Defendant served its discovery requests on November 26, 2012, and Plaintiffs’ responses 

were due on December 26, 2012. (Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 18.) On December 18, 2012, Plaintiffs 

moved to stay discovery, arguing that the resolution of a constitutional challenge is purely a 

matter of law, involving no questions of fact, which may be addressed on summary judgment. 

(Pls.’ Mot. [13] at 1.)

3 In response, on January 8, 2013, Defendant filed a cross-motion to compel 

discovery arguing that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses are relevant to whether or not this Court 

has proper jurisdiction. (Def.’s Cross-Mot. [16] at 1.)

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) authorizes discovery “regarding any matter, not 

privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it 

relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery . . .” For purposes of discovery, 

relevance is broadly construed. Burlington Ins. Co. v. Okie Dokie, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 

(D.D.C. 2005) (citing Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Comm’l Workers Int’l Union, 103 F.3d 

 2 After the six-month waiting period expires, multicandidate political committees are permitted to make a maximum 

contribution of $5,000 to an individual candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A).

3 Defendant invoked Fed. R. of Civ. P. 33(b)(4), requesting this Court to find that “[b]ecause [P]laintiffs raised no 

timely objections to any specific discovery request, they are barred from raising such objections now.” (Def.’s 

Cross-Mot. [16] at 18.) Rule 33(b)(4) states: “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with 

specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the 

failure.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4). In this case, Plaintiffs moved to stay discovery in lieu of responding to the 

Defendant’s discovery requests. 

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1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). “A showing of relevance can be viewed as a showing of need; for 

the purpose of prosecuting or defending a specific pending civil action, one is presumed to have 

no need of a matter not ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.’” 

Friedman v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 738 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)). 

If a relevancy objection is raised, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate that the 

information sought to be compelled is discoverable. See Alexander v. Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, 194 F.R.D. 316, 325 (D.D.C. 2000). If there is an objection based on undue 

burden, the objecting party must make a specific, detailed showing of how the discovery request 

is burdensome. See Chubb Integrated Systems Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 

52, 60-61 (D.D.C. 1984) (“An objection must show specifically how an interrogatory is overly 

broad, burdensome or oppressive, by submitting affidavits or offering evidence which reveals the 

nature of the burden.”) Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B) allows a party to move to compel a response 

to interrogatories and document production requests. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iii) provides that the court may limit discovery on its own 

initiative, if it determines that the “burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 

likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ 

resources, the importance of the issue at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the 

proposed discovery in resolving those issues.” Rule 26 vests the court with “broad discretion to 

tailor discovery narrowly.” In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d 1205, 1215 (D.C. Cir. 

2004) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998)). In exercising that discretion,

the court may “undertake some substantive balancing of interests”. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 809 F. 

2d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). See also Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food and 

Commercial Workers Int’l. Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[A] district court’s 

decision to permit or deny discovery is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation 

omitted).

Rule 56(d) [formerly Rule 56(f)] emphasizes the “importance of discovery in defending a 

motion for summary judgment.” Wiggins v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 153 F. Supp. 2d 16, 

19 (D.D.C.2001) (citing Dyson v. Winfield, 113 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C.2000)). See also 

Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[S]ummary judgment is 

premature unless all parties have ‘had a full opportunity to conduct discovery[.]’”(quoting 

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986))). Rule 56(d) motions “requesting 

time for additional discovery [before summary judgment] should be granted ‘almost as a matter 

of course unless the nonmoving party has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence.’” Id. 

(quoting Berkeley v. Home Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). See also Resolution 

Trust Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir.1994) (“Consistent with the 

salutary purposes underlying Rule 56(f), district courts should construe motions that invoke the 

rule generously, holding parties to the rule's spirit rather than its letter.” (citation omitted)).

Notably, the nonmoving party implementing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) 

“bears the burden of identifying the facts to be discovered that would create genuine issues of 

material fact and the reasons why the party cannot acquire those facts without ... discovery.” 

Graham, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 52-53 (citation omitted). Rule 56(d) is not “designed to allow fishing 

expeditions, and [the nonmoving party] must specifically explain what [its] proposed discovery 

would likely reveal and why that revelation would advance [its] case.” Id. at 54 (quotation 

omitted). See also Milligan v. Clinton, 266 F.R.D. 17, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2010) (directing the party 

requesting additional discovery before summary judgment to supplement her motion with an 

explanation of how the discovery she sought would create a genuine factual dispute).4

III. Analysis

A. Discovery is not precluded in First Amendment cases

Plaintiffs argue that because their case involves a constitutional challenge under the First 

Amendment, there should be “minimal if any discovery, to allow parties to resolve disputes 

quickly without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome litigation.” (Pls.’ Mot [13] at 

10) (quoting FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (“WRTL”), 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)). See 

also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010) (noting that protracted lawsuits stifle 

speech because “[b]y the time the lawsuit concludes, the election will be over and the litigants in 

most cases will have neither the incentive nor, perhaps, the resources to carry on. . . .”)5

 4 Implementation of discovery through Rule 56(d) requires the movant to submit an affidavit to the court detailing 

why additional information is necessary. Convertino, 684 F.3d at 99. The affidavit submitted must 1) outline the 

facts the movant seeks and explain why the facts are crucial to the movant’s case, 2) explain why the movant was 

unable to produce the facts in opposition to the opposing party’s motion for summary judgment, and 3) demonstrate 

that the facts sought are discoverable. Id. at 99-100. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 5 In Citizens United, id., a nonprofit corporation sued the FEC for declaratory/injunctive relief in anticipation of 

being subjected to civil and criminal penalties for airing a film about a presidential candidate within thirty days of 

the primary election. In Wisconsin Right to Life, supra., a nonprofit advocacy corporation sued the FEC seeking a 

ruling that certain provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act violated the First Amendment by barring the 

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Plaintiffs further assert that summary judgment is preferable in cases involving First Amendment 

disputes because “unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the 

exercise of First Amendment rights and because speedy resolution of cases involving free speech 

is desirable.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 13) (citing Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1435 

(9th Cir. 1992)). See also Hickey v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D. Or. 

1992) (Summary judgment is the “preferred means of dealing with first amendment cases due to 

the chilling effect of first amendment rights inherent in expensive and time-consuming 

litigation.” (citing Basilius v. Honolulu Pub. Co., Ltd., 711 F. Supp. 548, 550 (D. Hawaii 

1989))). 

The Court notes that the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs involve claims for defamation 

against a newspaper (Dorsey), a network (Hickey) and the publisher of a magazine (Basilius) and 

none of the cases explicitly address whether discovery should be permitted prior to briefing of 

summary judgment motions. Both the Supreme Court and this district have permitted discovery 

prior to summary judgment in cases involving facial challenges to voting and elections-related 

laws. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187-88 (2008) 

(describing district court’s summary judgment decision, after discovery, rejecting facial 

challenge to state voter identification requirement due to insufficient evidence); McConnell v. 

FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 206-207 (D.D.C 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 

(2003) (agreeing that “even in the context of a facial challenge” to campaign finance laws, “wide 

ranging” discovery was necessary (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-

68 (1994))).

6

In Turner, cable television operators and programmers challenged certain provisions of 

the Cable Television Consumer Protection Act that required them to carry local broadcast 

stations. The Supreme Court remanded the case to “permit the parties to develop a more 

thorough factual record.” 512 U.S. at 668. The Supreme Court held that in order to demonstrate 

the detrimental impact of striking a law, the Government needed to more fully demonstrate 

possible harms to the broadcasting industry and substantially elaborate on the evidence behind its 

assertions. Id. at 667. Without such elaboration, the Court could not determine if the threat to the 

 

broadcasting of advertisements that the corporation wanted to run before the state’s primary and general federal 

elections. Those two cases involved restrictions on the content of speech while the case at bar involves the contentneutral application of a regulation. 6 Crawford, supra. involved a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Indiana law requiring photo identification in 

order to vote. 

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industry outweighed the constitutional challenge made by the Plaintiffs. Id. Additionally, the 

Court noted that fair consideration of the case required more information regarding the projected 

“actual effects” of striking the law, a crucial consideration in a First Amendment case. Id. at 667-

668. 

The McConnell case encompassed eleven consolidated actions challenging the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and raised issues concerning the financing of federal election 

campaigns. 251 F. Supp. 2d at 183. In outlining the procedural history of McConnell, the court 

referred to a status conference that was held to determine the scope of discovery necessary to 

develop an adequate factual record. 251 F. Supp. 2d at 206. The defendants in McConnell

“argued that wide-raging discovery was necessary even in the context of a facial challenge, ... [in 

order to] look to the record of the case for evidence substantiating the governmental interests 

asserted in support of legislation said to violate the First Amendment.” Id. The Court agreed with 

the defendants, finding that extensive discovery was appropriate in order to develop an adequate 

factual record. Id. at 207. The Court also emphasized the danger of compromising “informed and 

deliberate judicial decisionmaking” in favor of quickly proceeding with the litigation. Id.

The Court finds that discovery should not be precluded merely because this case involves 

a First Amendment challenge and there is a preference to resolve the dispute expeditiously to 

avoid chilling speech.7 The Crawford, Turner and McConnell cases, supra., indicate that it is 

appropriate for the parties to conduct discovery in cases involving constitutional challenges. 

B. Discovery is necessary to address the Court’s Article III jurisdiction.

Defendant argues that discovery is necessary for purposes of addressing this Court’s 

jurisdiction. The jurisdictional question in this case rests on whether this case properly falls 

within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to dismissing otherwise moot 

cases. Plaintiffs concede that their case is moot but argue that the Court retains jurisdiction 

because this case falls within the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine. (Pls.’ 

Mot. [13] at 4.) The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine applies where “(1) the 

challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 

expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be 

subjected to the same action again.” (Id.) (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 

 7 The Court notes that the six-month waiting period that is being challenged does not bar newly formed political 

action committees from making any contributions but instead they are limited in the amount they can contribute for 

a discrete period of time

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(1975)). In addressing the first prong of this doctrine, Plaintiffs look to Wisconsin Right to Life, 

551 U.S. at 462, where the court found that the plaintiff advocacy corporation in WRTL could not 

have “obtained judicial review of its claims in time for it to air its ads during the BCRA blackout 

periods.” Plaintiffs similarly assert that they could not have obtained judicial review of its claims 

in time for the TPLF to increase its contributions to the individual Plaintiffs. (Pls.’ Mot. [13] at 

6.) This Court agrees that Plaintiffs could not have obtained judicial review of their claims before 

the election took place.

Regarding the second prong of this doctrine, Plaintiffs also look to Wisconsin Right to 

Life, which indicates that there must be a “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability

[ ]that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” WRTL, 551 U.S. 

at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted). In WRTL, the plaintiff non-profit advocacy corporation

aired radio advertisements as part of a “grassroots lobbying campaign.” 551 U.S. at 458. The 

Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had “credibly claimed that it planned on running 

materially similar future targeted broadcast ads” in the future and even “sought another 

preliminary injunction based on an ad it planned to run” for a particular approaching blackout 

period. Id. at 463-465 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In this case, TPLF will never be disadvantaged by the six-month waiting period again. 

Whether or not Plaintiffs Sean Bielat and John Raese will be disadvantaged by the six-month 

waiting period in the future is an inquiry that may be answered through the discovery being 

sought by Defendant. The FEC contends that it is not enough for the Plaintiffs to assert that 

repetition is a possibility but instead the evidence must show a “demonstrated probability” of 

repetition. (Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 10) (citing James v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 824 

F.2d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Plaintiffs argue that they have “amply demonstrated” that Mr. 

Bielat and Mr. Raese have a “reasonable probability” of running for federal office in the future. 

(Pls.’ Reply [17] at 10.) Plaintiffs rely upon the fact that “Messrs. Raese and Bielat have already 

run for federal office a combined total of six times.” Id. Plaintiffs further argue that the FEC

could “explore its own voluminous database and determine how many unsuccessful candidates 

have run for office more than once.” (Pls.’ Reply at 10.) The Court finds that the number of 

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unsuccessful candidates who have run for office multiple times has no bearing on whether 

Plaintiffs Bielat and Raese will run for office again.8

Plaintiffs have the burden of showing a “demonstrated probability” of repetition—a 

standard that was articulated in Herron for Cong. v. FEC, 903 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2012)

(quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam)). In Herron, the named plaintiff 

(hereinafter referred to as “Herron”) was a political committee for an unsuccessful Congressional 

candidate [Mr. Herron] who alleged that his opponent violated federal law by failing to make 

certain disclosures in his FEC filings. Id. at 11.

9

 Herron filed an administrative action with the 

FEC and when the FEC decided not to issue penalties, Herron filed a civil action against the 

FEC. 

The court began its analysis by noting that Herron had the burden of demonstrating that 

the claim was not moot because the election had passed. Id. at 13. In applying the “capable of 

repetition, yet evading review” doctrine, the court “assume[d] that Herron’s claim –like most 

electoral controversies –could not be fully litigated prior to election day.” Id. at 14. 

Accordingly, the first prong of the standard set forth in Wisconsin Right to Life; i.e., a challenged 

action with a duration too short to permit full litigation prior to cessation, was met. Id. (citing 

WRTL, 551 U.S. at 462.) 

The court then examined the second prong of the WRTL standard requiring a reasonable 

expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action. Id. The court 

noted that “[o]rdinarily, courts require plaintiffs to submit evidence suggesting that their 

controversy is likely to recur.” Id. at 14. In Herron’s case, Mr. Herron had to demonstrate his 

“clear and definite intent” to participate if future elections and show a “demonstrable 

probability” that he would again be subjected to the same action. Id. 

The Court found that the case was moot, in part because Mr. Herron admitted that he was 

only “considering” another run for office. Id. The court further determined that:

 8 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs’ references to other candidates for office and political action committees that 

may be disadvantaged by the statute at issue in this case, (Pls.’ Reply Memorandum [17] at 10-11), as well as the 

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), (Pls.’ Mot. at 4-5), are misplaced because the instant 

case is not a class action. The Supreme Court ruled that “in the absence of a class action, the ‘capable of repetition, 

yet evading review’ doctrine [is] limited to the situation where ... there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same 

complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (citing 

Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 187 (1979); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)). 9 Herron alleged that his political opponent failed to file accurate financial disclosures and the campaign received an 

unlawful corporate contribution. 903 F.Supp.2d at 12. 

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[b]ecause [Mr.] Herron does not provide any evidence [regarding his opponent 

receiving another allegedly improper bank loan], his claim is theoretical at best. 

And a “theoretical possibility” does not create a justiciable controversy. Murphy 

v. Hunt, 455 U.S. at 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181; Pharmachemie, 276 F.3d at 633; see 

also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49–50, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) 

(rejecting “speculative contingencies” regarding future elections as grounds for 

continuing a moot controversy); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109, 89 S.Ct. 

956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969) (concluding that it was “wholly conjectural” that the

plaintiff would be a candidate for Congress again and thereby run afoul of a 

state's electoral regulation). 

Id. 

In contrast, the Herron court provided examples of two cases in which the Supreme 

Court found a “demonstrated probability” that the controversy was capable of repetition. Id. at 

15. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 736 (2008)(where the plaintiff publicly announced his 

intention to run in an upcoming federal election); Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463

(finding that the controversy was capable of repetition during the next election cycle because 

plaintiff had filed a similar legal challenge to the same campaign finance regulations during the 

prior election cycle). 

In this case, Defendant’s discovery requests are aimed at ascertaining whether the 

controversy at issue in this case is likely to recur; i.e., whether Plaintiffs Raese and Bielat intend 

to run for office in the future and they anticipate that political action committees will be willing

to give them contributions of $5,000.00 but will be prohibited from doing so. Plaintiffs 

characterize the discovery requested as “a fishing expedition into the private operations of Tea 

Party Leadership Fund, and into the personal lives of Mr. Raese and Mr. Bielat” and “overly 

expansive.” (Pls.’ Mot. at 11) This Court finds that the discovery propounded by Defendant 

requests information that Plaintiffs are required to prove in order to demonstrate that their claims 

are not moot. Furthermore, the discovery requests are limited in number and the scope of such 

requests may be further limited by this Court to reduce any burden on the Plaintiffs. 

Accordingly, the Court determines that, at this stage in the proceeding, Defendant is entitled to 

obtain some discovery from the Plaintiffs regarding issues that are relevant to jurisdiction. 

C. Permitting discovery before Defendant responds to the motion for summary judgment

This Court has already determined that discovery is not unilaterally barred in First 

Amendment cases and further, that Defendant is entitled to obtain responses to its discovery 

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requests that are relevant to the issue of the trial court’s jurisdiction.

10 Accordingly, this Court 

need not consider Defendant’s argument that discovery should be permitted prior to its response 

to Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion.11

D. Discovery Requested

Plaintiffs attached a copy of Defendant’s discovery requests as exhibits to their motion. 

See Defendant’s Discovery Requests to Raese [13-2]; Defendant’s Discovery Requests to Bielat 

[13-3]; Defendant’s Discovery Requests to the Tea Party Leadership Fund [13-4]. The Defendant 

served Plaintiffs Bielat and Raese with the same six interrogatories and six requests for 

production of documents, and a request for admission that the documents produced are originals 

or true and correct copies of the originals. Def.’s Disc. Reqs. [13-2 & 13-3].12 The Defendant 

served Plaintiff TPLF with one interrogatory, five requests for production of documents, and a

request for admission that the documents produced are originals or true and correct copies of the 

originals. Def.’s Disc. Reqs. [13-4].

1. Defendant’s Interrogatories

A. Plaintiff Raese shall respond to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6. Plaintiff Raese 

shall respond to Interrogatory No. 3 although it may be impossible for him to identify 

political committees that have not yet been created (or even contemplated). Plaintiff 

Raese need not respond to Interrogatories Nos. 4 and 7. 

B. Plaintiff Bielat shall respond to Interrogatories Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5. Plaintiff Bielat shall 

respond to Interrogatory No. 3 although it may be impossible for him to identify 

political committees that have not yet been created (or even contemplated). Plaintiff 

Bielat need not respond to Interrogatory No. 6. 

 10 This ruling is not meant to preclude Defendant from pursuing responses to its other discovery requests at a later 

date. 

11 As previously noted, this argument by Defendant overlaps with the arguments set forth in Defendant’s CrossMotion to Continue to Allow for Discovery [20], which is pending before the trial court. Rule 56(d) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where a party moves for summary judgment and the nonmovant demonstrates 

by affidavit that it lacks sufficient facts to substantiate its opposition, the court may defer consideration of the 

motion for summary judgment or “allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(d)(2). The rule essentially “allows a summary judgment motion to be denied, or the hearing on the motion to 

be continued, if the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986). This rule is crucial for fairness in judicial proceedings as it would be patently unfair for a 

moving party to “railroad[] a non-moving through a premature motion for summary judgment before the nonmoving party has had the opportunity to make full discovery.” Graham v. Mukasey, 608 F. Supp. 2d 50, 53 (D.D.C. 

2009) (quoting Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP v. Orian, 563 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (D.D.C.2008)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

12 Defendant requested one additional interrogatory from Raese.

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C. Plaintiff TPLF shall respond to Interrogatory No. 1. 

2. Defendant’s Requests for Production of Documents

D. Plaintiff Raese shall produce documents responsive to Request for Production No. 1,

to the extent that the requested communications are confined to the subject matter of 

this civil action and are not privileged. Plaintiff shall produce a privilege log for 

documents that are confined to the subject matter of this civil action but are alleged to 

be privileged. Plaintiff Raese need not produce documents responsive to Requests for 

Production Nos. 4, 5, or 6. Plaintiff Raese shall produce documents responsive to 

Requests for Production Nos. 2 and 3. 

E. Plaintiff Bielat shall produce documents responsive to Request for Production No.1,

to the extent that the requested communications are confined to the subject matter of 

this civil action and are not privileged. Plaintiff shall produce a privilege log for 

documents that are confined to the subject matter of this civil action but are alleged to 

be privileged. Plaintiff Bielat need not produce documents responsive to Requests for 

Production Nos. 4, 5, or 6. Plaintiff Bielat shall produce documents responsive to 

Requests for Production Nos. 2 and 3. 

F. Plaintiff TPLF need not produce documents responsive to Request for Production 

Nos. 2 and 5 and that portion of Request for Production No. 3 inquiring about future 

contributions. Plaintiff TPLF need only respond to Request for Production No. 4 to 

the extent that the requested communications are confined to the subject matter of this 

civil action and are not privileged. Plaintiff shall produce a privilege log for 

documents that are confined to the subject matter of this civil action but are alleged to 

be privileged. Accordingly, Plaintiff TPLF shall produce documents responsive to 

Request for Production No. 1 and a portion of Requests for Production Nos. 3 and 4, 

as noted above. 

2. Defendant’s Requests for Admission

Raese, Bielat, and TPLF shall respond to the Requests for Admission asking for 

verification that the documents produced are originals or true copies. 

It is hereby this 26th day of August, 2013, 

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ORDERED that the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Discovery [13] be and hereby is granted in 

part and denied in part and it is further

ORDERED that the Defendant’s Cross-Motion to Compel Responses to the 

Commission’s Discovery Requests [16] be and hereby is granted in part and denied in part. 

Within fifteen [15] days from the date of this Memorandum Order, Plaintiffs John Raese, Sean 

Bielat, and the Tea Party Leadership Fund must respond to Defendant’s discovery requests, 

consistent with the rulings in this Memorandum Order. 

____________/s/____________________

ALAN KAY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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