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63–832 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 111–1104 

NINE YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE 

TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Professional Staff Member 

SEAMUS A. HUGHES, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security Affairs 

LUKE P. BELLOCCHI, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator McCain ................................................................................................ 18 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 21 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 25 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 27 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 39 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 41 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010 

Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security . 5 

Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. 

Department of Justice ......................................................................................... 8 

Hon. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence .............................................................. 10 

ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF WITNESSES

Leiter, Hon. Michael E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 73 

Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

Napolitano, Hon. Janet A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

APPENDIX 

Document for the Record submitted by Secretary Napolitano in response 

to Senator McCain’s request ............................................................................... 59 

Responses for the Record from: 

Secretary Napolitano ........................................................................................ 83 

Mr. Mueller ....................................................................................................... 114 

Mr. Leiter .......................................................................................................... 131 

(1) 

NINE YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE 

TERRORIST THREAT TO THE HOMELAND 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Burris, 

Kaufman, Collins, McCain, Ensign, and Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. Good 

morning. And in particular, thanks to Secretary Janet Napolitano, 

Director Robert Mueller, and Director Leiter for being here. 

This is an important hearing in the year of this Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. It is our third annual 

hearing at which we invite the three leaders of the three most involved and important agencies of our Federal Government in protecting to discuss where we are in the terrorist threat to our homeland, how has it evolved, and how have our defenses evolved 

against it. And it gives us an annual report, a snapshot picture, of 

where we are and what the facts of the past year say to us about 

what we can do together to continue to improve the security of the 

American people post-September 11, 2001. 

Last week, we marked the ninth anniversary of the September 

11, 2001, attacks, and we paid homage to the 3,000 people who 

were murdered that day by Islamist extremist terrorists. 

I was struck yesterday by reading a Gallup poll in one of the 

newspapers that showed a significant decrease in concern about 

terrorism among the American people. Now, this is understandable, particularly because of the stress that the current economic 

conditions have put so many American families under. 

But as the three witnesses know very well, the threat is still all 

too real. Our Committee knows that as well. It is our job and yours 

to be focused on protecting our homeland and our people from violent extremists and terrorists no matter what the state of public 

opinion is about it at the moment, and that is why, of course, we 

are so happy and grateful that you are here today. 

The tragedy of September 11, 2001, is a daily reality for the 

three of you and the tens of thousands of men and women who 

work with you every single day to ensure that such an attack never 

2 

happens again. In some sense, the three of you oversee a mighty 

force of literally hundreds of thousands of people that have been reorganized or augmented in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 

when the Islamist extremist terrorists declared war on us and we 

responded, taking us into two active fields of combat, of course, 

first in Afghanistan and the Iraq, but involving us on unconventional battlefields all across the world, and quite significantly, 

which is the focus of our attention today, our homeland and the extent to which this enemy, unlike any we have ever faced, threatens 

our security, our way of life, our freedom, and is prepared to do in 

extraordinarily inhumane ways right here at home. 

Let me just share three observations about what I see over the 

last year, and I know that you will respond to this and other things 

in your opening statements. 

Since our last threat assessment hearing a year ago, it is clear 

that there has been a marked increase in Islamist terrorist attacks 

against us here at home. Most incidents, thank God and thanks to 

you and all the work with you, have been thwarted, some really 

with extraordinary, almost miraculous work, taking a shred of evidence, building on it, developing it, and finding the people who 

were planning the attack, and stopping them, capturing them before they did. 

But the fact that I know you know very well is that three of the 

attempted attacks in the last year by terrorists managed to break 

through our defenses, very different kinds of attacks; first, the Fort 

Hood shooting last November, the Christmas Day attack, and the 

Times Square bombing attempt. And, of course, in the Fort Hood 

case, 13 people died at the hands of Nidal Hasan. Fortunately, in 

the Christmas Day attempt and in Times Square, the explosives 

failed in both cases and no one was hurt. 

These attacks and others show the full range of threats we now 

face from lone wolves, if you will, freely-operating terrorists like 

Hasan, who, nonetheless, was motivated by terrorist agitators from 

abroad to form homegrown terror cells, such as the so-called Raleigh 7 or the Fort Dix plotters, or to become inexperienced but potentially deadly operatives, including American citizens directly 

trained by al-Qaeda or its affiliates around the world, as Faisal 

Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, and Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber. 

So the first fact that comes out at me is that there is an increased pace of attacks against our homeland in this war in which 

we are involved, most thwarted, but three broke through. Second, 

since 2009, at least 63 American citizens have been charged or convicted for terrorism or related crimes. Now, to me, just stepping 

back and accumulating that number, that is an astoundingly high 

number of American citizens who have attacked or planned to attack their own country, our country. 

In addition to this number, an increasing number of Americans 

are now actually in leadership positions in international terrorist 

groups. Most notable is Anwar al-Awlaki, who, through his 

writings and audiotapes, has inspired several plots against the 

West over the last 5 years; and in the case of the Christmas Day 

attack, apparently played a direct operational role. 

3 

Like Adam Gadahn, who continues to serve as a chief propagandist for al-Qaeda, these are all Americans with citizenship status. Omar Hammami from Alabama, convert to Islam, featured 

prominently in al-Shabaab recruiting videos and was identified as 

an operational commander. Adnan el Shukrijumah, who grew up in 

the United States and has legal permanent resident status, is now 

a senior al-Qaeda operative and apparently responsible for the 

planned attack last year—or involved in it—by Najibullah Zazi on 

the New York subway system. 

So this is quite significant to me that we have this number of 

Americans playing an active role. I know it is an infinitesimal in 

proportion of the American public, but it is still a growing number 

of Americans and something to be concerned about in terms of 

homegrown terrorism and self-radicalization. 

The third fact is the growing role of the Internet in selfradicalization and homegrown terrorism, which raises the question 

of what we can do to combat the use of the Internet for these purposes. Many of those arrested in the last year have been radicalized online, influenced by al-Qaeda’s core narrative, that the 

United States is at war against Islam, which has been tailored to 

a Western, English-speaking audience by al-Awlaki and other online violent extremists. The fact is that al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have adapted their online media strategies to 

mainstream Web sites and social networking tools, and that has 

made it easier for people to access extremist material and has significantly raised the challenge to our counterterrorism agencies 

who we count on to discover and disrupt these terrorist plots. 

So, those are three changing, evolving factors that jump out at 

me, and I look forward to your response to them. The bottom-line 

fact is that the fight against Islamist extremism and terrorism sure 

looks like it is going to go on for a long time to come. It is the great 

security challenge of our time. We must confront it with, in Lincoln’s words, ‘‘energy and sleepless vigilance’’ until it is defeated. 

And again, I thank the three of you, and all who work with you, 

for the extraordinary work that you are doing, really 24/7, 365 days 

a year, to make sure that we do succeed in this fight. Thank you 

very much. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Nine years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, our government is challenged today by the evolving nature of the terrorist 

threat. We know that terrorists revise their tactics to adapt to 

these security measures that we put in place. As we have made it 

more difficult for terrorists to come in from abroad, we are seeing 

the escalation of a significant new threat that takes advantage of 

radicalized violent Islamist extremists within our borders. Foreign 

terrorist organizations are aggressively targeting these homegrown 

terrorists to carry out attacks. These home-based terrorists could 

decide to act independently as lone wolves, motivated by terrorist 

propaganda but acting on their own. Others appear to be acting 

under the direction of foreign terrorist groups. 

4 

To be sure, overall, the United States is far better prepared to 

confront the terrorist threat than we were 9 years ago. Since September 11, 2001, we have created new security and intelligence 

systems to detect, deter, and defend against terrorism, most notably through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 

that Senator Lieberman and I coauthored. We have expanded our 

intelligence gathering and information sharing systems. We have 

erased bureaucratic barriers and dismantled silos. We have learned 

to fight an enemy that wears no official uniform, that has no borders, and that represents no State in the traditional sense of the 

word. 

The results have been significant. Terrorists’ plots both at home 

and abroad have been thwarted, but the threat has not been neutralized. Indeed, it is evolving and ever changing, and in some 

ways more dangerous than ever. It is a chameleon by design. AlQaeda has extended its tentacles into regional terrorist organizations causing threats to emanate from new locations, like Yemen, 

through the activities of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

(AQAP). 

AQAP and the radicalized American who has ties to that terrorist organization were behind the attempt to detonate a bomb on 

a flight last Christmas Day and apparently were the inspiration for 

U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Hasan’s murderous attack at Fort 

Hood. 

This Committee has been sounding the alarm regarding homegrown terrorism since 2006 when we held our first hearing on the 

threat of violent radicalization within our prison system. In all, 

Senator Lieberman and I have held 11 hearings on this issue. Our 

investigation has predicted a potential wave of future terrorist activity in this country. We warned that individuals within the 

United States could be inspired by al-Qaeda’s violent ideology to 

plan and execute attacks even if they do not receive direct orders 

from al-Qaeda. 

Unfortunately, our warnings have proven to be prescient. In the 

past 2 years, our Nation has seen an escalation in the number of 

terrorist attacks with roots based in our own country. In fact, the 

Congressional Research Service found that since just May of last 

year, arrests have been made in 19 plots by U.S. citizens and residents compared to 21 plots during the 71⁄2 years from September 

11, 2001, to last May. That is an alarming, significant increase. 

On the eve of our Nation’s September 11, 2001, commemorations, 

the National Security Preparedness Group, led by Lee Hamilton 

and Tom Kean, issued a timely report entitled, ‘‘Assessing the Terrorist Threat.’’ The report said that America continues to face serious threats from al-Qaeda affiliates around the world and from 

home-based terrorists. It warned of an increasingly wide range of 

U.S.-based jihadist militants who do not fit any particular ethnic, 

economic, educational, or social profile. It also sounded this grave 

warning. The American melting pot has not provided a firewall 

against the radicalization and recruitment of American citizens and 

residents, though it has arguably lulled us into a sense of complacency that homegrown terrorism could not happen in the United 

States. Initially, I remember we thought this was a problem that 

5 

1The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears in the Appendix on page 44. 

Western Europe would have but that we would not have because 

of the differences in our culture. 

The Kean-Hamilton report called 2009 a watershed year in terrorist plots in the United States. As the Chairman has been pointing out, the statistics are a call for alarm. In 2009 alone, at least 

43 American citizens or residents, aligned with violent Islamist extremists, were charged or convicted of terrorism crimes in the 

United States or elsewhere. And this year to date, 20 have been 

similarly charged or convicted. 

We also are seeing the terrorist threat morph into another stage 

of development. While we must still remain focused on the catastrophic or spectacular attack on the scale of September 11, 2001, 

I am convinced that terrorists are beginning to focus their efforts 

on smaller scale attacks with small arms and explosives, such as 

we saw at Fort Hood, in Arkansas, and in India. 

We must see the disparate attacks and the changing tactics for 

what they are, separate parts of a more dangerous pattern. The 

past 2 years have taught us, through harsh lessons, that we simply 

must increase our efforts. As the Kean-Hamilton report observed, 

it is fundamentally troubling that there remains no Federal Government agency or department specifically charged with identifying 

radicalization and interdicting the recruitment of U.S. citizens or 

residents for terrorism. 

We must redouble our efforts to better anticipate, analyze and 

prepare. We must address what is quickly becoming a daunting 

and highly challenging crisis. This dangerous reality must be met 

with better security measures, innovative community outreach, and 

enhanced information sharing. Most of all, we cannot risk another 

failure of imagination. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, 

for that excellent statement. 

Secretary Napolitano, welcome, and let us begin with you. 

TESTIMONY OF JANET A. NAPOLITANO,1 SECRETARY, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Collins, and Members of the Committee for the opportunity to be 

here today to testify on the terrorist threat to the United States 

and what the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is doing to 

combat it. I am very pleased to be here as well with my colleagues, 

the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and the 

Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). We do 

a lot of this work together. 

As was alluded to in your opening comments, the threat of terrorism is constantly evolving, and over the past years, it has become more and more diverse. It is diversifying in terms of sources. 

It is diversifying in terms of tactics. It is diversifying in terms of 

the targets being considered. 

Now, in terms of sources, the threat of terrorism is now emerging 

from more places than it was on September 11, 2001. While alQaeda itself continues to threaten the United States, al-Qaeda also 

6 

inspires an array of affiliated terrorist groups. Some of these, like 

al-Shabaab in Somalia, have not tried to attack the United States. 

They have carried out attacks elsewhere, but they have leaders 

that espouse violent anti-American ideology. Others, like Tehrik-iTaliban (TTP) and AQAP, have attempted to attack the United 

States in the Times Square and Christmas Day bombing attempts, 

respectively. 

In addition, a new and changing facet of the terrorist threat 

comes from homegrown terrorists, and by which I mean U.S. persons who are radicalized here, and received terrorist training either 

here or elsewhere, and bring knowledge of the United States and 

the West to terrorist organizations. A clear trend in recent attacks 

has been the role of English language and online propaganda from 

operatives like al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen based in Yemen. 

We are also seeing more diversity in terms of tactics. Recent 

events and intelligence show a trend toward, as you mentioned, 

Senator Collins, smaller, faster-developing plots rather than larger, 

longer-term plots like September 11, 2001. These plots may include 

the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or teams who use 

small arms and explosives, both forms of attack have been used 

abroad. The results of these changing tactics are that there are 

fewer opportunities to detect and disrupt plots. 

Now, we are also seeing greater diversity of targets. While some 

targets, like commercial aviation, remain constant, others, like 

mass transit systems and chemical facilities, are among critical infrastructure that terrorists could seek to strike. 

These elements which make the terrorist threat more diffuse also 

make it more difficult for law enforcement and the intelligence 

community to detect and disrupt. 

Accordingly, we are moving forward in a variety of ways to counteract these evolving threats. The steps we are taking are not a 

panacea. However, they are substantially strengthening our defenses against terrorism here at home. One step we are taking is 

getting information where it should be, when it should be there, 

and in it’s most useful format. In this threat environment, it could 

very well be a local police officer who detects or disrupts a threat 

rather than an intelligence analyst here in Washington, DC. That 

is why one of the top priorities for the department is to get information, tools, and resources out of Washington and into the hands 

of the men and women on the frontlines. 

Our fusion centers, which connect Federal, State, and local enforcement to first responders on the ground, play a major role in 

identifying, preventing, and disrupting threats. We support these 

centers through DHS personnel who work side-by-side with State 

and local law enforcement. 

We are also working with the Justice Department on the nationwide suspicious activity report (SAR) system, which standardizes 

ways for police to identify and report suspicious activities and report it back to Federal intelligence so that they can be analyzed 

against current threat information to identify broader trends. 

We are supporting State and local law enforcement through 

Homeland Security grants, eliminating red tape so these grants 

can be used to sustain current programs rather than being forced 

to buy new equipment or technology each year, and also making it 

7 

easier to use these funds to rehire and retain experienced first responder personnel. 

We are also working to raise public awareness through a campaign with the slogan ‘‘If you see something, say something,’’ which 

was originally used by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) 

in New York with Homeland Security grant funds. As we all remember, it was a New York City street vendor who tipped off the 

police about the bombing attempt in Times Square and the passengers themselves who thwarted the attack on Flight 253. 

We are working with police in communities to counter violent extremism in cities and towns across our country. Homeland Security, in fact, begins with hometown security, and we are working 

on a variety of recommendations made by a working group of our 

Homeland Security advisory council to aid local law enforcement in 

this effort. Specifically, DHS is using proven community-oriented 

policing techniques to develop training and hold regional summits 

for law enforcement to give them the tools they need to work with 

communities to combat sources of violence and detect threats when 

they arise. 

We are also working to strengthen security in several specific 

sectors. For example—and this is not an exhaustive list, it is just 

examples. In terms of aviation security, next week, we expect the 

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is part of 

the United Nations, to issue a historic international agreement on 

aviation security, strengthening security measures and standards 

around the globe. And, we continue to move forward to enhance 

surface transportation security, working closely with Amtrak and 

mass transit agencies around the country to integrate our information-sharing efforts. 

These initiatives are only a small part of the ongoing work at the 

Department of Homeland Security. With the FBI and the NCTC, 

we are conducting initiatives every day to help secure the country. 

We are and will continue to do everything in our power to prevent 

attacks, but I want to emphasize that it is impossible to guarantee 

that there will never be another attack. We cannot simply put the 

country under a glass dome. What we can do is take every possible 

step to provide those on the frontlines with the information, the 

tools and resources they need to better secure our country. This is 

the homeland security architecture that we are building, and this 

is what the hardworking men and women of the Department of 

Homeland Security are devoted to every day. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here. I look forward 

to answering the Committee’s questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Napolitano. That was a really good statement to begin our discussion 

with. 

Director Mueller, thanks for being here once again, and thanks 

for all the good work that you and everybody that works with you 

do every day. 

8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears in the Appendix on page 66. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,1 DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and 

Members of the Committee. 

As you know, the FBI’s highest priority continues to be the prevention of terrorist attacks against the homeland, and since September 11, 2001, the threat from terrorism has evolved, as you 

pointed out, in ways that present new challenges for us and for our 

partners. 

This morning let me focus on the most serious of these threats 

and give you some idea of how we are moving to counter them. Despite the significant counterterrorism pressure abroad, al-Qaeda 

continues to be committed to high profile attacks directed at the 

West, including plans against Europe as well as the homeland. 

Recent investigations have revealed some shift in their strategy 

for these attacks. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, 

2001, al-Qaeda plots and plans focused on using individuals from 

the Middle East or South Asia for their attacks. Since 2006, alQaeda has looked to recruit Americans or Westerners who are able 

to remain undetected by heightened security measures. For example, last year for the first time since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda 

successfully trained and deployed an operative to the United States 

to carry out such an attack. That operative was Najibullah Zazi, a 

lawful U.S. permanent resident who was plotting to attack the New 

York subway system. 

The threat from al-Qaeda affiliates has also evolved as other terror groups have developed greater intent and capability to strike 

at the homeland. We are increasingly concerned about the threats 

from these groups operating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, 

Somalia, and Iraq. Their threats focus more on homeland attacks 

now, as we saw with the Christmas Day and Times Square attempted bombings. 

Of course, these groups are also seeking to recruit extremists 

from the West. Cooperation between al-Qaeda and other terrorist 

groups has changed in the past year suggesting that this threat 

may increase. Sharing financial resources, training and recruits, 

these groups have been able to withstand significant counterterrorism pressure from the United States, coalition, and local government forces. 

As both of you have pointed out, threats from homegrown violent 

extremists also pose a significant concern to the United States. 

These individuals may be inspired by the global jihadist movement 

or use the Internet to connect with other extremists even if they 

do not receive direct guidance or training from a terrorist group. 

Often, they have diverse backgrounds and life experiences, as well 

as differing motivations. Based on cases from the past year, homegrown extremists are more sophisticated, harder to detect, and better able to connect with other extremists. In certain cases, they are 

more operationally capable than what we have previously seen. 

Moreover, the Internet has expanded as a platform for spreading 

extremist propaganda, a tool for online recruiting and a medium 

9 

for social networking with like-minded extremists, and this has 

contributed to the threat from homegrown radicalization in the 

United States. 

We also face a continuing threat from U.S. persons traveling 

overseas to conflict zones, seeking terrorist training, or combat experience. While the motivations and backgrounds of these individuals vary, once Americans travel overseas and make connections 

with extremists on the ground, they become targets for use in plots 

to attack the homeland, as we saw with the attempted Times 

Square bombing. And in particular, Somalia has drawn the attention of American extremists, as more than two dozen Americans 

have made it there to train or to fight in the past few years. Recent 

disruptions inside the United States show that some Americans 

still desire to travel to Somalia for extremist purposes. 

To counter these threats, the FBI has joined with our Federal 

partners and with State and local law enforcement in more than 

100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These task forces operate nationwide to prevent and dismantle terrorist plots. Our partnerships are critical to our understanding of the threat environment and to protecting our Nation and its citizens. And the FBI, 

along with the Department of Homeland Security, and NCTC, is 

also committed to a nationwide approach for participating in State 

and local fusion centers. 

The FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, and DHS have 

also joined together on initiatives to enhance our understanding of 

homegrown violent extremism. And we also continue to work with 

DHS to issue joint intelligence products on radicalization for our 

Federal, State, and our local partners. 

Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the FBI has developed an 

extensive outreach program to the Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh 

communities in order to develop trust, address concerns, and dispel 

myths about the FBI and our government. In 2009, we established 

specialized community outreach teams composed of special agents, 

analysts, and community outreach specialists to assist our field offices, establish new contacts with key communities, and work with 

DHS to address these concerns. 

Let me conclude by thanking this Committee for its service and 

its support. And on behalf of the men and women of the FBI, I look 

forward to working with you to continue to improve the FBI and 

to help keep America safe. I, of course, will be happy to answer any 

questions you might have, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director Mueller. At the beginning of your statement, you said something that is significant, 

which is that the FBI’s No. 1 priority continues to be the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States. And I know that 

is the truth, and your statement reminds us of how much our government has reorganized, refocused, and expanded in response to 

September 11, 2001, to prevent terrorist attacks against our homeland. 

We have two agencies here who did not exist on September 11, 

2001, DHS and NCTC. And in the case of the FBI, we have an 

agency that obviously was somewhat involved in counterterrorism 

but has greatly increased its role, involved with not only law enforcement but prevention. So I hope that is something that is noVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:57 Nov 14, 2011 Jkt 63832 PO 00000 Frm 000013 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\63832.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter appears in the Appendix on page 73. 

ticed not only by the American people but by those who would 

think of attacking us. 

Michael Leiter is the Director of the National Counterterrorism 

Center, which was one of the most significant results of the 9/11 

Commission report and the Intelligence Reform Act that began in 

this Committee and passed Congress, signed by President Bush. 

Thanks for being here, Mr. Leiter. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER,1 DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 

Mr. LEITER. It is my pleasure. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, 

Senator Collins, and distinguished Members. It is always good to 

be here, especially with Director Mueller and Secretary Napolitano. 

I can tell you that there is virtually no terrorist event or issue that 

comes up when the three of us do not work in a very close partnership. 

Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, as you have already 

noted, the past year has noted the most significant developments 

in terrorism since September 11, 2001. The three attempted homeland attacks during the past year from overseas-based groups and 

the two lone-wolf attacks here in the United States, by Carlos 

Bledsoe in Arkansas and Nidal Hasan, surpass the number and 

pace of attacks during any year since September 11, 2001. The 

range of al-Qaeda core-affiliated and allies plotting against the 

homeland during the past year suggests the threat has, in fact, 

grown far more complex and underscores the challenges of identifying and countering a more diverse array of threats to the homeland. 

Al-Qaeda’s affiliates’ and allies’ increasing ability to provide 

training, guidance and support for attacks against the United 

States makes it very difficult to anticipate the precise nature of the 

next attack and from where it might come. The regional affiliates 

and allies that have grown have been able to compensate, to some 

extent, for the decreased willingness of al-Qaeda and Pakistan to 

accept and train new recruits. And additional attempts by al-Qaeda 

affiliates and allies to attack the United States, particularly attempts in the homeland, could attract the attention of even more 

Western recruits, thereby increasing those groups’ threat to the 

homeland. 

Even failed attacks, such as AQAP’s and TTP’s attempts this 

part year, do, to some extent, further al-Qaeda’s goal of fomenting 

terrorist attacks against the West and demonstrate that some affiliates, allies, and homegrown terrorists are embracing their vision. 

Now, today al-Qaeda in Pakistan is at one of its weakest points 

organizationally, but I would stress a significant however, that the 

group has time and time again proven its resilience and remains 

a very capable and determined enemy. 

The threat to the homeland is, as you have noted, compounded 

significantly by operationally distinct plotting against the United 

States by its allies, affiliates, and sympathizers. Now, with respect 

11 

to regional affiliates, I think it is worth highlighting four of particular concern. First and most notably is AQAP in Yemen and we 

assess that it continues to pose significant threats to U.S. interests 

in Yemen and that it continues to plot against the homeland. 

Of additional note, as both Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins noted, dual Yemeni-American citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, who 

played a significant role in the attempted airliner attack over Detroit, continues to be a key concern given his familiarity with the 

West and his participation in AQAP external operations. 

In addition, East Africa remains a key locale for al-Qaeda associates, and Somalia-based terrorists associated with the insurgent 

group, al-Shabaab. Some al-Shabaab leaders share al-Qaeda’s ideology and publicly have praised Osama bin Laden and asked for 

further guidance from the group. And as Director Mueller noted, 

more than two dozen Americans, most ethnic Somali but not all, 

have traveled to fight in Somalia since 2006. Now, of course, the 

potential for those trainees to return to the United States or elsewhere in the West remains a very significant concern. And I think 

it is also worth noting that al-Shabaab has vividly illustrated its 

commitment to attacking outside Somalia, most tragically in the 

waning days of Africa’s first-ever World Cup with a deadly attack, 

a series of coordinated deadly attacks in Kampala, Uganda. 

In North Africa, al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb remains a 

persistent threat to the U.S. and Western interests primarily in the 

form of kidnapping and ransoms, but we are, of course, concerned 

with their potential to reach beyond North Africa. 

Finally, in Iraq, although the counter terrorism successes have 

greatly diminished al-Qaeda in Iraq’s effectiveness, we continue to 

see them as a key al-Qaeda affiliate and having continued interest 

in attacking beyond Iraq. 

Now, as this Committee has very effectively noted, the spike in 

homegrown violent extremism is indicative of a common cause that 

has undoubtedly rallied some individuals within the United States 

to al-Qaeda’s banner. In plots disrupted in New York, North Carolina, Arkansas, Alaska, and Texas, all of these were operationally 

distinct but are indicative again of a collective subculture and common cause that has rallied these independent extremists. And undoubtedly, the Internet, as you noted, has been a significant factor 

in many of these attacks or plots. 

Now, although we are focusing on al-Qaeda today, I do believe 

it is important to note, we continue to try to keep our eye on 

groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hamas, and Hezbollah that threaten 

U.S. interests abroad and potentially within the United States. 

Now, given this very diverse landscape, and especially the failed 

attack over Detroit on Christmas Day, at your instruction and at 

the President’s direction, we have implemented several changes to 

try to address the diversity of this threat. As you know, NCTC led 

the Director of National Intelligence Master Action Plan to make 

sure that analytic resources were appropriately aligned with this 

new threat and to appropriately allocate additional resources that 

the Congress generously gave the counterterrorism community. 

Second, we created pursuit groups which focus at a very granular 

level on those issues which might not immediately appear to be 

threats to the homeland but can, as in cases like Christmas Day, 

12 

manifest themselves in tragic ways. In addition, we have worked 

with the entire interagency, especially DHS and FBI, to review 

watchlisting protocols and improve our watchlisting effort. 

Finally, we have spent significant time, effort, and leadership on 

developing an improved information technology infrastructure to 

better meet the demands of increased information sharing with this 

diverse threat. 

Now, finally, as this Committee knows, NCTC has both an intelligence and a policy responsibility for coordinating across the U.S. 

Government. And on that front, although I do not want to speak 

about all of those areas, I would like to briefly speak to our efforts 

to coordinate combating violent extremism, especially here in the 

homeland. 

Senator Collins, you noted the quote from the Kean and Hamilton group that we were somehow lulled into a sense of complacency about homegrown extremism. I will take the liberty of speaking for everyone at this table and tell you that none of us, nor anyone in our organizations, were lulled into any sense of complacency. 

And to the extent there was complacency, I think it occurred outside, not inside the counterterrorism community. 

But I would note, there is some truth to the idea that no one single organization is responsible for countering radicalization. But 

from my perspective, that is actually a good thing. In fact, there 

is centralized policy oversight of combating violent extremism at 

the National Security Council; there is, in fact, centralized coordination of those efforts at NCTC; and there is also centralized assessment of the effectiveness of those programs at NCTC, providing 

that to the White House. 

What there is, though, is decentralized execution of programs related to countering violent extremism in the homeland. And from 

my perspective, I think that is particularly important because the 

issue is so complex that no one organization, FBI, Department of 

Justice, or DHS, is in a position to address all of the factors of violent extremism. So I think it can be somewhat misleading to suggest that no one is in charge. I think, in fact, there is centralized 

coordination and decentralized execution of the programs, which 

have to be very varied to combat a varied threat. And, of course, 

I am very happy to discuss this more in your questions. 

In conclusion, I, again, want to thank this Committee. This Committee was instrumental in the creation of NCTC and the Department of Homeland Security. This Committee has helped us keep 

our eye on the ball for violent extremism, both domestically and 

abroad, and I look forward to continuing to work with this Committee as the challenges do change and we hope we get on top of 

this threat. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Director Leiter. 

We will do 7-minute rounds of questioning. 

Let me begin with a current situation and ask you to respond to 

the extent that you can. And I am going from public sources here. 

There have been public statements over the last month by Homeland Security officials in Europe, particularly France, England, and 

Germany, about heightened threat levels. And I wonder if you 

would care to comment at all, particularly whether the statements 

13 

and actions taken in Europe suggest the same for—that is to say 

a heightened threat level for the U.S. homeland as well. 

Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, thank you. There have 

been a number of activities in Europe. We are in constant contact 

with our colleagues abroad. Indeed, I will be at a meeting next 

week on this topic. I think in an open setting, suffice it to say that 

we are all seeing increased activity by a more diverse set of groups 

and a more diverse set of threats, and that activity, much of which 

is Islamist in nature, is directed at the West generally. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Leiter, do you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, I would largely echo what the Secretary said. One thing I would note is that these levels, although 

they are only apparent to the public sometimes, are constantly up 

and down for us. We track a lot of things that never become public 

and we do not want them to become public because that would undermine our ability to disrupt those threats. 

September 11, 2001, and the period around that is always a time 

of elevated threat, and I think we have worked quite closely with 

our European counterparts on some specific issues because we do 

not see any particularly focused on the homeland, but we have to 

assume that any threat against the West can also implicate the 

homeland. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that response and the fact 

that the three of you are on top of it. 

Let me go to one of the conclusions that we have all drawn, 

which is that the pace of Islamist terrorist attacks, or attempted 

attacks against the United States in the last year, has gone up. 

The number is greater. And I hear at least two causes that I think 

explain that from your testimony. One is the increase in attempted 

attacks by foreign terrorist organizations, other than al-Qaeda, who 

were created for more local foreign purposes, al-Shabaab in Somalia, other groups related to problems in Kashmir or Pakistan. So 

that is one. The second is the increase in homegrown 

radicalization. 

Are those the two that explain this increase that we are seeing 

in attacks against the U.S. homeland or is there something more? 

Has there been a judgment made at the top of the al-Qaeda, for 

instance, that it is time to sort of build back in attacking the U.S. 

homeland? 

Maybe, Director Mueller, you should start first on that one. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start, if I could then, and say that the 

third factor quite probably is the examples of Mumbai and Hasan 

in Fort Hood and the ability to undertake terrorist attacks with 

very few people, but launched pursuant to the ideology and the desire to expand jihadist extremism, and understanding that launching a larger, perhaps more devastating attack, is not worth the additional effort when you can get substantial coverage and impact 

with smaller attacks. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. So that a large sophisticated 

September 11, 2001, is always possible, but that for now, the direction of the enemy is on a smaller scale, more individual attacks, 

as they have seen nonetheless, even when they fail, as they did on 

14 

Christmas Day and the Times Square, it unsettles our country and 

receives a lot of attention. 

So what about the question of why there are more Americans involved? Is this just the obvious, that the process of homegrown 

radicalization and the use of the Internet is growing greater, or is 

there something else happening here? 

Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Mr. Chairman, I think that we do not yet 

have a complete understanding of what would cause a person to become radicalized to the extent of violence, to the extent of traveling 

to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas to train, and then returning to the United States. But as Director Leiter said, we are 

looking at what is the continuum of activity, where the best place 

that we could possibly intervene is. 

What we are doing at the Department of Homeland Security is 

really working with the community policing strategy, and that is 

to say really educating local police departments, arming them with 

intelligence, products that we jointly develop so they can watch for 

tactics and trends to prevent one of those persons from being actually able to carry out an attack. So, we have really focused on acknowledging the phenomenon exists, and figure out what do we do 

from a law enforcement perspective to minimize the risk an attack 

can be successful. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Leiter, you responded in your 

opening statement to Senator Collins’ reference to the Kean-Hamilton report. They said in their report, ‘‘There remains no Federal 

Government agency or department specifically charged with identifying radicalization and interdicting the recruitment of U.S. citizens or residents for terrorism.’’ 

But I heard you to say in your opening statement that the National Counterterrorism Center is that agency. Am I right? 

Mr. LEITER. We are the organization responsible, in conjunction 

with the National Security Council, for helping to coordinate what 

different departments and agencies are doing. I think in terms of 

identifying people who are radicalized and the factors that go into 

that radicalization, our closest partners in that are the FBI and 

DHS. Director Mueller can address what they do, but the basic 

idea is the FBI is the investigative piece, DHS is working with 

State, local, tribal officials, private sector and awareness, and 

working with the communities. NCTC is trying to piece together 

the foreign perspective and the domestic perspective into one cohesive picture of where we see that radicalization. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We have heard from leaders in the Muslim-American community that different Federal Government agencies have their own outreach efforts to the community, which at 

times do not appear to be closely coordinated. And obviously, this 

community—I will state for the record, we all know it—is overwhelming made up of patriotic, law-abiding Americans, but the 

problem is coming from a small group of people in that community 

who can cause our country terrible damage. And so in some sense, 

they are within the community the first line of defense in noticing 

potential trouble. 

15 

Are we adequately coordinating our outreach to the MuslimAmerican community and their cooperation with us in this counterterrorism effort? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start, if I could, by saying that since September 11, 2001, we have 56 field offices, 400 resident agencies in 

the FBI. Since September 11, 2001, every one of those entities in 

the United States has been engaged in an outreach effort with the 

Muslim community, from the bottom all the way to the top. My 

message to the Muslim community is the worst thing that could 

happen to the Muslim community is another attack. We need your 

help. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER. Law enforcement cannot do it itself. And through 

a variety of mechanisms, whether it be citizen academies or other 

mechanisms, we have to bring the community in so that they understand the FBI. We have been doing this since September 11, 

2001. 

There are additional areas of activity that have grown over a period of time, and I do believe that the coordination is successful 

with NCTC. Inevitably, there will be particular areas where the coordination does not go as well as you would like, but I think generally it is good. 

The other thing to remember is that we also have the responsibility for investigating civil rights offenses, and we want to make 

certain that the Muslim community understands that whenever 

there is an offense that falls within that purview, that we are out 

there investigating that and making certain the persons responsible are brought to justice. 

So I do believe we have substantial outreach, have had it for a 

number of years, does not mean that it cannot be improved, but 

that it is moving in the right—I hate to say moving in the right 

direction, but it is contributing substantially and in coordination 

with the other partners. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think I should leave it at that because 

I am over my time. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I was just going to add, Mr. Chairman, 

that if the comment is there is too much outreach, not too little, 

it seems to me we cannot do enough outreach in this setting. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, I agree. I mean, the comment was 

that it is not coordinated. 

Maybe I will come back to you, Director Leiter, on that on the 

next round. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to ask each of you a basic question. We have seen a dramatic spike in the number of attempted and successful attacks during the past year and a half. Do you believe this is an aberration 

or is this likely to continue? 

Madam Secretary, we will start with you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that caution would dictate that 

we assume it is not an aberration, that we are going to see increased diversification of groups, tactics, and targets, and that 

means we have to continue to work on keeping State and locals 

prepared and informed. It means information sharing is at a preVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:57 Nov 14, 2011 Jkt 63832 PO 00000 Frm 000019 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\63832.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
16 

mium. It means we need to involve the entire U.S. citizenry. This 

is why we have campaigns like ‘‘See something, say something.’’ 

And, we must be very resilient should an attack actually succeed. 

Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. As the Secretary says, we have to assume it is not 

an aberration. I do think it is, in part, contingent on what happens 

overseas, whether it be in Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan, and that 

the seriousness, the effectiveness of the threat will grow or be reduced in some part with our success overseas. 

Most of the individuals who have been radicalized in the United 

States have been radicalized by influences outside the United 

States as opposed to being radicalized by influence in the United 

States. And to the extent that we can address those radicalizing influences, whether it be in Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 

or elsewhere, I also think it is important to reduce the level of the 

threat. 

Senator COLLINS. Director Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. I would agree with Director Mueller that the outside 

influences are very important here. Right now, we do not see any 

great likelihood of those diminishing any time in the future, nor do 

we see any indicators within the United States of a significant 

drop-off in radicalization. 

What I would say is the silver lining, I hope, that through greater awareness and engagement with these communities of the risks 

to their children traveling overseas to Somalia or Yemen, that the 

community engagement will over time reduce the likelihood of 

radicalization. 

Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller, several years ago, I held 

hearings on terrorism financing, and I recognize that the Department of Treasury, as well as the FBI, play the critical lead role in 

trying to block money from flowing from this country to terrorist 

groups overseas. A means of funneling that money is often the 

hawalas, and indeed, there was a recent indictment which indicated that there was a money transfer to the Times Square attempted attacker. 

How big a problem do you believe it is with funds from groups, 

such as Somalian immigrants in this country, going to terrorist 

groups like al-Shabaab? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would say it is a significant problem, and it is 

a difficult problem to know fully how extensive it is, principally, because while we can often track funds from the United States, many 

of those funds are going overseas for legitimate purposes to support 

families and the home countries of the individuals sending the 

funds, and the inability of our investigations to identify the funding 

stream all the way to the pocket of the terrorists. 

It is a substantial problem, difficult to address. We have a number of ways of doing that, whether it be through looking at it 

through technology, the money transfers, or most particularly, the 

use of sources but there is a substantial problem with challenges 

to being successful in turning it off. 

Senator COLLINS. Should there be greater regulation of hawalas? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would have to look at exactly what that regulation might be, but, yes, additional recordkeeping that gives us inVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:57 Nov 14, 2011 Jkt 63832 PO 00000 Frm 000020 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\63832.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17 

sight into the purpose of the transfers is always beneficial to our 

abilities to stop that stream of funding. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Leiter, in the wake of the Christmas Day 

attempted bombing, we held hearings at which your deputy, Mr. 

Travers, talked about the problems with linking databases, and he 

testified that had information been linked with the cable from the 

embassy in Nigeria with information in other databases, it would 

have supported a watchlisting nomination that would have stopped 

Abdulmutallab from flying into the United States. He went on to 

say that the government needs to improve its ability to piece together this partial information that is in various databases. 

What was disturbing to me, however, is Mr. Travers went on to 

say that there were policy limitations and legal limitations that 

must be addressed to enable effective information sharing. We have 

asked, over and over and over again, what are those policy and 

legal limitations because we want to address them. We want this 

information sharing, which is so vital, to be improved, so that the 

vital information can be linked while protecting, obviously, the privacy and civil liberty rights. And we have heard from technology 

experts that a federated search capability across multiple agencies 

and platforms is possible, that this is not a technical problem. 

So what is the problem? What are the legal and policy constraints? 

Mr. LEITER. Well, Senator Collins, I am happy to come up and 

spend time with the Committee and walk through them in great 

detail. I will tell you that, given the multitude of databases that 

exist, hundreds of databases that might be relevant to some of 

these challenges, there are a multitude of challenges. I will give 

you some specific examples. 

There are some issues that I have written a letter to the Senate 

Intelligence Committee about regarding the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and ways in which FOIA, as currently structured, 

reduce the incentive for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to 

provide NCTC certain data. As Secretary Napolitano well knows, 

there are significant policy issues with the European Union and 

their provision of passenger name record information to the U.S. 

Government and retention periods, which can inhibit effective use 

of this data in counterterrorism operations investigations. Similarly, as I know you are well aware, the complexities of the Foreign 

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the various amendments 

to FISA have significant limitations on how—and I need to stress, 

some very appropriate limitations—U.S. persons’ information can 

be handled. 

Each of these are examples as to how, although we can have a 

federated search, it is sometimes difficult to fully integrate databases in a way that the computers connect information prior to an 

individual having to dive into a specific database and find that information. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is an 

issue that we do need to work further on. We have talked about 

it for months, but we have never received the specifics from the Administration. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I absolutely agree with you, Senator Collins, and we will do that. 

18 

I just want to pick up on one comment, the response to Senator 

Collins’ questions about the threat to our homeland. And you said 

that the extent of the threat really depends a lot on what is happening in places far away, like Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan. And 

it reminds us of what I suppose is obvious to all of you, which is 

that this war with Islamist extremism is really a world war, so 

that what happens far away really affects our security here at 

home. And therefore, the ongoing U.S. and allied efforts in countries like Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan against extremists groups 

is critically important to the work that you are doing here at home. 

In order of appearance among the Senators present, Senator 

McCain is next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. Leiter, if the United States captures a terrorist tomorrow 

outside the U.S., Iraq, or Afghanistan, where would we detain that 

person for purposes of interrogation? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think it would obviously depend, in part, 

on the circumstances of the capture, but I believe that he can be 

detained by U.S. military forces or potentially detained by the 

country in which he was captured. 

Senator MCCAIN. He would be detained where? 

Mr. LEITER. Or potentially he could be turned over to the country 

in which he was captured or his home country. 

Senator MCCAIN. A terrorist that is apprehended in attempting 

to inflict a act against the United States of America would be 

turned over to the host country? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, as I said, it depends on many factors. He 

could be detained—I am not an expert on law of war and Department of Defense (DOD) authorities, but obviously, if he were captured by the U.S. military, there is an ability to detain there, or, 

in some circumstances, in host nations or the individual’s host 

country if they were a willing partner with the United States. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, maybe you can look into it and give us 

a better answer. That is not a good answer. 

Mr. Leiter, recently, Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton said that 

the situation and violence in Mexico is now comparable to that of 

Colombia in the 1980s. 

Do you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I would actually have to defer to both Director Mueller and Secretary Napolitano, who are much closer to 

the Mexico issue. 

Senator MCCAIN. Let me ask then both of them. Mr. Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Senator, I am in no position to equate what happened in Colombia 5 or 6 years ago to what is happening in Mexico 

now. 

Senator MCCAIN. You have no ability to do that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I am somewhat familiar with what happened in Colombia and what has changed in Colombia since then, 

but the structure of the feuding factions in Colombia is different 

than the types of feuding factions that you have in Mexico today. 

You had the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) that 

19 

was involved in narcotics trafficking with an infrastructure that I 

would say is far different from the colliding cartels today. 

So I am not certain how you would compare what happened 5, 

6, or 7 years ago in Colombia with what is happening in Mexico 

today, although I do believe that some of the mechanisms that contributed to the successes in Colombia should be adopted by Mexico. 

Senator MCCAIN. You do agree that there has been a dramatic 

increase in violence in Mexico in all areas, ranging from assassination and kidnapping of journalists, and murder of 72 immigrants 

from other countries, including 14 women. 

Would you agree that the violence in Mexico has dramatically escalated in, say, the last 3 or 4 years? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. And would you say that increases the threat of 

national security on the other side of our border? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think that is right, and particularly in 

some of the states of northern Mexico, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas, 

for example, homicide rates are up dramatically as are attacks on 

government. And, of course, we saw the paper in Juarez just a few 

days ago on a front page editorial saying what do we need to do. 

Senator MCCAIN. So wouldn’t that lead one to the concern that 

with still hundreds of thousands of people crossing our border illegally, that a terrorist act could be committed on the United States 

of America since there have been threats by the cartels alone to do 

so? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That goes to all of the efforts that are 

going on with Mexico in Mexico and along the Southwest Border. 

But to the extent, yes, we see groups in Mexico, the large drug cartels. 

Now, the plain fact of the matter is that illegal immigration, 

while still too high, is down significantly. It is the plain fact that 

drug seizures, cash seizures, and gun seizures are up significantly. 

It is the plain fact that there is more manpower and more technology at the border than ever before and more is going to the border. But it is also true that the situation in Mexico is very serious 

and we have seen it escalate in the past several years. 

Senator MCCAIN. And does that mean that the situation in Mexico has worsened over the last couple of years or improved? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think in terms of the violent crime in 

Mexico, it has worsened. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Napolitano, there is an old saying 

about, in your duties, on a policy, it is not where you stand, it is 

where you sit. In 2008, you sent a letter to Secretary Chertoff saying, ‘‘arguing for more help on the border.’’ You said then, ‘‘Human 

and drug smuggling rings continue to thrive in Arizona, crossing 

our border and using our elite cities as major hubs to transport 

crossers throughout the country. We wait for real progress on the 

virtual fence, and we know there has not been progress on the virtual fence. Border communities in Arizona will continue to be 

strained by the millions of dollars in costs they must absorb to the 

state of border security.’’ 

20 

1The Document for the Record from Secretary Napolitano to Senator McCain’s request appears in the Appendix on page 59. 

Then, of course, just last week you said, ‘‘He is a governor. He 

always has the ability, in a way, to bring up National Guard if he 

is willing to pay for them. That is always an option available to a 

governor.’’ At the same time, suing the State of Arizona for trying 

to get its border secure by enacting legislation to try to address the 

issue of illegal immigrants in our State, which is a Federal responsibility, all that in the backdrop of, apparently, that there will be 

new policy by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) according to a Fox News report, ‘‘ICE proposes new policy that would let 

illegal immigrants go free.’’ 

According to a news report and other news reports, proposed ICE 

changes in ICE policy state, ‘‘Immigration officers should not issue 

detainers against an alien charged only with a traffic-related misdemeanor unless or until the alien is convicted. The ICE proposal 

would prevent law enforcement officers from reporting illegal immigrants identified during the course of a traffic-related stop or arrest 

to Federal authorities unless they are a convicted felon, they are 

wanted for a felony, they are part of an existing investigation, they 

were involved in an accident involving drugs or alcohol, or they fled 

the scene.’’ Apparently, the draft proposal was posted on ICE’s Web 

site last month. 

Could you testify as to what in the world is going on here? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, sure can. 

Senator MCCAIN. Good. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. And I would be happy to. First of all, 

where I sit has not changed my position. 

Senator MCCAIN. Clearly, you have. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No, I disagree, Senator. 

But what we have done in the past 2 years is put more resources 

at the Southwest Border than ever before, both in terms of Federal 

and providing resources to the States. I am not going to get into 

the tit for tat with Governor Rick Perry of Texas. I think that is 

not worthy of this Committee. 

ICE has put out guidance that we are going to focus on criminal 

aliens, and, in fact, we have removed, and will be removing, more 

criminal aliens from this country than ever before. And I think that 

is the right policy, criminal aliens, felony fugitives, those in our 

country illegally also endangering public safety. However, ICE has 

not said in any formal policy that others will not be detained. 

So I would be happy to respond in writing. I think the ICE comments that you have just made are misconstrued, misinterpreted, 

and just wrong. I would also be happy to put in the hearing record, 

the entire record of DHS on the border.1

Senator MCCAIN. So it is not true that the ICE has proposed that 

it would enact a policy that would prevent law enforcement officers 

from reporting illegal immigrants identified during the course of a 

traffic-related stop or arrest to Federal authorities unless they are 

a convicted felon, wanted for a felony, etc.? That is not true? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. ICE has issued guidance to prioritize 

those who are convicted felons, those who have committed violent 

crimes, those who are felony fugitives, and those who are gang 

21 

members. And our removals of those individuals are at record numbers. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would that prevent law enforcement officers 

from reporting illegal immigrants identified during the course of a 

traffic-related stop? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. 

Senator MCCAIN. It would not? 

Sectary Napolitano. No. 

Senator MCCAIN. That proposal, as posted on the Web site of 

ICE, is not true? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. That is not the policy of ICE. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. I know that you are very busy, but 

from my visits to the southern part of our State, they do not see 

this dramatic improvement, Madam Secretary. In fact, they are 

more worried than they have ever been. They see continued home 

invasions. They see continued requirement for our government to 

put up signs that say ‘‘warning’’ to our citizens that they are in a 

‘‘drug smuggling area and human smuggling area.’’ They do not 

have the same security that people do in other parts of our country. 

Our wildlife refuges continue to be trashed. The treatment and horrible abuses that are committed by these coyotes and human and 

drug smugglers, who are basically the same now—at least in the 

view of the citizens I represent—they have not actually seen any 

improvement. They have seen conditions worsen, and they live 

there. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, again, I would be happy to come 

and brief you personally, because we are in constant contact with 

those very citizens, at least in law enforcement. And all I can do 

is say, look, I measure what we are doing by the results and by 

the numbers, and what should be going up is going up, what 

should be going down is going down. However, the situation in 

Mexico is very serious, and it does demand our utmost attention. 

You are correct about that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could I just finally respond then? Well, let us 

get Sheriff Larry Dever and the sheriffs that Secretary Napolitano 

says she is in contact with, and they will tell you, they are the law 

enforcement people. They are down there on the front line, and 

they will tell you, they have not seen improvement. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, we will add Sheriff Tony Estrada, 

Sheriff Ralph Ogden, and some of the other sheriffs, as well. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would be more than happy to. They are on the 

front lines and they are the citizens that—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Let us get them all up here. 

Senator MCCAIN. Things are not improving at all, Secretary 

Napolitano. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you both. 

Let us go to Senator Brown, who can bring some sheriffs from 

Massachusetts. [Laughter.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just as a follow-up to Senator McCain, do you consider people 

who cross our border without proper authority or paperwork to be 

here illegally? 

22 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes. 

Senator BROWN. And if that is the case, especially in Arizona and 

surrounding areas, what is your policy and the Administration’s 

policy with regard to when you, in fact, stop somebody, whether it 

is through a traffic stop or some other means? What actually happens to those individuals? What is your policy and recommendation 

and the Administration’s? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, it depends on the circumstances of 

the stop and it depends on the—— 

Senator BROWN. Well, assuming the stop is illegal and they are 

stopped properly—— 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Correct. 

Senator BROWN [continuing]. And all that legal stuff which we all 

know. But what happens? What is the position? Are they then subjected to being deported or does it depend on whether they are a 

violent offender? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No. They will be recorded. They will be 

put into the immigration system. They may or may not be detained, which is—— 

Senator BROWN. Well, that is where I am a little confused—may 

or may not. They are either here illegally or they are not. If they 

are here illegally, are they supposed to be detained or are they not? 

I mean, what are the factors? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Well, it depends on, quite frankly, the seriousness of the offender and the availability of bed space. And this 

is a real problem along the border. We do not have enough beds, 

as senators who are from the border recognize, and we have testified before. There are not enough beds to detain everybody who 

crosses the border, and so what happens is some of them who are 

here illegally—and that is their offense; they have crossed illegally, 

but they have committed no other crime—they will be put into an 

administrative procedure. If, however, if somebody has crossed illegally and they have a felony record, or they are a gang member, 

they are somebody who is a fugitive, then we will be able to seek 

detention and removal. 

Senator BROWN. And is there a plan to ultimately secure the border, as Senator McCain, Senator Kyl, and others have tried? I remember when I was down there visiting, I was surprised. One section of the country that has a double fence and is secure, and another part of the State is somewhat porous. 

Is there a plan? Do you have a plan? I know when you were the 

governor you had the very same concerns. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Those concerns have been the concerns 

that I have been acting on as the Secretary, and we have built a 

fence. I think the Congress has appropriated enough money for 700 

miles of fence, roughly, and we have built all but a few miles. But 

you cannot just rely on a fence. You must have technology. You 

must have manpower. And as I told Senator McCain, there is more 

of that at the border than ever before and more is on the way. 

Senator BROWN. Great. Thank you. 

Further, let me start out by just saying, I appreciate all the efforts of all of you and all of our law enforcement and other officials 

trying to battle daily to try to keep our country safe, and aside 

from our economic problems that we are having, our national secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:57 Nov 14, 2011 Jkt 63832 PO 00000 Frm 000026 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\63832.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
23 

rity and international security is the No. 1 threat that faces us. 

And, quite frankly, if we do not get our economy squared away, we 

are going to have some difficulty, I feel, dealing with a lot of the 

national security obligations that we have not only locally but 

throughout the world in helping our international friends. 

Director Leiter, 8 months ago, after the Christmas Day bombing, 

you announced the creation of pursuit teams who were charged 

with chasing leads and connecting the dots by freeing up some of 

your analysts. 

Have you seen any benefits? Are these teams in place? Are there 

any benefits, in fact, because of that, that you have seen, and have 

we caught any intelligence links that we might otherwise have 

missed? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, they are in place. There are more than 50 

analysts working on them. I would also note that something we 

added since that last testimony, some of them are merged components with FBI investigative groups to further increase the information sharing. We have seen benefit. We have FBI cases that 

have been opened because of pursuit group leads that otherwise 

would not have been uncovered. We have enhanced numerous 

watchlisting records that otherwise would not have been enhanced. 

So I think we have done a better job since Christmas Day of 

identifying new cases, domestically and overseas, and enhancing 

our understanding of individuals who may pose a threat to the 

United States. 

Senator BROWN. Would you suggest that DHS and FBI would 

benefit from adopting that model as well or are they? 

Mr. LEITER. I think for the FBI, again, the jointness of the 

groups, from my perspective, that is the FBI doing it with us, and 

I think that is the optimal way to do it. We are also co-locating 

members from DHS operational intelligence components to enhance 

the transfer of information as we uncover something immediately 

into Secretary Napolitano’s area of responsibility, setting screening 

standards and the like. 

Senator BROWN. And could you give me an assessment of what 

you feel Hezbollah’s terrorist capabilities are as to how they affect 

the United States? 

Mr. LEITER. Hezbollah remains a highly effective terrorist and 

political organization, with quite incredible capability, both within 

the Levant, but also elsewhere. They have a global network of individuals, and within the Levant, they have highly sophisticated 

weaponry that they, in the past, used against Israel. 

The big question mark for us has always been not their capability but their intent. Currently, we do not assess there to be a 

clear intent to attack the United States, but should that intent 

change, they undoubtedly have the capability to launch attacks 

against the United States and the West on a relatively global scale. 

Senator BROWN. Now, I know Iran is obviously the chief sponsor 

of their money and weaponry. 

Mr. LEITER. Yes. 

Senator BROWN. That is still the case? 

Mr. LEITER. That is still the case. 

24 

Senator BROWN. Do you think if there is an escalation between 

Iran and Israel, that we will see more of a threat here in the 

United States? 

Mr. LEITER. Yes. 

Senator BROWN. And then to shift gears a little bit, how have you 

noticed that the coordination between the State and local intelligence shops, how closely does the NCTC work with, for example, 

the Boston Police Department, the New York Police Department, 

and those local authorities, because I know the Secretary said it 

needs to be a local effort, almost like a neighborhood watch on a 

statewide basis. 

What have your experiences been? 

Mr. LEITER. First and foremost, everything we do with State and 

locals is really done in conjunction or through DHS and the FBI. 

We think that is critical because, honestly, what we have heard 

from State and local is that they do not want more places to connect in the U.S. Government. They want to understand who is 

doing what and having another organization deal with them directly is not what they seek. 

What we try to do is take that national-level intelligence and 

work with DHS and the FBI to get it down to a level where it is 

actually useful to State and local officials either through JTTFs or 

through the fusion centers. I would simply note, though, Boston 

and New York are two organizations that we have always had a 

very close relationship with. I have a New York City detective who 

is an analyst in our organization, and I also have a Boston Police 

Department lieutenant who leads an organization that is led by 

DHS but is within NCTC to provide information back to State and 

local organizations. And, in fact, in conjunction with the FBI and 

DHS several months back, we ran an exercise on information sharing and terrorist threats with the City of Boston. 

Senator BROWN. And if I could just, Mr. Chairman, follow up 

with the remaining two folks that are testifying with that same 

question. How are you noticing the relationship between the State 

and local governments? And also, I would just like to convey, when 

we do know of an issue that is happening in our State, it is important, I think, to let us know—the senators or congressman that are 

dealing with it—so we can work with you in concert, with the public relations to get the word out in a respectful, responsible manner. 

So if you two could comment on that same question, which is, between the State and local intelligence shops, how do they work 

with you? 

Then I would be done, Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. MUELLER. We have a very successful Joint Terrorism Task 

Force in Massachusetts. We also have branches in States to the 

north in which the Boston Police Department, State police, other 

police departments and organizations contribute. The persons who 

work on the Joint Terrorism Task Forces are given top secret clearances. They have access to everything we have. And whenever 

there is a threat, the information running the threat is distributed 

to those who will be responsible for that threat. And if it is at the 

secret or top secret level, we get it out so that it could be more 

widely disseminated. 

25 

But I ask you to go and sit down and talk with the Joint Terrorism Task Force and perhaps be briefed by not only what the 

composition of the task force is but what they are currently looking 

at in that area. 

Senator BROWN. I have, and I will again. Thank you. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Likewise, Senator, fusion centers are 

somewhat different than JTTFs. They have a different function. 

They complement each other, and we would be happy to get you 

briefed up on what is happening in Massachusetts. 

Senator BROWN. That would be wonderful. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Brown. Senator 

Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for holding these hearings as you have so consistently. 

During a similar hearing last year, I asked the question whether 

or not someone who is on local law enforcement who arrests somebody for suspicion of commission of a crime could call a single place 

or find out from a single location whether or not there is any information that this person may be engaged in terrorist activities. 

Secretary Napolitano, I think at that time you testified that the 

ability to fuse that information and get it available to the officer 

on the street was a work in progress. And I am wondering whether 

or not progress has been made on that in the last year. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, I think significant progress has been 

made, and if there were arrests on that basis and the person were 

to run a name and any other identifiers through either the JTTF 

or the fusion center, there would be the ability to cross-check 

against a number of databases. 

Senator LEVIN. And how many databases are not included in 

that information and how many are? Is it the majority of sources 

of information, two-thirds, three-quarters, and are we improving 

that number? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We are definitely improving that number. 

There are a lot of databases, and I think the search engines have 

been improved as well. I know at DHS, for example, there are at 

least 47 different databases against which such information could 

be run. It is easier to say how many as opposed to what is out 

there in other agencies that we do not yet have. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, how many are you seeking that you have 

not yet gotten? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Let me provide you with that information 

after this hearing, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you do that for the record? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. The 50 states now form nearly two million corporations and limited liability companies each year without knowing who actually owns them. The failure to collect ownership information invites wrongdoers to misuse U.S. companies for terrorism, 

money laundering, tax evasion, or other crimes. It is a subject 

which this Committee has been examining for a number of years 

now. 

26 

Just one example, of how corporations are being misused by terrorists. A man named Victor Bout is a Russian arms dealer who 

has been indicted in the United States for the following: Conspiracy 

to kill U.S. nationals, to acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles, and 

to provide material support to terrorist organizations. He carried 

out his activities in part by using shell companies, including a 

number of them, about 10, right here in the United States. We are 

trying to extradite Mr. Bout right now from Thailand. 

In a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 4 years ago, 

the FBI was quoted as saying that U.S. shell companies with hidden owners had been used to launder as much as $36 billion from 

the former Soviet Union and were involved in most of over 100 

stock market manipulation cases, and many other reports have followed since them. 

Corporations have been misused for drug trafficking, financial 

crime and more. Yet we continue to have a corporation formation 

regime in this country that does not require people forming corporations to provide information about the real owners. You have 

to provide more information to a State in order to get a driver’s license in this country than to form a new corporation. We properly 

criticize tax havens who create these shell corporations as mechanisms which frustrate law enforcement. And yet, we ourselves have 

not taken the action that is so important to law enforcement, as 

law enforcement has testified here consistently. 

Secretary Napolitano, your predecessor, Michael Chertoff, testified to this Committee about law enforcement problems caused by 

U.S. companies with hidden owners. Here is what he said. ‘‘In 

countless investigations where the criminal targets utilize shell corporations, the lack of law enforcement’s ability to gain access to 

true beneficial ownership information slows, confuses or impedes 

the efforts of investigators to follow criminal proceeds. This is the 

case in financial fraud, terrorist financing, and money laundering 

investigations.’’ And he went on, ‘‘It is imperative that states maintain beneficial ownership information while the company is active 

and to have a set time frame for preserving those records. By maintaining records not only of the initial beneficial owner but of the 

subsequent beneficial owners, the states will provide law enforcement, the tools necessary, to clearly identify the individuals who 

utilize the company at any given period of time during the company’s history.’’ 

So let me start with you, Director Mueller. Do you agree with 

Mr. Chertoff’s assessment that it is imperative that states obtain 

beneficial ownership information? 

Mr. MUELLER. I certainly agree with Mr. Chertoff’s assessment 

of the problem. 

Senator LEVIN. And you believe that the lack of beneficial ownership information for corporations creates a problem for law enforcement? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Napolitano, would you give your answer to those same two questions? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I would concur on both, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, we have a bill, as I think both of you know, 

S. 569 that I introduced with Senators Grassley, McCaskill, and I 

27 

believe others. It is a bipartisan bill to give law enforcement access 

to beneficial ownership information and to require states to obtain 

and maintain that information. We have been working with the 

Administration and with law enforcement to improve and strengthen that bill. 

Let me ask you both, do your agencies support enacting legislation to require states to obtain beneficial ownership information for 

U.S. corporations? Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator Levin, I think we may have actually seen some draft language on that bill, but, yes, we support 

that concept. 

Mr. MUELLER. And I would have to defer to the Department of 

Justice and whatever views that are being put together on that 

particular legislation. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know what views they have expressed on 

it? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not. 

Senator LEVIN. Could you check it out? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. I think it is important. Well, I know that they 

have expressed support, and frankly, I am surprised you do not 

know that they have expressed support. But in any event, you are 

the FBI and you are the law enforcement agency that would be 

helped by this information, and I would hope you would weigh in 

with the Department of Justice. They have indicated support, but 

to translate that support into real action so that we can get this 

done is something else. And your help would be very much valued, 

and I hope you would take a look at that. 

Mr. MUELLER. I understand, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you do that? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. I think my time is up. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Levin. Senator Akaka. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. 

I would also like to thank our witnesses for being here today. 

In the 9 years since September 11, 2001, the United States has 

become better prepared to confront a wide variety of terrorist 

threats. However, the Times Square bomb plot and also the plot to 

bring down an airliner traveling to Detroit remind us that we must 

stay vigilant. In particular, the United States must confront the 

threat of homegrown terrorist attacks. 

An ongoing concern of mine, that I’d like to address to the panel, 

has been about how well the United States communicates its core 

values, national identity, and policies to people around the world. 

How are your agencies working with the Department of State and 

other agencies to ensure that our public diplomacy offers a compelling narrative and an array of programs that challenge the messages offered by al-Qaeda and its affiliates? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. We work very closely, Senator, across the 

interagency and internationally. I think one of the things that has 

surprised me most, as the Secretary of Homeland Security, is how 

28 

much international reach there needs to be to give full effectiveness 

to the job. And so we work, as I mentioned earlier, with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on international aviation standards. We work with the G–6. We work with the European Union on the exchange of information. We work very closely 

with Canada and Mexico, our two neighbors. 

So there is a huge amount of interaction at the international 

level but all designed to minimize the risk that a terrorist could either enter the United States or be plotting somewhere else to injure U.S. interests. 

Senator AKAKA. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Senator, we have realized for any number of 

years, certainly before my time, that our success is in large part 

dependent on working with our counterparts overseas. We have 

over 60 legal attache offices now in the embassies around the 

world, which we use as a liaison bridge to our counterparts. We 

have had since the 1970s the national academy in which we bring 

in State and local law enforcement for a 10-week period for training. We have for many years included our foreign counterparts, 

whether they be from Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, as part of 

those classes in an effort to educate persons as to what the FBI 

does but also how the FBI does it and what we do not do. And in 

those relatively small ways, but I think important ways, we have 

developed persons that provide the relationships that are necessary 

to operate in a global environment. 

Senator AKAKA. Director Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, one of our closest partners is the Under 

Secretary for Public Diplomacy at the State Department, Judith 

McHale. We work quite closely with her and also, of course, the 

White House to ensure that U.S. messaging and outreach that occurs overseas is consistent with the same message we are also trying to convey to our Muslim-American communities. 

We really do not think all that much of a foreign audience and 

domestic audience. In many cases, these audiences are one. In the 

age of the Internet, that information is moving across boundaries 

far faster than we can sometimes keep up. So we have worked 

closely with the White House. We are working with them on followup from the President’s speech in Cairo and also Istanbul to make 

sure that the programs follow up from those pledges that the President made. And again, we work quite closely with the State Department to ensure that our diaspora communities are well connected with their communities in their home countries to convey 

American values and the experience of American Muslims, which 

are often skewed by al-Qaeda’s propaganda. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

At this Committee’s hearing on the failed plot to bring down an 

airliner traveling to Detroit, a former Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair, testified that the Privacy and Civil Liberties 

Oversight Board would provide a valuable service. To date, it is not 

in place. As you know, this Board was created by the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act to protect Americans’ privacy and civil liberties. 

What is the status of this Board being formed and how do government-wide counterterrorism efforts currently incorporate privacy and civil liberty protections? 

29 

Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary Napolitano. Senator Akaka, I think the membership of 

that board is currently being looked at by the White House, but I 

would share with you that we have within the Department of 

Homeland Security, an Office of Privacy. It is fully staffed, and 

they are fully incorporated in our policy decisionmaking, not as an 

afterthought, but at the outset to make sure that we are taking 

those values into account. 

Senator AKAKA. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. We have both internally but also through the Department of Justice individuals that look at our undertakings from 

the perspective of assuring the sanctity of privacy and civil liberties. 

Senator AKAKA. Director Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, we have a similar structure. We have a 

civil liberties protection officer who is involved not after the fact 

but during the construction of policies and operations. In addition, 

we have an inspector general within the Director of National Intelligence. And finally, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board 

also does reviews of our work often relating to civil liberties. 

Senator AKAKA. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just ask this final question. 

I have always been interested in language skills. How are your 

agencies coordinating to ensure that our language skills for homeland security and intelligence meet the needs of our counterterrorism mission? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we are constantly looking to hire 

individuals with a variety of language skills. It is a high demand 

area, and I would hope that over time our universities will produce 

even more. But we do that primarily in the hiring process—identify 

those areas where we need more language expertise, particularly 

for intelligence and analysis, and we go and recruit. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. To a certain extent, we recruit from the same 

cadre of individuals. There are too few with the particular languages that we need. I know in the wake of the 1950s and during 

the Cold War, there were governmental efforts to encourage development of language capabilities. I have seen, I think, in the last 

2 or 3 years emphasis in universities and around the country on 

languages as important, whether it be Arabic or Chinese, just to 

name two off the top of my head. And so I think that the pool is 

growing but not growing as fast as we need it to. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Director Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. I would echo my colleagues’ points and simply add 

that it remains a challenge, especially in hard-to-find languages. I 

think we have done a better job over the past several years of being 

more flexible in providing resources from one government entity to 

another during times of crises to cover critical areas. That being 

said, we absolutely need them not just for the language but for the 

cultural literacy, which is often associated with understanding a 

foreign language. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

30 

We will do another round and move as quickly as we can. 

Director Leiter and others have responded in testifying on what 

lessons we learned from the Christmas Day bombing attempt and 

what we are doing to implement those lessons. I want to focus the 

three of you on the Times Square bombing and ask you to do a 

similar sort of post-event analysis of how did Shahzad break 

through and what lessons did we learn. What have we changed, to 

the extent you can say in open session, since that attempt? 

Madam Secretary, you want to begin? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. And we had a beltand-suspenders approach really to finding Shahzad. It involved 

both the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the 

Customs and Border Protection (CBP). CBP ultimately was able to 

pull him off the plane. To prevent him from getting on the plane, 

however, we have now made sure that we have converted all the 

watchlist vetting from the airlines themselves. We have accelerated 

the cut-over so that TSA actually does that vetting. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. How about before? In other words, I 

mean, obviously, you can build on that, but is there anything that 

we think we should have done or could have done to have stopped 

him from actually getting—put that car in Times Square with the 

bombs in it? 

Mr. MUELLER. I think there are areas that we subsequently 

learned about in the debriefing of Shahzad and others that have 

enabled us to look at certain investigative techniques and tools and 

the like, but they are better discussed in closed session. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Director Leiter. 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, at a very broad level for the same reasons 

as Director Mueller noted, I will just give you two areas of successes and challenges. On the success front, as Senator Brown 

asked before, pursuit worked. Pursuit in conjunction with DHS and 

the FBI, I believe, helped accelerate the investigation, so that sort 

of activity. And not just that investigation but making sure we did 

not have other things going on, so pursuit worked in that context. 

Second, and we cannot talk about these in open session, but 

much of what DHS and FBI does on a preventative side, I think 

increased the likelihood that his bomb-making skills would lead to 

failure. There were things in place that made it less likely that the 

IED would be effective. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is very interesting and encouraging 

to hear. 

Mr. LEITER. On the challenges of even when we know someone 

is there and traveling back and forth to Pakistan, how far can investigations go on so many individuals who have similar profiles. 

That is an ongoing challenge. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The profile of just going back and forth 

from the United States to Pakistan? 

Mr. LEITER. Exactly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Obviously, we have a lot of PakistaniAmericans who are going back to see their families. 

Mr. LEITER. And respecting individuals’ civil liberties, what kind 

of investigative steps you want to take in that scenario? And I 

think that continues to be a challenge for us and one that, obviously, you are well aware of. 

31 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me go back to the coordination of 

what I would call the counter-homegrown radicalization effort. I 

just want to be clear about this because this is really important 

now, based on the statistics we see, with more and more Americans 

being radicalized over the Internet and through other influences, 

still personal influences on them. 

Do you feel that you have enough authority and resources at 

NCTC to effectively coordinate across the Federal Government the 

counter-radicalization effort, Mr. Leiter? 

Mr. LEITER. I think as a government bureaucrat, my answer to 

those are always supposed to be no. But I do not want to go down 

that easy path. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But it is clear to you that your authority 

is recognized that as across the government. I know everybody always would like more resources. I want to just be clear that in the 

Federal Government, when people ask who is in charge of trying 

to run a counteroffensive to homegrown radicalization that they 

say it is the director of the NCTC. 

Mr. LEITER. I think saying ‘‘in charge’’ would probably be too 

strong a term. Who is responsible for coordinating across multiple 

departments in conjunction with the National Security Council or 

the NCTC? 

I do think your prior question to Secretary Napolitano and Director Mueller about are there ways to improve outreach coordination—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. LEITER [continuing]. I think there undoubtedly are, and it is 

one of the reasons that we have had discussions at the Deputies 

Committee at the White House, to institute some sort of improved 

coordination function that would still be interagency led. That sort 

of coordination can be done better, but the important thing is 

Washington having a light hand of coordination and then enabling 

a coordinated face among the Federal, State, and local officials in 

the field so they can adjust their strategies for outreach and engagement at a local level because local circumstances differ very 

significantly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. So now let me focus in, in the 

counter-homegrown radicalization effort on the reality that the war 

against terrorism, Islamist terrorism, is a war of ideas and values, 

because underneath all these brutal acts, there is an ideology, an 

extreme theology that is totally inconsistent with our values. And 

as we have said here before, we assumed at the outset of this 

that—and I like to think, for most Muslim-Americans it is still true 

that they are much more accepted, integrated, free, and successful 

here than in other countries of their diaspora. And yet, there clearly is a group, particularly younger people, younger males, but not 

exclusively males, who are vulnerable to the jihadist approach 

about ideas that they get, particularly on the Internet, but also 

from individuals they run into. 

So how do we coordinate—I know what we are doing with public 

diplomacy abroad. This is very different in its way. How do we figure out how to target and get that message out to what is a relatively small group of Americans who can nonetheless cause very 

large damage, pain, and death in our country? 

32 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, I think you have clearly identified 

the challenge, and I would say it is a different challenge than what 

we have seen overseas, because unlike the population of the United 

Kingdom, it is not easily isolated to a single demographic group. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. LEITER. It is quite varied here. But I think the key point I 

would make is the Federal Government will be able to do some of 

this. State and local governments will be able to do a lot of this. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Who does it? Is it the Department of Education? I mean, I was surprised, as I have said before at these 

hearings, that when we have asked leaders in the Muslim-American community who do you have most contact with in the Federal 

Government—this was 2 or 3 years ago—and they said the FBI. 

Mr. LEITER. Well, my last point there, and then I am going to 

come to your question, specifically Muslim-American communities 

are key in this. And I think we have seen, since September 11, 

2001, Muslim-American mainstream communities condemn terrorism and al-Qaeda. I think over the past year, with the growth 

of radicalization, we have seen a corresponding growth in mainstream Muslim communities condemning this. We have to as the 

Federal Government help enable that and amplify that. 

Now, your point about who in the Federal Government should be 

the face of this, my answer is lots of people, including ones who are 

not sitting at this table. We helped coordinate, about a month ago 

now, a roundtable effort in Minneapolis through the Department of 

Education—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. 

Mr. LEITER [continuing]. With various educators from communities that have significant Somali-American populations to talk to 

them about the radicalization issues and get their input. Health 

and Human Services, Citizenship and Immigration Services, all of 

these are critical partners, because Director Mueller’s folks do a 

great job, but every once in a while, people react, in a way you do 

not want them to, when the FBI shows up. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, sure. That was what was surprising 

about the answer. I mean, it was a positive answer, that they had 

the most constructive interaction with the FBI. 

Do either of you want to add to that, about the counter-homegrown radicalization effort? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Yes, first of all, I think there is no one 

way of counter-messaging. Second, I think that we are learning a 

lot about counter-messaging. Third, as I mentioned earlier, Mr. 

Chairman, our focus has been on sharing information and empowering local first responders, whether they are police, or other first 

preventers, and to empower them on kind of a community policing 

theory to be working with specific communities, building those 

strong relationships, recognizing that they will be more effective locally than anything we can do from Washington. 

That being said, both our Civil Rights and Civil Liberties group 

and others, have been actively out around the country having town 

halls and sessions similar to what Director Leiter mentioned. Some 

of them are co-scheduled, by the way. I mean they are done together. In addition, Citizenship and Immigration Services is part 

of the Department of Homeland Security, and they have a lot of 

33 

outreach into communities. So there is a lot of that that goes on, 

but I think our key strategy here is to really work through the local 

first responders. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You want to say anything, Director, in defense of the FBI? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, not in defense. I would say, however, that a 

success, whether it be law enforcement or intelligence, is generally 

dependent upon relationships. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. MUELLER. And the agencies have probably better coverage 

around the United States. We have the 400 resident agencies in 

many of the communities and our 56 field offices. And it is the development of relationships, and from those relationships comes the 

trust and understanding and the ability to see things together. And 

what we strive to do is build up those relationships in a variety of 

ways. And we are a piece of it, but there are other aspects of it, 

the war of ideas versus identifying radicalization, and moving to 

prevent persons from being radicalized to the point that they are 

willing to undertake extremist events. But it is very important for 

us and I think we play a strong role in it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, I agree, of course. It is very important to be proactive and, to the extent that you can, to coordinate 

those efforts. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, when I hear the witnesses describe the outreach efforts, I cannot help but think that we have 

a lot of good people, a lot of good agencies, a lot of activity, but 

there still does not seem to be an overall strategy, nor accountability built in, nor a means of assessing the success. And I think 

that is what the Kean-Hamilton report was trying to say. It is not 

that there are not great efforts going on in various cities by all of 

your people, but how are we assessing the success and who is accountable for determining if this approach works versus that approach, whether there are best practices that should be shared? 

Director Mueller, you and I had an interesting conversation 

about the British approach, the Prevent Strategy, which has been 

criticized in some ways and may not work well in our country for 

constitutional and cultural reasons. But I am concerned that this 

is too diffuse, that it is too nebulous. And I do not know to whom 

to direct this. 

Mr. Leiter, since you responded to me in your opening statement, 

if you would like to start and maybe I will ask all three of you to 

comment. 

Mr. LEITER. Well, Senator, I would offer you six prongs of activity that I think do encompass the overall approach to this strategy 

and the effort here. And I want to stress that, again, NCTC is not 

in charge of this. NCTC has a coordinating function in this. 

Senator COLLINS. That is my point. Who is in charge? 

Mr. LEITER. I understand, Senator, and what I tried to stress at 

the opening was I think there is a coordinated policy which comes 

from the White House. There is a coordination of efforts in conjunction with the White House through NCTC, and then there is an assessment role that NCTC has to provide those assessments back to 

the White House. And that final prong is that the White House is 

34 

requiring monthly updates, not just on domestic countering violent 

extremism but global countering violent extremism to measure the 

effectiveness of programs. 

Senator COLLINS. Director Mueller, do you have anything to add 

to that? 

Mr. MUELLER. The problem itself is multifaceted with radicalization occurring from persons overseas—there are a number of 

areas in the Federal Government where I would like to say, put 

somebody in charge. Often, it takes a representative of the White 

House, who has a coordinating activity, whether it be in foreign 

policy or sometimes in military policy and the like, and which a 

number of entities and institutions play a particular role. I am not 

certain that this is not one of those areas in which National Security Council, through NCTC, is able to coordinate and direct and 

identify whatever gaps there may be, as opposed to identifying one 

person in that hierarchy and saying, OK, you are in charge. I 

throw that out as sort of a reflection on the challenge and the issue 

that we have in something like this that is so complex. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Leiter, let me go back to you for a moment. 

Do you think it would be helpful to have a strategy? 

Mr. LEITER. I think it is helpful to ensure that the entire interagency is on the page of what needs to get done. I think that could 

be done through a written strategy. I think there are additional 

disadvantages of a strategy, though. Sometimes people can get 

wrapped around the axle trying to write that strategy rather than 

to do the work that we know has to be done. 

Senator COLLINS. Secretary Napolitano. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. I think I would concur with both Directors Leiter and Mueller. I believe that we know and have had a 

number of meetings and discussions on countering violent extremism (CVE). We know that each of our departments and others are 

all doing important work. We know there is communication that is 

occurring between those departments. We know that NCTC has 

some coordinating role that is a very important one. And perhaps 

the only thing that is missing out of that is an overarching written 

strategy, and it may be that at some point we want to invest in 

that. But I do not think the lack of a single document on CVE 

should be mistaken for a lack of activity in that area. There has 

been a tremendous amount. 

Senator COLLINS. Madam Secretary, I want to go back to an answer that you gave to the Chairman because I felt it was incomplete. And it had to do with the actions that we had taken to catch 

the Times Square would-be bomber on the airplane. You said that 

TSA now vets the list, but, in fact, isn’t TSA doing that vetting 

only for U.S. carriers? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, actually, they have moved and 

cut over a large number of international carriers as well, and have 

prioritized flag carriers from countries of particular interest. And 

I would be happy to give you that list. 

Senator COLLINS. So are they doing—let me pin you down on 

this. Is TSA doing the vetting for all carriers whether domestic or 

foreign? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. They will complete the cut over for international carriers, I believe, by the end of the calendar year. I will 

35 

get you that list, but they have completed it for all domestic and 

international carriers that carry the great majority of passengers, 

but there are a few airlines left that have not yet cut over. 

Senator COLLINS. Let me switch to another issue. Our country 

has welcomed many people from Somalia. Somalia has been a 

failed state. We have had many people come into our country and 

seek status as refugees. Given that we very generously welcome 

people from failed states like Somalia, how do we ensure that a Somali who presents himself at our borders is not a member of alShabaab seeking entrance into our country through our refugee 

system? 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Senator, we run names and identities of 

those seeking refugee status across a number of databases when 

applications are made. We are working on a system to be able to 

apply after acquired derogatory information; if someone, for example, has lied on their refugee application, we would be able to go 

backwards as well as looking at what we have at the time of application. That is a project that is underway. It is not complete. 

Senator COLLINS. I think it is a real problem and something that 

we need to take a closer look at. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Indeed. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator 

Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, there is a loophole in Federal law that prevents 

the Federal Government from stopping the sale of firearms or explosives to a person who is on the terrorist watchlist, unless that 

individual falls into some other category, like having a criminal 

record. But being on the terrorist watchlist in and of itself is not 

sufficient to prevent the sale. 

According to a May 2010 GAO report, individuals on the terrorist 

watchlist were able to purchase firearms and explosives from licensed dealers about 1,120 times between 2004 and 2010. To close 

that loophole, Senator Lautenberg has introduced legislation, which 

I have cosponsored, that would give the attorney general the authority to deny the transfer of a firearm when an FBI background 

check reveals that the prospective purchaser is a known or suspected terrorist and the attorney general has a reasonable belief 

that the purchaser may use the firearm in connection with terrorism. 

Do you believe that the Department of Justice should have the 

authority to block guns and explosives sales to suspected terrorists, 

and do you believe they should be able to block the sale of guns 

to persons who are on the terrorist watchlist? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would defer to the department in responding on 

the policy questions inherent in what you are asking, sir, with regard to that legislation. I can say, needless to say, we share a common interest in keeping guns out of the hands of terrorists. In the 

meantime, what we do is when a person’s name shows up on the 

Terrorist Screening Center watchlist, we take what time is necessary to do an immediate investigation as to why that person was 

on the watchlist and what the impact of selling a gun would be to 

36 

that individual, and we will take what steps are necessary to protect the American public in the meantime. 

Senator LEVIN. And you have certain number of hours, I believe, 

72 hours, is that right, to react? 

Mr. MUELLER. I believe it is. I would have to check on that. 

Senator LEVIN. And have you been asked by the Department of 

Justice for your opinion as to whether or not persons on the terrorist watchlist should be able to buy guns and explosives? 

Mr. MUELLER. This would be a particular issue, and versions of 

the legislation have been around for a couple of years. I may have 

been, but I would have to go back and check and get back to you, 

sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, do you have an opinion? I know that the 

Department of Justice makes the policy decisions, but do you have 

an opinion on the subject? 

Mr. MUELLER. As I have said before, I think all of us would want 

to keep weapons out of the hands of terrorists. 

Senator LEVIN. And/or persons on the terrorist watchlist? 

Mr. MUELLER. And/or persons on the terrorist watchlist, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. And what about maintaining the records? Now, 

the FBI is required to destroy the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, generated and approved firearm transfer 

records after 90 days, for those persons who are on the terrorist 

watchlist. 

Would you like to be able to keep those records for longer than 

90 days for persons on the terrorist watchlist? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am generally in favor of records retention whether it comes to communication carriers records or records relating 

to the purchase and sales of guns because the retention of records 

gives us an ability to go back when we identify some person to determine whether or not there is additional information we would 

have in those records that would enable us to conduct a more efficient investigation. 

Senator LEVIN. And does your general view in that matter apply 

specifically to transfers to persons who are on the terrorist 

watchlist? 

Mr. MUELLER. It applies generally to records retention across the 

board. 

Senator LEVIN. Does that include those persons? 

Mr. MUELLER. I would generally be in favor of records retention, 

yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Have you determined how many firearm transactions by suspected terrorists, or persons on the terrorist 

watchlist, between 2004 and 2010 involved purchasers who were 

subsequently charged with a crime? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do not know that. I do not dispute the GAO figures that you listed, but I do not know the breakdown of those figures and I would have to get back to you as to how many of those 

were subsequently convicted of a crime. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you see if you can determine? That is a 

very specific number of cases and could you tell us how many were 

subsequently prosecuted, charged with crimes? 

37 

Mr. MUELLER. It is probably much easier to find out how many 

were arrested, but to follow it through the court system would 

be—— 

Senator LEVIN. That is OK. Arrest would be fine. 

Mr. MUELLER. OK. 

Senator LEVIN. And finally, there was a question which we asked 

for the record. We had a hearing in this Committee on May 5 entitled, ‘‘Terrorists and Guns: The Nature of the Threat and Proposed 

Reforms’’ that looked at the issue you and I have just been discussing. Mr. Roberts, the assistant director of the FBI Criminal 

Justice Information Services Division, testified at that hearing. I 

submitted questions for the record. 

Following the hearing, answers to those questions were supposed 

to be received a long time ago. They would have helped a great 

deal, frankly, in preparing for this hearing. Can you check out the 

reasons why those answers have not been forthcoming? 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I believe we completed those some time ago. 

I will see where they are in the process. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you so much. Thank you all. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Levin. 

Thanks very much to the three of you. This has been a very informative, constructive and, of course, as always, unsettling hearing. But I appreciate very much your testimony and what you are 

doing. The obvious fact is that the war that began on September 

11, 2001—although it was actually being conducted by Islamist extremists against us before, but it certainly began in our response 

to it after September 11, 2001—goes on across the world on many 

battlefields. And increasingly, we can see, from your testimony 

today and what we know, that our enemies in the war with 

Islamist extremism are bringing the fight to the homeland in the 

United States with greater frequency. And while this started, clearly, as a war of foreign nationals against us, and it is still primarily 

that, they are working increasingly to build alliances or essentially 

recruit soldiers for their army against us from within the United 

States. 

So the threat is evolving and in some sense increasing to the 

homeland, but so is our defense evolving and increasing. And it certainly gives me, and I hope will give the American people, some 

sense of confidence in the midst of this unconventional conflict that 

has come home within the continental United States in an unprecedented way. 

I was thinking as I was listening in the most simplistic terms, 

we are in a fight that we did not start. But now that we are in 

it, we are damn sure not going to lose it. And I am confident, based 

on everything you and all the people working with you are doing, 

that we will be successful in that regard. It is not going to happen 

tomorrow. It is going to go on for a period of years. But in the end, 

we are going to triumph. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to echo your thanks to our witnesses and also to the 

thousands of Federal employees who work for them and with them 

each and every day to try to detect, deter, and defend our country 

against terrorist attacks. The focus tends always to be on the failVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:57 Nov 14, 2011 Jkt 63832 PO 00000 Frm 000041 Fmt 06633 Sfmt 06633 P:\DOCS\63832.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
38 

ures, and we all know from our classified briefings that there are 

so many successes that the public never hears about. And I just 

want to acknowledge that publicly here today. 

I am going to, for the record, follow up on some issues that we 

did not get into today. For example, in the Washington Post today, 

there is a story about Bob Woodward’s new book that says that a 

classified exercise in May showed that the government was ‘‘woefully unprepared to deal with a nuclear terrorist attack in the 

United States.’’ 

I chose not to go into this today because I have a feeling this is 

something we would need to deal with in a classified setting in any 

event. But obviously, that is very troubling. We have had on this 

Committee repeated hearings on our ability to deal with a nuclear 

attack, whether it is a full-scaled weapon or a dirty bomb, as well 

as looking at chemical and biological attacks. We know the warning 

from the Graham-Talent Commission of an attack somewhere in 

the world by the year 2013 using a nuclear, chemical, or biological 

weapon, still rings in my ears. And so, I do believe this is an issue 

that we need to pursue as well. 

Finally, in my private meeting with Director Mueller, I asked 

him, ‘‘What do you need from us?’’ And I would invite all of you, 

for the record, to tell us what changes in laws, what different allocation and resources, what you need from Congress in order to 

more effectively carry out the counterterrorism mission with which 

you have been charged and which is so critical to our Nation’s security. 

But again, I thank you very much for your hard work, dedication 

and commitment. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins, very well done. 

Do any of you want to say a final word? Madam Secretary. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. No, except I really appreciate thanking 

the men and women who work in our departments. To go back to 

a comment you made in your opening, Mr. Chairman, a lot of them 

work very hard—and do not get a lot of sleep sometimes. So I really want to express my appreciation to them, and I will try to get 

some additional information to Senator McCain. 

Senator LEVIN. And I am sure you would want to add, as we all 

feel, that they do this at great risk, frequently, to their own wellbeing and to their families’ well-being, and that is true in all of 

your cases. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Secretary NAPOLITANO. Indeed. 

Senator LEVIN. And we are doubly grateful for that risk that 

they take. 

Mr. MUELLER. Nothing to add. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

So that phrase was from Abraham Lincoln, who is always a great 

source of wisdom, said, obviously, at a different time of conflict in 

our country, at home, too, of course, but that we would fight with 

‘‘energy and sleepless vigilance.’’ And I thank all of you for doing 

exactly that. 

The record will stay open for 15 days for the submission of additional statements or questions. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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