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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED

In re P T L Cotton, Minor. June 30, 2016

No. 329417 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division

LC No. 14-516909-NA

Before: M ETER , P.J., and S HAPIRO and O’B RIEN , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

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Respondent appeals as of right the trial court order terminati ng her parental rights to her minor child, PC, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (failure to rectify conditions leading to adjudication) and (g) (failure to provide proper care and custo dy). We affirm.

In June 2014, petitioner filed a petition seeking jurisdictionover PC. The p etition alleged that respondent had left PC with two non-parent adults and that , while in their care, PC sustained several injuries including a laceration to his forehead, bruise s on his head, healed lesions on his arms, and second-degree burns on his head and in his genital ar ea. PC was removed from respondent’s care on June 12, 2014. On June 23, 2014, responde nt pleaded to jurisdiction.

Respondent was referred to numerous services aimed at reunific ation. Rasha Bradford, a foster care case manager, testif ied that the barriers to reunif ication were parenting skills, housing, and lack of legal income. She added that resp ondent’s parentin g skills were th e biggest issue, which was why multiple services were offered to address it.

Bradford testified that respondent was referred to the parent partner program. She explained that the purpose of the program was to assist respond ent in completing the parent/agency treatment plan (PAT P). Bradford testified that t he program was designed to help parents by giving them information and tools needed to complete the PATP so that the parents could move toward reunification. She added that it was suppose d to help respondent maneuver through the system by helping he r: (1) find a job, (2) obtain s uitable housing, (3) earn a high school diploma or a GED, (4) obtain pre-natal services after it was apparent respondent was expecting another child, and (5) provide financial literacy cla sses. Bradford believed the service would have benefited respondent if she had participated in it. However, she testified that the program did not work because respondent refused to participate; in May 2015 the service was
terminated based on that refusal.-2- Bradford also testified that res pondent was first referred to parenting classes in September 2014. She was later re- referred for pa renting classe s, which she eventually completed in February 2015. Respondent recei ved a psychological evaluati on on February 26, 2015. Bradford testified that as a result of the evaluation, responde nt was re-referred to parenting classes, was referred to a psychiatric evaluation, continued su pervised visitation, and was referred to therapy. She explained that the psychological eval uation basically stated that respondent had no parenting skills. 1

Bradford testified that responde nt was initially provided pare nting time two times per week for three hours each visit. She testified, however, that respondent requested her parenting visits to be decreased, so they were reduced to once per week. Bradford testified that respondent missed numerous visits and that she was consistently late to th e visits she did attend. Morgan Barr, a foster care worker, testified that respondent was offer ed 86 parenting time visits and missed 37. She also testified that after the termination petit ion was filed, respondent was offered 8 or 9 additional visits and missed one. Bradford opined that the missed visits affected PC. Barr explained that the foster parent s reported behavior problems af ter visits, including a regression in potty training. Barr also reported that on one occasion respon dent told PC that the bogey man was going to get him, PC told his foster parents, and then late r he woke up screaming from a nightmare.

Bradford testified that infant mental health services were als o provided to respondent. She explained that the infant mental health services were to take place during parenting time to help with bonding. She testified that respondent was not consi stently participating in infant
mental health services because s he did not consistently come to parenting visits where the
services were offered.

Nastassja Cuellar-Wilson, an infant mental health therapist, t estified that she began offering services in September 2014, but that she initially had difficulty contacting respondent. Cuellar-Wilson testified that PC presented as two different chi ldren when she observed him during parenting time visits and when she observed him in his f oster placement. She explained that at the foster home PC was compliant, asked for help, rarel y said ‘no,’ interacted with his foster family, touched a lot, and asked for his foster family’s attention. She observed a secure bond between PC and his foster pare nts. In contrast, she testi fied that at parenting time there was a lot of tension and struggle between PC and respondent. She t estified that PC was defiant, repeatedly said no, and pulled away from respondent, who used h er cell phone to get his

1 In particular, the psychologica l evaluation stated that respon dent “was not able to verbalize adequate parenting skills” and that it was “uncertain whether s he has insight in her role pertaining to her son’s removal from the home.” The report not ed that it was “imperative that therapeutic intervention” occur before reunification, and it re commended individual therapy to address emotional turmoil relating to current legal circumstanc es, a psychiatric evaluation to determine the appropriateness of psychotropic medication, super vised parenting time to help foster a bond between respondent a nd PC, and parenting educatio n classes to help her understanding of age-app ropriate parenting.-3- attention and to get him to comply with her directives. Cuella r-Wilson opined that although PC called respondent “mom” and there were “moments of hope” during the visits, that there was no “secure bond” between respondent and PC. She added that respon dent’s interactions with PC were conflicting and that PC learned defensive mechanisms, suchas humor, to deflect hard
emotions. Cuellar-Wilson also testified that she had observed PC hit respondent and attempt to
bite her. 2 She testified that she was wo rried about those negative behav iors showing up in the foster home. Cuellar-Wilson added that PC appears to have a hi gh stress or traumatic response to the parenting time visits. Cuellar-Wilson explained that if a parent obtained what they needed from the parenting classes, then it would show up in the parent ’s interactions with the child. She
testified that she had not seen a ny marked improvement in respo ndent’s parenting.

Additionally, based on observed interactions between responden t and PC during parenting time visits, Bradford also opined that respondent had not benefited from the parenting
classes. Bradford testified that for the majority of visits, P C would cry for his foster parents and
act like he did not want to be at the visits. She said that re spondent would sometimes calm PC with her cell phone. Bradford added that respondent frequentlyused her cell phone and that there were times when respondent was not on the phone where PC would not want to play with her. Bradford also testified that PC would hit, bite, and scra tch respondent. Further, she also testified that, on a few occasions, if PC did not want to hug r espondent, respondent would tell him that she was going to get food for herself, but not for PC. Bradford testified that she never observed a bond between PC and respondent. 3

Barr observed the majority of the visits that occurred after the termination petition was filed. She testified that PC did not want to go and was very c lingy to his foster mother, that respondent would use her cell phone to get him to come in to vi sit, and that during the visits, respondent did not use a lot of parenting skills. Barr said th at they would play next to each other, argue back and forth, and that respondent once grabbed PC’s arm and he said that it hurt. Overall, Barr did not see any i ndication that respondent benefi ted from the pare nting classes.

Bradford testified that although the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) had discretion to provide unsupervised or overnight visits, no such visits were authorized because respondent had not shown that she could parent PC or th at PC and she had a secure
attachment. Barr added that the re were no unsupe rvised visitat ions because respondent did not show proper discipline and because of respondent’s lack of enga gement. She testified that respondent’s discipline techniqu es are inappropriate, noting th at there was arguing and that respondent would pull on PC’s arm even after he told her that i t hurt.

2 Cuellar-Wilson testified that the hitting and biting speak to PC’s perception of security in the relationship.

3 Bradford did testify that res pondent’s parenting improved when Bradford or a supported visitation person was in the room, but she testified that it wa s not a significant improvement and
that it was not consistent. She added that basically every vis it had to be regulated.-4- In contrast, respondent’s mother testified that she observed s ome of the visits. She testified that PC was missing respondent as a parent and that r espondent gave him a lot of
attention. She testified that PC would ask to go home with her and respondent. She also testified that PC was just play biting and that respondent would grab him like anyone else would after the biting. Respondent’s mother further testified that respondent is a better parent now because she takes parenting more serious. She believes that respondent wou ld now be an overprotective parent because she learned her lesson. She also testified that PC and respondent have a bond.

Bradford testified that respondent was twice referred for indi vidual therapy. Barr explained that respondent was initially referred in September 2 014, but the services were terminated for lack of attendance in January 2015. Respondent was re-referred in March 2015 and the services continued through to the date of the terminati on hearing. Barr testified that respondent was “not near completion” and her therapist reported only minimal progress. Further, Bradford testified thatrespondent’s therapist reporte d that respondent needed at least a year of therapy to benefit.

With regard to income, Barr tes tified that respondent provided proof of employment on two occasions, but she currently had no legal income source.

With regard to respondent’s housing situation, Bradford testif ied that respondent was provided services to help her housing situation. Barr testifie d that respondent provided a new signed lease agreement the week b efore the termination hearing. She indicated that she was told it was a two bedroom apartment, but said that she had not inves tigated it yet. She testified that respondent reported that the apartment had a roach problem, whi ch made the housing inappropriate.

Finally, Bradford expressed concern about respondent’s judgmen t. She testified that during the case, respondent met a man who also had a pending ch ild protective services (CPS) case for failure to protect. She testified that respondent ent ered into a relationship with that man, who, according a report by respondent, hit her and chased her d own a street with a dog after she became pregnant. Bradford testified that respondent’s decisionto enter a relationship with the
man showed that she was unable to make “safe decisions for hers elf or for her child.” Bradford testified that respondent denied being in a relationship with t he man, stating that they were just
friends before she disclosed that she was pregnant with his chi ld.

Following a termination hearing, the trial court found that gr ounds for termination were established under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (g). The court also found that termination was in
PC’s best interests.

On appeal, respondent argues that termination was not proper u nder (c)( i ) or (g) because she was bonded with PC and was at least in partial compliance w ith the PATP. Respondent points out that she had complete d a psychological evaluation, a psychiatric evaluation, and her parenting classes. She also points out that she visited the ch ild for more than half of the offered parenting time visits and also attended all of the court hearin gs. Respondent argues those facts show that there was a very reasonable expectation that she woul d be able to provide care and custody within a reasonable time and that PC would not be harme d if returned to her home. We disagree.-5- In order to terminate parental rights, “the trial court must f ind that at least one of the statutory grounds for terminati on in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been p roved by clear and convincing
evidence.” In re Ellis , 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). 4 The trial court in this case found grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (g), which provide:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a ch ild if the court finds, by clear and convinc ing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

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(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of aninitial dispositional order, and the c ourt, by clear and convincing evi dence, finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the a djudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide pro per care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation th at the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable tim e considering the child’s age.

The biggest challenge to reunification was respondent’s parent ing skills. Although respondent completed services aimed at rectifying this conditio n, she nevertheless missed a significant number of parenting visits, failed to participate i n services aimed at helping develop a bond, and was consistently late to the parenting time visits sh e did attend. She was unable to demonstrate age appropriate parenting skills, was frequently onher phone, and was unable to adequately discipline PC. None of the caseworkers who testifie d were able to see any improvement in respondent’s parenting as a result of the comple ted parenting classes. Thus, despite being offered numerous s ervices to address her parentin g skills, respondentwas unable to show an improvement to her parenting after over a year of servi ces. Although respondent points out that she participated in and actually completed some servic es, a parent's mere participation in and benefit from services is insufficient; rather, a parent mus t demonstrate sufficient compliance with and benefit from services to address the problem targeted by those services. In re Frey , 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Further, respondent wa s unable to obtain suitable

4 This Court reviews for clear e rror a trial court’s finding of whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(K); In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 ( 2004). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mista ke has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s sp ecial opportunity to observe the witnesses.” Id . at 296-297.-6- housing during the pendency of the proceedings. Although, she had secured a two-bedroom apartment shortly before the termination hearing, the record re flects that it was inappropriate because it had a roach problem. Respondent was also unable to maintain a stable income source. At the time of the termination hearing, PC was two years old an d had been in foster care for almost half his life. Given respondent’s failure to comply wit h and benefit from services aimed at reunification during the pendency of the proceedings, the tr ial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (g).

Although respondent does not directly challenge the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest, we conclude that the court’s finding was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. “In deciding whether terminatio n is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the pare nt’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantage s of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (internal citations omitted).

The record reflects that PC had been in care for half his life . Respondent was provided with numerous services, including multiple referrals for parent ing classes and individual therapy. She was terminated from the parent partner program for lack of attendance. She failed to attend a significant number of parenting visits. Over a year after th e case started, she still had no appropriate housing and no legal income. Further, respondent d isplayed poor judgment when she became involved in a relationship with a man who had an ope n CPS case. After becoming pregnant with that man’s child, she was subjected to domestic a buse when he hit her and chased
her down the street while she w as pregnant. The record also re flected that respondent lacked a secure bond with PC despite being provided with services specif ically aimed at improving her
bond. Cuellar-Wilson testified th at PC was anxious at parentin g-time visits, would bite and hit, and had resorted to humor to deflect hard feelings. She testif ied that he presented completely different with his foster parents , with whom he displayed a sec ure bond. She added that he was thriving in that placement. Given the record in this case, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of res pondent’s parental rights was in PC’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien