Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat 

 Report of the 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

June 2006 

“The call to wage war against America was made because America has 

spearheaded the crusade against the Islamic nation, sending tens of thousands 

of its troops to the land of the two Holy Mosques over and above its meddling 

in its affairs and its politics, and its support of the oppressive, corrupt and 

tyrannical regime that is in control. These are the reasons for singling America 

out as a target (August 23, 1996).”1

“It is a duty for the Umma [nation] with all its categories, men, women and 

youths, to give away themselves, their money, experiences and all types of 

material support....Jihad today is an imperative for every Muslim. The Umma 

will commit sin if it did not provide adequate material support for jihad (April 

24, 2006).”2

“The battles that are going on in the far-flung regions of the Islamic world, 

such as Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia, they are just the 

groundwork for the major battles which have begun in the heart of the Islamic 

world....If our intended goal in this age is the establishment of a caliphate in 

the manner of the Prophet and we expect to establish its state predominantly 

according to how it appears to us in the heart of the Islamic world, then your 

efforts and sacrifices, God permitting, are a large step towards that goal (July 

9, 2005).”3

“As for similar operations taking place in America, it is only a matter of time. 

They [the terrorists] are in the final stages, and you will see them in the heart 

of your land as soon as the planning is complete (January 20, 2006).”4

 Statements made by al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 

 

1

 Usama bin Laden. “Declaration of War Against the United States,” August 23, 1996. 2

 Usama bin Laden. “Bin Laden accuses the West,” April 24, 2006. 

3

 “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Press Release 3-

05, October 11, 2005. 

4

 Usama bin Laden: "There is No Shame in This Solution," http://www.jihadunspun.com, January 20, 2006. 

1
Summary 

Almost five years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States 

remains a nation at war. Al-Qaeda and Islamist extremist terrorist groups with likeminded goals and ideologies remain one of the most immediate strategic threats to the 

national security of the United States. Nonetheless, the threat we face today is quite 

different from the terrorist threat that we faced prior to September 11, 2001. America’s 

intelligence agencies are in agreement that: 

• Al-Qaeda leaders and their terrorist affiliates remain committed to global jihad 

against the West. Currently, this is the single most important terrorist threat to 

U.S. national security. 

• Al-Qaeda’s terrorist campaign has attracted a global support and recruitment 

network. Despite the loss of key lieutenants, Jihad retains its global appeal. 

• Al-Qaeda leaders wait patiently for the right opportunity to attack. 

• Al-Qaeda has metastasized its scale of influence by reaching out to like-minded 

Islamist extremist groups and inspiring new groups and individuals to emerge and 

carry out independent attacks. 

• Iraq has become the front line for the global war on terrorism. Prior to his death 

in June 2006, Abu Musab Zarqawi aligned his group with Al-Qaeda. 

• The United States must be concerned about the threat of homegrown terrorism. 

• The Islamist extremist threat will continue to grow through the exploitation and 

use of the Internet. 

The United States has taken positive steps to enhance our national security against the 

threat of future terrorist attacks. However, the threat of terrorism is still very real, and in 

many ways more alarming than the threat that existed prior to September 11, 2001. 

There are a growing number of groups building the capability to attack the United States, 

our allies, and our interests abroad. The United States must remain vigilant in the face of 

these threats and provide our intelligence, law enforcement and military personnel the 

necessary legal authorities, resources and tools to protect our national security. 

2
Understanding the Strategic Threat 

Today, the remnants of al-Qaeda and radical Islamist terrorist groups with like-minded 

goals and ideologies remain the single most important threat to the national security of 

the United States. Although al-Qaeda has suffered significant setbacks since 9/11, the 

organization is constantly evolving, and its leaders patiently wait for the right opportunity 

to direct another attack against the United States. As evidenced by Usama bin Laden’s 

statement from January 2006, al-Qaeda’s leadership still possesses the desire to carry out 

further attacks. Breaking a fourteen-month silence, bin Laden said: 

“As for similar operations taking place in America, it is only a matter of 

 time. They (the terrorists) are in the final stages, and you will see them in 

 the heart of your land as soon as the planning is complete.”5

 

The enemy we face today is not the same enemy that attacked the United States in 2001. 

Al-Qaeda has been forced to adapt to its changing environment and has relinquished 

some of its operational control to an extended network of like-minded terrorist groups to 

ensure the movement’s longevity. Today, the war on terrorism is being fought on 

multiple fronts. First, we are fighting al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization led by Usama 

bin Laden. Usama bin Laden formally declared war against the United States in a 1996 

letter urging Jihad against America. In his 1996 letter, and subsequent statements, Usama 

bin Laden cites the United States and its allies for their military presence in the Middle 

East, support for Israel and the occupation of Iraq. His 1998 statement expanded on the 

1996 fatwa to sanction attacks on all Americans, including civilians. Usama bin Laden 

justified attacks against the American people because “they are the ones who pay the 

taxes which fund the planes that bomb us in Afghanistan, the tanks that strike and destroy 

our homes in Palestine, the armies which occupy our lands in the Arabian Gulf, and the 

fleets which ensure the blockade of Iraq.” He further states, “The American people are 

the ones who employ both their men and their women in the American Forces which 

attack us.”6

 

Successful operations against al-Qaeda’s core have created new problems in the sense 

that al-Qaeda is no longer a hierarchical organization run by bin Laden. Rather, the 

terrorist threat has evolved into what some experts refer to as “franchised” terrorism. In 

this new phase, previously identified al-Qaeda leaders serve as examples and provide 

ideological rather than organizational and material support to terrorist operatives around 

the world. Al-Qaeda acts as an inspiration to groups from Chechnya to the Palestinian 

territories, as well as to individuals in Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom that 

have minimal contact with the network.7

Al-Qaeda’s ability to export its ideology to terrorist organizations around the world has 

created a second front in the war on terrorism. In addition to the central group, “al-

 

5

 Usama bin Laden: "There is No Shame in This Solution," http://www.jihadunspun.com, January 20, 2006. 6

 Usama bin Laden, “Usama bin Laden’s Letter to the America,” Observer Worldview, November 24, 

2002. 

7

 Raymond Whitaker, “Bin Laden Hunt Stepped Up,” Canberra Times, March 22, 2004. 

3
Qaeda” has become a network of loosely affiliated assembly that subscribe to its 

ideology, but have little, if any, contact with its core leaders and sometimes differ on end 

goals and agendas.8

 In Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed by Coalition forces 

on June 8, 2006, declared allegiance to bin Laden, al-Qaeda and an extreme interpretation 

of Islam. Although bin Laden and al-Zarqawi’s supporters in Iraq have their differences, 

they share the same end goal and are willing to put these disagreements aside as they 

work to create a Muslim state under a new Caliphate.9 Al-Qaeda has also benefited from 

the rise of homegrown terrorist cells in Europe and North America, as well as its ability 

to exploit the Internet to increase support among Muslims and other sympathizers 

worldwide. 

We are no longer fighting a war against just al-Qaeda. Rather, we are now fighting a war 

against various entities inspired by al-Qaeda and radicalized in various areas around the 

world, including in the United States. Al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit large support 

networks should not be overlooked. As long as al-Qaeda can spread its ideology to other 

groups, the movement will continue to grow and threaten to change the way the Islamic 

world is governed. To win the war on terrorism, the United States and our allies will 

have to not just kill and capture key terrorist operatives, but also identify ways to 

discredit the radical ideology that supports these groups. Organizations like Jemaah 

Islamiyah, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Salafist Group for Preaching and 

Combat have shown willingness to support al-Qaeda’s global operations. Although the 

core element of al-Qaeda is still dangerous, it may increasingly look to leverage support 

from affiliates to carry out attacks against the United States. Today, al-Qaeda and alQaeda associated groups maintain a presence in dozens of countries worldwide, including 

the United States (See Figure 1). 

 

8

 Kenneth Katzman, “Al-Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment,” Congressional Research Service, 

February 10, 2005, pp. 7-8. 

9

 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006. The 

Caliphate is the system of succession in Islam that combined both religion and state under the rule of one 

Caliph (the term or title for the Islamic leader of the Umma, or community of Islam). The dissolution of 

the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey in 1924 by the British signaled the end of the pan-Islamic Caliphate 

system. 

4
Figure 1: 

Map provided by the Investigative Project 

Of particular concern is a relatively new phenomenon—the rise of homegrown Islamist 

extremism. In London, Casablanca, Madrid, the Netherlands and elsewhere, homegrown 

terrorist cells comprised of second and third generation radicalized Muslims have proven 

difficult for authorities to track or preempt their activities.10 Such homegrown cells have 

been able to train and prepare in secrecy, escaping detection even from the local 

community. Although the United States has not yet seen this phenomenon on the same 

scale as our European allies, the potential for America to face homegrown terrorism is 

real. This threat calls for a more robust, capable, and empowered Intelligence 

Community. 

Islamist extremism, as it is discussed throughout this report, refers to the political 

philosophy that says that, in order to defend a carefully defined vision of Islam and 

protect pious Muslims around the world, one has to impose, essentially, a 7th century 

political structure over the people of the Islamic world, and that this political structure 

must be implemented by violent Jihad, or Holy War. We are not looking at Muslims who 

practice Islamic faith fundamentally—there is nothing wrong with practicing religion in a 

fundamental way.11 

 

10 Bruce Hoffman, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, February 16, 2006. 

11 Ambassador Francis Taylor, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, “Emerging Threats to 

Homeland Security,” May 10, 2004. 

5
In preparing this report the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held 

numerous hearings (both open and closed), briefings and meetings with representatives 

from the Intelligence Community, academia, and the private sector to enable Members 

and staff to better understand the threat presented by Islamist extremist groups. Due to 

the unclassified nature of this report, the Committee has only drawn from publicly 

available sources. In no way does this undermine the threat facing the United States—the 

Committee would reach the same findings and conclusions using classified information. 

Al-Qaeda 

AL QAEDA’S ROOTS IN SALAFI ISLAM 

Most Sunni Islamist extremist movements follow a conservative Islamic tradition known 

as Salafism. Salafism is rooted in the belief that the Koran and the teachings of the 

Prophet Mohammed and his companions are the most legitimate sources of religious 

conduct and reasoning, and as such should be emulated and put into practice in 

contemporary Islamic communities. The movement has a long and varied history, and 

there are notable methodological differences among today’s Salafis and those we might 

call Salafis from generations past. However, active opposition to Western encroachment 

in the Muslim world remains a constant.12 

Some contemporary Salafists believe that violence is a legitimate means of reasserting 

control of the world’s Islamic community. Salafi Jihadists represent a small percentage 

of the overall Salafi population, but they are very influential and al-Qaeda’s distorted 

interpretation of Salafi Islam has attracted Muslims from around the world.13 

Usama bin Laden’s message is taken from the Salafi Jihadist tradition that calls for a 

global Islamic state under the control of the Muslims and the teachings of Mohammed. 

When al-Qaeda’s message is interpreted in light of an extremist’s intentions, such words 

are intended to polarize the Islamic world into two clearly delineated factions: one that is 

against the West and the other that is closely tied to the United States and its allies. 

Usama bin Laden has called for a war against the United States and the West to remove 

their presence from Muslim territories as the first step to restoring the Muslim Caliphate, 

ruled by one Caliph (See Figure 2).14 Bin Laden urged Muslims to find a leader to unite 

them and establish a "pious caliphate" that would be governed by Islamic law and follow 

Islamic principles of finance and social conduct.15 Bin Laden repeatedly argued that 

Afghanistan had become a model Islamic state under his Taliban hosts and used religious 

rhetoric to solicit support for the Taliban and al-Qaeda.16

 

12 “Who Wages Terror and Jihad: Pros and Cons of Frequently Used Terms,” DCI Counterterrorist Center 

and Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program, May 31, 2005. 

13 According to the recent Gallup Organization World Poll, only 8% of Muslims consider themselves to be 

militant or sympathetic to military. 

14 Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002. 15 "Pakistan Interviews Usama Bin Laden," (Islamabad, Pakistan), Mar. 18, 1997. 

16 "Website Publishes Bin Laden 'Speech'" Internet Supporters of Shariah, June 22, 2000; and "Al Jazirah 

Program on Bin Laden" Al Jazirah Television (Doha, Qatar), June 10, 1999. 

6
Figure 2: 

 Open Source Center 

A NEW GENERATION OF AL-QAEDA OPERATIVES 

Al-Qaeda has suffered significant setbacks since the start of the war (See Figure 3), but 

the organization is extremely resilient and remains a major threat to the United States 

homeland, our allies and U.S. interests abroad. Although Coalition forces have killed or 

captured several of al-Qaeda’s top leaders, these vacancies have been filled by a new 

generation of extremists. Most of these new leaders have obscure backgrounds, and we 

lack adequate knowledge about their particular methods of operating. As a result, our 

understanding of the evolving network is incomplete. There are concerns that we could 

see a new-generation of terrorists that are more willing than their predecessors to act 

autonomously. They may also look to capitalize on experience gained in Afghanistan 

and Iraq to lead subsequent attacks against the United 

States and our interests abroad. In addition, al-Qaeda’s 

core elements, including Usama bin Laden and his key 

deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, continue to elude capture 

and claims to prepare terrorist strikes against the West.17 

Picture provided by the National 

Counterterrorism Center 

 17 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of 

National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006. 

7
Al-Qaeda understands the importance another attack on the United States would mean for 

its movement. The importance of such a strike cannot be overstated. For Islamist 

extremist groups, 9/11 was the “shot heard around the world.” Al-Qaeda looks to 

capitalize on this attack to further undermine and challenge western ideals and the United 

States position as a world power. In addition, successful attacks against Western 

countries aid recruiting and ensure financial support by keeping al-Qaeda’s message 

relevant and in the news. Al-Qaeda uses these attacks in its propaganda to show 

disempowered and rudderless youth throughout the Middle East that they too can strike a 

powerful blow for the global Jihad. 

A weakened al-Qaeda still presents a greater threat to our security than most other 

terrorist groups. Its remaining members still has the ability to reach the United States and 

Europe and has repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to recruit on a global scale.18 

Figure 3: 

Key al-Qaeda Members Killed or Captured since September 11, 2001 

 Coalition forces have killed or captured hundreds of al-Qaeda members and 

associates. This list represents some of al-Qaeda’s key operatives who can no longer participate in 

terrorism. 

Captured: 

Abu Faraj al-Libi—Senior Operational Manager 

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad—Senior al-Qaeda External Operations Chief 

Riduan bin Isomuddin—Senior al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah Operational Planner 

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri—Al-Qaeda Operational Chief for Arabian Peninsula 

Issa al-Hindi—Western al-Qaeda Operative 

Abu Bakr al-Azdi—Al-Qaeda Operational Planner and Saudi Arabian Cell Leader 

Abu Zubaydah—Al-Qaeda-associate Logistics Coordinator 

Sharif al-Masri—Facilitator and Operational Manager 

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar—Jihadist theorist 

Killed: 

Muhammad Atef—Al-Qaeda Deputy 

Hamza Rabia—Senior al-Qaeda External Operations Chief 

Abu Hajir al-Najdi—Senior Operations Planner in the Persian Gulf 

Yusif al-Uyayri—Facilitator and propagandist in Saudi Arabia 

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq 

 

18 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006. 

8
DISRUPTED AL-QAEDA PLOTS 

Although there has not been a successful al-Qaeda attack in the United States since 2001, 

there is corroborated information that al-Qaeda continues to plan attacks, in particular 

against the U.S. homeland. President Bush reported that the United States has helped 

disrupt ten al-Qaeda attacks since 2001, including three against targets inside the United 

States.19 One of the disrupted plots was devised by Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (KSM), 

the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. KSM’s plan involved flying a hijacked plane into a 

target in California.20 Interrogations of KSM in July 2003 indicate that there were at 

least two potential attackers: Abderraouf Jdey (a.k.a Faruq al-Tunisi) and Zaini Zakaria 

(a.k.a Mussa). This plot most likely was part of KSM’s plan to carry out a “second 

wave” of attacks after September 11, 2001. The Committee is aware of other credible 

plans by al-Qaeda members to attack the United States, but cannot discuss these plans in 

an unclassified report. 

The disruption of these plots, the President reminded America, “means the enemy is 

wounded, but the enemy is still capable of global 

operations.”21 Where the American public tends to have a 

relatively short time horizon and want results right away, 

al-Qaeda has never lacked patience in both the operational 

planning and execution of its attacks. Recall, for example, 

that the first, moderately successful al-Qaeda-associated 

attack against the World Trade Center (WTC) occurred in 

1993. Rather than an immediate second attempt, al-Qaeda 

waited almost a decade before striking the U.S. homeland 

again. Even after Khalid Sheik Mohammed formulated 

the plan in 1998, al-Qaeda leaders were willing to wait 

patiently as operatives received the necessary training and 

resources. The United States cannot afford to assume that 

the absence of another terrorist act means al-Qaeda has 

lost either the will or the ability to attack—terrorist 

operatives might simply be in the planning phase of their 

next strike. 

Picture provided by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation 

Al-QAEDA PLANS FOR A “SPECTACULAR” ATTACK 

So long as al-Qaeda is capable of hitting the United States, it may look to carry out 

another “spectacular” attack of 9/11 proportions. Past threat alerts suggest al-Qaeda may 

 

19 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” 

October 6, 2005. 

20 Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, “Bush says 10 Plots by al-Qaeda Were Foiled,” Washington Post, 

October 7, 2005. 

21 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” 

October 6, 2005. 

9
favor attacks that meet certain criteria, including high symbolic value, mass casualties, 

severe damage to the U.S. economy and maximum psychological trauma.22 However, a 

battered and weakened al-Qaeda, new counterterrorism laws, and heightened security at 

our borders and ports of entry have made it more difficult for al-Qaeda’s core elements to 

carry out a large-scale attack. As a result, there are ongoing discussions of what alQaeda’s leadership considers “spectacular.” Today, target vulnerability and likelihood of 

success may be as important to al-Qaeda as the target’s prominence.23 Major subway 

systems, nuclear plants, and national landmarks could be attractive targets if they are 

perceived as “soft.” Regardless of the target, any plan by al-Qaeda will look to achieve at 

least one of the following: mass casualties, damage to the U.S. economy and maximum 

psychological trauma on the American public. 

If for nothing else, another attack against the United States or our allies would help the 

group to recruit new supporters. Islamist extremist groups use terrorist attacks to 

propagate the organization’s ideology among its supporters and potential recruits. If alQaeda can no longer effectively recruit supporters from around the world, it will cease to 

exist as the dangerous network that we know today. 

AL-QAEDA’S SEARCH FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Any successful attack with weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or 

nuclear) would, in addition to causing mass casualties, have an impact on both the U.S. 

psyche and the U.S. economy. As an example, the still unsolved anthrax attacks that 

occurred in the wake of 9/11 produced only a limited number of deaths, but disrupted 

mail and sowed fear throughout the country. 

The Intelligence Community continues to be concerned about al-Qaeda’s efforts to 

acquire weapons of mass destruction. In a December 1998 interview with Time, Usama 

bin Laden was asked whether he, as the U.S. had alleged, was attempting to obtain 

chemical or nuclear weapons. In his response he stated: 

“Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have 

indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if 

I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for 

Muslims not to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting 

harm on Muslims.”24

There is a detailed public record of al-Qaeda’s interest in obtaining chemical and 

biological weapons. According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 

 

22FBI Director Robert Mueller, “War on Terrorism,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, February 11, 2003. 

23 FBI Director Robert Mueller, “War on Terrorism,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence, February 11, 2003. 

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Wrath of God: Osama bin Laden Lashes Out Against the West,” Time, January 

11, 1999. 

10
the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission, al-Qaeda sought to obtain 

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and “remains interested in using a radiological 

dispersal or dirty bomb, a conventional explosive designed to spread radioactive 

material.”25 In addition, in 2004, then-Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

George Tenet warned Congress that “al-Qaeda’s effort to produce deadly anthrax is one 

of the most immediate terrorist threats.”26 There is little doubt that if Usama bin Laden 

were successful in acquiring WMD, he would use these weapons against the West. 

AL-QAEDA’S METHODS OF RAISING MONEY 

Prior to September 11, 2001 al-Qaeda built a vast, sophisticated and elusive network to 

raise money to support itself, terrorist operations and its supporters around the world. 

Trailing Usama bin Laden’s funds was complicated and al-Qaeda was able to move 

money around the world without compromising its security and secrecy. One reason it 

was so difficult to track terrorist finances was because Usama bin Laden preferred not to 

operate with banks that charged interest since usury is prohibited by the Koran. AlQaeda did, however, use banks that operate according to Islamic principles, such as the 

Dubai Islamic Bank in the United Arab Emirates (it was not until after September 11, 

2001 that the United Arab Emirates enforced tighter restrictions on its banking system). 

In addition, al-Qaeda relies on couriers and the venerable hawala system of interlocking 

money changers--it would not be uncommon for money to switch hands several times 

before the delivery reached its final destination.27 The result was a layered system that 

kept the United States in the dark, unable to determine how, and more importantly to 

whom, al-Qaeda was providing funds. 

The CIA estimates that al-Qaeda spent about $30 million a year to sustain its activities.28 

Contrary to popular belief, Usama bin Laden did not use his personal wealth that he 

inherited from the Bin Laden construction company when his father passed away. 

Instead, al-Qaeda’s activities were supported largely through various fundraising efforts 

worldwide, including contributions from mosques, non-governmental organizations, the 

Internet, wealthy donors and charitable foundations. 

Members of the Intelligence Community have reported, and we have no reason to believe 

otherwise, that al-Qaeda has not used the United States as a primary source of its funding. 

It is difficult to determine how much funding has been channeled from the United States 

to al-Qaeda. However, intelligence experts agree that the funding to al-Qaeda amounts to 

 

25 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Twelth Public Hearing, June 16, 

2004. 

26 Director of the CIA George Tenet, “The Worldwide Threat 2004: Challenges in a Changing Global 

Context,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2004. 

27 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, The Free Press, 2001, p. 

103-104. 

28The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Monographs, “Al-Qaeda’s 

Means and Methods to Raise, Move, and Use Money,” August 21, 2004. 

11
much less than is raised by other terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah.29 We 

will look at some U.S.-based charities with links to al-Qaeda later in this report. 

Since September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda’s fundraising network has been damaged by new 

laws and increased efforts to disrupt the international terror finance network. However, 

terrorism does not require a huge sum of money. The estimated cost of the bomb used to 

attack the World Trade Center in 1993 was $3,000. This attack killed six people, injured 

a thousand more, and caused more than a half a billion dollars in damage. Further, 

estimates suggest the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 cost somewhere from 

$200,000 to $500,000.30 This amount of money can be raised from al-Qaeda supporters 

and sympathizers around the world (See Figure 4). 

Figure 4: 

Map provided by the Investigative Project 

 

29 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Monographs, “Al-Qaeda’s 

Means and Methods to Raise, Move, and Use Money.” August 21, 2004. 

30 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc. Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, The Free Press, 2001, p. 

104. 

12
The Growing Insurgency in Iraq

THE FIGHT FOR IRAQ 

In 1998, Usama bin Laden laid out his reasons for formally declaring war against the 

United States. In addition to the United States’ continued support for Israel, bin Laden 

said: 

“for over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the 

holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating its rulers, 

humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the 

Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim 

peoples.”31

In subsequent statements, Usama bin Laden repeatedly returns to the issue of America’s 

military presence in Muslim countries. These statements suggest al-Qaeda feels 

obligated to confront Western forces present in the region. Al-Qaeda also felt compelled 

to engage the 200,000 coalition forces entering Iraq, which it considers part of the sacred 

Muslim world. Usama bin Laden said, “terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms on 

our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty.”32 Al-Qaeda views a ground war in 

Iraq, similar to the Jihad in Afghanistan in the early 1980’s, as a critical opportunity to 

drive Western forces from the region. 

In his July 2005 letter to the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Ayman al-Zawahiri discussed 

al-Qaeda’s goals in Iraq, which he believes can be accomplished in four stages. First, 

expel the Americans from Iraq. Second, establish an Islamic authority, then develop it 

and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate-over as much territory as you can 

to spread its power in Iraq. Third, extend the jihad wave to the secular countries 

neighboring Iraq. And finally, eliminate Israel and the possibility that an Israeli state 

would challenge any new Islamic entity.33

If Islamist extremist groups are successful in preventing a legitimate government from 

flourishing in Iraq, the country could become a permanent base for al-Qaeda to recruit, 

train and conduct operations against non-Islamic governments in the region, and 

eventually the United States. It would be seen as a tremendous success for Islamist 

extremist groups and boost terrorists ability to recruit new members far beyond the 

current rate. 

 

31 Usama bin Laden. “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” February 23, 1998. 

32 Usama bin Laden. “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 

Places,” August 1996. 

33 Ayman al-Zawahiri. “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi,” Reprinted by the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence, October 11, 2005. 

13
ABU MUSAB al-ZARQAWI’S TERRORIST NETWORK 

In December 2004, Usama bin Laden named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as emir in charge of 

al-Qaeda operations in Iraq.34 Zarqawi rose from the ranks of mediocrity to become the 

most dangerous terrorist in Iraq, and subsequently the leader of Tawhid and Jihad 

(Monotheism and Holy War) in Iraq. Zarqawi’s group is 

responsible for a number of attacks against Westerners in Iraq. A

Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on June 7, 2006 by Coalition forces

This is a tremendous success story for Coalition forces. Abu Mus

al-Zarqawi was a committed terrorist, who was planning furth

attacks against innocent Iraqis, as well as Western civilians. 

However, Zarqawi’s death will not affect the long term fight in 

which we are involved. In fact, it did not take al-Qaeda in Iraq 

much time to name Abu Hamza al-Muhajir as al-Zarqawi’s 

replacement. 

bu 

. 

ab 

er 

 

Although Abu Musab Zarqawi and Usama bin Laden shared a similar ideology, the two 

differed on how to remove U.S. and Western influence from Muslim territories and 

restore a Caliphate in the region. In September 2005, Zarqawi declared an all out war on 

Shia Muslims in Iraq, and is believed to be responsible for masterminding suicide attacks 

targeting Shias across Iraq. This drew criticism from core al-Qaeda officials and other 

Sunni Muslims. In his July 2005 letter, Usama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant Ayman alZawahiri warned al-Zarqawi that his actions were eroding support for al-Qaeda in Iraq. 

Al-Zawahiri questioned whether it was a wise decision to open another front, especially 

with over 100 al-Qaeda personnel being held by the Iranians, who are predominantly 

Shia. 

Although he declared an all out war against Shia Muslims in Iraq, al-Zarqawi apparently 

listened to advice and showed a willingness to change some of his tactics to retain his 

stature and influence as the leader in Iraq. Prior to his death, Zarqawi apparently directed 

his supporters to change certain tactics to deflect negative press from al-Qaeda and other 

extremist groups. For example, al-Zarqawi created a Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC) 

in Iraq to downplay al-Qaeda’s role in these attacks and put an Iraqi face on the 

insurgency. In addition, he directed his supporters not to indiscriminately attack Shias, 

but only to target Shia who support the Iraqi government. With Zarqawi dead, it is 

unclear how his followers will treat Shia Muslims. 

Regardless, Usama bin Laden continues to capitalize on the popularity of the insurgency 

in Iraq to muster further support for al-Qaeda and the defeat of the Coalition. With the 

loss of its major training camps in Afghanistan the war in Iraq became a major rally point 

and a fertile recruiting ground for al-Qaeda.35 

In addition, Usama bin Laden may use Islamist extremists fighting in Iraq to launch 

attacks outside of the country. A memo from bin Laden to Zarqawi in 2005 indicates that 

34 Usama bin Laden, Audio Tape, December 2005. 

35 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006. 

14
bin Laden was encouraging Zarqawi and his group to consider plotting terrorist attacks in 

the United States.36 Although there is nothing to suggest Zarqawi’s supporters currently 

are preparing attacks within the United States, they eventually may look to target the 

United States, or our interests abroad. In August 2005, al-Qaeda supporters claimed 

responsibility for firing three missiles from a Jordanian port that missed a U.S. Naval ship 

in the area. Then, in November 2005, three suicide bombers conducted simultaneous 

attacks in Amman, Jordan that left sixty dead. Jordanian officials report that Zarqawi’s 

group in Iraq is responsible for the attacks.37 

THE FOREIGN FIGHTER NETWORK 

Besides Zarqawi’s group, al-Qaeda benefits from the support it receives from foreign 

fighters who have traveled to Iraq to destabilize the region and prevent Coalition forces 

from spreading democratic values to Iraq and its neighbors. Foreign fighters use Iraq to 

gain battle experience before returning home to conduct terrorist attacks against 

governments and civilians. They appear to be working to make the insurgency in Iraq 

what Afghanistan was to the earlier generation of jihadists—a melting pot for jihadists 

from around the world.38 Unlike the mujahideen who returned home from Afghanistan 

in the 1980’s trained in rural guerilla warfare, the fighters who leave Iraq will have 

acquired first-hand experience in urban warfare—including the use of improvised 

explosive devices. Upon returning home, they have the potential to use their knowledge, 

credibility and popularity to recruit and train younger generations to fight against the 

United States and our allies. 

At this time, there is no reason to believe foreign fighters are ready to withdraw from 

Iraq. Iraq continues to provide al-Qaeda and its supporters the best opportunity to attack 

the United States and our interests. Although the death of Abu Musab Zarqawi 

represents a huge symbolic victory, the insurgency is still very dangerous and terrorist 

attacks continue. These terrorist groups continue to present a considerable threat to 

coalition forces, Iraq’s new government and neighboring countries. 

Other Sunni Islamist Extremist Groups 

THE GLOBAL TERRORIST NETWORK 

Coalition success in the global war on terrorism has forced al-Qaeda’s core elements 

increasingly to reach out to other Sunni Islamist extremist groups for support. 

Historically, these “other” groups have focused their efforts against local targets, but 

there is growing evidence that these groups are more willing to work with bin Laden. 

This is especially true when working with al-Qaeda serves their own particular interests. 

 

36 Bret Baier and Nick Simeone, “Officials: Bin Laden Urges Zarqawi to Hit U.S.,” www.foxnews.com, 

March 1, 2005. 

37 James Phillips, “Zarqawi’s Amman Bombings: Jordan’s 9/11,” The Heritage Foundation, November 18, 

2005. 

38 State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004,” April 2005, p.7. 

15
Some of these groups have received training, weapons and funding from al-Qaeda.39 

Others have received only ideological inspiration while remaining organizationally and 

operationally distinct. Although these groups pose less danger to the U.S. homeland than 

al-Qaeda’s core elements, they are increasingly a threat to our interests abroad. Such 

groups also could look for an opportunity to attack the United States in the future.40 

Even if Usama bin Laden is captured or killed tomorrow, Sunni extremist groups may 

seek to attack U.S. interests for decades to come.41 

 

Open source information has identified at least nineteen Sunni extremist organizations 

that both share al-Qaeda’s ideology and have the capability to reach the United States and 

our interests overseas.42 However, the likelihood that all nineteen groups will look to 

carry out independent attacks against the United States is believed to be low. It is likely 

that most of these groups will continue to focus their efforts on launching attacks in their 

respective regions. There are, nonetheless, certain groups the Intelligence Community 

monitors with increasing scrutiny because they have demonstrated the capacity to carry 

out successful terrorist attacks. This list is not exclusive of other Sunni extremist groups, 

such as Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. We offer this list as an example to show 

the public how certain groups that were “off the radar screen” of many intelligence 

analysts just a few years ago have become more dangerous under the influence of alQaeda’s ideology. 

JEMAAH ISLAMIYA 

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is a Southeast Asia-based radical Islamist group that began plotting 

violent attacks against regional targets in the 1990s. JI’s stated goal is a pan-Islamic state 

across much of the region. JI is not a stranger to violence, and has shown the willingness 

to inflict mass casualties against innocent civilians 

and those it believes to be allied with Western 

interests.43 JI is responsible for recent attacks in 

Indonesia, including the Bali bombing in 2002 that 

killed 202 people and wounded some 300 others, the 

J.W. Marriott bombing in 2003, the 2004 bombing 

of the Australian Embassy and the second attack on 

Bali in 2005. In addition, we know through 

information received from Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammad that JI operatives were supporting alQaeda attacks against U.S. interests after 9/11, 

including plans to attack sites in California using a 

 hijacked plane.44

Picture provided by the Government of 

Australia, Office of Emergency Management 

 

39 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006. 40 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of 

National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006. 

41 James Phillips, “The Evolving Al-Qaeda Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2006. 42 “Al-Qaeda,” GlobalSecurity.org 

43 “Jemaah Islamiya,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3613. 

44 President George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy,” 

October 6, 2005. 

16
The Indonesian Government has successfully disrupted terrorist operations since the 2002 

Bali bombing. Of noteworthy success, Indonesian courts have convicted at least 100 

members of JI or affiliated groups on terrorism charges. Indonesian forces killed Azahari 

bin Husin, JI’s chief bomb-maker. In addition, JI operations chief Hambali, was arrested 

in Thailand in 2003. Hambali is tied to several of the major attacks, and was thought to 

be Jemaah Islamiyah’s main link to al-Qaeda.45

The death of JI’s chief bomb-maker and arrest of Hambali are major breakthroughs in the 

battle against terrorism in Southeast Asia, but the network is still robust. JI operatives 

Noordin Top, Dulmatin and Umar Patek remain at large and have the capability and 

experience to carry out large-scale attacks against U.S. interests in the region.46 

Two events have the potential to further escalate JI’s militancy in the region and against 

the United States. First, JI’s spiritual leader, Emir Abu Bakar Bashir (also Abubakar 

Ba'asyir), recently was released from prison. Bashir was serving thirty-three months for 

his involvement in the 2002 Bali bombing. It is unclear what role Bashir will take now 

that he has been released, but in the past he has expressed support for bin Laden’s 

struggle. Bashir once said, “His is the true struggle to uphold Islam, not terror—the 

terrorists are America and Israel.”47 

Second, depending on what takes place in Iraq, al-Qaeda members and other terrorist 

operatives could migrate to Indonesia. As the world’s most populous Muslim country, 

Indonesia appears to be an obvious place for al-Qaeda to migrate. Indonesians 

traditionally have practiced a more moderate interpretation of Islam, but an increasingly 

militant element has emerged in some local schools. The country’s porous maritime 

borders, weak central government, separatist movements and loosely regulated financial 

system make it a fertile ground for terrorist activities.48

The threat of a JI attack against U.S. interests is greatest in Southeast Asia. In the past, JI 

assisted al-Qaeda with attacks outside Southeast Asia and continues to share al-Qaeda’s 

ideology.49 As was the case with al-Qaeda’s plot to attack the United States using JI 

operatives, some terrorists increasingly are tied to the ideology rather than the group. 

These individuals are willing to support terrorist attacks that support their particular 

beliefs regardless of the affiliation to any specific organization. 

 

45 “Hambali Captured,” http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=924. 

46 “Jemaah Islamiya,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 3, 2005. 

47 “Profile: Abu Bakar Bashir,” Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org. June 14, 2006. 48 Ibid. 

49 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of 

National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006. 

17
LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP 

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in the early 1990s among Libyans 

who fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Initially organized to overthrow the 

Qadhafi regime and install a Shari'a-based government, the LIFG subsequently has 

embraced the global jihadist agenda of al-Qaeda. Some LIFG members still strictly 

adhere to the original cause (anti Libyan/Qadhafi activities), while others have aligned 

themselves to Bin-Laden causes. Some senior members of LIFG are believed to be or 

have belonged to al-Qaeda’s senior command structure. The LIFG itself calls upon 

Muslims inside and outside of Libya to take part in what it terms the fight of Islam 

against its enemies.50 Evidence suggests that the LIFG provided guidance in the 

planning of the 2003 bombing in Casablanca, Morocco.51 LIFG maintains a presence in 

Asia, Africa and Europe, primarily in the United Kingdom.52 

The LIFG constitutes the most serious threat to potential U.S. investment and business in 

Libya. In addition, LIFG has called on Muslims everywhere to fight against the U.S. in 

Iraq.53 In response to this threat, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 freezing 

the assets of the LIFG in the U.S. citing the group as a threat to America’s national 

security. The LIFG has been added to the terrorism exclusion list and in December 2004, 

the U.S. designated the LIFG as a foreign terrorist organization.54 Most recently, on 

February 8, 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated five individuals and 

four entities for their role in financing the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The 

individuals were supporting LIFG’s activities through a sophisticated charitable front 

organization. According to the Department of the Treasury, "the Libyan Islamic Fighting 

Group threatens global safety and stability through the use of violence and its ideological 

alliance with al Qaeda and other brutal terrorist organizations.”55

SALAFIST GROUP FOR PREACHING AND COMBAT 

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is an extremist group based in 

Algeria. The organization was formally created in 1996 when it broke away from the 

Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which was the primary terrorist organization in Algeria. It 

has been linked to an external network of extremists in Western Europe.56 

Some GSPC members favor a global Jihad, and look to expand the group’s reach beyond 

its current area of focus. The GSPC issued several communiqués on its website 

 

50Moshe Terdman, “The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),” The Project for the Research of Islamist 

Movements (PRISM), Volume 3, Number 2, June 2005. 

51 US Department of State, “Libya,” Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2005, p. 89. 

52 “Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,” Dudley Knox Library Naval Postgraduate School, May 11, 2005. 

53 Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of 

National Intelligence,” Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2006. 

54 US Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations Designation Table,” December 2004. 55 The United States Department of Treasury, “Treasury Designates UK-Based Individuals, Entities 

Financing Al Qaida-Affiliated LIFG,” Press Room, February 8, 2006. 56 “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, December 2005. 

18
threatening foreigners in Algeria and pledged renewed allegiance to al-Qaeda and global 

Jihad.57 Kamel Bourgass, a GSPC member convicted in April 2005 in the United 

Kingdom (where he already is serving a life sentence for murdering Detective Constable 

Stephen Oake in 2003) for “conspiracy to cause public nuisance by use of poisons and/or 

explosives,” was connected with London-based GSPC leader Abu Doha, a known 

Jihadist linked with the foiled plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport.58 There 

also are financial links between GSPC cells in Europe and Algeria.59 

LASHKAR-E-TAIBA 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) is a Pakistani-based militant group seeking a pan-Islamic state in 

South Asia. Although the group is focused primarily on the secession of Jammu and 

Kashmir, an ambitious sect of the group is calling for a worldwide Jihad.60 There are 

several reports that al-Qaeda used LET to fill some of its operational gaps after the 

United States successfully targeted al-Qaeda members following the attacks on 

September 11, 2001. The State Department annual terrorism report states that a top al 

Qaeda-associate Abu Zubaydah was captured at a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe house in March 

2002.61

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has made the difficult and potentially regime 

threatening decision to support the global war on terrorism. The Pakistani Government 

has targeted militant Islamic groups and apprehended or detained a number of important 

al-Qaeda supporters. At the same time, Pakistan historically has been supportive of 

Kashmiri separatist movements such as LET. There is strong popular support for LET’s 

activity in Jammu and Kashmir.62 This support has provided an opening for LET to 

continue operations in Pakistan. 

Since 9/11, the United States has been concerned about the reportedly large number of 

LET members in the United States and Canada. In 2003, U.S. officials charged eleven 

men, nine of whom are Americans, with preparing to wage Jihad combat overseas on 

behalf of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Muhammad Aatique, one of the eleven men charged, told the 

federal judge hearing the case that he and his co-conspirators may have taken up arms 

against the United States had they not been arrested.63 In addition, Canadian officials 

arrested Raja Ghulam Mustafa, a Pakistani national and suspected LET captain with links 

to al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden.64 Still, the Intelligence Community lacks a clear 

understanding of the group’s activities in the United States. 

 

57 US Department of State, “Algeria,” Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2005, pp. 58-9. 

58 “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, December 2005. 

59 US Department of State, “Algeria,” Country Reports on Terrorism, April 2005, pp. 57-58. 

60 “Kashmir Militant Extremists,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 2005. 

61 U.S. Department of State Global Pattern of Terrorism 2002, April 30, 2003. 

62 “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, March 10, 2006. 

63 Jerry Markon and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Indictment Expands “VA. Jihad” Charge,” Washington Post, 

September 26, 2003. 

64 Sarah Kennedy, “Anti-terror Bust Targets T.O. Home,” The Calgary Sun, March 31, 2006. 

19
Homegrown Terrorism

The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 

(START), a University of Maryland database has compiled information on worldwide 

terror incidents since 1970, reports that one of every seven terrorist attacks is carries out 

by a homegrown extremist.65 The July 2005 bombings in London support this trend, and 

may provide further insight into the future of terrorist activities. These terrorists were 

homegrown, born or raised in the United Kingdom. Although their ties to al-Qaeda 

remain unclear, they were willing to conduct attacks to support al-Qaeda’s global jihad. 

London is not the only place where homegrown terrorists have carried out attacks against 

innocent people. In 2004, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh brought this 

issue to the forefront. Van Gogh was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch citizen 

of Moroccan decent, who belonged to the Hofstad Group, a radical extremist group made 

up of mainly Dutch citizens of North African decent. Attacks in Casablanca, Morocco 

and Madrid, Spain were also the work of homegrown terrorist cells. On November 4, 

2005, Pakistani security forces captured Mustafa Setmariam Nasar (aka Abu Musab alSuri), a jihadist theorist suspected of planning the 2004 and 2005 bombings in Madrid 

and London. Whether it is an individual assassination or a large scale attack, both 

represent religious-inspired terrorism as propounded by al-Qaeda since the late 20th

Century.66

Next-Generation Jihadist: A Case Study 

Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, aka Abu Musab al-Suri, is a Syrian native who fought against the Soviet Union 

in Afghanistan He later became an acquaintance of Usama bin Laden, but remained an independent 

minded ideologue. Nasar spent several years living in Europe and is believed to be the architect for 

terrorist cells operating in Europe. After September 11, 2001, Nasar called for a “third generation” of 

Salafi Jihadists—one that works primarily on its own with guidance from roving operatives acting on 

behalf of the broader movement. Nasar published thousands of pages on the Internet, using lessons 

learned from past conflicts, on how small independent groups of Islamist extremists can effectively conduct 

operations against the West. He authored a 1,600-page document titled, “The Call for a Global Islamic 

Resistance,” which was posted on the Internet and is believed to be used by some terrorist groups 

worldwide. 

 

65 Statistic provided by the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START), Gary LaFree, 

www.start.umd.edu/. 66 Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat, Report produced by the 

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Hague: Netherlands, March 2006, p.7. 

20
 De Telegraaf Associated Press 

Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was killed by Mohammed Bouyeri, who is a member of 

a radical terrorist group in the Netherlands called the Hofstad Group (Left). 

On March 11, 2004 devastating terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain killed 191 people 

(Right). 

The presence of “homegrown” Islamist extremist cells in Europe is of particular concern 

to the United States. Most Western European countries participate in the Visa Waiver 

Program, which allows citizens of those countries to visit the United States without a 

visa. There is concern that Islamist extremists who have citizenship in these countries 

could now gain entry to the United States with relative ease. 

Recent events demonstrate that Europe is not the only location where Islamic militants 

can establish themselves. There are legitimate concerns about the terrorist threats 

orchestrated by cells in Mexico or Canada, countries with whom we share some 5,000 

miles of border. For many reasons, security along the border with Mexico has been a 

primary focus. However, the border to the north, which in many places is porous and 

unattended, must also be addressed. Disturbingly little attention has been paid to this 

3,100 mile border despite the fact that terrorist groups have made previous attempts to 

enter the United States from Canada (the Millennium Plot). A Customs and Border 

Protection spokeswoman recently stated that “fewer than ten percent—approximately 

1,000—of the nation’s border patrol agents are deployed to the Canadian border.”67

 

On June 4, 2006, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested 17 Canadian suspects on 

terror charges. The group, which ranged in age from 19-43, is charged with purchasing 

three tons of ammonium nitrate for the manufacture of bombs to attack Canadian 

government buildings. The group also appears to have links with Islamic militants in the 

United States. The people involved seem to meet the criteria of the growing homegrown 

 

67 “Homegrown Terrorists Under Close Watch in the U.S.” Associated Press, June 22, 2006. 

21
terrorism threat that we in America may not be following as closely as we should. The 

individuals arrested by the Canadian police are educated, come from well-established 

families and have no criminal record—there is nothing in their past to draw the attention 

of law enforcement officials. This group met in relative anonymity and was able to 

spread support for violent Jihad. The fact that it was able to do so is a fundamental 

national security threat. 

The Dutch intelligence agency, AIVD, recently conducted a study that found certain 

Muslim youth groups in the Netherlands are not only receptive to radicalization, but 

perceive violent Jihad as positive and “cool.”68 The study found several factors 

associated with the radicalization of Muslims. First, Western nations have struggled with 

only limited success to integrate Muslim immigrant communities into the rest of society. 

This lack of integration leaves some Muslims feeling disenfranchised and alienated from 

Western society. This is particularly true among second and third generation Muslims in 

Europe who feel discriminated against and rarely leave their Muslim enclaves. The 

international community is also seeing a Muslim youth that is becoming keenly aware of 

his heritage and is equally interested in Muslim affairs globally. The increasing use of 

the Internet allows Muslim youth to communicate with other Muslims worldwide. They 

see what is happening to fellow Muslims in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq and 

are angry and frustrated at what they consider to be Western policies toward Muslims. 

Usama bin Laden continually speaks along these lines when he says, “Muslims are being 

humiliated, tortured and ruthlessly killed all over the world, and its time to fight these 

satanic forces with the utmost strength and power.”69 Islamist extremists have 

capitalized on events like the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal and Guantanamo Bay to 

rally Muslim support against the West. Other factors that may lead Muslims to feel a 

sense of cultural alienation include their social status, lack of employment opportunities 

and imprisonment. 

 

 

 Associated Press 

The July 2005 attacks in London killed 52 people. Subsequent investigations discover 

attacks were the work of homegrown terrorists. 

It should be noted that homegrown cells aligning their beliefs with al-Qaeda or radical 

Islam are not unique to Europe. While the United States has not seen a major attack by 

homegrown terrorists, it does not mean we are immune from such an attack. Following 

 

68 Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat, Report produced by the 

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Hague: Netherlands, March 2006, p.8. 

69 Usama bin Laden, “Message to Muslim Youth,” Markaz al-Dawa (Internet), December 13, 2001. 

22
the July 2005 bombings in London, FBI Director Robert Mueller admitted, “The United 

States could face attacks from homegrown terrorism very similar to bombings in London 

that killed 52 people and wounded another 700.” The plot carried out by four men in 

London may be a "likely model for future U.S. attacks." The bombers, all British 

citizens, had no criminal records, weren't on any watch lists and had no extremist pasts.70

U.S. prisons and universities continue to be used as potential recruitment centers for 

Islamist extremists. In addition, some mosques have been used by extremist groups to 

recruit new members. The radicalization of Islamic inmates in prison is not a recent 

phenomenon. Prison systems throughout the world have been and continue to be 

breeding grounds for radicalism and facilities for the planning and training of radical 

activities. Concerns regarding the radicalization of Muslim inmates were heightened 

after former inmates Richard Reid and Jose Padilla were arrested for allegedly attempting 

to commit terrorist acts against the United States. 

In July 2005, law enforcement officials uncovered a California-based homegrown Islamic 

terrorist cell, known as Jamiyyat Ul Islam Is Saheeh (JIS). This group was planning 

attacks against military facilities, religious institutions and other facilities in the United 

States. Kevin James (a.k.a. Shakyh Shahaab Murshid), the founder of JIS, recruited 

fellow prison inmates to join JIS. The group preached it was the duty of members to 

target for violent attack any enemies of Islam, including the U.S. Government and Jewish 

and non-Jewish supporters of Israel. Upon release from prison, JIS members sought to 

establish cells of JIS members outside of prison who were willing to plot terrorist acts 

and commit armed robberies.71 While the group did not actively work on behalf of 

Usama bin Laden, it did swear allegiance to al-Qaeda. 

SUNNI EXTREMIST GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES 

Sunni extremist organizations that have expressed an interest in attacking the United 

States have maintained a presence here for years. These groups use America’s openness 

to establish roots in our communities and focus on training, recruiting and fundraising, 

rather then carrying out terrorist attacks. For these groups, the value of fundraising and 

recruiting far outweighs the benefit of an attack. 

Since September 11, 2001, Federal authorities have raided and shut down at least twentyfive charities contributing to terrorist activities, including some that served as front 

companies for al-Qaeda. For example, on October 13, 2004, the U.S. Treasury 

Department designated the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), also known as the 

Islamic American Relief Agency, as a supporter of terrorism. The designation froze all 

accounts, funds and assets of IARA, a charity that belongs to a larger network with 

headquarters in the Sudan. According to the Treasury Department, the charity funneled 

 

70 Charlotte Sector, “Experts Say Suicide Mission in the U.S. is Inevitable,” ABC News, July 18, 2005. 71 “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other 

Targets,” U.S. Department of Justice, www.usdoj.gov, August 31, 2005. 

23
hundreds of thousands of dollars to Usama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.72 In addition, in 

2002 U.S. authorities raided the offices of the Benevolence International Foundation 

(BIF). The Government charged various people tied to the organization with trying to 

obtain chemical and nuclear weapons on behalf of al-Qaeda. 

Since the 1980s, terrorist organizations have developed a sophisticated and diverse 

financial infrastructure within the United States. It is widely known that almost every 

terrorist organization from Hamas to al-Qaeda has accessed America’s financial 

resources and institutions to their benefit. They have leveraged magazines, mosques and 

charities as front organizations to support terrorist activities overseas. Although these 

groups do not share all the same objectives, they have shown the willingness to work 

together in the United States to raise money for terrorist activities (See Figure 5).73 

Terrorists also exploit various venues to raise funds and spread their violent message to a 

wider audience, most unwitting of the source. For example, at the 1996 annual 

convention of the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) in Chicago, Abdurahman 

Alamoudi told the audience, “once we are here, our mission in this country is to change 

it. There is no way for Muslims to be violent in America, no way. We have other means 

to do it.”74 Alamoudi, who has been a guest at the White House on several occasions 

under the Clinton and Bush Administration’s, pleaded guilty to smuggling money into the 

country, as well as to participating in a plot to kill the then-crown prince of Saudi Arabia. 

Not all people who speak at these conventions are radical or favor violence against the 

United States. In fact, extremists account for only a very small percentage of the people 

who attend these functions, but the events also attract the worst of terrorists. In the past, 

these Muslim conferences have even hosted the likes of Ayman Zawahiri, who is 

believed to have attended a fundraising conference in Santa Clara, California for the 

Egyptian Islamic Jihad sometime after the first World Trade Center attack75 This would 

have been al-Zawahiri’s second visit to the United States since 1989. 

 

72 “Islamic African Relief Agency,” U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Terrorism and Financial 

Intelligence, October 13, 2004. 

73 Richard Clarke, “Testimony before the United States Senate Banking Committee,” October 22, 2003. 74 “United States of America v. Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi,” United District Court, Eastern 

District of Maryland (www.findlaw.com), September 30, 2003. 

75 “Egyptian Doctor Emerges as Terror Mastermind,” Profile of Ayman al-Zawahiri, www.cnn.com 

24
Figure 5 

 Map provided by the Investigative Project 

25
Exploitation of the Internet 

The art of terrorist strategic communication has evolved to a point where the terrorists 

themselves can now control the entire production process.76 In recent years, the Internet 

has become the primary tool used to project their extremist message. The increasing use 

of technology, especially the use of the Internet, by Islamist extremist groups has led to a 

new phenomenon known as “glocal” issues, whereas global issues are now becoming 

local issues. Usama bin Laden could not have his current, and increasing, level of 

success if Muslims did not believe their faith, brethren, resources, and lands to be under 

attack by the United States and, more generally, the West.77 The Internet has helped alQaeda reach Muslim communities around the world with this very message. 

The Internet has provided al Qaeda a tool to proselytize its message to an international 

audience and convince Muslim communities that they are being threatened by their local 

government.78 Today, almost all terrorist organizations use the Internet in some capacity, 

and the majority of them maintain one or more websites. Easy access, lack of regulation 

and the ability to shape the message are all too alluring for terrorist groups to bypass. 

Terrorist groups increasingly are reliant on the Internet to accomplish several of their key 

objectives. First, the Internet provides a means for terrorists to reach out to a larger 

audience. The Internet allows terrorist groups to communicate not only with their 

supporters and members, but also to influence the opinion of the general public. The 

Internet also provides terrorist groups a new means to spread its propaganda and increase 

publicity. Through propaganda, terrorist seek to communicate a particular message to a 

particular audience.79 In certain circumstances we have come to learn that terrorists are 

targeting children as young as seven years old, sometimes younger. Young adults of the 

Muslim world rely less on the television, cable, or radio to get their news—but 

exclusively get their information from the Internet.80 

Terrorist groups will continue to use the Internet to shape their image and the image of 

their enemies. They also will use the Internet to raise money for terror activities. In the 

past, terrorists have used their Websites to advertise bank account numbers that 

supporters can send money. 

The Internet is an ideal vehicle for recruitment. Although terrorists have experienced 

difficulty penetrating the United States since 9/11, the ability to recruit new members 

through the Internet poses new challenges for the Intelligence Community and law 

enforcement officials. Terrorists now can use the Internet to pass along operational 

 

76 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. 

77 Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, Potomac Books, 2005, p. xi. 78 Ambassador Francis Taylor, “Emerging Threats to Homeland Security,” May 10, 2004. 

79 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. 

80 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. 

26
guidance. Terrorist groups post messages on their websites letting potential terrorists 

know that they do not have to travel to other lands to join terrorist organizations or 

receive training.81 New recruits can now become radicalized without leaving the home. 

Finally, terrorists exploit the Internet for intelligence-gathering and targeting. Today, 

anyone can go on the Internet and collect information against key infrastructure and 

sensitive components. Terrorists use these sites to conduct reconnaissance on potential 

targets without ever having to put feet on the ground to conduct surveillance. During 

raids in Afghanistan, U.S. forces came across computers in the homes of known terrorists 

that held information on important U.S. landmarks, such as the Hoover Dam, the New 

York financial sector and government buildings in Washington, D.C. 

Conclusion 

We remain a nation at war. The United States is not safe simply because we have not 

seen an attack on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001. The loss of key personnel, training 

camps and lines of communication have had a significant impact on al-Qaeda’s near-term 

operational capabilities, but the group still remains the single, greatest threat to America, 

our allies and our interests abroad. Al-Qaeda has bridged some of these gaps by 

increasingly reaching out to other Sunni extremist organizations, as well as homegrown 

terrorist cells, to support local attacks against the United States and our allies. In 

addition, its ability to exploit the Internet has enabled the group to communicate with its 

followers, recruit new supporters and spread its message to a wider audience. These 

groups continue to plan for horrific attacks. The Intelligence Community is fighting a 

daily war against Islamist extremism—this can not be stressed enough. Just because 

terrorists are not conducting attacks does not mean they are not recruiting, fundraising, 

training and planning future attacks. Unfortunately, there are still gaps in our 

understanding of Islamist extremist groups, which leaves America vulnerable to future 

attacks. 

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks there have been numerous commissions, reports 

and studies to identify shortfalls in the Intelligence Community and recommend ways to 

improve the capabilities and effectiveness for all intelligence components to prevent 

future attacks against the United States. Some of the most noteworthy recommendations 

acted on by the Congress and the Bush Administration include the creation of the Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence who serves as head of the Intelligence 

Community and acts as the principal adviser to the President. In addition, the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act created the National Counterterrorism 

Center (NCTC) to integrate all intelligence possessed by the United States Government 

pertaining to terrorism. Finally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established a 

National Security Branch (NSB) that integrates intelligence collection and analysis 

capabilities addressing the domestic terrorist threat. 

 

81 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. 

27
These reforms have strengthened America’s stance against Islamist extremist terrorist 

groups, and without question we are a safer nation then we were before 9/11. However, 

there are still significant shortfalls within the Intelligence Community. 

Recognizing this War is Different – The global war on terrorism is not a war of our 

choosing. America did not seek out this conflict, but it is upon us and must be won. It is 

a new type of war – one where the enemy is not a nation, but a movement. Our enemy 

seeks to inflict massive civilian casualties. We must be willing to use force when 

necessary, and the command and control of our forces much be sufficiently nimble to 

strike when the opportunity presents itself. In this war, intelligence and information are 

as important as military capability. Losing control of information can cost American 

lives. 

Understanding Your Enemy—A successful U.S. strategy will therefore ultimately 

depend on our ability to counter the ideological appeal of al-Qaeda and other Islamist 

extremist groups. However, to be successful, we first need to better understand the 

animosity and arguments that underpin al-Qaeda and the wider radical Jihad movement, 

and the region of the world from which its struggle emanated and upon which its 

argument still rests.82 Understanding the Islamist extremist ideology will not allow us to 

influence the terrorists—these extremists cannot be reasoned with. We cannot expect to 

win the hearts and minds of those who have already been indoctrinated into the jihadist 

cause. We, however, can look to influence younger generations that may be vulnerable 

to recruitment.83 

The Central Intelligence Agency created an office in September 2004 to look at political 

Islam and brief senior policy makers on the issue, as well as organize academic outreach 

programs around the world. These types of efforts are essential to help people better 

understand the terrorist, and how they use religion to justify and rationalize their actions. 

Still, this is not enough. This one program at the CIA can only reach a finite number of 

people. In the years ahead, the Committee would like to see the Intelligence Community 

dedicate additional funding and resources to standing up similar offices to help people 

understand the challenges of Islamist extremism. Otherwise, we will continue to make 

the same mistakes. 

Domestically, we need a better understanding of the threat posed by homegrown terrorist 

groups. One of the things we have learned from the attacks in the Netherlands, Madrid, 

Casablanca and London is that there is not a one size fits all reason to answer why these 

individuals chose to adopt this violent form of Islam. The Department of Homeland 

Security should look to address the issue of radicalization, not just among Islamist 

extremist groups, but all terrorism groups within the United States. We need a better idea 

 

82 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. 

83 Richard Perle, Testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 

2005. 

28
of who is vulnerable, where are people becoming radicalized and to what extent the threat 

already is ingrained in our communities. 

Winning the War of Ideas—The global war on terrorism is different than any other war 

in America’s history. However, as in most wars, America has been forced to engage in a 

“War of Ideas” against the enemy. This war against Islamist extremism can only be 

partially won through the use military, the rest must be accomplished with soft power, or 

diplomacy. The terrorists understand the importance of this tactic and are extremely 

adept at waging a war of ideas. Through the use of the Internet and other means, 

terrorists have had considerable success in spreading an anti-American message 

throughout the Muslim community. Terrorists utilize Internet websites to post comments 

and pictures that will incite their target audience—the younger Muslim population. They 

are distorting the truth to recruit new supporters. For the most part, they do this 

uncontested. America, with the help of our allies, in particular our Muslim partners, must 

increase its efforts to counter these anti-Western messages. 

Responding to the Enemy Presence within the United States—The Islamic Jihadist war 

against the West is a war without borders. Since 9/11, a number of jihadist cells have 

been identified within the United States, and terrorist plots have been thwarted in their 

initial phase of planning. Prudence demands that we remain alert to the very real 

possibility of terrorist attacks on the Homeland. U.S. law enforcement authorities must 

utilize all legal and constitutional tools to aggressively prevent domestic terrorist activity. 

Successfully combating terrorists or would-be Jihadists who are already located within 

the United States will require the cooperation of all Americans. It is quite possible that 

the local police or highway patrol may get the first inklings of some terrorist activity. As 

a result, it is also absolutely essential that the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, 

and other federal agencies work very closely with state and local authorities. The Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces that have been established throughout the country now serve an 

important coordination and communication function. 

The JIS case in California illustrates the importance of law enforcement partnerships and 

cooperation between state, local and federal authorities. In this particular case, local 

police officials uncovered critical information that they then shared with the FBI, and all 

levels worked together to protect our country from the threat of terrorism.84 We should 

continue to look for creative ways to capitalize on the expertise and knowledge of local 

law enforcement. 

The Internet—The Internet has become a key enabler for Islamist extremist groups to 

recruit, train, raise money and propagate their message. Although the United States has 

done an adequate job of creating venues to reach and influence moderate Muslims with a 

pro-Western message, these same forums have proven ineffective at influencing persons 

 

84 “Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities, Other 

Targets,” U.S. Department of Justice, www.usdoj.gov, August 31, 2005. 

29
who may already have been radicalized by the Internet.85 The Committee impresses 

upon the United Government the need to do a better job in this realm to counter terrorists’ 

unchallenged use of the Internet. We need to increase efforts to challenge the 

propaganda, distorted truths, messages of hate and calls for violence on the Internet. 

 

 

85 Bruce Hoffman. “The Use of the Internet by Extremists,” Testimony before the House Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence, May 4, 2006. 

30
Appendix 1 

al-Qaeda: In Their Own Words 

Since Usama bin Laden officially declared jihad on America in his August 23, 1996 

message entitled: “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of 

the Two Holy Mosques; Expel Heretics from the Arabian Peninsula,” there have been 

numerous comments made by al-Qaeda leaders outlining their reason for jihad and 

calling for continued attacks against America and our interests abroad. 

Thanks to the help of dedicated analysts at the Open Source Center and the National 

Counterterrorism Center we have included several comments taken from statements 

released by al-Qaeda. For a better understanding and to put the comment in appropriate 

context, we recommend looking at the full statement. 

“Its [Saudi Government] failure to protect the country, opening it to the nation’s enemy, 

the American crusader forces who have become the main cause of all aspects of our 

plight (Usama bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the 

Land of the Two Holy Mosques, August 23, 1996).” 

“Muslims burn with anger at America. For its own good, America should leave [Saudi 

Arabia.] ... There is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the 

holy land. ... The presence of the USA Crusader military forces on land, sea and air of the 

states of the Islamic Gulf is the greatest danger threatening the largest oil reserve in the 

world (Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the Two 

Holy Mosques, August 23, 1996).” 

“Destruction of the oil industries, because the presence of the crusader and American 

military forces in the Islamic Gulf states, on land, in the air, and at sea, represents the 

greatest danger and harm and the greatest threat to the largest oil reserves in the world. 

That presence is a provocation to the people and an affront to their religion, feelings, and 

dignity, and has driven them toward armed struggle against the occupying invaders 

(Usama bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of 

the Two Holy Mosques, August 23, 1996).” 

“Your brothers in the land of the two holy mosques and Palestine seek your help and ask 

you to participate with them in their jihad against their enemies and yours, the Israelis 

and the Americans, with everything that would drive them out of the Islamic holy places, 

defeated, with each of you doing what he can (Usama bin Laden, Declaration of Jihad 

Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, August 23, 

1996).” 

31
“We declared jihad against the US government, because the US government is unjust, 

criminal and tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous and 

criminal whether directly or through its support of the Israeli occupation (CNN interview 

with Osama bin Laden, March 1997).” 

“For this and other acts of aggression and injustice, we have declared jihad against the 

US, because in our religion it is our duty to make jihad so that God's word is the one 

exalted to the heights and so that we drive the Americans away from all Muslim countries 

(CNN interview with Osama bin Laden, March 1997).” 

“For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the 

holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, 

humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into 

a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples (Usama bin Laden, 

February 22, 1998).” 

“All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on 

God, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic history 

unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy destroys the Muslim 

countries (Usama bin Laden, Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, February 1998).” 

“On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all 

Muslims: the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an 

individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to 

do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their 

grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and 

unable to threaten any Muslim (Usama bin Laden, Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, 

February 1998).” 

“Hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be rewarded for it by God. 

To call us Enemy No. 1 or 2 does not hurt us. Osama bin Laden is confident that the 

Islamic nation will carry out its duty. I am confident that Muslims will be able to end the 

legend of the so-called superpower that is America (Time interview, December 23, 

1998).” 

“As for the United States, I tell it and its people these few words: I swear by Almighty 

God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United States nor he who 

lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine 

and before all the infidel armies leave the land of Muhammad, may God’s peace and 

32
blessing be upon him (Usama bin Laden, Speech following September 11, 2001 terrorist 

attacks, Al-Jazirah TV).” 

“Our message to our enemies is this: America and its allies should know that their crimes 

will not go unpunished, God willing. We advise them to hasten to leave Palestine, the 

Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan, and all Muslim countries, before they lose everything. 

We addressed some messages to America’s allies to stop their involvement in its crusader 

campaign. The mujahid youths have addressed a message to Germany and another to 

France. If the measures have not been sufficient, we are ready, with the help of God, to 

increase them. As for America, it should expect to be reciprocated for its actions and for 

the Jews’ use of American weapons to destroy Palestinian homes with the residents 

inside. It should expect to be reciprocated for the Jews’ killing of Muhammad al-Durrah 

and his peers with American weapons. Then, the American people will curse Bush and 

his Administration, while they are alive and after their death, for the grave scores that 

will be settled. God willing, we will continue to target the key sectors of the U.S. 

economy (Ayman al-Zawahiri, October 8, 2002).” 

“America and its allies have become aware of this reality and the earth has trembled 

under them. And they now know that the winds of jihad will wobble their thrones and 

shake their structures. They, therefore, have gathered themselves and formed a union to 

face the coming enemy: it is Islam under the true jihad banner . . . Now that jihad has 

raised its flag, and the arms of Islam’s heroes in Iraq have gotten more powerful, the 

hearts of the Islamic nation are beating with joy, awaiting a hopefully better morning, 

which will take away the long and heavy darkness of the humiliation, by the Jews, the 

Crusaders and their agents from our renegade leaders (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, October 

28, 2004).” 

“This is in addition to our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of 

attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the Mujahideen, bled Russia 

for ten years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat . . . So we are 

continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy (Usama bin Laden, 

November 1, 2004).” 

“You tried to deny us the decent life, but you cannot deny us a decent death. Refraining 

from performing jihad, which is sanctioned by our religion, is an appalling sin. The best 

way of death for us is under the shadows of swords. Do not be deluded by your power 

and modern weapons. Although they win some battles, they lose the war. Patience and 

steadfastness are better than them. What is important is the outcome. We had patiently 

fought the Soviet Union for 10 years with our few weapons and we managed to drain 

their economy. Thus, they became a history, with God’s help. You should learn lessons 

from that. We will remain patient in fighting you, God willing, until the one whose time 

33
has come dies first. We will not escape the fight as long as we hold our weapons in our 

hands (Usama bin Laden, January 2006).” 

“Look at what the mujahidin did for the Russians in Afghanistan and then in Chechnya. 

Look at what the mujahidin are doing for the Jews in Palestine. Look at what the 

mujahidin did to the Americans in Somalia and what the mujahidin are doing to them in 

Iraq and Afghanistan today. Look at what your 19 brothers did to America—which 

claimed that it can hear the crawling of ants, see what is inside the earth, and monitor its 

enemies day and night—in both the New York and Washington “raids”. Nineteen 

honest men exposed America’s incompetence and weakness (Ayman al-Zawahiri, 

December 2005).” 

 “I would like to tell you that the war is for you or for us to win. If we win it, it means 

your defeat and disgrace forever as the wind blows in this direction with God's help. If 

you win it, you should read the history. We are a nation that does not tolerate injustice 

and seek revenge forever. Days and nights will not go by until we take revenge as we did 

on 11 September, God willing, and until your minds are exhausted and your lives become 

miserable (Usama bin Laden, January 19, 2006).” 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

34

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF PETE HOEKSTRA, CHAIRMAN

 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been a 

nation at war. Our enemy is not a nation, but a political movement that remains 

determined to destroy our country and kill as many Americans as possible. Followers of 

Usama bin Laden do not wear uniforms, and seek to remain as inconspicuous as possible 

until they strike. And, despite suggestion to the contrary, our enemy is in many ways a 

highly sophisticated adversary that utilizes technology and understands our legal system. 

 Some months ago I began to observe what I felt to be an alarming trend in the 

media reporting on the Global War on Terrorism. Journalists and former political 

officials have begun in increasing numbers to suggest that our nation is not truly at war 

with terrorism, and that terrorism should more properly be considered a law enforcement 

matter. Given the absolute commitment of al Qaeda and its affiliates to launch new 

attacks on America, I find this view to be disturbing, dangerous, and fundamentally 

incorrect. The fact that the United States has not been successfully attacked since 9/11 

does not mean that Usama bin Laden and his followers have surrendered. Quite the 

opposite, the failure of follow-on attacks reflects our success in a very aggressive war 

against terrorism. Our nation is blessed with outstanding military and intelligence 

personnel who, empowered with expanded authorities, have taken the battle to the 

enemy. We have successfully disrupted much of al Qaeda’s support structure and 

eliminated many of their key figures. Despite our successes in the Global War on 

Terrorism, the enemy remains quite capable of launching additional attacks on the 

homeland. It is worth repeating -- we remain a nation at war. 

 How then, can the Committee best convey this concern? Preparing an 

unclassified document that highlights the continuing terrorist threat requires a delicate 

balancing act. While the attached report is based on unclassified sources, the data 

collected by the various elements of the Intelligence Community support its findings. As 

stipulated by the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee is routinely 

apprised of many possible threats to the United States. From entities such as the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) we 

receive information regarding the plans and actions of terrorists. But to reveal these 

threats would be to disclose classified information, and could provide our enemy with 

valuable insights into our collection capabilities. The Intelligence Community already 

has sufficient problems with the unauthorized leaking of classified information, and the 

Committee has no wish to compromise sources and methods of intelligence collection. 

 As a result, the staff drew upon information that has previously been made public 

by the Executive branch, and is corroborated by information that we have received in the 

normal course of our oversight activity. For example, the report draws heavily upon 

information released in the public hearings of the Director of National Intelligence, as 
well as the annual unclassified worldwide threat testimony of former DCIA Goss and 

DCI Tenet. The National Counterterrorism Center has also released important and useful 

information, including key strategic details such as the captured letter from Ayman AlZawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For information related to domestic terrorist threats, 

the report utilizes the annual testimony of Director Mueller and other senior FBI 

personnel. The Department of Justice also has released important information regarding 

cases that they are prosecuting. The Committee also drew upon the Department of State 

publications such as the annual Patterns of Global Terrorism as well as speeches by 

senior officials from the Departments of State and Treasury. Where appropriate, the 

report cites official reports compiled by key allied partners. 

 The Committee conducts regular closed-session intelligence updates, at least on a 

bi-monthly basis, where Members are briefed by NCTC and CTC on the latest 

information related to the terrorist enemy. The Committee receives annual classified 

testimony on the worldwide threat, a responsibility that Director Negroponte has now 

assumed. As was the practice with his predecessors, DCIA Hayden continues to 

regularly brief the Committee on terrorist activity. In addition, we receive similar 

briefings on domestic terrorist threats and radicalization within the U.S. prison system 

from Federal law enforcement officials. The Committee has conducted closed-door 

hearings on the changing nature of the terrorist threat and the presence of domestic 

terrorism. The Committee also receives daily intelligence reporting, including detailed 

reporting on terrorist and counterterrorist activity. We receive lengthier intelligence 

products on specific aspects of the threat, as well analyses prepared by the National 

Intelligence Council. And, in a break with past tradition, the Committee has held several 

public hearings in the 109th Congress, including hearings on the Jihadist use of the 

Internet for strategic communications, and hearings on global threats to U.S. interests in 

the 21st Century. 

 It should also be recognized that Members and staff of the Permanent Select 

Committee on Intelligence have the privilege to travel to frontline locations in the Global 

War on Terrorism, where we meet with those exceptional military and intelligence 

officers whose task it is to ensure American security. Each Member of the Committee 

has traveled to hazardous locations and discussed various aspects of the counterterrorism 

mission. We meet with key liaison partners to solicit the views of our allies and to 

convey messages that support the Executive branch. All of this activity feeds our general 

understanding of the terrorist threat.

 In preparing this report, staff met with various elements of the Intelligence 

Community, and coordinated closely with the NCTC. Meetings were held to elicit the 

views of outside experts at the RAND Cooperation and other organizations. In a number 

of instances, the report cites press reports of on the record briefings provided by senior 

government officials. For example, the White House briefed the press on ten terrorist 

events that had been interdicted prior to execution – events the Committee know to be 

accurate. 
 Every effort was made to ensure that the report was a bipartisan product. 

Regardless of party affiliation, interested staff with appropriate security clearances were 

invited to participate in briefings, visits, and inquiries. Drafts were circulated to staff at 

various stages, and Members were provided with two weeks to review and comment 

upon the document. Minority staff provided valuable input in the drafting phase, and 

Minority Members offered specific guidance that was incorporated into the report. I 

thank those who offered their constructive observations, and would like to recognize the 

efforts of professional staff member Jacob Abel, whose initial effort served as the basis 

for the report. 

 Questions have been raised as to why the Committee should be releasing an 

unclassified report on a matter upon which we all agree. The reason is quite simple – 

because a significant portion of the American public seems to have forgotten that the 

threat remains. We, as a nation, will be at greater risk if the utter sincerity of our enemy 

is forgotten. 

Pete Hoekstra 

Chairman 

MINORITY VIEWS 

on 

“Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamic Extremist Threat” 

issued by 

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

This paper is not a report of the Committee’s work. It is merely an assemblage of press 

clippings. It is a product of staff, not a bipartisan work product of the full Committee. It 

does not represent effective congressional oversight. 

One of the most critical roles of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is 

to conduct oversight. In overseeing the Intelligence Community (IC), the Committee 

ensures that intelligence agencies have effective strategies, produce results, operate within 

the law, and make efficient use of the resources at their disposal. 

It is clear that al-Qaeda and Islamic extremists pose a serious threat to U.S. national 

security. The American people do not need the House Intelligence Committee to remind 

them of this fact. But this “threat assessment” adds no new information to the nation’s 

understanding of the challenges or to the U.S. government’s ability to address them. 

A valuable, bipartisan oversight report would be based on hearings and briefings that 

address the threat of Islamic extremism and the capabilities employed by the IC to counter 

that threat. The Committee could then have issued a report of findings and 

recommendations that the Director of National Intelligence could use as a road map to 

improve the Community’s performance. 

To better understand the Islamic extremist threat and the Intelligence Community’s 

collection, analysis, and operational response to that threat, the Committee should 

evaluate: 

I. The Intelligence Community’s efforts to track and disrupt terrorist finance. The 

Committee must hold hearings on the Administration’s terrorist financing 

programs to assess whether the programs are legal, effective in thwarting alQaeda and other terrorists, and adequately protective of innocent citizens’ 

privacy rights. 

II. The implementation of the NCTC National Strategy to Combat Terrorist 

Travel. The Committee should assess the execution of directives designed to 

constrain and detect terrorists’ mobility, including hindering travel facilitators, 

building capacity of partner countries, and improving information-sharing. 

III. IC efforts to identify and undermine “homegrown” terrorists. The Community 

works to identify “homegrown” terrorists who can operate under the radar in 

their home countries, including the United States. The Committee should 

assess the effectiveness of these initiatives, focusing on the collection and 

analysis of information and on collaboration across the U.S. government and 

with foreign partners. 
IV. The value of the President’s Domestic Surveillance Program. The Committee 

has exercised too little oversight of this program to date. While the legality of 

the program is itself a matter for debate, other issues also merit aggressive 

congressional oversight: Has the program produced results? Are the private 

communications of innocent Americans adequately protected? 

V. Intelligence support to counterterrorism initiatives. The Committee should 

assess the Intelligence Community’s support to counterterrorism analysis and 

operations and offer the IC recommendations for improvement. 

VI. The impact of intelligence reforms. The Committee must continue to evaluate 

the stand-up of the DNI to ensure that reforms enhance, rather than complicate, 

the management of the Intelligence Community as it pertains to 

counterterrorism. 

To date, the Committee’s examination of these issues has not been adequate. We urge the 

Majority to embark upon a serious oversight effort. We are eager to join an effort to 

produce a public report which accurately and seriously reflects the bipartisan conclusions 

we reach. 
 

Jane Harman Alcee L. Hastings 

Ranking Democrat 

 

Silvestre Reyes Leonard L. Boswell 

 

Robert E. (Bud) Cramer Anna G. Eshoo 

 

Rush D. Holt C.A. (Dutch) Ruppersberger 

John F. Tierney 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE HASTINGS

Though I was present for the debate on this report, I was away from the hearing room on 

Rules Committee business when the vote was taken to adopt the report. Had I been 

present for the Committee vote, I would have voted “no.” 

Alcee L. Hastings 

Member of Congress 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE ESHOO

June 29, 2006 

This paper tells us nothing new. It reminds the American public that terrorists and 

religious extremists are a threat. The paper offers no constructive recommendations or 

solutions, nor is it a tool for the Intelligence Community. 

Furthermore, as my Minority colleagues have asserted, this paper does not reflect the 

Committee’s work. We are not intelligence analysts. Our job is not to produce threat 

assessments for the American public, as we cannot be experts on all subjects. Our job is 

to legislate and conduct oversight. 

Committee Members and staff have traveled to all corners of the globe and met with 

representatives of every American intelligence agency to ensure that the U.S. intelligence 

apparatus functions effectively. Yet the Majority’s paper fails to incorporate information 

about the Intelligence Community’s capabilities that the Committee has learned in the 

course of its oversight efforts. For example: 

• The paper asserts that counterterrorism initiatives and improved U.S. border 

security have made it more difficult for al-Qaeda to attack the United States. To 

some extent, this may be true. But no lessons from the Committee’s oversight of 

Intelligence Community counterterrorism capabilities are reflected in the paper. 

• The paper notes in passing that prison extremism represents a security threat. 

Committee Members and staff have held several hearings and briefings with the 

FBI, Bureau of Prisons, and other agencies on the threat of prison inmates who 

become radicalized while incarcerated. Yet the paper addresses none of the issues 

examined by the Committee. 

• Simply repeating Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s rhetoric provides no insight into the 

United States’ ability to address the insurgency in Iraq. The Committee has been 

repeatedly briefed on terrorist and insurgent activities in Iraq, yet this paper 

incorporates none of the Intelligence Community’s insights about the strength, 

composition, and financing of the insurgency; the selection of Zarqawi’s 

successor; the disputes between Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; 

and the extent to which U.S. policy failures and missteps – such as the decision to 

suspend the Geneva Conventions, the policy of endless detention at Guantánamo 

Bay, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib – have contributed to the success 

of insurgents’ recruiting and propaganda. 

On a positive note, I am pleased the meeting at which the Committee considered this 

report was held in open session. However, the meeting was noticed as a closed session, 

precluding the public from attending. Measures to improve the transparency of the 

Committee’s business are welcome, but they should not stop halfway. 

Anna Eshoo 

Member of Congress 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE RUPPERSBERGER

June 29, 2006 

I concur with the Minority Views submitted by my colleagues. 

I would like to emphasize that the best way for this Committee to exercise its oversight 

responsibilities would be for both Majority and Minority Members to agree on a plan of 

action, convene a series of hearings and briefings, and issue a joint, bipartisan report that 

thoroughly analyzes the threat and offers concrete recommendations to the Intelligence 

Community. 

This report, while interesting, is not the product of a thoughtful, bipartisan, collaborative 

effort. 

C.A. (Dutch) Ruppersberger 

Member of Congress 
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE TIERNEY

June 29, 2006 

I agree with the views expressed by my Minority colleagues, but I wish to add the 

following additional thoughts. 

First, the Majority made very clear to the Committee that its purpose in drafting this 

report is to remind the American public that Islamic extremists and terrorists continue to 

pose a threat to our security. But to repeat platitudes that “the United States must remain 

vigilant” or that “we remain a nation at war” is to oversimplify the issue. The Majority 

makes it appear as if the Committee is panicked that the United States will be overcome 

by a global wave of Islamic extremism, that Iraq will become a terrorist safe haven, or 

that Osama bin Laden is on the verge of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The real 

threat is indeed significant but it is our charge to lead a rational, realistic response – not to 

lead into panic. 

Second, the paper offers far too many conclusions based on an unsophisticated analysis 

of the facts; in some cases, information presented is simply incorrect. In the section on 

“The Growing Insurgency in Iraq,” for example, the majority demonstrates a shallow 

understanding of the relationship between Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 

• The Majority states that while Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi “shared 

a similar ideology,” they had “some differences.” In fact, they had major differences. 

Bin Laden focused on the “far enemy” (the United States), while Zarqawi’s attention 

was fixed on the “near enemy” (infidels in Iraq and those who collaborated with the 

U.S.-installed government). Bin Laden also objected to Zarqawi’s targeting of 

Shi’ites, and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, strongly criticized Zarqawi’s gruesome 

beheadings of Westerners. 

• The Majority presents Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as fast partners. 

Yet bin Laden only jumped on the bandwagon in Iraq when he realized that Zarqawi 

was having a direct, violent impact on the United States for which he would not 

receive credit. 

The same section exhibits an incomplete and unimaginative analysis of the insurgency in 

Iraq. 

• The Majority describes the threat posed by battle-hardened foreign jihadis who gain 

combat experience in Iraq, but it fails to note that foreign fighters represent a small 

percentage of the insurgents fighting Coalition forces in Iraq. Furthermore, while 

these foreign fighters might use their training to fight against the United States, as the 

paper asserts, they are more likely to turn their vitriol against regional governments 

which they view as insufficiently Islamic. 

• The Majority proposes that extremists could prevent the emergence of a successful 

democratic government in Iraq and turn the country into “a permanent base for alQaeda to recruit, train, and conduct operations.” But not all Members of the 

Committee are such Cassandras. Ordinary Iraqis may eventually tire of the chaos 

caused by Islamists and foreign fighters and turn against them, as has already 
happened in parts of western Iraq. The ultimate end state may lie somewhere in 

between these two outcomes, yet the paper fails even to consider the more optimistic 

scenarios. 

Finally, the paper demonstrates that the Majority’s views of the terrorist threat is out of 

touch with the perspective of mainstream national security experts. The Majority asserts 

in its paper, for example, that the reorganization of the Intelligence Community has 

“without question” made the nation more secure; yet in a recent survey (dubbed “the 

Terrorism Index) published by Foreign Policy magazine, more than half of 100 highly 

respected national security experts said that “creating the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence has had no positive impact in the war against terror.” Perhaps the 

Committee should consult some of these leading experts to develop a more realistic 

assessment. 

In the course of our oversight work, this Committee has developed a sophisticated 

appreciation of the nature of the Islamic extremist threat and the Intelligence 

Community’s considerable abilities to address it; neither are effectively characterized in 

this report. 

John Tierney 

Member of Congress