U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

65–497PDF 2011

THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS:

CRUSHING HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME?

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 1, 2011

Serial No. 112–56

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

KAREN BASS, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Daniel A. Russell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Russia, Ukraine, 

Moldova, and Belarus, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. 

Department of State ............................................................................................ 9

Mr. David Kramer, executive director, Freedom House ....................................... 23

Mr. Matt Rojansky, deputy director, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace ................................................................... 37

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 6

Mr. Daniel A. Russell: Prepared statement ........................................................... 12

Mr. David Kramer: Prepared statement ................................................................ 27

Mr. Matt Rojansky: Prepared statement ............................................................... 39

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Missouri: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 60

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Material submitted for the record ................................... 61

(1)

THE GOVERNMENT OF BELARUS: CRUSHING 

HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME? 

FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EURASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:50 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

[chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and 

Human Rights] presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittees will come to order. And good 

afternoon and welcome to this joint hearing of the Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights Subcommittee and the Europe and Eurasia Subcommittee, which will explore the recent mockery of an 

election and a crackdown on democracy activists by the Lukashenka dictatorship in Belarus. 

We will also seek to answer questions about how we can most 

constructively hold the Lukashenka dictatorship accountable for its 

crimes and best assist the Belarusian people in their struggle for 

freedom, human rights and democracy. 

After the Presidential election of December 19, 2010, thousands 

of Belarusians peacefully protested the massive electoral fraud. 

The Lukashenka dictatorship sicced its security forces on the 

crowds, indiscriminately clubbing demonstrators, and detained over 

700 people. 

In a manner reminiscent of the late Soviet era, the dictatorship 

has focused its ongoing crackdown on the democratic political opposition, independent media and civil society. The dictator’s brutal 

campaign has been marked by the abuse of those jailed, by unfair 

trials and harsh sentences up to 4 years so far and by harassment 

and intimidation by the KGB, including interrogations, raids and 

other forms of pressure on families of opposition leaders, their lawyers, journalists and democratic activists. 

Recently I have had meetings with relatives and friends of the 

imprisoned Presidential candidates. They have told me heartbreaking stories about the mistreatment of their loved ones. And 

one of those who remains imprisoned is my personal friend, 

Anatoly Lebedko, a courageous and long-time leader of the democratic opposition. 

We have to keep in mind that the post-election crackdown is not 

over. In the last few days alone, a correspondent for Poland’s largVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:51 Oct 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\040111\65497 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

est daily newspaper was charged with ‘‘insulting the President,’’ a 

crime in Belarus. And the Belarusian KGB interrogated another 

journalist as well. On Tuesday, the dictatorship’s courts sentenced 

a democratic activist to 31⁄2 years of imprisonment for taking part 

in the December 19th protest. His was the eighth in a series of 

show trials. 

Just yesterday, the Belarusian Government forced the closure of 

the Minsk office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe despite many OSCE efforts to keep it open. 

As part of a Helsinki Commission visit to Minsk in June 2009, 

I had the opportunity, along with my colleagues, to press 

Lukashenka directly on his dismal human rights record and denial 

of fundamental freedoms. While making clear our support for 

Belarus’ independence, the delegation reiterated the longstanding 

message that the only way to improve relations between our two 

countries was and is for him to take steps to increase political freedom and respect human rights. We told Lukashenka that the ball 

was in his court. There were even small, tentative steps taken at 

that time in the right direction. But since December 19th, any 

hopes for change have been squashed. 

Aleksandr Lukashenka continues to turn a deaf ear to all criticism of his government. At a press conference after the election, 

Lukashenka said that Belarus will have no more ‘‘mindless democracy,’’ clearly manifesting his sneering contempt for the Belarusian 

people, many of whose lives have been ruined and whose country 

he stole 16 years ago, transforming it into a grotesque anomaly, 

what is often called Europe’s last dictatorship. 

The United States and the EU have responded to the electoral 

fraud, violence and repression with strong condemnations, including from our President, and some additional punitive measures, at 

least for now. I would encourage both, especially the EU, to look 

for additional ways to hold Lukashenka to account. The scale of the 

post-election violence and the severity of the crackdown have far 

exceeded anything Lukashenka has done in the past. For the time 

being, the U.S. and the EU are not tempted to placate Lukashenka 

or to try to change his rule by rewarding him. 

This is one reason why we need legislation to address the human 

rights tragedy and other issues created by the Lukashenka dictatorship: To ensure steady focus and policy consistency. This will require continued and even strengthened economic and travel sanctions against the dictatorship and its senior leaders and security 

forces. All this until Lukashenka releases political prisoners and 

dramatically improves his government’s human rights record. This 

is exactly what the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 

2011, H.R. 515, which I introduced in January along with my good 

friend and colleague from Indiana, provides. Most of these issues 

were also successfully addressed in the Belarus Democracy Acts of 

2004 and of 2006, both of which I authored and which were signed 

into law. 

The Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 brought the U.S. into the 

struggle for freedom in Belarus decisively on the side of the 

Belarusian people, who wish to live in a country where human 

rights are respected, democracy flourishes, and the rule of law is 

the norm. I remain convinced that the time will soon come when 

3

Belarus will be integrated with the family of democratic nations. 

We must continue to stand at their side as they continue to work 

their way out from under the oppressive yoke of Aleksandr 

Lukashenka. I would like to yield to my good friend and colleague, 

Mr. Payne, for any opening comments he might have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me 

also commend you for your longstanding leadership on this issue. 

I know that this is an important priority for you, especially in your 

role as co-chair of the Helsinki Commission, along with my good 

friend, Alcee Hastings, of Florida. Your leadership on this issue is 

exemplified, as you just mentioned, in your sponsorship of the 

original Belarus Democracy Act of 2004, which garnered significant 

bipartisan support from our late chairman, Tom Lantos, Minority 

Whip Hoyer and Mr. Hastings of Florida. I know that bill is up for 

reauthorization this year. And given the troubling developments in 

the wake of the December 2010 elections, this is a good time to 

highlight those issues. 

As you know, this year, I have been particularly focused on elections and the democratic process, particularly in Africa, North Africa, Central Africa, the whole thrust of democracy is burning in that 

continent. And it is also very important that President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton have asserted time and time again that the 

United States must support the democratic aspirations of all people. It is troubling to me that like Cote d’Ivoire, a strong willed 

leader has chosen to suppress the will of the electorate and refuses 

to leave the office that he was recently defeated in. 

During Aleksandr Lukashenka’s 16 years as President of 

Belarus, the government has tightened control over civil society. A 

recent softening of Belarus’s foreign relations has let some activists 

inside the country, as well as foreign policy makers, to hope for a 

more reasonable regime. But as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 

International, and others have reported, such expectations were 

dashed on December 19, 2010, the night of Belarus’ Presidential 

elections, when as many as 30,000 people took to the streets of the 

capital of Minsk to peacefully protest what they feared would be 

yet another stolen election. 

When Lukashenka’s victory of 79.7 percent was declared, a few 

dozen mass people started breaking windows in the main government building which overlooks independence square. Things took 

an even more drastic turn when police and security forces rushed 

in and beat up everyone within reach. Most of them peaceful demonstrators, even going as far as to kick those who fell, chasing 

those and grabbing people, including innocent bystanders in adjacent streets. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers determined the election, despite fairer campaigning practices than in previous elections, has failed to meet 

OSCE standards. 

In the wake of the December 19th post-election protests, 

Belarusian civil society activists and independent media face new 

government harassments and threats. Amnesty International has 

reported that Lukashenka is responsible for several political disappearances. And just last month, the Human Rights Watch issued 

a 31-page report documenting human rights violations that ocVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:51 Oct 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\040111\65497 HFA PsN: SHIRL
4

curred on election night and in the wake of the election through 

February of this year. 

Again, the parallels to Cote d’Ivoire are remarkable. It is amazing what Lukashenka’s regime has done to the people of Belarus 

in just a few short months. The HRW report refers to incidents of 

persecution of opposition candidates and activists, abuse of detainees, trials behind closed doors and raids on human rights organizations. The report further details allegations of extremely poor conditions in detention, denial of access to defense counsel and government pressure on lawyers representing those facing criminal 

charges related to post-election protests. 

The international community has recognized Belarus’ measures 

as intentionally silencing the legitimate citizens’ grievances. Financial and travel sanctions against ruling officials have been leveled 

by the European Union and the United States in an attempt to 

force the Belarusian Government to cease its abuse of human 

rights violations. 

It is clear that Lukashenka and his regime must focus on restoring the human rights guaranteed by Belarus’ own Constitution, as 

well as international law. 

Chairman Smith, Burton and Ranking Member Meeks, I appreciate this important hearing and hope that our Africa Subcommittee will also hold a hearing on the deplorable same type of 

rapidly deteriorating human rights conditions there as it is beginning to be in the midst of a civil war. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I commend you for your continued 

persistence on this area of human rights. And I commend you for 

it. 

One last item I would like to ask to be placed in the record. 

Belarus—it is called, ‘‘Shattering Hopes, Post Election Crackdown 

in Belarus,’’ by Human Rights Watch. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

And thank you for your eloquent statement. I would like to now 

yield to my good friend and colleague, Mr. Burton, the chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia. 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Chairman Smith. 

I appreciate having this joint hearing with you, and I appreciate 

our witnesses being here today. We look forward to hearing your 

testimony. I am not going to make a long statement but there are 

a few things I would like to say. I think my colleagues have covered a great deal of this already. So I will submit much of my 

statement for the record. 

One other thing that bothers me in addition to what they are 

doing to their own people, is what they are doing in other areas. 

It appears as though this despot is also helping other criminal regimes. He has worked with Iran and has economic ties with him 

in violation of international sanctions, and our President announced this week penalties against Belarus for its business with 

Tehran. And this is a good start by President Obama, but I would 

like to see more action taken against this dictator and his regime. 

Finally, we are to meet shortly with the State Department officials in a closed hearing to hear whether the Belarusian regime is 

providing terrorists with arms and munitions in violations of international agreements. We have reports of Belarusian attack heliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:51 Oct 04, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\040111\65497 HFA PsN: SHIRL
5

copters and heavy weapons being sent to the Ivory Coast to suppress democratic opposition. I just met with the Ivory Coast’s Ambassador the other day and what he told me was extraordinary 

about the number of people being killed by a person who was defeated in the last election but will not relinquish power. And so we 

have got a severe problem there as well, and he is just adding to 

the problem by sending weapons and helicopters to them. 

Of course, these allegations have been retracted by the U.N. But 

they follow a disturbing pattern of aiding criminal regimes. Most 

recently, we have heard the much publicized United Nations accusation that Belarus was sending arms and munitions to Libya to 

supply the armies of Ghadafi, also in violation of international 

agreements. The Belarusian regime is the last remnant of the old 

Iron Curtain and Lukashenka is a thug who I would like to see go. 

I think all of us would. 

I am eager to hear how this administration is working to make 

this happen and to help provide freedom and democracy to the people of Belarus, and I want to thank our witnesses today for being 

here to testify and I want to thank the Department of State for 

their help and willingness to provide a witness and briefer for today’s topic, especially the work of the State’s legislative affairs 

team. 

And finally, I want to thank the staff of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen 

for their help in arranging today’s hearing and briefing, especially 

Mark Gage, the deputy staff director of the Foreign Affairs Committee, who I understand is going to retire today after three decades. 

Mark has done a great job, and I will tell you how difficult it is 

around here. When I first met him, he had a real bushy head of 

hair, and you can see what this kind of a job does to you. 

But anyway, Mark, thank you very much for everything you have 

done. Thanks for your help in solving the problems we had the 

other day. 

With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. And I 

want to yield to my good friend, Mr. Meeks, the ranking Democrat—he should be a Republican—the ranking Democrat. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burton follows:]

6


65497d-1.eps
7

Mr. MEEKS. Don’t make that mistake. 

Thank you, Chairman Burton and Chairman Smith, for conducting or bringing this hearing up today. A very, very important 

hearing. 

Let me first say, laba diena, to my good friend, to Mr. Zingeris. 

And thank you for addressing this body today. And I am grateful 

for the opportunity to meet you. And I look forward to working 

with you together on transatlantic interparliamentary affairs. And 

I truly appreciate the Lithuanian Parliament’s leadership in trying 

to support and bring change in Belarus. So it was great hearing 

from you this afternoon. 


65497d-2.eps
8

And you have heard from my colleagues already that there had 

been at the beginning some thought, maybe some hope that something would change in Belarus, until December 19th. And so we 

can just sum it up like this: Lukashenka is a bad actor and Belarus 

under his leadership is a dangerous place for someone who embraces democratic principles or republican principles for that matter. 

I expect that we will hear from Mr. Russell about Lukashenka’s 

autocratic, repressive regime, his tight control of the economy, his 

unyielding grip on social order and stranglehold on dissent. I expect Mr. Russell and my colleagues will say or recount how 

Lukashenka runs roughshod over democratic ideas and expressions, including civil and human rights to free speech and assembly, free and fair elections, independent judiciary and the rule of 

law. 

He has been called and remains Europe’s last dictator, holding 

this dubious distinction for nearly a generation. What I hope to understand better after today’s discussion is what we are doing about 

this situation, both to help Lukashenka’s victims and to change the 

situation. It is clear to me that the situation must change and 

equally clear that the United States has a role in seeing that it 

does. Not only do we care as humanitarians about what happens 

in Belarus, we care from a global security standpoint. 

Anticipating some of your remarks, I want to emphasize my support for the multilateral approach that the administration has 

adopted. After all, what is going on in Belarus, is not just a problem for the United States; it is a problem for the community of democracies. But it is definitely our concern, too. 

While Belarus is in Western Europe’s backyard, the neighborhood is shrinking. Our response to December’s stolen election 

seems to have been well coordinated with the European Union and 

through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 

with a broader community as well. Our joint statements, joint demands for the release of political prisoners, joint insistence on respect for human rights and joint condemnation of Belarus’ decision 

to close the OSCE mission were on target. 

I am concerned nevertheless about the effectiveness of our efforts. In the face of our diplomatic efforts, sanctions and assistance 

just this week, a Belarusian court sentenced one of the protesters, 

a 20-year-old, to 21⁄2 years in prison. Several candidates who ran 

against Lukashenka remain in jail, and others have been sentenced 

to prison terms, and dozens of protesters and organizers remain political prisoners. It continues to astonish me that this can happen 

in Europe in 2011. 

So I hope to hear thoughts on Belarus’ future. I particularly 

would like to hear about springtime in Belarus. The parallel between the Governments of Libya and Belarus are extraordinary, 

with two notable exceptions. Lukashenka lacks Ghadafi’s control of 

abundant oil resources, and fortunately, Belarus has been our partner in nuclear nonproliferation efforts. I would like your assessment of the Belarusian opposition and general public’s willingness 

to endure the situation or the susceptibility to be swept up in the 

movement that has inspired young Arabs this spring. 

9

Finally, I want to commend your team on the ground, led by Mr. 

Michael Scanlan. They are working in a tough neighborhood, and 

we recognize how difficult the work of a handful of officers and 

local staff can be. And we thank you for all of the work and look 

forward to hearing your testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. Marino for 1 minute if you would like. 

And Mrs. Schmidt? 

Thank you. 

Now, it is my privilege to welcome Dan Russell. Mr. Russell is 

Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Europe and Eurasian 

Affairs, responsible for U.S. relations with Russia, Ukraine, 

Moldova, and Belarus and for international security and arms control issues in the Bureau of European and Eurasia Affairs. 

He has held many key State Department posts, including chief 

of staff to Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William 

Burns from 2008 to 2009; Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow, in 

Russia of course, from 2005 to 2008; and Deputy Chief of Mission 

in Kazakhstan from 2000 to 2003. Deputy Assistant Secretary Russell speaks fluent Russian, Spanish and French, but will be testifying in English today. 

Mr. Russell. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL A. RUSSELL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR RUSSIA, UKRAINE, MOLDOVA, AND 

BELARUS, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith, Chairman 

Burton, members of the committee, for inviting me today to discuss 

the situation in Belarus. 

We share all of the concerns that everyone has expressed about 

the government’s brutal crackdown in the aftermath of the flawed 

Presidential election. I think, simply put, the United States is pursuing a policy first to press the Government of Belarus to free its 

political prisoners and end the crackdown and, second, to support 

those inside Belarus seeking democracy. And we are doing this in 

concert with our European partners. 

Looking back to—my written statement has been submitted for 

the record, and maybe I will just summarize a few key points. And 

I think first, looking back to election day, to December 19th, in 

Belarus, it is fair to say the government did not conduct a transparent vote. The OSCE, which was able to provide a team to monitor the elections, concluded that the campaign period was characterized by an uneven playing field and a restrictive media environment. They reported a lack of independence, impartiality and 

transparency in the electoral process, and they characterized the 

vote count in over half of the precincts that they observed as bad 

or very bad. 

Now, nine Presidential candidates were allowed to run and to 

conduct limited campaign activities this time, which was an improvement from 2006, but you get the overall picture. Things 

looked pretty predictable during the day, but after the sun went 

down on December 19th, things changed. A large group, up to 

30,000 people as some of the members have pointed out, came out 

10

in downtown Minsk to protest against the official claim of Mr. 

Lukashenka’s landslide 80 percent victory. 

While we may never know all of the facts of what happened that 

night, one point is clear, the government’s reaction to this largely 

peaceful demonstration was brutal. Some 700 individuals were detained, including, amazingly, seven Presidential candidates. The 

beatings of demonstrators have clearly been documented. Most of 

the detainees were subject to 10 to 15 days in jail. But six Presidential candidates, along with 30 other activists, now face charges 

that could lead to lengthy prison sentences. Trials have begun in 

February. Eight demonstrators have been convicted. No one has 

been acquitted. 

The detainees are clearly being held on political grounds, and the 

United States considers them political prisoners. Our response to 

this situation was clear in the media. Secretary Clinton and the 

White House have issued multiple statements beginning hours 

after the crackdown, condemning the violence and calling for the 

unconditional and immediate release of all detainees. We have 

done this together with the European Union’s high representative, 

Cathy Ashton, echoing the same message. 

Unfortunately, the government not only moved to put the detainees on trial, it initiated a broader campaign to intimidate and 

weaken the political opposition and civil society. The offices and 

homes of activists and civil society representatives have been subject to police raids and searches. 

So, on January 31, we adopted the following steps against the 

government in Belarus and the individuals and entities we think 

have a role in this crackdown. First, we reimposed full sanctions 

against Belarus’ largest petroleum and chemical conglomerate. Second, we announced the expansion of the list of Belarus officials 

subject to a travel ban to the United States. And third, we announced that the United States is working to impose additional financial sanctions against additional individuals who contributed to 

the crackdown. And we welcomed the European Union’s concurrent 

decision to reimpose and expand their own travel restrictions and 

asset freeze. 

I want to make clear that this is one piece of our policy and our 

actions were not aimed at the people of Belarus. An integral part 

of our policy in the election aftermath has been to increase support 

for efforts to build a modern democratic society. On February 2nd, 

I took part in a donor’s conference in Warsaw that was organized 

by the Polish Government, and I had the privilege to announce an 

additional $4 million to support the—$4 million to support democracy related programs in Belarus. This funding is in addition to the 

$11 million we provided for programs in this area in 2010. And following the crackdown, the United States has also begun providing 

legal and humanitarian assistance to those facing repression. 

Unfortunately, the Government of Belarus has chosen not to engage the international community. As Chairman Smith mentioned, 

the latest development has been its refusal to extend the mandate 

of the OSCE office in Minsk which closed on March 31. We believe 

that is a step backwards. We will continue to call on Belarus to 

meet its OSCE commitments, and we are working with like-minded 

11

OSCE members to pursue an independent investigation into the 

events of December 19th and their aftermath. 

Just a comment on the backdrop to our policy: I think if the 

Obama administration’s response to the post-election crackdown 

should be viewed within the context of its decision to continue longstanding U.S. principled engagement with Belarus, engagement 

that is centered on advocacy for democracy and human rights, engagement that has enjoyed bipartisan support. We have made clear 

to senior Belarusian officials our bottom line that only progress on 

democracy and human rights lead to improvements in overall relations with the United States. 

Just a word on—yes and unfortunately, I mean, the government’s 

failure to respect the human rights of its people and not uphold 

OSCE commitments is not a new development in Belarus. In the 

aftermath of the flawed elections in 2006, the United States had 

imposed sanctions. 

And I might just mention a word on sanctions. While economic 

and commercial ties between the United States and Belarus are 

limited, the Government of Belarus has reacted to targeted sanctions. In 2008, following the decision to increase U.S. sanctions, the 

government released all of its political prisoners. And in response, 

the United States temporarily licensed U.S. persons to do business 

with two subsidiaries of this petroleum and chemical conglomerate. 

I also should take a brief opportunity here to commend Representative Smith and other Members of Congress who helped to 

secure the release of American citizen Emanuel Zeltser in 2009. 

Now, looking ahead, the recent actions of the Government of 

Belarus, to state the blindingly obvious, give us little cause for optimism in the near term. But at the same time, I think the aspirations of the people of Belarus for a brighter future do offer longterm hope. The country’s youth particularly want a freer and more 

democratic country that is clearly part of a modern Europe. And we 

want to help them realize their dreams for that future. 

And as we continue to calibrate our response to the policy of repression that we see unfolding in Minsk, I think the elements of 

our policy response are pretty clear: One, we are going to continue 

to implement targeted sanctions to press the Government of 

Belarus to change its course. Our goal remains the immediate and 

unconditional release of political prisoners, and in that regard, additional sanctions and a further expansion of the assets freeze and 

travel ban against Belarusian officials are among the options we 

should consider. Second, we are going to continue to expand support for those in Belarus seeking a more democratic modern country that respects the rights, democratic actors in Belarus represent 

the future of that country, and they deserve our support. And 

third, we are going to continue to act in concert with the European 

Union and our other European partners in providing support for 

the people of Belarus. The European Union is also considering the 

imposition of targeted economic sanctions against Belarus firms, 

and we hope that it will join us in this approach. 

Lastly, I want to say that we have no illusions that influencing 

a movement toward democracy and greater respect for human 

rights in Belarus will be easy or quick. But we believe the United 

States should encourage and support the people of Belarus’ desire 

12

for freedom and democracy. It is both in our national interests and 

it is the right thing to do. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]


65497a-1.eps
13


65497a-2.eps
14


65497a-3.eps
15


65497a-4.eps
16


65497a-5.eps
17


65497a-6.eps
18


65497a-7.eps
19

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Russell, thank you very much for your testimony but, more importantly, for the work you are doing to help 

the oppressed Belarusians, especially those that are in prison. 

Thankfully, this is a totally bipartisan effort, and you have great 

support here in the House and I know in the Senate on both sides 

of the aisle. So I do commend you personally and the Department 

for being so clear and unambiguous about our position on 

Lukashenka and the Belarus dissidents. 

Let me ask you—and I limit myself and I think we, because of 

time and votes, all of us, to 5 minutes, and I will be very brief. The 

new media law, if you could comment on that. We know that they 

borrowed handsomely from the Chinese Government, and they are 

experts on the use or misuse of the Internet to find, apprehend, 

and arrest those who are dissidents. The new media are not working well because they are trying to subvert them. 

What is Russia doing? Is Moscow being helpful? If you could 

speak also to what we could be doing further and especially what 

our allies and the European Union could be doing. Yesterday, I understand, there was a very contentious meeting at the OSCE and 

the Canadians took the lead with a very strong statement. Should 

the Moscow Mechanism be invoked? And finally, with regards to 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, have they cranked up further 

their efforts to get the message to the people of Belarus about what 

their dictator is doing to the best and the bravest and the finest 

in Belarus? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, thank you very much. 

On the new media law, obviously, we are concerned, as are you, 

about any attempts to restrict the Internet. And clearly, the registration provisions that are in this law are an attempt to do exactly that, although I must say personally I think it is a fool’s errand to try to restrict the Internet. It hasn’t really worked anywhere, and I don’t think it is necessarily going to stifle people with 

creativity in Belarus. But nonetheless, it is not a good step and not 

one we welcome. 

The role of Russia is a complicated question. After the crackdown, we saw the Russian Government join with others and the 

Council of Europe to call for the release of political prisoners. At 

the same time, Russia and Belarus have a longstanding economic 

relationship, which involves subsidies for Belarus, particularly in 

the energy sector. And we have seen the Prime Minister of Russia 

make a recent visit there. 

We are going to continue to work with Russia. I don’t think that 

anybody wants to let Mr. Lukashenka play a zero-sum game where 

he can play Russia off against the West because that is simply not 

going to work. In fact, I would argue that he is more isolated than 

he has ever been. It is not only the European Union and the 

United States. The Ukraine has issued a statement about the disproportionate use of force. And like I said, with the Russians, we 

have seen some concern about what is going on there as well. But 

clearly, this is going to be a work in progress. 

On the OSCE and the Moscow Mechanism, the United States is 

working to support the Moscow Mechanism. This is something I 

talked to our Ambassador to the OSCE today about this. And this 

is something we are going to push next week. Whether we succeed 

20

or fail, we are going to be committed to try to get our friends with 

us in the OSCE to support an independent investigation into the 

election and the aftermath. 

And finally, on broadcasting, we and several of our European allies have longstanding commitments to support broadcasting from 

outside into Belarus to try to help inform the Belarusian people 

and help them make informed decisions about their future. I was 

struck by polling results that showed that over half of Belarusians 

had never met anybody from the European Union and over 70 percent of them had never travelled to a European Union country. And 

I think that speaks volumes about why we and the Europeans both 

need to do more to try to bring them into the more modern world 

in which we all live. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Russell, because we have a vote and some 

of our members have commitments they have to keep, and the vote 

will make it so they are precluded from coming back. I thought we 

could ask all of our members to ask questions and, as best you can, 

start the answers, and then those of us who can come back will 

hear the remainder of those answers. 

Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. I will be very brief. 

Recently, in our committee, we have heard discussion about foreign assistance. Many of the new members have questions about 

that, and they talk about corruption that was discussed in a discussion on Africa. But I would like to also ask you a question about 

Transparency International focuses on corruption and ranks 

Belarus, which of course is in Europe, as 127th in corruption. So 

I would like to know, one, how do we assure that any aid funding 

does not inadvertently end up in the hands of corrupt officials? Secondly, do we have any indications that corrupt Belarusian officials 

abuse the U.S. financial system through money laundering and so 

forth? And just finally, what efforts can the U.S. undertake to help 

combat the corruption in Belarus? Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Chairman Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. My main concern—I mean, my colleagues on the 

Human Rights Subcommittee, they are covering their concerns very 

well. 

But I want to know what is going on as far as Belarus being a 

conduit for weapons going into other countries like Libya, the Ivory 

Coast and so forth. One of the big problems we have got right now 

is the whole northern tier of Africa is in flux. The Persian Gulf, the 

Middle East; it is all kind of up in the air, and we are very concerned that some of the more radical elements aren’t fomenting 

more revolution and more upheavals that could lead to severe problems for us. 

We get over 30 percent of our energy from that part of the world. 

And if there is a real conflagration that spreads throughout the region, we could have real problems. So, in a nutshell—I don’t want 

to hold everybody up—in a nutshell, if you could tell us, how extensive are the operations of Belarus and their government in getting 

weapons to these other countries? 

Mr. SMITH. Ranking Member Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, sir. 

21

My question will go in this regard: What should we be concerned 

or should we be concerned about plans for construction of a nuclear 

power plant in Belarus? And given the current state of Belarus’ 

economy, do we assume that this will be a Russian financed program? And is it also reasonable to assume that a new nuclear plant 

would supply other European countries? 

And finally, what impact if any should the U.S. response be to 

Lukashenka’s crackdown have on our cooperation with Belarus on 

nuclear issues? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thanks. 

First, Mr. Payne, on foreign assistance, we give no direct foreign 

assistance to the Government of Belarus. Most of our aid is in democracy programs, and in the $16 million we gave in 2010, $11 

million of that went to the nongovernmental sector and the rest of 

it went to programs working on issues such as trafficking in persons and tuberculosis, and it wasn’t funneled directly to the Government of Belarus but to organizations that we trust, like the 

World Health Organization. So this is one country where I can say 

we probably don’t have that concern. 

Transparency International, frankly, if they had more information on what is going on inside Belarus, I am not sure they would 

be as high as 127th on the corruption list. On the abuse of the U.S. 

financial system, we have had an assets freeze in place against 

some of—President Lukashenka and some of his top aides for several years now. I cannot verify this, but I suspect there is very little money from senior people at that level in the United States. 

On arms sales, this has been a longstanding concern of the 

United States. Belarus continues to rank somewhere between 25th 

and 20th in arms sales, and clearly, that is an issue we need to 

continue to follow. We have sanctioned individual entities in 

Belarus for arms transfers in the past, and we continue to have 

sanctions available to us should other information become available. And certainly, in the second part of this, we are going to discuss this subject in a little more detail. 

Mr. Meeks, on the nuclear power plant project, Belarus has had 

an interest in building a nuclear power plant for some time. The 

United States supports the right of countries to have civil nuclear 

power, but we have urged in Belarus that any power plant be constructed in a manner that meets international standards and 

meet—and be it operated in a way that meets international safeguards. And that is a bottom line for us. And clearly, Belarus also 

needs to take into account the concerns of its neighbors and to 

meet its commitments under various international conventions on 

this. 

On the supply to other countries, it depends, obviously, on the 

size of the power plant. There are now power plant projects talked 

about. There are four in Finland; one in Lithuania; others in Poland and the Czech Republic. I don’t have a crystal ball. I cannot 

tell you after the Japanese nuclear disaster how many of these are 

actually going to go or whether there will still be public support for 

them. But I think, obviously, these need to be done on some sort 

of commercial basis. 

What we want in Belarus and we have supported, we want to see 

a project that is done on a competitive basis and one that meets 

22

international standards. When Prime Minister Putin visited Minsk 

earlier this month, the Russians again signed some sort of deal on 

building a nuclear power plant in Belarus. The financing of that 

project is unclear at this point, and it is something we are going 

to continue to watch. 

Mr. SMITH. Just in the very few minutes remaining, Secretary 

Russell, let me just ask you, has the Human Rights Council or has 

our representative to the Human Rights Council raised the issue 

of Belarus? 

Secondly, I know we are not signatories—or we are signatories, 

but we have not ratified the ICC. But is there any sense that either 

the Europeans or with our support, a referral might be made to the 

prosecutor’s office for crimes committed by the Lukashenka regime? 

And thirdly, with regard to the political prisoners, had they been 

visited by the ICRC? Are there conditions that one might describe 

as degrading, inhumane and certainly torture? And if so, has the 

Convention Against Torture and the panel of experts initiated any 

kind of proceedings to hold Lukashenka to account under the torture convention? 

Mr. RUSSELL. I honestly don’t know whether we have raised this 

at the Human Rights Council in the current session. I will come 

back to you with an answer on that. 

Mr. SMITH. If not, if you could ask them to do so. Our representative. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes. We support this. We have raised this at every 

international forum that it has been appropriate. The ICC, I am 

not aware of any action that has been taken to refer this, and I 

am not a lawyer. I don’t know enough about the grounds for that. 

On ICRC access, the United States and the other key members 

of the ICRC have clearly asked the ICRC quietly to get involved. 

Obviously, they don’t report their findings, but I think you are 

right that it is important that they have access. The Convention 

Against Torture, one of the Presidential candidates who has now 

sought political asylum in the Czech Republic asserted that torture 

had taken place. So this is obviously an issue we need to look at. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I thank you very much for 

your testimony and your strong concern. The subcommittee will go 

into a brief recess. Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittees will resume their sitting. And I 

apologize deeply to our witnesses, but believe me, your testimonies 

will be disseminated, not just in the record but to all the members 

of both subcommittees and the full committee, because we do need 

to hear from you. 

We did have a second panel that was supposed to testify on the 

arms issues, arms transfer issues, and that had to become classified. So I do hope that both of our distinguished witnesses understand, and I apologize for the inconvenience. 

We will now hear from David Kramer who is executive director 

of Freedom House, one of Washington’s most respected voices on 

freedom and human rights issues. 

Mr. Kramer has a distinguished NGO, academic, and government career. In government, he has served as assistant secretary 

of state for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from March 2008 

23

to January 2009. In that capacity, in addition to everything else he 

has done, he also then sat on the Helsinki Commission. We greatly 

appreciated his insights and help with regards to that Commission. 

He was also Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and 

Eurasia Affairs, responsible for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and 

Belarus and was closely involved in formulating and implementing 

U.S. policy toward Belarus. 

Finally, we will hear from Matthew Rojansky, the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program for the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on U.S. and Russian national security and nuclear 

weapons policies, his work focuses on relations among the United 

States, NATO and the states of the former Soviet Union from 2007 

to 2010. He served as executive director of the Partnership for a 

Secure America, which sought to rebuild bipartisan dialogue on 

U.S. national security and foreign policy challenges. 

Secretary Kramer, please. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID KRAMER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. KRAMER. Hello, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. 

It is a pleasure again to appear before you. And thank you very 

much for doing this hearing. In fact, it is critically important that 

you and the subcommittees are holding a hearing on Belarus. 

Given that the world’s attention is understandably riveted on 

events in North Africa and the Middle East and yet we still have 

an enormous challenge in Europe itself, in Belarus and, as you 

have rightly described him, in Aleksandr Lukashenka as the last 

dictator in Europe. 

I also do want to acknowledge Dan Russell, Larry Silverman, 

and Mike Scanlan, his staff and Embassy Minsk, what is left of it, 

and Ian Kelly, who is the OSCE Ambassador in Vienna, for the 

work all of them have been doing to keep the focus on Belarus and 

U.S. policy. 

It has already been described at length the kind of situation we 

are dealing with in Belarus; where there are dozens of people still 

in jail held as political prisoners, where torture is common by 

Lukashenka and his KGB goons. I think it is very important to understand that this is a serious threat to the people of Belarus, to 

Europe, to the region as a whole and, in fact, globally. And it is 

a vital issue for the United States to stand firm and on principle 

in dealing with this challenge that we all face. 

Talk about Lukashenka sometimes gets carried away, Mr. Chairman, when people say he is this all powerful leader. Let us remember that there were credible polls that showed that on December 

19th of last year, he got less than 50 percent of the vote and was 

fearful that he would have to run in a second round of the election. 

What that suggests is that the majority of the people who turned 

out in that election voted against Aleksandr Lukashenka, and that 

means that his support is slipping and eroding. And I think that 

alone is something that scares him and forces him to lash out 

against the opposition so that he doesn’t risk losing total control. 

Let’s also remember that there were tens of thousands of people 

who turned out in downtown Minsk in Independence Square, in unprecedented numbers, that also suggest that many people in 

24

Belarus have had enough of Aleksandr Lukashenka and want to 

see a change. Those things I think are very noteworthy and something we should not overlook. 

What should we do about the situation? I would argue for a twoprong approach. The first is dealing with assistance, in standing 

with the people of Belarus and showing solidarity. It is critical that 

the U.S. and EU speak with one voice and that we make it clear 

that Aleksandr Lukashenka is the enemy here, he is the threat, 

and that we stand for freedom and democracy. They are the common cause in our goals in Belarus. 

Yesterday’s OSCE statement that was issued condemning 

Lukashenka’s refusal to allow the OSCE mission to remain open in 

Minsk was a good sign of international solidarity on this, and we 

need to see more indications of this. 

It is important for Europeans in particular to reduce the fees for 

visas, if not in fact waive the fees entirely, so that more 

Belarusians can travel and, if necessary, relocate to European 

countries. 

We need to expand exchange programs. We need to help students 

who have been expelled from universities because they have been 

accused of exercising freedom of assembly and speech. We need to 

help the families of those who are being held in jail, help them 

with lawyer fees, medical bills, with food assistance, all kinds of 

desperately needed assistance. 

We need to help organizations like Charter 97 as well as the 

Belarus Free Theater, the performers of which have not been allowed to return home, and they are living on fumes. They need 

vital financial assistance. 

We need to get more media into Belarus so that the people of 

Belarus understand that Europe and the United States stand with 

them, that the problem we have is with the leader of Belarus, not 

with the population of Belarus. 

We need to resume material support for the opposition. Neutrality on this issue or an unwillingness to provide such support, 

frankly, in the face of a threat like Lukashenka is an enemy of 

freedom. We need to lift the restrictions that have been put in 

place by USAID. 

We need to meet, as you have, Mr. Chairman, with members of 

the opposition, with activists, with families of those in detention. 

And I want to thank you very much in particular for taking time 

to meet with the delegation that Freedom House, IRI, NDI, and the 

German Marshall Fund brought to the United States several weeks 

ago. It is extremely important that you and other members meet 

with these families to hear firsthand the heart-wrenching stories, 

so we can put a human face with the suffering the people of 

Belarus are enduring. 

Again, thanks for your efforts on the legislation dealing with 

Belarus, the bill on Belarus, and your leadership on that in 2004 

and 2006; it was vitally important. When I was in the government, 

that legislation was a critical tool for us to deal with this dangerous threat. That is on the support, assistance, and solidarity 

side. 

On dealing with the regime, we need to ratchet up the pressure 

and really go after Lukashenka and those around him. Sanctioning 

25

state-owned enterprises, in my view, is the way to free the political 

prisoners. It worked in 2007 and 2008 when the United States in 

November, 2007, sanctioned Belneftekhim. Two months later, the 

release of the political prisoners started. 

The U.S. has reimposed the sanctions that eased after all the 

prisoners were released in 2008. It has reimposed those on 

Belneftekhim, but it is not enough. We need to go after the Belarus 

potash firm. We need to go after other state-owned enterprises. 

This is where Lukashenka keeps his money. This is where he benefits personally through massive corruption, and it is where the Europeans need to really step up to the plate. Here the Europeans are 

divided, not only from us on this issue but divided among themselves; and they need to get behind sanctions against state-owned 

enterprises. 

We should not have meetings with senior officials of the 

Lukashenka regime. We did not recognize the election results; and 

if we don’t recognize Lukashenka as President, we should not be 

meeting with his representatives. We should add Foreign Minister 

Martynov to the visa banned list so Lukashenka doesn’t have a 

stooge running around Europe and the United States peddling his 

lies. 

We should end International Monetary Fund and European Bank 

for Reconstruction and Development support for Belarus, particularly with Belarus’ hard currency reserves dwindling and facing a 

devaluation, which apparently it has done by 20 percent with even 

a possible default. The last thing we should be doing is providing 

international loans that would bail out Lukashenka and throw him 

a lifeline. 

I am in favor of suspending Belarus from the European Union’s 

Eastern Partnership Initiative, but at a minimum, if the Europeans do not do that, instead of inviting representatives of the 

Lukashenka regime, they should invite representatives of the opposition in civil society to sit in those seats when they have a summit 

later this year. 

We should strongly urge the International Hockey Federation to 

relocate its world championship which Belarus is scheduled to host 

in 2014. Aleksandr Lukashenka is a big hockey fan. He is a player 

himself. This, if nothing else, might get his attention if we threaten 

to take this prize away from him. 

We should reject engagement with the regime. Engagement was 

tried from the fall of 2008 right up until December 19th. Engagement with this regime failed. Engagement with this regime should 

not be resumed. 

Aleksandr Lukashenka is not serious about engagement with the 

West. He is brilliant at playing the West and Russia off of each 

other, threatening to go to one if the other increases the pressure. 

We should not fall for this game once again. 

We should understand that pressure is what gets Lukashenka’s 

attention. That is the way to get these people out of jail. That is 

the way to end their suffering. 

Also, I would just say, in response to your question to Dan Russell about the ICC, we should begin a serious and comprehensive 

effort to document the many crimes that Lukashenka has committed, so that when and if there is a process in place to bring 

26

Lukashenka to justice, we already have much of the documentation 

in place to move forward. 

Belarus, Mr. Chairman, just to conclude, is a real test for the 

West, with ramifications for the region and, frankly, for the whole 

globe. Left unchallenged, Lukashenka becomes a model for other 

authoritarian leaders in the region and in the world, a number of 

whom, as we have already heard and based on questions from 

Chairman Burton, are clients of his for weapon sales. And so if we 

don’t respond to this challenge, the West will be exposed as an impotent force, unable to deal with problems in its own neighborhood. 

We saw tens of thousands of people turn out in the streets to protest Lukashenka’s rule, and we saw a fraudulent election where official results suggested that he got 80 percent, when in fact most 

results would suggest he got less than 50 percent. Many more people voted against him than for him in that election. 

Our support should be for those tens of thousands of people who 

turned out in downtown Minsk, brave people who risked their lives, 

risked injury to speak their minds and exercise their right to freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. They are the future of 

Belarus, and they need our support and solidarity now. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer follows:]

27


65497b-1.eps
28


65497b-2.eps
29


65497b-3.eps
30


65497b-4.eps
31


65497b-5.eps
32


65497b-6.eps
33


65497b-7.eps
34


65497b-8.eps
35


65497b-9.eps
36


65497b-10.eps
37

Mr. SMITH. Secretary Kramer, thank you very much for that very 

comprehensive prescription of what we need to be doing. I am taking notes, and I know others will as well. I do thank you for that 

and for your leadership in the past as well. 

Mr. Rojansky. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MATT ROJANSKY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT 

FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. ROJANSKY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

As a member of last December’s OSCE election observer mission 

in Belarus I am particularly appreciative of this opportunity to 

share my assessment of what has taken place there and how I believe we need to move forward. 

Of course, you yourself, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Payne, Secretary 

Russell, and others I think have provided an ample and accurate 

summary of the recent repressions. I am also in full agreement 

with Mr. Kramer that a reversal of these measures should be a top 

U.S. policy priority at this point. 

What I would like to focus on, though, is what I believe is ultimately our core policy challenge. How can we in the West help to 

create the conditions for future positive change? 

In light of the ongoing abuses by the Lukashenka regime, Western governments are understandably compelled to adopt a strong 

and a moral stance, severing public engagement with Minsk, withdrawing previously offered incentives, and imposing new penalties. 

An example, of course, is what you heard Mr. Kramer say about 

not meeting with Mr. Martynov, the Foreign Minister. 

These sanctions I believe, as they have been reinforced and reinstated, should remain in force until Minsk acts clearly to reverse 

the most egregious consequences of the crackdown. We and our European allies should assist those still suffering under government 

repression, including specifically identifying and imposing new penalties on their persecutors as individuals, supporting victims’ legal 

defense, and publicizing their harrowing stories. And some of that 

has been done already. 

The present sanctions as they have been reinforced should also 

continue until the OSCE can return to Belarus with an explicit 

mandate to investigate the violence linked to the elections. And 

here I would agree with the suggestion of implementing the Moscow Mechanism. 

That said, an approach in my view that is centered solely on coercion and punishment is unlikely to help the people of Belarus. 

Some recognition first is due for recent responsible behavior by 

Minsk, for example, the commitment to eliminate all highly enriched uranium by the 2012 nuclear summit; compliance with 

terms of the IMF and World Bank loans; and the announced reduction of regulatory burdens on small- and medium-sized businesses. 

Because these in fact enable greater economic independence from 

Lukashenka and the state for the Belarusian people. 

To prevent imposing de facto isolation on the people of Belarus, 

Western governments must also sustain and enhance their efforts 

to engage with ordinary citizens. Our goal should be to build the 

skills and capacity of Belarusians to take responsibility for their 

38

own political future but not to catalyze regime change when it is 

not yet ripe domestically. 

As a friend involved in civil society working in Belarus told me, 

the real long-term challenge is social and political change, not regime change. The former gives us Poland, the latter gives us 

Ukraine, by which I mean an incomplete and possibly unstable 

transition to democracy. 

Western governments should make small- and medium-sized 

grants to grassroots organizations, especially those that are outside 

of Minsk and those with nonpolitical missions. Examples would include groups working to treat social problems like drug and alcohol 

abuse, domestic violence, groups that track reforms and monitor 

corruption and network-building NGOs. 

Western aid should include training on the Internet and social 

networking tools, basic communication strategy, and community 

advocacy. Independent media, above all, that cover Belarus need 

better training, and they need the means to reach audiences 

throughout the country. 

In the near term, we must remain firm and uncompromising in 

the demand that Lukashenka release the political prisoners and 

stop the repression. However, we should also have an eye to the 

upcoming 2012 parliamentary elections. These elections, it has 

been announced by the Belarusians, will once again have OSCE observers invited. 

In my view, the best mechanism to prevent another blatantly undemocratic electoral process is to push hard and uncompromisingly 

now for an electoral commission which has independent membership and to train and equip Belarusians to serve as domestic election observers. This, by the way, is a role that was authorized 

under the 2010 election law as it was amended at the urging of the 

OSCE, but I personally did not see domestic observers in polling 

stations. They lacked the capacity and the training. 

The U.S. and the European Union have done an admirable job 

of coordinating their official response, particularly in terms of official statements. Now I believe that, thanks to improved dialogue 

among Washington, Brussels, and Moscow, we can seek coordination with Russia as well. We cannot allow Lukashenka alone to define the terms of Belarus’ engagement with East and West. 

Russia and the West have different interests with respect to 

Belarus, surely, but the costs of business as usual are shared and 

the danger is shared if Belarus’ economic vulnerability and political 

isolation lead to more upheaval, violence, and potentially bloodshed. For Russia, coordination with the West does not need to undermine historically close ties with Belarus. 

Mr. Chairman, there is no simple policy prescription to change 

the nature of the Belarusian regime without exacting painful costs 

for the country’s people. But there are some short- and long-term 

steps that can enable Belarusians themselves to define a future in 

which they enjoy security and prosperity with close ties to partners 

throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. I believe these measures are 

in our national interest and in the interest of the people of Belarus. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rojansky follows:]

39


65497c-1.eps
40


65497c-2.eps
41


65497c-3.eps
42


65497c-4.eps
43


65497c-5.eps
44


65497c-6.eps
45


65497c-7.eps
46


65497c-8.eps
47

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Rojansky, for your testimony and for being a part of reform for so long there and elsewhere. I just have a few questions. 

I would like to ask, are we coordinating our democracy assistance 

well enough with the European Union? How is USAID getting it 

wrong, or is it getting it right with regards to that assistance? 

And with regard to the additional sanctions, Secretary Kramer, 

that you mentioned, do you believe that is something that is seriously being contemplated or have we done enough and closed the 

door and we are now looking somewhere else and waiting to see if 

those sanctions already articulated are going to have any kind of 

bite? 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I think on the coordination issue, 

there was a donors’ conference that the Poles hosted in Warsaw in 

early February that was a good opportunity for the Americans and 

Europeans to compare notes to coordinate, avoid duplication, and 

make sure that there is sufficient coverage. 

My impression is that there is good coordination between Europeans and the United States on these issues. The assistance people 

at the State Department are in constant contact with their European colleagues. I don’t really have any criticism of the coordination when it comes to assistance programs. 

On USAID’s point, USAID, with the operations for Belarus that 

are run out of Embassy Kiev, has been resistant to go ahead with 

material support for opposition. They feel that that is unwarranted, 

that it is playing favorites with certain individuals, and they simply feel it is not something the United States should be doing. We 

have to be clear here, which is that we are not talking about a level 

playing field. We are talking about a playing field that is grossly 

tilted in favor of Aleksandr Lukashenka. 

What we are trying to do in pushing forward on this is to suggest 

that they need as much support as they can possibly get. They are 

not going to get it inside Belarus. They need help with training and 

with equipment and other things to at least give them a uniform 

to play in the game. We are not even talking about fair competition. 

And so my hope is that USAID would go along with this and recognize that such assistance is in fact important to go through. And 

it is not really for my organization. It is for organizations that do 

this work for a living that are very good at it, such as IRI and NDI. 

On the issue of sanctions, I speak from the experience of working 

with the Europeans very closely on this in 2006 and 2007. We in 

the U.S. and Europe went forward with the visa ban and asset 

freeze. When it came to sanctions against state-owned enterprises, 

we did that unilaterally. The Europeans did not go along with it. 

But it is critical to remember when that sanction was imposed 

against Belneftekhim in November, 2007, within 2 months of that 

sanction a representative of Lukashenka came to the U.S. Embassy 

in Minsk and asked what the United States—not what Europe 

would do, what the United States would do—if they started releasing the political prisoners. And we explained we would ease the 

sanctions on Belneftekhim. We found their vulnerability with that 

sanction against state-owned enterprises. It took us too long, but 

we finally found it. 

48

And what we need to do now is recognize that a visa ban and 

asset freeze are nice to do, and they are important. I don’t mean 

to minimize them. But they are nowhere near sufficient if we want 

to effect a change in the status of the political prisoners. 

But by these sanctions I don’t want to imply that we are going 

to bring democracy to Belarus. That won’t happen as long as Aleksandr Lukashenka sits in the President’s chair in Minsk. But it 

will at least mitigate the deteriorating situation on the ground and 

the terrible plight that people like Andrei Sannikov Alexander 

Lebedko and Vladimir Neklyayev and others have experienced, 

people who are being tortured on a daily basis, the Belarus Free 

Theater people, who barely escaped with their lives. 

This is a leader who disappeared four critics and opposition figures in 1999 and 2000. This is not new behavior. This is typical 

Lukashenka behavior, and we have to understand that democracy, 

and democratic reform are not going come to the country as long 

as he is there. So regime behavior won’t change, and I think we 

really do have to start talking about some form or another of regime change. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Mr. ROJANSKY. Mr. Chairman, I want to say, first, that I am in 

full agreement with Mr. Kramer as far as it concerns reversing the 

abuses that have taken place, getting the folks out of jail, providing 

the assistance to make sure that they have legal defense. I think 

the OSCE mission has to go back, and I think it has to have the 

capacity to have an investigation. Those are the minimum steps. 

I think in terms of what comes next when we look at the bigger 

picture, I have a slightly different view. Regarding democracy assistance and coordination, I think the dialogue has been there. 

What is missing I think is an understanding of what role Western 

assistance for democracy and opposition figures has played thus 

far. 

I agree that there certainly are cases in which very targeted punitive steps can get people who have already been put in prison out 

of prison. But as to whether democracy assistance from the West 

can create an opposition, a political opposition which is truly capable of taking on the mantle of governance, of democratic effective 

governance in Belarus in place of Lukashenka—because I am truly 

of the opinion that Lukashenka will not last in Belarus. But when 

that change comes, the question is will we have prepared the 

ground for a democratic opposition or democratic forces to truly 

take leadership in Belarus? And I think that is where our assistance has been uncoordinated and it has been ineffective. 

I will give you just a couple of examples of I think how that has 

taken place. One is that it is a mistake for us to anoint opposition 

leaders. We should not be in search of the next Vaclav Havel in 

Belarus, because I think we will only be hurting that person and 

those closest to that person. In a sense, we create a mutually damaging symbiosis, particularly I think when we take these people in 

in the West and we raise them up, we give them publicity. They 

don’t appear to be of the people and understood by the people and 

understanding the people in Belarus. 

49

I will tell you from my personal experience people didn’t know 

who most of those candidates on that list of 10 candidates were. 

They knew who Lukashenka was. He’s a nationally known figure. 

I don’t think we can know with certainty what the real percentages were in that vote, because it wasn’t a real vote. It was rigged. 

But I would posit he is the one figure who has national name recognition. 

I think what we can do is we can help to build conditions where 

there is more communication and more access to information. 

These are kind of basic building blocks of democracy, as opposed 

to doing the type of sophisticated political party training and campaigning that can be helpful in other contexts but, in my view, not 

so much in Belarus. I think that addresses as well the question 

about the USAID policies and providing material support to opposition. 

With respect to additional sanctions, my feeling here is we have 

sanctions in place now that send a very strong message. And those 

sanctions have been reinstated, and they have been strengthened 

from the United States’ part. From Europe’s part, one of the reasons that Europe has influence on Belarus—and I think we have 

seen the limitations, with all due respect, to those achievements 

that the last administration had. I think we have seen the limitations of the effectiveness of American leverage, quite simply because we have very little relationship left with Belarus to exercise 

leverage on. The Europeans have a much, much larger relationship 

diplomatically, economically, and in every other way. 

I think it is sort of like the wedding ring problem, which is to 

say, if you have worn a wedding ring all your life and you’ve been 

faithful, if you take it off it sends a bad message. But if you haven’t 

worn a wedding ring and nonetheless you have been faithful, you 

don’t need to put that ring on in order to show your moral position. 

And I think the Europeans have made their position very clear 

through their statements. I don’t think at this point that they need 

to ratchet up broad sanctions. They need to have targeted punishments, and they have done that with the visa ban list. 

The last comment I’ll make, sir, is just, as I said, I think in the 

long term the disappearance of Lukashenka from the scene is going 

to happen; and the evidence for that is the instability and vulnerability and isolation that he faces right now. Over 50 percent of the 

GDP now is made up by foreign debt. He cannot sustain that situation. Around 15 percent of his annual budget is in deficit. He cannot sustain that situation. The Belarusian people are withdrawing 

their assets and transitioning them into foreign hard currency and 

sticking it under the mattress. 

This guy is going to go. And this is why I say it is in the interest 

of Moscow, of Brussels, of Washington, of the entire world community to ensure that that situation doesn’t lead to instability and violence and bloodshed in the heart of Europe; and I think that is 

where we need to have a unified front and more coordination. 

Mr. SMITH. To follow up on the state-owned enterprises and 

whether or not the EU ought to take a stronger sanctions approach 

toward them, do you agree with that? 

Mr. ROJANSKY. I would only agree to the extent that assets can 

be specifically traced to individuals who are tied—and I would say, 

50

for example, the visa ban list is an example of some of the individuals who are responsible for the abuses on December 19th and 

afterwards. But I would not do blanket cutting off of the economic 

relationship with Belarus because I think the EU—and we can’t 

dictate their policy, but I think the EU will lose their ability to implement effective policy in a few years down the road. 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, if I can, I absolutely think the EU 

needs to take these steps. I think each day that passes people in 

jail will suffer, possibly lose their lives. The EU does have more 

room to maneuver than the United States does. We don’t have 

many more bullets in our revolver left. The EU has many. Belarus 

is quite dependent on trade with the EU, and the EU needs to use 

that as a point of leverage to exercise change in Lukashenka’s behavior. 

We should also, I would say, listen to people like Iryna 

Bogdanova, who is the sister of Andrei Sannikov; Natalia Kalyada, 

who is one of the directors of the Belarus Free Theater; of Irina 

Krasovskaya, who is the widow of one of the disappeared; Eva 

Neklyayeva, the daughter of Vladimir Neklyayeva. All of these people are in support of sanctions against state-owned enterprises. 

So the concern that some people have that this would have an 

adverse effect on the population, these people don’t see that argument. They also don’t buy the argument that these steps would 

push Belarus and Lukashenka toward Russia. If that is all 

Lukashenka can do, I think his days are in fact numbered. Because 

the elite around him don’t want to be puppets of the Russian Government and Belarus; the population does not want to be subservient to the Russian people. 

So I think this step is vitally important. I am disturbed by the 

divisions within the European Union over this issue. They need to 

show resolve, and they need to do it as soon as possible to end the 

suffering of people who are in jail. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. If I could, to Mr. Rojansky, why wouldn’t it be a good 

idea? I mean, sanctions can be imposed. They can be unimposed almost as quickly as they are imposed, although there is probably a 

turnaround time to get it up and running in terms of the facilitation of that trade to that company. 

But it seems to me that we do need a tourniquet when we are 

on the eve of, rather than at the end of, a number of show trials 

that will see increasingly harsher penalties, I would think, being 

imposed on the dissidents and people like Lebedko. 

Why wouldn’t we want to really strongly admonish our European 

friends, to say enough is enough, put that tourniquet on? Because 

Lukashenka, in my opinion, feels that the world is so diverted from 

Belarus and from Minsk, Japan, all the occurrences in the Middle 

Eastern countries, all the chaos in the Sudan. And we do know 

that one of the arms suppliers to Sudan happens to be—to Khartoum, that is—happens to be Belarus. So they are fomenters of potentially truly destabilizing actions—hopefully, not a resumption of 

hostilities in southern Sudan. Big, key dates obviously are coming 

up, July 9th being the biggest in Sudan. 

So why wouldn’t you want to do that, if you could further explain. 

51

Mr. ROJANSKY. Absolutely, sir. 

My objection would not be to very targeted and what you described as easy-to-switch-on and easy-to-switch-off measures. To 

the extent that we are dealing with those, that they are targeted 

at individuals who we know are criminally responsible for behavior 

since the 19th, I think that makes a lot of sense. 

What I am concerned about are blanket sanctions that do harm 

the people of Belarus. I think there is no question about that. They 

are in a very precarious situation today. People had savings prior 

to 2 years ago. Today, they do not have savings anymore. They 

have hard currency shoved under the mattress, and they are in a 

dangerous position. So we have to be careful not to worsen that situation. 

We also don’t want to cut off our own access to being able to 

build some of the long-term building blocks of democracy that I was 

talking about. Because we don’t want to see a scenario of potentially violent change, or even nonviolent change but which results 

in no real change in the system. It is entirely possible that you get 

rid of the individual personality of Aleksandr Lukashenka and you 

have another similar system in place with another so-called strong 

man. 

And then I guess my bigger concern about the leverage of sanctions logic is, if you look at recent history, there was a long period 

in which we used sanctions and I think we made some progress, 

but we imposed very, very harsh sanctions; and we didn’t achieve 

the big picture goal. And the progress that we made—you asked 

what about reversing sanctions and turning them off. Well, the 

progress was turned off, too. So I think it is a two-way street. 

And if you look at the legacy of sanctions, for example, against 

Cuba, we did everything that we can; and now we don’t have leverage left. And I am concerned that we end up with a situation where 

Belarus is Cuba and we and Europe have no leverage left and then 

we will wish that we had coordinated with Moscow, quite frankly, 

earlier than we did, because they will be the only ones with any 

leverage. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Kramer. 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect to Matt, let’s 

look at what worked. We imposed a visa ban and asset freeze in 

the summer of 2006 after the fraudulent election in 2006 against 

Lukashenka. That didn’t work. It took the sanction against 

Belneftekhim in November 2007, which 2 months later brought the 

regime to the U.S. Embassy to say how do we get you to ease off 

on these sanctions? That is the kind of sanction that is going to 

free the political prisoners; there is a proven track record. 

When I was in the State Department there was intelligence to 

back up this claim, and it seems to me that is the step that we 

need right now. A visa ban and asset freeze aren’t irrelevant, but 

they are not going to get the job done. Lukashenka was anticipating this. What he was worried about before the EU took its decision on January 31st was that there would be sanctions against 

state-owned enterprises and that is why he freed two political prisoners on the eve of that decision. 

52

On people losing their savings, that wasn’t due to sanctions. That 

is due to the ridiculous economic policies of Lukashenka and his 

government. 

On engagement, let’s remember that after sanctions were suspended by the EU in October 2008—bad timing because it was 1 

month after a bad parliamentary election in September 2008—October 2008 there was a full-throttle engagement effort, including offers of $3.5 billion by European foreign ministers that if the elections passed the free and fair test the EU would help Belarus. 

And what did Lukashenka do? On December 19th, he gave those 

who support engagement two middle fingers. That is what he 

thinks of engagement. So I think engagement has been tried. Engagement was the policy during this whole period leading up to 

when people have been losing their savings. It isn’t because of 

sanctions. It is because of his leadership. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Let me just ask you a few final questions. 

First, with regards to the United Nations’ response, to the best 

of your knowledge, has Ban Ki-moon said anything? I know that 

on March 14th, 45 U.N. states presented a statement on Belarus 

at the session of the Human Rights Council. The statement expressed deep concerns on human rights. Belarus responded by denying dialogue and making counteraccusations. 

But I am wondering, the Human Rights Council has been, unfortunately, a great disappointment following up to the egregiously 

flawed Human Rights Commission. But, that said, we are a member—the United States is a member, and many European countries 

also have delegations there. And I am wondering about an official 

investigation, tabling of a resolution that would very clearly and cogently single out Lukashenka and his henchmen for the harm they 

are doing every day. 

I am very worried about the loss of life as well as what the cruelty of torture does to a person’s mind as well as body, PTSD. I 

have written four laws called the Torture Victims Relief Acts, and 

from my contacts with former victims of torture those scars are absolutely lifelong. Although some of the influences or consequences 

can be mitigated, they carry those scars. And I am so concerned, 

as I know both of you are, about the scars that are being inflicted 

as we meet at this hearing today. Especially with long, long sentences likely to be meted out in these show trials. 

So I am wondering if the U.N. can be—I asked our previous witness, Secretary Russell, if he would raise the issue of the Convention Against Torture and degrading and cruel treatment. They are 

signatories. ‘‘They’’ being the Belarusians. Why aren’t the panel of 

experts and the mechanisms being invoked there? Because certainly, at a minimum, cruel and degrading treatment is being imposed and I do believe torture as well. I was just wondering, why 

is the U.N. seemingly silent on this? 

Mr. KRAMER. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Chairman, I am 

not aware of any statement from the Secretary General. I would be 

happy to stand corrected, but I don’t believe he has. 

On the Human Rights Commission, I agree there should be every 

effort made to bring attention to the situation in Belarus. Of 

course, Russia is a member of the Human Rights Council and is 

53

likely to block any resolutions or efforts to launch a special investigation on torture or any other allegations against Belarus 

through that mechanism. 

Freedom House has efforts, and has outreach to different delegations in the Human Rights Council, and we will be happy to pursue 

those relationships we have and strongly urge this be taken up 

with the Human Rights Council. 

Mr. ROJANSKY. Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize very clearly 

that I am not proposing engagement as a solution here. For that 

reason, I actually think that investigation and putting on the 

record the crimes of the Lukashenka regime, of Lukashenka personally and his associates, makes perfect sense; and the Human 

Rights Commission is exactly the right venue. I would recommend, 

also, Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, OSCE; 

and indeed I think this would be a case in which the ICC’s 

complementarity doctrine could be applied. 

I think that the challenge, quite frankly, in practice with any of 

these things—which, again, is analogous to my concern about blanket sanctions and highly punitive measures, is what if they don’t 

work. If we cannot go in and arrest Aleksandr Lukashenka, then 

all we have done is create a public record. And I think that is important, but I do think we have to think about the long term and 

things we can do that will make a difference. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Just on that, we are looking to mark up H.R. 515 very shortly. 

Any text ideas that you might have, we would greatly appreciate 

it. 

We do have an amendment in the nature of a substitute that has 

some refinements already, including calling on the International 

Ice Hockey Federation to suspend its plan to hold the 2014 International Hockey Championship in Minsk until the Government of 

Belarus releases all political prisoners. And it seems to me that 

that is an absolute bare minimum. 

I find it appalling, in a parallel way, that the Olympics occurred 

in China, despite the massive crackdown on dissidents. I remember 

I met Wei Jingsheng, the father of the Democracy Wall Movement 

in the early ’90s in Beijing. He was let out in order to get Olympics 

2000, which the Chinese Government did not get. And then they 

rearrested him and brought him close to death. And on a humanitarian only basis they allowed him to leave. 

But those kinds of tools, and you gentlemen have recommended 

them, I think they are excellent ideas. Secretary Kramer, you focused on that. I think it is a great idea. But any ideas you might 

have for how we can beef up our response to Lukashenka so that 

we don’t miss any opportunity to engage and to hold him to account through sanctions and other ways. 

Is there anything else either of you would like to conclude with? 

And I thank you again for your extraordinary patience but also, 

more importantly, for your very wise counsel. 

Mr. KRAMER. Mr. Chairman, thank you and thanks for coming 

back after the vote. I know it is a Friday afternoon, and so your 

patience with us is also very much appreciated. 

On the legislation, and I think this is already in there, but I 

would strongly urge that attention also be focused on the IMF so 

54

that international financial institution support not go forward. The 

U.S. should use its weight in the IMF to block any possible assistance and should strongly—in fact, including through the EBRD, in 

which we have a large share as well. We should exercise our influence in these international institutions to make sure that 

Lukashenka is not propped up. There is an aspect where I think 

the worse a situation is the weaker his grip on power becomes. 

I don’t quite share the same concerns that the situation could 

spiral out of control. Having just been in Egypt last week, when I 

was there also in mid-December, it is a night-and-day change. 

There are still many challenges in Egypt, a lot could go wrong in 

Egypt, but there is really for the first time in decades hope and optimism in large part because Hosni Mubarak is no longer in power. 

The same is true in Belarus. As long as Mubarak was in power in 

Egypt, democracy and freedom and human rights were not possible 

in Egypt. As long as Aleksandr Lukashenka is in Belarus, the same 

thing is true in that country as well. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. ROJANSKY. Thank you again for the opportunity, sir. 

I think in this case there is much less disagreement than there 

appears to be. I think we are of the same mind. No question that 

Lukashenka requires targeted punishment to get him to reverse 

the most recent abuses. 

I think in the bigger picture the one thing that I would love to 

see in the legislation, if it is not there already, and I’ll be sure to 

check this, is that we take advantage of a very new relationship 

that we have created with Moscow. Because I think at the end of 

the day—and here I would not argue that we are pushing 

Lukashenka toward Moscow, and if that is the problem, quite the 

opposite, that there is great power and influence in the hands of 

the Kremlin and that I think the Kremlin may be prepared or more 

prepared to use that. Because, if you think about it, our interests 

in avoiding a scenario in Belarus in which there is instability and 

chaos or there is a change which leads to damage in Russia’s interest and the United States’ interests I think are very much shared. 

So I think this is a case where we can have more of a united 

international front than we have had in the past, and that may in 

fact change this history that I’m concerned about where steps have 

been taken but that they haven’t led to the change that we are 

looking for. So I would like to see that. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you for that counsel. 

And, just to conclude, this is the first in a series of hearings on 

Belarus. This will not be the last. We hope to go to markup soon 

in subcommittee, then bring it to the full committee, then to the 

floor. 

And I do believe the legislation—not just the debate itself—will 

also bring attention to Belarus. There are a number of members 

who knew what happened in December, but who are not sure 

where it went. It kind of fell off the front page and page 3 and everywhere else in our news media. That has to change, and I think 

we are going to try to bring much more light and scrutiny to it and 

press immediately for the release of all the political prisoners and 

the end of their unjust incarceration and mistreatment. 

55

And, again, you, both gentlemen, have provided enormous insights and the subcommittees are deeply grateful for that. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(57)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

58

f


65497n.eps
59

f


65497m.eps
60

f


65497e.eps
61

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY


65497f-1.eps
62


65497f-2.eps
63


65497f-3.eps
64


65497f-4.eps
65


65497f-5.eps
66


65497f-6.eps
67


65497f-7.eps
68

[NOTE: The previous article is not reprinted here in its entirety but is available in 

f committee records.]

Æ


65497f-8.eps