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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

CHARLES HALL, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Case No. 14-12706 

 Honorable Linda V. Parker 

v. 

IKEA PROPERTY INC. 

J.W. LOGISTICS, LLC. 

 Defendants, 

IKEA PROPERTY INC. 

 Third Party Plaintiff 

J.W. LOGISTICS, LLC. 

 Third Party Defendant 

__________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING IKEA PROPERTY INC.’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 39] AND GRANTING J.W. 

LOGISTICS, LLC.’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 

47] 

 Presently before the Court in this diversity action is Defendant/ Third Party 

Plaintiff IKEA Property Inc.’s (“IKEA”) motion for summary judgment, brought 

against Defendant/ Third Party Defendant J.W. Logistics, LLC (“J.W.”) pursuant 

to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 39.) For reasons that 

follow, the Court DENIES IKEA’s motion for summary judgment. 

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I. Background 

IKEA asserts that Hall was employed by J.W. to ship furniture to the homes 

of IKEA customers who had purchased furniture from IKEA. (Hall Dep., ECF No. 

31-2 at Pg. ID 264, 268; Third Party Compl., ECF No. 60 at Pg. ID 830.) Each day, 

prior to making deliveries, Hall was given a delivery checklist that identified the 

items that he needed to retrieve from the J.W.’s warehouse, as well as the IKEA 

location in Canton, Michigan. (Hall Dep., ECF No. 31-2 at Pg. ID 268.) 

On May 24, 2014, at the IKEA location in Canton, Michigan, Hall slipped 

off a docking plate while loading a mirror onto the delivery truck, fracturing his 

left tibia and fibula. (Id. at Pg. ID 279; ECF No. 28 at Pg. ID 121.) Subsequently, 

Hall sued IKEA and J.W. (ECF No. 28.) 

Shortly thereafter, IKEA filed a third party complaint against J.W., asserting 

that a contract existed between IKEA and J.W. at the time of Hall’s accident, and 

that pursuant to the agreement, J.W. agreed to: (1) indemnify IKEA for any 

damages incurred relating to J.W.’s work; and (2) obtain insurance for the benefit 

of IKEA. (IKEA Compl., ECF No. 60 at Pg. ID 830–31.) IKEA asserts that J.W. 

failed to comply with these obligations as required by the Customer Delivery 

Services Agreement (ECF No. 47-4 at Pg. ID 694), and accordingly, sought 

summary judgment for J.W.’s breach of its contractual obligations. (IKEA’s Mot., 

ECF No. 39 at Pg. ID 421.) 

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 J.W., in its combined responsive brief and cross-motion for summary 

judgment (ECF No. 39) asserts that the contractual agreement between the parties 

sets forth specific guidelines for resolving disputes, including a binding arbitration 

requirement precluding IKEA’s claims against J.W. from being filed in both state 

and federal court. (J.W.’s Resp. Br., ECF No. 47 at Pg. ID 618.) Additionally, J.W. 

asserts that regardless of the arbitration clause, IKEA’s claims should be dismissed 

because IKEA’s claims do not fall under the scope of J.W.’s obligations to 

indemnify IKEA under the agreement. Further, J.W. in its responsive brief also 

seeks summary judgment against IKEA, relying on the same arguments asserted 

for the dismissal of IKEA’s summary judgment motion. 

II. Standard of Review 

Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is 

appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The central inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 251-52 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56 

mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of 

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an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party bears the burden 

of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The movant has the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Once the movant meets this burden, the 

“nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To 

demonstrate a genuine issue, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence 

upon which a jury could reasonably find for that party; a “scintilla of evidence” is 

insufficient. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. 

“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed” must 

designate specifically the materials in the record supporting the assertion, 

“including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or 

declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court must accept as true the non-movant’s evidence 

and draw “all justifiable inferences” in the non-movant’s favor. See Liberty Lobby, 

477 U.S. at 255. 

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III. Analysis 

A. Binding Arbitration Clause 

The Court must determine whether Section 26.1 of the Customer Delivery 

Services Agreement between IKEA and J.W. requires this Court to compel 

arbitration. Section 26.1 of the agreement holds the following: 

26.1 Any disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement 

or its interpretation shall be dealt with as follows: 

26.1.1 It shall be referred initially to the next Local Operational 

Meeting for resolution; 

26.1.2 If the dispute cannot be solved during the Local 

Operational Meeting it shall be referred to a meeting of the 

Steering Committee for resolution. If the next scheduled 

meeting of the Steering Committee is more than one month 

after the relevant Local Operational Meeting, either Party may 

require a special meeting of the Steering Committee to be 

convened to consider the matter within one month after the 

relevant Local Operational Meeting; 

26.1.3 If the dispute cannot be solved by the Steering 

Committee, it shall be referred as soon as possible, and, in any 

event, within fourteen (14) days, escalated to the managing 

directors of TSP and IKEA for resolution; 

26.1.4 If the dispute cannot be solved by the managing directors 

within fourteen (14) days, then, upon written notice by either 

party to the other, all disputes, claims, questions or differences 

shall be finally settled by arbitration administered with a panel 

of three arbitrators. Any arbitration pursuant to the Agreement 

shall be conducted in and governed by the law of the State of 

New Jersey in accordance with the American Arbitration 

Association's Commercial Rules or as modified by the Parties. 

The award shall be final and binding on the Parties. The 

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prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and 

attorney's fees from the other party. 

(Customer Deliver Services Agreement, ECF No. 47-4 at Pg. ID 694.) 

1. The Federal Arbitration Act governs the arbitration clause 

The parties dispute whether Michigan or New Jersey arbitration law governs 

the arbitration clause at issue. IKEA asserts that Michigan law governs, and that 

under Michigan law, the arbitration clause gives rise to common-law arbitration, a 

procedure which permits either party to revoke its agreement to arbitrate without 

penalty until the time the arbitrator issues an award. (ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID 707–

08.) Contrastingly, Defendant asserts that New Jersey law applies, and that 

nevertheless under both Michigan and New Jersey law, the agreement to arbitrate 

is binding and not unilaterally revocable. (ECF No. 52 at Pg. ID 737–740.) This 

Court turns to Mech. Power Conversion, L.L.C. v. Cobasys, L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 

2d 716, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2007) for guidance in making its determination. In Mech. 

Power Conversion, L.L.C., the district court was faced with arguments similar to 

those raised by the parties in this matter concerning which body of law governs the 

arbitration clause. The district court held the following, in relevant part: 

This clause requires binding arbitration. Plaintiff asserts that this 

clause does not require this because the Michigan Supreme Court has 

found that language similar to that used in this arbitration clause gives 

rise only to common-law arbitration, a procedure which permits either 

party to revoke its agreement to arbitrate without penalty until the 

time the arbitrator issues an award. (See Pl. Resp. Br. 9–10 citing 

Wold Architects & Eng'rs v. Strat, 474 Mich. 223, 713 N.W.2d 750, 

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754–59 (2006).) Defendant argues first that this language is sufficient 

to meet the requirements for statutory arbitration under Michigan law, 

and in the alternative that the FAA preempts Michigan's interpretation 

that this language calls for common law arbitration. (Def't Reply Br. 

3–4.) 

The FAA preempts Michigan's law regarding common law arbitration. 

As it is undisputed that this contract “involv[es] commerce” as that 

definition is used in the FAA, this agreement is undoubtedly within 

the scope of the federal act. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2. Pursuant to the 

Supremacy Clause, the terms of the FAA govern. U.S. Const. art. VI, 

cl. 2. The fact that this is an issue of contract interpretation in a case 

before this Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction is immaterial; the 

FAA created substantive law regarding arbitration clauses that must 

be enforced both in state and federal courts. Southland Corp. v. 

Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984) (“We 

thus read the underlying issue of arbitrability to be a question of 

substantive federal law: ‘Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration 

Act governs that issue in either state or federal court.’ ”) quoting 

Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 

24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). 

Mech. Power Conversion, L.L.C. v. Cobasys, L.L.C., 500 F. Supp. 2d 716, 719 

(E.D. Mich. 2007) 

Thus, having reviewed the decision in Mech. Power conversion, L.L.C., this 

Court holds that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., governs 

the arbitration clause at issue – contrary to the parties assertion that state law 

governs. Section 2 of the FAA provides the following: 

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 

evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 

controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or 

the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 

in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out 

of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, 

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and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 

for the revocation of any contract. 

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 2. 

Further, commerce under the statute is defined as such: 

“[C]ommerce”, as herein defined, means commerce among the several 

States or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States 

or in the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 

another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign 

nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State or Territory 

or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts 

of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 

workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 

Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1. 

 The FAA applies to commercial transactions governed by written 

agreements that provide for arbitration of disputes arising out of that transaction. 

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984). IKEA is a major distributor 

of goods nationwide and J.W. ships said goods to IKEA’s customers. As it is both 

clear and undisputed that this contract “involv[es] commerce” as that definition is 

used in the FAA, this agreement is undoubtedly within the scope of the federal act. 

See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2. Thus, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the terms of the 

FAA govern. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 

2. J.W.’s purported waiver of its contractual right to arbitration 

The FAA states that every written provision in a contract “evidencing a 

transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 

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arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 

upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 

U.S.C. § 2. Further, the FAA requires federal courts to stay an action when an 

issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration, see 9 U.S.C. § 3, and to compel 

arbitration when one party fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of an 

enforceable arbitration agreement. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Highlands Wellmont Health 

Network, Inc. v. John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Supreme Court cases have found that these provisions “manifest a ‘liberal federal 

policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ ” High v. Capital Senior Living Properties 

2-Heatherwood, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 789, 796-97 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing 

EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002). 

However, this does not mean that a federal court faced with an arbitration 

clause must find that it always governs the resolution of a dispute between the 

parties. Id. at 797. “The language of the contract defines the scope of disputes 

subject to arbitration.” Id. (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 

514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). 

In the present matter, the dispute resolution procedure laid out in the 

Customer Delivery Services Agreement applies to “[a]ny disputes arising out of or 

in connection with [the] Agreement [.]” (Custom Delivery Services Agreement, 

ECF No. 47-4 at Pg. ID No. 694, § 26.1 (emphasis added.)) Further, the dispute 

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resolution procedure outlined in the agreement states that the arbitration award 

“shall be final and binding on the parties.” (Id.) Thus, in accordance with the 

agreement’s arbitration clause, all claims listed in IKEA’s third party complaint 

against J.W. are subject to the binding arbitration clause unless IKEA can provide 

a reason why the Court should not compel arbitration. 

 IKEA asserts that the arbitration clause is inapplicable to the instant matter 

because J.W. has waived its contractual right to arbitration. (ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID 

703–707.) With respect to waiver of the right to arbitration, the Sixth Circuit has 

expressed that there is a strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration 

agreements, and thus, “waiver of the right to arbitration is not to be lightly 

inferred.” Glazer v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 394 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2005). 

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit holds that a party may waive the right to 

arbitration by engaging in a course of conduct completely inconsistent with 

reliance on an arbitration agreement or delaying assertion of the right to such an 

extent that the opposing party incurred actual prejudice. Shy v. Navistar Int'l Corp.,

781 F.3d 820, 827–28 (6th Cir.2015); Johnson Associates, 680 F.3d at 717; Hurley 

v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 610 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2010). “Both 

inconsistency and actual prejudice are required.” Shy, 781 F.3d at 828. Both prongs 

are not met in this case. 

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Recent Sixth Circuit decisions in Johnson Associates, Hurley, and Shy, cited 

above, lay out the proper analysis for determining whether a defendant waived its 

contractual right to arbitration. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit holds: 

The parameters of our scrutiny are well defined by three recent Sixth 

Circuit rulings, cited above. The district court relied on Johnson 

Associates and Hurley, where we affirmed denials of motions to 

compel arbitration. In Shy, decided since the district court's ruling, we 

vacated the denial of a motion to compel. Comparison of all three 

decisions confirms the correctness of the district court's ruling in this 

case. 

In Hurley, the defendant had participated in litigation for two years 

before asserting its right to arbitration. The plaintiffs' actual prejudice 

consisted of their participation in extensive discovery, defending 

against four summary judgment motions, and being subjected to a 

change in venue at the defendant's request. Hurley, 610 F.3d at 338–

40. In Johnson Associates, the defendant delayed eight months before 

raising the issue of arbitration. In the meantime, the defendant's 

participation in litigation consisted of filing an answer without raising 

arbitration as an affirmative defense, engaging in settlement 

negotiations, participating in a scheduling conference, and serving 

discovery requests. Again, even absent a showing of “substantive 

prejudice,” we held “actual prejudice” was made out by the delay and 

expenses incurred. Johnson Associates, 680 F.3d at 718–20. 

In Shy, on the other hand, we vacated the district court's denial of a 

motion to compel where arbitration was first raised ten months after a 

third party moved to intervene in existing litigation, but promptly after 

the court granted intervention and the intervenor's complaint was 

filed. Distinguishing Johnson Associates, we held that the defendant's 

“pre-litigation” (i.e., before intervention was allowed) conduct was 

not inconsistent with reliance on arbitration, that the defendant did not 

actively pursue litigation during the pendency of the motion to 

intervene, and that consequently, the intervenor did not incur 

unnecessary expenses amounting to actual prejudice. Shy, 781 F.3d at 

829–30. 

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Gunn v. NPC Int'l, Inc., 625 F. App'x 261, 264 (6th Cir. 2015) 

a. Inconsistency 

 With respect to the first prong – inconsistency with reliance on an agreement 

to arbitrate – IKEA asserts that J.W. has actively participated in litigation for 

almost a year without attempting to enforce the arbitration clause. IKEA asserts 

that J.W. has demonstrated this by failing to raise the arbitration agreement as an 

affirmative defense in its original answer to the third party complaint and doing 

“nothing to enforce his rights under Section 26 of the Agreement.” (ECF No. 48 at 

Pg. ID 703, 705.) IKEA also asserts that “now that the time has come for JW to 

explain to the Court why it has refused to honor its indemnity obligations, JW 

brings [its] 11th hour request for dismissal[.]” (Id. at 704.) The Court disagrees. 

Inconsistency with reliance on an agreement to arbitrate “typically involves 

a defendant’s failure to timely invoke arbitration after being sued or its interference 

with a plaintiff’s pre-litigation efforts to arbitrate.” JPD, Inc. v Chronimed 

Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 393 (6th Cir. 2008) (further citations omitted). The 

Sixth Circuit in Hurley held that defendants “consistently and actively litigated 

[the] action in court,” by not only responding to the plaintiff's motions, but also by 

filing “multiple dispositive and non-dispositive motions of their own, including 

motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and a motion to change 

venue.” Hurley, 610 F.3d at 339. “By filing a motion to change venue, 

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[d]efendants proactively selected the forum in which they wished to defend against 

[p]laintiffs' claims.” Id. Additionally, in Hurley, the Court observed that, as in 

other cases where waiver was found, the defendants “did not attempt to enforce 

their arbitration rights until after the district court entered an unfavorable 

decision.” Id.

“Regardless of whether a defendant is required to raise arbitration as a 

defense under Rule 8(c), a defendant’s failure to raise arbitration as an affirmative 

defense shows his intent to litigate rather than arbitrate. The filing of an answer is, 

after all the main opportunity for a defendant to give notice of potentially 

dispositive issues to the plaintiff; and the intent to invoke an arbitration provision 

is just such an issue.” Johnson Associates Corp., 680 F.3d at 719. 

Contrary to IKEA’s assertion that J.W. participated in litigation for almost a 

year without attempting to enforce the arbitration clause, it is readily apparent that 

J.W.’s conduct was consistent with reliance on an agreement to arbitrate. While it 

is true that J.W. did not raise arbitration as an affirmative defense in its initial 

answer to the third party complaint, J.W. timely amended its answer merely three 

weeks later, and consistently and actively demonstrated its reliance on the 

arbitration agreement thereafter by raising the arbitration defense in response to 

Hall’s first amended complaint, as well as in response IKEA’s motion for summary 

judgment against J.W. – the only document (other than IKEA’s third party 

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complaint) filed against J.W. by IKEA. (ECF No. 36 at Pg. ID No. 380; ECF No. 

47 at Pg. ID 622.) Thus, J.W. has clearly engaged in conduct consistent with 

reliance on an agreement to arbitrate. 

Additionally, concerning litigation, IKEA asserts that J.W. has actively 

litigated the action in Court, having done the following: 

[J.W.] has answered the complaint and cross-claim, filed a witness list 

and Rule 26 disclosures, sent discovery requests, appeared for Hall’s 

deposition, concurred in IKEA’s motion for summary judgment as to 

Hall’s claim and has now filed its own motion for summary judgment 

seeking to enforce this right. J.W.’s conduct in this regard shows 

intent to litigate, not arbitrate. 

(ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID 705.) 

 J.W.’s conduct does not amount to waiver of arbitration. As asserted 

previously, J.W. asserted its contractual right to arbitration in: (1) its answer to 

Hall’s amended complaint; (2) its answer to IKEA’s third party complaint; and (3) 

in response/cross-motion to IKEA’s motion for summary judgment. 

Regarding J.W.’s involvement in discovery and appearing for Hall’s 

deposition – given that the contractual agreement was entered into by J.W. and 

IKEA solely, J.W. had to comply with the discovery schedule and partake in 

discovery with respect to Hall, since Hall’s action was not subject to the arbitration 

clause of the contract between J.W. and IKEA. Regardless of J.W.’s arbitration 

agreement with IKEA, J.W. was still a named defendant in Hall’s lawsuit, and thus 

had to litigate the claims Hall asserted against it – and J.W. was thereby litigating 

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issues that were not subject to arbitration. (See ECF No. 28). Concerning IKEA, 

J.W asserts that it has not served or answered any discovery with respect to the 

third party complaint brought by IKEA. (ECF No. 52 at Pg. ID 734.) Additionally, 

J.W. asserts that while IKEA served requests for production on J.W., J.W. has not 

responded to those requests – since there is a binding arbitration clause that 

governs the action between itself and IKEA – and thus has not engaged in 

discovery. IKEA has not sought to file a sur reply or supplied any additional 

information to challenge J.W.’s assertion that J.W. has not engaged in discovery 

with respect to the third party complaint. Thus, for the abovementioned reasons, 

the Court finds that J.W.’s conduct does not amount to a waiver of arbitration. 

b. Prejudice 

Regarding actual prejudice, IKEA asserts the following: 

 [I]KEA would certainly be prejudiced by being forced into some 

form of alternative dispute resolution a year into this litigation. In 

addition to the obvious delay, IKEA has incurred expenses associated 

with filing pleadings, motions, engaging in discovery and taking 

Hall's deposition – the combination of which has caused “actual 

prejudice.” 

(ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID 706.) 

 IKEA’s assertion that it suffered prejudice as a result of J.W.’s failure to 

raise arbitration earlier fails, given that J.W. asserted its contractual right to 

arbitration in its amended answer to IKEA’s third party complaint, and continued 

to do so thereafter. Further, with respect to IKEA’s argument that it suffered 

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prejudice by way of expenses that resulted from filings, pleadings, motions, 

discovery, and Hall’s deposition, these expenses were incurred as a result of the 

complaint between Hall and IKEA – which was not subject to the arbitration 

agreement – rather than the third party complaint involving J.W. and IKEA. As 

previously indicated, J.W. has not engaged in any discovery with IKEA with 

respect to the third party complaint. Thus, any expenses J.W. has incurred as a 

result of Hall’s complaint would nevertheless have been experienced regardless of 

the binding arbitration agreement and J.W.’s assertion of his contractual right to 

arbitration. Accordingly, IKEA has failed to meet either prong of the Sixth 

Circuit’s waiver inquiry. Given that any dispute arising from the agreement is 

subject to arbitration, IKEA’s action against J.W. must be stayed and arbitration 

must be compelled. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Highlands Wellmont Health Nework, Inc. v. 

John Deere Health Plan, Inc., 350 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2003); High, 594 F. Supp. 2d 

at 797. 

3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(1) 

Lastly, IKEA asserts that “the spirit” of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

14(a)(1) allows it to file a third party complaint against Plaintiff irrespective of a 

binding arbitration clause. (ECF No. 48 at Pg. ID 710–11). The Court disagrees. 

Rule 14(a)(1) provides, in relevant part: 

A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and 

complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of 

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the claim against it. But the third-party plaintiff must, by motion, 

obtain the court's leave if it files the third-party complaint more than 

14 days after serving its original answer. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a)(1). 

While Rule 14 permits the filing of a third party claim, it does not do away 

with a federal court’s obligation “to stay an action when an issue in the proceeding 

is referable to arbitration.” High, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 797; See 9 U.S.C. § 4. IKEA 

has failed to provide the Court with any case law demonstrating otherwise. “Issues 

adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed 

argumentation, are [ ] deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a 

possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to ... put flesh on its 

bones.” McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting 

Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 59 

F.3d 284, 293–94 (1st Cir. 1995)) (further citations omitted). Thus, IKEA’s “spirit 

of Rule 14” argument fails. 

Accordingly, 

For the abovementioned reasons, IKEA Property Inc.’s summary judgment 

motion (ECF No. 39) is DENIED and J.W. Logistics, LLC’s motion for summary 

judgment (ECF No. 47) is GRANTED in that the Court holds that IKEA's third 

party claims against J.W. are subject to arbitration. J.W. is therefore dismissed as a 

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party to this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: March 17, 2016 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, March 17, 2016, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

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