Military Leadership Diversity Commission 

Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve 

February 2011 

MLDC decision papers present the Commission-approved, subcommittee-specific recommendations. 

These recommendations are the product not only of the logic and evidence presented in the decision 

papers but also the values and judgments of the Commissioners. Legally imposed time constraints 

naturally limited the Commission’s ability to undertake extensive research. Thus, the decision papers 

present the evidence that was available and that could be collected during the discovery phase of the 

Commission. The decision papers were reviewed by subject-matter experts external to the Commission.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #5: Defining Diversity

CONTENTS

Introduction .....................................................................................................................1

The Military Leadership Diversity Commission ................................................................................. 1

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee ................................................................................ 1

A Relevant and Diverse National Guard and Reserve ..........................................................3

The Structure and Significance of Reserve Component Manpower.................................................... 3

Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Characteristics of the Reserve Component ............................................. 6

Structural Diversity............................................................................................................................ 21

Recommendations for Improving Diversity Management in the Reserve Component.........25

Defining Diversity and Diversity Leadership .................................................................................... 25

Widening the Pool ............................................................................................................................ 26

Widening Opportunities ................................................................................................................... 38

Organization and Management......................................................................................................... 53

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................61

Widening the Pool ............................................................................................................................ 62

Widening Opportunities ................................................................................................................... 62

Organization and Management......................................................................................................... 63

Final Note.......................................................................................................................................... 63

Appendix A: MLDC Charter Tasks .................................................................................65

Appendix B: Subcommittee Recommendations ................................................................66

Appendix C: National Guard and Reserve Recommendations ...........................................71

References ......................................................................................................................73
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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INTRODUCTION

This decision paper documents the work of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC) 

National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee. It presents the research, facts, assumptions, and 

opinions that informed the Commission in devising those recommendations that are aimed at 

increasing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the Reserve Component and at improving the 

integration of Reserve Component personnel into the total force.1

The Military Leadership Diversity Commission

The Commission was established under the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2009. The Commission was asked by Congress to execute a wide-ranging review of 

issues regarding diversity in the military services. Specifically, Congress defined 16 charter tasks for 

the Commission.2

 To address these tasks, the Commission formed nine subcommittees:

• Branching and Assignments

• Definition of Diversity

• Implementation and Accountability

• Diversity Leadership and Diversity Training

• Outreach and Recruiting

• Promotion

• Retention

• Metrics

• Legal Implications.

Although the Commission’s initial mandate was to address diversity issues in the Active 

Component, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 expanded the mission of 

the MLDC to include the National Guard and Reserve. No new specific tasks were added, but 

Congress wanted to ensure that “[n]o component [was] left behind in the DOD’s shift to increase

diversity in the Armed Forces” (Congressional Record, 2009). Therefore, about nine months after 

the Commission had started its work, six new Commissioners were added to the Commission, and 

the tenth subcommittee was formed: the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee was charged with examining the same wide range of 

diversity issues considered by the entire Commission but to do so from the perspective of the Reserve 

Component. Even with this broad scope, the subcommittee had to work under an abbreviated 

timeline because when the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee was added, the Commission 

had already ended its discovery phase and had started deliberating on recommendations.

Consequently, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee worked quickly to get up to 

speed, meeting frequently, interviewing subject-matter experts, organizing briefings, and reviewing 

 1

 For a brief discussion of these recommendations and the logic behind them, please refer to the conclusion of this 

paper.

2

 See Appendix A for a complete list of Charter Tasks.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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research already produced by the Commission. The subcommittee relied on the expertise of the 

Commission at large and on the knowledge and experience of its own members. To fill in gaps, 

especially those related to areas either specific to the Reserve Component or to the differences 

between the Reserve and Active Components, the subcommittee produced its own research, which is 

documented in a series of issue papers.

This research and the subcommittee’s discussions brought several important points to the fore. 

First, because the National Guard and Reserve constitute about 50 percent of military manpower in 

the U.S. military, any change in their demographic makeup could have a significant effect on the 

demographic makeup of the entire military.

Second, because National Guard and Reserve servicemembers integrate on the battlefield with 

active-duty branches, operate in disaster relief situations, and are mobilized within the United States 

for missions (including homeland security), the National Guard and Reserve should strive to mirror 

the racial, ethnic, and gender demographic diversity of the United States.

Third, because of the military/civilian duality of the Reserve Component and because Reserve 

servicemembers integrate with active-duty forces, the National Guard and Reserve, with their 

particular institutional characteristics, add a different dimension of diversity to the Armed Forces: 

structural diversity.

These three issues form the general backdrop for what is examined in this paper. The first part of 

the paper provides necessary background information on the Reserve Component and supplies a 

discussion of diversity, placing particular emphasis on issues of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity 

and on structural diversity. This background information helps frame the paper’s second piece: an 

analysis of the recommendations approved by the Commission at large but considered from a 

Reserve Component perspective.

The subcommittee examined each of the Commission’s recommendations at length. When a 

recommendation spoke directly to the diversity issues raised by the National Guard and Reserve 

Subcommittee, the recommendation was left unchanged, and the subcommittee did not comment on 

it. Although these recommendations are briefly discussed in this paper, for details, readers should 

consult the relevant decision papers.

In cases when a recommendation did not fully address the diversity issues specific to the Reserve 

Component, the subcommittee developed possible modifications for the Commission’s 

consideration. Finally, when the existing recommendations did not attend to diversity issues 

particular to the National Guard and Reserve, the subcommittee proposed new recommendations to 

be discussed by the Commission. This paper details the final versions of these Commission-approved 

subcommittee recommendations.3

 3

 The recommendations discussed in this decision paper are the Commission-approved, topic-specific 

recommendations that resulted from the Commission’s understanding and interpretation of the findings from this 

subcommittee. Following the approval of all of the subcommittee-specific recommendations, the Commission 

developed its final recommendations by combining recommendations across subcommittees to reduce overlap and 

repetition. Therefore, the recommendations presented in this paper do not map directly to the recommendations 

presented in the Commission’s forthcoming final report.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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A RELEVANT AND DIVERSE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE

This section presents three topics: the structure and significance of Reserve Component manpower; 

racial, ethnic, and gender characteristics of the Reserve Component; and structural diversity. The 

section on manpower structure describes how the National Guard and Reserve are organized and 

how the Reserve Component compares with the Active Component in terms of size. The section on 

demographic characteristics illustrates how the National Guard and Reserve compare with their 

respective Active Component counterparts in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender. It also includes 

comparisons with external benchmarks, such as the population eligible for military service and the 

U.S. population as a whole. These statistics provide a basic measure of demographic diversity in the 

Reserve Component. The structural diversity section discusses the institutional features that 

characterize the Reserve Component and the differences that distinguish it from the Active 

Component. The section emphasizes those characteristics that play a role in the integration of 

Reserve and Active Component servicemembers.

By emphasizing these issues, the subcommittee’s findings are framed in terms of the importance 

of the Reserve Component, given its size; in terms of racial, ethnic, and gender representation 

relative to the Active Component and to the U.S. population as a whole; and in terms of the 

integration of the Reserve Component into the total force.

The Structure and Significance of Reserve Component Manpower

In total, the Reserve Component constitutes almost 50 percent of U.S. military personnel and 

consists of seven components, divided into two groups:4

• National Guard

– Army National Guard

– Air National Guard

• Reserve

– U.S. Army Reserve

– U.S. Navy Reserve

– U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

– Air Force Reserve

– Coast Guard Reserve.

The role of the Reserve Component, as codified in Title 10, Section 10102, is

to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in 

the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other 

times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed 

forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the 

regular components.

 4

 This list does not include the United States Health Service Reserve Corps, which is a uniformed service but 

not an armed service.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Title 10 gives the Reserve Component a federal mission and puts all the Reserve Components 

under federal control. However, based in Article 1, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, and regulated 

by Title 10 and Title 32, the National Guard also has a state mission. Each state or territory can 

employ its National Guard force, which is under the command and control of the Governor of that 

state or territory.5

 The National Guard, then, can be characterized as 54 organizations under the 

command and control of the Governors of each state, unless otherwise recalled into federal duty.

Thus, the main difference between the National Guard and the other Reserve Components is 

that, although the Reserve’s missions are exclusively federal in nature, the National Guard falls under 

the purview of both federal and state governments, depending on the mission.

The Manpower Structure of the Reserve Component

Organization

Figure 1 shows the principal categories and various subcategories of the Reserve Component 

personnel. Issue Paper #53 describes each of the categories and subcategories in detail, but only the 

following major categories are included here: the Ready Reserve, which includes the Selected 

Reserve; the Standby Reserve; and the Retired Reserve.

The Ready Reserve is composed of National Guard and Reserve members—organized in units or 

as individuals—who can be called to active duty during war or a national emergency. This category is 

divided into three subcategories. Here and throughout this paper, the focus is on the Selected 

Reserve because reservists in the Selected Reserve are the primary source of augmentees to active 

forces and because they actively train throughout the year.6

 Selected reservists are designated by their 

respective Services as essential to initial wartime missions and can be called into active duty when the 

President issues a mobilization order.7

The Standby Reserve is made up of several different types of personnel, including those who 

maintain Reserve affiliation but who are not in the Ready Reserve, reservists who have been 

designated key civilian employees, and reservists who have a temporary hardship or disability. 

Personnel in the Standby Reserve are not required to train or be part of units. Rather, the Standby 

Reserve is made up of trained individuals who can be mobilized if necessary in order to fulfill 

manpower needs in specific areas.

 5

 This dual role has several legal implications for the National Guard. One of the most important implications is 

that, although the Posse Comitatus Act proscribes the use of the military for the enforcement of civil law, the 

National Guard is only bound by this act when in federal service. Other legal exceptions bestow law enforcement 

authority on the Coast Guard and allow the President to use the military to control internal insurrections and other 

violence.

Note that, throughout this paper, in the context of the National Guard, the word states refers to states, 

territories, and the District of Columbia, unless otherwise noted.

The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard. 

Usually, this responsibility is delegated through the Secretary of Defense to the Commanding General Joint Force 

Headquarters, District of Columbia National Guard, who is the equivalent of the Adjutant Generals in the states 

and other territories.

6

 Selected Reserve servicemembers train a minimum of one weekend a month and two consecutive weeks in a given 

year.

7 The actual language from DoD Instruction 1215.06 is, “The Selected Reserve consists of those units and 

individuals in the Ready Reserve designated by their respective Service, and approved by the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, as so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority over all other Reserves” (U.S. 

Department of Defense, 2008b).
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Figure 1. Reserve Component Manpower Categories

SOURCE: Adapted from Office of the Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), 2005.

The Retired Reserve is made up of officers and enlisted personnel who are eligible to receive 

retirement pay for their military service. They can be involuntarily called to active duty in the event of 

full mobilization.

Size

Reserve manpower, with a total of about 1.28 million people, constitutes an major portion of overall 

military end strength. Indeed, the Selected Reserve constitutes more than one-third of the force. 

When the Standby Reserve and Retired Reserve are also included, the Reserve portion jumps to 

nearly 50 percent.

Tables 1 and 2 show, by Service, Reserve and active-duty manpower as percentages of the total 

force. The last row of each table combines all Services to show percentages for the entire U.S. 

military. Table 1 focuses on the Selected Reserve, and Table 2 looks at total Reserve manpower—

Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve—as a percentage of each Service’s total 

military strength. To make comparisons with Active Component counterparts, the Army Reserve is 

combined with the Army National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve is combined with the Air 

National Guard. The data used to create the tables come from September 2008 snapshots from the 

Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) (found at Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008). Issue 

Paper #53 shows the raw numbers that underlie the percentages presented here.

As Table 1 shows, when Selected Reserve personnel from all Services are combined, Selected 

Reservists made up just over 37 percent of the total force. The Army stands out with a Reserve share 

that surpassed its Active share; in the Air Force, about one-third of its total strength came from the 

Reserve.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Table 1. Selected Reserve and Active-Duty Percentages, by Service

Service Selected Reserve Active Duty

Army 50.8% 49.2%

Coast Guard 16.1% 83.9%

Air Force 35.1% 64.9%

Marine Corps 15.9% 84.1%

Navy 17.2% 82.8%

All Services 37.2% 62.8%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

In Table 2, all categories of Reserve personnel (i.e., Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired 

Reserve) are included. When the Services are combined, Reserve strength is shown to have 

represented nearly 50 percent of the total manpower of the U.S. military. Reserve shares in the Army 

and Air Force were around 50 percent, and shares in the remaining Services were between 25 percent 

and 34 percent.

Table 2. Total Reserve and Active-Duty Percentages of Total Military Strength, by Service

Service

Reserve

(Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and 

Retired Reserve) Active Duty

Army 56.8% 43.2%

Coast Guard 25.9% 74.1%

Air Force 47.9% 52.1%

Marine Corps 34.0% 66.0%

Navy 33.3% 66.7%

All Services 47.4% 52.6%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

As this section shows, the Reserve Component has been an important source of manpower for 

the U.S. military, representing over one-third of the total force when only Selected Reservists are 

included and more than half when all Reserve manpower is taken into account. With this in mind, 

the next section presents the racial, ethnic, and gender profiles of the Reserve Components.

Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Characteristics of the Reserve Component

The focus of this subsection is on racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the National Guard and 

Reserve. First, by looking at both officers and enlisted personnel, it compares the racial, ethnic, and 

gender composition of each of the Reserve and Active Components. Second, it presents a 

comparison of the National Guard and Reserve, in aggregate, against two external benchmarks: the 

U.S. population as a whole and a proxy eligible population.

This discussion serves several purposes. First, it provides a general understanding of demographic 

representation in the National Guard and Reserve, essentially giving a snapshot of where the Reserve 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Component was at the time the data was collected in 2008. Second, it highlights similarities and 

differences between the Reserve and Active Components in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender. 

Third, it reveals those areas in which demographic representation may have to improve if the goal is 

for the force to mirror the population that it serves.

Throughout this discussion, it is important to keep in mind that, as highlighted in the previous 

subsection, Reserve manpower constitutes a large portion of the total force, even when only the 

Selected Reserve is taken into account. Therefore, any change in demographic representation in the 

Reserve would be reflected in the makeup of the total force.

Comparing the Reserve Component with the Active Component

To better understand how the racial, ethnic, and gender profiles of the Active Component compare 

with the Selected Reserve in each of the Reserve Components, this section presents side-by-side 

comparisons in Figures 2–5.

As in the previous subsection, the data are snapshots based on DMDC data from September 

2008. For a more detailed breakdown of the information provided here, and for the raw numbers that 

underlie the percentages shown in the following figures, see the demographic profile issue papers and 

their respective appendixes.8

Figures 2 and 3 show the percentages of women in the officer corps and the enlisted ranks, 

respectively. Figures 4 and 5 show the same information for minorities, with all race and ethnicity 

categories combined into a single “minority” category in order to contrast it with non-Hispanic 

whites. The minority category includes non-Hispanic Asian Pacific Islanders (API, NH), nonHispanic blacks (black, NH), Hispanics, and non-Hispanic others (American Indians, Alaska 

natives, and those reporting more than one race). It does not include “unknown,” and it does not 

further categorize by gender. That is, both women and men are included in the categories used 

Figures 4 and 5. For detailed breakdowns by race and ethnicity, see the issue papers listed above.

For two primary reasons, caution is urged in the interpretation of the percentages presented in 

this section. First, in some cases, because the numbers that underlie the percentages are so small, any 

change could have resulted in large differences in percentage shares. For example, as pointed out in 

Issue Paper #54, women constituted 11.1 percent of the flag/general officer corps in the Marine 

Corps Reserve and 0.0 percent in the Coast Guard Reserve. This difference of over 11 percentage 

points seems very large. However, if there had been just one fewer female flag/general officer in the 

Marine Corps Reserve, the female share in that component would have fallen to 0.0 percent, erasing 

the difference between the two organizations. Second, because the analysis presented here does not 

include information about why differences across Components exist, it would be inappropriate to 

interpret differences in the profiles presented here as evidence of the presence or lack of 

discrimination in the Reserve, the Active Component, or any of the individual Services. The 

numbers presented in this section are intended to be descriptive of particular issues in the Services 

rather than prescriptive.

Female Representation: Officers

As shown in Figure 2, with regard to ranks O-1 through O-6, the Air Force Reserve, the Army 

Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve stand out, with female shares of more than 21 percent. In the 

case of the Air Force Reserve and the Army Reserve, around one-quarter of the O-1 through O-6 

officer population was made up of women. Of the Active Components, the Air Force, with 18.4 

 8 Specifically, see Issue Paper #13, Issue Paper #19, Issue Paper #44, Issue Paper #54, and Issue Paper #55.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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percent, had the largest female share. In most cases, when the Active Components are compared 

with their respective Reserve Components, female representation is shown to have been higher in the 

Reserve.

Two exceptions are the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard, whose shares of 

females were lower than the shares of females in the Air Force and Army, respectively. In some cases, 

the differences in percentages are large. For example, the female share in the Air Force Reserve was 

over 25 percent, and the female share in the Air Force was 18.4 percent—nearly 7 percentage points 

lower. Similarly, the Army Reserve share was 24.6 percent, and the Army share was 16.9 percent.

In the case of flag/general officers, because their numbers were so small, any change in gender 

makeup could have drastically affected the percentages. Keeping that in mind, two observations need 

to be made. First, with the exception of the Marine Corps Reserve and the Navy Reserve, female 

representation across the board fell in the flag/general officer ranks. Second, comparing flag/general 

officers in each Reserve Component with flag/general officers in their respective Active Components 

shows that female representation, in most cases, was higher, albeit slightly, in the Reserve. Notable 

exceptions are the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve, with 12.5-percent female representation 

in the Active Component but 0.0-percent representation in the Reserve, and the Air Force and Air 

National Guard, with a 9.5-percent female share in the Air Force and an 8.6-percent share in the Air 

National Guard.

Figure 2. Percentage of Female Officers, by Component and Grade, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

NOTES: ANG = Air National Guard. ARNG = Army National Guard. USAR = U.S. Army Reserve. USNR = U.S. Navy Reserve. USMCR = U.S. 

Marine Corps Reserve. AFR = Air Force Reserve. CGR = Coast Guard Reserve (CGR). USAF = U.S. Air Force. USA = U.S. Army. USCG = U.S. 

Coast Guard. USMC = U.S. Marine Corps. USN = U.S. Navy

Female Representation: Enlisted

As in the case of the officer population, Figure 3 shows that female shares were larger in the junior 

enlisted ranks than they were in the senior enlisted ranks in both the Reserve and Active 

Components, but the differences tended to be less dramatic in the enlisted population than in the 

officer population. For example, consider the Air Force Reserve. Women constituted over 25 percent 

of the O-1 through O-6 officer population but only 9.5 percent of the flag/general officer 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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population. In contrast, although the lower ranks of the enlisted population in the Air Force Reserve 

also consisted of over 25 percent women, the female share dropped only a few percentage points (to 

21.8 percent) in the senior ranks.

Figure 3. Percentage of Female Enlisted Personnel, by Component and Rank, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

Female representation was generally higher in the Reserve Component than in the Active 

Component both for ranks E-1 through E-6 and for senior enlisted personnel. In some cases, the 

differences were large. For example, in the E-1 through E-6 population in the Army, the female 

share was 13.5 percent. The Army Reserve share, in contrast, was more than 10 percentage points 

higher, at 24.4 percent. Female representation in the Navy was about 5 percentage points lower than 

in the Navy Reserve. The same proves true when the E-1 through E-6 populations in the Air Force 

and the Air National Guard are compared. Large differences were also evident in the senior ranks. 

Female shares in the Navy, for example, were about 10 percentage points lower than in the Navy 

Reserve. Women constituted 21.8 percent of the senior enlisted population in the Air Force Reserve 

but only 13.5 percent in the Air Force.

There are a few exceptions to the general results discussed above. In the E-1 through E-6 ranks, 

female representation in the Air Force was greater than it was in the Air National Guard, although 

not by much—20.9 percent compared with 19.2 percent. This also proved true when comparing the 

Marine Corps (women had a 6.3-percent share) with the Marine Corps Reserve (women had a 4.8-

percent share). In the E-7 through E-9 ranks, the female share of the population was higher in the 

Army (11.0 percent) than it was in the Army National Guard (9.5 percent). The same proved true 

when comparing the female share in the Marine Corps (5.2 percent) with female share in the Marine 

Corps Reserve (4.6 percent).

Minority Representation: Officers

Figure 4 shows that, in the O-1 through O-6 officer population the Coast Guard Reserve, with 31-

percent minority representation, stands out when compared with the other Components. However, 

as noted in Issue Paper #54, this percentage is likely inaccurately high. Research for that issue paper 

revealed that representation in the other, NH category—one of the four categories grouped to create 

the “minority” category presented here—was significantly higher than it was in the other 
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Services/components. According to communications between Coast Guard representatives and the 

Commission, this is likely due to a systematic default inaccuracy that improperly recorded the race 

and ethnicity of some members in both the officer and enlisted populations of the Coast Guard’s 

Active and Reserve Components. The Coast Guard has contacted affected members, and future data 

should not contain this inaccuracy.

Figure 4. Percentage of Minority Officers, by Component and Grade, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008

Notable minority shares in the O-1 through O-6 ranks include those of the Army Reserve, with 

27.8 percent, and the Army, with 22.6 percent. Both organizations reported relatively high 

percentages of minority officers. In most cases, compared with their respective Reserve Components, 

the Active Components had larger minority shares in the O-1 through O-6 ranks. Exceptions 

include the Air Force Reserve, which had the essentially same minority share as the Air Force (14.3 

percent and 14.2 percent, respectively), and the Army Reserve, which had a larger minority share 

than the Army (27.8 percent and 22.6 percent, respectively). In addition, the Coast Guard Reserve 

had a larger share than the Coast Guard (31.0 percent and 19.7 percent, respectively); however, as 

noted earlier, the Coast Guard percentages may be inaccurate.

When the minority share in an Active Component was larger than its respective Reserve 

Component, the difference in percentage share was generally fairly small. In only one case did the 

difference exceed 5 percentage points: that of the Army (22.6 percent) and the Army National Guard 

(15.9 percent).

In all cases, minority representation declined in the flag/general officer ranks. Note, however, 

that the flag/general officer population was very small, so any change in raw numbers could have 

significantly affected the percentages. Keeping this in mind, the following observations about the 

flag/general ranks can be made. The Army Reserve, with 14.7 percent, had the largest minority 

share; the Army National Guard, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Army followed, each with 

minority shares greater than 10 percent. In general, the Reserve Components had larger minority 

shares than their respective Active Components. The three exceptions are the Air Force (5.5 percent) 

and Air Force Reserve (4.1 percent), the Coast Guard (7.5 percent) and Coast Guard Reserve (0.0 

percent), and the Navy (6.5 percent) and Navy Reserve (4.4 percent). However, as noted earlier, the 

Coast Guard percentages may be inaccurate. With the exception of the Coast Guard, the difference 
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in percentage share of minority representation in flag/general officers ranks between the Active 

Components and their respective Reserve Components never exceeded 5 percentage points.

Minority Representation: Officers

Figure 5 shows that, in the E-1 through E-6 population, the Navy, Navy Reserve, and Army Reserve 

all had minority shares of over 40 percent. Minority representation in the Army and Air Force 

Reserve followed closely behind, with percentages in the mid-30s. Comparing each Reserve 

Component with its respective Active Component reveals that minority percentages in the E-1 

through E-6 ranks were generally greater in the Active Component than in the Reserve. The 

difference is especially notable when the Army, with a 36.1-percent minority share, is compared with 

the Army National Guard, which had a 25.4-percent minority share. In two cases, a Reserve 

Component had a larger minority share than its Active counterpart: that of the Air Force Reserve 

and the Air Force (33.7 percent and 28.5 percent, respectively) and that of the Army Reserve and the 

Army (41.1 percent and 36.1 percent, respectively).

Figure 5. Percentage of Minority Enlisted Personnel, by Component and Grade, September 2008

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008.

Unlike the officer population, whose minority shares decreased in the senior ranks in every 

component, in the enlisted population, minority shares sometimes increased in the senior ranks. This 

was the case for the Army Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Army, and the Marine Corps. 

These same components also had the largest minority shares in their senior ranks, ranging between 

approximately 35 percent and 45 percent. Comparing each Reserve Component with its active-duty 

counterpart reveals that, in all but one case (the Army and Army Reserve), minority representation 

was higher in the Active Component. The differences were sometimes quite large. For example, the 

Army minority share of the senior enlisted ranks was 45.2 percent, and the Army National Guard 

share was nearly 25 percentage points lower. Similarly, in the Navy, minority representation was 36 

percent; in the Navy Reserve, it was 22.2 percent.
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Summary

Comparing female representation in the Active Components with female representation in the 

Reserve counterparts reveals that, in general, women were better represented in the Reserve 

Components. This was true for both officers and enlisted personnel and in both lower and upper pay 

grades. In contrast, in terms of minority shares, the Active Component, in general, tended to have 

higher minority representation. This was especially true in the enlisted ranks in both the lower and 

upper pay grades. The difference is less notable in the O-1 through O-6 officer ranks. In the 

flag/general officer corps, the Reserve Components, in most cases, had larger minority shares than 

their active-duty counterparts. Services in both the Reserve and Active Components tended to have 

lower minority and female representation among flag/general officers than in the O-1 through O-6 

officer ranks. This was also the case among senior enlisted personnel when compared with the E-1 

through E-6 population, although there were more exceptions.

Comparing the Reserve Component with the U.S. Population

As part of its tasking from Congress, the Commission examined how demographic representation in 

the military compares with the demographic characteristics of the U.S. population in general. The 

relevance of this comparison stems from the general belief “that a force reflecting society is . . . likely 

to respect societal values, advance societal goals, and receive societal support” (Kirby & Thie, 1997).

In the last few years, prominent government and military leaders have echoed this sentiment. In 

February 2008, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, said, “The Navy must 

reflect the face of the nation. When the nation looks at its Navy, it should see itself reflected back. 

From diversity we cross rank, we draw different perspectives, we make ourselves better and that’s why 

it’s important” (Roughead, 2008). In the congressional record from June 25, 2009, Congressman 

Elijah Cummings was quoted as saying, “My passion is to ensure that our armed services are 

representative of America and that the leadership pipeline reflects our Nation’s diversity” (quoted in 

Issue Paper #9). As “citizen warriors,” it is important that Reserve Component servicemembers 

reflect the demographics of the nation. In many ways, they are the face of the military in 

communities around the United States.

The concept that the Armed Forces should mirror the nation, demographically speaking, is 

particularly relevant in the case of the National Guard, and especially in the states that each of the 

“54 National Guards” serve. This is because these units are often called upon by state governments to 

serve in domestic operations in the areas where they are based. Although there is still work to be 

done, the National Guard recognizes the importance of the issue. As Felton Page, then the National 

Guard Bureau’s (NGB’s) equal opportunity and civil rights director, noted in an interview for a 

Department of Defense (DoD) news article, “gone are the days when an all-white Guard unit would 

go into a predominantly black neighborhood to maintain order, as during the 1965 riots in Los 

Angeles” (Smith, 2008).

Unlike the National Guard, the Reserve is, at all times, under the control of the federal 

government, and it does not have a specific state mission. Therefore, within the Reserve, the 

emphasis on diversity centers primarily on representing the nation as a whole, as opposed to the 

specific geographic areas where units are based. However, there is a relationship between the 

demographics of an area and the demographics of Reserve members located within that area. And 

although the Reserve does not have a mission attached to any specific geography, the dual 

military/civilian life of Reserve members does link them to their locations because of their jobs and 

families.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

13

Tables 3–5 compare the benchmarks established in Issue Paper #26 and the demographic 

characteristics of the Reserve and National Guard. The focus in this section is on national 

benchmarks, so this paper does not provide statistics below the national level. However, as discussed 

above, the subcommittee believes that, for both the National Guard and the Reserve, benchmarks at 

the state and community levels are particularly important. As a result, one of the National Guard and 

Reserve Subcommittee recommendations focuses specifically on that issue. However, National 

Guard and Reserve data available to the Commission did not supply credible statistics at the state 

level.

In this section, three benchmark populations are considered: the U.S. population as a whole, a 

proxy eligible population, and the Active Component as a whole. Although the Active Component 

population and the U.S. population are clearly defined in terms of demographics, how to define the 

eligible population is less straightforward. The effects of subtle differences between the Services and 

their eligibility requirements,9

 such as those related to military qualification test scores and weight, 

are not observable for all portions of the U.S. population.10 So, although it is not possible to identify 

the exact eligible population, it is possible to construct a proxy eligible population from data that are 

closely correlated with eligibility requirements and observable to researchers. The results presented 

here reflect the proxy eligible population defined in Issue Paper #26.11

 9 For example, the Services can issue waivers that admit into their ranks people who would otherwise be ineligible.

10 For example, only those who which to enter into military service take the qualification tests. This information is 

not observed for the rest of the population.

11 Issue Paper #26 states:

Due to the difficulty of estimating a “true” eligible population, a proxy for the 

eligible population is often constructed. Such proxies are used in the DoD 

Population Representation documents. For instance, these reports rely on CPS 

data, using citizens ages 18–44 as a civilian comparison for the enlisted force and 

using citizen college graduates ages 21–49 as a civilian comparison for the officer 

commissioned corps. In the data we present . . . , we further refine the eligible 

population comparisons, using CPS [Current Population Survey] data to define 

proxy eligible populations through age, citizenship, education, and labor-force 

participation. Specifically, our proxy populations were the following:

• Junior enlisted (E-1–E-4): Active labor-force participant (i.e., currently 

working or seeking employment), high-school education or equivalent, 

between ages 19 and 30; no citizenship requirement because 

noncitizens can enlist and subsequently gain citizenship through 

military service

• Midlevel enlisted (E-5–E-6): Citizen, active labor-force participant, 

high-school education or equivalent, between ages 23 and 39

• Senior enlisted (E-7–E-9): Citizen, active labor-force participant, 

high-school education or equivalent, between ages 31 and 47

• Company-grade officer (O-1–O-3): Citizen, active labor-force 

participant, college education, between ages 23 and 40

• Field-grade officer (O-4–O-6): Citizen, active labor-force participant, 

college education, between ages 33 and 52

• Flag-grade officer (O-7–O-10): Citizen, active labor-force participant, 

college education, between ages 48 and 59.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

14

The military data presented come from the September 2008 DMDC datasets, and the data used 

to construct the civilian benchmarks presented in Issue Paper #26 and reproduced here come from 

the October 2008 CPS (found at U.S. Census Bureau, 2008).12

Officer and enlisted populations are considered by pay grade. Officers are divided into three 

groups: O-1 through O-3, O-4 through O-6, and O-7 through O-9. Enlisted personnel are also 

divided into three groups: E-1 through E-3, E-4 through E-6, and E-7 through E-9. Here, each 

component is not addressed separately. Rather, the five Reserve Components are grouped under 

“Reserve,” and the two National Guard Components are grouped under “National Guard.” Likewise, 

the Active Component is not broken out by individual Service.13 Each table also includes a column 

with statistics for the entire Reserve Component (i.e., the National Guard and Reserve together).

Discussions accompany each table, and a summary paragraph is included at the end of each 

discussion. Female shares are considered first, and minority shares, broken out by race and ethnicity 

category, are discussed second.

Female Representation: Officers and Enlisted

Before examining the percentages specifically, it is important to contextualize female representation 

in the military, which, at all ranks—in both the Reserve Component and the Active Component—

has fallen very short of reaching either the U.S. population benchmark or the eligible population 

benchmark. As discussed in Issue Paper #26,

Women make up about half of the U.S. population, but, with the 

exception of a Navy policy of seeking an enlisted force that is 20-percent 

female, we have not found any DoD representation “benchmark” for 

women.

There are two contributors to uncertainty about where to set a 

benchmark for women. First, women are currently prohibited from 

serving in combat arms. The proportion of restricted positions is not 

consistent across Services. Only two-thirds of positions in the Army and 

the Marine Corps are open to women, while nine of ten in the Navy are 

and almost all positions in the Air Force are. In the current system, 

women have a much greater chance of reaching top leadership positions 

in the Navy and the Air Force than in the Army and the Marine Corps 

(Harrell & Miller, 1997). . . .

Second, women have a lower propensity than males to serve in the 

military. According to the 2008 Youth Poll, female propensity is about 

half that of males (Yanosky et al., 2009). This implies that one might 

expect women to constitute a maximum of one-third of the military. 

Such a figure does not take into account limitations on careers for 

women in the military. However, these conditions (i.e., propensity to 

 12 For more-detailed information on the data, as well as a detailed discussion of how these particular benchmarks 

were established, see Issue Paper #26.

13 Breakdowns by individual component are provided in the prior section, “Comparing the Reserve Component with 

the Active Component.” See also the demographic profile issue papers, which are Issue Paper #13, Issue Paper #19, 

Issue Paper #44, Issue Paper #54, and Issue Paper #55.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

15

serve and restrictions on female service in certain military positions) 

could change if societal expectations shift over time.

This quotation mentions two specific benchmarks: a goal of 20-percent female representation in

the enlisted ranks of the Navy and a minimum of 33-percent female representation in the military, 

based on current female propensity to serve but not including limitations on careers. However, if the 

goal is for the Armed Forces to mirror the population that it serves, then the benchmark for women 

should be set at 51 percent, which is the female share of the U.S. population. Changes in policy and 

military culture could help close the gap between current representation and this benchmark. Many 

of the Commission’s recommendations address this issue.

With this in mind, the following discussion centers on how female representation in the Reserve 

Component compares with female representation in the United States and in a proxy eligible 

population. Table 3 presents this figures.

As Table 3 shows, with regard to the lower ranks of the officer population, although no group in 

either the Reserve or Active Component approximated the U.S. population benchmark or the proxy 

eligible population benchmark, the Reserve stands out, with 27.05-percent female representation. 

This was about 9 percentage points higher than the Active Component and about 12 percentage 

points higher than the National Guard. However, with respect to both external benchmarks, it still 

fell about 25 percentage points short.

Table 3. Female Reserve Component, Active Component, and External Demographic Profiles

Reserve Component Benchmarks

National Guard Reserve

Total for the 

Reserve 

Component

Active 

Component U.S. Population

Proxy Eligible 

Population

Officer

O-1–O-3 15.48% 27.05% 21.09% 18.20% 51.00% 52.70%

O-4–O-6 12.02% 19.20% 16.86% 12.90% 51.00% 49.40%

O-7–O-10 6.21% 11.07% 8.19% 6.40% 51.00% 47.60%

Enlisted

E-1–E-4 17.56% 22.07% 19.38% 14.70% 51.00% 45.60%

E-5–E-6 13.34% 20.67% 16.51% 14.30% 51.00% 45.10%

E-7–E-9 12.74% 19.90% 15.96% 10.10% 51.00% 46.60%

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

Moving from the junior to the midlevel pay grades, it is evident that female representation 

declined across the board, although female representation in the Reserve, which had a 19.2-percent 

female share, was higher than both the National Guard, which had a 12.02-percent share, and the 

Active Component, which had a 12.90-percent share. Moving to the senior pay grades, it is evident 

that female representation declined further: Women constituted 11.07 percent of the Reserve but 

only 6.21 percent of the National Guard and 6.40 percent of the Active Component.

The trends were similar in the enlisted population. In the E-1 through E-4 ranks, female 

representation in the Reserve, which was made up of 22.07 percent women, was about 8 percentage 

points higher than in the Active Component and 5 percentage points higher than in the National 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

16

Guard. Representation fell through the midlevel and senior pay grades, although not as sharply as it 

did in the officer corps. For example, the table shows that, in the total for the Reserve Component, 

women constituted 21.09 percent of the junior officer corps and 8.19 percent of the senior officer 

corps—a difference of about 13 percentage points. In the enlisted ranks, women constituted 19.38 

percent of the population in the junior pay grades and 15.96 percent in the senior pay grades. In this 

case, the difference was only 3.42 percentage points.

Minority Representation—Officers

Table 4 shows how the officer corps in the Reserve and National Guard compared with the U.S. 

population and with a proxy eligible population in terms of race and ethnicity. The focus is on six 

specific groups: Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic (API); black, non-Hispanic (black); 

Hispanic; other, non-Hispanic (other); unknown; and white, non-Hispanic (white).

Table 4. Officer Reserve Component, Active Component, and External Racial and Ethnic Demographic 

Profiles

Reserve Component Benchmarks

National Guard Reserve

Total for the 

Reserve 

Component

Active 

Component U.S. Population

Proxy Eligible 

Population

Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic

O-1–O-3 2.95% 4.87% 3.89% 4.30% 4.60% 6.10%

O-4–O-6 1.60% 2.64% 2.30% 2.80% 4.60% 5.90%

O-7–O-10 1.69% 1.64% 1.67% 0.50% 4.60% 5.30%

Black, non-Hispanic

O-1–O-3 8.09% 14.23% 11.07% 8.80% 12.20% 8.50%

O-4–O-6 5.83% 9.81% 8.51% 8.20% 12.20% 8.40%

O7–O-10 4.24% 4.92% 4.52% 5.40% 12.20% 7.10%

Hispanic

O-1–O-3 5.29% 7.20% 6.22% 5.60% 15.40% 6.60%

O-4–O-6 3.88% 4.61% 4.38% 4.40% 15.40% 5.50%

O-7–O-10 3.67% 2.87% 3.34% 1.60% 15.40% 3.90%

Other, non-Hispanic

O-1–O-3 0.21% 0.72% 0.46% 1.50% 2.10% 1.30%

O-4–O-6 0.24% 0.50% 0.42% 0.80% 2.10% 1.10%

O-7–O-10 0.56% 0.00% 0.33% 0.10% 2.10% 0.90%

Unknown

O-1–O-3 2.50% 4.15% 3.30% 5.80% N/A N/A

O-4–O-6 1.28% 3.62% 2.86% 3.40% N/A N/A

O-7–O-10 0.56% 3.28% 1.67% 0.10% N/A N/A
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Reserve Component Benchmarks

National Guard Reserve

Total for the 

Reserve 

Component

Active 

Component U.S. Population

Proxy Eligible 

Population

White, non-Hispanic

O-1–O-3 80.46% 68.27% 74.55% 74.10% 65.80% 77.50%

O-4–O-6 86.72% 78.39% 81.10% 80.40% 65.80% 79.10%

O-7–O-10 88.98% 87.30% 88.29% 92.30% 65.80% 82.80%

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

NOTES: N/A = not applicable. It was not possible to calculate benchmarks for the “unknown” category.

Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic. With regard to APIs, in the lower officer ranks, the 

Reserve had the highest representation (4.87 percent). This compared favorably with the U.S. 

population (4.60 percent) but fell slightly short of the proxy eligible population, which was 6.10 

percent. It was slightly higher than the Active Component, which had a 4.30-percent API share. In 

all cases, API representation decreased with rank. The total for the composite Reserve Component, 

for example, fell from 3.89 percent in the junior officer ranks to 1.67 percent in the flag/general 

officer ranks.

Black, non-Hispanic. In the lower officer ranks, black representation was highest in the Reserve, 

which had a 14.23-percent share; this was 2 percentage points higher than the U.S. population and 

nearly 6 percentage points higher than the proxy eligible population. The National Guard share (8.09 

percent) was similar to the proxy eligible population (8.50 percent) and to the Active Component 

population (8.80 percent). Across the board, representation declined with rank. At midlevel ranks, 

the Reserve Component had an 8.51-percent black share, the Active Component had an 8.20-

percent black share, and the U.S. population had a 12.20-percent black share. The proxy eligible 

population was 8.40 percent black. Compared with the lower ranks, at the flag/general officer ranks, 

black representation declined substantially, to 4.24 percent in the National Guard, 4.92 percent in 

the Reserve, and 5.40 percent in the Active Component. The benchmarks at this level were 12.20 

percent for the U.S. population and 7.10 percent for the proxy eligible population; both benchmarks 

were markedly higher than actual black representation in the flag/general officer ranks.

Hispanic. Compared with the U.S. population, Hispanic officers in all ranks in both the Active 

and Reserve Components were underrepresented. However, compared with the proxy eligible 

population, the difference was less noticeable. In the lower ranks, the Reserve, with a 7.20-percent 

Hispanic share, came the closest to the 15.40-percent U.S. population benchmark, and the Reserve 

was the only group that surpassed the 6.60-percent proxy eligible population benchmark. Hispanics 

constituted 5.29 percent of the National Guard in ranks O-1 through O-3 and 5.60 percent of the 

same population in the Active Component. As in the other race and ethnicity categories, 

representation decreased with rank, falling a few percentage points in the transition to midlevel ranks 

and then a few more in the transition to the flag/general officer ranks. Although the U.S. population 

benchmark remained constant, the proxy eligible population decreased. With a 3.67-percent 

Hispanic share in the flag/general officer ranks, the National Guard compared favorably with the 

3.90-percent proxy eligible population benchmark but fell significantly short of the 15.40-percent 

U.S. population benchmark. The Reserve had a 2.87-percent Hispanic share, and Hispanics 

constituted only 1.60 percent of the flag/general officer population in the Active Component.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Other, non-Hispanic: The “other” category comprises American Indians, Alaska natives, and a 

category for people reporting more than one race. In both the military and civilian populations, the 

“other” share was small. The U.S. population benchmark was 2.10 percent. The proxy eligible 

population was lower and decreased with rank, from 1.30 percent in the lower officer ranks to 0.90 

percent in the flag/general officer ranks. The Active Component, with 1.50 percent in the lower 

ranks, had the largest “other” share, coming close to the U.S. population benchmark and surpassing 

the proxy eligible population benchmark by 0.20 percentage points. The percentage of officers in the 

“other” category decreased with rank.

Unknown. Unlike civilian data, military data include cases when race and ethnicity are listed as 

“unknown.” It was not possible to calculate benchmarks for this “unknown” category. The 

“unknown” category is included in our calculations because, were it excluded, the proportions for 

other categories would not be computed accurately. Issue Paper #26 discusses in detail the effect of 

including the “unknown” category in the calculations.

White, non-Hispanic. In the case of non-Hispanic whites, representation increased substantially 

with rank, and, compared with the U.S. population benchmark of 65.80 percent, whites were 

overrepresented in all officer ranks and in all components. In many cases, the difference was quite 

large. For example, whites constituted 88.98 percent of the flag/general officer ranks in the National 

Guard—over 23 percentage points higher than the U.S. population benchmark. Comparing the 

Active Component with this benchmark reveals that the difference was even larger (26.5 percentage 

points).

Minority Representation: Enlisted

Table 5 illustrates how the enlisted populations of the Reserve and National Guard compared with 

the U.S. population and a proxy eligible population in terms of race and ethnicity.

Table 5. Enlisted Reserve Component, Active Component, and External Racial and Ethnic Demographic 

Profiles

Reserve Component Benchmarks

National Guard Reserve

Total for 

Reserve 

Component

Active 

Component U.S. Population

Proxy Eligible 

Population

Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic

E-1–E-4 2.40% 4.93% 3.42% 4.00% 4.60% 3.30%

E-5–E-6 2.24% 4.12% 3.05% 4.30% 4.60% 2.60%

E-7–E-9 1.62% 2.36% 1.95% 3.30% 4.60% 2.50%

Black, non-Hispanic

E-1–E-4 13.83% 17.62% 15.35% 15.00% 12.20% 13.60%

E-5–E-6 12.42% 20.01% 15.70% 20.40% 12.20% 15.10%

E-7–E-9 10.52% 24.32% 16.71% 24.60% 12.20% 14.50%

Hispanic

E-1–E-4 8.13% 13.49% 10.29% 11.90% 15.40% 18.00%

E-5–E-6 7.68% 13.38% 10.14% 12.20% 15.40% 14.10%

E-7–E-9 6.21% 8.96% 7.44% 8.60% 15.40% 11.20%
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Reserve Component Benchmarks

National Guard Reserve

Total for 

Reserve 

Component

Active 

Component U.S. Population

Proxy Eligible 

Population

Other, non-Hispanic

E-1–E-4 0.23% 0.79% 0.45% 3.40% 2.10% 2.40%

E-5–E-6 0.30% 0.93% 0.57% 2.30% 2.10% 2.20%

E-7–E-9 0.24% 0.41% 0.32% 1.20% 2.10% 1.80%

Unknown

E-1–E-4 1.48% 1.48% 1.48% 1.00% N/A N/A

E-5–E-6 2.16% 2.56% 2.33% 2.70% N/A N/A

E-7–E-9 1.58% 2.09% 1.81% 3.60% N/A N/A

White, non-Hispanic

E-1–E-4 73.04% 60.46% 67.98% 64.80% 65.80% 62.80%

E-5–E-6 74.48% 58.24% 67.47% 58.30% 65.80% 66.00%

E-7–E-9 79.15% 61.33% 71.16% 58.60% 65.80% 70.00%

SOURCES: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008; U.S. Census Bureau, 2008.

NOTES: N/A = not applicable. It was not possible to calculate benchmarks for the “unknown” category.

Asian and Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic. For the API category, the U.S. population benchmark 

was 4.60 percent. In the lower and midlevel pay grades, the Reserve compared favorably with this 

benchmark, with 4.93- percent and 4.12-percent shares, respectively. The National Guard shares in 

these pay grades were about 2 percentage points lower than the U.S. population benchmark. 

Compared with the proxy eligible population, both the lower and midlevel pay grades in the Reserve 

surpassed the benchmark, and the difference between the benchmark and the API share of the 

National Guard was less pronounced. API shares dropped in the senior pay grades, but, although the 

U.S. population benchmark remained constant, the proxy eligible population benchmark declined, 

making the difference less noticeable.

Black, non-Hispanic. In the Reserve and National Guard, black shares exceed the U.S. 

population benchmark in all but one group: E-7 through E-9 National Guard personnel. In some 

cases, the difference was great. For example, blacks constituted 24.32 percent of the E-7 through E-9 

population in the Reserve, and their share of the general U.S. population was only 12.20 percent—a 

difference of over 12 percentage points. Compared with the proxy eligible population, blacks were 

also overrepresented, although less so than when compared with the general population. For 

example, looking at the total for the Reserve Component shows that blacks constituted 15.35 percent 

of the E-1 through E-4 population, whereas the proxy eligible population was 13.60 percent. Black 

representation fell with rank in the National Guard but increased with rank in the Reserve.

Hispanic. Compared with both the U.S. population benchmark and the proxy eligible population 

benchmark, Hispanics were underrepresented in all pay grades in both the Reserve and Active 

Components. The E-1 through E-4 enlisted Hispanic population in the Reserve, with a 13.49-

percent share, came closest to the 15.40-percent U.S. population benchmark. Hispanic 

representation in the Reserve dropped sharply in the E-7 through E-9 pay grade (to 8.96 percent). 

Compared with the U.S. population benchmark, this was a difference of over 6 percentage points, 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

20

but the difference was only about 2 percentage points when compared with the proxy eligible 

population. The Hispanic share in the National Guard was smaller than in the Reserve in all pay 

grades, and the difference between Hispanic shares in the National Guard and the benchmarks was 

pronounced in some cases. For example, comparing the proxy eligible population benchmark with 

the E-1 through E-4 pay grade reveals a difference of around 10 percentage points. This gap closes 

when the Hispanic share is compared with the U.S. population benchmark. As in the Reserve, 

Hispanic shares fell with rank, but the difference was less noticeable in the National Guard.

Other, non-Hispanic. Representation in the “other” category was small in the Reserve and 

National Guard, ranging from 0.23 percent in the E-1 through E-4 pay grade in the National Guard 

to 0.93 percent in the E-5 through E-6 pay grade in the Reserve. Compared with the U.S. 

population benchmark (2.10 percent) and the proxy eligible population benchmark (2.40 percent, 

2.20 percent, and 1.80 percent), “other” representation in the Reserve and National Guard fell short 

in all pay grades.

Unknown. As noted above, this category is included for completeness in the computation of the 

results.

White, non-Hispanic. Compared with the benchmark population and the proxy eligible 

population, white Reserve members in all enlisted pay grades were underrepresented. In the National 

Guard, however, white shares were greater than both benchmarks in all pay grades. In the case of the 

Reserve, the differences ranged between 4.47 percentage points and 7.56 percentage points below the 

U.S. population benchmark (depending on pay grade). Comparing the E-7 through E-9 population 

with the proxy eligible population shows that the difference was slightly more pronounced (8.67 

percentage points), but, in the case of the E-1 through E-4 population, the difference was much 

smaller (just over 2 percentage points). White shares in the National Guard were larger compared 

with both benchmarks. Depending on pay grade, the differences ranged between 7.24 percentage 

points and 13.35 percentage points over the U.S. population benchmark. Compared with the proxy 

eligible population, the differences were smaller but still hovered between 8 percentage points and 10 

percentage points over the benchmark.

Summary

In summary, in all pay grades in both the officer corps and the enlisted ranks, the Reserve 

Component had a larger female share than the Active Component, but all pay grades lagged 

significantly behind the external benchmarks. Again, if the goal is for the force to mirror the 

demographic characteristics of the population that it serves, then the number of women serving will 

have to increase substantially.

Turning to race and ethnicity, compared with the U.S. population benchmark, whites were 

overrepresented in the officer corps and all other race and ethnicity categories were underrepresented, 

a pattern most noticeable in the upper ranks. As was the case with black and API shares, there were a 

few exceptions in which minority shares in the lower officer ranks compared favorably to or surpassed 

the U.S. population benchmark. Compared with the proxy eligible population, whites were, again, 

overrepresented, and all other race and ethnicity categories were underrepresented. As before, this 

was most noticeable in the upper ranks. However, in the case of the proxy eligible population, the 

differences were less striking. In the lower ranks, the representation of blacks and Hispanics 

compared favorably with the proxy eligible population, even surpassing the benchmark in a few cases; 

in one case, whites were underrepresented.

Compared with the U.S. population and the proxy eligible population benchmarks, in the 

enlisted ranks, whites were underrepresented in the Reserve but overrepresented in the National 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

21

Guard. In many cases, black shares were greater, sometimes significantly greater, than the U.S. 

population benchmark. This difference was less apparent, however, when comparing black 

representation against the proxy eligible population. And, in the case of the National Guard, in the 

midlevel and senior-level pay grades, blacks were underrepresented. In all pay grades and in both the 

Reserve and National Guard, Hispanics were underrepresented, compared with the U.S. population 

and proxy eligible population benchmarks. In many cases, API shares compared favorably with the 

benchmarks, especially in the Reserve and in the lower pay grades. Representation of the “other” 

category in both the Reserve and National Guard was lower than both benchmarks in all cases.

Structural Diversity

The introduction to this paper lists three strategic issues that have served as a backdrop for the work 

of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee: the importance of the size of the Reserve 

Component relative to the size of the overall force, the importance of the Reserve Component 

demographically reflecting the population it serves, and the particular characteristics that differentiate 

the Reserve Component from the Active Component and that affect the way that the Active and 

Reserve Components integrate and interact. The first two issues speak to the significance of 

representation. The last issue adds a new dimension of diversity: structural diversity.

Structural Diversity Defined

Generally speaking, whereas demographic diversity considers race, ethnicity, and gender,14 structural 

diversity focuses on institutional and organizational backgrounds. Structural diversity is based on 

work-related differences and is found in groups made up of people that come from different 

organizations, roles, positions, or ranks. The institutional background that each member brings 

exposes the group to different types of organizational knowledge, skills, and behaviors—that is, to 

diversity.15

Specifically, for the purposes of this paper, structural diversity is defined by those structural 

differences that determine how servicemembers from the Reserve Component integrate with 

servicemembers in the Active Component.

Structural Differences Between the Reserve and Active Components

The main structural differences between the Reserve and Active Components stem from the 

components’ contrasting natures. The Active Component is, by definition, active. Active-duty 

servicemembers are on military duty full time. In contrast, the men and women of the National 

Guard and Reserve serve the nation in their military capacity while at the same time carrying on with 

their civilian and professional lives. Furthermore, also in contrast to those in the Active Component, 

National Guard and Reserve members generally serve in units close to their homes, and part of their 

mission is specifically focused on the states and communities that they serve.

Given the different natures of the Active and the Reserve Components, diversity and 

representation within the Active and the Reserve Components could be analyzed separately. In fact, 

this was the method the Commission followed before the National Guard and Reserve 

Subcommittee was created. Before the subcommittee was created, the Commission’s research and 

 14 Demographic diversity includes not only race, ethnicity, and gender, which are the focus of the Commission’s 

representational concerns, but also other personal characteristics, such as age and religion.

15 Conceptually, the definition of diversity is consistent across sources. See Cummings, 2004, and Issue Paper #3.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

22

recommendations for improving diversity management were solely based on information about the 

Active Component.

However, National Guard and Reserve servicemembers routinely integrate with active-duty 

forces. They provide support within the Active Component ranks and operational capabilities on the 

battlefield. This makes managing structural diversity an operational imperative in that it advances 

effective integration of the Reserve Component into the total force.

Consequently, to help the Commission identify recommendations that aim to improve total force 

integration, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee considered the interaction between the 

Active and Reserve Components and the structural differences between the two.

Operational Requirements and the Integration of the Active and Reserve Components

In the last three decades, the Reserve Component has faced and met increasing operational 

requirements. The shift began in 1990 with Desert Storm and the first involuntary activation of the 

Reserve Component since the Vietnam War.16 Following Desert Storm, continuing through Desert 

Shield, and throughout the 1990s, the tempo of operations in the Reserve Component continued to 

be higher compared with earlier eras.17 However, it was not until the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 

that the use of the Reserve Component expanded dramatically. Reserve servicemembers started 

regularly deploying with active-duty forces, requiring increased interaction between the Active and 

Reserve Components.

Although the Commission does not have direct measures that quantify this interaction, several 

indicators point to an increased use of Reserve forces, which implies increased interaction. These 

indicators include the frequency of mobilizations, the rate of utilization of Reserve Component 

servicemembers, and the number of National Guard and Reserve servicemembers deployed at any 

given time.

For example, in 2003, the Chief of the Army Reserve, Lieutenant General James Helmly, 

reported that “Army Reserve soldiers have been deployed 10 times in the past 12 years for operations 

from Bosnia to Iraq,” adding, “During the 75 years before that, the Army Reserve had been 

mobilized just nine times” (Helmly, 2003). Moreover, the Commission on the National Guard and 

Reserves (2008) reported that use of Reserve Component personnel increased from 12.7 million 

duty-days in fiscal year (FY) 2001 to 61.3 million duty days in FY 2006. Lastly, at their peak 

utilization, National Guard and Reserve servicemembers represented 33 percent of the forces 

deployed to Iraq (Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008).

DoD acknowledged and discussed these increased requirements in DoD Directive 1200.17, 

Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force. The directive states that it is DoD policy 

that the Reserve Components provide capabilities to meet defense requirements “across the full 

spectrum of conflict” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008a). It also states that the Active and Reserve 

Components should be integrated as part of the total force and that the Reserve Components should 

be resourced to meet their operational requirements.

DoD Directive 1200.17 also tasked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and 

the Secretaries of the military departments with managing their Reserve Components as operational 

forces. It noted the importance of providing necessary training to the Reserve Component, of 

ensuring readiness, and of supporting family and employer programs. However, many of these 

programs are in their early stages and, as discussed in the recommendations below, there is still much 

 16 See Duncan, 2004.

17 See Binnendijk & Cordero, 2005.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

23

to be done to ensure proper integration of the Reserve Component into the total force.18 Also, many 

Reserve Component leaders acknowledge that the debate about the role of the Reserve Component 

as a strategic force with increasing operational requirements is still ongoing.19

Structural Diversity and Total Force Integration

Riche et al. (2007) describe the similarities and differences between the Active and Reserve 

Components thus: “On one hand, the organizations have parallel structures and a shared mission; 

on the other hand, they have different mind-sets, different degrees of skill, and different policies, 

as well as different social identities.” This statement could apply to the Active and Reserve 

Component in general or it could apply to any of the Services and their respective Reserve 

Components in particular.

For example, Bell (2005) argues that the Army really has three separate cultures—an Army 

National Guard culture, an Army Reserve culture, and an active-duty Army culture. He argues that 

the increase in Army National Guard and Army Reserve participation in what used to be the sole 

domain of the active Army makes a greater understanding among these three Components mission 

critical.

Riche et al. (2007) describe some of the difficulties related to Active and Reserve Component 

integration. Most arise from ambiguity regarding which elements of personnel control on joint 

assignments rest with which components. Difficulties also stem from differences in policies that 

govern the structure and length of the work day and from support services that are not 

accommodating in terms of working with the Reserve Component.

Kraus et al. (2007) examine deployed servicemembers’ perceptions of the role of group diversity 

in determining performance in the combat environment. The authors’ analysis is based on transcripts 

of interviews and includes a section detailing issues of structural diversity. Although most comments, 

whether positive or negative, related to structural differences between Services, several interviewees

spoke of issues that arose when the Active Component and the Reserve Component worked 

together. For example, an active-duty captain described apprehension about working with National 

Guard or Reserve personnel, noting that there were widespread perceptions that Reserve Component 

servicemembers, compared with servicemembers in the Active Component, are less committed to 

deploying and to getting their jobs done. Some Reserve Component servicemembers described 

feelings of discrimination based on their organizational affiliation.

Although several difficulties have been noted in these studies, Riche et al. (2007) also report that 

deployment overrides some of these issues because of both the close contact between Active and 

Reserve Component servicemembers and their shared mission. In interviews reported in Kraus et al. 

(2007), some positive comments were noted. For example, a major in the Air Force Reserve made 

the following statement: “Believe it or not, reservists brought much more knowledge than some of 

the Active Duty individuals because of their vast experience in the civilian sector and the military 

sector. So, I believe that across the board it was a positive experience” (quoted in Kraus et al., 2007).

As just demonstrated, the structural differences between the Active and Reserve Components 

can, on one hand, cause friction that may detract from the mission. On the other hand, these 

 18 Also note that the degree to which the Reserve Component should transition to a more operational force has been 

extensively debated. See, for example, Graham, 2005. 19 For example, the Air Force Reserve strategy suggests the need to maintain a strategic Reserve while leveraging it 

to provide an operational capability. See Stenner, 2009.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

24

structural differences can bring together different types of experiences that help advance mission 

objectives.

As military operations have become more joint, with the Reserve Component operating 

alongside active-duty personnel and with different Services working together, the importance of 

managing structural diversity has increased. However, there is limited research on structural diversity, 

on its effect on mission accomplishment, and on how to manage it for maximum gains.

Using information gleaned in their focus groups, Riche et al. (2007) provide some guidance for 

managing structural diversity. They note that respondents frequently mentioned wanting more 

information about the other groups that they work with, such as reservists and civilians. Respondents 

also suggested that the policies that govern individual groups should be more similar from one group 

to the next. It was also noted that frequent interaction and a common goal contributed to successful 

working relationships.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING DIVERSITY 

MANAGEMENT IN THE RESERVE COMPONENT

According to its charter, the primary mandate of the MLDC is to conduct a comprehensive 

evaluation and assessment of policies that provide opportunities for the promotion and advancement 

of minority members of the Armed Forces and to provide recommendations for increasing racial, 

ethnic, and gender diversity within the Armed Forces. To support the Commission’s effort, the 

National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee reviewed the Commission’s work, considering the 

particularities of the Reserve Component. It examined diversity issues in the Reserve Component 

and helped the Commission identify strategic areas in which new recommendations were needed.

To carry out its work, the subcommittee examined features that differentiate the Reserve 

Component from the Active Component and tried to identify diversity management issues—as well 

as other institutional factors that can affect diversity in the force—at each stage of a servicemember’s 

career. As previously noted, the background work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee 

highlights three main ideas. First, given the size of the Reserve Component, which constitutes about 

50 percent of total manpower in the Armed Forces, any changes in the demographic makeup of the 

Reserve Component will be reflected in the total force. Second, diversity metrics show that, although 

it is more representative than the Active Component in many respects, the Reserve Component falls 

short of many national population benchmarks. Third, institutional and cultural differences between 

the Active and Reserve Components emphasize the issue of structural diversity in the Armed Forces 

and the importance of the Reserve Component in the current operational environment.

With this background in mind, the next four sections examine the strategic diversity issues that 

led to the recommendations that resulted from the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee’s 

work. The first section provides the Commission’s definition of diversity. The remaining sections 

present the new recommendations in three broad categories: those that address widening the pool of 

people that join the Reserve Component, those that focus on widening the opportunities of 

advancement for those already in service, and those that aim to improve the organizational structures 

that support diversity and diversity management. To provide the reader with a framework within 

which to contextualize diversity issues in the Reserve Component, the Commission’s work on activeduty diversity issues is interweaved with the new recommendations.

Defining Diversity and Diversity Leadership

Definition of Diversity

Diversity Beyond Demographics in the Reserve Component

Diversity means different things to different people. For some, diversity is strictly associated with a 

person’s race or ethnicity, but for others, diversity goes beyond demographic characteristics and 

includes such characteristics as cognitive ability, education, experience, and job type. The 

Commission recognizes that diversity spans many dimensions. Accordingly, the Commission 

recommends that DoD expand its diversity definition to read: “Diversity is all the different 

characteristics and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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values, integral to overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflective of the Nation we 

serve.”20

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes that this definition applies to the 

Reserve Component. Moreover, the broad nature of this definition emphasizes structural diversity as 

one of the aspects of diversity that, together with demographic diversity, are integral to the 

recommendations that the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee advocates in this paper.

The subcommittee placed special emphasis on the concept of structural diversity because doing so 

helped frame the subcommittee’s perspective. Although demographic diversity provides the 

background for most of the Commission’s recommendations, structural diversity forms the backdrop 

for those recommendations that address the particular issues related to the National Guard and 

Reserve.

Moreover, structural diversity is especially relevant to the congressional task that requires the 

Commission to propose a new definition of diversity. Congress asked for a definition of diversity 

that, among other things, is consistent with the vision of DoD for the future workforce. The 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) emphasizes that this vision includes

• more regional and cultural capabilities

• more partner capacity skill sets

• more joint military/civilian capability

• seamless integration between the Reserve and the Active Components

• more specialized skills, such as foreign languages, medicine, and computer network 

operations (Department of Defense, 2010).

The subcommittee discussions that resulted in recommendations endorsed by the Commission 

addressed each of these points. The subcommittee’s recommendations aim to leverage the structural 

differences that distinguish the Reserve and the Active Components, with the ultimate goal of 

creating a more effective total force that is aligned with the QDR’s vision.

Widening the Pool

Outreach, Recruiting, and Retention

In the military’s closed personnel system, the demographic profile of the leadership, and that of the 

force as a whole, depends on past outreach, recruiting, and retention efforts. In an all-volunteer force, 

outreach and recruiting inform the general population about military opportunities and bring in 

qualified personnel. They also determine the demographics of the initial population from which the 

military will develop its leadership. Retention efforts aim to ensure that qualified personnel moving 

through the ranks stay in the military, and, together with branching, assignments, and promotions, 

they shape how the demographic composition of each of the Services evolves through the ranks.

From the perspective of the subcommittee, outreach, recruiting, and retention efforts take on an 

additional dimension in the Reserve Component. In the Active Component personnel system, only 

those who join at the lowest ranks have the opportunity to move up the ranks—that is, it is a closed 

system. In contrast, in the Reserve Component, servicemembers leaving active-duty service can join 

the Reserve Component at any rank, if they are eligible. In fact, about one-third of enlisted personnel 

and almost 90 percent of officers in the Reserve Component come from prior active-duty service.21

 20 See Appendix B for the full text of this recommendation.

21 See Issue Paper #57 and Issue Paper #61.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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This effectively means that the National Guard and Reserve can attract active-duty personnel that 

may otherwise leave the military, thus increasing, overall, the retention of talent that would otherwise 

be entirely lost to the Armed Forces.

This section discusses, from a National Guard and Reserve perspective, the recommendations 

presented by the Outreach and Recruiting Subcommittee and the Retention Subcommittee. In 

general, these recommendations are aimed at expanding the pool of applicants, at increasing the level 

of the skills of potential applicants through early engagement efforts, at improving recruiting from 

the current pool, and at detecting the causes of possible retention problems—especially for women. 

The reader should refer Decision Paper #1 and Decision Paper #3 for a complete discussion of the 

research and logic behind these recommendations.

This section also includes the discussion of a recommendation that is the direct result of the work 

of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee: a recommendation aimed at improving 

transitions between the Reserve and Active Components and between individual Reserve 

Components. The ultimate goal of this particular recommendation is to improve total force retention 

by attracting into the Reserve Component those talented servicemembers who might otherwise leave 

the military altogether.

Outreach and Recruiting: Expanding the Pool, Early Engagement, and Improving Recruiting

Current population trends show that the proportion of minorities in the population that is ageeligible to serve in the military is growing while the age-eligible population itself is not projected to 

grow. Moreover, education projections indicate that, although the rates are improving, minorities 

will continue to meet eligibility requirements at a lower rate than their white counterparts for the 

foreseeable future.22 Because the age-eligible population is not growing and because those 

subpopulations that are increasing in proportion meet eligibility requirements at a lower rate, a 

decrease in the eligible pool of applicants is expected.

This issue affects the Reserve Component in two ways. First, it affects Reserve Component 

recruitment from the civilian population. Second, it affects the Reserve Component through the 

prior service pool that joins its ranks. The Commission identified this decrease in the eligible 

population as an important problem for all the Armed Forces and proposed a series of 

recommendations to help address it.

First, the Commission recommends that all stakeholders, including the President, Congress, 

DoD, and state and local officials, take steps to increase the size of the eligible pool. This 

recommendation’s aim is to increase the number of individuals that are eligible to serve in the 

military. It asks the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria. It does not ask them to 

lower standards but rather to ensure that the chosen standards are good predictors of future 

performance in the military. It also involves stakeholders outside the military and asks them to work 

in partnership with the military to make sure that the youth of this country are educated and healthy 

so that they are eligible to serve.

The second recommendation emphasizes the role of early engagement programs that help 

increase the level of skill of potential applicants. The emphasis is not on using these programs as a 

recruiting tool. Rather, the programs are intended to be civic in nature, focused on encouraging 

youth to study science, technology, and mathematics; helping them stay in and succeed at school; and 

assisting them in becoming and staying physically fit.

 22 See Riche, 2010.
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The goal for the third recommendation is to improve current recruitment practices so as to 

ensure that all qualified potential applicants are reached. The recommendation aims to improve 

recruitment in all areas of the country and to streamline the process for applying to Service Reserve 

Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) and academy programs.

In its discussions, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee found that these 

recommendations address Reserve Component outreach and recruitment issues in that an increase in 

the eligible population will benefit diversity in the National Guard and Reserve, both in the civilian 

pool and in the prior service pool.

The subcommittee also believes that the National Guard, because of its proximity to the 

communities it serves, can be an effective partner in implementing these recommendations. In fact, 

the National Guard is already working in this capacity. Current efforts include programs that help atrisk students succeed in school, such as the Patriot Academy program23 and GED Plus.24 Other 

programs focus on early engagement efforts. These include the Guard Fit Challenge and the Warrior 

Challenge programs, which focus on fitness, and the About Face program, which teaches life skills to 

students between the ages of 13 and 17.25

Retention: Sabbatical Programs and Improved Data Collection

Retention helps shape the demographic profile of the upper ranks of the military. If servicemember 

retention differs by race, ethnicity, or gender, the upper ranks will not be representative of the lower 

ranks. In fact, the demographic profiles presented earlier in this paper reflect this pattern.

In its research, the Retention Subcommittee found that, among active-duty personnel, retention 

for minority groups was not a cause for minority underrepresentation in the upper ranks. In fact, in 

general, minority retention was found to be higher than white retention. However, women in both in 

the enlisted ranks and the officer corps were less likely than men to remain in service.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee found similar results for women, but it also 

found that blacks are less likely than their white counterparts to remain in service in the Reserve 

Component. The next few paragraphs describe these results in more detail. These statistics help 

frame how the Retention Subcommittee–approved recommendations affect the National Guard and 

Reserve. For details about active-duty retention, see Decision Paper #3.

Retention as Measured by Conditional Continuation Rates. This subsection makes use of 

conditional continuation rates by years of service (YOS) as a measure of retention. The continuation 

rates used here were constructed using data from the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data 

System (RCCPDS) provided by DMDC (found at Defense Manpower Data Center, 2008, 2010b), 

and they represent averages that include information from FY 2004 to FY 2009.

To facilitate the interpretation of our results, average continuation rates are presented as 

percentage-point deviations from the baseline.26 For gender, the male category serves as the. For the 

race and ethnicity category comparisons, the white category is the baseline. This means that, for 

women, average continuation rates are presented as a percentage-point difference from the male 

 23 The Patriot Academy program offers otherwise qualified high school dropouts the opportunity to join the 

National Guard and provides them with curriculum and resources to earn their high school diploma. 

24 The GED Plus program enables qualified students to earn their GED while experiencing military training at the 

GED Plus residential school in Arkansas.

25This program is a coordinated effort between the National Guard and the departments of military affairs in the 

states. See New Jersey National Guard, 2010. 26 For more details about how to compute these conditional continuation rates and for a more comprehensive 

presentation of our results, please see Issue Paper #59 and Issue Paper #60.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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rates. For race and ethnicity categories, comparisons are presented as percentage-point differences 

from the white category.

Note that conditional continuation rates, as presented here, measure the percentage of individuals 

who stayed in the Reserve Component in a given year, given that they were in the Reserve 

Component the year before. Thus, they give us an aggregate measure of servicemember retention 

outcomes. Specifically, although continuation rates do reflect the individual decision to remain in the 

military an additional year, they also capture other causes for separation, such as not meeting a 

specific qualification, lack of promotion opportunities, and other factors that are not directly decided 

by the individual servicemember.

National Guard and Reserve Officer Continuation Rates. The baseline row in Table 6 reports 

the average continuation rate for male officers in the National Guard and Reserve. The “Female” row 

reports the average deviation from the baseline rate. For example, in Table 6, the average 

continuation rate for male officers in the Navy Reserve was 86.2 percent. The average continuation 

rate for females was 1.8 percentage points below that. These estimates were constructed using 

regression analysis. Standard errors are shown in parenthesis, and those estimates that are statistically 

significant are marked with an asterisk.27

Our results show that, on average, and across all YOSs, women had lower continuation rates than 

men in all the Services. All results are significant to at least at the 10-percent level, except in the case 

of the Air National Guard.

Table 6. Average Effect of Gender on Officer Conditional Continuation Rates, by Service

Air Force 

Reserve

Air National 

Guard

Army National 

Guard Army Reserve

Coast Guard 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve Navy Reserve

Female –0.0212*** –0.0042 –0.0047* –0.0124*** –0.0354*** –0.0221* –0.0181***

(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.013) (0.003)

Baseline 0.9032*** 0.9237*** 0.8967*** 0.8889*** 0.8995*** 0.8048*** 0.8618***

(Male) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)

N 90,349 66,246 151,448 177,461 6,355 16,331 86,424

F 86.5267 2.3847 3.7629 51.8464 13.4350 2.7271 33.5594

d.f. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

p-value 0.0000 0.1225 0.0524 0.0000 0.0002 0.0987 0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = p < 0.10. ** = p < 0.05. *** = p < 0.01.

Table 7 reports differences in average continuation rates by race and ethnicity. In this table, the 

“Baseline” row indicates the average retention rates for whites for all the YOSs included in the 

sample. The columns labeled with each of the race and ethnicity categories indicate deviations from 

that average.

 27The standard errors provide a measure of the accuracy of the results given the sample of data used to construct the 

estimates. Smaller standard errors are associated with more-accurate estimates. Likewise, more asterisks point to a 

smaller probability that the results appear to be different from zero due to chance alone. For example, * means that 

there is at most a 10-percent probability that gender results are in fact zero, ** shows that this probability is 5 

percent, and *** shows that this probability is only 1 percent.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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With the exception of blacks and, in some Services, APIs, minorities had higher continuation 

rates than whites in the National Guard and Reserve. However, not all of these continuation rate 

differentials were statistically significant, and, therefore, it cannot be ruled out with statistical 

certainty that these rates were different from the continuation rates for whites. Note, however, that, 

considering the magnitude of the results, they may merit further investigation.

Table 7. Average Effect of Race and Ethnicity on Officer Continuation Rates, by Service

Air Force 

Reserve

Air National 

Guard

Army National 

Guard Army Reserve

Coast Guard 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve Navy Reserve

API, NH 0.0056 0.0024 0.0031 0.0156*** –0.0255** –0.0211 0.0115**

(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.020) (0.006)

Black, NH –0.0147*** 0.0007 0.0022 0.0039* –0.0201 –0.0374** –0.0151***

(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.021) (0.015) (0.006)

Hispanic 0.0046 0.0064 0.0092** 0.0087*** –0.0051 –0.0157 0.0126**

(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.018) (0.015) (0.006)

Other –0.0086 –0.0032 0.0006 0.0212*** 0.0226 0.0240* 0.0111***

(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.020) (0.014) (0.004)

Baseline 0.8984*** 0.9227*** 0.8954*** 0.8834*** 0.8951*** 0.8051*** 0.8570***

(White, NH) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)

N 90,349 66,246 151,448 177,461 6,355 16,331 86,424

F 4.3107 0.4495 1.7697 9.8674 1.5579 2.9611 6.3388

d.f. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

p-value 0.0017 0.7728 0.1318 0.0000 0.1826 0.0186 0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = p < 0.10. ** = p < 0.05. *** = p < 0.01.

National Guard and Reserve Enlisted Continuation Rates. In the enlisted ranks, the racial, 

ethnic, and gender differences in continuation rates were more marked. Table 8 shows that, on 

average, women had lower continuation rates than men for all the Services, and all results were 

significant at least at the 1-percent level.Table 9 shows that, compared with whites, APIs and 

Hispanics tended to have higher continuation rates and blacks had consistently lower rates. In the 

“other”category, continuation rates depended on the particular Service. Most of the resuls were 

statistically significant. This indicates that, on average, the reader can be confident in the patterns 

just described.
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Table 8. Average Effect of Gender on Enlisted Conditional Continuation Rates, by Service

Air Force 

Reserve

Air National 

Guard

Army National 

Guard Army Reserve

Coast Guard 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve Navy Reserve

Female –0.0177*** –0.0272*** –0.0406*** –0.0203*** –0.0281*** –0.0276*** –0.0169***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)

Baseline 0.8831*** 0.9051*** 0.8328*** 0.8144*** 0.8527*** 0.8002*** 0.7875***

(Male) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

N 320,453 474,644 1,716,119 875,876 38,876 204,232 284,849

F 170.5018 569.1499 2333.2497 423.5561 29.3769 40.4876 78.7512

d.f. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = p < 0.10. ** = p < 0.05. *** = p < 0.01.

Table 9. Average Effect of Race and Ethnicity on Enlisted Conditional Continuation Rates, by Service

Air Force 

Reserve

Air National 

Guard

Army National 

Guard Army Reserve

Coast Guard 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve Navy Reserve

API, NH 0.0081*** 0.0142*** 0.0135*** 0.0303*** 0.0192** –0.0036 –0.0018

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)

Black, NH –0.0146*** –0.0221*** –0.0174*** –0.0075*** 0.0002 –0.0399*** –0.0428***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)

Hispanic 0.0050** 0.0008 0.0146*** 0.0107*** 0.0096 –0.0368*** –0.0013

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)

Other 0.0015 –0.0021 –0.0155*** –0.0131*** 0.0110 0.0034 –0.0274***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)

Baseline 0.8809*** 0.9017*** 0.8287*** 0.8089*** 0.8466*** 0.8071*** 0.7932***

(White, NH) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

N 320,453 474,644 1,716,119 875,876 38,876 204,232 284,849

F 30.7661 67.0050 209.3027 102.1680 1.8564 77.9737 113.7692

d.f. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1151 0.0000 0.0000

SOURCE: Estimates obtained using FY 2004–FY 2009 data from Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTES: * = p < 0.10. ** = p < 0.05. *** = p < 0.01.

In summary, the research initiated by the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee shows 

results similar to those found by the Retention Subcommittee. Consistently, women had lower 

continuation rates across the Reserve Component. In general, continuation rates for most minority 

groups were higher than white continuation rates. However, unlike the results for the Active 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

32

Component, the results for the National Guard and Reserve revealed lower continuation rates for 

blacks and for API officers in some Services.

To understand the causes of these continuation rate differentials, the subcommittee used the June 

2008 Status of Forces Survey of Reserve Component Members (found at Defense Manpower Data 

Center, 2009) to examine overall satisfaction with the military way of life and retention intentions in 

the Reserve Component. In general, this research suggests that women and minority groups in the 

Reserve Component do not show significant differences in their reported satisfaction with the 

military way of life compared with their male and white counterparts, respectively. The same is true 

for their reported retention intentions. However, as reported in Issue Paper #52, although the 

differences are not statistically significant, the numbers suggest that women are slightly less satisfied 

than men and that some minority groups are slightly less satisfied than their white counterparts.

The results presented above help identify potential problems, but they do not reveal much about 

the actual causes of the continuation rate differential. Moreover, continuation rates, as reported here, 

only measure whether an individual leaves a Service; they do not tell us why. Many factors other than 

retention can affect these rates. For example, an individual may decide to leave because of lack of 

promotion opportunities, as a result of health or behavioral issues, because of legal problems, or 

because of a failure to obtain necessary qualifications to remain in service. Investigating the effect of 

these and other factors on retention will help the Services identify root causes and implement policies 

and programs that address current and future retention problems.

Although further analysis might have helped clarify some of these issues, data and time 

constraints prevented the Commission from investigating the root causes of a number of issues 

identified during the discovery phase.28 Therefore, the information presented here is intended to 

describe the situation. The methodological limitations of using these results to inform policy 

decisions must be kept in mind, since effective policy should be directed at the causes of these 

patterns in order to successfully drive change.

With these caveats in mind, the Commission developed two recommendations directed at 

improving retention. First, the Commission recommends that the Defense Advisory Committee on 

Women in the Services (DACOWITS) expand its current focus to investigate the causes of retention 

rate differentials for women. It also recommends that DACOWITS investigate the effects of 

sabbatical programs on the retention of women. Further, it asks that the results of this research be 

presented to the Secretary of Defense.

The aim of this recommendation is twofold: to investigate the causes of retention problems for 

women and to find appropriate solutions for them. Although the recommendation is specifically 

directed at DACOWITS and aimed at improving retention rates for women, the National Guard 

and Reserve Subcommittee suggests that the Services, and especially the Reserve Components, 

expand on this idea and investigate retention issues not only for women but also for minorities, 

especially blacks.

To support the Services’ efforts to identify retention issues and their causes, the Commission also 

recommends that DoD establish a universal data collection and analysis system to track issues related 

to military career progression over time. This system should include qualitative and quantitative data 

from all the Services and should consistently track information about branching, assignments, 

promotion, and retention.

 28More information is available in the issue papers on retention in the Active and Reserve Components.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: The Prior Service Pool

As codified in Title 10, Section 10102, one of the main roles of the Reserve Component is to serve as 

a repository of “qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or 

national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require.” Although the 

Reserve Component obtains a large portion of its force from the civilian population, almost 90 

percent of its officers and over one-third of its enlisted personnel were once active-duty 

servicemembers.

The next few paragraphs describe the importance of the prior service pool as a source of 

personnel for the Reserve Component and that pool’s role in promoting structural diversity, total 

force integration, and overall retention.

The Importance of the Prior Service Pool to Reserve Component Recruiting and Accessions.

Table 10 shows that, for all seven Components, the vast majority—an average of 87 percent—of 

Selected Reserve officer accessions, and 38 percent of enlisted gains, came from the prior service 

pool. Thus, although there are differences among the Services, in general, the relevant Selected 

Reserve recruiting pool was constituted of individuals leaving active-duty service rather than of 

civilians.

Table 10. Prior Service Contribution to Selected Reserve Gains 

Service Enlisted Officer

Air Force Reserve 62.5% 94.3%

Air National Guard 44.9% 91.3%

Army National Guard 30.7% 84.8%

Army Reserve 39.3% 80.1%

Coast Guard Reserve 54.9% 87.7%

Marine Corps Reserve 26.3% 97.2%

Navy Reserve 66.6% 89.1%

Total 38.4% 87.3%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010a.

In addition to its implications for racial, ethnic, and gender diversity, this fact has important 

implications for recruiting and training costs that are worth mentioning here. According to the 

Office of Management and Budget, the cost of recruiting a new member into the Armed Forces in 

2008 was $17,047 (Office of Management and Budget, 2009b), an amount calculated by dividing the 

total cost of the program by the number of recruits. The estimated cost of accession training for 

newly enlisted servicemembers was $8,757 in 2008 (Office of Management and Budget, 2009a), an 

amount that is a weighted average of cost per recruit for all four Services and that includes only the 

cost of basic training.

An average estimate for officer training is not easily defined. Enlisted servicemembers follow very 

similar training regimes when newly recruited, and, therefore, there is less variance in the cost of 

training them. The cost of training an officer, on the other hand, depends not only on the specialty 

(e.g., pilot, medic, infantry) but also on the commissioning source (e.g., ROTC, a Service academy). 

Regardless of the exact cost, the training and recruitment money invested in a servicemember is lost, 

sometimes in as little as two to six years, if that servicemember decides to leave his or her Service. 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

34

However, if active-duty servicemembers join one of the Reserve Components, the initial investment 

is not entirely lost because the skills are kept within the Armed Forces.

There are two important implications of the prior service pool on Reserve Component racial, 

ethnic, and gender demographics. First, given that a large percentage of enlisted personnel, and 

nearly all officers, that join the Reserve Component come from the Active Component, the 

demographics of Reserve Component accessions are constrained, to a great extent, by the 

demographics of the Active Component population. Second, the eligibility issues that affect the 

demographic diversity of Active Component also affect Reserve Component accessions, both 

indirectly via prior service accessions and directly via nonprior service accessions. Thus, the 

demographics of those who come from the prior service pool largely determine the demographics of 

the Reserve Component as a whole.

Service Pool Affiliation Rates Race, Ethnicity, and Gender. Tables 11 and 12 report the rate at

which prior service servicemembers joined the Selected Reserve within six months of leaving active 

duty by gender and race/ethnicity for FY 2008. Each percentage reported in the table is calculated 

within group.29 Therefore, the percentages can be thought of as a crude affiliation rate for each of the 

categories reported. For instance, about 6 percent of female officers who left the Air Force in FY 

2008 joined the Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard, compared with 6.3 percent of men.

In Table 11, the data for officers show that, across the Services, women joined at a slightly higher 

rate than men: 10.1 percent compared with 8.6 percent. Prior service minorities, except for blacks, 

joined the Selected Reserve at a higher rate than whites.

Table 11. Percentage of Prior Service Officers that Joined the Selected Reserve

Gender Race/Ethnicity

Service Female Male API Black Hispanic Other White

Air Force 6.0% 6.3% 8.9% 3.8% 8.4% 6.0% 6.2%

Army 17.0% 14.7% 21.8% 7.3% 17.6% 6.3% 12.8%

Coast Guard 35.9% 13.8% 20.0% 12.5% 54.2% 12.8%

Marine Corps 5.8% 5.9% 0.0% 11.3% 8.3% 7.7% 5.5%

Navy 0.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 2.6% 0.0% 1.5%

Total 10.1% 8.6% 12.1% 5.7% 10.8% 14.1% 7.3%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010a.

NOTE: The “unknown” category is not included.

As shown in Table 12, the results were similar for enlisted personnel. Women joined the 

Selected Reserve at a higher rate than men, and all minority categories joined at higher rates than 

whites.

 29 The prior service pool percentages reported here are derived from the number of individuals in each category that 

joined the Selected Reserve, divided by the total number of individuals in the category as a whole.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

35

Table 12. Percentage of Prior Service Enlisted that Join the Selected Reserve

Gender Race/Ethnicity

Service Female Male API Black Hispanic Other White

Air Force 9.9% 7.9% 10.5% 8.0% 11.5% 9.1% 8.0%

Army 10.9% 11.9% 18.7% 9.9% 16.0% 10.8% 11.5%

Coast Guard 17.0% 10.8% 0.0% 4.8% 12.8% 28.3% 9.7%

Marine Corps 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 2.2% 1.8% 1.6% 1.3%

Navy 3.5% 3.0% 5.2% 3.8% 3.9% 2.2% 2.5%

Total 8.2% 7.0% 10.5% 7.1% 8.9% 9.0% 6.6%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010a.

NOTE: The “unknown” category is not included.

Although these results are encouraging, the actual numbers of women and racial and ethnic 

minorities from the prior service pool that joined the Selected Reserve were relatively small. As 

reported in the issue papers on the demographics of the prior service pool (i.e., Issue Paper #57 and 

Issue Paper #61), only 22 percent of officers and 17 percent of enlisted servicemembers who joined 

the Selected Reserve during FY 2008 were women. The percentages for minorities are more 

encouraging: In FY 2008, 27 percent of officers and 46 percent of enlisted were minorities. However, 

although the data show that women and minorities joined the National Guard and Reserve at a 

higher rate than whites after leaving active duty—perhaps showing a higher propensity to continue 

service in the Reserve Component—the numbers need to be higher to significantly increase the 

demographic diversity, particularly the gender diversity, of the Reserve Component senior leadership.

Structural Diversity, Total Force Integration, and Overall Retention. The transfer of active-duty 

prior service personnel into the Reserve Component brings trained and experienced personnel into 

the Reserve. This not only adds to the structural diversity of the National Guard and Reserve but also 

helps facilitate total force integration. Overall retention also increases as a result: Prior service 

personnel who may have otherwise left the Armed Forces altogether are retained. This subsection 

presents a discussion about how flexible service opportunities may help increase retention. Structural 

diversity and total force integration are discussed in other sections of this paper.

A major retention issue that the military faces in its pursuit of demographic diversity, particularly 

in the higher ranks, is the retention of women. Private industry has a similar problem, and many 

companies have started addressing this by adding work flexibility in order to improve career 

management within their organizations. Hewlett and Luce (2005) argue that work flexibility should 

be thought of not only as a flexible work day but also defined in terms of a flexible career arc.

Using a nationally representative survey of a group of highly qualified women, Hewlett and Luce 

(2005) show that almost four in ten women leave their jobs at some point in their careers. The 

reasons for leaving are both internal and external. The authors cite family and personal needs as 

external pull factors for leaving. They also cite internal push factors, such as low satisfaction and lack 

of opportunity, as reasons for leaving.30 However, whatever the reason for leaving, Hewlett and Luce 

(2005) point out that “companies that can develop policies and practices to tap into the female talent 

pool over the long haul will enjoy a substantial competitive advantage.” The authors present some 

 30 Men cite some of these same reasons. See Decision Paper #3 for more information.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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strategies on how to achieve that goal. For flexible working arrangements to succeed over the long 

term, they suggest, among other things, that employers remove the stigma associated with these 

arrangements. They encourage them not to burn bridges, to maintain a connection with employees, 

and to nurture ambition.

The story is not significantly different in the military, and many of the same solutions could be 

adapted to improve the retention of servicemembers leaving the ranks. Using a survey of naval surface 

warfare officers, Parcell (2007) shows that traditional retention methods, including retention 

bonuses, are not closing the gap between the retention rates of men and women. Additionally, 

Parcell (2007) points out that the causes associated with female officers’ continuation decisions 

cannot be easily affected by accession or retention policies.31

However, survey and focus group results for both male and female officers in Parcell’s 2007 study 

suggest that taking time away from an active-duty career in order to achieve a better work-life 

balance could help retention, as long as career progression is not hindered. In general, progress is 

being made in this area, and as, Decision Paper #3 reports, there are already working pilot programs 

in the Navy and the Coast Guard that allow servicemembers to take time off and then return to 

active duty. However, there are cultural, policy, and practical barriers that need to be addressed in 

order for these programs to be widely applied across all Services.

Recommendation 2—

DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting Active to Reserve 

Component and internal Reserve Component transition protocols to promote structural 

diversity, total force integration, and overall retention.

Personnel leaving active duty are a valuable resource for the Reserve Component in particular and 

for the Armed Forces in general. For this reason, the Commission believes that DoD needs to 

improve its policies, practices, and personnel and pay systems in order both to encourage these 

servicemembers to join the Reserve Component rather than leave the military altogether and to 

facilitate the process. Moreover, the Commission believes flexibility in transitions within the Reserve 

Component could improve retention, broaden advancement opportunities for National Guard and 

Reserve servicemembers, and positively affect demographic diversity.

As it reported to the Commission, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee strongly 

believes in the positive effect of the added service flexibility made possible by streamlining transition 

processes. The next few paragraphs present some background on the transition processes and the 

relevant effects of improving them.

The current process for officers transitioning from Active Duty List to Reserve Active Status 

List, and for enlisted active-duty personnel transitioning to the Reserve Component, is lengthy and 

inefficient. National Guard and Reserve Components told the subcommittee that current policies are 

cumbersome and may discourage members from applying. Indeed, although the details are different 

for each of the Reserve Components, data presented by the Services show that it can take an average 

of one to six months for a servicemember to move from active duty to the Reserve Component, 

 31 For example, female Naval Academy graduates, women with high scores on technical/mathematics tests or with

technical/mathematics degrees, and single women are more likely to have lower retention rates. Although these 

observable differences describe those groups that are most likely to leave the Navy, they do not explain the causes of 

the lower retention rates and, therefore, do not easily translate into policy solutions. 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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depending on the branch of Service.32 The process can take even longer if there is a break in service 

during which the servicemember leaves active duty before starting the process of joining the National 

Guard or Reserve.

In general, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy requires officers to be approved for 

release from active duty by their Service and to be approved for a Reserve appointment. 

Servicemembers’ records are screened for adverse material before their names can be included in a 

scroll that is then routed through various channels for final approval by OSD.33 Although some 

Services have automated and streamlined parts of the process, for the most part, the process is 

manual, and, in some cases, the availability of personnel or, as in the Coast Guard, the periodicity of 

panel meetings, drives the process.34

The process is similar for enlisted personnel. Servicemembers’ records are screened for eligibility, 

and, if they are found acceptable, the servicemembers are authorized for transition. Authorization for 

transition includes being authorized to leave active duty and to find a billet in the Reserve 

Component.

In general, then, the process is based on a series of boxes that need to be checked before 

transition can take place. Many steps in this process could be improved by automation and better 

interfaces between personnel and finance (pay) systems across the Services. This includes automatic 

checks, wherever possible; real-time updated billet availability for assignment approvals; and close-toreal-time transitions between personnel and pay systems across the Services.

The Commission believes that streamlining this process will give the National Guard and 

Reserve access to a broader talent pool because it will make it easier for a servicemember leaving 

active duty to join the Reserve Component. Although the Commission also suspects that the effect 

on the demographic makeup of the Reserve Component will be positive, there are no estimates of the 

exact magnitude of the change.

Also note that the Retention Subcommittee recommends further study into flexible service 

opportunities and their effect on female retention. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee 

would like this study to also include the effects that streamlining the Active to Reserve Component 

and internal Reserve Component processes could have on female and minority retention. Again, 

although the Commission does not yet know whether making this process more efficient will retain 

underrepresented groups at a greater rate, it does believe it could have a positive impact. Therefore,

the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee recommends that this issue be studied further.

Lastly, this recommendation is consistent with the 2010 QDR, which emphasizes that the 

military departments should engage in original ways to retain qualified personnel and that the Armed 

Forces should offer “more flexible ways for military personnel to serve, by implementing programs to 

better enable transitions between Active and Reserve Component service” (U.S. Department of 

Defense, 2010). Furthermore, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resource Strategy 

(2000) and the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (2008) point out that smooth 

transitions between components would help improve total force integration.

In summary, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee sees facilitating the transition 

between the Active and the Reserve Component and between National Guard and Reserve 

Components as a way to increase retention and promote structural diversity and total force 

integration. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee strongly believes that streamlining and 

 32 Note that these are Service averages and that there is also case-by-case variation.

33 This scroll includes the names of those wishing to be added the Reserve Active Status List.

34 In the Coast Guard, an appointed panel meets quarterly to consider Active Component officers who, within a 

year of resignation of their active-duty commissions, have requested Reserve commissions.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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shortening the transition process, which would make it easier for active-duty servicemembers to 

transition to the Reserve Component and for Reserve Component personnel to transition between 

Reserve Components, will likely have a positive effect on demographic diversity in the Armed Forces 

in general.

Widening Opportunities

Branching, Assignments, and Promotion

Bringing a diverse pool of people into the Reserve Component is only the first step in developing a 

diverse senior leadership in the National Guard and Reserve. After joining the Reserve Component, 

servicemembers need to be developed into future leaders. This development process determines who 

will reach top leadership positions. Each step in the career life cycle of servicemembers is therefore 

directly linked to the demographic composition of the future leadership. Two key steps in this career 

progression are (1) branching and assignments and (2) promotion. Branching and assignments 

decisions determine the career field and assignments an that individual will have throughout his or 

her career. In turn, career field and assignments have an effect on potential promotion opportunities. 

As explained below, these two factors—(1) branching and assignments and (2) promotion—help 

shape the demographics of the upper ranks.

From the National Guard and Reserve perspective, branching, assignments, and promotions 

present some of the same issues that exist in the Active Component. First, branching and 

assignments decisions, and especially career field decisions, have a considerable effect on the 

promotion opportunities of officers. Moreover, there are demographic differences in the various 

career fields that have an effect on the number of promotion opportunities available to women and 

minorities. Second, the Commission identified several issues in promotion rates across demographic 

groups that relate to assignments and evaluation, but it believes the design of the selection board 

process to be, in general, fair. However, the Commission also recognizes that servicemembers need 

to be adequately educated about the promotion process to be able to take advantage of opportunities 

available to them.

The next section presents a discussion of the branching and assignments recommendations put 

forth by the Commission and presents the National Guard and Reserve perspective. It also includes a 

discussion of a new recommendation and an addition to a branching and assignments 

recommendation. The new recommendation aims to change the current officer career management 

system to a more flexible one that does not necessarily prioritize tactical occupations. The addition to 

the existing recommendation focuses on improving mentoring programs to provide to all 

servicemembers support regarding career decisions.

The following section includes a discussion of the promotion recommendations and provides the 

logic behind a new recommendation that is the direct result of the work of the National Guard and 

Reserve Subcommittee. This recommendation concentrates on providing Reserve Component 

officers a path toward attaining the education and experience necessary to develop their full potential.

Branching and Assignments: Institute Accountability Reviews, Eliminate Combat Exclusion Policies, 

and Improve Mentoring

Research conducted by the Branching and Assignments Subcommittee shows that there are 

structural and perceptual barriers that affect career field preferences and command assignment 

opportunities. This research also shows that career and command assignments can, in turn, affect the 

diversity of senior military leadership.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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The Commission identified two structural barriers that may obstruct the advancement of women 

and minority officers in the military. First is the combat exclusion policies that preclude women from 

serving in occupations that involve direct ground combat. These policies close many tactical 

occupations to women and, because of the preponderance of officers in tactical fields in the upper 

ranks, may curtail promotion opportunities. The second barrier is that minority officers are less likely 

to be commissioned via Service academies, and, at least in the Army and Air Force, a larger 

proportion of tactical slots goes to academy graduates.

The Commission also identified perceptual barriers that lower the likelihood that women and 

minorities will choose occupations in tactical career fields. Although the Commission identified 

many possible reasons for these differences in preferences, it found no unifying framework that 

consistently explains this perceptual barrier.

Based on these facts, the Commission proposes three recommendations. The first 

recommendation asks the Secretary of Defense to conduct annual diversity accountability reviews. 

The goal of this recommendation is to assess diversity patterns across the military lifecycle and, in 

doing so, to help identify potential problems and hold leadership accountable.

The second recommendation asks DoD to eliminate the combat exclusion policies for women. 

The intent of this recommendation is to eliminate structural barriers that prevent many female 

officers from reaching the upper ranks of the military.

The third recommendation asks the Services to ensure that all servicemembers are informed 

about the effect of different career paths on their assignment and promotion opportunities. Based on 

the work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee, the Commission modified the 

mentoring recommendation. The subcommittee also added a fourth recommendation that proposes a 

more flexible career management system for officers. Both the modification and the new 

recommendation are discussed below. Decision Paper #2 contains details on all three 

recommendations. The next section, however, documents the facts and logic behind the 

modifications to the mentoring recommendation and to the career management recommendation.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: Career Field Assignments35

This section examines the nature of the relationship among career field assignments, demographic 

diversity, and promotion potential. First, it looks at the effects of career assignment on promotion 

opportunities in the Reserve Component. Next, it presents a discussion of how career assignments 

are distributed across demographic groups. Decision Paper #2 considers these issues for the Active 

Component.

Table 13 illustrates the distribution of career fields across different stages of an officer’s career in 

the Reserve Component. In general, this table shows whether specific career fields have an effect on 

opportunities for advancement. If the percentage of servicemembers in a particular career field 

increases with rank, this indicates that those in that career field have a higher chance of advancing 

through the ranks relative to those in other occupations whose percentages do not increase in the 

higher ranks.

 35 In general, this paper refers to the process that determines the career field of an officer as an assignment. However, 

the way in which career fields are determined is much more complex than a simple “assignment.” The process 

accounts for the officers’ choice, aptitude tests, and the needs of each Service. For detailed information about this 

process, see Decision Paper #2.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Table 13. Distribution of Career Fields, by Pay Grade

Career Field O-1–O-3 O-4–O-6 O-7–O-8

Unknown 3.82% 0.78% 0.00%

Tactical operations 22.05% 35.30% 52.98%

Intelligence 8.90% 6.19% 2.89%

Engineering 11.78% 9.48% 9.58%

Scientist and professional 4.85% 9.96% 5.06%

Health care officer 19.51% 20.72% 5.79%

Administrator 8.55% 7.29% 11.57%

Supply, procurement, and allied 7.91% 10.16% 12.12%

Nonoccupational 12.64% 0.11% 0.00%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTE: Data are for Selected Reserve officers not in active duty.

The most salient example of a career field that is conducive to advancement is tactical operations. 

Although some other career fields show increases from one pay grade category to another, the tactical 

career field shows substantial increases across all pay grade categories. This clearly indicates that a 

servicemember in a tactical occupation would have a higher chance of advancement than another 

servicemember with exactly the same characteristics but in a different career field.

Because the assignment of an officer to a tactical career field can affect promotion opportunities, 

it is important to examine whether there are any diversity implications associated with this fact. 

Table 14 shows the demographic distribution of officers in the tactical career fields. The numbers 

presented here represent the within-group distribution of servicemembers in tactical occupations by 

race, ethnicity, and gender categories. It shows that female and minority officers tend to be 

underrepresented in tactical occupations. This may be hurting their advancement opportunities.

Table 14. Percentage of Officers in Tactical Careers, by Gender and Race/Ethnicity

Gender Race/Ethnicity

Men Women Asian/PI Black Hispanic Other White

All officers 34.15% 7.06% 20.04% 13.5% 23.02% 24.93% 31.83%

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

NOTE: Data are for Selected Reserve officers not in active duty.

For women, this pattern of underrepresentation is consistent across careers and becomes even 

more pronounced in the higher ranks. Female officers may have fewer opportunities to advance to 

more-senior levels because, as shown in Figure 6 and as of June 2010, few female officers were in 

tactical occupations at the ranks of O-1 through O-3.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Figure 6. Percentage of Officers in Tactical Occupations in June 2010, by Gender and Pay Grade

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.

The situation is similar for minority officers. Figure 7 suggests that occupational assignment for 

minority officers was, as of June 2010, indeed related to advancement opportunities. The percentage 

of minority officers in tactical fields in the junior (i.e., O-1 through O-3) ranks was lower than that 

of their white counterparts. Among company grade officers, white officers were the category most 

likely to be occupied in tactical careers. This same trend existed for field and flag/general officers, 

with one exception: “other” minorities at the flag/general officer level, who represented only a small 

number of servicemembers. When other qualifications were the same, because minority and female 

servicemembers tended to be assigned to tactical career fields at a lower rate, they had fewer 

opportunities for advancement than their white and male counterparts, respectively.

Figure 7. Percentage of Officers in Tactical Occupations in June 2010, by Race/Ethnicity and Pay Grade

SOURCE: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2010b.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Thus, occupational category appears to play a substantial role in limiting the ability of officers in 

underrepresented demographic groups to attain senior pay grades. Those in tactical career fields have 

had more opportunities for advancement. The findings reported here for the Reserve Component are 

consistent with those reported for the Active Component in Decision Paper #2: Flag/general officers 

tend to come from career fields involving tactical occupations, but minority and female officers have 

been considerably underrepresented in tactical occupations.

Based on these facts, the Commission proposed two recommendations that are discussed below.

Recommendation 4—

The Services and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, must specify the knowledge, skills, 

abilities, and potential necessary to be an effective flag or general officer and senior 

noncommissioned officer.

As noted above, research from the Branching and Assignments Subcommittee and the National 

Guard and Reserve Subcommittee shows that the majority of flag/general officers have been drawn 

from tactical occupations and that tactical occupations have been disproportionately composed of 

white males. Moreover, tactical career fields have tended to become more dominant in the more 

senior officer pay grades. This implies that the choice or assignment of career field may influence the 

type and number of opportunities for promotion available to officers throughout their careers.

Therefore, the Commission recommends a shift toward a more flexible officer career 

management system that does not necessarily prioritize tactical occupations. Although the ultimate 

goal of this more flexible management system is to improve mission effectiveness in an increasingly 

complex operational environment, a secondary result of this change could be a more diverse senior 

leadership.

A Changing Operational Environment. Many have noted that future leaders in the officer corps 

will require a greater mix of knowledge, skills, and abilities in order to be effective in ever-changing 

operational environments. This claim is supported by changes that have already occurred as a result 

of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and against Al-Qaeda and its Violent Extremist Affiliates and by 

forecasts of needed competencies that have been laid out in such reports as the QDR. Many of the 

forecasts suggest a greater need for cultural and language skills and for improved expertise in cyber 

warfare. Although the demand for these skills is growing, in terms of career advancement, it is often 

risky for servicemembers to deviate from traditional career paths if they seek to reach the highest 

ranks of the military.36

Language and cultural skills. According to the QDR, operational missions are likely to be 

increasingly asymmetric and complex, with no clearly delineated front lines. This new operational 

environment will require more officers to work collaboratively in interagency environments, with 

different governments, and in nation-building activities. As a result, officers will need “greater 

expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills” (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 54).

Metrics Recommendation 3 promotes this aim by requiring DoD and the Services to track 

regional and cultural expertise and to continue to track language ability. The National Guard and 

Reserve Subcommittee augmented that recommendation by also including relevant Reserve 

Component civilian expertise, which may include some of these same foreign-language, regional, and 

cultural skills. Moreover, one way to create incentives for servicemembers at all ranks to develop these 

 36 Decision Paper #4 for full explanation of this issue.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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skills is to recognize their value at the time of promotion. A more flexible career management system 

could take those skills into account.

Cyber warfare. Cyber warfare is becoming increasingly important, and it requires the Services to 

have “cyber experts” (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 38). Such expertise has not been part of 

traditional tactical career fields, yet it will be increasingly necessary at all ranks. Again, a more flexible 

career management system could take those skills into account, helping to promote those individuals 

whose skills meet the needs of the evolving operational environment.

A Flexible Career Management System. A career management system based on specified 

knowledge, skills, and abilities could provide all officers—not just racial and ethnic minority and 

female officers—more flexibility in managing their careers than a rigid, time-based, or tactical 

occupation–prioritized career management system. Furthermore, a system based on knowledge, 

skills, and abilities also fits with the Services’ “emerging human capital strategies,” which aim to 

connect “mission[s] and goals that result from capability-based defense planning to personnel policies 

via competencies” (Schirmer et al., 2006, p. 5). This system will meet the military’s demand for 

different knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential and will reward individuals prepared for 21stcentury warfare.

Clearly, implementing a more flexible officer career management system requires the Services to 

identify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and potential required by each assignment and to decide how 

to manage each; it also requires them to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities that education 

and training should confer. Because requirements will change over time, assessments will have to be 

conducted regularly. Also, there should be explicit consideration of knowledge, skills, and abilities 

that may be needed in the future.

This recommendation is even more pertinent to certain sectors of the Reserve Component. For 

example, the Army Reserve is predominantly a combat-support Service. In the current system that 

emphasizes tactical career fields in the flag/general officer ranks, Army reservists without prior 

active-duty service have a reduced chance of reaching the upper ranks. This also points to a structural 

diversity issue, as Reserve Component servicemembers may not always have the same opportunities 

for advancement as their active-duty counterparts.

This recommendation also aims to provide more career flexibility to senior noncommissioned 

officers. Although enlisted servicemembers have a different career management system than officers, 

and although the data presented here do not provide evidence that career fields are a limiting factor 

for female and minority advancement among enlisted servicemembers, the added flexibility and 

transparency afforded by specifying knowledge, skills, and abilities will also provide a benefit to these 

servicemembers and the Services. As is the case for officers, this system will provide the Services with 

the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for current and future warfare environments.

In summary, this recommendation aims to open advancement opportunities to highly qualified 

officers regardless of career field. This will result in a senior leadership with knowledge, skills, and 

abilities that are consistent with the current and future warfare environment. As an additional 

benefit, this recommendation will increase promotion opportunities for women and minorities. 

Currently, these groups have, on average, fewer promotion opportunities available to them because 

they tend to be in the combat arms fields at lower rates than their male and white counterparts, 

respectively.

Recommendation 3—

The Services should ensure their career development programs and resources enhance 

servicemembers’ knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Component 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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opportunities, to optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices 

from accession to retirement.

a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field 

decision point and continue throughout the servicemember’s career.

b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line of 

communication between protégé and mentor.

The Commission approved a recommendation from the Branching and Assignments 

Subcommittee that addressed the issue of mentoring. However, that recommendation missed some 

of elements that are unique to the Reserve Component. The National Guard and Reserve 

Subcommittee added language to this recommendation in order to address the issues specific to the 

Reserve Component. These modifications, as approved by the Commission, aim to benefit 

servicemembers in all of the Armed Forces. (Changes to the recommendation are underlined.)

The following is a clarification of the additional language the National Guard and Reserve 

subcommittee added to the Commission’s recommendation. “[I]ncluding Reserve Component 

opportunities” refers to advising active-duty servicemembers about Reserve Component opportunities 

and to advising Reserve Component servicemembers about other Reserve Component opportunities, 

whether they be in a different branch of the Reserve Component or related to vacancy-driven 

promotion issues. “[A]nd employ an active line of communication between protégé and mentor” 

refers to ensuring face-to-face contact between mentor and protégé. This is particularly important in 

the Reserve Component because reservists meet with their units only a few times a year.

One of the main concerns of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee, and of the 

Commission as a whole, is ensuring that advancement opportunities are open to all servicemembers. 

The subcommittee believes that one of the most basic strategies that will guarantee that advancement 

opportunities are open to all is ensuring that servicemembers are informed about how different 

choices can affect their careers.

As seen above, racial and ethnic minorities and women are currently underrepresented in the 

upper ranks of the military. This is documented in a series of demographic profile issue papers for 

both the Active and the Reserve Components.37 Although part of the problem may be related to 

recruiting, retention, and other issues, our research shows that that there is a strong relationship 

between branching and assignment decisions and advancement opportunities.

This body of research shows that, especially for officers, a tactical career field can lead to a greater 

number of advancement opportunities than other fields. It also shows that minorities and women 

tend to be in tactical career fields at a lower rate than their white and male counterparts, 

respectively.38 This is the case in both the Active and Reserve Components.39

There are different ways to address this issue. One of them, the one discussed here, is mentoring, 

which will help servicemembers make informed choices about careers in the military. Another one is 

to open some of the positions that have traditionally gone to servicemembers with a tactical 

background to all others that meet the positions’ requirements. The latter is addressed in a 

recommendation discussed below. Here, the focus is on mentoring.

 37 See the following demographic profile issues papers: Issue Paper #13, Issue Paper #19, Issue Paper #44, Issue 

Paper #54, and Issue Paper #55. 38 See Issue Paper #15, Issue Paper #23, and Issue Paper #32.

39 See Issue Paper #58.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

45

Both of the modifications added to the original recommendation should also have positive effects 

on the total force in general. Mentoring active-duty servicemembers about National Guard and 

Reserve opportunities may help increase the numbers of women and minorities that stay in the 

Armed Forces. The second modification is intended to ensure that mentors and protégés get 

adequate face time in the Reserve Component. In addition, this practice will benefit Active 

Component servicemembers by ensuring that they also receive face-to-face mentoring.

Moreover, to have successful careers, Reserve Component personnel must understand how to 

maneuver within the structural and geographic constraints of the National Guard and Reserve. In 

many instances, taking advantage of promotion opportunities may require servicemembers to move to 

a different region of the country or to regularly travel long distances. In general, the vacancy-driven 

promotion system dictates that any individual promoted to a higher rank must identify a billet, in 

that rank, to be promoted into.40 Mentors should advise National Guard and Reserve 

servicemembers on how the force structure, promotion system, and geographic distribution of billets 

could affect their career decisions; this will allow servicemembers to plan appropriately. These issues 

are unique to the Reserve Component and need to be included, along with other career issues, in the 

Reserve Component mentoring program.

In summary, many of the branching and assignment mentoring issues pointed out by the 

corresponding subcommittee also apply to the National Guard and Reserve. However, there are 

specific issues that require the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee to propose a modification 

to the existing recommendation. These modifications should also enhance mentoring programs in 

the Active Component.

Promotion

Promotion: Report Promotion Rates, Monitor Perceptions, and Promote Transparency

Two important issues in the promotion process are its fairness and transparency. Fairness ensures 

that those best qualified have the best chance of being promoted. Transparency ensures that 

servicemembers participate in the process with ample information to manage their careers to the best 

of their potential. Although the Commission’s research did not identify any significant problems in 

the promotion process, and although the Commission considers it fair, by and large, the Commission 

did find that servicemembers could benefit from more transparency. The Commission further 

believes that added transparency could also help identify existing and emerging promotion issues.

The main pattern found in the research conducted by the Promotion Subcommittee is that, with 

very few exceptions, promotion rates for active-duty minority officers in ranks O-4 through O-6 are 

lower than those for white officers. Promotion rates for female officers and enlisted servicemembers 

in general are not as clear. The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee could not obtain data 

that would allow it to consistently compare promotion rates for all demographic categories and for all 

Services.

Based on this information, and to ensure the transparency of the process, the Commission 

proposes three recommendations. First, the Commission recommends that the Service report 

enlisted and officer promotion rates, for all demographic groups, based on common definitions and 

methodology. This can help the Services identify potential issues early on, investigate root causes, 

and take corrective actions as necessary. Second, the Commission recommends that the Services use a 

common survey instrument to monitor perceptions about the promotion process and to take 

corrective action. This can help the Services make sure that the process is transparent and that it is 

 40 This is more prevalent in the National Guard. Parts of the Reserve have moved away from this system.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

46

also perceived as transparent. Third, the Commission recommends that the Services promote 

transparency and educate and counsel all servicemembers on how to prepare themselves for the 

promotion process.

Moreover, although the Commission did not investigate the causes of the promotion rate 

differentials, the Commission believes that part of the problem may arise from involuntary deviations 

from normal career paths due to, for example, equal opportunity (EO) or recruiting assignments that 

may negatively affect promotion opportunities. The Commission recommends that these involuntary 

deviations from normal career paths should be acknowledged by senior rater evaluations. Decision 

Paper #4 contains more details about the logic behind these assumptions.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: Joint Requirements

Over the past several decades, joint operations have become the norm in the U.S. military. As a 

result, both Active and Reserve Component officers are required to gain military experience and 

education not only so that they can lead successful joint missions but also so that they can advance in 

their careers. However, these increasing expectations for joint experience and education are not easily 

aligned with the career path of traditional drilling reservists in the National Guard and Reserve. 

Unlike their Active Component counterparts, Reserve Component servicemembers must meet their 

educational and operational requirements without detriment to or neglect of their civilian 

occupations. In addition, their window of opportunity to gain operational experience and credibility 

in their primary area of concentration, and to complete a joint assignment, is particularly narrow.

If, as may soon become the case, Reserve Component officers are required to be designated as 

Joint Qualified Officers (JQOs) in order to be promoted to O-7, many will lack the necessary 

qualifications and, as a result, become noncompetitive for general/flag officer ranks. This could have 

a negative effect on diversity, both structural and demographic, because the eligible promotion pool 

will likely be smaller.

The discussion that follows describes these issues in detail. Although one of the principal aims of 

the recommendation presented here is to ensure that there is a qualified traditional Reserve 

Component officer corps, the recommendation also aims at promoting structural diversity in the 

upper ranks by clearing the path so that skilled National Guard and Reserve officers can represent the 

Reserve Component in the highest ranks. In addition, the National Guard and Reserve 

Subcommittee believes that this recommendation may help improve demographic diversity in the 

upper ranks by increasing the pool of qualified officers who can compete for promotion.

Recommendation 5—

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must assess 

how Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain operational experience 

and fulfill joint requirements given the constraints of their dual military/civilian lives and 

take action as appropriate.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee recommends that DoD and the Services 

implement policy that provides flexible opportunities for officers to become joint-qualified, ensuring 

that the constraints and requirements of the Reserve Component career path are accommodated and 

that the military/civilian duality is taken into account. In particular, the Services should provide 

mechanisms for officers to acquire both joint and operational experience at the appropriate rank. The 

Services should also provide enough education slots so that all qualified National Guard and Reserve 

servicemembers can complete their education requirements in a timely fashion. Furthermore, because 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

47

senior leaders may find it difficult to release their officers from unit responsibilities so that they can 

enroll in courses, the Services may need to incentivize such releases.

The Increasing Importance of Joint Experience. In recent history, joint experience has become 

increasingly important in both the Active and Reserve Components. Specifically as it relates to the 

Reserve Component, beginning in 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 

Reorganization Act (GNA) outlined the process and procedures for delivering joint education to 

Reserve Component members, but it did not include statutory guidelines for Reserve Component 

Joint Officer Management. The requirements for Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs), outlined in Title 

10, Chapter 38, were specifically intended for the Active Component—that is, Reserve Component 

officers could not be designated as JSOs. Recent congressional and DoD action opens the JQO 

designation to Reserve Component officers, but there is no requirement for Reserve Component 

officers to be joint-qualified.41

Despite the lack of a requirement, increasing emphasis is being placed on joint experience and 

joint education in the Reserve officer corps. For example, the October 2007 DoD Instruction 

(DoDI) 1300.19, DoD Joint Officer Management Program, established that it is DoD policy to

designate as JQOs sufficient numbers of quality officers who have 

completed Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II (or in 

the case of RC officers, Advanced Joint Professional Military Education) 

. . . [and to] establish, to the maximum extent practicable, similar policies 

emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for officers [in the 

Reserve Component]. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007)

DoDI 1300.19 assigns responsibility to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs for 

monitoring “RC compliance with the . . . goal of increasing the pool of RC joint-qualified officers” 

(U.S. Department of Defense, 2007).

More recently, the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves urged Congress to 

amend the GNA to require that Reserve Component officers be designated as joint-qualified. They 

further recommended the following:

At the end of a 10-year transition period, . . . joint qualification [should 

be made] a criterion for promotion to flag and general officer rank. 

Congress should mandate that the Services develop an action plan and 

milestones and report regularly to Congress on progress made to 

accomplish this goal. (Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, 

2008, p. 20)

This recommendation was based primarily on the increasing importance of joint experience for all

officers. However, it also stems from the notion that Reserve officers should be held to similar 

standards as Active Component officers, who are required to be JQO-designated in order to be 

promoted to O-7.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is currently studying the Commission’s recommendation that 

would require JQO status for Reserve officer promotion to the rank of O-7. His November 24, 2008, 

memorandum stipulates the following:

 41 Title 10 only requires the Reserve Chiefs and Directors of the Air and Army National Guard to have “significant 

joint experience” to be considered for assignment to these positions. 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

48

1. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in 

coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. 

Special Operations Command, shall:

a. evaluate the changes to Joint Officer Management as amended by the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 and DoD 

Instruction 1300.19, DoD Joint Officer Management Program, issued 

on October 31, 2007, and updated on March 30, 2008—which included 

adding Reserve billets to the Joint Duty Assignment List and the 

establishment of the experience path in the new Joint Qualification 

System—to determine if those changes allow sufficient flexibility to 

produce a sufficient number of joint-qualified general and flag officers. 

The evaluation shall include a recommendation regarding the effects of 

mandating that the provisions of chapter 38 of title 10, United States 

Code (U.S.C.), be imposed for Reserve component officers, and

b. if determined appropriate in the evaluation, modify the DoD 

instruction and develop legislative proposals for consideration in the 

Department’s legislative process.

2. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:

a. consider including in promotion board precept language that the board 

consider joint qualifications in their deliberations; and

b. as part of the periodic implementation updates provided to the 

Secretary/Deputy Secretary, report on their efforts to integrate the 

management of their Reserve component officers with the Active 

component officers to afford Reserve component officers the joint duty 

and educational opportunities to improve their competitiveness for 

promotion to senior ranks. (Gates, 2008)

Joint Experience. As mentioned above, the principal motivation behind these policy changes and 

discussion is the need for joint-trained and joint-qualified officers who can respond to the 

increasingly joint nature of operations (Smith & Pullen, 2008). Lovely (2007) reports that, according 

to the DoD’s 2006 Strategic Plan for Joint Officer Management & Joint Professional Military Education, 

“Joint Task Forces now define the way we array our Armed Forces for both war and operations other 

than war.” As a result, Reserve officers are frequently serving side by side with their Active 

Component counterparts. With this in mind, the strategic plan recognizes the importance of 

providing joint opportunities and education that are similar for both Reserve and Active Component 

officers (Joyner & Mazezka, 2009; Lovely, 2007).

There have been recent improvements to the joint qualifying process for Reserve officers. One 

important change is the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the congressional 

modification of the GNA that allows officers to gain joint experience through two paths. Before this 

new system is discussed, however, it is important to note that it is currently under review, as 

stipulated in Secretary Gates’ November 2008 memorandum. In that that memorandum, the 

Secretary of Defense directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

49

coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, to evaluate whether this change 

(among others) provides “sufficient flexibility to produce a sufficient number of joint-qualified 

general and flag officers” (Gates, 2008).

The Joint Qualification System (JQS) was the result of a collaborative effort involving OSD, the 

Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the Services (Hemmerly-Brown, 2010). Previously, 

only active-duty officers who were assigned to a sanctioned joint-duty billet could become jointqualified. Now, officers can nominate themselves to receive joint credit if they have served in a 

nonappointed joint position, such as on a deployment or on a combined Joint Task Force for 

humanitarian relief.

This self-nomination process is referred to as the “experience” path. Although officers can still 

become joint-qualified by completing the standard joint assignments, the new experience-based track 

acknowledges joint experiences based on a formula that considers the environment and intensity of 

the joint environment. Experiences that are germane to National Guard forces, such as responding to 

national security threats, interagency combat operations, and humanitarian crises, are now 

recognized. As a major in the Air Force Reserve commented, “It’s the way Citizen Airmen typically 

serve: a few months here, a few weeks there. Joint experience begins to accumulate” (Joyner & 

Mazezka, 2009). This new system allows DoD to better incorporate Reserve officers’ joint 

experiences and qualifications into assignment and development decisions, which can accelerate 

Reserve Component participation in the joint community.

However, despite these recent improvements, which essentially define joint experience more 

broadly, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes that further flexibility and more 

education on the new processes may be necessary in order to improve representation and ensure that 

Reserve Component officers can achieve their full potential. In terms of flexibility, it is important to 

point out the importance of considering the structural differences between the Active and Reserve 

Components when defining joint expectations. Active Component officers work full time in their 

military capacity, but Reserve Component officers are, in general, civilians who train one weekend a 

month and two full weeks a year while maintaining a civilian job. Although expectations are not 

identical, it is important to remember the military/civilian duality of the Reserve Component officer 

corps. In terms of education, clarity and the appropriate tools should be provided so that Reserve 

Component officers can identify and navigate a defined career path to the best of their ability. It is 

also important to note that, in some cases, language regarding how some of these policies are to be 

implemented has not yet been written. This means that, in some Components, servicemembers are 

likely unaware of their options.

Joint Education.42 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) requirements still apply in the 

new JQO system. To be designated as a JQO, a Reserve Component officer must have completed 

JPME I and the Advanced JPME (AJPME, which is equivalent to JPME II for Active Component 

officers). Moreover, Reserve Component officers are still expected to complete the appropriate level 

of educational requirements before assignment to a Joint Duty Assignments Reserve (JDA-R) billet. 

 42 Although this section focuses on officers, the Services would also like to increase the proportion of joint-qualified 

senior enlisted personnel. An example of this is the Army’s goal of having all E-9’s complete a joint keystone course. 

Our recommendation is targeted at officers, but the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the 

Service Chiefs must also be attentive to changes in policy so that Reserve Component enlisted personnel also have 

the opportunity to access the same educational and assignment opportunities as their Active Component 

counterparts.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

50

DoD is working now to identify positions that require no JPME, those that require JPME Phase I, 

and those that require AJPME.

However, only a very small number of Reserve Component officers in the O-4 through O-6 

ranks currently enroll in the AJPME courses (Smith & Pullen, 2008). And, in general, only a limited 

number of school seats are available to Reserve Component servicemembers. In many cases, unfilled 

Active Component seats open up to Reserve Component members at the last minute. These slots 

either go unfilled or are filled by personnel who are available rather than by those best qualified to 

receive the opportunity.

Increasing the number of Reserve Component officers enrolled in the AJPME is considered the 

responsibility of senior leaders (Lovely, 2007; Smith & Pullen, 2008). However, leaders may be torn 

between fulfilling this responsibility and retaining the strong officers in their unit who would benefit 

from this training, particularly if the unit is preparing for a deployment. Moreover, Reserve 

Component officers may find it increasingly difficult to consider joint education, given their 

operational requirements and their civilian responsibilities.

As a first step in addressing this issue, the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee suggests 

that the Services examine the historical allotment of school seats for Reserve Component personnel 

and make seats available to the Reserve Component in a timely manner. Ensuring lead time between 

the announcement of school seat openings and the start of the course will allow Reserve Component 

servicemembers who would otherwise be unable to consider applying for the school seats to plan 

ahead and accordingly vis-à -vis their civilian lives and jobs.

A second step is to examine the demand for these seats and ensure that supply can meet the

demand. In some cases, the situation could be improved by opening up more online seats to some of 

these courses. In other cases, completing part of the course online may serve as a screening 

mechanism for completing the last part of the course onsite. Although some of the Services are 

already doing much of this, others lag behind.

Finally, as mentioned above, senior leaders may need to be incentivized to release officers from 

unit duties so that they can participate in joint education opportunities.

In summary, given the constraints of the Reserve Component structure, this recommendation 

asks the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs to establish 

policies and procedures that allow Reserve Component officers to gain operational and joint 

experience. The subcommittee’s aim is to ensure that Reserve Component officers remain 

competitive throughout their careers.43 The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes that 

this can add to the structural diversity of the upper ranks by ensuring that traditional reservists are 

qualified to be promoted to the highest ranks. The subcommittee also believes that this 

recommendation could have an impact on demographic diversity by increasing the pool of qualified 

personnel that could reach the highest ranks.

Diversity Metrics

Ensuring that the Military Offers the Same Opportunities to All Those Qualified

Although the Services are currently making an effort to improve diversity within their ranks, much of 

this effort is not institutionalized and not driven by an overall DoD strategy. The work of the 

Metrics Subcommittee identified the need for OSD to provide and institutionalize a framework for a 

set of common, strategic metrics that can help measure and sustain diversity and diversity 

 43 See Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008, especially recommendations 12–18 (pp. 147–149) 

and the accompanying text (pp. 138–149). 
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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management progress in the Services and that can reflect an overall diversity strategy for DoD. These 

metrics should allow for an integrated approach to diversity across DoD and, at the same time, help 

the Services identify their own unique issues.

According to the research done by the Metrics Subcommittee, this framework should allow for 

the development of metrics that enable evaluation and control over performance and resources, 

communicate performance to internal and external stakeholders, and help identify areas where 

improvement is needed (Melnyk et al., 2004). Additionally, these metrics should be developed with 

strategic goals in mind, help measure progress toward a concrete end state, be easily understood and 

communicated, incorporate useful information about key aspects of performance, and provide 

information that can be acted upon.

With this in mind, the Commission recommends that Congress revise Title 10 to institutionalize 

the establishment and reporting of diversity metrics throughout DoD. This recommendation asks 

OSD to develop standard metrics and benchmarks to track progress, to submit an annual report to 

the President and Congress about progress toward diversity goals, and to produce an annual report 

about the available pool of qualified minority and female candidates for 3- and 4-star flag/general 

officer positions. It also requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct annual diversity accountability 

reviews with Service Secretaries, Service Chiefs, and senior enlisted advisors.

The Commission also recommends that OSD revise and reissue DoD diversity policies to define 

clear measures of DoD’s diversity goals, to establish standards for the collection and analysis of data 

needed to measure progress toward diversity goals, and to provide oversight and support for the 

Services’ diversity initiatives.

Lastly, the Commission recommends that OSD take steps to ensure that all qualified candidates 

are considered for nomination to every 3- and 4-star position. Also, it recommends that if there are 

no female or minority candidates, a statement of explanation should be submitted to Congress.

Together, these three recommendations provide a general structure to help OSD institutionalize 

a set of strategic diversity metrics that can help DoD and the Services focus their efforts on strategic 

goals, clearly communicate with stakeholders, and promote accountability. The main thread through 

these recommendations is that DoD and the Services need to do everything possible to ensure that 

every prospective and current servicemember knows that every opportunity for entry and 

advancement in the Armed Forces is open to all those qualified.

Moreover, the Metrics Subcommittee also recognizes the effect of different types of 

qualifications on structural diversity. At issue is whether the Armed Forces contain the range of 

expertise needed to meet the requirements associated with current and future conflicts as outlined in 

the QDR. Although there have been efforts to track some of these types of expertise, the 

Commission recommends that DoD and the Services expand these efforts.

Structural diversity here is an issue of particular importance to the National Guard and Reserve. 

By nature, individuals in the Reserve Component not only bring their military skills to their Service 

but also possess civilian skills that can enhance their value to the Services. The next few paragraphs 

discuss the background of this recommendation.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: Civilian Expertise

The Commission approved a recommendation proposed by the Metrics Subcommittee that requires 

DoD and the Services to track regional and cultural expertise and continue to track language ability. 

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee augmented this recommendation by including 

language that requires DoD and the Services to track relevant Reserve Component civilian expertise. 

(Changes to the recommendation are underlined.)
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The Metrics Subcommittee makes the case for tracking regional, cultural, and language expertise 

by linking these skills to the current needs of the force as put forth in the 2010 QDR. The dual 

military/civilian nature of Reserve Component personnel allows them to bring these and other types 

of expertise that have value to today’s military. For instance, National Guard and Reserve personnel 

may have gained regional, cultural, or language expertise through their civilian employment or other 

experience. However, these skills are currently not consistently tracked across the Reserve 

Component.

Moreover, National Guard and Reserve personnel also bring other types of expertise to the 

military. For example, in addition to regional, cultural, and language expertise, the current QDR 

identifies expertise in the following areas as necessary and relevant to today’s military: information 

technology, engineering, and biological technology. The civilian education, employment, and 

experiences of many reservists may include expertise in these and other relevant skill areas. 

Recognizing and valuing the relevant civilian expertise that Reserve Component personnel bring to 

the total force promotes structural diversity, as both Active and Reserve Component skill sets will be 

acknowledged and integrated.

Recommendation 1—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve 

Component civilian expertise and continue to track language expertise upon military 

accession and throughout servicemembers’ careers in order to better manage personnel 

with mission-critical skill sets.

The Commission proposes that DoD and the Services codify and track civilian expertise that is 

deemed mission critical.44 Some of these types of expertise, such as cultural expertise or language 

ability, may be closely associated with demographic diversity. Additionally, the National Guard and 

Reserve Subcommittee members believe that acknowledging the value of other civilian expertise will 

help attract and retain a wider pool of applicants to the Reserve Component.

A potential mechanism that could be leveraged to track relevant Reserve Component civilian 

expertise already exists. Currently, the Civilian Employment Information (CEI) program requires 

each member of the Ready Reserve to report

• employment status

• employer’s name

• employer’s complete mailing address

• member’s civilian job title

• total years experience in current civilian occupation.

This information is maintained in the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System 

(RCCPDS). The CEI program could be expanded to collect mission-critical skills, including 

regional, cultural, and language expertise and additional civilian expertise deemed relevant. This 

additional information could be tracked in the RCCPDS and made accessible to commanders 

requiring specific skill sets.

 44 It is important to note that, although the Services can solicit volunteers, the Services are precluded from using 

civilian skills as a basis for involuntary mobilization. So, although it is important to track this type of information, it 

is also important to have the right incentives in place for individuals to use their skills in military settings.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

53

The subcommittee acknowledges that Reserve Component personnel may not be forthcoming 

about possessing certain civilian expertise if there is a perception that reporting expertise may result 

in increased deployment.45 Thus, Reserve Component personnel must be incentivized to provide this 

information and to make their civilian skills available to the military. For example, to help attract a 

diverse and diversely skilled pool of personnel, high levels of in-demand civilian skills could be 

considered for lateral entry into the Reserve Component at a rank corresponding to the level of skill 

but that considers the lack of previous military experience. Other incentives could include one-time 

bonuses for achieving a certain level of proficiency in a skill that is considered valuable to the military. 

In a different recommendation, the Commission directly recommends that such relevant civilian 

skills be considered in promotions.

However, even if this information is tracked, there are several issues that still need to be 

addressed. For example, it is difficult to discern skill levels from self-reported information or job titles 

as currently reported on the CEI. One way to assess skill level is to focus on educational degrees and 

technical credentials (e.g., plumber’s or electrician’s licenses), together with years of experience. 

Another problem is how to evaluate the value of different qualifications to the Services. Demand for 

skills is one way to address this problem, but it does not address future requirements.

In summary, the modified metrics recommendation follows the spirit of the current QDR and 

highlights the importance of identifying mission-critical skills that may already be available to DoD 

and the Services.

Organization and Management

Diversity Leadership

The Commission recommends that diversity leadership become a core competency at all levels of the 

Armed Forces. Research shows that the link between diversity and increased capability is not 

automatic; rather, it requires diversity-conscious leadership (Issue Paper #14). Absent such 

leadership, diversity—whether defined in traditional demographic or broader terms—can actually 

reduce capability, most frequently through decreased communication, increased conflict, or both. 

The next few paragraphs present a brief discussion of diversity leadership and its importance for 

today’s military. For more detail, see Decision Paper #6.

The Commission defines diversity leadership as the ways in which leaders, at all ranks and 

organizational levels, shape the impact of diversity dynamics in the forces under their command.46

Moreover, it views diversity leadership as a set of skills, and a fundamental way of thinking, at which 

all military leaders must excel in order to get the best performance possible from the servicemembers 

they lead every day.

Diversity leadership involves applying practices that management professionals have long 

identified as successful people-management techniques but that take on new significance for leaders 

of diverse workgroups. This is because leaders are responsible for the way the group communicates, 

cooperates, trusts one another, and remains cohesive—all of which may be affected by the degree of 

diversity in the group. Absent effective leadership, such as the leader focusing the group on the 

overarching mission, these dynamics decrease on-the-ground capability in a diverse group.

The Diversity Leadership Subcommittee identified several effective practices for leading diverse 

workgroups that can help the Services benefit from diversity and avoid potential pitfalls (see Issue 

 45 Or that they will be force to perform a job that they may want to keep separate from their military life.

46 In this case, the group dynamics that arise specifically as a result of group diversity. See Decision Paper #6 for 

more detail.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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Paper #29). In particular, studies suggest that effective diversity leadership begins with a leader 

looking through a “diversity lens” to identify and understand the diversity dynamics that are relevant 

in his or her command.47 Doing this requires the leader to

• recognize the “differences” that exist within the group

• both understand the dynamics that can cause those differences to have negative effects 

(e.g., loss of cohesion, communications difficulties, conflict) and create opportunities for 

having a positive effect on organizational performance

• apply leadership practices that can neutralize the potential negative effects and, if 

possible, leverage those differences in support of the mission (see Issue Paper #29).

However, facilitating strong communications, cooperation, trust, and cohesion can be 

challenging for leaders when members of the group are different, and training can greatly help 

leaders successfully implement the steps listed above. Therefore, the Commission emphasizes 

education as part of the recommendation pertaining to diversity leadership. Developing leaders to 

lead diverse groups effectively goes beyond training them to understand diversity; it requires 

educating them about the dynamics that diversity creates in workgroups and then training them in 

practices that will neutralize the negative dynamics and maximize diversity’s positive potential.

The Commission also stresses that diversity leadership training must be offered at all levels. 

There are two important reasons for this. First, this will help the military grow leaders who are 

current on the skills and ways of thinking necessary to lead diverse workgroups at every level in the 

military. Second, it is important to note that it is those individuals who are in direct contact with 

workgroups who can make a difference in capability. The key term here is workgroup because it is in 

these groups that day-to-day interactions among different people take place. In other words, the 

Commission views diversity leadership practices as the things that all leaders do, day to day, not what 

others (e.g., EO advisors, diversity officers) may do on their behalf.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee believes the idea of making diversity leadership 

a core competency across DoD and the Services is equally relevant in the Reserve Component. The 

Commission’s recommendation asks that this be implemented through leadership education and 

training and that the Services determine the framework for how to inculcate such education into 

leader development. From the point of view of the National Guard and Reserve, and as reflected in 

the recommendations below, DoD and the Services should specify how this training is to be 

incorporated into the current training requirements for reservists and should ensure that Reserve 

Component servicemembers receive adequate support to complete this training.

Implementation and Accountability

The work of the Implementation and Accountability Subcommittee points to four main pieces that 

need to be in place for the successful implementation of diversity initiatives. First, the most 

important lesson from the private sector is that the top leader of an organization must personally 

commit to guiding the diversity effort in a visible, specific, and persistent manner (Visconti, 2010). 

This commitment should also include the establishment of support structures within the 

organization that are in close contact with the leadership and that can help deliver and implement a 

consistent diversity message. Second, diversity policies need to be clear and specific and to assign 

responsibility to those in charge of carrying them out. Third, the culture of the organization must 

support the diversity goals. This may require a cultural change driven by the realization that diversity 

 47 Refer to Decision Paper #6 and the other work of the Diversity Leadership Subcommittee for a list of references.
Military Leadership Diversity Commission Decision Paper #9: National Guard and Reserve

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can add value to the organization. Fourth, organizations must have accountability systems and 

monitoring mechanisms that create the right incentives, in terms of rewards and consequences, for 

individuals.

Currently, although many of these pieces are in place as a result of some of the diversity efforts 

undertaken by DoD and the Services, in general, it is the view of the Commission that there is no 

institutional effort that has all the pieces in place to affect permanent changes within DoD and the 

Services. The Implementation and Accountability Subcommittee found many instances in which 

some of the pieces were in place and found that there has been a sincere institutional and leadership 

effort to implement effective diversity policy, but it found no programs containing all these elements 

and no unified strategy across DoD to support these efforts.

Given these findings, the Commission developed several recommendations that ask the 

leadership of DoD and the Services to personally commit to making diversity an institutional 

priority, to align OSD’s organizational structure so as to ensure a sustained focus on diversity, to 

institute clear and robust diversity policies with a focus on accountability, to adjust organizational 

cultures to inculcate a broader understanding of different types of diversity, and to institute 

mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring.

In its work, the National Guard and Diversity Subcommittee found that, although all these 

recommendations could have a positive effect on the Reserve Component, the particularities of the 

command structure in the National Guard made it necessary for the Commission to modify its 

recommendation and add new recommendations to improve implementation and accountability in 

the National Guard.

Reserve Component–Specific Strategic Issues: The Structure of the Reserve Component

The main accountability problem in the National Guard is the fact that, as previously noted, the 

National Guard is basically composed of 54 separate organizations with 54 different commanders in 

chief. This diffuses accountability because there is no centralized position with direct command and 

control of all 54 state National Guards. Although Chief, NGB, writes and disseminates policy at the 

national level, each individual state is in charge of policy implementation.

Moreover, because of the local nature of the National Guard in particular, and, to a lesser degree, 

the Reserve, most Reserve Component servicemembers live in the state where their unit is located. 

This implies that no single state National Guard will be representative of the overall population of 

the country and that the demographics of most Reserve units will not mirror the demographics of the 

nation. However, each state National Guard can strive to be representative of the state it serves, and 

each Reserve unit can strive to be representative of the larger area surrounding the unit. This will 

make the Reserve Component representative of the nation as a whole. This is particularly important 

for National Guard units because, as previously discussed, they may be called on to provide support 

to local communities during emergencies.

The next few sections discusses those aspects of National Guard and Reserve that made it 

necessary for the Commission to modify existing recommendations and add new ones to cover 

implementation and accountability issues in the Reserve Component.

Recommendation 6—

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability and 

internal and external monitoring at the OSD and Service levels for both the Active and 

Reserve Components by:
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• a. Embedding diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout 

careers.

• b. Establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and 

appointment to senior enlisted leadership positions and flag/general officers, 

including 3- and 4-star positions and Service Chief

– i. Include in Senate Armed Services Committee questionnaire

– ii. Document and publish the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star 

selection

• c. Transferring the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council 

(DEOC) to a periodic meeting of the existing Defense Advisory Working Group 

(DAWG).

• d. Instituting a system of “accountability reviews” that is driven by the Secretary 

of Defense.

• e. Directing the “Research and Analysis” office to support the Chief Diversity 

Officer.

• f. Expanding the DACOWITS charter to encompass diversity as a whole.

This recommendation aims to institute mechanisms for accountability and monitoring at OSD 

and Service levels. The Commission approved the top level of this recommendation, originally 

proposed by the Implementation and Accountability Subcommittee. The National Guard and 

Reserve Subcommittee augmented this recommendation with a statement that includes the Reserve 

Component in these accountability mechanisms. This additional language (underlined) was added to 

ensure accountability at all levels—not only for the Active Component but also for the Reserve 

Component.

As stated in Decision Paper #1, “Lessons from the private sector indicate an important best 

practice in achieving accountability: ‘[E]mbed the accountability for diversity into many things . . . 

we find that it is most effective if it shows up in multiple places and in different ways throughout the 

corporation.’” The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee concurs with this statement about the 

means of achieving accountability, and it also believes that holding leaders accountable is key to 

achieving diversity goals in both the Active and Reserve Components.

The unique features of the Reserve Component require specific attention in terms of 

implementation and accountability. In particular, the command and control structure of the National 

Guard makes holding leaders accountable at the state level a complex issue. Thus, by specifically 

naming the Reserve Component in the language of this recommendation, the subcommittee’s aim is 

to call out state-level leaders and make it clear that they will be held accountable for, and monitored 

on, their progress with respect to diversity efforts.

For instance, this recommendation requires that the Reserve Component, in addition to the 

Active Component, include diversity leadership in performance assessments throughout Service 

careers. This would apply to all states’ performance assessments in the case of the National Guard. 

Furthermore, by specifically naming the Reserve Component in the recommendation, the intention 

is that diversity leadership will be a criterion for nomination and appointment to senior leadership 

positions for the National Guard and Reserve, as outlined in Recommendation 5b. Ensuring that the 

National Guard complies with these requirements along with the Active Component will also be 

relevant when National Guard members apply for federal recognition.
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Recommendation 7—

Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures that 

support DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard diversity 

leadership efforts.

Decision Paper #7 points out that one overarching strategic goal is to devise institutional 

structures in DoD and the Services that promote accountability and that involve the top leadership.48

The Commission recommends that NGB and the Reserve Components implement such a 

structure.49

Until recently, NGB did not have a diversity office. Although NGB has made efforts to improve 

the situation, the current diversity office is not staffed, resourced, or placed appropriately in the 

organizational chart to promote accountability. Moreover, the Commission believes that, as currently 

structured, this office will not be able to effectively implement and coordinate the diversity endeavors 

that will result from the Commission’s recommendations. The next few paragraphs describe this 

office in its current state, present a discussion some of its problems, and present some possible 

solutions.

The recently created office of the Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity was established to 

meet NGB’s basic diversity needs. This office was stood up on September 14, 2009, with one 

position at the GS-15 level, with no other staff, and no annual budget.50 NGB created this position 

to emulate efforts by the Services and to address the poor diversity numbers that the NGB’s EO 

office had been observing for some time. Its current activities include writing the diversity strategic 

plan for Chief, NGB, thereby setting diversity policy for the National Guard, and organizing the 

NGB Diversity Council.

There are two particular problems with the current diversity support structure at NGB that the 

Commission wishes to address with our recommendation: the role of this office, and its location in 

NGB’s organizational chart.

The role of the Special Assistant for Diversity is to provide diversity policy for the entire National 

Guard. The Army and Air National Guard offices are responsible for supporting these policies in 

each of the states. The Army National Guard has a national diversity office and a diversity 

coordinator in each state. The Air National Guard planned to stand up a diversity office in January 

2011 and has a Human Resource Advisor in each state.

However, these offices do not report directly to NGB’s diversity office and are not obligated to 

advocate national diversity policy. Thus, much of the intended impact of this office is curtailed 

because the diversity office at the national level cannot effectively fulfill its role due to lack of direct 

implementation power. Good communication about the importance of the message and support for 

implementing the policy are key elements for successful implementation of national policy in the 

states, territories, and the District of Columbia.

 48 The other two overarching strategic goals are (1) implementing strategic efforts across human capital enterprises 

and throughout careers in order to ensure diversity in the senior leadership and (2) instituting clear and robust 

polities that embed reporting and accountability.

49 Because the implementation and accountability recommendations include the Reserve Components through their 

parent Services, our focus here is on the National Guard.

50 This office meets its budget needs by requesting funds from the office of the Comptroller for training, travel, 

material, or any other particular need on a case-by-case basis. This situation is expected to improve with time as this 

office becomes more established and is incorporated into the budget cycle.
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As currently established, the office of the Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity reports to 

the Comptroller and Director of Administration and Management for NGB. As shown in Figure 8 

the Comptroller oversees this and a number of other offices with Comptroller-related functions. This 

structure takes away some of the visibility necessary to actively include top leadership in diversity 

efforts.

Figure 8. National Guard Bureau Organizational Chart

SOURCE: National Guard Bureau, 2010.

Thus, the two main issues are that (1) this office does not have the manpower and visibility to 

have more influence on the policy implementation side and (2) the office’s position in the 

organizational chart impedes communication and information flow between the Special Assistant for 

Diversity and Chief, NGB. These two issues can be rectified dramatically with some simple changes 

in the organization of this office.

The Commission believes that the Special Assistant to the Chief for Diversity should report 

directly to Chief, NGB, to maximize leadership visibility and involvement and that this office should 

be properly staffed to support the policy objectives of the leadership.

A suggested location for the Office of the Special Assistant for Diversity is on the Chief’s 

Personal Staff. As shown in Figure 8, the Personal Staff comprises offices, such as the Inspector 

General and legislative liaison, that report directly to Chief, NGB, and advise him or her on matters 

that require leadership involvement.

A diversity office on the Personal Staff could act as the center of communication between NGB 

and OSD. It could also distribute policy and information to the Air and Army National Guard from 

the Chief, NGB, Personal Staff position. This would likely increase the visibility and therefore the 

ability of the Special Assistant for Diversity to influence NGB diversity policy and its 

implementation.
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Diversity Metrics

The National Guard of the United States is made up of 54 organizations, corresponding to the 50 

states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, and the 

District of Columbia. Each of these National Guards is made up of residents from that state, 

territory, district, or surrounding metropolitan area. Unless the National Guard is called into federal

service, the commander in chief of each National Guard is the governor of that state or territory; in 

the case of the District of Columbia’s National Guard, the President of the United States is the 

commander in chief.

The ideal pursued by this Commission is for the Armed Forces in general to be representative of 

the nation. NGB can contribute to this ideal by helping the National Guard strive to represent the 

state, territory, or district that it serves.

Recommendation 8—

The Commission recommends that Congress include the following text in Title 32:

• a. The National Guard Bureau shall report annually to Congress and DoD on the 

status of diversity for all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard in each state, 

territory, and the District of Columbia. This report shall show how reflective each 

district, territory, and state National Guard is of its respective general population, 

relevant labor pool, and eligible population.

• b. Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce a 

dashboard of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National Guard. 

This dashboard shall show comparisons across states, territories, and the District 

of Columbia and highlight best practices.

The unique features of the National Guard require specific attention in terms of implementation 

and accountability. In particular, the command and control structure of the National Guard makes 

holding leaders accountable at the state level (here, states includes U.S. territories and the District of 

Columbia) a complex issue. Thus, the subcommittee recommends implementing an accountability 

mechanism that will encourage states to take measures necessary to improve its National Guard’s 

diversity.

One of the main problems in achieving accountability is the complexity of command and control 

issues in the National Guard. As codified in Title 10, the President is the Commander in Chief of 

the Armed Forces of the United States, including the National Guard and Reserve when called to 

active duty. However, most of the time, the National Guard in not in active duty and, therefore, not 

under federal control.

Title 32 assigns command of state National Guard units to the governors of the state—the state 

governors are commanders in chief for their state National Guard when the National Guard is not 

under federal control.51 As commanders in chief, it is also the governors who select the Adjutant 

Generals to their states. Title 10 and Title 32 effectively indicate that Chief, NGB, has no command 

authority over each state’s National Guard.

Therefore, to increase accountability at the state level, the National Guard and Reserve 

Subcommittee recommends that NGB prepare a report to Congress and a detailed diversity 

dashboard to help National Guard units, and their state leadership, assess their diversity efforts. The 

 51 The President is the Commander in Chief of the District of Columbia National Guard.
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report to Congress will offer diversity and representation statistics to Congress and DoD that provide 

comparisons with different civilian population benchmarks. The purpose of this report is to increase 

stakeholder and public awareness about diversity issues in the National Guard and, consequently, to 

increase accountability.

The dashboard will serve as an information sharing tool to aid each state in identifying diversity 

problem areas and solutions. This report should include some of the same statics included in the 

report to Congress, but it should be augmented with diversity indicators at the unit level.

Moreover, the dashboard should also include a compendium of diversity best practices and 

programs. This report will help leaders assess the diversity situation of their unit or command and 

help them facilitate improvement in state National Guard diversity programs. All of the information 

contained in the dashboard should be available to the states.

In summary, Congress should revise Title 32 to make these reports a permanent assessment of 

diversity in the National Guard. This will ensure a permanent focus on diversity issues and will place 

accountability at the state level. NGB can track these diversity metrics, report them to Congress, and 

serve as a facilitator of diversity best practices for states struggling with diversity initiatives.
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CONCLUSION

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee was created to bring the Reserve Component 

perspective to the Commission. In its work, the subcommittee highlighted the differences between 

the Active and Reserve Components with regard to issues that pertain to the diversity of the force. 

As a first step in its assessment, the subcommittee provided a description of the manpower structure 

of the Reserve Component, assembled demographic profiles of all of the Reserve Components, and 

illustrated the role of structural diversity in the integration of the Active and Reserve Components as 

a total force. This provided the backdrop for the rest of the work of the subcommittee.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee then reviewed the work the Commission had 

already done with regard to the Active Component, and it added its own analysis informed by the 

Reserve Component perspective. This helped the Commission identify recommendations that 

required modification in order to fully addresses Reserve Component issues and identify existing 

recommendations that failed to cover diversity issues specific to the National Guard and Reserve. In 

those cases, the subcommittee proposed new recommendations.

The National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee found that most issues covered by the 

Commission at least partially addressed diversity issues in the Reserve Component. However, the 

subcommittee also found that new recommendations were necessary in order to increase the pool of 

applicants that join the Reserve Component, to increase promotion opportunities, and to improve 

the management and organizational structures that can improve representation in the Reserve 

Component.

The first part of this paper presents background facts and a demographic profile of the Reserve 

Component, highlighting three main points. First, depending on how it is measured, the Reserve 

Component constitutes between 37 percent and 47 percent of total U.S. military manpower. Second, 

although there are several differences between the Active and Reserve Components, including the 

fact that the percentage of women in the Reserve Component is higher than in the Active 

Component, in general, both the Active and Reserve Components exhibit the same representation 

issues when compared with the general population. Lastly, because of the increased interaction 

between the Active and Reserve Components, differences between Active and Reserve Component 

personnel are assuming an important new dimension in the form of structural diversity.

These facts indicate that, because of the size of the Reserve Component relative to the total force, 

any change in the demographic profile of the National Guard and Reserve will be reflected in the 

demographic profile of the Armed Forces as a whole. They also indicate that structural diversity 

issues, which arise from the interaction between the Active and Reserve Components, could have a 

positive effect on mission readiness and mission accomplishment if they are identified and managed 

appropriately.

Mindful of this information, the remainder of this section summarizes the Commissionapproved, topic-specific recommendations that resulted from the Commissioners’ understanding and 

interpretation of the findings of this and other subcommittees. These recommendations are grouped 

into three categories: (1) recommendations that widen the pool of those entering the Reserve 

Component, (2) recommendations that widen opportunities and remove barriers so that qualified 

servicemembers can move up the ranks, and (3) organization and management recommendations 

that aim to improve diversity support structures and leadership accountability in the Reserve 

Component.
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Widening the Pool

Because of the structure of the Reserve Component, the recommendations related to widening the 

pool of applicants can be organized into three main topics: retention, the prior service pool, and 

civilian skills and expertise. The National Guard and Reserve subcommittee found that, just as in the 

Active Component, the Reserve Component has low retention rates for women and, to a lesser 

degree, minority groups. The subcommittee also found that much of the Reserve force comes from 

prior service personnel and that prior service personnel are a valuable source of manpower for the 

Reserve Component and the military as a whole.

Based on this fact, the Commission recommends improving transition processes to allow 

servicemembers to more seamlessly move from their active-duty Services to the National Guard and 

Reserve and also between Reserve Components. The Commission believes that, improving these 

processes, talented individuals who might otherwise leave the military altogether could be retained in 

the Reserve Component, thereby increasing the pool of personnel who may join the National Guard 

and Reserve. The Commission also believes that the added flexibility implied by these seamless 

transitions will decrease barriers to service and potentially increase the retention rates of women and 

other groups in both the Reserve and Active Components. However, the Commission also 

recognizes that more research is necessary to assess the effects on retention of this added flexibility.

Widening Opportunities

The recommendations intended to widen opportunities for those in the force aim to remove barriers 

that may have a detrimental effect on advancement opportunities for different demographic groups or 

that may have negative effects on structural diversity. The National Guard and Reserve 

Subcommittee’s main findings in this area are that career assignments—specifically, assignment to a 

tactical occupation—can supply more advancement opportunities than are provided by other career 

fields. Furthermore, the subcommittee also found that women and minorities tend to be in tactical 

occupations at a much lower rate than males and whites, respectively. The Commission 

acknowledges this to be a barrier that affects the rate of advancement of these groups to the higher 

ranks of the military.

The Commission also examined structural issues that may impede the advancement of traditional 

reservists. The Commission recognizes that one of the major differences between active-duty and 

Reserve Component servicemembers is that, to achieve operational credibility, National Guard and 

Reserve personnel must achieve some of the same career milestones achieved by active-duty 

personnel while at the same time balancing their civilian lives and employment demands.

Lastly, the Commission recognizes that the civilian skills and expertise of reservists can be 

valuable to the Service in the operational environments of today and the future.

Given these facts, the Commission proposes four recommendations. First, the Commission 

recommends that knowledge, skills, ability, and potential be emphasized for promotion to the 

flag/general officer ranks. The Commission believes deemphasizing career field and placing more 

weight on the qualifications required for flag/general officer positions may remove some of the 

barriers that encumber the advancement of women and minorities—with no detriment to the quality 

of officers in the upper ranks.

Second, although the Commission identified some areas for concern in promotion rates, the 

Commission believes the process to be fair in general. However, the Commission also believes that 

fairness in the process is not enough and that all servicemembers should have a good understanding 

of the promotion process so that they are aware of the opportunities available to them. Because of 
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this, the Commission recommends that the Services improve their mentoring programs, and it 

believes that these programs should include information about Reserve Component opportunities. 

Particularly important for the Reserve Component is an emphasis on the person-to-person aspect of

mentoring. Because Reserve Component units meet only a few times a year, the amount of time 

available for personal contact between mentor and protégée is often limited. The Commission 

believes that, given these constraints, every effort should be made to take advantage of the limited 

time available.

Third, the Commission recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

and the Service Chiefs identify ways for National Guard and Reserve personnel to effectively fulfill 

joint and operational requirements. As previously mentioned, because of the military/civilian duality, 

the time available for Reserve Component servicemembers to achieve these career landmarks is 

limited; therefore, the Services must strive to provide the appropriate opportunities for reservists to 

achieve these milestones.

Fourth, the Commission recommends that DoD and the Services track civilian skills and 

expertise. The Commission believes that by acknowledging and appreciating the value of these skills, 

the Reserve Component will be able to attract a more diverse pool of applicants. The principal aim of 

these recommendations is to provide opportunities to all those qualified and thereby attract a diverse 

pool of qualified candidates to the Reserve Component.

Organization and Management

Lastly, the Commission provides recommendations that will help the National Guard and Reserve 

align themselves with DoD diversity initiatives, facilitate implementation of policies that promote 

and help manage diversity, and institute accountability mechanisms. The subcommittee found that, 

due to the command and control structure of the National Guard and the need to accomplish the 

goals set forth by the Commission, modifications to the existing recommendations and a new set of 

recommendations were required.

The Commission makes three recommendations in this regard. First, the Commission 

recommends that the Reserve Component institute the same mechanisms for accountability and 

internal and external monitoring required of the Active Component. These accountability and 

monitoring mechanisms should be instituted at the OSD and Service levels and aimed at promoting 

accountability at all levels in a servicemember’s career.

The second recommendation asks Chief, NGB, to establish and support organizational structures 

that facilitate diversity efforts. This recommendation aims to provide the National Guard with the 

support it requires to write, disseminate, and support the diversity policy that is to be implemented in 

all the states.

Third, the Commission recommends that NGB collect and publish diversity metrics at the state 

level. These metrics will be the basis of a report to Congress. They will also form the basis of a 

dashboard, which is intended to help the states identify diversity issues and will serve as a tool to 

disseminate best practices. The Commission believes that the report to Congress will serve as an 

accountability tool that will hold state leadership accountable for its diversity efforts.

Final Note

In conclusion, the work of the National Guard and Reserve Subcommittee provided the perspective 

of the Reserve Component to the Commission. The subcommittee identified issues that were unique 

to the National Guard and Reserve, bringing them to the Commission for deliberation. The work 
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and deliberations resulted in recommendations that cover issues related to widening the pool of 

people that may enter the Reserve Component, widening opportunities for qualified servicemembers 

to advance through the ranks, and providing the organization and management structures to support 

diversity initiatives. The Commission believes that, together, these recommendations can have a 

strong positive effect on diversity in the Reserve Component.
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APPENDIX A: MLDC CHARTER TASKS

1. Develop a uniform definition of diversity to be used throughout DoD congruent with the 

core values and vision of DoD for the future workforce.

2. Incorporate private sector practices successful in cultivating diverse leadership to DoD policy.

3. Assess the ability of the current organizational structure to ensure effective and accountable 

diversity management across DoD, including ODMEO and other similar offices within the 

Military Departments.

4. Explore options available to improve the substance and implementation of current plans and 

policies of DoD and the Military Departments.

5. Examine existing metrics and milestones for evaluating DoD diversity plans (including the 

plans of the individual Services) and how to facilitate future evaluation and oversight.

6. Evaluate efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership at all levels of the Armed Forces.

7. Analyze successes and failures of efforts to develop and maintain diverse leadership, 

particularly of flag officers.

8. Determine the status of prior recommendations made to DoD and Congress concerning 

diversity initiatives within the Armed Services.

9. Consider the benefits of conducting an annual conference focused on diversity attended by 

DoD civilians, active duty and retired military personnel, and corporate leaders, to include a 

review of current policy and the annual demographic data from the DEOMI and DMDC.

10. Examine the possible effect of expanding DoD secondary educational programs to diverse 

civilian populations, including military academy preparatory schools.

11. Evaluate the ability of current recruitment and retention practices to attract and maintain a 

diverse pool of qualified individuals in sufficient numbers in pre-commissioning officer 

development programs.

12. Assess the pre-command billet assignments of ethnic-specific officers.

13. Examine command selection for officers of particular ethnicities.

14. Evaluate the establishment and maintenance of fair promotion, assignment, and command 

opportunities and their effect by gender and ethnicity for officers at O-5 and above.

15. Evaluate the existence and maintenance of fair promotion, assignment, and command 

opportunities for ethnic and gender-specific members of the Armed Forces at the levels of 

warrant officer, chief warrant officer, company and junior grade, field and mid-grade, and 

general and flag officer.

16. Measure the ability of current activities to increase continuation rates for ethnic and genderspecific members of the Armed Forces.
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APPENDIX B: SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

Definition

Recommendation 1—

The DoD shall expand its definition of diversity to read: Diversity is all the different characteristics 

and attributes of individuals that are consistent with Department of Defense core values, integral to 

overall readiness and mission accomplishment, and reflect the nation we serve.

• a. The DoD shall accompany this definition with a mission statement that prioritizes 

equity and inclusion and provides a purpose that is actionable and measurable.

• b. The mission statement shall be accompanied by a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 

to advance implementation.

Outreach and Recruiting

Recommendation 1—

The shrinking pool of qualified candidates is a threat to national security. All stakeholders should 

develop and engage in activities that will expand the pool of qualified candidates.

• a. The President, Congress, and state and local officials should develop, resource, and 

implement strategies to address current eligibility issues.

• b. DoD and DHS (Coast Guard) should:

– i. Create and leverage formal partnerships with other stakeholders.

– ii. Institutionalize and promote citizenship programs for the Services.

– iii. Require the Services to review and validate their eligibility criteria for military 

service.

Recommendation 2—

DoD and the Services should focus their outreach efforts on early engagement. They should conduct 

strategic evaluations of the effectiveness of their current K–12 outreach programs and practices. To 

that end, they should increase resources and support for those that are found to be effective.

Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services should engage in activities to improve recruiting from the currently available 

pool of qualified candidates by:

• a. Creating, implementing, and evaluating a strategic plan for outreach to, and recruiting 

from, untapped locations and underrepresented demographic groups.

• b. Creating more accountability for recruiting from underrepresented demographic 

groups.

• c. Developing a common application for Service ROTC and academy programs.

• d. Closely examining the prep schools’ admissions processes and making required changes 

to ensure that accessions align with the needs of the military.
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Branching and Assignments

Recommendation 1—

To assess demographic diversity patterns across the military lifecycle, the Secretary of Defense shall 

hold annual accountability reviews with the individual Service secretaries, Service chiefs, and Chief, 

National Guard Bureau. The Coast Guard should be subject to a similar review.

Recommendation 2—

The Services should ensure their career development programs and resources enhance 

servicemembers’ knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Component opportunities, to 

optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession to retirement.

• a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field 

decision point and continue throughout the servicemember’s career.

• b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line of 

communication between protégé and mentor.

Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services should eliminate the “combat exclusion policies” for women, including the 

removal of barriers and inconsistencies, to create a level playing field for all qualified servicemembers. 

The commission recommends a time phased approach:

• a. Women in career fields/specialties currently open to them should be immediately able 

to be assigned to any unit that requires that career field/specialty, consistent with the 

current operational environment.

• b. DoD and the Services should take deliberate steps in a phased approach to open 

additional career fields and units involved in “direct ground combat” to qualified women.

• c. DoD and the Services should report to Congress the process and timeline for removing 

barriers that inhibit women from achieving senior leadership positions.

Promotion

Recommendation 1—

The Services should report enlisted and officer promotion rates based on a common definition of 

demographic groups, a common methodology, and a common reporting structure to the SecDef. 

Specific deviations for demographic groups and career fields should be investigated for underlying 

causes and corrective actions should be taken as appropriate. Each Service shall make the promotion 

and/or selection rate of underrepresented groups a key metric of the Services’ success in creating an 

inclusive environment.

Recommendation 2—

DoD should continue to require that its Services use a common survey instrument to monitor and 

periodically report on servicemembers’ perceptions about promotion opportunities. The Coast Guard 

should participate in this effort. DoD and the Services should take corrective actions whenever 

negative perceptions emerge or persist.
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Recommendation 3—

The Services shall ensure that promotion board precepts provide guidance regarding Service-directed 

special assignments outside of normal career paths and/or fields. As appropriate, senior raters’ 

evaluations should acknowledge when a servicemember has deviated from the due-course path at the 

specific request of his/her leadership.

Recommendation 4—

DoD and the Services must ensure that there is transparency throughout the entire promotion system 

so that servicemembers may better understand performance expectations and promotion criteria and 

processes. The Services shall educate and counsel all servicemembers on the importance of, and their 

responsibility for, a complete promotion board packet.

Retention

Recommendation 1—

DACOWITS should expand its current focus on retention to include an explanation of the gender 

gap in retention. As part of this renewed focus, DACOWITS should examine the effects of 

retention programs such as the sabbatical programs currently offered by the Navy and the Coast 

Guard, as well as any other innovative Service-specific approaches to retention. Findings and 

recommendations from this research should be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation 2—

DoD shall establish a universal qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis system that 

tracks career progression over time, including branching and assignments, promotion, and retention.

Diversity Leadership

Recommendation 1—

To enhance readiness and mission accomplishment, leading diverse groups effectively must become a 

core competency across DoD and the Services. To implement this recommendation:

• a. Leadership training at all levels shall include education in diversity dynamics and 

training in practices for leading diverse groups effectively.

• b. DoD and the Services should determine the framework for how (e.g., curriculum, 

content, methods) to inculcate such education and training into leader development, 

including how to measure and evaluate its effectiveness.

Metrics

Recommendation 1—

Congress should revise Title 10 Section 113 to require that:

• a. The Office of the Secretary of Defense develop a standard set of strategic metrics and 

benchmarks that enables the Secretary of Defense to track progress toward its goal of 

having a dynamic and sustainable 20-30 year pipeline that yields (1) An officer and 

enlisted corps that reflects the eligible U.S. population across all Service communities and 
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ranks and (2) A military force that is able to prevail in its wars; prevent and deter conflict; 

defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance 

the all-volunteer force.

• b. The Secretary of Defense meet at least annually with Service secretaries, Service chiefs 

and senior enlisted advisors to drive progress toward diversity management goals.

• c. The Secretary of Defense send an annual report to Congress and the President on the 

progress made toward diversity goals in the Services, including the National Guard and 

Reserve.

• d. The Secretary of Defense report annually an assessment of the available pool of 

qualified minority and female candidates for the 3- and 4-star general and flag officer 

positions.

Recommendation 2—

The Office of the Secretary of Defense must revise and reissue existing DoD diversity policies to:

• a. Require DoD to define clear measures of its diversity goals.

• b. Require DoD to establish standards that allow for the accurate collection and analyses 

of data needed to measure progress towards diversity goals.

• c. Provide oversight and support for the Services’ respective diversity initiatives and 

metrics to ensure that, as a minimum, they align with the end state established by DoD.

Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve Component 

civilian expertise, and continue to track language expertise upon military accession and throughout 

servicemembers’ careers in order to better manage personnel with mission-critical skill sets.

Recommendation 4—

The Secretary of Defense must ensure that all qualified candidates (including minorities and women) 

have been considered for the nomination of every 3- and 4-star position. If there were no qualified 

minority and/or female candidates, then a statement of explanation should be made in the package 

submitted to the Senate for the confirmation hearings.

Implementation and Accountability

Recommendation 1—

The leadership of DoD and the Services must personally commit to making diversity an institutional 

priority.

Recommendation 2—

The OSD organizational structure must be aligned to ensure a sustained focus on diversity and 

diversity initiatives and should include establishment of the position of Chief Diversity Officer who 

reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.
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Recommendation 3—

DoD and the Services must institute clear, robust diversity policies with emphasis on roles, 

responsibilities, authorities, and accountability (R2A2).

• a. DoD and the Services shall revise and/or reissue and enforce compliance with their 

diversity and equal opportunity policies.

• b. Diversity policies at all levels should be implemented via strategic plans and within a 

life-cycle framework.

Recommendation 4—

DoD and the Services should adjust their organizational cultures to inculcate a broader 

understanding of the various types of diversity by:

• a. incorporating diversity leadership skills and respect for diversity into training and 

education throughout career development.

• b. identifying and rewarding the skills needed to meet the operational challenges of the 

21st century.

• c. using strategic communications plans to communicate their diversity vision and values.

Recommendation 5—

DoD should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and external monitoring at OSD 

and Service levels, including the Reserve component, by:

• a. Embedding diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout careers.

• b. Establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to 

senior enlisted leadership positions and Flag and General officers, including 3-star and 4-

star positions and Service chief.

– 1. Formalize the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star selection in the DoD 

instruction 1320.4, Military Officer Actions Requiring Approval of the Secretary 

of Defense or the President, or Confirmation by the Senate.

• Service laydowns.

• Slates of candidates.

• Broadened pool to include nontraditional sources.

• Describe vetting process to emphasize accountability.

– 2. Include diversity leadership statement in SASC questionnaire.

• c. Transferring the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council 

(DEOC) to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD’s leadership, the existing Defense 

Advisory Working Group (DAWG).

• d. Instituting a system of “accountability reviews” that is driven by the Secretary of 

Defense.

• e. Directing “Research and Analysis” office to support the Chief Diversity Officer.

• f. Expanding the DACOWITS charter, where appropriate, to encompass diversity as a 

whole.
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APPENDIX C: NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE

RECOMMENDATIONS

In cases when language was added to an existing recommendation, that language is underlined.

Recommendation 1 (Added to Metrics Recommendation 3)—

DoD and the Services must track regional and cultural expertise and relevant Reserve Component 

civilian expertise and continue to track language expertise upon military accession and throughout 

servicemembers’ careers in order to better manage personnel with mission-critical skill sets.

Recommendation 2 (Outreach and Recruiting)—

DoD must improve the personnel and finance systems affecting Active to Reserve Component and 

internal Reserve Component transition protocols to promote structural diversity, total force 

integration, and overall retention.

Recommendation 3 (Added to Branching and Assignments Recommendation 

2)—

The Services should ensure their career development programs and resources enhance 

servicemembers’ knowledge of career choices, including Reserve Component opportunities, to 

optimize the ability of servicemembers to make informed career choices from accession to retirement.

• a. Mentoring and career counseling efforts shall start prior to the initial career field 

decision point and continue throughout the servicemember’s career.

• b. Mentoring programs shall follow effective practices and employ an active line of 

communication between protégé and mentor.

Recommendation 4 (Promotion)—

The Services and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, must specify the knowledge, skills, abilities, and 

potential necessary to be an effective flag or general officer and senior noncommissioned officer.

Recommendation 5—

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Service Chiefs must assess how 

Reserve Component members can more effectively both gain operational experience and fulfill joint 

requirements given the constraints of their dual military/civilian lives and take action as appropriate.

Recommendation 6 (Added to Implementation and Accountability 

Recommendation 5)—

DoD must and DHS (Coast Guard) should institute mechanisms for accountability and internal and 

external monitoring at OSD and Service levels for both the Active and Reserve Components by:

• a. Embedding diversity leadership in performance assessment throughout careers.
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• b. Establishing diversity leadership as a criterion for nomination and appointment to 

senior enlisted leadership positions and flag/general officers, including 3-star and 4-star 

positions and Service Chief.

– i. Include in Senate Armed Services Committee questionnaire

– ii. Document and publish the process and requirements for 3- and 4-star selection

• c. Transferring the functions of the former Defense Equal Opportunity Council 

(DEOC) to a minimum of biannual meetings of DoD’s leadership, the existing Defense 

Advisory Working Group (DAWG).

• d. Instituting a system of “accountability reviews” that is driven by the Secretary of 

Defense.

• e. Directing the “Research and Analysis” office to support the Chief Diversity Officer.

• f. Expanding the DACOWITS charter to encompass diversity as a whole.

Recommendation 7 (Implementation and Accountability)—

Chief, National Guard Bureau, must establish and resource organizational structures that support 

DoD diversity initiatives and reinforce ongoing National Guard diversity leadership efforts.

Recommendation 8 (Implementation and Accountability)—

Congress include the following text in Title 32:

• The National Guard Bureau shall report annually to Congress and DoD on the status of 

diversity for all ranks of the Army and Air National Guard in each state, territory, and 

the District of Columbia. This report shall show how reflective each district, territory, 

and state National Guard is of its respective general population, relevant labor pool, and 

eligible population.

• Based on the report to Congress, the National Guard Bureau shall produce a dashboard 

of diversity metrics to be used by the Army and Air National Guard. This dashboard 

shall show comparisons across states, territories, and the District of Columbia and 

highlight best practices.
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