### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 9, 200 4
RA YM OND MITC HELL v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 95-B-1222 Seth Nor m an, Jud ge

No. M2003- 02063-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Septem ber 17, 2004

The pe titioner, Ray mond Mitchell, was convicte d in 1 9 9 6 o f two counts of ra pe and one count of attempted rape
. He pled nolo contendere t o a t h i r d r ap e c h ar g e , w h i c h w a s r e d u c e d t o s e x u a l b a t t e r y. He re c e ive d a

tot a l e ff e c tiv e sen ten ce of f

if te e n y e ars a s a

Ra ng e I , s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r, a ndhis convictions wer e af

firmed on d i re ct appeal. Subsequently , he filed a petition for dec laratory judg me n t i n th e Ch a n c e r y Co u r t f o r D a v id s o n Co u n ty , a ll e g in g h e w a s e n ti tl e d to e ar n s e n te nce reduc tion credits and c halleng ing his c lassification as a “multiple r apist.” The trial court dismissed the petition and he a

ppeale d. The Court of Appe als held that the De partment of Corr ection (“ DOC”) did not err by

classifying the petitioner as a multipl e rapist and determining he was not elig ible for sentenc e re duction cre dits. The petitioner then filed a petition fo r post -convic tion relief, a lleg ing ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l, pros ecutor ia l mi sc on du c t, i mpr op e r j ury ins truc tio ns , d ou ble j eo p ar d y v i o l a t i o n s , an d aga i n ch al l en gi n g t h e s en t en ce en fo rc em en tb y t h e D OC

. Fo l l o wi n g a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and this appeal followe d. We affirm the order of the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt de nying the pe tit ion bu t r e ma nd for ent ry of c or re c te d ju dg me nts in Counts 2 and 3 to ref

lect that the petit ioner is a “multi ple rapist,” and his sentenc es ar e to be se rved as such.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d and Rem anded f

or Entry of Corre cte d Jud gm ents

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivere d the opinion of t he court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH and J OE G. R I L EY , J J ., joined.

Jac k D a vis , N a sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Ra y mon d M itc he ll.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l an d

R e p o r t e r; El iza be th B . M arn e y , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, I I I , Distr i ct Att orney Gene ral; and D an Ha mm, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.-2- OP IN ION

F AC TS

The fa cts of this case we re se t out in the opinion of thi s court on dire ct appe al, af firming the pe tit ion e r’ s c on vic tio ns :

The [petit ioner] w as indicted on three counts of ra pe ac complished by fraud and one c ount of attempted rape by fraud. Be fore trial, one of the ra pe cha rg es wa s sever ed b y t he prose cution and set to be adjudicate d separ ately . The re maining t wo counts of rape by fraud and the c ount of attempted ra pe by fraud wer e tried tog ether

. The [petitioner] was tried by a jury in the joint procee ding and
wa s c on vic te d a s c ha

rg e d o n th e tw o coun ts of rape a nd the sin g le count of attempted rape. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I standard of

fende r to ten y ear s for eac h conviction of rape and to five y ear s for the c onviction of attempted ra pe. The ten-y ear

sentenc es we re or de re d to ru n c on c ur re ntl y to e a c h oth e r a ndc on se c uti ve ly to the fi ve -y e ar s e nte nc e , f

or a tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

fi ft e e n y e ars
. On the seve red count of ra pe by fraud, the [petiti oner] enter ed a plea of nolo contendere to the lesser of fense of sexual battery . The trial court se ntence d the [ petitioner] to two y ear s on that conviction, to run conc urre ntly

to the above f

ifteen- y ear

s en t en ce . The [petit ioner] reserved a c ertified issue f or appeal fr om the plea
a g re e me nt. His a

pp e a l in that c a se ha s b e e n c on so lid a te d w ith his dir e c t app e a l f

ro m th e jury

tr ia l. State v. Ray mond Mi t chell, I I I , No. M1996-00008-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 559930, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App. J u ly

30, 1999), perm. to appeal de nied (Te nn. J an. 31, 2000). Subseque ntly , the petitioner filed a petiti on for declar atory judgme nt in the C hance ry Court for Da vidson Countyand
wa s d e nie d r e lie f. He app e a le d. Th e app e llate op ini on se t f orth the fo llo wi ng re le va nt f a c ts: This ap p ea l involves a dispute betwe en a prisoner and the T en n es s ee De p ar t m en t o f C o rr ec t i o n re gar d i n g t h e D e p ar t m en t 's decision to classify

the prisoner

as a multiple rapist under

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523( b) (2000) . After the Commi ssioner of Corre ction denied his petition for a

decla ratory order , the prisoner filed a pe tition for a decla ratory judgme nt in t h e C h ancery Court for Da vidson Cou nty c la imi ng that th e De pa

rt me nt ha d mis c la ssi fi e d h im a nd , if it ha d n ot, that he was still e nti tle d to e arn se nte nc e re du c tio n c re dit s beca use he w as a Range I

standard of

fende r. The trial court-3- dismiss ed the pe tition, and the prisoner ha s appea led. We have de te rm ine d th a t the De pa rt me nt pr op e rl y c la ssi fi e d th e priso ne r a s a multipl e ra

pist and that the prisoner is not otherwise e ntitled to earn
s en t en ce re d u ct i o n cr ed i t s
. Ac co rd i n gl y , w e a f f i rm t h e t ri al co u rt 's jud g me nt. Mitchell v. Campbell, 88 S.W .3d 561, 563 (Tenn. Ct. App.) , perm. to a ppeal denied (Tenn. 2002)

. The pe titioner filed a pro s e petition for post-conviction relief on April 4, 2001. Counsel was appointed, and an amende d petiti o n was filed on Aug ust 9, 2001. Counsel was relieve d and new counsel wa s retaine d on April 24, 2002. A sec ond amende d petition wa s filed on October 3, 2002, and hea ring s were held on Dec ember 17, 2002, and May

2, 2003.

As we w ill ex plain, we ha ve had substantial diff iculty in determining what cla ims were prese nted to the court at the post-conviction hea ring and which of t h e n u m erous c laims raised on appea l are , in fac t, proper ly befor e thi s court. The pro s e petition f or post-conviction relief

prese nted thirteen claims for relief, some of which wer e closely rela ted. The first amende d petition, which was filed by counsel, c ontinued to a

rg ue all thirteen of these claims. The sec ond amende d petition, filed by new c ounsel, prese nted ar g uments only as to claims 1, 2, 5, 12, and 13. At the post-c onviction hea ri n g, counsel for the petitioner, who did not testify , did not specifica lly identify the issues on which they

wer e proc eeding , but it appear s, from the witnesse s prese nted and the nat u re of the questioning, that they

pursued only o ri ginal petition issues 5 (the prosec utor failed to disclose the identity of an e x culpatory

witness), 12 (trial counsel was ineffec tive in not obtaining the testimony of this witness at trial), and 13 ( the DOC wa s illega lly requiring that t h e p etitioner’s sente nces be
serve d at 100%, rather than 30% as p ro v i d ed b y the judg ments.) I n its findings of f act a nd conclusions of law , the post-conviction court ruled adver sely to the petitioner on issues 1, 3, and 13 and, as to the othe r cla ims raised in the petition, d et er m i n ed they wer e without merit bec ause “ no proof was offe red at the evidentiary hearing in support of such.” Since the petitioner ne ither testified at the evide ntiary

hearing nor

prese nted an y fa v o rable witnesses, the proof consisted solely

of witnesses, as we will explain, who denied the alleg ations of the petition. We now will consider the iss ue s o n a

pp e a l.

Roberta Ande rson, a se ntence man age r with the DOC, testified that the pe titioner had “finished” his f

ive-y ear sentenc e, reduc ed by sentenc e cre dits, a nd was serving his two c oncurr ent ten-y ear sentenc es, which wer e at 100%, althoug h the judgme nts f or these sente nces state they are to be serve d at 30%. The pe titioner’s trial counse l testified that he had pr actice d law for twenty -five y ears and, along with another attorney , had re prese nted the petitioner at his trial. He said t hey had filed motions claimin g t h at the indictment was unc onstitut ional, to dismi ss the indictment, and for a bill of particula rs. I n the ana ly sis section of this opinion, we will revie w counsel’s testimony reg arding the sp e c if ic c la ims a s to ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l.-4-

Th e a ssi sta nt d ist

ri c t atto rn e y g e ne ra l in the pe tit ion e r’ s o ri g ina l tria l te sti fi e d a s to wi tne ss in f o r mati o n p r o v id e d to d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l, d e n y in g th a t he h a d w ith h e lde xc u lp a to r y in f o r mati o n
. We will review the specific s of his testimonyin the analy sis section of this opinion.

Gail S. Ba

rbee , the Direc tor of Boa

rd Oper ations for the Tenne ssee Boa rd of Probation and Parole, testified tha t although the petitioner had me t with the parole board, by statute he wa s require d to serve 100% of his rape sentenc es.
As we ha ve stated, the petitioner did not testify at the hea

ring

. AN AL YSI S

I. P ost-Conviction Standard of Review

T h e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n p e ti ti o n e r b e ar s th e b u r d e n o f p r o v in g h is a ll e g a ti o n s byclea r and convincing evidenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ) (2003) . When an evidentiary hearing is held in the pos t-conviction setti ng , the findi ng s of fact m ade by the court are c onclusive on appe al unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. See Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1 9 9 6 ). W h er e ap p el l at e re v i ew i n v o l v es p u re l y fa ct u al i s s u es , t h e a p p el l at e c o u rt s h o u l d n o tre we i gh
or r ee v al u at e the evidence . See He nley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) . Howeve r, re vie w o f a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s app lic atio n of the la w to the fa c ts of the c a se is de novo , with no presumption
o f co rr ec t n es s . See Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998). T he issues of de ficient perf ormanc e of c ounsel and possible pre judice to th e defense a

re mixed questions of law and f act and, thus, subject to de novo revie w by the appellate court. See S tate v. Burns, 6 S.W .3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

. II. St at ut e of Lim it at ion s First, we will consider the State’s arg ument that the petit ioner’s a ppeal should be dismissed for lac k of jurisdiction because his petition was not timelyfiled. By statute, a person in c ustody must file a petition for post-convic tion relief within one y ear “of the date of

the final a ction of the hig hest state appellate court to w hich an appea l is taken

. . . or consideration of such petition shall be barr ed.” T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(a ) (2003)

. Further, “[t] ime is of the essence of the right to file a pe tition for post-conviction relief . . . and the one -y ear lim itatio ns pe ri odis a n e le me nt o f the ri g ht t o f il e su c h a n a c tio n a ndis a c on dit ion up on its exercise.” I d. Also, due proc ess may , in limi ted circ umstances, r equire tolling of the post-c onviction statute of limit ations. See Seals v. State, 23 S.W .3d 272, 278-79 (Te nn. 2000); Bur ford v. State, 845 S.W .2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992)

. Fr om our revie w of the r ecor d, it is clea r t hat t his petition was unti mely

. Our supre me court denied the pe titioner’s application for permission t o appeal on J anuary 31, 2000. Although the petitioner sig ned and dated his orig inal petition for post-conviction re lief on April 2, 2001, more thanW e h av e p rev i o usly ex p resse d o ur co nc ern w i t h t he S t ate rais i ng t he st atute o f l i m i t ati o ns d efen se for the f i rst 2 t i me on a pp e a l

. J oh n Pa r k e r Roe v
. St a t e , N o. W 20 00

- 02 78 8- CCA- R3- PC, 20 02 W L 31 62 48 50 , a t * 12 n
. 2 ( T e n n
. Cr i m. A pp
. , Jac ks on, N ov. 20, 200 2), per m. t o app eal deni ed ( T enn
. Feb. 24, 200 3). W e a t t r i but e t hi s probl em t o t he f act t hat t he as s i s t ant at t orn ey gen er al r epre s ent i ng t he St at e on appeal i s us ual l y not t he s ame at t orn ey r epre s ent i ng t he St at e a t t he p o st

- co nvi ct i o n heari ng. -5- tw o mon ths a ft e r the e xpir a tio n of the on e -y e ar pe ri od , he faile d to e xpla in wh y he did no t f ile his pe tit ion wi thi n th e on e y e ar o r w hy the on e -y e ar s ta tute of li mi tat ions s ho uldno t ba r h is c la im. Howeve r, the Stat e d i d n o t raise this i ssue in its response to the petition or at the post-c onviction he ari ng , b ut i ns te a d d id s o f or the fi rs t ti me on thi s a

pp e a l. 1

“ Gi ve n th e po st- c on vic tio n s ta tut e ’s la ng ua g e c on fe rring jurisd ic tio na l imp ort to the tim e ly filing of a petition, it is essential that the question of timeliness be resolve d befor e any adjudication on the merits of the pe titioner’s claims may proper ly occur .” A n t o n i o L

. S auls berry v. State, No. W2002 -02538 -C CA -R 3- PC, 2 00 4 WL 23 97 67 , a t *1 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. F e b. 9, 20 04 ), pe rm . to appea l denied (Te nn. J une 1, 2004) ( citing T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(b) (2003))

. “I n many case s that h ave c ome bef ore the appellate courts in which the pe titioner’s compliance with the statute of limitations i s an issue, the a ppellate c ourts hav e re m an d ed for
e v i d e n t i ar y

h e ar i n g s
. ” Id

. a t* 2 ( c i t i n g B u t l e r v
. S t a t e , 9 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 8 7 , 3 9 0 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 2 ) )

. In Saulsberry , the petitioner a dmitted that his fili ng was untimely , and thus t h ere was no que stion of fac t as to whether

the petition had bee n timely filed. I d. (stating that in the “ty pical case
. . . there is a question whether

the petitioner ha s actua lly complied with the statute of l i m i t ati ons or has
c on fo rm e d to the priso n ma ilb ox ru le s” ). I n the pr e se nt c a se , the re are no ne of the ty pic a l di sp ute s, for e x ample, illeg ibilit y

of the stamped f

iling date or whe ther the petition wa s timely filed and then lost in t he prison “ma il” sy stem. I nstead, the pe titioner admits in his o ri gi n al p eti tion that the Tenne ssee Supre me Court denied his application for permission t o appea l on J anuary 31, 2000, and he sig ned and dated the petition on April 2, 2001. There fore , his petition was subject to summ ary dismiss al. See id. (c iting Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 106(b) ( 2003) [“I f it plainly appea rs from the fac e of the petition, . . . that the petition was not filed . . . within the time set forth in the statute of limit ations, . . . the judge shall enter an order dismiss ing the petition.”]; State v. Nix , 40 S.W .3d 459, 46 4 ( Te nn . 200 1) (c omp lia nc e wi th s ta tut e of lim itatio ns is e le me nt o f rig ht t o f ile pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief; incumbent upon petit ioner to alleg e either compliance with or tolling of limitations period)) . I n the pre sent ca se, just as in Saulsberry , “[t] he fa ct that the lower court did not take that
a c tio n d oe s n ot a llo w the pe tit ion e r, a t thi s jun c tur e , to a vo id op e ratio n of the statut e of lim itatio ns
. As such, his appe al must be dismissed due to the untimeliness of the underlying pe tition. Thi s court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the ca se.” 2004 WL 239767, at *2. Additionally , t h e petitioner’ s claims do not fall wit hin any of t he three exceptions set forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30-102( b)(1) -(3) , which would excuse the late filing, nor does the petition r aise the types of due proce ss conce rns that would also toll the statute of limit ations. See Sample v. State, 82 S.W .3d 267, 273 (Tenn. 2002) (statute of l i m i t at i ons tolled due to a late a rising suppr ession of exculpatory evidenc e cla im); W illiams v. State, 44 S.W .3d 464, 477 (Tenn. 2001) (misrepre sentation by attorney as to continuing repre sentation, rathe r than mer e attorne y neg lige nce, possibly

tolled the statute of limit ations); Seals, 23 S.W .3d at 278-79 (statute of limit ations tolled due to mental incompetenc e-6-

of petitioner) ; Sands v. St ate, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn. 1995) ( g rounds for r elief a rose a fter the statut e of lim itatio ns no rm a lly

wo uldha ve ru n) ; B ur fo rd , 8 45 S.W. 2da t 20 6 ( pe tit ion e r u na ble to file post-convic tion claim in one county until conviction in another county had bee n set aside)

. Despite our c onclusion that the petiti o n was ba rre d bythe statute of limitations, we nonetheless will addre ss the i ssues raised by the petit ioner because of t he possi bilityof a f urther a ppeal of this matter. See Jacobs v. State, 450 S.W.2d 581 (Tenn. 1970); State v. Pender g rass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

. III. Inef fective Assistance of Cou nsel

I n the orig inal and the f

irst amended pe tition, s even se parate claims we re made that trial counsel ha d been ine ffe ctive. I n the sec ond am en d ed p eti tion, the only claim of inef

fec tive
a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l w a s th a t c ou ns e l “ faile d to su bp oe na the ra pe vic tim ’s a lle g e d bo y frie nda s a witness to rebut the fa lse testimony g iven in the pre sence of the jury by the a l l eged r ape vic tim.” This was the only

ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim pur s u ed at t h e evidentiary hearing. O n appea l, the petitioner has raised se ven cla ims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, but, of these, w e will consider only

the claim arg ued at the hearing, f or the re maining six, not having be en pursue d,
are waived. See Brimmer v. State, 29 S.W .3d 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)

. I n order to determine the competenc e of c ounsel, Tenne ssee courts have applied standar ds develope d in f

eder al ca se law. See State v. Tay lor, 968 S.W .2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (n oti ng that th e sa me sta nd ardfor dete rm ini ng ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l th a t is app lie d in fede ral c ases a lso applies in Tennesse e). The United States Supreme Court articulate d the standar d in S tr ic klandv. Was hin g ton , 4 66 U. S. 668 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 05 2, 80 L . E d. 2d67 4 ( 19 84 ), wh ic h is widely acc epted as the appropriate standard for all claims of a convicted petitioner that co u n sel’s assistance was defec tive. The standard i s firmly g rounded in the belief that counsel play s a role that is “critica l to the ability of the adver sarial sy stem to pr oduce just re sults.” I d. at 685, 104 S. Ct. at 20 63 . T he Str ic klandsta nd ardis a tw o- pr on g te st: First, the de fendan t must show that counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s defic ient. This require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counsel wa s not functioning a s the “c o u nsel” g uara nteed the de fe nd a nt by the Sixth Am e nd me nt. Se c on d, the de fe nd a nt must sh ow that th e de fi c ie nt p e rf orma nc e pr e

jud ic e d th e de fe ns e . T his require s showing that counsel’s err ors wer e so serious as to deprive the def endant of a fa ir trial, a tria l whose re sult is reliable.

I d. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The Strickland Court furth er ex p l ai ned the meaning of “def icient p e r f o r m a n c e ” i n t h e f

i r s tp r o n g o f

t h e t e s ti n t h e f

o l l o w i n g w a y:
I n any case prese nting a n ineffe ctiveness c laim, the perf ormanc e inq uiry mu st be w he the r c ou ns e l’ s a ssi sta nc e wa s r e a so na ble-7- considering all the circ umstances. . . . No pa rt i cu l ar s et of detailed rules for counsel’s c onduct ca n s at i s fac torily take a ccount of

the varie ty of circ umstances f

ace d by defe nse counse l o r t h e ra ng e of leg itimate decisions reg arding how best to re p resent a criminal de fe nd a nt.

I d. a t 68 8- 89 , 1 04 S. Ct . at 20 65 . T he pe tit ion e r mus t e sta bli sh “ that c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll below an obje ctive st an d a

r d o f r e asonable ness under

preva iling prof

essional norms.” House v. State, 44 S.W .3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996))

. As for the prejudice prong of the test, the Strickland Court stated: “The defe ndant m ust show that there is a rea sonable proba bilitythat, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional e rror s, the re sult of the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob abil ity

is a pr ob abil ity su ffi c ie nt t o undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068; see a lso Overton v. Sta te , 8 74 S.W. 2d6, 11 (T e nn . 1 99 4) (c on c lud ing that pe tit ion e r f a ile d to e sta

bli sh that “ the re is a
rea sonable proba

bilitythat, but fo r

c ounsel’s er

rors, the outc ome of the pr ocee dings w ould have be en differ ent”)

. Cou rt s n e e d n ot a

pp ro a c h th e Str ic klandte st i n a sp e c if ic or de r o r e ve n “ a dd re ss b oth components of the inquiry if the def endant make s an insufficie nt showing on one .” 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; se e also Goad, 938 S.W .2d at 370 (stating that “fa ilure to prove e ither def iciency or pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny relief on the ineff

ective a ssistance c laim”).

We note that the re viewing court must indulge a strong p re s u mption that the conduct of counsel fa lls withi n the ra ng e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance, se e Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct . at 2066, and may not second- g uess t he tactical and strateg ic choice s made by trial counsel unless those choice s were uninformed be cause of inade quate pr epar ation. See He llard v. State, 629 S.W .2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982) . The fa ct that a strateg y or tac tic failed or

hurt the def

ense doe s not alone support the claim of ine ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. See Thompson v. State, 958 S.W .2d 156, 165 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) . Finally , a person char g ed with a c riminal offe nse is not entitled to perfe ct repr esentation. See Denton v. State, 945 S.W .2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) . As explained in Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 46 2 , “[ c] o n d u ct that is unreasona ble under the fa cts of one c ase ma y be perf ectly rea sonable unde r the fa cts of anothe r.”

As to the sole alleg ation of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l pursued at the post-c onviction he ari ng , name ly , th at tria l c ou ns e l f a ile d to su bp oe na

a su pp os e dly

fa vo ra ble wi tne ss w ho c ou ld rebut the victim’s “ false testimony ,” we note initially that the post-conviction court did n ot specific ally

addre ss this allegation in its opinion, a lthough stating that, in a ddition to his sentencing
c la ims , “ [t]he pe tit ion e r a lle g e d oth e r g ro un ds fo r re lie f wh ic h we re inc lud e d in his Pe tit ion fo r P os tConviction Relief, but no proof wa s offe red at the evidentiary hearing in support of such. The Court
accor din g ly

fi nd s n o me ri t to the se oth e r c la ims .” Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt wa s c or re c t in thi s analy sis, for the only

“proof ” at the he aring as to ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel , s i n ce the petitioner did not testify , was the te stimonyof trial counsel who denied that he had be en inef fec tive,-8-

explaining ef

forts he ha d made to locate the so- ca l l ed “e x culpatory ” witness and r easons why the witness would not have be en helpf ul, as well as the te stimony of the prose cutor at trial, who opined t h a tt h e w i t n e s s w o u l d n o th a v e b e e n e x c u l p a t o r y.
This claim was e x plained i n t h e second amende d petition as “potentially exculpatory evidenc e wa s withheld by the State re g arding o n e wi tness’ [sic] boy friend.” Appar ently , the petitioner’s theory , as st ated by his attorney at the post-convic tion hearing , was that the te stimony of thi s b oy frie nd“ wo uldha ve so me be ari ng on the jury ’s op ini on of wh e the r [the pe tit ion e r] c ou ld have pulled of

f this trickery . Whether the victim’s [sic] honestly believed that t h i s ca l l er [ the petitioner] was that boy friend.”

At the hea

ring , the petitioner’s tria l counsel wa s questioned as to his knowledg e of the vic tim s’ bo y frie nd s:

Q And did y ou discover any of the identities of these alleg ed bo y frie nd s?

A I think sometim e, I ’ll answer this then I ’d like to g ive the backg round, if I

could. Q Al l r ig ht.

A S o m e t i m e a f

t e r t h e c a s e w a s s e tf

o r tr i a l , a n d m a yb e w i t h i n d a ys of it g oing to tria l, I

think y ou-all have my

file, but I don’t reme mber the note, see ing the note in the fil e. Someone ca lled our off ice a nd said we have a name, and per haps g ave a

number. B ut we we re ne ver able to locate that per son. And this would have be en, orig inally the
case was set f

or trial in the snow and it wa s put of f a wee k. So I

don’t
reme mber the time fr ame, but I know i t was a very short time frame

.

. . . . Q What efforts did y ou take to find this person?

A We called the number. I think my investigator at that time, tried to l oc a te him . T hat I

c a n’ t be su re of

, it ’s be e n a

wh ile . I f Ic ou ld
ex p l ai n s o m et h i n g? Q C e r t a i n l y.
A The pre -trial motions in thi s ca s e, the first motions that were filed on the indictment w as the indictment w as unconstitutional. That is it said fraud, without defining what fr aud wa s. That was de nied.-9- Th e n w e fi le d a

mot ion to d ism iss the ind ic tme nt b e c a us e it d id not put a fac tual alleg ation as re quired by the s tatute. That is, i f they
are g oing to say fraud, they should put the facts in the indictment that substantiate the fr aud. That was denie d. Then we fi l ed another motion for a bill of particulars. Say ing ok a y , if y ou sa y the ind ic tme nt is g oo d, Judg e , the n le t the Sta te c ome fo rw arda nd tell u s ta lk t o w hat th is f ra ud is i n a bil l of pa rt ic ula rs
. The Court said we wer e only entitled to the date, time and pla ce. We too k th a ti s s u e a l l t h e w a y t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p re me Cou rt . T he n I

arguedto the Judg e , w e ll Jud g e , if in f a c t, l e t’ s ju st assume that the fraud is imper sonation, who did he i m p er s o nate? And the court said, y ou’re not entitled to that information. So w he n w e got a c a ll b e fo retr ia l, andI do n’ t sp e c if

ic a lly actua lly reme mber, I ’ve ta lked to some other pe ople and I ’m sure we g ot some call at the of

fice , but I don’t rec all t h at b eing this is the pe rs on . It w a s, thi s is so me thi ng we c ou ld l ook in to a ndthi s is a phone nu m b er. I

don’t reme mber, but we wer e alr eady told by the Court that we we re not e ntitled to that information.

Trial counse l testified as to eff orts to locate this witness and his opinion that the testimony of the witness c ould have “ killed” the def ense: Q Do y ou believe that the identity of this alleg ed, t h i s J o hn Doe boy friend would help y ou in a def ense of [t he petitioner] in this case?

A Sir, the phone ca ll we re ceive d, I t h i n k was ve ry

very close, may be within a day , two day s, something of that of trial. And I

don’t
rec all that specific ally

. We had alre ady been told we are not entitled to this inf

orma tio n. Pr ior

to the tr ia l, I

iss ue d a su bp oe na

fo r this witness. I issued a John Doe subpoena. I n fac t, J ohn Doe subpoe na was serve d on the investigator for the case
. We served him with the J ohn Doe subpoe na. We had made e very

attem p t t h at we c ould to ge t that information. And he w as not a witness to the ca se. He is somebody I wo uldha ve lik e d to ha ve ta lke d to . He is som e bo dy I wo uldlik e to know if he e x isted. Q Do y ou thi nk

the pr e se nc e of thi s pe rs on in fr on t of a jury c ou ld have pr esente d some diffe renc e in cha rac teristics from [the p e ti ti o n e r ]?

A Cou ld h a ve he lpe d u s, c ou ld h a ve kil le d u s.-10- Q And –

A I mean, y ou don’t know. I

would say

he’s be tter friends with [t he victim] then [sic] he would be w ith [ t h e p et i t ioner] or with us. I wouldn’t expect him to be rea l helpful, just from past experience

. At t h e h ea ri ng , post-conviction counse l were asked by the court whether

this “J ohn Doe” wi tne ss w ou ld b e te sti fying a nda dv ise d that the y , th e mse lve s, ha d n ot l oc a te d th is w itn e ss anddid not know whether

he eve n exis ted:
[C OUNSEL ]: Your Honor , we be lieve that this J ohn Doe boyfriend would have pr ovided exculpatory - - THE COURT: Where is the John Doe boy friend?
[C OUNSEL ]: He wa s never produce d.

T H E C O U R T : W h e r e i s h e t o d a y?
[COU NSE L ]: We do n’ t kn ow that he e xists or do e s n ot e xist.

THE C OURT: Well, how does [t rial counse l] know whethe r he
e xists or no t?
[C OUNSEL ]: We believe [trial counsel] was in a be tter position at the tim e that he re pr e se nte d [the pe tit ion e r] at the tr ia l to ob ta in this information. THE COURT: Why ? Whycan’ t y ou do it now?
[C OUNSEL ]: Well Your Honor, as, I g uess we could. I

chec ked the transcript, I

don’t see - -
TH E CO UR T: Th e on ly

way I c a n d e te rm ine wh a t a

wi tne ss w ou ld ha ve sa id i n a

po st c on vic tio n re lie f pe tit ion is if I he ar that w itn e ss.
Trial counse l’s uncontra dicted testimony at the post-conviction hearing was that he issued
a “ John Do e ” su bp oe na

be fo re the tr ia l and a tte mpt e d to asc e rt a in the ide nti ty of thi s witn e ss at tr ia l, but was re fused the information by the court. During the course of the trial, he de cided not to pursue this witness any

further . Since this witness was not produce d at the ev i d en t i ar y hearing, the pe tit ion e r h a s f

a ile d to sh ow that he wa s p re jud ic e d b y

c ou ns e l’ s n ot pr od uc ing thi s witn e ss at tria l. See B lack v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (sta ting that “ [w] hen a pe titioner
c on te nd s th a t tria l c ou ns e l f a ile d to dis c ov er, in ter vie w, or pr e se nt w itn e sse s in su pp ort of his-11-

de fe ns e , th e se wi tne sse s sh ou ld b e pr e se nte d b y th e pet ition e r at th e e vid e nti ary he ari ng . A s a g ener al rule, this is the only way the petitioner can establish that

. . . the failure t o h av e a k n o wn witness prese nt or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial of c ritical evide nce w hich inured to the prejudice of the pe titioner.”).

IV. P rosec utorial Misconduct

I n his origina l petition, the petitioner alleg ed that his convictions wer e:
b a s e d u p o n f

a l s e t e s t i m o n y a n d th e s t a t e p r o s e c u t o r w i l l f u l l y, de lib e rate ly

a ndkn ow ing ly

wi thh e ld e xcu lpatory

e vid e nc e that c ou ld ha ve pr ov e n th e ra

pe vic tim wa s c omm itt ing perj ury . The vic tim claimed that she had sexual intercour se with Petitioner beca use she thought Pe t itioner was he r boy friend. T he District Attorne y Gene ral[’s] Off

ice interviewe d the alleg ed John Doe and lea rned that John Do e wa s not the vic tim ’s bo y frie nda ndthat he ha d s e ve re d th e ir
sex ual re lationship mont hs prior to the alleg ed ra pe due to the vic tim ’s pr omi sc uo us be ha vio r. Th e pr os e c uto rs su pp re sse d this informat i o n, ref

used to g ive Petitioner J ohn Doe’ s name a nd knowing ly

allowed f alse testimony

to be pre sented to the jury which,
c on se qu e ntl y , v iol a te d th e Du e Pr oces s Clau se of the F ou rt e e nth Amendment to the U n i t ed S tates Constitut ion, and Article I § 8, of the Tenne ssee Constitution.

I n his se cond amende d petition, the petitioner restate d the issue as “[w]hether P et i t i oner’ s c on vic tio ns we re ba se d o n [th e ] Sta te ’s un c on sti tut ion a l f a ilu re to dis c los e e xcu lpatory e vid e nc e in the form of

the name and identity of a “John Doe ” alleg ed boy friend of one of the State’s witnesses.” As with the other c laims, the only testimonyat the hea

ring as to t h i s as s er t ion came f rom trial counsel and the prosecutor, bot h of whom denied that exculpatory information had be en withheld. No ne the le ss, we wi ll c on sid e r t he c la im.

I n Br ady v. Mary land, 37 3 U. S

. 8 3 , 87, 83 S. Ct . 1194, 1196-97, 10 L . Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963) , th e U n it e d St a te s Su p r e me Co u r t h e ld th a t th e p r o s e c u ti o n h a s a d u ty to f u r n is h to the defe ndant exculpato ry ev i d ence pertaining e ither to the ac cused' s g uilt or innocence or to the potential punishment that may be imposed. The Court held t hat "suppression by the prosec ution of evidenc e favorable to an accuse d upon reque st violates due proc ess wher e the e vidence is material either to g uilt or to punishment, irr espec tive of the g ood faith or bad faith of the prosec ution." I d. Th e du t y t o d i s c l o s e e xt e n d s t o a l l i n f o r m a t i o n f

a v o r ab l e t o t h e a c c u s e d w h e t h e r t h e e v i d e n c e is admissible or inadmissible, St ate v. Spurlock, 874 S.W .2d 602, 609 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) , and to information "w hich might be useful to the defense[.]” Br anch v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 164, 173, 469 S.W .2d 533, 536 (1969). How ever , the S tate' s duty to turn over e vidence under B rady does
no t e xten d to inf

orma tio n th a t th e de fe ns e e ith e r a lr e a dy po sse sse s o r i s a

ble to o btain o r t o information not in the pos session or control of t he prosecution. Wooden v. State, 898 S.W .2d 752,-12-

755 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (citing Ba nks v. State, 556 S.W .2d 88, 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977)). Furt h er , Br ad y d oes not requir e the State to investig ate on be half of the defe ndant. State v. Rey nolds, 671 S.W .2d 854, 856 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984)

. I n o rd er to establish a due pr ocess violation under Br ady , a def

endant must show the fo l l o wi n g:
1. The de fenda nt must have reque sted the i nformation (unle ss the

evidenc e is obviously

exc ulpatory , in which ca se the State is bound to relea se the information whether reque sted or not); 2. The State must have suppr essed the inf ormation;

3. The information must have bee n favor able to the a ccuse d; and

4. Th e inf

orma tio n mu st h a ve be e n mate ri a l. State v. Edg in, 902 S.W .2d 387, 389 (Tenn. 1995) (citations omitted).

At the po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng , the a ssi sta nt dis tr ic t a tto rn e y g e ne ra l te sti fied as to his kn ow le dg e of

the “ John Do e ” wi tne ss: Q Ge n er al [ ] , fo r p u rp o s es o f t h i s p o s tco n v i ct i o n p r o c e e d i n g, would y ou like to make a statement that would be pr oof as e vidence ?

A Ye s. As fa

r as thi s witn e ss, Yo ur

Ho no r, a s f

ar a s [tria l c ou ns e l] testified we w ere not ordere d to divulge the name of this witness by [the tr ia l ju dg e ’s ] bil l of

pa rt ic ula rs . O bv iou sly

if we we re a wa

re if th e w it n e s s h a d p o te n ti a l e xc u lp a to r y in f o r mati o n , w e w o u ld

. We
wer e able to find this witness, Ithink on the Frida y befor e the tri al sta rt e d o n a Mo nd a y . H is n a me wa s Jef f. I do n’ t r e c a ll h is l a st n a me r ig h t o f f th e to p o f my h e a d

. B u t h e w a s n o w li v in g o u t o f s tate

. We talked to him and dis cussed what [t he victim] was going to testify to. He co rr o b orate d it, y es, he ha d been he r friend and ha d g one over there at various tim es, ea rly morning hours, had ca l l ed her a nd wh isp e re d o n th e phon e a ndthi ng s o f t hat natur e . So he ba sic a lly
c or ro bo rate d th e wi tne ss. [Co- c ou ns e l] a ndI

d e t e rm i n e d

wh e the r w e sh ou ld g ive that name or no t, h e wa s no w marrie d a nddid n’ t w a nt t o g e t in vo lve d in thi s c a se
. B ut we didg ive that name to the de fe ns e wh e n w e fo un d h im and what the phone number was. I can’ t testify

whether they talked to him or not, but i n interviewing him there wa s absolutely nothing-13- exculpatory

in his stateme nt. But we did provide the information and his location.

On cr oss-examination, the assistant dist rict attorn e y g e n e r a l e x plained why

he did not believe the pe tit ion e r w ou ld h a ve be ne fi tte d h a d th is w itn e ss a pp e are d at th e tr ia l: Q Did y ou hear

this man’s voice?

A Yes, I

normally do when I

talk to people. Q Okay . And y ou don’t think that the jury could have hear d any differ ence s betwee n the voice of this witnes s an d t h e voice of [the p e ti ti o n e r ]?

A Wel l , i f y ou revie w the tra nscript, she talke d about that he wa s whispering and voice s being disguised. A t times he would whisper and he w ould, so it was a whispering voice, so I don’t know. Q Would y ou ag ree that wer e the jury able to differe ntiate betwe en thi s ma n a nd[the pe tit ion e r] that th a t c ou ld h a ve be e n favor able to [t h e p e ti ti o n e r ]?

A No , b a se d o n th e pr oo f, I do n’ t. The post-c onviction court dete rmined that i t could not make a determination concerning the
e xcu lpatory

va lue of thi s w itn e ss witho ut ha vin g the wi tne ss te sti fy a t th e he ari ng . Si nc e the on ly wi tne ss p re se nte d at th e po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng on thi s is su e de nie d th e va ri ou s a lle g a tio ns in this reg ard, it is clea

r that the pe titioner has fa iled to show by clea r and c onvincin g ev i dence that the te s ti mo n y o f th is “ Jo h n D o e ” b o y f r ie n d w a s o b v io u s ly e xc u lp a to r y , f a v o r ab le to th e a c c used, or suppressed by

the State. See Edg in, 902 S.W .2d at 389.

I n addition, this allegation has been w aived f or fa ilure to prese nt it on dir ec t ap p ea l

. “A g round for

relief is waived if the petitioner persona lly or throug h an attorney failed to pre sent it for de te rm inatio n in a ny

pr oc e e din g be fo re a

c ou rt of c omp e te nt jurisd ic tio n in w hic h th e g ro un d c ou ld ha ve be e n p re se nte d .

. . .” Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 40 -3 0- 10 6( g ) (2 00 3)

. Th e pe tit ion e r f a ile d to e xpla in in h is p e tit ion or

a t th e po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng wh y thi s is su e wa s n ot r a ise d o n d ir e c t app e a l. T his is an eleme ntary

part of any

petition f or post-conviction relief

. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 104(e) (2003).

V. P erc entage of Sentence t o be Served

The petitioner ar g ues on appe al, as we understand his c laim, that his judgments provide tha t his se nte nc e s a

re to b e se rv e d at 30 % anddo no t cla ss if y him a s a mul tip le ra

pis t a ndthe DO C is-14-

bound by these. The State disag ree s, arg uing th at this identical claim wa s resolved a g ainst the petitioner in Mitchell v. Campbell, 88 S.W .3d 561 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). A s we will explain, we ag ree with the State. The judg ment forms ar e included in the rec ord on appea l, and, on all four doc uments, the box for “ Standard 30% Ra ng e 1” is checke d and the box beside “multi ple rapist” is not chec ked on any of the forms. I n Mitchell, 88 S.W .3d at 566, the Court of Appe als reje cted this same c laim by the petitioner:

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523( b) . . . wa s part of his sente nce w hen

h e was tried and c onvicted of multiple rape s in 1996. The Depa rtment had n o d i s cr et i o n re gar d i n g t h e a p p l i ca t i o n o f T en n
. Code Ann. § 39-13-523( b) to [the petitioner] i n light o f his two rape convictions. Acc ording ly , the Depa rtment did not err by

classifying [t he petitioner] as a “ multipl e rapist” for the purpose of Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-523( b) and by determining that he w as inelig ible to earn se nte nc e re du c tio n c re dit s.
I d. (footnotes omitted).

Ac co rd i n gl y , we c onclude that the pe titioner made this same a rg ument in Mitchell, where the c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t it

wa s w ith ou t me ri t. A pp ly ing the la w of the c a se , we c on c lud e that th is iss u e w a s p r e v i o u s l y

r e s o l v e d a g a i n s tt h e p e t i t i o n e r a n d c a n n o tb e l i t i g a t e d a n e w
. S e e M e mph is Publ’g Co. v. Te nnessee Petroleum Under g round Sto ra ge T ank Bd., 975 S.W .2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998).

VI
. O th er Cl a i ms On appe al, the petition er ha s prese nted a number of additional cla ims, none of which wa s arg ue d o r e ve n a c kn ow le dg e d at th e po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng a nd mos t of wh ic h we re la st r e c ite d in the first ame nded petition but not the second. No e x planation is g iven as to why these long
un pu rs ue d is su e s h a ve be e n r e su rr e c te d o n a pp e a l. We no w w ill re vie w the c la ims ma de on app e a l, observing first that we ha v e t he same problem as did the post-c onviction court in diffe rentiating be tw e e n c e rt a in o f the c la ims , w hic h a pp e ar t o b e ne arl y

ide nti c a l.

I n his appellate brief, the pe titioner prese nts the additional claims that: I ssue I – requiring him to serve 100% of his rape sentenc es violates, int e r a lia , his Fourth and F ourtee nth Amendment rig hts ( appar ently a new claim ra ised for the first time on appea l); I ssue I I – the State fa iled to notify him that he woul d serve 100% of his ra pe sente nces if c onvicted (r aised in the sec ond amende d petition and determined by the post-conviction court adver sely to the petitioner); I ssue I I I – as in the pr e vio us iss ue , th e pe tit ion e r r e a lle g e s th a t th e Sta te sh ou ld h a ve g ive n h im no tic e that “ he wo uld be tr ie d a s a multi ple ra

pis t and if c on vic te d wou ld ha ve to se rv e ” his se nte nc e s a t 10 0% (r a ise d in second a mended pe tition and determined by the pos t-conviction court adver sely to the petitioner);-15-

I ssue I V – the petitioner should se rve his ra pe sente nces at 30%, as provide d by the judg ments, and not at 100% (a

rg ued at the he aring and dete rmined by the post-conviction court adver s elyto the petitioner); I ssue V – the petitioner prese nts f ive separ ate claims of inef fec tive assistance of counse l (not raise d in the second amended petition or at the hearing ); I ssue VI – trial counsel was ineffe ctive for f ailing to subpoe na a f

ormer boy friend of

the victim or seek a

continuance of the trial (pursue d
a tt h e h e ar i n g a n d d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o u r ta d v e r s e l y t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r ) ; Is s u e V II – the State fa iled to disclose the name and identity of a f ormer boy friend of

one of the victims (pursued
a tt h e h e ar i n g a n dd e t e r m i n e d b y t h e p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o n c o u r ta d v e r s e l y t o t h e p e t i t i o n e r ) ; Is s u e V III – the petitioner’s multiple rape convictions violate his double jeopar dy and due pr oce s s ri gh t s (not pu rs ue d at th e he ari ng ); I ssu e XI [sic ] – fa ult y jury ins truc tio ns (a

pp are ntl y raise d fo r the fi rs t ti me on appea l).

Th us , f oll ow ing the po st- c on vic tio n he ari ng , the c ou rt ru le d a dv e rs e ly

to the pe tit ion e r a s to I ssues I I , I I I , I V, VI , and VI I

. As to I ssues I I and I I I , the post-conviction court corre ctly determined that the petitioner “has not shown

. . . prejudice ” by lack of notice. F inally , as the post-c onviction
c ou rt no te d, the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt ha s p re vio us ly

he ld that th e “ [n]ot ic e su c h a s th a t rule [R ule 12.3 of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure ] requires is not constitutio n a ll y ma n d ated.” State v. Har

ris, 919 S.W .2d 323, 331 (Tenn. 199 6 ) (c i ting State v. B erry , 592 S.W .2d 553, 562 (T e nn . 1 98 0) ). As we ha ve pr e vio us ly state d, the re c or d s up po rt s th e se de te rm inatio ns . T he po stconviction court found as to the numer ous claims which had be en set out in his orig inal, first, and second a mended pe titions that “no proof was offe red at the evidentiary hearing in support of

such [and] [t ]he court ac cording ly finds no merit to these other claims.”

I n Brimmer, 29 S.W .3d at 530, this court ex plained that a post-c onviction claim is waived wh e n n o p ro of

is p re se nte d at th e e vid e nti ary he ari ng a s to thec la im:

Th e re is no ev ide nc e a t the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng c on c e rn ing the se a lle g a tio ns a ndwe c a nn ot s pe c ulate a s to the su bs ta nc e of the c la ims

. "We [must] decide case s
. . . on the basis of the r ecor d as pre sented to us for our c onsideration." Dea rbor n e v. State, 575 S.W .2d 259, 26 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) . T he bu rd e n is a lw a y s upo n the app e a lin g pa rt y to devel op a

re c or d w hic h c on ve y s a fair , a c c ur a te , a ndc omp le te acc ount of those proc eeding s which form the basis of the appea l. I d. Thus, appea l claims I , V, VI I I , and XI are waived because no proof was pre sented in support
o f t h em at t h e e v i d en t i ar y h ea ri n g.
CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the foreg oing authorities and reasoning , we a ffirm the or der de ny ing the petition for post-c onviction relief. We r emand the matter for entry of cor rec ted judg ments as to Counts 2 and 3 of I ndictment No. 95-B -1222 to ref lect that, as to e ach c ount, the petitioner is a “ multipl e ra pist,”-16-

and his sentenc es ar e to be se rved a s such.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE