UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division 

_______________________________________

)

STOP HILLARY PAC and DAN BACKER, ) No. 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant. )

_______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Dan Backer, Esq. Michael T. Morley

Virginia State Bar # 78256 Virginia State Bar #65762

DB CAPITOL STRATEGIES PLLC COOLIDGE REAGAN FOUNDATION

203 South Union Street, Suite 300 1629 K Street, Suite 300

Alexandria, VA 22314 Washington, DC 20006

Phone: (202) 210-5431 Phone: (860) 778-3883

Fax: (202) 478-0750 Fax: (202) 331-3759

E-mail: DBacker@DBCapitolStrategies.com E-mail: michaelmorleyesq@hotmail.com

Attorney for Plaintiff Stop Hillary PAC Attorney for Plaintiff Dan Backer

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 1 of 39 PageID# 27
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................1

FACTUAL BACKGROUND.......................................................................................................1

A. The Importance of Stop Hillary PAC’s Name......................................................1

B. The FEC’s Threats Over Stop Hillary PAC’s Name ............................................4

C. Changing Stop Hillary PAC’s Name Would 

Impose Substantial Costs and Burdens.................................................................5

ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................................7

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A PROHIBITORY PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO BY ALLOWING STOP HILLARY PAC TO 

RETAIN ITS NAME THROUGHOUT THE PENDENCY OF THIS LAWSUIT .....................7

A. Plaintiffs are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Claims .........................10

1. Section 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition Abridges the 

Fundamental First Amendment Rights of Speech and 

Association for Political Committees, as Well as Their 

Treasurers, Contributors, and Other Supporters.....................................10

2. Section 30102(e)(4) is Unconstitutional As Applied to 

the Creation and Maintenance of PACs With Names That 

Clearly and Unambiguously Oppose Candidates Because 

It Does Not Further a Valid Government Interest ..................................15

3. Section 30102(e)(4) is Unconstitutional, Both Facially and As

Applied to the Creation and Maintenance of PACs Bearing Names

That Clearly and Unambiguously Oppose Candidates Because

It Is Poorly Tailored to Achieving the Government’s Goals..................18

4. Section 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition Violates the 

First Amendment Because It is Unconstitutionally Vague.....................19

B. Stop Hillary PAC and Backer Will Suffer 

Irreparable Injury Without an Injunction............................................................23

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 2 of 39 PageID# 28
ii

C. The Balance of Hardships Weighs in 

Favor of Stop Hillary PAC and Backer ..............................................................26

D. An Injunction Would Be in the Public Interest...................................................28

CONCLUSION...........................................................................................................................30

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 3 of 39 PageID# 29
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 

542 U.S. 656 (2004)........................................................................................................10

Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 

482 U.S. 569 (1987)........................................................................................................20

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 

463 U.S. 60 (1983)....................................................................................................13, 16

Buckley v. Valeo, 

424 U.S. 1 (1976).................................................................................................... passim

Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 

594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010) ........................................................................................23

Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 

507 U. S. 410 (1993).......................................................................................................14

Citizens Against Rent Cont./Coal. for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 

454 U.S. 290 (1981)........................................................................................................12

City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 

512 U.S. 43 (1994)..........................................................................................................12

Citizens United v. FEC, 

558 U.S. 310 (2010)..................................................................................................15, 29

Common Cause v. FEC, 

655 F. Supp. 619 (D.D.C. 1986).....................................................................................11

Common Cause v. FEC, 

842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988)............................................................................16, 19, 29

Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 

269 U.S. 385 (1926)........................................................................................................20

Cousins v. Wigoda, 

419 U.S. 477 (1975)........................................................................................................10

Doe v. Reed, 

561 U.S. 186 (2010)........................................................................................................14

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 4 of 39 PageID# 30
iv

Elrod v. Burns, 

427 U.S. 347 (1976)........................................................................................................23

FCC v. Fox TV Stats., Inc., 

132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012)....................................................................................................19

Fogerty v. Poor Boy Prods., 

No. 96-56546, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 24695 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1997)........................28

Friends of Phil Gramm v. Am. for Phil Gramm in ’84, 

587 F. Supp. 769 (E.D. Va. 1984) ..................................................................................18

Galliano v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

836 F.2d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1988)......................................................................................14

Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 

303 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 2002) ..........................................................................................29 

Global Tel*Link, Corp. v. Jail Cell Servs., LLC, 

No. 1:14-CV-1557 (TSE/JFA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55591 

(E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2015) ................................................................................................27

HCI Techs., Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 

446 F. Supp. 2d 518 (E.D. Va. 2006) .............................................................................26 

Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 

425 U.S. 610 (1976)........................................................................................................20

JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier, 

624 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2010) ..........................................................................................24

Kolender v. Lawson, 

461 U.S. 352 (1983)........................................................................................................20

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 

769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................9

Legend Night Club v. Miller, 

637 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................23, 28

Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 

431 U.S. 85 (1977)..........................................................................................................13

Lytle v. Brewer, 

73 F. Supp. 2d 615 (E.D. Va. 1999) ...............................................................................29

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 5 of 39 PageID# 31
v

McCutcheon v. FEC, 

134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014)........................................................................................13, 15, 18

Mills v. Alabama, 

384 U.S. 214 (1966)........................................................................................................10

Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Qual. Cable Op. Co., 

22 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 1994) ......................................................................................24, 26

Murrow Furn. Gall, Inc. v. Thomasville Furn. Indus., 

889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989) ..........................................................................................30

N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 

376 U.S. 254 (1964)........................................................................................................18

Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 

354 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2003) .............................................................................. 23, 28-29

Odenbrecht Constr. v. Sec’y, Fla. DOT, 

715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013) ......................................................................................23

Pan Am World Airways, Inc. v. Flight 001, Inc., 

No. 06 Civ. 14442 (CSH), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51012 

(S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007) ................................................................................................28

Pashby v. Delia, 

709 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................30

Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 

408 U.S. 92 (1972)..........................................................................................................13

Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 

813 F. Supp. 2d 738 (E.D. Va. 2011) .............................................................................26

Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC, 

No. 1:15-CV-1217-TSC (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2015) .................................................... 14-15

Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 

575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................9

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 

135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).............................................................................................. 13-14

Reno v. ACLU, 

521 U.S. 844 (1997)........................................................................................................19

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 6 of 39 PageID# 32
vi

Republican Party v. N.C. State Bd. of Elecs., 

No. 94-1057, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14961 (June 17, 1994)........................................26

Riley v. Nat’l Fed for the Blind, 

487 U.S. 781 (1988)........................................................................................................17

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 

514 U.S. 476 (1995)........................................................................................................13

Sci Apps. Int’l Corp. v. CACI-Athena, Inc., 

No. 1:08-CV-443 (JCC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37849 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2008).........26

Sig. Flight Sup. Corp. v. Landow Aviation Ltd. P’ship, 

442 F. App’x 776 (4th Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................24

Smith v. Goguen, 

415 U.S. 566 (1974)........................................................................................................20

Stop Hillary PAC v. FEC, 

No. 1:14-02080-KBJ (D.D.C. 2014).................................................................................4

United States v. Nat’l Treas. Emp. Union, 

513 U.S. 454 (1995)........................................................................................................17

United States v. South Carolina, 

720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013) ............................................................................................9

United States v. Stevens, 

559 U.S. 460 (2010)........................................................................................................18

United States v. Williams, 

553 U.S. 285 (2008)........................................................................................................19

Vollette v. Watson, 

978 F. Supp. 2d 572 (E.D. Va. 2013) .............................................................................27

W. Insulation, L.P. v. Moore, 

No. 3:05-CV-602, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4390 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 2008) ....................28

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 

491 U.S. 781 (1989)........................................................................................................14

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 

552 U.S. 442 (2008)........................................................................................................18

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 7 of 39 PageID# 33
vii

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 

555 U.S. 7 (2008)..............................................................................................................9

Yellow Cab Co. v. Rocha, 

No. 3:00-CV-13, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11597 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2000).....................27

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 

471 U.S. 626 (1985)........................................................................................................15

Statutes and Regulations

11 C.F.R. § 102.14..........................................................................................................14, 17, 25

52 U.S.C. § 30102............................................................................................................... passim

52 U.S.C. § 30104.......................................................................................................................11

52 U.S.C. § 30120.................................................................................................................12, 25

Other Sources

FEC, Adv. Op. 2015-14, at 3-4 (July 16, 2015)..............................................................................

Mark Bartholomew, Trademark Morality, 

55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 85 (2013) ...............................................................................12

Lindsey Boerma, “Hillary Clinton for President in 2016?,” 

CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2012), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/

news/hillary-clinton-for-president-in-2016.......................................................................8

Tracy Connor, “Hillary Clinton Explains Why She 

Might Not Run,” NBC NEWS (June 10, 2014), 

available at http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hillary-clinton-interview/

hillary-clinton-explains-why-she-might-not-run-n127576...............................................7

FEC, Adv. Op. 2015-04 (July 16, 2015)...............................................................................22, 25

FEC, “Special Fundraising Projects and Other Use of Candidates Names 

By Unauthorized Committees,” 59 FED. REG. 17,267 (Apr. 12, 1994)..............16, 17, 19

FEC, “Special Fundraising Projects and Other Use of Candidates Names 

By Unauthorized Committees,” 57 FED. REG. 31,424 (July 15, 1992)...............16, 17, 19

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 8 of 39 PageID# 34
viii

Taegan Goddard, “Did Hillary Clinton Ever Stop Running for President?,” 

THE WEEK (Feb. 21, 2014), available at http://theweek.com/

articles/450436/did-hillary-clinton-ever-stop-running-president .....................................8

Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 

86 IND. L.J. 381 (2011)...................................................................................................11

“Hillary Clinton May Not Run for President After All, Says Senator 

Who Conferred With Her,” THE WEEK (Sept. 20, 2014), 

available at http://theweek.com/speedreads/445928/

hillary-clinton-may-not-run-president-after-all-says-senator-who-conferred. .................8

Melissa Jeltsen, “Hillary Clinton: ‘I Really Don’t Believe’ I’ll Run for President 

Again (VIDEO),” HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2012), 

available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/

hillary-clinton-2016_n_2286173.html..............................................................................8

Elise Labott, “Hillary Clinton: Repeats ‘No’ for 2016, Can’t Stand 

‘Whining’ About Life Choices,” CNN (Oct. 18, 2012), 

available at http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/18/

hillary-clinton-repeats-no-2016-cant-stand-whinin-about-life-choices/...........................8

Michael Muskal, “Hillary Clinton Again Says She Won’t Run 

for President in 2016,” L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), 

available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/

17/news/la-pn-hillary-clinton-future-20111017 ...............................................................8

Senate Rules and Admin. Comm., Hearing on Amending 

the FECA of 1971, as Amended, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 13, 1979) ........................16

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 9 of 39 PageID# 35
1

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Stop Hillary PAC and Dan Backer respectfully move this Court for a preliminary 

injunction to maintain the status quo during the pendency of this constitutional challenge. They 

ask that this Court issue an interim order permitting Stop Hillary PAC to retain the name it has 

used for nearly two-and-a-half years for the duration of the lawsuit, as well as prohibiting the FEC 

from enforcing 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4), and from commencing, recommending, pursuing, or 

ordering any adverse administrative, civil, criminal, or other action against Stop Hillary PAC or 

Backer based on Stop Hillary PAC’s name during that time. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Importance of Stop Hillary PAC’s Name

Trying to have Stop Hillary PAC without “Hillary” is like trying to have Hamlet without 

“Hamlet,” Kill Bill without “Bill,”1 or Freddy v. Jason without either “Freddy” or “Jason.”2 The 

messages conveyed by these titles would be both different and diminished if they had to be changed 

to “Ruminations of a Danish Prince,” “Kill Someone,” and “Battle of Fictional Psychopaths,”

respectively. 

Stop Hillary PAC is a non-connected hybrid political committee (colloquially, a “PAC”) 

that its Treasurer, Dan Backer, and others formed on May 16, 2013, by filing a Statement of 

Organization with Defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). See Declaration of Dan 

Backer in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (hereafter, Backer Decl.); see 

also Verified Compl., Ex. 1. The Statement of Organization listed “Stop Hillary PAC” as the 

PAC’s name, and Dan Backer as its Treasurer and custodian of records. Backer Decl., Ex. 1. At 

 1 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0266697/?ref_=nv_sr_1/. 2 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0329101/. One would be left only with “V”, an entirely different 

movie about a race of reptilian aliens masquerading as humans. 

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0085106/?ref_=fn_al_tt_3. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 10 of 39 PageID# 36
2

the time Backer formed Stop Hillary PAC, Hillary Rodham Clinton was not a candidate for federal 

office (nor, apparently, was anyone else bearing the first or last name “Hillary”). 

Stop Hillary PAC’s website describes the organization’s mission: “Stop Hillary PAC was 

created for one reason: to ensure Hillary Clinton never becomes President of the United States.” 

Backer Decl., Exh. 2 (emphasis added). It further explains, in flamboyantly hyberbolic terms, 

“The American way of life is under attack and Hillary Clinton is the liberal standard-bearer of the 

next generation of liberal creep on our Constitutional rights. We are committed to saving America 

from this destructive far-left, liberal cancer that’s trying to transform America.” Id. Thus, Stop 

Hillary PAC’s name reveals the organization’s purpose and goal clearly, succinctly, accurately, 

and effectively. Cf. Backer Decl. ¶ 16. 

The committee’s name has been an important component of its identity, as well as its 

constitutionally protected political speech and association. Backer Decl. ¶ 16. All e-mails from 

the committee originate from addresses with the domain “@StopHillaryPAC.org,” id. ¶ 8(a); the 

committee’s website is http://www.stophillarypac.org, id. ¶ 8(b); the URL for its Facebook page 

is https://www.facebook.com/StopHillaryPAC, id. ¶ 8(c); and its Twitter handle is 

“@StopHillaryPAC,” id. ¶ 8(d). The committee uses its name pervasively as a means of 

expression, a way of attracting public support, and an organizing principle. Id. ¶ 16. 

Stop Hillary PAC has operated continuously for the past two years and four months, since 

its founding, in pursuit of its mission. Id. ¶ 5. During that time, the committee has spent 

well over $1 million engaging in public communications through various media under its name, 

generating name recognition and goodwill. Id. ¶ 8. Each month, the committee sends millions of 

e-mails bearing its name, from “@StopHillaryPAC.org” e-mail addresses, and has sent well over 

100 million e-mails. Id. ¶ 8(a). Its website, http://StopHillaryPAC.org, is the 1,920th most-visited 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 11 of 39 PageID# 37
3

website in the United States, visited by an average of over 1 million people each month. Id. ¶ 8(b). 

Over five dozen other websites presently link to StopHillaryPAC.org, helping drive traffic there 

and familiarize people with the committee. Id. 

The committee’s Facebook page has received approximately 200,000 “likes,” and the 

committee’s posts appear in the Facebook newsfeeds of over 1.1 million people each week. Id. 

¶ 8(c). Over the past week alone, 38,000 people have shared Stop Hillary PAC’s Facebook posts, 

and over 14,000 people have commented on them. Id. The committee also has made 1,264 Tweets

from its @StopHillaryPAC handle, and posted five YouTube videos critical of Clinton under its 

name, which have received over 100,000 direct views. Id. ¶ 8(d)-(e). 

As a result of this public outreach, hundreds of thousands of people have chosen to express 

support for, or associate together with, Stop Hillary PAC. Since its creation, Stop Hillary PAC 

has raised more than $2 million from over 100,000 contributors. Id. ¶ 7(a). Between 750,000 and 

1 million people have affirmatively expressed support for, or otherwise associated with, Stop 

Hillary PAC in one or more ways, such as making a contribution, signing a petition, or joining the 

committee’s mailing list. Id. ¶ 7(b). Among the committee’s most widely supported efforts, this 

past May, it submitted a petition signed by 469,954 Americans to Rep. Trey Gowdy supporting 

the Benghazi Select Committee’s investigation into Clinton’s culpability before, during, and after

the attack on the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi. Id. ¶ 9. 

Stop Hillary PAC also has received tremendous coverage in both the popular and political 

press. Id. ¶ 10; see also id. Exh. 3 (sample articles). It has been discussed in outlets such as CNN, 

CBS News, the National Journal, the Daily Caller, The Hill, Huffington Post, Forbes, Washington 

Times, and The Week. Id. ¶ 10; see also id. Exh. 3. It has further garnered public attention by 

associating with high-profile conservative politicians such as Congressman Steve Stockman (RCase 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 12 of 39 PageID# 38
4

Tex.), Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, and its former honorary chairman, Colorado state 

senator Ted Harvey. Id. ¶ 13. Additionally, the committee filed a complaint with the FEC, and 

later sued the FEC, over Clinton’s alleged improper support of the Ready for Hillary SuperPAC’s 

efforts to draft her as a candidate, and the FEC’s yearlong delay in determining whether to 

investigate it. See Stop Hillary PAC v. FEC, No. 1:14-02080-KBJ (D.D.C. 2014); see also Backer 

Decl. ¶ 11. In short, the committee’s name has proven to be a rallying point for hundreds of 

thousands of people opposed to Clinton’s candidacy; has received substantial public exposure; and 

precisely conveys the committee’s sole purpose.

B. The FEC’s Threats Over Stop Hillary PAC’s Name

At the time Plaintiff Dan Backer formed Stop Hillary PAC, in May 2013, neither Hillary 

Clinton, nor apparently anyone else bearing the first or last name of Hillary, was a candidate for 

federal office. Backer Decl. ¶ 17. Clinton did not officially declare her candidacy until nearly two 

years later in April 2015. Id. ¶ 18. Backer became aware of her “official” candidacy at that time, 

and also was familiar with 52 U.S.C § 30102(e)(4)’s prohibition on the inclusion of candidates’ 

names in the names of unauthorized PACs. Id. ¶ 19. He nevertheless refrained on First 

Amendment grounds from changing Stop Hillary PAC’s name to remove its reference to Hillary, 

since it created no risk of public confusion. Id. 

On April 27, 2015, the FEC sent a “Request for Additional Information” (“RFAI”) to 

“DAN BACKER, TREASURER[,] STOP HILLARY PAC.” Verified Complaint, ¶ 15. The RFAI 

stated, “Your committee’s name includes the name of a candidate; however, your committee does 

not appear to be authorized by a candidate.” Id. The RFAI ordered that, if Stop Hillary PAC was 

not a candidate-authorized committee, Backer would have to amend its Statement of Organization 

to change its name “so that it does not include the candidate’s name and/or provide further 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 13 of 39 PageID# 39
5

clarification regarding the nature of your committee.” Id. The RFAI did not specify whether 

Hillary Clinton would have to authorize the committee, or simply any candidate bearing the first 

or last name of “Hillary.” Id. As Treasurer, Backer colorfully responded to the RFAI by declining 

its invitation to change the committee’s name. Id. ¶ 16. 

Following further communications between Backer and the FEC, see id. ¶ 17, on 

September 8, 2015, the FEC sent a letter to Stop Hillary PAC and Dan Backer, declaring that they 

“may have violated” FECA, and that the matter has been referred to the FEC’s Office of General 

Counsel for “possible enforcement action,” id. ¶ 18. The letter charged that Stop Hillary PAC and 

Backer failed to remove the name of a federal candidate, Hillary Rodham Clinton, from the name 

of Stop Hillary PAC, in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4). Id. ¶ 19. It stated the FEC was 

giving Stop Hillary PAC and Backer the opportunity to “demonstrate in writing that no action 

should be taken.” Id. If they failed to file a response, the FEC “may take further action,” including 

an audit. Id. The letter also threatened that the FEC could “refer knowing and willful violations 

of the Act to the Department of Justice for potential criminal prosecution.” Id. 

C. Changing Stop Hillary PAC’s Name Would Impose Substantial Costs and Burdens

Compelling Stop Hillary PAC to change its name would impose substantial financial, 

logistical, and practical burdens on Stop Hillary PAC. Most basically, an alternate name that does 

not mention “Hillary” as the person to be stopped would express the committee’s purpose and 

goals far less accurately and precisely. Cf. Backer Decl. ¶¶ 12, 16. The quality of the expression 

conveyed by the committee’s name would be substantially degraded. Moreover, people would be 

forced to associate, if at all, under a name that did not directly, forcefully, and precisely convey 

their mission and goals. An alternate, vaguer name also would necessarily interfere with the 

committee’s ability to attract supporters and raise funds. It would be more difficult for people 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 14 of 39 PageID# 40
6

wishing to devote themselves to opposing Clinton’s candidacy to determine whether a renamed 

entity is exclusively focused on that goal. 

If the committee were forced to change its legal name, beyond filing a new Statement of 

Organization with the FEC, id. ¶ 14(a), it would have to similarly update its name with the Internal 

Revenue Service (“IRS”), with regard to its employer identification number (“EIN”); with banks, 

for its bank accounts; with the U.S. Postal Service, to continue receiving mail; and on all vendor 

contracts, id. ¶¶ 14(b)-(e). The committee also would have to obtain an entirely new online and 

social media presence, including a new web domain, Twitter handle, and Facebook page, which

did not use the name “Stop Hillary PAC.” Id. ¶¶ 14(f)-(i). These new accounts would not have 

the established history and following of Stop Hillary PAC’s current accounts, and likely would 

receive far lower placement from web search engines. Id. ¶ 15. 

Stop Hillary PAC also would have to obtain new checks, stationary, pre-printed direct-mail 

inbound and outbound envelopes, reply cards, thank-you cards, “best efforts” compliance 

materials, and bumper stickers, bearing its new name, at substantial expense. Id. ¶ 15(k)-(o). 

Additionally, it would be legally obligated to update its name in its statutorily mandated disclaimer 

on every single web page, video, picture, and advertisement. Id. ¶ 15(p). On Facebook alone, 

Stop Hillary PAC’s name is emblazoned more than a hundred pictures that would have to be 

digitally updated with its new name. Id. 15(r). Stop Hillary PAC should not be forced to undergo 

this tremendous burden, if at all, until this lawsuit is complete and its constitutional claims have 

been fully adjudicated. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 15 of 39 PageID# 41
7

ARGUMENT

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A PROHIBITORY PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION TO ALLOW STOP HILLARY PAC TO MAINTAIN 

ITS NAME THROUGHOUT THE PENDENCY OF THIS LAWSUIT 

This Court should grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff Stop 

Hillary PAC has operated under its name since its founding nearly two-and-a-half years ago. 

Backer Decl. ¶ 5. Its name clearly, succinctly, accurately, and powerfully conveys its important 

mission. Id. ¶¶ 6, 12, 16. The committee has sent out millions of communications under that 

name, been the subject of numerous news articles, run over a million dollars of political 

advertisements under that name, and otherwise generated valuable goodwill and name recognition. 

Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. Hundreds of thousands of people have decided to associate together under the name 

“Stop Hillary PAC,” by making contributions to the PAC, assisting in its projects, or joining its 

mailing list. Id. ¶ 7. Requiring Stop Hillary PAC to change its name would cause it to incur 

substantial cost and inconvenience; require it to acquire an entirely new online presence; squander 

the goodwill associated with its present name; and compel it to operate under a less specific, less 

effective name that does not reflect it mission and purpose. Id. ¶ 14. 

In May 2013, when Stop Hillary PAC was formed and registered under its name, neither 

Hillary Clinton, nor (apparently) anyone else bearing the first or last name of “Hillary,” was a 

federal candidate. Id. ¶¶ 4, 17. Consequently, both at the time of its formation, and throughout 

the first two years of its existence, the committee’s name was indisputably consistent with federal 

law, see 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4). In the months leading up to Stop Hillary PAC’s formation—

indeed since the 2010 congressional elections—Hillary Clinton repeatedly insisted that she was 

not going to become a candidate for President of the United States.3

 These denials proved untrue. 

 3 See Tracy Connor, “Hillary Clinton Explains Why She Might Not Run,” NBC NEWS (June 10, 

2014) (“Hillary Clinton says there are a few reasons she might not run for president — and one of 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 16 of 39 PageID# 42
8

Thus, Stop Hillary PAC adopted its name at a time when Clinton was not a candidate, and 

affirmatively discounted any intent of becoming a candidate. Nevertheless, after over two years 

of engaging in core First Amendment activities under this name, Plaintiff Stop Hillary PAC and 

its counsel, treasurer, supporter, and contributor Plaintiff Dan Backer are being threatened with 

burdensome administrative proceedings, regulatory financial audits, substantial civil fines, and 

even criminal prosecution for violating 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4), all because Clinton changed her 

mind and decided to become a candidate. Verified Compl. §§ 21-22. 

Section 30102(e)(4) states, in relevant part, “In the case of any political committee which 

is not an authorized committee, such political committee shall not include the name of any 

candidate in its name.” 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4) (hereafter, “Name Prohibition”). The FEC has 

threatened administrative proceedings, audits, civil fines, and even criminal prosecution to compel 

Backer to change Stop Hillary PAC’s name. Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this Court grant them 

a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo, while their facial and as-applied constitutional 

 

them hasn't even been born yet.”), available at http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hillary-clintoninterview/hillary-clinton-explains-why-she-might-not-run-n127576; Taegan Goddard, “Did 

Hillary Clinton Ever Stop Running for President?,” THE WEEK (Feb. 21, 2014), available at

http://theweek.com/articles/450436/did-hillary-clinton-ever-stop-running-president (“Hillary 

Clinton long denied that she would be running for president again after her loss to Barack Obama 

in 2008.”); Melissa Jeltsen, “Hillary Clinton: ‘I Really Don’t Believe’ I’ll Run for President Again 

(VIDEO),” HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2012), available at

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/hillary-clinton-2016_n_2286173.html; Lindsey 

Boerma, “Hillary Clinton for President in 2016?,” CBS NEWS (Dec. 9, 2012), available at

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-for-president-in-2016/ (“Mrs. Clinton has denied 

harboring any desire to weather another election.”); Elise Labott, “Hillary Clinton: Repeats ‘No’

for 2016, Can’t Stand ‘Whining’ About Life Choices,” CNN (Oct. 18, 2012), available at

http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/18/hillary-clinton-repeats-no-2016-cant-standwhinin-about-life-choices/; Michael Muskal, “Hillary Clinton Again Says She Won’t Run for 

President in 2016,” L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2011), available at

http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/17/news/la-pn-hillary-clinton-future-20111017; see also 

“Hillary Clinton May Not Run for President After All, Says Senator Who Conferred With Her,” 

THE WEEK (Sept. 20, 2014), available at http://theweek.com/speedreads/445928/hillary-clintonmay-not-run-president-after-all-says-senator-who-conferred. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 17 of 39 PageID# 43
9

challenges to § 30102(e)(4) are pending, so that Stop Hillary PAC need not change or otherwise 

stop using its name. 

The sole purpose of § 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition is to ensure that the public is not 

misled into believing that a non-connected PAC is actually a candidate’s official authorized 

committee. See infra Subsection I.A.2. Neither the FEC nor the Clinton campaign has identified 

even a single individual anywhere in the nation who even momentarily suspected that Stop Hillary 

PAC might be Clinton’s official authorized campaign committee, or that Stop Hillary PAC was 

trying to facilitate Clinton’s effort to become President. The Government lacks a constitutionally 

valid basis for seeking to curtail the fundamental First Amendment rights of speech and association 

of Stop Hillary PAC, its supporters and contributors, or Backer. Section 30102(e)(4) is an 

embarrassingly hamfisted, blunderbuss, and overbroad attempt at preventing the purely imaginary 

chimera of confusion posed by groups such as Stop Hillary PAC. 

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must show that:

(1) they are likely to succeed on the merits; 

(2) they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction; 

(3) the balance of hardships weighs in their favor; and

(4) the injunction is in the public interest.

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also United States v. South 

Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 533 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 575 F.3d 

342 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), reinstated in relevant part, 

607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010)). Each of these factors is satisfied here.

A. Plaintiffs are Likely to Succeed on the Merits of Their Claims

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 18 of 39 PageID# 44
10

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their facial and as-applied challenges to 52 

U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4)’s vague and overbroad Name Prohibition. Subsection 1 explains that this 

provision abridges Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights of speech and association and therefore is 

subject to strict—or, at the very least, “exacting”—scrutiny. Subsection 2 demonstrates that, as 

applied to committees whose names expressly and unambiguously oppose federal candidates, §

30102(e)(4) does not further any important government interests. 

Subsection 3 establishes that, both facially and as applied, § 30102(e)(4) is an 

unconstitutionally overbroad means of attempting to further the government’s asserted goal of 

preventing public confusion. Finally, Subsection 4 shows that the provision violates the First 

Amendment because it is impermissibly vague. Importantly, because § 30102(e)(4) infringes First 

Amendment rights, Plaintiffs must be deemed likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge 

unless the Government can affirmatively demonstrate § 30102(e)(4)’s constitutionality, both 

facially and as-applied. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004). 

1. Section 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition Abridges the Fundamental First 

Amendment Rights of Speech and Association for Political Committees, 

as Well as Their Treasurers, Contributors, and Other Supporters. 

Section 30102(e)(4) substantially burdens fundamental First Amendment rights to freedom 

of speech, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 

(1966)), as well as political and expressive association, see id. at 15 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 

419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975)). Federal law generally requires individuals wishing to band together to 

collectively participate in the political process by contributing to candidates or making 

independent expenditures on commercials, mailers, or other communications about candidates to 

form a political committee. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4). The committee must have a treasurer, id. 

§ 30102(a), who is responsible for filing all required reports with the FEC, id. § 30104(a). Such 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 19 of 39 PageID# 45
11

reports, which are publicly available on the FEC’s website, id. § 30104(d)(2), must contain the 

committee’s name and identify every person who has contributed $200 or more to the committee. 

Id. § 30104(b)(3)(A). 

The First Amendment squarely protects the right of a committee itself, through its founders 

and officers, to determine what its name will be. A committee’s name is a matter of pure political 

expression. See Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 391 

(2011) (“Names, whether personal or commercial, have historically been a way of communicating 

information to others . . . .”). “[P]olitical machinery is powered by names and what those names 

symbolize and identify.” Common Cause v. FEC, 655 F. Supp. 619, 621-22 (D.D.C. 1986), rev’d 

842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Especially in politics, the name of an organization or committee 

goes to the very essence of defining what that organization is and how it chooses to present itself 

to the public. A committee uses its name to convey its mission and values, to attract and inspire 

supporters. Cf. Backer Decl. ¶¶ 12, 16. To understand the expressive importance of a name, one 

has only to look at the vitriolic public debates over whether the #BlackLivesMatter movement 

should be #AllLivesMatter. The message conveyed by Defendant Federal Election Commission’s 

name would be quite different if Congress changed it to Meaningless Paperwork Bureaucracy. By 

adopting a name that reflects its mission, goals, or values, a committee can engage in succinct, 

powerful communication each time the committee is mentioned or discussed, even if a listener, 

viewer, or reader does not have time, opportunity, or inclination to completely digest a complete 

advertisement or other communication from the committee. 

The right to select a name also lies squarely at the heart of the First Amendment right to 

political association. See Citizens Against Rent Cont./Coal. for Fair Hous. v. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 20 of 39 PageID# 46
12

, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (“[T]he practice of persons sharing common views banding 

together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American political process.”). 

Federal law requires that most political association relating to federal elections occur through 

political committees. 52 U.S.C. § 30102(a), and each political committee is required to adopt a 

name. “Names are an obvious badge of identity,” Mark Bartholomew, Trademark Morality, 55 

WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 123 (2013), and “the identity of the speaker is an important component 

of many attempts to persuade,” City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994). Requiring a 

committee to change its name, or prohibiting it from adopting a certain name in the first place, 

inexorably affects the core of that committee’s very identity. A name defines what that committee 

is; it is the banner around which people exercise their fundamental First Amendment right to 

associate together to achieve their shared political goals. Moreover, a political committee is 

statutorily required to include its name in disclaimers on virtually all advertisements and 

communications to the public, 52 U.S.C. § 30120(a), as well as its publicly available disclosure 

reports, id. § 30104(b)(3)(A). Thus, name restrictions compel people to publicly associate, if at 

all, with entities bearing names that do not fully and accurately describe their goals, convey their 

values, or express their true beliefs. 

Section 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition abridges the First Amendment right to freedom of 

speech and association of political committees; their founders, officers, and treasurers; and their 

supporters, contributors, and members. It directly limits political expression and association by 

prohibiting non-connected committees from adopting names that include federal candidates, even 

when the use of such names is essential to accurately, succinctly, and powerfully express the 

committee’s mission, goals, and values. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 21 of 39 PageID# 47
13

The fact that § 30102(e)(4) bars committees only from adopting certain names does not 

remove the constitutional infirmity. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 

(1977), the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting homeowners only from posting “For Sale” 

signs on their front lawns, even though they could post any other signs they wished there, and 

could advertise the sale of their homes through various other means. Likewise, in Rubin v. Coors 

Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), the Court struck down a law that prohibited beer manufacturers

from printing alcohol content on beer labels, even though they could include other desired 

information on the labels, and communicate the alcoholic content of their beverages in other ways. 

See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (invalidating law prohibiting 

mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements, even though it did not prohibit the mailing of 

other unsolicited advertisements, and contraceptive manufacturers could advertise in other ways). 

Thus, § 30102(e)(4) is subject to strict scrutiny, and must be invalidated unless it serves a 

“compelling” government interest and is “the least restrictive means” of achieving that interest. 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45.

* * *

Another reason § 30102(e)(4) triggers strict scrutiny, in addition to its substantial burden 

on First Amendment rights of association and expression, is because it is a content-based 

restriction on First Amendment activities. The Government “has no power to restrict expression 

because of its . . . content.” Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). A law is 

content-based if it “applies to particular speech because of . . . the idea or message expressed” or 

it “cannot be justified ‘without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” Reed v. Town 

of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 

791 (1989)). For example, a law that prohibits the posting of signs relating to events is contentCase 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 22 of 39 PageID# 48
14

based because it applies only to signs that mention an event. See id. at 2231. A law prohibiting 

political committees from adopting names that include candidates’ names candidates is similarly 

content-based. Moreover, as discussed below, the law’s asserted purpose is to ensure that the 

content of the expression—the inclusion of a candidate’s name—does not confuse the public. 

Thus, § 30102(e)(4) is content-based. The fact that the Government may have enacted 

§ 30102(e)(4) with a “benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the 

ideas contained’ in the regulated speech” does not preclude strict scrutiny from applying. Reed, 

135 S. Ct. at 2228 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 429 (1993)).

* * *

In Pursuing America’s Greatness v. FEC, No. 1:15-CV-1217-TSC (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 

2015), the only constitutional issue raised was whether the First Amendment permitted the FEC to 

carve out various exceptions to § 30102(e)(4) in its implementing regulation, 11 C.F.R. 

§ 102.14(b). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that § 30102(e)(4) is “part 

and parcel of FECA’s disclosure regime.” Pursuing America’s Greatness at 23; see also Galliano 

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 836 F.2d 1362, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that § 30102(e)(4) is one 

way in which FECA “require[s] political bodies to disclose the identity of persons associated with 

them”). In that court’s view, it is subject only to intermediate scrutiny. 

Pursuing America’s Greatness and the D.C. Circuit precedents upon which it is based 

misapprehend the nature of disclosure requirements. A disclosure requirement is a law requiring 

an entity to reveal certain information. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 61-64; see, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 

561 U.S. 186 (2010) (holding that a law making signatures on a petition publicly available is “not 

a prohibition on speech,” but rather “a disclosure requirement”). A law that goes beyond merely 

requiring a person to provide certain information, and instead restricts or prohibits his ability to

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 23 of 39 PageID# 49
15

engage in certain political expression, cannot be considered a mere “disclosure requirement.” See 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010) (holding that a law cannot be treated as only a 

disclosure requirement if it “prevent[s] anyone from speaking”); cf. Zauderer v. Office of 

Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 650-51 (1985) (outlining the “material differences between 

disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech”). 

Section 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition seeks to prevent public confusion by making it 

easier to determine whether a committee is non-connected, but that provision goes beyond merely 

requiring a committee to disclose its “non-connected” status. Section 30102(e)(4) directly limits 

a committee’s ability to express itself and associate with supporters through its name by outright 

prohibiting the committee from adopting certain names. See supra pp. 11-14. Thus, § 30102(e)(4) 

is more than a mere disclosure requirement, substantially burdens First Amendment rights, and is 

subject to strict scrutiny. Nevertheless, even if this Court agrees with the reasoning of Pursuing 

America’s Greatness, § 30102(e)(4) remains subject to exacting scrutiny, meaning that it must be 

invalidated unless the Government can establish that it is “closely drawn” to achieving an 

“important” government interest. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (2014); accord Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 25. 

2. Section 30102(e)(4) is Unconstitutional As Applied to the Creation and 

Maintenance of PACs With Names That Clearly and Unambiguously Oppose 

Candidates Because It Does Not Further a Valid Government Interest.

Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to § 30102(e)(4) as applied 

to the creation and maintenance of non-connected political committees bearing names that clearly 

and unambiguously oppose candidates, because the statute does not further a valid governmental 

interest. Section 30102(e)(4) restricts political committees from choosing names based on their 

content: whether they include the name of a candidate. The Supreme Court has “sustained contentCase 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 24 of 39 PageID# 50
16

based restrictions” on First Amendment activities “only in the most extraordinary circumstances.” 

Bolger, 463 U.S. at 65.

Here, the legislative intent behind § 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition was to “avoid 

confusion,” to make it easier for the public to determine whether a particular committee has been 

authorized by a candidate. Senate Rules and Admin. Comm., Hearing on Amending the FECA of 

1971, as Amended, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (July 13, 1979); see also Common Cause v. FEC, 

842 F.2d 436, 447 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (recognizing that § 30102(e)(4) was enacted to “prevent 

confusion arising from misleading committee names”). The FEC likewise has explained that its 

implementing regulations were intended to “minimize or eliminate the possibility” for “confusion 

or abuse” that can purportedly occur when non-authorized committees adopt candidates’ names. 

FEC, “Special Fundraising Projects and Other Use of Candidates Names By Unauthorized 

Committees,” 57 FED. REG. 31,424, 31,424 (July 15, 1992); accord FEC, “Special Fundraising 

Projects and Other Use of Candidates Names By Unauthorized Committees,” 59 FED.REG. 17,267, 

17,268 (Apr. 12, 1994). The FEC feared that people might believe they are receiving 

communications from, or making contributions to, a candidate’s committee when in fact they are 

dealing with an unauthorized PAC. Id. 

No valid governmental interest is furthered by prohibiting political committees from 

adopting names that clearly and unambiguously oppose candidates. Neither FEC, the Clinton 

campaign, the media, nor anyone else has identified a single person who even momentarily 

believed that Stop Hillary PAC might have been Clinton’s authorized candidate committee, or that 

a contribution to Stop Hillary PAC otherwise would have been used to support Clinton’s 

candidacy. In the words of the FEC itself, “the potential for fraud and abuse is significantly 

reduced in the case” of a name which “opposes the candidate.” 59 FED. REG. at 17,269 (quotation 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 25 of 39 PageID# 51
17

marks omitted). Thus, applying § 30102(e)(4) to political committees with names that clearly and 

unambiguously oppose a federal candidate does not further the government’s asserted interest in 

combating fraud or preventing confusion. 

The FEC also contends that “[a] total ban” on unauthorized committees’ use of candidate 

names is “easier to monitor and enforce” than less restrictive measures. 57 FED. REG. at 31,425. 

By definition, however, it would not be burdensome for the FEC to determine whether a committee 

name “clearly and unambiguously” opposes a federal candidate. The FEC already reviews the 

name of each political committee name to determine whether it violates § 30102(e)(4), assessing 

whether words such as “Young,” for example, refer to a candidate or instead are used in a different 

sense. And 11 C.F.R. § 102.14(b)(3) already requires the FEC to determine whether the names of 

unauthorized committees’ “special projects” clearly and unambiguously express opposition to a 

candidate. Thus, the FEC is well equipped to make that same determination concerning the names 

of political committees themselves. Moreover, in any event, the Government may not burden First 

Amendment rights to promote “administrative convenience.” United States v. Nat’l Treas. Emp. 

Union, 513 U.S. 454, 473 (1995); see Riley v. Nat’l Fed for the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988) 

(“[T]he First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency.”). 

Finally, the FEC has argued that it must restrict unauthorized committees’ ability to use 

candidates’ names because some candidates have “disagree[d] with the views expressed” by such 

committees and “object[ed] to the use of [their] names.” 57 FED. REG. at 31,425; accord 59 FED.

REG. at 17,268. But the Government may not bar a committee from adopting a candidate’s name 

simply because the candidate may object. The “fundamental First Amendment right to advocate 

the defeat of election of a candidate necessarily carries with it a right to use a candidate’s name. . . 

. By permitting a candidate to regulate the use of his name in a political campaign, such remedies 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 26 of 39 PageID# 52
18

would stifle the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues that the First 

Amendment was designed to promote.” Friends of Phil Gramm v. Am. for Phil Gramm in ’84, 

587 F. Supp. 769, 774 (E.D. Va. 1984) (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). 

Thus, the Government lacks a constitutionally valid interest in prohibiting unauthorized 

committees from adopting names that clearly and unambiguously oppose candidates.

3. Section 30102(e)(4) is Unconstitutional, Both Facially and As 

Applied to the Creation and Maintenance of PACs Bearing Names 

That Clearly and Unambiguously Oppose Candidates, Because 

It Is Poorly Tailored to Achieving the Government’s Goals.

Section 30102(e)(4) also is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to committees 

such as Stop Hillary PAC, because it is substantially overbroad and not tailored to achieving the 

Government’s goals. A law violates the First Amendment due to overbreadth when “a substantial 

number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 

sweep.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) 

(quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010). Likewise, 

under strict scrutiny, a law is unconstitutional if more narrowly tailored or less restrictive means 

exist of pursuing the Government’s goals. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

44-45. To survive “exacting” or “closely drawn” scrutiny, in contrast, a law must “employ[] means 

closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement” of First Amendment rights. Buckley, 424 U.S. 

at 25. Section 30102(e)(4) cannot survive any of these tests. 

Section 30102(e)(4) flatly prohibits any non-authorized committees from adopting a name 

that includes the name of a candidate, in order to prevent the public from being misled into 

believing that a non-connected committee is actually an authorized candidate committee. Common 

Cause, 842 F.2d at 447 n.31; 57 FED. REG. at 31,424; 59 FED. REG. at 17,268. This blanket 

prohibition sweeps unnecessarily broadly, covering not only committees that a person reasonably 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 27 of 39 PageID# 53
19

could mistake for a candidate’s authorized committee, but also ones such as Stop Hillary PAC that 

clearly and unambiguously oppose the named candidate. The FEC itself has recognized that names 

do not carry the same “potential for fraud and abuse.” 59 FED. REG. at 17,269 (quotation marks 

omitted). Stop Hillary PAC clearly and unambiguously conveys the committee’s opposition to 

Clinton’s candidacy, and the FEC cannot adduce a single person who believed it might have been 

Clinton’s official authorized candidate committee. Thus, § 30102(e)(4) is overbroad, poorly 

drawn, and unnecessarily invasive of First Amendment rights. 

4. Section 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition Violates the First

and Fifth Amendments Because It is Unconstitutionally Vague.

Even if this Court concludes that § 30102(e)(4) can survive heightened or strict scrutiny, it 

still should hold the law facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment and Fifth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it is impermissibly vague. The provision’s vagueness 

chills political committees in exercising their constitutional right to select a name and confers upon 

the FEC impermissibly broad interpretative and enforcement discretion. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 

U.S. 844, 870-871 (1997) (“The vagueness of [a content-based regulation of speech] raises special 

First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect”). A statute is unconstitutionally 

vague if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is 

so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” FCC v. 

Fox TV Stats., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (quotation marks omitted); accord United States 

v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). 

The Supreme Court has struck down statutory terms as impermissibly vague when they 

regulated expressive activities yet were undefined by statute, regulation, or prior judicial 

construction. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1983) (invalidating law 

requiring people to present “credible and reliable” identification to police upon request, due to 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 28 of 39 PageID# 54
20

vagueness); Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620-21 (1976) (invalidating law 

requiring anyone wishing to engage in door-to-door solicitation for a “recognized charitable cause” 

to first register with the police, due to vagueness); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581-82 (1974) 

(invalidating law that barred “contemptuous treatment” of the Flag, due to vagueness); see also 

Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 576 (1987) (holding phrase “‘airport 

related,’” as used in interpretation of airport policy, unconstitutionally vague); Connally v. Gen. 

Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1926) (holding phrases “current rate of wages” and “locality”

unconstitutionally vague). 

In the context of § 30102(e)(4), the term “name” is as vague as other terms that the 

Supreme Court has held unconstitutional. Neither FECA nor FEC regulations defines what 

portions of a candidate’s name are necessary to trigger § 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition. Is it a 

candidate’s full name? Is just a candidate’s first, middle, or last name sufficient? Must a 

committee avoid adopting a name that includes a candidate’s legal name, the candidate’s 

nickname, the name the candidate listed on their FEC Statement of Candidacy, or some 

combination thereof? Does it matter whether the committee subjectively intends for a word in its 

name to refer to a certain candidate? Or instead whether any word in the committee’s name simply 

happens to be the same as any portion of any name of any candidate? Or is the issue instead 

whether someone, somewhere, might understand the committee’s name to be referring to a 

particular candidate? And in making that determination, is this hypothetical person limited to 

considering only the committee name itself in isolation, or instead must he consider the name in 

the context of various advertisements or communications by the committee (and, if so, how many 

advertisements or communications, and which ones?).

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 29 of 39 PageID# 55
21

A few examples illustrate § 30102(e)(4)’s vagueness. Clinton’s statement of candidacy 

lists “Hillary Rodham Clinton” as “Name of Candidate.” See Hillary Rodham Clinton, Statement 

of Candidacy, FEC Form 2 (Apr. 13, 2015), attached as Backer Decl. Exh. 4. Stop Hillary PAC’s 

name, in contrast, refers only to “Hillary.” Thus, at most, Stop Hillary PAC has adopted only part 

of the name of a candidate, yet the FEC has threatened Plaintiffs with administrative, civil, and 

criminal prosecution. Verified Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. If the PAC were named “Stop the Clinton Family 

PAC” or “Stop the Clinton Legacy PAC” instead, it would contain a reference to Hillary’s last 

name, but that also happens to be the last name of former President William J. Clinton, who is not 

presently a federal candidate and to whom § 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition therefore does not 

apply. It is unclear whether a committee would face administrative, civil, and criminal penalties 

for adopting such a name. 

In contrast, Bush’s statement of candidacy lists “Jeb Bush” as the “Name of Candidate.” 

See Jeb Bush, Statement of Candidacy, FEC Form 2 (June 15, 2015), attached as Backer Decl. 

Exh. 5. Bush’s legal name, however, is John Ellis Bush. Don Gonyea, 5 Things You Should Know 

About Jeb Bush, NPR (June 14, 2015), available at http://www.npr.org/sections/ 

itsallpolitics/2015/06/14/414093887/5-things-you-should-know-about-jeb-bush. A person cannot 

reasonably know whether § 30102(e)(4) prohibits “Vote Jeb PAC,” since it contains the 

candidate’s name as it appears on the FEC Form 2, or instead names such as “We Love John Ellis 

Bush PAC” or “John Ellis for President PAC,” since they contain the candidate’s real name. And 

if “Jeb PAC” is invalid because it refers to the candidate’s name, would “JEB PAC,” as a reference 

to the candidate’s initials, be more permissible?4

 

 4 There presently exists an unauthorized PAC containing the name “Jeb”: VAMOS FOR JEB 

2016, with the website http://www.vamosforjeb2016.com. According to its publicly available 

FEC file, it has not yet received an RFAI from the FEC or otherwise been the target of adverse 

administrative, civil, or criminal action. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 30 of 39 PageID# 56
22

Sanders lists “Bernard Sanders” on his Statement of Candidacy as the “Name of 

Candidate.” See Bernard Sanders, Statement of Candidacy, FEC Form 2 (Apr. 30, 2015), attached 

as Backer Decl. Exh. 6. Although that is apparently also his legal name, the FEC has opined that 

non-connected political committees may not use the name “Bernie,” because that is a nickname 

commonly used to refer to Sanders. See FEC, Adv. Op. 2015-04, at 3 (July 16, 2015). Thus, a 

person can apparently violate § 30102(e)(4) when naming a committee, even while avoiding a 

candidate’s legal name and the name the candidate registered with the FEC. There is no guidance, 

however, as to the range of purported nicknames to which § 30102(e)(4) extends (i.e., would it 

have precluded “Gipper PAC” when Reagan was a candidate?). 

Chafee lists “Lincoln Davenport Chafee” on his Statement of Candidacy as the “Name of 

Candidate.” See Lincoln Chafee, Statement of Candidacy, FEC Form 2 (June 16, 2015), attached 

as Backer Decl. Exh. 7. A reasonable person would have no way of knowing whether this would 

preclude him from forming a “Lincoln PAC” or a “Lincoln Values PAC,” to support candidates 

who support the ideals of former President Abraham Lincoln. Along those lines, it is unclear 

whether someone else named Lincoln—such as former Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart—

would be precluded from forming a “Lincoln PAC,” either. Overall, the law offers no guidance 

as to whether a non-connected PAC’s ability to include the term “Lincoln” in its name hinges 

solely on the subjective, and potentially unexpressed, intent of its founders as to the particular 

“Lincoln” to which the committee’s name would refer. 

Section 30102(e)(4) also raises vexing issues when one or more words in a candidate’s 

name bears another meaning. For example, there are presently two House candidates with the 

surname “Young.” There also exist several unauthorized political committees bearing that name, 

including “Young Conservatives of America” and “Stonewall Young Democrats.” Based on these 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 31 of 39 PageID# 57
23

committees’ names, it is impossible to determine whether their references to “Young” relate to a 

particular candidate (akin to “Reagan Conservatives of America” or “Stonewall Clinton 

Democrats”), or instead the youth of the PAC’s supporters. Section 30102(e)(4) reasonably may 

deter committees from fully exercising their First Amendment rights by adopting such names 

precisely to avoid unnecessary FEC entanglements. And it appears solely up to the FEC, on a 

case-by-case basis, to determine which of these committee names will trigger administrative 

proceedings, civil fines, audits, and the threat of criminal prosecution. This Court should 

invalidate § 30102(e)(4) due to unconstitutional vagueness. 

B. Stop Hillary PAC and Backer Will Suffer Irreparable Injury Without an Injunction

Second, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if this Court declines to grant an injunction. 

Most basically, 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4)’s Name Prohibition burdens their First Amendment rights, 

see supra Section A, and “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of 

time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) 

(plurality op.); accord Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2011); Newsom v. 

Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003). 

Moreover, any harm that Plaintiffs suffer as a result of their name change would be 

irreparable because sovereign immunity prevents them from suing the FEC for compensatory 

damages in the event this Court later strikes down § 30102(e)(4). Odenbrecht Constr. v. Sec’y, 

Fla. DOT, 715 F.3d 1268, 1289 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In the context of preliminary injunctions, 

numerous courts have held that the inability to recover monetary damages because of sovereign 

immunity renders the harm suffered irreparable.”); Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 

F.3d 742, 770-71 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Imposition of monetary damages that cannot later be 

recovered for reasons such as sovereign immunity constitutes irreparable injury.”).

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 32 of 39 PageID# 58
24

In addition, the harm Stop Hillary PAC would suffer from having to change its name cannot 

be easily quantified. To be sure, it would immediately incur substantial economic costs because 

it will have to acquire a new online presence (i.e., new webpage, e-mail domain, Facebook page, 

and Twitter handle without the offending name); remove its current name from all disclaimers, 

online photos, videos, advertisements, and other materials; and purchase new checks, business 

cards, stationary, direct-mail envelopes, reply cards, thank-you cards, “best efforts” compliance 

materials, and bumper stickers with its new name. Backer Decl. ¶ 14. 

Beyond those quantifiable costs, however, Stop Hillary PAC necessarily will suffer a loss 

of the goodwill and name recognition it has built up over the past two years of its existence. This 

Court has recognized that “‘the potential loss of goodwill . . . support[s] a finding of irreparable 

harm.’” JTH Tax, Inc. v. Frashier, 624 F.3d 635, 639 (4th Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) 

(quoting Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Qual. Cable Op. Co., 22 F.3d 546, 552 

(4th Cir. 1994)); see, e.g., Sig. Flight Sup. Corp. v. Landow Aviation Ltd. P’ship, 442 F. App’x 

776, 784-85 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s grant of injunction based on finding of 

irreparable injury due to “‘possibility’” that a company would lose its goodwill). 

Stop Hillary PAC has generated a substantial amount of goodwill and name recognition 

under its current name. It has spent over $1 million pursuing its goals under the name “Stop Hillary 

PAC,” developing its brand. Backer Decl. ¶ 8. It has sent out well over 100 million -mails from 

the “@StopHillaryPAC.org” domain to engage supporters and spread its message, id. ¶ 8(a); 

currently receives an average of 1 million visitors monthly to its website, 

http://www.StopHillaryPAC.org, which is the 1,920th most-visited site in the nation, id. ¶ 8(b); 

and has received roughly 200,000 “likes” on its Facebook page, 

https://www.facebook.com/StopHillaryPAC, id. ¶ 8(c). The Committee’s Facebook posts appear, 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 33 of 39 PageID# 59
25

under its name, in the Facebook Newsfeeds of over 1.1 million individuals each week. Id. ¶ 8(c). 

Its Twitter account, “@StopHillaryPAC,” has approximately 6,900 followers and has made over 

1,200 tweets. Id. ¶ 8(d). The committee has received extensive coverage under its current name 

in the popular and political presses. Id. ¶ 10; see id. Exh. 3. 

Although Plaintiff still may refer to Clinton “in the body of any website or 

communication,” and use Clinton’s name in the “‘title of a special project name or other 

communication’” that “‘unambiguously shows opposition’” to her, FEC, Adv. Op. 2015-14, at 3-

4 (July 16, 2015) (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 102.14(b)(3)), it cannot retain “Stop Hillary PAC” as its 

name. Thus, Plaintiff must stop referring to itself as “Stop Hillary PAC,” particularly in statutorily 

required disclaimers in its solicitations and other communications, see, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 30120(a). 

Over three-quarters of a million people have chosen to associate together under the banner “Stop 

Hillary PAC” in a variety of ways, such as by making financial contributions, supporting its 

projects, or joining its mailing list. Backer Decl. ¶ 7(a)-(c). The committee would suffer the 

irreparable loss of this goodwill if it were forced to change its name. 

Compelling Stop Hillary PAC to operate under a different name also would inflict 

unquantifiable harm by interfering with its mission and ability to attract supporters and raise funds. 

The name “Stop Hillary PAC” clearly, succinctly, accurately, and powerfully conveys the 

committee’s precise and exclusive purpose, id. ¶¶ 6, 12, 16—a purpose that already has attracted 

over three-quarters of a million people, id. ¶ 7. Compelling the committee to operate under a 

different, vaguer name that does not directly communicate its mission would hinder its ability to 

attract potential supporters or contributors, who would be unable to discern its purpose simply 

through a glance at its name. Id. ¶ 16. Even if the committee were to completely eschew decorum 

and civility by changing its name to something like the inflammatory “Stop the Manipulative Liar 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 34 of 39 PageID# 60
26

Who Has Undermined Our National Security PAC,” the public would have no idea which 

“manipulative liar” in Washington, D.C. who has “undermined our national security” the PAC was 

opposing without further research or reading. 

“[A] finding of irreparable harm is most appropriate where the plaintiff’s damages are 

difficult to calculate.” HCI Techs., Inc. v. Avaya, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 518, 521 (E.D. Va. 2006) 

(citing Multi-Channel TV Cable Co., 22 F.3d 546); see also Sci Apps. Int’l Corp. v. CACI-Athena, 

Inc., No. 1:08-CV-443 (JCC), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37849, at *8 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2008) 

(holding that irreparable harm is likely to exist where it is “impossible to ascertain[] with any 

accuracy the extent of the loss”) (quotation marks omitted). Here, it would be extremely difficult 

to attempt to estimate the financial and other loss Stop Hillary PAC would suffer from having to 

operate under a less informative and attractive name. Indeed, even if the amount by which its 

contributions declined could be reliably ascertained, monetary damages would be insufficient to 

compensate for fundamentally non-economic harms such as the reduction in additional new 

members, other supporters, and people joining its mailing lists that would likely result from an 

alternate name. Cf. Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 813 F. Supp. 2d 738, 744 (E.D. Va. 

2011) (“[M]onetary damages are insufficient to compensate for denial of a statutory right to access 

completed voter registration applications.”). Thus, allowing the FEC to compel Stop Hillary PAC 

to change its name would inflict irreparable injury upon Plaintiffs. 

C. The Balance of Hardships Weighs in Favor of Stop Hillary PAC and Backer

Third, an injunction is warranted because the balance of hardships clearly tilts in favor of 

Plaintiffs. If this Court declines to issue an injunction, Stop Hillary PAC’s constitutional rights 

will be abridged because it will no longer be able to clearly, succinctly, powerfully, and accurately 

express its sole, precise mission through its name, cf. Backer Decl. ¶¶ 6, 16. Similarly, its hundreds 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 35 of 39 PageID# 61
27

of thousands of supporters and contributors, see id. ¶ 8, will no longer be permitted to associate 

under that banner. The abridgement of constitutional rights constitutes a substantial hardship 

generally warranting injunctive relief. See, e.g., Republican Party v. N.C. State Bd. of Elecs., No. 

94-1057, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 14961, at *8 (June 17, 1994) (affirming district court ruling that 

balance of hardships “tipped decidedly in favor” of victims of constitutional violation); Vollette v. 

Watson, 978 F. Supp. 2d 572, 597 (E.D. Va. 2013) (holding that “the balance of hardships plainly 

weighs in favor of Injunction Plaintiffs,” because they “continue to suffer from the effects of the 

unconstitutional retaliation”). 

Substantively, Plaintiffs will suffer substantial hardship in the absence of an injunction 

because the FEC—through the threat of burdensome administrative proceedings, substantial civil 

penalties, and even criminal prosecution, see Verified Compl. ¶¶ 21-22—will force Plaintiffs to 

discontinue using the name under which they have operated for more than two years and adopt a 

different, vaguer, less accurate, and less effective name, Backer Decl. ¶ 14; see Yellow Cab Co. v. 

Rocha, No. 3:00-CV-13, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11597, at *15 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2000) (“Not 

being able to use their current trade names will harm [Plaintiffs] . . because the current trade names 

. . . are the ones they have been using in building their” operation and brand.). 

Adopting a different name will cause Stop Hillary PAC to lose the goodwill and name 

recognition that it spent over $1 million legally cultivating throughout the first two years of its 

existence. Backer Decl. ¶ 8; see Global Tel*Link, Corp. v. Jail Cell Servs., LLC, No. 1:14-CV1557 (TSE/JFA), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55591, at *21 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2015) (recognizing loss 

of goodwill associated with an entity’s name as a hardship warranting injunctive relief); see also 

W. Insulation, L.P. v. Moore, No. 3:05-CV-602, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4390, at *11-12 (E.D. Va. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 36 of 39 PageID# 62
28

Jan. 22, 2008) (holding that the balance of hardships favored grant of injunctive relief to prevent 

plaintiffs’ “goodwill from eroding further”). 

The committee also will be forced to incur substantial inconvenience and spend a 

substantial amount of money changing its name on all communications, stationary, disclaimers, 

and social media. Backer Decl. ¶ 14; Fogerty v. Poor Boy Prods., No. 96-56546, 1997 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 24695, at *9-10 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1997) (holding that a litigant would suffer substantial

hardship from being forced to change its name because the change “will require substantial 

expense and may undermine” its future operations); cf. Pan Am World Airways, Inc. v. Flight 001, 

Inc., No. 06 Civ. 14442 (CSH), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51012, at *58 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007) 

(denying preliminary injunction that would have required the defendant to change its name, 

because it would have suffered hardship from changing “store signage, bags, product hand tags, 

gift wrap, gift cards, and website” and would “lose the goodwill it has developed”). 

The FEC, in contrast, will not suffer any hardship from a preliminary injunction. As an 

initial matter, a government entity does not suffer hardship by being enjoined from enforcing a 

law where it would likely be unconstitutional. See Legend Night Club v. Miller, 637 F.3d 291, 

302-03 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that a state “is in no way harmed by issuance of an injunction that 

prevents [it] from enforcing unconstitutional restrictions”); Newsom v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 

354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a school “is in no way harmed by issuance of a 

preliminary injunction which prevents it from enforcing a regulation, which, on this record, is 

likely to be found unconstitutional”). To the contrary, an injunction would benefit the FEC, 

because it would have one less law to spend its limited resources enforcing, and it could better 

focus its enforcement efforts on pursuing more serous conduct, such as the solicitation or receipt 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 37 of 39 PageID# 63
29

of foreign contributions, or quid pro quo corruption. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. Thus, 

the balance of hardships tilts sharply in favor of Plaintiffs. 

D. An Injunction Would Be in the Public Interest

Finally, an injunction would promote the public interest. Enforcing constitutional rights, 

of course, is always in the public interest. Newsom, 354 F.3d at 261 (overturning district court’s 

refusal to grant preliminary injunction in First Amendment case, in part because “upholding 

constitutional rights serves the public interest”); Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 

521 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction against enforcement of public nudity 

statute on First Amendment grounds, because “upholding constitutional rights surely serves the 

public interest”), modified in part on other grounds, 470 F.3d 1074 (4th Cir. 2006). This is 

especially true of First Amendment rights. See Lytle v. Brewer, 73 F. Supp. 2d 615, 629 (E.D. Va. 

1999) (“[W]henever there is a possibility that constitutionally protected rights will be infringed by 

the chilling of free speech, the public interest weighs in favor of protecting the constitutional rights 

of the people.”).

Constitutional considerations aside, the public also has a strong interest in avoiding 

confusion by knowing the identity, mission, goals, and purpose of political committees they may 

wish to support, subsidize, or otherwise associate with. Common Cause v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 

447 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that “Congress’ general intent” behind § 30102(e)(4) was 

“to prevent confusion arising from misleading committee names”). Allowing Stop Hillary PAC 

to retain its name furthers this goal because that name clearly, succinctly, powerfully, and 

accurately conveys the committee’s sole purpose, Backer Decl. ¶¶ 6, 16, without in any way

suggesting that it might be authorized by, or otherwise affiliated with, Clinton or her campaign. 

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 38 of 39 PageID# 64
30

While the FEC may contend that the public generally has an interest in the enforcement of 

federal laws, Fourth Circuit precedent shows that mere recital of a generalized interest in law 

enforcement is insufficient to satisfy this prong. Murrow Furn. Gall, Inc. v. Thomasville Furn. 

Indus., 889 F.2d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1989); cf. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 329 (4th Cir. 2013) 

(criticizing district court’s assumption that the public interest “‘always lies with upholding the 

law’” and enforcing a law). In this case, the FEC has not, and cannot, present any evidence that 

anyone might be misled into contributing to, or supporting, Stop Hillary PAC under the mistaken 

assumption that it is Clinton’s official authorized campaign committee. Nothing would further the 

public interest more than allowing this committee to continue, unimpeded, its important work of 

ensuring that Hillary Clinton does not become President. 

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court issue a preliminary 

injunction barring the FEC from enforcing 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4), either facially, or as applied 

to non-connected political committees (and their treasurers, counsel, and officers) bearing names 

that clearly and unambiguously oppose one or more candidates, including but not limited to Stop 

Hillary PAC and any other such non-connected political committees Backer may choose to form.

Dated this 6th day of October, 2015. Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ Michael T. Morley

Dan Backer, Esq. Michael T. Morley

Virginia State Bar # 78256 Virginia State Bar #65762

DB CAPITOL STRATEGIES PLLC COOLIDGE REAGAN FOUNDATION

203 South Union Street, Suite 300 1629 K Street, Suite 300

Alexandria, VA 22314 Washington, DC 20006

Phone: (202) 210-5431 Phone: (860) 778-3883

Fax: (202) 478-0750 Fax: (202) 331-3759

E-mail: DBacker@DBCapitolStrategies.com E-mail: michaelmorleyesq@hotmail.com

Attorney for Plaintiff Stop Hillary PAC Attorney for Plaintiff Dan Backer

Case 1:15-cv-01208-GBL-IDD Document 3-1 Filed 10/06/15 Page 39 of 39 PageID# 65