The I DEA wa s rea uthorized and rec odified pursua nt to the Individuals with Disabilit ies 1 Education I mprovement Ac t in 2004, Pub. L . No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004). The amendments provide that the short title of the re authorized and amended pr ovisions remains the Individuals with Disabilit ies Education Act. SeePub. L . No 108-446, § 101; 118 Stat. at 2647; 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (“T his chapter may be cited a s the ‘Individuals with Disabilit ies Education Act’”) . Acc ording ly , the Court ref ers to the amended Ac t here in as the IDEA. DERRI CK SHEL TON Plaintiff,
v. MAYA AN GEL OU PUB L I C CHARTER S C H O O L, De fe nd ant. UNI TED S TATES DI S TRI CT COURT FO R T H E D IST R IC T O F C O L U M B IA

Ci vi l Ac t i on No
. 0 7- 93 3 ( CKK)

MEMOR A N D U M OP I N I ON ( Se pt e mbe r 18 , 20 09) Pla int if f, De rric k Sh e lto n, an a du lt s tud e nt, br ou g ht t his a c tio n und e r t

he Ind ivi du a ls w ith Disabilities Education Act (“ I DEA” ), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. , as we ll as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 1 (“Sec tion 1983”), ag ainst Defe ndant, Maya Ang elou Public Charter School (“ MAPCS ”). The I DE A p ro vid e s th at a ll c hil dr e n w ithdis a bil iti e s w ill be pr ov ide d a fr e e and a pp ro pr iate pu

bli c education (“F APE”), a

nd provides for

proce dural saf

eguards to ensur e that disabled c hildren
rec eive individualized education prog rams (“ I EP”) to fulfill the Act’ s g oals. Plaintiff alleg es that Def endant MAPCS has failed to comply with an April 5, 2007 He aringOffic er D eter mination (“H OD”) , and see ks decla ratory and injunctive re lief. The pa rties in this case pr eviously filed cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt. In a Memorandum Opinion and O rder dated Septembe r 26, 2008, the Court denie d Def endant’ sTh e Court a lso de nie d Pl a int if

f’ s mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to his 2 I DEA c laim and alleg ations that MAPCS ’ re fusal to implement the HOD ultimately resulted in a denial of F APE. Shelton , 578 F. Supp. 2d at 101-04. A s permitted by the Court’s September

26, 20 08 Or de r, Pla int if

f h a s si nc e fi le d a

re ne we d mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt o n h is IDE A c la im and re quest for c ompensatory education. SeePl.’s Mem. in S upport of his Request for Com pe ns ator y Ed uc atio n, Do c ke t N o. [30]. Pla int if f’ s r e ne we d mo tio n f

ile d w ithre sp e c t to his I DEA c laim shall be addre ssed by separ ate or der a

nd is not at issue in the instant Memorandum Opinion. 2 motion for summary

judgme nt, and g rante d-in-par t and denied- in-part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt. See She lton v. Maya Ange lou Pub. Charter Sch. , 578 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). A s is specifica lly rele vant to the instant Memorandum Opinion, the Court denie d Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt with respec t to his S ection 1983 cla im, finding that Plaintiff had “a ltoge ther fa il[ ed] to demonstrate that he is entitled to summary judgme nt.” See

2 id. at 10 5. Th e Court

e mph a size d in

pa rt ic ula r t ha t Pla int if f h a d who lly

“ fa il[e d] to e sta

bli sh ‘that the District of Columbia has a custom or pra ctice that is the moving for ce be hind the alleg ed I DEA violations,’” a s is required to state a Section 1983 cla im based upon an a lleg ed I DEA violation. See id. (qu o t i n g W alk e r v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 157 F. Supp. 2d. 11, 30 (D.D.C. 2001)) . Rather, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgme nt “state[d] only

that ‘the re fusal to comply with hear ing of

fice r’s de terminations is not a new phe nomenon in the District of Columbi a Public School sy stem,’” a nd did “not provide a

ny fac tual support for this asser tion.” Id. at 10 5 ( qu oti ngPl. ’s MSJ at 14 ). Al tho ugh s uc h a

fa ilure “ wo uld

or din ari ly

ind ic ate that hi s Section 1983 claim should not procee d to trial,” bec ause the Def endant ha d not addre ssed Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im at a ll in its m otion for summary judgme nt nor had it moved for summary judgme nt in its favor

on that claim, the Court was una ble to dismiss the Section 1983 claim from this lawsuit. See id. Acc ording ly , the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for summaryTh e Court e mph a size s th at, a lth ou g h D e fe nd ant’ s b ri e fi ngoc c a sio na lly re fe rs to 3 materia ls outside the pleading s, see, e .g., Def .’s Reply at 3 (re fer encing“[t] he exhibits relied on by both Plainti ff a

nd Def endant in the r ece nt filings”) , the Court has not relied upon or considere d any

materia l outside the pleading s in ruling upon the instant Motion to Dismiss
. 3 judgme nt with respec t to his S ection 1983 cla im, but concluded that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 must remain in the lawsuit for the time being
. Id . Howeve r, g iven the complete lack of support fo r P la int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im, the Court dir e c te d th e De fe nd ant t o “ fi le an a pp ro pr iate motion reg ardingthe viability of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 cla im.” Id. Pursuant to that directive, D efe ndant filed a [29] Motion to Dism iss Pl aintiff’s Sec tion 19 83 Cla im, wh ic h is no w p e nd ingbe fo re the Court . Upo n a se arc hin ge xami natio n o f b oth parties’ filings, the r eleva nt statutes and ca se law, a nd the entire rec ord her ein, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a Section 1983 cla im, and there fore GRANTS Def endant’ s [29] Motion to Dism iss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) , for the r easons se t forth below. I. BACKG ROUND Th e Court

a ssume s f

amil iari ty wi th t he fa c tua l ba c kgro un d o f t his c a se , whic h is se t f

or th in detail in its S eptember

26, 2008 Memorandum Opinion, see ge nerally Shelton , 578 F. Supp. 2d 83, and ther efor e discusses only those fac ts and alleg ations that are rele vant to the pending Mo tio n to Di smi ss. On

May 21 , 2 00 7, Pla int if

f f ile d th e Com

pla int in t he a bo ve -c a pti on e d c ivi l 3 action. See Compl., Docket No. [1] . As is releva nt to the issues at hand, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleg es a Sec tion 1983 claim based on a lleg ed violations of the I DEA—more specific ally , the Def endant’ s ref

usal to comply

with the April 5, 2007 HOD. See Compl. ¶¶ 26-31. Plaintiff contends that “ MAPCS have [ sic ] vio late d a nd c ontin ue to v iol ate se c tio n 1 98 3 b y blatantl y ref using to c omply

with the April 5, 2007 HOD,” and that these actions, which “ wer e per formed under the color of state law,” resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s “ rig hts under fe dera l statute”Al tho ugh D e fe nd ant, in m ov ingto d ism iss Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3, did

no t sp e c if

ic a lly 4 art ic ulate that it s mo tio n is br ou g ht p ur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Pr oc e dure 12 (b )( 6) , it is no ne the le ss r e a dil y

a pp are nt t hat D e fe nd ant’ s mo tio n is a Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

fo r f a ilure to state a c laim. See, e .g., Def .’s MTD at 2 ( “Plaintiff has fa iled to establish . . . the require d e le me nts fo r a

§ 1 98 3 c la im) ; Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 2 ( de sc ri bin gDe fe nd ant’ s mo tio n a s a “ Rul e 12(b)( 6) motion[ ]”). 4 ( i.e. , the I DEA). Id. ¶¶ 27- 29. Plaintiff furthis alleg es that he “ has suffe red a nd is suffer ing irrepa rable harm to his education and development,” and that “the actions of MAPCS are interfe ringwith [ his] ability to obtain acc ess to a fr ee a nd appropr iate educ ation.” Id. ¶¶ 30- 31. Noticea bly absent fr om Plainti ff’ s Complaint i s any alleg ation that the District or MAPCS has or ha d a c us tom or pr a c tic e of

re fu sin gto c omp ly

wi th H OD s o r t

hat th e a lle g e d I DE A v iol atio n in this case we re somehow

cause d by

an alleg ed municipal custom or pr actice
. See ge nerally id. Currently pendingbefor e the Court is Def endant’ s Motion to Dis miss, in which the Def endant a sserts that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim should be dismissed for f ailure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6). See Def .’s MTD, Doc ket No. [29] . Plaintiff has filed an 4 Opposition, seePl.’s Opp’n, Docke t No. [32] , and De fenda nt a Reply , seeDef

.’s Reply , Docke t No . [33 ]. A c c or din g ly , b ri e fi ngwi th r e sp e c t to De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss i s n owc omp le te and the matter

is ripe for the Court’s revie w and r esolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure re qu ir e that a c omp la int

c onta in “ ‘a

sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘ g ive the defe ndant fa ir notice of what the . . . cla im is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.’” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 5 5 0 U. S
. 5 4 4 , 5 5 5 (2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Eric kson v. Pardus , 5 51 U. S. 8 9, 93 (p e r c ur iam) . A lth ou g h “ de ta ile d f a c tua l a lle g atio ns ”5

are not nece ssary

to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the “grounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “mor e than labe ls and conc lusions” or “a formulaic r ecitation of the elements of a cause of ac tion.” Id . at 19 64 -6 5; see also Papasan v. Al lai n , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Instead, a complaint must contain sufficient f actua l matter,
acc epted a s true, to “state a cla im to relief that is plausible on its face .” Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A c laim has fac ial plausibilit y when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual conte nt that allows the court to dra

w the re asonable infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , _

_ U. S
. _ _ , 1 2 9 S
. C t . 1 9 3 7 , 1 9 4 9 (2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 556). In e va luatin ga

Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to s tate a

c la im, the c ourt

mus t
c on str ue the c omp la int

in a light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pla int if

f a nd mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll
rea sonable fa ctual infe renc es dra wn from we ll-pleade d fac tual alleg ations. In re United M ine W orkers of Am. Em

ployeeBene

fit Plans L itig. , 8 54 F . Su pp . 9 14 , 9 15 (D .D .C. 19 94 ); se eals o Schuler v . United States , 6 17 F .2 d 6 05 , 6 08 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) (“ Th e c omp la int mus t be ‘l ibe ra lly construed in f

avor of the plaintiff,’ who must be g rante d the bene fit of all infer ence s that can be derive d from the f

acts a lleg ed.”) . Howeve r, as the Supre me Court rec ently made c lear , a plaintiff must provide more than just “a sheer possibili ty

that a def endant ha s acte d unlawfully .” Iqbal , 12 9 S. Ct. at 19 50 . Wh e re the we ll- ple a de d f a c ts s e t f or th i n th e c omp la int

do no t pe rm it a

c ourt , draw ing on its judicial experienc e and c ommon sense, to infer mor e than the “ mere possibili ty of misconduct,” the c omplaint has not shown that the pleade r is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950. III . D ISC USS ION As the Court previously

explained in its September 26, 2008 Me morandum Opinion, courts in this District have c oncluded that “ I DEA violations can be the pre dicate f or a § 19836

claim base d on those statutory violations.” J

oh ns on v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 190 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 -4 7 ( D. D. C. 2 00 2) ; R. S. v . D ist ric t of Colum bia , 2 9 2 F
. S u

p p . 2 d 2 3 , 2 8 ( D
. D
. C
. 2 0 0 3 )
. In consideringsuch cla ims, courts have la rg ely applied a f

our-pa rt test, requiringplaintiffs to show: (1) that the de fenda

nt violated I DEA; (2) that “exceptional cir cumstance s” exist, s uch that the defe ndant’s conduc t that cause d the I DEA violation was pe rsistently egreg ious and preve nted or frustrated the plaintiff f

rom secur ing e quitable re lief under the I DEA; (3) “that the District of Columbi a has a

custom or pra ctice that is the moving for ce be hind the alleg ed I DEA violations”; and (4) that the normal re medies off ere d under the I DEA, includingcompensatory education, are inadequate to compensate the plaintiff f or the ha rm he or she alleg edly

suffe red. W

alker v

. Di str ic t of Colum bia , 1 57 F . Su

pp . 2 d. 11 , 3 0 ( D. D. C. 2 00 1) ; R.S. , 292 F. Supp. 2d at 28. Alternatively , some courts have only considere d the first and third f actor s of the W

alker test. See R.S. , 2 9 2 F. S u

p p . 2 d at2 9 (c i t i n g Johnson , 190 F. Supp. 2d at 46-47, Zearley v . Ack erman , 116 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114 (D.D .C. 2000)). De fe nd ant h a s mo ve d f

or dis mis sa l of

Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im p ur su ant t o Ru le 12(b)( 6), ar guing that—even a ssuming Plaintiff ca n demonstrate a

violation of the I DEA a s
re qu ir e d in

pr on gon e —Pl a int if

f h a s f a ile d to a de qu ate ly

a lle g e the re qu ir e d e le me nts a s se t f or th in the second, third a

nd fourth prong s of the W alker te st. B e c a

us e the Court

a g re e s w ith Def endant that Plaintiff has f ailed to alleg e “that the District of Columbia has a c ustom or prac tice that is the movingforc e behind the a lleg ed I DEA violations,” as is re quired unde r the third prong , Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim fa ils for this reason, a nd the Court need not c onsider Def endant’ s arguments in the alternative. Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im i s p re dic ate d s ole ly up on the De fe nd ant’ s r e fu sa l to c omp ly7

with the April 5, 2007 HOD. SeeCom pl. ¶¶ 26 -3 1. As the Court

pr e vio us ly

e xpla ine d in

its September 26, 2008 Me morandum Opinion, Plaintiff’s alleg ation that the Def endant violated the Ap ri l 5, 20 07 HO D i s, wi tho ut m or e , in su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

a Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im. Pla int if f m us t also set forth some f

actua l basis to support an alleg ation that a municipal policy or custom ca

used Def endant to violate the H OD. See She lton , 578 F. Supp. 2d at 104-05. This Plainti ff ha s not done. Indeed, Plaintiff ha s neither a lleg ed that the De fenda nt’s ref usal to comply

with the HOD
wa s so me ho w c a

us e d b y an a lle g e d mu

nic ipa l c us tom

or pr a c tic e no r h a s h e se t f

or th i n h is Complaint any

fac tual alleg ations that would support a re asonable infere nce that the District or MAPCS has or ha d a custom or policy of re fusingto comply

with HODs. See ge nerally Compl. Plaintiff’s only

argument in support of his claim that he has suf ficiently alleg ed a
mun ic ipa l po lic y

or pr a c tic e is h is i ll- fo un de d a sse rt ion that th e De fe nd ant’ s r e fu sa l to c omp ly with the April 5, 2007 HOD is somehow by itself a municipal policy
. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 9. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, “ MAPCS ’ re fusal to comply with a hea

ringoffice r’s de termination resulted in a sing le dec ision that became policy .” Id. Pla int if f f ur the r c ontin

ue s th at th is “ sin g le decision made by

MAPCS , resulted in staff understandingthat in situations reg arding unfavor able HO D’s, noncomplianc e wa s allowed be cause the unfavorable HOD wa s being appea led.” Id. Signif

ic antl y , h ow e ve r, Pla int if f h a s n ot o ff

e re d a ny fa c tua l su

pp or t f or thi s state me nt n or

ha s h e po int e d to any

fa c tua l a lle g atio ns in t

he Com pla int or e lse wh e re that c ou ld
re a so na bly be inf e rr e d to su

pp or t su c h a n a sse rt ion . Si mpl y

op ini ngwi tho ut s up po rt

that a pa rt ic ula r a c t is a po lic y do e s n ot m ake it s o. Rathe r, Pla int if f m us t of fe r a fa c tua l ba sis fo r t

his claim, which he has not done. Pla int if f r e sp on ds that “ se c tio n 1 98 3 d oe s n ot r e qu ir e a pla int if f t o p ro ve mul tip le8

instances of

misconduct if the plaintiff c an prove an unconstitutional municipal policy responsible for

a sing le instance of misconduct.” Id. T h i s ar gum e n tm i s s e s th e p o i n te n t i r e l y. Al tho ugh a

Pla int if f n e e d n ot a lle g e mul tip le ins tanc e s o f m isc on du c t in or de r t o s uc c e ssf

ull y state a Sec tion 1983 claim, a plaintiff do es need to include some fac tual basis for the a lleg ation that a municipal policy

or custom ca

used the a lleg ed I DEA violations—whether that is shown throug h alleg ations of multiple incidents or otherwise. A ccor dingly , beca use Plaintiff’s Complaint does not set forth any fac tual alleg ations that could support a re asonable infere nce that the Def endant ha d a policy

or pra ctice of

ref using to c omply

with HODs or that the a lleg ed I DEA vio latio n in

thi s c a se wa s th e re su lt o f a mun ic ipa l po lic y , D e fe nd ant’ s [29 ] Mot ion to D ism iss Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 Cl a im f

or fa ilure to s tate a

c la im p ur su ant t o Ru le 12 (b )( 6) is GRANTED. IV . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt GR AN TS D e fe nd ant’ s [29 ] Mot ion to D ism iss Pla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 Cl a im f

or fa ilure to s tate a

c la im p ur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Civ il Procedur e 12(b) (6). An a ppropriate Orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.

Dat e : Se pt e mbe r 18 , 20 09 / s / C O LLEE N K O LLA R -K O T E LLY U n ite d S ta te s D is tric t J u d ge