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Boyd Wiggam (Wyoming Bar # 6-4059)

WYOMING LIBERTY GROUP

1902 Thomes Ave. 

Ste. 201

Cheyenne, WY 82001

(307) 632-7020 [Tel.]

(307) 632-7024 [Fax]

boyd.wiggam@wyliberty.org

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF WYOMING

UNNAMED PLAINTIFF #1,

UNNAMED PLAINTIFF #2, 

PILLAR OF LAW INSTITUTE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Defendant.

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C.A. No. 16-CV-135-S

________________________________

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

________________________________

I. Introduction

Donald Trump, a Republican candidate for President, could contribute $10,000 or more to 

each delegate participating in the upcoming Republican National Convention. Such an act is 

perfectly legal under the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”) and thus not corrupting under 

federal law. But under the same law, a small non-profit corporation cannot associate with delegates 

to teach about delegate autonomy. Under the FECA, non-profits are not allowed to contribute 

educational books to delegates. This, by federal standards, would be corrupting. Similarly, nonCase 2:16-cv-00135-SWS *SEALED* Document 12 Filed 06/03/16 Page 1 of 20

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profits cannot provide legal aid to delegates facing an ill-tempered and litigious candidate or his 

supporters. This, too, is corrupting by federal standards. Moreover, a non-profit cannot offer 

opportunity scholarships to delegates facing financial hardships. This is also prohibited by the 

same law. These asymmetric restrictions are not only bizarre, but unconstitutional.

Americans face the most acrimonious election in decades and, perhaps, the most contested 

conventions since the passage of the FECA. At a moment when some convention delegates desire 

to discuss and debate their autonomy in the convention process, one federal election law, 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30118, ensures delegates will stay out of the fray. Plaintiffs in this case ask this Court to restore 

their First Amendment rights, so that they might associate together to promote shared political 

beliefs without fear of investigation, fines, or imprisonment by the Federal Election Commission 

(“FEC”) or Department of Justice, and to have access to resources to defend themselves against 

legal and extralegal threats from an ill-tempered candidate and his aggressive supporters.

II. Facts

The Pillar of Law Institute is a program of the Wyoming Liberty Group, which is a 

nonprofit corporation organized under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Verified 

Complaint (Doc. No. 1) ¶11 (hereinafter “Compl.”). Pillar focuses its efforts on public education, 

public interest litigation, and testimony about political freedoms guaranteed under the First 

Amendment. Pillar is particularly concerned about delegate autonomy in this electoral season.

Delegate autonomy is the principle that political parties are private institutions entrusted to select 

their own leadership and members without outside interference. See generally Democratic Party 

v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). Pillar would like to provide books on this subject free of charge 

to delegates to the Republican National Convention. Compl. ¶42. Given the many threats of 

lawsuits in this election, Pillar would like to offer pro bono legal defense services to delegates at 

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the Republican National Convention. Compl. ¶¶23–27. Finally, Pillar would like to offer 

opportunity scholarships to delegates. Compl. ¶31. All of these activities are banned under 52 

U.S.C. § 30118.1

Unnamed Plaintiffs are duly selected delegates to the Republican National Convention. 

Compl. ¶¶ 12–13. Both would like to accept the services and goods of the Pillar of Law Institute, 

but cannot due to the same ban. Unnamed Plaintiffs are particularly concerned about legal 

harassment given the presumptive Republican nominee’s history of frivolous legal threats and 

litigation, and would like to have pro bono legal counsel available in these events. See Compl. ¶33. 

Although federal law permits individuals to contribute unlimited sums of money to 

delegates, any charitable or educational efforts by non-profits to provide goods or services are 

entirely banned. Similarly, federal law permits corporations to provide specific types of legal aid 

to party and candidate committees, but never to delegates. Delegates cannot then associate with 

likeminded groups holding shared political beliefs—the very purpose of the First Amendment’s 

protection of political association. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (“Discussion of 

public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the 

system of government established by our Constitution”). Plaintiffs ask this Court to preliminarily 

enjoin the enforcement of Section 30118 against their proposed activities given its baseless 

prohibition of these First Amendment activities. 

III. 52 U.S.C. § 30118

It is important to plot a course through Section 30118 and FEC regulations to establish the 

censorship imposed upon the Plaintiffs. The FECA’s definition of “election” includes “a 

																																																						 1 Depending upon the circumstances of the Democratic National Convention and Pillar’s funding, 

it would like to offer similar educational materials, aid, and books to Democratic delegates. Compl. 

¶7 n.2.

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convention or caucus of a political party which has authority to nominate a candidate.” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also 11 CFR 100.3(e). However, the term “candidate” is 

limited to persons who “seek[] nomination for election, or election, to Federal office[.]” 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30101(2) (emphasis added); see also 11 CFR 100.3. “The term ‘Federal office’ means the office 

of President or Vice President, or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident 

Commissioner to, the Congress.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(3); see also 11 CFR 100.4. So, although an 

“election” includes a political party convention, its delegates are not “candidates” for purposes of 

the FECA.

A “contribution” is generally “any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money 

or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal 

office.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, money given to a convention delegate

by an individual is not a “contribution” under the law. Importantly, although this definition of 

“contribution” broadly regulates donations to candidates for federal office, it also provides 

important exceptions for corporate contributions, including the allowance of unlimited pro bono

legal and accounting services to candidates’ committees, political committees and parties. 52 

U.S.C. § 30101(8). But these exceptions only apply to candidates for federal office, not convention 

delegates. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(2). Outside of these exceptions, contributions for in-kind services 

are the same as direct monetary contributions. 11 CFR 100.52(d)(1) (“[T]he term anything of value

includes all in-kind contributions. Unless specifically exempted under 11 CFR part 100, subpart 

C, the provision of any goods or services without charge . . . is a contribution”).

Having established the absence of convention delegates from most of the standard 

definitions within the FECA except for “election”—the legal basis for unlimited individual 

contributions to delegates—the broad corporate prohibition of 52 U.S.C. § 30118 comes into play:

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It is unlawful for . . . any corporation organized by authority of any law of 

Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election 

to any political office, or in connection with any . . . political convention or 

caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation 

whatever . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any 

election at which presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator or 

Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to 

be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention

or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any 

candidate, political committee, or other person knowingly to accept or receive 

any contribution prohibited by this section, or any officer or any director of any 

corporation . . . to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the corporation, 

. . . as the case may be, prohibited by this section.

52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (emphasis added). Although this section’s definition incorporates the general 

definition of “contribution,” it also broadens it. As previously discussed, the exceptions in that 

provision do not apply to convention delegates. 52 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2); 52 U.S.C. § 30101(2).

Section 30118 prohibits contributing corporate money, or anything of value, “in connection with . 

. . any political convention.” Section 30118’s definition provides no exception for providing pro 

bono legal services to delegates, and this prohibition further extends to giving a penny of corporate 

funding to a convention delegate in the form of books, travel expenses or the like.

IV. Standard of Review

In the Tenth Circuit, the grant of preliminary injunctive relief is “within the sound 

discretion of the district court.” Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. State of Oklahoma, 874 F.2d 

709, 716 (10th Cir. 1989). In order to secure a preliminary injunction, a movant must demonstrate: 

“(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will result if the 

injunction does not issue; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any damage the 

injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) issuance of the injunction would not be adverse 

to the public interest.” Northern Natural Gas Co. v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 697 F.3d 1259, 1266 (10th 

Cir. 2012) (quoting Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout, 653 F.3d 1230, 1233 n.2 (10th Cir.2011)). In 

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First Amendment challenges, “the ‘likelihood of success on the merits will often be the 

determinative factor’ because of the seminal importance of the interests at stake.” Verlo v. 

Martinez, 2016 WL 1395205 at *8 (10th Cir. April 8, 2016). 

In the context of political speech and elections, there “are short timeframes in which speech 

can have influence.” Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n (FEC), 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010). In 

judging the constitutionality of contribution limits, courts have routinely acknowledged that “while 

not subject to strict scrutiny, contribution limits still involve a ‘significant interference with 

associational rights’ and ‘must be closely drawn to serve a sufficiently important interest.’”

Republican Party of New Mexico v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Davis v. 

FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 n.7 (2008)). But this line of reasoning applies to direct monetary 

contributions to candidates where the expressive or associational element of writing a check is 

very small, thus triggering lower scrutiny. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 

528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000). This is so because “contribution limits ‘leave the contributor free to 

become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association’s efforts 

on behalf of candidates.’” Id. at 387 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22). However, where 

government maintains that giving out free books, helping a group, or offering pro bono legal 

services become “contributions,” this rationale does not hold. Indeed, the “contributions” in this 

case are ordinary ways individuals associate and speak at the core of the First Amendment, thus 

triggering strict scrutiny. Even if strict scrutiny is not warranted, the Constitution still requires a 

fit “whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ . . . [that is] narrowly tailored to achieve 

the desired objective.” McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1456–57 (2014) (quoting Board of 

Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989)).

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V. Argument

The Pillar of Law Institute seeks to do what the FECA permits individuals to do—provide 

contributions to delegates. Pillar also asks that it be allowed to do what other corporations may do 

in limited instances—provide in-kind contributions in the form of books and pro bono legal 

services. And the Unnamed Plaintiffs simply wish to associate with Pillar for these purposes. In 

this instance, it is a group of ordinary Americans in the non-profit corporate form who would join 

together to offer educational and charitable services and goods to delegates. Because the law so 

broadly defines a contribution (“anything of value”), Pillar is prohibited from engaging in any of 

its aforementioned activities and the delegate plaintiffs are barred from associating with Pillar in 

these capacities.

Because political “[s]peech is an essential mechanism of democracy,” and “the means to 

hold officials accountable to the people,” it follows that “political speech must prevail against laws 

that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.” Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, 

Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 871 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339).

Similarly, political speech and association do not lose protection simply because they arise out of 

the corporate form. Id.

In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Supreme Court’s ruling created the “MCFL 

exemption” to a federal ban on corporate independent expenditures—speech expressly advocating 

the election or defeat of a candidate. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). The Court reasoned that non-profits 

formed to disseminate political ideas did not implicate any government interest in preventing 

corruption. Id. at 259. Thus, so long as non-profit corporations met three criteria—(1) they were 

formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideals; (2) they lack shareholders; and (3) 

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they were not established by corporations or labor unions—they could produce independent 

expenditures. Id. at 263–64; see 11 CFR 114.10 (regulations implementing the MCFL exemption).

Unlike cases focusing on independent speech, challenges to corporate contribution bans 

have usually failed in the context of candidates. In FEC v. Beaumont, the Supreme Court 

considered the constitutionality of the federal prohibition of direct corporate political 

contributions. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). Because corporations might amass “war chests” of funding 

and because corporations could be used to circumvent individual contribution limits to candidates,

the Court upheld the direct corporate ban. It did not, however, consider the constitutionality of the 

ban as applied to the private affairs of delegates and conventions. In Citizens United, the Supreme

Court held that egalitarian concerns about leveling the playing field or protecting against unfair 

advantages in the political marketplace are illegitimate government interests. 558 U.S. at 359–60. 

Thus, the “war chests” or anti-distortion rationale for campaign finance laws found in Beaumont

are now invalid. Indeed, only the prevention of quid pro quo corruption may serve as a valid 

government interest. See McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1462. Moreover, because there are no limits 

on individual contributions to convention delegates, the anti-circumvention rationale could not 

validly apply to prohibit corporate contributions to convention delegates.

The law at issue here—52 U.S.C. § 30118—operates in a wholly different manner than any 

other provision found in the FECA. In every other instance, the FECA regulates federal elections 

by placing limits on what individuals may give to candidates and some committees, includes a 

complementary corporate contribution ban, and also bans foreigners and federal contractors from 

making contributions. These interests share a common, sensible parity: to prevent corruption and 

the circumvention of campaign finance limits. Preventing the influence of foreign money in the 

American political process has also been a bedrock interest of proper campaign finance reform. 

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See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 287 (D.D.C. 2011). And preventing corporate 

circumvention of individual contribution limits remains a proper interest. See, e.g., U.S. v. 

Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618 (4th Cir. 2012). These interests are not implicated here.

Section 30118 remains a curious outlier. It is only in the context of delegates and national 

conventions that the Congress determined unlimited individual contributions to delegates were 

non-corrupting, but, somehow, corporate contributions were corrupting. In 1979, the Senate 

contemplated amending the FECA to link individual contribution limits to delegates. See S.1757, 

96th Cong. § 118 (1979). This amendment remains indefinitely postponed. The statutory scheme 

embodied in 52 U.S.C. § 30116—regulating individual contributions—makes sense because of the 

shared parity of the governmental interest. If Congress wished to prevent corruption by imposing 

individual limits, it could then sensibly follow to provide corporate bans to prevent the

circumvention of those limits. But the regulatory scheme devised in 52 U.S.C. § 30118 simply 

does not add up. To make matters worse, Congress has already decided that some corporate giving 

of in-kind contributions to political party committees and candidate committees is entirely 

permissible. By a series of Advisory Opinions, the FEC has even allowed car manufacturers and 

dealers to provide free use of expensive automobiles to convention committees. FEC Advisory 

Opinion (“AO”) 1996-17; FEC AO 1988-25. But delegates are a step further removed from the 

political process and remain shut out of these allowances such that providing them a free copy of 

a book is considered a danger to the Republic.

Although the anti-corruption rationale may provide a basis to uphold contribution limits, 

the asymmetrical speech regulations in this case pose significant constitutional dangers. The risk 

is that government is using campaign finance laws—designed to combat corruption—to 

manipulate the marketplace of ideas by imposing absurdly unequal speech burdens across different 

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classes of speakers. The Supreme Court recognized this danger in Davis. 554 U.S. 724. There, the 

Supreme Court invalidated the “Millionaire’s Amendment” in the FECA, which allowed an 

opponent of a self-funding candidate to accept up to three times the contribution limit from 

respective donors after the self-funding candidate contributed a certain amount of funds to his own 

campaign. Id. at 729–30. At the same time, the self-funding candidate would remain subject to the 

same contribution limits from other contributors. Id. If money above the contribution limit was 

corrupting in the first instance, it had to be corrupting in the second instance. Thus, under the 

Millionaire’s Amendment, Congress was not actually regulating corruption, but manipulating the 

political playing field.

2

In the present case, because Congress determined that it is not corrupting for individuals to 

give unlimited amounts of money to delegates, it lacks a constitutional basis to entirely ban 

contributions from corporations. Because of this special determination, if money given to delegates 

corrupts, it must corrupt both individually and in the corporate form. But if money does not corrupt 

delegates when it comes from individuals, and Congress has elected not to regulate it, it cannot 

corrupt them when it comes from corporations. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52–

53 (1994) (under-inclusiveness “diminish[es] the credibility of the government’s rationale for 

restricting speech”); Florida Star v. B.J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–542 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] 

law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a 

																																																						 2 In other contexts, asymmetry is equally problematic in signaling government’s favor of certain 

speakers or ideas over others. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court reasoned that St. 

Paul’s Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance was invalid under the First Amendment because it 

asymmetrically punished some speakers, but left others untouched. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). At the 

core of the Court’s reasoning was that any government interest in preventing hate speech had to 

be achieved in a uniform manner, lest government have the “authority to license one side of a 

debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” Id. at 

392. 

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restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest 

unprohibited” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); McCutcheon, 134 S.Ct. at 1452 

(“If there is no corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is difficult to 

understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as corruptible if given $1,801, and all others 

corruptible if given a dime”). Going even further, Congress has already determined that corporate 

giving of particular in-kind contributions directly to candidate and political party committees is 

permissible. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(B)(viii), (xiii). Banning non-profits from offering the same

assistance to delegates is simply unsupportable.

What makes this case different from prior corporate contribution challenges rests in the 

fact that in the remainder of federal election law, there is parity between an individual contribution 

limit and a related corporate ban. It is only in this narrow pocket of the FECA that Congress 

decided unlimited contributions by individuals were permissible, thus triggering Plaintiffs’ 

constitutional concern about the asymmetrical effect. It is as though Congress designed a 

regulatory regime where it decided that knitting was safe, permitted individuals to knit, but banned 

knitting groups. This Court may afford relief here under two alternative scenarios. First, it may 

decide that Congress acted improperly, as in Davis, and lacks a proper basis to support a corporate

contribution ban to delegates while allowing unlimited individual contributions. Second, it may 

decide that Plaintiffs’ proposed activities should not be captured under the FECA’s expansive 

definition of “contribution” and employ a narrowing construction of the statute, as in Buckley, to 

reach that result. 424 U.S. at 40–44.

A. Plaintiffs are Likely to Succeed on the Merits

The first prong of Pillar’s delegate autonomy project centers around providing free books 

to delegates. However, these books constitute “anything of value,” and giving them to delegates 

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without charge would constitute prohibited corporate contributions. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118; see 

also 11 CFR 114.1(a)(1). In the FEC’s treatment of this issue through advisory opinions, it has 

consistently held that goods or services provided at no charge or at less than the usual and normal 

charge for such goods or services constitute prohibited corporate contributions. 11 CFR 

100.52(d)(1); 11 CFR 100.111(e)(1); see also FEC AO 2004-06 (MeetUp). There is no inquiry 

into whether a good or service actually promotes or opposes a candidate for federal office. Only 

where a corporation makes services or goods available for free or discounted prices to society at 

large has the FEC permitted such activity.

In FEC Advisory Opinion 1996-2, CompuServe planned to create a “nonpartisan online 

election headquarters.” Id. at 1. In doing so, it offered to provide free accounts for all federal and 

statewide elective offices. CompuServe did this on a partial basis elsewhere by giving featured 

accounts to notable journalists or public figures. All this contributed to the company’s goodwill 

and prestige, furthering its business interests. Id. at 2. It also provided a means for voters to get 

information from candidates directly in an era when Internet communications were nascent. But, 

ultimately, the FEC decided that the “proposed gift to Federal candidates of valuable services 

which enable them to communicate with voters and advocate their candidacies would constitute 

in-kind contributions to those candidates and would be prohibited by [52 U.S.C. 30118].” Id. at 4. 

Because CompuServe could not show it offered these gifts to society at large in the ordinary course 

of business, its free candidate accounts were banned.

Pillar has no plans, and no budget, to offer its educational books on delegate autonomy to 

the world at large. Rather, its intended audience is among the 2,472 delegates who will be attending 

the Republican National Convention. An important principle of First Amendment jurisprudence is 

that speakers enjoy the autonomy to select their message and audience. See Hurley v. IrishCase 2:16-cv-00135-SWS *SEALED* Document 12 Filed 06/03/16 Page 12 of 20

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American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). Section 30118’s

reach to prohibiting non-profits from distributing free books “restricts access to the most effective, 

fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse. . . .” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.

414, 423 (1988). That the law may permit non-profits to distribute books for free—just so long as 

they provide them to 318 million Americans—does not relieve its burden on First Amendment 

expression. Id.3

Unlike most cases involving restrictions on contributions, distributing books is expressive 

speech and association that is far removed from direct monetary contributions. As a nation 

contemplates its political future and as members of a private association, the Republican National

Committee, decide how it will be governed, Pillar’s expressive outreach is of great concern. While 

Section 30118 restricts the distribution of free books to delegates as part of an effort to to combat 

corruption, individuals are free to contribute unlimited sums under Section 30101. This disparity 

illustrates the the delegate contribution ban serves no genuine interest in protecting against 

corruption and must be stricken. The FEC’s disparate interpretation that permits the distribution 

of free books with a purported commercial motivation but bans distribution of books when the 

purpose is the spread of ideas turns normal First Amendment jurisprudence on its head. See, e.g., 

Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“commercial 

speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the 

																																																						 3 In Advisory Opinion 1987-08 the FEC did approve distribution of a free book to convention 

delegates, but only on the rationale that the publisher was a national magazine whose book 

distribution efforts were promoting its local business interests. As a non-profit corporation Pillar 

has no business interests and is not seeking to distribute books to promote commercial interests, 

but to promote ideas.

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scale of First Amendment values . . . .”); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425 (First Amendment protection at 

its zenith for political speech and association). 

The second prong of Pillar’s delegate autonomy project is to provide pro bono legal 

counsel to delegates to the Republican National Convention who may be threatened with spurious 

litigation or otherwise harassed. Understanding that corporations can play helpful roles in 

elections, Congress permitted them to provide pro bono legal services in narrow circumstances. 

Under the FECA, free legal services may be rendered to the political committee of a political party 

if the person paying for the services is the regular employer of the person rendering the services 

and the efforts do not “directly further” the election of a candidate to federal office. 52 U.S.C. § 

30101(8)(B)(viii)(I). Similarly, legal services offered for free to candidate committees or any 

political committee are permissible if the person paying for the services is the regular employer of 

the person rendering the services and only if those services are for compliance with the FECA. 52

U.S.C. § 30101(8)(B)(viii)(II). These two instances where corporate in-kind contributions of legal 

services are allowed are presumptively non-corrupting. However, any non-profit corporate entity 

wishing to provide counsel to convention delegates for compliance with the FECA, to protect their 

constitutional liberties, or protect against spurious lawsuits are banned from doing so. This, by 

federal standards, is corrupting.4

																																																						 4 Pillar brings the present case as a pro bono representative of the Unnamed Plaintiffs. Thankfully, 

the FEC has never, as far as counsel knows, pursued actions against representation in constitutional 

challenges as political contributions, and state agencies that have attempted to bring such actions

have failed. See, e.g., Institute for Justice v. State of Washington, No. 13-2-10152-7 (Wash. 

Superior Ct., Feb. 20, 2015). However, the FEC has ruled that pro bono corporate-funded legal 

representation is prohibited, even in constitutional cases. See FEC AO 2006-22 (“Andrius R. 

Kontrimas, Esquire”).

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The asymmetrical bans in 52 U.S.C. 30101(8)(B) jump off the page. Congress may only 

restrict First Amendment rights in campaign finance when its efforts are aimed to prevent quid pro 

quo corruption. Under current law, corporate-funded lawyers could advise the Republican Party, 

for free, on political law, arms treaties, gift laws, or the like so long as certain conditions were met. 

Likewise, corporate-funded lawyers could advise a Democrat candidate committee about 

compliance with the FECA, but not about political law, arms treaties, or gift laws. And the 

connected political committee of a corporation could also receive the aid of corporate-funded 

lawyers. But if the organization in question is unfortunate enough to be a charitable, non-profit 

corporation wishing to educate delegates—themselves a step further removed from the electoral 

process—then no legal services may be donated. Indeed, barring this Court’s intervention, it is 

conceivable that the Unnamed Plaintiffs could find themselves at the convention facing corporatefunded lawyers operating on behalf of the RNC while they, themselves, are prohibited from 

accepting corporate-assisted legal representation.

The legislative developments that created the FECA as it is read today illustrate a gradual 

liberalization of this rule and an understanding that corporate donated legal services are not 

corrupting. In the Congressional Record of the 1979 amendments to the FECA, testimony 

explained the unfair ways that the legal services exception operated. This included the adverse 

effect of federal election law on state and local party committees. See 125 CONG. REC. 23,814 

(1979). Thus, the 1979 amendments recognized the disparate treatment of the law for party 

committees and extended the exception such that corporations could provide pro bono legal aid to 

state and local party committees. See S.REP. NO. 96-319, at 4 (1979). Plaintiffs do not have the 

budget or luxury to timely petition Congress such that non-profit pro bono legal services may be 

given to delegates. They simply request that their First Amendment rights of association be given 

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the same respect and protection as those of political parties, candidates, and committees. Since 

there is no risk of corruption for corporations to provide pro bono services to those classes, there 

can be no risk of corruption for corporations to provide these services to delegates.

Besides the constitutional problems addressed, the FEC has selectively allowed 

corporations to contribute pro bono legal services in self-defined circumstances through a series 

of its own advisory opinions. For example, in AO 2003-15 (“Majette”), the FEC determined that 

corporate funds raised to cover litigation costs in a case challenging Georgia’s open primary 

system were not “in connection” with a federal election and were thus permissible. Likewise, in 

AO 1996-39 (“Heintz”), the Commission determined that corporate funds could be received to 

defend against litigation related to a pre-election challenge pertaining to ballots. See also FEC AO

1983-37 (“Massachusetts Democratic State Committee”); 1982-35 (“Hopfman”). Similarly, here, 

because the corporate funding would provide legal defense to delegates unrelated to the support or 

opposition of a candidate, it should be protected under this line of reasoning. 

Finally, Pillar would like to offer a small set of delegate opportunity scholarships, which 

the Unnamed Plaintiffs wish to accept. The difficulty of delegate fundraising is apparent; some 

have turned to innovative techniques to make participation in national conventions affordable. 

Natalie Andrews, Delegates Turn to GoFundMe to Pay Way to Conventions, WALL STREET J., 

Apr. 27, 2016, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/delegates-turn-to-gofundme-to-pay-wayto-conventions-1461781747. Although wealthy individuals can contribute as much as they want 

to individual delegates, non-profit corporations are barred from doing the same. Pillar’s

opportunity scholarships would provide a $500 grant to individual delegates. Because providing 

an opportunity scholarship, or travel stipend, is “anything of value,” it is prohibited under Section

30118.

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Curiously, the FEC recently permitted DePauw University, also a 501(c)(3) organization, 

to provide a stipend to an intern student volunteering with the Hillary for America committee. See 

FEC AO 2015-14. Based on its self-created formula, the FEC determined that because DePauw 

was offering the stipend for bona fide educational activities where students could use the funds at 

any entity, the stipend did not result in a prohibited corporate contribution to the Hillary for 

America Campaign. Id. at 3–4. The Commission made this determination despite Section 30118’s

unequivocal prohibition against corporate contributions in connection with an election. Because 

the Pillar of Law Institute is, like DePauw University, a 501(c)(3) educational organization, and 

because, like DePauw, it is offering a stipend to partially offset delegate expenses while teaching 

them about a public policy issue, its activities should be deemed likewise non-corrupting or be 

deemed outside the definition of “contribution.”

Congress has already decided that unlimited individual contributions to delegates do not 

corrupt. When given the opportunity to impose individual contribution limits on delegates in 1979, 

it declined. It also realized that limited, corporate in-kind contributions to candidates and political 

party committees are not corrupting. Thus, while individual contributions to delegates remain 

unlimited, so too must corporate contributions to delegates. Notably, this rationale does not apply 

to other areas of the FECA. Outside of delegates, FECA imposes a $2,700 per person contribution 

limit for federal candidates per election. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116. As explained in Beaumont, 

Congress saw a need for this limit to prevent corruption, as it is well within its power to do so. 539 

U.S. at 155. The corporate contribution ban in federal elections served as a necessary corollary to 

an individual limit. Where Congress has made a finding of corruption in a given act—individual 

contributions—it may then act to prevent circumvention of the law through corporate 

contributions. But if there is no concern about corruption in the first place, such as in individuals 

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contributing to delegates, there cannot be a concern in the corporate example. See McCutcheon, 

134 S.Ct. at 1452 (“And if there is no risk that additional candidates will be corrupted by donations 

of up to $5,200, then the Government must defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they 

prevent circumvention of the base limits”). Invalidating the law here brings simple constitutional 

parity to delegates and allows them to associate freely just like delegates may do with individuals. 

It also brings about a social good and equity—allowing broader sources of funding for delegates 

to participate in this nation’s political future.

B. Irreparable Harm

Pillar has refrained from launching its delegate autonomy project and Unnamed Plaintiffs 

have refrained from associating with Pillar on these activities. As the Supreme Court has 

explained, the “‘loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, 

unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Verlo, 2016 WL 1395205 at *8 (citing Elrod v. 

Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). By foregoing the delegate autonomy project, Pillar and 

Unnamed Plaintiffs have been irreparably harmed, and this harm will continue so long as the law 

is allowed to be enforced to its current lengths. When granted injunctive relief by this Court, 

Plaintiffs intend to associate and promote delegate autonomy as detailed in this memorandum and 

their Verified Complaint.

C. Balance of Hardships

Where serious First Amendment concerns have been raised, the balance of equities tips in 

the movant’s favor. Verlo, 2016 WL 1395205 at *9. Here, Plaintiffs seek to enjoy the same First 

Amendment rights enjoyed by similarly situated actors, but which are denied through Section

30118. Until relief is granted, Plaintiffs will remain muzzled and unable to associate about a 

pressing issue of public concern—the governance, values, and leadership of the Republican Party.

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D. Public Interest

It is “always in the public interest to protect constitutional rights.” Id. Providing relief here 

would allow Plaintiffs the timely ability to engage one another and the American public about 

delegate autonomy, associate freely, and otherwise enjoy the same constitutional protection 

afforded to most other civic-minded speakers.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed herein, this Court should grant Plaintiffs request to preliminarily 

enjoin the enforcement of Section 30118. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Benjamin Barr

Benjamin Barr

Stephen R. Klein

PILLAR OF LAW INSTITUTE

455 Massachusetts Ave. NW

Washington, DC 20001-2742

202.815.0955 (Tel.)

benjamin.barr@pillaroflaw.org

stephen.klein@pillaroflaw.org

Boyd Wiggam (Wyoming Bar # 6-4059)

WYOMING LIBERTY GROUP

1902 Thomes Ave. 

Ste. 201

Cheyenne, WY 82001

(307) 632-7020 [Tel.]

(307) 632-7024 [Fax]

boyd.wiggam@wyliberty.org

June 3, 2016

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Benjamin Barr, hereby certify that on this 3rd day of June, 2016, the foregoing

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction was electronically served 

on Defendant’s counsel via electronic mail pursuant to consent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E).

/s/ Benjamin Barr

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