UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DEANNA JANE BRELINSKI,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 14-cv-13300

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS 

(document no. 15), ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

(document no. 14), DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT (document no. 11), GRANTING COMMISSIONER'S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (document no. 12), AND DISMISSING THE CASE

The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied the application of Deanna Jane

Brelinski ("Brelinski") for disability income benefits ("DIB") in a decision issued by

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Kevin W. Fallis on May 30, 2013. See Administrative

Record ("A.R.") 8–23, ECF No. 8-2. After the SSA Appeals Council declined to review the

decision, Brelinski appealed. The Court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge David R.

Grand, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See Mots. Summ. J.,

ECF Nos. 11, 12. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder pursuant

to an administrative order and Magistrate Judge Binder issued a Report and

Recommendation ("Report") suggesting that the Court deny Brelinski’s motion and grant

the Commissioner of Social Security's motion. Report, ECF No. 14. Brelinski filed timely

objections to the Report. Obj., ECF No. 15.

After examining the record and considering Brelinski's objections de novo, the Court

concludes that her arguments do not have merit. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the

2:14-cv-13300-SJM-CEB Doc # 17 Filed 09/21/15 Pg 1 of 6 Pg ID 915
Report's findings, deny Brelinski's motion for summary judgment, grant the Commissioner's

motion for summary judgment, and dismiss the complaint.

BACKGROUND

The Report properly details the events giving rise to Brelinski's action against the

Commissioner. Report 1–4, ECF No. 14. The Court will adopt that portion of the Report.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Civil Rule 72(b) governs the review of a Magistrate Judge's report. A District Court’s

standard of review depends upon whether a party files objections. The Court need not

undertake any review of portions of a Report to which no party has objected. Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). De novo review is required, however, if the parties "serve

and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). In conducting a de novo review, "[t]he district judge may accept, reject,

or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to

the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Thus, the Court will

conduct de novo review of the Report with respect to Brelinski’s objections. 

When reviewing a case under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court "must affirm the

Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to

apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial

evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th

Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Substantial evidence consists of "more than a scintilla of

evidence but less than a preponderance" such that a "reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th

Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). An ALJ may consider the entire body of evidence without

2

2:14-cv-13300-SJM-CEB Doc # 17 Filed 09/21/15 Pg 2 of 6 Pg ID 916
directly addressing each piece in his decision. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F.

App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). "Nor must an ALJ make explicit credibility findings as to

each bit of conflicting testimony, so long as his factual findings as a whole show that he

implicitly resolved such conflicts." Id.

DISCUSSION

Brelinski objected to four parts of the Report: (1) the analysis of whether there was

substantial evidence on the record to support the ALJ's decision; (2) the analysis of

Brelinski's psychiatric impairment; (3) the finding that the ALJ's credibility analysis was

accurate; and (4) the analysis of the ALJ's residual functional capacity ("RFC")

determination. 

All of Brelinski's objections, however, are taken almost verbatim from her motion for

summary judgment. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 11. She raises nothing new that the

magistrate judge did not already consider. She disregards the requirement to "file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations" under Civil Rule

72(b)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court need not address the objections.

See Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.1991) (general

objections render a district court's review of the magistrate's report useless); Owens v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-CV-47, 2013 WL 1304470, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2013)

(the Court is not obligated to address objections that are "merely recitations of the identical

arguments that were before the magistrate judge"). As a matter of completeness, however,

the Court will briefly evaluate each objection in turn.

First, Brelinski argues that the magistrate judge wrongly analyzed whether Brelinski

retained the RFC for light work. Obj. 1–2, ECF No. 15. Brelinski alleges that the

3

2:14-cv-13300-SJM-CEB Doc # 17 Filed 09/21/15 Pg 3 of 6 Pg ID 917
assessment "is devoid of any RFC assessments of any physicians" and the decision "does

not comport with the medical evidence or Plaintiff's testimony." Id. The Court finds that the

ALJ properly reviewed several medical records, including the descriptions of Brelinski's

positive post-surgery health from Drs. Jawad Shah and Paul Telehowski. A.R. 15, 17, 688,

711, 742, 770–79, ECF Nos. 8-2, 8-8. Accordingly, the Court finds Brelinski's objection is

without merit.

Second, Brelinski asserts that the magistrate judge should have concluded that her

"psychiatric condition was a severe impairment." Obj. 2–3, ECF No. 15. The issue,

however, is whether the ALJ properly considered Brelinski's mental condition in his RFC

evaluation. Brelinski did not provide any medical opinions or other evidence showing that

her mental condition prevented her from performing light work. A.R. 17, ECF No. 8-2. She

also failed to "participat[e] in any recent formal mental health treatment." A.R. 15, ECF No.

8-2. The ALJ relied, therefore, on the opinion of state agency psychologist Dr. Darrell

Snyder, who concluded that Brelinski's mental impairments were non-severe. A.R. 17, ECF

No. 8-2. The ALJ found Dr. Snyder's conclusions to be credible. Id. The Court agrees with

the ALJ.

Third, Brelinski contends that the magistrate judge improperly upheld the ALJ's

credibility analysis regarding Brelinski's testimony at the administrative hearing. Ob. 3–4,

ECF No. 15. The Court disagrees. When considering the claimant's complaints of pain, "an

ALJ may properly consider the credibility of the claimant. Furthermore, an ALJ's findings

based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight and deference,

particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness's demeanor and

credibility." Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal

4

2:14-cv-13300-SJM-CEB Doc # 17 Filed 09/21/15 Pg 4 of 6 Pg ID 918
citations omitted). The ALJ here considered Brelinski's credibility by juxtaposing Brelinski's

self-described symptoms with a successful surgery, several positive reports from treating

physicians, and a "mild limitation" on activities of daily living. A.R. 13–15, ECF No. 8-2. The

Court gives deference to the ALJ's findings and concludes that the ALJ properly assessed

evidence related to Brelinski's credibility.

Fourth, Brelinski objects to the magistrate judge's analysis of the ALJ's RFC

determination. Obj. 4–6, ECF No. 15. The Court will overrule that objection as well. The

ALJ noted Brelinski's history of "a degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical

spine," "history of degenerative joint disease of the left foot," and "history of depression and

anxiety." A.R. 17, ECF 8-2. The Court finds that the ALJ properly analyzed Brelinski's

impairments in light of clinical findings from Brelinski's examining physicians when making

the RFC determination. Report, ECF No. 14.

CONCLUSION

The Court has carefully reviewed the parties' motions, the Magistrate Judge's Report,

and Brelinski's objections. The Court finds Brelinski's objections unconvincing, and agrees

with the Report's recommendation to grant the Commissioner's motion for summary

judgment and deny Brelinski's motion for summary judgment.

ORDER

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Brelinski's Objections (document no. 15)

are OVERRULED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

(document no. 14) is ADOPTED.

5

2:14-cv-13300-SJM-CEB Doc # 17 Filed 09/21/15 Pg 5 of 6 Pg ID 919
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brelinski's Motion for Summary Judgment (document

no. 11) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment

(document no. 12) is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III 

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

United States District Judge

Dated: September 21, 2015

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on September 21, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol Cohron 

Case Manager

6

2:14-cv-13300-SJM-CEB Doc # 17 Filed 09/21/15 Pg 6 of 6 Pg ID 920