SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1981-17T3

MARY FOURTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHRYSLER CAPITAL,

a foreign Limited

Liability Company,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________

Submitted December 6, 2018 – Decided March 1, 2019

Before Judges Simonelli and O'Connor. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-004207-17.

Michael W. C. Fourte, attorney for appellant.

LeClairRyan, PC, attorneys for respondent (Robert J. 

Brener, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Plaintiff Mary Fourte appeals from the November 17, 2017 Law Division 

order granting summary judgment to defendant Chrysler Capital (Chrysler) and 

dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's claims under the Consumer Fraud Act

(CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 

U.S.C. §§ 1681a to 1681x, and her claim of unjust enrichment.

1

 We affirm. 

I.

We derive the following facts from the evidence submitted by the parties 

in support of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motion, viewed in the 

light most favorable to plaintiff, who opposed entry of summary judgment. 

Elazar v. Macrietta Cleaners, Inc., 230 N.J. 123, 135 (2017). 

On October 30, 2013, plaintiff entered into a thirty-nine-month closedend motor vehicle lease with DeCozen Chrysler Jeep Dodge (DeCozen) for a 

2014 Chrysler minivan. DeCozen immediately assigned the lease to CCAP Auto 

Lease Ltd., and Chrysler began servicing the lease on October 30, 2013. 

The lease required plaintiff to make thirty-nine monthly payments of

$299.81. After she made the initial payment of $299.81 on October 30, 2013, 

 

1

 The order also dismissed plaintiff's claim under the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a to 1692p. Plaintiff does not appeal from the

dismissal of that claim. In addition, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims 

under the New Jersey Fair Credit Reporting Act, N.J.S.A. 56:11-28 to -43, and 

the New Jersey Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, N.J.S.A. 45:18-1 to -6.1. 
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each of her monthly payments thereafter were due on the twenty-ninth day of 

the month beginning in November 2013. The lease required plaintiff to pay a 

late charge of the lesser of twenty dollars or five percent of the unpaid amount

if she did not pay all or any portion of a monthly payment within ten days of its 

due date. Plaintiff incurred a late charge thirty-five times over the course of the 

lease. 

The lease required plaintiff to pay a $495 vehicle return fee if the lease 

was terminated before the lease term and the vehicle was returned. The vehicle 

return fee would not apply if the lease ended early by plaintiff's purchase of the 

vehicle. The lease required plaintiff to pay a $395 disposition fee if she returned 

the vehicle at the end of the lease term. The disposition fee would not apply if 

the lease ended early or if plaintiff purchased the vehicle at the end of the lease 

term. Upon return of the vehicle, the lease required plaintiff to pay a charge for 

any excessive wear and tear on the vehicle.

On July 9, 2016, Chrysler sent plaintiff a billing statement for an 

outstanding payment of $299.81 for June 2016, plus $39.73 in late fees, for a 

total of $339.54, to be paid by July 29, 2016. The billing statement also 

indicated there were six months remaining on the lease. On July 25, 2016, 

plaintiff made a $300 payment, leaving five payments due under the lease. Her
4

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next payment, the thirty-fifth, was due on August 29, 2016. She did not make 

the payment and incurred a late charge. 

Plaintiff returned the vehicle to DeCozen in September 2016, before the 

end of the lease term, and did not purchase it. Accordingly, the lease required 

plaintiff to pay the $495 vehicle return fee. 

Plaintiff and DeCozen agreed to a new lease transaction whereby

DeCozen would make the remaining five lease payments due under the current 

lease for August 2016 to December 2016. Plaintiff claimed that "[t]he 

paperwork [for the new lease transaction] expressly stated that [i]f [she] leased 

a new Chrysler car [she] would not be charged a disposition fee." However, the 

paperwork actually stated otherwise: "Any [additional] fees such as 

[disposition] fee/wear & tear/over mileage/penalties are customer[']s 

responsibility. [DeCozen is] not paying anything except for [five remaining] 

payments." (Emphasis added). Additional paperwork also stated: "Lessee is 

responsible for a disposition fee. This fee can be waived for customers that lease 

a new . . . vehicle with Chrysler. . . ." (Emphasis added). There is no evidence 

that Chrysler waived the disposition fee or the vehicle return fee.

According to plaintiff, Chrysler called her on September 19, 2016, and 

advised it had not received her August 2016 payment, and she may be reported 
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to the credit bureaus if she did not immediately make the payment. Plaintiff

replied that DeCozen should have sent her remaining five payments to Chrysler. 

Plaintiff called Chrysler on September 23, 2016 and was advised she still owed 

payment. Thus, on September 23, 2016, plaintiff made a $300 payment.

On September 22, 2016, DeCozen paid $1,449.05, which Chrysler applied 

to the five payments due for August 2016 to December 2016. This did not end 

plaintiff's responsibility under the first lease because she still owed the vehicle 

return fee and excessive wear and tear and late charges. Chrysler applied the 

$300 payment plaintiff made on September 23, 2016 incorrectly to the $395 

disposition instead of the $495 vehicle return fee plaintiff owed under the lease. 

On September 29, 2016, and again on October 11, 2016, Chrysler sent plaintiff

an end of term final bill for $95 for the balance of the disposition fee, $506.50 

for excessive wear and tear, and $53.55 for late charges, for a total of $655.05. 

Plaintiff did not dispute the disposition fee and paid the bill in full on January 

10, 2017. 

Plaintiff later discovered that an Experian credit report dated February 7, 

2017, showed she was thirty-days past due on her Chrysler account in September 

2016, and sixty-days past due in October 2016. Plaintiff filed a dispute with 

Experian. 
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On February 8, 2017, Chrysler received a notice of dispute from Experian 

Information Solutions, Inc., which listed a "late mark" on plaintiff's Chrysler 

account only for September 2016. The notice of dispute was electronically 

transmitted to Chrysler through the Online Solution for Complete and Accurate 

Reporting (e-OSCAR), which is a browser-based, Metro 2 complaint system that 

Equifax and three other credit-reporting agencies, Experian, Innovis, and 

TransUnion, developed to create and respond to consumer disputes. The creditreporting agency uploads the dispute to e-OSCAR when the agency receives a 

request from the customer. The request is then transmitted electronically via eOSCAR to the furnishers of the information identified in the request, which was 

Experian here. 

Chrysler also received a letter from plaintiff's attorney accusing Chrysler 

of erroneously reporting that plaintiff was thirty days past due on her Chrysler 

account in September 2016, and sixty days past due in October 2016, and 

threatening a lawsuit. Chrysler denied it had done so. 

Chrysler conducted an investigation upon receiving the notice of dispute. 

On February 22, 2017, Chrysler submitted an Automated Credit Dispute 

Verification (ACDV) to Experian reporting that plaintiff's Chrysler account was 

current and paid in full and the date of plaintiff's last payment was September 
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2016. Chrysler requested that the "late marks" for September 2016 and October 

2016 be removed and plaintiff's account be updated to reflect the account as

being "Paid/Closed current, no late marks reported." Chrysler transmitted the 

form to Experian through the e-OSCAR system. Because Chrysler requested 

that Experian update the information Experian had reported, Chrysler's response 

was automatically carbon copied to all other credit reporting agencies, including 

Equifax and TransUnion. Chrysler also notified plaintiff's attorney of its 

response to the notice of dispute. 

On March 15, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that Chrysler 

violated the CFA by receiving forty lease payments (thirty-four from her, five 

from DeCozen, and the $300 payment she made on September 23, 2016) when 

it knew it was only entitled to thirty-nine payments, and knowingly and 

maliciously failed to disclose this to her. Plaintiff also alleged that Chrysler was 

unjustly enriched by the fortieth lease payment. 

Plaintiff further alleged that Chrysler violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(7) 

of the FCRA by willfully and falsely reporting that she was thirty and sixty or 

more days delinquent on her monthly payments under the lease and not notifying 

her of the alleged delinquency with thirty days of making the report. 
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Chrysler filed a motion for summary judgment and plaintiff filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment on her FCRA claim. Plaintiff did not file 

a motion to amend her complaint or seek leave to file such a motion. In 

opposition to Chrysler's motion, plaintiff argued for the first time that Chrysler 

violated the CFA by unlawfully charging her a disposition fee. 

The motion judge granted summary judgment to Chrysler.

2

 The judge 

found that Chrysler's receipt of a fortieth payment, if true, did not rise to the 

level of consumer fraud within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. The judge 

further found that plaintiff failed to offer any facts demonstrating a violation of 

the CFA in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise, and 

the alleged fortieth payment did not relate to a sale of merchandise. 

The judge also found that plaintiff had no private right of action under 15 

U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(7), Chrysler was not collecting its own debts, and Chrysler 

did not use plaintiff's name falsely to indicate a third person as collecting a debt. 

Rather, Chrysler was collecting the lease payments. The judge concluded that 

 

2

 Contrary to plaintiff's argument on appeal, the judge considered her crossmotion and found it was moot in light of summary judgment granted to Chrysler. 

The judge also correctly rejected plaintiff's request to strike Chrysler's 

opposition to her cross-motion, which Chrysler filed timely under R. 1:6-3(b).
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even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there was no 

evidence that Chrysler violated the FCRA.

Lastly, the judge found Chrysler was not unjustly enriched by the 

disposition fee because it corrected the error to apply the $300 to the end of the 

lease balance rather than seek the payment back only to collect it again. 

Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, applying the 

same legal standard as the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 

(2017). Thus, we review the record and consider "whether the evidence presents 

a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. 

v. Nowell Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)). Summary judgment must be 

granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions 

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment or order as a matter of law." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. National 

Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). 

"To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opponent must 'come 

forward with evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact.'" Cortez v. 
10 A-1981-17T3

Gindhart, 435 N.J. Super. 589, 605 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Horizon Blue 

Cross Blue Shield of N.J. v. State, 425 N.J. Super. 1, 32 (App. Div. 2012)). 

"[C]onclusory and self-serving assertions by one of the parties are insufficient 

to overcome the motion[.]" Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005).

If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then "decide whether 

the trial court correctly interpreted the law." DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. 

Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting 

Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). We 

review issues of law de novo and accord no deference to the trial judge's legal 

conclusions. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013). Applying the 

above standards, we discern no reason to reverse.

II.

Plaintiff argues that Chrysler violated the CFA by fraudulently

misrepresenting she owed an extra $300 lease payment, fraudulently charging 

her a $395 disposition fee to which it was not legally entitled, and threatening 

that her credit would be negatively impacted if she did not make the $300

payment. Plaintiff also argues that she suffered an ascertainable loss by paying 

$395, having a tainted credit report, and spending fees on credit monitoring. We 

disagree with these arguments.
11 A-1981-17T3

The CFA "was enacted 'to combat "sharp practices and dealings" that 

victimized consumers by luring them into purchases through fraudulent or 

deceptive means.'" Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill, 217 N.J. 99, 121

(2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 16 

(1994)). "To that end, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 prescribes a cause of action on behalf 

of '[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real 

or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of any 

method, act, or practice declared unlawful under this act.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 56:8-19).

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 identifies the type of conduct that constitutes an "unlawful 

practice" under the CFA:

The act, use or employment by any person of any 

unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, 

false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the 

knowing[] concealment, suppression, or omission of 

any material fact with intent that others rely upon such 

concealment, suppression or omission, in connection 

with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or 

real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such 

person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in 

fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is 

declared to be an unlawful practice.

[(Emphasis added).]
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"An unlawful practice under the CFA requires 'fraudulent, deceptive or other 

similar kind of selling or advertising practices.'" Manahawkin Convalescent, 

217 N.J. at 122 (quoting Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 271, 

(1978)).

"An 'unlawful practice' contravening the CFA may arise from (1) an 

affirmative act; (2) a knowing omission; or (3) a violation of an administrative 

regulation." Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 51 (2017). Affirmative 

acts are "unlawful practices that include unconscionable commercial practices, 

fraud, deception, false promise, false pretense, and misrepresentation." 

Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 245 (2005). 

"In order to establish an affirmative misrepresentation violative of the 

[CFA], plaintiffs [are] not required to show [the defendant's] knowledge of the 

falsity of [the defendant's] statement or an intent to deceive." Ji v. Palmer, 333 

N.J. Super. 451, 462 (App. Div. 2000). "An affirmative misrepresentation in the 

context of the [CFA] is 'one which is material to the transaction and which is a 

statement of fact, found to be false, made to induce the buyer to make the 

purchase.'" Ibid. (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 288 N.J. Super. 

504, 535 (App. Div. 1996)). However, a showing of intent is essential if the 

claimed CFA violation is an omission. Dugan, 231 N.J. at 51. A CFA violation 
13 A-1981-17T3

based on an omission occurs only if it "was made knowingly with the intent to 

deceive the purchasers." Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc., 243 N.J. Super. 590, 

602 (App. Div. 1990). 

"To prevail under the CFA, a plaintiff must not only prove 'unlawful 

conduct by defendant,' but must also demonstrate 'an ascertainable loss by 

plaintiff' and 'a causal relationship between the unlawful conduct and the 

ascertainable loss.'" Dugan, 231 N.J. at 52 (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 

216 N.J. 168, 184 (2013)). A plaintiff must prove an ascertainable loss that is 

"quantifiable or measurable," not "hypothetical or illusory." Thiedemann, 183 

N.J. at 248. "The limiting nature of the requirement allows a private cause of 

action only to those who can demonstrate a loss attributable to conduct made 

unlawful by the CFA." Dugan, 231 N.J. at 53 (quoting Thiedemann, 183 N.J. at 

246).

Chrysler was entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's CFA as 

a matter of law. Chrysler allegedly made the fraudulent misrepresentations

about the $300 payment in September 2016, three years after plaintiff entered 

into the lease. Thus, the alleged misrepresentations were not made in connection 

with the sale of the lease, and were not material to the transaction or made to 

induce plaintiff to enter into the lease. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2; Manahawkin 
14 A-1981-17T3

Convalescent, 217 N.J. at 12; Ji v. Palmer, 333 N.J. Super. at 462. Further,

plaintiff failed to establish that Chrysler made the alleged misrepresentations 

knowingly with the intent to deceive her into executing the lease. Chattin, 243 

N.J. Super. at 602. While this alone warranted dismissal of plaintiff's CFA 

claim, there are more reasons supporting dismissal.

Chrysler did not make any fraudulent misrepresentations to plaintiff about 

the $300 payment, as all of its representations were true and accurate. On 

September 19, 2016, when Chrysler allegedly fraudulently misrepresented that 

plaintiff owed $300, she still owed the thirty-fifth August 2016 payment, as 

DeCozen had not made the remaining five payments until September 22, 2018. 

In addition, under the new lease transaction with DeCozen, plaintiff 

remained responsible for excessive wear and tear and late charges and any

additional fees, such as the disposition fee, which Chrysler did not waive. On 

September 23, 2016, when Chrysler allegedly made the second fraudulent 

misrepresentation, plaintiff was subject to the $495 vehicle return fee, and she 

owed $506.50 for excessive wear and tear and $53.33 for late charges when she 

spoke to Chrysler on September 23, 2016. Thus, Chrysler made no fraudulent 

misrepresentations to plaintiff about the $300 payment.
15 A-1981-17T3

Plaintiff's argument about the $395 disposition fee is unavailing. The 

clear terms of the lease required plaintiff to pay the $495 vehicle return fee

because she returned the vehicle before the end of the lease term and did not 

purchase it. The only deviation from the lease provision was that Chrysler 

charged her $395, instead of $495, and incorrectly identified the charge as a 

disposition fee on the end of term final billing statement instead of a vehicle 

return fee. Accordingly, plaintiff paid $100 less that what she owed under the 

lease. 

Without any evidence of unlawful conduct, plaintiff cannot establish an 

ascertainable loss or a causal relationship. We conclude, therefore, that

summary judgment was properly granted to Chrysler. 

III.

Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that Chrysler violated 15 U.S.C. § 

1681s-2(a)(7) by willfully and falsely reporting she was delinquent on her 

monthly payments and not notifying her of the alleged delinquency within thirty 

days of making the report. The motion judge correctly found that plaintiff had 

no private right of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(c)(1) (a private right of action does not apply to a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 

1681s-2(a)); see also SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 652 F. 3d 355, 
16 A-1981-17T3

358 (3d Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment in the defendant's favor and 

holding there is no private cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)). 

Plaintiff now contends for the first time on appeal that she mistakenly

cited 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) in her complaint; the judge knew she meant to cite 

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), which permits a private right of action; and the judge 

should have sua sponte amended the complaint or granted her leave to amend. 

We generally decline to address contentions, such as these, that were not raised 

before the trial court, are not jurisdictional in nature, and do not substantially 

implicate the public interest. Zaman v. Felton, 219 N.J. 199, 226-27 (2014). 

However, we address them for the sake of completeness.

Plaintiff argues that Chrysler violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) when it 

reported inaccurate information to the credit-reporting agencies regarding her 

payment history and only notified Experian, and not the other credit-reporting 

agencies, of the inaccuracy within the thirty-day period prescribed under 15 

U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(D). This argument lacks merit.

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) provides as follows:

(1) In general

After receiving notice pursuant to [15 U.S.C. §]

1681i(a)(2) . . . of a dispute with regard to the 

completeness or accuracy of any information provided 
17 A-1981-17T3

by a person to a consumer reporting agency, the person 

shall--

 (A) conduct an investigation with respect to the 

disputed information;

 (B) review all relevant information provided by the 

consumer reporting agency pursuant to [15 U.S.C. §]

section 1681i(a)(2) . . . ;

 (C) report the results of the investigation to the 

consumer reporting agency;

 (D) if the investigation finds that the information is 

incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all 

other consumer reporting agencies to which the person 

furnished the information and that compile and 

maintain files on consumers on a nationwide basis; and

 (E) if an item of information disputed by a consumer 

is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be 

verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1), 

for purposes of reporting to a consumer reporting 

agency only, as appropriate, based on the results of the 

reinvestigation promptly—

 (i) modify that item of information;

 (ii) delete that item of information; or

 (iii) permanently block the reporting of that item of 

information.

(2) Deadline

A person shall complete all investigations, reviews, and 

reports required under paragraph (1) regarding 

information provided by the person to a consumer 
18 A-1981-17T3

reporting agency, before the expiration of the period 

under [15 U.S.C. §] 1681i(a)(1) . . . within which the 

consumer reporting agency is required to complete 

actions required by that section regarding that 

information.

15 U.S.C. § 1861i(a)(1)(A) provides as follows:

(A) In general.--Subject to subsection (f), if the 

completeness or accuracy of any item of information 

contained in a consumer's file at a consumer reporting 

agency is disputed by the consumer and the consumer 

notifies the agency directly, or indirectly through a 

reseller, of such dispute, the agency shall, free of 

charge, conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to 

determine whether the disputed information is 

inaccurate and record the current status of the disputed 

information, or delete the item from the file in 

accordance with paragraph (5), before the end of the 

30-day period beginning on the date on which the 

agency receives the notice of the dispute from the 

consumer or reseller.

The record confirms that Chrysler fully complied with the requirements 

of 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(b)(1) and U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). Within thirty days of 

receiving the notice of dispute, Chrysler conducted an investigation, reported 

the results of the investigation to Experian and all other consumer reporting 

agencies with which Chrysler had a reporting relationship, and requested that 

the "late marks" for September 2016 and October 2016 be removed and 

plaintiff's account be updated to reflect the account as being "Paid/Closed 

current, no late marks reported." Thus, plaintiff's newly raised FCRA claim
19 A-1981-17T3

under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) fails as a matter of law and the assertion of this 

claim in an amended complaint would not have survived a motion to dismiss. 

Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 256-57 (App. Div. 

1997). 

IV.

Lastly, plaintiff contends the judge erred by dismissing her unjust 

enrichment claim and failing to view the facts in the light most favorable to her. 

We have considered these contentions in light of the record and applicable legal 

principles and conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Affirmed.