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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

___________________________________ 

 ) 

PETER J. VROOM, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civil Action No. 12-143 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

___________________________________ ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 Peter J. Vroom seeks review of the dismissal of his administrative complaint by 

the Federal Election Commission.1

 Mr. Vroom complained that the FEC wrongly approved the 

disaffiliation of General Electric Company’s Political Action Committee (“GEPAC”) and Penske 

Truck Leasing Corporation, L.P.’s Political Action Committee (“Penske PAC”). The PACs had 

been affiliated due to GE’s financial control of Penske. With their request to disaffiliate the 

PACs, GE and Penske informed the FEC that their relationship had changed, so that GE no 

longer held a controlling financial interest in Penske. Mr. Vroom urged the FEC to investigate 

GE and Penske, asserting that they had filed false and misleading information about their 

corporate relationship, which had caused the FEC to disaffiliate their two PACs wrongly. 

Without four votes among the FEC Commissioners to initiate an investigation, Mr. Vroom’s 

 

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 Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, “[a]ny person who believes a violation of [the] 

Act . . . has occurred, may file a complaint” with the FEC. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1). 

Commissioners vote on whether they have “reason to believe” a violation has occurred. Id.

§ 437g(a)(2). If four of the six commissioners vote affirmatively, the FEC begins an 

investigation. Id. However, if no majority makes such a finding, the FEC dismisses the 

complaint, and the complainant may seek district court review of whether the dismissal is 

“contrary to law.” Id. § 437g(a)(8). 

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administrative complaint was dismissed. The FEC now moves to dismiss his amended complaint 

before this Court, arguing that Mr. Vroom does not have standing to bring this suit because he 

has suffered no tangible harm. Appearing pro se, Mr. Vroom insists he has suffered an 

informational injury sufficient for standing. 

I. FACTS 

 This Court previously dismissed without prejudice Mr. Vroom’s original 

complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Order [Dkt. 12] (Dec. 6, 2012) at 4. That complaint sought 

only a legal determination that GE and Penske violated the Federal Election Campaign Act 

(“FECA”), 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq., not a remedy to a cognizable injury. See Compl. [Dkt. 1] ¶ 16 

(“The FEC’s failure to adequately investigate and pursue Vroom’s complaint and to cooperate 

fully . . . has allowed GE/Penske to continue to operate in violation of the law and denied Mr. 

Vroom the benefits of the FEC’s findings on the merits of his complaint.”). The Court dismissed 

that complaint because “[t]o hold that a plaintiff can establish injury in fact merely by alleging 

that he has been deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation of the law has occurred 

would be tantamount to recognizing a justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law. This we 

cannot do.” Order at 3-4 (quoting Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 

(per curiam)). In other words, even though FECA provides that “[a]ny person who believes a 

violation of [the] Act . . . has occurred, may file a complaint,” and sue if the complaint is 

dismissed, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8), a plaintiff must have standing to file a complaint in federal 

court, which requires a personal and tangible interest in the outcome, or the court is without 

jurisdiction under the Constitution to hear the claim. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 

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 In his opposition to the FEC’s motion to dismiss the initial complaint, Mr. Vroom 

alleged an “informational injury,” citing Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 

(1998). Opp’n [Dkt. 9] at 9. Akins held that the plaintiffs had alleged a concrete and 

particularized injury where the FEC had not defined the American Israel Public Affairs 

Committee (“AIPAC”) as a political committee because this determination deprived the 

plaintiffs of information regarding contributions to federal candidates made by AIPAC. Id. at 

21. The Supreme Court found that voters have a cognizable injury when they are unable to 

obtain information that helps them evaluate candidates for office. Id. Similarly, “Mr. Vroom 

claimed in his opposition that he was prevented from seeking information that will help him to 

evaluate candidates for office.” See Order at 4. As a result, the Court provided Mr. Vroom with 

the opportunity to amend his complaint to reflect this injury. Id. 

 Mr. Vroom filed his Amended Complaint on January 7, 2013, which includes 

allegations of an informational injury. Am. Compl. [Dkt. 13]. He alleges that the FEC’s 

dismissal of his complaint “denies Vroom the ability to fully and accurately determine the 

source, magnitude and ultimate recipients of political contributions made by the General Electric 

PAC.” Id. at 5-6. The FEC moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, asserting again that Mr. 

Vroom lacks standing to pursue his complaint. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. 15]. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court must review the complaint liberally, granting the plaintiff the 

benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 

1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004). To determine whether it has jurisdiction over the claim, a court 

may consider materials outside the pleadings. Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 

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1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005). No action of the parties can confer subject matter jurisdiction on a 

federal court because subject matter jurisdiction is an Article III and a statutory requirement. 

Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The party claiming 

subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists. Khadr 

v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

III. ANALYSIS

 FECA uses broad terms to describe its enforcement by the public: “[a]ny person” 

who believes the law has been violated may file a complaint with the Commission, 2 U.S.C. 

§ 437g(a)(1); “[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint filed 

by such party” may seek review in the District Court for the District of Columbia, id.

§ 437g(a)(8)(A); and “[i]n any proceeding under this paragraph the court may declare that the 

dismissal of the complaint or the failure to act is contrary to law,” id. § 437g(a)(8)(C) (emphases 

added). Mr. Vroom filed a complaint with the Commission; he considers himself aggrieved by 

the Commission’s failure to investigate his allegations; and he has petitioned for review in this 

Court, arguing that the Commission’s failure to investigate is contrary to law. 

 Despite the broad language of FECA, however, a plaintiff in federal court must 

also satisfy the requirements for standing under Article III of the Constitution. To establish 

standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact – an invasion of a legally protected 

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s action or inaction and

“likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 660-61 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Circuit has cautioned that: 

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In those cases where “a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the 

government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of 

someone else” it is substantially more difficult to establish injury in fact, 

for in such cases “one or more of the essential elements of standing 

‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not 

before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion 

the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.’”

Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). Thus, while Congress can 

indicate its intent that disputes be resolved in federal court, as it has in FECA, a litigant must still 

meet the requirements for standing set forth in Lujan to have his case heard. See id. at 419 

(holding that FECA’s language providing for judicial review “does not confer standing; it 

confers a right to sue upon parties who otherwise already have standing”). That is, Mr. Vroom 

must present a real injury, caused by the FEC, and subject to amelioration by court order. The 

FEC challenges Mr. Vroom’s ability to show an injury-in-fact. 

 Although FECA itself does not confer Article III standing, allegations of 

“informational injury” can provide the requisite injury-in-fact for such standing. That is, when 

FEC action or inaction deprives voters of information that would help them evaluate candidates 

for office, such voters may have standing to complain. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. “[T]he nature 

of the information allegedly withheld is critical to the standing analysis,” Common Cause, 108 

F.3d at 417, so that if the requested information is available from other filings, no standing 

exists. See Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1073, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that 

appellants “only [sought] the same information from a different source”). Critically, “[i]f the 

information withheld is simply the fact that a violation of FECA has occurred,” the plaintiff has 

not suffered the type of “informational injury” recognized in Aikens. Common Cause, 108 F.3d 

at 417. 

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 Mr. Vroom tries to articulate an informational injury here. He alleges that the 

FEC’s dismissal of his complaint “denies Vroom the ability to fully and accurately determine the 

source, magnitude and ultimate recipients of political contributions made by the General Electric 

PAC.” Am. Compl. at 5. He also alleges that FEC data is inaccurate and cannot be used for this 

purpose because the contribution reports for the two PACs are no longer combined: 

The FEC argues that despite its approval of disafilliation for the GE and 

Penske PACs, Vroom is still able to determine the amount each PAC 

“reports” for its contributions to federal candidates, and therefore he 

suffers no informational injury. Incredibly, the FEC appears to be saying 

that as long as Vroom can get information, regardless of its validity or 

accuracy, he suffers no harm. . . . [T]he FEC has an obligation to collect 

and present to the public reliable and accurate information on federal 

political contributions. Therefore, it’s [sic] approval of the GE/Penske 

PAC disaffiliation and dismissal of Vroom’s complaint in the face of 

overwhelming evidence of the ongoing control of Penske by GE, 

imposes a very real and substantial injury upon Vroom and others who 

seek this information both in their occupations and for purposes of 

voting. 

Id. at 6-7. 

 The question of standing raised by Mr. Vroom’s Amended Complaint resolves 

itself as to whether he has suffered a justiciable injury from having to review multiple filings 

from GEPAC and the Penske PAC to ascertain contribution levels instead of merely a combined 

GEPAC/Penske PAC single filing. The PACs’ contribution levels and recipients, insofar as 

FECA requires such disclosure, are already fully disclosed in GEPAC and the Penske PAC’s 

respective FEC filings. Indeed, Mr. Vroom relies on the public disclosures by these PACs to 

argue that the FEC erred in its decision to disaffiliate them. See Opp’n [Dkt. 17] at 10-11; 

Compl. at 19. Thus, Mr. Vroom has not identified any information that is truly unavailable, only 

that it is presented in a way that he believes is legally insufficient. 

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 Mr. Vroom seeks no additional facts but, rather, a legal determination, i.e., that 

“any contributions made by the GE and Penske PAC’s [sic] that in the aggregate exceed the 

limitations placed upon a single affiliated PAC, are illegal.” Am. Compl. at 9. The law in this 

Circuit is clear that Mr. Vroom has no standing to sue on the basis that “the information withheld 

is simply the fact that a violation of FECA has occurred.” See Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417. 

Likewise, the data error perceived by Mr. Vroom relates back to the FEC’s disaffiliation decision 

about which he filed an administrative complaint and reflects only his desire for information 

concerning a violation of FECA. See id. at 418 (“Nothing in FECA requires that information 

concerning a violation of the Act as such be disclosed to the public.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

 Although he redrafted his complaint to present an informational injury, Mr. 

Vroom can articulate no inaccessible information from the GEPAC and Penske PAC filings that 

would be available were the two PACs no longer disaffiliated. The FEC’s motion to dismiss, 

Dkt. 15, will be granted. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

Date: June 28, 2013 /s/ _ 

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER 

United States District Judge 

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