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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ROBERT L. WIGGINS, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-cv-12680 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC et al., 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________________________________/ 

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF #27), 

OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS TO THE REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, (ECF #28), AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF #13) 

 On July 9, 2014, Plaintiff Robert L. Wiggins (“Wiggins”) filed a pro se

Complaint against Defendants Nationstar Mortgage LLC (“Nationstar”), Deutsche 

Bank National Trust Company on Behalf of GS Mortgage Securities Corp., GSAA 

Home Equity Trust 2005-10 Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2005-10 (“DB”), 

and Argent Mortgage Company LLC (“Argent”). (See Compl., ECF #1.) Wiggins 

brings multiple state and federal claims that all appear to arise out of the 

refinancing of Wiggins’ home loan on March 28, 2005, and the subsequent 

foreclosure of that property in October 2011. Nationstar and DB jointly filed a 

motion to dismiss Wiggins’ claims against them (the “Motion to Dismiss”). (See 

ECF #13.) 

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 The assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on 

July 14, 2015, (the “R&R”) in which he recommended that the Court grant the 

Motion to Dismiss. (See ECF #27.) The Magistrate Judge first concluded that the 

majority of Wiggins’ claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 

(See id. at 5-6, Pg. ID 291-292.) He next held that even if some of Wiggins’ 

claims were not time-barred, the doctrine of res judicata prohibited Wiggins from 

bringing each of the counts of his current Complaint. (See id. at 6-9, Pg. ID 292-

295.) The Magistrate Judge explained that in 2011, Wiggins filed a very similar 

suit in this Court to the one he brings now in which he alleged that DB and Argent 

committed fraud and other misconduct related to his home loan (the “2011 

Wiggins Action”). (See id.) Judge Paul D. Borman dismissed the 2011 Wiggins 

Action with prejudice, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that 

decision. See Wiggins v. Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, 945 F.Supp.2d 817 

(E.D. Mich. 2013), aff’d Case No. 13-1797 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2014). The 

Magistrate Judge concluded that each of Wiggins’ current claims “were or could 

have been raised in the previous case before Judge Borman, and are therefore 

barred under the doctrine of res judicata.” (R&R at 6, Pg. ID 292.) Finally, the 

Magistrate Judge held that Wiggins’ claims of predatory lending failed for the 

independent reason that the statute under which Wiggins sought to bring those 

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claims – 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) – did not apply retroactively to Wiggins’s claims. 

(See id. at 9, Pg. ID 295.) 

 Wiggins has now filed timely objections to the R&R (the “Objections”). 

(See ECF #28.) A number of the Objections are general in nature and/or do not 

address a specific flaw with the reasoning of the Magistrate Judge. For example, 

Wiggins objects to the dismissal of counts I, IV, V, VI, VIII, and IX of his 

Complaint as follows: 

Plaintiff's Count I--Respa Violations makes specific 

charges and enumerates specific facts in Document 1, 

¶26a-g of violations and they may not be dismissed 

without a hearing before the trier of facts at trial. 

Counts IV--specifies with particularity the violations 

committed by defendants in Document 1, ¶26a-g, and 

these facts have never been adjudicated. 

Count V--intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress can 

not be dismissed without a hearing on the facts. Insofar 

as the court makes findings of fact in the granting of 

defendants' motion it oversteps its bounds and authority. 

[....] 

Count Vll--Breach of Fiduciary Duty raises purely 

questions of fact and has never been litigated. The 

ongoing dispute between the plaintiff and defendant 

preserves its viability as it has always been an assertion 

of plaintiff of which defendant was aware. There is no 

prejudice to defendants by its continuation. 

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Count VIII--Declaratory Relief is within the sound 

discretion of the court, but should still be based upon a 

proper hearing of the evidence and not dismissed without 

an opportunity to be heard. 

Count IX--Breach of Contract alleges specific breaches 

of the contract by defendants which have never been 

tested in the crucible of trial. 

(Objections at 3-4, Pg. ID 299-300.) Such “vague, general, [and] conclsuory 

objections do[] not meet the requirement of specific objections and [are] 

tantamount to a complete failure to object.” Zimmerman v. Cason, 354 Fed. App'x 

228, 230 (6th Cir. 2009). Indeed, the kinds of general objections Wiggins has 

lodged here have “the same effect[] as would [the] failure to object. The [] 

[C]ourt's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making 

the initial reference to the magistrate useless ... The duplication of time and effort 

wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes 

of the Magistrates Act.” Id. (quoting Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Serv., 

932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, to the extent not addressed below, 

the Court concludes that the Objections are “vague, general, or conclusory” and 

they are overruled on that basis. 

 With respect to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court 

dismiss Counts II (titled “fraudulent misrepresentation”) and III (titled “innocent 

misrepresentation”), Wiggins objects on the basis that “[f]raud is [] intrinsically 

fact driven” and “[t]hese facts were never tested in the prior action before Judge 

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Borman and therefore remain viable and not subject to claims of res judicata.” 

(Objections at 2-3, Pg. ID 298-299.) However, “Michigan takes ‘a broad 

approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already 

litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, 

exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.’” Thompkins v. 

Crown Corr, Inc., 726 F.3d 830, 841-842 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Adair v. State, 

680 N.W.2d 386, 396 (Mich. 2004)) (emphasis added). Wiggins does not dispute 

that he could have raised his fraud claims in the 2011 Wiggins Action but did not 

do so. Thus, whether the fraud claims were ever “tested” in the 2011 Wiggins 

Action is not relevant and does not save Wiggins’ fraud claims here. 

 Moreover, Wiggins has failed to even address the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation that his fraudulent misrepresentation and innocent 

misrepresentation claims be dismissed on the alternative ground that they are 

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. (See R&R at 5, Pg. ID 291.) 

Wiggins has thus waived his right to object and seek review of the dismissal of 

those claims. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear 

that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or 

legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party 

objects to those findings”); Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.1991) 

(“[O]nly those specific objections to the magistrate's report made to the district 

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court will be preserved for appellate review; making some objections but failing to 

raise others will not preserve all the objections a party may have”). And even if 

Wiggins had objected to that recommendation, such an objection would fail. 

Michigan has a six-year statute of limitation for claims of fraudulent 

misrepresentation and innocent representation. See M.C.L. § 600.5813. In his 

Complaint, Wiggins claims that his fraudulent misrepresentation and innocent 

misrepresentation claims arise out of allegedly fraudulent statements made “[o]n or 

about March 28, 2005.” (See Complaint at ¶¶ 16, 21.) Because these alleged 

statements were made more than six years before Wiggins filed his Complaint, the 

Magistrate Judge properly concluded that they were time-barred. 

 Wiggins further objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the 

Court dismiss his predatory lending claims in counts X and XII of his Complaint. 

(See Objections at 4-5, Pg. ID 300-301.) Wiggins argues that these counts 

“specifically allege conduct by the defendant which have [sic] been found to be 

illegal and actionable by Congress and the President of the United States. The fact 

that this codification did not occur until after the closing of plaintiff’s mortgage 

does not mean that the actions themselves are not grounds for a cause of action in 

common law.” Id. But Wiggins has provided no authority to support the 

proposition that any such common-law claim for “predatory lending” exists. See, 

e.g., Haisha v. Countywide Bank, FSB, 11-cv-11276, 2011 WL 2271319, at *5-*6 

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(E.D. Mich. June 8, 2011) (dismissing claim for “predatory lending,” and 

concluding that “[c]ourts that have ventured to search for a ‘predatory lending’ 

cause of action in Michigan have returned from the search wanting”); O'Brien v. 

BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 10–15136, 2011 WL 1193659, at *4 (E.D.Mich. 

Mar. 28, 2011) (“Michigan does not recognize a claim for predatory lending”). 

Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge concluded in the alternative that res judicata

barred Wiggins’ predatory-lending claims, and Wiggins’ general and conclusory 

objection that these claims “have never been properly litigated” (Objections at 5, 

Pg. ID 301) fails for the reasons stated above. 

 Finally, Wiggins objects to the dismissal of all of his claims against 

Nationstar because, Wiggins says, Nationstar’s “involvement in this case did not 

become known to [him] until less than two years before the filing of [his] 

[C]omplaint.” (Objections at 3, Pg. ID 299.) Wiggins further argues that 

Nationstar’s identify was fraudulently concealed from him, and thus his claims 

against Nationstar were tolled pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.58551

. (See id.) 

                                                            

1 M.C.L. § 600.5855 provides that “[i]f a person who is or may be liable for any 

claim fraudulently conceals the existence of the claim or the identity of any person 

who is liable for the claim from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the 

claim, the action may be commenced at any time within 2 years after the person 

who is entitled to bring the action discovers, or should have discovered, the 

existence of the claim or the identity of the person who is liable for the claim, 

although the action would otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.” 

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 Wiggins’ objection on this basis fails for two reasons. First, “while the 

Magistrate Judge Act, 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq., permits de novo review by the 

district court if timely objections are filed, absent compelling reasons, it does not 

allow parties to raise at the district court stage new arguments or issues that were 

not presented to the magistrate.” Murr v. United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n .1 (6th 

Cir. 2000). Here, Wiggins never argued to the Magistrate Judge that his claims 

against Nationstar should be saved because Nationstar’s identity was fraudulently 

concealed from him. (See Wiggins’ Response Brief, ECF #17.) Instead, Wiggins 

only argued to the Magistrate Judge that “Nationstar was not a party to any prior 

litigation” and that “[t]his action was brought against Nationstar within one year of 

the assignment of the mortgage to Nationstar.” (Id. at 8, Pg. ID 226.) Thus, 

Wiggins has waived his argument that Nationstar’s identity was fraudulently 

concealed and that his claims against Nationstar should be tolled on that basis. See 

Murr, 200 F.3d at 902, n.1 (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to [a] 

magistrate judge's report and recommendation are deemed waived”). 

 Moreover, and in any event, Wiggins’ objection addresses only whether his 

claims against Nationstar should be considered timely filed. But the Magistrate 

Judge recommended that the Court dismiss Wiggins’ claims against Nationstar 

even if they were timely because Nationstar was “in privity with [DB], a party to 

the [2011 Wiggins Action],” entitling Nationstar to the same res judicata

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protections as DB. (R&R at 8-9, Pg. ID 294-295.) Wiggins does not address this 

recommendation in his Objections and he has therefore provided no basis to reject 

the recommendation that his claims against Nationstar be dismissed on the basis of 

res judicata. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF #27) is ADOPTED as the 

Opinion of this Court, Wiggins’ Objections to the Report and Recommendation 

(ECF #28) are OVERRULED, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF #13) is 

GRANTED. 

 

       s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: August 20, 2015 

 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on August 20, 2015, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113

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