In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-2725

JEFFREY WEBB,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CLYDE L. CHOATE MENTAL HEALTH AND

DEVELOPMENT CENTER, a facility of the State

of Illinois Department of Mental Health and

Developmental Disabilities, THOMAS RICHARDS,

Facility Director, in his official capacity, MIKE

MOORMAN, Labor Relations Administrator,

in his official capacity, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 97-C-4101--David R. Herndon, Judge.

Argued September 7, 2000--Decided October 25, 2000

 Before Bauer, Posner, and Evans, Circuit Judges.

 Bauer, Circuit Judge. Jeffrey Webb appeals from

the district court’s entry of summary judgment in

favor of Clyde L. Choate Mental Health and

Development Center ("Choate"), on cross motions,

on his claim that Choate failed to reasonably

accommodate his disability and terminated his

employment in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et

seq. Webb contends that the district court erred

in finding that he was not a "qualified

individual with a disability" within the meaning

of the ADA, that he was provided with reasonable

accommodations to perform the essential functions

of his job, and that he was not discharged

because of his disability. On appeal, Choate

disputes our jurisdiction over this appeal. For

the reasons set forth below, we find that we have

jurisdiction over this appeal, and affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment for

Choate.

BACKGROUND

 Jeffrey Webb has a bachelor’s degree in
psychology and master’s degree in psychological

counseling, and is working toward a Ph.D. Choate

is a residential facility operated by the State

of Illinois to serve the needs of developmentally

disabled persons. Webb began his employ at Choate

in 1982 as a mental health technician trainee.

Over his twelve years at Choate, Webb was

promoted to Mental Health Technician I, Mental

Health Technician II, and Psychologist Associate.

In 1989, Webb developed severe asthma and took a

leave of absence until 1993. In 1995, Choate

promoted Webb to the position of "Psychologist

I." Some of the typical responsibilities of a

Psychologist I include performing the initial

assessment of those in need of mental health

services, and providing group and individual

therapy, as well as crisis intervention. The

position of Psychologist I is considered a

"direct care" position because direct interaction

with patients is an essential function of the

job. Therefore, all "direct care" staff members

are specifically trained to handle patients who

display unpredictable violent tendencies.

 Due to his asthma, Webb again took a leave of

absence until 1996. On July 8, 1996, he made a

request for accommodation from Choate because his

ability to breathe, walk, and work was impaired

by his asthma, osteoporosis, and weakened immune

system. Webb requested:

(1) a well-ventilated office removed from asbestos

or fibrous insulating material;

(2) adherence to job position duties;

(3) an immediately accessible, lockable storage

unit for medication;

(4) an immediately accessible, lockable

refrigeration unit for storage of medication and

liquid that must be kept cool;

(5) permission to attend doctor appointments with

prior notification;

(6) prior notice of application of insecticide,

disinfectant or other chemical with a strong odor

to the work area and permission to avoid that

area for 24 hours following application;

(7) exemption from intentional contact with

patients displaying violent behavior; and

(8) exemption from intentional contact with

patients known to have infectious conditions.

After consideration and discussion, Choate

accommodated Webb’s first six requests. Choate,

however, denied Webb’s requests for exemption
from intentional contact with patients known to

be violent and/or have infectious conditions. The

basis for Choate’s refusal was that the position

of Psychologist I required significant direct

contact with patients who displayed unpredictable

violent behavior. Further, the nurses at Choate

confirmed that the impaired communication skills

of most patients made it difficult to discover

whether incoming patients were carrying any

infectious diseases.

 Webb filed suit under the ADA because Choate

refused these two requests. Webb argued that the

requests could be reasonably accommodated. For

example, Webb suggested that his contact with

contagious patients could be postponed until the

infectious stage had passed. Also, he proposed

that other members of the "direct care" staff

could intervene if there were any sudden violent

outbursts by patients in his care. According to

Webb, his request was merely to be exempted from

"intentional" contact from patients "known" to be

violent and/or infectious. He claims that he is

willing to "accept the risk" of "unintentional"

interaction with patients whose conditions are

"unknown."

 Both Webb and Choate filed motions for summary

judgment, and the district court granted Choate’s

motion. The district court found that Webb was

not a "qualified individual with a disability"

under the ADA, and further, even if Webb were a

qualified individual, that Choate had reasonably

accommodated him.

DISCUSSION

 A. Jurisdiction

 At oral argument, Choate requested leave to

submit a supplemental brief, arguing that we lack

jurisdiction over this appeal. We granted

Choate’s request because, although both parties

in their briefs submitted that we had

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291, "[i]t is

never too late, of course, to raise a

jurisdictional challenge . . . ." Karazanos v.

Madison Two Assoc., 147 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir.

1998). Therefore, before proceeding on the

merits, we address this jurisdictional challenge.

 On June 11, 1999, the district court granted

summary judgment in favor of Choate. Webb filed

a post-judgment motion in the district court on

June 23. On July 7, Webb filed a notice of appeal

from the grant of summary judgment, docketed as

case No. 99-2725. We issued an order on July 20th

to Webb stating:

 A preliminary review of the short record
indicates that the order appealed from may not be

a final appealable judgment within the meaning of

28 U.S.C. sec. 1291.

 A notice of appeal filed before the district

court issues its ruling on a timely Rule 59

motion is ineffective until the order disposing

of the motion is entered on the district court’s

civil docket. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).

 In the present case, plaintiff filed a motion

to alter or amend on June 23, 1999. This may be

a timely Rule 59 motion. See Charles v. Daley,

799 F.2d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1986). As such, this

appeal may be premature, because it appears that

the district court has not disposed of the motion

and entered its order on the district court’s

civil docket. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff-appellant shall

file, on or before August 3, 1999, a brief

memorandum stating why this appeal should not be

STAYED pending the entry of the order disposing

of the [post-judgment] motion. A motion for

voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.

42(b) will satisfy this requirement. . . .

The following day, July 21st, the district court

denied Webb’s post-judgment motion. On July 26,

Webb filed in this Court a document entitled

"Judicial Memorandum-- Motion for Voluntary

Dismissal Pending a Final Order," requesting

dismissal of the appeal, No. 99-2725, pending the

district court’s final order. The motion stated

that Webb "filed his appeal within the 30 day

required period after the entry of judgment to

assure his time for appeal would be protected,

aware that a Rule 59 Motion would likely stay the

appeal." However, it went on to state that Webb

"hereby moves this Court to dismiss his appeal,

pending a final Order . . . ." We responded in an

order, dated August 30th, which stated: "the

motion for voluntary dismissal is GRANTED and

appeal no. 99-2725 is DISMISSED pursuant to

Fed.R.App.P. 42(b)."

 Prior to this grant, on August 24, Webb filed a

notice of appeal from the post-judgment order,

which was docketed as case No. 99-3189 on August

25th. On September 1, we issued the following

order: 

a notice of appeal in a civil case [must] be

filed in the district court within 30 days of the

entry of the judgment or order appealed. In this

case, the order denying plaintiff’s post-judgment

motion was entered on July 22, 1999, and the

notice of appeal was filed on August 24, 1999,

one day late. . . .
 [Appellant is ordered to] file a brief

memorandum stating why this appeal should not be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A motion for

voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P.

42(b) will satisfy this requirement. . . . If

appellant wishes to request an extension of time

in which to file the notice of appeal, he should

file an appropriate motion in the district court,

not this court, as soon as possible. Appellant’s

jurisdictional memorandum should include a

discussion of the status of any such motion.

In response to this order, on September 9, Webb

filed a document entitled "Status Report On

Extension of Time Within Which to File Notice of

Appeal of Post-Judgment Order." In the document

Webb stated that he was "withdraw[ing] his Notice

of Appeal of his Post-Judgment Motions" and

requested "that a briefing schedule be set on the

district court’s denial of summary judgment." On

September 14, the district court denied Webb’s

request for a time extension. On September 22, we

issued another order, which explained that we

construed the status report "as a motion to

dismiss this appeal," and ordered the appeal

dismissed. We denied a briefing schedule since we

deduced that Webb had "voluntarily dismissed his

appeal . . . ."

 On September 30, Webb filed a document named

"Motion to Reconsider Order of Court Dismissing

Appeal and to Recall Mandate of Dismissal and

Motion for Leave to Withdraw Dismissal of Appeal

in Case No. 99-2725." On November 12, we granted

Webb’s motion, stating that the "mandate in 99-

2725 is RECALLED and this appeal is REINSTATED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss

the appeal filed on August 25, 1999 [No. 99-3189]

is WITHDRAWN." Upon reinstatement, a briefing

schedule was set and oral arguments were

arranged. As mentioned, Choate challenged our

jurisdiction at oral argument.

 Choate argues that we lack jurisdiction because

once Webb’s appeal had been voluntarily

dismissed, it could not have been reinstated by

the September 30th motion because it was filed

outside the time limit for filing the original

notice of appeal. See Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d

1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the

court cannot "resurrect a notice of appeal after

the time provided by Fed.R. App.P. 4 for

commencing an appeal"; rather, it must be treated

as if "notice [was] never filed"). Choate further

contends that since Webb’s motion to reinstate

was too late, we "lack the power to reinstate"

the appeal. Webb counters that we have the

inherent power to recall our mandate, and

properly did so in this case. While we believe

Choate correctly states the law in Barrow, the
facts of this case do not fit squarely within

that case. Rather, we view this case as similar

to Patterson v. Crabb, 904 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir.

1990). In Barrow, after we issued an order worded

exactly as the July 20th order in this case, the

appellants voluntarily dismissed the appeal

rather than explain why we had jurisdiction. See

977 F.2d at 1102. The appellants later argued

that the appeal should be reinstated because of

judicial error. See id. We viewed this as a

strategic choice of the attorney, albeit a poor

one. See id. In Patterson, we dismissed the

appeal because we found no final order in the

record. See 904 F.2d at 1179. However, the final

order had been entered, but was overlooked. See

id. As in Patterson, the jurisdictional facts of

this case present a series of misunderstandings

between Webb and this Court. We now turn to

untangling them.

 The first gaffe occurred when Webb’s counsel

misinterpreted our July 20th order and merged the

options of submitting a memoranda to explain why

the appeal ought to be stayed, or move for

voluntary dismissal./1 This misinterpretation is

demonstrated in the title--"Judicial Memorandum--

Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Pending a Final

Order." Webb believed our order meant that "the

appeal would be temporarily dismissed but once

the order of the district court on the postjudgment motion was received, the appeal of the

summary judgment would be reinstated." We

interpreted Webb’s motion to be a full dismissal,

and not a memorandum explaining why the appeal

should be stayed. Webb, in turn, interpreted our

dismissal as a stay, probably because counsel had

wrongly labeled the motion a "voluntary

dismissal." 

 Webb failed to call our attention to the fact

that on July 21st, a day after our order was

entered, the district court had ruled on the

post-judgment motion. See 904 F.2d at 1179-80.

We, of course, wish that this matter had been

resolved earlier, but we believe this mix-up is

similar to that in Patterson. The fault lies with

a misinterpretation of this Court’s orders and

the mislabeling of the motion. There was also

judicial error in misreading the motion before

the appeal was dismissed. The motion asked for

both the appeal to be stayed and for it to be

dismissed. We ought to have caught the

discrepancy and sought a resolution.

 We have noted that we will only reinstate an

appeal in extraordinary circumstances. See United

States v. Holland, 1 F.3d 454, 455-56 (7th Cir.

1993) (citing Patterson, 904 F.2d at 1180). This

power will be used sparingly. Therefore, we must

emphasize that this is not a case in which only
counsel misunderstood the law. A misunderstanding

of the law or fact by counsel alone would not

compel us to reinstate an appeal. Rather, this is

a case of misinterpretations by both the Court

and counsel. However, as in Patterson, our

decision might be different if Choate had been

prejudiced by these events. See 904 F.2d at 1180.

We see no prejudice here. Both parties have been

laboring on this case since June of 1999, and the

issues were briefed and ready for oral argument

before this Court.

 As to our power to reinstate the appeal, we

again rely on Patterson, which reasoned that

"[t]he assertion of this power fills a gap in the

appellate rules and is well within the

traditional authority of the courts, properly

described as inherent, to regulate procedures in

them in the absence of legislatively prescribed

rules." Id.; see Holland, 1 F.3d at 455.

Therefore, we hold that we have jurisdiction to

hear this appeal. We now address Webb’s ADA

claim.

 B. Standard of Review

 Our review of the district court’s grant of

summary judgment for Choate is de novo. We must

construe all facts and inferences in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thus, the

district court’s grant of summary judgment will

be affirmed only if the record as a whole reveals

no genuine issue of material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment as

a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We

apply this standard with added rigor in

employment discrimination cases, where intent and

credibility are crucial issues. See Schmidt v.

Methodist Hosp. of Indiana, Inc., 89 F.3d 342,

343 (7th Cir. 1996).

 C. "Disability" under the ADA

 The ADA proscribes employers from discriminating

against: 

a qualified individual with a disability because

of the disability of such individual in regard to

job application procedures, the hiring,

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment.

42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). A qualified individual

is "an individual with a disability who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C.

sec. 12111(8). Therefore, we must first address

whether Webb’s condition qualifies as a

"disability" as defined under the ADA. 

 For the purposes of Webb’s claim, a disability

includes "a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C.

sec. 12102(2)(A); see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.

624, 631 (1998). "Substantially limits" means

that the person is either unable to perform a

major life function or is "significantly

[restricted in] the duration, manner or condition

under which [the] individual can perform a

particular major life activity, as compared to

the average person in the general population . .

. ." 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(j). With regard to the

major life activity of working, "substantially

limits" means the individual is "significantly

[restricted in] the ability to perform a class of

jobs or a broad range of jobs in various

classes." Weiler v. Household Finance Corp., 101

F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996). "Thus, an

individual is not substantially limited in

working just because he or she is unable to

perform a particular job for one employer, or

because he or she is unable to perform a

specialized job or profession requiring

extraordinary skill, prowess or talent"; instead,

"the impairment must substantially limit

employment generally." 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(j),

App. (1999); see Byrne v. Bd. of Educ., School of

West Allis-West Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7th

Cir. 1992). Webb has the burden of presenting

evidence to demonstrate that his impairment

limited an entire class of jobs. See Skorup v.

Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir.

1998); see also 29 U.S.C. sec. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)

(listing factors to assess the substantiality of

the impairment on plaintiff’s ability to work).

 Webb produced evidence that he suffers from

severe asthma, osteoporosis, and a weakened

immune system. Webb contends that his major life

activity of working is substantially impaired by

these conditions./2 The district court addressed

whether Webb was substantially impaired in the

major life activity of working, and concluded

that Webb was not disabled under the ADA because

his asthma, osteoporosis, and weakened immune

system did not substantially limit his employment

as a psychologist generally.

 Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable

to Webb, we affirm that Webb has not established

that he suffers from a disability under the ADA

because he has not presented evidence that his

condition prevents him from performing a class of

jobs. In Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., a
therapist with ADD brought suit under the ADA

because she was fired for her slowness in

dictating her notes from counseling sessions. See

133 F.3d 499, 503 (7th Cir. 1998). This Court

found that the therapist failed to show that

dictating was a skill other counseling positions

required, and thus held that the therapist was

not substantially limited in the major life

activity of working. See id. at 507. We

explained, "[a]t most, the evidence in this case

suggests as a result of ADD, Davidson was unable

to perform her job at Midelfort. Davidson has

come forward with no evidence from which one

might reasonably infer that ADD precluded her

even from holding other comparable positions as

a therapist. . . . and the record does not

suggest that ADD imposed other limitations on her

ability to function effectively in her role as a

counselor." Id. 

 Webb’s case is similar to Davidson; while

Webb’s condition may impair his ability to

perform in the specialized niche of psychology

practiced at Choate, which requires direct

interaction with violent and/or infectious

patients, Webb is not disabled as a psychologist

generally. Employment as a Psychologist I at

Choate does not resemble the typical sedentary

"office therapy" most commonly associated with

the profession. Rather, a psychologist at Choate

interacts with patients coping with intense

developmental problems. Many patients are housed

at Choate precisely because they exhibit

unpredictable violent behavior--the very behavior

Webb asserts he is unfit to counsel. Webb is not

precluded from employment as a psychologist in an

environment that does not house patients such as

those at Choate.

 Moreover, as noted by the district court, this

result is consistent with the explanation and

example provided in 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630(j). The

example involves an airline pilot who suffers

from a minor vision impairment, which

disqualifies him from employment with a

commercial airline. While this narrow category of

employment is foreclosed, the individual has the

option of employment as a co-pilot for a

commercial or courier airline. Similarly, Webb’s

condition forecloses his employment only in the

specialized niche of Choate psychologist, which

requires interaction with potentially violent

and/or infectious patients. Other counseling

positions are certainly not foreclosed. 

 Therefore, to overcome Choate’s summary judgment

motion, Webb would have had to provide some

evidence that would create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether his impairments

"substantially limited [him] from employment

generally." Skorup, 153 F.3d at 514 (citing
Byrne, 979 F.2d at 565). This has not been shown.

Without this evidence, we conclude that Webb is

not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA.

 D. "Qualified individual" under the ADA

 Even if Webb were disabled as defined under the

ADA, he failed to create a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether he is a qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA. As

recited, a qualified individual with a disability

is "an individual with a disability who, with or

without reasonable accommodation, can perform the

essential functions of the employment position

such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. sec.

12111(8). There is no violation of the ADA if

Webb cannot perform the essential functions of

his job. See Miller v. Illinois Dept. of

Corrections, 107 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1997).

Webb is not a qualified individual because he

cannot perform the essential functions of the

position of Psychologist I. 

 Choate is entitled to define the essential

functions of the job as Psychologist I. See 42

U.S.C. sec. 12111(8); Webster v. Methodist

Occupational Health Centers, Inc., 141 F.3d 1236,

1238 (7th Cir. 1998). Choate has shown that

direct interaction with patients is an essential

facet of Psychologist I. Webb contends that

"intentional" interaction with violent and/or

infectious patients is not an essential function

of the job. He claims that he could perform his

job if he could avoid "known" violent and/or

infectious patients. Webb explains that he is

willing to "accept the risk" of interaction with

patients whose violent tendencies and/or

illnesses are "unknown" to Choate. Given the

extreme working environment created by the

patients housed at Choate, Webb’s request to

restructure his position in this way wholly

undercuts the essential functions of the job.

 Unfortunately for Webb, the very essence of

working at Choate is to counsel violent and/or

infectious individuals. These are precisely the

types of patients in need of counseling by

psychologists at Choate. Perhaps interacting with

patients is not an essential element of the job

of psychologist generally, but it certainly is an

essential aspect of practicing psychology at a

mental health center like Choate. In light of

this, we conclude that Webb is not a qualified

individual with a disability because he cannot

perform the essential function of a Psychologist

I at Choate.

 E. "Reasonable accommodation" under the ADA
 Moreover, even if Webb had demonstrated that he

is a qualified individual with a disability who

can perform the essential functions of his job

with reasonable accommodations, Webb’s request

for exemption from intentional interaction with

known violent and/or infectious patients was not

reasonable. An employer is not required to

facilitate every accommodation a disabled

employee requests. See Gile v. United Airlines,

Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996). To avoid

violation, employers must make "reasonable

accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified

individual," unless the employer demonstrates

that the accommodation would unduly burden the

business. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). 

 The district court found that Webb’s requested

accommodations were not reasonable because it

would be impossible for a facility such as Choate

to constantly monitor the health or potential

violent behavior of the patients interacting with

Webb. Choate satisfied six of Webb’s eight

requests, but denied the two dealing with

restructuring his job. We repeat that the

position of Psychologist I at Choate requires

direct interaction with violent and/or infectious

patients. A request to avoid contact with these

patients is not reasonable. At the core, Webb’s

requests seem to ask Choate to change the type of

patients the facility serves in order to

accommodate his impairments. Such a request, of

course, is unreasonable.

 Further, we recognize Choate’s concern over who

would be responsible for determining whether and

when Webb could interact with a patient. We can

easily imagine that the line between patients

"known" and "unknown" to be violent and/or

infectious would be difficult to establish during

a typical day at Choate. As the district court

explained:

But how is the employer, as a practical matter,

to monitor or judge the situations which

plaintiff claims present the risk of potentially

violent behavior or potentially lethal illness?

Is the plaintiff to be judge of that or is the

employer the final arbiter? And in a situation

that is calm and suddenly becomes violent, it

seems to the court that other employee’s [sic]

safety is placed at risk if plaintiff is

compelled to step aside and wait for someone else

to deal with it. This situation is rife with

potential additional controversy.

Such an accommodation would place Choate on the

"razor’s edge" of being sued under the ADA for

denying Webb’s request or eventually being sued
for negligence if Webb’s health is put in

jeopardy by a "known" violent and/or infectious

patient. See, e.g., Palmer v. Circuit Court of

Cook County, Ill., 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir.

1997) (citations omitted). Webb’s last two

requests for accommodation were not reasonable

within the meaning of the ADA.

CONCLUSION

 We have jurisdiction over this appeal, and we

hold that Webb is not a "qualified individual

with a disability" within the meaning of the ADA.

The district court’s grant of summary judgment

for Choate is hereby AFFIRMED.

/1 As previously quoted, the July 20th order

requested a "brief memorandum stating why this

appeal should not be STAYED pending the entry of

the order disposing of the [post-judgment]

motion. A motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant

to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b) will satisfy this

requirement." As instructed in Barrow, the

language of this order gives counsel a strategic

choice between either: (1) submitting a memoranda

"explaining" why we have jurisdiction; or (2)

voluntarily "dismissing" the appeal. See 977 F.2d

at 1102. 

 As we have warned:

The staff attorneys examine the short record that

district courts transmit with the notice of

appeal and the jurisdictional statement that

Circuit Rule 3(c) requires of all appellants. A

quick review catches many problems but inevitably

overlooks the solutions to some. Thus the role of

the order to file jurisdictional memoranda: the

staff identifies what looks to be a problem and

asks the lawyers for their views, giving

appellant the option of voluntary dismissal if

counsel cannot find a solution. After counsel

state their views, the legal staff gives the

papers to the judges for decision. Counsel who

surrender, neglecting research and dismissing

appeals when they could have obtained judicial

resolution, have only themselves to blame.

Id. at 1102-03.

/2 In his brief, Webb argued that he is also

substantially limited in the major life activity

of breathing, and that "[d]espite the

documentation of plaintiff’s significant

limitation on the major life activity of

breathing, the district court concluded that

plaintiff was not a qualified person with a

disability because his asthma did not

substantially limit his employment generally."

The district court opinion addressed only the
major life activity of working. Webb asked this

Court to remand the case so that the district

court could analyze the major life activity of

breathing. We decline this request because Webb

did not adequately document this issue.

Furthermore, remand is unnecessary because we

find that Webb is not a "qualified individual

with a disability," and that Choate reasonably

accommodated him.