-. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ABSALOM F • JORDAN I JR. I 

Plaintiff, 

v. Civil Action No. 91-2428 (NHJ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION . . •. . ""; !. 

Plaintiff Absalom Jordan brings this action pursuant to 2 u.s.c. 

S 437g(a)(8)(A), appealing from the decision .of defendant Federal 

Election Commission ("FEC") to dismiss his complaint against Handgun 

Control Inc. and its separate segregated fund, Handgun Control, Inc. --

Political Action Committee (collectively, "HCI"). Plaintiff claims 

that because members of HCI lack sufficient control over the 

organization, they are not "members" within the meaning of 2 u.s.c. 

S 441b(b)(4)(C) and therefore cannot be the subject of solicitations by 

HCI. Defendant argues that plaintiff is barred from raising these 

claims because he is "in privity" with the National Rifle Association 

( "NRA"), an organization that previously litigated and lost similar 

claims before the FEC. Defendant also argues that previous FEC 

decisions have already resolved the issues plaintiff seeks to raise, 

and that the FEC therefore need not revisit them. Both parties have 

filed dispositive motions. 

BACKGROUND 

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ( "FECA") makes it 

"unlawful for . any corporation • . . to make a contribution or 

~ tJ) • "*.r 
expenditure in connection with" certain federal elections. 2 u.s.c. 

S 44lb(a). FECA also makes it unlawful "for a corporation, or a 

separate segregated fund established by a corporation, to solicit 

contributions to such a fund from any person other than its 

stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative 

personnel and their families." I d. § 44lb(b) ( 4) (A). FECA contains an 

exception to this rule, however, for it does not prevent "a corporation 

without capital stock, or a separate segregated fund established by 

a . . . corporation without capital stock, from soliciting 

contributions to such a fund from members of such corporation 

without capital stock." Id. § 44lb(b) ( 4) (C). 

From 1983 to 1992, the NRA filed several administrative complaints 

with the FEC arguing that HCI did not qualify as . a membership 

organization under S 44lb(b)(4)(C) and that HCI had therefore violated 

S 44lb(b) (4) by soliciting political contributions from people who were 

not HCI members. The NRA's first administrative complaint resulted in 

a 1984 conciliation agreement that required HCI to pay a civil penalty 

' ~ " and to amend the group's byl-aws. The NRA' s second administrative 

complaint alleged that HCI's amended bylaws still were inadequate to 

qualify it as a membership organization because they ( 1) failed to 

require that business of any sort be conducted at HCI 's annual 

membership meeting and (2) failed to establish members' right to elect 

a director tcr the governing board because members could only vote for 

"someone who had been preselected by the Board• and because the board 

retained the "power to remove any director without . cause," including 

the "preselected candidate chosen by the 'membership.'" The FEC 

dismissed the complaint in 198.5, concluding that "HCI ha• 

2 

~ ;···.a 
satisfactorily established rights of participation in the 

organization's affairs for those deemed members of the corporation." 

The NRA did not seek timely review of this dismissal. 

The NRA's third administrative complaint repeated the same claims 

with respect to annual meetings and board member elections that the FEC 

had already rejected in the NRA's second complaint. After the FEC 

dismissed the complaint, the NRA pursued an appeal that eventually led 

to affirmance of the dismissal by the United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia Circuit. See National Rifle Ass'n v. 

Federal Election Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The NRA then 

filed a fourth complaint in which it modified its argument with respect 

to board member elections by arguing that HCI's bylaws were 

insufficient because they did not permit HCI members to elect "all, ·or 

even a majority of the directors." The FEC dismissed this complaint on 

the ground that it raised an issue which had been resolved in the NRA's 

previous actions. The NRA's appeal once again resulted in affirmance 

of the FEC's dismissal. See National Rifle Ass'n v. Federal Election 

. .. Comm•n, No • . 89-3011 (D.E>.C. • Feb.- 27, 1992) (Johnson, J.), aff'd, 1993 

WL 52591 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 25, 1993). 

Meanwhile, in July 1990 plaintiff Absalom Jordan, a member of both 

the NRA and HCI, sued HCI in the Superior Court for the District of 

Columbia, arguing that HCI could not seek restrictions on possession of 

rifles and shotguns because its ,articles of incorporation stated that 

its purpose was to advocate "the control of handguns." In response to 

his suit, HCI amended its articles of incorporation ·to state that its 

purpose was to seek measures "for the prevention of gun violence. " 

Then, on November 8, 1990, plaintiff filed an administrative complaint 

3 
with the FEC charging that HCI was not a membership organization 

because it had amended HCI's arti cles of incorporation without 

providing its members with any notice or opportunity to participate in 

the decision. 1 The administrative complaint also raised the same legal 

issue with respect to board member elections as the NRA • s fourth 

complaint. 2 The FEC dismissed plainti ff's complaint, stating: 

• . • 'il 

This complaint presents a claim which is substantially 

similar to that which has been previously made against 

the same Respondents in four prior complaints; that 

HCI's bylaws do not provide members with sufficient 

rights of control in the governance of the organization 

to qualify it as a membership organization. The 

Commission has already determined what rights HCI must 

provide to its members for it to be in compliance with 

the Act, and the Commission has concluded that HCI's 

current bylaws satisfy those requirements. See [NRA's 

first, second, and third administrative complaints]. 

The issue raised in the instant matter has been 

conclusively resolved. This complaint amounts to 

another request that the Commission reconsider its 

prior decisions. 

Administrative Record at 188. Plaintiff's appeal of this decision has 

resulted in the instant action. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Res Judicata Does Not Bar This Action 

The FEC ·claims that the NRA has funded and controlled plaintiff's 

lawsuit, and that plaintiff therefore is "in privity" with the NRA. 

---

His complaint~s time-barred, according to the FEC, because it amounts 

to nothing more than yet another appeal of the NRA's second 

1. Jordan and HCI stipulated to dismissal of the Superior Court action on 

January 29, 1991. 

2. The parties agree that the two complaints raise the same legal issue v1tb 

r espect to the board elections. ~ Mem. in Support of Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 7. 

. ..· '· 4 
administrative complaint, which the NRA failed to appeal in 1985. 

However, even if the FEC' s allegations of control are true, res 

judicata (also known as "claim preclusi on") cannot apply here because 

a case involving different parties is, by definition, a different cause 

of action. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.s. 14 7, 154 ( 1979) 

( " ( T 1 he cause of action which a nonparty has vicariously asserted 

differs by definition from that which he subsequently seeks to litigate 

in his own right.") The FEC correctly notes that " ( u 1 nder res 

judicata, a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties 

or their privies based on the same cause of action." Id. at 153. For 

res judicata purposes, however, the definition of "privity" does not 

encompass persons who con~rplle4 -p;revious litigation, but instead 

applies to parties who already have a close relationship to a suit, 

such as those who acquire an interest i n the subject matter of a suit 

after it is filed (~, successors to property) and those who sue on 

behalf of others (~, trustees and executors). Jack H. Friedenthal 

et al., Civil Procedure S 14.13, at 685-86 (2d ed. 1993). Because 

Jordan asserts the instant claim in his own right, this case does not 

involve the same "cause of action" as the NRA complaints and res 

judicata therefore does not apply. 

B. collater~Bstoppel Does Hot Bar This Action -~ :":';_......._ ... ..,. 

Under tn doctrine of collateral estoppel (also known as "issue 

·. preClUSiOn") 1 "OnCe an iSSUe iS aCtUally and necess-arily·., cmterznined by 

a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in 

subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party 

to the prior litigation.• Montana, 440 u.s. at 153. Furthermore, "(a) 

·• . . · .;,.-

. ·.-. 
person who is not a party to an action but who controls or 

substantially participates in the control of the presentation on behalf 

of a party is bound by the determination of issues decided as though he 

were a party." Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 39 ( 1982); ~ also 

Montana, 440 u.s. at 154. The FEC argues that the NRA has exercised a 

high degree of control over this litigation, and that plaintiff 

therefore should be estopped from reopening the same issues that the 

NRA has already litigated and lost. Specifically, the FEC claims that 

NRA Legislative Counsel Richard Gardiner (1) selected Jordan to be the 

plaintiff in this case, (2) personally recruited Stephen Halbrook to 

serve as counsel for him, ( 3) completely funded plaintiff's legal 

actions, (4) provided Halbrook with copie~ of · pleadings previously 

filed by the NRA, ( 5) defined plaintiff's litigation strategy, ( 6) 

communicated more often with Halbrook than plaintiff himself did, and 

( 7) exercised total control over the litigation by retaining the 

absolute right to cut off funding if the litigation proceeded in what 

Gardiner believed to be the "wrong direction." 

The Restatement of Judgments has set forth the elements that a 

court should consider in determining whether one party has exercised 

sufficient control over another to be bound by the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel: 

~- - To n! xa: control of litigation requires that a person hav~ effective choice as to the legal theories and 

proof&!_-- t .o be advanced in behalf of the party to the 

action. He must also have control over the opportunity 

to obtain review. Whether his involvement in the 

action is extensive enough to constitute control is a 

question of fact, to be resolved with reference to 

these criteria. It is sufficient that the choices were 

in the hands of counsel responsible to the controlling 

person1 moreover, the requisite opportunity may exist 

even when it is shared with other persons. It is not 

6 
sufficient, however, that the person merely contributed 

funds or advice in support of the party, supplied counsel to the party, or appeared as amicus curiae. 

Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 39 cmt. c (1982). The FEC has not 

demonstrated that the NRA exercised control over the instant litigation 

to such a degree. The FEC has only managed to show that the NRA paid 

plaintiff's legal bills, provided copies of NRA pleadings to Halbrook 

and communicated with Halbrook regularly. See Exs. 45-49 to Def.'s 

Mot. summ. J.; Dep. of Richard Gardiner at 120-21, 142-43. 3 

This showing does not establish privity because mere contributions 

of "funds or advice" cannot amount to control. Gardiner testified that 

when the NRA funds litigation it always requests attorneys to file 

draft briefs and regular status reports, and that the NRA's role is 

limited to reading the briefs, editing them, and offering suggestions 

and advice. Dep. of Richard Gardiner at 12-13, 24, 152-53. He also 

testified that the NRA maintains a brief bank for use in all the cases 

it funds, and that by providing Halbrook with copies of previous 

pleadings the NRA hoped to reduce the cost of this litigation by 

eliminating the need to "reinvent the wheel." Id. at 15, 121, 142-43. 

He noted that the NRA defers to the attorneys• judgment on tactical 

questions and recognizes that attorneys must act in their clients' best 

interests, even when those interests are contrary to the interests of .. So: -· .. ' 

the NRA. r®r:.at~ 30-32:. --:.-· :;:~ 

Nothin<j-in the record indicates that the NRA possessed "effective 

choice as to the legal theories" to be advanced in this litigation. To 

3. Whether Gardiner "selected" Jordan to be the plaintiff in thia 

case or "personally recruited" Halbrook is irrelevant to the question 

of control as defined by the Restatement. 

7 

. ; · ... 
the contrary, Gardiner testified that he believed Halbrook was very 

experienced, that he was "very confident" of Halbrook's abilities, and 

that for this reason he was likely to s upervise Halbrook's activities 

even less than he might in other NRA-funded cases. Id. at 23-24, 36-

37. Nor did the NRA possess "control over the opportunity to obtain 

review." Gardiner testified that the NRA would never had funded 

Jordan's appeal of the FEC's decision if Jordan had not himself first 

expressed an interest in pursuing an appeal. See id. at 132. 

The FEC also argues that the NRA exercises control over this 

litigation because it retains the absolute right to cut off funding if 

the litigation proceeds in the "wrong direction." See id. at 29. The 

Court rejects this argument. In the first place, the Court notes that 

Gardiner could not recall a single instance when such a cutoff had 

occurred, and there is certainly no evidence that Gardiner ever 

threatened to cut off funding in this case. See id. at 29-30. 

Furthermore, even if the NRA were to decide to cut off funding to a 

case, it would still continue to pay the plaintiff's legal fees up to 

the agreed-upon maximum figqrer ., 4 .. • • 

See id. at 29. Most important, 

however, the FEC's argument is incorrect because the Restatement has 

established that a nonparty does not control litigation merely because 

it contributes funds or supplies counsel. Implicit in a nonparty's 

decision to provide counsel to a party is the assumption that the 

nonparty may.:.::-.Iater withdraw its support. Under the FEC • s reasoning, ··--· 

however, these nonparties would be bound by collateral estoppel because 

their right to withdraw support would constitute control. This 

position conflicts with_ the Restatement and the Court therefore refuses 

to accept it. The FEC has therefore failed to show that the NRA is in 

8 
control of the instant litigation, and the Court accordingly rejects 

the FEC' s argument that collateral estoppel prevents Jordan from 

proceeding with this case. 

c. The FEC's Decision Was Not Contrary to Law 

Under 2 u.s.c. S 437g(a)(8), "[a]ny party aggrieved" by the FEC's 

dismissal of a complaint may petition the United States District Court 

for the District of Colwnbia, which "may declare that the dismissal of 

the complaint or the action, or the failure to act, is contrary to law" 

and order the FEC to conform with the court's declaration. The FEC's 

decision is "contrary to law" if (1) the FEC dismissed the complaint as 

a result of an impermissible interpretation of . the FECA, or (2) the ... ' • li .. 

FEC's dismissal of the complaint, under a permissible interpretation of 

the statute, was arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 

Orloski v. Federal Election Comm'n1 795 F.2d 156 1 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 

In determining whether an interpretation of the FECA is 

permissible, a court's task is 

not to interpret the statute · as it [thinks] best but 

rather the narrower inquiry into whether the 

Commission • s construction was "sufficiently reasonable" 

to be accepted by a reviewing court. To satisfy this 

standard it is not necessary for a court to find that 

the agency's construction was the only reasonable one 

or even the reading the court would have reached if the 

questi_on. initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. 

Federal Elecifion' Conun'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campafgn Comm., 454 

U.s. 27 1 39 ( 1981) (citations omitted). To determine whether the FEC' a 

construction of a statute is "sufficiently reasonable" the court muat 

examine the legislation itself 1 using traditional tools 

of statutory construction, to ascertain if its intent 

.. ~ '·· ... 9 
·-

is clear. Clear congressional intent derived from the 

plain language or legislative history of the statute 

dictates [the] result. However, where "the statute and 

its history are silent or ambiguous with respect to a 

specific issue," the agency's construction, if 

reasonable, must ordinarily be honored. 

Common Cause v. Federal Election Comm'n, 842 F.2d 436, 439 (D.C. Cir. 

1988) (citations omitted) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 u.s. 837, 843 (1984)). 

As explained above, the dispute in this case focuses upon the 

definition of a "membership organization" under 2 u.s.c. 

S 441b(b)(4)(C). The statute does not itself define the term. The 

Supreme Court, in discussing the legislative history of the statute, 

came to the conclusion that "some relatively enduring and independently ·-~ . ' < .... ., ;, . . 

significant financial or organizational attachment is required to be a 

'member' under S 4 41b (b) ( 4) (C) , " but observed that " [ t] here may be more 

than one way under the statute to go about determining who are 

'members' of a nonprofit corporation." Federal Election Comm' n v. 

National Right to Work Comm., 459 u.s. 197, 204, 211 (1982). The FEC 

defines a "member" as a person who is "currently satisfying the 

requirements for membership in a membership organization" and specifies 

that a person is not a "member" if the only membership requirement is 

contribution · to a segregated fund, standing alone. 11 C.P.R. 

S 114.1(e) (1993). Following the Supreme Court's decision in National 

Right to Wort;:·committee, FEC advisory opinions further refined this 

definition to include persons who "have ( 1) some ri.g~t:... t!' ~articipate 

in the governance of the organization and (2) an obligation to help 

sustain the organization through regular financial contributions of a 

predetermined amount. " Solicitation of Non-Voting Members, 2 Fed. 

.10. . . - -

. . 
Election. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) ! 5815, at 11,171 (1985) (No. AO 1985-

11); ~also Solicitation of Doctors, 2 Fed. Election Camp. Fin. Guide 

(CCH) ! 5893, at 11,369 (1987) (No. AO 1987-13). 

The FEC applied these standards to HCI in 1985 when it ruled on 

the NRA's second administrative complaint. The FEC observed: 

We note, first of all, that HCI has instituted by-laws 

establishing annual meetings for members and 

authorizing the nomination and election of a "Memberat-Large" of the Board by members of HCI. While a 

Nominating Committee screens such nominees to assure 

that only persons who ha ( ve] demonstrated their support 

of HCI's principles become candidates, this procedure 

appears to satisfy the requirements of the [ 1984 

conciliation) agreement. The Governing Board, to be 

sure, retains the power to remove Directors, but this 

clause applies equally to all Directors, and not solely 

to those elected at-large by the- membership. 

Consequently, it appears that HCI has satisfactorily 

established rights of participation in the 

organization's affairs for those deemed members of the 

corporation. 

Ex. 59 to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 4-5. Plaintiff argues that this 

conclusion is incorrect because the Supreme Court, in National Right to 

Work Committee, observed that "members" of groups like HCI should be 

defined,· "at least in part, by analogy to stockholders of business 

corporations and members of labor unions.• 459 u.s. at 204. Plaintiff 

notes that stockholders and union members can remove their management 

if they disagree. with its policies, whereas members of HCI cannot. 

Plaintiff t~~~?re argues that HCI cannot be considered a membership 

organizatiodi-'"until its members have "real power to vote for board 

members" just like stockholders in a private corporation. Plaintiff 

also argues that HCI cannot possibly be considered a membership 

organization so long as its board of directors has the power to change 

HCI's Articles of Incorporation without the consent of the membership. 

11 
Despite plaintiff's objections, the Court finds the FEC's 

interpretation of S 44lb(b)(4)(C) to be permissible under Chevron. As 

noted above, the statute itself is silent on the definition of 

"membership" and the Supreme court, after analyzi~g the legislative 

history of S 44lb(b)(4)(C), concluded that "some relatively enduring 

and independently significant financial or organizational attachment is 

required to be a 'member•" within the meaning of the section. 459 u.s. 

at 204. The Court did not define the nature of this "attachment," and 

did not even require that the attachment involve member control over 

the organization. It merely specified that there must be "some" 

attachment between the organization and its members, and that this 

attachment must be "independent" of members' responses to the 

organization 1 s mass solicitations. The Court certainly did not require 

that members be provided with the opportunity to seize total control of 

the organization, as plaintiff argues. Nevertheless, the FEC has 

interpreted National Right to Work Committee as requiring_ organizations 

to give their members "some right to participate in the governance of 

the organization• before soliciting them for contributions under 

S 44lb(b)(4)(C). Neither the supreme Court nor the legislative history 

of the statute dictate any other requirement. Nor has plaintiff 

presented any authority directly contradicting the FEC's conclusion 

that HCI 1 s l?x!a~a provide its members with "some• power to control ;: ..... 1" .. _·. -:· 

.y • .,. ...... 

HCI' s affaiJl'~ .: . In the absence of any such contradiction, the Court -"::--~ --' '-

must conclude that· the FEC 1 S interpretation of the statute is 

permissible. ~ Chevron, 467 u.s. at 842-43; see also Common Cause, 

842 F. 2d at 448 (noting that deference to the FEC "is particularly 

appropriate" when the FEC is interpreting the FECA). 

12 

·. .., ;· ·-.. 
. . Having reached this conclusion, the Court need only determine 

whether the FEC' s dismissal of plaintiff's administrative complaint was 

arbitrary and capricious. See Orloski, 795 F.2d at 161. The Court 

concludes that it was not. The FEC correctly noted in its opinion that 

a series of previous decisions had "conclusively resolved" the issues 

plaintiff raised. An agency's scrupulous adherence to precedent is 

hardly arbitrary. Cf. Association of Data Processing Serv. orqs. v. 

Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 

1984) (noting that "abrupt and unexplained departure from agency 

precedent" amounts to arbitrary and capricious action). Plaintiff also 

argues that the FEC acted arbitrarily by refusing even to consider his 

argument that HCI is not a membership .organization because its 

directors can change HCI 's Articles of Incorporation without consulting 

its members. This refusal makes perfect sense, however, because the 

FEC has already determined that HCI provides its members with 

sufficient power to qualify HCI as a membership organization. Whether 

HCI decides to provide its members with some additional power -- such 

as the right to approve .,a.I!lel1,dm,el\ts to the Articles of Incorporation --

is therefore irrelevant. 

For these reasons, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion for 

summary judgment and grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. An 

appropriate o~de~ will. issue. 

·-"·· -

·· .. ~·~:- J -. 

13 
• 

f • UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

ABSALOM F • JORDAN I JR. I 

Plaintiff, 

v. Civil Action No. 91-2428 (NHJ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

;~ 

~. ... ..._., 

- - -- . . --· ; · - .. .. - J .. -~;._ 

~ .;; .... -. ~.: ~.~ 

For the reasons set forth in the memor~ndbm opinion issued today, • • • • -.1 

it is this 27th day of May, 1994, 

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be, and 

hereby is, denied; it is further 

ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and 

hereby is, granted; and it is further 

ORDERED that judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor of 

. defendant Federal Election Commission. 

•::·..:-. JUDGE 

,.· '··