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No. _________ 

================================================================ 

In The 

Supreme Court of the United States ----♦-- -

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ADAMS, et al., 

Appellants, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., 

Appellees. 

----♦-- -

On Appeal To The United States District Court, 

District Of Columbia 

----♦-- -

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 

----♦-- -

BONITA P. TENNERIELLO 

Counsel of Record 

JOHN C. BONIFAZ 

LISA J. DANETZ 

BRENDA WRIGHT 

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS 

INSTITUTE 

27 School Street 

Suite 500 

Boston, MA 02108 

(617) 624-3900 

DAVID A. WILSON


AVI SAMUEL GARBOW


HALE AND DORR LLP 


1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 


10th Floor 

Washington, DC 20004 

(202) 942-8400 

Attorneys for Appellants 

================================================================ COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 
i 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that a 

challenge to the increased “hard money” contribution 

limits found in sections 304, 307 and 319 of the Bipartisan 

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-

155, 116 Stat. 81, 97-100, 102-03, and 109-112 (codified as 

amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 441a-1) is nonjusticiable 

due to lack of cognizable injury, even though the increases 

will confer preponderant electoral power on wealthy 

donors and will effectively exclude candidates and voters 

without access to networks of large donors from electoral 

participation, in violation of the equal protection guarantee incorporated by the due process clause of the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
ii 

PARTIES 

Actual parties to the proceedings in the United States 

District Court were: 

(1) Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton, 

Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald, 

Anurada Joshi, Nancy Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose 

Taylor, Stephanie L. Wilson, California Public Interest 

Research Group, Massachusetts Public Interest Research 

Group, New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, 

United States Public Interest Research Group, Fannie Lou 

Hamer Project, and Association Of Community Organizers 

For Reform Now, plaintiffs, appellants herein, 

(2) The United States of America, defendant, 

(3) The Federal Communications Commission, defendant, 

(4) The Federal Election Commission, defendant, 

(5) John Ashcroft, in his capacity as Attorney General of the United States, defendant, 

(6) Sen. John McCain, Sen. Russell Feingold, Rep. 

Christopher Shays, Rep. Martin Meehan, Sen. Olympia 

Snowe, and Sen. James Jeffords, defendant-intervenors. 
iii 

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 

None of the appellants has a parent corporation, and 

no publicly held company owns 10% or more of the stock of 

any of the appellants. 
iv 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Table of Authorities .................................................... v 


Opinions Below........................................................... 1 


Jurisdiction................................................................. 1 


Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... 1 


Statement of the Case ................................................ 2 


A. 	 The electoral exclusion of candidates lacking 


personal wealth or access to large networks


of wealthy donors............................................. 3 


B. 	 The exclusion of non-wealthy voters from the 


electoral process .............................................. 4 


C. 	 The predominance of monied interests in the


electoral process .............................................. 6 


D. The entrenchment of incumbents ................... 9 


E. 	The further exclusionary effects of the 


“millionaire” provisions ................................... 10 


F. Proceedings in district court ........................... 11


Reasons for Noting Probable Jurisdiction ................. 12 


A.	 The appellants have presented a cognizable


injury implicating core constitutional values


of equality ........................................................ 12 


B. 	 The appellants’ injuries are fairly traceable 


to the BCRA..................................................... 19 


Conclusion .................................................................. 23 

v 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page 

CASES: 

Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996) ....................... 20 


Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983)..................... 13 


Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).................................... 14 


Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000)................ 17, 18 


Buchanan v. FEC, 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000) ....... 17 


Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)........................ 15, 16, 21 


Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) .................. 12, 13, 14 


Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)........................... 12 


FEC v. Mass Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 


(1986) .............................................................................. 15 


Fulani v. Brady, 953 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991)............... 17 


Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 


F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989) ............................................. 13, 17 


Ga. State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 


183 F.3d. 1259 (11th Cir. 1999)................................ 13, 20 


Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)................................ 14 


Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663


(1966) .............................................................................. 12 


Int’l Assn. of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092 


(D.C. Cir. 1982)................................................... 12, 17, 18 


Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).......................... 12, 13 


Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ......... 20 


NAACP Los Angeles Branch v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317


(9th Cir. 1997)................................................................. 20 

vi 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 

Page 

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 


U.S. 377 (2000) ......................................................... 15, 16 


Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ............ 12, 14, 15, 16


Vote Choice Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.


1993).................................................................... 12, 17, 20 


Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)............................. 23 


Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) ......................... 14 


White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) .............................. 14 


CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES: 

U.S. Const., Amend. V.................................................1, 2, 11


Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, 


Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)......................... 1 


Title III 


§ 304, 116 Stat. 97....................................................2, 11


§ 307, 116 Stat. 102....................................................... 2 


§ 319, 116 Stat. 109..................................................2, 11


Title IV


§ 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. 113-14 ......................................... 1 


OTHER AUTHORITIES: 

Center for Responsive Politics, “John R. Edwards: 


Politician Profile,” available at http://www.opensecrets.


org/1998os/index/N00002283.htm ................................. 19 


Ronald Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions

of Democracy, in IF BUCKLEY FELL 63 (E. Joshua


Rosenkranz ed., 1999) .................................................... 22 

vii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued 

Page 

Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 

Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986) ................................................ 21 

Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered 

Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. 

Rev. 1055 (1999).............................................................. 21 

Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Bush’s Heaviest Hitters to 

Be Called Rangers,” New York Times, May 24, 

2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 

05/24/politics/campaigns/24DONA.html?ex=1054 

353600&en=ff0eeb59d76f3bb5&ei=5062&partner 

=GOOGLE ........................................................................ 8 

Sharon Theimer, “Bush Volunteer Fund-Raising 

Group Formed,” Associated Press, May 23, 2003, 

available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/ 

wp-dyn/A30660-2003May23.html.................................... 8 

U.S. Census Bureau, “Income 2001,” available at 

http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/income01/inc 

tab1. html.......................................................................... 5 

U.S. PIRG, “Presidential Candidates Getting More 

Money from Big Donors,” available at http://www. 

pirg.org/democracy/democracy.asp?id2=9950 ................. 7 
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1 

OPINIONS BELOW 

The opinions of the three-judge United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia are not yet reported. In 

accordance with this Court’s order of May 15, 2003 (Nos. 

02-M-98 and 02-M-99), they are omitted from the appendix 

that is bound with this jurisdictional statement and will 

be reprinted in a single appendix to be filed on behalf of all 

appellants. 

----♦-- -

JURISDICTION 

The final judgment of the court below was entered on 

May 2, 2003. The Adams appellants, Victoria Jackson 

Gray Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek 

Cressman, Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Nancy 

Russell, Kate Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie L. 

Wilson, California Public Interest Research Group, Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, New Jersey 

Public Interest Research Group, United States Public 

Interest Research Group, Fannie Lou Hamer Project, and 

Association Of Community Organizers For Reform Now, 

filed their notice of appeal on May 4, 2003. See Appendix 

(“App.”) 1a. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 

the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, 

Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 113-114 

(2002). 

----♦-- -

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 

PROVISIONS INVOLVED 

This constitutional challenge is brought pursuant to 

the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
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2 

United States Constitution, set forth at App. 3a. The 

challenged sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance 

Reform Act of 2002 are codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 

441a-1 and set forth beginning at App. 4a. 

----♦-- -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

The case arises out of radical increases in the limits 

on individual campaign contributions contained in the 

Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 

§§ 304, 307 and 319, 116 Stat. 81, 97-100, 102-03, and 109-

112 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a and 441a-1). 

These provisions raise the amount that an individual may 

contribute to a federal campaign from $1,000 per election 

to $2,000 per election. BCRA § 307. The individual contribution limit is further raised in races where a candidate 

faces an opponent who has spent over a threshold amount 

in personal funds. Under such circumstances, a candidate 

for Representative may receive individual contributions of 

up to $3,000 per election, and a Senate candidate may 

receive individual contributions of up to $12,000 per 

election. BCRA §§ 304 and 319. 

The appellants are candidates lacking personal wealth 

and access to large networks of wealthy donors; nonwealthy voters supporting such candidates; and organizations representing the interests of non-wealthy voters. 

They assert that the increased contribution limits deprive 

them of the equal opportunity to participate in all integral 

aspects of the electoral process, in violation of the equal 

protection guarantee incorporated by the due process 

clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. Voluminous evidence submitted by the 
3 

appellants demonstrates that by increasing exponentially 

the amount of money that the highest donors can give to 

their favored candidates, the challenged BCRA provisions 

will magnify the influence of the wealthy in the electoral 

process to such an extent that candidates lacking personal 

wealth or access to large networks of high donors will 

effectively be excluded from electoral competition. The 

ruling of the three-judge district court, that the appellants 

lack standing because there is no cognizable injury fairly 

traceable to the BCRA, Per Curiam op. at 10-11; Henderson op. at 339-343, fails to take adequate account of this 

evidence. 

A. 	 The electoral exclusion of candidates lacking 

personal wealth or access to large networks 

of wealthy donors. 

Under the BCRA hard money limit increases, candidates without access to networks of wealthy donors will be 

effectively excluded from seeking political office, as the 

war chests of well-connected candidates grow and the 

financial bar rises far beyond the reach of those lacking 

such connections. Candidates with a financial advantage 

nearly always win elections, and won congressional office 

94 percent of the time in the 2000 general election. Adams 

Exh. 1, Declaration and Expert Report of Derek Cressman 

(“Cressman Decl.”), ¶2, App. 22a. A large proportion of 

winning campaigns are funded through maximum contributions; maximum donations made up 60 percent of the 

individual funds raised by winning candidates in the 2000 

election cycle. Id. ¶5. These pandemic realities are confirmed by numerous individuals who have previously run 

for federal office and are considering doing so again, but 

who testified that BCRA increases would deter them from 
4 

future candidacies because they lack access to large 

networks of maximum donors.1

 Senator Russell Feingold, a 

defendant-intervenor and a co-sponsor of BCRA, admitted 

that the hard money limit increases will likely further 

enable certain candidates to build up campaign war 

chests, “potentially discourag[ing] some people from 

running” for federal office. Deposition of Russell Feingold 

(“Feingold Deposition”), September 9, 2002, 264, line 14 to 

265, line 3. 

B.	 The exclusion of non-wealthy voters from the 

electoral process. 

In opposing the hard money limit increases, Senator 

Christopher Dodd eloquently described how increased 

hard money limits would marginalize the great majority of 

voters to the point of “de facto exclusion.” 

[W]hat are we doing here by raising these 

amounts? We are moving further and further and 

further away from the overwhelming majority of 

Americans. I would like to see the average 

American participate in the electoral process of 

the country . . . I do not see many campaigns that 

are going to bother any longer with smaller donors. It is the de facto exclusion of more than 99 

percent of the American adult population who 

could support, financially, the political process in 

this country, that worries me the most. 

1 See Adams Exh. 19, Declaration of Dr. Thomas A. Caiazzo, App. 

79a; Adams Exh. 20, Declaration of Gail Crook, App. 83a; Adams Exh. 

21, Declaration of Victor Morales, App. 88a; Adams Exh. 22, Declaration of Cynthia Brown (“Brown Decl.”), App. 93a; Adams Exh. 23, 

Declaration of Ted Glick (“Glick Decl.”), App. 96a. 
5 

Congressional Record – Senate, March 27, 2001, S2965 

(emphasis added). 

If elite donors are permitted to double the hard money 

they now channel to their favorite candidates, the candidates favored by non-wealthy voters and communities will 

not stand a chance. Most Americans are unable to make 

contributions anywhere near the BCRA limit. A $2,000 

contribution would represent nearly five percent of the 

median U.S. family income, which U.S. Census Bureau 

data puts at $42,228. See U.S. Census Bureau, “Income 

2001,” available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/ 

income01/inctab1.html. The $12,000 limit applicable in 

some races under the millionaire provisions would represent over 28 percent of median income. 

The ability of the average person to have a meaningful 

impact on elections will diminish as the electoral weight of 

the largest donors increases. Voter-plaintiffs and other 

non-wealthy voters have testified that the hard money 

increases would make their vote less meaningful, and that 

they would therefore be discouraged from forms of electoral participation such as volunteering, making small 

contributions, and even voting itself. As one voter-plaintiff 

testified, “[t]he increases in the hard money contribution 

limits make it no longer conceivable that I can access the 

political process. They undermine the meaning and value 

of my vote.” Adams Exh. 25, Declaration of Carrie Bolton 

(“Bolton Decl.”), ¶12, App. 106a.2

 Representatives Hilliard 

2 See also Adams Exh. 24, Declaration of Victoria Jackson Gray 

Adams (“Adams Decl.”) ¶5, App. 101a (“The largest donors get more 

attention, and when the ceiling is raised the voices of small contributors 

and voters like myself will be lost.”); Adams Exh. 30, Declaration of 

(Continued on following page) 
6 

and Thompson testified that the increases will harm the 

ability of low- and moderate-income communities, and 

communities of color, to elect the representatives of their 

choice.3 

C.	 The predominance of the high donors in the 

electoral process. 

The appellants presented substantial, uncontroverted 

evidence that the challenged provisions would give grossly 

disproportionate weight in the electoral process to a small 

portion of the population able to contribute the maximum 

amount permitted. Only a small minority of the voting-age 

population, 0.11 percent, gave maximum hard money 

contributions to federal candidates in the 2000 election 

cycle, yet these contributions constituted nearly half of all 

individual funds raised. Cressman Decl. ¶¶4-5, App. 22a23a. These highest donors come disproportionately from 

the ranks of corporate management and wealthy communities, and are overwhelmingly white and male. See Adams 

Exh. 2, Declaration and Expert Report of Prof. John Green, 

¶3 (“Green Decl.”), App. 31a. The challenged increases in 

Chris Saffert, ¶18, App. 125a-126a (“The effect of the contribution limit 

increases will be to drown out the voices of people from low and 

moderate-income communities . . .”); Adams Exh. 26, Declaration of 

Daryl Irland, App. 107a; Adams Exh. 27, Declaration of Anuradha 

Joshi; Adams Exh. 28, App. 110a, Declaration of Howard Lipoff, App. 

113a; Adams Exh. 29, Declaration of Nancy Russell, App. 116a; Adams 

Exh. 31, Declaration of Kate Seely-Kirk, App. 127a; Adams Exh. 32, 

Declaration of Stephanie L. Wilson, App. 130a. 

3 See Thompson Deposition, 87, lines 9-12 (“[B]y doubling the hard 

money contribution, you price low and moderate communities out of the 

market for electoral participation”); Hilliard Deposition, 103, lines 4-7. 
7 

BCRA will “result in increased giving by the elite pool of 

individual donors to federal campaigns,” Id., ¶4, and 

would permit this elite group to double the disproportionate weight they already enjoy in the electoral process. 

Indeed, analysis of FEC data for the first quarter of 2003 

shows that fully 80 percent of funds raised for primary 

campaigns came from donors giving over $1,000. See U.S. 

PIRG, “Presidential Candidates Getting More Money from 

Big Donors,” available at http://www.pirg.org/democracy/ 

democracy.asp?id2=9950. 

Candidates with networks of maximum donors are 

able to further augment their fundraising advantage by 

encouraging these donors to bundle (i.e. solicit or facilitate) maximum contributions from business associates, 

friends and family members. Adams Exh. 3, Declaration 

and Expert Report of Craig McDonald (“McDonald Decl.”) 

¶5, App. 47a. The BCRA hard money limit increases will 

multiply the amounts bundled by well-connected donors, 

giving these donors even greater electoral power. Candidates lacking networks of large donors will be even more 

greatly disadvantaged when faced with sophisticated 

bundling operations. 

The Bush Pioneer program – the hard money bundling operation employed in the 2000 election cycle by the 

George W. Bush Presidential Exploratory Committee, Inc., 

and its successor organization, the George W. Bush For 

President Committee – exemplifies the disproportionate 

electoral influence that bundlers enjoy. Each Pioneer was 

responsible for gathering at least $100,000 in hard money 

contributions, and the 212 Pioneers channeled over $22 

million to the 2000 Bush presidential campaign. Id., ¶13, 

App. 53a. Under the BCRA increases, this small group 

could have potentially collected twice as much from the 
8 

same number of donors. In fact, press accounts indicate 

that the Bush campaign for 2004 is asking a new group, 

called “Texas Rangers,” to bundle at least $200,000 each. 

See Sharon Theimer, “Bush Volunteer Fund-Raising Group 

Formed,” Associated Press, May 23, 2003, available at; http:// 

www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30660-2003May 

23.html; Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Bush’s Heaviest Hitters 

to Be Called Rangers,” New York Times, May 24, 2003, 

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/24/politics/ 

campaigns/24DONA.html?ex=1054353600&en=ff0eeb59d76f 

3bb5&ei=5062&partner=GOOGLE. 

The Pioneer program also demonstrates that those 

who bundle contributions often do so with the aim of 

gaining enhanced access and influence with elected 

officials. The Pioneers – who were comprised largely of 

corporate executives and lobbyists, McDonald Decl., ¶10, 

App. 50a-51a – were each assigned a tracking number so 

that the Bush Campaign could record the total amount of 

money raised by each individual. See id., ¶15; Deposition 

of John L. Oliver III, 30(b)(6) witness on behalf of Bush for 

President, Inc., 46, line 10 to 57, line 11, 106, lines 10-16. 

As wealthy individuals such as the Pioneers are increasingly able to determine electoral outcomes under BCRA, 

they will also expand their ability to influence legislative 

outcomes. A wealth of evidence documents the disproportionate access and influence that maximum donors and 

bundlers enjoy in Congress.4 

4 See Adams Exh. 18, Declaration of Pat Williams, former Member 

of Congress from Montana, ¶4 (“Williams Decl.”), App. 77a (“There is no 

doubt in my mind that those giving the largest contributions expect 

preferential access and disproportionate influence”); Adams Exh. 17, 

(Continued on following page) 
9 


D. The entrenchment of incumbents. 

By aiding candidates favored by the wealthy, incumbent members of Congress dealt themselves a powerful 

advantage, for incumbents most often are the favorites of 

the wealthy. Appellants’ expert witnesses Professor Thomas Stratmann, Derek Cressman, and others testified 

that BCRA’s hard money increases will benefit incumbents, who enjoy greater access to large donors than do 

challenger candidates. See Cressman Decl., ¶19, App. 29a; 

Stratmann Decl., ¶¶5-12, App. 57a-60a. A leading cosponsor of the BCRA, Defendant-Intervenor Senator 

Feingold has admitted that the hard money limit increases 

will benefit incumbent candidates facing challengers 

without access to wealth. Feingold Deposition 260, lines 7-

8. 

These predictions are buttressed by evidence documenting incumbents’ strong advantages in raising maximum contributions. An analysis of Federal Election 

Declaration of Paul Simon, former U.S. Senator from Illinois, ¶4, 

(“Simon Decl.”), App. 73a (“No member of Congress, not even the most 

scrupulous, is unaware of his or her largest contributors, and not even 

the most scrupulous members will ignore them.”); Deposition of 

Representative Earl F. Hilliard, September 5, 2002, 68, lines 18-20, 86, 

lines 9-15, 95, lines 9-11; Deposition of Representative Bennie G. 

Thompson, September 19, 2002, 68, lines 16-22. Fact witnesses for the 

defendants make the same point. See Adams Exh. 33, Declaration of 

Senator Dale Bumpers, former U.S. Senator from Arkansas, ¶14, App. 

137a (discussing hard and soft money donors); Deposition of Arnold 

Hiatt, major hard money donor, September 26, 2002, 102, lines 20-25, 

104, lines 5-19. See also Stratmann Decl., ¶13-30, App. 60a-67a 

(documenting evidence that campaign contributions affect legislators’ 

voting behavior). “The increased individual contribution limits will 

exacerbate the disproportionate access and influence that the largest 

donors enjoy.” Simon Decl., ¶10. App. 74a-75a. 
10 


Commission data from the 2000 election cycle finds, 

“Senate incumbents in 2000 raised, on average, nearly 

three times as much as their challengers did from donors 

of $1,000 or more: $1.8 million v. $650,000. House incumbents in 2000 raised more than twice as much from donors 

of $1,000 or more as their challengers, on average: 

$178,000 v. $85,000.” Adams Exh. 35, “Why the Battle 

over Hard Money Matters: Hard Facts on Hard Money,” 

Public Campaign, App. 152a-153a. Raising the hard 

money limit would exacerbate the advantage incumbents 

already have over challengers. 

E.	 The further exclusionary effects of the “millionaire” provisions. 

The burdens on non-wealthy candidates described 

above will increase exponentially in races where a selffunded candidate triggers provisions allowing opponents 

to raise funds in increments of $3,000 per election in 

House races, and up to $12,000 per election in Senate 

races. See BCRA §§ 304 and 319. The record demonstrates 

that when one candidate takes advantage of these “millionaire” provisions to multiply maximum contributions, a 

competing candidate whose supporters cannot make large 

donations will be buried in her opponents’ cash. Candidates who have in the past faced wealthy, self-funded 

opponents have testified that the burden of simultaneously confronting a second campaign with vast infusions of 

cash from wealthy donors would make it impossible for 

them to compete. For example, North Carolina Senate 

candidate Cynthia Brown testified, “The people that I 

know can hardly afford to contribute twenty-five dollars, 

let alone $12,000. There is no way that any candidate like 

me can compete under these new conditions. These increases 
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11 

in the hard money contribution limits would effectively 

eliminate any future campaign I might hope to wage for 

the U.S. Senate.” Brown Decl., ¶¶8-9, App. 95a; See also 

Glick Decl., ¶6, App. 98a (“It is impossible to participate 

facing that tremendous disparity in resources. I just do not 

run in the circles of people who can contribute $12,000.”). 

F. Proceedings in district court. 

The Adams plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Columbia on May 7, 2002. 

Count I alleged that the increases in the individual hard 

money contribution limits contained in BCRA Sec. 307 

violate the equal protection guarantee incorporated by the 

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution. Count II alleged that the BCRA provisions 

providing for further contribution limit increases in 

response to expenditures from personal funds (the “millionaire” provisions), BCRA §§ 304 and 319, similarly 

violate the Fifth Amendment. 

The case was consolidated with ten other challenges 

to various provisions of the BCRA and assigned to a threejudge panel. A two-day trial based on recorded testimony 

was held on December 4 and 5, 2002. The defendants and 

defendant-intervenors presented no evidence counter to 

that presented by the Adams plaintiffs. Rather, they 

argued that the plaintiffs’ injuries were insufficient to 

confer standing. Defendants’ Opening Brief (“Def. Br.”) at 

208-209. The three-judge District Court issued a final 

judgment on May 2, 2003 ruling the claims of the Adams 

plaintiffs nonjusticiable. 

----♦-- -
12 

REASONS FOR NOTING PROBABLE 

JURISDICTION 

A.	 The appellants have presented a cognizable 

injury implicating core constitutional values 

of equality. 

The appellants’ evidence demonstrates that the 

challenged BCRA provisions will multiply the electoral 

power of donors able to give the maximum contributions, 

and will thereby deny any realistic hope of gaining office to 

candidates drawing their support from non-wealthy 

voters. While this Court has not previously addressed an 

equal protection challenge to a law creating inequalities in 

campaign finance, it has long held that wealth discrimination in elections violates equal protection principles, see 

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) 

(poll tax violates equal protection clause of Fourteenth 

Amendment); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) 

(candidate filing fees violate equal protection clause); 

Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (same), and that all 

citizens are entitled to an equally meaningful vote. See, 

e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (dilution of 

voting strength based on geography violates equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (dilution of voting strength of 

political group is justiciable under equal protection 

clause). The district court’s ruling of nonjusticiabilty, Per 

Curiam op. at 10-11; Henderson op. at 339-342, stands in 

direct conflict with the fundamental constitutional values 

of equality embodied in these cases. It also conflicts with 

established case law recognizing that an injury to the 

ability to compete in elections is justiciable. See, e.g., Int’l. 

Assn. of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 

Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1993) 
13 

(“Vote Choice”); Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. 

Fund, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Fulani I”). 

The only member of the three-judge district court to 

discuss the court’s nonjusticiability ruling was Judge 

Henderson, who wrote that the appellants “have not 

suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest,” because “no one has a ‘right to equal influence in the overall 

electoral process.’ ” Henderson op. at 340 (citing Ga. State 

Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259, 

1263-64 (11th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis in original). As is clear 

on the face of the appellants’ pleadings, they seek not 

equal influence but an equal ability to participate in the 

electoral process regardless of economic status. This is 

precisely the right that this Court affirmed when it struck 

mandatory candidate filing fees as unconstitutional wealth 

discrimination. In Bullock and Lubin, the Court held that 

candidates “lacking both personal wealth and affluent 

backers are in every practical sense” excluded from the 

electoral process by mandatory filing fees, and that “[t]he 

effect of this exclusionary mechanism on voters is neither 

incidental nor remote.” Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143-144. See 

also Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716 (rights of excluded candidates 

are “intertwined with the rights of voters”); and see Anderson et al. v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786-787 (1983) 

(striking early candidate filing deadline which unconstitutionally burdened rights of voters supporting independent 

candidate). While Judge Henderson supports her ruling by 

noting that “none of the Adams plaintiffs has been, or 

conceivably will be, stripped of his right to vote or of access 

to the ballot,” Henderson op. at 340, the same was true in 

Bullock and Lubin. The challenged statutes in those cases 

did not directly abridge the right to vote, but rather denied 

non-wealthy voters a meaningful vote. The exclusion of 
14 

voters and their preferred candidates was de facto rather 

than de jure; those lacking wealth were not literally but 

“in every practical sense” excluded from elections. Bullock, 

405 U.S. at 143-144. 

Similarly, the apportionment cases recognize that “the 

right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution 

of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by 

wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” 

Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 

186 (1962) (vote dilution claim is justiciable); Gray v. 

Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (violation of equal protection 

and due process clauses of fourteenth amendment, and of 

seventeenth amendment, to weight rural votes more 

heavily than urban votes); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 

(1964) (vote dilution violates Art. I, § 2); Davis, 478 U.S. 

109 (dilution of voting strength of political group is justiciable under equal protection clause). The multimember 

districts invalidated in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 

(1973), did not explicitly restrict the vote of racial minorities, yet this Court upheld the lower court’s conclusion 

that such districts “effectively excluded” minority groups 

from participation in the primary because such groups 

“had less opportunity than did other residents in the 

district to participate in the political process and to elect 

legislators of their choice.” Id. at 766-67 (emphasis added). 

Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (claim of 

racial vote dilution from multi-member districts is justiciable but not shown on the record). 

The district court’s ruling takes a far more constricted 

view of the right to vote than the wealth discrimination 

and apportionment cases permit. Indeed, the district 

court’s standard would bar all voting rights claims except 

where the right to vote were explicitly and directly 
15 

abridged by the state. No voter is stripped of the right to 

vote by a mandatory candidate filing fee, and no voter is 

stripped of the right to vote by unfair legislative apportionment, yet such practices indeed deny these voters 

equal protection of the law. This Court has recognized the 

right of each citizen to “an equally effective voice” in 

elections, declaring, “Modern and viable state government 

needs, and the Constitution demands, no less.” Reynolds, 

377 U.S. at 565. The appellants’ claim that the BCRA hard 

money provisions deny them an “equally effective voice” 

may not be dismissed as nonjusticiable merely because the 

law does not, on its face, abridge the vote. 

Judge Henderson summarily rejects the above-cited 

wealth discrimination and apportionment case law as 

“inapposite,” with no more than a citation to Buckley’s 

well-known admonishment that the voting rights cases do 

not support “abridging the rights of some persons to 

engage in political expression in order to enhance the 

relative voice of other segments of our society.” Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n. 55 (1976). That statement was 

written in regard to the FECA’s expenditure limitations 

which, on the record in Buckley, the Court held to be an 

unconstitutional restriction of speech. Id. at 51. The 

appellants in this case do not seek to “abridge” the speech of 

anyone; rather they seek to maintain the very contribution 

limits which Buckley held entail “only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,” 424 U.S. at 20, and do not substantially infringe 

the speech or associational rights of donors. Id. at 22; see 

also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 

377, 386-88 (2000) (distinguishing between spending and 

contribution limits and upholding Missouri’s contribution 

limits ranging from $250 to $1,000); FEC v. Mass Citizens 
16 

for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-260 (1986) (“We have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less 

compelling justification than restrictions on independent 

spending”). The appellants here seek to “assure that 

citizens are accorded an equal right to vote for their 

representatives regardless of . . . wealth,” a principle 

affirmed in Buckley, 424 U.S. 49 n. 55, and not to validate 

“governmentally imposed restrictions on the franchise” as 

Buckley prohibits. Id. Far from stifling speech, contribution limits “aim to democratize the influence that money 

itself may bring to bear upon the electoral process. In 

doing so, they seek to build public confidence in that 

process and broaden the base of a candidate’s meaningful 

financial support, encouraging the public participation and 

open discussion that the First Amendment itself presupposes.” Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., joined 

by Ginsburg, J., concurring), citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 

565.5 

5 Further, in his Shrink concurrence Justice Breyer cautioned 

against reading Buckley’s disapproval of spending limits as a prohibition of any effort to promote electoral equality, particularly through 

contribution limits. 

[Buckley] said . . . that it rejected ‘the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.’ But 

those words cannot be taken literally. The Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in order to 

prevent a few from drowning out the many. . . . Regardless, 

as the result in Buckley made clear, the statement does not 

automatically invalidate a statute that seeks a fairer electoral debate through contribution limits, nor should it forbid 

the Court to take account of the competing constitutional interests just mentioned.” 

528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
17 

Additionally, the district court decision conflicts with 

case law explicitly recognizing competitive electoral injury 

as a justiciable claim. See Int’l. Assn. of Machinists, 678 

F.2d 1092; Vote Choice, 4 F.3d 26; Fulani I, 882 F.2d 621; 

Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381 (1st Cir. 2000); Buchanan v. 

FEC, 112 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000); cf. Fulani v. Brady, 

953 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Fulani II”).6

 To deny 

cognizable injury from a candidate’s loss of competitive 

advantage “would tend to diminish the import of depriving 

a serious candidate for public office of the opportunity to 

compete equally for votes in an election.” Fulani I, 882 

F.2d at 626. 

The competitor standing doctrine has clear application 

in a case such as this one, where the appellants suffer an 

economic disadvantage from the challenged provisions. 

For example, under this doctrine, a candidate has been 

granted standing to challenge a statute which permitted 

her competitors participating in public financing to accept 

contributions of $2,000 per year, while she would be 

limited to $1,000 per year as a non-participating candidate. Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 37. Elsewhere, voters had 

standing to challenge FECA provisions that they alleged 

allowed corporations greater latitude in solicitation than 

6 The Court in Fulani II noted that “[u]nquestionably, there is 

such a concept as ‘competitor standing,’” 953 F.2d at 1327, but denied 

standing because plaintiffs sued under the Internal Revenue Code and 

plaintiffs’ injuries were not fairly traceable to the tax status of the 

defendant. The Buchanan decision notes that in Fulani II, “the fact 

that the plaintiffs did not sue under FECA, but rather under the 

Internal Revenue Code, proved dispositive. . . . The FECA, unlike the 

Internal Revenue Code, confers a broad grant of standing.” See Buchanan, 112 F.Supp.2d at 63. 
18 

unions, giving corporate political committees an economic 

advantage. Int’l Assn. of Machinists, 678 F.2d at 51. The 

court was satisfied with allegations that the plaintiffs 

“suffer a relative diminution in their political voices – 

their influence in federal elections – as a direct result of 

the discriminatory imbalance Congress is alleged to have 

ordered in the 1976 FECA amendments.” Id. Here, the 

appellants similarly claim that by advantaging wealthy 

donors and their favored candidates, the BCRA will cause 

the appellants to suffer a relative diminution in their 

political voice. The appellant candidates’ and voters’ 

assessment of the disadvantage they will suffer is entitled 

to deference. A court should not second-guess “a candidate’s reasonable assessment of his own campaign,” for 

this “would require the clairvoyance of campaign consultants or political pundits – guises that members of the 

apolitical branch should be especially hesitant to assume.” 

Becker, 230 F.3d at 387. 

Finally, the district court finds a lack of injury from 

the millionaire provisions because “none of the Adams 

plaintiffs is a candidate in an election affected by the 

millionaire provision.” Henderson op. at 343. This ignores 

the claims of plaintiff Cynthia Brown, who testified that 

she was a candidate for the United States Senate from 

North Carolina in the 2002 Democratic Primary, Brown 

Decl. ¶3, App. 94a; that one of her opponents was a millionaire who “contributed enormous sums of money to his 

own campaign;” that another opponent “raised large sums 

of money from wealthy contributors” id. ¶5; that her own 

contributions averaged approximately $25, id. ¶4; and 

that she would consider running again for the U.S. Senate, 

but the BCRA millionaire provisions would “seriously 

discourage” her from participating. Id. ¶7. “If I were to run 
19 

for the U.S. Senate again from North Carolina, I would 

likely face again a millionaire opponent. Under the increases in the hard money contribution limits, my other 

opponents would be free to raise up to $12,000 per individual per election. The people I know can hardly afford to 

contribute twenty-five dollars, let alone $12,000. There is 

no way that any candidate like me can compete under 

these new conditions.” Id. ¶8, App. 95a.7 

Neither Ms. Brown nor any of the other candidates 

challenging various provisions of the BCRA in the consolidated litigation could have demonstrated complete certainty that they would compete in the 2004 elections, 

given that the lawsuits were filed during the 2002 elections. However, there is a clear likelihood that if Ms. 

Brown were to run for Senate in North Carolina in 2004 

she would be in a race where the millionaire amendment 

provisions apply. Incumbent Senator John Edwards spent 

$6.15 million of his own money to win election in 1998, see 

Center for Responsive Politics, “John R. Edwards: Politician Profile,” available at http://www.opensecrets.org/ 

1998os/index/N00002283.htm, and he will face re-election 

in 2004. 

B.	 The appellants’ injuries are fairly traceable 

to the BCRA. 

The district court concluded that the appellants’ 

injuries are not fairly traceable to BCRA because “any 

7 Carrie Bolton, a North Carolina voter supporting Ms. Brown, also 

testified regarding her desire to support Ms. Brown in future elections. 

Bolton Decl., App. 103a-106a. 
20 

inequality the Adams plaintiffs may suffer would be at the 

hands of other individuals, not BCRA.” Henderson op. at 

340-41, citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. In so concluding, the 

court relied nearly entirely on cases in which plaintiffs 

sought to challenge the entire system of privately funded 

campaigns as a violation of equal protection, and sought 

judicial imposition of public campaign financing as a 

remedy. See id., citing Cox, 183 F.3d 1259; NAACP Los 

Angeles Branch v. Jones, 131 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Albanese v. FEC, 78 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 1996). However, in 

contrast with these “wealth primary” cases, the appellants 

here challenge an enactment of Congress that directly 

impairs their ability to participate in elections. 

The Adams plaintiffs are not asking the Court to craft 

a judicial remedy for general inequalities in campaign 

finance, but rather to enjoin a statute that actively creates 

inequalities so severe as to disenfranchise the plaintiffs. 

Here, Congress has empowered the wealthiest donors to 

give double the amount previously permitted (and many 

times more in the case of the millionaire provisions), and 

there can be no doubt of the link between the challenged 

statute and the inequalities of which the appellants 

complain. The appellants here, as in Vote Choice, seek “a 

permanent injunction against enforcement of the very 

statutes which cause[ ] [their] injury. This produces the 

causal connection between the injury alleged and the relief 

requested.” Vote Choice, 4 F.3d at 37. The fact that the 

challenged statute injures the plaintiffs by advantaging 

private individuals does not destroy the causal link between the statute and the injury. If that were the case, 

then there would have been no standing in Vote Choice, 

where the candidate plaintiff claimed harm from increased 

private contributions to her competitors. See id. 
21 

While Buckley did not find that the promotion of 

equality justified the imposition of spending limits, 424 

U.S. at 48-49, neither does that decision give constitutional license to a law which creates gaping inequalities. 

Since Buckley, the threats posed by money in politics have 

become clear. Before the BCRA increases, a mere 0.11 

percent of the voting-age population was providing nearly 

half of all money raised in individual contributions, 

Cressman Decl., App. 22a-23a, and the largest donors had 

learned to multiply their electoral power through bundling. See McDonald Decl., App. 45a. Now, with BCRA, 

this miniscule elite has permission to double its ability to 

determine electoral outcomes, locking disfavored candidates out of contention and stretching democracy to the 

breaking point. 

Justice Breyer has observed that contribution limits 

“protect the integrity of the electoral process – the means 

through which a free society democratically translates 

political speech into concrete action.” Shrink Missouri, 528 

U.S. at 401 (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring). 

The evisceration of contribution limits accomplishes the 

inverse, striking at the integrity of the electoral process. 

Many observers have noted the dangers to democracy 

posed by the increased influence of wealth in elections. 

See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered 

Reading of the First Amendment, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1055, 

1072-73 (1999) (“[W]ealth disparity introduces massive 

political inequality skewed to a predictable set of selfinterested positions” and permits “wholly unjustifiable 

differences in political power to emerge . . . The obvious 

inequalities introduced by massive wealth disparities 

cause many persons to lose faith in the system.”); Owen M. 

Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 
22 

1405, 1412 (1986) (in an election campaign, the resources 

at the disposal of the rich “enable them to fill all available 

space for public discourse with their message”); Ronald 

Dworkin, Free Speech and the Dimensions of Democracy, 

in IF BUCKLEY FELL 63, 78 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 

1999) (“People cannot plausibly regard themselves as 

partners in an enterprise of self-government when they 

are effectively shut out from the political debate because 

they cannot afford a grotesquely high admission price”). 

The BCRA’s hard money increases turn these dangers into 

accomplished fact. 

Equal protection principles require that the Court act 

to preserve the franchise for all citizens, just as it did in 

the wealth discrimination cases, Harper 383 U.S. 663; 

Bullock, 405 U.S. 134; Lubin, 415 U.S. 709, and the one 

person – one vote cases. See Baker, 369 U.S. 186; Gray, 

372 U.S. 368; Wesberry, 376 U.S. 1; Reynolds, 377 U.S. 

533; Davis, 478 U.S. 109. When this Court enforced the 

one person – one vote standard in Wesbery, it recalled 

Madison’s words: 

Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not 

the learned more than the ignorant; not the 

haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than 

the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the 

people of the United States. 

376 U.S. at 18 (citing The Federalist, No. 57 (Cooke ed. 

1961)). With the BCRA hard money increases, the rich will 

in every practical sense become the electors of federal 

officeholders, for nobody lacking their favor will have a 

significant chance of success. In Wesbery, this court famously observed, “No right is more precious in a free 
----------------------------- ------------------------------

23 

country than that of having a voice in the election of those 

who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must 

live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the 

right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no 

room for classifications of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.” 376 U.S. at 17-18. It is this vision 

of the Constitution which the Court must now act to 

protect. 

----♦-- -

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should note 

probable jurisdiction. 

Respectfully submitted 

BONITA P. TENNERIELLO 

Counsel of Record 

JOHN C. BONIFAZ 

LISA J. DANETZ 

BRENDA WRIGHT 

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS 

INSTITUTE 

27 School Street 

Suite 500 

Boston, MA 02108 

(617) 624-3900 

DAVID A. WILSON 

AVI SAMUEL GARBOW 

HALE AND DORR LLP 

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, 

NW, 10th Floor 

Washington, DC 20004 

(202) 942-8400 

Attorneys for Appellants 
1a 

APPENDIX A 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON ) 

GRAY ADAMS, et al., ) 

) Plaintiffs, ) 

-vs- ) 


)
 THE FEDERAL ELECTION )
 COMMISSION et al., ) 

Defendants. 	 ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action NO. 

02-cv-877 KLH CKK RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

NOTICE OF APPEAL 

(Filed May 4, 2003) 

Notice is hereby given that Victoria Jackson Gray 

Adams, Carrie Bolton, Cynthia Brown, Derek Cressman, 

Victoria Fitzgerald, Anurada Joshi, Nancy Russell, Kate 

Seely-Kirk, Rose Taylor, Stephanie L. Wilson, California 

Public Interest Research Group, Massachusetts Public 

Interest Research Group, New Jersey Public Interest 

Research Group, United States Public Interest Research 

Group, Fannie Lou Harner Project, and Association of 

Community Organizers For Reform Now, plaintiffs in 
2a 

the above named case, hereby appeal to the United 

States Supreme Court from the final judgment entered 

in this action on the 2nd day of May 2003. This appeal is 

taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 and the Bipartisan 

Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113-114 (2002). 

Dated: May 5, 2003 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ 	David A. Wilson 

DAVID A. WILSON 

(D.C. Bar # 430400) 

HALE AND DORR LLP 

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, 

10th Floor 

Washington, DC 20004 

(202) 942-8400 

JOHN C. BONIFAZ 

(admitted pro hac vice) 

LISA J. DANETZ 

(admitted pro hac vice) 

BONNIE TENNERIELLO 

(admitted pro hac vice) 

BRENDA WRIGHT 

(admitted pro hac vice) 

NATIONAL VOTING RIGHTS INSTITUTE 

27 School Street 

Suite 500 

Boston, MA 02108 

(617) 624-3900 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
3a 

APPENDIX B 

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows: 

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 

land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 

service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 

person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 

jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any 

criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use 

without just compensation. 
4a 

APPENDIX C 

The relevant sections of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 

Act of 2002 provide as follows: 

PUBLIC LAW 107-155 – MAR. 27, 2002 

SEC. 304. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION 

LIMITS IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM 

PERSONAL FUNDS. 

(a) INCREASED LIMITS FOR INDIVIDUALS. – Section 315 

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 

441a) is amended – 

(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking “No person” 

and inserting “Except as provided in subsection (i), no 

person”; and 

(2) by adding at the end the following: 

“(i) INCREASED LIMIT TO ALLOW RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. – 

“(1) INCREASE. – 

“(A) IN GENERAL. – Subject to paragraph 

(2), if the opposition personal funds amount with 

respect to a candidate for election to the office of 

Senator exceeds the threshold amount, the limit 

under subsection (a)(1)(A) (in this subsection referred to as the ‘applicable limit’) with respect to 

that candidate shall be the increased limit. 

“(B) THRESHOLD AMOUNT. 

“(i) STATE-BY-STATE COMPETITIVE AND 

FAIR CAMPAIGN FORMULA. – In this subsection, the threshold amount with respect to 
5a 

an election cycle of a candidate described in 

subparagraph (A) is an amount equal to the 

sum of – 

“(I) $150,000; and 

“(II) $0.04 multiplied by the voting age population. 

“(ii) VOTING AGE POPULATION. – In this 

subparagraph, the term ‘voting age population’ means in the case of a candidate for the 

office of Senator, the voting age population 

of the State of the candidate (as certified 

under section 315(e)). 

“(C) INCREASED LIMIT. – Except as provided 

in clause (ii), for purposes of subparagraph (A), if 

the opposition personal funds amount is over – 

(i) 2 times the threshold amount, but 

not over 4 times that amount – 

“(I) the increased limit shall be 3 

times the applicable limit; and 

“(II) the limit under subsection 

(a)(3) shall not apply with respect to any 

contribution made with respect to a candidate if such contribution is made under 

the increased limit of subparagraph (A) 

during a period in which the candidate 

may accept such a contribution; 

“(ii) 4 times the threshold amount, but 

not over 10 times that amount – 

“(I) the increased limit shall be 6 

times the applicable limit; and 

“(II) the limit under subsection 

(a)(3) shall not apply with respect to 
6a 

any contribution made with respect to a 

candidate if such contribution is made 

under the increased limit of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the 

candidate may accept such a contribution; and 

“(iii) 10 times the threshold amount – 

“(I) the increased limit shall be 6 

times the applicable limit; 

“(II) the limit under subsection 

(a)(3) shall not apply with respect to 

any contribution made with respect to a 

candidate if such contribution is made 

under the increased limit of subparagraph (A) during a period in which the 

candidate may accept such a contribution; and 

“(III) the limits under subsection 

(d) with respect to any expenditure by a 

State or national committee of a political party shall not apply. 

“(D) OPPOSITION PERSONAL FUNDS AMOUNT. 

– The opposition personal funds amount is an 

amount equal to the excess (if any) of 

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of 

expenditures from personal funds (as defined in section 304(a)(6)(B)) that an opposing candidate in the same election makes; 

over 

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds made by the candidate with respect to the election. 
7a 

“(2) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER 

INCREASED LIMIT. 

“(A) IN GENERAL. – Subject to subparagraph (B), a candidate and the candidate’s 

authorized committee shall not accept any 

contribution, and a party committee shall 

not make any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph (1) – 

“(i) until the candidate has received notification of the opposition 

personal funds amount under section 

304(a)(6)(B); and 

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to the aggregate 

amount of contributions previously accepted and party expenditures previously made under the increased limits 

under this subsection for the election 

cycle, exceeds 110 percent of the opposition personal funds amount. 

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING CANDIDATE. – A candidate and a candidate’s 

authorized committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall not make any expenditure under the increased limit after the date on 

which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to the extent that the amount of such increased limit is attributable to such an opposing 

candidate. 

“(3) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. – 

“(A) IN GENERAL. – The aggregate amount of 

contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s 

authorized committee under the increased limit under 
8a 

paragraph (1) and not otherwise expended in connection with the election with respect to which such contributions relate shall, not later than 50 days after 

the date of such election, be used in the manner described in subparagraph (B). 

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. – A candidate or 

a candidate’s authorized committee shall return the 

excess contribution to the person who made the contribution. 

“(j) LIMITATION ON REPAYMENT OF PERSONAL LOANS. – 

Any candidate who incurs personal loans made after the 

effective date of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 

2002 in connection with the candidate’s campaign for 

election shall not repay (directly or indirectly), to the 

extent such loans exceed $250,000, such loans from any 

contributions made to such candidate or any authorized 

committee of such candidate after the date of such election.”. 

(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL 

FUNDS. – Section 304(a)(6) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 434(a)(6)) is amended 

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (E); and 

(2) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following: 

“(B) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL 

FUNDS. – 

“(i) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL 

FUNDS. – In this subparagraph, the term ‘expenditure 

from personal funds’ means 
9a 

“(I) an expenditure made by a candidate 

using personal funds; and 

“(II) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the candidate’s authorized 

committee. 

“(ii) DECLARATION OF INTENT. – Not later than 

the date that is 15 days after the date on which an 

individual becomes a candidate for the office of Senator, the candidate shall file a declaration stating the 

total amount of expenditures from personal funds 

that the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to 

make, with respect to the election that will exceed the 

State-by-State competitive and fair campaign formula 

with 

“(I) the Commission; and 

“(II) each candidate in the same election. 

“(iii) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. – Not later than 24 

hours after a candidate described in clause (ii) makes 

or obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds in excess of 2 times the 

threshold amount in connection with any election, the 

candidate shall file a notification with 

“(I) the Commission; and 

“(II) each candidate in the same election. 

“(iv) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. – After a candidate files an initial notification under clause (iii), the 

candidate shall file an additional notification each 

time expenditures from personal funds are made or 

obligated to be made in an aggregate amount that exceed $10,000 with – 
10a 

“(I) the Commission; and 

“(II) each candidate in the same election. 

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 hours 

after the expenditure is made. 

“(v) CONTENTS. – A notification under clause 

(iii) or (iv) shall include – 

“(I) the name of the candidate and the office sought by the candidate; 

“(II) the date and amount of each expenditure; and 

“(III) the total amount of expenditures from 

personal funds that the candidate has made, or 

obligated to make, with respect to an election as 

of the date of the expenditure that is the subject 

of the notification. 

“(C) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. – In the next regularly scheduled report after the 

date of the election for which a candidate seeks nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, the 

candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee shall 

submit to the Commission a report indicating the source 

and amount of any excess contributions (as determined 

under paragraph (1) of section 315(1)) and the manner in 

which the candidate or the candidate’s authorized committee used such funds. 

“(D) ENFORCEMENT. – For provisions providing for 

the enforcement of the reporting requirements under this 

paragraph, see section 309.”. 

(c) DEFINITIONS. – Section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431), as amended by 
11a 

section 101(b), is further amended by adding at the end 

the following: 

“(25) ELECTION CYCLE. – For purposes of sections 

315(1) and 315A and paragraph (26), the term ‘election cycle’ means the period beginning on the day after the date of the most recent election for the specific 

office or seat that a candidate is seeking and ending 

on the date of the next election for that office or seat. 

For purposes of the preceding sentence, a primary 

election and a general election shall be considered to 

be separate elections. 

“(26) PERSONAL FUNDS. – The term ‘personal 

funds’ means an amount that is derived from – 

“(A) any asset that, under applicable State 

law, at the time the individual became a candidate, the candidate had legal right of access to or 

control over, and with respect to which the candidate had – 

“(i) legal and rightful title; or 

“(ii) an equitable interest; 

“(B) income received during the current 

election cycle of the candidate, including – 

“(i) a salary and other earned income 

from bona fide employment; 

“(ii) dividends and proceeds from the 

sale of the candidate’s stocks or other investments; 

“(iii) bequests to the candidate; 

“(iv) income from trusts established 

before the beginning of the election cycle; 
12a 

“(v) income from trusts established by 

bequest after the beginning of the election 

cycle of which the candidate is the beneficiary; 

“(vi) gifts of a personal nature that 

had been customarily received by the candidate prior to the beginning of the election 

cycle; and 

“(vii) proceeds from lotteries and similar legal games of chance; and 

“(C) a portion of assets that are jointly 

owned by the candidate and the candidate’s 

spouse equal to the candidate’s share of the asset 

under the instrument of conveyance or ownership, but if no specific share is indicated by an 

instrument of conveyance or ownership, the 

value of 1/2 of the property.”. 

SEC. 307. MODIFICATION OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. 

(a) INCREASE IN INDIVIDUAL LIMITS FOR CERTAIN 

CONTRIBUTIONS. – Section 315(a)(1) of the Federal Election 

Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)) is amended 

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “$1,000” 

and inserting “$2,000”; and 

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking “$20,000” 

and inserting “$25,000”. 

(b) INCREASE IN ANNUAL AGGREGATE LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS. – Section 315(a)(3) of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)) is 

amended to read as follows: 
13a 

“(3) During the period which begins on January 

1 of an odd-numbered year and ends on December 31 

of the next even-numbered year, no individual may 

make contributions aggregating more than – 

“(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to 

candidates and the authorized committees of 

candidates; “(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of which not more than $37,500 may be attributable to contributions to political committees which 

are not political committees of national political parties.”. 

(c) INCREASE IN SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE 

LIMIT. – Section 315(h) of the Federal Election Campaign 

Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 441a(h)) is amended by striking 

“$17,500” and inserting “$35,000”. 

(d) INDEXING OF CONTRIBUTION LIMITS. – Section 

315(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 

U.S.C. 441a(c)) is amended – 

(1) in paragraph (1) – 

(A) by striking the second and third sentences; 

(B) by inserting “(A)” before “At the beginning”; and 

(C) by adding at the end the following: 

“(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in any 

calendar year after 2002 – 

“(i) a limitation established by subsections 

(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (b), (d), or (h) shall be increased by the percent difference determined under 

subparagraph (A); 
14a 

“(ii) each amount so increased shall remain in 

effect for the calendar year; and 

“(iii) if any amount after adjustment under 

clause (i) is not a multiple of $100, such amount shall 

be rounded to the nearest multiple of $100. 

“(C) In the case of limitations under subsections 

(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and (h), increases shall only be 

made in odd-numbered years and such increases shall 

remain in effect for the 2-year period beginning on the 

first day following the date of the last general election in 

the year preceding the year in which the amount is increased and ending on the date of the next general election.”; and 

(2) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking “means the 

calendar year 1974” and inserting “means – 

“(i) for purposes of subsections (b) and (d), 

calendar year 1974; and 

“(ii) for purposes of subsections (a)(1)(A), 

(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and (h), calendar year 2001”. 

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE. – The amendments made by 

this section shall apply with respect to contributions made 

on or after January 1, 2003. 

SEC. 319. MODIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION 

LIMITS FOR HOUSE CANDIDATES IN RESPONSE TO EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL 

FUNDS. 

(a) INCREASED LIMITS. – Title III of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is 
15a 

amended by inserting after section 315 the following new 

section: 

“MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN LIMITS FOR 

HOUSE CANDIDATES IN RESPONSE TO 

PERSONAL FUND EXPENDITURES OF OPPONENTS 

“SEC. 315A. (a) AVAILABILITY OF INCREASED LIMIT. – 

“(1) IN GENERAL. – Subject to paragraph (3), if 

the opposition personal funds amount with respect to 

a candidate for election to the office of Representative 

in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the 

Congress exceeds $350,000 – 

“(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) 

with respect to the candidate shall be tripled; 

“(B) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall 

not apply with respect to any contribution made 

with respect to the candidate if the contribution 

is made under the increased limit allowed under 

subparagraph (A) during a period in which the 

candidate may accept such a contribution; and 

“(C) the limits under sub-section (d) with 

respect to any expenditure by a State or national 

committee of a political party on behalf of the 

candidate shall not apply. 

“(2) DETERMINATION OF OPPOSITION PERSONAL 

FUNDS AMOUNT. – 

“(A) IN GENERAL. – The opposition personal 

funds amount is an amount equal to the excess 

(if any) of – 

“(i) the greatest aggregate amount of 

expenditures from personal funds (as defined 
16a 

in subsection (b)(1)) that an opposing candidate in the same election makes; over 

“(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds made by the candidate with respect to the election. 

“(B) SPECIAL RULE FOR CANDIDATE’S CAMPAIGN FUNDS. – 

“(i) IN GENERAL. – For purposes of determining the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds under subparagraph (A), such amount shall include 

the gross receipts advantage of the candidate’s authorized committee. 

“(ii) GROSS RECEIPTS ADVANTAGE. – For 

purposes of clause (i), the term ‘gross receipts 

advantage’ means the excess, if any, of – 

“(I) the aggregate amount of 50 

percent of gross receipts of a candidate’s 

authorized committee during any election cycle (not including contributions 

from personal funds of the candidate) 

that may be expended in connection 

with the election, as determined on 

June 30 and December 31 of the year 

preceding the year in which a general 

election is held, over 

“(II) the aggregate amount of 50 

percent of gross receipts of the opposing 

candidate’s authorized committee during any election cycle (not including 

contributions from personal funds of 

the candidate) that may be expended in 

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 of 
17a 

the year preceding the year in which a 

general election is held. 

“(3) TIME TO ACCEPT CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER INCREASED LIMIT. – 

“(A) IN GENERAL. – Subject to subparagraph 

(B), a candidate and the candidate’s authorized 

committee shall not accept any contribution, and 

a party committee shall not make any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph 

(1) – 

“(i) until the candidate has received 

notification of the opposition personal funds 

amount under subsection (b)(1); and 

“(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to the aggregate amount of 

contributions previously accepted and party 

expenditures previously made under the increased limits under this subsection for the 

election cycle, exceeds 100 percent of the opposition personal funds amount. 

“(B) EFFECT OF WITHDRAWAL OF AN OPPOSING 

CANDIDATE. – A candidate and a candidate’s authorized committee shall not accept any contribution and a party shall not make any 

expenditure under the increased limit after the 

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be 

a candidate to the extent that the amount of such 

increased limit is attributable to such an opposing candidate. 

“(4) DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. – 

“(A) IN GENERAL. – The aggregate amount 

of contributions accepted by a candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee under the increased 

limit under paragraph (1) and not otherwise 
18a 

expended in connection with the election with respect to which such contributions relate shall, 

not later than 50 days after the date of such election, be used in the manner described in subparagraph (B). 

“(B) RETURN TO CONTRIBUTORS. – A candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee shall 

return the excess contribution to the person who 

made the contribution. 

“(b) NOTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES FROM PERSONAL 

FUNDS. – 

“(1) IN GENERAL. – 

“(A) DEFINITION OF EXPENDITURE FROM PERSONAL FUNDS. – In this paragraph, the term ‘expenditure from personal funds’ means – 

“(i) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal funds; and 

“(ii) a contribution or loan made by a 

candidate using personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the candidate’s 

authorized committee. 

“(B) DECLARATION OF INTENT. – Not later 

than the date that is 15 days after the date on 

which an individual becomes a candidate for the 

office of Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress, the candidate shall file a declaration stating the total 

amount of expenditures from personal funds that 

the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to 

make, with respect to the election that will exceed $350,000. 
19a 

“(C) INITIAL NOTIFICATION. – Not later than 

24 hours after a candidate described in subparagraph (B) makes or obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds 

in excess of $350,000 in connection with any election, the candidate shall file a notification. 

“(D) ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION. – After a 

candidate files an initial notification under subparagraph (C), the candidate shall file an additional notification each time expenditures from 

personal funds are made or obligated to be made 

in an aggregate amount that exceeds $10,000. 

Such notification shall be filed not later than 24 

hours after the expenditure is made. 

“(E) CONTENTS. – A notification under subparagraph (C) or (D) shall include – 

“(i) the name of the candidate and the 

office sought by the candidate; 

“(ii) the date and amount of each 

expenditure; and 

“(iii) the total amount of expenditures 

from personal funds that the candidate has 

made, or obligated to make, with respect to 

an election as of the date of the expenditure 

that is the subject of the notification. 

“(F) PLACE OF FILING. – Each declaration or 

notification required to be filed by a candidate 

under subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) shall be filed 

with – 

“(i) the Commission; and 

“(ii) each candidate in the same election and the national party of each such 

candidate. 
20a 

“(2) NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSAL OF EXCESS CONTRIBUTIONS. – In the next regularly scheduled report 

after the date of the election for which a candidate 

seeks nomination for election to, or election to, Federal office, the candidate or the candidate’s authorized 

committee shall submit to the Commission a report 

indicating the source and amount of any excess contributions (as determined under subsection (a)) and 

the manner in which the candidate or the candidate’s 

authorized committee used such funds. 

“(3) ENFORCEMENT. – For provisions providing 

for the enforcement of the reporting requirements 

under this subsection, see section 309.”. 

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT. – Section 315(a)(1) of 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 

441a), as amended by section 304(a), is amended by 

striking “subsection (i),” and inserting “subsection (i) and 

section 315A.”. 
21a 

APPENDIX D 

Exhibit 1 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ) 


ADAMS, et al., ) 


)


Plaintiffs, ) 


-vs- ) 

THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) 

COMMISSION et al., ) 

) Defendants. ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT 

OF DEREK CRESSMAN 

1. My name is Derek Cressman. I am the Democracy 

Program Director of the State Public Interest Research 

Groups. The PIRGs are a network of non-profit, nonpartisan research and advocacy organizations that have 

analyzed campaign finance issues and other public interest issues for the past 30 years. I have professionally 

studied federal hard money contributions since 1995 with 

U.S. PIRG, the national policy office of the State PIRGs. In 

that time, I have authored or co-authored nine studies and 

white papers regarding the financing of federal campaigns. I 
22a 

have provided testimony before the United State Senate 

Rules Committee on the topic of increasing federal contribution limits. I have not received any compensation for 

providing this declaration and expert report. 

2. It is my expert opinion that hard money contributions 

and expenditures significantly influence the outcome of 

elections. In 440 of 469 (or 94%) of 2000 general election 

races for the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate, 

the candidate who spent the most money won their race 

[see exhibit A, Look Who’s Not Coming to Washington, U.S. 

PIRG, January 2001, Appendix A]. Winning candidates 

outraised opponents by a margin of 2.6 to 1 [see exhibit B, 

The Best Elections Money Can Buy, U.S. PIRG, November 

2000. page 4]. In 1998, the candidate who spent the most 

won 94% of House races and 95% of Senate races. Further, 

in every presidential primary since 1976, the candidate 

who has raised the most money has won his party’s 

nomination [see exhibit C, Running for the Money, U.S. 

PIRG, September 1999, page 5]. 

3. While money is not the sole factor in determining 

elections, it is an overwhelming factor. This is the reason 

that candidates and campaign directors, who are experts 

in the business of winning elections, spend so much time 

and energy raising campaign funds. If money did not 

largely determine election outcomes, then candidates 

would not bother raising it. 

4. Federal campaign funds come from a small minority of 

citizens. In the 2000 election cycle, fewer than 232,000 

individuals gave contributions of $1,000 or more to federal 

candidates. This represents just 0.11% of the voting age 

population [see exhibit D, Reinforcing the Rich, Public 

Citizen, February 2, 2001, page 2]. Clearly the current 
23a 

federal limits only affect a miniscule proportion of U.S. 

citizens, the vast majority of whom are limited by their 

disposable incomes in what they can give at amounts far 

lower than $1000. 

5. The small number of donors who give the maximum 

amount comprise a significant source of candidate funds. 

Contributors who gave $1000 or more to a federal candidate gave 46% of all individual contributions to federal 

candidates from January 1, 1999 to November 28, 2000 

[see exhibit E, The Consequences of Raising Federal 

Contribution Limits, U.S. PIRG, March 2001, page 5]. Of 

those candidates who were successful, 60% of their individual funds came from donors who gave $1000 or more 

[see exhibit A, page 6]. 

6. Common sense would indicate that citizens who can 

afford to give $1000 will tend to be wealthier than those 

who cannot. This has been documented by surveys showing that of large donors to federal elections, 95% had 

family incomes greater than $50,000 while almost twothirds of American households had incomes below that 

level. Large donors are 95% white, 80% male, and 50% 

were over 60 years of age. This compares to a U.S. population that is 17% non-white, 51% female, and only 12.8% 

over the age of 60. Large federal donors are much more 

likely to be employed in business or law professions than 

the public at large. They are more conservative than the 

public at large on economic matters and environmental 

matters. However, one-third of large donors identified 

themselves as liberal compared to one-fifth of the general 

public, so it is primarily the middle of the political spectrum that is underrepresented among large donors [see 

exhibit F, Pushing the Limit, U.S. PIRG, July 1999, page 

7 and exhibit G, Individual Campaign Contributors: 
24a 

WEALTHY, CONSERVATIVE – AND REFORM MINDED, 

Green, Hernson, Powell, and Wilcox, June 1998]. 

7. In the first 15 months of the 1999-2000 election cycle, 

2/3 of Fortune 500 CEOs gave at least one maximum 

$1000 contribution to a candidate, compared to less than 

one percent of the general population [see exhibit H, 

Legalizing the Loophole, U.S. PIRG, June 2000 page 3]. 

Clearly, CEOs have greater influence over election results 

than ordinary citizens. 

8. Because campaign fundraising is such a large factor in 

electoral success, many potential candidates choose not to 

run for office or drop out of contention because they do not 

have the backing of large donors. For example, Congressman John Kasich and Elizabeth Dole withdrew from the 

Republican Primary for President in the last election 

before a single vote was cast in large part due to fundraising. Had these candidates had similar large donor support 

to frontrunner George W. Bush, or had Bush raised 

amounts similar to Kasich and Dole, those candidates 

would likely have remained in the race. At the time John 

Kasich dropped out of the Republican presidential primary, George W. Bush had raised 74.4% of his funds from 

maximum $1000 donors [see exhibit C, page 2]. 

9. Therefore, through giving hard money contributions of 

$1000, a small and unrepresentative group of citizens has 

vastly more influence than most Americans in determining 

who runs for federal office, and who wins elections. All 

citizens do not have equal opportunity to participate in the 

electoral process in America, and the accompanying 

results cannot be interpreted to represent the will of the 

majority of citizens. 
25a 

10. Low and moderate-income citizens are aware that 

their voices do not carry equal weight in federal politics. In 

1999, only 29% of Americans trusted the government in 

Washington to do the right thing, according to a poll by the 

Council for Excellence in Government. The same survey 

found that 63% of respondents feel that government serves 

the special interests, while only 25% said it serves the 

public interest. Just 39% said that they believed our 

current government meets Abraham Lincoln’s goal of 

government of, by, and for the people, while 54% said we 

do not have a government of, by, and for the people [see 

exhibit I, Testimony of Campaign Finance Reform, Derek 

Cressman, March 29, 2001]. The feeling of disenfranchisement is a significant reason for declining rates of 

voter participation and a barrier to citizens getting involved in federal elections through volunteering or making 

small contributions. This then exacerbates the undue 

influence of large donors on the process. 

11. Members of Congress are also aware of the disproportionate role that money plays in influencing election 

outcomes. Even if a member of Congress grants no access 

to a donor, and has no personal communication let alone 

quid pro quo understanding with a donor, that member of 

Congress knows that the donor can influence his or her reelection and is therefore more accountable to that donor 

than to other constituents. For politicians who favor their 

political career more than their personal wealth, the 

unequal influence of large donors on election outcomes can 

be more corrupting in the form of distortion to the political 

process than traditional bribery. A recent study by political 

scientists Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro found that 

in 1980, federal lawmakers followed the wishes of the 

majority of Americans about two-thirds of the time. In 
26a 

2000, that was down to 40% of the time. The professors 

concluded that lawmakers answer “to the extreme ideological elements of their parties, to their contributors, and 

to special interests” [see exhibit J, Politicians Don’t Pander, Washington Post, March 19, 2000.] 

12. If legislators do not follow the wishes of large donors, 

they may find themselves defeated by candidates who do. 

For example, with one exception, the candidates in the 

2000 election who received the most money from Enron 

and Arthur Anderson defeated their opponents. One 

specific example involves the 1994 election for the 18th 

Congressional District in Texas. Enron CEO Kenneth Lay 

recruited Sheila Jackson Lee to challenge then-incumbent 

Craig Washington because of Washington’s opposition to 

NAFTA. Lay and other Enron employees helped raise 

nearly $600,000 for Jackson Lee, three times as much as 

Washington had raised in his previous re-election. The 

result was an overwhelming win for Jackson Lee. This 

demonstrates how large contributions can influence policy 

decisions without any quid pro quo or even access granted 

by the candidate. Representative Jackson Lee’s position on 

NAFTA was likely not influenced by her contributors. 

However, Lay and his fellow large donors were able to 

change the vote of the representative of the 18th District 

of Texas by dint of large campaign contributions. This 

avenue of political influence is unavailable to most voters 

in the 18th District of Texas [see exhibit K, Phantom Fixes, 

U.S. PIRG, January 2002, page 10]. 

13. The influence of large donors on election outcomes 

has increased significantly since the Supreme Court 

upheld the current $1000 limit in 1976. The techniques 

of television advertising, polling, focus groups, direct mail 

marketing, and other expensive modern campaign practices 
27a 

were in their infancy in the 1960s and early 1970s. As 

professional campaign managers have become more 

skilled at employing these marketing techniques to win 

political campaigns, the competitive advantage of candidates who have significant large donor backing over those 

who do not has increased and the influence of large donors 

has grown correspondingly. A Wall Street Journal Poll in 

1997 found that 68% of respondents think that the American political system was more influenced by special 

interest money than it was twenty years earlier [see 

exhibit I, page 1]. 

14. Increasing contribution limits will further reduce the 

role of small donors in influencing federal elections. I 

estimate that the proportion of individual funds raised by 

federal candidates from donors who give less than $200 to 

candidates will shrink from 30% to 21-25%. Meanwhile, 

the percentage of individual funds federal candidates raise 

from donors who give the maximum amount allowed will 

increase from 46% currently to 55-63% [see exhibit E, page 

5]. 

15. Increasing federal contribution limits will reduce the 

free speech opportunities of low and moderate-income 

donors, and of candidates who are backed by these donors. 

There is a limited amount of advertising time available for 

purchase during a campaign season. As candidates compete for this limited time, the cost of advertising increases. 

The price of advertising triples in some markets as a 

result of increased campaign season demand [see exhibit 

L, The Case for Free Air Time, Alliance for Better Campaigns, March 2002, page 9]. Candidates need to purchase 

air-time to compete, but those candidates backed by lower 

income voters are effectively priced out of speech opportunities by candidates who have large donor backing. If the 
28a 

large donor candidates raise even more money under 

higher contribution limits, it will further drive up the cost 

of advertisements and literally reduce the number of 

advertisements that a lesser-funded candidate could 

purchase, potentially driving their campaigns below the 

level of notice. 

16. Even in races that do not depend upon TV or radio 

advertising, which is limited by its very nature, voters 

have a limited capacity to absorb political information. 

This is limited not only by the time in the day, but by 

competing demands for a voters attention in their everyday lives. Candidates backed by large donors can effectively capture nearly all of most voters’ attention spans 

through saturation advertising techniques, and literally 

drown out the voices of lesser-funded candidates. 

17. The rationale used by Congress to increase federal 

contribution limits is not compelling. Although inflation 

has occurred since the limits were set, federal candidate 

fundraising has risen even faster. House and Senate 

candidate fundraising increased by 425% from 1977-78 to 

1999-2000, with inflation accounting for less than half of 

this increase [see exhibit E, page 4]. Candidates are 

raising and spending more money than ever in the history 

of our republic under the current $1000 limits. 

18. Increasing contribution limits will not reduce the 

time candidates spend raising funds. Many states have no 

contribution limits at all, yet there is no evidence from 

those states that candidates spend any less time raising 

funds. Candidates will spend time raising funds to the 

extent that they believe their opponent is doing so and 

could therefore defeat them. In fact, higher limits may 

encourage candidates to spend more of their personal time 
29a 

raising funds. The higher the donation level, the greater 

the incentive for a candidate to personally speak with a 

donor as opposed to letting a direct mail piece, internet 

site, or campaign staff make the solicitation. Further, the 

larger the donation, the more the donor expects a personal 

call from the candidate, or a seat at the same dinner table 

at a fundraiser, or a photograph. Only limits on candidate 

spending would effectively reduce the time candidates 

spend raising funds. 

19. Increasing contribution limits will not help challengers. Under the current limits, House incumbents outraised 

House challengers by margins ranging from 2.3 to 1 up to 

4 to 1 in elections from 1990-1998. Since there is no reason 

to believe that higher contribution limits will allow either 

challengers or incumbents to find additional donors, only 

receive more from existing donors, it is certain that higher 

contribution levels will only increase the fundraising 

disparity between challengers and incumbents [see exhibit 

F, page 11]. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of 

the United States of America that the foregoing is true and 

correct. 

Executed on: Sept. 20, 2002 

/s/ Derek Cressman 

Derek Cressman 
30a 

Exhibit 2 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ) 


ADAMS, et al., ) 


)


Plaintiffs, ) 


-vs-	 ) 

) THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) COMMISSION et al., ) 

Defendants.	 ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT OF 

PROF. JOHN C. GREEN 

1. My name is John C. Green. I am the director of the 

Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the University 

of Akron, where I teach courses on campaign finance and 

fundraising. I have published widely on American campaign finance, especially on the behavior of individual 

campaign contributors. I am the editor and a contributor 

to Financing the 1996 Election, and I am a contributor to 

Financing the 2000 Election. My curriculum vitae further 

establishing my expertise on campaign finance matters is 

attached to this declaration as Exhibit A. I have not 
31a 

received any compensation for providing this declaration 

and expert report. 

2. I am the co-author with Clyde Wilcox, Paul S. 

Herrnson and Peter L. Francia of “Raising the Limits,” 

published in the May/June 2002 issue of the Public 

Perspective. A copy of the “Raising the Limits” article is 

attached to this declaration as Exhibit B. 

3. In “Raising the Limits,” we analyzed the impact of the 

increased contribution limits in the Bipartisan Campaign 

Reform Act. Our findings were based on a national random sample survey of hard money contributors to congressional campaigns, conducted at the University of Akron in 

1997-98. In an earlier report based on this survey research, we found that 81 percent of such donors had 

annual family incomes higher than $100,000, ninety-five 

percent were white, and eighty percent were men. 

4. In “Raising the Limits,” we concluded that the cumulative impact of doubling the individual contribution limits 

would result in increased giving by the elite pool of individual donors to federal campaigns. 

5. We further concluded that this increased giving is 

likely to exacerbate the upper status character of the 

donor pool, providing greater voice to wealthy businessmen and individuals already heavily engaged in giving. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of 

the United States of America that the foregoing is true 

and correct. 
32a 

Executed on: September 18, 2002 

/s/ 	John C. Green 

John C. Green 

Exhibit 2B 

Campaign finance reform may hold some surprises 

Raising 

the Limits 

By Clyde Wilcox, John C. Green, Paul S. Herrnson, Peter 

L. Francia, Lynda W. Powell, and Benjamin A. Webster 

The United States has embarked upon a major reform of 

the federal campaign finance laws, something that happens only about once a generation. Congress has passed, 

and the president has signed, the most extensive regulation of campaign money since the Watergate-era Federal 

Election campaign Act (FECA). 

Unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, 

the new law will restrict “soft money” contributions to 

political parties and “issue advocacy” spending by parties 

and interest groups (neither regulated by FECA). The new 

law will also increase “hard money” contributions (those 

regulated by FECA). 

Clyde Wilcox is professor of government and Benjamin A. 

Webster is a doctoral student, Georgetown University. John C. 

Green is professor political science, University of Akron. Paul 

S. Herrnson is professor of government and politics, and Peter 

L. Francia is a research fellow at the Center for American 

Politics and Citizenship, University of Maryland. Lynda W. 

Powell is professor of political science, University of Rochester. 
33a 

For example, it will double the limit on the amount individuals can give to congressional candidates in an election from 

$1,000 to $2,000, so that in a typical race, an individual will 

be able to give a candidate a total of $4,000 ($2,000 in the 

primary and $2,000 in the general election). The law also 

expands to $95,000 per year the total aggregate amount 

individuals can give to candidates, parties, and PACs. 

Some reformers, many of them Republicans, argue that 

doubling the individual limits will largely restore the 

value of contributions eroded by inflation, thus expanding 

participation and helping wean candidates away from soft 

money and issue advocacy. Other reformers, many of them 

Democrats, say the new limits will mostly increase the 

participation of Republican and conservative donors, and 

thus mostly help GOP candidates. Still others think the 

new limits will allow candidates to spend less time raising 

money, and more time legislating, because their fundraising efforts will yield more money. 

Further analysis is needed, however, because the effects of 

reform are often unanticipated by reformers. Labor unions 

pushed for language permitting the formation of political 

action committees (PACs) in 1974, but did not foresee the 

tidal wave of corporate PAC formation in the 1980s. 

Likewise, the activists who supported the creation of party 

soft money in 1979 did not fully anticipate the sheer 

magnitude of those funds twenty years later. Thus, it is 

worth asking: with increased individual limits, who will 

give more money, and which candidates will benefit? 

We can offer some tentative answers to these questions 

with a combination of survey and campaign finance data. 
34a 

Supported by a grant from the Joyce Foundation, we 

conducted a mail survey of a random sample of individuals 

who gave $200 or more to congressional candidates in 

1996 (hereafter referred to as “major donors”), drawn from 

the records of the Federal Elections Commission. 

Because these records list specific contributions and not 

contributors, we weighted the major donor sample to 

correct for oversampling those who made many contributions. To make sure we understood the donors who gave 

the most, we also surveyed a special list of individuals who 

had given to at least eight candidates and/or gave a total 

of $8,000 (hereafter referred to as “most active donors”). 

The surveys were conducted at the University of Akron, 

and the survey responses were matched to the actual 

donation records, thus linking donor attitudes directly to 

contributing behavior. [See the July/August 2000 issue of 

Public Perspective for an earlier article on this study.] 

As part of a battery of campaign finance reform questions, 

we asked both samples of donors, “How might your own 

contributions to congressional candidates be affected if the 

following changes were enacted? If larger individual gifts 

were allowed?” The response categories were “would give 

more,” “would give the same,” and “would give less.” 

Just 15% of the major donors reported that they would 

give more if the limits were raised – we refer to these 

respondents as “Expanded Givers” – and 5% said that they 

would give less if contribution limits were raised (“Reduced Givers”. Among the most active donors, 30% were 

Expanded Givers and only 3% Reduced Givers. However, 

the great bulk of both samples said they would be unaffected by the change: 80% of the major donors and 67% of 
35a 

the most active said their contributions would remain the 

same. We call them “Stand-Pat Givers.” 

Speculation on the impact of increased contribution limits 

has naturally focused on those donors who “maxed out” at 

the current limit of $1,000, since only they were restricted 

by the old law. Yet our study yields a surprising result: 

nearly one-half of major donors who would give more did 

not make a maximum contribution in 1996, and this was 

true of nearly one-quarter of the most active donors as 

well. 

Why would someone who does not make a maximum 

contribution give more if the limit were doubled? Many 

donations are made at events, such as dinners and cocktail 

parties, which typically require a minimum contribution, 

set below the legal limit. An increase in the limit is likely 

to produce higher minimum contributions for these events: 

a senator’s $500-a-plate dinner may become $750 or 

$1,000, and all attendees will give more. Indeed, many 

Stand-Pat Givers might have to contribute more to participate in the same events. 

Why would a donor give less if the legal limit for contributions were raised? The Reduced Givers are deeply disillusioned with the campaign finance system, with one-half 

saying that the current campaign finance system is 

“broken and needs to be replaced.” As a consequence, they 

are strong supporters of limits on campaign spending and 

television advertising, and a ban on soft money. Many 

already contribute only occasionally and in small amounts. 

Thus, they may well reduce their giving – or stop it completely – if the role of “big money” grows. 

Expanded Givers have a different perspective. For starters, they have a more positive opinion of the campaign 
36a 

finance system, with a plurality claiming “it has some 

problems but is basically sound.” Many are habitual 

donors who regard campaign contributing as a legitimate 

form of political activity. They also support campaign 

finance reform, and one of their favorite reform proposals 

is raising individual limits. 

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the demographic and political 

characteristics of Expanded Givers compared to the entire 

donor samples. These results must be viewed with caution 

because the Expanded Givers make up only a small 

portion of the donor pool, but the patterns are nevertheless quite interesting. 


39a 

As can be seen in Figure 1, major congressional donors are 

disproportionately wealthy, well-educated, middle-aged, 

and male. Among the major donors, the Expanded Givers 

fit this profile well. Twenty-two percent report incomes of 

over $500,000, compared with 14% of the entire sample. In 

terms of occupation, Expanded Givers are more likely 

(43% vs. 35%) to be business managers. (Business managers are defined as corporate CEOs, vice presidents, and 

other high-level business bureaucrats.) 

Education and age show more a more complex pattern. 

Expanded Givers tend to have some graduate training, 

rather than just a college degree or a graduate degree. 

Likewise, they tend to be middle-aged, with most between 

46 and 60 years of age. There is also a gender gap: Expanded Givers are even more masculine than the sample 

as a whole. 

The Reduced Givers tend to have the opposite characteristics, being less affluent, less educated, and more female, 

but comprising more older and younger donors. Most of 

these demographic characteristics are less important for 

the most active donors. Here the Expanded Givers are 

wealthier and more likely to be less than 60 years old. But 

there are few differences in occupation or education, and 

the gender gap is smaller. 

Thus, Expanded Givers tend to be wealthy, middle-aged 

businessmen, with some variation among the most active 

donors. And, thus, increased giving is likely to intensify 

the existing upper-status bias of the donor pool and reduce 

the representation of women. Raising the limits may well 

increase individual participation in campaign finance, but 

in a highly selective fashion. 
40a 

This conclusion is reinforced by the motives the donors 

report as “very important” for their giving. Compared to 

the samples as a whole, Expanded Givers were most likely 

to report business motives, such as “so my business will be 

treated fairly,” “candidate is friendly to my industry or 

line of work,” or “[I was] asked by someone I cannot say no 

to.” Reduced Givers were less likely to cite this kind of 

motive as important. 

Given the demography and motivation of Expanded 

Givers, their political profile in Figure 2 should come as no 

surprise. Among the major donors, Expanded Givers were 

more likely to be strong Republicans and strong conservatives compared to the sample as a whole. 

These patterns extended to specific issues, especially 

economic questions. Expanded Givers were more likely to 

support tax cuts “even if it means reducing public services.” Similarly conservative-leaning results obtained for 

Expanded Givers on national health insurance, antipoverty programs, and environmental protection. 

Much the same thing occurred on social issues. For example, Expanded Givers were more likely than other donors 

to agree that “abortion should be outlawed except to save 

the mother’s life,” and were also more conservative on gay 

rights and affirmative action. 

In addition, there is an organizational component to these 

figures. Fully 30% of the self-identified members of business or conservative interest groups qualified as Expanded 

Givers. In contrast, just 7% of members of both environmental and liberal groups said they would give more if the 

limits were raised. 
41a 

These partisan and ideological tendencies hold for the 

most active donors – an important finding, because the 

most active donors are more Democratic and liberal than 

the major donors. Thus, increased giving may erode a 

Democratic counterbalance to the Republican tilt of the 

major donors. Overall, the Reduced Givers are more likely 

to be liberals, independents of various sorts, and Democrats. 

What kind of congressional candidates did Expanded 

Givers support in 1996? Not surprisingly, they directed 

more than 70% of their money to Republicans. This figure 

contrasts sharply with the Reduced Givers, who gave just 

38% of their 1996 funds to Republicans, and the Stand-Pat 

Givers, who gave 56%. Taken together, all of this evidence 

suggests some factual basis for the opposition to increased 

individual limits by Democratic reformers. 

It is very difficult to estimate the amount and distribution 

of new funds resulting from the doubling of the individual 

limits. Much depends on the circumstances of the election 

and how a wide range of political actors responds to the 

entire reform package. We can, however, use our major 

donor sample to estimate the extra funds that might have 

been raised in 1996, had the increased limits been in 

place. 

For this purpose, we assume that all the Expanded Givers 

doubled their 1996 contributions, the Reduced Givers cut 

their contributions to zero, and the Stand-Pat Givers 

remained unchanged. Table 1 reports the results of this 

estimate overall and for various kinds of candidates. 
42a 

Table 1 

What If Limits Had Applied in 1996? 

TOTAL 

REPUBLICAN 

INCUMBENTS 

NONINCUMBENTS 

DEMOCRATIC 

INCUMBENTS 

NONINCUMBENTS 

1996 ESTIMATED ESTIMATED ESTIMATED 

TOTAL IN % NEW FUNDS TOTAL IN 

MILLIONS1 CHANGE2 IN MILLIONS

3 MILLIONS4 

$203.5 16.7% $34.0 $237.5 

$62.8 25.6% $16.0 $78.8 

$50.1 19.6% $9.8 $59.9 

$38.2 13.3% $5.0 $43.2 

$52.4 6.2% $3.2 $55.6 

Note: 1

total funds raised by congressional candidates from 

individual contributions of $200 or more in 1996. 2

Estimated increase in individual donations of $200 or 

more assuming: a) all Expanded Givers doubled their 1996 

contributions, and b) all Reduced Givers reduced their 

1996 contributions to zero.3

 Column one multiplied by 

column two.4

 Column one added to column three. 

Source. Estimated by the authors from the University of 

Akron Fall 1997 survey and Federal Election Commission 

data. 

The first row in Table 1 reports the total funds raised in 

1996 from individuals’ donations of $200 or more to 

congressional candidates ($203.5 million). We estimate 

that these funds would have been 16.7% higher if the 

increased limits had been in place and the above assumptions were met, producing an additional $34 million. 
43a 

There is a sharp partisan bias in the distribution of the 

estimated funds. For Republican incumbents, funds 

increased by 25.6% and accounted for almost one-half of 

the increased funds ($16 out of $34 million). Republican 

non-incumbents (challengers and open-seat candidates) 

showed a smaller increase of 19.6% and obtained a little 

more than one-quarter of the estimated new money. 

By comparison, Democrats fared less well: incumbents 

increased by 13.3% and non-incumbents by 6.2%. The total 

Democratic increase was $8.2 million, about one-third of 

the total Republican gain. 

These estimates must be viewed with caution, of course, 

since different assumptions will produce different results, 

and future campaigns may not resemble that of 1996. The 

total figures could be much higher if the Stand-Pat Givers 

are induced to contribute more, or the Reduced Givers 

continue to participate rather than abstaining. 

It is possible that Democratic candidates will more successfully exploit the new limits than Republicans, or that 

the larger maximum donations will help non-incumbents 

by providing crucial “seed money” for their campaigns. 

However, it is also possible that these patterns will also 

apply to the increased contributions to parties and PACs, 

to the further advantage of the GOP and conservative 

candidates. 

Finally, the level of estimated new money is high enough 

to suggest that some candidates may be able to spend less 

time on fundraising and more time on other duties – 

especially if they are Republicans and incumbents. 

What, then, is the likely impact of doubling individual 

contribution limits? Although only one in six major donors 
44a 

claim they would give more, and one in twenty would give 

less, the cumulative impact could be significant. Increased 

giving is likely to exacerbate the upper status character of 

the donor pool, providing greater voice to wealthy businessmen and individuals already heavily engaged in 

giving. 

More of the new funds are likely to go to Republican 

congressional candidates, particularly incumbents, and 

may allow these candidates to spend less time on fundraising and more time legislating. Thus, the new reforms may 

produce some political consequences unforeseen – but not 

unforeseeable – by the reformers. 
45a 

Exhibit 3 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT 

OF CRAIG MCDONALD 

I, Craig McDonald, hereby declare as follows: 

1. I am the Director of Texans for Public Justice, a 

non-profit research organization based in Austin, Texas. I 

have served as director of Texas for Public Justice since its 

establishment in 1997. Prior to that I was employed by 

Public Citizen, Inc. and the Center for New Democracy 

and as an employee of those organizations, I have accumulated over 20 years of experience in studying and analyzing campaign financing practices and policy with a focus 

on both federal and state campaigns. My curriculum vitae 
46a 

is attached to this declaration as Exhibit A. I have not 

received any compensation for providing this declaration 

and expert report. 

2. Texans for Public Justice monitors, documents 

and analyzes political campaign donation activity of 

political candidates and political committees. In July 1999, 

Texans for Public Justice began monitoring and gathering 

information on the Governor George W. Bush Presidential 

Exploratory Committee, Inc. and its successor organization, the George W. Bush For President Committee. A 

particular focus of our research was the establishment and 

activity of the Pioneer fundraising network that was 

established by the Bush Exploratory Committee and 

functioned as an ongoing activity of the George W. Bush 

for President Committee. Since July of 1999, Texans for 

Public Justice has produced several reports documenting 

the operation of the Pioneer network and detailing the 

identities, occupations and economic interests of the Bush 

Pioneers. 

3. The existence of the Bush Pioneer program first 

became public in May 1999, two months after the creation 

of Bush’s presidential exploratory committee on March 7, 

1999. The program was designed to circumvent the $1,000 

limit on individual contributions to the Bush Presidential 

Exploratory Committee and the Bush For President 

Campaign Committee. The Pioneer program solicited 

individual campaign supporters to commit to raising a 

minimum of $100,000 for the campaign by reaching out to a 

network of personal contacts and encouraging those contacts 

to contribute directly to the campaign. To reach their goal of 

$100,000 a Pioneer would have to build a network of at least 

100 donors who could contribute the $1,000 maximum 

amount allowed under law. Each volunteer participant in 
47a 

the Pioneer program was assigned an identification, or 

tracking number, which was to appear on all checks the 

individual Pioneer successfully solicited for the campaign. 

The Bush campaign monitored the progress of each volunteer at it Austin headquarters. In May 1999, when the 

existence of the Pioneer program became public, Mr. 

Donald Evans, the Bush campaign fundraising chairman, 

acknowledged that 150 individuals had signed up for the 

Pioneer program, but noted he did not expect all to reach 

the $100,000 goal. 

4. To build the fundraising network and meet the 

campaign’s goal of raising $50 million by the end of 1999, 

Bush had courted hundreds of money men who had traveled into Austin to lunch with the Governor either in a 

downtown restaurant or at the Governor’s mansion. While 

the campaign initially refused to publicly disclose the 

identities of the 150 participants in the Pioneer program, 

the campaign revealed that Bush had enlisted the help of 

an undisclosed number of Republican governors and 

Washington lobbyists. Texas-based lobbyist Tom Loeffler 

was named as a Pioneer, as was Washington-based lobbyist Haley Barbour. 

5. Essentially, the Pioneer program is what is 

commonly referred to as a “bundling” operation. Bundling 

is the term used when supporters of a particular candidate 

or campaign assist the campaign in raising money from 

their own networks of family, employees, friends, coworkers, etc. A “bundler” is often a donor that has pledged 

or contributed the maximum contribution allowed by law, 

but is willing to engage in further fundraising outreach to 

their own networks and encourage an unlimited number of 

other individuals to contribute to the candidate or campaign. Bundlers, therefore, facilitate the delivery of – and 
48a 

often take and receive credit for – amounts of money that 

are many times the amount allowed by law for individual 

contributions. The practice of “bundling” campaign contributions and delivering them to candidates or campaigns is 

not new and is practiced by many modern federal campaigns. However, the Bush Pioneer program elevated this 

practice to new levels of sophistication. The practice of 

bundling campaign contributions, while contrary to the 

spirit of the federal campaign laws limiting individual 

contributions to candidates to $1,000 per election, is not 

prohibited as long a those who engage in it do not coerce 

others to give a campaign contribution. 

6. In July of 1999, the campaign revealed further 

information about the Pioneer program. Jim Francis, 

Director of the Texas Public Safety Commission, served as 

the head of the Pioneer program. According to Francis, 115 

individuals had reached the goal of bundling $100,000 

each. Francis acknowledged there were close to 400 Bush 

supporters working toward the $100,000 goal, including 

the 115 that already there. 

7. The degree to which the Bush Pioneer program 

was systemically tracking – and crediting – donors with 

contributions exceeding the individual limits, was further 

brought to light when a May 27, 1999 memo from Pioneer 

and Edison Electric Institute president, Tom Kuhn to 

electric utility industry executives became public. The 

Kuhn memo, written on Bush campaign committee stationary [sic], revealed that the campaign was not only tracking 

and crediting individuals for bundling over the limits, but 

was tracking bundlers with respect to the industries they 

represented. An excerpt from the Kuhn memo: 
49a 

“My personal thanks to all of you for taking a 

leadership role in gathering support for the June 

22 reception honoring Governor George W. Bush 

. . . As you know, a very important part of the 

campaigns outreach to the business community 

is the use of tracking numbers for contributions. 

Both Don Evans and Jack Oliver have stressed 

the importance of having our industry incorporate the #1178 tracking number in your fundraising efforts. Listing your industry’s code does not 

prevent you, any of your individual solicitors or 

your state from receiving credit for soliciting a 

contribution. It does ensure that our industry is 

credited, and that your progress is listed among 

the other business/industry sectors. If you have 

any questions about your industry’s tracking information, please do not hesitate to let me know 

. . . ” 

8. Clearly, the conclusion that can be derived from 

the Bush campaign’s own characterization of the program 

and the explicit description by Tom Kuhn of the importance of making sure the proper “codes” were included on 

donations so that the individual, state and industry would 

receive “credit for soliciting a contribution” from the 

campaign’s key staff, must be that some benefit(s) would 

accrue to those who delivered the largest amounts or share 

of money. If there were no expectation of special access, 

rewards, or favors, there would have been no need to 

“track” contributions and “credit” them according to the 

industries, states and individuals generating them. 

9. The Bush campaign made public a list of 115 

Pioneers on July 19, 1999. According to the campaign, 

these 115 individuals were those who had met the goal of 

bundling a minimum of $100,000 in contributions to Bush. 

According to campaign spokespersons, individuals who 
50a 

had not yet fulfilled the goal of reaching the $100,000 

mark were not considered Pioneers and their names were 

not disclosed. Neither did the campaign publicly disclose 

(at the time or anytime subsequently) the total amounts 

that Pioneers were credited with raising. This and subsequent limited disclosures by the campaign were criticized 

by TPJ. We believed the public had the right to know the 

total amounts Pioneers were being credited with raising, 

and the right to know the names and amounts credited to 

any individuals the campaign might be tracking regardless of whether they had reached the magic $100,000 

number. 

10. Periodic disclosures of those considered to be 

Pioneers according the campaign’s definition resulted in 

the release of 226 names. In July 2000, TPJ published an 

analysis of the occupations and economic interests of 212 

Pioneers whose names had been disclosed through June 

2000. The report concluded that the ranks of the Pioneers 

were dominated by corporate executives and lobbyists. The 

report classified the known Pioneers by their business and 

primary economic or ideological interests, tracked the total 

money each spent on politics, and provided individual 

profiles of each. The major findings of the report were: 

• 	 133 Pioneers were business executives, 16 of 

whom George W. Bush appointed to state government posts. 

• 	 The 212 identified Pioneers, who by definition 

had raised a minimum of $21.2 million for 

Bush’s presidential effort, had also personally 

contributed an additional $7.1 million to federal candidates and PACs since the ‘96 election cycle. 
51a 

• 	 When the 212 were identified by their primary economic interest or profession 44 of 

the Pioneers were classified as Lawyers & 

Lobbyists, 38 represented the Financial sector, 28 were from the Energy & Natural Resources sector (dominated by oil and gas), 24 

were from the Real Estate sector, and 23 were 

classified as representing Miscellaneous 

Businesses. 

11. Members and/or potential members of the Pioneer network enjoyed special access to Governor Bush and 

the campaign, prior to the official announcement that he 

would pursue the presidency, and during the campaign 

itself. Governor Bush met with Pioneers and future or 

potential Pioneers on a number of occasions as documented in the media: 

• 	 On December 18, 1998 a group gathered at 

the Governors Mansion to discuss the campaign. That group included California financier 

Brad Freeman and California agribusiness tycoon Howard Leach, both later designated by 

the campaign as Pioneers. 

• 	 In the Spring of 1999, Bush met in Austin 

with Christine Toretti, head of Pennsylvania 

drilling company who pledged to deliver $1 

million to the primary campaign yet was 

never designated a Pioneer. 

• 	 At least seven “Pioneers” stayed at least one 

night in the Texas governor’s mansion between February 1, 1999 and March of 2000. 

These Pioneers included Don Jordan of Relient Energy, investment banker Brad Freeman, Craig Stapleton of Marsh and McLellan, 

and Roland Betts of Chelsea Piers Management. 
52a 

• 	 According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in June 1999, Charles Cawley, president 

of MBNA America Bank, hosted a dinner at 

his summer home in Kennebunkport, Maine. 

More than 200 guests gathered to help underwrite the presidential campaign of George 

W. Bush, the party’s guest of honor. Over the 

next year, Cawley would personally raise at 

least $100,000 for the Bush campaign, qualifying him as a Pioneer, helping to secure 

MBNA’s slot as Bush’s single top contribution 

with more than $240,000 in contributions 

from its employees during 1999-2000. 

• 	 On November 15, 1999, the Bush campaign 

hosted a gathering of 300 top fundraisers in 

Austin, TX, 150 of whom had been designated 

“Pioneers.” 

• 	 August 16, 2002, Bush held a gathering at his 

Crawford, TX residence for the “Pioneer” 

network. 

12. Many of the Pioneers were rewarded with 

government appointments. A report released by Texan [sic] 

for Public Justice on March 5, 2002 shows that 43 of the 

publicly named Pioneers had received presidential appointments of some kind. Again, by definition, these 43 

Pioneer appointees delivered more than $4.3 million to 

Bush’s presidential race. Pioneers who received Bush 

appointments include: 

• 	 19 U.S. ambassadors to countries from Austria to Uruguay; 

• 	Five members of the Energy Department 

Transition Team that first envisioned Bush’s 

supply-side energy policy (including ex-Enron 

CEO Ken Lay); and 
53a 

• 	 Two seats on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 

13. It is impossible to determine exactly how much 

money the Pioneer network was responsible for raising for 

the Bush campaign, given the fact that the campaign has 

not publicly disclosed that information nor produced that 

information for this litigation. At a bare minimum, relying 

on the Bush campaign’s limited public disclosure, the 

Pioneers were responsible for raising $22.6 million, or 

approximately one-fifth of the private money raised by the 

campaign. (Based on the campaign’s public release of the 

names of 224 Pioneers who achieved their “goal” of raising 

$100,000.) 

14. It is likely that the Pioneer network raised many 

millions more than the acknowledged $22.6 million. 

According to documents produced by the Bush for President Committee for this litigation, the campaign was 

tracking a total of 431 individuals as part of the Pioneer 

program. This means there were at least 207 individuals 

who pledged to raise $100,000 but apparently fell short of 

the goal, or achieved the goal but were not disclosed by the 

campaign. It is also quite likely that several, if not many 

of the Pioneers raised well more than $100,000 for the 

campaign. Again, documents produced by the Bush for 

President Committee for this litigation reveals that 34 

Pioneers pledged to raise more than $100,000 with 29 of 

them committing to raise $250,000 or more and three 

pledging to raise more than $1,000,000. When considering 

that the campaign did not disclose how much the “underachieving” and “overachieving” Pioneers delivered, it is 

reasonable to speculate that the total amount of money 

raised by the Pioneer bundling operation may have 

reached $50,000,000 or more. 
54a 

15. The increased limits on individual contributions 

called for under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 

2002 (BCRA) would undoubtedly increase the ability of 

elite fundraisers, such as those who comprise the Bush 

Pioneers, to deliver larger amounts of money to political 

campaigns. With those larger amounts of funds, would 

likely come more access and potential influence over public 

policy and governmental actions. I believe it is reasonable 

to speculate that under the more indulgent contribution 

limits of BCRA, the same Bush Pioneer network might 

have been able to provide the campaign with many millions of dollars more than it delivered for the 2000 election 

effort. It is not unrealistic to speculate that, under BCRA, 

the Pioneers would be able to double the amount of contributions delivered in 2000, meaning that a relatively small 

handful of citizens could be responsible for delivering 

anywhere from $45 million up to $100 million to a federal 

presidential effort – enough money to fund an entire 

campaign. 

16. The sources that I have relied on in forming my 

opinions are attached as Exhibits B-Q. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of 

the United States of America that the foregoing is true and 

correct. 

Executed on September 19, 2002 

/s/ Craig McDonald 

Craig McDonald 
55a 

Exhibit 4 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ) 

ADAMS, et. al., ) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

) 

)

-vs ) 

) 

THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) 

COMMISSION et al., ) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION AND EXPERT REPORT OF 

PROFESSOR THOMAS STRATMANN 

I, Thomas Stratmann, hereby declare as follows: 

1. I am a Professor of Economics at George Mason 

University. I have received a Ph. D. in Economics from the 

University of Maryland in 1990, and a M.A. in Economics 

from the University of Maryland in 1988. I have given 

expert testimony in a campaign finance case in Montana 

(Montana Right to Life Assoc. v. Eddleman, No. CV 96-165-

BLG-JDS), and in Vermont (Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 

2d 459 (D. Vt. 2000)). I receive a $175 fee per hour for 
56a 

working on this case. A current version of my CV is at

tached to the affidavit. 

2. My research on campaign finance issues falls into 

three areas. In one research area I examine whether limits 

on contributions to candidates make it more difficult or 

less difficult for challengers to compete with incumbents. 

This work examines whether contribution limits make 

elections more or less competitive. In another research 

area I examine whether contributions to legislators affect 

the voting behavior of legislators and, specifically, whether 

there is a causal link between contributions and legisla

tors’ voting behavior. In a third research area I examine 

whether contributors pursue solely an “electoral strategy” 

in allocating their contributions across legislators (i.e., do 

they give money solely to assist the election of legislators 

who support the contributors’ policy views) or whether the 

allocation of contributions reflects a “legislative strategy” 

(i.e., giving money to influence legislators’ votes on legisla

tion). 

Contribution limits and competitiveness of elec

tions. 

3. The subject of the causal relationship between 

campaign contribution limits and the outcome of elections 

has been debated for many years. Some argue that limit

ing campaign contributions amounts to “incumbent protec

tion”. This school of thought holds that contribution limits 

are damaging to challengers as a class because they 

prevent them from getting their message out and compet

ing against an incumbent with strong name recognition. 

Moreover, reductions in contributions would hurt chal

lengers overall if each dollar is marginally more important 
57a 

to challengers. Others contend that limits make challeng

ers more competitive. They claim that contribution limits 

are helpful to challengers as a class because they reduce the 

amount by which incumbents can outspend challengers. 

4. Studies conducted at the federal level offer little 

insight regarding the effects of contribution limits because 

these studies took place at the federal level, where federal 

campaign finance laws had not changed since the mid1970s. But, there is another way to determine the effects 

of contribution limits on election outcomes. By turning to 

the states, the traditional laboratories of democracy, we 

can compare states that have no contribution limits to 

those that have them. State campaign finance laws exhibit 

a lot of variation across states and over time. Since the 

late1970s, many states have enacted and changed their 

own campaign finance laws and therefore states provide a 

natural testing ground for theoretical campaign finance 

models. If contribution limits amount to “incumbent 

protection,” then challengers should do comparatively well 

in states with no limits, and fare more poorly as contribu

tion limits get lower in other states. 

5. My work in “Competition Policy for Elections: Do 

Campaign Contribution Limits Matter?” co-authored with 

Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, looks at the states with 

contribution limits and without limits and empirically 

measures changes in competitiveness. The analysis is 

based on more than 30,000 elections to state lower houses 

in 45 states between 1980 and 2001. I measure competi

tiveness by examining electoral margins in winner-take-all 

elections, which are dominant in U.S. elections. I look at the 

margin of victory of the winning candidate to measure 

“closeness” of elections and at the percentage of races won by 

challengers to measure how often incumbents get re-elected. 
58a 

I also look at the number of candidates in each general 

election, which should be a good indicator of the ability 

and willingness of challengers to mount a campaign either 

for the purposes of winning or for the purposes of raising 

important issues that may not yet have majority support. 

6. The multi-state, multi-year analysis shows that 

states with contribution limits have closer elections. I 

document that campaign contribution limits favor chal

lengers by reducing the incumbent margin of victory. 

7. The existence of a contribution limit reduced the 

margin of victory for open seat candidates and incumbents 

who were in office after the passage of the contribution 

limits by 7.6% for individual contribution limits, 9.4% for 

PAC limits, 4.1% for limits on corporations (although this 

percentage is not statically [sic] significant at conventional 

levels) 6.5% for limits on unions, and 6.9% for limits on 

party giving. 

8. If open seat races are removed, we can look only 

at the effect of contribution limits on incumbents. Incum

bents who are in office when campaign contribution limits 

are passed may not experience the full effect of those 

limits. Those incumbents have had years of campaigning 

under the old limits to build up their brand name recogni

tion. They also have had the chance to build up large 

reserves of campaign funds under the old limits that they 

may use for future campaigns even after new limits have 

gone into effect. To isolate this effect, we can look only at 

incumbents who take office after a change in campaign 

finance law has gone into effect. Examining races that 

involve incumbents only, I find that individual limits 

reduce the margin of victory for post-limit incumbents by 

6% while it reduces the margin of victory for pre-limit 
59a 

incumbents by 3.1%. We find similar effects for PACs, 

corporations, unions and parties. 

9. The findings show that all forms of contribution 

limits have a negative impact on incumbents’ margin of 

victory, although they have a lesser impact on incumbents 

who are already in office when the law takes effect. Re

gression results also indicate that the presence of contri

bution limits results in a 0.1 (or 5%) increase in the 

number of candidates (in races with post-limit incum

bents), taking the average from 1.8 to 1.9 candidates in a 

race. 

10. The data further indicate that the lower the 

contribution limit, the greater the increase in competitive

ness overall. When examining races with incumbents the 

results show that lowering a contribution limit by $1,000 

when controlling for factors such as term limits and 

election day registration, time invariant state characteris

tics and factors that influence election outcomes nationwide, reduces the margin of victory for incumbents by 5.4 

percent. When this is further controlled to account for the 

number of candidates in the race, then a $1,000 decrease 

in contribution limits yields a 3% decrease in incumbent 

margin of victory. When all races are included, not just 

incumbents, a $1,000 decrease in contribution limits results 

in a 1.5% to 2.6% reduction in the margin of victory, so 

lowering a limit appears to have a slightly larger impact on 

incumbents than open seat candidates. 

11. Given that incumbents on average win elections 

with 78% of the vote, the decrease in vote margins from 

contribution limits is not large enough to cause most 

incumbents to lose. When the estimate on incumbent vote 
60a 

loss is applied to the actual margins of victory by incum

bents, I find that approximately 4% of successful incum

bents would have lost had the contribution limits in their 

races been lowered by $2,000. The presence of individual 

contribution limits result in a 1.1% reduction in likelihood 

of incumbent victories, and when limits are placed on all 

sources of contributions, (individuals, PACs, corporations, 

unions, and parties) the likelihood of incumbent victory 

reduces by 2.1%. 

12. The data show that contribution limits make 

races closer, reduce the incumbency advantage, and lead to 

more candidates in elections. The data do not lend support 

to the hypothesis that contribution limits protect incum

bents. Quite to the contrary, lower contribution limits help 

challengers, make them more competitive, and increase 

the likelihood they emerge as winners in electoral races. 

Therefore, the new higher limits on hard-money contribu

tions in the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act are 

likely to benefit incumbents at the expense of challengers. 

Campaign contributions and the voting behavior of legislators. 

13. Whether campaign contributions induce a 

legislator to favor the interests of the contributor has been 

a long-standing research questions. In particular, the 

question is whether contributions to legislators affect the 

voting behavior of legislators and whether there is a 

causal link between contributions and legislators’ voting 

behavior. 

14. In my 1991 and 1995 articles (Southern Economic Journal 1991, Review of Economics and Statistics, 
61a 

1995) I analyze roll call votes on subsidies to the agricul

tural sector and to examine whether campaign contribu

tions from agriculture caused legislators to vote in 

agricultural interests. I examine roll call votes on amend

ments to the 1981 and 1985 Farm Bill as well as votes on 

agricultural appropriations and emergency funding. The 

outcome of these votes was important to the agricultural 

sector, as these votes provided funding, subsidies, and 

favorable regulations for particular agricultural sectors. 

The benefits associated with these votes were concen

trated among the agricultural sector, while the costs were 

distributed throughout the electorate. 

15. Between two articles I analyze a total of fifteen 

roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1981 

and 1985. All votes are on agricultural issues such changes 

in the level of subsidies for dairy, peanuts, sugar, tobacco, 

and wheat, while others were votes on emergency funding 

for agriculture, appropriation bills for agriculture, and the 

final vote on the agricultural bill. Some of these votes 

proposed increasing government farm subsidies, others 

proposed decreasing farm subsidies. 

16. Any research examining the effects of campaign 

contributions on voting behavior, and wanting to establish 

a causal effect going from contributions to voting behavior, 

has to recognize that contributors may give to their 

friends, and thus that a vote favoring a contributor may 

not indicate that the vote has been ‘bought’. I address this 

issue by using a well accepted statistical technique, called 

two-stage least squares, that allows the researcher to 

tease out the causal effect going from campaign contribu

tions received to voting behavior, if such an effect is in the 

data. 
62a 

17. In my regression analysis I examine whether 

contributions from the dairy industry influence votes on 

dairy issues, and proceed with an equally detailed analysis 

for votes on tobacco, wheat, sugar, and peanut issues. For 

analyzing the Farm bill and emergency finding I examine 

whether contributions from the entire agricultural sector 

cause legislators to vote in agricultural interests. 

18. My research shows that campaign contributions 

are effective in altering politicians’ voting behavior. I find 

that in most of these votes, campaign contributions increase the probability that a legislator is voting in con

tributors’ interests. My 1991 and 1995 articles document 

that contributions from agricultural Political Action 

Committees (PACs) increased the probability that legisla

tors would vote in favor of PAC interests. Not only are 

contributions in the current election cycle important for 

influencing the voting behavior of politicians, but contri

butions in the period prior to the roll call votes are also 

important. For example, dairy contributions in 1983/84 

electoral cycle and contributions received early in 1985 

influence a dairy vote late in 1985. 

19. An alternative measure to assess the impact of 

campaign contributions is to examine whether the outcome of the congressional roll call vote would have 

changed if congressmen had received no campaign contri

butions. I examine this in my 1991 article and find that in 

two out of the ten votes examined, agricultural interests 

would have lost the vote if campaign contributions were 

prohibited. For example, an amendment to increase sugar 

subsidies passed by a vote of 267-146. I estimate that 

without campaign contributions this amendment would 

have been defeated 203-210. These numbers indicate that 
63a 

campaign contributions are quite effective in changing 

legislators’ voting behavior. 

20. In my most recent work on this topic I have 

conducted a detailed study examining changes in voting 

behavior in financial services legislation. This paper is 

forthcoming in the October 2002 issue of the Journal of 

Law and Economics. I examine two votes in the U.S. 

House of Representatives on the repeal of the Glass 

Steagall Act. One vote took place in 1991 and the other 

vote took place in 1998. No roll call vote on the repeal of 

the Glass Steagall Act took place between these two dates. 

Banking interests favored the repeal of the Glass Steagall 

Act, while insurance and securities interests opposed it. 

21. Some legislators sided with banking interests in 

1991 and switched sides in 1998 by voting for insurance 

and securities interests. Other legislators switched from 

voting for insurance and securities interests in 1991 to 

banking interests in 1998. In this study I analyze why 

legislators changed their position between 1991 and 1998. 

I find that changes in the flow of financial services cam

paign contributions can explain much of the change in 

voting behavior. Moreover, the article documents that 

junior legislators’ voting behavior is particularly suscepti

ble to being influenced by campaign contributions. In 

particular, this study examines whether changes in 

contribution flows can explain why legislators switched 

sides. I find that legislators switched their voting behavior 

from insurance/securities to banking interests when they 

received larger banking contributions in the late 1990s 

than in the early 1990s. 

22. This is the first study of its kind that examines 

whether changes in contributions over time lead to 
64a 

changes in legislators’ voting. I find that changes in 

contributions lead to changes in voting and I believe that 

this is a causal effect. One could argue that some legisla

tors changed their position from favoring banking inter

ests to favoring insurance interests and that this was the 

reason that they received more contributions. However, 

though this is possible, I believe that it is unlikely. Finan

cial services legislation is not a salient issue in legislators 

home district, giving them little opportunity to stake out a 

public position. One of the few opportunities to stake out a 

position is to vote on this issue, and there were no roll call 

votes between 1991 and 1998, which would have allowed 

them to take a position favoring one interest over another. 

Moreover, there is not evidence of substantial changes in 

the desire of the home constituency with respect to the 

repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, which could have caused a 

legislator to shift position. Thus I am confident that this 

paper estimates a causal effect of money on votes. 

What contributors do: assist the election of 

legislators who support the contributors’ policy views or give money to influence legislators’ votes on legislation? 

23. Another important question in campaign finance 

is whether contributors pursue solely an “electoral strat

egy” in allocating their contributions across legislators 

(i.e., do they give money solely to assist the election of 

legislators who support the contributors’ policy views) or 

whether the allocation of contributions reflects a “legisla

tive strategy” (i.e., giving money to influence legislators’ 

votes on legislation)? 
65a 

24. My research findings published in the Journal of 

Political Economy 1992, the Journal of Law and Economics 1996, and the Journal of Law and Economics 1998 

shows that PACs allocate contributions across legislators 

in ways that are consistent with the objective of influenc

ing legislators’ votes on legislation. 

25. In the Journal of Political Economy article I 

raise the question of how PACs would behave if their 

objective were to influence legislators’ voting decisions. I 

argue that the rational allocation of funds implies that 

PACs do not contribute to those legislators who will vote in 

their favor regardless of whether or not they receive 

contributions, but rather contribute to legislators who are 

likely to be opposed to their interests. The more a legisla

tor is opposed to PAC interests, the more the PAC is going 

to have to contribute to swing his or her voting decision. 

Moreover, given that Congress uses simple majority rule to 

decide on issues such as, for example, tariffs, subsidies, 

and price supports, PACs have an incentive to give contri

butions in order to secure a majority, not unanimity. 

Therefore, if PACs could rank legislators in terms of how 

likely they are to oppose PACs’ interest, most contributions 

would have to be given to the median legislator, i.e., the 

legislator with the median level of opposition to the PACs’ 

interests. Legislators with declining opposition would 

receive fewer contributions, in line with their level of 

opposition. 

26. To test whether contributors give less to legisla

tors who are compelled to vote in PAC interests because of 

constituency interests, it is important to identify a sector 

in the economy in which voters in some constituencies have 

the same interest as the PAC. I identified the farm sector, 

which has a voting constituency in most congressional 
66a 

districts, as well as PACs that work for farm interests. 

Identifying the number of potential farm interest support

ers in a legislative district allows the ranking of legislators 

in terms of their likelihood of supporting PAC interests: 

the smaller the farm constituency size the less likely the 

legislator will support farm PAC interests, and thus the 

larger the necessary contribution required to change his or 

her voting behavior, keeping in mind that legislators with 

more than the median amount of opposition do not need to 

receive any contributions. 

27. My empirical findings show that the pattern of 

giving by agricultural PACs follows the line of reasoning I 

outlined. Legislators with virtually no farm constituency, 

such as Representatives from New York City and Los 

Angeles, receive little or no farm contributions. Most 

contributions are received by legislators with a median 

farm constituency (for example, legislators from Maryland), and, the larger the farm constituency beyond the 

median (legislators from Montana, and the Dakotas), the 

lower the amount contributed by farm PACs. 

28. In my 1996 Journal of Law and Economics 

article I analyze the contribution pattern of labor PACs 

and corporate PACs. I hypothesize that if PACs were 

contributing primarily to assist the election of legislators 

who support the contributors’ policy views, labor PACs 

would contribute more money to liberal Democrats than to 

conservative Democrats and corporations would contribute 

more to conservative Republicans than to liberal Republi

cans. If these PACs would try to influence legislators’ votes 

(using similar logic as in my Journal of Political Economy 

article) then labor PACs would concentrate their contribu

tions on conservative Democrats. Similarly corporate PACs 

would concentrate their contributions liberal Republicans. 
67a 

Using regression analysis, and controlling for a variety of 

factors, including the closeness of the electoral race, I 

documented that labor PACs contribute more to conserva

tive Democrats than they do to liberal Democrats, and 

that corporate PACs give more to liberal Republicans than 

they do to conservative Republicans. The findings show 

that PACs contribute less to legislators who will vote 

clearly in their favor than to legislators who are undecided 

or potentially opposed to their interests. 

29. The 1998 Journal of Law and Economics article 

argues that if the contribution-for-vote exchange occurs, in 

part, at the time the legislation is voted on, then one can 

expect that contributions flow around the time of the 

House roll call votes. Focusing on farm legislation, this 

article documents that there is a significant increase in 

contributions at the time that congressional votes are 

taken. 

30. To a legislator, a one dollar campaign contribu

tion from PACs is as valuable as a one dollar campaign 

contribution from individuals. Both contributions will be 

equally valuable in his or her reelection campaign. Therefore, on a dollar for dollar basis one expects contributions 

from individuals to have a very similar effect on legisla

tors’ votes as contributions from PACs. Although contribu

tion limits are lower for individuals than for PACs, 

individuals can bundle contributions, which will allow 

them to exert a stronger influence on legislators’ decisions. 

There is no reason to believe that PAC monies exert 

different influence on legislative behavior than do monies 

from individuals. Thus, the conclusions that I have 

reached regarding PAC behavior can be extended to 

contributions from individuals. 
68a 

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746 that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 19th day of September, 2002. 

/s/ Thomas Stratmann 

Thomas Stratmann 
69a 

Exhibit 16 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON ) 

GRAY ADAMS, et al., ) 

) Plaintiffs, ) 

-vs- )


)
 THE FEDERAL )
 ELECTION COMMISSION ) et al., ) 

Defendants. 	 ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Sam Gejdenson 

I, Sam Gejdenson, declare as follows: 

1. I served as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from the Second District of Connecticut from 

1981 to 2000 and now run an international trade company, 

Gejdenson International. 

2. During my tenure in Congress, I sponsored campaign finance reform legislation, and held many hearings on 

this topic across the United States. It became clear to me 

during these hearings that as the size of campaign contributions has increased, the average voter has felt more irrelevant to electoral politics. The growing importance of the 
70a 

largest contributions has depressed voter turnout and 

volunteerism. The new generation of voters believes that 

politics is primarily about raising money to buy television 

advertising. 

3. The increased contribution limits of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act (BCRA) will convince 

many voters that their participation in politics is meaningless. When the wealthy few are permitted to contribute 

$2,000 per election (or $4,000 per cycle), and to gather 

$2,000 from wealthy friends and relatives, those who 

cannot contribute or solicit large donations will be marginalized from politics. This will be even truer in cases 

where candidates with a wealthy, self-funded opponent are 

able to take contributions twice as high (or, in Senate 

races, up to $12,000). 

4. The increased contribution limits will enable 

those candidates who have access to large contributors to 

raise far more money. Those who lack such access will 

either be discouraged from seeking office, or will have to 

spend far more time fundraising. Under the current campaign finance system, I have observed that Members of 

Congress spend about three hours a day seeking contributions from large donors during the campaign, and at least 

three to six hours a week fundraising throughout the 

term. This will only worsen when maximum donors are 

able to multiply their clout, and fundraising will displace 

contact with voters. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
71a 

This 3 day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Sam Gejdenson 

Sam Gejdenson 
72a 

Exhibit 17 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON 

GRAY ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL 

ELECTION COMMISSION 

et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION OF PAUL SIMON 

I, Paul Simon, declare as follows: 

1. I served as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Illinois from 1975 through 1984, and then 

as a U.S. Senator for Illinois from 1985 through 1996. I am 

currently the Director of the Public Policy Institute at 

Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. 

2. Based on my experience as a Senator and as a 

U.S. Representative, I believe that the increased individual 

contribution limits enacted in the Bipartisan Campaign 
73a 

Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) will increase the 

influence of the largest campaign donors to such an extent 

that those who lack wealth, or access to wealth, will not be 

able to participate equally in the political process. 

3. The vast majority of my former constituents, and 

of U.S. voters, are unable to make large campaign contributions. Doubling the contribution limits to $2,000 per 

election – and up to $12,000 in Senate races with a selffunded candidate – will place the highest contributions 

even further out of reach for these people. 

4. No member of Congress, not even the most scrupulous, is unaware of his or her largest contributors, and 

not even the most scrupulous members will ignore them. 

As a Senator, if I returned to my home or to a hotel room 

late at night and found twenty phone messages, one from 

a maximum donor and nineteen from people whose names 

I did not recognize, I would not make twenty calls but I 

might make one call: to the maximum donor. 

5. Like other members of Congress (except the most 

wealthy), I was forced to fundraise throughout my terms 

in office. The potential donors whom I regularly called 

personally were those who had given the maximum, or 

were likely to do so. The donors to whom I regularly sent 

personal thank-you notes were those who had given the 

maximum. The donors who were regularly invited to small 

receptions with me, or who had their photograph taken 

with me, were also the highest donors. 

6. Because money has become critical to winning reelection, every member of Congress is subject to similar 

fundraising pressures. Visitors to the U.S. Senate may be 

discouraged to see only two or three Senators on the floor 

debating the issue at hand at any given moment. They 
74a 

would be appalled if they knew the reality, that far more 

Senators were on the phone trying to raise campaign 

funds. 

7. It was clear to me that the largest donors expected 

favorable policy consideration in exchange for their 

contributions. For example, after I voted in favor of the 

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) my longtime friends in the labor movement were displeased; one 

union official observed to a small gathering that I had 

received over $600,000 in labor contributions, with the 

clear implication that I therefore should have voted 

against NAFTA.

8. Sensitivity to large donors’ concerns was a fact of 

life known to all Senators and Representatives. When I 

once complained to a meeting of Democrats that the 

Senate was caving in to special interests, a fellow Senator 

rebuked me by saying, “Special interests. Special interests. 

I’m tired of hearing about special interests. We’ve got to 

face who’s buttering our bread.” 

9. There were several occasions when I believed that 

the outcomes of policy debates were influenced by campaign contributions. Defense appropriations for unnecessary projects, such as the B-2 Bomber, could not be cut 

without the loss of contributions from donors associated 

with the defense industry, and so many unnecessary 

programs continue. President Clinton’s health care bill 

was defeated, in part, because donors associated with the 

insurance industry and American Medical Association give 

far more to members’ campaigns than the 41 million 

Americans who lack health insurance. 

10. The increased individual contribution limits will 

exacerbate the disproportionate access and influence that the 

largest donors enjoy. Those who are able to contribute the 
75a 

maximum amount, and gather maximum contributions from 

friends, family and associates, will fund an ever-greater 

share of campaign budgets. Lower-income citizens will be 

discouraged from active participation in political campaigns. 

11. The increased contribution limits will only increase 

the amount of time Senators and Representatives spend 

fundraising. Members of Congress deter potential challengers, and assure electoral victory, by raising as much 

money as possible. Therefore, Members of Congress will 

continue to maximize their fundraising time. The increased limits will make each potential maximum donor 

doubly attractive, and will only ratchet up the arms race 

in campaign spending. 

12. I remember when I was in the fourth grade or 

maybe fifth grade, learning about the philosophical differences between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. 

Hamilton wanted to give people of wealth and property 

greater voice in government and Jefferson want to treat 

all citizens equally. How proud I was that Jefferson prevailed! But with our present system of financing we have 

ended up siding with Hamilton, and Jefferson is the loser. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 18 day of September, 2002. 

/s/ Paul Simon 

Paul Simon 
76a 

Exhibit 18 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON 

GRAY ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL 

ELECTION COMMISSION 

et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Pat Williams 

I, Pat Williams, declare as follows: 

1. I served as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives representing Montana from 1979 through 1996. 

I am currently the Executive Director of the Center for the 

Rocky Mountains West. 

2. Based on my experience running for office, and my 

experience as a Member of Congress, I believe that the 

increased contribution limits of the Bipartisan Campaign 

Finance Reform Act (BCRA) will permit wealthy interests 

to more heavily influence electoral outcomes and will 

prevent the non-wealthy from equal political participation. 
77a 

3. In Montana and other Western states, voters overwhelmingly express pro-environmental positions in polls, 

and yet Westerners are sending to Congress representatives 

who favor extractive industries, such as mining and logging, and oppose environmental regulation. Candidates 

who favor these industries have attracted far more money 

in contributions, enabling them to dominate the media 

with misleading 30-second television ads that skew the 

ability of voters to choose candidates who really represent 

their interests. Thus the extractive industries, by amassing contributions from executives, their family members 

and associates, have been able to disproportionately influence election results. By potentially doubling the amount of 

contributions that these industries can gather, the BCRA will 

radically increase their ability to determine electoral outcomes. 

4. There is no doubt in my mind that those giving 

the largest contributions expect preferential access and 

disproportionate influence. As one sign of this, members of 

committees with jurisdiction over matters of concern to 

wealthy interests attract large numbers of maximum 

contributions. 

5. Neither do I doubt that money does buy access for 

large donors. In my own case, I tried not to pay much 

attention to who was or was not contributing to my campaigns. But if my secretary brought me a list of people 

wanting to see me, and if a contributor who had helped 

elect me was on that list, I would meet with that person as 

a political friend. And often money made people political 

friends; in many cases, when I left office I noted that the 

friendship with a donor had dried on the vine, and I 

realized that it was all about access to the office I held. 
78a 

6. Money has become the driving force behind elections. Trying to be in politics and not worry about money 

would be like trying to swim across Lake Michigan without getting wet. It is not possible. The increased contribution limits, by opening the spigot and adding more money 

to elections, threatens a system that is already in serious 

trouble. I speak regularly with elder voters about public 

land policy in the West, and they are discouraged from 

political participation by the influence of money. Recently, 

one gentleman told me, “Pat, I’m very interested in this. 

You have told me that public lands are my lands, but I 

don’t see how I can influence policy over my own property. 

I’ve given up trying because I’ve realized that the people 

with all the money have all the say.” 

7. The increased contribution limits will convince 

many more voters that their votes, their small campaign 

contributions, and their political participation are 

meaningless. If many average people already feel 

powerless in the face of $1000 contributions, doubling that 

limit (and even further multiplying it for candidates faced 

with a wealthy, self-funded opponent) will worsen the 

problem to the point where equal political participation is 

denied to those without wealth. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 3rd day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Pat Williams 

Pat Williams 
79a 

Exhibit 19 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON 

GRAY ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL 

ELECTION COMMISSION 

et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Dr. Thomas A. Caiazzo 

I, Tom Caiazzo, declare as follows: 

1. 	 I am a political science professor at Collin County 

Community College in Plano, Texas, and hold a 

terminal degree in political science. I have taught 

political science at the community college and 

university level for the past eleven years. 

2. 	 I ran in 2002 as a Republican seeking to represent Texas’ third congressional district in the U.S. 

House of Representatives. I was defeated in the 

Republican primary, receiving 15.7% of the vote 
80a 

against incumbent Sam Johnson. I raised approximately $12,000 for this race, while Mr. Johnson 

has raised over $500,000. 

3. 	 Based upon my experience as a candidate for 

Representative in the U.S. Congress, I believe 

that the increased individual contribution limits 

enacted in the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) will make it more difficult for those without wealth or access to wealth 

to mount a viable campaign for federal office. Furthermore, the higher contribution limits will increase the influence of the largest campaign donors 

to such an extent that those who lack wealth, or access to wealth, will be unable to exercise their 

constitutionally protected right to equal participation in the political process. 

4. 	 I believe that money was a deciding factor in my 

primary loss. In spite of the qualifications listed 

above and my experience helping other Republican candidate’s seek and win elective office, as 

well as being involved/member of the [sic] 

5. [sic] local Republican Men’s’, Young, and College 

organizations], I was not able to compete effectively 

for the Republican party’s nomination. This is 

largely due to the fact that my opponent outspent 

me nearly 20 to 1. The fact that 94% of the candidates who raised the most money won their congressional elections in 2000 backs up my own 

experience. 

6. My opponent’s huge fundraising advantage allowed 

him to boost his already sizable name recognition, 

communicate a clear message, and drown out my 

attempts to communicate with the public. He was 

able to accomplish this primarily through television and radio advertisements. The incumbent 
81a 

was continuously on the radio and television. 

Wheras [sic] he was on major radio and television 

stations/frequencies at least fifty times, I ran only 

one radio ad and one television ad, which was 

played no more than 10 times. The incumbent 

also had a plethora of money to flood primary voters with attractive mail-outs and flyers; some 

primary voters received four in the final week of 

the campaign. 

7. 	 Mr. Johnson was able to fund this media barrage 

by raising money from special interests and 

wealthy individuals. In addition to $269,667 from 

political action committees, over 99% of which 

came from business PACs, Mr. Johnson has raised 

$341,949 from individuals. At least $119,000 of 

this individual money came at the $1000 level or 

above. In the 2000 election cycle, only 1/9 of 1% of 

voting age Americans contributed $1,000 to a 

candidate for federal office. 

8. 	 I elected to run a grassroots campaign for Congress. I sought to engage – and raise funds from – 

average Texans. Therefore I did not hold expensive fundraisers or seek many $1,000 checks. Instead I held simple bbq and dinner parties. I 

received only six $1000 checks, compared with my 

opponent’s 119. 

9. 	Because many of Mr. Johnson’s campaign 

contributions came at the existing limit, it is 

reasonable to assume that the increased 

contribution limits enacted as part of BCRA – had 

they been in effect for my race – would have 

enabled my opponent to significantly increase his 

fundraising. Because few of my contributors could 

afford to contribute even the current limit, the increased limits would not have had a significant 

impact on my fundraising ability. 
82a 

10. 	Therefore, I assert that I would have been less 

competitive with Mr. Johnson had the increased 

limits been in effect. BCRA would make it more 

difficult for grassroots candidates who raise money 

from average citizens to mount effective campaigns 

for office. 

11. Fundraising concerns generally – and the increases in federal contribution limits contained in 

BCRA specifically – will play an important role in 

my decision about whether to run for federal office in the future. The higher contribution limits 

will make it even more difficult for me to run a 

grassroots campaign geared towards average Texans and run competitively against a candidate 

who raises big money from wealthy individuals 

and special interests. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of 

my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 30th day of September 2002. 

/s/ Thomas A. Caiazzo 

Thomas A. Caiazzo 
83a 

Exhibit 20 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY ) 


ADAMS, et. al., ) 


) 


Plaintiffs, ) 


-vs- ) 

) 

THE FEDERAL ELECTION ) 

COMMISSION et al., ) 

Defendants.	 ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Gail Crook 

I, Gail Crook, declare as follows: 

1.	 I am currently retired from a 34-year career in 

public service. I worked in the budget office at the 

Air Force Headquarters, for four years as the GS14 appropriation manager of the annually appropriated $11 – 18 billion two-year Research, Development, Test and Evaluation appropriation, 

receiving sustained superior performance evaluations. For approximately seven years I worked national issues for the Department of Defense as a 

GM 15 budget and security assistance analyst. I 

receive at least one monetary performance award 
84a 

and two outstanding performance awards. I 

graduated with a bachelor’s degree from Central 

State University, Edmond, Oklahoma, in the top 

ten percent of my graduating class and have a 

master’s degree in Business Administration. I 

paid for my education myself. I have raised three 

children. I have served my community in the Air 

Force Reserves for 24 years and as a non-partisan 

election official for 12 years. I meet all the qualifications required of candidates for the U.S. Senate: 

I am over 30 years of age. I have resided in Northern Virginia for more than one year (approximately 20 years) and since I was born in the 

United States I have been a U.S. citizen for more 

than nine years. 

2.	 I am currently running as a write-in candidate for 

U.S. Senate in Virginia. 

3.	 I decided to run for office because I was dissatisfied with the representation being provided by the 

incumbent, Senator John Warner. As a parent, I 

feel a responsibility to preserve the environment 

and improve education for future generations. As 

a public servant, I feel a responsibility to provide 

Virginians an opportunity to lobby effectively and 

to ensure that our laws regarding arms sales are 

followed. Initially, I approached the Democratic 

Party to volunteer to work for a candidate who 

would oppose Sen. Warner. When the Washington 

Post reported, February - March 2002, that there 

was no one planning to oppose Mr. Warner, I decided to run myself. 

4. 	 I contacted the Executive Director of the Democratic Party in Richmond to express my interest in 

running against Sen. Warner. I was told that if I 

was to run, the party would not offer me any resources except as required by law. 
85a 

5. 	I then contacted the party steering committee. 

The first question they asked me was “How much 

money do you have?” They then informed me that 

I needed to have at least $1 million in the bank – 

but really more like $2 or $3 million – by May 31st 

in order to be considered by the Democratic party 

as a viable candidate to oppose Sen. Warner. If I 

was unable or unwilling to raise this money, I 

would be denied the party nomination. 

6. 	 I presented the filing fee and statement of candidacy for the office with the Party’s Congressional 

District 8 Office as required by the Party’s call for 

candidates. My timely and notarized filing document and cashier’s check filing fee were refused 

by the 8th District. 

7. 	I subsequently met with the Chairman of the 

party in Richmond to discuss my interest in running against Senator Warner and also protested 

District 8’s refusal to accept my timely filing fee or 

my notarized filing document. The Chairman of 

the Central Committee in the presence of the Executive Director refused to accept the filing and 

confirmed the Steering Committee member’s 

guidance that if I were to receive the Democratic 

Party’s nomination for US Senate I would have to 

raise $1 million by May 31, 2002. 

8. 	 In response to this directive, I sent out between 

one and two thousand fundraising letters to my 

family and friends, most of whom are public servants and reservists. I received contributions and 

pledges of contributions from Virginia, the District 

of Columbia, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Arizona, 

Pennsylvania, Louisiana, California, Georgia and 

Arkansas; yet, I fell well short of the $1 million target and was not able to secure the party nomination. 

My average contribution was approximately $200. 
86a 

My pledges were contingent upon my receiving the 

party’s nomination. 

9.	 Senator Warner, by contrast, has raised over $3.5 

million for his re-election campaign. He has garnered over $1.3 million in $1,000 contributions 

alone. This prodigious fundraising has not only 

virtually assured that he will win re-election in 

2002; it has led Democrats to forgo nominating a 

challenger. My campaign will be immeasurably 

more difficult as a write-in candidate than it 

would have been as a nominated Democratic challenger with the resources and appeal of the party 

behind me. 

10. Based upon my experience as a candidate for U.S. 

Senate, I believe that the increased individual 

contribution limits enacted in the Bipartisan 

Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 will make 

it more difficult for those without wealth or access 

to wealth to mount a viable campaign for office. If 

the new, higher, limits had been in place for this 

election cycle, Sen. Warner would likely have 

raised even more money. His 1,314 $1,000 donors 

would have been able to double their contributions. The price of entry for the Democratic nomination – set by the party steering committee at $1 

million – would likely have gone up as well. Given 

that most of my contributors could not afford to 

give at the current $1,000 limit, the increased 

caps would not have benefited my candidacy. Not 

only would the increased limits have hurt my ability to compete as a write in candidate, but they 

would have put me even farther away from earning the Democratic nomination. 

11. I believe that the increased contribution limits 

will increase the influence of the largest campaign 

donors to such an extent that those like myself 
87a 

who lack monetary wealth, or access to monetary 

wealth, will be unable to exercise our constitutionally protected right to equal participation in 

the political process. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of 

my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 30th day of September 2002. 

/s/ G. Gail Crook 

Gail Crook 
88a 

Exhibit 21 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Victor Morales 

I, Victor Morales, declare as follows: 

1. 	 I have been a member of Crandall city council and 

a teacher for 20 years. 

2. 	 I ran for the position of U.S. Senator from Texas in 

1996. I secured the Democratic nomination and 

received 44% of the vote in the general election 

against incumbent Phil Gramm, in spite being 

significantly outspent. I raised approximately 

$900,000 in the last four months of this campaign. 

Overall, approximately 87% of the funds I raised 

came in contributions less than $100. 
89a 

3. 	 In 1998, I ran against incumbent Congressman 

Pete Sessions in Texas’s fifth congressional district. In spite of being outspent about $1 million to 

about $800,000, I again received 44% of the vote. 

4. 	 I ran in 2002 against Dallas Mayor Ron Kirk in 

the U.S. Senate Democratic primary. In spite of 

being outspent by more than $1 million I forced a 

runoff, which I lost – after again being badly outspent – 59-41. 

5. 	Based upon my experience as a candidate for 

Senator and Representative in the U.S. Congress, 

I believe that the increased individual contribution limits enacted in the Bipartisan Campaign 

Finance Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) will make it 

more difficult for those without wealth or access to 

wealth to mount a viable campaign for federal office. Furthermore, the higher contribution limits 

will increase the influence of the largest campaign 

donors to such an extent that those who lack 

wealth, or access to wealth, will be unable to exercise their constitutionally protected right to equal 

participation in the political process. 

6.	 When I first decided to run for office, I knew that 

money would be the biggest factor. The first state 

representative that I contacted regarding my 

campaign made this very clear. His first question 

was “how much money do you have; how much 

money can you raise.” He didn’t ask about my experience or how I stood on the issues, etc. In fact, 

most of the status quo politicians wouldn’t even 

return my calls because I wasn’t perceived as a big 

money candidate. 

7. 	 I believe that money was a deciding factor in each 

of my losses. I traveled around the state of Texas 

in a pickup truck and ran a grassroots campaign. 
90a 

My dedication and articulation of ideas that appealed to average Texans allowed me to remain 

competitive despite a huge financial disadvantage. 

However, in the end, Senator Gramm’s, Representative Session’s, and Ron Kirk’s warchests were 

simply too much to overcome. 

8.	 My opponents’ huge fundraising advantage 

allowed them to boost their already sizable name 

recognition, communicate a clear message, and 

drown out my attempts to communicate with the 

public. For my Senate race, the money comes in 

because obviously you can’t meet 3 million people. 

One commercial in Texas costs $600,000. Papers 

don’t take you seriously unless you have money. 

You also need the money for signs, bumper stickers, phone calls, all the basics. My campaign used 

no consultants, no machinery. The reaction I got 

was “Who does he think he is – a schoolteacher 

running for office. 

9.	 My opponents each funded their campaigns 

through contributions from special interests and 

wealthy individuals. Mr. Kirk raised more than 

$1.8 million through contributions of $1,000 or 

more for the 2002 Senate race. 

10. I ran my campaigns by driving a pickup truck 

throughout the state and appealing to average 

Texans. My campaign and my fundraising were 

geared towards lower and middle income families. 

At the beginning, I would simply ask folks to contribute $15 to fill my truck with gas. For the 2002 

campaign, I received only $12,000 in contributions 

at or above $1,000. 

11. Because many of my opponents’ campaign contributions came at the existing limit, it is reasonable to 

assume that the increased contribution limits 
91a 

enacted as part of BCRA – had they been in effect 

for my races – would have enabled my opponents 

to significantly increase their fundraising. Because few of my contributors could afford to contribute even the current limit, the increased limits 

would not have had a significant impact on my 

fundraising ability. 

12. Therefore, I assert that I would have been less 

competitive in each of my campaigns had the increased limits been in effect. BCRA has made it 

more difficult for grassroots candidates who raise 

money from average citizens to mount effective 

campaigns for office. 

13. I also believe that the increased contribution 

limits will further alienate my supporters, specifically those that contribute in small amounts. During my 1996 campaign, I ran into two of my 

former students walking out of the post office. 

They said “Mr. Morales, we’re so proud of you. 

When we see you on TV, we say – that’s our government teacher. We were going to send you $25 

each, but we didn’t because we thought “what’s 

$25, he needs millions.” The big money system has 

already alienated people like my former students; 

and the contribution limit increases will only 

make this worse. 

14. Fundraising concerns generally – and the increases in federal contribution limits contained in 

BCRA specifically – will play an important role in 

my decision about whether to run for federal office 

in the future. The higher contribution limits will 

make it even more difficult for me to run a grassroots campaign geared towards average Texans 

and run competitively against a candidate who 

raises big money from wealthy individuals and 

special interests. 
92a 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of 

my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 3rd day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Victor M. Morales 

Victor Morales 
93a 

Exhibit 22 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Cynthia Brown 

I, Cynthia Brown, declare as follows: 

1. I am a registered and qualified voter in Durham, 

North Carolina. 

2. For the past twenty years, I have worked with 

grassroots communities to advocate for the rights of poor 

and modest income people. From 1995 to 1999, I served on 

the Durham City Council where I fought to expand the 

living wage, strengthen the housing code, protect workers 

on the job, and promote economic development in poorer 

communities. I have also worked as the executive director 

for Southerners for Economic Justice based in Durham 
94a 

and in several staff positions, including interim director, 

for the Southeast Women’s Employment Coalition based in 

Lexington, Kentucky. I have served as the director of a 

shelter for battered women and as the North Carolina 

representative for the National Coalition Against Domestic 

Violence. 

3. I ran as a candidate for the United States Senate 

from North Carolina in the 2002 Democratic primary. I 

ran in that primary because I believe that people most 

affected by public policy should have a say and that public 

policy should be based on human need, not corporate 

greed. 

4. I worked hard to raise money for my campaign 

and I raised approximately $50,000. Most of my contributions averaged around twenty-five dollars. I collected only 

a few $1,000 contributions for my campaign. My base of 

support consisted of working class people, people of moderate and low income. 

5. One of my opponents in the Democratic primary 

was a millionaire and contributed enormous sums of 

money to his own campaign while raising large sums of 

money from wealthy contributors around the country. 

Another opponent also raised large sums of money from 

wealth contributors. 

6. I found that, in spite of the money barrier I faced 

in this election, I could compete effectively, but I could not 

win without the money. Erskine Bowles, the millionaire 

candidate, won the primary. 

7. I would consider running again for the U.S. 

Senate, but the increases in the hard money contribution 
95a 

limits in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act will seriously discourage me from participating as a candidate. 

8. If I were to run for the U.S. Senate again from 

North Carolina, I would likely face again a millionaire 

opponent. Under the increases in the hard money contribution limits, my other opponents would be free to raise 

up to $12,000 per individual per election. The people I 

know can hardly afford to contribute twenty-five dollars, 

let alone $12,000. There is no way that any candidate like 

me can compete under these new conditions. 

9. These increases in the hard money contribution 

limits would effectively eliminate any future campaign I 

might hope to wage for the U.S. Senate. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 4 day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Cynthia Brown 

Cynthia Brown 
96a 

Exhibit 23 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Ted Glick 

I, Ted Glick, declare as follows: 

1. I am a registered and qualified voter in Bloomfield, New Jersey. 

2. I am running as the Green Party candidate for the 

United States Senate from New Jersey in the 2002 general 

election. I am running for the United States Senate 

because I believe in building alternatives to the Democratic and Republican parties. I decided to run to provide a 

different voice in this Senate election in the face of what 

has been happening in this country since the September 

11 terrorist attack. I am running on a platform that 
97a 

challenges the shifting of our national budget priorities to 

the Pentagon and the top wealthy one percent of the 

population at the expense of basic human needs, such as 

health care, housing, and education. I do not believe that 

our government’s sharply increased militarism will bring 

us a safer world or will bring us closer to social and economic justice for all. I am deeply concerned that we protect 

our civil rights and liberties as we take steps to provide 

security. 

3. In addition to running for the U.S. Senate, I am 

employed as the national coordinator for the Independent 

Progressive Politics Network, an organization which I cofounded. The Independent Progressive Politics Network is 

a national third party network made up of fifty organizations with the aim of building an alternative voice in 

American politics to the two major parties. I have served 

as the network’s national coordinator for the past seven 

years. 

4. I have worked hard to raise money for my campaign, but I do not have access to wealthy circles. I have 

raised approximately $25,000. The average donation to my 

campaign is approximately fifty dollars. I have received 

only two donations at the $1,000 level. I have had to 

scramble for resources in order to get my message out and 

to reach the voters. 

5. By contrast, my Democratic and Republican 

opponents have extremely well-funded campaigns. My 

Republican opponent, Douglas R. Forrester, has contributed millions of dollars of his own money to his campaign. 

My prior Democratic opponent, Senator Robert G. Torricelli, 

had raised millions of dollars from wealthy contributors 

across the country. My new Democratic opponent, former 
98a 

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, is, like Mr. Forrester, a 

multimillionaire, and Democratic Party leaders are currently seeking to make the millions of dollars Senator 

Torricelli raised available to support Mr. Lautenberg’s new 

candidacy. 

6. If I do not win this Senate race, I would consider 

running for the U.S. Senate in a future election, but the 

increases in the hard money contribution limits of the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act would seriously discourage me from doing so. Those increases would create an 

extremely uneven playing field and would prevent me 

from effectively competing for the office. If I were to run 

again in a race with similar circumstances, I would be 

facing not only a self-funded candidate but another candidate able to raise up to $12,000 per individual per election 

or $24,000 per individual per election cycle. It is impossible to participate facing that tremendous disparity in 

resources. I just do not run in the circles of people who can 

contribute $12,000. 

7. I realize some of the proponents of these hard 

money limit increases have tried to argue that a candidacy 

like mine might be helped, suggesting that in this new 

scenario I could raise larger sums from a few supporters. I 

draw the analogy of a sporting event where one team has 

twenty players and the other team has three players. The 

suggestion that I could raise more money under these 

increased limits is like saying that the team with the three 

players can just play harder to compete against the team 

with the twenty players. This argument does not reflect 

the real world in which candidates like me do not have 

access to wealthy contributors. 
99a 

8. These increased hard money contribution limits 

will have the effect of drowning out my voice in any future 

candidacy for the U.S. Senate and the voices of my votersupporters. They will prevent me from participating in the 

electoral process on an equal basis. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This ___ day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Ted Glick 

Ted Glick 
100a 

Exhibit 24 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Victoria Jackson Gray Adams 

I, Victoria Jackson Gray Adams, declare as follows: 

1. I have been an active advocate for voting rights 

for over forty years. During the 1960s, I was a State 

Supervisor of Citizenship Education of the Southern 

Christian Leadership Conference in Mississippi and a 

founder of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, 

which challenged the seating of Mississippi’s all-White 

delegation to the 1964 Democratic Party’s national convention. I currently serve as a member of the Board of 

Directors of the Fannie Lou Hamer Project, which advocates for equal voting rights regardless of economic status. 
101a 

2. I am a registered and qualified voter in Petersburg, Virginia. I have voted regularly, and believe that the 

failure to vote would betray the many people who lost 

their lives in the voting rights struggle. I also contribute 

what money I can to candidates who stand for equality, 

although I am only able to make small contributions. 

3. As hard as I have fought for voting rights, I 

believe that the right to vote is useless if the only people 

who can qualify for office don’t have a clue as to the needs 

and aspirations of the average citizen. The increased 

contribution limits of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

of 2002 (BCRA) will mean that candidates who do not have 

personal wealth, or connections to people with wealth, will 

be at such a great disadvantage that many will not run for 

office. Candidates who represent my interests, and the 

interests of non-wealthy communities, will be blocked from 

office. This will deprive me of full political participation 

and discourage me from involvement with electoral politics. 

4. I cannot afford to contribute anywhere near 

$2,000 to a candidate, and if the individual contribution 

limits are raised to $2,000, I will be discouraged from 

giving any money at all. Candidates will be forced to 

gather as many $2,000 contributions as they can, dwarfing 

the kind of contribution I could afford to give. 

5. If candidates are forced to seek $2,000 contributions in order to be competitive, those who cannot afford 

such contributions will have less of an opportunity to be 

heard on policy matters. The largest donors get more 

attention, and when the ceiling is raised the voices of 

small contributors and voters like myself will be lost. 
102a 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 7th day of October, 2002. 

/s/ 	Victoria Jackson Gray Adams 

Victoria Jackson Gray Adams 
103a 

Exhibit 25 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Carrie Bolton 

I, Carrie Bolton, declare as follows: 

1. I am a registered and qualified voter in Pittsboro, 

North Carolina. 

2. For the past eleven years, I have served as the 

pastor of the Alston Chapel United Holy Church, Inc., 

located in Pittsboro. I serve a 200-member congregation of 

predominantly African-American working class citizens. 

3. I also serve on a part-time basis as the field 

director for Democracy South based in Carrboro, North 

Carolina. Democracy South, of which I am a founding 
104a 

member, is a non-profit, non-partisan organization advocating for progressive change in the Southeast region of 

the United States in key areas of concern to ordinary 

citizens, including electoral and campaign finance reform, 

environmental justice, and economic justice. 

4. I am also a founding member and current board 

chair of the Fannie Lou Hamer Project, a national grassroots organization dedicated to redefining campaign 

finance as a civil rights issue. The Fannie Lou Hamer 

Project, named after a legendary civil rights worker from 

Mississippi, advocates for equal participation of all citizens in the political process, regardless of economic status. 

5. I have voted in every single election at the local, 

state, and federal level since I turned 18. I remember 

clearly the day my father was denied the right to vote 

more than four decades ago because he had difficulty 

writing his name. I knew then at the age of 12 the importance of my right to vote. 

6. I am rarely able to make campaign contributions 

to candidates of my choice. The largest contribution I have 

ever made was for fifty dollars to a candidate running for 

county commissioner. I am a single parent with two 

daughters and living on a modest income. I do not have 

the economic base that allows me to make large contributions to candidates. 

7. I voted for Cynthia Brown in the 2002 Democratic 

Party primary election for the United States Senate from 

North Carolina. I supported Cynthia Brown because she 

was the candidate who more often had lived, worked, and 

walked among the people in the community and the 

surrounding counties. She has a record of speaking out on 

issues affecting poor and working class people, including 
105a 

the living wage, environmental justice as a civil rights 

issue, education, health care, and equality in the political 

process for all people, no matter what their income may 

be. Cynthia Brown stood up for all of those things I live 

with on a daily basis as a pastor and as an individual 

citizen. 

8. I volunteered for Cynthia Brown’s campaign, 

putting up yard signs, making telephone calls, and reaching out to other voters. While I could not afford to make a 

financial contribution during this race, I tried to talk with 

others I knew who might be able to contribute. I raised 

money from about five of my friends, none of whom could 

give a contribution greater than $100. Many others I knew 

who supported Cynthia Brown could not give any money 

at all. 

9. Cynthia Brown faced a millionaire opponent who 

contributed an enormous amount of his own money to his 

campaign while, at the same time, raising large sums of 

money from wealthy contributors around the country. She 

faced another opponent who also raised large sums of 

money from wealthy contributors. 

10. I understand that if Cynthia Brown were to run 

again for the U.S. Senate facing the same circumstances, 

the increases in the hard money contribution limits of the 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act would allow wealthy 

individuals to give up to $12,000 each, a twelve-fold 

increase over what they were allowed to give in the 2002 

primary election. 

11. Under those increases, I would not even get on 

the scale with those making significant contributions. 

Cynthia Brown is like most of us. She is not connected to 

people who have that kind of money. I could put up all the 
106a 

signs I wanted in that kind of future race, but I would 

never be able to get my voice heard. It would be like 

fighting a fire with a cup of water. 

12. The increases in the hard money contribution 

limits make it no longer conceivable that I can access the 

political process. They undermine the meaning and value 

of my vote. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 3rd day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Carrie Bolton 

Carrie Bolton 
107a 

Exhibit 26 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION OF DARYL IRLAND 

I, Daryl Irland, declare as follows: 

1. 	 I am a twenty-year-old politically active college 

student. I attend school at Collin County Community College in Plano, Texas. I have voted in several local, state, and federal elections since 

turning of age. 

2. 	I was recently involved in a campaign for U.S. 

House of Representatives, supporting Tom Caiazzo against Sam Johnson in Texas’ third district 

Republican primary. 
108a 

3. 	 We ran a grassroots campaign chiefly supported 

by college students and other young people. My 

primary role in the campaign was to canvas district 

three voters. This included planning neighborhood 

campaign routs and soliciting votes. In addition I 

was involved in coordinating several campaign 

events to stimulate voter interest. 

4. 	Most of Dr. Caiazzo’s supporters – including 

myself – could not afford to contribute $1,000 to 

the campaign, so we gladly donated our time instead. When we reached out to voters and potential volunteers, we asked them to contribute small 

sums of money and to volunteer for the campaign. 

5.	 Our opponent, on the other hand, was able to raise 

large sums for money from many wealthy contributors. The result was that Mr. Johnson’s campaign took in approximately 40 times more money 

than ours. 

6. 	 This fundraising deficit proved to be a hurdle we 

could not overcome. Our opponents’ huge financial 

advantage severely impaired our chances of being 

successful. Money does not guarantee success but 

certainly creates the appearance of credibility. Not 

only did his financial edge allow Mr. Johnson to 

overwhelm our message with paid mailings and 

advertisements, but the media also treated fundraising as an appropriate measure of candidate 

viability, not treating our candidacy seriously. Ultimately, this helped to create a self-fulfilling prophesy: Mr. Johnson was able to win easily in part 

because the media (and therefore the public) believed he would win easily. 

7. 	 Based upon my experience as a volunteer on a 

congressional campaign, I believe that raising the 
109a 

individual contribution limit to two thousand dollars will only serve to widen the gap between the incumbent and the first time candidate. This belief is 

confirmed by U.S. PIRG’s new report Contribution 

Limits and Competitiveness, which demonstrates 

that higher contribution limits (or none) lead to 

greater margins of victory for incumbents. 

8. 	 Increasing the individual contribution limits will 

also further limit the options of the voter and discourage young voters such as myself from being 

involved in the political system. The process of a 

political campaign is both fascinating and eye 

opening. I would not trade that year of my life for 

anything, but I doubt that I would invest the time 

again knowing now that money alone can decide 

elections. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of 

my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 30th day of September 2002. 

/s/ Daryl Irland 

Daryl Irland 
110a 

Exhibit 27 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION OF ANURADHA JOSHI 

1. 	 My name is Anuradha Joshi. I am a registered 

voter in Berkeley, California. I am a college student and am co-Chapter Chair of the California 

Student Public Interest Research Group, CALPIRG. For the past three years I have participated 

in the Youth Vote project, working to increase 

voter participation among young people. 

2. 	 I have voted in two elections, including the November 2000 presidential and congressional elections. I will continue to vote after the increase in 

federal hard money contribution limits goes into 

effect, however I believe that my vote will matter 

less. I believe that money pretty much controls 
111a 

elections and that I will be less important to a 

candidate than someone who can give $2000 because they will have greater influence in helping 

to elect that candidate. 

3.	 I have never donated to a federal candidate for 

office. This is partially because there have not 

been candidates in my district that I believed 

strongly in, and partly because the amount that I 

could afford to give wouldn’t be competitive with 

what others could give. I feel that making contributions at the level I can afford would almost be 

pointless. This will become even more the case after contribution limits increase, so I am less likely 

to contribute in the future. 

4. 	 In the 2000 election cycle, I personally registered 

many students to vote. Working with others in my 

organization, we registered about 7,000 students 

to vote. This year, our goal is to register 10,000 

students to vote and to increase youth turnout by 

3%. I definitely believe that the increase in contribution limits will make it harder to register students to vote in future election cycles. Already, 

many students tell me that voting is not an effective tool to influence democracy or politics. They 

believe that elections are controlled by corporations and special interests. These students are not 

apathetic. They get involved in CALPIRG’s 

community service projects and volunteer many 

hours. But they almost feel like they are taking a 

stand by not voting, taking a stand against the 

corruption that has penetrated the voting process. 

Knowing how hard it is already to get students involved in the political process, I believe it will become even more difficult once contribution limits 

increase and large donors play an even greater 

role in determining election outcomes. 
112a 

5.	 As co-chapter chair, I am responsible for recruiting students to join the CALPIRG chapter. I believe that as a result of the contribution limit 

increases, we will recruit as many students as we 

do now, but they will be more attracted to our service projects than ones that involved public policy. 

I know that for me personally, it will make our 

case seem more hopeless once you realize that 

wealthy people will have greater opportunity to 

control politicians by making larger contributions 

to them. This will make it harder for us to have an 

effective political association. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of 

the United States of America that the foregoing is true and 

correct. 

Executed on: 10/2/02 

/s/ Anuradha Joshi 

Anuradha Joshi 
113a 

Exhibit 28 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Howard Lipoff 

I, Howard Lipoff, declare as follows: 

1. I am a registered and qualified voter in Little 

Falls, New Jersey. 

2. I work as a special education teacher at Fort Lee 

High School in Fort Lee, New Jersey, a position I have 

held for the past five years. I have worked as a public 

school teacher since 1991. 

3. I have volunteered in a number of political campaigns at the local, state, and federal level. I currently 

serve as the Passaic County coordinator for the Green 

Party of New Jersey. 
114a 

4. I do that volunteer work because I believe that it 

is important that people get involved in the political 

process. The Green Party is not a corporate party and it 

allows an individual like myself to be involved in a meaningful way. The Passaic County chapter of the party 

collects small dues of twenty dollars each from its members every year and it does not solicit big money. We do not 

want big corporate influence in our party. 

5. I am a supporter of Green Party candidate Ted 

Glick who is running for the U.S. Senate from New Jersey 

in the 2002 general election. I have contributed seventyfive dollars to his campaign, the largest campaign contribution I have ever made. 

6. I am limited in what I can afford to contribute to a 

political campaign. I make a modest salary as a public 

school teacher and cannot write large checks to the candidates of my choice. 

7. The increases in the hard money contribution 

limits of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act will discourage me from participating in the political process. The 

idea that other people can have more say in the political 

process than I do simply because they earn or have more 

money is very undemocratic. I cannot make a contribution 

anywhere near the $12,000 allowed per individual in a 

race involving a self-funded candidate, such as the 2002 

U.S. Senate race in New Jersey. Only rich people are able 

to afford to contribute that kind of money. These increases 

will allow the rich person to have more influence in elections and will drown out my voice. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
115a 

This 3 day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Howard Lipoff 

Howard Lipoff 
116a 

Exhibit 29 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Nancy Russell 

I, Nancy Russell, declare as follows: 

1. I am a registered and qualified voter in Yardley 

Pennsylvania. 

2. I reside in the same Congressional district as 

former Member of the U.S. House of Representatives, 

Peter Kostmayer. I supported him in his campaigns from 

1982 to 2000 and intend to support Mr. Kostmayer’s 

candidacy for federal or state office. 

3. I do not have the ability to contribute an amount 

of money anywhere near $2000. 
117a 

4. I have not traditionally supported candidates who 

represent the interests of wealthy individuals and do not 

intend to support such candidates. I support candidates 

whose platforms address the needs of non-affluent and 

ordinary voters. Mr. Kostmayer is one example of this type 

of candidate. 

5. The increased contribution limits of the recentlypassed Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act tilt the scales of 

democracy against average voters like me. Because I, and 

others like me, cannot contribute large amounts of money 

to a campaign, very few candidates will pay attention to 

our concerns. 

6. The increased contribution limits of the recentlypassed Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act will also hinder 

or prevent Mr. Kostmayer, a candidate who does listen to 

and represent the interests of non-affluent communities 

and average voters like me, from mounting a successful 

campaign. Because of the resultant large difference in 

fund-raising between Mr. Kostmayer and any potential 

opponent, he will be less able to get his message out than 

his adversaries. 

7. Because most candidates will not pay attention to 

me, and candidates who do pay attention to my concerns 

will be at a competitive disadvantage, my right to equal 

participation in the political process will be undermined 

once the new law goes into effect. 

8. In addition, I have done a significant amount of 

voter registration work in blue-collar and lower-income 

areas. As money has played a larger role in political 

campaigns over the years, I have been able to generate 

less and less interest in voting. I have I [sic] increasingly 

encountered people who express their feelings of extreme 
118a 

disenfranchisement – that their votes don’t matter compared to the votes and contributions made by wealthy 

interests. 

9. The increased contribution limits of the recentlypassed Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act will exacerbate 

the advantage of wealthy donors in getting representation 

in Congress to such an extent that many people in nonaffluent communities will simply opt out of any political 

participation, including voting. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 2 day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Nancy Russell 

Nancy Russell 
119a 

Exhibit 30 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Chris Saffert 

I, Chris Saffert, declare as follows: 

1. For three years, ending September 30, 2002, I was 

the Legislative Director of ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now). As of October 1, 

2002, I have been the Deputy Director of ACORN’s Financial Justice Center. 

2. ACORN is the nation’s largest community 

organization of low and moderate-income families, with over 

120,000 member families organized into 600 neighborhood 

chapters in 45 cities across the country. ACORN is dedicated 

to organizing the poor and powerless to fight the exclusion 
120a 

of the concerns of low and moderate-income people from 

the nation’s political agenda. ACORN’s priorities include 

better housing for first time homebuyers and tenants, 

living wages for low-wage workers, more investment in 

low and moderate-income communities from banks and 

governments, and better public schools. ACORN works 

toward these goals by building community organizations 

that engage in direct action, negotiation, lobbying for 

legislation, and voter participation. 

3. As ACORN’s Legislative Director, my responsibilities included lobbying of the federal government – focusing 

primarily on banking and housing – and staying abreast of 

federal legislative and regulatory developments that 

would affect ACORN’s members and local issue campaigns. I kept our local offices updated about such developments. My lobbying duties included a couple hundred 

meetings every year with Congressional staff, phone calls, 

and preparing materials and/or comments for different 

federal regulatory proposals. 

4. As the representative of a membership organization of low and moderate income voters, who cannot make 

large contributions to elected officials, I have had significantly less access to elected officials than advocates who 

represent the interests of voters who are able to (and do) 

contribute large sums of money to candidates’ campaigns. 

5. For example, I was actively involved in lobbying 

against the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (“FSMA”), also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 

Act of 1999, from March 1999 until the law’s passage in 

November 1999, because of its harm to low-income and 

minority communities. By repealing the Glass-Steagall 
121a 

Act, which prohibited insurance companies from conducting banking business and the banking industry from 

getting involved in insurance, and making other changes, 

the Act allowed the financial services industry to become 

more concentrated. Even without such concentration, few 

banks have been living up to their responsibility to provide 

access to financial services in poor and minority communities. With the increasing concentration allowed by the 

FSMA, the new conglomerates that have already been, 

and likely will continue to be formed will likely make 

fewer loans and services available in underserved communities and be even less responsive to the needs of those 

communities. 

6. In addition, as part of the FSMA, Senator Gramm 

sought to eliminate or at least significantly roll back the 

Community Reinvestment Act, a law that is designed to 

address redlining by banks in poor and minority communities. The elimination of the CRA would severely hamper 

the ability of citizens in poor and minority neighborhoods 

to have fair access to quality financial services. 

7. In my lobbying activities at the Senate in opposition to the FSMA, I was surprised at how few Senators 

would meet with me. Before working on behalf of ACORN, 

I had spent three years as a staffer on Capitol Hill (one 

year as a Legislative Correspondent and two years as a 

Legislative Assistant) and it was my experience that 

Members of Congress would often drop in on their staffer’s 

meetings. From what I saw generally on the Hill, in order 

to determine whether and how much time the Member 

would spend with a visitor to the office, a judgment was 

usually made as to the importance of the visitor, including 

whether their name appeared on the contributor list. 

Although I do not represent a constituency that can make 
122a 

substantial contributions, I believed that Members of 

Congress would make an effort to meet with me because of 

the importance of the concerns I was raising. 

8. Although I met with staff from the offices of 

almost all Senate Democrats and many Senate Republicans, plus many Representatives, in my lobbying in 

opposition to FSMA, only very rarely did the Senators or 

Representatives stop by the meetings to hear our perspective on the FSMA. In conversations with another advocate 

who had been lobbying on the FSMA for several years 

before I became involved with the issue and had met with 

elected officials, on occasion he was told that the Congress 

Member would not devote any energy to supporting 

various amendments to improve the legislation – not on 

the merits of the issues but simply because the financial 

services (insurance, banking, and securities) industry 

would oppose such changes. 

9. At one point, the dispute regarding the CRA held 

up agreement in the Conference Committee and therefore 

passage of the legislation. The rumor mill and subsequent 

news reports indicated that Sandy Weill, Citigroup’s 

Chairman, broke the logjam with calls to the White House, 

then-Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, and Senator 

Phil Gramm, among others, to urge FSMA’s passage. The 

deal was reached shortly thereafter without elimination of 

CRA but with significant changes that were adverse to 

poor and minority communities. 

10. In the last few months, I have lobbied against 

the Bankruptcy Bill, which has been passed out of a 

House-Senate Conference Committee. This bill harms low 

and moderate-income voters in a variety of ways. 
123a 

11. To understand why the Bankruptcy Bill is so 

horrible for poor communities, it is necessary to understand why many individuals in these communities are 

forced to file for bankruptcy. In many poor and minority 

neighborhoods, predatory home loans are made in concentrated volumes and better loans are not readily available. 

The higher costs imposed by these loans, which often 

result from credit card debts being consolidated into 

mortgages, seriously weaken the borrowers’ financial 

positions and undermine their ability to handle the three 

life events that cause 90% of bankruptcy filings – loss of 

job, divorce, or large medical bills. (Roughly speaking, 

predatory lending means imposing unfair and abusive 

loan terms on borrowers that strip away equity and 

greatly increase borrowers’ costs, frequently through 

aggressive sales tactics and outright deception, often 

taking advantage of borrowers’ lack of understanding of 

extremely complicated transactions.) Predatory loans turn 

the dream of homeownership into a nightmare, in the 

worst instances ending in foreclosure. Notwithstanding 

the dire financial situation faced by such individuals, 

nevertheless they typically still receive an unending 

stream of offers for credit cards or live checks in the mail, 

frequently from the same institution that provided the 

original unsecured debts and then pressured them to 

consolidate those debts into their mortgages. The legislation will strengthen lenders’ sales pitch for consumers to 

consolidate credit card debt into mortgages – the most 

common scenario for predatory loans – and removes 

judges’ ability in the bankruptcy process to address problems with predatory home loans, such as loans that have 

been inflated by huge finance fees and other add-ons above 

the house’s value. 
124a 

12. The Bankruptcy Bill makes bankruptcy more 

expensive by increasing the court filing costs and by 

allowing credit companies, for example, to lodge more legal 

challenges than they have been able to do until now. For 

many low and moderate-income individuals whose debt 

has spiraled out of control, this law will create an insurmountable financial barrier to gaining the protections of 

the bankruptcy laws. 

13. The Bankruptcy Bill also prevents individuals 

who earn more than the median income in a specified 

geographic area from filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 

7, which does not protect many assets from sale but which 

does eliminate unsecured debt like credit card debt, and 

forces such individuals to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, which protects more assets (depending on applicable state law) but does not allow the elimination of 

unsecured debt. That the law applies only to those who 

earn above the median income does not protect low and 

moderate-income communities because the median income 

is very low in many metro areas and most individuals just 

above the median income who are filing for bankruptcy 

will not have any assets to possibly be protected by Chapter 13. 

14. In Pine Bluff, Arkansas, for example, I recently 

heard that the median income is around $19,000 per year. 

Under the Bankruptcy Bill, anyone who earns more than 

$19,000 in Pine Bluff will be unable to wipe out unsecured 

debt through the bankruptcy process and will therefore be 

denied access to the “fresh start” that bankruptcy laws are 

supposed to provide (even as a huge negative mark is left 

on the consumer’s credit record). 
125a 

15. Although the Bankruptcy Bill will have serious 

and severe consequences for low and moderate-income 

communities, effectively pushing individuals into a spiral 

of debt from which it will be nearly impossible to emerge – 

precisely what the bankruptcy laws are supposed to 

prevent – the bill nevertheless provides protection of the 

assets of affluent individuals who declare bankruptcy. The 

bill, for example, preserves the Homestead Exemption, 

which allows residents of several states who declare 

bankruptcy to protect their homes from seizure. This 

benefits mainly the very wealthy, who can shelter their 

luxury homes from seizure while those who rent would 

lose everything. 

16. As with my lobbying against the FSMA, I have 

made many lobby visits to the offices of Members of 

Congress but only rarely have I been allowed to meet with 

the particular elected officials rather than with staff 

exclusively. I understand that many of the industry 

advocates in favor of the Bankruptcy Bill have been able to 

meet directly with Senators and Representatives. I know 

from my prior experience on Capitol Hill that most Members spend one to two hours every day calling their hard 

money contributors, including those in the credit card 

industry who have been pushing for this legislation. 

17. ACORN’s membership cannot afford to make 

large hard money contributions to candidates for office. 

18. The increase in the hard money limits in BCRA 

will further reduce the access of low and moderate-income 

people, and their representatives, to Members of Congress 

to the point that the Members become even less accessible 

and less responsive to the needs of low-income communities. The effect of the contribution limit increases will be to 
126a 

drown out the voices of people from low and moderateincome communities, which already too often go unheard, 

on issues that directly affect their families and neighborhoods. 

19. Because the effect of the hard money increases 

will be to drown out the voices of low and moderate-income 

people, their interests will be represented in candidates’ 

platforms less frequently and neglected even more often as 

legislation and regulations move through Congress and 

the Administration. 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 3rd day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Chris Saffert 

Chris Saffert 
127a 

Exhibit 31 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

DECLARATION OF KATE SEELY-KIRK 

1. 	 My name is Kate Seely-Kirk. I am a registered voter 

and voted in the recent congressional primaries. I am 

the co-chapter Chair of the California Student Public 

Interest Research Group, CALPIRG, at UC Berkeley. 

2. 	 The maximum that I could afford to give a candidate 

would be $50-$100. I work at a minimum wage job, 

and it would take me about 10 hours of work to earn 

$50. The increase in federal contribution limits as 

part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) 

makes me less likely to contribute to political campaigns in the future. When other people just have 

$2000 lying around that they could easily contribute 
128a 

to a candidate under the new limits and I would have 

to work so hard just to contribute $50, that demonstrates to me that political contributions are not a a 

good way to show my level of support for a candidate. 

I might feel much more strongly in favor of a candidate than someone who can easily give $2000, but 

that wouldn’t be at all reflected in the contributions. 

This discourages me and makes me feel that I might 

as well not give my $50 at all because it won’t go as 

far under the new limits, and won’t demonstrate my 

true level of support for candidates. This will become 

even worse when contribution limits increase. 

3. 	 I am also discouraged from making political contributions because I feel the passage of BCRA demonstrates that Congress is corrupt. They claimed that 

they were in favor of reform, but I believe that there 

will be loopholes to allow corporations and special interests like the mining industry, logging industry, and 

oil industry to continue giving soft money. And, with 

the increased contribution limits, wealthy individuals 

will be able to give twice as much. This is not campaign finance reform, and the fact that members of 

Congress claimed that it was disillusions me about the 

entire system. It seems really sneaky. The passage of 

the BCRA makes me feel like my voice is less likely to 

be heard and makes me less likely to want to contribute small amounts to federal candidates. 

4. 	 I am registered with the Green Party and believe that 

the increase in federal contribution limits will further 

increase the advantages of the two major parties over 

the candidates that I support. The increase in contribution limits will further encourage the two major 

parties to adopt positions that are supported by the 

mining, logging, and oil companies because executives in 

those companies will be able to give even more money. 

This will leave even less room for third party candidates 

that do not adopt positions that are supported by people 
129a 

from these industries. I believe that the candidates I 

support would do better under lower contribution limits, and will be less likely to run competitive campaigns under the higher limits. So, I will be less able 

to vote for candidates who support my interests and 

opinions if contribution limits increase. 

5. 	 I am involved in the Youth Vote campaign to register 

students to vote. I find that students are already 

disillusioned with the voting process and often do not 

want to register to vote. I frequently find that only 2 

students will register for every hour I spend at a 

registration table talking to students. When I ask if 

people are registered, they tell me, “Nope. It doesn’t 

matter anyway.” I definitely believe that the increase 

in contribution limits will increase the disillusionment 

among people my age and make them less likely to 

vote. It will make people feel like they have less of a 

voice. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of 

the United States of America that the foregoing is true and 

correct. 

Executed on: 10/2/02 

/s/ Kate Seely-Kirk 

Kate Seely-Kirk 
130a 

Exhibit 32 

IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

VICTORIA JACKSON GRAY 

ADAMS, et. al., 

Plaintiffs, 

-vsTHE FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

02-cv-877-KLH-CKK-RJL 

consolidated with 

02-cv-582-KLH-CKK-RJL 

(lead case) 

and 

02-cv-581-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-633-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-751-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-753-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-754-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-781-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-874-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-875-KLH-CKK-RJL 

02-cv-881-KLH-CKK-RJL 

Declaration of Stephanie L. Wilson 

I, Stephanie L. Wilson, declare as follows: 

1. I am a registered and qualified voter in Kalamazoo, Michigan. 

2. I serve as the executive director of the Fannie Lou 

Hamer Project, a national grassroots organization dedicated to redefining campaign finance as a civil rights 

issue. The Fannie Lou Hamer Project, named after a 

legendary civil rights worker from Mississippi, advocates 

for equal participation of all citizens in the political process, regardless of economic status. 
131a 

3. I have never missed an election since I turned 18. 

My mother always instilled in us the importance of our 

right to vote, and as part of our high school graduation 

packets, each of us received a voter registration card. 

4. The only campaign contribution I have ever made 

was for fifteen dollars to a candidate running for state 

representative in Michigan. I have three children, ages 

thirteen, ten, and six. My fiancée and I live on a monthly 

budget based on one income and we focus solely on meeting our family’s basic needs, such as food, clothes, shelter, 

lights, and gas. I cannot afford to make large contributions 

to candidates of my choice. 

5. The increases in the hard money contribution 

limits of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act further 

moves me away from being able to participate in the 

political process. My fifteen dollars will definitely be no 

match for a wealthy person’s contribution of $2,000. I’m 

getting less representation and less democracy under the 

current system. With these increases, I’m going to get no 

representation and no democracy. 

6. As an African-American woman, I recognize that 

my community will be disproportionately harmed by these 

increases since we are disproportionately poorer. By and 

large, people of color are not the ones financing our elections today, and we are not the ones redeeming the rewards and benefits of representation in government. These 

increases will only further that disparity. 

7. The increases in the hard money contribution 

limits will allow wealthy contributors to drown out my 

voice in the political process. The increases will prevent 

me from being able to participate in the electoral process 

on an equal basis. 
132a 

I declare under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1746, that the foregoing is true and correct to the 

best of my knowledge, information and belief. 

This 3rd day of October, 2002. 

/s/ Stephanie Wilson 

Stephanie Wilson 
133a 

Exhibit 33 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

SENATOR MITCH 

McCONNELL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION 

COMMISSION, et al., 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) Civil Action No. ) 02-0582 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

) 

) Consolidated Actions 

) DECLARATION 

) 

) 

DECLARATION OF SENATOR DALE BUMPERS


Background 

1. My name is Dale Bumpers. 

2. 	 I served two terms as Governor of Arkansas, 

from 1971 to 1975. After my service as Governor, 

I served as a Member of the United States Senate, 

representing the state of Arkansas, from 1975 to 

1999. After I retired from the Senate, I spent one 

year directing the Center for Defense Information, a nonprofit think-tank based in Washington, 

D.C. I have also taught classes at the University 

of Arkansas and other schools. 

3. 	 Currently, I practice law in Washington, D.C., 

at Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, PLLC, 

where I provide strategic counsel and advice to 
134a 

corporations, trade associations, and nonprofit organizations on a broad range of international and 

government relations issues. 

The Role of Political Parties 

4. 	 Political parties’ primary interest is in supporting and electing their candidates. The parties 

are money raisers, and they spend the money they 

raise to assist their candidates in campaigns. Party 

committees focus their resources on competitive 

races. Unlike some other groups that are active in 

the political process, party committees keep information on the opposing party so they can tell their 

candidates about things like their opponents’ legislative votes and public statements, and thereby help 

them win elections. 

5. 	 Political parties do not have economic interests beyond their broad view that the public generally prospers more as a result of the election of 

that party’s candidates. 

6. 	 I have never been contacted by the party 

about any issue, and have never been lobbied by 

the party to take a certain position on an issue or 

matter before Congress. In my view, the party is 

not the leader on policy issues, and it is not very 

issue-oriented. It is the Members who provide 

leadership on policy issues, and the party is a follower that promotes those policies in order to 

elect its candidates. I am not aware that the party 

has any interest in the outcome of public policy 

debates that is separate from its interest in supporting and electing its candidates. 

7. 	 Parties expect Members to raise money for 

the party. At weekly caucus meetings, for example, party leaders pressured members to raise 
135a 

funds. Party leaders would also recognize members who helped raise significant amounts of 

money. This money is normally raised from those 

who are involved in donating to Democratic or 

Republican causes in the home states of these 

Members. 

Members of Congress and Soft Money Fundraising 

8. 	 In my experience, it is a common practice for 

Members of Congress to be involved in raising 

both hard and soft dollars for the national party 

committees, at the parties’ request. I have raised 

hard money for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (“DSCC”) and have attended 

any number of fundraising functions for both the 

Democratic National Committee (“DNC”) and the 

DSCC. While I have not raised soft money for the 

Party, occasionally the Party had asked me 

whether certain people I knew would be willing to 

make large soft money donations. 

9. 	 Parties expect Members to call some of the big 

donors in their home states and, for example, 

suggest sending the DNC a donation of $15,000 

for a table at a DNC dinner. These are often donors who have previously contributed to the 

Member’s campaign, and some of them may be 

“maxed out” donors who have already contributed 

the maximum allowable amount of hard dollars to 

that campaign. 

10. 	 When a Member raises money for the party, 

there is a sense on the part of the Member that he 

or she is helping his or her own campaign by virtue of raising that money. When Members raise 

funds for the DNC, it helps the DNC perform its 

function of keeping tabs on statements, policies, 
136a 

and votes of opposition party members and 

groups. 

11. 	 Members who raise money for the DSCC 

expect some of that money to come directly back 

to them. Part of this unwritten but not unspoken 

rule is that if you do not raise a certain amount of 

money for the DSCC, you are not going to get any 

back. The DSCC does not give a candidate the 

maximum allowed unless he or she has raised at 

least a certain amount for the DSCC. The last 

time I ran, I remember that the DSCC promised 

to give every candidate a minimal amount of 

money regardless of whether he or she did any 

fundraising for the DSCC. To get more than the 

minimum, however, you had to raise money for 

the DSCC. For example, if I had helped the DSCC 

raise the maximum amount it could legally expend on my behalf, I certainly would have expected the maximum to come back to me. 

12. 	 For Members there would not be any real 

difference if the funds they solicited were for 

themselves or for the DNC or DSCC, or if they 

were hard or soft money donations. Members and 

donors understand that donations to the party 

committees help Members. 

Soft Money Donors 

13. 	 People give money to the DNC, DSCC, and 

the state parties for the same reasons that they 

give to individual Members. Some feel that they 

are ingratiating themselves with the Member who 

is soliciting the donation. Others contribute out of 

friendship with the Member who is soliciting the 

donation, or because they are true believers who 

simply want to support Democratic causes. People 
137a 

will only give money to the parties when they are 

solicited by a Member they respect, like, or know 

out of friendship, and I do not think they normally expect to have any say as to how the donation will be spent. 

14. 	 Although some donors give to Members and 

parties simply because they support a particular 

party or Member, the lion’s share of money is 

given because people want access. If someone 

gives money to a party out of friendship with a 

Member, that donor may never ask for anything 

in return. However, although many people give 

money with no present intention of asking for 

anything in return, they know that if they ever 

need access they can probably get it. Donations 

can thus serve as a type of insurance. 

15. 	 Giving soft money to both parties, the 

Republicans and the Democrats, makes no sense 

at all unless the donor feels that he or she is buying access. The business community makes such 

donations quite often. 

16. 	 I believe that, in many instances, there is an 

expectation of reciprocation where donations to 

the party are made. Donors also often give large 

soft money donations when legislation that affects 

them is being considered in Congress. For example, when the Senate considered the Patients’ Bill 

of Rights, the insurance companies began loading 

up the Republican Party with soft money. 

17. 	 Likewise, I do not think the tobacco industry 

gives the Republican Party a million and a half or 

two million dollars because they expect them to 

take a very objective view on tobacco issues. I 

think the tobacco industry got what they expected 

when, after they had given scads of money to both 
138a 

the Republican National Committee and the National Republican Senatorial Committee, a majority of Republicans killed the tobacco bill. You can 

just look at a series of events: the money is given 

to the Republicans, the party begins to take a 

stand, Members of the party start filibustering 

any efforts by Democrats to bring up the bill. It 

was the best investment that the tobacco industry 

ever made. Those things are not written out or 

spoken, that is just the way it happens. 

Effects of Soft Money Donations 

18. 	 I doubt there is a politician on Capitol Hill 

who would deny that soft money donations get 

people access. The unwritten law in the Congress 

is that those who have consistently been good 

party members and good donors can get access. 

They can get their phone calls returned. I have 

heard that some Members even keep lists of big 

donors in their offices. 

19. 	 I think a lot of politicians have a little filter 

in their ears when a legislative vote comes up. 

They quite often run that vote through their 

memory filter and determine how the vote will affect jobs in their state, and how it will affect the 

supply of donations, in terms of who is likely to be 

offended and who is likely to be helped by the 

vote. That is just human nature, and there is 

nothing illegal about it. 

20. 	 I think it would be naive in the extreme to 

suggest that, for example, someone who gave 

$20,000 to the DSCC at the solicitation of a Member would not get his or her phone call returned, 

or have access to the Member who solicited the 

donation. And you cannot be a good Democratic or 
139a 

a good Republican Member and not be aware of 

who gave money to the party. If someone in Arkansas gave $50,000 to the DNC, for example, I 

would certainly know that. Likewise, if someone 

gives $100,000 to the Presidential inauguration 

committee, that is something politicians and 

party officials keep in their memory bank. 

21. 	 Soft money gives big corporations and the 

very wealthy an inordinate advantage over others 

in the legislative process. If these corporations or 

individuals have given $100,000 to either or both 

parties, their chances of securing a change in legislation in Congress is exponentially increased. 

Often donors seek legislative changes so that they 

or their business can reap large financial gains. 

22. 	 The effect of soft money on the legislative 

process is sometimes obvious, as with the tobacco 

legislation or the Patients’ Bill of Rights. Other 

times, however, there are more subtle ways to affect legislation that do not receive media attention. For example, Members may choose to 

filibuster a bill which would adversely affect an 

industry that has given large soft money donations to their party, or a committee chairman may 

similarly stall a bill. 

23. 	 Constituents do not distinguish between 

money that candidates raise for their own campaigns and money they raise for the party committees. 

The Burdens of Fundraising on Members of Congress 

24. 	 The rise in soft money giving has increased 

the burden placed on Members to spend time raising funds. The great majority of Members find it 

anathema to spend such an inordinate amount of 
140a 

their time trying to raise money. But with the rise 

of self-funded millionaires running for election to 

Congress, Members do not have a choice but to 

spend more and more time raising funds. 

25. 	 The burdens of fundraising are sometimes a 

reason that Members choose to retire. For example, I remember when Tom Eagleton made a 

speech on the Senate floor announcing that he 

would not be running for reelection. I went up to 

him afterwards and said, “Tom, why are you doing this? You’re a great Senator and we need 

you.” He responded by saying that he was tired of 

going around with his tin cup out. I, too, detested 

fundraising, and that was one reason I decided 

not to seek reelection. 

Issue Advertisements 

26. 	 Soft money also finds its way into our 

system through so-called “issue advertisements” 

sponsored by outside organizations that mostly 

air right before an election. Organizations can run 

effective issue ads that benefit a candidate without coordinating with that candidate. They have 

experienced professionals analyze a race and reinforce what a candidate is saying. These ads influence the outcome of elections by simply stating 

“tell him [the opponent] to quit doing this.” The 

“magic words” test is completely inadequate; 

viewers get the message to vote against someone, 

even though the ad may never explicitly say “vote 

against him.” 

27. 	 Members or parties sometimes suggest that 

corporations or individuals make donations to interest groups that run “issue ads.” Candidates 

whose campaigns benefit from these ads greatly 
141a 

appreciate the help of these groups. In fact, Members will also be favorably disposed to those who 

finance these groups when they later seek access 

to discuss pending legislation. 

28. 	 Politicians especially love when a negative 

“issue ad” airs against their opponents. If these 

politicians did not feel that the issue ads were 

helping them, they would call the people sponsoring them and tell them to stop, or they would hold 

a press conference and angrily denounce the ads. 

But that rarely, if ever, happens. 

29. 	 One of the most insidious things about soft 

money “issue ads” is that the ordinary viewer 

doesn’t have a clue as to who paid for the ad. I 

first noticed this problem in 1996, when I saw 

several issue ads before it ever dawned on me 

that those ads were not being paid for by the candidate. What caused my curiosity to be piqued 

was the ending tag lines on those ads: “Call so 

and so and tell him to quit doing so and so.” At 

first I just assumed that the ads were paid for by 

the opposing candidates’ campaign funds, though 

I did think it was very strange that the opposing 

candidates’ names were never mentioned. In those 

ads, everything is honed in on the candidate the 

ad is trying to defeat. At that time, I did not know 

that they were soft money spots. Of course it 

didn’t take long for me to inquire and figure out 

that they were. However, my view is that 95 to 98 

percent of the constituents today who watch ads 

produced by soft money think nothing of the tag 

line saying to call someone and never realize 

those are soft money ads. These ads are clearly 

election-related. 

30. 	 I considered soft money-funded issue advertising in 1996, and I consider it now, to be the 
142a 

most insidious thing going on in politics. Soft 

money spent on issue ads is a way to circumvent 

the campaign contribution limits. A thousand dollars is the most a candidate can take from an individual, but you can take a gazillion in soft 

money and run those kinds of ads, which make a 

mockery of the campaign finance laws. In this respect, the current system is rotten to the core, and 

in my opinion, it is awful for the body politic. 

Lobbyists and Political Donations 

31. 	 As a government relations consultant, I have 

seen firsthand how campaign finance money affects the legislative process. My clients expect me 

to advise them on what is likely to happen in 

Congress and especially what actions they should 

take when legislation that affects them is at a 

critical stage. Having spent 24 years in the Senate, I often know exactly what Congress is going 

to do and why. Oftentimes, campaign finance 

money is the reason why certain legislation either 

passes or dies. 

32. 	 Like other governmental relations consultants, I will occasionally discuss political donations 

with my clients. Sometimes I advise my clients to 

make donations; other times, my clients approach 

me about political giving. I tell my clients that 

they should contribute to the Members who can 

do the most good for them, such as the Chairman 

or Ranking Member of a committee that has jurisdiction over issues affecting them. 

33. 	 From time to time, I will also recommend to 

clients that they participate in a political fundraiser. Lobbyists often receive invitations for 

fundraising events to pass on to their clients. In 
143a 

fact, I receive an average of five fundraising invitations per day from Members or parties. Both 

Members and the parties pressure lobbyists and 

their clients to attend these events and make donations. 

34. 	 Although I am loathe to perpetuate what I 

see as a corrupt process, I still encourage my clients to attend fundraisers and make donations. 

The truth is that you cannot be a player in Washington unless you immerse yourself in the current 

system. 

Conclusion 

35. 	 I do not accept the specious claim that free 

speech rights will be infringed by the new McCainFeingold law. I am a staunch defender of the Bill 

of Rights, and I fully support the new law. 

36. 	 Our current campaign finance system is 

crass, unholy, and destructive of democracy. People are dreaming if they think a democracy can 

survive when elected officials and the bills they 

consider are beholden to big donors. Currently, 

you can’t find a better method of ensuring government help from time-to-time than to make 

significant soft money donations. The vast majority of citizens do not have the resources to donate 

soft money, and they are entitled to as much consideration as those that do. James Madison would 

be whirling in his grave if he saw how corrupt our 

system has become. 

37. 	 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare 

under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 

and correct. 
144a 

/s/ Dale Bumpers 

Dale Bumpers 

Executed on this 1st day of October, 2002 
145a 

Exhibit 35 

Public Campaign 

[LOGO] 

Why the Battle Over Hard Money Matters 

Hard Facts On Hard Money 

Executive Summary 

While political party soft money is getting the most attention, it’s hard money that dominates the campaign finance 

landscape. The core of the McCain-Feingold bill is banning 

approximately the one-sixth of the campaign dollar pie 

comprised of soft money contributions to national political 

parties. That’s an important objective. But the real battle 

over the bill could end up turning on amendments that 

would relax rules governing hard money – most significantly 

by raising the $1,000 individual per-election, per-candidate 

contribution limit. 

• 	 Of the $2.9 billion collected for the 2000 elections 

by federal candidates and national political parties, three-fourths – $2.2 billion – was hard money 

(see page 2). Hard money outweighs party soft 

money by a ratio of 4.4 to 1 (p. 2). 

• 	 Total hard money contributions to candidates and 

parties rose by $555 million in 2000 as compared to 

1996. Soft money increased by $232 million over 

the same period (p. 3). 

• 	 Well connected donors bundle hundreds of $1,000 

hard money donations. Their influence reflects 

their ability to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars 

from family members, business colleagues and others 

– not their personal $1,000 contributions. Increasing 

the limit would increase their influence (p.5). 
146a 

• 	In the 2000 elections, seven out of ten dollars 

collected by federal candidates from individual donors came from donors of $200 or more; 44 percent 

came from donors giving $1,000 or more. p. q. In 

the 2000 elections just 1/8th of one percent of the 

voting age population gave $1,000 or more. (p. 9) 

Top donors have influence disproportionate to their 

numbers even at the current limit. 

• 	 These donors are not representative of the nation 

economically or demographically. They are wealthier and older than most Americans and most are 

white males (p. 9). 

• 	 If the hard money limit were hiked from $1,000 to 

$3,000, new hard money contributions could easily 

surpass the amount of soft money banned by the 

McCain-Feingold bill (p. 1). 

• 	Senate incumbents in 2000 raised, on average, 

nearly three times as much as their challengers 

did from donors of $1,000 or more: $1.8 million v. 

$650,000. House incumbents in 2000 raised more 

than twice as much from donors of $1,000 or more 

as their challengers, on average: $178,000 v. 

$85,000. Raising the hard money limit would exacerbate the advantage incumbents already have 

over challengers. 

• 	 The effect of bundled hard money contributions on 

policy can be clearly seen in recent congressional 

actions on bankruptcy reform, the Arctic National 

Wildlife Refuge, and workplace ergonomics regulations. 

The hard facts are clear. Ridding the campaign finance 

system of party soft money would eliminate an enormous 

amount of special interest cash. Yet, at the same time, no 

matter how the numbers are sliced and diced, increasing 

the amount of cash that individuals can contribute in hard 
147a 

money would limit severely the benefits of a ban on party 

soft money. Campaign donors would simply shift their soft 

money contributions into the hard money pile, which is 

already substantial, and, in fact, towers over the amount 

of party soft money raised. 

Banning party soft money would be an important accomplishment. But, comprehensive campaign finance reform 

must address the whole issue of special interest money in 

elections, including hard money. If it does not, the American people will be stuck with the same problem they have 

now – trying to make their voices heard over the ka-ching 

of special interest cash. 

INTRODUCTION 

The 2000 elections set the record for campaign contributions. Disgust over the billions contributed by special 

interests, seeking special favor, is a driving force behind 

the reform effort in Congress led by Senators John McCain 

(R-AZ) and Russell Feingold (D-WI). At the core of their 

legislation, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, 

is a ban on “soft money” contributions to national political 

parties. Banning these unlimited, unregulated contributions would be an important first step toward comprehensive campaign finance reform. Nevertheless, it is crucial to 

remember that the money the McCain-Feingold bill 

reaches is only about a sixth of the campaign dollar pie. 

Most money raised by politicians is old-fashioned “hard 

dollars.” In fact, of the $2.9 billion collected for the 2000 

elections by federal candidates and national political 

parties, three-fourths – $2.2 billion – was hard money. 

This hard money is not “good” or “clean” or “disinterested” 

money. Although there are certainly many ordinary 
148a 

Americans giving contributions because of their convictions, the bulk of political money comes from generous 

donors with more practical reasons for giving. In the 2000 

elections, seven out of ten dollars collected by federal 

candidates from individual donors came from donors of 

$200 or more; 44 percent came from donors giving $1,000 

or more. These donors are not representative of the nation 

economically or demographically. They are wealthier and 

older than most Americans and most are white males. 

Many are corporate executives, bundling contributions 

with their colleagues and handing them over to politicians 

sitting on important committees regulating their businesses. 

These hard facts are all the more important because of 

what is expected to occur as Congress debates the McCainFeingold bill. Among the expected amendments are several 

that would loosen the current restrictions on hard money. 

These amendments could be tremendously damaging. It is 

expected that proposals will be offered to increase the 

amount of hard money an individual is permitted to 

contribute to a candidate’s campaign from the current 

limit of $1,000 per candidate per election (primary and 

general) to $1,500, $3,000, or even $6,000. Hard money 

already comprises the majority of campaign cash collected 

for elections. If party soft money is eliminated, it is a safe 

bet that some special interest money will simply flow back 

into the campaign finance system in the form of hard 

money, or through other means. If hard money limits are 

increased, the gains of banning party soft money easily 

could be undone. 

Ultimately, a complete overhaul of how elections are 

funded will be required if the goal is to clean politics of the 

taint of special interest influence. Legislation to accomplish 
149a 

this for federal elections has been introduced by Senator 

Paul Wellstone (D-MN) and Representative John Tierney 

(D-MA). Under such a Clean Money/Clean Elections 

campaign finance system, candidates who agree to forego 

private contributions and accept spending limits receive 

limited money to run their campaigns from a publicly 

financed Clean Money/Clean Elections fund. On the state 

level, the Clean Money/Clean Elections system has proven 

itself as a practical reform. Maine and Arizona’s laws went 

into effect this past election with outstanding results. 

In this report, we will give an overview of hard money: 

what it is, who gives it, and how political fundraising 

might be affected if hard money limits were increased. It 

updates the Public Campaign report Hard Facts: Hard 

Money in the 2000 Elections (October 2000) which was 

based largely on data from the first 18 months of the 2000 

election cycle. In this report, 2000 election cycle data 

includes contributions from January 1, 1999 through 

December 31, 2000, the full election cycle, as reported to 

the Federal Elections Commission. 

Source: Federal Election Commission. Reflects 


campaign money collected between 1/1/99 - 12/31/00 


by Congressional candidates and national 


political parties, and contributions from 


1/1/99 - 11/27/00 by presidential candidates. 


HARD MONEY IS BIG, SPECIAL INTEREST 

MONEY 

When people think “campaign finance reform,” the next 

words that come to mind are usually “soft money.” Yet 

hard money remains the major feature of the political 

contribution landscape, and it comes from the same cast of 
150a 

special interest donors. When politicians and party officials count up the cash that rolls in from generous donors, 

they do not necessarily make a distinction between 

whether the donor gave a hard or a soft dollar. The difference between hard and soft dollars is simply a matter of 

the legality of how these dollars are given and how they 

can be spent. 

“Hard money” is the term commonly used to describe 

direct contributions to politicians’ campaign committees 

and party committees that are limited under the Federal 

Election Campaign Act (FECA). Under the law, individuals 

may give $2,000 directly to a candidate over an election 

cycle – $1,000 for the primary, and $1,000 for the general 

election. An individual may also give up to $20,000 to a 

national party committee annually, and up to $25,000 in a 

calendar year overall. Political Action Committees (PACs) 

may give $10,000 per election to a candidate ($5,000 for 

the primary, $5,000 for the general). 

Also included in “hard money” are candidates’ contributions to their own campaigns, which are not limited by 

law. In a few instances, wealthy candidates are spending 

tremendous sums. For example, Sen. Jon Corzine (D-NJ), 

who earned a fortune working for investment firm Goldman Sachs, gave himself $60.2 million toward his bid for a 

New Jersey Senate race.1

 Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA), 

who became wealthy working as a senior vice president for 

the high-tech company RealNetworks, gave herself $10.3 

million.2 

Party “soft money” is simply a different type of political 

cash.3

 Through a loophole in campaign finance laws, any 

individual or entity, including corporations and unions 
151a 

(which are forbidden to give direct hard money contributions) can give unlimited amounts of cash to national 

party committees. The parties use the money for state and 

local campaigns, party building, and voter drives. Technically, this soft money is not supposed to be used to advocate for or against a particular candidate. However, the 

parties have become adept at skirting this restriction by 

running advertisements or sending out letters that avoid 

using words such as “vote for” or “vote against,” but for all 

practical purposes support or oppose a candidate. Soft 

money contributions to national party committees increased astronomically in the 2000 elections over soft 

money collected in the previous presidential election cycle. 

The national parties collected nearly twice as much soft 

money in the 2000 elections as they had in 1996, $494 

million versus $262 million – an increase of $232 million.4 

Source: Federal Election Commission. 2000 totals reflect 


campaign money collected between 1/1/99 - 12/31/00 by 


Congressional candidates and national political 


parties, and contributions from 1/1/99 - 11/27/00


by presidential candidates. 


The amount of hard money contributions collected by 

candidates and parties also rose significantly in 2000 

compared to 1996, up to $2.165 billion from $1,610 billion 

– a 35 percent increase totaling $555 million. So, although 

party soft money has caught people’s eye because of its 

shocking rate of increase, and its leap onto the stage as a 

major source of campaign funding, hard money has actually increased more in total dollars. Hard money remained 

the dominant source of campaign funding in the 2000 

election cycle outweighing party soft money by a ratio of 

4.4 to 1. 
152a 

IT COULD GET WORSE 

There is serious discussion in Congress of, as part of the 

McCain-Feingold bill, easing the rules on hard money to 

allow hundreds of millions more dollars into the campaign 

finance system. The particular proposal getting the most 

attention is an increase in the $1,000 limit on the amount 

individuals can give congressional candidates. An amendment such as this could completely undermine the objectives of the McCain-Feingold legislation. 

Even a McCain-Feingold bill that stuck to banning party 

soft money is unlikely to squeeze every party soft money 

dollar out of the system. Some would find its way back in 

through hard money contributions and non-party issue 

advocacy. But increasing the hard money limits could open 

a door to move the money stopped by the soft money ban 

back in via other paths. 

Donors giving a hard money contribution of at least $1,000 

gave about $380 million to federal candidates in the 2000 

elections, for both primary and general races. If the limit 

had been $3,000 it is possible those donors could have 

given over a billion dollars. Their additional contributions 

could have been well over the amount of party soft money, 

which amounted to $494 million, that would have been 

banned by McCain-Feingold. A bill that bans party soft 

money but hikes the hard money limit could easily fail to 

achieve even the minimum goal of reducing the amount of 

influence-buying money in politics. 

Raising hard money limits would also exacerbate forces in 

the system that protects incumbents and make it difficult 

for qualified challengers to run a competitive campaign. 

For example, Senate candidates in 2000 raised, on average, 

nearly three times from donors of $1,000 or more as much as 
153a 

their challengers did: $1.8 million versus $650,000. House 

incumbents in 2000 raised more than twice as much from 

donors of $1,000 or more as their challengers, on average: 

$178,000 versus $85,000. Raising hard money limits could 

amount to enacting “The incumbent Protection Act of 

2001.” 

Source: Analysis of data provided by Center for Responsive


Politics, 2000 cycle based on Federal Election Commission 


data reflecting contributions from 1/1/99 through 12/31/00, 


downloaded in March 2001. Contributions reflect 


the full six year Senate cycle. 


Source: Analysis of data provided by Center for Responsive


Politics, based on Federal Election Commission data 


reflecting contributions from 1/1/99 through 


12/31/00, downloaded in March 2001. 


BUNDLING HARD MONEY INCREASES 

‘PURCHASE POWER’ FOR SPECIAL INTERESTS 

The statutory limits on contribution size give some a false 

sense of security when it comes to hard money, and an 

opportunity for deception for others. Currently, an individual can give up to $2,000 per election cycle – $1,000 for 

the primary, $1,000 for the general – to a candidate. 

Although out-of-reach for most Americans, it is sometimes 

suggested that, with the levels of campaign contributions 

being what they are, $1,000 doesn’t buy much influence 

from a Member of Congress. Whatever $1,000 might or 

might not buy, hard money frequently comes bundled in 

much bigger amounts than $1,000. 

Families, for example, often collaborate to give significant 

amounts of hard money. If each member of a couple gives 

the maximum, then together they can give a total of 
154a 

$4,000 to a candidate for a primary and general election. 

Creative families can, and often do, get their kids involved 

as well. There is nothing in the law to prevent a child from 

also giving a contribution. If a couple has two children, 

and if all four family members give the maximum contribution, then the family can give $8,000. If contribution 

limits were tripled that would go up to $24,000 per candidate per election cycle. 

Nothing Beats Hard Cash 

There are a number of reasons why hard money is crucial 

for politicians’ success. First, early money is hard money. 

The name of EMILY’s List, the network of political donors 

founded to help elect pro-choice Democratic women, is 

derived from the political slogan “Early Money Is Like 

Yeast – It Makes the Dough Rise.” Or, as former House 

member Vic Fazio said, “People are looking for winners . . . 

Early money has been one of the indicators that rarely 

goes wrong.” 

• 	Early money means viability. One of the first 

things political contributors, the political parties 

and other potential supporters want to know about 

a new candidate is whether they can raise enough 

money for a viable candidacy. The way for a candidate to show viability is by accumulating early contributions directly for their campaign treasury. 

This type of contribution is hard money. 

• 	 Early money can intimidate. Potential candidates 

and their supporters also want to know how much 

the opponent will raise. Well-connected candidates 

scare off challengers, and support for challengers, 

with large war chests of early hard money contributions from wealthy individuals and PACs. This 
155a 

is one reason most experts saw only 30 to 40 congressional races as competitive in 2000. 

• 	Party soft money is useless without hard money. 

Federal law requires that party soft money may 

only be spent in combination with hard money according to a complex state-by-state formula – in a 

presidential election year, roughly two hard dollars 

for every one soft dollar. It is as if a store would 

only accept your one dollar bill if you also provided 

two Sacagawea dollar coins along with it. 

Hard money is more versatile than soft money. Hard 

money may be used for any election expense, from polling 

to phone-banking to advertisements that directly urge the 

public to vote for the candidate. Technically, soft money 

cannot be used to fund ads that use phrases such as “vote 

for” or “vote against.” As a practical matter, this isn’t much 

of a limitation. But hard money is, nevertheless, more 

valuable because it is not subject to these limitations. 

This same strategy works even better for corporate executives with colleagues in their company and industry. 

Analysis of campaign finance records often shows patterns 

such as many corporate executives giving contributions to 

a particular candidate on the same day or on days close 

together. For example, 63 donors listing “MBNA” as their 

employer gave Sen. Joseph R. Biden (D-Del.) a total of 

$47,250 over the period of just one month – May 1999. 

Over the course of the entire election cycle, Biden collected 

a total of $130,175 from MBNA National Bank executives 

and their families. MBNA National Bank, the nation’s 

largest credit card issuer, is poised to be one of the biggest 

beneficiaries of bankruptcy reform legislation recently 

approved by Congress. (See: Why Bundling Matters later 
156a 

in this report.) Biden voted “yes” on the legislation when it 

came to a floor vote on March 15, 2001. 

Biden was not the only candidate given a bundle of cash 

from MBNA. The top donor to President George W. Bush’s 

presidential campaign was MBNA National Bank’s executives, their families, and PAC, who gave him nearly 

$240,700 in individual hard money. MBNA CEO Charles 

Cawley is a Bush “pioneer,” one of the volunteer fundraisers who raised at least $100,000 for the campaign. He and 

his wife Julie personally gave a total of $2,000 to Bush and 

nearly $20,000 overall to federal candidates. Bush has 

indicated his support for the bankruptcy reform legislation. 

In accepting MBNA money, Biden and Bush weren’t doing 

anything that isn’t widely practiced. It’s all part of being a 

successful politician in today’s political system. 

Other examples of campaign cash bundles are the $60,000 

that Sen. Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) received from Lockheed 

Martin’s PAC, employees, and families between 1995 and 

2000; the nearly $27,000 that Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE.) 

received from ConAgra Inc’s PAC, employees and families; 

and the $27,000 Sen. John Breaux (D-LA) received from 

Joseph E Seagram & Sons’ PAC, employees and their 

families over the same time period.5

 Increasing the hard 

money limits would increase the capacity of institutions 

like these companies to influence the political process with 

large hard money contributions from well-off executives, 

combined with contributions from PACs. 

The current $1,000 hard money limit is, thus, not serving 

as an effective barrier to corporate influence in the political process. Raising the limit would, obviously, increase 
157a 

the influence of those currently able to bundle large 

numbers of $1,000 checks. 

A CASE STUDY: THE LINDNERS, THE FAMILY 

THAT BUNDLES TOGETHER 

Carl H. Lindner has been on the Forbes list of the 400 

richest Americans since 1982, and has a personal fortune 

estimated at $800 million. He is chairman of the board of 

American Financial Group, Inc., a financial holding 

company whose primary business is insurance. In addition, he has a 40 percent stake in Chiquita Brands International, which grows bananas in Central America. 

Lindner and his family are famous for bundling contributions to politicians and political parties. He is also well 

known for extracting what he needs from the U.S. government. One recent example is how Lindner successfully 

lobbied the Clinton Administration to impose trade sanctions against certain European imports in retaliation for 

import restrictions on the bananas he produced in Latin 

America, as detailed in an investigative report by award 

winning Time journalists Donald L. Barlett and James B. 

Steele.6 

Though they lean Republican in their donations, they are 

also generous to Democrats. In the 2000 elections, Lindner 

and his wife, Edyth, alone were the source of $786,000 in 

contributions, 65 percent of which went to Republicans.7 

An examination of Federal Election Campaign contribution records shows how blatantly the Lindner clan bundles 

political donations. For example, on May 27, 1999, 13 Lindners each gave a contribution of $1,000 to then-presidential 

candidate George W. Bush for his primary campaign, for a 

total of $13,000. At that point, the Lindners were still 
158a 

playing the presidential field. On March 24, members of 

the Lindner family had given a $12,000 bundle to Elizabeth Dole; on March 31, they had given $6,000 to Dan 

Quayle, and on May 25, they had given Steve Forbes 

$10,000.8 

By the close of 1999, however, with George W. Bush 

looking more like he would be the presidential contender, 

the Lindners wrote $150,000 worth of hard money checks 

to the “1999 State Victory Committee.” Created in November 1999, the 1999 State Victory Committee was a special 

joint fundraising group that targeted donors who had 

already “maxed out” on their hard money contributions 

directly to the Bush campaign, but not on hard money 

contributions to the national political parties.9

 Overall, in 

just two short months, the State Victory Committee raised 

nearly $5.2 million in hard money contributions, many of 

these in chunks of $20,000 or $25,000.10 This is good, hard 

proof that donors will write large hard money checks to 

benefit specific candidates if given the opportunity. If hard 

money contribution limits are raised and party soft money 

is banned, we can expect donors like the Lindners to write 

bigger checks for politicians’ campaign funds. 

160a 

Other Lindner Bundles: 

• 	$10,000 for Sen. George Allen (R-VA) on October 

10, 2000;11 

• 	$20,000 to GOP Missouri Senate candidate John 

Ashcroft, now attorney general; $11,000 on March 

14, 2000, and $9,000 more on October 16, 2000; 

• $5,000 to Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA) on June 1, 1999; 

• 	 $29,000 to Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH): $13,000 on 

April 26, 1999; $10,000 on August 1, 2000, and 

$6,000 from September 26-30, 2000; 

• 	 $14,000 to Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY) during the 

month of August 1999; 

• 	 $13,000 to Sen. Mike Dewine (R-OH) on May 26, 

1999; 

• 	$8,000 to Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) on July 15, 

1999; 

• 	$12,000 to GOP presidential candidate Elizabeth 

Dole on March 24, 1999; 

• 	$10,000 to GOP presidential candidate Steve 

Forbes on May 25, 1999; 

• 	 $6,000 to GOP presidential candidate Dan Quayle 

on March 31, 1999; 

• 	$6,000 for GOP Florida Senate candidate Bill 

McCollum; $4,000 on June 30, 2000, and $2,000 On 

October 17, 2000; 

• 	 $8,000 to Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) on July 12, 

1999; 

• 	$13,000 for Sen. George V. Voinovich (R-OH) on 

June 19, 2000. 

FEW GIVE BIG – AND THEY EXPECT TO RECEIVE 

The Lindners and other hard money bundlers are members of an elite donor class that want something in exchange for their contributions. In the 2000 elections, about 

265,000 people out of 206 million people of voting age gave 

a contribution of $1,000 or more to federal candidates. 
161a 

This is just about 1/8th of one percent of the voting age 

population. A survey of donors of $200 or more in the 1996 

elections revealed that four-fifths had an annual family 

income of more than $100,000 a year, only one in 20 had 

annual incomes of $50,000 or less. More than nine out of 

ten were white.12 By comparison twelve percent of U.S. 

households have total income of $100,000 or more and 60 

percent have total income of $50,000 or less.13 Twenty-nine 14 percent are people of color. 

An examination of individual contributions to federal 

candidates in the 2000 elections shows that the majority – 

three-fourths of hard money contributions to candidates – 

came from donors giving at least $200 apiece. Of that 

amount, 44 percent came from donors giving at least 

$1,000. Thus, the narrow band of well-off contributors who 

can give $1,000 contributions play a role that is already 

vastly out-of-proportion to their numbers. Increasing the 

hard money limits would give them even more power 

relative to most Americans. 

When hard money donors are asked what they get for their 

money, they tell it straight: they gain access that others 

don’t. A recent poll of political donors by Lake, Snell, Perry 

and Associates commissioned by the Nation Institute and the 

Institute for America’s Future revealed that 54 percent of 

large donors said they had spoken personally to a federal 

elected official in just the past year-clearly a far larger 

percentage than the general population.15 A survey of donors 

in the 1996 presidential elections revealed that 76 percent 

said “influencing policy/government” was a “very important” 16 reason why they gave money. 
162a 

Source: Analysis of data provided by Center for Responsive 

Politics, based on Federal Election Commission data 

reflecting contributions from 1/1/99 through 12/31/00, 

downloaded in March 2001. 

WHY HARD MONEY MATTERS 

There is no need to be theoretical about how hard money 

might affect policymaking in Washington. All that is 

needed is to look at what is going on right now. As this 

report is being written, the 107th Congress has already 

approved major legislation supported by major campaign 

contributors. These are givers of soft money, to be sure – 

but even more generous givers of hard money. 

Bankruptcy Reform 

For more than two years, the credit card industry has been 

lobbying to change the country’s bankruptcy laws to make 

it more difficult for people to wipe out their debts if they 

hit hard times. The industry argues that people ought to 

live up to their financial obligations. Consumer critics, 

however, counter that the credit card industry should bear 

responsibility for extending credit to people who can’t 

afford it, such as college students and people already 

strapped by debt. In addition, many people in bankruptcy 

are facing a major life crisis – such as divorce or serious 

illness – which can wreak havoc on even carefully planned 

family finances. 

On March 1, 2001, the House of Representatives voted 306 

to 108 to pass H.R. 333, sponsored by Rep. George Gekas 

(R-PA), and on March 15, 2001, the Senate followed suit 

with a vote of 83 to 15 on S.420, sponsored by Sen. Charles 
163a 

Grassley (R-IA). The bill, authored with the help of the 

credit card industry, would make it tougher for overextended consumers to reduce their debts, forcing many to 

file under a section of the bankruptcy code where they are 

more likely to lose their homes and cars. If the bill becomes law, it could mean billions of dollars in additional 

profits for the credit card industry, raising their profits by 

as much as 5 percent in 2002.17 

The credit and commercial banking industry distributed 

$38 million to federal candidates and parties in the 2000 

elections. Two-thirds of those dollars were hard money 

contributions – contributions bundled from company 

executives and PACs. MBNA (see Bundling Hard Money 

Increases ‘Purchase Power’ for Special Interests) is poised 

to benefit greatly from the legislation if it becomes law – 

an additional $75 million in extra profits in 2002.18 The 

two industries giving Gekas, the lead House sponsor of the 

legislation, the most money in his last election were the 

credit and commercial banking industries – a total of 

$37,200. Grassley, the lead Senate sponsor, received 

$82,300 from commercial banks between 1995 and 2000, a 

full Senate cycle.19 

165a 

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, industry 

profile, www.crp.org. 

Opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 

Gas and heating bills are up, and consumers are feeling 

the crunch. In Congress, Sen. Frank Murkowski (R-AK) 

and Sen. John Breaux (D-LA) have responded with their 

plan for dealing with our energy woes: drill more oil. The 

National Energy Security Act of 2001, S. 388, would open 

up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil 

exploration. 

The refuge is home to polar bears, grizzlies, Arctic wolves, 

musk ox, and caribou. The Natural Resources Defense 

Council (NRDC) calls it one of the “world’s last truly 

pristine wild places,” and “one of the largest sanctuaries 

for Arctic animals on the planet.” According to NRDC’s 

analysis, Americans use up over a six-month period the 

amount of oil that is economically recoverable in the 

ANWR – some 3.2 billion barrels over 50 years.20 

The oil and gas industry distributed $32.4 million to 

political candidates and parties in the 2000 elections, just 

over half of which came in the form of hard money. President George W. Bush, who has declared his strong support 

for drilling in the ANWR, received $1.8 million in hard 

money for his presidential campaign from the oil and gas 

industry. 

Oil & Gas Industry, 2000 Election Cycle 

Individuals 

($200+) PACs Soft Money Total 

$10,225,525 $6,684,702 $15,514,575 $32,424,802 

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, industry 

profile, www.crp.org. 
166a 

Ergonomics 

In today’s mechanized and office oriented economy, one of 

the biggest threats to workers’ safety are injuries incurred 

from repetitive motion – whether it is typing at a computer terminal, performing the same movement on an 

assembly line, or loading packages in a warehouse. When 

President Clinton, in the waning days of his administration, issued new workplace safety regulations on ergonomics, it was an enormous win for organized labor, which had 

been pushing for new rules for a decade. 

All that was undone in early March, when the Senate and 

the House, in quick succession, voted to repeal the new 

regulations, largely along party lines. In the House, the 

vote was 223 to 206; in the Senate, it was 56 to 44. 

A look at campaign contributions helps explain this swift 

action. Although labor unions contribute significant 

amounts to politicians and political parties, that amount is 

dwarfed by the amount that business interests give. In the 

2000 election cycle, for every one dollar contributed by 

labor unions, hard and soft, business interests gave $15. 

The imbalance is even more extreme when contributions 

from individuals are examined. Business executives outcontributed labor leaders and staff by a factor of 1,000:1. 

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, 

www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/storysofar/blio.asp. “Hard 

Money” includes PAC contributions and contributions 

from individuals of $200 or more. 

Conclusion 

The hard facts are clear. Ridding the campaign finance 

system of party soft money would eliminate an enormous 

amount of special interest cash. Yet, at the same time, no 
167a 

matter how the numbers are sliced and diced, increasing 

the amount of cash that individuals can contribute in hard 

money would limit severely the benefits of a ban on party 

soft money. Campaign donors would simply shift their soft 

money contributions into the hard money pile, which is 

already substantial, and, in fact, towers over the amount 

of party soft money raised. 

Comprehensive campaign finance reform must address the 

whole issue of special interest money in elections, including hard money. If it does not, the American people will be 

stuck with the same problem they have now – trying to 

make their voices heard over the ka-ching of special 

interest cash. 

Public Campaign supports Clean Money/Clean Elections 

Campaign Reform. This approach creates a new way of 

funding elections rather than trying to sew up the many 

loopholes in the current system. The link between special 

interests and politicians is severed, because candidates do 

not have to rely on their money in order to run a viable 

campaign for public office. Under a Clean Money/Clean 

Elections campaign finance system, candidates who agree 

to forego private contributions and accept strict spending 

limits receive limited money to run their campaigns from a 

publicly financed Clean Elections fund. If the candidate’s 

opponent opts out of the Clean Money system and runs on 

private money, then the Clean Money candidate can 

qualify for additional matching funds. Clean Money/Clean 

Elections candidates targeted by issue ads can also receive 

additional funds. There is no more political party “soft 

money,” and, aside from small qualifying contributions, no 

more “hard money” either for Clean Money/Clean Elections candidates. 
168a 

Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts, and Vermont have new 

Clean Money systems. On the federal level, Senator Paul 

Wellstone (D-MN) and Representative John Tierney (DMA) have proposed legislation. Although reforms that ban 

soft money are an essential step, these states and leaders 

recognize the fundamental truth that hard money is just 

as much a corrupting influence on our elections as soft 

money – and the best solution to the corrosive effects of 

the current system is Clean Money/Clean Elections Campaign Reform. 

Methodology 

Unless otherwise noted, all campaign finance data in this 


report are based on a Public Campaign analysis of data


provided by the Center for Responsive Politics, which 


collects and analyzes campaign finance data from the 


Federal Election Commission. Data for the 2000 election 


cycle reflect contributions from 1/1/99 - 12/31/00, and were 


downloaded in March 2001. Totals for Senators include 


contributions from 1995 to 2000, a full six-year Senate 


cycle. Most Senators raise the majority of their cash in the 


two years preceding an election. 


Other Methodological Notes: 


The totals in this report referring to “donors who gave at 


least $1,000” or “contributions of at least $1,000” include 


only contributions by donors who gave at least $1,000 to a 


candidate in a single contribution. Some donors, however,


give $1,000 or more spread over several checks for smaller 


amounts during the course of a campaign. Thus, the $380 


million indicated may slightly understate the amount 


given by donors who gave a total of at least $1,000 or more


to a candidate over the entire election cycle. 

169a 

There is, however, also a very small offsetting over-counting 


resulting from the methodology employed. Conceivably, there


are instances where contributors wrote a single check for 


$1,000 or more and are thus counted in the $380 million, 


but the contribution was allocated partly to a primary and 


partly to a general election campaign. In such a case, it is


possible that the donor did not “max out” at $1,000 for


either the general or the primary election campaigns 


despite having written a check for over $1,000. In the FEC 


data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics, there 


are also sometimes errors-sometimes on the donor end, 


when a contributor writes a check for more than is legally 


allowed, which later may be corrected in a negative, or


return contribution, or a reallocation of the contribution to


a different campaign fund or entity. In order to correctly


account for these erroneous contributions, totals referring


to “contributions of $1,000 or more” include the negative


contributions reported by the FEC where they are nega­


tive entries of $1,000 or more. 


The FEC data complied by the Center for Responsive


Politics reflects contributions over a calendar time period 


which may not precisely reflect contributions over an


election cycle. For example, contributions are still being 


made, well into 2001, to pay off debts incurred by candi­


dates during the 2000 election cycle. 


As with all information that is transferred from written 


reports into electronic form, there are also sometimes FEC 


data entry errors. 


FOOTNOTES: 

1. www.opensecrets.org/politicians/index/N00009945.htm. 

2. www.opensecrets.org/politicians/index/N00007836.htm. 
170a 

3. Another type of “soft money” is money spent on issue 

advertising and other communications by private groups – 

business coalitions, labor unions, special interest groups – 

that, like those bought with party soft money, stop just 

short of direct political advertising. Because this type of 

soft money is not required to be reported to the Federal 

Election Commission (FEC), as party soft money is, we do 

not know exactly how much is spent. However, the likelihood is that it is a much smaller amount than party soft 

money. Most outside money is spent on competitive races, 

and the number of competitive races is shrinking rapidly. 

A study of seventeen of the most competitive congressional 

races in 2000 found that an estimated $20 million was 

spent on television and radio advertising by outside 

groups, such as the Business Roundtable and the AFLCIO. (See: David B. Magleby, editor, “Election Advocacy: 

Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional 

Elections,” Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Brigham Young University, February 2001. The 

authors estimated the amount spent on issue advertising 

by analyzing television and radio advertisements in 

selected races and extrapolating costs from broadcast 

advertising data.) 

4 Federal Election Commission. 

5 Center for Responsive Politics, politician profiles. 

6. Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele, “How to Become 

a Top Banana,” Time, February 7, 2000. 

7. Center for Responsive Politics, based on data downloaded 

October, 1, 2000, www.opensecrets.org/2000elect/storysofar/ 

topindivs.asp. 

8. Contributions downloaded from Center for Responsive 

Politics website (www.crp.org), which provides a search 

engine for data collected by the Federal Elections Commission. 

9. Jim Drinkard, “Bush, state parties create partnership,” 

USA Today, November 1, 1999, p. 17A. 

10. Search of FEC data via CRP search engine 

(www.crp.org). 
171a 

11. Search of FEC data via CRP search engine 

(www.crp.org). 

12. John Green, et al., “Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy, Conservative and ReformMinded,” The Joyce Foundation, June 1998. 

13. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, 

P60-209, Money Income in the United States: 1999, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2000, Table 

2. 

14. “Resident Population Estimates of the United States 

by Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin,” U.S. Census Bureau, 

January 13, 2001. 

15. Celinda Lake and Robert Borosage, “Money Talks,” 

The Nation, August 21/28, 2000. 

16. Peter L. Francia, et al., “Individual Donors in the 1996 

Federal Elections,” in Green, John C., Financing the 1996 

Election, M.E. Sharpe, 1999 

17. Philip Shenon, “Lobbyists Near Bankruptcy Bill Goal,” 

New York Times, March 13, 2001. 

18. ibid. 

19. Center for Responsive Politics, politician profiles, 

www.crp.org. 

20. A Responsible Energy Policy for the 21st Century, 

Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), February 

2001.