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65–452 PDF 2011

IMPROVING THE NATION’S RESPONSE TO 

CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: HOW TO MINIMIZE 

COSTS AND STREAMLINE OUR 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 

(112–20) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 30, 2011 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

TOM REED, New York 

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

JEFFREY M. LANDRY, Louisiana 

STEVE SOUTHERLAND II, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

BOB FILNER, California 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa 

TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

JASON ALTMIRE, Pennsylvania 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY

MANAGEMENT

JEFF DENHAM, California, Chairman 

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas, 

Vice Chair 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

STEPHEN LEE FINCHER, Tennessee 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida (Ex Officio) 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

BOB FILNER, California 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia 

(Ex Officio) 

(III) 

(V) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... vi 

TESTIMONY 

Christmann, Gary A., Commissioner, City of St. Louis Emergency Management Agency ......................................................................................................... 26 

Fugate, Hon. W. Craig, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency ................................................................................................................... 5 

Hubbard, James, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry, Forest Service, 

U.S. Department of Agriculture .......................................................................... 5 

Murphy, Brendan, Director, Grants Management, California Emergency Management Agency, on behalf of Dayton, Mike, Acting Secretary, California 

Emergency Management Agency ........................................................................ 26 

Rash, Rob, CEO and Chief Engineer, St. Francis Levee District of Arkansas ... 26 

Shimanski, Charles S., Senior Vice President, Disaster Services, American 

Red Cross .............................................................................................................. 26 

Weber, Michael, Deputy Executive Director for Operations for Materials, 

Waste, Research, State, Tribal, and Compliance Programs, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission ....................................................................................... 5 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bishop, Hon. Timothy H., of New York ................................................................. 38 

Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, of the District of Columbia ................................. 40 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Christmann, Gary A. ............................................................................................... 42 

Dayton, Mike 1 .......................................................................................................... 47 

Fugate, Hon. W. Craig ............................................................................................ 56 

Hubbard, James ....................................................................................................... 79 

Rash, Rob ................................................................................................................. 86 

Shimanski, Charles S. ............................................................................................. 89 

Weber, Michael ........................................................................................................ 93 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Fugate, Hon. W. Craig, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency: 

Responses to questions from Hon. Jeff Denham, a Representative in Congress from the State of California ................................................................... 69 

Response to question from Hon. Richard L. Hanna, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of New York ............................................................ 75 

Responses to questions from Hon. Timothy H. Bishop, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of New York ........................................................ 76 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, responses to questions from the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 

Management ......................................................................................................... 97 

1The prepared written statement is from Mr. Dayton. Mr. Murphy testified 

on behalf of Mr. Dayton at the hearing. 

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(1) 

IMPROVING THE NATION’S 

RESPONSE TO CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: 

HOW TO MINIMIZE COSTS AND STREAMLINE 

OUR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC

BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in Room 

2253, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Denham (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DENHAM. The subcommittee will come to order. First, let me 

welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them for testifying. 

The purpose of our hearing is to understand how prepared we are 

today, and what else Congress should do to enable you to perform 

your jobs successfully. 

I am confident that each of you will do everything within your 

power to save lives and reduce suffering when disaster strikes. Yet 

in 2005, we saw how a confused chain of command, failed communications, and a host of other problems could thwart the efforts of 

thousands of responders. Since Hurricane Katrina, much has been 

done to correct those problems. Congress rewrote the disasters 

laws, we put FEMA back together again and made it clear the administrator is responsible for managing disasters on behalf of the 

President. We expedited military assistance. The Red Cross revamped its disaster operations and will coordinate mass care operations. And we spent billions on planning, communications, and logistics at every level of government. 

According to the Department of Homeland Security’s inspector 

general, FEMA has made moderate progress in most of the key 

preparedness areas. While this report is encouraging, there is significant room for improvement. The catastrophe in Japan is a stark 

reminder of how bad and unpredictable disasters can be. Japan essentially faces three major disasters: an earthquake, tsunami, and 

nuclear incident. Any one of these disasters would stretch our capabilities. But could we handle three at once? 

In my home State of California, and our vice chair’s region, we 

face similar earthquake hazards and have several nuclear reactors. 

Nationwide there are several natural and manmade disaster scenarios that could result in tens of thousands of casualties and displace well over 1 million people. Are we ready for such an event? 

2 

Are we even planning for the worst case scenario? And are we prepared to take the necessary steps after such an event to respond 

and recover quickly? 

While it’s not possible to prevent most disasters, proper preparedness will save lives, minimize cost, and ensure our response 

and recovery is not bogged down in bureaucratic red tape. In addition to recommendations regarding our preparedness levels, the 

committee is interested in several specific areas. 

Could the Japanese nuclear disaster happen here? And are we 

ready to respond? 

Will the 2011 national level exercise for the New Madrid earthquake zone really push the system and reveal its weaknesses? 

Will the American Red Cross and FEMA be able to shelter over 

1 million people? 

What are the Forest Service and FEMA doing to reduce the risk 

of catastrophic wildfires? 

Proper planning and preparedness is key. We must ensure before 

a catastrophe hits there is coordination at all levels of government. 

And to the extent there is red tape that can stifle response and recovery, we must address it now. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today to address these important issues. I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Norton from the District of Columbia for 5 minutes to make any opening statements she may have. Welcome. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are grateful to our 

witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today to testify on 

the important and timely issue before us. 

We need look no further than the catastrophic events that shook 

Japan less than 3 weeks ago to ask whether the United States is 

prepared for such an attack here. The earthquake that shook 

Japan, measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale, sent a tsunami racing 

toward the Japanese coast, wiping towns and villages literally off 

the globe. 

With an earthquake or tsunami of this scale, would—while an 

earthquake or tsunami of this scale would represent a catastrophic 

disaster, the cascading events, including the crippling of a nuclear 

power—of nuclear power plants, and continuing radiation release, 

compel us to think—to rethink the scope of disaster that could 

occur in our own homeland. 

The tragedy in Japan presents us with a unique teaching moment to help us learn to better prepare for and respond to catastrophic disaster. While we will study these lessons for future disasters, our thoughts and prayers must first be with the Japanese 

people, as they struggle to overcome these triple calamities. Today 

we ask the necessary question. How can we improve the Nation’s 

response to catastrophic disaster? 

Every since Hurricane Katrina exposed the Federal Government’s unacceptable inability to respond to a disaster of unexpected 

magnitude, this subcommittee has performed vigorous oversight on 

steps the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, 

should take to improve its planning and preparation for catastrophic disaster, as well as for efforts to mitigate potential damage. 

3 

During the 110th and 111th Congresses, our subcommittee held 

hearing after hearing to ensure that FEMA would not repeat the 

failures seen on the Gulf Coast. I appreciate that Chairman 

Denham has chosen to continue this oversight, and I look forward 

to working with him on these critical issues. 

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act was signed into law in 1988. The act, authorized by our committee, serves as the Federal Government’s primary authority for 

addressing major disasters. Importantly, the Stafford Act recognizes that States and local communities, and not the Federal Government, have primary responsibility to address disasters and 

emergencies. The Federal Government acts to supplement the efforts and resources of States and of local and tribal governments, 

as well as disaster relief organizations. 

Yet it remains unclear whether the Stafford Act contemplates 

catastrophic disasters, even like Hurricane Katrina, or certainly 

like the threefold earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown currently unfolding in Japan. For the most part, the authority provided by the Stafford Act has provided sufficient—was sufficient to 

address all types of disasters and emergencies, natural and terrorist. But some have questioned whether the Stafford Act is sufficient for catastrophic disasters. 

In 2006 this committee sought to address these potential gaps by 

enacting the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, enacted as title VI of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriation Act. The Post-Katrina Act defined a catastrophic incident 

as one that ‘‘results in extraordinary levels of casualties or disruption severely affecting the population, including mass evacuations, 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an area.’’ 

This definition provides the framework for how the Federal Government should plan for catastrophic incident. However, there remain questions about whether this is an appropriate trigger for 

catastrophic disaster. In fact, I chaired a subcommittee hearing in 

July 2009 that addressed this issue. I look forward to continuing 

to listen to this ongoing debate within the emergency management 

community. 

While we may not have settled on the best definition of catastrophic, we do know that one characteristic that distinguishes catastrophic disasters from other disasters is that the magnitude of a 

catastrophic event often has national impact, and that such disasters are complex, unusually large in their effects, hard to predict, 

and very expensive. We also know another catastrophic event will 

someday strike the United States. And we must be ready for that 

day. 

In September 2010 the Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general released a report that addressed the issue of 

FEMA’s preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster. The report 

provided a detailed analysis of the Nation’s level of preparedness 

in 10 key areas. The report, in part, shared good news. FEMA had 

made progress in all 10 areas, and in particular, had made substantial progress toward improving emergency communications. 

However, the report also cited concerns about the lack of effective 

coordination between FEMA and State, local, and tribal governVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 21, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\ED\3-30-1~1\65452.TXT JEAN
4 

ments, the need for updated information technology systems, to upgrade and integrate Agency-wide resources, the lack of experienced 

staff to handle the demanding workload at FEMA as States and localities are pressed in the aftermath of the great recession, and left 

without stimulus or other funds from the Federal Government, and 

insufficient funding to carry out the Agency’s mission. 

While many look to FEMA to take the lead during disasters, we 

must remember that the heart and soul of FEMA’s mission is to 

equip, train, and work with their State, local, and tribal partners, 

along with relief organizations that serve the country—that serve 

as the country’s first responders in most disasters and emergencies. 

I very much look forward to hearing today from Administrator 

Fugate and others on steps FEMA has taken to address these 

shortcomings. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Ms. Norton. I now call on Mr. 

Crawford for a brief opening statement. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to take 

a brief opportunity to introduce a witness that will testify before 

this committee a little later today, Mr. Rob Rash. He is the chief 

executive officer and chief engineer of the St. Francis Levee District of Arkansas. The St. Francis Levee District, headquartered in 

West Memphis, Arkansas, serves northeast Arkansas, and covers 7 

counties with 160 miles of mainline Mississippi River levees and 75 

miles of St. Francis River tributary levees. These levees are a part 

of the Mississippi River and Tributees Flood Control Project, which 

contains a total of 3,787 miles of levees, along with other structures 

such as flood walls, floodways, flood plains, diversions, reservoirs, 

pumping plants, and every other proven method to prevent flooding 

from the 41 percent of the waters of the United States that flow 

to the Gulf of Mexico. 

Mr. Rash is a respected voice throughout Arkansas and the midSouth for his knowledge and expertise in flood control and prevention and emergency preparedness. Mr. Chairman, I hope that the 

wisdom that Mr. Rash has gained in working in the States can be 

applied to the Federal Government to improve our response to future disasters. And with that I yield back to the chairman. And I 

will fill in for him briefly. 

I would like to now recognize Mr. Carnahan for an opening statement. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. I want to join my colleagues in welcoming this panel and the one to follow, thank Chairman Denham 

and Ranking Member Norton for putting this hearing together. It 

is very timely, given the events in Japan, but also in terms of our 

own preparedness. In particular when we have heard the descriptions of Japan being one of the most prepared countries for an 

earthquake-type event, I think it really causes serious pause for us 

to re-evaluate our own preparedness. 

I come from a region of the country in the Heartland, the St. 

Louis, Missouri, region, that, unfortunately, has been home to 

great floods, tornados, ice storms, droughts. And we sit on one of 

the largest fault lines on the New Madrid fault line that goes up 

and down the Mississippi River corridor. We are not prepared 

enough. We continue to hear concerns about interoperability, about 

having back-up systems in place. So we very much welcome the upVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 21, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\ED\3-30-1~1\65452.TXT JEAN
5 

coming national exercise that is going to be conducted in the New 

Madrid seismic zone. 

I especially want to give a personal welcome to a witness on the 

second panel, our city of St. Louis emergency management agency 

commissioner, Gary Christmann. Gary, welcome. We are pleased to 

have you here today to be a part of this national conversation, but 

also to bring to light some of the local challenges that we face in 

our region. 

He is a career professional, has been involved working with hospitals, ambulance, public health areas, incident response teams. So 

we are very pleased to have your voice here to be a part of this 

debate. Thank you, and welcome. I yield back. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. [presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. Are there 

any other Members who would like to make opening statements? 

[No response.] 

Mr. CRAWFORD. OK. Hearing none, then I would like to welcome 

our witnesses here today. Our first panel will be the Honorable W. 

Craig Fugate, the administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency; Mr. James Hubbard, deputy chief for state and 

private forestry, Forest Service; and Mr. Michael Weber, deputy executive director for operations for materials, waste, research, state, 

tribal, and compliance programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses’ full statements be 

included in the record. 

[No response.] 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Without objection, so ordered. Since your written 

testimony has been made part of the record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes, and we will 

begin with Administrator Fugate. You may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF W. CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; JAMES HUBBARD, 

DEPUTY CHIEF FOR STATE AND PRIVATE FORESTRY, FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; AND MICHAEL WEBER, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS FOR MATERIALS, WASTE, RESEARCH, STATE, TRIBAL, AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman Denham and Ranking Member Norton, Vice Chairman, and the rest of the distinguished members of the subcommittee. Today we are talking about 

catastrophic preparedness. And that has a lot of different definitions and what it means to people. I think it’s important that you 

see that we are not here by ourselves, this panel. There are a lot 

of different capabilities and resources within the Federal family. 

And so I want to talk about what FEMA’s role is, the lessons we 

have learned. 

As the ranking member pointed out, with the Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act, how we approach disasters is, 

I think, significantly improved than what we were doing with the 

previous tools we had. The Homeland Security Act, as amended by 

the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act reinforced 

FEMA’s role. It clarified the mission of the Agency. 

6 

But, more importantly, it recognized something that the ranking 

member alluded to, and that is, in waiting for disaster to occur, 

and waiting until locals are overwhelmed, and waiting until a governor has made a formal request to the President to declare a disaster, to active the Stafford Act, often times puts us too far behind 

a response. And this is particularly true when you have a largescale event that occurs without notice. In waiting until you have 

assessed, and waiting until the local responders are overwhelmed, 

the Federal Government would often times find itself reacting to, 

rather than being proactive in that response. 

The Post-Katrina Reform Act clarified that, and said that, in absence of a declaration of a state of emergency, however when it is 

assumed that impacts would result in that, or at the direction of 

the President, FEMA could, with tasking authorities out of the disaster relief fund, assign missions to agencies, contract for vendors, 

and issue mission assignments to Department of Defense in anticipation of. 

I will give an example in real time. When the tsunami occurred— 

actually, the earthquake occurred—off the coast of Japan, the two 

tsunami warning centers for the United States—one in Hawaii, one 

in Alaska—issued tsunami advisories and then ultimately warnings for areas along our islands and territories, State of Hawaii, 

and along the West Coast, including the Alaskan Aleutian Islands. 

At that point, upon those notifications, FEMA began activating 

the team. There was no formal request. There was no damage at 

that point. We knew that, based upon maps and work that had 

been done with our State partners along the West Coast and the 

well-exercised plan, unfortunately, in Hawaii for tsunami evacuations, that the governor of Hawaii had already activated his team, 

had started to order the evacuations of his areas, and the West 

Coast was evaluating the tsunami forecast and the impacts for that 

evacuation. 

We knew approximately the populations involved, and began mobilizing and moving resources out of our territorial warehouses in 

Guam, as well as in the Hawaiian Islands, and our warehouses on 

the West Coast, began moving supplies in anticipation that there 

may be evacuations and sheltering required for that population. 

This was all occurring in the early morning hours, and all based 

upon the authorities vested in us from Congress under the PostKatrina Reform Act. We did not have a formal request. We did not 

have the disaster that had occurred. We were preparing for what 

potentially could happen. 

This has to be done, however, in partnership with our State and 

local partners, as well as our other Federal agencies. Because 

FEMA, as an entity itself, has limited resources, a bulk of our capabilities in this government are actually vested in our Federal 

agencies and our military. So we utilize those tools to respond. 

But there is another part of this that we have also taken to heart 

and that is that in supporting our States and their local governments, we often times have only focused on what I call a Federalcentric approach to problem solving. We have only looked at what 

government can do. This, unfortunately, leaves out a lot of resources, like our volunteer and non-governmental organizations, 

like the American Red Cross, but also the private sector. 

7 

When you look at what would happen in these type of catastrophic events, and you leave out the private sector, particularly 

the retail sector, it would be very difficult to imagine that you 

could go from a no-notice of event to getting supplies in quickly if 

we weren’t leveraging the private sector that could get their stores 

up and get running. 

We have taken steps now to bring in the private sector into 

FEMA in a day-to-day basis at the National Response Coordination 

Center. We now have a representative, on a rotating basis, from industry focused on coordinating in real time the private sector with 

our response, so that we don’t compete with the private sector at 

what they do best, but we focus on those gaps. 

And then, in my final minute, the last piece of this: personal preparedness. Why is it so critical, and why do we tell people to be 

prepared? Is it that we’re saying, ‘‘Government can’t get to you in 

time?’’ No. What we’re saying is those of us that can prepare and 

should be prepared for those things we know and those things that, 

again, may not give us warning. When we fail to prepare, who are 

you cutting in line in front of? The poor? The disabled? Infants and 

children? The frail elderly? 

This isn’t about you are on your own, this is about we have to 

work as a team. And the public needs to realize the better prepared 

we are as individuals and families, the more we can focus on the 

most vulnerable populations and the most critical things of life-saving and life-sustaining activities, without having to have us compete with our most vulnerable citizens. It is part of what we call 

the whole of community. 

We must be prepared, as a Nation, to support our local responders and the governors, but more importantly, not compete with the 

most vulnerable citizens when we, as individuals and families, 

could have done a better job of being prepared. With that, thank 

you. 

Mr. CRAWFORD. Thank you, Administrator Fugate. 

Mr. Hubbard, you may proceed. 

Mr. HUBBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee. Wildland fire is a part of the responsibility in the Forest Service that I deal with, and I want to give you just a brief 

overview of our wildfire suppression activities. 

This very much is a community partnership with States and 

locals and including the volunteers, the tribal governments, the private contractors, and the Federal agencies, and the Forest Service, 

and the Department of Interior. And our priorities are dealing with 

life, property, and natural resource protection. 

What we are experiencing in the United States is, because of prolonged drought, is longer fire seasons. We are dealing with hotter, 

dryer weather. So we get larger fires that are more difficult to control. And we increase the complexity of that by the number of 

homes and people that are in the way of those fires, which is increasing all the time. 

One of the things that we have embarked on, though, that we 

think will help in this, at the direction of Congress, is to put together a cohesive wildfire strategy for the country. That is underway, and that involves dealing with those State and local partners 

on how we respond to fire, how we protect communities, and how 

8 

we restore landscapes that cause threats to communities and to 

people. We will sort out those roles and responsibilities, and see 

where the best response should be, and how we can improve in this 

increasing complexity that we deal with. 

For this year, this fire season, it is underway. Oklahoma and 

Texas have experienced quite a bit of trouble. Georgia, Florida, as 

well. It’s beginning in New Mexico, Arizona, and a little early in 

Colorado. Our preparedness levels are at a continuing level, so— 

and that will only be strengthened by this dialogue that is going 

to occur with this cohesive strategy. 

Federally, we have 16,000 firefighters ready to fight fire this 

year. That is a normal level for us. 

We also get involved a lot with FEMA. And, as Mr. Fugate pointed out, it’s in the coordination and how we deal with the State and 

locals and how we involve them in our responses. We get involved 

through those mission assignments that the national response 

framework provides to us. Our primary assistance is in wildfire, 

but with the number of resources that we have that we can mobilize, in terms of engines and aircraft and people. 

We also serve in other capacities. We have a lot of specialists in 

our system, as well. So we can mobilize from 1 to 10,000, if we 

need to. And that specialization and that skilled labor force is—becomes important, especially when we rely on the qualifications and 

standards that are consistent across agencies. 

Our command system is one that we share, too, with all those 

agencies. So we have an incident response command system that 

cuts across all of that and helps people to have a common response 

and an organized response. 

So, it comes down to being about the relationships and the working agreements that we have in place with the other Federal agencies and with the State, locals, tribes, and private contractors. All 

of that has been in place and functions quite well. We just have 

more of a problem that we have to address. And we think we are 

prepared to do that. Thank you. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Hubbard. 

And, Mr. Weber, you may proceed. 

Mr. WEBER. Good morning, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member 

Norton, and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to appear 

before you today to represent the United States Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission to discuss two aspects: the emergency planning and 

preparedness program for nuclear power facilities in the United 

States; as well as the protective action guidance that we recently 

issued in response to the events at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 

power plant station in Japan. 

NRC’s primary mission, as you may know, is to regulate nuclear 

power plants, reactors, and materials and waste in a manner that 

protects public health and safety, and promotes the common defense and security. 

Emergency preparedness is a key element in our defense indepth philosophy, and that philosophy ensures quality in design, 

construction, and operation of nuclear facilities, requires redundant 

safety systems that reduce the chances of accidents from occurring, 

and recognizes that, in spite of all these preparations, unforeseen 

events can occur. Through emergency planning and preparedness, 

9 

mechanisms are in place to protect the public health in the unlikely event that these other measures fail. 

The NRC emergency preparedness and planning regulations are 

extensive and require licensees to develop comprehensive and effective emergency plans as a condition of their license to operate. 

Nuclear power plant operators are required to provide extensive 

emergency response training to emergency plant workers. For example, they are required to provide severe accident management 

training to control room operators, and to conduct a rigorous drill 

and exercise program. The NRC inspects licensees to ensure that 

they are meeting these requirements, and monitors their performance. 

To form a coordinated system of emergency preparedness and response, the NRC works with licensees, other Federal agencies, 

State, tribal, local responders and officials, and, of course, first responders. The program includes an every-other-year full participation exercise that engages both on-site and off-site response organizations, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

And we work with FEMA to evaluate the quality and the conduct 

of those exercises. 

NRC resident inspectors also observe licensee on-site emergency 

drills and exercises. So it’s safe to say that over the 30-plus years 

of operating experience with 140 operating nuclear power plants in 

the United States, there have been thousands of drills and exercises in response to both abnormal and emergency conditions. 

For planning purposes, we define two emergency planning zones, 

or EPZs, around nuclear power plant sites. The first zone is called 

the plume exposure pathway, an area that covers the 10-mile radius in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant. This area would require the most immediate protective actions in the event of a severe emergency causing a large-scale release. Planning for this 

area is comprehensive, and includes consideration of protective 

measures for members of the public at very low-dose levels, such 

as evacuation, sheltering, and administration of potassium iodide, 

as appropriate. 

A second emergency planning zone is the ingestion pathway EPZ, 

and this covers a 50-mile radius around each plant to protect 

against potential lower level, longer term risks from ingestion of 

contaminated food, milk, and water. The comprehensive planning 

in both the 10- and the 50-mile EPZs provide a substantial basis 

for expansion, if necessary, in response to the emergency. 

Let me now address NRC’s protection action recommendations 

that we made recently for U.S. citizens in Japan to evacuate out 

to 50 miles from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant site. 

That decision was based on the best available information we had 

at the time. NRC began monitoring of the event with a tsunami 

warning that was issued for Hawaii and territories in the West 

Coast of the United States early that morning. In order to provide 

timely information to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and to best 

protect the health and safety of U.S. citizens in Japan, we based 

our assessment on conditions as we understood them. 

This site has six nuclear power plants, and four of those plants 

continue to face extraordinary challenges. Units one, three, and 

four appear to have suffered significant damage as a result of hyVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 21, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\ED\3-30-1~1\65452.TXT JEAN
10 

drogen explosions. Unit four was in a refueling outage, and so it 

recently transferred spent fuel into its spent fuel pool. If the water 

was drained from that pool, it would have posed a risk of overheating that fuel, and another large-scale release. Radiation monitors were showing very high levels of radiation at the plant site, 

which would pose complications for the plant crew in returning to 

stabilize the reactors, and there were off-site readings indicating 

fuel damage was occurring. 

Since communications were limited and there was a high degree 

of uncertainty, it is difficult to accurately assess the radiological 

hazard. However, we conducted calculations to evaluate the proper 

evacuation distance, and we used hypothetical but not unreasonable estimates of fuel damage, the containment, and other release 

conditions. These calculations demonstrated that EPA’s protective 

action guidelines could be exceeded at a distance of 50 miles from 

the site if a large-scale release occurred from the reactors or the 

spent fuel pools. 

We understood that some of our assumptions were conservative, 

but we believed it was better to err on the side of protection, especially in the case of a rapidly deteriorating condition. Acting in accordance with that framework, and using the best available information we had, NRC determined that an evacuation out to 50 

miles for U.S. citizens was the appropriate course of action, and we 

made that recommendation to the other government agencies, including the ambassador. 

This concludes my testimony. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I would be happy to answer questions. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Weber. I will now recognize each 

Member for 5 minutes. We will most likely have time for a second 

round of questioning. So I would ask each Member to keep it to— 

their question to 5 minutes. 

First question I have, Mr. Fugate, the whole world is focused on 

Japan right now, and the devastation that we have seen right now. 

Let’s assume a scenario like the one in Japan occurred in the 

United States. There is a massive 9.0 earthquake in California, a 

tsunami followed by severe floods, and the nuclear reactions which 

are near the coast are severely damaged. Millions of people are displaced, thousands missing, no shelters or supplies in the immediate 

area. Walk us through the type of response that we could expect 

to see from FEMA and other organizations as—dealing with this 

type of catastrophe. 

Mr. FUGATE. Mr. Chairman, I would eat up all your 5 minutes. 

I’m going to try to be succinct, and probably want to do a written 

response in more detail. But just a thumbnail. 

We recognize—and I think what is happening in Japan at the 

nuclear power plant is, often times in the media, overshadowing 

the actual impacts of the tsunami, earthquake, and the deaths that 

occurred, and the impacts to the infrastructure and local—and the 

prefectures, which are the equivalent of States. 

This is what you call a maximum event. I think this is, when 

people talk about catastrophic disasters, what we see. And what I 

found in my profession was the tendency to plan for what we were 

capable of, and then place these in the too-hard-to-do box. As Arlin 

11 

used to say, this was the hurt locker. You put things in here that 

you couldn’t deal with, and you come back later. 

We are trying to change that at FEMA. In fact, our most recently 

released strategic plan, rather than talking about being prepared, 

we put numbers against it. And this was actually in production 

prior to the tsunami earthquake, nuclear power plant tragedy. And 

what it showed was we were looking at these kind of numbers. 

What we are trying to do is move away from being so scripted 

around a specific scenario, and really start looking at, if you looked 

at the worst case maximum events that occur from earthquakes to 

terrorism to hurricanes, what do the big numbers look like? And 

it actually closely follows what we’re seeing in the tsunami. And so 

the numbers you’re throwing out there is what we have to plan 

against. And this will require national effort. 

Again, what we are finding is these would definitely overwhelm 

our locals. Often times they may become casualties in the impact. 

States would be severely stressed. This would require a Federalsupported response, but also pointed out the need to incorporate in 

the whole deal. 

The private sector has got to be integrated into these plans, because where they can get their facilities up and running, we need 

to be focused where they cannot. We need to bring in a lot of different players, such as the U.S. Forest Service, who may not be 

fighting fires, but may be running staging areas or base camps, or 

helping us assist local governments in managing the complexity of 

these disasters. 

And we also have to stay focused on a very short timeframe. The 

first 72 hours are the most critical in these disasters to save lives. 

We are not going to be able to wait for assessments, we’re not 

going to be able to wait for clarity. We are going to have to respond 

as if it is as bad as you thought it could be, and then deal with 

the most pressing issues in the order of very focused, get into the 

areas, secure it, rescue, start meeting those basic essential needs, 

and ultimately set the stage for the decisions that may be required. 

If we cannot get resources to people fast enough, we may need to 

start taking people to where the resources are. 

And so, this planning is based upon that maximum of maximum, 

looking at not just a scenario, but looking at aggregating out these 

types of disasters, and then going back to how do we build a national capacity. This is going to require a lot of mutual aid from 

States that aren’t impacted. This is going to require a lot of assistance that would not normally be just federally directed or federally 

managed resources. 

And so, as you point out, that coordination and building this on 

the front-end—what we call planning for real—is one of the keys 

that we take away from this, and essentially has been validating 

what we’re trying to do in FEMA now to plan for these types of 

scenarios, sir. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. And I will look forward to a more detailed response. I know it’s a huge question. But just quickly, in 

these last few seconds here, how prepared are we, if we had millions of people displaced? 

12 

I mean, nationally, the—obviously, a different scenario for different States. But I mean, if you could, give us a broad overview 

of—— 

Mr. FUGATE. We are much better prepared than we were in 

Katrina. But I think this is the lesson learned. You’re going to have 

to make a very quick decision that won’t be necessarily popular 

with local officials, even State officials. It sometimes is better to 

take people to where resources are, out of an area, than try to 

bring resources into that area. 

So, part of this is looking at, again, evacuations that won’t be 

temporary, they may be longer term. Looking at how you then do 

this—and we’ve worked on this with host States that may not be 

impacted by the disaster, but would need Federal assistance to do 

sheltering operations, so we worked on sheltered populations outside of that. 

A lot of this work, you know, was focused on the hurricane scenarios. We are trying to move this into New Madrid and the other 

earthquake scenarios where, again, it may be that you cannot get 

resources in fast enough. You’re going to have to move people to 

where the resources are. This is one advantage we have in these 

types of events. We are such a large country that we do have a lot 

of resiliency, just because of the geographical separation of key resources. So it’s unlikely we would have a situation where one part 

of the country would be so overwhelmed that the other parts of the 

country wouldn’t be able to provide that assistance. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. Now I recognize Ms. Norton for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Weber, how many 

nuclear plants in the United States sit on or near fault lines, and 

how many are located on the coast near to areas subject to tsunami? 

Mr. WEBER. All the nuclear power plants in the United States 

are near faults. Faults are—— 

Ms. NORTON. How come? 

Mr. WEBER. The point is that—— 

Ms. NORTON. I mean you must have been looking to locate them 

on fault lines. 

Mr. WEBER. No, ma’am. They are sited where they’re needed for 

providing the electrical power. But faults and seismic activity is 

one of the external events that is considered in the design of the 

nuclear power plant to ensure that, should a large earthquake 

occur, the plant would remain in a safe—— 

Ms. NORTON. Would you locate such a nuclear plant on a fault 

line today? 

Mr. WEBER. There are faults throughout the United States. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, would you locate a nuclear plant on a fault— 

on or near a fault line today? I repeat my question. 

Mr. WEBER. In siting a nuclear power plant, that is one of the 

things we specifically look at. But not just seismic activity. We also 

look at other natural hazards. 

Ms. NORTON. So you would or would not, Mr. Weber? I have only 

so much time, sir. 

Mr. WEBER. You would take faults into consideration in siting a 

nuclear power plant. 

13 

Ms. NORTON. So the—so you—have you taken them into consideration before? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. So you’re not doing anything different from what 

you did before, even after the Japan catastrophe. 

Mr. WEBER. Even in low seismic areas there are faults. 

Ms. NORTON. I didn’t ask you if there were—I asked you would 

you build or would you authorize the building of a nuclear plant 

on a fault line, and your answer is yes, you take into account, and 

that is a very troubling answer. What would you do to mitigate potential hazard of a nuclear plant located on a fault line, or near a 

part of the coast susceptible to tsunami? 

Mr. WEBER. We would make certain that if there were an earthquake on that fault, or faults near the plant, that the plant would 

remain safe. Otherwise, we would not—— 

Ms. NORTON. How would it remain safe? You know, that is what 

they thought in Japan. 

Mr. WEBER. Because the site is specifically designed to protect 

against—— 

Ms. NORTON. So was that site. Mr. Weber, I am going to go on 

to Mr.—— 

Mr. WEBER. OK. 

Ms. NORTON. All you have done is to leave me with really a set 

of questions that astonish me. I would have thought that after this 

disaster you would say that there were some steps that you are in 

the process of taking to mitigate the effects of disasters. Are there 

any such steps? 

Mr. WEBER. We are—— 

Ms. NORTON. Steps after Japan? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, ma’am. We are taking both a near-term and a 

long-term review of our existing safety program. We are conducting 

a 90-day review, which will be followed by a longer term review. 

The purpose of that is to learn what we can from the experience 

in Japan, and to specifically look at whether we need to change our 

regulatory program to ensure that, in light of what we have 

learned from—— 

Ms. NORTON. When is that review due to be completed? 

Mr. WEBER. The first part of that is due within 90 days of last 

week, and the second review is due within 6 months of the completion of the 90-day—— 

Ms. NORTON. Would you make sure that a copy of that review 

is sent to this committee, to its chairman? 

Mr. WEBER. We can do that. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Fugate, when is the disaster relief fund due to 

run out of money? 

Mr. FUGATE. Based upon the continuing resolutions in funding, 

we are sitting at a little over $1.1 billion in the current fund. We 

are also in the process of looking at open disasters and replenishing that. And, based upon that, all things being equal, May/June 

timeframes look like we may get close to what we would call immediate needs funding, where we would drop under $1 billion. And we 

would then look at reductions in certain activities, most principally 

hazard mitigation and certain public assistance. It would not affect 

14 

the initial response or individual assistance. But there is not a 

hard, fixed date based upon what we’re doing right now. 

One of the things you have directed and requested us to do is go 

back and close out old disasters. In doing that, we are—last year 

we did about $2 billion that were able to go back into the funds 

that were de-obligated from missions from previous disasters, most 

notably the Katrina-Rita-Wilma timeframe. 

So, it’s not a fixed date. And we will have a better idea as we 

get clarity on the current budget, and also on where we’re getting 

these dollars to come back. But we look at that $1 billion mark as 

the point at which we would have to look at whether we implement 

immediate needs funding—— 

Ms. NORTON. And you are how close to that now? 

Mr. FUGATE. It is over $100 million, but that is based upon the 

continuing resolutions that we get incremental funds coming in, 

and we also are getting money back from disasters where we are 

closing out completed missions. And as you de-obligate those funds 

and put them back in, it is bringing that fund back up. We are 

holding it at kind of a—we are—as fast as money is going out, 

these dollars are coming back in, keeping us above that level. 

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Fugate, let me see where we are on the old 

concern of this subcommittee and committee on the existence of the 

so-called principal Federal officer and the Federal coordinating officer. 

Everyone believes that one of the causes of the Federal Government’s failures in Japan was the placement of FEMA in the Department of Homeland Security, such that the Department insisted 

upon a—the dual existence of something they called a principal 

Federal officer when throughout the history of FEMA there had 

been one chain of command and it was the Federal coordinating officer, and there was no confusion about who was to be in charge. 

This is what happened when we layered up. We didn’t expect 

this to happen. And there was bipartisan concern on this committee that you had—that the Agency had marginalized the person 

who was supposed to be in charge, who is supposed to know most, 

the Federal coordinating officer. 

Now, I understand you have said that you would no longer appoint a principal Federal officer to compete with the Federal coordinating officer. The Federal coordinating officer is a statutory officer. This other thing was thrown in by the Department of Homeland Security, and messed up—there is no question, messed up— 

the Gulf Coast. It is hard enough. But when two captains are running around trying to guide the ship, you really do have a disaster, 

a bureaucratic disaster on top of a natural disaster. 

Now, I note, however, that the national response framework has 

not been updated to make clear that in the event of a disaster 

there is chain of command, there is one person in charge, and he 

is the Federal coordinating officer. Why hasn’t—why isn’t that reflected in that plan which we look to to see how you would operate? 

And does this mean that this commitment about the PFO, or the 

principal officer and the Federal officer, is in limbo? 

Mr. FUGATE. The short answer is—and I will read the statement 

again, because, as I did last time, I want to make sure it is—I am 

completely right on this. And this is from the Secretary. 

15 

‘‘The Department has made the decision not to appoint principal 

Federal officials for’’—— 

Ms. NORTON. Just a minute. I want to stop you right here. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes. 

Ms. NORTON. I am asking you about the national response framework. You know, don’t read back to me the statement that you 

gave me. I understand. And I, myself, said that you, yourself, do 

not intend. 

My question is you have a national response framework. Your 

State and local and tribal officers look to it to see how you operate 

and how you will operate in their area if there is a tsunami or an 

earthquake. Why doesn’t the national response framework say that 

there will be a Federal coordinating officer, as the Stafford Act 

mandates, in the event of a catastrophe in your area? 

Mr. FUGATE. The simple but probably unacceptable answer is we 

are in a rewrite and just have not stricken that as we go through 

the rewrite for a new updated—— 

Ms. NORTON. So you do intend to make clear that only the Federal coordinating officer in your area, wherever you are in the 

United States, is in charge. That is who is the command, that is 

who we will look to. 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. I wish you would get that in—do your editing. And 

let me ask you when that editing will be complete, please. 

Mr. FUGATE. That will be—we will respond back to that, but that 

is being updated, and that is in part of the revisions. It just has 

not been finalized to go back out for publication. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Fugate. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Ms. Norton. Just to clarify, when will 

the review be done? 

Mr. FUGATE. I will need to get back on the timing of that. We 

currently have it in a rewrite. And I will have to get back on the 

timing of that when the—part of this, too, is to engage our local 

and State partners and tribal partners in these rewrites. So we are 

trying to avoid what we used to have, which we’d write it and send 

it out and say, ‘‘What do you think?’’ We are trying to engage people as we are going through the rewrite, to make sure we are capturing the lessons learned and bringing this up to the most current 

operational guidance. 

Mr. DENHAM. And as a freshman here I am not familiar with the 

timelines. Are we talking 1 month, 1 year, 10 years? 

Mr. FUGATE. Not 10 years. But as I found coming from the State, 

moving at the speed of government is somewhat frustration. This 

is a process that has been ongoing now for—it is not a 10-year 

project, but I would really like to be able to get back to you on this 

one, because I think it is basically a contract to update, and that 

process I would have to be very specific about timeframe. I think 

we are looking at this year to get the drafts back out and start 

working from it, but I do not know when we would have the final 

document that would be published. 

Ms. NORTON. Would the gentleman yield? I think the chairman’s 

question is well placed. This was—it was very frustrating for the 

subcommittee to even get the national response plan. 

16 

And, Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned at this—the openendedness of this, especially in light of the Japanese triple disasters. 

Mr. Fugate, don’t you think, in light of the chairman’s question, 

you should set a date and should respond to him concerning when 

you expect this to be done? There is great concern in the country. 

And we should be able, after this hearing, to give some sense to 

the American public that there are certain things we are about. 

Mr. Weber, you know, astonished me that he said nothing has 

changed, in effect. And you are dealing with a response plan that 

the whole Nation looks to, and with a kind of open-ended relaxation that will not put people at ease after Japan who live on fault 

lines which Mr. Weber thinks is, you know, just the way it is. 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, I wouldn’t want to give the impression that 

that document is the only document that we use to make these decisions and plans. It is more of a codification of the actual framework document. We have made progress. 

I would also point out—that was in the chairman’s statements— 

is the New Madrid earthquake exercise is coming up this May. And 

we want to be able to incorporate lessons learned there. We are 

taking that exercise to heart to take it to the point where we want 

to see where the failures are. We are not going to merely exercise 

to what we’re capable of. We want to take this to where do we see 

the failures. And part of that is to come back and look at national 

response framework and go, ‘‘Are these things that are structural 

in how we’re laying out the team?’’ 

This is what the national framework essentially does, is lay out 

the team. It doesn’t tell you how you do stuff, it lays out the team. 

So are there issues with that? Are there issues with the resources 

and how you do resource allocations? Or is it an issue in training 

and personnel? 

So, I would prefer to get back in writing about timeframe. But 

also understand that we are also looking at the national response 

framework and the object of NLE11. What do we see there? Does 

that structure need any additional changes, other than what we already know? So that timeline is, again, trying to incorporate the 

lessons we have been learning through these disasters, as well as 

looking at NLE11. 

But I would also remind people it is not defining that we would 

wait for that update to change anything. It really is focused on how 

is the structure of the team built, and how it works in a disaster. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Fugate. We would like to see a formal timeline, this committee would. 

As well, I do also want to confirm from Ms. Norton’s statement 

you have no intention—you are committing to us that there will be 

no appointment of a PFO? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, a PFO is not appointed by the FEMA administrator. But the Secretary has reassured us, and she has put it in 

writing, that she does not intend to appoint principal Federal officials in a Stafford Act declaration. 

And to amplify this, Mr. Chairman, and for the ranking member, 

in the Department of Homeland Security’s support and USAID response to Haiti, the incident lead for our team was actually a 

17 

FEMA leadership position. So I think it is recognized both within 

DHS that we do have capable leadership. 

The Agency has turned to us for non-Stafford Act assistance in 

lead agencies. And the Secretary has reaffirmed that she does not 

see the need to bring in, in these types of Stafford Act responses, 

outside entities, but depend upon the FEMA leadership and the 

Federal coordinating officer to coordinate that response in support 

of a governor. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Fugate. Mr. Fincher? 

Mr. FINCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you guys for 

being here today. Our hearts and thoughts and prayers go out to 

the folks in Japan. Just catastrophic. It is just hard to explain. 

I want to be careful not to put the blame as much with what has 

happened in Japan on the earthquake as the tsunami. That is what 

caused the power failure to cool the nuclear reactors. But at the 

same time, I think it is a gut check for all of us—and you guys, 

as well—to do the best job you can at having a clear path, a guided 

response, working with the States, making sure that you have a 

clean chain of command, that the right hand knows what the left 

hand is doing. 

But it is a disaster. What happened in Japan was a disaster. I 

live in a part of the State of Tennessee, where we live on the New 

Madrid fault. Reelfoot Lake was created back many, many years 

ago by a massive earthquake. So we are waiting for something to 

happen. But at the same time, you can only do so much preparing 

for a disaster. But you have to do your part. 

My question is last Congress you testified that FEMA would conduct review of its policies and regulations as they relate to response and recovery. As you know, the Stafford Act provides FEMA 

with broad authorities. However, as we saw in the recovery from 

Hurricane Katrina, the bureaucratic red tape found in regulation 

policy significantly slowed the process. 

Where are you in that review, and what changes do you expect 

to occur from the process? 

Mr. FUGATE. Thank you for a chance to come back to that. We 

have started the process—we actually were bringing in State and 

locals, as well as our subject matter experts in doing what we call 

a bottom-up review. We found that we were not being revolutionary, we were being evolutionary. So we have decided that we 

cannot do that without dedicating some full-time staff to that process. 

But what we have done—and I think we demonstrated this in 

the Tennessee floods—is we have to have a balance between speed 

and accountability. So in the individual assistance, where this became a huge issue in Katrina and other disasters, where we could 

not get funds out fast enough and we would literally find ourselves 

not able to make sure we were determining eligibility prior to administering funds, in the Tennessee floods we put about $100 million in the hands of eligible applicants that had a home inspection 

done within days of their request for assistance in those floods with 

no notice. If you remember, we started that weekend, and it was 

flooding. And by Monday, the governor had a request to the President, we had a declaration, and we were providing assistance by 

that weekend to folks that had been flooded. 

18 

So, we have been taking to heart looking at the flexibility inherent in the Stafford Act, and have began going back through a lot 

of these procedures that are not in the Stafford Act in the CFR, 

and questioning why they exist, eliminating those that are not relevant, but putting an emphasis on speed, but not haste, in doing 

these projects. So this is an ongoing evolution. 

We have already been successful in some areas. An area of note, 

we have clarified for federally recognized tribes that they can be an 

eligible applicant, as a grantee, after a governor has requested a 

disaster declaration. This is key to the sovereignty of those tribes 

and, again, was done internally to our policy reviews, where there 

was not a conflict in the Stafford Act, but we had that flexibility 

inherent to that, in order to do that. 

Mr. FINCHER. Again, we go back to the Gulf oil spill, how terrible 

that was. I think that no one wants to destroy the environment, 

that we need to make sure that we are safe with our energy, but 

also, at the same time, that if you do not operate and follow the 

law, you do pay a penalty. But again, we need to be steady, while 

careful, and do a good job. And I do appreciate your comments to 

that, guys. Thank you. I would yield back. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Fincher. Mr. Barletta, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Weber, do you anticipate any major impacts 

of the radiation from Japan reactors on the U.S.? I saw some reports showing certain States experiencing low-level effects from the 

Japan reactors, Pennsylvania being one of them, my home State. 

So I wonder if you could talk about that? 

Mr. WEBER. Certainly. We do not expect to see harmful levels of 

radiation in the United States, and that includes the Territories, 

Hawaii, Alaska, Aleutians. We are detecting trace levels of contamination from the releases from the Fukushima Daiichi emergency. And that is expected. And we are working within the Federal community to get data from the nuclear power plants—which 

may be some of the data that you are referring to—to share that, 

so that it can be integrated with other information taken around 

the United States, including monitoring data from the Environmental Protection Agency, to provide confidence to the American 

public that they are not at risk from those releases. 

Mr. BARLETTA. So there won’t be—you don’t anticipate any effects in water and rain—— 

Mr. WEBER. We are seeing elevated levels in rain, for example. 

But those levels are still at a very small amount, so that it is not 

posing a risk to U.S. citizens. 

Mr. BARLETTA. And to follow up on Ms. Norton’s question, how 

at risk are our nuclear power plants in the United States to the 

type of situation that occurred in Japan? 

Mr. WEBER. We are confident that the operating nuclear power 

plants are safe, and that is safe from earthquakes, safe from 

tsunamis, and other external hazards—hurricanes, tornadoes. That 

is all part of what we look at before we license a plant to operate. 

However, having said that, we are taking a close look at what 

is actually occurring in Japan, so that we can learn from that experience. At NRC we practice continuous improvement. So we do not 

19 

want to blow off a significant event like occurred in Japan. We 

want to learn from that, and continue to improve our programs. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. We will now start our second round of 

questioning. The first question I have again, Mr. Fugate, I am concerned about our planning. And there are obviously some things 

that are unpredictable, have become a bigger challenge for planning. Nobody could have planned what has happened—the catastrophe that has happened in Japan. 

But here in the United States we have the opportunity to plan 

for—you know, right now in California, I mean, we are going to see 

a huge amount of flooding this year we are predicting, because we 

just—we do not build the water storage facilities or the conveyance 

facilities, and you have a huge amount of snowfall this year, and 

now all of a sudden we are in normal 70-, 80-degree temperatures 

in California. 

Can you explain to me some—the planning that you do, based on 

some of the risk assessments from other departments? 

Mr. FUGATE. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you point out, some risks 

are dynamic. They change seasonally, they may change because of 

certain climate shifts that we see that we are going from drought 

into a very wet period right now in California. 

We utilize our regional offices. We have 10 FEMA regional offices 

with a regional administrator and a team that are empowered to 

work closely with the States to plan for these changing threats as 

the hazards increase or decrease. 

And so, Nancy Ward, our regional administrator in region nine, 

and her team worked with the State of California, California Emergency Management Agency, to look at—and again, California, because of the history of disasters, has a rather robust system of responding to disasters. So what we look at are where do they anticipate gaps or assistance that they would require, and plan that 

based upon this threat. 

We have been working on this actually a little bit more aggressively, because it was earlier in the Midwest and upper-Midwest 

Red River, where we already set up an incident staging base and 

moved supplies up there. Yet we have still not seen significant 

flooding, we are just in a ready mode. 

So, these are the kind of things we do when we see a hazard that 

is increasing, and work with the States, what we try to identify— 

what would they see as shortfalls, particularly from the standpoint 

of commodities or other resources that we need to move into an 

area? And then we would set up, in coordination with the State, 

initial staging bases, moving supplies in and getting ready for that. 

Again, with some of these threats you can actually see that 

changing. So we do what we call, you know, incident action planning with the State, and look at this kind of a real-time event of 

where do they see gaps, what do they see are issues, where do we 

need to go ahead and move or get resources ready so that if they 

are needed we are not starting from, ‘‘Oh, it is flooding, what do 

you need?’’ 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. And right now, obviously, with the $14 

trillion debt, you know, the cuts that are coming out here are very 

20 

large. And we expect to continue to be looking at the 2012 budget 

with a very critical eye. 

I imagine that FEMA, as you look at your budgets, you are looking at ways that you can save money, as well. Do you ever do any 

type of budget forecasting that would say—you know, as you get 

questioned about your budget, well, we could reduce FEMA expenditures if we built a levee, if we built a new water storage, if we 

managed our forests better? 

Mr. FUGATE. It goes to the question of investing before disasters 

happen, in mitigation and other activities, to buy down, literally, 

the risk of this country. The challenge is because there are so many 

areas, and you cannot always predetermine where those best investments would occur, it has not always been able to come back 

and focus exclusively on prevention and mitigation without having 

the capability to respond to large-scale catastrophic disasters. So 

you have to have a balance. 

I think the way you become cost effective is to look at a very simple idea, and that is do not compete with the private sector and 

what they do every day, and look at how, when a disaster occurs, 

we can maximize what they do so we expend our Federal dollars 

in those areas and gaps that would occur in the response. 

But I think it is that balance between where we can in future 

development, future growth, mitigate those risks, and look at how, 

through continuing programs, we can reduce that risk in those existing areas, whether they are in a flood plain, or whether they are 

in an earthquake-prone area, that building codes and other tools 

can help reduce that risk for future disaster. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. And Mr. Hubbard, what type of coordination exists when you do have multiple disasters hitting us at 

once? We have an earthquake which sets off a forest fire. What 

type of coordination do you have with FEMA and other agencies? 

Mr. HUBBARD. Our coordination is primarily aimed at responding 

to fire. And we have an extensive network to do that. But when 

FEMA gives us a mission assignment to help them in any other 

way, we divert the resources to do that, if we are able to. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. And one of the challenges that has 

come up in my district as we have had forest fires in the past, you 

end up with a lot of trees that are burnt and should be harvested 

so that we do not see another fire come right beyond that. Are we 

working to—can you give me any type of assurance that we are 

working to mitigate this from happening in the future? 

Mr. HUBBARD. One way or another, landscape restoration is a 

key to avoiding future risks to communities and to people and to 

natural resources. So, our restoration efforts are very much aimed 

at reducing that risk where it exists and it threatens the most. 

So, our assurance is that that is a priority for us. And we will 

do as much of it as we are able. 

Mr. DENHAM. Well, I mean, ‘‘as much of it as we are able’’ does 

not give me any sense of security. Do we expedite permits when 

that happens? 

Mr. HUBBARD. We go through our—each national forest goes 

through its normal process for environmental clearance, and that 

is still the same. 

21 

What we try to do with additional resources that we might have 

for hazard reduction or landscape restoration is to go into those 

areas and remove material, even if we do not have commercial 

market for it. 

Mr. DENHAM. So—— 

Mr. HUBBARD. We do that on a priority basis. 

Mr. DENHAM. So is it expedited? Are there ways to cut through 

the red tape so that we do not have a second natural disaster right 

beyond that? 

Mr. HUBBARD. Where the threats are high enough, and we rate 

it as a high-enough priority for us to do the work ourselves on Forest Service land, yes. 

Mr. DENHAM. And what about partnering with private individuals that can come in and help us to—— 

Mr. HUBBARD. That is where—when we can contract it, and we 

are the administrator of the contract, yes, we have some latitude. 

Where we have to operate through a salvage sale or a timber sale, 

the normal environmental clearances are in place. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. Ms. Norton? 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Fugate, I know that 

FEMA was of assistance in Haiti. Have you been of any assistance 

in Japan? 

Mr. FUGATE. We have been in support of USAID. The urban 

search and rescue teams that deployed the 2 teams that went to 

Haiti are part of the 28 national teams, 2 of which are funded by 

both FEMA and USAID. So these teams went, we provided support 

to USAID in mobilizing those teams. We also made available all of 

our capabilities. 

However, Japan did not—— 

Ms. NORTON. The teams came from Fairfax? Were they—— 

Mr. FUGATE. California and Fairfax. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. NORTON. Yes. 

Mr. FUGATE. But these are part of the 28 urban search and rescue teams that are funded by FEMA. But the two teams that went 

are also supported by USAID, and are primarily identified for 

international response. 

In addition to the response there—and again, we had no requests 

through USAID for any more assistance to Japan itself—we did 

support U.S. EPA in deploying additional radiation monitors as 

part of RADNET, particularly in the territories where there were 

not existing stations. We used our authority under the Stafford Act 

to provide that assistance to help deploy those to make sure that 

the territorial islands had monitoring, and we supported that. 

And we have been in a participatory mode in this event, both 

learning the lessons of the tsunami, earthquake, and nuclear power 

emergency. But other than those items, we have not provided direct assistance to—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, that is the kind of assistance I know you 

often do provide when there is a hazard or catastrophe in a foreign 

country. 

It seems—those teams are all back home now? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes, ma’am. They are all back. In fact, the California team got their equipment back so they are back up for deVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 21, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\ED\3-30-1~1\65452.TXT JEAN
22 

ployment. And I didn’t see the status today, but I think the Virginia team is merely awaiting their—— 

Ms. NORTON. Well, I noticed that the Virginia team came back 

rather quickly. Was that because of concern about a nuclear hazard? 

Mr. FUGATE. Unfortunately, the answer is not that. It was that 

the search was moving into recovery phase. They did not feel that 

there was going to be much more opportunity for rescues. And 

since those teams are primarily designed to do rescues and not 

body recovery, the Government of Japan asked that the teams be 

released and sent back to the U.S., while they continued recovery 

operations. 

Ms. NORTON. Actually, that is reassuring. Mr. Weber, one last 

question—this is a question for both of you, because I know that, 

Mr. Fugate, that you are about to undertake in May a much-discussed national exercise at—near the New Madrid fault line in the 

center of the country, south center of the country. 

One, are you, Mr. Weber, participating in this national exercise? 

Mr. WEBER. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. Are there any nuclear plants located near this particular fault line? What are the States, again? Tennessee? What 

are the States? 

Mr. WEBER. Ten States, right? 

Mr. FUGATE. Yes. Basically from Mississippi north through Illinois, across Arkansas, back over to Tennessee. When we looked at 

this exercise, it is based upon the historical event. So we are using 

the event that occurred in 1811/1812, was a major shock and then 

several major aftershocks in the area of impact, based upon USGS 

data that would indicate where we would see shaking and damages 

occurring across—it’s about eight States that would be seeing damages. 

There are reports that we could actually have shaking motion 

and impacts outside that area, but it would not result in significant 

damages. 

Ms. NORTON. Well, in those 10 States, is there any—are there 

any nuclear plants located along that fault line? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, there are. And in addition to nuclear power 

plants, there is also a large nuclear facility, such as the Paducah 

gaseous diffusion plant, and there is a conversion facility in Metropolis, Illinois. 

Our preparations are to participate fully in the national exercise, 

so that we could gain from the experience, working with our partners in FEMA, the States, the local responders. 

Ms. NORTON. And, Mr. Chairman, there—the first responders, 

the teams that went from Fairfax and California, might well be informative to us. I know we, ourselves, heard from the teams that 

went to Haiti, to see what they could tell us about what would happen if there were an earthquake in Haiti. 

Mr. Weber, I go back again to fault lines and construction along 

fault lines. Are you constructing along fault lines because you really don’t have any alternative? Knowing that it is a fault line, knowing that none of us can know when the fault line will prove disruptive, what leads you to construct a nuclear facility, in particular, 

along a fault line? Do you look at other options? 

23 

Mr. WEBER. Absolutely. 

Ms. NORTON. Well then why, for example, would a fault line location be chosen? 

Mr. WEBER. In dealing with faults, we have to distinguish between active and passive faults. Passive faults may have been active millions of years ago, but are no longer considered active. 

Ms. NORTON. OK, I am interested in the active ones. 

Mr. WEBER. The active ones you would obviously not try to site 

a nuclear power plant or other large nuclear facility on top of that 

fault. But if you were siting a facility, for whatever reasons, and 

a fault were active and nearby, you would take that into account 

in the design of the facility, such that—— 

Ms. NORTON. No, I am asking, in those instances, have you, in 

fact, decided to build or allow a nuclear facility to be built on a 

fault because there was no other alternative. 

Mr. WEBER. I am not aware of those instances. I do know, for example, at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power station in California, 

it was discovered during the course of the site investigation that 

there was a large fault nearby, the Hosgri fault. And that fault was 

specifically taken into consideration, so that we could have assurance that that facility, if there were an earthquake along that 

fault, that the Diablo Canyon nuclear power—— 

Ms. NORTON. So what would you do in that case that you 

wouldn’t do if a facility were not located on a fault? 

Mr. WEBER. You would add stiffening to certain parts of the 

plant, so that if there were seismic motion, that the plant would 

be safe. You could stand off the fault, so that if you had subsidence 

along the fault, that it didn’t disrupt critical components in the nuclear power plant. So, there are a variety of things that are taken 

into consideration. 

I think the point that is to be made is there are faults throughout the United States, and we need to take that into account, because we do not want to have a situation where we are surprised 

by a seismic event that causes damage to a plant. And that is the 

same design philosophy that we employ for flooding, for tsunamis, 

for tornadoes, for hurricanes. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. And do you want to do a third round 

of questioning? 

Ms. NORTON. No, no, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say that I 

have no—I don’t feel any more reassured by Mr. Weber’s testimony 

than before. I don’t know, for example, whether there are precautions that are taken along faults here that were not taken in 

Japan. 

I do think, Mr. Weber, that when you are finished your review, 

questions like that, the difference between the precautions you say 

are taken along our faults, and what was taken in Japan—and I 

tell you the reason I am interested. Japanese aren’t stupid. They 

are among the very best in preparing for just such catastrophes. 

They are located—if you look at the location of Japan, you will understand something of the Japanese people. 

Because when you have as vulnerable a location as they do, as 

a set of islands in the middle of a part of the world that sees 

tsunamis, and you have to build—and in their case, have to build— 

nuclear plants, and you have the level of technology that the JapaVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 21, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\ED\3-30-1~1\65452.TXT JEAN
24 

nese have, among the highest in the world, you, it seems to me, 

are the standard that everybody ought to look to. And I hope that 

in doing your review, you are at least comparing yourself with the 

Japanese. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

And before we go to the next panel, I just want to clarify a couple 

things. I still do not think that Ms. Norton’s question has been answered sufficiently. So let me pull out this map here. 

Realize that your standard answer is that we have got faults everywhere. I get that, but we have red areas here. Highest risk 

areas along the coast of California, Oregon, and Washington: are 

we planning on building any new nuclear plants there? 

Mr. WEBER. At this point we do not have any applications for 

new nuclear power plants in those locations. 

Mr. DENHAM. How about the Madrid area, the red area there? 

Mr. WEBER. No. 

Mr. DENHAM. OK. So any of the high-risk areas, do we have any 

plans? 

Mr. WEBER. Most of the construction that is going on now or as 

planned is in the southeastern United States, and with some in the 

mid-Atlantic. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

And as far as the current facilities that we have up and running 

today, I went to school real close to Diablo Canyon. I mean that 

facility must be 40 years old, 50 years old. Here we had in Japan 

a state-of-the-art facility. You know, I believe that that was probably the most modern—— 

Mr. WEBER. No, sir, I am sorry. Those plants are about 40 years 

old. Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1 is approaching its 40th anniversary. 

Mr. DENHAM. So similar technology? 

Mr. WEBER. Similar technology. 

Mr. DENHAM. Similar precautions? 

Mr. WEBER. Yes. 

Mr. DENHAM. Are there things that we would do now to upgrade 

San Onofre of Diablo Canyon or others after seeing what has happened in Japan? Are there new construction, new architecture that 

we would want to go in and update those facilities? 

Mr. WEBER. It is difficult to compare what our regulatory program has required over the years and how it is implemented versus 

what has been done in Japan. I will say that one of the reasons 

why we have been involved in our response is to insure that we 

learn from the Japanese experience, and we are constantly asking 

ourselves how would we cope with this situation in the United 

States. 

We have identified a number of features that are present in the 

nuclear power plants in the United States that we are not aware 

of were implemented in Japan, and those are the items that would 

be relied on to ensure that should such a catastrophe occur in the 

United States, that the nuclear power plants remain safe. 

These are things like supplemental emergency power that we 

have in the United States. We have diesel driven pumps. We have 

required our licensees that operate the nuclear power plants to 

take additional measures, particularly since 9/11, so that regardVerDate Aug 31 2005 10:59 Sep 21, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\112\ED\3-30-1~1\65452.TXT JEAN
25 

less of what event may occur, that they are in a more safe configuration, and they could cope with these kind of catastrophes. 

Mr. DENHAM. And I assume there is some type of risk assessment being done in light of what has happened in Japan. 

Mr. WEBER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DENHAM. And you would be able to provide this committee 

with that risk assessment and the recommendations you would 

have for each of those facilities? 

Mr. WEBER. Absolutely. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

And just to follow up, Mr. Hubbard, I want to make sure I understood your answer correctly. We have in actual disaster, we have 

a forest fire that takes out the entire fuel on the ground floor, 

leaves behind all of these trees that now are in the dying process. 

Before we see a second disaster, before we see a second forest fire, 

my understanding from your answer, what I heard from you was 

that the environmental review process would not be sped up. There 

would not be anything to provide local loggers the opportunity to 

come in and log those trees quickly and maybe actually get some 

economic impact to the local community and to the Forest Service 

and voice a second disaster. 

There is nothing in place today that would expedite that permitting? 

Mr. HUBBARD. There are several possibilities, and I will follow up 

with a better answer, but we often run into the environmental 

challenges that stop those activities, and that is still at play, and 

we have not eliminated that issue. 

Mr. DENHAM. Do you have recommendations on risk assessment 

that would say if we do not come in an log these, not only are we 

going to not see the economic impact, but we are at risk of another 

disaster? 

Mr. HUBBARD. With every fire we assess that risk, and we deal 

with the emergency restoration that follows any fire. Before it even 

is controlled we start, and that lasts for up to a year following to 

take care of what we think might still pose a risk to communities, 

in particular. 

But in terms of salvaging of what’s standing burned dead trees, 

that falls into a different category, and we have to go through our 

clearance processes. 

Mr. DENHAM. I mean, I guess I just find your answer unacceptable. I understand that we all want to be good stewards of the environment, but at a certain point human lives are at risk, and if 

we have already had one natural disaster and know specifically 

that the risk has greatly increased and could see a second natural 

disaster, why would we not expedite the process and reduce our 

risk of having a second national disaster? 

Mr. HUBBARD. We would for sure expedite process in and around 

communities to protect communities, but on large scale, 50,000 

acre fires, we would not deal with the entire landscape that way. 

We would deal with the areas immediately adjacent to those communities, and we would expedite that process. 

Mr. DENHAM. And expedite it with quick permits and bring in 

private industry if we needed to? 

Mr. HUBBARD. Yes. 

26 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

At this time I would like to call on our second panel. 

Mr. Murphy, Director of Grants Management, California Emergency Management Agency. 

Second will be Mr. Shimanski, the Senior Vice President of Disaster Services, the American Red Cross. 

Third, Mr. Christmann, Commissioner, City Emergency Management Agency, St. Louis, Missouri. 

And fourth, Mr. Rash, CEO and Chief Engineer, St. Francis 

Levee District of Arkansas. 

And I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses’ full statements 

be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

Since your written testimony has been made part of the record, 

the subcommittee would request that you limit your responses to 

oral to 5 minutes. 

Mr. Murphy, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF BRENDAN MURPHY, DIRECTOR, GRANTS MANAGEMENT, CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, ON BEHALF OF MIKE DAYTON, ACTING SECRETARY, 

CALIFORNIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; CHARLES 

S. SHIMANSKI, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, DISASTER SERVICES, AMERICAN RED CROSS; GARY A. CHRISTMANN, COMMISSIONER, CITY OF ST. LOUIS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY; AND ROB RASH, CEO AND CHIEF ENGINEER, ST. 

FRANCIS LEVEE DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am Brendan Murphy from the California Emergency Management Agency on behalf of Acting Secretary Mike Dayton. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Norton, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to provide testimony on how we can work together to improve catastrophic disaster response efforts while minimizing economic impacts. 

On behalf of the Acting Secretary of the California Emergency 

Management Agency, we have the overarching responsibility to insure that California works to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 

quickly recover from any type of disaster that may impact California, whether manmade or naturally occurring. 

CalEMA coordinates emergency activities to save lives and reduce property losses during disasters and works to expedite recovery from the effects of disasters. On a day-to-day basis, CalEMA 

provides leadership assistance and support to State and local agencies in planning and preparing for the most effective use of Federal, State, local and private sector resources during emergencies. 

Chairman Denham, as a representative from California, you 

know how vulnerable California is to disasters, such as fires, 

floods, and earthquakes, and how devastating these types of events 

are to our State and national economies. We have learned from our 

experiences in California that one of the best ways to help mitigate 

the effects of a large scale disaster is to invest in preparedness efforts. 

If we focus our investments on disaster preparedness efforts, we 

reduce the devastation of human suffering and financial loss in the 

27 

future. We must invest financial resources on the front-end in an 

effort to insure that our infrastructure is secure, that early warning systems are in place, and that the public is informed about the 

potential risks and have the tools to prepare themselves and their 

families when a disaster strikes. 

Similar to what Administrator Fugate said, every individual has 

to take the responsibility to help to work as a team to respond to 

an emergency. 

The following are some of the highlights of the efforts undertaken by the California Emergency Management Agency and our 

State and local partners in the areas of being prepared. 

We enhanced emergency notification systems. The core responsibility of public agencies is to insure that our communities are 

aware of disasters so that individuals, families and businesses can 

take the appropriate and necessary actions. 

To that end, we have focused some o four limited resources on 

enhancing and maintaining our ability to alert and warn the public 

during times of emergencies and disasters. 

Specifically, CalEMA operates the California State Warning Center, which is staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year to serve as 

the official State level point of contact for emergency notifications. 

As you know, Congressman, since you funded it while you were in 

California, the Warning Center personnel maintain contact with 

county warning points, State agencies, Federal agencies, and the 

National Warning Center in Berryville, Virginia. 

Through multiple communication channels, CalEMA insures that 

developing emergencies are responded to quickly and effectively. 

Last year our Warning Center staff handled 150,000 calls, including reports of more than 11,000 hazardous material spills and 140 

seismic and tsunami events. 

Between January 2009 and December 2010, more than 650,000 

alert and warning notifications were made for 45 major disasters 

to local, State, and Federal agencies and public-private partners. 

In light of the recent earthquake that occurred across the Pacific 

Ocean but still had significant impacts to California, the ability to 

warn the public regarding seismic events and tsunamis remains a 

concern and a priority. Depending on the location of an earthquake, 

a tsunami has the potential to reach the California coast in as little 

as 10 minutes. Because of the potential short time period for 

issuing a warning and the need to identify the areas of the State 

which may be impacted by a surge, CalEMA in partnership with 

the California Geological Survey and the Tsunami Research Center 

at the University of California developed Statewide tsunami inundation maps for California. These maps are used by coastal communities to plan and coordinate their specific emergency evacuation 

plans. 

When the tsunami warning was issued on March 11, 2011, 

CalEMA immediately contacted the coastal county offices of Emergency Services that were then able to use the tsunami maps and 

their local plans to focus their efforts for response and evacuation 

based on the type of tsunami that was coming at us. 

Local governments have the primary responsibility for alerting 

their residents to impending events. However, as a State, we provided Federal grant funds to every county in the State so that they 

28 

could install the telephone notification system, such as reverse 911, 

so that they could rapidly notify the people of the county. 

Wise investments in local tsunami warning systems save lives 

and property and mitigate the damaging effects of the recent tsunami, but as you know, plans are only as good as the actions taken 

by the individuals who use them, and that is why California remains focused on creating a culture of preparedness. 

Last week, March 20, 2011, through March 26, 2011, was National Tsunami Awareness and Preparedness Week, a timely event, 

and we used that opportunity to promote the importance of preparedness and personal responsibility in disaster planning. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. I would ask you to summarize your written statement. 

Mr. MURPHY. Along those lines, the most important thing that 

we have is the ability to plan, exercise, reinvigorate those plans, 

and do it again. It is that learning. It is a culture of preparedness. 

At the same time we have citizen preparedness. We have focused 

on having outreach, and one of the most important things is citizens are prepared and can handle themselves, as Administrator 

Fugate said. That allows valuable public resources to be put into 

the most critical of areas at that point in time. 

I yield the balance. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. Shimanski, I would ask you the same thing, if you would 

summarize your written statement. 

Mr. SHIMANSKI. Yes, sir. Good morning, Chairman Denham, 

members and staff of the subcommittee. 

This is an important issue before us, and we appreciate the opportunity to provide some input. The American Red Cross is committed to delivering the most effective and efficient relief services 

possible. We do so by working closely, of course, with Government 

and other NGOs and the private sector. Each and every day we 

stand ready to respond to the events ranging from hurricanes that 

can be forecast, to other events such as earthquakes and human 

caused catastrophes that cannot. 

In just a few short minutes I hope to discuss the Red Cross structure as well as our partnership efforts and the stewardship of donated dollars. 

First, let me explain our structure very quickly. The American 

Red Cross is a nationwide distributed network that ensures both 

local presence as well as national presence during larger events. 

Our facilities and our 60,000 trained disaster volunteers are spread 

throughout the country, which means that we are already there 

when a disaster strikes. 

This is best illustrated in terms of our commitment and strong 

collaboration with government by the memo of agreement that we 

signed recently with FEMA. This agreement has the Red Cross 

now sharing in the leadership of the ESF portion of mass care, 

ESF–6, Mass Care, which includes feeding, sheltering, bulk distribution, and family reunification. 

A person in a shelter should not care if the cot they sleep on is 

a FEMA cot or a Red Cross cot. There is plenty of work for the 

whole community. 

29 

The FEMA-Red Cross MOA takes us to the next level of coordinating and sharing information. For example, we are now sharing 

more data about available assets, about all sheltering activity and 

about the needs of clients. This will make it much faster and will 

improve service as well as save money. 

I will talk briefly about our partnership efforts. The American 

Red Cross works very closely with many NGOs and faith-based organizations involved in disaster response, and the FEMA MOA 

codifies our role in leading that. This will have, again, a positive 

impact on the response and a positive impact on cost. 

One key to efficient and effective partnerships is bringing partners together in our work, which the FEMA MOA, again, speaks 

to. 

I want to next talk briefly about stewardship. We are, of course, 

funded by donated dollars, and we take our responsibility to our 

donors very seriously, which means we’re working constantly to increase our efficiencies and reduce our expenses. As a result, the 

American Red Cross is proud to say that it spends more than 91 

cents on every donated dollar on direct relief. 

But we can always be better and we are always looking for ways 

to improve. This means we must put a stronger focus on our use 

of volunteers, be more efficient by optimizing our allocation of resources, and be better at sharing data. 

Finally, I want to briefly talk about our preparation for the next 

disaster. A big part of what we do is in looking at our performance 

in past disasters. For example, our catastrophic earthquake plans 

have come from reviews of Loma Prieta and Northridge, and they 

were adjusted some after Haiti. Our hurricane plans have been 

shaped by Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. And as Administrator 

Fugate and others have wisely noted, we must view the public not 

only as clients who need our support, but also as a potential asset. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let there be no doubt that the 

American Red Cross is committed to being as prepared as possible 

for whatever disaster will strike. We are committed to improving 

efficiencies, to partnering effectively, and to increasing individual 

and community preparedness. We stand ready to work with our 

partners to ensure that the country is as prepared as possible to 

respond. 

I thank you for your support, and I am happy to address questions when the time comes. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Shimanski. 

Mr. Christmann. 

Mr. CHRISTMANN. Good morning, Chairman Denham, Ranking 

Member Norton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

My name is Gary Christmann. I am the Commissioner of the St. 

Louis City Emergency Management Agency under the Department 

of Public Safety. I am a member of the U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency Managers. 

I am honored and appreciate the opportunity to testify today 

from the perspective of a local emergency manager. On behalf of 

the Nation’s local emergency managers, I would like to thank the 

committee for your support of the emergency performance grant, 

the vital role the committee played after Hurricane Katrina to 

30 

strengthen the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the post 

Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. 

We need strong emergency management on the local level. We 

recognize that all events start and end at the local level. However, 

we also need strong partners at the State and Federal level for 

those events that go beyond our capabilities. 

The city of St. Louis is 62 square miles made up of residential 

area, industry, business, transportation. We have three Major 

League sporting teams. We have five hospitals, which two of them 

are pediatric trauma centers, and we are the third largest inland 

port in the Nation. 

As a local emergency manager, I have the overall responsibility 

to coordinate a comprehensive emergency management system addressing all hazards with key stakeholders at all levels of government, volunteer agencies, private sector, hospitals, medical facilities, faith-based organizations, schools, colleges, and universities, 

utility companies, our residents, and all others. 

My responsibility includes planning for events we have most frequently, such as tornados and flooding, but also those high consequence, such as a catastrophic earthquake involving the New 

Madrid fault. 

Planning for an earthquake has many challenges due to the uncertainties which influence our response and recovery, such as the 

magnitude, the location of the epicenter, the time of day, the downtown activities, and the season. 

We recognize that a catastrophic earthquake can cause widespread damage, power outages, mass casualties, mass fatalities, 

and our missions would include an ongoing public information, continuity of government, mass shelter and care, search and rescue, 

debris removal, security operations, mass casualty and fatality 

management, volunteer management, to include our citizens’ emergency response teams, just to name a few. 

The only way that we can successful in a response to and recover 

from an event of the magnitude and complexity is to have a fully 

functional and test system of emergency management in place. The 

emergency management performance grant plays a pivotal role in 

maintaining that system. 

The city of St. Louis will be participating in the national level 

exercise in May of 2011. This exercise scenario is based around an 

earthquake on the New Madrid fault line. We will use the lessons 

learned from this exercise as well as those from the tragic situation 

in Japan to strengthen our plans and capabilities. 

In summary, Mayor Francis Slay, the city of St. Louis, and the 

Nation’s local emergency managers have appreciated the support of 

this subcommittee in the past in building a strong emergency management system at the Federal, State, and local level. The investment of the emergency management performance grant is small, 

given the potential return and creating a strong State and local 

emergency management system which handles a large majority of 

disasters. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have, and I 

appreciate your time. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. Rash. 

31 

Mr. RASH. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning. 

There are numerous items I would like to speak about. If you 

would allow the record to be left open for additional testimony submittal, I would appreciate that. 

I would like to limit my comments just to three key points: one, 

to utilize local responders and local recovery efforts first; two, to 

improve and remove the traditional bureaucratic cycle, which has 

obviously been mentioned here this morning; and food protection is 

a preemptive strike, and I will get to that in a moment. 

It is vital for us to utilize those local first responders. During 

Hurricane Katrina, a Levee Board in Mississippi responded 

through the governor’s office prior to landfall of Katrina and got 

themselves prepared, brought fuel and other items south to the 

Gulf Coast and Mississippi Gulf Shore, and their response was very 

welcome. 

These local responders, like the St. Francis Levee District of Arkansas, can be utilized along with other drainage districts, other 

small districts that are local, that can be utilized more easily, more 

readily available. But it has to be through coordination with local, 

State, and Federal efforts. There is no question about that. 

Mr. Fugate spoke about being prepared on a local level and that 

the Federal Government could not be expected to come in immediately because there were criteria in place or not in place to allow 

that. But the local responders are absolutely necessary, and there 

are some prepared. Local Levee Boards like myself would be a part 

of that immediate response. 

Second, I would like to talk about the traditional bureaucratic 

process that is in place. The permitting process is quite difficult. 

The NEPA, the National Environmental Policy Act, the permitting 

process has become so cumbersome that it is difficult to work 

through on a local level or the State level to get quick responses 

in minor disasters. 

It is very difficult. Hurricane Katrina was a good example of 

that, where the NEPA process was streamlined. It was streamlined 

so U.S. Army Corps of Engineer projects could be done much 

quicker and without the red tape. 

I know that there were questions about the process, but the 

NEPA process is quite cumbersome. It is very difficult, and the traditional bureaucratic layers have got to be better distributed or 

more easily cut through. I think there are a number of disasters 

that proved that. 

One thing in particular is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 

the creation of the Homeland Security Agency and consequently 

with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Under them is 

the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

In flood control we have utilized the Corps of Engineers for disaster protection or disaster response. They have been placed in 

Homeland Security under FEMA, and I understand that. 

However, the Corps has specific qualities that can be utilized, 

and I would ask that it be reevaluated as to where the Corps falls 

under that hierarchy in Homeland Security Agency. 

And last, I would like to talk about all of the disasters. There is 

no question there are numerous disasters we fall prey to at all 

32 

times, but flooding is one that we can prevent. Flooding is one we 

can work on. 

The Mississippi River and Tributaries Project is a project in the 

lower Mississippi River Valley from Cairo, Missouri, south to New 

Orleans, and this is an outstanding example of the work of the 

local people, the work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 

Congress to properly protect people from flooding events. This is 

one emergency that can be prevented. Instead of the reaction, it 

can be prevented, and the MR&T is an outstanding example of 

that. 

I would ask that this committee please look at the MR&T. I realize that it was a preventive mechanism. It was flood control at its 

best, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has got a lot to be 

proud of and Congress as well, and 120 years ago, districts like myself began building levees. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers came 

and utilized those levees. They built the 1928 Flood Control Act 

and began the MR&T. 

That project is not complete, but it did survive, and it has protected millions of people in the lower Mississippi River Valley. I 

would ask that we look at that because FEMA, under their current 

guidelines and direction, is expanding their national flood insurance program, and in doing so, they are undermining projects just 

like the MR&T by providing or placing areas under a shaded Zone 

X and other different criteria or other different areas of flood prone 

areas. They are being redefined. 

And areas that have been properly protected for 100 years are 

now being redefined in a flood hazard area. This is terrible for economic development, but it also undermines the very protective 

structures that have been in place and for 83 years have protected 

from disasters. 

So I would ask that you please look at that. Flooding is a disaster that can be prevented, and you have an outstanding example 

of that being the case in the Mississippi River and Tributaries 

Project. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Rash. Thank all of you for your 

testimony. 

Starting the first round of questioning, Mr. Murphy, obviously I 

am very familiar with the State’s response system, but how does 

that interface with the Federal system? 

Mr. MURPHY. Absolutely. So one of the unique things, I think, in 

California is that we have a really strong relationship with our regional administrator. In fact, the regional administrator about 15 

years ago worked at the former Office of Emergency Services in 

California, and Nancy Ward is our Regional Administrator. We 

know her well. We have known her very well. 

But ultimately it is a personal relationship that saves lives and 

property, and it is knowing that we can rely on the FEMA region 

to be there and to be the coordinating effort for the resources that 

the Federal Government brings to bear. I think that is one of the 

important factors to remember. 

You know, as far as responders go, specifically local responders 

are the first responders. Those are the people on the ground, and 

in that State and especially the regional FEMA role is to be able 

to bring to bear the Federal resources that come from the Federal 

33 

Government and can help those first responders and then save 

lives first and property second. 

Mr. DENHAM. And from a communications standpoint, the State 

system interfaces with the Federal system? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. We test that with an annual exercise, as you 

know, and in that exercise, we continually test form different parts 

of the State that ability to interface with FEMA Region 9 and specifically order resources from the Federal Government. 

And I think so far, you know, there are hiccups along the way, 

but that is part of the exercise and planning model. We do it in 

an exercise and learn from it and make it better the next time. 

Mr. DENHAM. And as far as making it better the next time, you 

know, given what has happened in Japan with the huge earthquake, with the challenges that we have in California, I have certainly seen especially from my old Senate seat, you know, we have 

had flooding; we have had challenges where we have not seen immediate reaction from FEMA. 

Are we prepared as a State to work with the governor in making 

sure that if there is a disaster, when the next disaster hits that we 

are requesting FEMA involvement quickly? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir, and absolutely we request FEMA involvement on a very fast basis for the majority of things, and I will say 

over the last few years, FEMA has been very, very responsive on 

more recent disasters, and as you say, that may have not historically always been the case, but the relationship is such that right 

now, for example, in the Harbor up in Del Mar County after the 

Tsunami, we had teams within 3 days on the ground. So, I mean, 

it happened on Friday and Monday afternoon we had teams surveying the damage. They were teams of CalEMA as well as FEMA 

staff. So, yes, the coordination at this point. 

To your point on catastrophic incidences, we have done numerous 

plans in both major urban area centers, the Bay Area as well as 

Los Angeles, and the catastrophic idea is trying to get the best plan 

for the scenario that as Administrator Fugate said, nobody wanted 

to think about a few years ago. 

And so in doing that, we have engaged everybody from our 

FEMA regional partners and actually DHS Headquarters all the 

way down through nonprofits and the american Red Cross at that 

local level to try and talk about what can you really provide in certain scenarios of a catastrophic incident. 

Mr. DENHAM. As you heard earlier, obviously floods especially 

this year are a huge concern in California as well as elsewhere 

around the Nation, but on the same level, forest fires. How closely 

does CalEMA work with the Forest Services to plan and prepare 

for wildfires? 

Mr. MURPHY. We do work very closely with the Forest Service. 

Our Fire Branch at CalEMA had an annual contract and contract 

reviews for maintaining the fire response areas and some joint and 

shared areas and the interfaces between mostly State public lands 

as well as Federal public lands. 

And so we do coordinate regularly. As you heard earlier, there 

are 16,000 fire fighting resources for the entire country at the Forest Service, and as you know, we have several hundred thousand 

fire fighters inside the State of California. Clearly, we tend to help 

34 

wherever we can, and especially where we think that lives and 

property can be evaluated. 

We have worked through differences of opinion in the past, and 

I thing it has built, on the learning side, it has built a better relationship moving forward in the last few years. 

Mr. DENHAM. My concern, again, is risk assessment. We oftentimes do not plan well or we ignore the huge risks that we may 

have over environmental policies. I think we have got to have balance between the two, especially in the case where we have, like 

I described earlier, we have a forest fire, and now we are stuck 

with a situation with trees that are, you know, dying. I mean, they 

have lost their foliage and are dying, and we do not move quickly 

and another fire could resume. 

Mr. MURPHY. I think, as you know, on State lands we worked to 

solve that problem in the last 7 or 8 years, and I think we have 

had some very successful resolutions in working with the California 

Environmental Protection Agency, as well as the resources agency 

inside California to make sure that we can effectively limit future 

losses to properly reinvigorate those lands, whether it be through 

cutting or through replanting, et cetera. 

I cannot speak for the U.S. Forest Service, but in that role, I 

mean, I would think from a State perspective we have done it on 

the State side, and I do not think we have been as successful in 

trying to help the Forest Service get to it. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. Shimanski, what do you see are the major challenges if a 

massive 9.0 type earthquake hit California or States along the New 

Madrid fault? 

Mr. SHIMANSKI. Well, let me first thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

let me start by saying I think the national level exercise in May, 

which everybody has been referring to as the upcoming exercise, 

but in fact, State agencies, FEMA and others have been engaged 

in planning efforts for many, many months, have already had resource allocations worked up, and I think that event will teach us 

a great deal. 

I think the challenges if something like what happened in Japan 

were to occur along your coast, the West Coast of California, one 

of the greatest challenges will be the communication to the affected 

communities, and communicating, which is not a responsibility 

that the Red Cross holds for the sector, but communicating as to 

where the shelters are so that our shelters are in safe areas where 

people can get to safely, and that the communities know where 

those shelters are. 

We have created a national shelter system that tracks our 56,000 

shelters throughout the United States, and it includes an outward 

facing Web portal and now a downloadable app so that people in 

the affected communities can find the closest Red Cross shelter in 

their community so that they can know exactly where to go and so 

that it is easy for them to get there. 

I should mention that in Japan, the maximum number of people 

that were being sheltered was 500,000. That number has now decreased to, I believe, below one-quarter of a million. 

Post Katrina the American Red Cross had done a great deal of 

work to build up and increase—— 

35 

Mr. DENHAM. Could you repeat that? 

Mr. SHIMANSKI. In Japan, the number of people sheltered, the 

maximum number of people sheltered from the event that recently 

occurred, the numbers I have seen are roughly half a million, and 

that number has now decreased to roughly one-quarter million, 

meaning that some of the people initially sheltered have found 

other facilities or other places to stay besides the shelter of the Red 

Cross and other shelter providers. 

Since Katrina, the American Red Cross has built its capacity. 

Now, with our partners, we can feed as many as a million meals 

in any given day. So I think we will learn a great deal from the 

New Madrid exercise, but I also think that if something happens 

along the lines of what happened with Japan, I think the whole 

community approach that Craig Fugate is bringing to FEMA and 

the philosophy of bringing the public in as a resource will certainly 

help. That’s where much of our exercise and our focus has been, 

utilizing spontaneous volunteers. 

I will finish with one last thought. Taking Hurricane Katrina as 

an example, when Katrina happened, we had roughly 24,0000 

trained disaster responders in our American Red Cross database, 

and yet we deployed ten times that figure, 234,000 volunteers. In 

other words, we had an intake of nine spontaneous volunteers for 

every one we had trained, and we were able to put them to work. 

That will be key if an event like what happened in Japan occurs 

on U.S. soil. 

Mr. DENHAM. And what would happen if we had more than one 

catastrophe at the same time in separate parts of the country? 

Would the Red Cross be prepared to mobilize and respond to two 

major catastrophes? 

Mr. SHIMANSKI. Thank you. It’s a very good question. 

First off, I mentioned that we had roughly 24,000 trained disaster volunteers pre-Katrina. That number has now grown to 

60,000, and again, these are individuals trained in communities all 

throughout the United States. 

Much of what we do is built around multiple events happening 

at the same time, again, much like Administrator Fugate addressed. That said, if there is a challenge to the American Red 

Cross response to multiple disasters occurring either in short succession or at the same time, the one challenge to the Red Cross 

would likely be in the area of charitable contributions. The public 

is very generous when a major event occurs. The generosity can at 

times decline when another big event occurs shortly thereafter. Donors, very generous donors, may have a sense of ‘‘I just gave to the 

Red Cross.’’ So if we have one concern about multiple activities 

happening in a short time table, it is whether there will be the 

charitable support that the Red Cross needs to do the work it does. 

Mr. DENHAM. And from a funding perspective, I mean, going 

through a recession, are you seeing budgetary challenges? 

Mr. SHIMANSKI. We are. We finished the last fiscal year with a 

very modest surplus, but we are facing some challenges this year 

that will likely result in more re-engineering, more efficiencies and 

optimization as we look at a revenue that is projected to decrease. 

Mr. DENHAM. So what happens if you are running and you are 

faced with multiple disasters? 

36 

Mr. SHIMANSKI. Well, we are fortunate in that the American public has historically been generous, and the contributions that we receive are sufficient for us to respond to the disasters. 

The times when we are not able to are generally at times when 

there is a Presidential declaration, and at that point we can work 

with FEMA; we can work with our State and other partners to see 

what other funding opportunities might be available if it is a major 

disaster and charitable contributions have not been sufficient. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

And, Mr. Christmann, from a local perspective on the grants, 

dealing with the same area, emergency management performance 

grants provide assistance to States and local communities to help 

prepare and plan for disasters. If those were eliminated or no 

longer focused on the all hazards approach to disasters, how would 

that impact the city of St. Louis? 

Mr. CHRISTMANN. It would impact our capability to coordinate 

our local resources, our regional resources, and have that partnership with our State and Federal partners. It would also impact our 

outreach programs to do public preparedness, to get our citizens, 

as a number of the panel have talked about, that having our citizens prepared is key to the response, knowing that they are going 

to be impacted. The locals are going to be impacted due to the catastrophic event. 

And resources will come, but they will take a little while to get 

into those impacted areas, especially looking at a New Madrid 

earthquake where multiple States, multiple urban areas will be involved. That coordination is very key on the local level to insure 

that we have the best picture of where our resources are, who our 

partners are, what they can provide to us, and then build that instant management capability to bring those all to bear on that disaster itself. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you. 

And we are short on time, but I did want to get one more question in. The Vice Chair of this committee, Mr. Crawford, had some 

great things to say about you, Mr. Rash, but one of the concerns 

that he had was FEMA de-certifying levees, and if you could just 

explain that in greater detail. 

Mr. RASH. Yes, sir. The process for certification of levees has 

changed dramatically in the last 5 years, and there are numerous 

levees across the country that are being de-certified under new 

standards. Given little or no time to bring these areas up to this 

new standard, it has been placed on the backs of the local people 

to bring these up to standard and not given any time for implementation. 

The levees that I maintain with our district are certified under 

these new standards. However, the designation behind these levees, even at the top certification given now by FEMA and the Corps 

of Engineers, shows a shaded Zone X, which designates an area 

that has not been shown in an historical flood hazard area and now 

shows it in a flood hazard area. It shows it as a shaded Zone X. 

As I mentioned in my statement, with the MR&T and the 

projects like those, our levees are being undermined just by the 

fear placed on the new designated areas and our lenders are requiring flood insurance to be purchased. 

37 

We have not had any type of levee breach in 83 years in our 

area. There are numerous levees that do need to be brought up to 

standard. I would ask that we not handicap the areas that are 

properly protected because of other areas that are not meeting 

these new standards. 

I understand the new standards, and there area lot of things in 

the new standards that I think are good. I think it is good and everybody here has spoken about taking a new look. When we find 

a disaster, we encounter a disaster, we learn form it and we move 

on. But we do not want to miss the point. 

I fear that a lot of the historical design, the maintenance, the 

construction of good flood control projects across the country are 

being undermined through this new certification process and providing false fear in a lot of areas. That is not true in all areas, and 

I understand that, but there are areas that are properly protected 

that are being shown as a newly designated flood hazard area, and 

it is not a proper designation. 

I would ask that we take a step back and that we look at this 

process, that we look at the certification process and that the local 

people, working with the State through FEMA, through the Corps, 

through the Congress, to upgrade these levees instead of downgrading them through needless flood insurance. 

Mr. DENHAM. Thank you, Mr. Rash. 

Mr. RASH. Thank you. 

Mr. DENHAM. Mr. Crawford tells me that you have got a great 

deal of information in this area. This is something this committee 

will be looking into, and we would ask you to provide that information back to the committee. 

At this time, I would ask unanimous consent that the record of 

today’s hearing remain open until such time as our witnesses have 

provided answers to any questions that may be submitted to them 

in writing, and unanimous consent that during such time as the 

record remains open additional comments offered by individuals or 

groups may be included in the record of today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

I would like to thank our witnesses again for your testimony 

today. If no other Members have anything to add, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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