NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY ALLAN DUNLAP, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

IMSI; CAMPBELL, Dr., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 22-35253 

D.C. No. 1:20-cv-00555-CWD 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Candy W. Dale, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 31, 2023**

San Francisco, California

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Prisoner Timothy A. Dunlap—a death-penalty inmate incarcerated at the 

Idaho Maximum Security Institution—asserts that he requested to be placed in the 

prison’s Acute Mental Health Unit based on his mental health condition, but that the 

prison and its officials unlawfully denied his request. He appeals pro se from the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JUL 31 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

district court’s decisions (1) granting summary judgment rejecting his claims, and 

(2) denying his motion for reconsideration. Because the facts are known to the 

parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.

I

Dunlap’s first line of attack fails—the district court did not err in granting 

summary judgment rejecting Dunlap’s claims. Summary judgment is appropriate 

when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)—and although pro se inmates 

are excused from “strict compliance with the summary judgment rules,” they are not 

excused “from all compliance.” Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 

2018); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (explaining that a 

movant without the burden of proof at trial can prevail by simply “pointing out to 

the district court ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party’s case”). 

Here, Dunlap has failed to raise a genuine dispute as to any material fact 

relevant to whether the prison or its officials were “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t]” to 

his “serious medical needs,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)—and he 

has failed to present material evidence showing that the prison or its officials knew 

of and disregarded “an excessive risk” to his “health and safety,” Colwell v. 

Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up), or that the prison and 
3 

its officials denied any treatment necessary for adequate care of his mental health 

condition, see Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (clarifying the 

“high ... standard” for such Eighth Amendment claims). And to the extent that 

Dunlap argues that the prison or its officials violated Idaho state law by declining to 

place him in the Acute Mental Health Unit, we reject that contention (to the extent 

it is adequately developed) as unmeritorious. Ultimately, Dunlap provides no 

material reason to conclude that the district court erred—and we affirm its grant of 

summary judgment.

II

Dunlap’s second line of attack also fails—the district court did not err in 

denying Dunlap’s motion for reconsideration. “Reconsideration is appropriate if the 

district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear 

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening 

change in controlling law”—and “our review of a denial of a motion to reconsider 

is for abuse of discretion.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 

5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993); see Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos 

Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Here, Dunlap has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion 

in denying his motion for reconsideration. First, Dunlap has failed to identify any 

newly discovered evidence materially affecting the result—and he certainly never 
4 

presented such evidence to the district court. Second, Dunlap has failed to establish 

that the district court committed clear error or that its initial decision was manifestly 

unjust—indeed, he has not shown that the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment was even incorrect. And third, Dunlap has failed to identify any 

intervening change in the controlling law materially affecting the result. Ultimately, 

Dunlap provides no material reason to conclude that the district court erred—and we 

affirm its denial of Dunlap’s motion for reconsideration.

AFFIRMED.1

1 Dunlap’s various motions—see Dkt. No. 7 (Motion for Injunctive Relief),

Dkt. No. 13 (Motion to Certify Appeal), Dkt. No. 17 (Motion for Appointment of 

Counsel), Dkt. No. 24 (Motion to Take Judicial Notice), Dkt. No. 28 (Motion to Lift 

Briefing Stay and Issue Remand), Dkt. No. 31 (Motion for Issuance of Press 

Release), Dkt. No. 34 (Motion to Expand the Record), Dkt. No. 36 (Motion for 

Appointment of a Special Master), Dkt. No. 38 (Emergency Petition for a Writ of 

Mandamus), Dkt. No. 40 (Motion to Proffer, Seek Review, and Admission of 

Addendum), Dkt. No. 42 (Motion to Adopt Proposed Court Order), and Dkt. No. 44 

(Motion to Proffer, Seek Review, and Commission of Supplemental Exhibits)—are 

DENIED.