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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

REBEKAH E. NORGREN, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 2:14-cv-12417 

Judge Sean F. Cox 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 11) AND TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 13) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRM the 

Commissioner’s decision. 

II. REPORT 

 Plaintiff, Rebekah E. Norgren, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 

and 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance (DI) 

and supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. This matter is before the United 

States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s motion 

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for summary judgment (DE 11), the Commissioner’s cross motion for summary 

judgment (DE 13), Plaintiff’s answer (DE 14) and the administrative record (DE 

6). 

A. Background

 Plaintiff filed her applications for DI and SSI benefits during October 2011, 

alleging that she has been disabled since August 4, 2010, at age 33. R 178-186, 

187-194. Plaintiff alleges disability as a result of bipolar disorder,1

 anxiety 

disorder,2

 C5-6 disc herniation status post laminectomy & fusion surgery, cervical 

radiculopathy to right arm & hand, chronic nausea, low back pain, and thoracic 

spine pain across shoulders. R. at 210-224. Plaintiff’s applications were denied on 

November 9, 2011. R. at 55-67, 68-80, 81, 82. 

 

1 Bipolar disorder is “an affective disorder characterized by the occurrence of 

alternating manic, hypomanic, or mixed episodes and with major depresive 

episodes. The DSM specifies the commonly observed patterns of bipolar I and 

bipolar II disorder and cyclothymia.” Stedmans Medical Dictionary 259770 (Nov. 

2014). 

2 Anxiety disorders are “a group of disorders involving various manifestations of 

anxiety that are grouped together nosologically in the DSM. These include panic 

disorder (see also panic attack), specific phobia, formerly simple phobia (see 

phobia); social phobia that was formerly called social anxiety disorder; obsessivecompulsive disorder (OCD); (see also obsession, compulsion, obsessivecompulsive); posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); acute stress disorder; 

generalized anxiety disorder (GAD); and anxiety disorders secondary to medical 

conditions or substance-induced or not otherwise specified.” Stedmans Medical 

Dictionary 259650 (Nov. 2014).

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Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”). R. at 106-108. ALJ Henry Perez, Jr. held a hearing on January 22, 2013, 

at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and Vocational Expert (VE) Helen 

Topcik testified. R. at 26-46. On January 31, 2013, ALJ Perez determined that 

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. R. at 8-

25. 

On April 4, 2013, Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision. R. at 7. 

On April 19, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. R. at 

1-6. Thus, ALJ Perez’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. 

Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action on June 20, 2014. DE 1. 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

 In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since August 4, 

2010. See R. at 180, 187. Plaintiff’s medical records span the period from May 9, 

2009 to December 18, 2012. R. at 252-782 (Exhibits 1F-26F). 

1. Orthopedic History 

Of particular import here are the records of Frederick S. Junn, M.D., 

Plaintiff’s treating physician. On June 6, 2010, Dr. Junn diagnosed Plaintiff with 

intractable neck pain with C6 radiculopathy on the right and hyperemesis 

gravidarum. Dr. Junn also noted that an MRI revealed a C5-C6 lesion paracentral 

to the right in the epidural space, which may be disk versus schwannoma, and was 

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less likely to be blood or abscess. Dr. Junn ordered an MRI and planned for 

surgical intervention. R. at 276-278. 

On June 9, 2010, Dr. Junn performed an anterior cervical discectomy at C5-

6. R. at 274-275. She had a postoperative visit on July 22, 2010, at which time her 

symptoms had improved “with an improvement in her right upper extremity 

weakness, numbness and radicular pain.” Notes from that visit indicate that “most 

of her pain is located in the scapular region bilaterally and will radiate down to the 

mid thoracic region.” R. at 271-272. 

On November 4, 2011, Plaintiff complained of neck pain, “mostly on the 

right side that radiates into the [right upper extremity] with [numbness/tingling] 

and weakness[,]” and her pain was a 4/10. Dr. Junn prescribed physical therapy, 3 

times per week for 4 to 6 weeks. R at 727. 

On July 12, 2012, Plaintiff presented with constant pain in her right arm. 

Dr. Junn prescribed Neurontin. R. at 726. On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff 

underwent a cervical myelogram, which revealed (1) post-surgical changes with 

fusion hardware at C5-C6 without CT evidence of hardware loosening; and (2) redemonstration of a small central, posterior disc protrusion at C6-C7 without 

significant spinal canal stenosis. R. at 763-764, 765. 

On November 1, 2012, Dr. Junn completed a State of Michigan Family 

Independence Agency Medical Examination Report. Here, Dr. Junn noted that 

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Plaintiff could occasionally lift/carry up to 10 pounds, but could not lift/carry 20 or 

more pounds. R. at 761-762. 

On December 18, 2012, Plaintiff complained of neck pain and rated her pain 

an 8/10. Dr. Junn diagnosed degeneration of cervical intervertebral disc and other 

nerve root and plexus disorders. Dr. Junn prescribed physical therapy, 3 times a 

week for 4 to 6 weeks. R. at 759-760. 

2. Psychiatric History 

Plaintiff reports having suffered what can only be described as heartrending 

and severe abuse as a child. (See R. at 265, 416). The record reveals several 

diagnoses of mood disorder3

 and bipolar disorder. For example, on May 9, 2009, 

psychiatrist Babu R. Vadlamudi, M.D. diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar affective 

disorder4

 depressed type, assessed a GAF score of 15 and determined that Plaintiff 

needed acute psychiatric inpatient treatment. (R. at 261-262.) At a January 25, 

2011 office visit with Jessica Haveman, M.D., Plaintiff was assessed with mood 

disorder and started on Seroquel and Wellbutrin. (R. at 592-594.) On February 8, 

 

3 Mood disorders are “a group of mental disorders involving a disturbance of mood, 

accompanied by either a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome that is not 

due to any other mental disorder. Mood refers to a prolonged emotion that colors 

the whole psychic life; it generally involves either depression or elation; e.g.,

manic episode, major depressive episode, bipolar disorders, and depressive 

disorder (see separate entries for each).” Stedmans Medical Dictionary 260260 

(Nov. 2014).

4 Affective disorders are “a group of mental disorders characterized by a mood 

disturbance.” Stedmans Medical Dictionary 259620 (Nov. 2014).

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2011, therapist Betty Rickman diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder. (R. at 

419.)5

 Dr. Haveman again assessed Plaintiff with mood disorder on February 24, 

2011; she was to continue Wellbutrin but was not taking Seroquel. (R. at 595-

597). Notes from a March 21, 2011 consultation/initial psych evaluation with 

Michelle Fontenelle-Gilmer, M.D. diagnose Plaintiff with “Bipolar, Manic”, 

indicate that Plaintiff’s prescription for Wellbutrin would continue to be on hold 

and that Plaintiff would stop Seroquel, and prescribe Geodon. (R. at 598-600.) On 

April 7, 2011, Dr. Haveman assessed Plaintiff with “Bipolar disorder, 

unspecified”; although apparently experiencing diarrhea from the Geodon, Plaintiff 

was to continue taking it for two weeks, after which the prescription would be 

reassessed. (R. at 601-603.) 

On November 29, 2011, therapist Rickman assessed Plaintiff with bipolar 

affective disorder unspecified and a GAF score of 55. (R. at 686.) Plaintiff 

attended Life Practice, L.L.C. several times from November 29, 2011 through 

October 29, 2012. (R. at 757; see also, R. at 686-700, 758.). 

 C. Hearing Testimony (January 22, 2013) 

 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

 

5 Plaintiff treated at Hope Network Insight during February, April and June 2011. 

(R. at 415-424).

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 Plaintiff Rebekah Elizabeth Norgren testified at the January 22, 2013 

hearing. R. at 29-41. Plaintiff lives with her husband and four children. She has 

an Associate’s Degree, a medical assisting certification, and took a course in 

phlebotomy. R. at 29. In the past, she has worked as a sales associate at Hot 

Topic, in the meat department at Whole Foods, as a secretary, and at an industrial 

strength container heater company. R. at 30-31. 

When Plaintiff was healthier and working, she weighed about 170-175 

pounds. R. at 30. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff weighed 200 pounds. R. at 

29. Plaintiff attributes her increase in weight to being unable to “do anything.” R. 

at 30. 

 Plaintiff testified that she stopped working on August 4, 2010, due to a June 

2010 cervical spinal fusion. R. at 31. She went back to work two or three weeks 

after having the surgery, but after two or three weeks of working she had to stop. 

R. at 31-32. She could not do any of the work, as it was very painful in her back, 

neck, arm and hand. R. at 32. 

 Plaintiff describes the pain in her neck as “crunching” and “burning.” R. at 

34. She describes the pain in her arm as “often a burning and tingling or a numb 

pain and that also goes down into my hand and my fingers[,]” on the right side. R. 

at 34-35. This pain is almost always constant. R. at 35. 

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 For pain, Plaintiff takes hydrocodone (Norco) and perhaps Tylenol. She has 

a heating pad. Also, she uses Gabapentin as a nerve medicine and for her 

depression. R. at 35. She gets debilitating headaches from her neck pain two or 

three times per week. Often times, she will have to lie down. Sometimes the 

headaches last a couple of hours, sometimes an entire day. The headaches can 

make Plaintiff throw up. R. at 36. 

In addition to treating her neck pain with surgery and medication, Plaintiff 

stated that she has undergone three rounds of physical therapy, which helped a 

little bit. Every day, she uses a heating pad. R. at 37. During the day, she is 

usually on her bed, which has a “big, squishy mattress topper[,]” because 

“[e]verything else is kind of hard and painful.” R. at 37-38. Plaintiff is able to sit 

for about 10 or 15 minutes, stand for 5 or 10 minutes, and walk about one half of a 

block. R. at 38. She can lift and carry about a half gallon. She does not drive very 

much, because she cannot turn her head and is anxious. R. at 39.6

She spends her days at home. R. at 39. She does not really read anymore, 

because she is easily distracted. She watches more television than anything, but 

her mind “goes bad places when [she watches] TV.” She can fold laundry and 

sometimes dusts or wipes down the table. R. at 40. She cannot do the other 

 

6 In her function report, she indicates that she goes out “[a]bout 4 to 5 times a 

week[,]” either driving or as a passenger in a car. (R. at 228.). 

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chores, because “[t]hings are heavy, difficult, or require motions that I can’t do 

with my hand because I’m right-handed and I can’t use it hard.” R. at 40-41.7

 

 Plaintiff testified about psychological matters, including depression, sadness, 

anxiety, “racing thoughts,” “trouble concentrating,” “suicidal ideologies,” 

nervousness, lack of motivation, and crying. R. at 32-34. Plaintiff has been in 

therapy since she was 11 years old. (R. at 32.). 

 2. Vocational Expert Testimony

 The VE also testified. R. at 41-46. She was asked to assume an individual 

of Plaintiff’s age, education and work experience, with the following limitations: 

lifting 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently; sitting/standing/walking six 

hours; occasional handling with the right upper extremity; occasionally climbing, 

balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, and crawling; occasional, brief contact 

with the public; and jobs where an individual could carry out tasks that have one to 

two step instructions and do not require prolonged periods of sustained 

concentration, putting the individual at the unskilled level. R. at 43. 

The VE testified that such a person could not perform Plaintiff’s past 

relevant work. R. at 43. However, such a person could perform the occupations of 

 

7 In her function report, she also mentions taking care of her baby, overseeing her 

older children’s homework and bed times, preparing quick and easy meals one to 

three times per day, folding laundry multiple times per week and dusting biweekly. 

(R. at 226-227.).

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night patrol inspector, with 3,000 in the Detroit area; inspector, with 3,000 in the 

Detroit area; and sorter, with 3,500 in the Detroit area. R. at 43-44.8

 D. The Administrative Decision9

 ALJ Perez rendered his decision on January 31, 2013. R. at 8-25. At Step 1, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

August 4, 2010, the alleged onset date. R. at 13. 

 

8 The VE also testified as to hypotheticals where Plaintiff’s testimony was found 

credible, and exertional limitations and non-exertional limitations were taken into 

consideration. R. at 44-45. 

9 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a 

five-step sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). 

Although a dispositive finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin 

v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential 

review considers and answers five questions: 

 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

 2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

 3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet 

or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

 4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the 

claimant perform his or her past relevant work? 

 5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the 

national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th 

Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe impairments of status 

post anterior cervical discectomy (June 2010), affective disorder, and anxiety 

disorder. R. at 13. 

At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments. R. at 13-14. 

 At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work 

with the following limitations: lift no more than 10 pounds frequently and 20 

pounds occasionally; sit for no more than 6 hours of an 8-hour workday; stand 

and/or walk for no more than 6 hours of an 8-hour workday; occasionally handle 

with her right upper extremity; occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

or crawl; occasional, brief contact with the public; tasks with 1 or 2 step 

instructions; cannot require prolonged periods of sustained concentration; and 

unskilled work. R. at 14-18. Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to 

perform any past relevant work. R. at 18-19. 

 At Step 5, having considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, 

and RFC, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy that Plaintiff can perform. R. at 19-20. 

 E. Standard of Review

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 The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final 

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case 

under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal 

standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see 

also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as 

to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under 

this standard, “substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence 

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 

1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); 

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, 

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

 Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. 

The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from 

[the] weight’” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 

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395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 

(1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this 

Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that 

would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a 

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its 

own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or 

deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting 

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

F. Analysis

In her motion for summary judgment, as well as her answer to Defendant’s 

dispositive motion, Plaintiff sets forth three statements of error: (1) the ALJ failed 

to accord controlling weight to the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating surgeon, Dr. 

Junn, as to functional limitations required by his patient, contrary to the terms of 

the treating physician rule; (2) the ALJ’s finding that post-surgical images revealed 

only “mild abnormalities” is not supported by substantial evidence, further 

undercutting his findings as to the severity of Plaintiff’s condition; and (3) the ALJ 

additionally failed to adequately account for plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations 

in setting forth the RFC. DE 11 at 13-19, DE 14 at 4-8. 

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The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff’s motion, asserting that: (1) substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s assignment of weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

treating surgeon; (2) substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of the 

record medical imaging; and (3) Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the ALJ omitted 

any significant non-exertional limitations from his RFC finding or his 

corresponding hypothetical to the VE. DE 13 at 17-29. 

The Undersigned will address each argument raised in turn. 

1. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Weighing of 

Opinion Evidence. 

The ALJ must consider all medical opinions that he or she receives in 

evaluating a claimant’s case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). The regulations define 

medical opinions as “statements from physicians . . . that reflect judgments about 

the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis 

and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or 

mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2). “Administrative law judges are 

not bound by any findings made by State agency medical or psychological 

consultants, or other program physicians or psychologists.” 20 CFR § 

404.1527(e)(2)(i). The ALJ must, however, “consider findings and other opinions” 

of State Agency medical or psychological consultants. 

The ALJ generally gives deference to the opinions of a treating source 

“since these are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a 

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detailed, longitudinal picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring 

a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the 

objective medical findings alone . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2); Blakley v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). To qualify as a treating 

source, the physician must have an “ongoing treatment relationship” with the 

claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. 

If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion, the ALJ must meet certain procedural requirements. Wilson v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). 10 Specifically, if an ALJ does not 

give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight: 

[A]n ALJ must apply certain factors—namely, the length of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature 

and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, 

consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the 

 

10 An exception exists for treating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the 

Commissioner, which “are never entitled to controlling weight or special 

significance.” S.S.R. 96-5p, 61 FR 34471-0, at *34473. Examples of issues 

reserved to the Commissioner include: 

1. Whether an individual’s impairment(s) meets or is equivalent in 

severity to the requirements of any impairment(s) in the listings; 

2. What an individual’s RFC is; 

3. Whether an individual’s RFC prevents him or her from doing past 

relevant work; 

4. How the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience 

apply; and 

5. Whether an individual is “disabled” under the Act. 

Id. 

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specialization of the treating source—in determining what weight to 

give the opinion. 

Id.

Furthermore, an ALJ must “always give good reasons in [the ALJ’s] notice 

of determination or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] your treating source’s 

opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning “must be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that 

weight.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-3889, 2010 WL 1725066, at *7 

(6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals 

for the Sixth Circuit has stressed the importance of the good-reason requirement: 

“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants 

understand the disposition of their cases,” particularly in situations 

where a claimant knows that his physician has deemed him disabled 

and therefore “might be especially bewildered when told by an 

administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some reason for the 

agency’s decision is supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d 

Cir.1999). The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the 

treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s 

application of the rule. See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32–33 

(2d Cir. 2004). 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544–45. Thus, the reason-giving requirement is “particularly 

important when the treating physician has diagnosed the claimant as disabled.” 

Germany-Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312 F. A’ppx 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242). 

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Among the ALJ’s many citations in his Step 4 RFC determination is his 

discussion of Dr. Junn’s November 1, 2012 State of Michigan Family 

Independence Agency (FIA) Medical Examination Report. R. at 17, 761-762. 

After noting Dr. Junn’s diagnosis of cervical disc herniation - and the limitations of 

lifting no more than 10 pounds occasionally, standing and/or walking for a total of 

less than 2 hours in an 8-hour work day, sitting and standing at will, and an 

inability to repetitively use either upper extremity for simple grasping or fine 

manipulation, while further noting Dr. Junn’s assessment that Plaintiff can meet 

her needs in the home - the ALJ stated: 

Weight is given to this opinion. Dr. Junn’s treatment records do not 

reflect any problems with Claimant’s left upper extremity. However, 

his opinion that Claimant has some difficulty standing or walking for 

prolonged periods is consistent with the [RFC] and Claimant’s 

testimony. The opinion that Claimant can meet her needs in her home 

is consistent with Claimant’s statements that she is able to prepare 

simple meals, do light housekeeping, and care for her children. 

R. at 17 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to 

perform light work with the following limitations: lift no more than 10 pounds 

frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; sit for no more than 6 hours of an 8-hour 

workday; stand and/or walk for no more than 6 hours of an 8-hour workday; 

occasionally handle with her right upper extremity; occasionally climb, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; occasional, brief contact with the public; tasks with 

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1 or 2 step instructions; cannot require prolonged periods of sustained 

concentration; and unskilled work. R. at 14-18. 

In the motion at bar, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not comply with 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 in his treatment of the functional limitations imposed 

by Dr. Junn. DE 11 at 14. In particular, after referring to the above-quoted portion 

of the ALJ’s Step 4 RFC determination, Plaintiff notes that the ALJ later stated: 

“None of Claimant’s treating sources have opined that her pain prevents her from 

working. It does not appear that any functional or work limitations were discussed 

at any of Claimant’s office visits.” R. at 18 (emphasis added). It is Plaintiff’s 

position that ALJ Perez’s opinion contradicts itself as to limitations and that the 

RFC does not address some of the limitations the ALJ acknowledged. 

To be sure, the Undersigned acknowledges that there are differences 

between Dr. Junn’s November 1, 2012 assessment of functional limitations and the 

functional limitations set forth in Plaintiff’s RFC. R. at 14, 761-762. Moreover, 

considering that the November 8, 2011 physical RFC assessment was signed by a 

single decision maker (SDM), Dr. Junn’s opinion November 1, 2012 opinion may 

well be, as Plaintiff asserts, “the only opinion of record as to [P]laintiff’s RFC.” 

DE 11 at 16, R. at 75-76, 761-762. 

However, the Court should conclude that the ALJ did provide “good 

reasons” for rejecting certain functional limitations assessed by Dr. Junn: 

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a. Repetitive Action with Hands/Arms 

The ALJ acknowledged Dr. Junn’s November 1, 2012 assessment. Dr. Junn 

had noted that Plaintiff could not use either upper extremity for simple grasping or 

fine manipulating, but could use both hands and arms for reaching, pushing and 

pulling. (R. at 762). The ALJ observed that Dr. Junn’s treatment records did not 

reflect any problems with Plaintiff’s left upper extremity. R. at 17. The resulting 

RFC contains the limitation that Plaintiff “can only occasionally handle with her 

right upper extremity[,]” which seems to accredit Dr. Junn’s assessment. R. at 14. 

b. Standing/Walking and Sitting 

Dr. Junn also assessed Plaintiff (by form checklist) as being able to stand 

and/or walk with normal breaks11 for a total of less than 2 hours in an 8-hour work 

day, including a handwritten notation which reads, “sit and stand at will[.]” R. at 

762. Here, the ALJ recognized that Plaintiff had “some difficulty” with standing 

or walking for prolonged periods and found this consistent with the RFC and 

Plaintiff’s testimony. R. at 17. The corresponding limitation in the RFC is that 

Plaintiff may stand and/or walk for no more than six hours of an eight-hour 

workday. R. at 14. 

 

11 In her motion, the Commissioner refers to the Program Operations Manual 

System (POMS): “Consider an 8-hour workday and a 5 day work week (with 

normal breaks, e.g., lunch, morning and afternoon breaks) in evaluating the ability 

to sustain work-related functions.” POMS, § DI 24510.005(C)(2)(b), 

https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0424510005; see also, DE 13 at 19, 27. 

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The RFC does not address Dr. Junn’s assessment that Plaintiff should have a 

sit and stand at will option (R. at 762). However, any omission in this regard is 

harmless. At the hearing, the ALJ posed a second hypothetical in which the VE 

was asked to treat Plaintiff’s testimony as credible and take into consideration 

exertional impairments. Here, the VE testified that such conditions would preclude 

light jobs but would permit sedentary mobs with a sit/stand option, such as: a 

sedentary inspector, for which there were 3,500 in the Detroit area; a surveillance 

system monitor, for which there were 800 in the Detroit area; and a table worker, 

for which there were 3,000 in the Detroit area. R. at 44-45. Therefore, the 

Commissioner is correct that, even if the ALJ had credited Dr. Junn’s sit/stand 

option, the ALJ would still have concluded that Plaintiff was capable of 

performing other work. DE 13 at 19-20 n.4. 

c. Lifting/Carrying 

Dr. Junn also limited Plaintiff to occasionally lifting/carrying 10 pounds or 

less and never lifting/carrying 20-50 pounds or more. R. at 762. At the January 

22, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she could lift and carry about a half gallon. 

R. at 39. As noted earlier, the ALJ’s RFC determination included limitations of 

lifting no more than 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally. R. at 14. 

Here, too, any inconsistency between Dr. Junn’s assessment, Plaintiff’s 

testimony and the ALJ’s corresponding RFC limitation is harmless. When the ALJ 

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posed the second hypothetical, which included Plaintiff’s exertional impairments, 

the VE acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony that “she could only lift a half a gallon, 

which is, I believe, 64 ounces.” R. at 44, 39. Although this limitation precluded 

light jobs, it would permit the aforementioned sedentary jobs with a sit/stand 

option. R. at 44. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).12 Therefore, even if 

the ALJ had credited Dr. Junn’s limitation of occasional lifting/carrying 10 pounds 

or less, the ALJ would still have concluded that Plaintiff was capable of 

performing other work. 

d. Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of 

her credibility. 

Moreover, the ALJ was not required to base his decision on Dr. Junn’s 

November 1, 2012 assessment. “[T]reating source opinions on issues that are 

reserved to the Commissioner are never entitled to controlling weight or special 

significance. Giving controlling weight to such opinions would, in effect, confer 

upon the treating source the authority to make the determination or decision about 

whether an individual is under a disability, and thus would be an abdication of the 

Commissioner's statutory responsibility to determine whether an individual is 

 

12 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and 

occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. 

Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount 

of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are 

sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary 

criteria are met.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).

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disabled.” SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, 2 (July 2, 1996); see also, Rudd v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec., 531 F.App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013). 

To be sure, “the ALJ may not substitute his own medical judgment for that 

of the treating physician where the opinion of the treating physician is supported 

by the medical evidence.” Meece v. Barnhart, 192 Fed.Appx. 456, 465 (6th 2006) 

(citing cases). Also, “[t]he ALJ must not substitute his own judgment for a 

doctor's conclusion without relying on other medical evidence or authority in the 

record.” Mason v. Commissioner of Social Sec., No. 1:07-cv-51, 2008 WL 

1733181, 13 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 14, 2008) (Beckwith, C.J. adopting report and 

recommendation of Hogan, M.J.); see also, White v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 

No. 13-15172, 2015 WL 1510640, 13 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2015) (Cox, J., 

accepting and adopting report and recommendation of Hluchaniuk, M.J.) (citing 

Mason). 

Here, the ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s credibility. For example, the ALJ 

noted Plaintiff’s testimony about spending most of the day in bed, compared to her 

statements about caring for her baby and two school aged stepchildren. See R. at 

18, 29, 37-38, 39-40, 226.13 Although Plaintiff takes the position that she would 

not have been found able to work had she been found credible (DE 11 at 12), her 

 

13 Likewise, based upon other information contained in the record, the ALJ could 

have pointed to the fact that Plaintiff folds laundry, dusts, drives and goes out 

about four to five times per week. R. at 226-228. 

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arguments do not challenge the ALJ’s assessment of her credibility (DE 11 at 13-

19). See also, Hogg v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 328, 333 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The evidence 

tends to show that Hogg did not experience marked restrictions in activities in her 

daily living. She herself stated that she was able to care for herself and her son, and 

that she was able to maintain an active schedule of daily activities, including 

attending church and vocational training, visiting relatives, and driving herself.”); 

Sizemore v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 865 F.2d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 

1988) (“the appellant's own testimony disclosed that he was able to drive an 

automobile, shop, do housework, visit relatives regularly and babysit his grandson 

occasionally, read and view television, feed the chickens daily and garden from 

time to time.”). 

Thus, as the Commissioner asserts, the ALJ credited Dr. Junn’s opinion to 

the extent he found it consistent with the record evidence as a whole, and did not 

afford it controlling weight where he found Plaintiff’s corresponding statements 

about her limitations to be less than fully credible. DE 13 at 21-22.14 It was well 

 

14 In reply, Plaintiff cites Wyatt v. Commissioner of Social Sec., No. 12-11406, 2013 

WL 4483074 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2013) (O'Meara, J., adopting report and 

recommendation of Randon, M.J.) within her argument that "The ALJ failed to 

accord controlling weight to the opinions of plaintiff’s treating surgeon, Dr. Junn, 

as to functional limitations required by his patient, contrary to the terms of the 

treating physician rule." See DE 14 at 5. In Wyatt, the Court noted: "'there are 

limited occasions when the medical evidence is so clear, and so undisputed, that an 

ALJ would be justified in drawing functional capacity conclusions from such 

evidence without the assistance of a medical source.'" Wyatt, 2013 WL 4483074, 

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within his authority to handle the information in this manner. Crum v. Sullivan, 

921 F.2d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 1990).15 

2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s discussion of the 

post-surgical images. 

 As noted above, Plaintiff’s surgery occurred on June 9, 2010. R. at 274-275. 

Among Plaintiff’s medical records are post-surgery diagnostic testing, such as: a 

January 17, 2011 MRI of the cervical spine (R. at 505-506); a January 17, 2011 

plain film of the cervical spine (R. at 497-498); a January 17, 2011 EMG (R. at 

499-500); a June 13, 2011 MRI of the lumbar spine (R. at 495-496); a July 25, 

2012 EMG (R. at 728); and an August 20, 2012 CT myelogram cervical S/I (R. at 

765). 

Within his Step 4 RFC determination, ALJ Perez stated: “Despite 

Claimant’s allegations of disabling neck, back, and arm pain, post-surgical images 

 

*16-*17 (quoting Mitsoff v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:12cv046, 2013 WL 

1098188, at *9 (S.D. Ohio March 15, 2013)). In the instant case, as noted above, 

the ALJ gave weight to Dr. Junn’s November 2012 opinion, albeit not controlling 

weight with respect to each functional limitation. This is not a case in which the 

ALJ formulated an RFC “without the assistance of a medical source.” He in fact 

utilized the information gained from the medical source, while giving aspects of it 

appropriate, relative weight in light of the Plaintiff’s diminished credibility. 

15 “The ALJ did not ignore Dr. Wiley's (the psychiatrist's) report. He specifically 

found that the evidence presented by the claimant's treating physician, Dr. 

Barrowclough, and by Dr. Konrad (a consulting physician) were more consistent 

with Dr. Hier's (the psychologist's) assessment than with Dr. Wiley's. Further, Dr. 

Hier performed accepted psychological tests, while Dr. Wiley's opinions were 

established almost entirely on the basis of the claimant's subjective complaints.” 

Crum, 921 F.2d at 645.

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show only mild abnormalities.” R. at 18 (emphasis added). In the instant, Plaintiff 

challenges this statement by pointing to the July 25, 2012 and August 20, 2012 

tests, which Plaintiff claims were consistent with Dr. Junn’s November 1, 2012 

report. DE 11 at 16-17. 

 However, the Court should conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s statement that post-surgical images show only mild abnormalities.16 The 

medical record contains information in support of a range of adjudicative 

conclusions. The ALJ did consider the July 25, 2012 EMG, which was consistent 

with right C7-C8 radiculopathy, and the August 20, 2012 cervical myelogram, 

which revealed “[p]ostsurgical changes with fusion hardware at C5-C6 without CT 

evidence of hardware loosening[,]” and “[r]edemonstration of a small central, 

posterior disc protrusion at C8-C7 without significant spinal canal stenosis.” R. at 

16, 728, 763-765.17 In contrast, the ALJ also considered the June 3, 2010 MRI of 

the cervical spine, which revealed “effacement of the thecal sac with mild

narrowing of the central spinal canal and mild to moderate narrowing of the right 

lateral recess[;]” the January 17, 2011 cervical spine MRI, which revealed mild 

disc herniation in the left C7 neural foramen without compromise of the exiting 

 

16 The parties agree that EMGs are not “images.” See DE 13 at 22-23, DE 14 at 6. 

17 Presumably, it was to the August 20, 2012 cervical myelogram (R at 763-

765)that Dr. Junn was referring in his November 1, 2012 assessment, in which he 

stated: “CT myelogram shows small central disc protrusion @ C6-C7 causing 

effacement of thecal sac[.]” R. at 761-762. 

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nerve root; and the June 13, 2011 MRI of the lumbar spine, which revealed “[n]o 

MR evidence for focal disc protrusion to suggest disc herniation[,]” and “[m]ild 

disc desiccation and diffuse disc bulgings at L3-L4 and L4-L5 . . . .” R. at 16, 322, 

505-506, 495-496 (emphasis added); see also R. at 338-339. 

Plaintiff replies that the August 20, 2012 myelogram clearly contradicts the 

ALJ’s January 31, 2013 finding that “post-surgical images show only mild 

abnormalities[,]” and undercuts the ALJ’s conclusions as to the limitations 

necessitated by Ms. Norgren’s cervical problems. DE 14 at 6-7, R. at 18, 763-765. 

However, as the Commissioner points out, the January 17, 2011 EMG was normal 

(R. at 499-500) and the December 18, 2012 notes of Dr. Junn state his belief that 

Plaintiff’s arm symptoms were related to thoracic outlet syndrome rather than 

cervical radiculopathy (R. at 759-760), a statement upon which the ALJ relied. See

DE 13 at 24, R. at 17. Thus, the significance of the July 25, 2012 EMG, which 

revealed evidence of cervical radiculopathy (R. at 729-730), is questionable. 

In sum, there is ample support in the June 2010 cervical spine MRI (R. at 

322, 338-339), the January 2011 cervical spine MRI (R. at 505-506) and the June 

2011 lumbar spine MRI (R. at 495-496) for the ALJ’s statement that “post-surgical 

images show only mild abnormalities[,]” R. at 18. Plaintiff is just asking the Court 

to reassess the weight of the evidence, which it may not do. See Haun v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec., 107 F.App’x 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2004) (“We may not 

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reweigh conflicting evidence on appeal, but instead must affirm Judge Davis's 

decision because substantial evidence supports it.”). 

3. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the ALJ omitted any 

significant physical or mental limitations from the residual 

functional capacity (RFC) finding. 

 Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately account for her 

non-exertional limitations in setting forth the RFC. DE 11 at 17-19. Plaintiff’s 

RFC is “the most [he or she] can still do despite the physical and mental limitations 

resulting from [his or] her impairments.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. 

App’x 149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). 

The determination of Plaintiff’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner and 

must be supported by substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(3), 416.927(e). 

‘“ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own 

independent medical findings.’” Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App’x 

181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 

1996)). 

Pursuant to Social Security Rule 96-8p, the RFC assessment must include: 

[A] narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each 

conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings) and 

nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations). In 

assessing RFC, the adjudicator must discuss the individual’s ability to 

perform sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a 

regular and continuing basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or 

an equivalent work schedule), and describe the maximum amount of 

each work-related activity the individual can perform based on the 

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evidence available in the case record. The adjudicator must also 

explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the 

evidence in the case record were considered and resolved.

S.S.R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *6-7 (July 2, 1996) (emphasis added). 

During the hearing, ALJ Perez questioned the VE about Plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations, and VE Topcik testified: “The non-exertional limitations 

would be things such as her problems concentrating, the headaches which cause 

her to have to lay down two hours at a time or a whole day, her crying spells, 

depression, any of these things which would cause her to be off-task would 

preclude the ability to perform any jobs at all.” R. at 45 (emphasis added). 

a. The Non-Exertional Limitations in the RFC are 

supported by substantial evidence. 

As noted earlier, ALJ Perez’s Step 4 RFC determination included limitations 

for occasional, brief contact with the public; tasks with one or two-step 

instructions; and no requirement for prolonged periods of sustained 

concentration. R. at 14. In arriving at his RFC determination, the ALJ considered 

several records, such as: 

 May 9, 2009 screening assessment from Hegira Programs, Inc. 

Psychiatric Intervention Center, which indicated suicidal 

ideation and showed a primary diagnosis of bipolar affective 

disorder depressed type and a GAF score of 15 (R. at 258, 261); 

 January 25, 2011 notes of Jessica Haveman, M.D. of Oakwood 

Westland, which acknowledged “possible [postpartum], 

depression[,]” and assessed Plaintiff with “mood disorder,” (R. 

at 593); 

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 February 8, 2011 notes of Ms. Rickman, which listed a 

diagnosis of bipolar disorder and a GAF assessment of 53 (R. at 

419); 

 November 29, 2011 notes of a therapist Betty Rickman from 

Life Practice, L.L.C., which listed a diagnosis of bipolar 

affective disorder and a GAF score of 55 (R. at 686); and 

 November 29, 2011 through October 29, 2012 attendance log of 

Life Practice, L.L.C. (R. at 757-758). 

 

See R. at 17-18.18 Moreover, the ALJ assigned some weight to the November 9, 

2011 mental RFC assessment of non-treating, non-examining Leonard C. Balunas, 

Ph.D. R. at 18. As to sustained concentration and persistence, Dr. Balunas opined 

that Plaintiff “can carry out tasks that have one and two step instructions and do 

not require prolonged periods of sustained concentration[,]” (R. at 63-65). 

 

18 The GAF scale was used to report a clinician’s judgment of an individual’s 

overall level of functioning. Clinicians selected a specific GAF score within the 

ten-point range by evaluating whether the individual was functioning at the higher 

or lower end of the range. See American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 33–34 (American Psychiatric Association, 

4th ed. text rev. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR). A GAF score of 20 indicated some danger of 

hurting self or others, or occasionally failing to maintain minimal personal 

hygiene, or gross impairment in communication. DSM-IV-TR at 34. A GAF 

score of 41-50 was indicative of serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe 

obsession rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, 

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job). DSMIV-TR at 34. However, “the most recent version of the DSM does not include a 

GAF rating for assessment of mental disorders.” Bryce v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 

12-CV-14618, 2014 WL 1328277, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2014). 

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 Furthermore, although Plaintiff was assessed nearly four years before the 

hearing date with a GAF score of 15 (on May 9, 2009)she was later assessed with a 

GAF score of 53 on February 8, 2011 and a GAF score of 55 on November 29, 

2011, and the ALJ took these scores into consideration. R. at 18, 261, 419, 686. 

GAF scores in the mid-50s do not preclude a conclusion that Plaintiff has the 

mental capacity to hold at least some jobs. Smith v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 

482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Even assuming GAF scores are determinative, 

the record supports a GAF in the high 40s to mid 50s, which would not preclude 

her from having the mental capacity to hold at least some jobs in the national 

economy.”). 

b. Plaintiff has not successfully challenged the ALJ’s 

non-exertional limitations. 

 

Plaintiff hypothesizes that the diagnosis of bipolar disorder “would provide 

for crying spells, depression, and problems concentrating . . . .” DE 11 at 17-18. 

Also, Plaintiff takes issue with the VE’s testimony in response to the first 

hypothetical, which included the limitation of not requiring prolonged periods of 

sustained concentration and yielded work as a night patrol inspector, an inspector 

and a sorter (see R. at 43-44), compared to the VE’s later testimony in response to 

the third hypothetical that Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations, among which were 

concentration problems, would preclude the ability to perform any jobs (see R. at 

45). DE 11 at 17. Furthermore, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s assignment of 

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“some weight” to the opinion of non-treating, non-examining Dr. Balunas, while 

the ALJ failed to indicate the weight assigned to the other treating mental health 

records, especially considering that Dr. Balunas’s November 9, 2011 assessment 

took place 14-15 months before the January 22, 2013 hearing. DE 11 at 17-18, R. 

at 60-61, 63-65. 

However, Plaintiff has not successfully challenged the ALJ’s RFC nonexertional limitations. At the time of Dr. Balunas’s November 9, 2011 assessment, 

he had before him, inter alia, records from: 

 Hope Network Insight, presumably Ex. 5F (R. at 415-424); 

 Oakwood Hospital-Westland; 

 Wayne State University Physician Group; 

 Oakwood Annapolis of Wayne, presumably Ex. 3F (R. at 280-

342); 

 Oakwood Hospital Medical Center, presumably Ex. 4F (R. at 

343-414); 

 Thermatrix, presumably Ex. 9F (R. at 655-668); 

 Lucia Zamorano, M.D., presumably Ex. 7F (R. at 456-510); 

 Psychiatric Intervention Center, presumably Ex. 1F (R. at 252-

270); 

 Team Mental Health, presumably Ex. 10F (R. at 669-670); 

 Plymouth Physical Therapy Specialist, presumably Ex. 6F (R. 

at 425-455); and 

 Oakwood Brain & Spine, presumably Ex. 2F (R. at 271-279) 

 

See R. at 56-58, 69-71. Here, Plaintiff’s argument about Dr. Balunas lacking 

the complete medical record “does not identify anything in [the] subsequent 

records that could reasonably be expected to have altered Dr. Balunas’ opinion had 

he had the opportunity to review it.” DE 11 at 18-19, DE 13 at 26. Plaintiff has 

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not shown that the omission was harmful. See Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an 

error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s 

determination.”). Moreover, the entry of additional medical documentation into 

the record, without more, does not automatically invalidate the opinions of a 

reviewing state agency medical expert. See Helm v. Commissioner of Social Sec. 

Admin., 405 Fed.Appx. 997, 1002 (6th Cir. 2011) (“the ALJ was not required to 

give relatively less weight to the agency source opinions simply because they were 

contrary to the opinion of Dr. Cheng.”).I acknowledge Plaintiff’s reply that 

harmless error analysis is not a substitute for articulating why certain pieces of 

evidence are credited or rejected, which, in turn, permits meaningful appellate 

review. DE 14 at 7-8. “Administrative law judges and the Appeals Council are 

not bound by findings made by State agency or other program physicians and 

psychologists, but they may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight 

given to the opinions in their decisions.” SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, 2 (July 2, 

1996); see also, Hurst v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 753 F.2d 517, 

519 (6th Cir. 1985) (“In the absence of an explicit and reasoned rejection of an 

entire line of evidence, the remaining evidence is “substantial” only when 

considered in isolation. It is more than merely ‘helpful’ for the ALJ to articulate 

reasons ... for crediting or rejecting particular sources of evidence. It is absolutely 

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essential for meaningful appellate review.”) (quoting Zblewski v. Schweiker, 732 

F.2d 75, 78 (7th Cir.1984)). 

Nonetheless, the foregoing discussion of ALJ Perez’s January 31, 2013 

decision evidences enough articulation to provide meaningful appellate review. 

Keeton v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 583 F.App’x 515, 531 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(“Following a partial review of Plaintiff's medical records, Lewis [the nonexamining state consulting psychologist] acknowledged Plaintiff's treatment 

history and reviewed the record to gain an understanding of Plaintiff's ability to 

perform daily life skills. Her report accurately summarized much of Plaintiff's 

medical history, and there is no direct evidence in the record that contradicts 

Lewis' findings. As a result, the ALJ did not err in according substantial weight to 

Lewis' opinion.”). 

c. Conclusion 

As shown above, the ALJ’s light work RFC finding included several 

limitations (R. at 14), and the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s non-exertional 

limitations is supported by substantial evidence. In the end, it is the claimant’s 

burden to prove his or her RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a);19 Foster v. Halter, 

279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has not satisfied her burden to 

 

19 “In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or disabled.” 20 C.F.R. 

416.912(a). 

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challenge the ALJ’s RFC finding. The ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s nonexertional RFC limitations - “occasional, brief contact with the public[,]” “tasks 

with one- or two-step instructions[,]” and “work [that] cannot require prolonged 

periods of sustained concentration[,]” and “unskilled work[,]” - R. at 14, is 

supported by the record. That being the case, it is not this Court’s role to reject the 

ALJ’s findings, even if it might have reached a different conclusion had it served 

as the trier of fact in the first instance. Braden v. Secretary of Health & Human 

Services, No. 90-3028, 1990 WL 177211, 2 (6th Cir. Nov. 14, 1990) (“If the 

administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed 

even if the court as trier of fact would have arrived at a different conclusion.”) 

(citing Elkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6th 

Cir.1981)). 

G. Conclusion

 In sum, from a review of the record as a whole, the Undersigned concludes 

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. 

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and 

AFFIRM the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

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35

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

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Dated: July 30, 2015 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on July 30, 2015, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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