1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

Alexandria Division 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

STOP RECKLESS ECONOMIC ) 

INSTABILITY CAUSED BY DEMOCRATS, ) No. 1:14-CV-00397-AJT-IDD 

NIGER INNIS, NIGER INNIS FOR ) 

CONGRESS, TEA PARTY LEADERSHIP ) 

FUND, and ALEXANDRIA REPUBLICAN ) Judge Anthony John Trenga 

CITY COMMITTEE, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiffs, ) Magistrate Judge Ivan D. Davis 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

_______________________________________) 

 

PLAINTIFFS’ REBUTTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND AGAINST DEFENDANT’S RULE 56(d) MOTION

 This case is about whether the First Amendment permits the government to impose 

different contribution limits on materially indistinguishable political committees (i.e., 

committees that have received more than 50 contributions and contributed to more than five 

federal candidates), based solely on whether they have existed for 6 months—particularly when 

the government increases the amount such a committee may contribute to a candidate when it 

hits the six-month mark, while inexplicably slashing the amount it may contribute to political 

parties. None of the discovery that the FEC claims to need, which focuses on Plaintiffs 

themselves, is necessary to resolve this pure question of law. Plaintiffs therefore respectfully ask 

this Court to adjudicate the merits of their summary judgment motion and deny Defendant 

Federal Election Commission’s (“FEC”) motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) for additional time 

in which to take discovery. 

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 Each piece of discovery the FEC seeks relates to either: 

 (i) pure questions of law that the U.S. Supreme Court already has resolved, rather than 

issues of fact for which discovery is appropriate;1

 (ii) matters that are not reasonably subject to dispute; 

 (iii) matters that, if established, would not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact,

see Murchinson v. Astrue, 466 F. App’x 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2012), or 

 (iv) information already within the FEC’s possession. 

 Some of the FEC’s requests test the bounds of credulity. For example, despite the fact 

that Plaintiff Niger Innis is appearing on Nevada ballots in a few weeks as a candidate for the 

Republican nomination for Congress and has an active candidate committee registered with the 

FEC, the FEC professes the need for discovery to determine “whether plaintiff Innis is eligible to 

vote in a presidential election.” FEC Rule 56(d) Brief 13 n. 11;2 cf. Voter Registration Record 

for Niger Innis (attached as Exh. 1 to Declaration of Dan Backer). Requests such as this 

underscore the fact that the FEC’s requested discovery will lead only to unnecessarily delay, 

without facilitating resolution of the pure questions of law this case entails. 

1. Plaintiffs’ claims are narrow, pure questions of law. Plaintiffs ask this Court 

to determine whether, under the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment, the Government 

 

1 See Pisano v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of Rule 56(f) motion 

in First Amendment ballot-access case “given that the question before us is principally one of 

law”); see also Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor & City Council, 683 F.3d 

539, 559 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s refusal to allow defendant to take discovery 

concerning plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, because plaintiffs asserted “overbreadth” 

claims that were apparent from “the face of the Ordinance” and constituted “question[s] of law”) 

(quotation marks omitted); 

2

 This brief uses the abbreviation “FEC Rule 56(d) Brief” to refer to Defendant Federal Election 

Commission’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Allow Time for Discovery Under Rule 

56(d) and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. #27-1 (May 23, 

2014). 

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may prohibit a political committee that meets all the requirements for recognition as a 

“multicandidate political committee” (“multicandidate PAC”), except for the fact that it has not 

yet existed for 6 months, from contributing the full statutory amount of $5,000 per election to the 

candidates it supports, while simultaneously cutting the amounts that it may contribute to local, 

state, and national political party committees once it reaches that six-month mark. 

 Current law imposes the following disparate limits on non-connected political 

committees that have received contributions from more than 50 people, and contributed to five or 

more federal candidates, based solely on whether the committee has been registered with the 

FEC for more than six months: 

Recipient of Contribution: 

If the Political Committee 

Making Contribution 

Has Existed for Less 

Than Six (6) Months 

If the Political Committee 

Making the Contribution 

Has Existed for More 

Than Six (6) Months 

Candidate $2,600 

2 U.S.C § 441a(a)(1)(A) 

$5,000 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) 

(limit increased) 

State political party 

committee and local 

party committee affiliates 

 

$10,000 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(D) 

 

$5,000 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(C) 

(limit reduced) 

 

National political 

party committee 

$32,400 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) 

$15,000 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B) 

(limit reduced) 

This Court may adjudicate the constitutionality of this disparate treatment of materially identical 

political committees as a matter of law, based on precedent, without subjecting Plaintiffs to 

intrusive discovery about their intended exercise of their fundamental First Amendment rights. 

Case 1:14-cv-00397-AJT-IDD Document 29 Filed 05/27/14 Page 3 of 15 PageID# 189
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2. This case is time-sensitive by its very nature, because Plaintiffs Stop Reckless 

Economic Instability Caused by Democrats (“Stop PAC”)3 and Niger Innis for Congress 

(“NIFC”)4 seek to challenge a discriminatory limit on contributions from political committees to 

candidates that applies only during the first six (6) months of a committee’s existence. The FEC 

contends, and Plaintiffs are willing to stipulate for purposes of this litigation, that Stop PAC was 

formed on March 11, 2014. FEC Rule 56(d) Brief at 6 n.7. This means that the discriminatory 

restriction will be lifted on September 11, 2014 (at which point the FEC is likely to contend that 

this case has become moot,5 see Hancock Decl., ¶ 7(a)).6 To grant Stop PAC full and 

meaningful relief, this Court should adjudicate the challenges to the six-month waiting period 

within that six-month waiting period (and potentially also allow time for appeal).7 Despite the 

FEC’s claims to the contrary, this time pressure is not the result of Plaintiffs’ timing or delay, see 

 

3

 The FEC objects to abbreviating this Plaintiff’s name as “Stop REID.” See (hereafter, “FEC 

Rule 56(d) Brief”). Without conceding the legitimacy of FEC’s position, and solely for the 

purpose of avoiding unnecessary disagreement over an immaterial issue, Plaintiffs will use the 

FEC’s abbreviation of “Stop PAC” in this litigation. 

4

 The FEC contends that this Court may not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff Niger Innis’ claims. 

See FEC Rule 56(d) Brief at 7 n.9. Because Plaintiff Niger Innis for Congress, a political action 

committee not subject to 2 U.S.C. § 437h, seeks the same injunctive and declaratory relief as 

Plaintiff Innis himself, this Court need not resolve that issue in order to fully adjudicate this 

matter and grant full relief. 

5

 Plaintiffs believe that this case will be subject to the exception to the mootness doctrine for 

disputes that are capable of repetition, yet evading review. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 

724, 737 n.8 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 

405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); see also Lawrence v. 

Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 372 (6th Cir 2005). This Court need not adjudicate this issue at the 

present time, however. 

6

 This brief uses the abbreviation “Hancock Decl.” to refer to the Declaration of Counsel in 

Support of Defendant Federal Election Commission’s Motion to Allow Time for Discovery 

Under Rule 56(d), Doc. #27-2 (May 23, 2014). 

7

 Indeed, the 60-day deadline for filing an Answer—of which it seems the FEC will take full 

advantage—itself will consume 1/3 of this period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2). 

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FEC Rule 56(d) Brief at 15-17, but rather the impermanent nature of the waiting period itself, 

and would exist regardless of when a plaintiff sued to challenge it.8

 

3. The FEC has not identified any appropriate issues for discovery. The FEC’s 

brief identifies three areas in which it claims it will seek discovery, but none of them warrant 

deferring ruling on Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion: 

 a. The burdens that the discriminatory contribution limits place on 

Plaintiffs—First, the FEC contends that it needs discovery about the “burdens [Plaintiffs] in fact 

face” as a result of the discriminatory limits Plaintiffs challenge. See FEC Rule 56(d) Brief 11; 

see also Hancock Decl., ¶ 7(a) (“[T]he Commission requires discovery to determine the actual 

scope and extent of the burdens that plaintiffs allege FECA has placed on their ability to 

associate with each other and to speak.”). In particular, they seek to scrutinize Plaintiffs’ 

“contributions, resources, plans, and capabilities.” Id. 

 The constitutional burden imposed by the discriminatory limits Plaintiffs challenge is 

clear: Stop PAC is limited, throughout the first six months of its existence, to contributing only 

$2,600 per election (rather than $5,000) to each federal candidate it supports. And Plaintiff Tea 

Party Leadership Fund (“the Fund”) is permanently limited to contributing only $5,000 annually 

(rather than $10,000) to the state and local political party committees it supports, as well as 

$15,000 (rather than $32,400) to national political party committees. 

 

8

 In any event, it is neither surprising nor unreasonable that political committees are especially 

likely to coalesce, be able to raise funds, and make contributions or independent expenditures as 

elections draw near. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 334 (2010) (“It is well known 

that the public begins to concentrate on elections only in the weeks immediately before they are 

held. . . . The need or relevance of the speech will often first be apparent at this stage in the 

campaign.”). Moreover, plaintiffs wishing to bring challenges such as this must attempt to 

minimize the risk that their claims be subject to dismissal as unripe, hypothetical, or abstract. 

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 The FEC misapprehends the nature of Plaintiffs’ allegations. The Supreme Court already 

has held, as a matter of law, that contribution limits burden fundamental First Amendment 

rights, albeit to a lesser extent than limits on expenditures. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24 

(“[T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is their 

restriction of one aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political association.”); see, e.g., Citizens 

Against Rent Cont./Coalition for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296 (1981) (holding that 

limiting contributions to a political committee engaging in advocacy concerning ballot measures 

“is clearly a restraint on the right of association”).9 

Because contribution limits “operate in an area of the most fundamental First 

Amendment activities,” they are subject to a “rigorous standard of review,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

14, 29; accord McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444; see also Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 737 (2008) 

(recognizing that contribution limits must be “closely drawn” to survive heightened 

constitutional scrutiny); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 247 (2006) (same). Thus, detailed 

evidence about the precise manner in which the discriminatory contribution limits burden these 

particular Plaintiffs is irrelevant. 

 Indeed, the FEC acknowledges that, to prevail in this suit, it is required to show that the 

discriminatory limits Plaintiffs challenge are “closely drawn to furthering the government’s 

important interest[s].” FEC Rule 56(d) Br. at 12. And the Supreme Court has never intimated 

that a lesser level of scrutiny might apply to a contribution limit, based on its impact on a 

particular plaintiff. 

 

9 See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22 (“The Act’s contribution ceilings thus limit one important 

means of associating with a candidate or committee . . . .”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 

U.S. 377, 388 (2000) (holding that contribution limits “bore more heavily on the associational 

right than on freedom to speak”). 

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 Finally, this case presents the pure legal question of whether the Government 

constitutionally may impose different contribution limits on materially indistinguishable PACs 

(i.e., those that have received more than 50 contributions, and contributed to more than 5 federal 

candidates), based solely on whether they have been registered for at least six months. Nothing 

about Plaintiffs’ individual circumstances, or the precise impact that these discriminatory limits 

has on these particular Plaintiffs, is relevant to resolving that constitutional issue. 

 Thus, the FEC’s proposed discovery into the precise burdens to which the discriminatory 

limits subject Plaintiffs is immaterial. 

 b. Alternate avenues for speech and association available to Plaintiffs—

Second, the FEC contends that it needs discovery into whether Plaintiffs “have alternate ways to 

speak and associate aside from making contributions.” Hancock Decl. ¶ 7(b). This is merely a 

subset of the discovery the FEC seeks in its previous request, concerning the magnitude of the 

burden that the discriminatory limits impose on the particular Plaintiffs in this case. As 

discussed above, the extent of the discriminatory limits’ individualized impact on these particular 

Plaintiffs is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the limits themselves. 

 Moreover, the Supreme Court already has presumed that contributors have numerous 

alternate ways of expressing their support for a candidate, which is the main reason why 

contribution limits are subject only to “heightened scrutiny” or “rigorous” review, rather than 

strict scrutiny. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22. Especially since the FEC does not dispute that such 

heightened scrutiny applies, see FEC Rule 56(d) Brief at 12, discovery into Plaintiffs’ other 

potential avenues for speaking about, and associating with, their favored candidates is not 

required to adjudicate their constitutional challenge. 

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 Finally, because the alleged absence of alternate means of political speech and expression 

is not a material fact upon which the validity of Plaintiffs’ claim depends, Plaintiffs would 

concede to striking from their Listing of Undisputed Facts the paragraphs relating to that issue 

See Plaintiffs’ SJ Memo at 5, ¶¶ 19, 21-23.10 

 c. The disadvantages to which the discriminatory contribution limits 

subject Plaintiffs—The FEC further asserts that it “cannot address whether FECA 

disadvantages Stop PAC or the [Fund] without taking discover to ascertain the actual 

disadvantages, if any, that plaintiffs face” as a result of the discriminatory limits. FEC Rule 

56(d) Brief 12; see also Hancock Decl. ¶ 7(c). This seems to be yet another restatement of the 

FEC’s first proposed area for discovery, concerning the “burdens” that the discriminatory limits 

impose upon Plaintiffs. Cf. FEC Rule 56(d) Brief 11; Hancock Decl., ¶ 7(a). 

 The only “disadvantage” Stop PAC alleges is that it is permitted to contribute only 

$2,600 to federal candidates, while a materially identical PAC that has been registered for more

than six months may contribute $5,000. Likewise, the only “disadvantage” that the Fund alleges 

is that it is permitted to contribute only $5,000 to state and local political party committees, and 

$15,000 to national political party committees, while a materially identical PAC that has been 

registered for less than six months could contribute $10,000 and $32,400, respectively, to those 

recipients. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of these discriminatory limits. Both sides 

recognize that these limits are subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny, requiring the FEC to 

prove that they are carefully tailored to achieving an important governmental interest. See FEC 

Rule 56(d) Brief at 12. Further discovery into the “disadvantages” imposed by these 

discriminatory burdens is therefore unnecessary and immaterial. 

 

10 This Brief uses the abbreviation “Plaintiffs’ SJ Memo” to refer to Memorandum of Law in 

Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. #6-1 (May 6, 2014). 

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 d. The overbreadth of the discriminatory limits—The FEC also claims 

that it requires discovery to establish whether FECA’s discriminatory limits are “closely drawn 

to furthering [its] important interest in either (1) preventing actual corruption; (2) preventing the 

appearance of corruption or (3) preventing circumvention of . . . contribution limits.” FEC Rule 

56(d) Brief 12; see also id. at 13; Hancock Decl. ¶ 7(d) (“[T]he Commission requires discovery 

to present evidence essential to proving that any constitutional burdens imposed by the 

challenged FECA provisions are justified since the statutes are closely drawn to furthering an 

important government interest.”). 

 This is perhaps the most shocking of the FEC’s contentions. The discriminatory limits at 

issue here long pre-date the creation of Plaintiffs Stop PAC, Fund, and NIFC, and they apply to 

thousands of political committees across the nation. Congress necessarily could not have been 

relying on any information about any of the Plaintiffs in enacting these limits. And the FEC has 

decades of experience enforcing them against both new and established PACs. To the extent 

there is any factual basis for the assorted increases and decreased in contribution limits to which 

a political committee is subject at the six-month mark, the FEC itself—not plaintiffs—would be 

in possession of the pertinent evidence. The constitutionality of these limits cannot hinge on 

any facts relating to Plaintiffs themselves.11 Cf. Pisano, 743 F.3d at 931 (affirming denial of a 

Rule 56(d) motion because, as the district court correctly held, “discovery was not needed to 

decide whether [a candidate filing] deadline is unconstitutional” under the First Amendment). 

Discovery is therefore unnecessary. 

 e. The circumstances of Stop PAC’s creation and operation—Relatedly, 

the FEC claims that it needs discovery into “the circumstances of Stop PAC’s creation and 

 

11 Indeed, if facts concerning the Plaintiffs PACs truly did bolster the constitutionality of the 

discriminatory limits, then by implication the constitutionality of those limits was on shakier 

ground before Plaintiffs were formed—an absurd result this Court should not embrace. 

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operation” to “determine the extent to which Innis’s colleagues, contributors, and campaign 

consultants are responsible for the formation and operation of Stop PAC and the extent to which 

it may operate to enable circumvention of the limits on contributions to Niger Innis for 

Congress.” FEC Rule 56(d) Brief 12-13; see also Hancock Decl. ¶ 7(e). 

 The FEC fails to explain how any such discovery is relevant to the central issue in this 

case: whether the Government may subject newly formed committees that have received at least 

50 contributions and contributed to at least five federal candidates to discriminatory low limits 

on contributions to candidates, while simultaneously subjecting materially identical committees 

that have been registered for more than six months to discriminatorily low limits on contributions 

to local, state, and national political party committees. 

 None of the facts that the FEC recites have anything to do with this six-month cut-off. 

All newly formed political committees are subject to this six-month waiting period, regardless of 

whether a candidates “colleagues, contributors, and campaign consultants” helped form it. FEC 

Rule 56(d) Brief 12-13. Conversely, once Stop PAC has existed for six months, the amount it 

may contribute to candidates will automatically increase to $5,000, see Plaintiffs’ SJ Memo, at 3-

4, ¶¶ 6-8, 14, regardless of the various circumstances to which the FEC points. Thus, none of the 

facts for which the FEC seeks to take further discovery bear any relevance to the 

constitutionality of the six-month waiting period. 

 Indeed, despite the facts the FEC raises, Stop PAC currently may contribute up to 

$10,000 to state and local political party committees, and $32,400 to national political party 

committees. Yet, like the Fund, once Stop PAC has existed for six months, those limits will be 

slashed to $5,000 and $15,000, respectively. None of the discovery the FEC seeks will shed any 

light on these issues. 

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 If the FEC does not approve of various arrangements Stop PAC has made, it may seek 

statutory amendments, or perhaps even attempt to promulgate regulations, to prohibit them. 

Similarly, if the FEC believes that any of Stop PAC’s arrangements violate current law, it is free 

to attempt to commence appropriate enforcement proceedings. None of the facts that the FEC 

raises about Stop PAC or any other Plaintiff, however, has any bearing on the fundamental 

constitutional question underlying this case: whether materially identical political committees 

may be subject to different contribution limits, based solely on whether they have existed for six 

months—especially when some limits increase at the six-month mark, and others are reduced. 

 f. Information concerning “similarly situated groups”—Finally, the FEC 

declares that it needs to seek discovery of all of the foregoing categories of information “as they 

relate to groups that are similarly situated to plaintiffs.” Hancock Decl., ¶ 7(f). As mentioned 

earlier, however, the FEC itself is the most logical repository of such information. Moreover, 

Plaintiffs’ explanations above as to why the FEC does not need any discovery concerning them 

apply with equal force to the discovery the FEC claims to need concerning other political 

committees and candidates. Additionally, the Supreme Court will invalidate contribution limits 

without separately scrutinizing, and requiring discovery for, each entity that is subject to them. 

See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462 (invalidating contribution limits as a matter of law, 

with no discovery); cf. Citizens Against Rent Cont., 454 U.S. 290 (invalidating limit on 

contributions to all committees engaged in advocacy concerning public referenda). 

 Thus, the FEC has failed to establish that discovery is necessary to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ 

narrow, carefully tailored constitutional challenge, which presents a pure question of law. 

Indeed, the very Fourth Circuit authorities that the FEC cites in support of its request are easily 

distinguishable and simply underscore the FEC’s failure to establish its need for discovery. See, 

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e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 247 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding 

that “summary judgment prior to discovery” was “particularly inappropriate” because the case 

involved “complex factual questions about intent and motive”) (cited in FEC Rule 56(d) Brief at 

9); TC Tech. Mgmt. v. Geeks on Call Am., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30068, at *21 & n.3 

(E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2004) (holding that summary judgment before discovery was premature 

where plaintiffs alleged that defendants “made fraudulent representations” and “induced” them 

to enter into a contract “by . . . fraud”). 

 4. The factual allegations underpinning Plaintiffs’ standing is not reasonably 

subject to dispute—The FEC goes on claim that it also needs discovery to “test the 

jurisdictional bases for plaintiffs’ claims.” Hancock Decl. ¶ 8. First, it seeks discovery 

concerning whether Plaintiff Niger Innis is “eligible to vote in a presidential election.” Id. ¶ 8(a). 

Plaintiffs have submitted a copy of Innis’ online voter registration record from the website of the 

Registrar of Voters for Clark County, Nevada. See Backer Decl., Ex. 1. 

Second, the FEC seeks discovery into whether Stop PAC will contribute to any federal 

candidates “‘immediately after’ the June 10 primary,” to ensure that its claim is not moot. 

Hancock Decl., ¶ 8(b). A hearing is scheduled on this motion for June 23, 2014. On that date, 

with the Court’s permission, Plaintiffs will provide the FEC and the Court with true and 

complete electronic copies of cancelled checks reflecting all contributions that Stop PAC makes 

to federal candidates after June 10, 2014 in connection with the November general election, 

which will be sufficient to preserve its standing in this case. Backer Decl., ¶ 7.12 

 

12 If Plaintiff Innis wins the June 10 primary election, Stop PAC intends to contribute $2,600 to 

his campaign for the general election at its earliest opportunity, which also will preclude his 

claims from becoming moot. Backer Decl., ¶ 8. 

 If Innis does not receive the Republican nomination for Congress from Nevada’s fourth 

district in that election, Plaintiffs will not argue his claims are “capable of repetition, yet evading 

review” based on the possibility that he might run for office in the future. Rather, Plaintiffs 

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Third, the FEC effectively contends that Plaintiff Stop PAC perjured itself—and, by 

extension, that the undersigned Plaintiffs’ counsel violated their ethical obligations to this 

Court—by representing to this Court, under oath, that it had contributed to at least five 

candidates and had more than 50 contributors. Hancock Decl., ¶ 8(c) (“[T]he FEC is entitled to 

test the veracity of these claims” to determine “if they are not accurate . . . .”).13 

 To defuse these spurious speculations and attempt to return focus to the merits of this 

case, Plaintiffs have submitted with this brief true and complete electronic copies of cancelled 

checks from Stop PAC reflecting contributions to five different federal candidates, including: 

 Date Candidate Name Amount of Contribution from Stop PAC 

a. 4/4/14 Niger Innis (NV-4) $2,600 

b. 4/4/14 Mark Amodei (NV-2) $250 

c. 4/4/14 Joe Heck (NV-3) $250 

d. 4/4/14 Jose Padilla (NV-1) $250 

e. 4/4/14 Dean Heller (Senate) $250 

See Backer Decl., Ex. 2. 

 Plaintiffs also have provided a certified list of 60 contributions that Stop PAC received 

from different individuals - out of more than 1200 received to date, all but 4 of which were in 

 

intend to argue that the Supreme Court permits plaintiffs challenging laws relating to elections to 

invoke that exception to the mootness doctrine, even if there is no chance they will again be 

subject to the challenged provisions. See, e.g., supra note 5. Thus, contrary to the FEC’s 

argument, see Hancock Decl., ¶ 8(b), discovery into Innis’ future electoral plans is unnecessary. 

13 The FEC notes that Stop PAC’s March 31, 2014 disclosure report did not reflect contributions 

from 50 or more people. Hancock Decl., ¶ 8(c). As the FEC itself acknowledges, contributions 

to PACs are reported only if they exceed $200.00. Id. Thus, for newly-formed grassroots PACs 

that rely primarily (although not exclusively) on small-dollar individual donors, the absence of 

reported contributions neither is remarkable nor suggests a lack of contributions. Stop PAC’s 

March disclosure report therefore provides no basis for the FEC to cast aspersions upon the 

veracity of the factual representations made by Stop PAC and submitted by Plaintiffs’ counsel. 

Case 1:14-cv-00397-AJT-IDD Document 29 Filed 05/27/14 Page 13 of 15 PageID# 199
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amounts of $100 or less - specifying the amount and date of each contribution; the first initial 

and last name of each contributor; and the contributor’s city, state, and zip code. Id. Ex. 3.14 

 Among the cancelled checks that Stop PAC has submitted is the check reflecting its 

$2,600 contribution to Innis, see Backer Decl, Ex. 2; cf. Hancock Decl., ¶ 8(c). Plaintiffs also 

have submitted a true and complete electronic copy of the cancelled check for $5,000 from 

Plaintiff Fund to the Alexandria Republican City Committee. See Backer Decl. Ex. 4; cf. 

Hancock Decl. ¶ 8(c). 

 Thus, there is no reasonable basis for seeking discovery concerning the jurisdictional 

facts underlying Plaintiffs’ claims. 

CONCLUSION

 

 Plaintiffs have brought this claim in good faith to obtain this Court’s ruling on pure 

questions of law under the Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment. Discovery is 

unnecessary and will not further illuminate these issues. For these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully 

request that this Court avoid unnecessary delay, deny the FEC’s Rule 56(d) Motion, and Grant 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 

 /s/ Michael T. Morley 

 Michael T. Morley, Esq. 

 Virginia State Bar # 65762 

 

14 The FEC’s purported skepticism over whether Stop PAC has 50 contributors rings especially 

hollow because, to qualify for multicandidate status, a political committee that meets the 

statutory criteria (i.e., it has existed for six months, has contributed to at least 5 candidates, and 

has received more than 50 contributions) need only file a “Notification of Multicandidate 

Status,” certifying the date on which it “received a contribution from its 51st contributor.” FEC 

Form 1M, available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm1m.pdf. The FEC generally does 

not traverse such representations by demanding the identities of the contributors or seeking other 

confirmation before recognizing a political committee as a multicandidate PAC. Thus, its 

purported need for such further proof from Plaintiff Stop PAC is curious. 

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15 

 COOLIDGE-REAGAN FOUNDATION

 1629 K Street, Suite 300 

 Washington, DC 20006 

 Phone: (202) 603-5397 

 Fax: (202) 331-3759 

 E-mail: Michael@coolidgereagan.org 

 /s/ Dan Backer 

 Dan Backer, Esq. 

 Virginia State Bar # 78256 

 DB CAPITOL STRATEGIES PLLC 

 203 South Union Street, Suite 300 

 Alexandria, VA 22314 

 Phone: (202) 210-5431 

 Fax: (202) 478-0750 

 E-mail: DBacker@DBCapitolStrategies.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I, Dan Backer, hereby certify that on this 27th day of May 2014, I will electronically file 

the foregoing Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment and 

Against Defendant’s Rule 56(d) Motion with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, 

which will then send a notification of such filings to the following counsel for Defendant: 

 Lisa J. Stevenson, Esq. 

 Kevin Deeley, Esq. 

 Harry J. Summers, Esq. 

 Holly J. Baker, Esq. 

 Esther D. Gyory, Esq. 

 Kevin P. Hancock, Esq. 

 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

 999 E Street, N.W. 

 Washington, D.C. 20463 

Counsel for Defendant

 /s/ Dan Backer 

 Dan Backer 

 Virginia State Bar # 78256 

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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