IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0868

Filed September 4, 2024

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF BETTY JACKSON, Deceased.

MIKE JACKSON and JOANN CALLISON, Co-Executors of the ESTATE OF 

BETTY JACKSON,

Appellants.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clarke County, Brad McCall, Judge.

Co-executors appeal from a ruling establishing purchase terms for real 

property owned by an estate. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED.

Matthew J. Hemphill of Bergkamp, Hemphill & McClure, P.C., Adel, for 

appellants.

Fred L. Dorr of Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C., West Des 

Moines, for appellees.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

Betty Jackson died testate in 2021. Her will named her four children—Mike, 

Joan, Lyle, and Charles—as beneficiaries, established a trust benefitting her 

children, and named Mike and Joan as co-executors. The dispute that leads to 

this appeal concerns an Arizona residential property Betty owned at the time of her 

death.

Article VI of Betty’s will addresses the Arizona property. In relevant part, it 

states:

I direct that my son Charles Jackson be given the right to 

purchase or rent the house in Arizona . . . . Rent shall be $15,000 

per year which will be deducted from his [a]nnual [t]rust payment. He 

shall also have the right to buy said property for the sum of two (2) 

times the assessed value or the appraised value for my estate, 

whichever is lower. The property will be sold if Charles Jackson fails 

to pay rent or upon the termination of the [t]rust.

Charles had lived in the property for several years prior to Betty’s death. The coexecutors had the property appraised. The appraiser determined the home was 

in poor condition, noting various aspects of the house in need of repair. The 

appraiser appraised the property at $390,000 in its current condition but opined it 

would be appraised at $515,000 if it was in “average saleable condition.” A dispute 

developed between the co-executors and Charles as to how Article VI of the will 

should be carried out and how the poor condition of the property should impact the 

purchase price.

The parties submitted the dispute to the district court, which held an 

unreported hearing on the issue. In a subsequent written ruling, the court 

determined that (1) Charles’s obligation to pay rent began the day Betty passed 

away and “shall continue through July 1, 2022,” the date Charles had offered to 
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pay $390,000 for the property; (2) Charles may still elect to purchase the property; 

(3) “[t]he purchase price shall be $415,000.00”; (4) if Charles decides against 

buying the property but wishes to rent it, then he may do so pursuant to the terms 

established by Betty’s will; (5) Charles shall be responsible for $25,000 of damages 

to the Arizona property; (6) the estate and trust are also responsible for $25,000 of 

the damage to the Arizona property; and (7) Charles shall have a credit of $23,750 

applied to the purchase price of the property to account for the difference between 

the $45,000 already withheld from his trust distributions for rent and the $21,250 

due for the period between Betty’s death and July 1, 2022. Then the court set out 

three different financing options for Charles to purchase the Arizona property.

The co-executors appeal. They argue the court erred by (1) setting the 

purchase price of the Arizona property at an amount not supported by the appraisal 

or an assessed value as required by Article VI of Betty’s will; (2) prematurely 

terminating Charles’s obligation to pay rent on the Arizona property; (3) creating 

three financing options for Charles to purchase the Arizona property; and 

(4) holding the estate responsible for some of the damage to the Arizona property. 

Our review is de novo. See Iowa Code § 633.33 (2021) (establishing all 

probate proceeds other than those “to set aside or contest wills, for the involuntary 

appointment of guardians and conservators, and for the establishment of 

contested claims” are tried in equity); Iowa R. App. P. 6.907 (recognizing “[i]n equity 

cases review is de novo”); see also In re Est. of Rogers, 473 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 

1991) (“A declaratory judgment action to interpret a will is tried in equity, and our 

review is de novo.”).
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We begin by highlighting our principles that guide our interpretation of wills. 

Those are:

(1) the intent of the testator is the polestar and must prevail;

(2) this intent, however, must be derived from (a) all of the 

language contained within the four corners of the will, (b) the scheme 

of distribution, (c) the surrounding circumstances at the time of the 

will’s execution and (d) the existing facts;

(3) we resort to technical rules or canons of construction only 

when the will is ambiguous or conflicting or the testator's intent is 

uncertain. In determining intent, the question is not what the testator 

meant to say, but rather what is the meaning of what the testator did 

say.

In re Est. of Roethler, 801 N.W.2d 833, 842 (Iowa 2011) (quoting Rogers, 473 

N.W.2d at 39). We address the co-executors’ challenges in order.

I. Purchase Price of Arizona Property

Referring to the Arizona property, Article VI of the will states that Charles 

could “buy said property for the sum of two (2) times the assessed value or the 

appraised value for my estate, whichever is lower.” There is no evidence of the 

assessed value in the record, and no one suggests that two times the assessed 

value is lower than the appraised value. So the parties are in agreement that the 

appraised value is the applicable purchase price if Charles exercises his purchase 

option. The record contains the appraisal ordered by the co-executors. That 

appraisal valued the Arizona property at $390,000 in its current condition but noted 

it would be worth $515,000 if in better condition. The district court set the 

appraised value of the property at $415,000.

The co-executors contend that Charles is obligated to pay $515,000 for the 

property to exercise his purchase option because that would be the value if it were 

in “average saleable condition.” They contend that the property’s poor condition 
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was caused by Charles’s lack of stewardship and argue the district court should 

have set the purchase price at the higher $515,000 value. 

The co-executors’ argument adds language to the will that is not there. The 

will says nothing about setting the sale price on Charles’s option to purchase the 

property based on the condition that the property could be in. It sets it based on 

the appraised value. There is no dispute that the appraised value of the property 

is $390,000—not the $515,000 value it would have with imagined repairs or 

improvements. So, based on the unambiguous terms of the will, we conclude that 

the district court did not err in declining to set the purchase price at $515,000. See 

In re Est. of Hamilton, 467 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Iowa 1991) (prohibiting the court from 

modifying clear and unambiguous terms of a will). We note that the district court 

also did not set the purchase price at $390,000—the undisputed appraised value 

of the property and thus the option price required by the will. However, Charles 

does not challenge the $415,000 purchase price set by the district court, and he 

did not cross-appeal to make such a challenge. So, we do not disturb the purchase 

price set by the court. See Boyd v. Boyd & Boyd, Inc., 386 N.W.2d 540, 544 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 1986) (“A party that neither appeals nor cross-appeals can have no 

greater relief or redress on appeal than was accorded it by the trial court.”).

II. Duration of Rental Obligation

The co-executors next challenge the district court’s declaration that Charles 

owed rent only from the date of Betty’s death to the date when Charles offered to 

purchase the Arizona property. We agree with the co-executors that nothing in the

will provides for the termination of Charles’s rental obligation at the time he offered 

to purchase the property. Instead, following the terms of the will, we conclude that 
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Charles’s rental obligation extends from the date of Betty’s death to the date he 

completes the purchase of the property or until his rent obligation ends for some 

other reason should Charles not purchase the property.

III. Financing Options

The co-executors also challenge the district court’s decision to give Charles

three financing options for his purchase of the Arizona property. The district court 

established these three options: (1) “Charles may obtain a loan from a commercial 

lender”; (2) Charles “finance the purchase under the same terms which Mike 

Jackson is purchasing agricultural real estate belonging to the decedent and 

provided for in the will”1; or (3) Charles “have an amount withheld from his annual 

distribution, in an amount equal to the amortization of the total amount owed, plus 

interest, over the term of the [t]rust.” 

The co-executors argue that establishing these three purchase options 

effectively rewrote Betty’s will by adding terms. We agree. The will provides none 

of the financing provisions created by the district court. Therefore, we vacate that 

part of the district court’s ruling establishing financing options for Charles’s 

purchase of the Arizona property. It is Charles’s obligation to figure out a way to

meet his financial obligation to purchase the Arizona property should he exercise 

his option.

1 Article V of Betty’s will stated: “My son, Mike Johnson, has purchased on contract 

the following described real estate [legal description of the real estate provided]. 

The balance of said contract at the time of my death shall be paid to my Trust as 

per the terms of the contract.” The terms of Mike’s contract to purchase this land 

is not in the record.
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IV. Responsibility for Damage to the Arizona Property 

The co-executors also contend that the district court incorrectly determined 

that the estate should be responsible for $25,000 in damages to the Arizona 

property. Again, we agree. This record contains no evidence of the cost of

restoring or repairing the property, who caused any decline in the condition of the 

property, or who is legally responsible to maintain or repair the property. This 

probate proceeding is not the proper vehicle to resolve those issues. Resolving 

them is a separate matter between the estate and Charles.

V. Conclusion

We vacate the part of the district court’s ruling declaring that Charles’s rental 

obligation ceased when he offered to purchase the property for $390,000. 

Charles’s rental obligation will continue until he closes on the purchase of the 

property should he elect to purchase it or until his rental obligation ends for some 

other reason should Charles not purchase the property. We also vacate the part 

of the district court’s ruling establishing financing options for Charles to purchase 

the Arizona property. Also, we vacate the part of the district court’s ruling that 

assesses partial responsibility for damage to the Arizona property to the estate

because the record does not contain evidence establishing the cost of restoring or 

repairing the property, who caused any decline in the condition of the property, or 

who is legally responsible to maintain or repair the property. 

We affirm the part of the court’s ruling setting the price for the exercise of 

Charles’s option to purchase the Arizona property at $415,000. But, because we 

have vacated the parts of the ruling ending Charles’s rental obligation prematurely, 

we also vacate that part of the district court’s order that adjusts the $415,000 
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purchase price for purported overpayment of rent. If Charles exercises his 

purchase option, the purchase price shall be $415,000, as set by the district court, 

with no adjustments based on Charles’s rental obligations.

We remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.