IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD 

P.O. Box 25554 

Alexandria, VA 22313 

PETER ACKERMAN 

1775 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Suite 1200 

Washington, DC 20006 

GREEN PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 

6411 Orchard Avenue 

Suite 101 

Takoma Park, MD 20912 

LIBERTARIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, 

 INC. 

1444 Duke Street 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

 Defendant. 

 

Civil Action No.: 15-1397 (TSC)

SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT 

FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 

Plaintiffs Level the Playing Field, Dr. Peter Ackerman, Green Party of the United States 

and Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action for declaratory and 

injunctive relief and allege as follows: 

 

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INTRODUCTION

1. As this Court has recognized, there is a “mountain” of evidence supporting 

Plaintiffs’ claim that the CPD’s debate-selection criteria are rigged in favor of Democrats and 

Republicans and against independent candidates.1 The CPD’s directors and officers include 

staunch partisans who have no qualms about their favoritism toward the Democratic and 

Republican parties. They have lavished Democratic and Republican candidates with substantial 

cash contributions, publicly endorsed these candidates, served in high-ranking positions in the 

Democratic and Republican parties and the offices of their elected officials, raised money for 

these officials, and funneled hundreds of thousands of dollars to them as lobbyists. The CPD’s 

directors have confirmed on multiple occasions that the Democratic and Republican parties 

decide who participates in the debates and that it is the CPD’s goal to exclude independent 

candidates. It is therefore unsurprising that the CPD has established debate-qualifying criteria 

designed to achieve that goal, and that Plaintiffs’ experts present empirical proof that the criteria 

are demonstrably biased against independent candidates. 

2. As the Court has also recognized, the FEC “appears to have stuck its head in the 

sand and ignored the evidence” that the process is rigged. When Plaintiffs filed administrative 

complaints challenging the CPD’s debate-selection criteria and petitioned for a rulemaking, the 

FEC ignored the evidence and summarily rejected these applications. Plaintiffs then instituted 

this action challenging the FEC’s decisions. On summary judgment, this Court held that “the 

FEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously and contrary to law,” and remanded the matter to the FEC. 

 

1

 Throughout this Complaint, the term “independent candidate” refers to candidates who 

are unaffiliated with any political party as well as candidates who are affiliated with 

political parties other than the Democratic and Republican parties, including but not 

limited to the Green Party of the United States and the United States Libertarian Party. 

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While it did not “mandate that the FEC reach a different conclusion on remand, the court note[d] 

that the weight of Plaintiffs’ evidence is substantial, and the FEC must demonstrate that it 

actually considered the full scope of this evidence.” 

3. Predictably, following remand, the FEC has now reached the exact same 

conclusions as before, again voting to dismiss the complaints and reject the rulemaking petition. 

And it is readily apparent from the FEC’s post-remand decisions that the FEC did not “actually 

consider[] the full scope” of Plaintiffs’ evidence—far from it. The FEC continues to disregard 

much of this evidence, and its treatment of the remainder is frivolous. 

4. The post-remand decisions do not and cannot explain the overwhelming evidence 

demonstrating the partisanship of the CPD’s members, including the multitude of endorsements, 

campaign contributions, and concessions that the CPD is “not likely to look with favor on 

including third-party candidates in the debates.” Most of this evidence remains unaddressed, and 

what the FEC does say about the evidence is laughable. For example, one director who 

characterized the CPD as “bipartisan” now claims that she really meant to say it was 

“nonpartisan”—even though the term “bipartisan” by definition “involv[es] cooperation, 

agreement, and compromise between two major political parties.” Yet the FEC rotely accepts 

her explanation and others like it. 

5. The FEC’s treatment of Plaintiffs’ expert evidence is equally frivolous. For 

example, the FEC purports to criticize one of Plaintiffs’ experts, William Young, for relying on 

“early primary” polling. Yet the Young report on its face uses “late primary” and “general” 

election polling which confirms Young’s conclusions. Thus, even now, it appears that the FEC 

has not even read this expert’s report, let alone given it the careful consideration that this Court 

demanded. 

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6. Similarly, in critiquing the conclusion of Plaintiffs’ other expert, Douglas Schoen, 

that independent candidates have difficulty attracting earned media, the FEC presents a 

purported analysis of a Westlaw news database in which it claims that Libertarian Party 

candidate Gary Johnson received substantial press in 2016. But the FEC apparently did not 

review the results of its news searches, or consider that “Gary Johnson” is a common name, 

because its “analysis” cites articles about dozens of Gary Johnsons who are not the presidential 

candidate, including athletes, chefs, museum presidents, criminals, doctors, lawyers, musicians 

and law enforcement officials all named Gary Johnson. This is but one of the many falsehoods 

underlying the FEC’s purported rejection of Schoen’s conclusions. 

7. Tellingly, insofar as the FEC now cites any evidence to justify the outcome, that 

evidence largely post-dates the FEC’s original decisions dismissing the administrative 

complaints and rejecting the rulemaking petitions. This shows that the FEC had no basis for 

those decisions at the time it made them, and merely invented a rationale after realizing that this 

Court would not rubber stamp yet another attempt to sweep the CPD’s partisanship under the 

rug. 

8. What is even more telling about the FEC’s post-remand decisions is how little 

they do to actually defend the 15% polling criterion. While the FEC quibbles with Plaintiffs’ 

evidence, it offers no justification of its own for a polling criterion so high that, since the CPD’s 

inception, no independent presidential candidate has satisfied it. As this Court observed, given 

“the evidence that since 1988 only one non-major party candidate . . . has participated in the 

debates, and only then at the request of the two major parties, and the evidence that the CPD’s 

chairmen and directors are actively invested in the partisan political process through large 

donations,” it is “perplex[ing]” that the FEC is so quick to deem the CPD’s criteria “objective.” 

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“This begs the question: if under these facts the FEC does not consider the fifteen percent 

polling criterion to be subjective, what would be?” The Court will search the FEC’s post-remand 

decisions in vain for an answer to its question. 

9. Accordingly, Plaintiffs now petition for relief from the post-remand decisions. 

They request that the Court: 

a. Declare that the FEC’s dismissals of Plaintiffs’ administrative complaints 

were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law, and direct the 

FEC, within 30 days, to find that the CPD has violated 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 by staging candidate 

debates in a partisan manner and without pre-established, objective criteria; violated 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30118(a) by making prohibited contributions and expenditures; and violated 52 U.S.C. 

§§ 30103 and 30104 by failing to register as a political committee and by failing to make 

required reports and disclosures; and 

b. If the FEC fails to so act, authorize Plaintiffs to bring a civil action against 

the CPD, its executive director, and the directors who have participated in these violations of 

federal election law to remedy those violations; and 

c. Declare the FEC’s denial of the petition for rulemaking was arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law, and order the FEC to open a 

rulemaking to revise its rules governing presidential debates to ensure that debate sponsors do 

not unfairly exclude independent and third-party candidates from participating. 

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BACKGROUND

10. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate, repeat and reassert the allegations in Paragraphs 1-

137 of the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 25) as though fully set forth herein.2

11. Plaintiffs commenced this action on August 27, 2015. Plaintiffs amended their 

complaint on October 22, 2015, and filed their Second Amended Complaint on January 5, 2016. 

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that the FEC’s dismissals of Plaintiffs’ administrative 

complaints were arbitrary, capricioius, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance 

with law under 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A) and 5 U.S.C. § 706. The Second Amended 

Complaint further alleges that the FEC’s denial of LPF’s petition for rulemaking was arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 706. 

12. On April 6, 2016, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On May 4, 2016, the 

FEC opposed Plaintiffs’ motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 

13. On February 1, 2017, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion denying the 

FEC’s motion and awarding summary judgment to Plaintiffs as to both the dismissal of the 

administrative complaints and LPF’s rulemaking petition. Level the Playing Field v. Fed. 

Election Comm’n, No. 15-cv-1397 (TSC), 2017 WL 437400 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2017). The Court 

 

2

 Since the Second Amended Complaint was filed, CPD’s leadership has changed in ways 

that do not affect the outcome of this action. Specifically, director Dorothy Ridings has 

reportedly replaced Mike McCurry as co-chair, but McCurry remains on the board. Like 

McCurry, Ridings has supported Democratic candidates and has expressed her preference 

for “the two-party system.” The composition of the board has also changed slightly, with 

Alan Simpson, Mitch Daniels and Leon Panetta having departed and Jim Lehrer having 

recently joined. In addition, the FEC’s leadership remains unchanged except that 

Commissioner Ann Ravel departed in March 2017. 

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remanded the matter to the FEC with instructions to explain the reasoning behind its dismissal of 

the complaints and refusal to institute a rulemaking. 

14. Specifically, the Court held that the FEC’s dismissal of the administrative 

complaints was “arbitrary and capricious” and “contrary to law” in four respects. First, the Court 

held that “the FEC did not articulate what standard it used to determine whether the CPD had 

endorsed, supported or opposed political parties—indeed, it did not mention these terms at all 

except in quoting the regulation and the respondents’ denials that they had endorsed, supported 

or opposed political parties.” Id. at *5. The Court determined that, “in the absence of any 

articulated standard or analysis, the FEC’s reliance on its past dismissals and the Buchanan case 

strongly implies that it has effectively adopted or relied on the control test it articulated in those 

past dismissals,” even though the “control” test “is contrary to the plain text of the regulation.” 

Id. at *5-6. Consequently, the FEC “acted arbitrarily and capriciously and contrary to law when 

it determined that the CPD did not endorse, support or oppose political parties in the 2012 

election.” Id. at *6. The Court held that, “[o]n remand, the FEC is ordered to articulate its 

analysis in determining whether the CPD endorsed, supported or opposed political parties or 

candidates.” Id. 

15. Second, the Court held that “the FEC failed to adequately consider the evidence 

[Plaintiffs] presented with [their] two administrative complaints.” Id. at *6-8. The Court 

recognized that this “mountain” of evidence was “quite substantial,” and found “that the FEC’s 

Legal & Factual Analyses do not provide any evidence that the FEC . . . took a hard look at the 

evidence.” Id. at *6-8, *10. Consequently, the Court ordered that, “on remand, the FEC must 

demonstrate how it considered the evidence,” including “the newly-submitted evidence of 

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partisanship and political donations and the expert analyses regarding fundraising and polling.” 

Id. at *8. 

16. Third, the Court determined that the FEC violated FECA by failing to notify ten 

CPD directors about the complaints. FECA requires that “[w]ithin 5 days after receipt of a 

complaint, the Commission shall notify, in writing, any person alleged in the complaint to have 

committed . . . a violation” of FECA. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(1). The administrative complaints 

here were brought against the CPD, its co-chairs, and ten other directors, and cited “new 

evidence specific to those ten directors regarding their partisan financial contributions and 

partisan political activity.” Level the Playing Field, 2017 WL 437400, at *9. But “the FEC only 

notified the CPD and the two chairmen [about the complaints], only solicited responses from 

them, and mentioned only them in its Factual & Legal Analyses.” Id. at *8. And the record 

indicated “that the FEC did not even consider” the evidence “specific to th[e] ten directors” or 

“the[] allegations” against them. Id. at *9. Accordingly, the Court determined that the FEC had 

committed a “procedural violation of the Act” and ordered the FEC to “notify these ten 

remaining directors, address these allegations and consider the evidence presented against these 

respondents.” Id. 

17. Fourth, the Court agreed with Plaintiffs that “the FEC’s dismissals were arbitrary 

and capricious because the agency unreasonably found that the CPD’s fifteen percent polling 

criterion was ‘objective’ under the regulation.” Id. Here again, “the FEC did not provide any 

indication that it actually considered the submitted evidence and engaged in any reasoned 

decision-making.” Id. at *10. Because “the weight of Plaintiffs’ evidence is substantial,” the 

Court held that on remand, “the FEC must demonstrate that it actually considered the full scope 

of this evidence, including the CPD chairmen’s and directors’ partisan political activity and the 

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expert reports, as well as explain how and why it rejected this evidence in deciding that the 

CPD’s polling requirement is an objective criterion.” Id. 

18. The Court reached similar conclusions with respect to the rulemaking decision. It 

found that the FEC failed to adequately respond to “the specific evidence that CPD’s use of the 

fifteen percent polling threshold has the result of excluding third-party and independent 

candidates.” Id. at *12. The Court expressed particular “concern[] at the agency’s cursory 

treatment” of evidence that the 15% rule “is being used subjectively to exclude independent and 

third party candidates” and that “polling thresholds are particularly unreliable and susceptible to 

this type of subjective use.” Id. As the Court recognized, “the FEC appears to have stuck its 

head in the sand and ignored the evidence that its lack of rulemaking and lack of enforcement 

may be undermining the stated purpose of its regulations and the Act.” Id. at *13. Accordingly, 

the Court found that “the FEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to engage in 

rulemaking without a thorough consideration of the presented evidence,” and ordered the FEC to 

“give the Petition the consideration it requires” on remand. Id. 

19. In a subsequent motion for clarification, Plaintiffs “request[ed] that the court 

expressly retain jurisdiction over this matter pending the remand to the FEC, in order to allow 

them to bring an additional challenge if necessary.” (ECF No. 64 at 3). On February 10, 2017, 

the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and expressly “retain[ed] jurisdiction pending remand” to 

hear “any further claims Plaintiffs bring regarding the FEC’s reconsideration on remand.” (Id.). 

20. On March 23, 2017, the FEC again voted to deny Plaintiffs’ petition for 

rulemaking. On March 29, the FEC entered a decision in the Federal Register purporting to 

explain why it had reached the same result as before. That same day, the FEC again voted to 

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dismiss Plaintiffs’ administrative complaints, and issued a “Legal and Factual Analysis” 

purporting to justify the dismissals. 

THE FEC FAILED TO ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN ITS DISMISSAL OF 

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS 

21. The Court ordered the FEC to issue a decision explaining why it did not act 

arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law when it dismissed the administrative compaints. 

Specifically, the FEC was required to (1) elaborate upon the standard it used to determine 

whether the CPD endorsed, supported, or opposed political parties, (2) demonstrate its reasoned 

consideration of Plaintiffs’ evidence, (3) notify the 10 CPD directors and address the allegations 

and evidence presented against them, and (4) explain why the CPD’s polling requirement is 

objective. The FEC’s post-remand Legal and Factual Analysis meets none of these 

requirements. For reasons including but not limited to those set forth below, the Factual and 

Legal Analysis is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. 

A. The FEC Failed To Articulate The Standard It Used 

22. The Factual and Legal Analysis does not “articulate what standard [the FEC] used 

to determine whether the CPD had endorsed, supported or opposed political parties.” Level the 

Playing Field, 2017 WL 437400, at *5. As the Court made clear, bare recitation of the 

regulation’s “endorse, support, or oppose” language is not enough. See, e.g., id. (when 

previously asked “how the FEC actually engaged in an analysis to determine whether the CPD 

endorsed, supported or opposed political campaigns or parties, FEC’s counsel responded simply, 

though unhelpfully, that ‘the FEC applied the endorsed, support, opposed standard that’s in the 

regulation’”). The FEC was instead required to explain this standard. Yet the Factual and Legal 

Analysis offers no such explanation; it merely claims that “the meaning of this standard is plain 

on its face,” without clarifying what that supposed “plain meaning” is. (Factual and Legal 

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Analysis at 12). The FEC’s tautological definition fails to elucidate what the FEC means when it 

claims that the CPD does not “endorse, support, or oppose” candidates, and disregards this 

Court’s demand for an explanation. 

23. Moreover, the Factual and Legal Analysis indicates that the FEC continues to use 

the “‘control’ standard that is contrary to the plain text of the regulation,” notwithstanding the 

FEC’s purported assurance that the standard is inapplicable. Level the Playing Field, 2017 WL 

437400, at *6. In the prior proceedings, the FEC “strongly implie[d]” that it had “effectively 

adopted” this improper standard by relying upon “its past dismissals of administrative complaints 

involving the CPD . . . as well as the single prior district court decision that considered the 

denials, Buchanan v. FEC, [112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C 2000)].” Id. at *5. Yet, in the Factual 

and Legal Analysis, the FEC again relies upon these same prior dismissals and the Buchanan 

case. (Factual and Legal Analysis at 14). Indeed, the Factual and Legal Analysis directly quotes 

from Buchanan, claiming that there is no “contemporaneous evidence of influence by the major 

parties.” (Id.) (emphasis supplied). In other words, the FEC remains focused on whether the 

major parties control the CPD, thereby contravening “the plain text of the regulation.” Level the 

Playing Field, 2017 WL 437400, at *6. 

B. The FEC Failed To Demonstrate How It Considered The Evidence 

24. The FEC fares no better when purporting to address the “mountain of submitted 

evidence” supporting the administrative complaints. Id. at *8. This includes (1) the numerous 

inculpatory statements by CPD directors and the other evidence of their partisan activities; (2) 

the expert analyses of Clifford Young and Douglas Schoen demonstrating the insurmountable 

hurdles facing independent candidates attempting to satisfy the 15% criterion; and (3) the CPD’s 

ability to cherry-pick polls that disfavor independent candidates and ensure they do not 

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participate in the debates. The FEC continues to disregard much of this evidence, and its 

response to the remainder is arbitrary and capricious. 

The Partisan Statements and Activities Of The CPD And Its Members 

25. The FEC specifically addresses only a handful of the numerous inculpatory 

statements and partisan acts of the CPD’s officers and directors. First, at its inception, 

Fahrenkopf and Kirk agreed that the CPD was “formed . . . by the National Republican and 

Democratic Committees,” that “future [debates] should be principally and jointly sponsored and 

conducted by the Republican and Democratic National Committees,” and that “all future 

presidential debates” would be “between the nominees of the two political parties.” According 

to the Factual and Legal Analysis, “it is not clear that, in context, these . . . past statements 

constitute an endorsement of, or support for, the Democratic and Republican parties.” (Factual 

and Legal Aanlysis at 15). But the FEC does not explain how these statements could be 

interpreted any other way. The Factual and Legal Analysis purports to rely upon Frank 

Fahrenkopf’s March 2017 affidavit, but this affidavit confirms that Fahrenkopf’s “goal” was to 

“secur[e] the commitment of both major party nominees to debate”—a quintessential 

“bipartisan” objective. (Id. (citing CPD Dir. Resp. Ex. 1, ¶ 10)). 

26. Even less convincing is the FEC’s “analysis” of two more recent statements by 

CPD directors. The first is Barbara Vucanovich’s characterization of the CPD as “bi-partisan.” 

The FEC purports to rely upon an affidavit from Vucanovich claiming that when she “used the 

word ‘bi-partsian,’” she really meant “non-partisan.” (Id.). But that is absurd. By definition, 

“bipartisan” means “marked by or involving cooperation, agreement, and compromise between 

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two major political parties” or “of, relating to, or involving members of two parties.”3 In other 

words, “bipartsian” means the opposite of “nonpartisan,” and it was arbitrary and capricious of 

the FEC to blithely accept Vucanovich’s contrary claim. 

27. Likewise, the FEC takes at face value Fahrenkopf’s wholly implausible 

explanation for why he said the CPD has a “system” that “primarily go[es] with the two leading 

candidates” from “the two political part[ies].” Fahrenkopf gave this answer in response to a 

question about “the prospects” of having more than two particiants in a presidential debate. 

Even though the question on its face was prospective, the FEC chose to credit Fahrenkopf’s selfserving claim that he was making “an assertion of historical fact.” (Factual and Legal Analysis 

at 18). That conclusion was both facially untenable and wholly unreasonable in light of 

Fahrenkopf’s history and current role as an active Republican partisan, his past campaign 

contributions, his public comments espousing his support for and affiliation with the Republican 

party, and his work as a lobbyist for an organization that donated over $150,000 to Democratic 

and Republican candidates in the 2011-12 election cycle alone. Likewise, the FEC’s suggestion 

that Fahrenkopf may act in a partisan fashion if he believes it serves the “public benefit” is 

nothing less than an admission that the FEC actively condones the CPD’s partisan bias. 

28. The Factual and Legal Analysis does not specifically address the remaining 

evidence of the CPD’s partisan activities, including: 

 Fahrenkopf’s statement that the CPD was “not likely to look with favor on 

including third-party candidates in the debates”; 

 Alan Simpson’s comment that “Democrats and Republicans on the commission [] 

are interested in the American people finding out more about the two major 

candidates—not about independent candidates who mess things up”; 

 

3

 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bipartisan (emphasis supplied). 

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 John Lewis’ comment that “the two major parties [have] absolute control of the 

presidential debate process”; 

 Newton Minow’s view that “other candidates could be included” in the debates 

only if “the Democratic and Republican nominees agreed”; 

 David Norcross’ concession that the CPD is “not really nonpartisan. It’s 

bipartisan.” 

 Congressional testimony that the Democratic and Republican parties determine 

who participates in the debates; 

 Fahrenkopf’s reference to the Republican Party as “our great party”; 

 The tens of thousands of dollars that the CPD’s co-chairs and directors have 

donated to Democratic and Republican campaigns; and 

 The lobbying efforts of CPD directors on behalf of industries that funneled 

hundreds of thousands of dollars to Democratic and Republican candidates. 

29. The FEC instead sweeps all of this evidence under the rug by claiming that the 

CPD members acted in a “personal” rather than “official” capacity, such that their conduct 

should not be attributed to the CPD. This argument elevates form over substance. It is 

undisputed that the CPD can and does only act through its personnel—i.e., the same staunch 

partisans who actively promote partisan causes and have conceded time and again that they view 

the CPD as a partisan organization. For example, it would make no sense to suggest that, when 

Fahrenkopf recently admitted that the CPD’s “system” is designed to include only “the two 

political party candidates,” he was speaking only in a “personal” capacity. Fahrenkopf founded 

the organization and has run it for three decades; Frank Fahrenkopf is the CPD, and he obviously 

does not operate the CPD any differently from the way he described. 

30. In any event, the FEC does not even really believe that the CPD as an 

organization is untainted by the partisanship of its directors. It never made such an argument in 

any of the prior CPD-related cases, including Buchanan. To the contrary, in its dismissal of the 

administrative complaint in MUR 5414, the FEC observed that certain statements made by CPD 

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director Alan Simpson about excluding independent candidates from the CPD’s debates “raise[d] 

questions” about the CPD’s opposition to independent candidates. And during summary 

judgment briefing in this case, the FEC similarly recognized that the behavior of the leaders of a 

debate staging organization is highly probative of whether that organization is partisan in 

violation of § 110.13(a). 

31. In a last-ditch attempt to circumvent Plaintiffs’ evidence, the CPD now claims for 

the first time that “[i]t has long been the informal policy of the CPD that Board Members are to 

refrain from serving in any official capacity with a political campaign.” (Factual and Legal 

Analysis at 20-21 (citing CPD Dir. Resp. Ex. 4, ¶ 6)). It is curious that the CPD never thought to 

mention this until now, but in any event, the alleged “informal policy” is meaningless. By its 

nature, an “informal policy” is one that is not enforced. Indeed, the CPD directors have 

repeatedly violated this alleged “informal policy”; Fahrenkopf himself did so as recently as May 

2017, when it was announced that he would serve as “co-chair” of a “fundrais[ing]” event for 

Nevada Republican Attorney General Adam Laxalt. Moreover, the “informal policy” only 

purports to prohibit supporting “political campaigns” in “an official capacity.” That would still 

allow the CPD members to endorse candidates, contribute to their campaigns, attend campaign 

functions, raise money for political candidates, campaign on their behalf, “unofficially” consult 

campaigns, and support either the Democratic or Republican parties in ways not connected to a 

particular campaign. This, of course, is precisely what the FEC has allowed the CPD’s directors 

to do for the past three decades. 

32. Similarly, the CPD now claims to also have a previously undisclosed “formal 

political activities policy” that is “intended to deter CPD-affiliated persons from participating, 

even in a personal capacity, in the political process at the presidential level.” (Factual and Legal 

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Analysis at 20 (citing CPD Dir. Resp. Ex. 4, ¶ 7)). The CPD thereby tacitly admits that it was 

improper for its personnel to engage such activities—if they were truly blameless, why adopt a 

policy prohibiting them? Indeed, the policy was supposedly adopted not long after the original 

action challenging the FEC’s dismissal of the administrative complaints was filed. Moreover, 

the CPD never supplied this alleged policy to the FEC. All the FEC received was the onesentence description quoted above, which the FEC was apparently content to rely upon. Even 

that cursory description reveals that the policy does not actually prohibit partisan activities, and 

is at most “intended to deter” them. It was arbitrary and capricious for the FEC to rely on the 

curiously-timed announcement of a previously undisclosed “policy” that the CPD continues to 

withhold from the FEC and, by the CPD’s own reckoning, is as toothless as the aforementioned 

“informal policy” that the CPD’s co-chairman openly flouts. 

The Young Report 

33. The Young Report showed that a candidate must, on average, obtain name 

recognition of at least “60-80%” among the “American public” in order to potentially achieve 

15% in the polls. The Factual and Legal Analysis offers nothing to undermine this conclusion. 

Instead, it responds with two non sequiturs: that (1) “polling results are not merely a function of 

name recognition,” because there are other things that could make a candidate “unpopular”; and 

(2) a single “YouGov” poll allegedly showing that Gary Johnson achieved 63% name 

recognition in 2016. (Factual and Legal Analysis at 24). Neither of these arguments addresses, 

let alone refutes, Young’s conclusion. 

34. As to the first argument, Young found that at least 60% name recognition is 

necessary to reach 15% in the polls. Young never suggested that it was sufficient, such that 

anyone who achieves this level of name recognition will automatically attract 15% support. 

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Rather, widespread name recognition is merely the first of many hurdles that an independent 

candidate would face when attempting to satisfy the CPD’s polling criterion. Of course there are 

factors beyond name recognition that might influence a candidate’s popularity, as Young himself 

acknowledges. But that does not undermine Young’s point—that a candidate must first become 

“known” before he or she can be “liked,” and 60-80% name recognition is what is required. 

35. Gary Johnson never achieved this level of name recognition. Young found that, 

on average, a candidate needs 60-80% name recognition among the population at large.

4

 The 

“YouGov” poll cited by the FEC was for a subset of those eligible to vote, and not the population 

at large. And even if the “YouGov” poll supported the FEC’s argument (it does not), the FEC 

cherry-picked that poll to create a misleading impression of Johnson’s name recognition. The 

FEC ignored two other polls, each taken within approximately two months of the “YouGov” 

poll, in which little more than one-third of Americans regognized Gary’s Johnson’s name. Even 

the CPD recognizes that a single poll can be erroneous and misleading, and that multiple polls 

should be consulted to better understand public opinion. That is why the CPD averages five polls 

in determining which candidates qualify for the debates. In any event, as discussed above, 

Young never suggested that 60% name recognition automatically translates into a 15% vote 

share. He only said it was necessary, and Johnson’s alleged showing in no way undermines that 

conclusion. 

36. Young also concluded that polling conducted in three-way races is more errorprone than in two-way races, and that there is a significant probability that an independent 

candidate could be excluded because of polling error. The FEC’s response is both counterfactual 

 

4

 See, e.g., Young Report at 14 (“all models point to a need for significant levels of name 

recognition—in excess of 60% of the American public...”) (emphasis supplied). 

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and superficial. Specifically, the Factual and Legal Analysis (1) purports to re-define polling 

“error” in a way that contradicts the CPD’s own definition; (2) argues that polling error is “just 

as likely to result in overinclusion of candidates shy of the 15 percent threshold”; and (3) 

quibbles with Young’s use of data from gubernatorial elections, ignoring the fact that Young 

already corrected for this. 

37. According to the FEC, “Young’s metric for polling error appears to be based on 

the difference between the poll and the actual results on Election Day. However, the CPD does 

not purport to use polls as predictors of what will occur on Election day, but as a reliable 

measure of candidates’ support at a given moment in September.” (Factual and Legal Analysis 

at 30). This contradicts the CPD’s own explanation of the 15% rule—indeed, the very 

explanation supplied by the CPD materials on which the FEC purports to rely. For example, 

when announcing its debate-qualifying criteria for the 2016 race, the CPD explained that rule as 

follows: “The purpose of the criteria is to identify those candidates whose support among the 

electorate places them among the candidates who have a realistic chance of being elected 

President of the United States.” Young faithfully adheres to the CPD’s own rationale for the 

15% rule. It was arbitrary and capricious for the FEC to contradict that explanation and to rely 

instead upon a conflicting, post-hoc rationale. 

38. The FEC next argues that while a deserving independent candidate might be 

excluded from the debate due to unfavorable polling error, it is also possible that an 

“undeserving” candidate might be included due to favorable polling error. That is completely 

beside the point. Democratic and Republican candidates are never excluded by the 15% rule; 

only an independent candidate at or near the 15% threshold is affected by the high risk of a false 

negative resulting from polling error. That risk therefore hurts only the independent candidate, 

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which makes the rule biased. Cf. Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 74 (“the objectivity requirement 

precludes debate sponsors from selecting a level of support so high that only the Democratic and 

Republican nominees could reasonably achieve it”). Moreover, the inaccuracy of polling is more 

likely to result in the exclusion of independent candidates who would otherwise satisfy polling 

thresholds. This is because, as explained in the petition for rulemaking, independent candidates 

tend to mobilize new voters whom pollsters tend to overlook when creating samples for their 

polls. 

39. Finally, when assessing the error in two-way races versus three-way races, Young 

relied upon data from gubernatorial races due to the relative paucity of three-way races at the 

presidential level. Recognizing that gubernatorial races are more error prone than presidential 

races, Young explicitly corrected for this difference in his calculations. In response, the Factual 

and Legal Analysis states that polling in presidential races is “inherently more reliable” than in 

gubernatorial races, but neither acknowledges that Young addressed this issue nor refutes the 

manner in which he corrected for it. (Factual and Legal Analysis at 31). Moreover, that threeway races are more error-prone than two-way races is a mathematical certainty, and not just 

Young’s “opinion” or a function of the gubernatorial results. The FEC does not and cannot 

refute the fundamental mathematical principles that make the 15% rule biased against 

independent candidates. 

The Schoen Report 

40. Schoen demonstrated that, because independent candidates have difficulty 

attracting earned media, they must raise approximately $266 million to achieve at least 60% 

name recognition. In response, the Factual and Legal Analysis argues that (1) independent 

candidates supposedly received “extensive” media coverage in 2016; (2) the 2016 election 

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supposedly demonstrates that Super PACs and social media substantially relieve third-party 

candidates of their fundraising burden, and (3) independent candidates “may start with some 

name recognition or financial resources,” using Gary Johnson and Michael Bloomberg as 

purported examples. Each of these arguments relies upon the 2016 election, which had not even 

occurred when the FEC issued its original 2015 decisions dismissing the complaints. And, for 

the reasons below, the FEC’s belated reliance upon the 2016 race is wholly unavailing. 

41. To support its claim that Gary Johnson and Jill Stein received “extensive” media 

coverage, the Factual and Legal Analysis claims (at 25 & n.7) that between them, they made on 

average about two media appearanes per month during their respective campaigns, many of 

which ran only on C-Span. It is absurd to suggest that this could support a modern presidential 

campaign. Nor does the FEC account for how fractured the media has become; to the extent that 

many media appearances was ever enough, voters now have innumerable news sources to choose 

from, and making a handful of appearances on a handful of these news outlets is patently 

insufficient. Moreover, the FEC’s rulemaking decision presents a separate analysis (discussed 

below) confirming that coverage of major party candidates dwarfed that of independent 

candidates in 2016. And all of this happened in a race in which the major party candidates were 

historically disliked, and the public’s appetite for a third-party or independent alternative was 

higher than ever. If the third-party candidates could not generate sufficient earned media in this 

race—according to the FEC’s own rulemaking analysis, they did not come close—it is hard to 

imagine a race in which that could happen. 

42. Independent candidates must spend money to garner sufficient attention, and 

neither Super PACs nor social media could plausibly relieve the massive fundraising burden 

imposed on them. Super PACs benefit Democrats and Republicans, not third parties, as the 2016 

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race amply shows. According to the FEC’s own data, in 2016 Super PACs and other outside 

funding sources raised over $700 million for Democratic and Republican candidates, and only 

$1.4 million for their third-party and independent counterparts (Johnson, Stein and McMullin).5 

Among the 21 Republican and Democratic candidates listed on the Open Secrets website—

including also-rans like Jim Webb, Martin O’Malley, James Gilmore, Scott Walker, Bobby 

Jindal, Rick Perry and George Pataki—the average Republican and Democratic candidate 

received almost $34 million, whereas the average third-party and independent candidate received 

$462,000. This merely adds to the substantial fundraising disadvantage independent candidates 

already face. Together with the Super PAC money, the average Democrat and Republican raised 

over $100 million in 2016, compared to approximately $6 million for their third-party and 

independent counterparts. Adding up these amounts, third-party and independent candidates 

received less than 1% of the billions of dollars raised for the 2016 presidential race. Super PACs 

don’t alleviate the financial burden on third-party and independent candidates; they increase that 

burden by placing those candidates at an even greater disadvantage. 

43. And the FEC does not seriously suggest that an independent candidate can 

overcome these massive disparities by sending messages on Facebook and Twitter. The sheer 

enormity of the major party candidates’ fundraising advantage renders that argument dubious on 

its face. The argument is also decisively refuted by the FEC’s own purported examples of how 

social media can relieve a candidate’s fundraising burden—the 2016 Trump campaign and the 

Obama presidential campaigns. (Legal and Factual Analysis at 26). Between the campaign 

itself, Super PAC donations and joint/party fundraising, Trump raised close to $1 billion in 2016, 

 

5

 See, e.g., https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16; https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/alsorans. 

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and Obama raised comparable amounts. By relying upon Trump and Obama as examples of how 

a campaign can be run cost-efficiently using social media, the FEC only bolsters the argument 

that independent candidates must raise amounts that make Schoen’s $266 million estimate seem 

modest by comparison. 

44. Finally, the Factual and Legal Analysis cites no poll to support its 

“presum[ption]” that independent candidates begin their campaign with meaningful name 

recognition.6 (Factual and Legal Analysis at 27-28). That is because candidates like Stein, 

Johnson, McMullin, and others without strong ties to the major political parties are, by and large, 

starting from scratch. That leaves independently wealthy candidates as the only ones realistically 

able to launch a serious independent campaign. The FEC uses Michael Bloomberg as an 

example (Factual and Legal Analysis at 28), and on this we agree with the FEC: if you are the 

10th richest person in the world, then you can run for President of the United States as an 

independent candidate. The problem is that virtually no one else can, because the CPD has 

rigged the process and the FEC refuses to do anything about it. 

The CPD’s Discretion To Manipulate Poll Selection 

45. The CPD’s polling criterion is biased for another reason: the CPD retains 

complete discretion regarding whom to poll, when to poll, what polls to consider, and when to 

make the debate-selection determination, which permits the CPD to arbitrarily select polls that 

disfavor an independent candidate. The FEC has no answer to this. It claims that the CPD has 

 

6

 In the rulemaking decision, discussed below, the FEC cites (at p. 15471) an early 2011 

poll in which Johnson had 11% name recognition among Republican voters. This poll 

(1) says nothing about Johnson’s overall name recognition, including whether 

Democratic or independent voters knew who the former Republican governor was, and 

(2) ranked Johnson dead last among the 2012 presidential candidates included in the poll. 

Presumably that is why, unlike the rulemaking decision, the Factual and Legal Analysis 

does not even purport to rely upon this poll. 

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yet to exclude an independent candidate in this manner (Factual and Legal Analysis at 29), but 

that is because the CPD has not had the opportunity, given how hard it is for an independent 

candidate even to approach the 15% threshold. It is undisputed that, if and when an independent 

candidate were ever to poll that high, there is nothing to stop the CPD from manipulating the 

selection of polls to exclude an independent candidate. Nor is there any real dispute that the 

polls themselves can be unreliable, as the CPD’s consultant, Frank Newport, recognized by 

discontinuing his own organization’s presidential horse-race polling. 

C. The FEC Failed To Meaningfully Consider The Evidence Against the CPD 

Directors 

46. The FEC previously failed to notify many of the CPD directors about the 

administrative complaints or respond to the allegations specific to those directors. This Court 

ordered the FEC to notify them, “address” the “allegations made against” them, and “consider 

the evidence presented against these respondents.” Level the Playing Field, 2017 WL 437400, at 

*9. 

47. The directors were finally notified of this action in or about February 2017, but 

their response demonstrates that neither they nor the FEC gave any thought to the evidence 

implicating them in this dispute. Soon after the Court’s decision, nine of the directors signed an 

identically worded, five-paragraph affidavit. Each affidavit has the same Microsofit Word 

document identifier in the footer (“232792 v.1”), and all but two were signed on the same day, 

suggesting that the same lawyer simultaneously distributed a form affidavit to all nine directors, 

seven of whom immediately signed it. And this form affidavit addresses the case only in 

conclusory terms. It summarily denies Plaintiffs’ allegations without responding to any of them 

specifically or addressing any of the evidence, let alone evidence specific to these directors. 

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48. Indeed, none of these directors confirm that they even reviewed the complaint or 

the evidence supporting it,7 and they clearly did not. For example, Alan Simpson is the director 

who once commented that “Democrats and Republicans on the commission [] are interested in 

the American people finding out more about the two major candidates—not about independent 

candidates who mess things up.” Yet in the affidavit he signed, Simpson declares under penalty 

of perjury that the CPD does not try to “keep any party or candidate from participating in the 

CPD’s debates” or “bring about a predetermined result,” and that “it has long been [Simpson’s] 

view that the CPD’s debates should include any independent . . . candidate if that candidate is 

properly considered a leading candidate.” Either Simpson (i) was not shown the evidence of his 

prior statement, (ii) did not read the conflicting affidavit before he signed it, or (iii) both. 

49. Similarly, Newton Minow is the director who once confirmed that “other 

candidates could be included” in the debates only if “the Democratic and Republican nominees 

agreed.” Yet the affidavit Minow signed is identical to Simpson’s, and contradicts Minow’s 

prior statement. Like Simpson, Minow fails to acknowledge, let alone reconcile, this 

inconsistency. 

50. The director affidavits are an obvious sham. The FEC failed to meaningfully 

consider the evidence against these directors, and its rote, unquestioning acceptance of their 

affidavits was arbitrary and capricious. (See, e.g., Factual and Legal Analysis at 16-17). 

D. The FEC Arbitrarily And Capriciously Concluded That The CPD’s Polling 

Criterion Was Objective 

51. For reasons including those set forth above, the FEC does not and cannot 

meaningfully address the evidence demonstrating that the CPD’s polling criterion is not 

 

7

 See CPD Dir. Resp. Ex. 6, ¶ 3 (“Contrary to what I understand the complaintants have 

claimed . . .”) (emphasis supplied). 

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objective. Nor does the FEC even try to explain why, in its view, the polling criterion does 

satisfy the objectivity requirement. All it does is identify a handful of independent candidates 

who supposedly would have qualified under the 15% rule—Teddy Roosevelt in 1912, Robert 

LaFolette in 1924, Strom Thurmond in 1948, Henry Wallace in 1968, John Anderson in 1980, 

and Ross Perot in 1992. The FEC’s purported reliance upon these campaigns does not withstand 

even the slightest scrutiny. 

52. It is undisputed that Perot would not have satisfied the CPD’s current rule, 

because he was polling at or below 10% prior to the 1992 debates. And neither George Wallace 

nor John Anderson was unaffiliated with the Democratic or Republican parties. Both competed 

in their respective parties’ primaries, and thus received the enhanced name recognition that truly 

unaffiliated candidates do not receive. Their candidacies do not undercut the case that the CPD’s 

rule is not one that unaffiliated candidates can reasonably satisfy. 

53. The FEC’s other examples are equally unavailing. The campaigns of Roosevelt, 

LaFolette and Thurmond are 105, 97, and 69 years old, respectively, and are plainly 

anachronistic. They predated not only the Internet age, but the television age too, and provide no 

guidance on 21st century campaigns. Nor does the Factual and Legal Analysis cite any evidence 

that these candidates would have qualified under the CPD’s current criteria. Moreover, to the 

extent any did poll at 15% or higher during the relevant time period, each rose to national 

prominence within a major party before running independently. Roosevelt was a two-term 

Republican president who then ran a third time on a third-party ticket. LaFolette was a 

Republican Senator who had previously run for president as a Republican. And Thurmond 

attended the 1948 Democratic National Convention as a prominent segregationist governor, 

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where Southern delegations staged a dramatic walkout and later nominated Thurmond on a 

segregationist third-party ticket. 

54. As this Court observed, “[g]iven . . . the evidence that since 1988 only one nonmajor party candidate . . . has participated in the debates, and only then at the request of the two 

major parties,” it is “perplex[ing]” that the FEC is so quick to rubber stamp the CPD’s criteria 

and find it to be “objective.” Level the Playing Field, 2017 WL 437400, at *10. “This begs the 

question: if under these facts the FEC does not consider the fifteen percent polling criterion to 

be subjective, what would be?” Id. The Factual and Legal Analysis simply ignores this critical 

question. 

THE FEC FAILED TO EXPLAIN ITS REFUSAL TO 

ENGAGE IN RULEMAKING 

55. The rulemaking decision largely mirrors the FEC’s reasoning in dismissing the 

administrative complaints. To the extent the rulemaking decision offers additional reasoning, it 

is equally arbitrary and capricious for reasons including, but not limited to, those set forth below. 

Put simply, nothing in the rulemaking decision justifies the FEC’s arbitrary and capricious 

refusal to institute a rulemaking. 

The Young Report

56. The rulemaking decision presents two additional critiques of the Young report, 

both of which are frivolous. First, the FEC argues that “the Young Report reaches its 60-80% 

name recognition result” by examining “data about name recognition of major party candidates 

at the early stages of the party primary process.” (Rulemaking Decision at 15470). The FEC 

claims that this purported focus on early polling “may amplify polling errors,” and suggests that 

the focus should be on data from later in the process. But the Young Report on its face informs 

the reader that the 60-80% result is based on polling data from every stage of the election, 

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including “late primary” and “general” election polling. Indeed, focusing the analysis on later 

stages of the election would require name recognition at the higher end of the 60-80% range. For 

example, Young ran three variations of the computation using only “late primary” data, which 

required name recognition of 76.9%, 78.4% and 77.1%, respectively. 

57. Second, while apparently acknowledging the strong correlation between name 

recognition and vote share, the FEC purports to question whether a “causative effect” can be 

implied. (Rulemaking Decision at 15470). In fact, a causative effect must be implied. As 

explained above, voters cannot like a candidate unless they first know who that candidate is. 

Consequently, there must be a causal relationship between name recognition—whether voters 

even know who the candidate is—and vote share—whether voters have decided to vote for that 

person. Indeed, because so many voters default to either the Republican and Democratic 

nominees, common sense dictates that an independent candidate must be widely known before 

he or she can achieve a vote share as high as 15%. The FEC does not seriously suggest 

otherwise. 

The Schoen Report 

58. The rulemaking decision’s attempt to impugn Schoen is equally unpersuasive. 

First, it disputes Schoen’s conclusion that independent candidates have difficulty attracting 

earned media, purportedly in reliance upon an analysis of newspaper coverage of the 2016 

presidential election. (Rulemaking Decision at 15470 n.6). In fact, as explained below, the 

FEC’s presentation of this newspaper coverage is false and misleading. 

59. The FEC claims to have searched the Westlaw “newspaper” database to 

determine how many newspaper stories mentioned the candidates during specified periods. 

Specifically, based on the results it reports, the FEC appears to have searched Westlaw’s “major 

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newspaper” database, which includes 46 newspapers from around the country. The FEC claims 

it searched the database for “Gary Johnson,” “Jill Stein” and “Evan McMullin” for the 277 days 

between February 5, 2016 and November 7, 2016. It claims that these searches yielded 3,001 

hits for Gary Johnson, 1,744 hits for Jill Stein, and 353 hits for Evan McMullin. The FEC also 

searched for stories that mentioned certain Republican and Democratic candidates, but for much 

earlier 277-day periods: August 1, 2015 to May 4, 2016 for the Republicans, and September 4, 

2015 to June 7, 2016 for the Democrats. The FEC claims that the results for Donald Trump and 

Hillary Clinton were 7,451 and 7,404, and that the results for other primary candidates (Jim 

Webb, Martin O’Malley, Lincoln Chafee, Rick Perry, George Pataki, Bobby Jindal, and Mike 

Huckabee) were lower and comparable to the independent candidates. 

60. There are numerous problems with the FEC’s purported analysis. First, its 

premise is deeply flawed. Simply being mentioned in an article is not necessarily indicative of 

increased or sustained name recognition. For example, an article may simply mention the 

independent candidate in passing after devoting most of its attention to the major party 

candidates, or discuss how an independent candidate has been excluded from the presidential 

debates. The FEC makes no effort to differentiate between articles that meaningfully advance a 

candidacy and those that do not. 

61. Second, the FEC simply misrepresents the number of newspaper stories 

mentioning the candidates in the Westlaw database, radically understating the coverage of the 

major party nominees. During the time periods it allegedly searched, Trump had at least 49,500 

stories (not 7,541), and Clinton had at least 39,608 (not 7,404). If one instead searches the later 

time period searched for the independent candidates (February 2016 to November 2016), these 

numbers increase to at least 84,709 for Trump and at least 68,997 for Clinton. The number of 

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stories devoted to the major party nominees therefore dwarfed those mentioning the 

independents, contrary to what the FEC suggests. 

62. Third, the FEC misrepresents the results in another way—it assumes that any 

search hit for “Gary Johnson” must be about the Libertarian presidential candidate. But because 

Gary Johnson is a common name, a number of the articles on which the FEC relies were not 

even about the presidential candidate, and were instead about a different person named Gary 

Johnson. Examples include: 

a. Dozens of obituaries in which either the deceased or a relative of the deceased 

was named “Gary Johnson”; 

b. Articles about up and coming Hawaiian chef Gary Johnson and his new 

restaurant, “Hana Ranch Provisions”; 

c. Articles about Gary “Big Hands” Johnson, the legendary defensive standout of the 

NFL’s San Diego Chargers; 

d. Property listings from around the country in which homeowners named Gary 

Johnson bought or sold their homes; 

e. A September 2016 article about Missouri real estate agent Gary Johnson’s 

collection of hand-painted earthenware; 

f. Articles recounting Texas Longhorn power forward Gary Johnson’s dramatic lastsecond bankshot to win the NCAA Maui Invitational; 

g. Articles detailing the criminal charges faced by the clients of Illinois defense 

attorney Gary Johnson; 

h. An August 2016 article covering a “competitive ax-throwing” event attended by 

Norristown, Pennsylvania resident Gary Johnson; 

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i. Results for golf, bowling, bass fishing and other tournaments in which various 

amateur athletes named Gary Johnson participated; 

j. An October 2016 story about musician Gary Johnson’s four-piece band 

celebrating German culture; 

k. Articles chronicling both the service of law enforcement officials named Gary 

Johnson and the misdeeds of the Gary Johnsons on the wrong side of the law who 

were either arrested or convicted of crimes in 2016; and 

l. The Boston Globe’s August 2016 plug for the Greg Abate Quartet, a jazz 

ensemble featuring Gary Johnson on the drums. 

63. These are just examples of the dozens of people named Gary Johnson referenced 

in the articles who are not Libertarian presidential candidate Gary Johnson. And, in addition to 

these irrelevant articles, the search results also include numerous duplicate articles and stories 

that, despite appearing in the Westlaw search results, do not actually refer to Gary Johnson. It is 

only by including all of these articles that the FEC arrived at the 3,001 references to “Gary 

Johnson” in its newspaper searches.8

 The FEC either knowingly included these irrelevant 

articles, or failed to conduct even a cursory review of the search results to exclude them. Either 

way, the FEC’s suggestion that these articles somehow advanced the candidacy of candidate 

Gary Johnson is arbitrary and capricious, and shows that the rationale for its decision is entirely 

pretextual. 

64. Third, the FEC gerryrigged the date ranges it searched to arrive at a 

predetermined result. It searched for articles about the Republican candidates between August 

 

8

 When Plaintiffs search the “Major Newspaper” database for “Gary Johnson” using the 

time period specified by the FEC, it yields 3,001 results—the same number reported by 

the FEC in its decision—which includes the irrelevant articles described above. 

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2015 and May 2016; and it searched for articles about the Democratic candidates between 

September 2015 and June 2016. But all of the primary candidates the FEC uses in its 

comparison (O’Malley, Webb, Chafee, Pataki, Jindal, Perry, and Huckabee) ended their 

campaigns long before May or June 2016. For example, Perry ended his campaign on 

September 11, 2015, meaning he was only running for president for the first month of the ninemonth period for which his name was searched. The FEC apparently set up the searches this 

way to make it seem like these candidates received less press than they did during the ninemonth search period, when in fact they were simply not running for president for most of that 

period. 

65. Conversely, the FEC went out of its way to inflate the results for the third-party 

candidates. It did not search for press coverage of those candidates during the same time period 

it examined for the major party candidates. Instead, it compared apples to oranges, examining a 

later time period for the third-party candidates—February 5, 2016 to November 7, 2016. It did 

this because (i) Gary Johnson and Jill Stein had active candidacies for this entire time period, 

unlike the major party candidates they were compared to, and (ii) there is more interest in the 

election in 2016 as opposed to 2015, thereby increasing news coverage. 

66. Thus, the FEC cherry-picked date ranges that would suppress the search results 

for the major party candidates, but inflate the results for the third-party candidates, in order to 

make it seem like the former and the latter received comparable press. By contrast, Plaintiffs 

conducted a comparison for the time periods when the third-party candidacies overlapped with 

the major party candidacies, using the same major party primary candidates whom the FEC 

claimed received press coverage that was comparable to the third-party candidates. This apples 

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to apples comparison demonstrates that, in fact, the major party candidates received far more 

press9: 

Major Party 

Candidate 

Search 

Hits 

Third-Party 

Candidate 

Search 

Hits 

Huckabee 3,557 Stein 17 

Jindall 2,668 Stein 11 

Perry 1,719 Stein 5 

Pataki 977 Stein 15 

Webb 581 Stein 9 

Chafee 564 Stein 10 

O’Malley 3,128 Stein 17 

Huckabee 447 Johnson 17 

O’Malley 525 Johnson 17 

67. Thus, similar to the general election, media coverage of third-party candidates 

during the primaries was dwarfed by coverage of the Democratic and Republican candidates. 

And, it is worth noting, the FEC also cherry-picked some of the least successful candidates from 

the major party primaries to compare to the third-party candidates—Jim Webb, Martin 

O’Malley, Bobby Jindall, George Pataki, Lincoln Chafee, Mike Huckabee, and Rick Perry. For 

every Jim Webb and Lincoln Chafee, there is a Bernie Sanders or Marco Rubio who is 

catapulted to national prominence through his participation in the primaries. Had the FEC 

compared press coverage of Sanders or Rubio to the third-party candidates, the results would 

have been even more one-sided. 

68. Fifth, regardless of the foregoing, the FEC fails to explain how the coverage it 

claimed the third-party candidates received could be remotely sufficient to support a presidential 

 

9

 This chart otherwise mimics the FEC’s methodology in order to show what the results 

would look like if the FEC performed an apples to apples comparison. 

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candidacy, and attract a level of support in polls of at least 15%. Because the search results for 

these candidates are for 46 different newspapers over a 9-month period, the independent 

candidates in reality received very little press. Below is a chart of each paper’s average number 

of stories per week that mentioned each candidate during their candidacies (compared with 

results for Trump and Clinton): 

Third-Party / 

Independent 

Candidate 

Average 

Mentions Per 

Week 

Stein 0.6 

Johnson 1.6 

McMullin 0.6 

Trump 34.1 

Clinton 27.8 

69. Stein and McMullin were mentioned, on average, about once every two weeks by 

these papers. And that includes a number of articles that made a mere passing reference to the 

candidate, discussed how the candidates were excluded from the debates, and/or or simply 

recited a poll result that happened to include the candidate. The number of stories that were 

meaningfully devoted to these candidates was much smaller. Meanwhile, these same 

newspapers published stories about Trump, on average, over 34 times per week. 

70. The FEC further contends that Schoen’s conclusion that independent candidates 

have difficulty attracting earned media is “based primarily on research published in 1999.” 

(Rulemaking Decision at 15471). This argument simply cherry-picks the one article Schoen 

cites from that time period, and ignores the various recent publications on which Schoen relies, 

including articles from 2010, 2012, and 2014. Moreover, the 2016 data above on which the FEC 

purports to rely amply demonstrates the inability of third-party candidates to generate sufficient 

earned media. 

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71. Next, Schoen provided two examples of major party candidates who benefited 

from the national exposure provided by early party primaries: Barack Obama in 2008 and Rick 

Santorum in 2012. The FEC quibbles with these examples, but offers nothing to undermine their 

validity. Specifically, the FEC disputes that Obama received a significant boost from Iowa. But 

this is a fact—Obama’s support increased dramatically following the Iowa caucuses.10 

(Rulemaking Decision at 15471). Moreover, to the extent people were already familiar with 

Obama, that was because he delivered the keynote address at the previous Democratic 

Convention. Approximately 9.1 million viewers are reported to have watched the speech, which 

elevated Obama’s status in the party and immediately led to speculation that he would run for 

president. This proves Plaintiffs’ point—it was the party nominating process that gave Obama a 

national audience and increased his notoriety. This opportunity would not be available to a thirdparty or independent candidate. 

72. Similarly, Schoen made the point that Santorum received a significant boost from 

news coverage of the 2012 Iowa caucus despite spending only $21,980 on media in Iowa. The 

FEC appears to dispute this figure, but offers no evidence that it was any higher than Schoen 

indicated. The FEC instead points to Santorum’s aggregated campaign expenditures, which 

include non-media costs like “rent, payroll, lodging, direct mail, communication consulting and 

coalition building.” (Rulemaking Decision at 15471). 

73. Finally, the FEC purports to question the experience and motives of Canal 

Partners, the media-buying firm that supplied Schoen with the $266 million estimate. (Id.). But 

there was nothing preventing the FEC from researching or seeking a further explanation if it had 

 

10 See http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/us/democratic_presidential_

nomination-191.html. 

Case 1:15-cv-01397-TSC Document 70 Filed 05/26/17 Page 34 of 38
35 

any concerns about Canal Partners. Had it done so, it would have learned that Canal Partners’ 

credentials are impeccable. They have decades of experience buying media for presidential and 

other high-profile races (including the presidential campaigns of Bill Clinton and Al Gore). And 

Schoen blinded Canal Partners to the identity of his clients (Plaintiffs) precisely to avoid any 

accusations of bias. 

* * * * * 

74. The CPD’s violation of the debate regulations and the FEC’s dismissals of 

Plaintiffs’ administrative complaints and LPF’s rulemaking petition have caused and continue to 

cause injury to Plaintiffs. In addition to the reasons set forth above, the Libertarian and Green 

Parties intend to nominate presidential candidates in the 2020 election, and LPF intends to recruit 

qualified independent candidates to run on a nonpartisan 2020 ticket should the relief sought 

herein be granted. 

75. It bears repeating that, as explained more fully above, the FEC itself is an 

inherently bipartisan institution that is invested in the bipartisan control of our politics in the 

same way that the CPD is. The FEC has now had two opportunities to explain why it dismissed 

the administrative complaints and declined to institute a rulemaking. In neither instance did it 

carefully consider Plaintiffs’ applications or give the evidence the hard look that the law 

requires. Because the FEC has demonstrated that it either cannot or will not fairly review 

Plaintiffs’ allegations, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that it would be futile to remand the 

administrative complaints to the FEC yet again, and that Plaintiffs should instead be permitted to 

bring a civil action against the CPD, its executive director, and the directors who have 

participated in the violations of law set forth above. 

Case 1:15-cv-01397-TSC Document 70 Filed 05/26/17 Page 35 of 38
36 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 

FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

(28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202) 

76. Plaintiffs repeat and reassert the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 75 as though 

fully set forth herein. 

77. The FEC’s dismissals of Plaintiffs’ administrative complaints were arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law. See 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(8)(A); 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

78. The FEC’s dismissals of Plaintiffs’ administrative complaints reflect the agency’s 

unwillingness and inability to investigate the CPD. 

79. The Court should declare that the FEC’s dismissals are contrary to law and direct 

the FEC, within 30 days, to find that the CPD has violated FECA as set forth in the 

administrative complaints, and, if the FEC fails to so act, order that Plaintiffs may bring a civil 

action to remedy the violations of FECA alleged in their administrative complaints. 

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 

FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

(28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202) 

80. LPF repeats and reasserts the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 75 as though 

fully set forth herein. 

81. The FEC’s denial of LPF’s petition for rulemaking was arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

82. The Court should declare that the FEC must act within 30 days to open a 

rulemaking to revise the regulations governing presidential debates and further declare that the 

FEC must complete that rulemaking in sufficient time to ensure that the revised rules will be in 

place for the 2020 presidential election. 

Case 1:15-cv-01397-TSC Document 70 Filed 05/26/17 Page 36 of 38
37 

REQUESTED RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, by their undersigned counsel, respectfully request that the 

Court grant the following relief: 

a) Declare that the FEC’s dismissals of Plaintiffs’ administrative complaints were 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law; 

b) Declare that the FEC’s denial of LPF’s petition for rulemaking was arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise contrary to law; 

c) Direct that the FEC find that the CPD has violated 11 C.F.R. § 110.13 by staging 

candidate debates in a partisan manner and without pre-established, objective criteria; 

d) Direct that the FEC find that the CPD has violated 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) by 

making prohibited contributions and expenditures; 

e) Direct that the FEC find that the CPD has violated 52 U.S.C. § 30116(f) by 

accepting prohibited contributions; 

f) Direct that the FEC find that the CPD has violated 52 U.S.C. §§ 30103 and 30104 

by failing to register as a political committee and by failing to make required reports and 

disclosures; 

g) Order the FEC to conform to such declaration and directives within 30 days and, 

if the FEC fails to so act, order that Plaintiffs may bring a civil action (1) to remedy the 

violations of FECA alleged in their administrative complaints and, (2) because the CPD also 

adopted rules for the 2016 election that violate 11 C.F.R. § 110.13, to remedy those violations of 

FECA as well; 

Case 1:15-cv-01397-TSC Document 70 Filed 05/26/17 Page 37 of 38
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h) Order that the FEC within 30 days open a rulemaking to revise its rules governing 

presidential debates and that the FEC conclude that rulemaking in sufficient time to ensure that 

the revised rules will be in place for the 2020 presidential election; 

i) Award legal fees and costs of suit incurred by Plaintiffs; and 

j) Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. 

Dated: May 26, 2017 

 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 

 /s/ Alexandra A.E. Shapiro 

Alexandra A.E. Shapiro (D.C. Bar No. 438461) 

Eric S. Olney (pro hac admission pending) 

Fabien Thayamballi (pro hac admission pending) 

SHAPIRO ARATO LLP 

500 Fifth Avenue 

40th Floor 

New York, New York 10110 

Phone: (212) 257-4880 

Fax: (212) 202-6417 

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