UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

PETER J. VROOM, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 12-143 (RMC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) COMPLAINT 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT 

Defendant Federal Election Commission respectfully renews its motion to dismiss this 

action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Because plaintiff Peter J. Vroom already possesses the information he 

purportedly seeks through this lawsuit, he has not alleged — and cannot allege — any cognizable 

informational injury caused by the Commission or redressable in this action. The amended 

complaint must be therefore dismissed because Vroom lacks Article III standing. A 

memorandum of points and authorities in support of the Commission’s motion and a proposed 

order are attached. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Anthony Herman (D.C. Bar No. 424643) 

General Counsel 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 1 of 21
2 

Dated: January 24, 2013 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

/s/ Charles Kitcher 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

Attorney 

ckitcher@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

Telephone: (202) 694-1650 

Fax: (202) 219-0260 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 2 of 21
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

PETER J. VROOM, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 12-143 (RMC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) AUTHORITIES 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 

AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS 

Dated: January 24, 2013 

Anthony Herman (D.C. Bar No. 424643) 

General Counsel 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

Attorney 

ckitcher@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

Telephone: (202) 694-1650 

Fax: (202) 219-0260 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 3 of 21
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Page 

I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 

II. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................2 

A. Statutory Background ..............................................................................................2 

1. Reporting Requirements and Contribution Limits for Political 

Committees ..................................................................................................2 

2. The FEC and Its Enforcement Process ........................................................3 

B. Factual Background .................................................................................................4 

C. Procedural History ...................................................................................................6 

III. PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING BECAUSE HE HAS SUFFERED NO 

INFORMATIONAL INJURY .............................................................................................7 

A. Plaintiff Bears a Heavy Burden to Demonstrate Article III Standing Here .............7 

B. Plaintiff’s Own Allegations Show that the Dismissal of His Administrative 

Complaint Has Not Deprived Him of Any Information ..........................................9 

IV. PLAINTIFF ALSO LACKS STANDING BECAUSE HE CANNOT 

ESTABLISH THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF CAUSATION AND 

REDRESSABILITY ..........................................................................................................14 

V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................15 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 4 of 21
1 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The Court dismissed plaintiff Peter Vroom’s original complaint for failure to plead a 

cognizable injury-in-fact under Article III of the Constitution, but granted him the opportunity to 

amend his complaint to attempt to allege an informational injury. (Order, Dec. 6, 2012 (“Order”) 

at 4 (Docket No. 12).) Because plaintiff’s amended complaint presents no allegation that he has 

suffered any cognizable informational injury — much less any injury traceable to the actions of 

defendant Federal Election Commission or redressable by this Court — the amended complaint 

must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint repeats his principal contention that the General Electric 

Company (“GE”) and Penske Truck Leasing Corporation, L.P. (“Penske”) filed with the FEC 

false and misleading information about their corporate relationship, leading the Commission in 

2009 to allow Penske’s political action committee (“Penske PAC”) and General Electric’s 

political action committee (“GE PAC”) to “disaffiliate.” See Advisory Opinion 2009-18, 2009 

WL 2413841, at 8 (July 29, 2009). What plaintiff does not allege, however, is any fact showing 

that the Commission’s dismissal of his administrative complaint about GE and Penske caused 

him informational injury. To the contrary, it is clear on the face of plaintiff’s amended complaint 

that he already has access to every piece of information that he claims to seek in relation to these 

entities. In reality, the only relief plaintiff seeks in this case is “a legal determination that 

General Electric and Penske are in violation of the law,” which the Court has already explained 

is “not a remedy to an injury.” (Order at 3.) Accordingly, dismissal of Vroom’s amended 

complaint is again mandated by the D.C. Circuit’s controlling holdings that federal courts lack 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 5 of 21
2 

jurisdiction in cases brought by plaintiffs seeking to force the FEC to “‘get the bad guys.’” 

Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1997).1

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Statutory Background 

1. Reporting Requirements and Contribution Limits for Political Committees 

The Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57 (“FECA”), provides that a 

corporation can establish and administer a “separate segregated fund,” apart from the 

corporation’s general treasury, “to be utilized for political purposes.” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). 

FECA defines such separate segregated funds to be a form of “political committee,” commonly 

known as a “PAC.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(B). 

PACs must file, inter alia, periodic public reports of their total operating expenses and 

cash on hand, as well as their receipts and disbursements, with limited exceptions for most 

transactions below a $200 threshold. See 2 U.S.C. § 434; see also Order at 2-3 (describing 

reporting requirements). PACs are also subject to limits on the contributions they can receive 

and make. Most PACs (including those at issue in this case) can receive contributions of up to 

$5,000 per contributor per year, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C), and can contribute up to $5,000 per 

election to any candidate (with primary and general elections counted separately), id.

§ 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 100.2 (defining “election”). If multiple PACs are “established or 

financed or maintained or controlled” by a single entity, all the contributions made by those 

 

1

 Vroom’s amended pleading fails, among other things, to “state [his] claims . . . in 

numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances,” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 10(b), and thus it is subject to dismissal for being facially defective. See, e.g., Rogler v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 620 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing 

amended pro se complaint for failing to comply with Rules 8(a) and 10(b)). However, because 

the absence of Article III jurisdiction in this case would render futile any further amendment of 

the complaint, the Commission does not seek dismissal of the amended complaint for its 

procedural improprieties. 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 6 of 21
3 

affiliated PACs are “considered to have been made by a single political committee” for purposes 

of the contribution limit. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5). 

2. The FEC and Its Enforcement Process 

The FEC is the independent agency of the United States government with exclusive 

jurisdiction over the administration, interpretation, and civil enforcement of FECA. 

Congress authorized the Commission to “formulate policy” with respect to FECA, 2 U.S.C. 

§ 437c(b)(1); “to make, amend, and repeal such rules . . . as are necessary to carry out the 

provisions of [the] Act,” 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(8); and to issue advisory opinions construing the 

Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d(a)(7), 437f. The Commission is also authorized to investigate possible 

violations of the Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 437g(a)(1)-(2), and has exclusive jurisdiction to initiate civil 

enforcement actions in the United States district courts, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6). 

FECA permits any person to file an administrative complaint with the Commission 

alleging a violation of the Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1); see also 11 C.F.R. § 111.4. After 

reviewing the complaint and any response filed by the respondent, the Commission may vote on 

whether there is “reason to believe” that a violation has occurred. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2). If at 

least four of the FEC’s six Commissioners vote to find such reason to believe, the Commission 

can institute an investigation. Id. If the Commission dismisses the administrative complaint, the 

complainant can seek judicial review of that determination pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A). 

If a court declares that the Commission’s dismissal was “contrary to law,” it can order the 

Commission to conform to the court’s declaration within 30 days. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(C); see 

also Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 415 (noting that standard of review is whether “the dismissal 

was based on an ‘impermissible interpretation of the Act . . . or was arbitrary or capricious, or an 

abuse of discretion’” (quoting Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1986))). 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 7 of 21
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B. Factual Background 

In 2009, the FEC issued Advisory Opinion 2009-18, 2009 WL 2413841 (July 29, 2009) 

(“AO 2009-18”). In that opinion, the Commission concluded that GE and Penske — which had 

previously shared much of their corporate ownership — were no longer controlled by the same 

entity. Id. at 8. Accordingly, the Commission found that the companies’ separate segregated 

funds (GE PAC and Penske PAC) would no longer be considered affiliated for purposes of 2 

U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5). See id. 

Plaintiff was the President and CEO of the Truck Renting and Leasing Association 

(“TRALA”) until July 8, 2009. (Compl. Exh. 6 at 35 (Docket No. 1-1).) He alleges that while 

employed at TRALA he “became aware” of certain improprieties involving GE, GE PAC, 

Penske, and Penske PAC. (Am. Compl. at 4 (Docket No. 13).)2

 On November 16, 2010, 

plaintiff filed with the Commission an administrative complaint — later designated Matter Under 

Review (“MUR”) 6455 — regarding these improprieties. Specifically, he alleged that the 

deconsolidation of GE and Penske was unlawful due to Penske’s ongoing financial reliance on 

GE. (Id. at 2; Compl. Exh. 6 at 35-37 (Docket No. 1-1).) Vroom included in his complaint 

materials he had previously submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the 

same subject. 

On February 8, 2011, Vroom amended his administrative complaint to allege that the 

unlawful deconsolidation of GE and Penske meant that GE PAC and Penske PAC should be 

treated as affiliated under FECA. The amended complaint asserted that the Commission had 

been mistaken in issuing AO 2009-18, and that Penske had filed “misleading and incomplete 

information with the FEC in order to obtain” the advisory opinion. (Compl. Exh. 6 at 38 (Docket 

 

2

 For the purposes of this motion only, the Commission “accept[s] as true” the facts 

pleaded in plaintiff’s amended complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 8 of 21
5 

No. 1-1).) The complaint stated that, after the Commission issued AO 2009-18, Penske PAC 

made $5,000 in contributions to the James Gerlach for Congress Committee in connection with 

each of the 2010 primary and general elections, and GE PAC made contributions of $1,500 and 

$1,000, respectively, for those elections to that same committee. (Am. Compl. at 9; Compl. Exh. 

6 at 38-39 (Docket No. 1-1).) Vroom therefore alleged that the affiliated PACs’ contributions 

had exceeded their combined contribution limit by $1,500 in the primary election and $1,000 in 

the general election. (Compl. Exh. 6 at 38-39 (Docket No. 1-1).) Vroom explained that he had 

identified these alleged violations by examining the information reported by the PACs and made 

publicly available by the FEC. (Id. at 38 (“I am providing information from the FEC database 

relating to the 2008-2010 election cycle showing the combined contributions made by Penske 

and GE to Representative James Gerlach (R-PA).”).) 

On November 29, 2011, after considering Vroom’s complaint and responses from the 

respondents in MUR 6455, the Commission determined by a vote of 5-0 that there was no reason 

to believe a violation of FECA had occurred. See FEC, MUR 6455 Certification, 

http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/11044310276.pdf (Dec. 1, 2011); see also Compl. Exh. 1 at 

2-16 (Docket No. 1-1). The Commission concluded that it had not relied on misleading and 

incomplete information in its issuance of AO 2009-18 because it had already been aware of the 

facts Vroom cited regarding, inter alia, overlapping board members and certain lines of credit 

between Penske and GE. (Compl. Exh. 1 at 9-12 (Docket No. 1-1).) Because Vroom’s 

allegations concerning AO 2009-18 were “without merit,” the Commission concluded that the 

PACs were properly disaffiliated, and their contributions to Representative Gerlach were 

therefore not excessive. (Id. at 16.) 

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C. Procedural History 

On January 27, 2012, plaintiff commenced the present action against the Commission 

pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8), seeking judicial review of the Commission’s dismissal of 

MUR 6455. On December 6, 2012, the Court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss 

plaintiff’s complaint on the basis that he sought only “a legal determination that General Electric 

and Penske are in violation of the law, not a remedy to an injury.” (Order at 3.) Relying on 

Common Cause, in which the D.C. Circuit held that a party does not have standing to sue the 

FEC on the grounds that “‘a violation of FECA has occurred’” and refused to “‘recogniz[e] a 

justiciable interest in the enforcement of the law,’” the Court found that Vroom failed to plead 

injury-in-fact. (Id. at 3-4.) Because plaintiff argued in his opposition to the FEC’s motion that 

he had suffered informational injury, however, the Court granted him leave to file an amended 

complaint demonstrating “that he was prevented from seeking information that will help him to 

evaluate candidates for office.” (Id. at 4.) 

On January 7, 2013, plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Docket No. 13) that restates 

his allegations regarding the Commission’s handling of his administrative complaint and AO 

2009-18. The amended complaint alleges that plaintiff has standing in this Court because the 

Commission’s dismissal of MUR 6455 denies him “the ability to fully and accurately determine 

the source, magnitude and ultimate recipients of political contributions made by the General 

Electric PAC” — information that he says he uses in his “career” and as a voter “in national 

elections.” (Am. Compl. at 5-7.) Vroom argues that by virtue of the “improper” disaffiliation of 

GE PAC and Penske PAC, “GE now has not one but two PACs under its control and it is 

therefore no longer possible for [Vroom] or [Vroom’s] organization, the Alliance for Corporate 

Integrity, to determine the extent of political contributions made to federal candidates that should 

be attributable to GE.” (Id. at 8-9.) He also claims that “the FEC’s failure to enforce and apply 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 10 of 21
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FECA responsibly” renders him “unable to use the FEC data, knowing it is not accurate.” (Id. at 

10.) 

Vroom’s amended complaint concludes with a request for the same relief sought in his 

original, dismissed complaint: An order directing the Commission “to consider Vroom’s 

complete complaint and to evenly apply its own preceden[ts] . . . to determine whether the GE 

and Penske PAC’s [sic] are affiliated”; or alternatively “to issue a declaratory judgment that 

declares that the GE and Penske PACs are in fact affiliated.” (Id. at 17.) 

III. PLAINTIFF LACKS STANDING BECAUSE HE HAS SUFFERED NO 

INFORMATIONAL INJURY 

Plaintiff cannot meet his burden under Article III to demonstrate that he has sustained any 

injury-in-fact here because the information he purportedly seeks — the total amount of GE’s 

political contributions — is already publicly available and in his possession. This case is not like 

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), in which the plaintiffs were concretely and actually injured by 

a true absence of information about an organization that was not under any obligation to file 

reports with the FEC. Rather, this case is indistinguishable from those in which advocacy groups 

have sought to obtain advisory legal declarations that various other entities violated the law — 

cases in which the courts of this Circuit have consistently found the plaintiffs to lack standing. 

A. Plaintiff Bears a Heavy Burden to Demonstrate Article III Standing Here 

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to cases or 

controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. That courts liberally interpret pro se pleadings does 

not “dispense with the constitutional requirement that the plaintiff have standing to bring his 

claims.” Dorsey v. District of Columbia, 747 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, No. 10-

7172, 2011 WL 1766035 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 12, 2011) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s complaint). 

“[T]he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orCase 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 11 of 21
8 

controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 

(1992). Nor does the fact that Vroom brings suit pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8), the statutory 

provision that allows challenges to the dismissal of an administrative complaint, relieve him of 

the obligation to demonstrate standing. “Section 437g(a)(8)(A) does not confer standing; it 

confers a right to sue upon parties who otherwise already have standing.” Common Cause v. 

FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1997).3

To establish standing, plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating (1) an “injury in fact,” 

(2) a causal connection between the alleged injury that is “fairly traceable” to the challenged 

conduct of the defendant, and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a “favorable 

decision” of the court. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Injury in 

fact” is “an invasion of a legally protected interest” which is both “concrete and particularized” 

and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff’s “asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly 

unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,” standing is “substantially more 

difficult” to prove. Id. at 562 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

 

3

 Relying on Akins, plaintiff raises a new contention that he has prudential standing in this 

Court because he has suffered informational injury that falls within the zone of interests that 

FECA seeks to address. (Am. Compl. at 5-6.) The doctrine of prudential standing, however, is 

not an alternative to Article III standing but an additional “judicially self-imposed” requirement. 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); see also Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-26 (requiring 

plaintiffs to establish both prudential standing and Article III standing); Nat’l Credit Union 

Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998) (“We have interpreted § 10(a) 

of the [Administrative Procedure Act] to impose a prudential standing requirement in addition to

the requirement, imposed by Article III of the Constitution, that a plaintiff have suffered a 

sufficient injury in fact.” (emphasis added)). Thus, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff falls 

within the “zone of interests” sought to be protected by FECA, he must nonetheless demonstrate 

the mandatory elements of constitutional standing. See Southwest Gas Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 40 

F.3d 464, 466-68 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (although plaintiff fell within “zone of interests,” it lacked 

standing because it suffered no injury in fact); cf. T & S Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 68 F.3d 

510, 512-14 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding no standing due to lack of injury in fact and, in light of 

that conclusion, finding no reason to address issue of prudential standing). 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 12 of 21
9 

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially 

cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). 

B. Plaintiff’s Own Allegations Show that the Dismissal of His Administrative 

Complaint Has Not Deprived Him of Any Information 

“Informational injury” arises “when voters are deprived of useful political information at 

the time of voting.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46 (D.D.C. 2003); see 

generally Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-25. In Akins, the plaintiffs were a group of registered voters who 

asserted that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) — an organization whose 

views the plaintiffs had long opposed — should have been regulated by the Commission as a 

political committee. 524 U.S. at 15-16. The Commission’s decision not to so regulate the group 

denied the plaintiffs access to the financial information that political committees must disclose. 

See 2 U.S.C. § 434. Without such disclosure, the Akins plaintiffs had no way to determine which 

candidates were supported by AIPAC and to what extent. 524 U.S. at 16, 20-21. Because there 

was “no reason to doubt [the plaintiffs’] claim that the information would help them (and others 

to whom they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office,” the Court held 

that the plaintiffs had suffered a concrete and particularized injury. Id. at 21; see also id. at 24-

25 (“[T]he informational injury . . . here, directly related to voting, . . . is sufficiently concrete 

and specific . . . .”). 

This case is nothing like Akins. First, the Akins plaintiffs were alleging that a nonreporting entity should be forced to report, so the plaintiffs stood to obtain a significant amount 

of information about AIPAC’s campaign-related spending if the Commission ordered AIPAC to 

register as a political committee. In contrast, Vroom’s allegations concern groups that are 

already subject to the full panoply of FECA’s political-committee reporting requirements. 

Indeed, plaintiff claims to seek information that would give him “the ability to fully and 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 13 of 21
10 

accurately determine the source, magnitude and ultimate recipients of political contributions 

made by the General Electric PAC” (Am. Compl. at 5-6), but the factual premise of his 

administrative complaint was that the sum of GE PAC’s and Penske PAC’s political 

contributions — information he took “from the FEC database” of the PACs’ mandatory reports 

— rendered those contributions unlawful. (Compl. Exh. 2 at 38-39 (Docket No. 1-1) (using 

reported data to calculate allegedly excessive contributions from GE to Representative Gerlach).) 

The “source, magnitude and ultimate recipients” of every other contribution made by these PACs 

is similarly available on the FEC’s website.4

 (See Am. Compl. at 7 (“Vroom very actively 

participates in the political process involving the analysis of candidates . . . and he regularly 

utilizes the FEC website and its database for this purpose.”).) Plaintiff has not alleged the 

existence of a single piece of information about the PACs’ receipts or spending of which he has 

been deprived. 

Because Vroom already knows or has access to the information he supposedly seeks, he 

cannot demonstrate any informational injury that is both “concrete and particularized” and 

“actual [and non-hypothetical].” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. No “depriv[ation] of useful political 

information” exists. Judicial Watch, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 46. Vroom’s failure to identify any 

actual information that he is credibly lacking “is of no small moment, for the nature of the 

information allegedly withheld is critical to the standing analysis.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d 

at 417. Here, the information Vroom supposedly lacks is now and will remain publicly available 

 

4

 This information can be obtained in both summary and detailed form from the 

Commission’s search page, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/candcmte_info.shtml. GE 

PAC’s identification number is C00024869; Penske PAC’s is C00373217. GE PAC’s and 

Penske PAC’s most recent filings total more than 800 pages. See

http://images.nictusa.com/pdf/780/12940824780/12940824780.pdf (GE PAC); 

http://images.nictusa.com/pdf/635/12940770635/12940770635.pdf (Penske PAC). 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 14 of 21
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as the two PACs continue to be subject to their reporting obligations.5

 Thus, Vroom’s real 

grievance is that the information he already possesses has not been deemed “illegal.” But, as the 

Court has already held, seeking “a legal determination that General Electric and Penske are in 

violation of the law [is] not a remedy to an injury.” (Order at 3.) 

Second, Vroom nowhere explains how the information he purportedly seeks would be 

“useful [to him] in voting.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418. The Akins plaintiffs wanted to 

know which candidates AIPAC was supporting so that they could vote against (and ask others to 

vote against) those candidates. Because the list of candidates GE PAC and Penske PAC have 

supported is a matter of public record, however, obtaining such information cannot be the basis 

for Vroom’s claim. The only allegation he makes regarding the use of non-disclosed information 

is the vague assertion that the Commission’s dismissal of his complaint will have “broad ranging 

implications” for unnamed “‘similarly situated’ entities.” (Am. Compl. at 8.) That is nothing 

more than an allegation that the Commission may fail to enforce the law properly in the future; it 

does not allege that plaintiff is missing any information, much less explain what plaintiff would 

do with such information. His allegation is therefore insufficient as a matter of law to render 

standing proper here. See Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 (D.D.C. 2004) 

(action under § 437g(a)(8) dismissed for lack of standing because plaintiffs “failed to show how 

information about the precise value of a mailing list . . . could have a concrete effect on 

 

5

 Vroom has never claimed that the PACs have failed to file their mandatory reports with 

the Commission or that the contribution amounts they have reported are inaccurate; he simply 

argues that the two entities should be treated as affiliated. Even if the PACs were deemed to be 

affiliated, they could continue to operate as two entities and file separate reports as long as they 

abided by the contribution limits applicable to a single entity. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5). 

Alternatively, the PACs might be able to reorganize themselves into a single entity, in which 

case they would file one set of reports for the joint organization. Either way, Vroom would 

receive no additional information. 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 15 of 21
12 

plaintiffs’ voting in future elections involving different candidates”); Alliance for Democracy v. 

FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 138, 144-45 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). 

Third, controlling D.C. Circuit precedent forecloses plaintiff’s claim of informational 

injury. Specifically, Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and Common Cause

rejected efforts to use section 437g(a)(8) to obtain a legal conclusion that third parties were in 

violation of federal campaign finance law. 

In Wertheimer, the plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint with the FEC alleging that 

during the 1996 and 2000 presidential campaigns the two major political parties made 

impermissible contributions to, and expenditures on behalf of, their presidential nominees. After 

the Commission dismissed the plaintiffs’ administrative complaint, they brought suit in this 

Court, claiming that the Commission’s dismissal injured them by “depriv[ing] them of required 

information about the source and amount of candidates’ financing.” Id. at 1073. Applying 

Akins, the D.C. Circuit noted that “all political parties currently report all disbursements [and] 

that each transaction appellants allege is illegal is reported in some form.” Id. at 1074. Thus, the 

court concluded that the plaintiffs had “failed to show either that they are directly being deprived 

of any information or that the legal ruling they seek might lead to additional factual 

information,” and that they therefore lacked injury-in-fact. Id. (“[T]he government’s alleged 

failure to ‘disclose’ that certain conduct is illegal by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally 

cognizable injury.”). 

The Wertheimer plaintiffs’ insufficient claim of informational injury cannot be 

distinguished from Vroom’s allegation that the public disclosure of GE PAC’s and Penske 

PAC’s contributions is “tainted” (Am. Compl. at 10) because the Commission has not labeled 

those contributions excessive or unlawful. Just as in Wertheimer, the political committees here 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 16 of 21
13 

“currently report all disbursements,” and “each transaction [plaintiff] allege[s] is illegal is 

reported in some form,” so success for Vroom would at most result in the same information 

being disclosed again or another way. 268 F.3d at 1074. Thus, like the plaintiffs in Wertheimer, 

Vroom has “failed to establish that the ruling sought would yield anything more than a legal 

characterization or duplicative reporting of information that under existing rules is already 

required to be disclosed.” Id. at 1075. 

Likewise, the plaintiff in Common Cause had filed with the Commission an 

administrative complaint alleging, inter alia, that certain political party committees had made 

excessive contributions to a senatorial candidate. When the Commission dismissed the 

administrative complaint after an investigation, Common Cause brought suit under section 

437g(a)(8), arguing that the FEC’s decision “deprived Common Cause’s voting members of vital 

political information.” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 417. On appeal from the district court’s 

grant of partial summary judgment to the Commission, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case for 

lack of standing, holding that “[n]othing in FECA requires that information concerning a 

violation of the Act as such be disclosed to the public.” Id. at 418. It further explained: 

To hold that a plaintiff can establish injury in fact merely by alleging that 

he has been deprived of the knowledge as to whether a violation of the law 

has occurred would be tantamount to recognizing a justiciable interest in 

the enforcement of the law. This we cannot do. . . . Congress cannot, 

consistent with Article III, create standing by conferring upon all persons 

an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental ‘right’ to have the Executive 

observe the procedures required by law. 

Id. (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). Because “the relief requested by 

Common Cause . . . is for the Commission to ‘get the bad guys,’ rather than disclose 

information[,] Common Cause ha[d] no standing to sue.” Id. As Judges in this District have 

repeatedly found, that holding and Wertheimer foreclose plaintiffs from using section 437g(a)(8) 

to bring suits that nominally seek publicly available information but actually seek a judicial 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 17 of 21
14 

declaration that some third party violated federal campaign finance law. See Herron for 

Congress v. FEC, Civ. No. 11-1466, 2012 WL 5451811, at *7 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 2012) (finding no 

Article III jurisdiction when plaintiff had already received information he claimed to desire); 

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 799 F. Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2011) 

(“[Plaintiffs] simply do not allege any specific factual information they lack that is not already 

publicly available in the published FEC documents . . . . [W]hat Plaintiffs want is a 

reclassification of [the administrative respondent’s] disbursements as ‘in-kind contributions’ 

under FECA.”); Alliance For Democracy, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 145 (“[P]laintiffs lack standing 

because they already have the information they are seeking and therefore have not suffered an 

informational injury.”). 

IV. PLAINTIFF ALSO LACKS STANDING BECAUSE HE CANNOT ESTABLISH 

THE REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF CAUSATION AND REDRESSABILITY 

An inevitable corollary of the fact that plaintiff has identified no actual informational 

injury is that he also cannot establish causation and redressability. In this context, where 

Vroom’s asserted injury stems from “the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 

regulation) of someone else,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (emphasis in original), the causation and 

redressability prongs of the standing analysis require greater scrutiny. “[W]hile not necessarily 

fatal to standing,” the indirectness of injury “may make it substantially more difficult to meet the 

minimum requirement of Art. III: To establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the 

consequence of the defendants’ actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm.” Simon 

v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44-45 (1976) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

For the reasons discussed above, the Commission’s dismissal of MUR 6455 caused no 

injury to plaintiff because it did not deprive him of any information. Plaintiff’s alleged injury is 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 18 of 21
15 

also not redressable because even if the Court were to grant the relief Vroom seeks in his 

Amended Complaint — i.e., to “instruct the FEC” to reconsider Vroom’s administrative 

complaint or alternatively to overrule AO 2009-18 (Am. Compl. at 17) — Vroom would receive 

no new information as a consequence of that ruling. The most that could happen would be that 

GE PAC and Penske PAC would have to re-affiliate, which would limit the combined size of 

their political contributions. Under no circumstance would any new or additional information 

about the PACs’ contributions be disclosed.6

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Commission requests that the Court dismiss Vroom’s 

Amended Complaint with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Anthony Herman (D.C. Bar No. 424643) 

General Counsel 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

 

6

 Like his original complaint, plaintiff’s amended complaint contains lengthy allegations of 

improprieties in the Commission’s issuance of AO 2009-18 and negligence in the processing of 

his administrative complaint. (Am. Compl. at 10-17.) The Court has already held that the 

allegations on these subjects in plaintiff’s original complaint failed to establish Article III 

standing (Order at 3-4), and that holding is the law of the case. See Crawford-El v. Britton, No. 

94-7203, 72 F.3d 919 (Table), 1995 WL 761781, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 28, 1995) (per curiam) 

(affirming dismissal of portions of amended complaint that “merely reasserted the same nonlitigation injuries” and concluding that “the law of the case controls”). The only remaining 

question for standing purposes is plaintiffs’ claim of informational injury. (See Order at 4 (“Mr. 

Vroom claimed in his opposition that he was prevented from seeking information . . . , and he 

will be given the opportunity to amend his Complaint to reflect this injury.” (emphasis added)).) 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 19 of 21
16 

Dated: January 24, 2013 

/s/ Charles Kitcher 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

Attorney 

ckitcher@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

Telephone: (202) 694-1650 

Fax: (202) 219-0260 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 20 of 21
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

PETER J. VROOM, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 12-143 (RMC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that on January 24, 2013, I caused to be electronically filed with the 

Court the Federal Election Commission’s Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities, and Proposed Order. I also certify that on that same date, I caused to be sent by UPS 

a copy of the same materials to plaintiff at the following address: 

Peter J. Vroom 

611 Oakley Place 

Alexandria, VA 22302 

/s/ Charles Kitcher 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

Attorney 

ckitcher@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

Telephone: (202) 694-1650 

Fax: (202) 219-0260 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 15 Filed 01/24/13 Page 21 of 21