1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re R.L., J.L., S.L.-1, and S.L.-2

No. 21-0111 and 20-0915 (Harrison County 20-JA-77-2, 20-JA-78-2, 20-JA-79-2, and 20-JA-80-

2)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother C.S., by counsel Allison S. McClure, appeals the Circuit Court of 

Harrison County’s September 17, 2020, order denying her request for an improvement period and 

terminating her parental rights to R.L., J.L., S.L.-1, and S.L.-2.1 Petitioner also appeals the circuit 

court’s January 13, 2021, order denying her request for modification of the dispositional order. 

The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Mindy M. 

Parsley, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s orders. The guardian ad litem 

(“guardian”), Dreama D. Sinkkanen, filed a response on behalf of the children also in support of 

the circuit court’s orders. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in (1) denying 

her motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period, (2) terminating her parental rights, (3) and 

denying her post-termination visitation with S.L.-1 and S.L.-2.

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

In April of 2020, the DHHR filed a child abuse and neglect petition against petitioner and 

the father alleging drug use; physical, mental, and verbal abuse of the children; and failure to 

provide the children with adequate food, medical, and dental care. According to the petition, the 

DHHR received three referrals between November of 2019 and March of 2020 concerning 

petitioner’s care of the children. The referrals alleged that petitioner verbally threatened to harm 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). Additionally, because two of the children share the same initials, 

we will refer to them as S.L.-1 and S.L.-2, respectively, throughout the memorandum decision.

FILED

June 22, 2021

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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the children, abused illegal substances, and “experienced retaliation from substance users or 

dealers that threw rocks through her car windshield and window in her home.” According to the 

petition, the referrals also indicated that petitioner physically abused the children and that she was 

arrested while the children were in her care. The DHHR also alleged that petitioner failed to 

consistently supervise the children or provide them with proper medical or dental care. 

The DHHR alleged that, as a result of the referrals, two Child Protective Services (“CPS”) 

workers made an unannounced visit to petitioner’s residence which was unsuccessful. The 

workers later returned to the home and interviewed petitioner over the vocal objections of the 

father. According to the petition, petitioner disclosed that she was arrested for falling asleep in a 

laundromat parking lot and was in possession of Klonopin without a valid prescription. Petitioner 

claimed she previously had a prescription for the drug from another state. Petitioner stated she was 

incarcerated for four days after the arrest until the father paid her bail. The DHHR alleged that 

petitioner also admitted to using marijuana and stated that she would be positive for marijuana and 

Klonopin if she participated in a drug screen. Petitioner further admitted that she continued to use 

Klonopin upon her release from incarceration, which she obtained from a family member. 

According to the petition, petitioner claimed she was attempting to obtain a prescription for the 

drug but that her doctor’s appointments were being rescheduled due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

After their interview, CPS workers obtained the criminal complaint from petitioner’s arrest, which 

stated that petitioner was also in possession of several other controlled substances, including 

oxycodone and methamphetamine. Petitioner further disclosed to the CPS workers that two-yearold S.L.-1 was living with a former neighbor, and seven-year-old R.L. and six-year-old J.L. were 

living with their maternal grandfather since her arrest in March of 2020. Petitioner stated that oneyear-old S.L.-2 was living with petitioner’s sister. Petitioner averred that she would have all of the 

children back in her care within a few weeks. The DHHR alleged that the CPS workers attempted 

to interview the children and agreed with petitioner upon a time and date to do so. According to 

the petition, the CPS workers were en route to petitioner’s residence on the day of the interview 

when they received a phone call from the children’s grandfather informing them that petitioner 

would not permit interviews with the children. The CPS workers arrived at petitioner’s home but 

no one answered the door and petitioner did not answer her phone. 

According to the petition, CPS workers interviewed the children’s various caretakers, 

including petitioner’s former neighbor, who was babysitting S.L.-1. The neighbor said she had 

cared for the child for approximately one year, but that petitioner refused to sign any paperwork 

giving her the ability to provide the child with medical or dental care or to have the child 

vaccinated. The neighbor reported that petitioner spoke to her previously about making the child 

available for the scheduled CPS interview. However, the neighbor reported that petitioner did not 

respond to text messages or calls on the morning of the scheduled interview. Further, the neighbor 

reported that petitioner had not seen the child since December of 2020 and that petitioner was 

physically aggressive toward the child and not “nurturing.” Next, the CPS workers interviewed 

R.L. and J.L. who reported that they had been residing with their maternal grandfather for two 

weeks. The children reported that they were not provided adequate food when living with 

petitioner. The children also reported that petitioner had a friend who physically abused them when 

petitioner was not present. The grandfather disclosed that he observed petitioner under the 

influence of controlled substances on two recent occasions and believed that petitioner had abused 

substances for the last seven years. The CPS workers also went to petitioner’s sister’s home, where 
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she reported being S.L.-2’s caregiver since July of 2019, when the child was just eleven months 

old. The sister reported that she had not seen petitioner since March of 2020, and that petitioner 

did not provide any support for the child. Finally, the sister reported that petitioner physically 

abused the children and abused drugs. Petitioner waived her preliminary hearing.

In July of 2020, the circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing wherein petitioner stipulated 

to a history of drug abuse that led to the neglect of the children. Petitioner admitted she allowed 

other individuals to provide for the children’s daily physical and emotional needs, instead of 

providing for them herself. Petitioner also stipulated that her substance abuse and “the 

corresponding lack of parental judgment” constituted neglect of the children. The circuit accepted 

petitioner’s stipulation, adjudicated her as an abusing parent, and ordered that petitioner submit to 

a psychological, drug, and alcohol evaluation; counseling; random drug testing; individualized 

therapy; parenting and life skills classes; maintain a substance-free residence; obtain employment;

and cooperate with service providers. Petitioner then moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement 

period.

The circuit court held a dispositional hearing in September of 2020 wherein petitioner did 

not appear but was represented by counsel. Petitioner’s counsel moved for a continuance. 

However, the circuit court denied the motion, finding that petitioner had notice of the hearing. At 

the hearing, a CPS worker testified that petitioner was referred for supervised visitation services 

and participated in some visits before services were suspended due to her lack of participation. As 

a result, the CPS worker testified that petitioner had not seen the children in over a month at the 

time of the dispositional hearing. The CPS worker also testified that petitioner tested positive for 

several controlled substances throughout the proceedings, including methamphetamine and 

fentanyl. The worker further testified that petitioner initially complied with drug screening but 

stopped complying and missed eleven random screens. The worker also testified that petitioner 

was scheduled to participate in a parental fitness evaluation, but it was unclear whether petitioner 

participated in the evaluation. The worker testified that the DHHR offered petitioner transportation 

to the evaluation, but that petitioner declined that assistance. The worker testified that petitioner 

also failed to maintain regular contact with the DHHR and had no contact with the DHHR in over 

a month. 

At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the circuit court found that petitioner failed 

to meet her burden of demonstrating that she was likely to participate in or complete an 

improvement period. Additionally, the circuit court found that petitioner continued to abuse drugs 

and failed to seek any form of treatment for the same. The circuit court also found that petitioner 

failed to fully avail herself of all the resources offered to her to correct the parental deficiencies 

that led to the abuse and neglect petition. Ultimately, the circuit court denied petitioner’s motion 

for an improvement period, finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that she could correct 

the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future and that termination of her parental rights 

was necessary for the children’s welfare. The circuit court also ordered that if petitioner could

show good cause for her failure to appear at or before the father’s dispositional hearing, it would 

entertain a motion to re-open the evidence in the matter. Finally, the circuit court ordered that 

petitioner was permitted post-termination visitation with R.L. and J.L., but only at the request of 

the children and with the consent of their guardians. The circuit court prohibited post-termination 

visitation between petitioner and S.L.-1 and S.L.-2 citing the children’s young ages, and lack of 
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contact and long-term parenting. The circuit court terminated petitioner’s parental rights by order 

entered on September 17, 2020.

The next month, petitioner filed a motion to modify the circuit court’s order terminating 

her parental rights to the children. In support of her motion, petitioner represented that she 

previously filed a motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Petitioner stated that the 

DHHR had supported her motion for an improvement period. In her motion to modify the court’s 

dispositional order, petitioner attributed her absence at the dispositional hearing to her recent move 

from Harrison to Upshur County, West Virginia. Petitioner represented in her motion that she did 

not have transportation on the day of the hearing, and that she lacked a working phone or internet 

service to contact her counsel. Petitioner maintains she moved to Upshur County to move away 

from people she believed would adversely impact her ability to obtain and maintain sobriety. 

Petitioner further contended that since her dispositional hearing, she took the initiative to schedule 

her psychological evaluation, applied for housing, scheduled a doctor’s appointment to discuss 

mental health concerns, and sought employment. According to her motion, petitioner also tested

negative for controlled substances in a recent drug screen and sought to transfer her drug screening 

to Upshur County. Finally, petitioner said that she asked the DHHR to set up parenting and adult 

life skills classes for her. However, petitioner acknowledged that the DHHR failed to setup any 

services given it was unsure whether such a referral could be made after petitioner’s parental rights 

had been terminated. 

In December of 2020, the circuit court held a hearing on petitioner’s motion to modify the 

dispositional order. At the hearing, petitioner testified as to the arguments set forth in her motion. 

Next, a CPS worker testified that petitioner missed her rescheduled parental fitness evaluation that 

was scheduled for November of 2020. Further, the CPS worker testified that petitioner had only 

drug screened once that week and admitted to a service provider that she was struggling to 

participate in screening. The worker also testified that petitioner had not visited the children since 

September of 2020 and that her visitation was sporadic during the proceedings. Finally, the worker 

testified that petitioner was not engaged during her visits with the children and instead was on her 

phone or not watching them. 

After considering the evidence, the circuit court found that petitioner knew about the 

September of 2020 dispositional hearing but still moved from Harrison to Upshur County. The 

circuit court also found that petitioner had still not enrolled in substance abuse treatment and 

missed her rescheduled psychological evaluation. The circuit court further found that petitioner 

was scheduled to participate in seven drug screens in the two weeks prior to the instant hearing but 

only drug screened once during those two weeks. Finally, the circuit court found that petitioner 

failed to show good cause for her failure to attend the dispositional hearing and denied her motion 

to modify the dispositional order by its January 13, 2021, order.2 Petitioner also appeals the 

September 17, 2020, order terminating her parental rights to the children.

The Court has previously established the following standard of review:

2

The father’s parental rights were terminated below. The permanency plan for the children 

is to adoption in their respective foster homes. 
5

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her a post-adjudicatory

improvement period because she participated in services until early in August of 2020 and because 

the DHHR supported her request for an improvement period in testimony during a September of 

2020 hearing. Petitioner acknowledges a decline in participation with services beginning in August 

of 2020 but contends that she had been participating well enough for the DHHR to support her 

motion for an improvement period. As such, petitioner asserts that she showed sufficient 

improvement to warrant the granting of an improvement period. Upon our review, we find that 

petitioner is entitled to no relief. 

West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) provides that the circuit court may grant a parent a 

post-adjudicatory improvement period when the parent “demonstrates, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the [parent] is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.” “This Court 

has explained that ‘an improvement period in the context of abuse and neglect proceedings is 

viewed as an opportunity for the . . . parent to modify his/her behavior so as to correct the 

conditions of abuse and/or neglect with which he/she has been charged.’” In re Kaitlyn P., 225 W. 

Va. 123, 126, 690 S.E.2d 131, 134 (2010) (citation omitted). Finally, the circuit court has discretion 

to deny an improvement period when no improvement is likely. In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 

448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002). 

While petitioner avers that she made some improvements, the record shows that petitioner 

failed to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect that led to the filing of the abuse and neglect 

petition. Specifically, petitioner failed to fully avail herself of the resources offered to her and 

failed to cooperate with or participate in the development of a family case plan. Although petitioner 

asserts that she participated in some services, such as visitation, these services were ultimately 

foreclosed due to her lack of participation. Further, petitioner continued to test positive for multiple 

controlled substances, including methamphetamine and fentanyl, while missing eleven scheduled 

drug screens. Petitioner also failed to appear for a scheduled parental fitness evaluation in 

September of 2020 and again in November of 2020, after filing her motion to modify the 

dispositional order. Petitioner was offered transportation assistance to attend the evaluation but 

declined the DHHR’s offer. Petitioner also failed to maintain regular contact with the DHHR and 

had no contact with it whatsoever for weeks prior the dispositional hearing. Finally, petitioner 
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failed to appear at the dispositional hearing, despite receiving proper notice. As such, by continuing 

to abuse drugs and failing to fully avail herself of services, petitioner failed to make any substantial 

changes to her circumstances despite the DHHR’s interventions and services. Therefore, it is clear 

that petitioner was unlikely to fully participate in an improvement period, and we therefore find 

no error in the circuit court’s decision. 

Next, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in failing to consider alternatives to the 

termination of her parental rights. According to petitioner, the circuit court was required to give 

precedence to the dispositions listed in West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c), and it should have 

granted her disposition pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5).3 We find no error in the 

circuit court’s termination of petitioner’s parental rights.

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) provides that circuit courts are to terminate parental 

rights upon finding that there is “no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse 

can be substantially corrected in the near future” and that termination is necessary for the child’s 

welfare. “No reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially 

corrected” means that “the abusing adult or adults have demonstrated an inadequate capacity to 

solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.” Id. at § 49-4-604(d). 

The circuit court correctly found that there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions 

of neglect or abuse could be substantially corrected because petitioner continued to abuse 

controlled substances, ceased visitation with the children, and stopped participating in the 

proceedings altogether. Notably, petitioner does not dispute that she missed or failed several drug 

screens and did not have contact with the children throughout the proceedings, instead she argues 

that she could have been granted a less-restrictive disposition to resolve these issues. Specifically, 

petitioner argues that if she had been granted a less-restrictive disposition than the termination of 

her parental rights, she would have complied with services and resolved her issues of drug abuse. 

Yet the record below indicates that petitioner was noncompliant with the DHHR and refused to 

participate in services during the proceedings that could have remedied these issues. While 

petitioner claims to have sought drug treatment during the proceedings, she provided no record of 

this to the circuit court. Ultimately, petitioner’s assertion that she could remedy her issues with 

more time ignores the fact that she failed to stay drug free, attend scheduled court hearings, or 

participate in drug screens sufficiently to justify the return of the children to her care.

Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the circuit court’s refusal to grant petitioner a 

less-restrictive alternative to the termination of her parental rights, given that we have previously 

held that 

3

West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5) provides that a circuit court may

[u]pon a finding that the abusing parent or battered parent or parents are presently 

unwilling or unable to provide adequately for the child’s needs, commit the child 

temporarily to the care, custody, and control of the department, a licensed private 

child welfare agency, or a suitable person who may be appointed guardian by the 

court.
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“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive 

alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [West 

Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be 

substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 

114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). As such, we find no error in the 

circuit court’s termination of petitioner’s parental rights.

Finally, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for posttermination visitation with S.L.-1 and S.L.-2 because she shared a bond with the children despite 

their young ages. Petitioner also contends she should be permitted contact with S.L.-1 and S.L.-2 

in light of the circuit court’s decision allowing her to exercise visitation with R.L. and J.L. We find 

petitioner’s arguments unavailing. 

In regard to post-termination visitation, we have previously held that

“[w]hen parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit 

court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation 

or other contact with the abusing parent is in the best interest of the child. Among 

other things, the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has 

been established between parent and child and the child’s wishes, if he or she is of 

appropriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate that such 

visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child’s well being 

and would be in the child’s best interest.” Syl. Pt. 5, In re Christina L., 194 W.Va. 

446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995).

Syl. Pt. 11, In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002). Here, the circuit court found 

it was not in S.L.-1’s and S.L.-2’s best interests to grant visitation. Although petitioner argues she 

formed a strong bond with these younger children, none of the other parties in the case agreed.

Further, at the time of the dispositional hearing, three-year-old S.L.-1 had been living with a 

caretaker for fifteen consecutive months, or more than one-third of his entire life. Two-year-old 

S.L.-2 was in the care and custody of a different caretaker for a similar length of time, constituting 

more than half of her entire life outside of petitioner’s home. Although petitioner may have 

affection for the children, “[o]ur cases indicate that a close emotional bond generally takes several 

years to develop.” In re Alyssa W., 217 W. Va. 707, 711, 619 S.E.2d 220, 224 (2005). Accordingly, 

we find no error in the circuit court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for post-termination visitation 

with S.L.-1 and S.L.-2.

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Petitioner raises a fourth assignment of error in which she alleges that the circuit court 

erred in denying her motion to modify the court’s dispositional order. We note, however, that 

petitioner’s parental rights had already been terminated, thus depriving her of standing to file such 

(continued . . . )
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For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

September 17, 2020, and January 13, 2021, orders are hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 22, 2021 

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Evan H. Jenkins 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice John A. Hutchison

Justice William R. Wooton

a motion under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606. Syl. Pt. 6, In re Cesar L., 221 W. Va. 249, 654 

S.E.2d 373 (2007) (“A person whose parental rights have been terminated by a final order . . . does 

not have standing as a ‘parent,’ pursuant to [West Virginia Code § 49-4-606] to move for 

modification of disposition of the child with respect to whom his/her parental rights have been 

terminated.”). As such, it is unnecessary to address the circuit court’s denial of this motion, given 

that petitioner lacked standing to have filed the same. However, even if the circuit court had 

jurisdiction to address petitioner’s motion, petitioner failed to demonstrate a material change in 

circumstances requiring a different disposition. First, the circuit court stated it would consider a 

motion to modify disposition if petitioner could show good cause for her failure to attend the 

September of 2020 dispositional hearing. At a subsequent hearing, the circuit court determined 

that petitioner knew about the scheduled dispositional hearing but still chose to move from 

Harrison to Upshur County, West Virginia, and to not attend the hearing. Petitioner also failed to 

attend a scheduled psychological evaluation in November of 2020—two months after the 

dispositional hearing—despite it being rescheduled after she missed a prior such appointment.

Additionally, petitioner was scheduled to drug screen on seven occasions in the two weeks 

preceding the court’s hearing in December of 2020 on petitioner’s motion to modify disposition. 

The record reflects that petitioner only completed one of the seven scheduled screens. 

Consequently, under the facts presented here, we find that petitioner is entitled to no relief.