UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civ. No. 08-1953 (BMK, RJL, RMC) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

et al., ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________________) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Defendant Federal Election Commission respectfully moves the Court for an order 

granting summary judgment to the Commission pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. A memorandum in support of this motion, a statement of material facts not in 

genuine dispute, and a proposed order are attached. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan (D.C. Bar No. 424222) 

General Counsel 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley 

Assistant General Counsel 

 /s/ Adav Noti 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Attorney 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

Dated: April 10, 2009 (202) 694-1650 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 56
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. SINCE BCRA’S ENACTMENT, NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES 

HAVE RAISED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, AMOUNTS THAT ARE SUFFICIENT 

FOR EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY........................................................................................2 

II. PLAINTIFFS’ RECEIPT OF CONTRIBUTIONS UNRESTRAINED BY THE 

ACT’S SOURCE AND AMOUNT LIMITATIONS WOULD CREATE AN 

APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION AND CREATE A DANGER OF ACTUAL 

CORRUPTION....................................................................................................................7

III. PLAINTIFFS’ ACTIVITIES AFFECT FEDERAL ELECTIONS ...................................12 

 A. The RNC’s “Grassroots Lobbying” Is Sham Issue Advertising............................12 

 B. The RNC’s Support for State and Local Candidates, Even in Elections Where 

No Federal Candidates Are on the Ballot, Affects Federal Elections....................15 

 C. The RNC’s Litigation Affects Who Obtains Federal Office .................................16 

 D. Get-Out-The-Vote Activity Affects All Elections on the Ballot ...........................17 

 E. Plaintiffs’ Other Federal Election Activity Affects Federal Elections ..................18 

IV. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................19 

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ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)......................................................................................3, 7, 14 

California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).....................................................................12 

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) ................................................6 

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (“WRTL”)......................................14 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)................................................................................. passim 

McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003)....................................................... passim 

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) ..........................................................................................3 

Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)..................................................................................12 

Statutes and Regulations 

2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)................................................................................................................18 

2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(ii)...............................................................................................................18 

2 U.S.C. § 431(21) .........................................................................................................................18 

2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) .........................................................................................................................17 

2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2) .....................................................................................................................18 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 .. passim 

 BCRA Title I.............................................................................................................. passim 

 BCRA § 101.......................................................................................................................18 

 BCRA § 307(a)(2)................................................................................................................4 

 BCRA § 307(d)....................................................................................................................4 

Other Authorities 

FEC Advisory Op. 2006-24, http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/2006-24.pdf (Oct. 5, 2006)............17 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ........................................................................................................................2 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 56
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civ. No. 08-1953 (BMK, RJL, RMC) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

et al., ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 

 ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________________) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Defendant Federal Election Commission (“Commission”) hereby submits this 

memorandum in support of the Commission’s motion for summary judgment. To reduce the 

burden on the Court, the Commission incorporates by reference its opposition to Plaintiffs’ 

motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 39 (“FEC S.J. Opp.”)), rather than repeating the 

arguments from that memorandum in their entirety. As the Commission demonstrated in its 

prior brief: 

(a) Title I of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 

is a contribution limit and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny (FEC S.J. 

Opp. at 7-10); 

(b) The specific activities that Plaintiffs wish to fund with soft money are irrelevant 

to the constitutionality of BCRA’s contribution limits (id. at 10-13); 

(c) The unique relationship between federal officeholders and their parties produces 

obligations on the part of the officeholders towards their parties’ biggest donors 

(id. at 13-24); 

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(d) BCRA provides political parties with advantages not granted to any other political 

organizations (id. at 24-26); 

(e) Plaintiffs’ claims regarding how they would go about soliciting soft money in the 

future are contrary to the massive factual record developed in McConnell v. FEC, 

540 U.S. 93 (2003), and these claims lack any constitutional significance under 

the plain terms of McConnell’s holding (id. at 26-32); 

(f) The phrase “unambiguously campaign related” is not a constitutional test and has 

no bearing on this case (id. at 32-36); and 

(g) Even if their proposed spending were relevant, most of the activities that Plaintiffs 

wish to fund with soft money affect federal elections (id. at 36-44). 

In addition to the foregoing, summary judgment should be granted to the Commission for 

the reasons set forth below.1

I. SINCE BCRA’S ENACTMENT, NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY 

COMMITTEES HAVE RAISED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, AMOUNTS THAT 

ARE SUFFICIENT FOR EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY

 

National party fundraising has flourished in the wake of BCRA, as the six national party 

committees have dramatically expanded their pool of contributors and raised more hard money 

 

1

 This memorandum and statement of material facts incorporate the “discovery and 

disclosure materials” obtained from Plaintiffs’ responses to the Commission’s first set of 

discovery requests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Additional discovery requests were served on Plaintiff 

on February 23, 2009, but, on March 30, Plaintiffs stated that they would not respond to those 

requests — or any others — until the Court rules on the Commission’s pending motion to 

dismiss the complaint and on Plaintiffs’ pending motion for summary judgment. DefendantIntervenor Van Hollen has filed a motion to compel Plaintiffs’ responses to Defendants’ 

outstanding discovery requests (Docket No. 54). Although that motion has not yet been 

resolved, the Commission is filing its motion for summary judgment at this time so as to not 

disrupt the Court’s scheduled hearing date of April 29, 2009. The Commission respectfully 

requests, however, that the Court permit the filing of supplemental memoranda and statements of 

fact should the Court grant the motion to compel. 

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than they raised in hard and soft money combined before BCRA.2

 The limit on contributions to 

national parties — presently set at $30,400 per year and indexed for inflation (see FEC S.J. Opp. 

at 4 n.1) — is “closely drawn” because it is not “so low as to ‘preven[t] candidates and political 

committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’” McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 135 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)); see also Randall v. Sorrell, 548 

U.S. 230, 247 (2006) (same) (Breyer, J., joined by Roberts, C.J. and Alito, J.). The hundreds of 

millions of dollars that the parties have been able to raise after BCRA are plainly sufficient for 

“effective advocacy.” 

Each election cycle since BCRA, the national party committees have raised amounts of 

hard money that are comparable to or greater than the amounts raised in hard and soft money 

combined before BCRA. The national parties collectively raised approximately $1.24 billion in 

hard money in each of the 2003-04 and 2007-08 election cycles, roughly 15% more than the 

$1.09 billion these committees raised in the last pre-BCRA presidential election cycle. (Def. 

FEC’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine Dispute (“FEC SMF”) ¶ 40.) In the 2005-

2006 non-presidential election cycle, the parties raised approximately $900 million in hard 

money alone, representing approximately 90% of the amount they had raised in hard and soft 

money combined in 2001-2002. (Id. ¶ 41.) 

This trend holds true for the RNC, which raises comparable or greater amounts of hard 

money now in relation to how much it raised in hard and soft money combined before BCRA. In 

the final presidential election cycle pre-BCRA (1999-2000), the RNC raised approximately $379 

million in hard and soft money combined. (FEC SMF ¶ 42(a).) In the two presidential election 

 

2

 The national party committees are the RNC, the National Republican Congressional 

Committee (NRCC), the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), the Democratic 

National Committee (DNC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and 

the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC). 

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cycles since BCRA was enacted, the RNC has raised — in hard money alone — approximately 

$392 million (2003-2004) and $427 million (2007-2008). (Id. ¶ 42(b)-(c).) Similarly, in the last 

non-presidential election cycle (2005-2006), the RNC raised in hard money alone approximately 

85% of the amount it had previously raised in hard and soft money combined. (Id. ¶ 43.) 

In McConnell, the RNC predicted that “‘[t]he net effects of BCRA will be massive 

layoffs and severe reduction of . . . speech at the RNC, and reduction of many state parties to a 

‘nominal’ existence.’” McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 698 (D.D.C. 2003) (KollarKotelly, J.) (quoting RNC brief). Despite BCRA’s raising and indexing for inflation the limits 

on contributions to political parties, BCRA § 307(a)(2),(d), the RNC “calculate[d] that that the 

BCRA will cause the RNC to lose revenues of approximately $48.5 million per nonpresidential 

election year, and $125 million per presidential election year.” (FEC SMF ¶ 48 (quoting Shea 

Decl. ¶ 19).) The RNC further asserted that it would “not be able to recoup these lost nonfederal revenues” because, the RNC projected, “it is unlikely that the RNC will be able to raise 

more federal money from lower-dollar contributors than it currently does.” (Id. (emphasis in 

original).) 

The Court in McConnell found that the “political parties’ evidence regarding the impact 

of BCRA on their revenues” was “‘speculative and not based on any analysis.’” McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 173 (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 524 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)). “If the history of 

campaign finance regulation . . . proves anything, it is that political parties are extraordinarily 

flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 

173. The Court was prescient. Directly contrary to the RNC’s predictions, the undisputed 

fundraising data shows that the national party committees — including the RNC — have, in fact, 

massively expanded their low-dollar contributor base in precisely the way that the RNC alleged 

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in McConnell was unlikely. (FEC SMF ¶ 49.) The RNC’s dire predictions about the “severe 

reduction” of the RNC’s “speech,” McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), have 

been proven unfounded. Consistent with McConnell, this Court should thus give short shrift to 

Plaintiffs’ conclusory and unsupported statements that they “cannot” or “will not” engage in any 

of the activities in their complaint because they cannot afford such activities absent the ability to 

receive contributions in unlimited amounts and from corporate and union sources. (E.g., Pls.’ 

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pls.’ SMF”) ¶¶ 23, 45, 62.) 

Furthermore, the funds that the RNC has raised since BCRA’s enactment have been 

sufficient for the RNC to engage in all of the activities it now claims it wishes to pursue: 

supporting state candidates, including in elections where no federal candidates are on the ballot; 

redistricting; grassroots lobbying; and litigation. (FEC SMF ¶ 52.) Similarly, the CRP has 

“spent . . . money supporting” federal candidates through direct and coordinated expenditures 

(id. ¶ 54 (quoting Pls.’ SMF ¶ 38)), and through substantial sums spent on federal election 

activity, including voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity. 

(Id.) The RPSD has distributed material promoting federal and state candidates together in every 

election cycle (id. ¶ 55), and, regardless of the outcome of this case, the RPSD will continue to 

conduct all of its voter registration, GOTV, and generic campaign activities in the same manner 

that it has conducted them since BCRA was enacted. (Id. ¶ 56.) 

To the extent that Plaintiffs are now claiming to suffer some form of competitive

disadvantage (Pls.’ SMF ¶ 26), such a claim has no basis in law or fact. BCRA’s soft-money 

provisions apply equally to all political parties and impose no unconstitutional competitive 

burden on Plaintiffs. Even if Plaintiffs’ Democratic counterparts were able to raise more hard 

money under BCRA’s neutral rules, such a fundraising advantage would be due to an ability to 

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obtain funds from a greater number of supporters, which is merely “an indication of popular 

support” for those party committees’ “political ideas.” Cf. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for 

Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986) (“Relative availability of funds is after all a rough barometer 

of public support.”). In any event, if a fundraising disparity between the parties were relevant, 

Plaintiffs have significantly outraised their Democratic counterparts since BCRA’s enactment. 

After a rough parity in the 2003-2004 election cycle, the RNC had fundraising advantages of 

64% and 85% in the two most recent election cycles. (FEC SMF ¶ 45(a).) Similarly, the CRP’s 

hard-money fundraising has dwarfed that of the California Democratic Party, with the former 

nearly quadrupling the latter’s income in the most recent election cycle. (Id. ¶ 45(b).) The 

RPSD has outraised its Democratic Party equivalent in hard money by a total of approximately 

$800,000 in the six years since BCRA became effective. (See id. ¶ 45(c).) 

 To the extent that Plaintiffs claim a competitive disadvantage relative to outside special 

interest groups (Pls.’ SMF ¶ 26), McConnell definitively rejected such a claim as the basis for a 

constitutional challenge. 540 U.S. at 187-88. BCRA actually favors political parties in a number 

of ways, and political parties have considerably greater legislative power than do interest groups. 

(FEC S.J. Opp. at 25.) The Court thus found that the political parties’ Equal Protection claims 

lacked merit. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 187-88.3

 

 

3

 Even if the fundraising of outside interest groups were relevant, Plaintiffs’ allegation of a 

fundraising disparity once again has no basis in fact. In comparison to the outside groups — i.e., 

the “527” organizations not registered with the Commission as political committees — with 

which Plaintiffs claim to be disadvantaged (see Pls.’ SMF ¶ 26), the national Republican Party 

committees have demonstrated a significant fundraising advantage. Not once since BCRA was 

passed have the Democratic-leaning 527s raised even half of what the Republican party 

committees raised in hard money; indeed, in the most recent cycle, the three national Republican 

committees outraised Democratic-leaning 527s by over $400 million — a ratio of more than 

four-to-one. (FEC SMF ¶ 46.) Furthermore, if each national party’s fundraising totals are 

aggregated with the 527s supporting that party, the totals for each side were roughly equal in the 

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 In sum, the record amassed since McConnell belies any assertion that Plaintiffs lack the 

ability to raise sufficient hard-money funds for effective advocacy. Plaintiffs’ prediction in that 

case that BCRA Title I would strip Plaintiffs of their funding, and that their huge, unregulated 

receipts could not be replaced by smaller, regulated contributions has proved to be inaccurate. 

“The overall effect of the Act’s contribution ceilings is merely to require . . . political committees 

to raise funds from a greater number of persons,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22, and such an 

expansion of the donor pool — as well as increased contributions up to the revised hard-money 

limits — has occurred. The Court should reject Plaintiffs’ unsupported claims that they cannot 

fund all of their proposed activities with hard money and that BCRA unconstitutionally limits 

their ability to raise funds. 

II. PLAINTIFFS’ RECEIPT OF CONTRIBUTIONS UNRESTRAINED BY THE 

ACT’S SOURCE AND AMOUNT LIMITATIONS WOULD CREATE AN 

APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION AND CREATE A DANGER OF ACTUAL 

CORRUPTION

Much of Plaintiffs’ case is premised on their claim that they must, as a constitutional 

matter, be permitted to solicit and spend soft money because they allegedly will not (a) provide 

soft-money donors with additional preferential access to candidates or officeholders above and 

beyond the preferential access those donors would receive through substantial hard-money 

contributions, or (b) involve federal candidates or officeholders in the solicitation of soft money. 

(See FEC S.J. Opp. at 26-32.) The record in the instant case disproves these claims, and the 

same promises were raised and rejected in McConnell. 

If the political parties were again permitted to accept million-dollar donations, softmoney donors “know that elected officials would become aware of who has given significant 

 

2003-2004 and 2007-2008 cycles, and the Republican groups had a significant advantage in the 

2005-2006 cycle. (See id. ¶ 46; Biersack Decl. ¶ 13 (FEC Exh. 33).) 

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amounts” (FEC SMF ¶ 16 (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶ 11)), even if Plaintiffs were to exclude 

federal officeholders from the soft-money solicitation process: 

Members will find out who made large contributions from their staffs, 

other Members, or through ‘thank you’ type events run by the party. . . . 

Sophisticated donors would understand that elected officials of the party 

would be aware and appreciative of the amounts contributed even if an 

officeholder had not personally solicited the funds contributed. 

(Id. (quoting Rozen Decl. ¶ 4).) Once the federal officials know who the big donors are, “those 

checks open the doors to the offices of individual and important Members of Congress and the 

Administration,” which “gives [soft-money donors] an opportunity to shape and affect 

governmental decisions.” (Id. ¶ 18 (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶¶ 11-12).) 

The RNC has a robust operation providing preferred access to officeholders at assorted 

events for its largest hard-money donors. (See FEC S.J. Opp. at 22-23.) “Even if entrance to 

[donor] events were tied to hard money contributions rather than soft money, such events would 

provide opportunities for people who had also given additional soft money amounts to interact 

with elected officials.” (FEC SMF ¶ 17 (quoting Rozen Decl. ¶ 3).) Specifically, “the 

officeholders would often know which of the attendees had made the large soft money donations, 

[and] they would naturally feel gratitude towards those donors commensurate with the amount of 

the donation.” (Id.; see also id. (quoting Rozen Decl. ¶ 4: “Members will find out who made 

large contributions . . . , and they will naturally be more responsive to those donors due to the 

amount of help the donors have provided to the Member’s party.”).) 

Because this system turns on the officeholders’ knowledge of donations — not solely on 

direct involvement in the solicitations — and because such knowledge will undoubtedly be 

obtained, a system in which the parties accept unlimited donations will inherently and inevitably 

create actual and/or apparent corruption of federal candidates and officeholders. Thus, “the 

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pernicious effects of the soft money system . . . will result whether or not Members of Congress 

themselves directly solicit the contributions.” (FEC SMF ¶ 17 (quoting Rozen Decl. ¶ 3); see 

also id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he system would be perpetuated whether a Member or some other person 

representing the party is calling to ask.”) (quoting Greenwald Decl. ¶ 11).) 

The RNC’s allegation that it will be only a limited conduit for access is not new. The 

RNC claimed in McConnell that its policy was to “not offer to arrange personal meetings 

between donors — no matter how large — and federal officeholders or candidates for office.” 

(FEC SMF ¶ 11 (quoting, inter alia, Shea Decl. ¶ 44).) When a donor would request such access 

as a condition of making a donation, the RNC asserted, the party “rejected the donation and 

denied the request.” (Id.) When an existing donor would request a meeting with an officeholder, 

the RNC’s stated policy was to “pass the request along to the officeholder’s staff without 

inquiring into the purpose of the proposed meeting, but neither to advocate a meeting nor 

ascertain whether a meeting has been arranged.” (Id. (quoting Shea Decl. ¶ 46).) These 

assertions are similar to the RNC’s claims about the policy it has followed and would follow in 

the future if it were permitted to solicit soft money again. (Id. (citing Josefiak Dep. 129:18-21); 

see also Pls.’ SMF ¶ 24.) 

In spite of this alleged “policy,” trading of soft money for access to federal officeholders 

— by the RNC and other party committees — was rampant before BCRA. See McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 150-52 (“The record in the present case[] is replete with . . . examples of national party 

committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large softmoney donations. . . . [T]he RNC holds out the prospect of access to officeholders to attract softmoney donations and encourages officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors.”) (citing 

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 500-03 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), 860-61 (Leon, J.)). Party officials 

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regularly arranged preferential access for soft-money donors: The McConnell record contained 

an enormous number of examples of explicit exchanges of soft money for access. (See FEC S.J. 

Opp. at 16-24.) All of these occurred under a policy — which the RNC would like to reestablish — of allegedly not encouraging meetings between soft-money donors and 

officeholders. 

The RNC also claims that it will not directly involve federal candidates and officeholders 

in soft-money fundraising. This is similar to the RNC’s position in McConnell, in which the 

party claimed that it was “exceedingly rare for [Members of Congress] to solicit funds through 

telephone calls or personal meetings.” (FEC SMF ¶ 14 (quoting, inter alia, Shea Decl. ¶ 17); see 

also id. (quoting RNC General Counsel’s testimony in McConnell that “it’s certainly not a 

program that we have in place to ask Members of Congress to solicit soft money”).) Such 

arrangements, however, neither removed federal officials from the soft-money solicitation 

process (see id. (noting solicitations by federal candidates and officeholders)), nor had any effect 

on the Members’ knowledge of who the biggest donors were: “Even when not participating 

directly in the fundraising, federal officeholders were well aware of the identities of the donors: 

National party committees would distribute lists of potential or actual donors, or donors 

themselves would report their generosity to officeholders.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 147 

(emphasis added). “‘[F]or a member not to know the identities of these donors, he or she must 

actively avoid such knowledge as it is provided by the national political parties and the donors 

themselves.’” Id. (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (emphasis 

added); see also id. (citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 853-55 (Leon, J.)). The record in 

McConnell established in great detail the myriad ways in which federal officials sought out 

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information regarding the largest donors, obtained that information, and factored it into their 

decision- and law-making activities. (See FEC S.J. Opp. at 16-24.) 

Given the RNC’s extensive (and thoroughly adjudicated) history of encouraging access 

and fundraising by officeholders in spite of the policies and practices the RNC has put forward in 

litigation, the most logical inference in the instant case is that, if the RNC were again permitted 

to raise soft money, the same exchanges of money for access would occur. For example, the 

RNC would undoubtedly take into account the amounts of soft-money donations when it 

determines who would sit with which officeholders at its various functions. (See FEC SMF ¶ 8.) 

The RNC might also raise its tiers of donation thresholds — as it does each time the contribution 

limits increase — to account for the permissibility of unlimited donations. (See id. ¶ 9 (noting 

that RNC’s donation tiers correspond to maximum legal contribution).) Prior to BCRA, when 

there was no legal limit on soft-money contributions, the RNC’s donor tiers were substantially 

higher than they are now: The “Team 100” threshold (currently $30,400) was $100,000, and the 

“Regents” threshold (currently $60,800 divided between the donor and his/her spouse) was 

$250,000 from one person during a single election cycle. (Id.) Because these tiers are the 

primary way in which the RNC (like the CRP and RPSD) determines which of its donors will 

receive the most preferential access to federal candidates and officeholders (see id. ¶¶ 7-8), the 

parties’ ability to directly or indirectly incorporate soft money into the thresholds would 

inherently provide the donors of unregulated funds with the most access to federal officials. On 

the level of individual donors, as well, the strong inference to be drawn from the RNC’s preBCRA conduct discussed above is that its “policies” and alleged practices regarding access 

would not prevent the party from openly or secretly helping its donors gain influence. 

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III. PLAINTIFFS’ ACTIVITIES AFFECT FEDERAL ELECTIONS 

As discussed in the Commission’s prior memorandum, McConnell held that BCRA 

Title I is constitutional as a contribution limit, and so the parties’ ultimate intended spending of 

their soft money is “beside the point” for purposes of assessing Title I’s constitutionality. (FEC 

S.J. Opp. at 7-13.) This holding is binding in the instant matter, and Plaintiffs are precluded 

from challenging it here. (FEC Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 20) at 24-28.) 

In any event, even if the Court were to address the specific activities that Plaintiffs claim to wish 

to fund with soft money, those activities would not be entitled to any form of constitutional 

exemption from BCRA.4

 In addition to the reasons discussed at FEC S.J. Opp. 36-44, Plaintiffs’ 

arguments regarding their activities fail for the reasons set forth below.5

A. The RNC’s “Grassroots Lobbying” Is Sham Issue Advertising

Prior to BCRA, when the RNC was permitted to receive nonfederal funds ostensibly to 

conduct “issue advertising,” “genuine issue advocacy on the part of political parties [was] a rare 

occurrence.” 251 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Similarly, the RNC spent only “a 

minuscule percentage” of its nonfederal budget on state and local governmental affairs. Id. at 

463. Instead, the parties funded hundreds of millions of dollars of “sham” issue advertising, i.e., 

“so-called ‘issue ads’” that “were actually electioneering advertisements,” id. at 826 (Leon, J.). 

 

4

 Plaintiffs’ artificial segregation of their activities into “federal” and “not-unambiguouslyfederal” is particularly untenable because, as amici note, “[m]oney is fungible.” (Mem. of P. & 

A. of Brennan Ctr., et al., Opp. Pls.’ Mot. for S.J. at 20-21 (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 

U.S. 600, 606 (2004)).) Thus, any soft money spent on a putatively nonfederal activity simply 

allows the party to spend more hard money on other activities. (See FEC S.J. Opp. 34-35, 44 

(citing California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).)

5

 As to Plaintiffs’ activities involving redistricting, voter registration, and ballot-initiative 

advertising, the Commission presents no further arguments at this time but supplements its prior 

discussions (FEC S.J. Opp. 12, 38-42) with additional factual support developed during 

discovery. (See FEC SMF ¶¶ 68-69 (redistricting), ¶¶ 60, 77-78 (voter registration), ¶¶ 79-80 

(ballot-initiative advertising).) 

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These ads, many of which overtly attacked the character, qualifications, and fitness for office of 

federal candidates, were one of the prime motivating factors for BCRA. See McConnell, 129-32 

(noting Senate Committee’s findings that “the ads enabled unions, corporations, and wealthy 

contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was intended to provide”), 169-170. They 

were also one of the main considerations in the Supreme Court’s upholding of the Act. See id. 

While McConnell unquestionably upheld BCRA’s prohibition on using soft money to 

fund the type of purported issue advocacy that the national political parties abused in the 1990s, 

the precise contours of what the RNC now considers to be “grassroots lobbying” — and 

therefore constitutionally exempt from Title I — are unclear. For example, when asked during 

the course of discovery to respond to interrogatories and to produce certain documents relating to 

“grassroots lobbying” as that term was defined in Plaintiffs’ own filings in this case, the RNC 

objected that the term was “extremely vague, overbroad and ambiguous.” (FEC SMF ¶ 63.) 

Indeed, the RNC’s definition is so vague that the party cannot even determine how much money, 

if any, it has spent on advertisements that it considers “grassroots lobbying” during the last three 

election cycles. (Id. ¶ 64.) Apparently, therefore, the RNC is asking this Court to hold that the 

First Amendment prohibits Congress from restricting the financing of a category of 

communications whose boundaries are so hazy that the RNC itself does not know what is or is 

not within them.6

 Because McConnell upheld Title I as to all advertising by national political 

parties, in large part as a reaction to the previously underinclusive regulatory scheme that had 

allowed sham issue ads, see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129-32, 169-70, Plaintiffs’ request to re-blur 

this line must fail. 

 

6

 BCRA, of course, does not prohibit the parties from engaging in any speech, including 

grassroots lobbying, regardless of how it is defined; in fact, the Democratic National Committee 

(which has far less cash-on-hand than does the RNC) recently used hard money to produce and 

distribute a genuine grassroots lobbying advertisement. (FEC SMF ¶ 67.) 

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14

In any event, it is undisputed that the RNC’s current definition of grassroots lobbying 

includes the very same sham issue advertising as to which the soft-money restriction was upheld 

in McConnell. Although the RNC has been unable to articulate any coherent description of the 

boundaries of its desired advertising, the party has specifically testified that several 

communications that this Court found in McConnell to be sham issue ads would constitute 

“grassroots lobbying” under the RNC’s definition of that term. (FEC SMF ¶ 65.)7 Thus, 

regardless of how the RNC would ultimately define grassroots lobbying, the definition would, at 

a minimum, permit unlimited corporate donations to be used to fund some sham issue ads. That 

result cannot possibly be squared with McConnell. 

Plaintiffs have claimed that, in light of FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 

2652 (2007) (“WRTL”), this Court is free to disregard McConnell’s holdings regarding sham 

issue advertising. (See Pls.’ Reply Mem. in Support of S.J. at 16 (Docket No. 50) (“Pls.’ S.J. 

Reply”).) Such an argument has no basis in the text of WRTL itself, which (a) applied strict 

scrutiny (b) to a restriction on spending (c) by an outside advocacy group. (See FEC S.J. Opp. at 

42.) In contrast, the instant case involves (a) the application of intermediate scrutiny (b) to a 

contribution limit (c) for a national political party. Because “actions taken by political parties are 

presumed to be in connection with election campaigns,” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64 (citing 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79), the WRTL holding that non-political committees are permitted to 

finance certain limited advertising with corporate funds has no application to the RNC’s request 

for a constitutional exemption for whatever it ultimately deems to be grassroots lobbying. 

 

7

 Similarly, the CRP has acknowledged that its “non-advocacy issue oriented mailings” are 

part of the CRP’s activities “supporting” candidates. (FEC SMF ¶ 66 (quoting Pls.’ SMF ¶ 39).) 

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15

B. The RNC’s Support for State and Local Candidates, Even in Elections 

Where No Federal Candidates Are on the Ballot, Affects Federal Elections

As the Commission noted in its prior brief, most of the putatively state and local activities 

that the RNC wishes to finance with soft money affect federal elections — by Plaintiffs’ own 

admission. (FEC S.J. Opp. at 38-39; see also infra Part III.D-E.) In any event, the RNC is free 

to spend as much of its money on these, or any other state and local activities, as it would like. 

Since 2003, the RNC has spent a total of approximately $2.2 million on elections in which there 

is no federal candidate on the ballot, although that only constitutes approximately 0.2% of the 

RNC’s disbursements during this period.8

 (FEC SMF ¶ 57.) If the RNC were interested in 

committing more of its resources to state and local activity, it could have spent more of the 

nearly $1.1 billion it raised during that time period (see id. ¶¶ 42-43) on such activity. As the 

history of soft money demonstrates, however, it is more likely that if the RNC is permitted to 

funnel soft money to them, “state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next 

conduits for the soft-money funding of sham issue advertising,” just as state parties served as that 

conduit prior to BCRA. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 185. 

The RNC has asserted that supporting state and local candidates specifically in elections 

in which no federal candidates are on the ballot is insufficiently connected to federal elections 

for constitutional purposes. (See Pls.’ S.J. Reply at 12-13.) However, the RNC’s off-year voter 

registration efforts increase the number of registered Republicans in subsequent years and 

facilitate the RNC’s compilation of voter information that the party uses to drive its GOTV and 

 

8

 Even when soft money was permitted, the RNC and DNC spent relatively little on state 

and local candidates: Combined, the two national parties spent “less than 4% of their soft money 

spending and 1.6% of their total financial activity in 2000” on state candidates. (FEC SMF ¶ 59 

(quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)).) Activities such as training of 

state and local candidates or direct donations to them “constituted a very small portion of the 

political parties’ nonfederal expenditures during the 2000 election cycle.” (Id.) 

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other programs assisting federal candidates in later elections. (FEC SMF ¶ 60.) In addition, by 

the RNC’s own admission, the party uses its state and local activities to “give the RNC the 

opportunity to test new and improved targeting and tactics.” (Id. (quoting memorandum from 

RNC Chairman).) For example, to “improve [its] grassroots effort, the RNC . . . deployed 

trained staff and resources into 2005 legislative and local special elections.” (Id.) These same 

efforts, refined in state and local races, “helped the GOP expand [its] majorities in the U.S. 

Congress . . . , in addition to re-electing President Bush.” (Id.; see also id. (quoting RNC press 

release stating that RNC’s “investment in [its] state parties and . . . grassroots organizations . . . 

will help ensure victory in the special election in New York’s 20th Congressional district.”).) 

The CRP likewise uses its state and local campaign activities to “further refine the strategies and 

tactics for [its] target congressional candidates.” (Id. (quoting CRP Chairman’s website post).) 

It is, therefore, undisputed that the RNC’s state and local activities help the party increase its 

electoral success in federal elections. 

C. The RNC’s Litigation Affects Who Obtains Federal Office

The purpose of the RNC’s “litigation account” is unclear: Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged 

that the account would “be used solely for paying the fees and expenses attributable to this case” 

(Compl. ¶ 21 (emphasis added)), while Plaintiffs’ briefs appear to take a more expansive view. 

(E.g., Pls.’ SMF ¶ 20.) To the extent the litigation account is limited to the instant case, it affects 

federal elections for the same reasons discussed previously regarding soft money in general and 

Plaintiffs’ activities in particular. To the extent the account also would be used to fund litigation 

regarding voter registration and similar issues (see Josefiak Dep. 172:13-176:3 (FEC Exh. 1)), 

such litigation affects federal elections for the same reasons that voter registration affects federal 

elections. (See FEC S.J. Opp. at 38-39; FEC SMF ¶¶ 77-78.) Finally, to the extent the account 

would be used to fund recount litigation and related activity for federal elections, such litigation 

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is, in the language of FECA, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), “in connection with” the underlying federal 

election, such that it must be financed with federal funds. See FEC Advisory Op. 2006-24, 

http://saos.nictusa.com/aodocs/2006-24.pdf (Oct. 5, 2006) (“[E]lection recount activities are in 

connection with a Federal election . . . .”). 

D. Get-Out-The-Vote Activity Affects All Elections on the Ballot

All three organizational Plaintiffs have explicitly acknowledged that the purpose of their 

GOTV activities is to support all Republican candidates — state and federal — on any given 

ballot, and that these activities do, in fact, help all such candidates. (FEC SMF ¶¶ 72-73; see 

also FEC S.J. Opp. at 38-39.) Indeed, Plaintiff Duncan has stated publicly that the RNC’s 

“prodigious fundraising” has allowed it to build up, “over a long period of time,” a GOTV 

program and other “organizational efforts [that] make the difference . . . generally, there’s 

probably a 2 to 5 percent difference in additional turnout for a candidate that you can make.” 

(FEC SMF ¶ 74 (quoting Victory Dream Team, CONGRESS DAILY, July 29, 2008).) This 

“difference” applies to both federal and “down-ballot” candidates (see id.), and it is effective 

regardless of whether any federal candidates are specifically mentioned in the course of the 

GOTV activity (id. ¶¶ 82-83). Thus, any argument that Plaintiffs’ GOTV activity does not 

influence federal elections is contrary to Plaintiffs’ own admissions and the record in this case. 

Furthermore, the CRP and RPSD already engage in the activity that they claim they 

require soft money to finance: Although they allegedly conduct GOTV only for purposes of 

helping state and local candidates, the RPSD uses federal funds to make GOTV phone calls and 

to distribute GOTV doorhangers “that include[] all Republican candidates” (FEC SMF ¶ 76 

(quoting Pls.’ Supplemental Discovery Resps. at 10)), and the CRP includes federal candidates in 

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18

some of its GOTV slate listings. (Id. ¶ 75.) Nothing in BCRA prohibits Plaintiffs from devoting 

more of their federal funds to GOTV activities in mixed federal-and-state elections.9

E. Plaintiffs’ Other Federal Election Activity Affects Federal Elections

To the extent that any of the state or local parties’ intended activities constitute “generic 

campaign activity” 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(ii) — which is “campaign activity that promotes a 

political party and does not promote a candidate or non-Federal candidate,” 2 U.S.C. § 431(21) 

— such activities influence federal elections. (See FEC S.J. Opp. 37-38 (quoting McConnell’s 

discussion of “generic campaign activity”).) As the CRP’s Chairman has stated: “Building 

organizational and communications capability — and expanding the ranks of congressional, state 

and local officials from our party — makes it more likely a state will be competitive in a 

presidential election down the road.” (FEC SMF ¶ 81; see also id. (quoting CRP Chairman’s 

website post noting that Congressional candidate was “benefitting from the organization our 

volunteer groups have built in the region”); id. ¶ 60 (noting use of party-building operations to 

refine strategies and tactics for federal campaigns).). This effect occurs (indeed, it is intended) 

regardless of whether the generic activity takes the form of GOTV, voter registration, or general 

party-building: 

Common sense dictates, and it was “undisputed” below, that a 

party’s efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly 

assist the party’s candidates for federal office. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 

460 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). It is equally clear that federal candidates 

reap substantial rewards from any efforts that increase the number 

of like-minded registered voters who actually go to the polls. See, 

e.g., id., at 459 (“‘[The evidence] shows quite clearly that a 

campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly Republican precinct 

 

9

 Furthermore, in BCRA § 101, 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(A)-(B), Congress permitted state and 

local parties to fund certain GOTV, voter registration, and other programs that constitute “federal 

election activity” under 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)-(ii) in part with nonfederal funds raised in 

amounts up to $10,000 per donor per year and in accordance with state law. (See FEC S.J. Opp. 

at 4 n.2, 41.) 

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19

will produce a harvest of votes for Republican candidates for both 

state and federal offices. A campaign need not mention federal 

candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a candidate . . . 

. [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct effect on federal 

elections’” (quoting Green Expert Report 14)). 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 167-68; see also FEC SMF ¶ 82 (quoting RNC Memorandum stating 

that “[t]here are certain election related party expenditures that make no reference to any specific 

candidates but do benefit the entire Republican ticket . . . . These generic programs include voter 

registration[] and GOTV programs . . . . These programs and projects benefit the Republican 

Party and all of its candidates, federal and state.”); id. (quoting state party chair’s testimony that 

state party’s “Get-out-the-vote program is designed to benefit all candidates. That could include 

voter registration and so on and so forth. Q. And is the same true of generic party advertising, in 

other words, Vote Republican, that’s designed to benefit all the candidates? A. Yes.”). To 

finance such “generic” activity with unlimited and corporate contributions would create the same 

actual and/or apparent corruption as would each of Plaintiffs’ other proposed uses for their soft 

money. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court grant 

summary judgment to the Commission. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan (D.C. Bar No. 424222) 

General Counsel 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley 

Assistant General Counsel 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 22 of 56
20

 /s/ Adav Noti 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Attorney 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

Dated: April 10, 2009 (202) 694-1650 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 23 of 56
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civ. No. 08-1953 (BMK, RJL, RMC) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

et al., ) STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________________) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN GENUINE DISPUTE 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 24 of 56
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. UNLIMITED CONTRIBUTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS WOULD CREATE AN 

APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION AND POSE A DANGER OF ACTUAL 

CORRUPTION ...................................................................................................................1

A. The Republican National Committee Is in a Unique Position Between Donors 

and Federal Candidates and Officeholders ..............................................................1 

B. The Republican National Committee Facilitates Its Largest Donors’ Access to 

and Influence Over Federal Candidates and Officeholders .....................................2 

C. Federal Candidates and Officeholders Know the Identity of Their Parties’ 

Large Donors, Regardless of Who Solicits the Donations ......................................6 

D. State and Local Political Parties Are Inextricably Intertwined with National 

Parties, Federal Candidates, and Federal Officeholders ........................................10 

E. State and Local Political Parties Facilitate Their Largest Donors’ Access to 

and Influence Over Federal Candidates and Officeholders ...................................12 

F. A National Party Official Acting as an Agent of His Party Raises the Same 

Actual and Apparent Corruption Concerns as the National Party Itself................14 

II. PLAINTIFFS AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES HAVE RAISED 

SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY WITHIN THE FEDERAL 

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ...............................................................................................15 

III. PLAINTIFFS’ ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................19 

A. Plaintiffs Are Demonstrably Willing and Able to Finance Their Activities 

with Federal Funds.................................................................................................19 

B. The RNC’s Ability to Support State and Local Candidates Is Unlimited, 

and Such Activity Has the Potential to Affect Federal Elections ..........................20 

C. The RNC’s “Grassroots Lobbying” Is Sham Issue Advertising............................22 

D. Redistricting Affects Federal Elections .................................................................24 

E. Plaintiffs’ Litigation Affects Who Obtains Federal Office....................................25 

F. Get-Out-The-Vote Activity Affects All Elections on the Ballot ...........................25 

G. Voter Registration Affects Federal Elections ........................................................26 

H. Advertising that Mentions State Ballot Measures and Promotes, Attacks, 

Supports, or Opposes Federal Candidates Affects Federal Elections....................27 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 25 of 56
ii

I. Plaintiffs’ Other Federal Election Activity Affects Federal Elections ..................28 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 26 of 56
Pursuant to LCvR 7(h) and 56.1, Defendant Federal Election Commission 

(“Commission”) submits in support of its motion for summary judgment the following statement 

of material facts not in genuine dispute. 

I. UNLIMITED CONTRIBUTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS WOULD CREATE AN 

APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION AND POSE A DANGER OF ACTUAL 

CORRUPTION 

A. The Republican National Committee Is in a Unique Position Between Donors 

and Federal Candidates and Officeholders 

1. Plaintiff Republican National Committee (“RNC”) is a “political arm of 

Republicans either seeking office or in office,” and representatives of the RNC are in 

communication with candidates and officeholders on a frequent, ongoing basis. (Josefiak Dep. 

197:1-18 (FEC Exh. 1).)1

2. National political parties are “‘inextricably intertwined with federal officeholders 

and candidates.’” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 155 (2003) (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. H409 

(Feb. 13, 2002)).2

3. “‘[T]here is no meaningful separation between the national party committees and 

the public officials who control them.’” Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 

468-69 (D.D.C. 2003) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.)). 

4. The “national parties” are in a “unique position” to serve as “‘agents for spending 

on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.’” Id. at 145 (quoting FEC v. 

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 452 (2001)). 

 

1

 FEC Exhibits 1-25 were appended to the Commission’s memorandum in opposition to 

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 39); FEC Exhibits 26-41 are appended to 

the instant memorandum. 

2

 Once resolved by an appellate court, issues of legislative fact need not be relitigated in 

lower courts each time they arise. See A Woman’s Choice—E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman,

305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, as to any fact that the Supreme Court resolved in 

McConnell, this Court may simply adopt the relevant finding from that case. 

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2

5. “The President typically controls his party’s national committee, and once a 

favorite has emerged for the presidential nomination of the other party, that candidate and his 

party’s national committee typically work closely together.” McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 697 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). When the President of the United States is a Republican, the President 

nominates the chairperson of the RNC, and there is regular strategic coordination between the 

party and the White House. (See Josefiak Dep. 193:2-194:20 (FEC Exh. 1).) 

6. The RNC works with federal candidates each election cycle to develop “victory 

plans,” which are joint, comprehensive, election-specific strategies. (See Josefiak Dep. 198:13-

199:8 (FEC Exh. 1); see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 159-60 (rejecting RNC’s Title I challenge 

in relation to victory plans); Victory Dream Team, CONGRESS DAILY, July 29, 2008, 2008 

WLNR 14131041 (FEC Exh. 26) (noting victory plans’ use in federal and “down-ballot” 

elections); 

 

 The RNC also sells voter preference 

data to campaigns (see Josefiak Dep. 200:10-12 (FEC Exh. 1)) and, on occasion, exchanges 

donor lists with them (see id. 98:8-14). 

B. The Republican National Committee Facilitates Its Largest Donors’ Access 

to and Influence Over Federal Candidates and Officeholders 

7. To facilitate its donors’ access to federal candidates and officeholders, the RNC 

organizes private receptions, dinners, and other events at which individuals who have made large 

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3

contributions (i.e., $15,000 or more) to the RNC have an opportunity to meet, dine, and speak 

with federal candidates and officeholders. (See Josefiak Dep. 58:18-61:5 (FEC Exh. 1).) These 

opportunities are “not offered to the public at large.” (Pl. RNC’s Discovery Resps. at 7 (FEC 

Exh. 4).) 

8. The RNC has created tiers of donors with specified benefits: For example, donors 

who give $15,000 receive “intimate luncheons, dinners, and meetings with key policymakers”; 

donors who give $30,400 “enjoy exclusive private functions with elected Republican leaders”; 

and donors who commit to raising $60,800 receive “at least one . . . exclusive event during the 

year,” as well as other “intimate events with key GOP policymakers.” (RNC 000130 (FEC Exh. 

7).) All of these benefits involve the privilege of attending events with federal candidates and 

officeholders, from candidates for the U.S. House to the sitting President of the United States. 

(See generally RNC 000058-000371 (FEC Exh. 8) (invitations to donor events with federal 

candidates and officeholders).) At these events, an attending donor has an opportunity to inform 

the federal candidate or officeholder about the donor’s opinion on legislation or other issues, and 

the candidate or officeholder is aware that the person expressing that opinion is a major donor. 

(See Josefiak Dep. 76:14-77:11 (FEC Exh. 1); see also Draft letter from Jim Nicholson to 

Deimer True, RNC 0302806 [DEV 102]3

 (explaining that donor who buys only one ticket to 

event is unlikely to sit with U.S. Senator because “sponsors, major donors, and table buyers are 

given first choice” of “VIP” assigned to their table).) 

 

3

 “DEV” and “Tab” citations refer to the McConnell Defendants’ Exhibit Volumes. A 

DVD copy of the non-confidential DEVs and a CD containing the confidential DEVs were filed 

in the instant action (see Docket No. 39-23), and courtesy copies were delivered to Chambers 

contemporaneously with the filing of the Commission’s opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment. 

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4

9. The RNC sets its highest donation tier to correspond to the legal contribution 

limit; when the contribution limits rise, the RNC increases the size of the donation required to 

reach the top tier. (Josefiak Dep. 102:19-103:6 (FEC Exh. 1).) Prior to BCRA, when there was 

no legal limit on soft-money contributions, the RNC’s donor tiers were substantially higher than 

they are now: The “Team 100” threshold (currently $30,400) was $100,000, and the “Regents” 

threshold (currently $60,800 divided between the donor and his/her spouse) was $250,000 from 

one person during a single election cycle. (See Shea Decl. ¶¶ 10, 14(f)-(g), McConnell v. FEC, 

Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 4, 2002) (FEC Exh. 27).) 

10. In McConnell, the plaintiffs’ own expert testified that, assuming money does buy 

access to or influence over federal officeholders, soft money is more likely to buy access or 

influence “simply by virtue of the numbers.” Primo Cross Tr. (Oct. 23, 2002) at 162, McConnell 

v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C.), Docket No. 344 (May 16, 2003); accord Krasno & Sorauf 

Expert Rep. at 15 [DEV 1-Tab 2] (“[T]he much greater size of the [soft money] individual 

donations at issue here pose a proportionately larger risk of influencing their beneficiaries than 

do contributions of hard money.”); Andrews Decl. ¶ 18 [DEV 6-Tab 1]; Wirthlin Cross Tr. (Oct. 

21, 2002) at 57, McConnell, Docket No. 344 (May 16, 2003). 

11. The RNC has no written policy — and gives no written guidance to its employees 

— against providing donors with preferential access to federal candidates and officeholders. 

(Josefiak Dep. 128:2-5, 184:10-21 (FEC Exh. 1).) To the extent the RNC has an unwritten 

policy on this issue, it is the same policy that was in effect prior to BCRA. (Id. 129:18-21.) That 

policy, according to the RNC in McConnell, was to “not offer to arrange personal meetings 

between donors — no matter how large — and federal officeholders or candidates for office.” 

(Shea Decl. ¶ 44 (FEC Exh. 27); see also Shea Dep. 79:22-81:11, McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 

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5

02-582 (D.D.C.) (FEC Exh. 28) (discussing policy).) When a donor requested such access as a 

condition of making a donation, the RNC asserted that it “rejected the donation and denied the 

request.” (Shea Decl. ¶ 44 (FEC Exh. 27).) When an existing donor requested a meeting with an 

officeholder, the RNC’s stated policy was to “pass the request along to the officeholder’s staff 

without inquiring into the purpose of the proposed meeting, but neither to advocate a meeting nor 

ascertain whether a meeting has been arranged.” (Id. ¶ 46.) In spite of this policy, trading of soft 

money for access to federal officeholders was rampant. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 150-52 

(“The record in the present case[] is replete with . . . examples of national party committees 

peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money 

donations. . . . [T]he RNC holds out the prospect of access to officeholders to attract soft-money 

donations and encourages officeholders to meet with large soft-money donors.”) (citing 

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 500-03 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), 860-61 (Leon, J.)). 

12. Many donors make large contributions at the suggestion of professional lobbyists 

as part of a broader plan to obtain influence. As one lobbyist explained, 

I advise my clients as to which federal office-holders (or candidates) they 

should contribute and in what amounts, in order to best use the resources 

they are able to allocate to such efforts to advance their legislative agenda. 

Such plans also would include soft money contributions to political parties 

and interest groups associated with political issues.

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citation omitted, emphasis added); see 

also id. (“‘To have true political clout, the giving and raising of campaign money for candidates 

and political parties is often critically important.’”) (quoting different lobbyist). Through 

lobbyists and others, “national parties have actively exploited the belief that contributions 

purchase influence or protection to pressure donors into making contributions.” McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 148 n.47. As the CEO of a major corporate donor explained, if a corporation had given a 

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6

lot of money to one party, “the other side,” i.e., the opposing national party committee, might 

have “a friendly lobbyist call and indicate that someone with interests before a certain committee 

has had their contributions to the other side noticed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

C. Federal Candidates and Officeholders Know the Identity of Their Parties’ 

Large Donors, Regardless of Who Solicits the Donations 

13. It is not only “contributions made at the express behest of” a candidate that raise 

corruption concerns, McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152, but also other contributions, because “[e]lected 

officials know exactly who the big party contributors are.” Rudman Decl. ¶ 12 [DEV 8-Tab 34]; 

accord Simpson Decl. ¶ 5 [DEV 9-Tab 38]; Greenwald Decl. ¶ 11 [DEV 6-Tab 16]. Donation 

patterns are well-known or easily ascertainable by party officials, officeholders, staff, and 

opposing lobbyists, through FEC reports or other means. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 148 n.47; 

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 488 (Kollar-Kotelly, J) (“‘[T]here is communication among 

Members about who has made soft money donations and at what level they have given, and this 

is widely known and understood by the Members and their staff.’”) (quoting CEO Wade 

Randlett); id. at 487 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), 853-54 (Leon, J.) (“‘[Y]ou cannot be a good 

Democratic or a good Republican Member and not be aware of who gave money to the party.’”) 

(quoting Senator Bumpers); id. at 487-88 (Kollar-Kotelly, J), 854 (Leon, J.) (“‘Legislators of 

both parties often know who the large soft money contributors to their party are.’”) (quoting 

Senator McCain); id. at 487 (Kollar-Kotelly, J), 854 (Leon, J.) (donor’s “‘lobbyist informs the 

Senator that a large donation was just made’”) (quoting Senator Boren). Congressional staffers 

also know the identities of the big soft-money donors. See id. at 482 (“‘Staffers who work for 

Members know who the big donors are, and those people always get their phone calls returned 

first and are allowed to see the Member when others are not.’”) (quoting Senator Simpson). 

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14. In McConnell, the RNC asserted that it was “exceedingly rare for [Members of 

Congress] to solicit funds through telephone calls or personal meetings.” (Shea Decl. ¶ 17 (FEC 

Exh. 27); Josefiak Dep. 105:6-7, McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C.) (Sept. 28, 2002) 

(FEC Exh. 29) (“I am not aware of Members of Congress being asked to solicit soft money on 

behalf of the RNC.”); id. at 119:15-121-3 (testifying that RNC staff and existing donors 

conducted most major-donor solicitations for RNC, and “it’s certainly not a program that we 

have in place to ask Members of Congress to solicit soft money. I'm not aware of that at all.”); 

 In fact, however, before the 

passage of BCRA, some soft-money solicitations were made by employees or officers of the 

national parties, and some were made by officeholders. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 125 (“[S]oftmoney contributions . . . were in many cases solicited by the candidates themselves.”); id. at 147 

(discussing fundraising in which federal candidates were not involved). 

15. “Even when not participating directly in the fundraising, federal officeholders 

were well aware of the identities of the donors: National party committees would distribute lists 

of potential or actual donors, or donors themselves would report their generosity to 

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8

officeholders.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added). “‘[F]or a member not to know 

the identities of these donors, he or she must actively avoid such knowledge as it is provided by 

the national political parties and the donors themselves.’” Id. (quoting McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 

2d at 487-88) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (emphasis added); see also id. (citing McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 

2d at 853-55 (Leon, J.)). 

16. In light of the foregoing, even if Plaintiffs were to exclude federal officeholders 

from the soft-money solicitation process, soft-money donors “know that elected officials would 

become aware of who has given significant amounts” (Greenwald Decl. ¶ 11 (FEC Exh. 30) 

(former CEO of soft-money donor)): As a lobbyist and former congressional aide explains, 

“Members will find out who made large contributions from their staffs, other Members, or 

through ‘thank you’ type events run by the party.” (Rozen Decl. ¶ 4 (FEC Exh. 31).) Indeed, 

“fundraising does not always involve a solicitation directly from a Member. . . . Sophisticated 

donors would understand that elected officials of the party would be aware and appreciative of 

the amounts contributed even if an officeholder had not personally solicited the funds 

contributed.” (Id.) 

17. Thus, “the pernicious effects of the soft money system . . . will result whether or 

not Members of Congress themselves directly solicit the contributions.” (Rozen Decl. ¶ 3 (FEC 

Exh. 31).) “Even if entrance to [donor] events were tied to hard money contributions rather than 

soft money, such events would provide opportunities for people who had also given additional 

soft money amounts to interact with elected officials.” (Id.) For example, fundraising events for 

hard-money donors would inevitably include donors who had also made soft-money donations. 

At such events, “the officeholders would often know which of the attendees had made the large 

soft money donations, [and] they would naturally feel gratitude towards those donors 

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commensurate with the amount of the donation.” (Id.; see also Ornstein Decl. ¶ 16 (Exh 3 to 

Van Hollen S. J. Opp. (Docket No. 41)) (“If the parties could now return to creating and 

managing events to solicit unlimited soft money contributions . . . with officeholders present, 

where they would interact with large donors and could be told by the parties who the large 

donors are, and would likely be told by the donors themselves, . . . it would require a huge 

suspension of disbelief to imagine that the officeholders would not pay close attention to who 

they are, and would lavish attention on them.”).) “The same willful suspension of disbelief is 

required to imagine that a busy lawmaker with a long list of phone calls to return or limited time 

to see people would ignore the call or appointment from a soft money donor who may have 

given six- or seven-figure contributions to his or her party.” (Ornstein Decl. ¶ 16; see also

Rozen Decl. ¶ 4 (FEC Exh. 31) (“The dangers of the soft money system . . . will still be present. 

Members will find out who made large contributions . . . , and they will naturally be more 

responsive to those donors due to the amount of help the donors have provided to the Member’s 

party.”).) 

18. “Though a soft money check might be made out to a political party, . . . those 

checks open the doors to the offices of individual and important Members of Congress and the 

Administration . . . .” (Greenwald Decl. ¶ 12 (FEC Exh. 30).) This access to federal candidates 

and officeholders, even if it were “not explicitly promised” by the party, “gives [soft-money 

donors] an opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Such 

influence provides the impetus for “the vast majority of soft money” (id. ¶ 11), and “the system 

would be perpetuated whether a Member or some other person representing the party is calling to 

ask.” (Id.) 

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D. State and Local Political Parties Are Inextricably Intertwined with National 

Parties, Federal Candidates, and Federal Officeholders 

19. State and local parties — such as Plaintiffs California Republican Party (“CRP”) 

and Republican Party of San Diego County (“RPSD”) — are “entities uniquely positioned to 

serve as conduits for corruption” because of their close connection to the national parties and to 

federal officeholders and candidates. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 156 n.51; see also id. at 161. 

20. “Congress recognized that” there were “close ties between federal candidates and 

state party committees,” id. at 161, and concluded — “based on the evidence before it” — that 

“state committees function as an alternative avenue for precisely the same corrupting forces” of 

soft money as the national party committees, id. at 164. 

21. The chairperson of each state Republican party sits on the RNC. (Josefiak Dep. 

14:18-15:13 (FEC Exh. 1).) This arrangement facilitates near-constant strategic communication 

between state parties and the RNC. (See id. 200:13-201:1.) 

22. The CRP’s chairperson serves on the RNC, and all three of the CRP’s RNC 

members regularly convey strategic information among and between the CRP and the RNC. 

(See Christiansen Dep. 14:16-18, 15:2-5, 17:14-18 (FEC Exh. 2).) Communication between the 

RNC and CRP is particularly frequent during election years, when the parties discuss strategic 

topics such as voter registration and voter contact goals. (See id. 173:19-174:15.) In addition, 

the CRP’s Board of Directors always includes a United States Representative, who serves on 

behalf of the entire California Republican congressional delegation. (Id. 170:6-11.) The CRP, 

therefore, is inextricably intertwined with both the RNC and California’s federal officeholders 

and candidates. 

23. Each Republican nominee for the United States Senate and House of 

Representatives sits on the CRP’s State Central Committee. Standing Rules & Bylaws of the 

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Cal. Republican Party § 2.01.01(A)(1)-(2) (Feb. 22, 2009), available at 

http://www.cagop.org/index.cfm/about_party_bylaws.htm. If elected, each of these federal 

officeholders appoints a minimum of eight to twelve additional delegates to the Committee. See 

id. § 2.01.01(B)(1)-(2),(6). Even if not elected, each nominee appoints a minimum of one to five 

additional delegates. See id. § 2.01.01(B)(7). All of California’s RNC members also sit on the 

CRP’s State Central Committee. See id. § 2.01.01(A)(3)-(4). Each of these members appoints 

four to twelve additional delegates to the Committee. See id. § 2.01.01(B)(3)-(4). 

24. The CRP engages in strategic coordination with local Republican committees, 

including the RPSD, as to key party activities, such as voter registration and voter contact. (See

Christiansen Dep. 175:8-176:4 (FEC Exh. 2).) 

25. The CRP’s Board of Directors — which always includes at least one federal 

officeholder, see supra ¶ 22 — is informed of individual “generous donations.” (Id. 82:14-

83:25.) 

26. Each Republican United States Representative from San Diego County is an 

officer of the RPSD (Buettner Dep. 11:14-23, 99:14-24 (FEC Exh. 3)), and so the leadership of 

the RPSD is inextricably intertwined with that area’s federal officeholders and candidates. 

27. The RPSD’s committee members — including federal officeholders, see supra

¶ 26 — have access to the RPSD’s internal donor records. (Buettner Dep. 33:20-34:4 (FEC Exh. 

3).) 

28. The RPSD also makes available to some candidates for the House or 

Representatives the RPSD’s file containing voter information. (Id. at 89:9-90:2.) 

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E. State and Local Political Parties Facilitate Their Largest Donors’ Access to 

and Influence Over Federal Candidates and Officeholders 

29. The CRP invites its donors to meet and speak with federal candidates and 

officeholders, including the President and Vice President (Christiansen Dep. 62:5-25 (FEC Exh. 

2)), candidates for President and Vice President (id. 54:2-58:16), and many other federal 

candidates and officeholders (see id. 94:24-99:2 (describing state party conventions); see also id. 

109:22-110:7 (acknowledging that “at a fundraising event, . . . [donors] can have access through 

that”); Pls.’ Supplemental Discovery Resps. at 5-6 (Response ¶ 4) (FEC Exh. 32) (“Federal 

candidates or officeholders who have spoken at such events include: Former Mayor Rudy 

Giuliani and former Governor Mitt Romney (2007); Senate candidate Bill Jones (2004); 

Congressman Ed Royce, Congresswoman Mary Bono Mack, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, 

and Congressman Kevin McCarthy.”).) 

30. Some of these events have tiered ticket structures, with donors who pay larger 

amounts receiving more intimate access to the officeholders and candidates, such as at seated 

dinners, where the officeholders and candidates know that the people with whom they are eating 

are the largest donors. (See Christiansen Dep. 54:2-58:16, 94:24-99:2 (FEC Exh. 2).) 

31. The CRP has a menu of defined benefits for its major donors, promising them that 

they will “work closely with California’s Republican candidates and officials” and that donors 

“are well recognized for their important support of the Republican campaign.” California 

Republican Party, Golden State Leadership Team, 

http://www.cagop.org/index.cfm/golden_state_leadership_team.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) 

(FEC Exh. 9); see also California Republican Party, Join the California Republican Party 

Golden State Leadership Team, 

http://www.cagop.org/pdf/Golden_State_Leadership_Application.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) 

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(FEC Exh. 10). The CRP believes that providing these benefits helps the party raise funds. 

(Christiansen Dep. 88:10-89:4 (FEC Exh. 2).) 

32. The CRP also “strong arms” federal candidates and officeholders into 

participating in conference calls with major donors. (Christiansen Dep. 85:25-86:16 (FEC Exh. 

2).) For example, Senator McCain’s presidential campaign manager held a conference call for 

the CRP’s major donors (id. 91:17-20, 92:23-94:6), and then held a second call for an even more 

exclusive set of the CRP’s very biggest donors — those who gave over $25,000 (id. 106:19-

107:15). 

33. The CRP does not intend to change its practice of giving its donors access to 

federal candidates and officeholders, even if the CRP is permitted to raise and spend soft money 

on federal election activity. (See id. 177:19-178:6.) 

34. The RPSD provides its donors with access to federal candidates and officeholders, 

including at events attended by such candidates and officeholders where donors giving larger 

amounts receive greater recognition. (Buettner Dep. 20:15-22:2 (FEC Exh. 3); see also id. 

37:10-38:3, 39:7-9.) Each month, the RPSD holds a meeting that is open to the public but that is 

followed by a reception to which only major donors and important guests (including federal 

candidates and officeholders) are invited. (Id. 49:2-51:3.) The RPSD also arranges “VIP 

junkets” to Washington, where major donors meet with members of Congress. (Id. 43:23-45:2, 

45:24-46:7.) This preferential access is set out in menus of defined benefits, including, “for [the 

RPSD’s] most generous supporters . . . private, complimentary VIP meetings and events with 

major Republican leaders and candidates.” RPSD, Join a Republican Supporter Club or Renew 

Your Membership, https://secure.repweb.net/sandiegorepublicans/donor/ (last visited Mar. 8, 

2009) (FEC Exh. 11); see also RPSD, Tony Krvaric, Chairman’s Circle Chair, 

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http://www.sandiegorepublicans.org/donor/chairmans_circle/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (FEC 

Exh. 12) (listing benefits for RPSD’s highest donor group). 

35. The RPSD does not intend to change its practice of giving access to donors, even 

if the RPSD is permitted to raise and spend soft money on federal election activity. (See 

Buettner Dep. 56:18-23 (FEC Exh. 3).) 

36. “‘[T]he federal candidates who benefit from state party use of [soft money] will 

know exactly whom their benefactors are; the same degree of beholdenness and obligation will 

arise; the same distortions on the legislative process will occur; and the same public cynicism 

will erode the foundations of our democracy — except it will all be worse in the public’s mind 

because a perceived reform was undercut once again by a loophole that allows big money into 

the system.’” McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (quoting Senator Rudman). 

F. A National Party Official Acting as an Agent of His Party Raises the Same 

Actual and Apparent Corruption Concerns as the National Party Itself

37. Plaintiff Duncan was Chairman of the RNC until January 30, 2009. (Josefiak 

Dep. 29:4-20 (FEC Exh. 1).) 

38. To the extent Duncan wishes to solicit soft-money donations in his capacity as an 

RNC member, each of the foregoing facts regarding the RNC, see supra ¶¶ 1-18, applies to 

Duncan with equal force. To the extent Duncan wishes to solicit soft money for state and local 

candidates in his individual capacity, or in his capacity as a state party official, BCRA does not 

prevent him from doing so. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 157. 

39. Duncan remains a member of the RNC, but he has no official leadership role 

within that organization. (Josefiak Dep. 29:21-30:13 (FEC Exh. 1).) He has no authority, 

beyond that of any other RNC member, over the actions or decisions of the current RNC 

Chairman. (See id.) 

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II. PLAINTIFFS AND OTHER POLITICAL PARTY COMMITTEES HAVE 

RAISED SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY WITHIN THE 

FEDERAL CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 

40. Since BCRA’s enactment, which raised the limit on contributions to national 

political parties and indexed it to inflation, BCRA § 307(a)(2),(d), the national party committees4

have raised more hard money during each presidential election cycle than they raised in hard and 

soft money combined prior to BCRA: 

a. In the 1999-2000 election cycle, the national party committees raised a 

total of approximately $1.09 billion — approximately $574.5 million in hard money and 

approximately $515.1 million in soft money. (Biersack Decl. ¶¶ 3-4 (FEC Exh. 33).) 

b. In the 2003-2004 election cycle, the national party committees raised 

approximately $1.24 billion in hard money. (Id.) 

c. In the 2007-2008 election cycle, the national party committees raised 

approximately $1.24 billion in hard money. (Id.) 

41. In the 2005-2006 non-presidential election cycle, the national party committees 

raised approximately $900.2 million in hard money alone, representing approximately 90 percent 

of the $1.011 billion ($515.2 million in hard money and $496.1 million in soft money) they 

raised in 2001-2002. (Biersack Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5 (FEC Exh. 33).) 

42. Since BCRA’s enactment, the amounts of hard money raised by the RNC each 

presidential election cycle have been greater than the amounts the RNC raised in hard and soft 

money combined prior to BCRA: 

 

4

 The national party committees are the RNC, the National Republican Congressional 

Committee (NRCC), the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), the Democratic 

National Committee (DNC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and 

the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC). 

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a. In the 1999-2000 election cycle, the RNC raised a combined total of 

approximately $379 million — nearly $212.8 million in hard money and approximately $166.2 

million in soft money. (Biersack Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6 (FEC Exh. 33).) 

b. In the 2003-2004 election cycle, the RNC raised approximately $392.4 

million in hard money. (Id.) 

c. In the 2007-2008 election cycle, the RNC raised approximately $427.6 

million in hard money. (Id.) 

43. In the 2005-2006 non-presidential election cycle, the RNC raised approximately 

$243 million in hard money, representing approximately 85 percent of the $284 million ($170 

million in hard money and $113.9 million in soft money) the RNC raised in 2001-2002. 

(Biersack Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7 (FEC Exh. 33).) 

44. The RNC, CRP, and RPSD are subject to the same contribution limits as their 

Democratic Party equivalents. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1). 

45. Since BCRA’s enactment, the RNC, CRP, and RPSD have in most election cycles 

each raised considerably more hard money than their Democratic counterparts: 

a. In the 2007-2008 cycle, the RNC raised approximately $427.5 million, 

roughly 64% more than the DNC’s $260.1 million. In the 2005-2006 election cycle, the RNC 

raised approximately $243 million, approximately 85% more than the DNC’s $130.8 million. In 

the 2003-2004 election cycle, the RNC and DNC each raised almost $400 million. (Biersack 

Decl. ¶¶ 3, 8 (FEC Exh. 33).) 

b. In the three post-BCRA election cycles, the CRP has raised significantly 

more hard money than the California Democratic Party (“CDP”). In the 2007-2008 election 

cycle, the CRP raised approximately $14 million, over 3.5 times more hard money than the 

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CDP’s $3.8 million. In the 2005-2006 election cycle, the CRP raised approximately $10.8 

million, almost double CDP’s $5.6 million. And in the 2003-2004 election cycle, the CRP raised 

approximately $13.3 million, or 25% more than the CDP’s $10.7 million. (Biersack Decl. 

¶¶ 9-10 (FEC Exh. 33).) 

c. In the six years since BCRA became effective, the RPSD has raised 

considerably more hard money than the San Diego Democratic Party (“SDDP”). Although the 

SDDP raised about $90,000 more hard dollars than the RPSD in the 2007-2008 election cycle, 

the RPSD raised twice as much hard money as the SDDP in the 2005-2006 cycle: $648,137 for 

the RPSD, versus $297,827 for the SDDP. In the 2003-2004 election cycle, the RPSD raised 

$703,478, more than 5.5 times the $121,803 raised by the SDDP. (Biersack Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 (FEC 

Exh. 33).) 

46. In the three election cycles since BCRA’s enactment, the amount of money raised 

by the national committees of the Republican Party is considerably greater than the combined 

total raised by all of the Democratic-leaning 527 groups that have a national presence and affect 

federal elections. In the 2007-2008 election cycle, the three national committees of the 

Republican Party cumulatively raised approximately $640.3 million, while the national 

Democratic 527 groups raised less than one-quarter of that amount, about $154 million. 

(Biersack Decl. ¶¶ 3, 13 (FEC Exh. 33); Hajjar Decl. ¶ 4 (FEC Exh. 34).) Similarly, in the 2005-

2006 election cycle, the national committees of the Republican Party raised approximately 

$508.1 million, more than quadrupling the Democratic 527 groups’ $112.5 million. (Biersack 

Decl. ¶¶ 3, 13 (FEC Exh. 33); Hajjar Decl. ¶ 5 (FEC Exh. 34).) The national Republican 

committees raised almost 2.5 times as much as all national Democratic 527 groups in the 2003-

2004 election cycle: $657 million for the Republican committees versus $264.5 million for the 

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key Democratic 527 groups. (Biersack Decl. ¶¶ 3, 13 (FEC Exh. 33); Hajjar Decl. ¶ 6 (FEC Exh. 

34).) The corresponding fundraising totals for national Republican-leaning 527 groups were 

$138 million in the 2008 election cycle, $106.2 million in the 2006 cycle, and $164.7 million in 

the 2004 cycle. (Hajjar Decl. ¶¶ 7-9 (FEC Exh. 34).) 

47. The RNC raises substantial funds via joint fundraising committees (“JFCs”), 

through which the RNC, state parties, and candidate campaign committees solicit donors 

collectively and share the proceeds received from those solicitations. (See, e.g., RNC 000106-

000110 at 000108, 000110 (FEC Exh. 13) (explaining breakdown of donations to JFC shared by 

RNC, McCain presidential campaign, and state Republican parties of Colorado, Minnesota, New 

Mexico, and Wisconsin).) 

48. The RNC predicted in McConnell that “‘[t]he net effects of BCRA will be 

massive layoffs and severe reduction of . . . speech at the RNC, and reduction of many state 

parties to a ‘nominal’ existence.’” McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) 

(quoting RNC brief). The RNC “calculate[d] that the BCRA will cause the RNC to lose 

revenues of approximately $48.5 million per non-presidential election year, and $125 million per 

presidential election year.” (Shea Decl. ¶ 19 (FEC Exh. 27).) The RNC further asserted that it 

would “not be able to recoup these lost non-federal revenues” because, the RNC projected, “it is 

unlikely that the RNC will be able to raise more federal money from lower-dollar contributors 

than it currently does.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) 

49. Directly contrary to the RNC’s foregoing predictions in McConnell: (a) the RNC 

generally raises more hard money now than it raised in hard and soft money combined before 

BCRA, see supra ¶¶ 40-43; and (b) the RNC also has massively expanded its low-dollar 

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contributor base. (See Ornstein Decl. ¶¶ 21-26 (Exh 3 to Van Hollen S. J. Opp. (Docket No. 

41)).) 

50. The RNC acknowledges that it has not yet “been able to compete effectively in 

[the] area” of fundraising via the internet. (Josefiak Dep. 185:22-186:12 (FEC Exh. 1); see also 

id. 188:17-189:1 (Q: . . . [T]here’s no reason that the RNC can’t raise hard dollars over the 

Internet in the same way and with the same effect as any other hard money group, is there? A. 

Correct. We attempt to raise it. It’s not productive, so the competition is there because others 

can, and we can’t.”), 83:18-84:5 (“[E]ven though we constantly try to increase . . . the 

solicitations by e-mail, which is very cost effective, we have not been as successful as the 

opposition party in generating interest by our donor base to contribute that way.”).) 

III. PLAINTIFFS’ ACTIVITIES 

A. Plaintiffs Are Demonstrably Willing and Able to Finance Their Activities 

with Federal Funds

51. BCRA does not “in any way limit[] the total amount of money parties can spend. 

Rather, [it] simply limit[s] the source and individual amount of donations.” McConnell, 540 

U.S. at 139 (citation omitted). 

52. Since BCRA’s enactment, the RNC has engaged in all of the activities it now 

claims to wish to pursue: supporting state candidates, including in elections where no federal 

candidates were on the ballot (Plaintiff RNC’s Discovery Resps. at 4-5 (FEC Exh. 4)); 

redistricting (id. at 5); grassroots lobbying (Josefiak Dep. 156:22-157:10 (FEC Exh. 1)); and 

litigation (id. 171:20-172:9). 

53. To the extent that the RNC has chosen to forego certain activities, that is the result 

of the RNC’s strategic decision to spend its plentiful federal funds on other elections. (See id. 

141:10-143:16, 160:12-20.) 

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54. Since BCRA’s enactment, the CRP has “spent . . . money supporting” federal 

candidates through direct and coordinated expenditures (see Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts 

¶ 38), and through substantial sums spent on federal election activity, including voter 

registration, voter identification, GOTV, and generic campaign activity, see infra ¶¶ 72-83. 

55. Since BCRA’s enactment, the RPSD has distributed material promoting federal 

and state candidates together in every election cycle. (See FEC Exh. 20 (RPSD materials); see 

also Buettner Dep. 77:2-79:21 (FEC Exh. 3) (acknowledging that RPSD has distributed materials 

endorsing federal candidates).) 

56. The purpose of the RPSD’s alleged activities is “to get Republicans elected” at 

the federal, state, and local levels. (Buettner Dep. 62:5-63:18, 66:3-67:9 (FEC Exh. 3).) 

Regardless of the result of this case, the RPSD will continue to conduct all of its voter 

registration, GOTV, and generic campaign activities in the same manner that it has conducted 

them since BCRA was enacted. (See id. 76:2-12.) 

B. The RNC’s Ability to Support State and Local Candidates Is Unlimited, and 

Such Activity Has the Potential to Affect Federal Elections

57. The RNC contributed approximately $900,000 to a candidate for governor of 

Virginia in 2005, $300,000 to New Jersey county parties that year, $540,000 to the Louisiana 

Republican Party in 2007, and $450,000 to the Kentucky Republican Party in 2007. (See Pl. 

RNC’s Discovery Resps. at 4-5 (FEC Exh. 4).) Thus, as to elections “in which there is no 

federal candidate on the ballot,” the RNC has spent a total of approximately $2.2 million on such 

elections since 2003, although that only constitutes approximately 0.2% of the RNC’s 

disbursements during this period. (See id.; disbursements per election cycle available at 

http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/srssea.shtml.) 

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58. If the RNC were interested in committing more of its resources to state and local 

activity, it was free to spend more of the nearly $1.1 billion it raised in that time period on such 

activity. See supra ¶¶ 42-43. 

59. Prior to BCRA — when the RNC was permitted to receive nonfederal funds 

ostensibly for the same type of activities at issue in this case — the RNC donated only a “small 

fraction” of its federal funds to state and local candidates. McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 464 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.). Combined, the two national parties donated “less than 4% of their soft 

money spending and 1.6% of their total financial activity in 2000” to state candidates. Id. 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Activities such as training of state and local candidates or 

direct donations to them “constituted a very small portion of the political parties’ nonfederal 

expenditures during the 2000 election cycle.” Id. at 465. 

60. The RNC’s off-year voter registration efforts increase the number of registered 

Republicans in subsequent years and facilitate the RNC’s compilation of voter information that 

the party uses to drive its GOTV and other programs assisting federal candidates in later 

elections. (See Josefiak Dep. 245:17-248:20.) More generally, the RNC’s state and local 

activities “give the RNC the opportunity to test new and improved targeting and tactics.” See

RNC, “Memo From Chairman Mehlman Regarding GOTV Efforts in Special Elections,” at 1 

(May 23, 2005) (FEC Exh. 35). This is true regardless of whether federal elections are also on 

the ballot: For example, to “improve [its] grassroots effort, the RNC . . . deployed trained staff 

and resources into 2005 legislative and local special elections.” (Id. at 2.) These same efforts, 

refined in state and local races, “helped the GOP expand [its] majorities in the U.S. Congress 

. . . , in addition to re-electing President George W. Bush.” (See id. at 1; see also Press Release, 

“RNC Makes Additional Investment in Northeast Republican Leadership” (Mar. 17, 2009) (FEC 

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Exh. 36) (stating that RNC’s “investment in [its] state parties and . . . grassroots organizations 

. . . will help ensure victory in the special election in New York’s 20th Congressional district.”).) 

The CRP, too, uses its state and local campaign activities to “further refine the strategies and 

tactics for [its] target congressional candidates.” Ron Nehring, California GOP Chair: Go 

Local, http://www.cagop.org/index.cfm/in-case-you-missed-it_599.htm (Dec. 7, 2008) (FEC 

Exh. 15). 

61. In light of the foregoing, if the RNC is permitted to funnel soft money to them, 

“state and local candidates and officeholders will become the next conduits for the soft-money 

funding of sham issue advertising,” just as state parties served as that conduit prior to BCRA. 

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 185. 

C. The RNC’s “Grassroots Lobbying” Is Sham Issue Advertising

62. Prior to BCRA — when the RNC was permitted to receive nonfederal funds 

ostensibly to, inter alia, conduct “issue advertising” — “genuine issue advocacy on the part of 

political parties [was] a rare occurrence.” McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (Kollar-Kotelly, 

J.). Similarly, the RNC spent only “a minuscule percentage” of its nonfederal budget on state 

and local governmental affairs. Id. at 463. “What is clear from the evidence [in McConnell],

however, is that regardless of whether or not it is done to advocate the party’s principles, the 

Republican Party’s primary goal is the election of its candidates who will be advocates for their 

core principles.” Id. at 470. 

63. The precise contours of what the RNC now considers to be “grassroots lobbying” 

are unclear: When asked during discovery to respond to interrogatories and to produce certain 

documents relating to “grassroots lobbying,” as that term was defined in Plaintiffs’ Statement of 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 48 of 56
23

Material Facts, the RNC objected that the term was “extremely vague, overbroad and 

ambiguous.” (See Pls.’ Supplemental Discovery Resps. at 3 (Objection ¶ 8) (FEC Exh. 32).) 

64. The RNC cannot determine how much money — if any — it has spent on 

advertisements that it considers “grassroots lobbying” during the last three election cycles. (Pl. 

RNC’s Discovery Responses at 6 (FEC Exh. 4); Pls.’ Supplemental Discovery Resps. at 4 

(Response ¶ 1 (FEC Exh. 32).) 

65. The RNC has testified that several communications that this Court found in 

McConnell to be sham issue ads — i.e., “so-called ‘issue ads’” that “were actually electioneering 

advertisements,” McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27 (Leon, J.) — would constitute 

“grassroots lobbying” under the RNC’s definition of that term. (Compare Josefiak Dep. 164:8-

22 (FEC Exh. 1) (testifying that RNC’s “Taxed Too Much” ad is grassroots lobbying), 170:14-

171:19 (same for RNC’s “More” ad), with McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (Kollar-Kotelly, 

J.) (including both ads in list of sham issue ads), 826 (Leon, J.) (same); see also ODP0029-00041 

(FEC Exh. 5) (text of ad); ODP 0023-02326 (FEC Exh. 6) (same).) 

66. Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts (¶ 39) includes disbursements for “nonadvocacy issue oriented mailings” in the CRP’s lists of disbursements “supporting” candidates, 

thereby further confirming the evidence that so-called “grassroots lobbying” affects candidate 

elections. 

67. Using hard money, the Democratic National Committee (which has far less cashon-hand than does the RNC) has recently produced and distributed a genuine grassroots lobbying 

advertisement. See “Door to Door,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtE4YX7_GVk (last 

visited Apr. 3, 2009). 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 49 of 56
24

D. Redistricting Affects Federal Elections

68. “Redistricting efforts affect federal elections no matter when they are held,” and 

national party redistricting efforts “are of value to Members of Congress because the changes in 

the composition of a Member’s district can mean the difference between reelection and defeat.” 

McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 462, 468 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). 

The most important legislative activity in the electoral lives of U.S. House 

members takes place during redistricting, a process that is placed in the 

hands of state legislatures. The chances that a House incumbent will be 

ousted by unfavorable district boundaries are often greater than the chances 

of defeat at the hands of the typical challenger. Thus, federal legislators 

who belong to the state majority party have a tremendous incentive to be 

attuned to the state legislature and the state party leadership. 

Id. at 462 (quoting Defendants’ expert Donald Green). The importance of redistricting to federal 

officeholders was not lost on large soft-money donors: As one memorandum to a high-level Fortune 

100 company executive from the company’s own governmental affairs staff explained, 

because both [national] parties will be working to influence redistricting 

efforts during the next two years, we anticipate that we will be asked to 

make soft money contributions to these efforts. Redistricting is a key oncea-decade effort that both parties have very high on their priority list. Given 

the priority of the redistricting efforts, relatively small soft money 

contributions in this area could result in disproportionate benefit. 

Id. at 508. 

69. In this case, the RNC has conceded that the purpose of its redistricting activities is 

to divide federal and state legislative districts “into a proper format that hopefully would be . . . 

more of a benefit to [the RNC] than the opposition party.” (Josefiak Dep. 155:18-21 (FEC Exh. 

1); see also Remarks of Chairman Jim Nicholson, RNC 0293683-85 [DEV 102].) Indeed, the 

CRP has repeatedly noted in this case the effect that redistricting can have on campaigns for the 

United States House of Representatives. (See Pls.’ Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 36, 38 

(“California’s Congressional seats were redistricted in 2001 to virtually eliminate partisan 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 50 of 56
25

competition at general elections . . . .”); see also Erwin Dep. 47:3-11, McConnell v. FEC, Civ. 

No. 02-582 (D.D.C.) (FEC Exh. 37) (“Q. . . . [T]he prospects for election of a candidate for the 

[H]ouse of [R]epresentatives would depend on redistricting; correct? A. Yes. Q. And to your 

knowledge do actual members of Congress and candidates for the [H]ouse of [R]epresentatives 

communicate with the state party and with state legislative officials about redistricting? A. 

Certainly members of Congress did.”).) The RPSD has noted the same effect. (Pls.’ Statement 

of Material Facts ¶ 55.) 

E. Plaintiffs’ Litigation Affects Who Obtains Federal Office

70. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the “litigation account” would “be used solely

for paying the fees and expenses attributable to this case.” (Compl. ¶ 21 (emphasis added).) 

71. To the extent the litigation account would be used to fund litigation regarding 

voter registration and similar issues (see Josefiak Dep. 172:13-176:3 (FEC Exh. 1)), such 

litigation affects federal elections. See infra ¶¶ 77-78. 

F. Get-Out-The-Vote Activity Affects All Elections on the Ballot

72. The purpose of the CRP’s voter identification and GOTV activities is to “get . . . 

to the polls” all Republicans and Republican-leaning voters (Christiansen Dep. 127:14-25 (FEC 

Exh. 2)), so that Republican candidates “win on election day” in federal and state races (id. at 

128:1-4). Accordingly, the CRP acknowledges that its GOTV activities affect federal elections. 

(Id. at 128:24-129:1.) 

73. The RNC, too, has acknowledged the affect of GOTV on federal elections: 

A. . . . Your get-out-the-vote program is to get Republicans and 

independents and maybe disgruntle[d] democrats to vote for your 

candidate. So it’s more than just the Republican base. It’s getting the 

base plus in order to win. 

Q. So it’s designed to get people to the polls who you believe will vote 

Republican? 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 51 of 56
26

A. Correct. 

Q. And, again, doesn’t that also help Republican candidates for federal 

office? 

A. It helps the ticket and Republican candidates, all Republican 

candidates for office, federal and non-federal. 

(Josefiak Dep. 27:18-28:19, McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 15, 2002) (FEC 

Exh. 17).) 

74. In 2008, Plaintiff Duncan stated publicly that the RNC’s “prodigious fundraising” 

has allowed it to “buil[d] up over a long period of time” a GOTV program and other 

“organizational efforts [that] make the difference . . . generally, there’s probably a 2 to 5 percent 

difference in additional turnout for a candidate that you make.” Victory Dream Team, CONGRESS 

DAILY, July 29, 2008, 2008 WLNR 14131041 (FEC Exh. 26). This “difference” applies to both 

federal and “down-ballot” candidates. See id. 

75. The CRP includes federal candidates in some of its GOTV slate listings. (See 

Door Hanger, “Elect Our Republican Team” (FEC Exh. 14); see also Christiansen Dep. 137:24-

139:11 (FEC Exh. 2) (noting that door hanger was distributed).) 

76. The RPSD uses federal funds to make GOTV phone calls and to distribute GOTV 

doorhangers “that include[] all Republican candidates.” (Pls.’ Supplemental Discovery Resps. at 

10 (Response ¶ 16) (FEC Exh. 32).) 

G. Voter Registration Affects Federal Elections

77. The purpose of the CRP’s voter registration activities is to register “as many 

Republicans as possible” and help elect Republican candidates in federal and state elections. 

(Christiansen Dep. 121:12-14, 121:23-122:3 (FEC Exh. 2).) The CRP acknowledges that its 

voter registration activity is intended to — and actually does — affect federal elections. (Id. 

123:1-17 (“Q: Does the CRP’s voter registration activity affect federal elections? A: Yes.”); 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 52 of 56
27

see also Phillip J. LaVelle, For GOP, California Dreamin’?, 2004 WLNR 17013682, San Diego 

Union Tribune, Sept. 1, 2004 (FEC Exh. 16) (“[C]hairman of the California Republican Party . . . 

said Republican registration gains are creating a Bush-friendly environment.”); Erwin Dep. 

31:15-32:25, McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C.) (FEC Exh. 37) (stating that voter 

registration is an “ongoing project[]” to “build our party base” that “helps with elections”).) 

78. The RNC, too, has acknowledged the affect of voter registration on federal 

elections: 

Q. When a state party . . . conduct[s] voter registration drives, are they 

designed to register likely Republican voters? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Doesn't that help Republican candidates for federal office? 

A. The hope is, as a lot of these plans refer to it, helps the entire ticket in 

that state. And whether it’s for the legislature or whether it’s for governor, 

whether it’s for Congress or the U.S. Senate, if they have any of those 

races in that particular year, that’s the whole purpose behind it and that 

was really the purpose behind the Federal Election Commission’s 

allocation regulations in the states recognizing based on who was on a 

ballot in any particular election federal election year. That’s how you 

would allocate resources. There was an acknowledgment that it benefited 

the entire ticket and how it benefited and what kind of funds were used 

were based on the categories on those candidates on the ballot. 

Q. So it does help federal candidates? 

A. It does. 

(Josefiak Dep. 26:5-27:8, McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-582 (D.D.C.) (Oct. 15, 2002) (FEC 

Exh. 17).) 

H. Advertising that Mentions State Ballot Measures and Promotes, Attacks, 

Supports, or Opposes Federal Candidates Affects Federal Elections

79. As to the direct effect on federal elections of advertising that promotes, attacks, 

supports, or opposes a federal candidate, “[t]he record on this score could scarcely be more 

abundant.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170. “Such ads were a prime motivating force behind 

BCRA’s passage,” and “any public communication that promotes or attacks a clearly identified 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 53 of 56
28

candidate directly affects the election in which he is participating.” Id. at 169-70 (emphasis 

added). 

80. Using federal funds, the CRP has distributed communications that endorse or 

oppose state ballot initiatives and identify federal candidates — thus associating the officeholder 

with the initiative — without promoting or attacking the candidate. (See California Republican 

Party, Your Official Orange County Republican Party Endorsements at 5 (FEC Exh. 21) (listing 

members of Congress endorsing ballot proposition); Pls.’ Supplemental Discovery Resps. at 9 

(Response ¶ 13) (FEC Exh. 32) (acknowledging that Exhibit 21 “was distributed to Republican 

voters in Orange County” and was paid for with “federal funds only”).) The CRP’s assertions 

that it “has not made any public communication that supported or opposed a ballot initiative that 

mentioned a federal candidate since BCRA became effective,” and that “[n]o federal funds were 

used for ballot measures” (id. at 9-10 (Response ¶¶ 14-15)) are therefore contradicted by the 

undisputed existence of occurrence of such a communication. 

I. Plaintiffs’ Other Federal Election Activity Affects Federal Elections

81. To the extent that any of the CRP’s intended activities constitute “generic 

campaign activity” 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(ii) — which is “campaign activity that promotes a 

political party and does not promote a candidate or non-Federal candidate” 2 U.S.C. § 431(21) 

— such activity also influences federal elections. See Ron Nehring, A Republican 50-State 

Strategy?, http://www.cagop.org/index.cfm/in-case-you-missed-it_617.htm (Jan. 27, 2009) (FEC 

Exh. 18) (CRP Chairman’s statement: “Building organizational and communications capability 

— and expanding the ranks of congressional, state and local officials from our party — makes it 

more likely a state will be competitive in a presidential election down the road.”); San Joaquin 

Republicans Organizing for Dean Andal, http://www.cagop.org/blog/2008/09/san-joaquinCase 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 54 of 56
29

republicans-organizing-for.html (Sept. 12, 2008) (FEC Exh. 19) (CRP Chairman’s blog post 

noting that Congressional candidate was “benefitting from the organization our volunteer groups 

have built in the region”); see also supra ¶ 60 (noting use of party-building operations to refine 

strategies and tactics for federal campaigns). 

82. The “generic” activities the CRP plans to conduct with soft money directly helps 

federal candidates and influences their election. Voter registration, voter identification, GOTV, 

and generic campaign activity as defined by BCRA “clearly capture activity that benefits federal 

candidates,” and “funding of such activities creates a significant risk of actual and apparent 

corruption.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 167-68. 

Common sense dictates, and it was “undisputed” below, that a 

party’s efforts to register voters sympathetic to that party directly 

assist the party’s candidates for federal office. 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 

460 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.). It is equally clear that federal candidates 

reap substantial rewards from any efforts that increase the number 

of like-minded registered voters who actually go to the polls. See, 

e.g., id., at 459 (“‘[The evidence] shows quite clearly that a 

campaign that mobilizes residents of a highly Republican precinct 

will produce a harvest of votes for Republican candidates for both 

state and federal offices. A campaign need not mention federal 

candidates to have a direct effect on voting for such a candidate . . . 

. [G]eneric campaign activity has a direct effect on federal 

elections’” (quoting Green Expert Report 14)). 

Id.; see also supra ¶¶ 60, 72-78 (discussing purpose and effect of voter registration, voter 

identification, and GOTV activities); RNC Memorandum, Non-Allocable Party Building 

Programs, RNC 0084450-64 at 0084455 [DEV 101] (“There are certain election related party 

expenditures that make no reference to any specific candidates but do benefit the entire 

Republican ticket . . . . These generic programs include voter registration[] and GOTV programs 

. . . . These programs and projects benefit the Republican Party and all of its candidates, federal 

and state.”); Philp Dep. 49:8-16, McConnell v. FEC, Civ. No. 02-874 (D.D.C.) (Sept. 19, 2002) 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 55 of 56
30

(FEC Exh. 38) (Chairman of Colorado Republican Party testifying that state party’s “Get-outthe-vote program is designed to benefit all candidates. That could include voter registration and 

so on and so forth. Q. And is the same true of generic party advertising, in other words, Vote 

Republican, that’s designed to benefit all the candidates? A. Yes.”). 

83. Each of the organizational Plaintiffs has conceded that, in an election where both 

state and federal candidates are on the ballot, any GOTV activity inherently affects the federal 

elections, even if such activity does not specifically mention any of the federal candidates. 

(Josefiak Dep. 45:7-16 (FEC Exh. 1); Christiansen Dep. 129:25-130:5 (FEC Exh. 2); Buettner 

Dep. 68:16-21 (FEC Exh. 3).) 

Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan (D.C. Bar No. 424222) 

General Counsel 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley 

Assistant General Counsel 

 /s/ Adav Noti 

Steve N. Hajjar 

Greg J. Mueller (D.C. Bar No. 462840) 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Attorneys 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

Dated: April 10, 2009 (202) 694-1650 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 56 of 56
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civ. No. 08-1953 (BMK, RJL, RMC) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________________) 

 [PROPOSED] ORDER 

This matter having come before the Court upon Defendant Federal Election 

Commission’s Motion for Summary Judgment, it is hereby 

ORDERED that Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, and it is further 

ORDERED that final judgment in this action is GRANTED to the Commission. 

 _________________________________ 

BRETT M. KAVANAUGH 

United States Circuit Judge 

 _________________________________ 

RICHARD J. LEON 

United States District Judge 

 _________________________________ 

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER 

United States District Judge 

Dated: ___________________, 2009

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-2 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 1
FEC Exhibit 26 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-3 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 3
7/29/08 Congress Daily (Pg. Unavail. Online)

2008 WLNR 14131041

Congress Daily

Copyright 2008 National Journal, Inc.

July 29, 2008

Victory Dream Team

In an interview with PolitickerOH.com, RNC Chair Mike Duncan said his party is "using technology investments, early-vote goals and prodigious fundraising" to

turnout voters for John McCain as well as down-ballot candidates. Duncan and RNC

staffers came to OH 7/26 to personally meet with members of McCain's regional camp

and the state GOP.

Duncan said the Victory program is "leaner and smarter" than previous versions

that helped carry OH for Pres. George Bush in '00 and '04. First, the RNC invested

$375K in handsets and voice-over-Internet protocol telephone systems. Duncan: "The

big savings on this handset is that now we can do the data-entry from the handset,

as opposed to having scanners, bubble sheets, human error and all of that. We'll

save, it was estimated, as much as $2 million just on what we would spend on scanning things into the system."

Fueling the Victory program is the RNC's fundraising, which has out-paced the DNC

in the '08 cycle by about $65M. Duncan: "It's a great system that we've built up

over a long period of time. We have a good direct-mail program; we have a good

phone program. Interestingly, you'll see next year when we release some of our

strategy in the campaign, we substantially increased the amount of money we're

raising over the internet now. That's a new thing for us."

For all of the RNC's "fine-tuned and well-funded GOTV effort," McCain or any other

candidate must generally be "within 5 points of their opponents" for the Victory

program to close the gap. Duncan: "We believe that our organizational efforts make

the difference... generally, there's probably a 2 to 5 percent difference in additional turnout for a candidate that you make."

But the GOP faces a "practically unprecedented ground effort" from Barack Obama

and OH Dems. The Obama-headed camp plans to hire 300 paid organizers for field

work and have 14K volunteers -- more than one for each of OH's 11.5K precincts --

"on top of" more than 500 training sessions for current activists, operatives and

elected officials. So far, the OH Dem party has spent $250K on polling, modeling

and microtargeting, "with more in the works" (Miller, PolitickerOH.com, 7/28).

7/29/08 CONGDLY (No Page) Page 1

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-3 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 3
---- INDEX REFERENCES ----

COMPANY: MILLER AND LOUGHRY INSURANCE; RCN CORP; MILLER; MILLER AND SCHROEDER FINANCIAL INC; MILLER AND MILLER INSURANCE AGENCY INC

Language: EN

OTHER INDEXING: (DNC; GOP; GOTV; JOHN MCCAIN; MCCAIN; MILLER; POLITICKEROH;

POLITICKEROH COM; RNC) (Duncan; George Bush; Interestingly; Mike Duncan; Victory;

Victory Dream Team)

Word Count: 435

7/29/08 CONGDLY (No Page)

END OF DOCUMENT

7/29/08 CONGDLY (No Page) Page 2

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-3 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 3
FEC Exhibit 27 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

1 

1 

1 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

1 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 1 

et al., ) 

Defendants. 1 

SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL, et al., 

V. ) Civ. No. 02-582 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

V. ) Civ. No. 02-874 (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

et al., 

All consolidated cases. 

Defendants. 

) 

DECLARATION OF BEVERLY ANN SHEA 

I, Beverly Ann Shea, hereby swear and depose as follows, based on my own 

personal knowledge: 

1. I am the Finance Director for the Republican National Committee 

(“RNC”). I submit this Declaration to discuss: (a) the RNC’s federal and non-federal 

fundraising programs and donors; (b) the RNC’s fundraising and direct financial assistance to 

state parties; (c) the financial impact of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) on state 

parties and the RNC; and (d) the faulty supposition that the RNC provides its major donors with 

improper access to federal officeholders 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 25
Education and Background in Political Fundraising 

2. I have 21 years of experience in professional political fundraising and 

finance, through positions with the RNC, state political parties, and campaigns for elected office. 

This experience is summarized in my biographical statement. See RNC Exhibit 2263, attached 

as Attachment 1 hereto. From February 2001 to the present, I have served as Finance Director 

for the RNC. Previously, from March 1997 to December 2000, I was Deputy Finance Director 

for the RNC. In the two month interim period between these positions, I was Chief Deputy and 

Director of Special Services for the 54th Presidential Inaugural for President George W. Bush. 

3. Before March 1997, I had a variety of political fundraising positions. 

From April 1993 until March 1997, I was President of Shea Consulting. In that position, I served 

as a fundraising consultant to the campaigns of many candidates for federal and state elected 

office. For various time periods between June 1981 and April 1993, among other positions, I 

was: (a) Regional Field Finance Director for the RNC; (b) Finance Director to the Republican 

Parties of New Mexico and Wisconsin; (c) Campaign Manager for congressional candidate 

Michael Brown; and (d) National Finance Director to the Bush-Quayle ’92 Primary Committee. 

4. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Journalism from West Virginia 

University in 1980. 

General Description of the RNC’s Finance Division 

5. The Finance Division is responsible for all fundraising activities of the 

RNC. The Division is led by the Finance Director, who is chosen by the RNC’s Finance 

Chairman, the Chairman of the RNC, or both. An organizational chart for the Finance Division 

is RNC Exhibit 2424, and is attached as Attachment 2 hereto. 

-2- 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 25
6. The Finance Division is organized into two marketing disciplines: (a) 

major donor programs, which are those involving contributions of $1,000 and up; and (b) direct 

marketing, which mostly involves small donations but also can include the RNC’s $1,000 and 

$5,000 donor programs. From 1997 to 2001, the Finance Division had a full-time staff of 40 to 

45 employees, not including the RNC’s in-house telephone solicitation center. 

7. In 2000, the Finance Division raised a total of $252,790,600. See RNC 

Exhibit 2429, attached as Attachment 3 hereto. Of this amount, $146,929,900 was raised 

through the RNC’s “major donor” programs as described below, and $105,860,700 was raised 

through direct marketing, which consists of direct mail, telemarketing, and electronic commerce 

solicitations through email and the internet. Id. This overweighting of major donations is unique 

to presidential election years. In all other years, direct marketing typically accounts for 60-65% 

of the RNC’s gross income. This return to the norm was borne out in 2001. In that year, the 

Finance Division raised a total of $82,027,300. Of this amount, $25,909,700 was raised through 

major donor programs, and $56,117,600 was raised through direct marketing. See 3. 

8. In 2000, federal money accounted for 60% of the total raised by the RNC, 

and the remaining 40% was non-federal money. See RNC Exhibit 535, attached as Attachment 4 

hereto. In 2001, the RNC’s total funds raised consisted of 78% federal money and 22% nonfederal money. 

9. The RNC’s active donor base in calendar year 2000 was 1,030,666 donors, 

of whom 435,908 were new first-time contributors. 

Attachment 5 hereto. The RNC’s donors in 2000 gave 2,470,093 separate donations during the 

year. Id. The average contribution to the RNC in 2000 was $102.34. Id. The RNC’s active 

donor base in calendar year 2001 was 794,682 donors, of whom 219,135 were new first-time 

RNC Exhibit 2430, attached as 

-3 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 25
contributors. l_d. The RNC’s donors in 2001 gave 1,437,370 separate donations during the year. 

- Id. In 2001, the average contribution to the RNC was $57.07. Id. 

The RNC’s Donor Programs 

10. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, allows 

individuals to contribute up to $20,000 per year to the RNC, and limits to $25,000 an 

individual’s total annual federal contributions to all recipients. Federal law allows multicandidate political committees (“PACs”) to contribute up to $1 5,000 annually to the RNC. 

These federal contributions are deposited into the RNC’s federal accounts. 

11. I understand that the BCRA will increase to $25,000 the annual limit on an 

individual’s federal contributions to political parties such as the RNC, and will increase to 

$57,500 the aggregate limit on an individual’s total federal contributions. The new federal limit 

regarding political party contributions will not produce much additional fundraising revenue for 

the RNC because it will affect, at most, only those 145 donors who presently contribute the 

current $20,000 federal limit, and perhaps other donors who contribute the $25,000 annual 

aggregate limit for federal money. Moreover, it is unclear how many, if any, of these donors will 

increase their contributions to the RNC as a result of the increased political party and aggregate 

limits. 

12. The RNC also receives donations from sources that may not contribute to 

federal campaign activity, and also receives donations in amounts above the federal contribution 

limits. Donations from individuals above the federal limits. as well as donations from 

corporations, labor unions, and other sources that may not make federal contributions, are 

deposited into non-federal accounts. Of the non-federal funds donated to the RNC in calendar 

year 2000, for example, 58% were from individuals and 42% were from corporations and PACs. 

-4- 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 5 of 25
The RNC’s non-federal accounts are maintained within the Republican National State Elections 

Committee (“RNSEC”). The BCRA will prohibit the RNC from raising, spending, transferring, 

or directing any non-federal money. 

13. In 2000, the RNC voluntarily instituted a limit on the amount of nonfederal money it would accept from a single individual or corporate donor during a given year. 

That limit was $250,000. On a handful of occasions in 2000, a donor offered a donation in 

excess of this voluntary limit and the RNC refunded the excess money. An internal RNC 

memorandum about one such refund is RNC Exhibit 636, attached as Attachment 6 hereto. 

Additional refunds of sums contributed above $250,000 in calendar year 2000 were made to The 

Kohler Company, Philip Morris Company, Mr. Sam Fox, and Mr. Michael Armstrong. 

Incidental fees paid by $250,000 donors for attendance at the Republican National Convention or 

similar events were not refunded. 

14. The RNC raises federal and non-federal money through a variety of donor 

programs, as follows: 

a. The “Sustaining Member” program seeks individual contributions 

of at least $25 per year to the RNC. Sustaining Members receive a subscription to the RNC 

magazine Rising Tide, access to a toll-free Members’ Hotline and a members-only internet 

website, membership commemorative materials, access to the RNC “Museum,” and membersonly events hosted by the RNC’s internet website, www.RNC.org. & RNC Exhibit 35a, 

attached as Attachment 7 hereto. In 2000, the RNC had 1,002,309 Sustaining Members and 

other donors who contributed less than $1,000 apiece, for a total of $95.65 million to the RNC, 

$94 million of which was federal money and $1.65 million of which was non-federal. 

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b. The “President’s Club” is a fundraising program designed for 

contributions of $1,000 per person or $2,000 per couple, per year, to the RNC. Members of the 

President’s Club are invited to an annual National Meeting featuring federal officeholders, and 

receive a special members-only newsletter and membership commemorative materials. See 

RNC Exhibit 35b, attached as Attachment 8 hereto. In 2000, the RNC had an active base of 

5,232 President’s Club members who contributed a total of $10.1 million to the RNC, $8 million 

of which was federal and $2.1 million of which was non-federal. Attachment 4 hereto. 

c. The “Chairman’s Advisory Board” program requires an annual 

contribution of $5,000 per year in federal or non-federal money to the RNC or RNSEC. 

Members of the Chairman’s Advisory Board are invited to two meetings held annually that are 

attended by party leaders. See RNC Exhibit 35c, attached as Attachment 9 hereto. In 2000, the 

RNC had an active base of 1,440 Chairman’s Advisory Board members who contributed a total 

of $10.8 million to the RNC, $8.1 million of which was federal and $2.7 million of which was 

non-federal. & Attachment 4 hereto. 

d. The “Eagles” program is the RNC’s oldest “major donor” program. 

It requires members to contribute either $15,000 in federal money or $20,000 in non-federal 

money to the RNC or RNSEC each year. Again, Eagles are invited to many RNC events, 

including some that feature party leaders. See RNC Exhibit 35d, attached as Attachment 10 

hereto. In 2000, the RNC had 1,449 members of the Eagles program who contributed a total of 

$30.7 million to the RNC, $20.3 million of which was federal and $10.4 million of which was 

non-federal. See Attachment 4 hereto. 

e. The “Majority Fund” is directed at PACs that donate $15,000 per 

year in federal or non-federal money to the RNC or RNSEC. Members of the Majority Fund are 

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invited to numerous RNC events, including some events specially designed for members of that 

group, and some of which feature party leaders. The RNC raises relatively little federal money 

from PACs, however, because PACs typically use their federal dollars to contribute to 

candidates. 

Majority Fund members that contributed a total of $2.4 million to the RNC, $400,000 of which 

was federal and $2 million of which was non-federal. See Attachment 4 hereto. 

RNC Exhibit 35e, attached as Attachment 11 hereto. In 2000, the RNC had 120 

f. “Team 100” members donate $100,000 upon joining, and $25,000 

in each of the three subsequent years, to the RNC or RNSEC. These donations typically include 

a mix of federal and non-federal money. Team 100 members are invited to many RNC events, 

some of which feature party leaders. See RNC Exhibit 35f, attached as Attachment 12 hereto. In 

2000, the RNC had 614 active Team 100 members who contributed a total of $49.6 million to 

the RNC, $5.4 million of which was federal and $44.2 million of which was non-federal. 

Attachment 4 hereto. 

g. The “Regents” program asks the donor to give an aggregate 

amount of $250,000 to the RNC or RNSEC per each two-year election cycle. Regents members 

are invited to all events sponsored by the RNC. In 2000, the RNC had 180 active Regents who 

contributed a total of $34 million to the RNC, $1.5 million of which was federal and $32.5 

million of which was non-federal. 

15. 

Attachment 4 hereto. 

In addition, the RNC establishes a special “Presidential Trust” program 

every four years to help raise the funds the RNC is permitted to spend directly on behalf of the 

Republican nominee for President of the United States, with certain amounts spent on behalf of 

other candidates for federal office as well. The programs asks the donor to contribute $20,000 in 

solely federal money, and no portion of the contribution is shared with state parties. 

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Participation entitles the donor to a one-year membership in the Eagles or Majority Fund 

program. 

16. To ensure strict compliance with federal laws regulating contributions to 

political party committees, the RNC provides current and prospective major donors with a set of 

Contribution Guidelines. The Guidelines explain the federal and non-federal RNC accounts and 

the extent to which contributions may be directed to one, or a combination, of these accounts. 

RNC Guidelines for the Regents, Team 100, and Majority Fund programs are RNC Exhibits 

2155, 2071, and 2097, respectively, and are attached as Attachments 13-15 hereto. 

, 

17. I understand that some persons who are unfamiliar with the RNC’s 

fundraising methods believe that Members of Congress regularly solicit donations to RNC major 

donor programs through telephone calls or personal meetings. Although it is true that Members 

of Congress occasionally sign fundraising letters for the RNC, it is exceedingly rare for them to 

solicit funds through telephone calls or personal meetings. As a matter of RNC policy, telephone 

and personal fundraising contacts for major donor programs are initiated by RNC Chairman 

Marc Racicot, Co-Chairman Ann Wagner, Deputy Chairman Jack Oliver, National Finance 

Chair Lew Eisenberg, and myself, 

18. 

Members of Congress. 

Contributions toward the Sustaining Member, President’s Club, and 

Chairman’s Advisory Board programs consist of federal dollars. So do many of the 

contributions to the Majority Fund and Eagles programs. Further, many (if not most) members 

of the Team 100 and Regents programs fulfill their obligations with a combination of federal and 

non-federal dollars. Indeed, contrary to popular misimpression, the RNC’s major donor 

programs ($1,000 and up) are a significant source of federal money. In 2000, for example, the 

funds raised through these programs were 32% federal money and 68% non-federal money. 

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 10 of 25
donor programs -- or who are in a position to direct corporate or PAC participation in those 

programs -- is a very small fraction of the roughly 4.5 million individuals that comprise the 

RNC’s base of potential donors at all levels. As noted above, although the RNC had a total of 

1,030,666 donors in calendar year 2000, only 180 were Regents, 614 were Team 100 members, 

and 120 were Majority Fund participants. Also, the RNC’s perceived political successes and 

failures affect the quantity and intensity of participation in the major donor programs. Finally, 

economic factors constrain the number of individuals, corporations, and PACs that participate in 

the RNC’s major donor programs and the degree to which they participate. 

22. There is a limit to the number of solicitations of new major donors that the 

RNC can profitably make. The farther from the RNC’s base of likely donors that the RNC 

prospects for new participants in its major donor programs, the lower its yield. Also, there is a 

limit to the number of attempts that the RNC can reasonably make to renew or upgrade existing 

major donors to higher dollar level programs. Most major donors decide whether to renew their 

participations or upgrade to a higher level on an annual basis. Thus, there is usually only one 

time during the year for each major donor that the RNC can profitably solicit an existing major 

donor to renew or upgrade his or her participation. Repeated solicitations to the same major 

donor risk alienating that donor and limiting the amount of money that the RNC may receive 

from the donor in the future. 

The Motivation of Non-Federal Donors to the FWC 

23. In my experience, donors of non-federal money are motivated by the same 

desires as donors of federal money. I believe there are three basic reasons why individuals and 

entities donate money to a political party, and the RNC appeals to these motivations in its 

fundraising activities. 

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24. F&t, both federal and non-federal donors tend to be strong and loyal 

supporters of the party. From my discussions and observations over the years, I can safely state 

that donors to the RNC believe in the Republican Party philosophy of low taxes, limited federal 

government, strong defense, and high ethical standards for public officials. From the lowest 

level donors to the highest level, they share a common interest in politics and good government. 

Donor belief in the philosophy of the Republican Party is confirmed by their loyalty; for the most 

part, non-federal donors give money to the RNC regardless of the issues then pending before 

Congress or the Executive Branch. 

25. The reason that individuals join the RNC’s major gift programs is 

that they enjoy being involved in RNC events, which often include speeches and presentations 

by prominent policymakers and commentators. The RNC expends much effort and money 

planning and holding receptions, dinners, retreats, and seminars for both federal contributors and 

non-federal donors. During the 1998 election cycle, the RNC spent $10.2 million planning, 

organizing, and staging major donor events. During the 2000 cycle, the RNC spent $1 8.5 

million, and thus far for the 2002 cycle the RNC has spent $7.5 million. If the RNC did not 

believe donors were motivated by the opportunity to attend events, it would not expend so much 

money on them. 

26. Although RNC events often “feature” party leaders, these leaders are not 

exclusively current federal officeholders. For example, this category very frequently includes 

the RNC Finance Chairman and Political Director, who provide insights on the current political 

climate. Party leaders also include former Cabinet officials from prior Republican 

Administrations. At one well-attended Team 100 event in 1998, for example, former Cabinet 

Secretaries Brent Scowcroft and Elizabeth Dole were featured. Other events have featured 

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National Review writer Kate O’Beirne, author P.J. O’Rourke, and other nationally-known 

political celebrities. 

27. Sitting Members of Congress and Executive Branch officials also are often 

featured at events for donors, but their roles at these events are commonly misstated by the proreform commentators. These officeholders (and candidates for federal office) do m appear at 

RNC events to solicit either federal or non-federal donations. Rather, they appear to speak on 

political or policy topics, and the substance of these comments does not differ from comments 

they frequently make on television or on the House or Senate floor. Nor does the content of their 

comments differ from events attended primarily by federal contributors to events attended 

primarily by non-federal donors. Question-and-answer sessions at RNC donor events focus on 

general policy issues and do not provide an opportunity for any individual to advocate a 

particular position on pending legislation. Attendees at some events sometimes have the 

opportunity to socialize, or play golf or tennis, with the speakers, but efforts to lobby during 

these events are frowned upon as exceedingly rude and are quite rare. 

28. Relatedly, participation in the RNC’s major donor programs increases 

during presidential election years, when the RNC typically has more events, especially those 

centered around the quadrennial Republican National Convention. Major donors receive special 

invitations to each Convention, and are also invited to participate in special meetings and social 

occasions during the Convention proceedings. An example of such an invitation for Team 100 

members to attend the 2000 Convention, which was held in Philadelphia from July 31-August 3, 

2000, is RNC Exhibit 723 and is attached as Attachment 16 hereto. The Conventions also permit 

the RNC to host special Gala celebrations in honor of the Republican nominees for President and 

Vice-president. Attendance at such events is available for donations of $1,000 per person, and 

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thus many attendees contribute only federal money to the RNC. A sample Gala invitation from 

the 2000 Convention is RNC Exhibit 847, and is attached as Attachment 17 hereto. Based on my 

personal experience, I conclude that participation in major donor programs increases during 

presidential election years for two basic reasons: (a) donors enjoy attending the unique events 

that can be made available only in presidential election years; and (b) donors are excited by the 

fact that so much more is at stake during presidential election years than in any other years. 

29. Similarly, involvement in major donor programs also allows donors to 

meet and become friends with like-minded people in business and politics. Members of Team 

100 and the Eagles, for example, tend to be successful entrepreneurs who have much in common. 

They enjoy the camaraderie of these social occasions and the non-political business opportunities 

that these associations with other major donors provide. 

30. The reason that individuals participate in the RNC’s major donor 

programs is that they have a sense of philanthropy that often begins with similar commitments to 

charitable organizations. Many members of Team 100, for example, are well known for their 

generosity to charitable causes. Members of RNC major donor programs are comfortable with 

the notion of giving to causes they support with no expectation of receiving tangible benefits in 

return. 

3 1, Based upon these and other personal observations, I strongly believe that 

participants in the RNC’s major donor programs do not expect, and do not receive, political 

favors in exchange for their donations. 

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Fundraising Assistance Provided by the RNC 

To State and Local Parties and Candidates 

32. A core function of the RNC is to assist state Republican parties in their 

activities, including fundraising. The RNC provides this assistance in five major ways, all of 

which appear to be criminalized by the BCRA to the extent they involve non-federal money. 

33. First, the RNC transfers and otherwise provides federal and non-federal 

funds to state parties (and candidates for state office). I understand that the Declaration of Jay 

Banning addresses this in more detail. 

34. State parties quite obviously benefit from RNC transfers, which represent 

funds that the state parties might not have otherwise obtained through their own efforts. Further, 

certain state parties rely heavily on RNC non-federal funds for their very existence. 

35. Second, the RNC shares its lists of fundraising prospects with state parties. 

A sample list-sharing agreement with the Massachusetts Republican State Committee for 2002 is 

RNC Exhibit 1801, attached as Attachment 18 hereto. As this document states in one of its 

initial clauses, because it is the “principal responsibility of the RNC to promote Republican 

candidates,” and because “a component part of its party-building activities is to develop and 

identify contributors who share common goals and ideals,” the list exchange program is “to the 

mutual advantage and benefit of the parties” thereto. a. Indeed, state parties benefit greatly 

from list-sharing because the RNC’s fundraising lists are very comprehensive and detailed, and 

provide solid prospects for donations that state parties might otherwise be unable to obtain on 

their own. Additional list-sharing agreements with the Republican Party of Ohio, Wisconsin, 

Tennessee, Iowa, and Indiana are RNC Exhibits 1195,933, 1001,911, and 956, respectively, and 

are attached as Attachments 19-23 hereto. 

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36. Third, the RNC co-hosts “tiered” fundraising events with state parties. 

“Tiered” fundraising events typically involve two or three separate events occurring on a single 

date at locations in the same vicinity. Typical tiered events will consist of a large low-dollar 

event for federal donors to candidates in the first tier, a middle-tier “photo op” event with larger 

donors, and often a separate top-tier dinner for the event Host Committee. Typically, the 

proceeds of the large first-tier event go to a candidate for state office, the proceeds of the middletier “photo op” go to the state party, and the proceeds of the top-tier dinner go to the RNC. Socalled “tiered” fundraising events such as these serve to benefit state parties because they are 

able to increase their fundraising success through direct association with the RNC. In fact, 

without the RNC holding an event in the same city and on the same date as the state party event, 

it would likely be logistically and financially impossible for the state party to convince majordrawing surrogates to be the featured guest at their own event. Further, the RNC has a highly 

professional and experienced fundraising staff, which many state parties do not. Indeed, some 

state parties have no fundraising employees at all. Therefore, state parties necessarily benefit 

from the involvement of RNC personnel in tiered fundraising activities, both because RNC 

fundraising staffers are highly competent and because their involvement supplements the efforts 

of state party personnel. 

37. The RNC also promotes state party events to its donors, in an effort to 

increase the fundraising ability of state parties. For example, since 1992 the Washington State 

Republican Party has hosted an annual GOP Picnic, often with the support of the King County 

Republican Party. Attendance at the Picnic has reached as high as 10,000 participants, and the 

event attracts elected officials from all levels of government, including members of Washington 

State’s congressional delegation, candidates for Governor in gubernatorial election years, and 

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state and local representatives. The RNC promotes the GOP Picnic to its major donors from 

Washington State, as demonstrated by the Team 100 letter that is RNC Exhibits 942 and 1126, 

attached as Attachment 24 hereto. 

38. m, the RNC has a program called “Finance PLUS,” which provides 

financial incentives for state parties develop and improve their fundraising capacity. Through 

Finance PLUS, the RNC reimburses state parties for the costs they incur in organizing and 

hosting their own fundraising events. In my experience, Finance PLUS is an effective means for 

the RNC to encourage and strengthen state party fundraising. 

39. Finallv. the RNC permits its Regents and Team 100 members to designate 

(or “return”) portions of their non-federal donations to state parties, and sometimes requests that 

its major donors make additional contributions to state parties that are in urgent need of funds. 

For example, in 2000, RNC Regents and Team 100 members designated $10.8 million in nonfederal donations to state parties. By way of example, a spreadsheet describing state-by-state 

Regents transfers in 2000 is RNC Exhibit 663, attached as Attachment 25 hereto. Several letters 

from Team 100 members, requesting the designation of contributions to state parties in 2000, are 

RNC Exhibits 881, 1522, and 1524, attached as Attachments 26-28 hereto. 

40. Related to direct fundraising for state parties, the RNC also engages in 

fundraising on behalf of candidates for state and local office. For example, the RNC has sent 

direct-mail fundraising letters on behalf of Virginia gubernatorial candidate George Allen, New 

Jersey gubernatorial candidate Bret Schundler, and St. Paul, Minnesota mayoral candidate Norm 

Coleman. See RNC Exhibits 1162,292, and 232, respectively, attached as Attachments 29-3 1 

hereto. Donations made in response to these letters were made directly to the candidates 

themselves, not to the RNC, and the RNC did not track or otherwise record who among the 

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recipients of the letters actually made contributions. Because contributions to state and local 

candidates are not federally regulated, the BCRA will prohibit this type of findraising assistance. 

Imnact of the BCRA on State Parties 

41. Major contributors often donate non-federal funds to the RNC in lieu of 

state parties. This can be explained by a variety of factors, all of which demonstrate that the 

RNC has a greater fundraising capacity than state parties do. 

a. - First, as the official national Republican Party committee, the RNC 

has a “brand nanic and prestige that the state parties, by definition, do not. Prospective donors 

are much more likely to have heard of the RNC, to consider it accountable and credible, to 

understand its role in the political process, and to trust that its activities are aligned with the 

national Republican Party agenda. Further, several state Republican Party organizations are 

largely inactive, and thus are unable to present compelling reasons for donors to support them. 

b. Second, the RNC has a large direct marketing and fundraising 

staff, consisting, in recent years, of between 40 and 45 employees. All of these personnel are 

full-time professionals with substantial experience in the field. State parties, in contrast, 

generally lack professional fundraising staff. The RNC, because it is a well-known national 

party committee, also tends to attract the most talented and dedicated marketing and fundraising 

employees. It is more difficult for state parties to do so. 

c. m, the size and scope of the RNC’s direct marketing and 

fundraising operations enable it to achieve economies of scale that state parties simply cannot 

match. For example, the RNC’s cost per mail piece in a nationwide fundraising campaign is 

substantially lower than the cost per mail piece of a statewide campaign conducted by a state 

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party, because the volume of mailings is so different. The RNC, therefore, can conduct direct 

market fundraising more cost-effectively than state parties can. 

d. m, as a national organization, the RNC is able to “go where 

the money is” with much greater ease and ability than a state party. For example, under current 

law, the RNC can hold a rindraiser in New York, then re-distribute that money internally to 

support a candidate running for state office in Mississippi. The Republican Party of Mississippi, 

in contrast, is much less likely to have fundraising success in New York. The ability of the RNC 

to raise funds nationwide is demonstrated by the attached charts that sort the RNC’s federal and 

non-federal contributions by state for 2000 and year-to-date for 2002 (as of June 28). RNC 

Exhibits 2259 and 65, respectively, attached as Attachments 32-33 hereto. Both charts show that 

the RNC raised federal and non-federal money from all 50 states in 2000 and year-to-date in 

2002. 

e. m, as noted above, my experience has demonstrated to me 

that donors have fairly firm limits on the amount of money they are willing and able to 

contribute to political parties. This is a fact of the marketplace that will not change merely 

because of the BCRA. Because the RNC is so much more prominent than state parties are, my 

experience suggests that donors are -- and will continue to be -- inclined to allocate more of their 

contributions to the RNC than to state parties. 

42. As described above, the BCRA threatens to outlaw the RNC’s fundraising 

assistance to state parties in the form ofjoint and tiered fundraising for non-federal money, 

transfers of non-federal funds, and designation and direction of non-federal funds. Because the 

state parties have less fundraising capacity than does the RNC, the elimination of RNC 

assistance with respect to non-federal money would have a significant detrimental effect on state 

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parties. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to observe that the BCRA threatens the very survival of the 

Republican Party committees in several particularly vulnerable states. I understand that the 

Declaration of Jay Banning sets forth information ahout the five most financially vulnerable state 

Republican Parties, namely those in Arkansas, Maine, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Oregon. 

The RNC Does Not Give Donors Improper 

Access to Candidates or Officeholders 

43. I understand that persons unfamiliar with political fundraising often 

contend that individuals and entities that donate non-federal money to political parties do so to 

“buy access” to candidates and officeholders, so that the donor can attempt to achieve improper 

influence over the legislative process. Based upon my 21 years of experience as a political 

fundraiser and finance consultant, I categorically reject this contention with respect to the RNC. 

44. As a matter of policy, the RNC Finance Division does not offer to arrange 

personal meetings between donors -- no matter how large -- and federal officeholders or 

candidates for office. During my tenure at the RNC, there have been a handful of occasions 

when individuals have attempted to condition donations on the arrangement of such meetings, 

and each time the RNC has rejected the donation and denied the request. In one related instance, 

the RNC rejected a contribution from a prospective Regents member because of public 

controversy involving his prior illegal contributions to Democratic candidates for federal office 

and his overnight stays in the Clinton White House as a major Democratic donor. See RNC 

Exhibit 552, attached as Attachment 34 hereto. The individuals who have sought to condition 

donations to the RNC on its arrangement of meetings with officeholders, more often than not, 

have proposed to contribute federal dollars to the RNC. One such recent instance involved a 

gentleman who proposed to condition his membership in the RNC Eagles program on a meeting 

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 20 of 25
with an officeholder. The RNC rejected the contribution. A ban on non-federal contributions to 

the RNC, therefore, would not stop most of these incidents from occumng. 

45. It is obvious why major donors to the RNC do not regularly use their 

donations as a means to obtain “access.” All or virtually all who have personal or organizational 

business with the federal government retain or employ professional lobbyists. Each election 

cycle, however, there are a very few instances in which federal or non-federal donors ask the 

RNC Finance staff or other RNC personnel to arrange meetings with federal officeholders. To 

confirm my recollection that such requests are very infrequent, I instructed my staff to review the 

RNC Finance Division’s files about all contacts from major donors between 1997 and the end of 

2001, These files record all contacts, in the form of letters, telephone calls, or personal meetings, 

between the RNC Finance Division and each major donor. There are literally thousands of such 

files, each of which contains multiple entries for each separate donor, with each entry showing 

the date and the substance of the contact. Some files contain dozens of entries. This review 

demonstrated, consistent with my recollection, that on average in recent years the RNC has 

received fewer than fifteen requests per election cycle in which donors -- of both federal and 

non-federal money -- ask RNC personnel to arrange meetings with federal officeholders. 

46. Such requests come from donors at all levels, and are more prevalent 

among federal contributors than among non-federal donors. In the relatively infrequent instances 

in which the RNC Finance staff receives such a request, our policy is to pass the request along to 

the officeholder’s staff without inquiring into the purpose of the proposed meeting, but neither to 

advocate a meeting nor ascertain whether a meeting has been arranged. In passing along the 

request, we do not indicate the amount of money donated by the person requesting the meeting. 

I received one such request, for example, on February 22,2001, and as a matter of course the 

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request was passed along to the officeholders’ staff. &Attachment 35 hereto (defendantintervenors’ exhibit). At no time did I or anyone on my staff advocate that the meeting occur, or 

follow up on whether it did occur. 

47. I understand that the defendants in this case have contended that an 

employee in the RNC Finance Division’s external affairs office, Stephanie Strategos, is 

employed for the purpose of arranging donor meetings with Members of Congress. The 

defendants are mistaken. In fact, it is the job of Ms. Strategos to arrange for Members of 

Congress, Cabinet officials, and other special guests and speakers to attend RNC events, which 

are attended by scores or even thousands of people. 

48. Relatedly, I understand that the defendants have referenced several RNC 

documents in an effort to support their claim that the RNC provides improper “access” to its nonfederal donors. In fact, none of these documents supports the defendants’ claims. 

a. First, the defendants point to an internal RNC memorandum dated 

October 23,2001, which tracks Presidential appointments of Team 100 members. See 

Attachment 36 hereto (defendant-intervenors’ exhibit). The purpose of the memorandum was to 

ensure that the RNC would refrain from future solicitations to these Team 100 members, because 

the RNC as a matter of policy does not solicit funds from Executive Branch officials or 

nominees. 

b. Second, the defendants refer to an RNC memorandum dated May 

15, 1995, from Tim Barnes, Director of Team 100, to former U.S. Senator Alphonse D’Amato, 

informing Senator D’Amato that a particular Team 100 member had designated $25,000 of his 

membership dues to the New York State Republican Party. See Attachment 37 hereto 

(defendant-intervenors’ exhibit). This memorandum was sent in response to a specific request 

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from Senator D’ Amato, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Republican Senatorial 

Committee and as a leader of the New York State Republican Party, for information about the 

extent to which FWC members contributed funds to the state party. The RNC did not facilitate 

any “access” to Senator D’Amato for the individual referenced in the memorandum. Moreover, 

it is rare for a federal officeholder to inquire about donations or donors, even though this 

information is publicly available through the FEC. 

C. Third, the defendants have identified an RNC memorandum dated 

October 8, 1999, from Dulce Zahniser to myself and my predecessor Margaret Alexander Parker, 

which in part references the possibility of fundraising telephone calls to Mississippi residents to 

be made by Congressman Charles (“Chip”) Pickering and U.S. Senate Majority Leader Trent 

Lott. See Attachment 38 hereto (defendant-intervenors’ exhibit). The memorandum makes clear 

that neither Congressman Pickering nor Majority Leader Lott had placed any such phone calls 

and, in fact, to my knowledge they never did. As noted above, it is exceedingly rare for 

Members of Congress or Senators to place RNC fundraising phone calls, and this memorandum 

is not to the contrary. 

49. The overwhelming majority of fimdraising events sponsored by the RNC 

include both federal and non-federal donors. In other words, a person does not need to 

contribute non-federal money to attend an RNC event and meet Republican officeholders and 

candidates. Even after the BCRA prohibits the RNC from raising non-federal money, I am 

confident that the RNC will still encourage candidates and officeholders to attend its events. 

Even today, for example, the RNC invites federal officeholders to attend the twice-yearly 

meetings of the Chairman’s Advisory Board, which consists solely of federal money donors to 

the RNC. 

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50. In my personal experience and observation, RNC fundraising events do 

not provide a forum conducive to or appropriate for lobbying. Virtually all of the RNC’s events 

include at least several dozen donors of diverse business and economic interests, and many 

events are attended by hundreds or thousands of donors. For the most part, donors who attend 

RNC events receive no more opportunity to interact with officeholders than a brief “photo 

opportunity.” Further, efforts to discuss business, much less to lobby an officeholder, at these 

events are considered rude and inappropriate. Attendees know that officeholders are 

uninterested in conducting business during RNC events. 

51. Finally, it is a well-known fact that individuals and entities with important 

business before Congress virtually always hire lobbyists. These lobbyists meet directly with 

Congressmen, Senators, and their staffs to make presentations and discuss issues. These 

activities are perfectly appropriate and usually occur during normal business hours. A business 

need not donate non-federal money (or contribute 

many companies with important business before Congress do not donate non-federal money to 

either party. 

money) to retain an effective lobbyist, and 

52. The various RNC exhibits attached to this declaration, with the exception 

of the private letter attached as Attachment 35 hereto, are to the best of my knowledge true and 

correct copies of records prepared and kept by the RNC in the course of its regularly conducted 

business activities. 

- 23 - 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 24 of 25
I declare under penalty of pejury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

October $, 2002 

- 24 - 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-4 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 25 of 25
FEC Exhibit 28 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-5 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 7
 1 

 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 3 

 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

 5 SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL, : 

 6 et al., : 

 7 Plaintiffs, : Civ. No. 02-582 

 8 v. : (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

 9 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, : 

 10 et al., : 

 11 Defendants. : 

 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

 13 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, : 

 14 et al., : 

 15 Plaintiffs, : 

 16 v. : Civ. No. 02-874 

 17 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, : (CKK, KLH, RJL) 

 18 et al., : 

 19 Defendants. : 

 20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 

 21 

 22 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-5 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 7
 2 

 1 DEPOSITION OF BEVERLY SHEA 

 2 

 3 Washington, D. C. 

 4 Friday, October 18, 2002 

 5 

 6 REPORTED BY: 

 7 KAREN HINNENKAMP 

 8 

 9 Deposition of BEVERLY SHEA, called for 

 10 examination pursuant to notice of deposition, on 

 11 Friday, October 18, 2002, in Washington, D.C., at 

 12 the offices of Covington & Burling, 1201 

 13 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., at 

 14 10:00 a.m., before KAREN HINNENKAMP, a Notary Public 

 15 within and for the District of Columbia, when were 

 16 present on behalf of the respective parties: 

 17 

 18 

 19 

 20 

 21 

 22 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-5 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 7
 79 

 1 Q When you say a couple of candidates this 

 2 year, do you have any idea of the number this year? 

 3 A No. 

 4 Q Five? 

 5 A I haven't kept track of it. Maybe five 

 6 or six. 

 7 Q Maybe five or six this year? 

 8 A Yeah. Maybe even more than that. I 

 9 don't know the answer to that offhand. I would have 

 10 to -- it is back in our records, but I don't know. 

 11 Q In an election year like 2000, would you 

 12 send also about five or six letters on behalf of 

 13 state candidates or local candidates? 

 14 A I don't know that there is a specific 

 15 number. 

 16 Q Okay. But would you say -- I don't need 

 17 a specific number from you. Is that in the 

 18 ballpark? 

 19 A Probably yes. 

 20 Q Less than 10? 

 21 A Probably yes. 

 22 Q Okay. In paragraph 44, all the way back 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-5 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 7
 80 

 1 on page 19, I think you said, this is a quote, "As a 

 2 matter of policy, the RNC Finance Division does not 

 3 offer to arrange personal meetings between donors -- 

 4 no matter how large -- and federal officeholders or 

 5 candidates for office." Is that right? 

 6 A Right. Correct. 

 7 Q It says it is a matter of policy. Is 

 8 this a written policy? 

 9 A No. It's just a known policy. 

 10 Q A known policy. 

 11 A Right. 

 12 Q What would happen if someone violated the 

 13 policy? 

 14 A Well, if I found out, they would be 

 15 fired. 

 16 Q They would be fired if they violated this 

 17 policy. 

 18 A Yes. 

 19 Q Okay. Last time we talked I think we 

 20 discussed a particular occasion on which this 

 21 happened -- 

 22 A Right. 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-5 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 5 of 7
 81 

 1 Q -- where you were actually asked to help 

 2 set up the meeting. 

 3 A Right. 

 4 Q You weren't fired, were you? 

 5 A No. But I did -- I mean it's -- wait, I 

 6 need to go back a second because I think I need to 

 7 clarify. In other words, I have no problem with if 

 8 a donor wants a meeting and we set them up with a 

 9 scheduler. That's perfectly fine. But what we 

 10 don't do is solicit a meeting on behalf of a 

 11 contributor to candidates, I mean or to officials. 

 12 That's heavyhandedness. It is more or less we will 

 13 call the scheduler, we will set you up with the 

 14 scheduler, you deal with it, and we get out of it. 

 15 Q That makes sense. 

 16 A Right. And if I would ever find out 

 17 somebody was doing some heavyhanding, in other words 

 18 calling a Member of Congress and saying you have to 

 19 meet with this Regent, they would be fired. So 

 20 there is a big difference there. 

 21 Q Okay. So the policy is more you try not 

 22 to force the federal officeholder or be very -- 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-5 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 6 of 7
 82 

 1 A No. 

 2 Q You try not to force federal 

 3 officeholders to meet with donors. 

 4 A We do not, right. Correct. 

 5 Q However, if a donor called and asked you 

 6 if you would pass it on to the scheduler, as you 

 7 just said, you would pass that on to the scheduler. 

 8 A Sure. Definitely. 

 9 Q And you would say, I think you said this 

 10 last time as well, but you would say this is a Team 

 11 100 member, could you see if you could fit them in, 

 12 that kind of thing? 

 13 A Correct. 

 14 Q Okay, thanks. Could I now turn your 

 15 attention to paragraph 48a, where you reference a 

 16 memorandum that I think we may have talked about 

 17 last time that talks about Team 100 members that had 

 18 been nominated for presidential appointments? 

 19 A Correct. Actually, we did not talk about 

 20 that last time. But I have seen it. 

 21 Q Okay, we did not. Now the people that 

 22 are mentioned in the memorandum, were those -- I'm 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-5 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 7 of 7
FEC Exhibit 29 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 8
 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 

 

 

 1 

 

 

 

 1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 

 2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 3 

 

 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x 

 

 5 SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL, : 

 

 6 et al. : 

 

 7 Plaintiffs, : 

 

 8 v. : Case No. 02-582 

 

 9 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, : 

 

 10 et al. : 

 

 11 Defendants. : 

 

 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 

 

 13 

 

 14 DEPOSITION OF THOMAS J. JOSEFIAK 

 

 15 

 

 16 Washington, DC 

 

 17 Saturday September 28, 2002 

 

 18 

 

 19 

 

 20 

 

 21 REPORTED BY: 

 

 22 FRANK A. SMONSKEY, CM 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 8
 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 

 

 

 104 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 20 Q I'm going to ask you a few questions about 

 

 21 fund raising for the Republican National Committee 

 

 22 and specifically what role Members of Congress play 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 8
 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 

 

 

 105 

 

 

 

 1 in soliciting and raising soft money contributions to 

 

 2 the RNC. 

 

 3 Are you aware of Members of Congress being 

 

 4 asked to help raise soft money for the Republican 

 

 5 National Committee? 

 

 6 A I am not aware of Members of Congress being 

 

 7 asked to solicit soft money on behalf of the RNC. 

 

 8 Q Are they just asked raise money for the 

 

 9 RNC? 

 

 10 A What do you mean by raise money? 

 

 11 Q Are they asked to participate in 

 

 12 fund-raising efforts of the RNC? 

 

 13 A They participate in activities of the RNC, 

 

 14 and they participate in our annual gala, which is a 

 

 15 fund raiser. 

 

 16 Q Is that the extent of the participation by 

 

 17 Members of Congress? 

 

 18 A They may also participate in other events 

 

 19 of the RNC, most of which would not be fund raisers. 

 

 20 Occasionally there are regional fund 

 

 21 raisers where Members of Congress may attend, but 

 

 22 they are not involved in soliciting. It is a draw 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 8
 

 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 

 

 

 106 

 

 

 

 1 rather than a solicitation. 

 

 2 Q So is it to fair to say that there are a 

 

 3 number of events that -- let me strike that and 

 

 4 rephrase here: 

 

 5 Are they asked to participate in different 

 

 6 programs or events that are put on by the RNC for the 

 

 7 benefit of certain donor groups to the RNC? 

 

 8 A Yes. 

 

 9 Q So they may go to a dinner, for example, 

 

 10 that's put on for the Regents, for example; is that 

 

 11 fair to say? 

 

 12 A That's correct. 

 

 13 Q Do they also sometimes participate in 

 

 14 periodic conference calls designed to update 

 

 15 different donor groups on key legislation? 

 

 16 A I believe so. I believe they have 

 

 17 participated in conference calls, yes. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 5 of 8
 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 

 

 

 119 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 15 Q Who does most of the major donor 

 

 16 solicitations for the RNC? 

 

 17 A I think it's a "team effort." 

 

 18 I think that a lot of the success of these 

 

 19 major donor programs are other members of these 

 

 20 particular clubs soliciting their friends and also 

 

 21 once we understand who may be potentially interested 

 

 22 probably personal calls from the chairman of the RNC, 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 6 of 8
 

 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 

 

 

 120 

 

 

 

 1 the cochairman of the RNC, the finance chairman of 

 

 2 the RNC, Jack Oliver as deputy chairman of the RNC. 

 

 3 Also I would think that as you saw in that 

 

 4 one exhibit the chairman of each individual club 

 

 5 would try to solicit either additional funds for an 

 

 6 RNC program or project over and above their 

 

 7 membership or attempt to have these individuals 

 

 8 renew. 

 

 9 I think it is more of a one-on-one basis 

 

 10 with the major donor clubs when you are talking about 

 

 11 TEAM 100, the Regents. When you get down to some of 

 

 12 the other clubs there is also a direct mail component 

 

 13 to them. 

 

 14 Q Are you aware of Members of Congress ever 

 

 15 participating in the direct solicitation of asking 

 

 16 someone to become a member of TEAM 100 or the 

 

 17 Regents? 

 

 18 A It's certainly not our policy to raise the 

 

 19 money that way. 

 

 20 I can't say that has a member ever 

 

 21 suggested is someone or had a friend? I wouldn't 

 

 22 rule that out. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 7 of 8
 

 

 THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 

 

 

 121 

 

 

 

 1 But it's certainly not a program that we 

 

 2 have in place to ask Members of Congress to solicit 

 

 3 soft money. I'm not aware of that at all. 

 

 4 MR. LEFFEL: Let's take another short break 

 

 5 and try to figure out what I've got left. 

 

 6 MR. BURCHFIELD: Sure. That's fine. 

 

 7 (Discussion off the record.) 

 

 8 MR. LEFFEL: Back on the record. 

 

 9 Bobby, for right now we are treating this 

 

 10 entire transcript highly confidential for this 10-day 

 

 11 period and then we will come back and designate which 

 

 12 portions you believe are highly confidential. 

 

 13 MR. BURCHFIELD: Correct. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-6 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 8 of 8
FEC Exhibit 30 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-7 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 6
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civ. No. 08-1953 (BMK, RJL, RMC) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

et al., ) DECLARATION 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________________) 

DECLARATION OF 

GERALD GREENWALD 

1. My name is Gerald Greenwald. 

2. I am a founding managing director of Greenbriar Equity Group, LLC, a private 

equity firm focused on investments in the global transportation industry. From 1994 through my 

retirement in 2000, I served as the Chairman and CEO of United Airlines, the largest employee 

majority-owned company in the United States. Prior to that, I was vice chairman at Chrysler 

Corporation and worked at Ford Motor Company. 

 3. In 2002, I provided testimony in the McConnell v. FEC litigation. As I explained 

at that time, I had direct experience with campaign fundraising over the previous fifteen years 

and served on the Board of Trustees of the Committee for Economic Development (CED), a 

nonpartisan organization of business and education leaders dedicated to policy research on major 

economic and social issues. These business leaders and their companies had been solicited by 

elected officials and party leaders for ever-increasing amounts of soft money corporate 

contributions to political parties (as well as for hard money contributions from corporate 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-7 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 6
2

employees and the corporation’s PAC if it had one). These business leaders accordingly had 

occasion to consider the pros and cons of contributing or declining to contribute. 

4. My clear conclusion, which I know was shared by CED Trustees generally, was 

that soft money fundraising by elected officials and party-officials and large soft money 

contributions by corporations corrupt the solicitors and the givers alike and certainly create an 

appearance among the electorate generally that American business buys influence and 

legislation. In the vast majority of instances large political contributions by corporations and 

unions are not given for ideological reasons, but rather to secure access and influence on 

legislation. 

 5. When I talked with leaders of large labor unions, I found that they shared the 

concerns of the CED Trustees about the corrosive effect of large soft money contributions on the 

system. 

 6. The fact is that the people who raised large soft money contributions from 

business corporations and labor unions were often sitting Members of Congress who had to 

consider matters that would affect the financial health or operations of the organizations being 

solicited. 

7. Often the Members who solicited large corporate contributions sat on committees 

that directly affect the corporation’s business. Similarly, these Members’ actions affect issues of 

interest to labor unions. Congress as a body and through these Congressional committees 

regularly considers matters that importantly affect both business and labor in regulated and 

unregulated industries, from tax legislation to trade legislation to industry deregulation to 

environmental legislation, to list just a few examples. 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-7 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 6
3

 8. I explained in testimony in McConnell that when sitting Members solicited large 

corporate and union contributions, the leaders of these organizations felt intense pressure to 

contribute, because experience had taught that the consequences of failing to contribute (or 

failing to contribute enough) may be very negative. 

 9. Business and labor leaders believed, based on their experience, that disappointed 

Members and their party colleagues may shun or disfavor them if they have not contributed. 

Equally, these leaders feared that if they refused to contribute enough, competing interests who 

do contribute generously would have had an advantage in gaining access to and influencing key 

Congressional leaders on matters of importance to the company or union. 

 10. The other side of the coin is that labor and business leaders were regularly advised 

that — and their experience directly confirmed that — organizations that made large soft money 

donations to political parties in fact did get preferred access to government officials. That access 

ran the gamut from attendance at events where they had opportunities to present points of view 

informally to lawmakers to direct, private meetings in an official’s office to discuss pending 

legislation or a government regulation that affects the company or union. 

 11. A similar effect would occur whether an organization was solicited by an elected 

official or some other representative of the party. In either situation, companies and unions 

know that elected officials would become aware of who has given significant amounts. 

Historically, party officials often promised access to elected officials to those who agreed to 

contribute large amounts of corporate or union money. Even if that access were not explicitly 

promised, during the solicitation process, major donors would still have access to Members and 

their staffs because of their contributions and the donors can and do contact Members directly. 

When I was in industry and I wanted to contact a Member regarding a legislative issue, I would 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-7 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 6
4

often contact him or her directly and would not necessarily rely on the parties to facilitate such 

access. The vast majority of soft money was given for such access and influence, and the system 

would be perpetuated whether a Member or some other person representing the party is calling to 

ask. 

 12. In sum, most unions and corporations gave large soft money contributions to 

political parties — sometimes to both political parties — because they were afraid to unilaterally 

disarm. They did not want their competitors alone to enjoy the benefits that come with large soft 

money donations, namely, access and influence in Washington. Though a soft money check 

might be made out to a political party, labor and business leaders would know that those checks 

open the doors to the offices of individual and important Members of Congress and the 

Administration, giving donors the opportunity to argue for their corporation’s or union’s position 

on a particular statute, regulation, or other governmental action. Labor and business leaders 

believe — based on experience and with good reason — that such access gives them an 

opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives 

from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties. 

 13. In these ways, the soft money loophole over two decades created a deeply cynical 

environment of real and perceived corruption that trapped American government, business, and 

labor unions. 

 14. This debilitating and demoralizing environment damages government and 

business alike. It goes without saying that maintaining governmental integrity is critically 

important to our democracy and our citizens’ faith in their government. It is also important for 

Americans to have faith in the integrity of their business institutions and labor unions as well. It 

is not good for America when American citizens believe their business leaders are corrupt, and 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-7 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 5 of 6
Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-7 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 6 of 6
FEC Exhibit 31 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 14
Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 14
Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 14
Exhibit A 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 14
"t

V _

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

SENATOR MITCH McCONNELL, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No. 02-0582 (CKK, KLH, RJL)

)

v. )

) CONSOL_ATED ACTIONS

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

DECLARATION OF ROBERT ROZEN

1. My name is Robert Rozen.

2. I provided a sworn declaration in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado

Republican Federal Campaign Committee, Civ. No. 89-N-1159, in the United States District

Court for the District of Colorado. The statements I made in that declaration are reproduced in

Exhibit A.

3. I reaffirm that the statements I made in the prior declaration are true and correct.

4. From 1995 until 1997, I worked as a lobbyist for various interests at the law firm

Wunder, Diefenderfer, Cannot3& Thelen. For the last six years, I have been a partner in a

lobbying firm called Washington Counsel; now Washington Council Ernst & Young. It was a

law firm until two years ago, when it became part of the accounting firm Ernst & Young. We

represent a varietyof corporate, trade association, non-profit, and individual clients before both

Congress and the Executive Branch. Our firm's primary focus is lobbying on tax issues, but we

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 5 of 14
also lobby on financial services, health care, and other issues. Our work includes preparing

strategic plans, writing lobbying papers, explaining difficult and complex issues to legislative

staff, and drafting proposed legislation. We also organize fundraisers for federal candidates and

from time-to-time advise clients on their political contributions. Our firm includes both

Democrats and Republicans. On the Democratic side, we host approximately six fundraisers per

year where we raise hard money for federal candidates.

5. I sometimes advise Washington Council clients with respect to their political

contributions. Most of our clients have PACs, and they occasionally ask for advice on who to

make contributions to.

6. Clients sometimes ask me for advice on whether to give non-federal money to

political party and other committees. I have been approached by elected officials or their staff

seeking assistance with raising soft money.

7. Some clients don't want to be major players in the political .money system so they

only contribute hard money to candidates. They are not interested in playing a bigger role,

usually because they know it is difficult to draw the line and once they participate at any level

expectations are raised for increasingly larger contributions. Those companies and associations

that do give soft money typically contribute to both parties in Congress because they want access

to Members on both sides of the aisle.

8. In some cases corporations and trade associations do not want to give in amounts

over the hard money limits, but they feel pressured to give in greater amounts and end up making

soft money donations as well. They are under pressure, sometimes subtle and sometimes direct,

from Members to give at levels higher than the hard money limits. For example, some Members

2

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 6 of 14
in a position to influence legislation important to an industry naturally wonder why a company in

that industry is not participating in fundraising events.

9. There is a spectrum of reasons people and organizations contribute soft money.

Some obviously give for ideological purposes. Others feel the need to give at a level above the

hard money limits as part of their public policy strategy. Finally, some feel pressured to give

above the hard money levels as a result of direct or indirect pressure from Members.

10. I know of organizations who believe that to be treated seriously in Washington,

and by that I mean to be a player and to have access, you need to give soft money. As a result,

many organizations do give soft money. While some soft money is given for ideological

purposes, companies and trade associations working on public policy for the most part give to

pursue their economic interests. In some cases, thatmight limit their contributions to one

political party. More often, they give to both. They give soft money because they believe that's

what helps establish better contacts with Members of Congress and gets doors opened when they

want to meet with Members. There is no question that money creates the relationships.

Companies with interests before particular committees need to have access to the chairman of

that committee, make donations, and go to events where the chairman will be. Even if that

chairman is not the type of Member who will tie the contribution and the legislative goals

together, donors can't be sure so they want to play it safe and make soft money contributions.

The large contributions enable them to establish relationships, and that increases the chances

they'll be successful with their public policy agenda. Compared to the amounts that companies

spend as a whole, large political contributions are worthwhile because of the potential benefit to

the company's bottom line.

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 7 of 14
11. When organizations give greater amounts of money through soft money

- contributions, they get better access to Members. While hard money contributions also provide

some access, larger soft money contributions get you significantly greater access, and of course

soft money contributions built around sporting events such as the Super Bowl or the Kentucky

Derby, where you might spend a week with the Member, are even more useful. At the events

that contributors are entitled to attend as a result of their contributions, some contributors will

subtly or not-so-subtly discuss a legislative issue thatthey have an interest in. Contributors also

use the events to establish relationships and then take advantage of the access by later calling the

Member about a legislative issue or coming back and seeing the Member in his or her office.

Obviously from the Member's perspective, it is hard to turn down a request for a meeting after

you just spent a weekend with a contributor whose company jt_st gave a large contribution to

your political party.

12. From the perspective of the donor, the difference between hard and soft money is

just the amount of money that you are allowed to give. Once an organization's PAC has given

up to the hard money limit, then it's simply a matter of how much more the organization wants to

give. From their perspective, what account the money goes into or how it's used is not

important. When it actually comes time to make out the check, youjust make it out to whatever

account they indicate. A Member or their agent will raise the money and someone will

eventually tell you whether the money should go to a soft money leadership PAC, a national

party committee, or a state party, but that's generally not a thought for the giver. Corporations

and trade associations, including the ones I am familiar with, are not usually giving to help the

Republican Party or the Democratic Party. Even though the original purpose of allowing the

national parties to have soft money was to let them raise money to be used on state elections and

4

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 8 of 14
general party-building, it would be the height of nai'vet_ to think that donors have motives

•- consistent with that purpose. Donors to the national parties understand that if a federal

officeholder is raising soft money--supposedly "non-federal" money--they are raising it for

federal uses, namely to help that Member or other federal candidates in their elections. Many

donors giving $100,000, $200,000, even $1 nfi.'llion,are doing that because it is a bigger favor

than a smaller hard money contribution would be. That donation helps you get close to the

person who is making decisions that affect your company or your industry. That is the reason

most economic interests give soft money, certainly not because they want to help state candidates

and rarely because they want the party to succeed.

13. Members understand and appreciate the difference between smaller hard money

contributions and larger soft money contributions. Members are raising both hard and soft

money. A PAC can give $5000 per election to a candidate and that is appreciated. But the

organization sponsoring the PAC can also give an unlimited amount of soft money; for example

a $100,000 or $250,000 contribution to the political party atthe request of a candidate. That is a

contribution of an entirely different dimension, and it naturally is appreciated more by the

Member who raises it. The bigger soft money contribution.s are more likely to get your call

returned or get you into the Member's office than smaller hard money contributions.

14. You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large donation and they

appreciate it. Ordinarily, people feel inclined to reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for

someone--that is, write a larger check--and they feel even more compelled to reciprocate. In my

experience, overt words are rarely exchanged about contributions, but people do have

understandings: the Member has received a favor and feels a natural obligation to be helpful in

return. This is how human relationships work. The legislative arena is the same as other areas of

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 9 of 14
commerce and life. It is similar to a situation that has been in the news recently: an investment

banking firm made shares of hot initial public offerings available to the officers of Worldcom

Inc., while Worldcom Inc. executives were giving the firm tens of millions of dollars in

investment-banking business. There doesn't have to be a specific tie-in to achieve the result.

15. Even though soft money contributions often go to political parties, the money is

given so that the contributors can be close to, and recognized by, Members, Presidents, and

Administration officials who have power. Members, not party staffers or party chairs, raise much

of the large soft.moneyeontributions. Party chairs do not have that much power because the

DNC and the RNC by themselves don't have power to do anything. So people are not giving to

be close to the party chairs. The Members of Congress and thePresident are the heart of the

national parties. The elected officials are the ones who are really raising the money, either

directly or through their agents.

16. The soft money system has allowed big money from private interests to get into the

federal election system. The system works in a very pernicious way that undermines public trust.

As I mentioned in my earlier declaration, campaign finance reform was one of the issues that I

handled while working for Senator Mitchell. In fact, the DSCC did not raise and spend soft

money while Senator Mitchell was Majority Leader because he thought it appeared improper. I

have also seen the system at work through my job as a lobbyist over the last seven years.

Although there are nominal limits on what individuals and PACs can contribute to federal

candidates, that law has now become a fiction because of the soft money contributions that

candidates have been able to raise through their political party. The general public does not even

begin to understand the degree to which moneyed private interests are able to influence public

policy through their campaign contributions. The effect of $15,000 or $20,000 contributions on

.,w

6

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 10 of 14
some Members that I discussed in paragraph 10 of my earlier declaration is even more true with

respect to larger $100,000 or $500,000 contributions. As I noted there, based on human

relationships, you are grateful to people who want to help you and naturally you want to be

responsive to them. When people have tried to help you--that is, an elected representative--in the

more substantial ways permitted through soft money contributions, you are even more grateful to

them andnaturally more responsive.

17. If you're a Chairmanof a committee, you are expected to raise more for the party

than more junior Members are. In spite of the seniority rules, you have the chairmanship at the

sufferance of the caucus and you are expected to help the party by raising money for a party

committee or through a leadership PAC that then distributes money to federal candidates of the

party inneed. Some of this money is raised in large increments as soft money. Published reports

indicate that candidates for chairman have raised money in amounts as high as $500,000 in their

drive to become chairman of a Congressional committee. They are able to in pan because they

will have so much power if they become chairman. Donors especially want to develop

relationships with these Members who will have a lot of power and are therefore in a position to

help the contributors achieve their public policy objectives.

18. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is

true andcorrect.

Robert Rozen _"

Executed on this ___ay of October, 2002 V

7

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 11 of 14
EXHIBIT A

1. My name is Robert Rozen.

2. I began working for Sen. Wendell Ford after I graduated from law school in June

1980. I was responsible for all issues before the Senate Finance Committee, and from the spring

of 1984 until early 1985 1handled his work with the Rules Committee, on which he was Ranking

Minority Member.

3. From January 1985 until January 1995,I worked for Sen. George Mitchell. I handled

a variety of legislative issues for Sen. Mitchell, including tax, trade, banking, and other financial

issues, including campaign finance reform.

4. Sen. Ford chaired the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) in the

1981-1982 election cycle. Sen. Mitchell held this position in the 1985-1986 cycle. My

experience was that both Senators kept their DSCC work separate from the office, in the sense

that no legislative staff was involved with DSCC campaign activities. I had no direct involvement in DSCC work, although I did gam general kriowledge about DSCC operations from my

proximity to the Chairmen. Additionally, my extensive work from 1987 through 1994 on

campaign finance reform legislative efforts exposed me to DSCC issues. Itis my sense that

Administrative Assistants know who has contributed both to their Senator's campaign and+tothe

DSCC, although some of them keep closer track of this than others.

5. At least on the Democratic side, the MajorityLeader is heavily involved with the

Senate campaign committee. The Majority Leader picks the Chair of the DSCC, and is also

involved in candidate recruitment, a primary responsibility of the DSCC. Even if other Senators

or DSCC staff members make the initial contacts, the Majority Leader wants to size up potential

candidates and be helpful in encouraging potentially strong candidates to run for office.

Oftentimes,.the candidates want to close the deal with the leader of their party in the Senate.

6. Other than recruiting candidates, the DSCC's main responsibility is raising money for

Senate c_trnpaigns. Especially during the last 15months of an election cycle, the Committee is

very active. Many weekends, four or five Senators will be out on the road, raising money at

DSCC events. Certain Senators are bigger draws than others, and the Majority Leader usually is

the biggest draw of all. So he probably attends as many of these events as anybody else other

than the Chairman.

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 12 of 14
7. Under the DSCC's tally system, all Senators are expected to help raise money for the

._ party. Some do it more enthusiastically than others, but the expectation is there. Senators can

solicit contributions directly, or sponsor fundraising events on behalf of the DSCC. The DSCC

also sponsors its own events, using Senators to draw contributors.

8. Sen. Mitchell took an especially active role with the DSCC after he was elected

Majority Leader in Nov. 1988. For example, it was his decision that the DSCC did not raise soft

money during his six years as Majority Leader.

9. It is only natural that most individuals and PACs want to make sure that they get

maximum recognition for whatever money they contribute. Of course, some expect nothing in

return, while others are more aggressive in trying to get a lot of mileage out of their

contributions. I would expect most of the largest PACs give the maximum allowed, or dose to

it, to party committees, and then send their members to party events or otherwise attempt to meet

personally with Senators. They may buy a table at an event for $10,000 and invite staff or a

Member to sit at the table. Other events are stand-up receptions where this sort of close

interaction is more difficult. But the idea for anyone who goes to any of these events is to be

seen by Members of Congress.

10. Contributors believe this interaction has an effect on Members, whether it does or

not. Certainly, it does have an effect on some Members. If you are raising money for your

campaign, or you have a tally and you're raising money for the party, and you have solicited a

$15,000 or $20,000 contribution, oftentimes this is going to have some effect. This isjust based

on human relationships, you are grateful to people who want to help you and naturally wantto be

responsive to them.

11. The bottom line is that there is a symbiotic relationship between contributors and

candidates. A contributor gives to have the opportunity to influence a Member, and the Member

is willing to provide this opportunity in order to raise more money. While this is usually subtle, _"

it can be extremely direct. For example, I know of a company that was recently involved in a

legislative battle critical to its bottom line. One Senator in particular was working on this issue.

The company, which was known to be a financial supporter of the other party, was asked by the

Senator, "Well, where have you been?" and the Senator's representatives later told the company

that they had to "be at the table," to contribute, if they wanted their views to be heard. This was a

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 13 of 14
shakedown, pure and simple. And it worked -- the company wound up contributing to the

national Senatorial Campaign Committee of the Senator's party, as requested.

12. Very little money that does not come through the mall is what I would call

"detached" money. Typically, a contributor gives money to establish relationships, to be able to

lobby on an issue, to get close to Members, to be able to have influence. While an elected

official of course does not have to do something because somebody gave, a contribution helps

establish a relationship, and the more you give the better the relationship. It is not that legislation

is being written in direct response to somebody giving a lot of money. Rather, it is one step

removed: relationships are established because people give a lot of money, relationships are built

and are deepened because of more and more money, and that gets you across the threshold to

getting the access you want, because you have established a relationship.

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-8 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 14 of 14
FEC Exhibit 32 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 23
United States District Court

District of Columbia

Republican National Committee et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Federal Election Commission,

Defendant.

Case No. 08-1953 (BMK, RJL, RMC)

 THREE-JUDGE COURT

Plaintiffs Supplemental Discovery Responses

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34, the Republican National

Committee (“RNC”), California Republican Party (“CRP”) and the Republican Party of San

Diego (“RPSD”)(collectively “Plaintiffs”) make the following discovery responses.

General Objections

1. Plaintiffs object to the FEC’s characterization of discovery “deficiencies.” Plaintiffs

took ample measures to prepare the 30(b)(6) witnesses and produce relevant documents in an

expedited manner. It is not unusual for the existence of other documents to come to light during a

deposition and Plaintiffs are being compliant and cooperative with these supplemental discovery

requests. Nothing that has arisen indicates that Plaintiffs’ original production was deficient. 

2. Plaintiffs object to discovery on First Amendment privacy and burden grounds because

the issues of this cases are legal in nature, not factual. Furthermore, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to

Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (“WRTL II”), recognized that in cases involving campaign-finance

regulation of expressive-association rights “extensive discovery,” including “ha[ving] to turn

over many documents related to . . . operations, plans, and finances[,] . . . constitutes a severe

1

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 23
burden on political speech,” id. at 2666 n.5, so that there must be “minimal if any discovery” in

such cases, id. at 2666. Moreover, this is not an enforcement action, but a case asserting First

Amendment rights, so citizen groups asserting First Amendment rights of privacy and freedom

from burden in their expressive association may not be penalized through discovery for asserting

their rights. Finally, what Plaintiffs seek to do in this case is prospective, not retrospective, so

that seeking information about what they have done, while what they want to do was illegal, is

unjustified by the First Amendment burdens imposed. For these reasons, no discovery is

permissible or at most should be far more minimal than what the FEC imposes, so that the parties

are within their constitutional rights to produce nothing or to make only minimal responses to

those requests coming closest to relevance to the legal issues raised.

3. Plaintiffs object to the requests to the extent that they purport to call for the

production of documents\information that: (a) contain privileged attorney-client

communications; (b) constitute attorney work product; (c) disclose the mental impressions,

conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of any attorneys or other representatives of the plaintiffs;

(d) were prepared in anticipation of litigation; or (e) are otherwise protected from disclosure

under applicable privileges, immunities, laws, or rules.

4. Plaintiffs object to the requests to the extent that they are vague, not limited in scope,

unreasonably broad and burdensome, or beyond the scope of either category of permissible

discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note

(2000).

5. Plaintiffs object to the instructions accompanying the requests to the extent that they

purport to impose obligations beyond those imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 23
local rules.

6. Plaintiffs object to requests for information the benefit of which is outweighed by its

lack of importance in resolving the issues at stake in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(i)

(discovery cannot be “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or . . . obtain[able] from some

other source . . . .” and is limited if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs

its likely benefit, taking into account . . .[inter alia] the importance of the proposed discovery in

resolving the issues.” Id. at (iii).

7. By responding to these requests, Plaintiffs do not concede that any of the

documents/information requested are relevant to a claim or defense or the subject matter of this

action, or are admissible at the trial thereof, or that any person identified in the responses has

documents relevant to this action. Plaintiffs reserve any and all objections as to competency,

relevance, materiality, privilege, admissibility, or any other grounds on which an objection may

be made. Plaintiffs expressly reserve the right to object to further discovery into the subject

matter of these requests. Any response to a request that inadvertently discloses privileged

documents/information is not intended to and shall not be deemed or construed to constitute a

waiver of any privilege or right of Plaintiffs. Insofar as a response to a request may be deemed to

be a waiver of any privilege or right, such waiver shall be deemed to be a waiver limited to that

particular response only.

8. Plaintiffs object to the FEC’s extremely vague, overbroad and ambiguous definition of

“donor,” “grassroots lobbying,” “officeholder,” “redistricting activities,” “donation,” and

“support state candidates” as stated in the FEC’s First Set of Discovery Requests. The RNC also

objects to the FEC’s extremely vague, overbroad and ambiguous definition of “solicitation,” as

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 23
found in the FEC’s First Set of Discovery Requests, which encompasses “indirect” requests or

suggestions that a person make a donation.

9. Subject to and without waiving any of the foregoing General Objections, which are

hereby incorporated into each response given below, Plaintiffs (a) object to the individual

requests and (b) make the required good-faith attempt to fulfill its duty to provide all responsive

information readily available to it without undue labor and expense as follows:

A. Questions that Plaintiffs Were Unprepared or Otherwise Unable to Answer During Rule

30(b)(6) Depositions

1. How much money has the RNC spent on grassroots lobbying since 2003? (Josefiak

Dep. 155:22-157:10.) 

 Objection: As stated above, the RNC objects to the FEC’s definition of “grassroots

lobbying,” as set forth in the FEC’s First Set of Discovery Requests, as vague, overbroad, and

ambiguous. Furthermore, as stated in the RNC’s original discovery responses, the RNC stores its

archived files in an offsite warehouse. To review such documents, especially in response to an

overreaching request, is unduly burdensome. 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, the RNC responds as follows.

Based on a review of the documents in the RNC’s possession, custody, and control, the

RNC cannot document the amount of resources expended for Grassroots Lobbying activities.

2. When did the CRP’s Congressional Target Committee become non-functional, who

made the decision to render it non-functional, and why was it rendered non-functional?

(Christiansen Dep. 13:17-14.7.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. The

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 5 of 23
Congressional Target Committee was non-functional before BCRA was adopted, for a variety of

reasons, including: (a) fewer Congressional seats to target since 1991; and (b) a greater role

played by the National Republican Congressional Committee in targeting seats along with

California Republican Congressmen. These circumstances, rather than an unilateral decision,

rendered the Committee non-functional.

3. Has a candidate for U.S. Senate attended a CRP fundraiser since 2003? (Christiansen

Dep. 35:7-17.) If so, which candidates, when were the fundraisers they attended, and what was

the cost of a ticket to the fundraiser? 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. Bill

Jones, the Republican Party nominee for Senate in 2004, may have attended CRP fundraisers, but

not as a keynote speaker. No CRP fundraiser was held to benefit him and he did not solicit

contributions for CRP in the 2003-2004 election cycle. 

4. How many federal candidates or officeholders have spoken at CRP fundraisers since

2003? (Christiansen Dep. 36:4-19.) 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

federal candidates or officeholders have spoken at CRP events that were devoted to fundraising. 

A number of federal candidates and officeholders have spoken at regular CRP convention

breakfast, luncheon and dinner events for which CRP typically charges from $50 to $100 per

ticket. Most of the proceeds of these convention events are federal hard dollars. Federal

candidates or officeholders who have spoken at such events include: Former Mayor Rudy

Giuliani and former Governor Mitt Romney (2007); Senate candidate Bill Jones (2004);

Congressman Ed Royce, Congresswoman Mary Bono Mack, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher,

5

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 6 of 23
and Congressman Kevin McCarthy. 

5. How many times has the Chair of the RNC attended a CRP fundraiser since 2003?

(Christiansen Dep. 36:20-37:2.) 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. The

Chair of the RNC has not attended any CRP fundraisers since 2003. 

6. What percent of the CRP’s funds are raised through fundraising events? (Christiansen

Dep. 37:3-7.) 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. The

percentage varies from year to year. Since 2003, California has had two off-election years (the

2003 gubernatorial recall and recall replacement election and the 2005 special ballot measure

election) which compared with “top of the ticket” activity normally occurring in gubernatorial

and Presidential election years. Based on a review of the documents in the CRP’s possession,

custody, or control, the CRP can find no responsive documents. 

7. Did federal candidates or officeholders make fundraising calls for the CRP between

2003 and Christiansen’s becoming COO? (Christiansen Dep. 37:21-38:7) If so, which 

candidates or officeholders, when did they make the calls, and who did they call? 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

federal candidates or officeholders have made fundraising calls for the CRP between 2003 and

Christiansen becoming COO. 

8. Whether any federal candidate or officeholder solicited donations to the CRP in: 

a. 2006 (other than the event in Colorado)? (Christiansen Dep. 59:20-60:14.) If so,

which federal candidates or officeholders, in what format did they solicit (e.g. 

6

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 7 of 23
telephone, mail, fundraising event, etc), and who did they solicit?

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

federal candidate or officeholder solicited donations to the CRP in 2006. 

b. 2005? (Christiansen Dep. 62:3-4.) If so, which federal candidates or 

officeholders, in what format did they solicit (e.g. telephone, mail, fundraising

event, etc), and who did they solicit?

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

federal candidate or officeholder solicited donations to the CRP in 2005. However, the FEC

Advisory Opinion 2005-10 (Berman/Doolittle) allowed federal officeholders to raise money for

statewide ballot measure elections in 2005. Nevertheless, CRP did not utilize any federal

candidates or officeholders to solicit any funds for ballot measures under the authority of that

advisory opinion. 

c. 2004 (other than events discussed at Christiansen Dep. 62:5-63:5.)?

(Christiansen Dep. 63:11-16.) If so, which federal candidates or officeholders, in 

what format did they solicit (e.g. telephone, mail, fundraising event, etc), and who

did they solicit?

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

federal candidate or officeholder solicited donations to the CRP in 2004. 

 d. Any other year since 2003? (Christiansen Dep. 64:20-23.) If so, which federal 

candidates or officeholders, in what format did they solicit (e.g. telephone, mail, 

fundraising event, etc), and who did they solicit? 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

7

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 8 of 23
federal candidate or officeholder has solicited donations to the CRP since 2003. 

9. At the Colorado event with President Bush (Christiansen Dep. 60:2-61:9.): 

a. How much did tickets cost, including how much each tier of tickets cost, if 

applicable? (Christiansen Dep. 61:10-13.) 

b. Did the President meet or speak with individual attendees? (Christiansen Dep. 

61:17-19.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows.

Based on a review of the documents in the CRP’s possession, custody, or control, the CRP

cannot identify any such CRP event, or any President Bush fundraising event from which CRP

benefitted. 

10. Which Congressman solicited donations to the CRP by mail, and when? (Christiansen

Dep. 64:20-65:10.) 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

Congressman has solicited donations to the CRP by mail. 

11. Other than any solicitations discussed in response to the proceeding questions, on

what other occasions have federal candidates or officeholders solicited donations to the CRP

since 2003? (Christiansen Dep. 65:21-25.) 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

federal candidate or officeholder has solicited donations to the CRP since 2003. 

12. Since 2003, has the Chair of the RNC solicited donations to the CRP (other than Ken

Mehlman’s attendance at a fundraiser in 2005)? (Christiansen Dep. 66:1-67:10.) If so, which

Chairs solicited, when did they solicit, in what format did they solicit (e.g. telephone, mail,

8

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 9 of 23
fundraising event, etc), and whom did they solicit? 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

Chair of the RNC has solicited donations to the CRP. 

13. Regarding Christiansen Dep., Exhibit G: 

a. Was this document publicly distributed? If so, who distributed it, and to whom 

was it distributed? 

b. What entities made disbursements in related to the document? For each such 

entity, what was the size of those disbursements in (i) federal funds, and (ii) 

nonfederal funds? (Christiansen Dep. 140:4-141:10.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows.

Exhibit G was distributed to Republican voters in Orange County. CRP made disbursements of

federal funds only for this mailer. Because the communication did not advocate the federal

candidate’s election, it was not reported as a non-monetary contribution or independent

expenditure. 

14. Since 2003, has the CRP made any public communication that supported or opposed a

ballot initiative and mentioned a federal candidate? (Christiansen Dep. 141:11-143:13.) For each

such communication, when was it made, which federal candidates were identified, and what was

the size of the CRP’s disbursements in relation to the communication in (i) federal funds, and (ii)

nonfederal funds? Also indicate which of these communications promoted, attacked, supported,

or opposed any of the federal candidates they identified. 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

such public communications have been made. For the reasons set forth in the Complaint and the

9

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 10 of 23
Declaration of Bill Christiansen, CRP has not made any public communication that supported or

opposed a ballot initiative that mentioned a federal candidate since BCRA became effective. 

Therefore, the response to (i) and (ii) is none. 

15. How much of the approximately $18 million that the CRP has spent on ballot 

measures has been paid with federal funds, and how much of it with nonfederal funds?

(Christiansen Dep. 158:6-16.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, CRP responds as follows. No

federal funds were used for ballot measures. 

16. On what did the RPSD spent $1,834 regarding the 2008 federal elections? (Buettner

Dep. 81:12-82:22.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, RPSD responds as follows.

The amount listed above consists of independent expenditures only. Of that amount, $519.11 was

for GOTV volunteer contact phone calls in support of Duncan D. Hunter. The balance was for

doorhangers that included all Republican candidates. 

17. Why does the RPSD make independent expenditures on behalf of Congressional

candidates in safe seats? (Buettner Dep. 82:24-83:13.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, RPSD responds as follows.

RPSD produces doorhangers that include all Republican candidates whether they are in safe

Republican seats or safe Democrat seats. While the federal races have not been RPSD’s main

focus, RPSD believes that information regarding Republican federal candidates is important to

Republican voters in those districts. 

10

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 11 of 23
B. Responsive, Unproduced Documents Mentioned During Rule 30(b)(6) Depositions

18. The solicitation discussed in #10, above. (Christiansen Dep. 64:20-65:10.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, the CRP responds as follows.

Based on a review of the documents in the CRP’s possession, custody, or control, the CRP can

find no responsive documents. 

19. All communications responsive to #14, above. (Christiansen Dep. 141:11-143:13.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, the CRP responds as follows.

Based on a review of the documents in the CRP’s possession, custody, or control, the CRP can

find no responsive documents. 

20. Any of the following that mention any of the activities or categories of activities at

issue in this lawsuit (i.e., the RNC’s state candidate support, redistricting, grassroots lobbying,

and litigation activities, and the other plaintiffs’ ballot-initiative and “federal election activity,” 2

U.S.C. § 431(20), including voter registration, voter identification, and GOTV): 

a. The budget documents described at Josefiak Dep. 6:1-8:15 (confidential 

portion). 

b. The minutes of the RNC, its budget committee, its finance committee, or any

other RNC committee. (Josefiak Dep. 33:2-35:2.) 

c. RNC victory plans (Josefiak Dep. 47:18.) 

d. The post-election analyses described at Josefiak Dep. 134:2-135:8. 

e. CRP budgets and “budget versus actuals.” (Christiansen Dep. 82:18-21, 110:19-

111:13, 113:12-114:20.) 

f. CRP meeting minutes. (Christiansen Dep. 21:2-6.) 

11

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 12 of 23
g. RPSD meeting minutes. (Buettner Dep. 15:7-23.) 

h. Documents describing or relating to the CRP’s or RNC’s bounty program. 

(Buettner Dep. 28:16, 61:25, 101:20-21, 102:7-8.) 

Response: The RNC objects to a, b, c, and d on the grounds that these documents were

not encompassed by the FEC’s First Set of Discovery Requests. The RNC further objects to the

extent that a, b, c, and d seek confidential proprietary information. 

Subject to and without waiving any objections, the CRP responds as follows. Regarding

e, to the extent this request is for RNC documents or CRP budgets and “budget versus actuals”

documents that relate to RNC activities or proposed activities, CRP has no such documents in its

possession, custody or control. To the extent the request is for CRP budget documents, the CRP

documents contain line items for voter registration, voter identification and GOTV but not

“ballot initiative” or “federal election activity” line items. CRP documents entitled “budget to

actual” were only prepared for the years 2007 and 2008. Subject to the objections noted, these

documents are provided. See CRP0001-CRP00028 (all designated “Counsel Only”). Regarding

f, there are no CRP meeting minutes responsive to this request. Regarding h, all responsive CRP

documents are attached. See CRP00029-CRP00034 (all designated “Counsel Only”). 

 Subject to and without waiving any objections, the RPSD responds as follows. Regarding

g, based on a review of the documents in the RPSD’s possession, custody, or control, the RPSD

can find no documents responsive to this request. 

21. All seating charts reflecting the seating of any federal candidate or officeholder.

(Josefiak Dep. 68:9-16.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, the RNC responds as follows.

12

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 13 of 23
Based on a review of the documents in the RNC’s possession, custody, or control, the RNC can

find no documents relating to the seating of any federal candidate or officeholder. 

22. All pages from the RNC’s donor websites (Josefiak Dep. 124:6-125:19) that refer to

(a) any federal candidate or officeholder, or (b) any benefit of being a member of any of the

RNC’s donor clubs. This includes all responsive pages that were displayed during the relevant

time period, even if those pages are no longer on the websites. 

Response: Subject to and without waiving the objections above, the RNC produces

all documents in its possession, custody and control responsive to this request. See

RNC000731-RNC000786. 

23. All “summary treasurer’s report[s]” to the CRP’s Board of Directors that name or

identify specific donors. (Christiansen Dep. 82:14-83:25.)

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, the CRP responds as follows.

Based on a review of the documents in the CRP’s possession, custody, or control, the CRP can

find no documents responsive to this request. 

24. All reports described at Christiansen Dep. 117:5-118:3. 

Response: Subject to and without waiving any objections, the CRP produces documents

in its possession, custody and control responsive to this request. See CRP00029-CRP00034 (all

designated “Counsel Only”). 

C. Other Discovery Deficiencies 

25. The RNC has withheld from its productions pages RNC000048-49 on grounds of

privilege, but we have not received a privilege log or equivalent description of the withheld pages

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A). Please provide a privilege log that identifies, at a

13

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 14 of 23
minimum, the sender, recipients, date, subject matter, and specific claim of privilege (e.g.

attorney-client communication, attorney work-product, etc.) for those pages and any other

withheld document. 

Response: The RNC provides the following privilege log relating to pages RNC000048-

49. 

Date From To cc: Privilege Doc. Type Description Bates Pgs.

1. 2/3/09 Counsel’s

Office

Attorney-Client

Communication

Memo Internal

memo

discussing

campaign

finance

issues

RNC0

0048-

49

2

26. Several of the RNC’s produced pages (e.g. RNC000199-206) are cut off; please

produce complete copies of all such pages. 

Response: In response to the FEC’s First Set of Discovery Requests, the RNC produced

true and accurate copies of the responsive documents in its possession, custody, and control. The

documents produced represent complete copies of the original documents as maintained by the

RNC. 

27. In the RNC’s March 3, 2009 production, some names or email addresses are blackedout such that we cannot determine to whom the documents were sent (e.g. RNC000607, 

RNC000622, RNC000719). Such editing of discovery documents is manifestly improper. We

were willing to overlook the RNC’s redaction of addresses and phone numbers from its earlier

production of event invitations because those redactions had relatively little effect on our ability

to review documents. Your redaction of addressees’ names and email addresses from emails,

however, is entirely inappropriate. Please reproduce the entire March 3, 2009 production without

14

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 15 of 23
redactions. 

Response: Subject to and without waiving the objections above, the RNC reproduces

RNC000607, RNC000622, and RNC000719, maintaining the original Bates numbering. In order

to comply with the FEC’s request but not allow private information to be subject to the Freedom

of Information Act, the RNC has redacted the domain name of the email addresses only. 

28. The last page of the document produced to us as RNC000575-96 seems to indicate

that it was a presentation made to the Commission. Please explain whether plaintiffs have, in

fact, shown this document to the Commission in the past and, if so, when and for what purpose.

Furthermore, if the document has been shown to the Commission - or the statements therein

otherwise made public - please indicate the grounds for any continued assertion of

confidentiality. 

Response: Documents RNC000575-96 constitute a presentation given internally at the

RNC by RNC staff, and includes an excerpt from a complaint proposed to be filed with the FEC

by the RNC. The presentation was never released into the public domain, and therefore, the

RNC continues to assert confidentiality. 

29. One of the confidential portions of the Josefiak deposition (11:4-12:11, confidential

portion) discussed budget documents containing date that the deponent later indicated had been

made public (Josefiak Dep. 57:4-58:13). Accordingly, please indicate whether you agree to

remove the confidentiality designation regarding that section. If you do not so agree, please

indicate the grounds for your continued assertion of the confidentiality of that section. 

Response: The RNC does not agree to remove any designation of confidentiality. The

RNC does not release details of its budget to the public. Subject to and without waiving any

15

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 16 of 23
objections, the RNC asserts that the following is an accurate and true summation of the budget

report given at the RNC’s 2009 Winter Meeting General Session, which was open to the public: 

The RNC is in sound financial condition as of December 31, 2008. We raised 

approximately $320 million in 2008. We have $13.8 million cash on hand and no debt as

of December 31, 2008. We processed in excess of $3,942,000 contributions for the year. 

For 2009, the Budget Committee projects revenues of $78,365,000 at a cost of 

$28,365,000. I now move that we approve the proposed budget for 2009. 

30. For each document produced to us by the CRP or RPSD, indicate the document

request to which the produced document was responsive. 

Response: In order to cooperate with the FEC’s wishes, CRP and RPSD produced all

responsive documents in less than 2 weeks, rather than the 30 days allowed under the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. In order to cooperate further, and without waiving any objections, the

CRP and RPSD respond as follows. 

All responsive documents pertain to Request for Production #1 (“All documents

containing the text or script, of their audio/visual equivalent, of any communication responsive to

Interrogatory 1.”) This includes the following sets of email attachments: SDRP-Group 1, San

Diego Door Hangers, Document Production-Group 1-2005, Discovery Group 2-2006, Discovery

2006-Group 2, Discovery-2006.3, Discovery-2006-Last Group, Discovery-2008-Group 1,

Discovery-2008-Group 2, and Discovery-2008-3. 

Based on a review of the documents in the CRP and RPSD’s possession, custody, or

control, the CRP and RPSD can find no documents responsive to this request #2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. 

Request #6 is fulfilled by the parties’ protective order granting the FEC access to the full

McConnell record. 

31. For the portion of the RNC’s document productions that has been designated counsel16

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 17 of 23
only but that consists primarily of summaries of publicly available information, please explain

who created these documents, who reviewed them, and the basis for their confidentiality

designation. 

Objection: The RNC objects to this request as impermissibly vague. Please describe in

detail which documents pertain to this request. Without knowing which specific documents are at

issue, the RNC is unable to respond. 

32. We were troubled to learn from plaintiff’s witnesses that few, if any, efforts have been

undertaken since the filing of this lawsuit to ensure that potentially relevant discovery material is

preserved. It is also apparent to us that undeniably responsive documents have not been produced

to us. (See, e.g., Josefiak Dep. 124:6-125:19; see also Buettner Dep. 108:13-19.) Accordingly,

please provide us with assurances as to each of the following: 

a. Other than the “offsite warehouse” mentioned in the RNC’s objection to the 

Commission’s request for production, indicate whether all plaintiffs have searched

all materials within their “possession, custody, or control” for responsive 

materials - including, at a minimum, all paper files, computer hard drives, network

drives, servers, laptops, and email accounts - and whether all plaintiffs have

produced all responsive material “stored in any medium from which information 

can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation.” See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 34(a)(1). 

b. If plaintiffs have not conducted the searches and made the productions 

described in the foregoing subparagraph, indicate the date by which such searches 

and productions will be complete. 

17

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 18 of 23
c. Indicate whether plaintiffs have taken any steps since the commencement of 

this action to prevent the destruction or other spoilation of responsive materials. 

Indicate specifically whether plaintiffs’ document destruction procedures have 

been suspended, whether plaintiffs’ email deletion procedures have been 

suspended, whether plaintiffs’ usual practice of overwriting backup tapes has been

suspended , and whether plaintiffs’ document custodians have been advised to 

maintain all information potentially relevant to this action. 

Response: Subject to and without waiving the objections above, Plaintiffs respond as

follows. Plaintiffs assert that they have met all obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, including searching all available mediums for responsive documents and retaining all

documents reasonably believed to contain information relevant to this matter.

18

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 21 of 23
Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 22 of 23
Charles H. Bell, Jr.* 

Bell, McAndrews & Hiltachk, LLP 

455 Capitol Mall, Suite 801 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Tel: (916) 442-7757 

Fax: (916) 442-7759 

cbell@bmhlaw.com 

Counsel for California Republican Party 

and Republican Party of San Diego County

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James Bopp, Jr. 

James Bopp, Jr., Bar #CO0041 

Richard E. Coleson* 

Clayton J. Callen* 

Kaylan L. Phillips* 

BOPP, COLESON & BOSTROM

1 South Sixth Street 

Terre Haute, IN 47807-3510 

812/232-2434 telephone 

812/234-3685 facsimile 

Lead Counsel for all Plaintiffs 

*Pro Hac Vice

22

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-9 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 23 of 23
FEC Exhibit 33 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-10 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civ. No. 08-1953 (RJL) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) DECLARATION 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

_______________________________________) 

Declaration of Robert W. Biersack 

1. My name is Robert W. Biersack. I am Special Assistant to the Staff Director for Data 

Integration for the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”). I am personally 

familiar with the Commission’s reporting requirements, and I have personal knowledge 

regarding the contents of the Commission’s database, including information regarding the 

receipts of national, state, and local political party committees. The Commission’s database is 

created and maintained by the Commission pursuant to its statutory duties. The information in 

the database is drawn from reports filed with the Commission. The Commission’s current 

database includes, inter alia, information supplied by national, state, and local political party 

committees in their FEC reports

2. I have reviewed the records in the Commission’s database regarding total receipts of 

the national party committees of the Republican and Democratic parties: the Republican 

National Committee (RNC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), the 

National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), the Democratic National Committee 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-10 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 7
(DNC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and the Democratic 

Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC). Aggregate totals for the national party committees of 

the parties have not been adjusted to reflect any transfers among the national committees of each 

party. I have also reviewed figures in the Commission’s database regarding total receipts of the 

California Republican Party (“CRP”), the California Democratic Party (“CDP”), the Republican 

Party of San Diego County (“SDRP”), and the San Diego County Democratic Party (“SDDP”). 

3. The following tables contain figures representing the total hard and soft money 

receipts of the national committees of the Republican and Democratic parties for the last five full 

election cycles. 

Receipts RNC DNC 

Hard Money Soft Money Hard Money Soft Money 

2007-2008 $427,558,768 $260,111,657 

2005-2006 $243,007,131 $130,821,232 

2003-2004 $392,413,393 $404,352,278 

2001-2002 $170,099,094 $113,928,997 $67,492,507 $94,564,827 

1999-2000 $212,798,761 $166,207,843 $124,034,380 $136,563,419 

Receipts NRCC DCCC 

Hard Money Soft Money Hard Money Soft Money 

2007-2008 $118,324,756 $176,210,540 

2005-2006 $176,300,627 $139,994,367 

2003-2004 $185,719,489 $93,236,164 

2001-2002 $123,615,586 $69,677,506 $46,436,093 $56,446,802 

1999-2000 $97,314,513 $47,295,736 $48,394,476 $56,702,023 

Receipts NRSC DSCC 

Hard Money Soft Money Hard Money Soft Money 

2007-2008 $94,424,743 $162,791,453 

2005-2006 $88,812,386 $121,376,959 

2003-2004 $78,980,487 $88,659,299 

2001-2002 $59,161,387 $66,426,117 $48,391,653 $95,049,520 

1999-2000 $51,475,156 $44,652,709 $40,488,666 $63,717,982 

2

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-10 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 7
4. In each of the last two presidential election cycles, 2007-2008 and 2003-2004, the 

national party committees raised more hard money than they raised in hard and soft money 

combined in the last pre-BCRA presidential election cycle, 1999-2000. In the 2007-2008 

election cycles, the national party committees raised approximately $1,239,400,000 in hard 

money. In the 2003-2004 cycle, the national party committees raised approximately 

$1,243,300,000 in hard money. In 1999-2000, the national party committees raised 

approximately $574,500,000 in hard money and approximately $515,100,000 in soft money for a 

combined total of approximately $1,089,600,000. 

5. In the last non-presidential election cycle, 2005-2006, the national political party 

committees raised almost 90 percent as much in hard money alone as they had raised in hard and 

soft money combined in the previous non-presidential election cycle, 2001-2002. In the 2005-

2006 cycle, the national party committees raised approximately $900,200,000 in hard money 

alone. In 2001-2002, the national party committees raised approximately $515,200,000 in hard 

money and approximately $496,100,000 in soft money, for a combined total of approximately 

$1,011,300,000 in receipts. 

6. In each of the last two presidential election cycles, 2007-2008 and 2003-2004, the 

Republican National Committee raised more hard money than it raised in hard and soft money 

combined in the last pre-BCRA presidential election cycle, 1999-2000. In the 2007-2008 

election cycle, the RNC raised $427,558,768 in hard money. In the 2003-2004 cycle, the RNC 

raised $392,413,393 in hard money. In 1999-2000, the RNC raised approximately $212,798,761 

in hard money and $166,207,843 in soft money for a combined total of $379,006,604. 

3

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-10 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 7
7. In the last non-presidential election cycle, 2005-2006, the Republican National 

Committee itself raised approximately 85 percent as much in hard money alone as it had raised 

in hard and soft money combined in the previous non-presidential election cycle, 2001-2002. In 

the 2005-2006 cycle, the Republican National Committee raised $243,007,131 in hard money. 

In 2001-2002, the Republican National Committee raised $170,099,094 in hard money and 

$113,928,997 in soft money, for a combined total of $284,028,091. 

8. In the 2003-2004 election cycle, both the RNC and DNC raised about $400 

million each. In the 2007-2008 cycle, the RNC raised about 64% more hard money than the 

DNC; when the RNC raised $427.5 million, and the DNC raised $260.1 million. Similarly, in 

the 2005-2006 election cycle, the RNC raised about 85% more hard money than the DNC. The 

RNC raised $243.0 million, compared to the DNC’s $130.8 million. 

9. The following table contains figures representing the total hard money receipts of 

the California Republican and California Democratic parties for the last three full election cycles. 

Receipts California Republican Party California Democratic Party 

2007-2008 $14,003,033 $3,875,385

2005-2006 $10,777,559 $5,564,990

2003-2004 $13,344,526 $10,676,768

2001-2002 $9,254,295 $4,491,824

1999-2000 $18,479,664 $10,742,260

10. In the 2007-2008 election cycle, the CRP raised in excess of 3.5 times more hard 

money than the CDP. While the CRP raised $14.0 million, the CDP raised only $3.9 million. In 

the 2005-2006 election cycle, the CRP raised almost twice the hard money raised by the CDP, 

$10.8 million compared to $5.6 million. And in the 2003-2004 election cycle, the CRP again 

4

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-10 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 5 of 7
raised more hard money that the CDP. In that presidential election cycle, the CRP raised $13.3 

million to the CDP’s $10.7 million. 

11. The following table contains figures representing the total hard money receipts of 

the Republican Party of San Diego County (“RPSD”) and San Diego County Democratic 

(“SDDP”) Party for the past three full post-BCRA election cycles. 

Receipts Republican Party of San Diego County San Diego County Democratic Party 

2007-2008 $684,173 $773,934 

2005-2006 $648,137 $297,827 

2003-2004 $703,478 $121,803 

12. In the six years since BCRA became effective, the RPSD has raised considerably 

more hard money than the SDDP Party. The SDDP raised about $90,000 more hard dollars than 

the SDRP in the 2007-2008 election cycle. In the 2005-2006 cycle, the RPSD raised twice as 

much hard money as the SDDP. In that time, the RPSD raised $648,137 compared to the 

SDDP’s haul of $297,827. In the 2003-2004 election cycle, the RPSD raised in excess of 5.5 

times the amount of hard money raised by the SDDP. In that presidential election cycle, the 

RPSD raised $703,478 to the SDDP’s $121,803. 

13. The following table contains figures representing the aggregate total hard money 

receipts for the last three election cycles of the three national committees of the Republican 

Party; the RNC, the NRCC, and the NSRC; and the three national committees of the Democratic 

Party; the DNC, the DCCC, and the DSCC. 

5

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-10 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 6 of 7
Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-10 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 7 of 7
FEC Exhibit 34 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-11 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 3
Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-11 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 3
Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-11 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 3
FEC Exhibit 35 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-12 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 6
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IN THE NEWS < NEWS < HOMETuesday, May 24, 2005Memo From Chairman Mehlman Regarding GOTVEfforts In Special Elections

TO: Republican National Committee Members FROM: Ken Mehlman, Republican National Committee ChairmanRE: Special Elections Confirm the Importance of Grassroots Turnout EffortsDATE: 5/23/05The 72-Hour Program is the Republican get-out-the-vote (GOTV) plan that has helped the GOP expand our majorities in the U.S. Congress for two consecutive cycles, in addition to re-electing President George W. Bush.Examples of GOTV Success in 2004:President Bush received 12 million more votes than 2000, anincrease of 23% nationally.3.4 million new Republicans registered to vote. 1.4 million volunteers helped with our turnout efforts. More than 31 million volunteer phone calls and door knocks were made during 2004 in battleground states alone. More than 17 million of those volunteer contacts were madeduring the final five days of the election.The Republican National Committee (RNC) has spearheaded the GOTV effort by internalizing the mechanics of the program, testing new tactics, refining the efficiency and effectiveness, and implementing the plan both nationally and locally.Local races and in particular, special elections, give the RNC the opportunity to test new and improved targeting and tactics that we have been working to improve since the 2004 election. The national committee is making an unprecedented

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-12 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 2 of 
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commitment to local and special elections that are helping grow the party and ensure grassroots activists remained energized in the political process.And as part of the committee’s four-year plan to improve our grassroots effort, the RNC has deployed trained staff and resources into 2005 legislative and local special elections. Republicans have won four of the six special elections held since Election Day 2004, with grassroots being decisive in each.The RNC has deployed staff and resources into special elections with three main objectives:

Help Republican candidates win races, build on past success, and grow the party. Allow state and local party staff and volunteers to hone their political skills, using grassroots tactics employed by Bush-Cheney ’04 and the RNC. Provide the committee an opportunity to test new and improved targeting and tactics that have been improved since November.

Below are examples of special elections the RNC has participated in over the last several months.MISSOURI – STATE SENATE DISTRICT 22On April 5th, Missouri Republicans won an open Democrat state Senate seat in Dick Gephardt’s former Congressional District currently held by Democrat Russ Carnahan (MO-03). In a four-way race in a state district carried by Senator John Kerry this past November, Bill Alter won the tough campaign over a sitting Democrat state Representative.

A Republican has not held this seat in over 50 years. Extensive individual voter ID was conducted well in advance of Election Day. ID data was then utilized to turn out identified supporters, outside the Republican base. The GOP was able to increase support within non-base precincts by 5%, leading to a win by 72 votes in a recount. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported, “Jefferson County election officials planned today to count by hand a sampling of votes in an attempt to verify who won Tuesday's hottest – and, probably, closest – contest in the state: the 22nd District state Senate race.

“Republican Bill Alter of High Ridge held a 66-vote edge in unofficial results in the four-way fight. ‘I am very proud of this victory and honored to serve the people of this district,’ said Alter, a former state legislator, in a statement issued late Tuesday.” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 4/6/05)PENNSYLVANIA – STATE SENATE DISTRICT 16Pennsylvania Republicans and state Representative Pat Browne won an open Republican stateSenate seat in Pennsylvania’s Lehigh Valley on April 5th. The race pitted Browne against Jennifer Mann, Democrat state House member. Browne won convincingly in this swing district in large part because the GOP base turned out at a much higher rate than that of the Democrats.

This seat was vacated due to the election of former state Senator Charlie Dent (PA-15) to

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-12 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 3 of 
Congress. The entire Republican GOTV universe – nearly 12,000 households – was contacted at least once on Election Day via local volunteers going door-to-door. Areas that constitute more densely concentrated Republican votes were contacted two to three times.

The result of these GOTV efforts:

Overall turnout in Republican base precincts more than doubled turnout in Democrat base precincts. Turnout in the targeted Republican base precincts, where multiple personal volunteer contacts were made, more than tripled turnout in Democrat precincts.

The Allentown Morning Call reported, “Browne easily won the south and east sides ofAllentown, where his 131st House District had been based before redistricting in 2001... ‘The people who had been represented by Pat Browne for a long time thought that he did a good job for them and they stood by him,’ said Jack Pressman, Mann’s campaign manager.” (Dan Sheehan, Daryl Nerl & Dan Hartzell, Allentown Morning Call, 4/6/05)

NEBRASKA - LINCOLN CITY COUNCILOn May 3rd, Nebraska Republicans ousted a popular Democrat incumbent in a Lincoln city council race by delivering the top two vote getters, Ken Svoboda and Robin Eschliman, in the hotly contested municipal election (i.e. top three vote getters were elected).

Republicans tested the absentee ballot program, which bolstered Republican turnout well before Election Day. 13,803 contacts (phone calls and door knocks) were made in the final four days of the campaign. Republican turnout increased by more than 22.8% over the city council elections in 2001. The Lincoln Journal Star reported directly after the primary that, “State Democratic Party Director Barry Rubin said that while his party traditionally has done a better job of contacting, persuading and turning out voters in Lincoln, the Republicans are getting better at it.

“‘We’ve taken notice, and we’re gonna do what we gotta do,’ he said.” (Deena Winter, Lincoln

Journal Star, 4/6/05)

The Lincoln Journal Star reported after the general, “Svoboda ... will be joined on the council by newcomer Robin Eschliman, who got 21,800 votes, or 19 percent. Both Svoboda and Eschliman are Republicans. Democrat Dan Marvin squeezed into the third open seat on the council with 18,819 votes, nearly 17 percent ...“Svoboda said the Republican Party also worked overtime behind the scenes to get people to vote. ‘This is very unlike Republicans to get involved in a race from a standpoint of making the phone calls and walking the precincts,’ Svoboda said. ‘This was a very good push by Republicans.’” (Deena Winter, Lincoln Journal Star, 5/4/05)NEW YORK – STATE SENATE DISTRICT 57New York Republicans and Assemblywoman Cathy Young convincingly won a Republicanopen state Senate seat on May 10th. While the district leans Republican, our candidate’s performance far outpaced those of many other Republicans in the same district.

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Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-12 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 4 of 
The seat was vacant as result of the death of former Republican State Senator Pat

McGee.Even though the district only maintains a 7% Republican registration advantage, our candidate won by 39% of the vote. In the Democrat’s base county Chautauqua, Democrats outnumber Republicans by wellover 200 registered voters, yet Republican-candidate Cathy Young won the county with 60.5% of the vote (more than 4,000 votes).The Buffalo News reported, “Catharine M. Young defeated Democrat Nancy Gay Bargar, a real estate executive, in a special election Tuesday to fill the seat left vacant by the April 2 death of Republican Patricia K. McGee.

“With all precincts reporting, Young, a Republican assemblywoman from Olean, had 28,100 votes, or 70 percent, compared with Bargar's 12,161 votes, or 30 percent, to win the 57th Senate District seat.” (Kathy Kellogg, Buffalo News, 511/05)TENNESSEE – STATE SENATE DISTRICT 33On May 10th, while losing a state Senate special election in Tennessee, Republicans continue to learn we can compete anywhere. In a district that voted 4-to-1 Democrat-to-Republican in 2004, Republicans ran a strong candidate in Mary Ann McNeil, and increased performance among Republicans by more than 10%.

No Republican has ever held this South Memphis-based State Senate seat. Turnout in the Republican base precincts was 8.2%, 2.5 times greater than that of turnout in the Democrat base precincts which was 2.9%.

PENNSYLVANIA- STATE SENATE DISTRICT 42On May 17th, while losing a state Senate special election in Pennsylvania, Republicans continued to improve voter performance. In a district that falls primarily within the city limits of Pittsburgh, where Republicans have not held a Senate seat in 60 years, and boasts a 3-to-1 Democrat-to-Republican registration gap, Republicans ran a strong candidate, state Representative Michael Diven. Diven, a lifelong Democrat, switched parties in January to better represent his constituents and participate in the party that shares his beliefs. The Republican candidate continued to reach out to Pittsburgh voters including African Americans, labor unions, and Catholics. By way of 250 Election Day volunteers, 15,000 voters were contacted in the campaign’s door-to-door effort.

On the same day as a competitive Democrat primary for Mayor of Pittsburgh, our Republican candidate improved GOP performance in city districts by 7% from 2004. The Democratic candidate ran an average of 12% points behind traditional Democrat numbers in the city precincts.

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FEC Exhibit 36 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-13 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 3
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IN THE NEWS < NEWS < HOMETuesday, March 17, 2009RNC Makes Additional Investment in NortheastRepublican Leadership

WASHINGTON - The Republican National Committee (RNC) todayannounced a second transfer of $100,000 to the New YorkRepublican State Committee, bringing the total to $200,000 in thepast month."The RNC is proud to make another investment in our state partiesand the hard workers in our grassroots organizations. I am confidentthis additional investment will help ensure victory in the specialelection in New York's 20th Congressional district. These funds willbe used to further show our commitment to re-establishing a strongGOP presence in the Northeast," said Chairman Michael Steele.

News Blog Take Action! Issues About the GOP State Parties GOP Stuff Connect Donors

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FEC Exhibit 37 

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FEC Exhibit 38 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

_______________________________________ 

 ) 

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE, ) 

et al., ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) Civ. No. 08-1953 (BMK, RJL, RMC) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

et al., ) NOTICE 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

_______________________________________) 

NOTICE OF FILING UNDER SEAL 

Pursuant to the Court’s Protective Order dated March 10, 2009 (Docket No. 43), 

Defendant Federal Election Commission (“Commission”) hereby submits the following 

documents under seal: 

(1) The Commission’s unredacted Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, which 

includes material that was redacted from paragraphs 6 and 14 of the electronically 

filed version of that document; and 

(2) FEC Exhibits 39, 40, and 41. 

Courtesy copies of the sealed material are being delivered to each Judge’s Chambers, and 

additional copies are being sent by e-mail to counsel for Plaintiffs and Intervenor-Defendant Van 

Hollen. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan (D.C. Bar No. 424222) 

General Counsel 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Case 1:08-cv-01953-RJL-RMC Document 56-16 Filed 04/10/2009 Page 1 of 2
2

Kevin Deeley 

Assistant General Counsel 

 /s/ Adav Noti 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Attorney 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

Dated: April 10, 2009 (202) 694-1650 

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