ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED MAY 16, 2013 

 

No. 12-5365 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

WENDY E. WAGNER, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia, Case No. 1:11-cv-01841-JEB 

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, 

DEMOCRACY 21 AND PUBLIC CITIZEN IN SUPPORT OF 

APPELLEE AND URGING AFFIRMANCE 

Fred Wertheimer 

DEMOCRACY 21 

2000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

(202) 429-2008 

Donald J. Simon 

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE

ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP 

1425 K Street, NW, Suite 600 

Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 682-0240 

Counsel for Amici Curiae

 

J. Gerald Hebert 

Tara Malloy 

Paul S. Ryan 

Megan McAllen 

THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER

215 E Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20002 

(202) 736-2200 

Scott Nelson 

PUBLIC CITIZEN

1600 20th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20009 

(202) 588-1000 

Counsel for Amici Curiae 

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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS AND RELATED CASES 

(A) Parties and Amici. Wendy E. Wagner, Lawrence M. E. Brown, and Jan 

W. Miller were the plaintiffs in the district court and are the appellants in this 

Court. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) was the defendant in the district 

court and is the appellee in this Court. The Campaign Legal Center and 

Democracy 21 filed a brief amici curiae in the district court; the Campaign Legal 

Center and Democracy 21, joined by Public Citizen, are filing a brief amici curiae

with this Court. 

(B) Rulings Under Review. Plaintiffs appeal the final order of the United 

States District Court for the District of Columbia (Boasberg, J.) (Nov. 2, 2012) 

granting the Commission’s motion for summary judgment. That order 

incorporates by reference the district court’s earlier order denying plaintiffs’ 

motion for a preliminary injunction (Boasberg, J.) (Apr. 16, 2012). The district 

court’s opinions are available at Wagner v. FEC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 

2012), and Wagner v. FEC, 2012 WL 5378224 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2012). 

(C) Related Cases. The amici are aware of no “related cases” as defined in 

D.C. Cir. R. 28(a)(1)(C). 

 

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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT OF 

AMICI CURIAE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, DEMOCRACY 21 AND 

PUBLIC CITIZEN 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, amici curiae

Campaign Legal Center, Democracy 21 and Public Citizen make the following 

disclosure regarding their corporate status: 

 The Campaign Legal Center (CLC) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan corporation 

working in the areas of campaign finance reform, voting rights and media law. 

The CLC has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation has any form 

of ownership interest in the CLC. 

 Democracy 21 is a nonprofit, nonpartisan corporation dedicated to making 

democracy work for all Americans, including promoting campaign finance reform 

and other political reforms to accomplish these goals. Democracy 21 has no parent 

corporation and no publicly held corporation has any form of ownership interest in 

Democracy 21. 

Public Citizen, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation dedicated to openness in 

government and the protection of individuals against overreaching by government 

and corporate entities alike. Public Citizen has no parent corporation and no 

publicly held corporation has any form of ownership interest in it. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS AND RELATED CASES ........ i 

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .................................................... ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. v 

STATEMENT OF INTEREST .............................................................................. 1 

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................... 1 

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 4 

I. A Review of State and Local Laws Demonstrates That Legislatures 

Across the Country Have Recognized the Potential for Corruption 

Posed by Campaign Contributions by Governmental Contractors. .......... 4 

A. State and Local Laws Limiting Government Contractor 

Contributions Reflect a Shared Interest in Safeguarding the 

Integrity of Government Contracting. ............................................. 4 

B. Enactment of State Contractor Contribution Regulations Is 

Often Prompted by Instances of Quid Pro Quo Corruption in 

Contracting. ..................................................................................... 6 

C. Courts Have Widely Held That Restricting Government 

Contractor Contributions Is an Appropriate Defense Against 

Actual and Apparent Corruption. .................................................... 9 

II. The Federal Contractor Contribution Ban is Constitutional.................... 13 

A. Strict Scrutiny Does Not Apply..................................................... 13 

B. Section 441c Constitutionally Advances the Important 

Government Interest in Preventing Actual and Apparent 

Corruption in Federal Contracting. ............................................... 15 

C. Section 441c Is Closely Drawn to Advance the Government’s 

Anti-Corruption Interest. ............................................................... 18 

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1. Section 441c Applies to Contributions to Federal 

Candidates, Party Committees and Political Action 

Committees. ......................................................................... 18 

2. Section 441c Applies to the Contracting Entity Only. ........ 22 

3. Section 441c Is a Prohibition. ............................................. 25 

D. Section 441c Is Not Underinclusive. ............................................. 27 

CONCLUSION. ..................................................................................................... 30 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................. 32 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. ........................................................................... 33 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

*Cases and authorities chiefly relied upon are marked with an asterisk. 

Cases: 

Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995) .................................................... 17, 27

*Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ............................................. 14, 17, 27, 28, 30

Casino Ass’n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So.2d 494 (La. 2002) ................... 11 

Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) ........................................................ 22 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) ............................ 1, 23

Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010) .................................................. 11, 12

DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2009) ............................................. 12

FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) ......................................... 28 

FEC v. Weinstein, 462 F. Supp. 243 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ............................................ 16 

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ............... 22

Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 

(2d Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 9, 17, 25

In Re Earle Asphalt Co., 950 A.2d 918 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008), aff’d, 

966 A.2d 460 (N.J. 2009) (per curiam) ................................................................... 11 

Lavin v. Husted, 684 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2012) ....................................................... 13

*McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) .......................................... 1, 14, 16, 21, 26

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) ..................................... 3 

Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2nd Cir. 2011) .............................. 10, 17, 20, 29 

Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2011) ...................................................... 18

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) ................................................................. 14

Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. 1976) ....................... 11

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Soto v. New Jersey, 565 A.2d 1088 (N.J. 1989) ..................................................... 11

United Auto Workers, Local Union 1112 v. Brunner, 911 N.E. 2d 327 (Ohio 

Ct. App. 2009) .................................................................................................... 12-13

United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007) ............................................ 7 

United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 

12-579 (Feb. 25, 2012) ............................................................................................ 13 

Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Haw. 2012), appeal docketed, 

No. 12-15913 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012). .................................... 10, 11, 15, 19, 20, 25

Statutes and Regulations: 

*2 U.S.C. § 441c ............................................. 1-4, 6, 9, 12, 14-16, 18, 21, 22, 25-29

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4) .............................................................................................. 21

2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4) .............................................................................................. 23

2 U.S.C. § 441f ........................................................................................................ 26

Cal. Gov’t Code § 84308. ....................................................................................... 4-6 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-601(1)-(2) .............................................................................. 21 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(C) ............................................................................ 6 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(C)-(E) ...................................................................... 6 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(D) .......................................................................... 21 

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F) ........................................................................... 20 

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-355 ................................................................................ 4, 6, 10 

30 Ill. Comp. Stat. 500/50-37 .................................................................................... 4 

30 Ill. Comp. Stat. 500/50-37(a) ............................................................................... 6 

Ind. Code § 4-30-3-19.5 ........................................................................................ 4, 5 

Ind. Code § 4-30-3-19.7 ........................................................................................ 4, 5 

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Ind. Code § 4-30-3-19.7(e) ........................................................................................ 6 

Ind. Code § 4-30-3-19.7(f) ........................................................................................ 6 

Ind. Code § 4-30-3-19.7(j) ........................................................................................ 6 

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 121.330 .................................................................................. 6 

L.A., Cal., City Charter § 470(c)(12) ........................................................................ 5 

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:1505.2(L) ........................................................................... 4 

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27:261 ..................................................................................... 5 

Md. Code, Elec. Law § 14-101, et seq.... .................................................................. 5 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 432.207b ................................................................................. 4 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 9-835. ............................................................................................ 5 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 9-803. ............................................................................................ 4 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-1476.01. ................................................................................... 4 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-1476.01(1) ............................................................................... 5 

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:44A-20.13 ................................................................................. 6 

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:44A-20.14 ................................................................................. 6 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-191.1 .................................................................................... 6 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-191.1(E) .............................................................................. 4 

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-702(18) ......................................................................... 5, 6 

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-703(1-a) ........................................................................ 5, 6 

N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-703(1-b) ........................................................................... 5 

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3517.13(I)-(Z) ..................................................................... 6 

25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3620a ......................................................................................... 5 

R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-27-2 .......................................................................................... 5 

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R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-27-3 .......................................................................................... 5 

S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1342. ................................................................................ 4, 6 

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 109 ....................................................................................... 5 

Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3104.01................................................................................ 5, 6 

W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-8-12. ..................................................................................... 6 

2008 Ill. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act 95-971 ...................................................................... 7 

N. J. Pub. L. 2005, c. 51 ............................................................................................ 8 

Administrative Rules and Materials: 

11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c) ................................................................................................ 21 

11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b) ................................................................................................ 26 

5 C.F.R. § 734.303 .................................................................................................. 29 

5 C.F.R. § 734.408-12 ............................................................................................. 29 

N.J. Admin. Code § 19:25-24.1 ................................................................................ 6 

N.J. Admin. Code § 19:25-24.2 ................................................................................ 6 

Less Restricted Employees—Political Restrictions and Prohibited Activities, 

U.S. Office of Special Counsel, 

http://www.osc.gov/haFederalLessRestrisctionandActivities.htm. ........................ 29 

N.J. Comm’n of Investigation, N.J. Enhanced Motor Vehicle Inspection 

Contract, at 1-2 (2002), available at

http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/mvinspect.pdf ............................................................ 8 

Miscellaneous Resources: 

Jack Maskell, Cong. Research Serv., RL 34725, Political Activities of 

Private Recipients of Federal Grants or Contracts (Oct. 21, 2008) ...................... 28 

Mike McIntire and Jeff Zeleny, Obama’s Effort on Ethics Bill Had Role in 

Governor’s Fall, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2008, 

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http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/us/politics/10chicago.html?pagewanted

=all ......................................................................................................................... 7, 8 

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STATEMENT OF INTEREST1

Amici curiae Campaign Legal Center, Democracy 21 and Public Citizen are 

non-partisan, non-profit organizations that work to strengthen the laws governing 

campaign finance and political disclosure. Amici have participated in several of 

the Supreme Court cases underlying the claims herein, including McConnell v. 

FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 

876 (2010). Amici thus have a demonstrated interest in the issues raised here. 

All parties have consented to amici’s participation in this case. 

INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

 The district court below upheld the 70-year old federal restriction on 

campaign contributions from government contractors, 2 U.S.C. § 441c, 

recognizing that Congress passed the restriction “to prevent corruption and the 

appearance thereof and, in so doing, to protect the integrity of the electoral system 

by ensuring that federal contracts were awarded based on merit.” Wagner v. FEC, 

854 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Wagner v. FEC, --- F. Supp. 2d ----

, 2012 WL 5378224, at *10 (D.D.C. 2012). Plaintiffs-appellants Wagner, et al. 

(the “Wagner contractors”) make no arguments that would justify a reversal of this 

decision. 

 

1

 No party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 

person, other than the amici curiae, contributed money intended to fund the 

preparation or submission of this brief.

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The Wagner contractors object that Section 441c is unsupported by current 

evidence of corruption in federal contracting, that it is both overbroad and 

underinclusive, and that it violates principles of equal protection. In this Brief, 

amici curiae will focus on the Wagner contractors’ arguments about the evidence 

of corruption and the statute’s tailoring. Amici will not separately analyze the 

equal protection argument because the Wagner contractors have conceded that 

“there is considerable overlap” between their First Amendment and equal 

protection claims, see Pls.’ Stmt. of Pts. and Authorities in Support of Mot. for 

Prelim. Inj., at 18 (Jan. 31, 2012) (“Pls.’ PI Br.”), and that they “kn[o]w of no case 

in which an equal-protection challenge to contribution limits succeeded where a 

First Amendment one did not.” Wagner, 2012 WL 5378224, at *10.2

The Wagner contractors assert that there is no current evidence that federal 

officeholders award contracts or seek to influence the award of contracts to reward 

contributors, indicating that the record of corruption in this case is inferior to the 

evidence that led to the enactment of recent state contractor contribution 

restrictions. Wagner, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 81; Plaintiffs’-Appellants’ Principal Brief 

(“Wagner Br.”) 45. See also Pls.’ PI Br. 30, 35. But the Wagner contractors’ 

complaint about this lack of evidence is proof of the statute’s success, not its 

infirmity. Given that the federal ban has been in place for over 70 years, it has 

 

2

 Amici agree with the FEC’s analysis of this claim. See Brief of the Federal 

Election Commission 48-60 (Feb. 20, 2013). 

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surely prevented the very corruption that the Wagner contractors claim is 

lacking—a point they concede. Wagner Br. 45. But insofar as instances of recent 

corruption would aid the consideration of this challenge, this Court can look to the 

experience of a number of states and municipalities that have enacted pay-to-play 

laws. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000) 

(sustaining state contribution limits in part because of the record of apparent 

corruption in federal elections that led to enactment of federal limits). A survey of 

state law illustrates the ubiquity of contracting scandals at all levels of government 

and “substantiate[s] the corruption worries that attend contributions by government 

contractors.” Wagner, 2012 WL 5378224, at *6. 

Second, the Wagner contractors devote much of their argument to 

challenging the tailoring of section 441c, listing a range of defects that supposedly 

renders the law both overbroad and underinclusive, and attacking policy details 

from the law’s coverage of “sole source” contracts to its exclusion of military 

academy students and federal loan recipients. Wagner Br. 49 n.7, 52-54. But few

of these objections directly relate to the class of contractors at issue here—

individuals with personal service contracts. Indeed, the Wagner contractors’ brief 

reads more like a policy paper than a constitutional argument: in essence, they ask 

this Court to assume a legislative role and tinker with section 441c in ways that 

would not even bring relief to the Wagner contractors. Their attempt to “throw out 

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. . . First Amendment objections to see what sticks” in no way casts doubt on the 

tailoring of section 441c. Wagner, 2012 WL 5378224, at *9. Such objections to 

the minutiae of the statute are better directed to Congress than to this Court. 

ARGUMENT 

I. A Review of State and Local Laws Demonstrates That Legislatures 

Across the Country Have Recognized the Potential for Corruption 

Posed by Campaign Contributions by Governmental Contractors. 

The prevalence of state and municipal pay-to-play laws, many passed in 

direct response to scandals involving quid pro quo exchanges, demonstrates that 

campaign activity by contractors and prospective contractors is widely and 

reasonably perceived to pose a threat of political corruption. 

A. State and Local Laws Limiting Government Contractor 

Contributions Reflect a Shared Interest in Safeguarding the 

Integrity of Government Contracting. 

In recent years, a growing number of states and localities have taken steps to 

limit the role of political contributions in government contracting. At least 

seventeen states have enacted limits or prohibitions on campaign contributions 

from prospective and/or current governmental contractors or licensees.3

 A number 

 

3

 Cal. Gov’t Code § 84308(d); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-612(g)(1), (2); Haw. 

Rev. Stat. § 11-355; 30 Ill. Comp. Stat. 500/50-37; Ind. Code §§ 4-30-3-19.5, -

19.7; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §121.330; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18:1505.2(L), id. § 

27:261(D); Mich. Comp. Laws § 432.207b; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 9-803, 49-1476.01; 

N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 19:44A-20.13, -.14; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-191.1(E); Ohio Rev. 

Code § 3517.13(I)-(Z); 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 895.704-A(a); S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-

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of municipalities, including New York City and Los Angeles, have followed suit.4

 

Two more states, Maryland and Rhode Island, have political disclosure 

requirements specific to contractors.5

 

Pay-to-play laws vary greatly from one jurisdiction to the next. Some 

statutes apply to a broad range of contracts and cover grants, licenses and other 

individualized state benefits,6

 while others are targeted to particular types of 

contracts. States variously define the subject class of contracts as, inter alia, 

industry-specific contracts,7

 contracts not subject to competitive bidding,8 or both 

competitive and no-bid contracts.9

 

 

1342; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 109(B); Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3104.01; W. Va. Code 

§ 3-8-12(d). 

4

 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 3-702(18), 3-703(1-a), (1-b); L.A., Cal., City 

Charter § 470(c)(12). 

5

 See Md. Code, Elec. Law § 14-101, et seq.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-27-2, -3. 

Several of the states that restrict contractor campaign contributions also require 

contractors to file disclosure reports. See, e.g., 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3260a(a). 

6

 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-702(18) (defining “business dealings 

with the city” to include contracts, real property transactions with the 

City, franchises, concessions, grants, pension fund investment contracts, economic 

development agreements, and land use actions); Cal. Gov’t Code § 84308(a)(5) 

(defining covered entitlements as “business, professional, trade and land use 

licenses and permits and all other entitlements for use, . . . and all franchises”). 

7

 See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 4-30-3-19.5, 19.7 (state lottery contracts); La. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. § 27:261 (casino licensees); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 9-835, 49-1476.01(1) 

(state lottery contracts). 

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Many states’ laws cover contracts for personal services, such as the 

consulting contracts of appellants Brown and Miller, although there is some 

variation. While a few statutes regulate specific subgroups of contracts or licenses 

that do not include contracts for personal services,

10 most state statutes either 

define “contracts” broadly enough to include service contracts,11 or explicitly cover 

contracts for “services” or “personal services.”12

 

B. Enactment of State Contractor Contribution Regulations Is Often 

Prompted by Instances of Quid Pro Quo Corruption in

Contracting. 

As was the case for section 441c, state and municipal pay-to-play laws were 

frequently enacted in response to scandals involving attempts by contractors to 

 

8

 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 84308(a)(5); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 121.330; 

S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1342; Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-3104.01. See also Mun. Sec. 

Rulemaking Bd. rule G-37. 

9

 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(C); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-355(a); 30 

Ill. Comp. Stat. 500/50-37(a) (excluding highway projects eligible for federal 

funds); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:44A-20.13 et seq. (excluding federal highway projects 

and those involving eminent domain); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-191.1; Ohio Rev. 

Code Ann. § 3517.13(A)(4); W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-8-12. 

10

 See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 84308(a)(5). 

11

 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 121.330(2); S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-1342 

12

 See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-612(g)(1)(C)-(E), (g)(2); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-

355(a); Ind. Code §§ 4-30-3-19.7(e), (f), (j); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:44A-20.14; see 

also N.J. Admin. Code §§ 19:25-24.1, -24.2; W.Va. Code Ann. § 3-8-12(d). See 

also N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 3-702(18), 3-703(1-a). 

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purchase influence over procurement processes by making or soliciting campaign 

contributions. 

For instance, Illinois’ government-contractor contribution ban was enacted 

in the wake of repeated pay-to-play scandals. See 2008 Ill. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act 

95-971. While serving as Illinois’s Secretary of State in the 1990s, Governor 

George Ryan steered leases and contracts to businesses controlled by an associate 

in exchange for kickbacks, including financial support for Ryan’s successful 1998 

gubernatorial campaign. United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 675 (7th Cir. 

2007). He was ultimately convicted of 18 felony charges including racketeering 

and fraud. Id. In the wake of Ryan’s conviction and other pay-to-play abuses, 

Illinois legislators enacted a state-contractor contribution ban—over the fervent 

opposition of Ryan’s notorious successor, then-Governor Rod Blagojevich. 

According to testimony at Blagojevich’s first trial, after his veto failed, 

Blagojevich sought to raise as much money from state contractors as possible 

before the law’s January 1, 2009, effective date. Mike McIntire & Jeff Zeleny, 

Obama’s Effort on Ethics Bill Had Role in Governor’s Fall, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 

2008, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/us/politics/10chicago.html?pagewanted=all. 

Federal agents were tipped off to the Governor’s redoubled efforts, and their 

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ensuing wiretap recorded his most spectacular feat of “pay-to-play”—his attempt 

to sell the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by President-elect Obama. Id.

Passage of New Jersey’s contractor contribution ban in 2005 also followed 

contractor corruption scandals. N. J. Pub. L. 2005, c. 51. One of the largest 

involved the award of an almost $400 million contract to Parsons Infrastructure & 

Technology Group to privatize automobile inspections. Although the contract was 

required to be awarded through a competitive bidding process, Parsons was the 

sole bidder. N.J. Comm’n of Investigation, N.J. Enhanced Motor Vehicle 

Inspection Contract, at 1-2 (2002), available at

http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/mvinspect.pdf. The system broke down weeks after 

its launch—with cost overruns exceeding $200 million—prompting an 

investigation that revealed how Parsons had used a “political strategy,” including 

lobbying and campaign support, to obtain the contract. Id. This “political 

strategy” enabled Parsons to receive exclusive information from senior officials 

prior to the publication of the state’s Request for Proposals, giving it “a head start 

on the deployment of corporate resources for a bid submission.” Id. at 3-4. The 

investigation concluded that the bidding process had been “tainted at key intervals 

by political considerations and by the granting of favored treatment.” Id. at 3. 

These examples represent only a fraction of the pay-to-play scandals that 

have arisen in government contracting. See also FEC Br. 12-15. And arguments 

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that the contracting systems in Illinois, New Jersey and other states are different 

from the federal system, see, e.g., Wagner Br. 45, miss the point. Although state 

and federal procurement processes undoubtedly differ, the prevalence of quid pro 

quo schemes at the state and local levels demonstrates that concerns about the 

corruptive potential of campaign activity by government contractors are legitimate 

and grounded in experience. In light of abundant examples of pay-to-play 

behavior, the district court rightly concluded that “[i]t in no way stretches the 

imagination to envision that individuals might make campaign contributions to 

curry political favor.” Wagner, 2012 WL 1255145, at *7. 

C. Courts Have Widely Held That Restricting Government 

Contractor Contributions Is an Appropriate Defense Against 

Actual and Apparent Corruption. 

In light of the ubiquity of pay-to-play practices, it is unsurprising that the 

courts have generally approved state restrictions on contractor contributions. 

In Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010), the 

Second Circuit upheld a Connecticut law banning contributions from state 

contractors. Unlike section 441c, the law applied not just to the contracting 

individual or entity, but also to certain “principals” and immediate family members 

of contractors. Id. at 202. Observing that the federal law is more limited in scope, 

the court nevertheless found that Connecticut had a valid anti-corruption interest in 

its expansive ban: “[T]he dangers of corruption associated with contractor 

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10

contributions are so significant . . . that the General Assembly should be afforded 

leeway in its efforts to curb contractors’ influence on state lawmakers.” Id. at 203. 

A subsequent Second Circuit decision also recognized that special 

restrictions on state contractors were justified by the governmental interest in 

preventing the actuality and appearance of corruption. In Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 

F.3d 174 (2nd Cir. 2011), the Court upheld a New York City provision imposing 

additional limitations on campaign contributions by entities “doing business” with 

the City. Noting the series of pay-to-play scandals in New York City preceding 

enactment of the law, the Court found that there was “no doubt that [contractor] 

contributions have a negative impact on the public because they promote the 

perception that one must ‘pay to play.’” Id. at 179. 

Similarly, a district court in Hawaii recently upheld that state’s broad ban on 

contractor contributions. Yamada v. Weaver, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Haw. 

2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-15913 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2012). The Hawaii law 

prohibits all contractors, regardless of the amount of their contracts, from making 

contributions to candidate and non-candidate committees. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 11-

355. The court upheld the ban based on the government’s interest in preventing 

actual and apparent corruption, finding that “[t]he legislative history of [the law] 

confirms that Hawaii’s Legislature passed the government contractor contribution 

ban in large part precisely because of these concerns—prevention of both actual 

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11

corruption and its appearance.” 872 F. Supp. at 1049; see also id. at n.27 

(recounting corruption scandals that preceded law). 

State courts have likewise sustained strict contractor contribution limits. 

See, e.g., In Re Earle Asphalt Co., 950 A.2d 918, 325 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008) 

(“In sum, the State’s interest in insulating the negotiation and award of State 

contracts from political contributions that pose the risk of improper influence, . . . 

or the appearance thereof, is a sufficiently important interest to justify a [$300] 

limitation upon political contributions.”) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted), aff’d, 966 A.2d 460 (N.J. 2009) (per curiam). Relatedly, state courts 

have also upheld a range of contribution restrictions applicable to certain highly 

regulated industries deemed to pose a heightened threat of political corruption. 

See, e.g., Casino Ass’n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So.2d 494 (La. 2002) 

(upholding state law prohibiting any political contributions from officers, directors, 

and certain employees in the casino industry, and their spouses); Soto v. New 

Jersey, 565 A.2d 1088 (N.J. 1989) (upholding similar prohibition on casinoindustry contributions); Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. 

1976) (upholding law prohibiting political contributions from any officer, 

associate, agent, representative, or employee of a liquor licensee). 

The Wagner contractors’ reliance on Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 

2010), is misplaced. That decision, which invalidated a Colorado law banning 

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12

contractor contributions, is readily distinguishable from this case. Indeed, the 

Colorado Supreme Court specifically distinguished the federal ban as far less 

burdensome than the state restriction, because the state law applied to the 

contracting entity as well as to a broadly defined class of family members and 

associates; 13 remained in effect from the beginning of negotiations until two years 

after the contract’s completion; and imposed harsh penalties for violations. Id. at 

617 (noting that violators were ineligible to hold state office or state contracts for 

three years, and government officials who knowingly violated the restriction were 

punishable by removal from office and disqualification from future office). While 

the Wagner contractors correctly point out that the Colorado law only applied to 

sole-source contracts valued above a $100,000 threshold, see Wagner Br. 49, that 

fact hardly renders it less restrictive than section 441c. Given the expansive scope 

of the Colorado law, Dallman provides scant support for the Wagner contractors’ 

constitutional arguments.14

 

 

13 The Colorado law defined “immediate family member” as “any spouse, 

child, spouse’s child, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, parent, sibling, grandparent, 

grandchild, stepbrother, stepsister, stepparent, parent-in-law, brother-in-law, sisterin-law, aunt, niece, nephew, guardian, or domestic partner.” Dallman, 225 P.3d at 

618. 

14 Only a handful of other cases have invalidated local pay-to-play laws, and 

they were decided on grounds not relevant to this case. See, e.g., DePaul v. 

Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2009) (invalidating restriction on gaming 

licensee contributions under Pennsylvania Constitution, but finding that state 

Constitution “provides broader protections of expression than the related First 

Amendment guarantee”); United Auto Workers, Local Union 1112 v. Brunner, 911 

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13

II. The Federal Contractor Contribution Ban Is Constitutional.

A. Strict Scrutiny Does Not Apply. 

The district court was correct to apply “closely drawn” scrutiny rather than 

strict scrutiny to the Wagner contractors’ First Amendment claims. Wagner, 854 

F. Supp. 2d at 88. The Supreme Court held in FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 

162 (2003), that laws regulating contributions are subject to “closely drawn” 

scrutiny, regardless whether the law takes the form of a limit or a ban. And all 

lower courts to have considered this issue following Citizens United have rejected 

the Wagner contractors’ contention that Citizens United cast doubt on Beaumont’s 

analysis of the scrutiny applicable to contribution limits. See, e.g., United States v. 

Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 618-19 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 12-579 (Feb. 

25, 2012). 

 In the court below, the Wagner contractors incorrectly asserted that amici

are effectively advocating use of a rational basis standard. Pls’ Response to Mem. 

of Amici, at 1-2 (Aug. 30, 2012). They argue that that judicial deference to 

Congress’s judgment in matters of campaign finance, as urged by amici, is 

 

N.E. 2d 327 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (invalidating amendments to Ohio contractor 

contribution limits on the basis of a procedural deficiency with the law’s 

enactment, and not under the First Amendment); Lavin v. Husted, 684 F.3d 543, 

547-48 (6th Cir. 2012) (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) (striking down law criminalizing 

contributions from state Medicaid providers to Attorney General and county 

prosecutor candidates, after state conceded a lack of evidence from Ohio or 

elsewhere linking campaign contributions to abuse of prosecutorial discretion). 

None of these decisions casts any doubt on the constitutionality of the federal ban. 

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incompatible with “closely drawn” scrutiny. Id.; see also Wagner Br. 21 

(complaining that district court “gave substantial deference to Congress, almost as 

if section 441c were subject to rational basis review”). But the Wagner contractors 

are simply wrong. In applying “closely drawn” scrutiny, the Supreme Court has 

consistently given deference to Congress’s expertise in regulating political 

contributions. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (noting the Court has 

“ordinarily” “deferred to the legislature’s determination of [contribution limits]”); 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137 (“The less rigorous standard of review we have 

applied to contribution limits (Buckley’s ‘closely drawn’ scrutiny) shows proper 

deference to Congress’ ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an 

area in which it enjoys particular expertise.”); Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155 (“[W]e 

have understood that such deference to legislative choice is warranted particularly 

when Congress regulates campaign contributions . . .”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 

1, 30 (1976) (noting that “a court has no scalpel to probe” details of contribution 

limits formulated by Congress). 

Indeed, the nature of the Wagner contractors’ attack on section 441c 

underscores the appropriateness of according deference to the legislature. To 

support their overbreadth claim, the Wagner contractors in the district court 

suggested a laundry list of revisions to section 441c that they believed would 

narrow the law without undermining its pay-to-play rationale. See Pls.’ Stmt. of 

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15

Pts. and Authorities in Support of Mot. Summ. J., at 10-13 (Jan. 31, 2012). They 

suggest, inter alia, that Congress should exempt both “sole source” and 

competitively bid contracts, establish a minimum amount for regulated contracts, 

and substitute a contribution restriction with a disqualification protocol. Id.; see 

also Wagner Br. 49 n.7, 48-51. But their list of proposed reforms simply 

underscores that the details of formulating contribution restrictions are best left to 

Congress. “[Q]uestions such as whether to apply the ban only to non-bid 

contractors or only large contractors, whether to allow small contributions or allow 

no contributions, or whether principals of contractors may contribute, are all 

legislative choices.” Yamada, 872 F. Supp. 2d. at 1062. A court need not apply

“rational basis review” to recognize that politicians might have a particular 

expertise in matters of political fundraising. “Closely drawn scrutiny” is consistent 

with deference to Congress’s judgment regarding campaign contributions. 

B. Section 441c Constitutionally Advances the Important 

Government Interest in Preventing Actual and Apparent 

Corruption in Federal Contracting. 

The FEC documented that the ban now found at 2 U.S.C. § 441c was 

enacted more than 70 years ago to respond to corruption in the federal contracting 

process, specifically the Democratic “campaign book scandal.” See Wagner, 2012 

WL 1255145, at *6; FEC Br. 6-8. As the court below recognized, the prohibition 

on contributions from federal contractors thus serves the important state interest in 

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“protect[ing] the integrity of the electoral system by ensuring that federal contracts 

[are] awarded based on merit.” Wagner, 2012 WL 1255145, at *5; see also FEC v. 

Weinstein, 462 F. Supp. 243, 248 (D.C.N.Y. 1978) (approving section 441c and 

noting that “the importance of the governmental interest” in preventing electoral 

corruption “through the creation of political debts” had “never been doubted”). 

The Wagner contractors do not deny that the government’s interest in 

preventing actual and apparent corruption is compelling, but assert that there is 

insufficient evidence of recent scandals in federal contracting to sustain section

441c. Wagner Br. 45. But as the state and municipal experience demonstrates, 

evidence of modern-day corruption in contracting is plentiful and concerns about 

pay-to-play politics have not diminished since the enactment of the federal ban. 

The limited record of recent corruption involving federal contractors thus does not 

suggest that the contribution ban is unnecessary; it suggests that the ban is 

working. Wagner, 2012 WL 1255145, at *7. 

Even if political quid pro quos were to occur only occasionally in 

contracting, the Supreme Court has allowed legislatures to take a prophylactic 

approach when political corruption is “neither easily detected nor practical to 

criminalize.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 153. Here, in light of contractor scandals 

across the country and the enactment of pay-to-play statutes in at least 20 states 

and municipalities, “the suggestion that those seeking federal contracts might ‘pay 

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17

to play’ is hardly novel or implausible.” Wagner, 2012 WL 1255145, at *7. 

Therefore, even if the evidence of potential corruption were less abundant than it is 

here, a prophylactic approach would still be permissible. See also Blount v. SEC, 

61 F.3d 938, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[N]o smoking gun is needed where, as here, 

the conflict of interest is apparent, the likelihood of stealth great, and the legislative 

purpose prophylactic.”). 

Furthermore, at least as important as the need to prevent actual corruption 

connected to federal contracting is the need to avoid the appearance of corruption. 

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. Recognizing the importance of this interest, the 

Second Circuit observed in Ognibene that recurrent pay-to-play scandals had 

“created a climate of distrust that feeds the already-established public perception of 

corruption.” 671 F.3d at 191 n.15. It was therefore “not necessary to produce 

evidence of actual corruption to demonstrate the sufficiently important interest in 

preventing the appearance of corruption.” Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Similarly, 

as the Second Circuit emphasized in Garfield, “widespread media coverage of 

Connecticut’s recent corruption scandals” created a “manifest need to curtail the 

appearance of corruption created by contractor contributions.” 616 F.3d at 200 

(emphasis added). Thus, multiple courts have reiterated that limiting contractor 

contributions is a key measure to combat the public perception that public business 

is for sale to private interests. 

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C. Section 441c Is Closely Drawn to Advance the Government’s 

Anti-Corruption Interest. 

The prohibition on contractor contributions is designed to prevent corruption 

and its appearance and to ensure a merit-based system of federal contracts; and its 

scope is limited in accordance with those goals. Far from being fatally overbroad, 

section 441c is a “channeling device, cutting off the avenue of association and 

expression that is most likely to lead to corruption but allowing numerous other 

avenues of association and expression.” Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 734 (4th 

Cir. 2011). By confining its limitations to a particular group of individuals and 

entities with a heightened financial interest in government contracting, while 

leaving open other forms of political expression, the federal ban is tailored to 

restrict the campaign contributions that Congress deemed likeliest to engender 

actual or apparent corruption. 

1. Section 441c Applies to Contributions to Federal Candidates, 

Party Committees and Political Action Committees. 

The Wagner contractors argue that section 441c is overbroad because “the 

connection between the would-be recipients of plaintiffs’ contributions and the 

awarding of federal contracts is far too remote.” See Wagner Br. 23. They claim 

“federal contracts are awarded at the agency level,” adding, without support, that 

political appointees “have nothing to do with most federal contracts.” Id. at 42. 

But there is no impermeable boundary between agencies, on the one hand, and 

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elected officeholders and presidential appointees, on the other. Agency officials 

are enormously dependent on legislators and presidential appointees, whether for 

appropriations, favorable appointments, employment benefits or other less tangible 

rewards. 

Elected officeholders and executive branch officials operate in a political 

culture with significant professional and social overlap, so identifying all persons 

who have the political capital to influence a contract’s award or oversight is not as 

simple as identifying agency officials with explicit contracting authority. See, e.g., 

FEC Br. 31, 35-38 (describing how political appointees could “reward political 

loyalty” by steering contracts to “those who make contributions to a favored 

candidate or party”). The Yamada court explained some of the many ways elected 

officials may affect the contracting process: 

The Legislature routinely holds informational and 

oversight hearings. Legislators . . . represent constituents 

and the public in an appropriate role overseeing 

administration of State contracts and utilization of 

appropriated funds—they might criticize, scrutinize, or 

support contractor performance. . . . Legislators make 

decisions and hold power over large infrastructure 

projects, sometimes involving hundreds of millions of 

dollars, where government contractors stand to benefit. 

And Legislators may have power over, or close 

friendships with, the government employees or others 

who do award or manage [state] contracts. 

872 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. Yamada went on to note that it would not make sense for 

the court to narrow Hawaii’s broad ban on contractor contributions because the 

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20

court lacked knowledge as to “which Legislators have ‘control’ over all types of 

contractual matters (whether large or small, be they for general electrical work or 

for a non-bid research study of a particular issue).” Id. at 1062. The Yamada court 

rightly recognized that determining which officials have influence over the 

contracting process lies in the expertise of the legislature, and that attempting to 

answer this question is fundamentally unsuited to the judicial role. 

The Wagner contractors claim that “in most of the litigated [state law] 

cases,” the contractor contribution ban “applied only to contributions to officials in 

the contracting process,” pointing to the Connecticut ban upheld in Garfield. 

Wagner Br. 45. But most of the laws upheld in recent case law were not so 

limited. See, e.g., Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 179-80 (noting that pay-to-play 

restrictions applied to candidates for all City offices); Yamada, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 

1035 (Hawaii contractor restriction applied to contributions to any “candidate 

committee or noncandidate committee”). Further, although the Connecticut ban is 

“branch-specific”—i.e., it bans only contributions to officials in the government 

branch with oversight authority over a particular contract—it is substantially 

broader than the federal law in other key respects: (1) it applies not only to the 

contractor himself, but also to “principals” and immediate family members of the 

contracting entity (board members, officers, managers and individuals holding at 

least a 5% interest in the business), see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F); (2) it 

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prohibits all state contractors from making contributions to state and town party 

committees, see id. § 9-601(1)-(2); and (3) its temporal coverage can extend for 

nearly a year after a contract’s termination, see id. § 9-612(g)(1)(D). As a whole, 

Connecticut’s statute is more expansive than section 441c. 

The Wagner contractors also argue that section 441c is overbroad because it 

covers contributions to party committees and “challenger” candidates “who have 

no current power.” Wagner Br. 47. But in claiming these recipients have no 

influence over contracting, the Wagner contractors fail to take into account the 

possibility of transfers between candidates, and between parties and candidates. 

Federal law allows for unrestricted transfers of funds between, inter alia, national 

and state party committees of the same party; affiliated committees; and from 

candidate committees to national party committees. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4); 11 

C.F.R. § 110.3(c). Consequently, contributions from a contractor to party 

committees can easily be aggregated and spent to the benefit of officeholders with 

influence over the relevant contracting process, such as congressional committee 

chairmen. Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognized the unique capacity 

of parties to serve as “effective conduits for donors desiring to corrupt federal 

candidates and officeholders.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 156 n.51. Because of the 

“close affiliation” between parties and elected officials, parties are placed “in a 

unique position, ‘whether they like it or not,’ to serve ‘as agents for spending on 

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behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.’” Id. at 145 (quoting

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 452 (2001)).

Given the “special relationship and unity of interest” between parties and federal 

officeholders, as well as the transferability of contributions, contractor 

contributions to party committees and “challenger” candidates pose a clear threat 

of corruption. See id.

15

2. Section 441c Applies to the Contracting Entity Only. 

The federal contractor ban encompasses only the contracting entity itself. It 

is thus narrower than many of the pay-to-play laws in place at the state level, as it 

does not reach political committees controlled by the contractor, nor individuals 

associated with or employed by the contractor. 

The Wagner contractors contend that, by regulating only the contracting 

entity, section 441c impermissibly favors corporations over individuals because it 

allows a corporation to contribute through a PAC or through the individual 

donations of its officers, directors and employees, whereas individual contractors 

do not have a comparable option. But as the district court recognized, and the 

Wagner contractors concede, section 441c applies equally to corporate and 

 

15 Contractor contributions to unconnected political committees could also be 

routed to the campaign coffers of officials with oversight over contracting. The 

Supreme Court has already recognized that political committees are vehicles for 

“circumvention of the other contribution limitations embodied in the Act.” Cal. 

Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 199 n.20 (1981). 

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23

individual contractors, and a corporation is legally distinct from its officers, 

directors, and shareholders, as well as from its PAC. See Wagner Br. 29. 

The Wagner contractors therefore must resort to arguing that a direct 

contribution from a corporate contractor would be the “functional equivalent” of a 

contribution from its PAC because both would be perceived as equally corrupt. 

Wagner Br. 29; Pls.’ SJ Br. 19. But this claim is at odds with settled principles of 

Supreme Court jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court has held, because a PAC is a 

“separate association from the corporation,” with separate legal rights and 

obligations, a corporate PAC “does not allow corporations to speak.” Citizens 

United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (emphasis added). Citizens United thus directly refutes 

the Wagner contractors’ theory that corporate contributions and corporate PAC 

contributions are functionally equivalent. The Wagner contractors attempt to 

dismiss the legal independence of corporations and corporate PACs having “no 

relevance,” but they ignore the many regulations that insulate corporate PACs from 

their corporate sponsors. Wagner Br. 29. The corporation cannot fund the 

corporate PAC’s political activity with its treasury funds,16 but may solicit only 

voluntary contributions from the corporation’s administrative and executive 

personnel and shareholders for this purpose. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4); 11 C.F.R. § 

 

16

 Citizens United struck down restrictions on corporate independent 

expenditures, but did not alter the ban on corporate contributions, including the 

restriction on the sources of funds used for candidate and party contributions by 

corporate PACs. 130 S. Ct. at 909. 

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114.5. Federal law further forbids the sponsoring corporation from coercing 

contributions in any manner—whether by job discrimination or financial reprisal. 

11 C.F.R. § 114.5. Thus, the sponsoring corporation can neither fund the PAC’s 

political activities nor control its receipt of political contributions. This regulatory 

system means that the direct beneficiary of a government contract—i.e., the 

corporation—is prevented from funding the contributions that could influence the 

grant of federal contracts, thereby reducing in a very practical sense the potential 

for corruption. Given these barriers between a corporation and its PAC’s funding, 

the Wagner contractors have no grounds for speculating that outside observers 

would perceive corporate PAC contributions as equivalent to direct corporate 

contributions. 

Similarly, there is no reason to think that there is an identity of interest with 

respect to contracting between a corporation and its officers, employees and 

shareholders. Few in this class have any involvement in, or knowledge of, the 

procurement of the corporation’s federal contracts. It is implausible that the 

majority of a large corporation’s shareholders, for instance, are even aware of the 

corporation’s government contracts, much less so invested in the procurement 

process than they are willing to make quid pro quo contributions. Furthermore, 

any resultant benefit from a government contract to the class of officers, employees 

and shareholders is likely to be diffuse. Shareholders of the government contractor 

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25

are unlikely to experience more than a negligible rise in the value of their 

investment due to a single contract, and it seems equally unlikely that a contract 

would result in a material change in the terms of employment for most of the 

contractor’s employees. The Wagner contractors offer no reason why the 

contributions of a corporation’s officers, employees and shareholders should be 

equated with those of a contractor for the purpose of the contractor contribution 

ban. 

3. Section 441c Is a Prohibition. 

The Wagner contractors also complain that 441c is a ban, not a limit, on 

contributions. But multiple courts have upheld state “bans” on contributions from 

contractors, lobbyists and other groups that raise a particular risk of corruption. 

See Section I.C. supra. And as the district court in Yamada explained, the choice 

of a ban instead of a limit suggests proper tailoring, not overbreadth: 

A choice to completely ban direct government contractor 

contributions indicates, at some level, the strength of the Legislature’s 

intended message combating a perception that government contracts 

are awarded to friends based on corruption (i.e., indicative of the 

tailoring of the restriction to the government interest). That a ban is 

total, that it has no dollar exceptions, might “eliminate[ ] any notion 

that contractors can influence state officials by donating to their 

campaigns,” and in that sense indicates closer tailoring to the 

important government interest than if contributions to certain types of 

Legislators were excepted. 

872 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (internal citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting 

Garfield, 616 F.3d at 205). 

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26

The Wagner contractors also attempt to analogize section 441c to the ban on 

contributions from minors that was invalidated in McConnell. See Wagner Br. 44. 

But the under-18 restriction barred a vast portion of the population from making 

political contributions not because the regulated class itself posed a heightened risk 

of corruption, but because parents might circumvent individual contribution limits 

by contributing in the names of their children. 540 U.S. at 231-32. The 

McConnell Court struck down the ban not because it was a ban, as the Wagner 

contractors allege, but because there was “scant evidence” of such circumvention, 

and the anti-circumvention interest was fully addressed by a provision barring 

contributions made “in the name of another.” Id. at 232; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441f; 

11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b). Section 441c, by contrast, does not rely on an anticircumvention interest, but rather targets federal contractors as a class that, because 

of its heightened incentive to purchase influence over candidates and officeholders, 

poses a greater risk of direct corruption than do ordinary donors. As the evidence 

of corruption in the states demonstrates, concerns about pay-to-play are not merely 

conjectural. And in contrast to the under-18 contribution restriction, the 

government’s anti-corruption interest here cannot be adequately addressed by other 

measures: generally applicable contribution limits alone have not prevented 

contracting scandals at the state and local levels. 

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Finally, although section 441c bans federal contractors from making 

political contributions, contractors are free to pursue other forms of political 

expression. Individual contractors may express their political views in a variety of 

ways, many of which are “more expressive than the act of making a political 

contribution.” Wagner, 2012 WL 1255145, at *9 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). 

Contractors are permitted to volunteer their time on a behalf of a candidate or party 

committee, solicit contributions and hold fundraisers. As a practical matter, it is 

difficult to see how the maximum individual contribution of $2,600 is more 

expressive than, for instance, canvassing for a candidate. The mere fact that the 

Wagner contractors have elected not to exercise these other forms of political 

expression in no way demonstrates that section 441c is improperly tailored. 

D. Section 441c Is Not Underinclusive. 

The Wagner contractors also contend that the federal contractor contribution 

ban is unconstitutionally underinclusive because it fails to capture all situations 

that they claim might lead to corruption or its appearance. Wagner Br. 51-55. But 

a statute is not “invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther 

than it did . . . .” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 105. In Blount, this Court confirmed that “a 

regulation is not fatally underinclusive simply because an alternative regulation, 

which would restrict more speech or the speech of more people, could be more 

effective.” 61 F.3d at 946. 

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Only when a regulation cannot “fairly be said to advance any genuinely 

substantial governmental interest” because it provides only “ineffective or remote” 

support for the asserted goals will it be deemed underinclusive. FCC v. League of 

Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 396 (1984). The Wagner contractors point to groups 

that do not fall within the strictures of section 441c, such as federal grant and loan 

recipients and military academy students, whom they allege are similarly situated 

to federal contractors. See Wagner Br. 52-54. But the Wagner contractors fail to 

explain why Congress’ decision not to include these disparate groups—for 

instance, military academy students who generally are obligated to serve in the 

armed forces in exchange for their free education—renders the federal contractor 

ban so ineffective as to advance no “substantial governmental interest.” Most 

states and municipalities with pay-to-play statutes have made similar 

determinations, as very few state laws cover grants or loans, and several state laws 

cover only limited varieties of contracts. See Section I.A supra. Congress was 

thus hardly alone in its judgment that campaign activity by governmental 

contractors was “the phase of the problem which seems most acute.” Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 105.17

 

17 In addition, many federal grantees and loan recipients are subject to different 

limitations on their political activities. See generally Jack Maskell, Cong. 

Research Serv., RL 34725, Political Activities of Private Recipients of Federal 

Grants or Contracts (Oct. 21, 2008). 

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The Wagner contractors complain in particular that federal employees are 

not subject to restrictions on political giving comparable to section 441c. Wagner 

Br. 33-36. But political activity of federal employees—like that of federal 

contractors—is subject to significant restrictions and prohibitions. Some of those 

limitations are more severe than section 441c: for instance, federal employees are 

prohibited from holding political fundraisers, or engaging in many volunteer 

activities for a campaign, such as distributing campaign materials or performing 

campaign related chores. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.303, 734.408-12; see also Less 

Restricted Employees—Political Restrictions and Prohibited Activities, U.S. Office 

of Special Counsel, 

http://www.osc.gov/haFederalLessRestrisctionandActivities.htm. It is thus far 

from clear that treating contractors like employees would have the speechenhancing effect the Wagner contractors seek. If the Wagner contractors were 

regulated as if they were employees, they would be subject to more campaign 

restrictions, not fewer. 

Given Congress’ stated goal of preventing corruption and its appearance, the 

decision to ban contributions from federal contractors but not contributions from 

other federally subsidized groups reflects a permissible legislative judgment that 

the risk of improper influence is greatest for contractors. See also Ognibene, 671 

F.3d at 191 (“The fact that the City has chosen to focus on one aspect of quid pro 

USCA Case #12-5365 Document #1422559 Filed: 02/27/2013 Page 39 of 44
30

quo corruption, rather than every conceivable instance, does not render its rationale 

a ‘challenge to the credulous.’”). As the Supreme Court has long maintained, 

“[r]eform may take one step at a time.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 105. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court’s 

decision. 

 

USCA Case #12-5365 Document #1422559 Filed: 02/27/2013 Page 40 of 44
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Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ J. Gerald Hebert 

J. GERALD HEBERT 

 ghebert@campaignlegalcenter.org 

(D.C. Bar No. 447676) 

Tara Malloy 

Paul S. Ryan 

Megan McAllen 

THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER 

215 E Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20002 

(202) 736-2200 

Fred Wertheimer 

DEMOCRACY 21 

2000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20036 

(202) 429-2008 

Donald J. Simon 

SONOSKY, CHAMBERS, SACHSE, 

ENDRESON & PERRY, LLP 

1425 K Street, NW 

Suite 600 

Washington, DC 20005 

(202) 682-0240 

Scott Nelson 

PUBLIC CITIZEN 

1600 20th Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20009 

(202) 588-1000 

Counsel for Amici Curiae 

Dated: February 27, 2013 

 

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32

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH FED. R. APP. P. 32(a) 

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 6,927 words, excluding the parts of the 

brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

 This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 

32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this 

brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Office 

Word 2007 in Times New Roman 14 point font. 

/s/ J. Gerald Hebert 

J. Gerald Hebert 

THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER 

215 E Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20002 

(202) 736-2200 

ghebert@campaignlegalcenter.org 

 Dated: February 27, 2013 

 

USCA Case #12-5365 Document #1422559 Filed: 02/27/2013 Page 42 of 44
33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 27th day of February 2013, I caused the 

foregoing BRIEF AMICI CURIAE to be filed electronically using this Court’s 

CM/ECF System and sent via the ECF electronic notification system to all 

CM/ECF registered counsel of record: 

Attorneys Representing Appellants Wagner, et al.: 

Alan B. Morrison 

 abmorrison@law.gwu.edu 

George Washington University Law School 

2000 H Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20052 

(202) 994-7120 

Arthur B. Spitzer 

 artspitzer@gmail.com 

American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area 

4301 Connecticut Avenue, NW 

Suite 434 

Washington, DC 20008-2368 

(202) 457-0800 

Attorneys Representing Appellee Federal Election Commission: 

Seth Nesin 

 snesin@fec.gov 

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1528 

Courtesy copies of the BRIEF AMICI CURIAE were sent to the counsel of 

record via email (where email addresses are available and known). 

USCA Case #12-5365 Document #1422559 Filed: 02/27/2013 Page 43 of 44
34

I further certify that I also cause the requisite number of paper copies of the 

brief to be filed with the Clerk on February 27, 2013. 

/s/ J. Gerald Hebert 

J. Gerald Hebert 

THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER 

215 E Street, NE 

Washington, DC 20002 

 (202) 736-2200 

ghebert@campaignlegalcenter.org 

 

USCA Case #12-5365 Document #1422559 Filed: 02/27/2013 Page 44 of 44