UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION, 

 Case No. 14-cv-13710 

 Plaintiff, 

 Hon. Sean F. Cox 

DONNA STEPHENS, as TRUSTEE OF THE 

AIMEE A. AND DONNA STEPHENS TRUST, 

 Plaintiff-Intervenor, 

v. 

R.G. & G.R. HARRIS FUNERAL HOMES, 

INC., 

 Defendant. 

 / 

JOINT FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER 

The parties to the above captioned matter submit this Joint Final Pretrial 

Order in accordance with the Court’s June 18, 2018 Scheduling Order as updated 

and amended by minute order dated August 20, 2020 and Local Rule 16.2. 

I. Jurisdiction 

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 

and 1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) and 

(3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000eCase 2:14-cv-13710-SFC-DRG ECF No. 116, PageID.2655 Filed 11/19/20 Page 1 of 22
5(f)(1) and (3) (“Title VII”), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 

U.S.C. § 1981a. 

II. Plaintiff EEOC’s and Plaintiff-Intervenor’s (collectively, 

“Plaintiffs’”) Claims 

The Complaints state the following: 

Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Garden City, 

Michigan facility, in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-2(a)(1), by terminating Aimee Stephens’s employment because of sex. 

Defendant’s decision to fire Aimee Stephens was because of Stephens’s sex. 

Specifically, Defendant fired Stephens because Stephens is transgender, because of 

Stephens’s transition from male to female, and/or because Stephens did not 

conform to Defendant’s sex- or gender-based preferences, expectations, or 

stereotypes. 

As a result of Defendant’s discrimination, Stephens suffered emotional pain, 

suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and humiliation. She also 

suffered lost wages and losses related to early withdrawal from her IRA account. 

Since September 9, 2012, Defendant engaged in unlawful employment 

practices, in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 

by providing a clothing allowance/work clothes to male employees but failing to 

provide such assistance to female employees because of sex. 

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Since October 2014, Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices, 

in violation of Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), by 

providing unequal clothing benefits to female employees because of sex. 

In addition, Plaintiff-Intervenor asserts: 

 Defendant argues below that the question of defendant’s liability for a 

violation of Title VII remains an open question to be litigated and tried, but that 

assertion is wholly at odds with rulings from this Court, the Sixth Circuit, and the 

Supreme Court. 

This Court has already held that Defendant violated Section 703(a)(1) of 

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), when it fired Stephens for failing to comply 

with Defendant’s sex-based stereotypes. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. 

& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853 (E.D. Mich. 2016) 

(“Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Court rejects the Funeral Home’s sexspecific dress code defense to the Title VII sex-stereotyping claim asserted on 

behalf of Stephens in this case.”). The Sixth Circuit affirmed that ruling, EEOC v. 

R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir. 2018) 

(granting “summary judgment to the EEOC on its unlawful-termination claim”), 

and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s judgment. Bostock v. 

Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (2020) (holding that the “judgments of 

the Second and Sixth Circuits in Nos.17–1623 and 18–107 are affirmed.”). The 

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Supreme Court’s affirmance of the Sixth Circuit’s decision left in place that court’s 

ruling that Defendant violated Title VII by terminating Stephens because she failed 

to comply with Defendant’s sex-based stereotypes. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity 

Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 

2018) (“reject[ing] the Funeral Home’s sex-specific dress code defense to the Title 

VII sex-stereotyping claim asserted on behalf of Stephens in this case” and 

“grant[ing] summary judgment to the EEOC on its sex discrimination claim”). 

 The Supreme Court stated that it was not deciding certain issues related to 

“bathrooms, locker rooms, or anything else of the kind,” because “[t]he only 

question before us is whether an employer who fires someone simply for being 

homosexual or transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated against that 

individual ‘because of such individual’s sex.’” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1753. This 

question the Court answered in the affirmative. 

Though Defendant argues that the Court did not affirm liability on a sexstereotyping theory, the use of different theories for reaching the same substantive 

conclusion that Defendant discriminated against Stephens because of her sex does 

not alter liability. Cf. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. College of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 

(7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“Although the analysis differs somewhat [between 

showing Title VII liability via a comparator method and an associational method], 

both avenues end up in the same place: sex discrimination.”). And even if the 

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different legal theories could be understood as separately establishing liability, the 

Supreme Court did not overrule the Sixth Circuit’s holding as to the sex 

stereotyping theory and it therefore stands. See, e.g., In re Quality Stores, Inc., 354 

B.R. 840, 843 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (“Vermont’s argument ignores the most obvious 

impediment to its position—the existence of binding Sixth Circuit precedent 

holding that the abrogation of sovereign immunity in § 106(a) was a valid exercise 

of Congressional power. The Supreme Court did not vacate or reverse this holding 

in Hood or in Katz. On each occasion the Supreme Court declined to rule on the 

validity of § 106(a) and affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s decision on other grounds. 

This Court is therefore bound by the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Hood.” (internal 

citations omitted)); Mastro v. Rigby, 764 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2014) (“In In re 

Bellingham, we held that ‘consent permits a non-Article III judge to decide finally’ 

a Stern claim. In Arkison, the Supreme Court affirmed our decision in In re 

Bellingham on other grounds . . . . The Supreme Court’s decision ‘not . . . to 

address . . . whether Article III permits a bankruptcy court, with the consent of the 

parties, to enter final judgment on a Stern claim’ leaves intact our holding that 

consent does, in fact, permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment on a Stern

claim.” (internal citations omitted)); Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangladesh Holding, 

Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 50 n.8 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decision in 

Kiobel did not disturb the precedent of this Circuit that corporate liability is not 

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presently recognized under customary international law and thus is not currently 

actionable under the ATS.” (internal citations omitted)). 

 Defendant’s liability under Title VII for firing Stephens has already been 

decided and that there is nothing left to brief in this case. 

Both plaintiff and plaintiff-intervenor state: 

The plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement their arguments regarding 

liability if the Court determines that liability needs to be further explored, and to 

submit additional evidence on this issue if the Court determines that liability has 

not been decided. 

III. Defendant’s Claims 

Defendant did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) by deciding not to 

retain Aimee Stephens after Stephens declined to follow Defendant’s sex-specific 

dress code in accord with Stephens’s biological sex. The dress code—standard for 

the industry and consistent with federal law, including the EEOC’s existing 

compliance manual—is sex-specific. At all times, Harris administered its dress 

code based on biological sex, not gender identity. The EEOC and Stephens have 

not challenged the dress code. Instead, they say that it constitutes sex 

discrimination to apply a dress code based on biological sex rather than an 

employee’s internal sense of gender. Defendant disagrees and also disagrees that 

its employment decision was motivated by Stephens’s self-identification as 

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transgender. The decisive consideration was Stephens’s insistence on violating the 

sex-specific dress code at work. Defendant would not have made the same decision 

had Stephens continued to conform to the dress code for male funeral directors 

while at work. And Defendant would have reached the same decision if a female 

funeral director had declared that she would not comply with the sex-specific dress 

code requirements based on biological sex. 

The Supreme Court’s decision in this case did not resolve the primary 

liability question. “The scope of a remand is determined by examining the entire

order or opinion.” Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis 

added). And the entirety of the Supreme Court’s opinion here makes clear that the 

Court expressly disclaimed prejudging whether Title VII allows an employer to 

enforce a sex-specific dress-code policy based on sex, leaving that question open 

for this Court on remand. Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 

1753 (2020) (“[N]one of these other laws [sex-segregated bathrooms, locker 

rooms, and dress codes] are before us; we have not had the benefit of adversarial 

testing about the meaning of their terms, and we do not prejudge any such question 

today. . . . The only question before us is whether an employer who fires someone 

simply for being homosexual or transgender has discharged or otherwise 

discriminated against that individual ‘because of such individual’s sex.’”) 

(emphasis added); accord id. (“Firing employees because of a statutorily protected 

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trait surely counts. Whether other policies and practices might or might not qualify 

as unlawful discrimination or find justifications under other provisions of Title VII 

are questions for future cases, not these.”). 

As for the Sixth Circuit’s opinion, it concluded that the EEOC was entitled 

to summary judgment based only on a sex-stereotyping theory. EEOC v. R.G. & 

G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 571–74 (6th Cir. 2018). And the 

Supreme Court did not affirm the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on this ground. In fact, the 

Supreme Court did not adopt or otherwise rely on a sex-stereotyping theory at all. 

Instead, the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s sex-discrimination analysis 

under Title VII’s plain language. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738–54. And in that 

analysis, the Sixth Circuit specifically held that the EEOC “should have had the 

opportunity, either through a motion for summary judgment or a trial, to establish 

that the Funeral Home violated Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination on the 

basis of sex by firing Stephens because she was transgender and transitioning from 

male to female.” 884 F.3d at 580–81. Construing both the Supreme Court and 

Sixth Circuit opinions together, that is the scope of the mandate. 

Accordingly, the Court should order a briefing schedule for the parties to file 

cross-motions for summary judgment. If the Court’s ruling on those motions does 

not resolve the case, the Court should schedule a trial so a jury can determine 

whether Harris Funeral Homes decided not to retain Stephens because of 

Case 2:14-cv-13710-SFC-DRG ECF No. 116, PageID.2662 Filed 11/19/20 Page 8 of 22
Stephens’s refusal to comply with the company’s sex-specific dress code based on 

biological sex or, instead, “simply for being . . . transgender.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 

at 1753. 

The Ninth Circuit’s memorandum opinion in Kastl v. Maricopa County 

Community College District, 325 Fed. Appx. 492 (9th Cir. 2009), is illustrative of 

the proper path forward. (Justice Gorsuch, who authored the Supreme Court 

opinion here, sat on the Kastl panel by designation.) In Kastl, a “transsexual” 

plaintiff claimed a Title VII violation when the defendant employer declined to 

allow Kastl to use the opposite sex’s restroom facility until completion of sex 

reassignment surgery and then failed to renew the plaintiff’s employment contract. 

The panel cited Ninth Circuit precedent holding that “it is unlawful to discriminate 

against a transgender (or any other) person because he or she does not behave in 

accordance with an employer’s expectations for men or women.” Id. at 493. In 

other words, the opinion acknowledged that an employer violates Title VII for 

discharging an employee merely for being transgender. But after recognizing that 

Kastl’s complaint stated “a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title 

VII,” the panel held that the employer “satisfied its burden of production under the 

second stage of the analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 

U.S. 792 (1973), when it proffered evidence that it banned Kastle from using the 

women’s restroom for safety reasons.” Id. “Because Kastle did not put forward 

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sufficient evidence demonstrating that [the employer] was motivated by Kastle’s 

gender, her claim is doomed at the third McConnell Douglas stage.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Accordingly, the employer was entitled to summary judgment. Id.

So too here. Defendant has proffered evidence that it declined Stephens’s 

proposal to violate the company’s sex-specific dress code based on concerns for 

Stephens’s coworkers and the funeral home’s clients. It is now the EEOC’s and 

Intervenor’s burden to put forward sufficient evidence demonstrating that 

Defendant was actually motivated by Stephens’s gender. If they do, the issue must 

be presented to a fact finder. If they do not, Defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment, just like the employer in Kastl. 

The issue of what triable issues remain is so important that it warrants full 

briefing and oral argument, not mere statements and counter-statements in a final 

pretrial order. Nonetheless, Defendant notes that Plaintiff-Intervenor’s reliance on 

cases like In re Quality Stores, Mastro, and Chowdhurry is misplaced. In each of 

them, the Supreme Court’s opinion left intact a circuit court’s ruling or precedent. 

But that’s not what happened here. 

Until the Supreme Court ruled, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion was controlling. 

That Sixth Circuit said that (a) the EEOC was entitled to summary judgment on its 

sex-stereotyping theory because “the Funeral Home may not rely on its [sexspecific dress code] policy to combat the charge that it engaged in improper se 

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stereotyping,” 884 F.3d at 574, and (b) the EEOC was entitled to pursue a claim 

that Defendant violated Title VII by “firing Stephens because she was 

transgender,” id. at 580. So what did the Supreme Court “affirm”? Only (b): “An 

employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the 

law.” 140 S. Ct. at 1754. Did the Court leave holding (a) intact? No. The Court 

expressly said that whether a sex-specific dress code “might or might not qualify as 

unlawful discrimination or find justifications under other provisions of Title VII 

are questions for future” decisions. Id. 1753 (emphasis added). What the Court 

“affirmed” was that the “EEOC should have had the opportunity, either through a 

motion for summary judgment or at trial, to establish that the Funeral Home 

violated Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sex by firing 

Stephens because she was transgender.” 884 F.3d at 580. That is the only 

interpretation that gives meaning to all aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision. 

As to the allegations regarding Defendant’s clothing benefits, Defendant 

leaves the EEOC to its proofs. 

IV. Stipulated Facts 

The parties stipulate to the following facts at trial: 

1. Aimee Stephens was employed by Defendant as a Funeral 

Director/Embalmer starting in October 2007. 

2. On or about August 15, 2013, Defendant fired Aimee Stephens. 

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3. Defendant’s employee manual specifies different dress codes for men 

and for women. 

4. Aimee Stephens complied with the dress code’s specifications for male 

employees from the time of hire until July 2013. Defendant purchased 

men’s suits for Stephens to wear and Stephens wore them. 

5. In July 2013, Stephens presented Defendant with a letter that is Plaintiffs’ 

Exhibit 7, that she was a woman, that her name was Aimee, and that she 

would comply with Defendant’s dress code for women. 

6. After considering the letter for approximately two weeks, Defendant told 

Stephens that “[t]his is not going to work” and fired her. Defendant 

offered Stephens a severance package in exchange for a release of all 

claims. 

7. Stephens planned to return to work wearing female attire that complied 

with Defendant’s dress code for women. 

8. After being fired by Defendant, Aimee Stephens was either unemployed 

or employed in a job that paid her less than she was paid by Defendant 

from August 15, 2013 until December 26, 2014, when she was unable to 

continue work due to her medical condition. 

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9. Aimee Stephens secured paid employment at Krysco LLC from 

approximately May 2014 to July 2014 and at VHS of Michigan from 

approximately July 2014 to December 2014. 

10.From her employment at Krysco LLC, Aimee Stephens earned 

$1,013.14. 

11.From her employment at VHS of Michigan, Aimee Stephens earned 

$13,068.09. 

12. As of December 26, 2014, Aimee Stephens became disabled and was no 

longer able to work. 

13. From December 2014 to March 2015, Aimee Stephens was on an unpaid 

medical leave of absence from VHS of Michigan. 

14. In 2013, Defendant paid Aimee Stephens compensation of $35,366.20, 

up through her termination on August 13, 2013. 

15. From the date Defendant fired Aimee Stephens (August 13, 2013) until 

the date she became disabled (December 26, 2014), Defendant would 

have paid her $77,805.64. 

16. During all relevant times, Defendant had a policy of matching 

employees’ contributions to their respective Roth IRA retirement 

accounts on a dollar-for-dollar basis, up to three percent of an employee’s 

earnings. 

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17. At the time she was fired, Aimee Stephens was contributing over three 

percent of her earnings from Defendant to her Roth IRA retirement 

account. 

18. If Aimee Stephens had been employed between the date Defendant fired 

her (August 13, 2013) and the date she became disabled (December 26, 

2014), Defendant would have contributed three percent of Stephens’s 

earnings—namely, $2,334.17—in matching funds to her Roth IRA 

retirement account. 

19. In 2014, Aimee Stephens withdrew $15,745.40 from her Roth IRA 

retirement account to replace income lost when she was fired by 

Defendant. 

20. She would not have withdrawn this money from her Roth IRA in 2014 if 

she had not been fired. 

21. Early distributions from traditional Roth IRA retirement accounts incur 

withdrawal penalty fees and are subject to federal taxation. 

22. Aimee Stephens incurred a ten-percent financial penalty of $1,574.54 for 

the early withdrawal from her Roth IRA account. 

23. Aimee Stephens paid federal income taxes of $2,361.81 on the amount 

withdrawn from her Roth IRA account. 

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24. Aimee Stephens’s lost wages from 2013 and 2014 and the losses 

associated with her early IRA withdrawal have accrued and continue to 

accrue prejudgment interest. 

25. Between September 9, 2012 and October 15, 2014, Defendant provided 

no clothing allowance or stipend for public-facing female employees at 

its funeral homes. 

26. During the same time frame, funeral directors were provided with two 

suits and ties at hire if full-time, and one suit and tie if part-time. 

Defendant expected these suits and ties to last for one to four years. 

27. In addition, funeral directors who were so furnished with suits could 

have them repaired and replaced as necessary. 

28. Prior to this litigation, Defendant had only one female applicant apply 

for an open funeral director position, and that applicant was not qualified. 

29. On October 15, 2014, Defendant began providing annual clothing 

stipends to non-funeral director, female public-facing employees. 

30. Defendant also provides a suit similar to the funeral director suit for 

male employees who interact with the public in positions other than 

funeral director. At the time of the litigation, all male employees, other 

than funeral directors, who interacted with the public were part-time and 

received one suit that was replaced when no longer serviceable. 

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31. Said stipends consist of $150 checks for full-time females and $75 

checks for part-time females. These stipends were paid annually. 

32. The cost to Defendant of each suit provided to male employees was 

$235. Defendant expected these suits to last one to four years. 

33. Defendant does not provide a clothing allowance or suit to employees 

who are not expected to have client contact, whether male or female. 

V. Issues of Fact to Be Litigated 

1. Defendant contends that following issues of fact remain to be litigated: 

A. Whether Defendant’s decision not to retain Stephens was 

motivated by Stephens’s refusal to comply with Defendant’s 

sex-specific dress code based on biological sex or was, instead, 

simply for being transgender. 

B. Whether Defendant administers the dress code based on its 

employees’ biological sex. 

C. Defendant’s dress code is consistent with the standard for the 

industry. 

2. The Plaintiff-Intervenor contends that liability has been established by 

the Sixth Circuit, which ruling was affirmed by the United States 

Supreme Court, so these issues do not need to be litigated. The 

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Commission reserves the right to further brief on the issue if necessary. 

See discussion above in Sections II and III. 

3. The Commission and Plaintiff-Intervenor contend that the following 

issues of fact need to be litigated: 

A. The amount of compensatory damages to be awarded to PlaintiffIntervenor. 

B. Whether Aimee Stephens engaged in reasonable efforts to find other 

employment after Defendant fired her. 

C. Whether Defendant’s clothing policy violated Title VII, and if so, the 

amount of pecuniary compensatory damages to be paid to female 

employees to make them whole for unequal clothing allowance 

benefits from September 9, 2012 to the present, if any. 

VI. Issues of Law to Be Litigated 

1. Defendant contends that this issue remains to be litigated: Whether 

Defendant’s enforcement of its sex-specific dress code based on 

biological sex violated Title VII. 

2. Plaintiff-Intervenor argues otherwise as set forth above in Section II, and 

the Commission reserves the right to further brief on the issue if 

necessary. 

3. Whether Defendant’s clothing-benefits policy violated Title VII. 

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VII. Evidence Problems Likely to Arise at Trial 

None anticipated.

VIII. Witnesses 

A. Plaintiffs Intend to Call: 

1. Aimee Stephens (via videotaped trial deposition and deposition 

transcript) 

2. Donna Stephens 

B. Plaintiffs May Call: 

1. Thomas Rost 

2. Shannon Kish 

3. If the Court determines that liability has not been established, 

Plaintiffs reserve the right to identify additional witnesses. 

C. Defendants Intend to Call: 

1. Aimee Stephens (via videotaped trial deposition and 12-16-15 

deposition) 

2. Thomas Rost 

D. Defendants May Call: 

1. Ms. Dolores Nemeth 

2. Ryan Kish 

3. Shannon Kish 

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4. Troy Shaffer 

5. Cody Higley 

6. George Crawford 

7. Matthew Rost 

8. Michelle Peterson 

9. David Kowaleski

10. David Cash 

IX. Exhibits 

A. Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 

Exh. 

No. 

Bates No. Document Description Defendant’s 

Objection 

1. 2013 W-2 for Aimee Stephens’s 

employment with Defendant

2. 2014 W-2 for Aimee Stephens’s 

employment at Krysco LLC 

3. 2014 W-2 for Aimee Stephens’s 

employment at VHS of Michigan 

4. August 22, 2013 earnings statement 

for Aimee Stephens’s employment 

with Defendant 

5. 2014 1099-R for Aimee Stephens 

6. 2014 1040 for Aimee Stephens 

7. 15-16 July 31, 2013 letter from Aimee 

Stephens to “Friends and CoWorkers” 

8. 52-525; 

528-2710 

ADP Easy Pay Payroll Register and 

Master List of Payroll Records for 

Defendant from 12-25-2011 to 12-

21-2014 

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10. HFH Bates 

19 

Select Financial Data 2012-2014 

11. HFH Bates 

144-183 

Stipend Checks paid to female 

employees and suit billing data for 

male employees, 2014-2015 

12. HFH 

Bates 17-

18 

List of Male Employees provided 

suits and female employees 

provided clothing stipends 

B. Defendant’s Exhibits 

Exh. No. Bates No. Document Description Plaintiffs’ 

Objection 

1. W-4 employee’s withholding 

allowance certificate dated 

October 1, 2007 when Anthony 

B. Stephens began employment 

with Harris funeral homes 

2. Cover letter and resume of 

Anthony B. Stephens submitted 

to Harris funeral homes when 

applying for the position of 

funeral director 

3. EEOC002717 

etc. 

Harris funeral homes employee 

manual presented to Stephens 

upon beginning employment 

and 2007 

X. Damages 

Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenor will be seeking damages in the form of 

backpay for lost wages and losses related to the IRA account withdrawal, in the 

amount of $69,994.93 plus prejudgment interest on that amount, plus 

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compensatory damages for the emotional distress inflicted by the Defendant as a 

result of the unlawful termination of Stephens in an amount to be determined by 

the jury. Costs, post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees also will be sought in 

post-judgment relief. 

Plaintiff EEOC will also seek pecuniary compensatory damages for unpaid 

clothing allowances should liability under Title VII be established. 

XI. Trial 

A. Jury/Nonjury: Assuming Defendant’s expected motion for summary 

judgment does not resolve the case, this is a jury trial. 

B. Length: 

1. Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenor estimate that their portion of 

this trial will take approximately one day running from 8:30 AM to 

1:30 PM, not including jury deliberations. 

2. Defendant estimates that its portion of this trial will take 

approximately two days on the same schedule. 

XII. Settlement Discussions 

The parties have engaged in settlement discussions, including most recently 

an exchange of emails on October 8 and 9. Although they agree on the amount of 

back pay and IRA-related damages to which Plaintiff-Intervenor would be entitled, 

the parties do not agree about either compensatory damages for Plaintiff-Intervenor 

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nor on her claim for attorney fees. Neither side has closed off further discussions, 

and further exchange of information is likely. 

XIII. Trial Briefs and Jury Instructions 

The parties agree that they will comply with the Court's instructions 

regarding the content and timing of trial briefs and jury instructions. 

XIV. Juror Expenses 

Each party acknowledges that the Court may assess juror expenses under LR 

38.2. 

Respectfully Submitted, 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT R.G. & G.R. HARRIS 

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION FUNERAL HOMES, INC. 

By:__/s/_Dale Price_______________ By:__/s/ Joel Kirkpatrick_ 

DALE PRICE (P55578) JOEL KIRKPATRICK 

Date: November 17, 2020 Date: November 18, 2020 

THE AIMEE A. AND DONNA STEPHENS TRUST 

By:___/s/ John Knight________ 

JOHN KNIGHT 

Date: November 17, 2020 

 SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 19, 2020 s/Sean F. Cox 

 Sean F. Cox 

 U. S. District Judge 

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