No. 09-50296 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

PIERCE O’DONNELL, Defendant-Appellee. 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California 

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

THOMASENIA P. DUNCAN 

General Counsel 

 DAVID KOLKER 

Associate General Counsel

KEVIN DEELEY 

Assistant General Counsel

ERIN CHLOPAK 

Attorney

STEVE HAJJAR 

Attorney

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

 September 23, 2009

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

 Page 

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE, 

THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION .........................................................2 

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................3 

A. The Interests Served by FECA..............................................................3 

B. The Prohibition on Making Contributions in the Name 

 of Another.............................................................................................4 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................5 

ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................8 

I. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED

TO THE COMMISSION’S INTERPRETATION OF 

SECTION 441f ................................................................................................8 

 A. The Commission’s Long-Standing Interpretation of

 Section 441f...........................................................................................8 

 B. The Commission’s Interpretation of Section 441f Should 

Have Been Accorded Chevron Deference ..........................................11 

II. COURTS UNIFORMLY INTERPRET SECTION 441F AS

PROHIBITING THE FUNNELING OF SECRET 

CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH STRAW DONORS..................................14 

 A. Courts Recognize That Section 441f’s Prohibition of

Concealed Contributions Through Undisclosed Straw 

Donors Fulfills FECA’s Underlying Policy Objectives......................15 

B. The Decision Below is An Outlier ......................................................16 

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 Page 

III. THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 

 441f PROMOTES THE CLEAR PURPOSE OF BOTH 

 SECTION 441f AND FECA AS A WHOLE................................................18 

A. Section 441f Must Be Interpreted In A Manner 

 Consistent With Its Specific Purpose and the Broader 

 Policy Underlying FECA ....................................................................18 

B. The Government’s Interpretation of Section 441f

 Complements Other FECA Provisions, Including

 Section 441a(a)(8)’s Regulation of Disclosed Conduit 

 Contributions .......................................................................................19 

C. The District Court’s Analysis Relied On a

Misunderstanding of the Scope of Section 441f .................................20 

D. The Decision Below Yields an Absurd Result....................................21 

1. The district court’s interpretation of section 441f 

 emasculates the provision’s anti-circumvention

function......................................................................................21 

2. The decision below is internally inconsistent ...........................23 

E. The Government’s Interpretation of Section 441f is 

Consistent with FECA’s Legislative History......................................24 

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................30 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s)

Cases

Albertson’s Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,

 42 F.3d 537 (9th Cir. 1994) ...............................................................18, 19, 23 

Babitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or.,

 515 U.S. 687 (1995).......................................................................................12 

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,

 534 U.S. 438 (2002).......................................................................................11 

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,

461 U.S. 574 (1983).................................................................................19, 22 

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976)................................................................................... passim

CFTC v. Schor,

478 U.S. 833 (1986).................................................................................12, 13 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

 467 U.S. 837 (1984).........................................................................................6 

FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,

 454 U.S. 27 (1981)................................................................................. passim

FEC v. Kopko,

Civ. No. 91-CV-7764 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 1992)..............................................14 

FEC v. Lawson,

Civ. No. 6:90-2116-9 (D.S.C. Apr. 8, 1991).................................................17 

FEC v. Rodriguez,

 Civ. No. 86-687-CIV-T-10 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 1988)..................................17

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Page(s)

FEC v. Weinsten,

462 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ..........................................................11, 14 

FEC v. Williams,

Civ. No. 93-6321-ER (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1995)............................................17 

FEC v. Wolfson,

Civ. No. 85-1617-CIV-T-13 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 1986) .................................17 

Fieger v. Gonzales,

 No. 07-CV-10533-DT, 

 2007 WL 2351006 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007) ...........................................14 

Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A.,

__ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (June 22, 2009)........................................... 12-13

Fulani v. FEC,

147 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1998).......................................................................12

Gen Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,

540 U.S. 581 (2004).......................................................................................19 

Goland v. United States,

903 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................... passim

In re Sealed Case,

223 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 2000).......................................................................12

LaRouche v. FEC,

28 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1994).........................................................................12

Lorillard v. Pons,

434 U.S. 575 (1978).......................................................................................13 

Mariani v. United States,

80 F. Supp. 2d 352 (M.D. Pa. 1999)................................................................5 

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Page(s)

Mariani v. United States,

212 F.3d 761 (3d Cir. 2000) ..............................................................14, 15, 16 

McConnell v. FEC,

540 U.S. 93 (2003).........................................................................................14 

Orloski v. FEC,

795 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).......................................................................12

Pressley v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., Inc.,

 760 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1985) .........................................................................18

Republican Nat’l Committee v. FEC,

76 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996).........................................................................12

Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. of Women, Inc.,

547 U.S. 9 (2006)...........................................................................................19 

Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc.,

437 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2006) .........................................................................18

United States v. Amer. Trucking Ass’ns,

310 U.S. 534 (1940).................................................................................19, 23 

United States v. Hankin,

607 F.2d 611 (3d. Cir. 1979) .....................................................................5, 14 

United States v. Alford,

No. 06-CR-00069 (N.D. Fla.)........................................................................10 

United States v. Berglund,

No. 06-CR-00191-RMU (D.D.C.).................................................................10 

United States v. Deloach,

No. 06-CR-20583 (S.D. Fla.) ........................................................................10 

United States v. Gill,

No. CV 09-05664 CAS (C.D. Cal.)...............................................................10 

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Page(s)

United States v. Hsu,

No. 07-Cr-1066 (S.D.N.Y.) ...........................................................................10 

United States v. Jinnah,

No. 2:06-cr-00383-GHK (C.D. Cal.).............................................................10 

United States v. Kanchanalak,

192 F.3d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999).........................................................12, 14, 23 

United States v. Koceja,

No. 2:06-cr-00239-AEG-1 (E.D. Wis.) .........................................................10 

United States v. Maloof,

No. 04-CR-60055 (S.D. Fla.) ........................................................................10 

United States v. Noe,

No. 06-CR-00796 (N.D. Ohio)......................................................................10 

United States v. Pierce-Santos

 No. 09-14 (EGS) (D.D.C.).............................................................................10 

United States v. Schoenburg,

No. 2:07-cr-00357-SS (C.D. Cal.).................................................................10 

United States v. Serafini,

233 F.3d 758 (3d Cir. 2000) ..........................................................................14

United States v. Spencer,

No. 06-CR-60041-MGC-1 (S.D. Fla.)...........................................................10 

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Calif.,

 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998).......................................................................14

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Calif.,

 941 F. Supp. 1277 (D.D.C. 1996).......................................................... passim

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Page(s)

United States v. Troha,

No. 07-CR-050 (E.D. Wis.)...........................................................................10 

United States v. Utter,

No. 05-CR-201 (E.D. Wis.)...........................................................................10 

United States v. Wade,

No. 06-CR-00049-RMU (D.D.C.).................................................................10 

Statutes

2 U.S.C. § 434(b) .....................................................................................................23 

2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1).................................................................................................2 

2 U.S.C. § 437d..........................................................................................................8 

2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(7).................................................................................................2 

2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(8).................................................................................................2 

2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(9)...............................................................................................12 

2 U.S.C. § 437f...........................................................................................................2 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) ...................................................................................................29 

2 U.S.C. § 441a ................................................................................................ passim

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)................................................................................................3, 20 

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8).....................................................................................4, 20, 28

2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) .....................................................................................................4 

2 U.S.C. § 441c(a)......................................................................................................4 

2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) .................................................................................................4 

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Page(s)

2 U.S.C. § 441f..................................................................................................passim

18 U.S.C. § 608........................................................................................................30 

18 U.S.C. § 614 (1970 Supp. V) (repealed 1976)................................................5, 27 

18 U.S.C. § 1001......................................................................................................23 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 

 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) ...........................................3, 13, 14 

Federal Corrupt Practices Act,

 43 Stat. 1073 (1925) ......................................................................................24 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 

 Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) .....................................................27, 30 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,

 Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) .................................................3, 27 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976,

 Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) ...............................................3, 5, 27 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979,

 Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980) .......................................................3 

Hatch Act (1940 Amendments),

 Pub. L. No. 753, 54 Stat. 767-72 (1940) .......................................................25 

Rules and Regulations

11 C.F.R. § 110.4 .......................................................................................................9 

11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(1)(i)..........................................................................................9 

11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2)(i)......................................................................................6, 8 

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Page(s)

Fed. R. App. P. 29(a) .................................................................................................1 

Legislative History 

117 Cong. Rec. 29,325 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1971) .....................................................27 

117 Cong. Rec. 30,071 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1971) .....................................................27 

122 Cong. Rec. H2606 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) ...................................................28

148 Cong. Rec. S1991-02, S1994 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2002)...................................29

H. R. Rep. No. 105-797 (1998)................................................................................29 

H. R. Rep. No. 105-829 (1998)................................................................................28 

S. Rep. No. 92-229 (1971) .......................................................................................30 

Miscellaneous

Cong. Quarterly, Congressional Campaign Finances: History, 

 Facts, and Controversy 33-35 (1992)...........................................................25, 26 

FEC Advisory Op. 1986-41 .......................................................................................9 

FEC Advisory Op. 1991-38, 1992 WL 51228...........................................................9 

FEC Advisory Op. 1995-19, 1995 WL 455822.........................................................9 

FEC Advisory Op. 1996-33, 1996 WL 549698.........................................................9

Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy 359 (1960)..........................................25 

Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House 

 House Transmitting Proposed Election Reform Act 

 of 1966 (May 26, 1966) .......................................................................... 26-27 

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Page(s)

Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns Congress, and Courts:

 The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law 24-40 (1988)..........................25 

Robert D. Probasco, Prosecuting Conduit Campaign Contributions — 

 Hard Time for Soft Money, 42 S. Tex. L. Rev. 841 (2001) ................................22 

Frank J. Sorauf, Money in American Elections 33 (1988).................................25, 26 

Staff of Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections, 85th Cong., Report on 1956 

General Election Campaigns (Comm. Print 1957)........................................26 

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 INTRODUCTION 

This Brief amicus curiae, submitted by the Federal Election Commission1

(“Commission”) in support of Appellant the United States pursuant to Fed. R. App. 

P. 29(a), addresses the question presented by Appellant: “Whether the district 

court erred by holding that the prohibition that ‘[n]o person shall make a 

contribution in the name of another person,’ 2 U.S.C. § 441f, did not apply where 

defendant solicited others to purportedly contribute in their names to a presidential 

candidate, with defendant actually providing them the money (by reimbursement 

or advancement), resulting in defendant secretly contributing $26,000 in the names 

of 13 other people.” (Gov’t Open. Br. at 1.) The district court’s decision — which 

lacks a single source of Commission or judicial support and which, in fact, 

contradicts Commission regulations, advisory opinions, enforcement actions and 

numerous federal judicial decisions — reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of 

the purpose of section 441f in particular and of the provision’s role in the broader 

context of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (“FECA” or 

“Act”) as a whole. If affirmed, the district court’s unprecedented interpretation of 

section 441f — which contradicts over thirty years of Commission and judicial 

interpretations of section 441f — could undermine the government’s ability to 

fulfill the policies of deterring actual and apparent corruption and providing voters 

1

 No party or counsel for a party has authored this brief in whole or in part. 

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with information on the sources of federal candidates’ funding. 

In light of the Commission’s “primary and substantial responsibility for 

administering and enforcing the Act,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109 (1976), 

the Commission’s views on the meaning and purpose of section 441f may 

materially assist this Court in deciding this appeal. The Commission thus 

respectfully submits this Brief explaining how the statute fits within FECA’s 

statutory scheme of campaign finance laws, detailing the Commission’s and 

federal courts’ long-standing interpretation of section 441f, and explaining why 

this Court should reverse the district court’s anomalous interpretation of that 

provision — an interpretation that would render the provision virtually 

meaningless.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE, 

THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

The Commission is the independent agency of the United States government 

with exclusive jurisdiction to administer, interpret, and civilly enforce the Act. 

The Commission is empowered to “formulate policy” with respect to the Act, 

2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1); “to make, amend, and repeal such rules . . . as are necessary 

to carry out the provisions of [the] Act,” 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(8); to issue advisory 

opinions construing the Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 437d(a)(7), 437f; and to civilly enforce 

the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g. In consideration of these broad statutory powers, the 

Supreme Court has observed that “the Commission is precisely the type of agency 

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to which deference should presumptively be afforded.” FEC v. Democratic 

Senatorial Campaign Comm. (“DSCC”), 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981).

This appeal seeks review of a district court decision that disregarded 

Commission regulations and precedent. Because the resolution of Appellant’s 

challenge could affect the enforceability and validity of section 441f as it has been 

interpreted by the Commission and courts for over thirty years, the Commission 

has a substantial interest in this case. 

BACKGROUND

A. The Interests Served by FECA 

 Congress enacted FECA “to limit the actuality and appearance of 

corruption” associated with the federal electoral process. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26, 

66-68. FECA, as amended,2

 addresses these compelling governmental interests 

through a comprehensive scheme that, inter alia, (1) limits the dollar amount of 

contributions by individuals and multi-candidate political committees to candidates 

for federal office, 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a); (2) requires disclosure of the original source 

of all campaign contributions “including contributions which are in any way 

earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit,” id.

2

 FECA was originally adopted in 1971 and has since been substantially 

amended four times. See FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 

Stat. 1263 (1974); FECA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 

(1976); FECA Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980); 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 

Stat. 81 (2002).

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§ 441a(a)(8); and (3) prohibits campaign contributions by corporations and unions 

from their general treasury funds, id. § 441b(a), by federal government contractors, 

id. § 441c(a), and by foreign nationals, id. § 441e(a)(1).

The Supreme Court has upheld FECA’s contribution limits and 

comprehensive disclosure requirements. It has recognized the importance of 

deterring actual and apparent corruption “spawned by the real or imagined coercive 

influence of large financial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their 

actions if elected to office.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. The disclosure requirements 

further provide the electorate with information on campaign financing “to aid the 

voters in evaluating those who seek federal office,” to “deter actual corruption 

and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and 

expenditures to the light of publicity,” and to enable the Commission to “gather[] 

the data necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations.” Id. 

at 66-68.

B. The Prohibition on Making Contributions in the Name of Another

The Act includes 2 U.S.C. § 441f, which complements the contribution 

limits, disclosure requirements, and source restrictions by independently 

prohibiting their violation through deceptive means: “No person shall make a 

contribution in the name of another person or knowingly permit his name to be 

used to effect such a contribution and no person shall knowingly accept a 

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contribution made by one person in the name of another person.”3

 Section 441f 

thus “prevent[s] the circumvention of the ban on corporate and union 

contributions,” “prevent[s] circumvention of the limits on contributions by 

individuals and groups . . . and the prohibition on contributions by foreign 

nationals,” and “ensures that proper disclosure of the actual sources of campaign 

contributions occurs in federal elections.” Mariani v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 

352, 368 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (certifying constitutional questions to en banc Third

Circuit); see Goland v. United States, 903 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1990) (Section 

441f prevents “circumvent[ion] [of] these restrictions,” including through the “use 

of ‘conduits’”); FEC Advisory Op. 1986-41, available at http://saos.nictusa.com/ 

aodocs/1986-41.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (Section 441f “serves to insure 

disclosure of the source of contributions to Federal candidates and political 

committees as well as compliance with the Act’s limitations and prohibitions.”). 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

By misinterpreting the scope of conduct prohibited by section 441f, the 

decision below undermines that provision; emasculates FECA’s disclosure 

requirements; weakens the government’s ability to enforce FECA’s restrictions on 

3

 The prohibition on making contributions in the name of another was 

formerly codified in 18 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1970 Supp. V). That statute was repealed 

and reenacted in amended form effective May 11, 1976, subject to a savings 

provision, Pub. L. 94-283, § 114, 90 Stat. 475 (1976), which maintained the 

vitality of the repealed act until the effective date of the recodification. See United 

States v. Hankin, 607 F.2d 611, 612 & n.1 (3d. Cir. 1979). 

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contributions from certain sources including corporations, labor organizations, and 

foreign nationals; and thwarts detection of violations of FECA’s contribution 

limits. The district court’s reasoning, which sought to resolve a misperceived 

anomaly in FECA’s statutory scheme, is flawed for at least three reasons. 

 First, section 441f’s plain language prohibits making concealed 

contributions in the names of straw donors, and it has been universally interpreted 

to that effect in a specific Commission regulation, Commission advisory opinions 

and enforcement decisions, and numerous federal judicial decisions. With the 

single exception of the decision below, this collective body of administrative and 

judicial authority uniformly interprets section 441f as prohibiting not simply the 

act of “making a contribution[] and providing a false name” (GER 3), but, more 

broadly, any “contribution in the name of another,” including “[g]iving money or 

anything of value, all or part of which was provided to the contributor by another 

person (the true contributor) without disclosing the source of money or the thing of 

value . . .” 11 C.F.R. 110.4(b)(2)(i).

This body of authority should have done more than inform the district 

court’s interpretation of section 441f: The Commission’s “construction of a 

statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer” should have been accorded 

“considerable weight.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Under Chevron, the Commission’s interpretation of 

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section 441f is entitled to deference as long as it represents a “permissible 

construction of the statute.” Id. at 843; see also DSCC, 454 U.S. at 39. It does.

Second, basic principles of statutory construction support the government’s 

interpretation of section 441f as broadly prohibiting any contribution made in the 

name of another person. The government’s interpretation is consistent with 

FECA’s overarching purpose as well as section 441f’s specific role in FECA’s 

statutory scheme of facilitating enforcement of FECA’s contribution limits, 

disclosure requirements, and source restrictions. By contrast, the district court’s 

unprecedented interpretation of section 441f facilitates circumvention of these 

vital, corruption-fighting measures. 

Finally, the government’s interpretation of section 441f is consistent with the 

legislative history of section 441f in particular and FECA as a whole. Although 

little direct legislative history exists on the Act’s prohibition against contributions 

in the name of another, the legislative history of subsequent FECA amendments 

confirms that the prohibition encompasses concealed contributions funneled 

through conduits. 

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ARGUMENT 

I. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE DEFERRED TO THE 

COMMISSION’S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 441f 

A. The Commission’s Long-Standing Interpretation of Section 441f

The Commission, exercising its “extensive rulemaking and adjudicative 

powers,” and its authority “to render advisory opinions with respect to activities 

possibly violating the Act,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 110; see 2 U.S.C. § 437d, has

repeatedly and uniformly interpreted the meaning and scope of section 441f.

Consistent with section 441f’s anti-circumvention purpose, the Commission, for 

over 30 years, has stated that the provision prohibits all contributions made in the 

name of another, including contributions ostensibly made in the name of a straw 

contributor that have been advanced or reimbursed by an undisclosed true 

contributor.

This interpretation is reflected, inter alia, in the Commission’s implementing 

regulations originally promulgated in 1977, which list as one example of making 

“contributions in the name of another” “[g]iving money or anything of value, all or 

part of which was provided to the contributor by another person (the true 

contributor) without disclosing the source of money or the thing of value . . . .” 

11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2)(i). See infra Section I.B.

Commission advisory opinions rely upon this interpretation: “the Act and 

Commission regulations prohibit the making and knowing acceptance of 

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contributions in the name of another . . . . This includes the reimbursement or 

other payment of funds by one person to another for the purpose of making a 

contribution.” FEC Advisory Op. 1996-33, 1996 WL 549698, at *2 (citing 

2 U.S.C. § 441f; 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)). See also FEC Advisory Op. 1995-19, 1995 

WL 455822, at *2 (“A contribution by a person who is reimbursed in advance or 

afterward by another person or entity is unlawful under the Act because it is a 

‘contribution in the name of another.’”) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441f; 11 C.F.R. 

§ 110.4(b)(1)(i)); FEC Advisory Op. 1991-38, 1992 WL 51228, at *2 (cautioning 

that under section 441f, campaign committee treasurer “may not be used as a 

conduit for payments from prohibited sources or persons attempting to make 

contributions to the committee through [the treasurer]”). 

The Commission was first asked in 1986 to opine on the permissibility of an 

employer-employee reimbursement scheme similar to that alleged here. See FEC 

Advisory Op. 1986-41, supra p. 5. Explaining that section 441f “insure[s] 

disclosure of the source of contributions to Federal candidates and political 

committees as well as compliance with the Act’s limitations and prohibitions,” id.

at 2, the Commission concluded that the proposal “to pay additional compensation 

to certain employees to enable such employees to meet demands on them for 

contributions to [the employer’s] PAC . . . would constitute the making of a 

contribution in the name of another and is prohibited by section 441f.” Id. at 3.

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The Commission’s regulatory interpretation of section 441f also underlies its 

actions in more than 40 civil enforcement matters over the past 20 years. Indeed, 

since 1990, the Commission has successfully concluded 45 civil enforcement 

matters in which over 220 respondents violated section 441f by participating in 

illegal schemes to reimburse contributions ostensibly made by others. See

Addendum. Those civil enforcement matters resulted in the imposition of over 

$6.1 million in civil penalties. See id.4

4

 The Department of Justice likewise has obtained numerous criminal 

judgments against defendants who violated section 441f by participating in 

concealed conduit-contribution schemes. See, e.g., United States v. Jinnah, No. 

2:06-cr-00383-GHK (C.D. Cal.) (Docket Nos. 97, 100); United States v. Spencer,

No. 06-CR-60041-MGC-1 (S.D. Fla.) (Docket Nos. 1, 22); United States v. 

Deloach, No. 06-CR-20583 (S.D. Fla.) (Docket Nos. 1, 36, 111); United States v. 

Noe, No. 06-CR-00796 (N.D. Ohio) (Docket Nos. 1, 38); United States v. Alford,

No. 06-CR-00069 (N.D. Fla.) (Docket Nos. 27, 142, 241); United States v. Maloof,

No. 04-CR-60055 (S.D. Fla.) (Docket Nos. 38, 42, 53); United States v. Wade, No. 

06-CR-00049-RMU (D.D.C.) (Docket Nos. 6, 31); United States v. Schoenburg,

No. 2:07-cr-00357-SS (C.D. Cal.) (Docket Nos. 1, 38); United States v. Troha, No. 

07-CR-050 (E.D. Wis.) (Docket Nos. 13, 21); United States v. Berglund, No. 06-

CR-00191-RMU (D.D.C.) (Docket Nos. 5, 14); United States v. Koceja, No. 2:06-

cr-00239-AEG-1 (E.D. Wis.) (Docket Nos. 2, 8); United States v. Utter, No. 05-

CR-201 (E.D. Wis.) (Docket Nos. 16, 23). See also United States v. Pierce-Santos

(No. 09-14 (EGS) (D.D.C.) (Docket No. 14); United States v. Hsu, No. 07-Cr-1066 

(S.D.N.Y.) (Docket No. 23, Minute Entry of May 18, 2009). At least one such 

defendant has moved to have his sentence vacated based on the decision below in 

this case. See United States v. Gill, No. CV 09-05664 CAS (C.D. Cal.), Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence, dated Aug. 3, 2009. 

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B. The Commission’s Interpretation of Section 441f Should Have 

Been Accorded Chevron Deference

“As in all statutory construction cases, [the court must] begin with the 

language of the statute . . . ‘to determine whether the language at issue has a plain 

and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.’”

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citation omitted). Here, 

the language of section 441f plainly covers all contributions made in the name of 

another person, including a donor’s use of a concealed conduit. When a donor 

contributes through a concealed conduit, the true source of the contribution is the 

donor, despite the nominal use of the conduit’s name. See, e.g., FEC v. Weinsten,

462 F. Supp. 243, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding “no ambiguity in the statutory 

language” of section 441f and holding that defendant’s reimbursement of 

concealed conduits violated statute).

Even if section 441f were found to have any ambiguity, and even if the 

district court’s unprecedented interpretation of section 441f were itself reasonable, 

the court’s outright rejection of the Commission’s reasonable interpretation was 

improper. “[T]he Commission is precisely the type of agency to which deference 

should presumptively be afforded.” DSCC, 454 U.S. at 37. Indeed, “Congress has 

vested the Commission with ‘primary and substantial responsibility for 

administering and enforcing the Act,’ providing the [Commission] with ‘extensive 

rulemaking and adjudicative powers,’” as well as the “authori[ty] to ‘formulate 

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general policy with respect to the administration of th[e] Act,’” and “the ‘sole 

discretionary power’ to determine in the first instance whether or not a civil 

violation of the Act has occurred.” Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 109, 110, 112, 

n.153; 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(9)). “For these reasons,” where, as here, the district 

court looked beyond the statute’s plain language to ascertain its meaning (GER 

5-7), “the FEC’s interpretation of the Act should [have] be[en] accorded 

considerable deference.’”5 United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1049 

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 

Fulani v. FEC, 147 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC,

76 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996); LaRouche v. FEC, 28 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).

“Such deference is especially warranted here, for Congress has twice 

amended [FECA] since” the Commission issued its regulation explaining the scope 

of section 441f “but has not overruled” the Commission’s interpretation. CFTC v. 

Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1986). “‘Congress is presumed to be aware of an 

administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation 

when it re-enacts a statute without change.’” Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., __ 

5

 Moreover, in the same context presented here, courts have held that the fact 

“[t]hat criminal liability is at issue does not alter the fact that [the Commission’s] 

reasonable interpretations of [FECA] are entitled to deference.” Kanchanalak, 192 

F.3d at 1047 n.17 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 

Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703-05 (1995)); see also In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 

779 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[d]eference [to Commission interpretations of FECA] is 

due as much in a criminal context as in any other”). 

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U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2492 (June 22, 2009) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 

U.S. 575, 580 (1978)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “[w]here, as here, 

‘Congress has not just kept its silence by refusing to overturn the administrative 

construction, but has ratified it with positive legislation’” — Congress itself 

characterized section 441f as the “conduit contribution ban” when it increased the 

penalties for violating the provision in the 2002 amendments encompassed in 

BCRA, see 116 Stat. 108 (2002) — courts “cannot but deem that construction 

virtually conclusive.” Schor, 478 U.S. at 846 (citation omitted). 

Here, “[t]he Commission’s position on the question before [the courts] is 

clear” and “consistently has [been] adhered to” since 1977. DSCC, 454 U.S. at 37.

“[T]he task for the [district court] was not to interpret the statute as it thought best 

but rather the narrower inquiry into whether the Commission’s construction was 

‘sufficiently reasonable’ to be accepted by a reviewing court.” Id. at 39 (citations 

omitted). It was: the district court itself acknowledged that the government’s 

interpretation “may reflect the spirit of FECA.” (GER 7.) The court nevertheless 

erred because it believed the government’s interpretation failed to “accord with the 

plain language of § 441f read in conjunction with” other parts of the Act. (Id.) But 

as discussed infra in Section III, no such conflict exists.

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II. COURTS UNIFORMLY INTERPRET SECTION 441F AS 

PROHIBITING THE FUNNELING OF SECRET CONTRIBUTIONS 

THROUGH STRAW DONORS 

The question presented here is not one of first impression. On the contrary, 

three U.S. courts of appeals — including this Court — and numerous federal 

district courts have recognized that section 441f prohibits concealed contributors 

from making contributions through the undisclosed reimbursement of one or more 

straw donors. See Mariani v. United States, 212 F.3d 761, 775 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 

banc); United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 763 (3d Cir. 2000); Kanchanalak,

192 F.3d at 1042; United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Calif., 138 F.3d 961, 

969 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Goland, 903 F.2d at 1251; U.S. v. Hankin, 607 F.2d 611, 612 

(3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Calif., 941 F. Supp. 

1277, 1281 (D.D.C. 1996); Weinsten, 462 F. Supp. at 249-50.6

 The Supreme Court 

has even observed that section 441f’s deterrence of “corruption by conduit,” i.e.,

“donations by parents through their minor children to circumvent contribution 

limits applicable to the parents,” may have explained the lack of evidence offered 

in support of the since-overturned prohibition on contributions by minors in former 

section 318 of BCRA. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 232 (2003). 

6 See also Fieger v. Gonzales, No. 07-CV-10533-DT, 2007 WL 2351006, 

at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007); FEC v. Kopko, Civ. No. 91-CV-7764 (E.D. Pa. 

May 22, 1992) (court-approved settlement of section 441f enforcement action 

involving reimbursed contributions) (complaint and judgment included in 

Addendum). See also cases cited infra p. 17.

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A. Courts Recognize That Section 441f’s Prohibition of Concealed 

Contributions Through Undisclosed Straw Donors Fulfills 

FECA’s Underlying Policy Objectives 

Among the cases invoking the Commission’s interpretation of section 441f 

are a decision from this Court recognizing the statute’s anti-circumvention role 

within FECA’s broader scheme and a Third Circuit decision rejecting a 

constitutional challenge to section 441f in recognition of its fulfillment of the 

Supreme Court-approved government interests underlying FECA’s disclosure 

requirements. See Mariani, 212 F.3d at 766; Goland, 903 F.2d at 1251. Both 

decisions interpret section 441f as prohibiting the conduct alleged here: Mariani 

“ma[de] campaign contributions . . . through enlisting company employees and 

others to forward contributions to the candidates that were thereafter reimbursed,” 

Mariani, 212 F.3d at 764, and Goland financed a candidate’s political ads by 

“arrang[ing] for 56 persons to make payments . . . to the media company with the 

understanding that Goland would reimburse them, which he apparently did,” 

Goland, 903 F.2d at 1251.

In Goland, this Court devoted 3 pages of the 13-page opinion to a detailed 

background of FECA that not only summarized its various provisions but also 

explained the historical context in which the Act was passed and discussed the 

Supreme Court’s evaluation of the constitutionality of its provisions. Goland, 903 

F.2d at 1249-51. Signaling section 441f’s complementary relationship to FECA’s 

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other provisions, this Court explained that “[t]he Act prohibits the use of ‘conduits’ 

to circumvent these restrictions . . .” id. at 1251, and expressly referenced 

section 441f’s anti-circumvention role in FECA’s broader scheme.

The district court’s novel interpretation of section 441f — that the statute 

“unambiguous[ly] . . . does not prohibit soliciting and reimbursing contributions” 

(GER 5 (emphasis added)) — fundamentally conflicts with this Court’s 

acknowledgment in Goland that the statute prevents circumvention of FECA’s 

other restrictions, 903 F.2d at 1251, as well as the Third Circuit’s holding in 

Mariani that section 441f survives constitutional scrutiny because its

“[p]roscription of conduit contributions (with the concomitant requirement that the 

true source of contributions be disclosed) would seem to be at the very core of the 

[Supreme] Court’s analysis [in Buckley],” 212 F.3d at 775. Yet the district court 

inexplicably dismissed Goland and Mariani as irrelevant. (GER 6.) Both 

decisions, however, directly address the meaning of section 441f and do so while 

explaining FECA’s overall regulatory structure.

B. The Decision Below is An Outlier 

In addition to this Court’s and the Third Circuit’s analyses, a number of 

district courts have enforced the Government’s interpretation of section 441f by 

entering judgments, or declining to overturn them, where defendants violated the 

statute by engaging in conduct like that alleged here. E.g., Sun-Diamond Growers,

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941 F. Supp. at 1281 (declining to dismiss indictment where defendant was 

convicted under section 441f); FEC v. Williams, Civ. No. 93-6321-ER (C.D. Cal. 

Jan. 31, 1995) (granting summary judgment to Commission where defendant 

violated section 441f “in that Defendant made 22 contributions totaling $22,000 in 

the names of others” by “advancing or reimbursing” $1,000 to each of those 22 

individuals); FEC v. Lawson, Civ. No. 6:90-2116-9 (D.S.C. Apr. 8, 1991) (default 

judgment regarding bonus paid to employee to effect contribution to House 

candidate); FEC v. Rodriguez, Civ. No. 86-687-CIV-T-10 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 

1988) (default judgment regarding reimbursement of individual contributions to 

presidential candidate); FEC v. Wolfson, Civ. No. 85-1617-CIV-T-13 (M.D. Fla. 

Feb. 6, 1986) (summary judgment regarding reimbursement of individual 

contributions to presidential candidate).7 See also cases cited supra p. 10 n.4. 

In Sun-Diamond Growers, for example, the defendant obtained contribution 

checks “from several employees” and “reimburs[ed] the individuals that advanced 

the campaign contributions.” 941 F. Supp. at 1281. The defendant was convicted 

of violating several provisions of FECA, including section 441f. Id. at 1279. In 

denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss certain counts of the indictment, 

including the section 441f counts, the district court observed that if the defendant’s 

7

 The complaints and judgments in Lawson and Rodriguez, summary 

judgment order and memorandum in Wolfson, and summary judgment order in 

Williams are included in the attached Addendum. 

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deceptive conduit-reimbursement scheme “were permitted in connection with an 

election, the judicially recognized purpose of FECA would be emasculated.” Id. at 

1281 (footnote omitted). 

No other court has embraced the district court’s novel interpretation that 

permits precisely the type of deceptive conduct that “emasculate[s]” the “judicially 

recognized purpose of FECA.” Id. The decision below is thus best “regard[ed] . . . 

as an outlier, inconsistent with the weight of authority” concerning the purpose and 

scope of section 441f. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 937-38 (9th Cir. 

2006).

III. THE GOVERNMENT’S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 441f 

PROMOTES THE CLEAR PURPOSE OF BOTH SECTION 441f AND 

FECA AS A WHOLE 

A. Section 441f Must Be Interpreted In a Manner Consistent With 

Its Specific Purpose and the Broader Policy Underlying FECA 

The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the 

intended purpose of a statute. This Court has thus held that even where a statute’s 

meaning is apparent from its plain language, courts “may not adopt a plain 

language interpretation of a statutory provision that directly undercuts the clear 

purpose of the statute.” Albertson’s Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 42 F.3d 

537, 545 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Pressley v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv., 

Inc., 760 F.2d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). Indeed, “even when [a statute’s] 

plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one 

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‘plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,’ [the Supreme 

Court] has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.” Albertson’s, 42 

F.3d at 545 (quoting United States v. Amer. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 

(1940) (citations omitted)). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 

574, 586 (1983).

When a statute’s meaning cannot be ascertained from its plain terms, courts 

may employ canons of statutory interpretation to understand “the text, structure, 

purpose, and history” of a statute, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 

U.S. 581, 600 (2004); the Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that “canons are 

tools designed to help courts better determine what Congress intended, not to lead 

courts to interpret the law contrary to that intent.” Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for 

Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 23 (2006) (citation omitted). 

Here, section 441f not only plainly prohibits defendant’s alleged conduct, 

canons of statutory interpretation also support the government’s reasonable 

interpretation of section 441f. 

B. The Government’s Interpretation of Section 441f Complements 

Other FECA Provisions, Including Section 441a(a)(8)’s 

Regulation of Disclosed Conduit Contributions 

The government’s interpretation of section 441f is harmonious with both 

FECA’s overarching anti-corruption purpose and section 441f’s specific anticircumvention role in FECA’s broader scheme. In particular, section 441f’s 

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prohibition of reimbursing contributions made through straw contributors that

conceal the identity of the true contributor works in tandem with 

section 441a(a)(8). The latter provision, unlike section 441f, contemplates a 

scenario in which a contributor is seeking not to conceal his identity but rather to 

make legitimate, earmarked contributions through the disclosed use of a conduit or 

intermediary. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8). Section 441a(a)(8) provides that in such 

a scenario, the “original source” is deemed to have made a contribution to the 

candidate-recipient and must be disclosed. Id. In other words, contributions up to 

the limits in section 441a(a) can legitimately be made through an intermediary or 

conduit, as long as the transaction is fully disclosed. 

 Thus, sections 441a(a)(8) and 441f serve different, but complementary 

purposes. The former requires disclosure for lawful conduit contributions within 

the statutory limits, while section 441f prevents circumvention of all contribution 

limits, the specific disclosure requirement in section 441a(a)(8), and FECA’s 

source restrictions. Interpreting section 441f to prohibit reimbursing contributions 

made through straw contributors that conceal the identity of the true contributor 

also facilitates detection of violations of these other requirements. 

C. The District Court’s Analysis Relied On a Misunderstanding of 

the Scope of Section 441f 

The district court correctly stated that if section 441f broadly proscribed all

conduit contributions regardless of whether the true source of the contribution was 

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disclosed, it might conflict with section 441a. (See GER 4 (“[If] § 441f covered 

indirect contributions made through a conduit, that would mean such contributions 

were never allowed.”).) The notion that section 441f might proscribe all conduit 

contributions, however, was mistaken. The district court thus never considered 

whether the proper interpretation of section 441f is reconcilable with the language 

of section 441a. It is. The only “conduit” contributions proscribed by section 441f 

are those in which the identity of the contribution’s true source is concealed. And 

no portion of section 441a or any other FECA provision permits concealed 

contributions in any form. 

The court’s mistaken interpretation of section 441f also contributed to its 

misplaced concern over the absence from section 441f of the words “indirectly,” 

“conduit,” or “intermediary.” The district court mistakenly concluded that because 

section 441f does not explicitly prohibit “indirect[]” contributions, or those passed 

through an “intermediary” or “conduit,” then the opposite must be true. Not so. 

As explained above, some indirect or conduit contributions are legal, while others 

are not; the touchstone is whether conduit contributions have been concealed. 

D. The Decision Below Yields an Absurd Result 

1. The district court’s interpretation of section 441f emasculates 

the provision’s anti-circumvention function 

Defendant concedes that “[t]he reason for the ban [in section 441f] . . . is . . . 

so that the public will know where money is coming from when someone makes a 

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contribution.” (GER 147-48.) As one commentator has observed, however, 

“making a campaign contribution while maintaining anonymity is difficult to do 

without using a conduit.” Robert D. Probasco, Prosecuting Conduit Campaign 

Contributions — Hard Time for Soft Money, 42 S. Tex. L. Rev. 841, 876 (2001).

“[T]o maintain anonymity while avoiding use of a conduit, the donor would have 

to make the donation in cash . . . , by a cashier’s check (on which the issuing bank 

usually notes the source’s name), or by money order.” Id.

The district court’s conclusion that section 441f “unambiguous[ly]” permits 

one of the principal means of circumventing FECA’s source restrictions and 

disclosure requirements fails to accord with section 441f’s specific purpose of 

preventing circumvention of FECA’s other requirements. If contributors could 

legitimately donate to candidates by using straw donors, evasion of FECA’s 

contribution limits and reporting requirements would be much easier. Indeed the 

conduct alleged here “clearly falls within the parameters of the type of behavior 

that would lead to the corruption of the political process, or at a minimum, to the 

appearance of corruption of the political process.” Sun-Diamond, 941 F. Supp. at 

1281.

The decision below thus interprets the statute in a manner that “defeat[s] the 

plain purpose of the statute.” Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586. And even if the 

“unambiguous” plain terms of the statute actually supported such an interpretation, 

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the interpretation would be no more permissible because it “directly undercuts the 

clear purpose of the statute,” Albertson’s, 42 F.3d at 545, and is “‘plainly at 

variance with the policy of [FECA] as a whole.” Amer. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 

at 543-44 (footnote omitted). 

2. The decision below is internally inconsistent 

Notwithstanding its interpretation of section 441f, the district court 

separately concluded that defendant may be criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001 for causing a false statement “‘that his employees had made contributions 

. . . when, in fact . . . O’Donnell had made those contributions by providing his 

money to those individuals . . . to make those contributions.’” (GER 8 (quoting 

Indictment at 8).) This conclusion was based on the court’s correct understanding 

that “‘§ 434(b) of FECA requires political committees to report the ‘true source’ of 

hard money contributions; thus, statements identifying conduits as the source of 

funds were not literally true.’” (GER 10 (quoting Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d at 1042 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).) “Principles of consistent usage in 

statutory interpretation must, however, be applied consistently.” Kanchanalak,

192 F.3d at 1047.

The court’s two conclusions are inconsistent and irreconcilable. The 

premise of the section 1001 count — that the reported contributions were actually 

made by defendant, the true source of the funds contributed — is the same premise 

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the court rejected in its construction of section 441f. Although the section 441f 

and section 1001 counts are predicated on the same underlying transactions, the 

district court described those transactions in substantively different terms for 

purposes of each count: The decision wrongly concludes that defendant did not 

violate section 441f when he “reimburs[ed] . . . employees for contributions they

made,” while correctly sustaining the section 1001 count for causing a materially 

false statement that defendant’s employees had made contributions because 

“O’Donnell had made those contributions by providing his money to those 

individuals . . . to make those contributions.” (Compare GER 7, with GER 8

(quoting Indictment at 8) (emphases added).) 

The district court’s failure to reconcile its novel interpretation of section 

441f with its other holding further demonstrates its unreasonable interpretation of 

that provision. 

E. The Government’s Interpretation of Section 441f is Consistent 

with FECA’s Legislative History 

 FECA’s history demonstrates that section 441f prohibits undisclosed 

contributions funneled through conduits, rather than merely prohibiting making 

contributions under a false name. For the nearly half century prior to FECA’s 

enactment, the nation’s chief campaign finance laws were the Federal Corrupt 

Practices Act of 1925 (“FCPA”), Title III of the Act of Feb. 28, 1925, 43 Stat. 

1073, which provided for regular reporting by certain political committees and 

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prohibited corporate political contributions, and the 1940 amendments to the Hatch 

Act (“Second Hatch Act”), Act of July 19, 1940, Ch. 640, Pub. L. No. 753, § 13, 

54 Stat. 767-72, which prohibited persons from contributing more than $5,000 in 

any calendar year in connection with any federal campaign. Riddled with 

loopholes, these laws contained no enforcement provisions and were routinely 

circumvented, often through the use of intermediaries. See generally

Congressional Quarterly, Cong. Campaign Finances: History, Facts, and 

Controversy 33-35 (1992); Frank J. Sorauf, Money in American Elections 33 

(1988); Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns Congress, and Courts: The Making of 

Federal Campaign Finance Law 24-40 (1988). 

 Individuals often evaded these laws by contributing through conduits, 

sometimes called “dummy” contributors. See Sorauf, supra, at 33; Alexander 

Heard, The Costs of Democracy 359 (1960). Alexander Heard, who would later 

serve as Chairman of President Kennedy’s Commission on Campaign Costs, 

described a lawyer who funneled $30,000 in campaign contributions through 

various intermediaries as a “classic illustration” of how individuals evaded the 

$5,000 limit on federal contributions. Heard, supra, at 359. Wealthy donors 

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frequently gave more than $5,000 by privately subsidizing contributions of 

relatives. See Congressional Quarterly, supra, p. 34.8

Similarly, corporations used conduits to evade the prohibition on corporate 

contributions by reimbursing executives for their contributions. See Sorauf, supra, 

at 33. Testimony developed by the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and 

Elections in 1956 showed that corporations circumvented the law by “pay[ing] or 

prepay[ing] bonuses with the explicit or tacit understanding that part of such 

remuneration shall be spent in campaign contributions.” Staff of Subcomm. on 

Privileges and Elections, 85th Cong., Report on 1956 General Election Campaigns 

(“Gore Report”) (Comm. Print 1957) at 24.9

8

 In a 1971 floor debate over the proposed FECA prior to its enactment, 

Senator Scott observed that a “loophole” existed by which “a man of influence” 

could evade the contribution limits by giving money through his friends. (See

GER 5.) Although the district court referenced Senator Scott’s observation and 

reasoned that “[i]f 441f prohibited using one’s friends as conduits for contributions 

there would be no ‘loophole’ to fill” (id.), it is unclear whether Senator Scott was 

referring to a loophole in the proposed FECA, or in the pre-existing law, which did 

not include section 441f or an analogue. The better view appears to be the latter; 

such a statement would be consistent with the history of evasion of the pre-FECA 

laws through the use of conduits. And even if it were the former, because this 

debate included no mention of the proposed prohibition on contributions in the 

name of another, Senator Scott’s remark is of limited use in divining the meaning 

of Section 441f’s forerunner.

9

 In a 1966 message to Congress proposing election reforms, President 

Johnson summarized the weaknesses of the FCPA and Second Hatch Act: “Too 

narrow in their scope when passed, they are now obsolete. . . . [M]ore loophole 

than law. They invite evasion and circumvention.” Letter to the President of the 

Senate and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting Proposed Election Reform 

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 In 1971, Congress acted to close various loopholes in the campaign finance 

laws and included among the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 

1971 the prohibition against contributions in the name of another.10 Pub. L. No. 

92-225, § 310, 86 Stat. 3, 19. As initially enacted, the prohibition specified that 

“[n]o person shall make a contribution in the name of another person, and no 

person shall knowingly accept a contribution made by one person in the name of 

another person.” In 1974, Congress moved the prohibition to the criminal code at 

18 U.S.C. § 614, and amended it to additionally prohibit anyone from “knowingly 

permit[ting] his name to be used to effect” a contribution in the name of another. 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 

§ 101(f), 88 Stat. 1263, 1267-68. The content of the provision has not since 

changed. In 1976, however, Congress returned the prohibition to Title 2, at 2 

U.S.C. § 441f. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 

94-283, §§ 112, 201(a), 90 Stat. 475, 494.

Act of 1966 (May 26, 1966), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 

index.php?pid=27617 (last visited Sept. 23, 2009).

10 See, e.g., 117 Cong. Rec. 30,071 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1971) (statement of Sen. 

Mansfield) (“This act closes those loopholes so that the public will know where the 

political obligations lie.”); 117 Cong. Rec. 29,325 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1971) 

(statement of Sen. Symington) (“[FECA] . . . goes far toward closing these and 

other loopholes which exist in the present law.”).

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 Although very little legislative history from the 1971 enactment specifically 

discusses the prohibition against contributions in the name of another, members of 

Congress have since repeatedly explained that the prohibition encompasses conduit 

contributions. During House floor debate over the 1976 amendments to FECA, a 

question arose regarding the reporting obligation of a person who gives another 

cash to purchase a ticket to a fundraiser. Representative Mathis cautioned that 

“there is a provision in the law that provides for criminal penalties for using 

another as a conduit for funds. One cannot give money for another.”11 122 Cong. 

Rec. H2606 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976).

 In a 1998 report, the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee 

repeatedly referred to section 441f as covering “conduit contributions.” See, e.g.,

H. R. Rep. No. 105-829 (“Investigation of Political Fundraising Improprieties and 

Possible Violations of Law”) pt. 1, at 178 (describing “contributions in the name of 

another” as “conduit contributions”), at 182 (same), pt. 4 at 4019 (referring to 

section 441f as a “conduit contribution” provision) (1998). In another 1998 report, 

the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct explained that “[i]t is 

11 Although Representative Mathis did not identify the provision that imposed 

criminal penalties for using another as a conduit, his actual words and the 

lawfulness of properly attributed and reported earmarked contributions, see 2 

U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8), strongly suggest that he was referring to the prohibition of 

contributions in the name of another. 

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illegal for any person to make a contribution to a federal candidate by using the 

name of another person. 2 U.S.C. § 441f. Such a contribution is commonly 

referred to as a ‘conduit contribution.’” H. R. Rep. No. 105-797 (“In the Matter of 

Representative Jay C. Kim”) at 94 n.658 (1998). 

 Amendments to FECA in 2002 make clear that members of Congress 

understood the prohibition on contributions in the name of another to encompass 

concealed conduit contributions. In section 315 of BCRA (codified as amended at 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (2002)), Congress enhanced the civil and criminal penalties for 

violations of the prohibition against contributions in the name of another, a 

prohibition described in an analysis of the bill placed into the record by one of its 

sponsors as “the conduit contribution prohibition in 2 U.S.C. § 441f.” 148 Cong. 

Rec. S1991-02, S1994 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2002). Congress, in fact, even titled the 

provision “Increase in Penalties Imposed for Violation of Conduit Contribution 

Ban.” 116 Stat. at 108.12 Compared to Congress’s repeated, unambiguous 

characterizations of section 441f, the two fragments of legislative debate 

mentioned by the district court — the latter relied on by the court to help construe 

a term not even found in section 441f (“indirect”) and touching on a different 

12 BCRA, inter alia, increased the maximum criminal penalty from the greater 

of $10,000 or 200 percent of the contribution involved to $50,000 or 1,000 percent 

of the amount involved. 116 Stat. at 108. 

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FECA provision (2 U.S.C. § 441b) — shed little light on the meaning of the 

prohibition against contributions in the name of another. 

 Finally, the district court’s construction of section 441f conflicts with the 

cardinal purpose of the 1971 Act. At inception, FECA replaced individual 

contribution limits, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (repealing 18 

U.S.C. § 608), with more rigorous disclosure requirements aimed at revealing the 

actual source of a candidate’s support. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 92-229, at 1859 

(1971) (“reject[ing] placing a limitation on individual contributions,” in part, 

because “[f]ull disclosure makes such a limitation unnecessary”). The district 

court’s interpretation of section 441f as only prohibiting contributions under a false 

name cannot be reconciled with this stated purpose of the 1971 Act. Under the 

court’s narrow reading, contributions through straw donors — from FECA’s 

enactment until enactment of the Act’s earmarking provision in 1974 — would 

have been left entirely unregulated, neither unlawful nor otherwise subject to 

disclosure.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the decision below should be reversed. 

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Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan

(D.C. Bar No. 424222) 

General Counsel 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley

Assistant General Counsel 

Steve Hajjar 

Attorney

s/ Erin Chlopak 

Erin Chlopak (D.C. Bar No. 496370) 

Attorney

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

September 23, 2009 (202) 694-1650 

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ADDENDUM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM 

Page

1 Table of Federal Election Commission’s Civil Enforcement of

Section 441f From December 1990 through the Present That 

 Includes Respondents’ Participation in Undisclosed 

 Conduit-Contribution-Reimbursement Schemes ....................................A1 

2 FEC v. Kopko, Civ. No. 91-CV-7764 (E.D. Pa.) 

 Stipulation and Order dated June 8, 1992 ...............................................A4 

 Complaint dated Dec. 16, 1991 ...............................................................A6 

3 FEC v. Williams, Civ. No. 93-6321-ER (Bx) (C.D. Cal.)

 Summary Judgment Order dated Jan. 31, 1995 ....................................A12 

4 FEC v. Lawson, Civ. No. 6:90-2116-9 (D.S.C.) 

Default Judgment dated Apr. 8, 1991....................................................A17

 Complaint dated Sept. 4, 1990 ..............................................................A18 

5 FEC v. Rodriguez, Civ. No. 86-687-CIV-T-10 (M.D. Fla.) 

Default Judgment dated Oct. 28, 1988..................................................A23 

 Complaint dated May 27, 1986 .............................................................A25 

6 FEC v. Wolfson, Civ. No. 85-1617-CIV-T-13 (M.D. Fla.) 

 Summary Judgment Order dated Feb. 6, 1986......................................A30 

 FEC Summary Judgment Memorandum dated Dec. 26, 1985..............A32 

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Form 8. Certificate of Compliance Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C) and Circuit

Rule 32-1 for Case Number ___________________________

(see next page) Form Must Be Signed By Attorney or Unrepresented Litigant and attached

to the back of each copy of the brief

I certify that: (check appropriate option(s))

__1. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32 (a)(7)(C) and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, the attached

opening/answering/reply/cross-appeal brief is

• Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains _________ words

(opening, answering, and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not exceed 14,000

words; reply briefs must not exceed 7,000 words),

or is

• Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and

contains _______ words or ________ lines of text (opening,

answering, and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals

must not exceed 14,000 words or 1,300 lines of text; reply briefs

must not exceed 7,000 words or 650 lines of text).

__2. The attached brief is not subject to the type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)

because

• This brief complies with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(1)-(7) and is a principal brief of no more than

30 pages or a reply brief of no more than 15 pages;

• This brief complies with a page or size-volume limitation established by separate court order

dated ____________ and is

• Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains _______

words,

or is

• Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and

contains ______pages or_______ words or ________ lines of

text.

Submit by Email Print Form

09-50296

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__3. Briefs in Capital Cases

• This brief is being filed in a capital case pursuant to the type-volume limitations set forth at

Circuit Rule 32-4 and is

• Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains _________

words (opening, answering, and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not

exceed 21,000 words; reply briefs must not exceed 9,800 words)

or is

• Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and

contains _______ words or ________ lines of text (opening,

answering, and the second and third briefs filed in crossappeals must not exceed 75 pages or 1,950 lines of text;

reply briefs must not exceed 35 pages or 910 lines of text).

__4. Amicus Briefs

• Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(d) and 9th Cir. R. 32-1, the attached amicus brief is

proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains 7000 words or less,

or is

• Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains not more than either 7000

words or 650 lines of text,

or is

• Not subject to the type-volume limitations because it is an amicus brief of no more than 15

pages and complies with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(1)(5).

__________________________ _________________________________

Date Signature of Attorney or 

Unrepresented Litigant

09/23/2009 s/ Erin Chlopak

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I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system 

on (date) . 

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be 

accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

When All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system 

on (date) . 

 

Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate 

CM/ECF system. 

 

I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. I 

have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, or have dispatched it 

to a third party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days to the following 

non-CM/ECF participants:

Signature (use "s/" format)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

When Not All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System

9th Circuit Case Number(s)

*********************************************************************************

Signature (use "s/" format)

NOTE: To secure your input, you should print the filled-in form to PDF (File > Print > PDF Printer/Creator).

*********************************************************************************

s/ Erin Chlopak

09-50296

September 23, 2009

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