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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 44672

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROMAN ROBERT HAMANN,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2018 Unpublished Opinion No. 374

Filed: February 28, 2018

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Shoshone County. Hon. Scott L. Wayman, District Judge. 

Judgments and orders of restitution, vacated.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Ben P. McGreevy, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge 

Roman Robert Hamann appeals from the district court’s judgments and orders of

restitution. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate both judgments and orders of restitution.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury found Hamann guilty of possession of stolen property for stealing a car (a Lexus).

I.C. § 18-2403(4). The car was recovered and returned to its owner a few days after it was 

stolen. At sentencing, the State sought restitution for State Farm Insurance Company and 

restitution for the victim. In support of the restitution requests, the State filed a memorandum

advising the district court that the State was requesting $1,700.26 restitution for State Farm and 

$316.83 restitution for the victim. The State attached a letter from State Farm and an invoice 
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from a car dealership to its restitution memorandum. The letter from State Farm reads: “We 

understand an arrest has been made in connection with our insured’s vehicle which was stolen on 

February 3, 2016. Should [Hamann] be found guilty, State Farm® is requesting restitution from 

[Hamann] for the damages sustained by our insured to the extent we have made claim 

payments.” The letter indicated that its “Losses to Date” were “$02/03/2016 [sic],”1 that its 

portion of the “loss” was $1,700.26, and that its insured’s deductible was $100. The invoice 

from the car dealership is for $216.83 and indicates it was for reprogramming a key fob for a 

Dodge. The State did not submit any other invoices and did not present any evidence at the 

sentencing hearing with respect to its restitution request. Hamann asked the district court to 

defer ruling on the restitution request until the State submitted additional information supporting 

the $1,700.26 request from State Farm and additional information explaining the basis for the 

request regarding the key fob. The district court denied Hamann’s request and ordered 

restitution in the full amount sought by the State, concluding “the out-of-pocket costs and the 

insurance costs were reasonable.” Hamann appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision of whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the discretion 

of a trial court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-5304(7) and by the 

policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer economic loss. State v. 

Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 

543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989). Thus, we will not overturn an order of restitution unless 

an abuse of discretion is shown. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37, 43 P.3d at 796. When a trial 

court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered 

inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, 

acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 

applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 

State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). To meet the second and third 

requirements of the multi-tiered inquiry, the trial court must base the amount of restitution upon 

 

1 February 3, 2016, was the date the car was stolen.
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the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor, defendant, victim, or presentence 

investigator. I.C. 19-5304(6). On appeal, the restitution award will be upheld if it is supported 

by substantial evidence. State v. Cheeney, 144 Idaho 294, 296, 160 P.3d 451, 453 (Ct. App. 

2007). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 

support a conclusion. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Hamann argues that the restitution award was not supported by sufficient evidence 

because the State failed to prove that Hamann’s criminal conduct caused the economic losses 

allegedly incurred by the victim and State Farm. The State concedes the evidence is insufficient 

to support the $216.83 award to the victim for reprogramming the Dodge key fob since Hamann 

did not steal that car. The State, however, contends there was sufficient evidence to support the 

remaining amount of restitution awarded--$1,700.26 to State Farm and $100 for the victim’s 

deductible. We agree with Hamann. 

Idaho Code Section 19-5304(2) authorizes a sentencing court to order a defendant to pay 

restitution for economic loss caused by a defendant’s criminal conduct. Economic loss includes, 

but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost 

wages, and direct out-of-pocket or losses or expenses resulting from the defendant’s criminal 

conduct, but does not include less tangible damage such as pain and suffering or emotional 

distress. See I.C. § 19-5304(1)(a). It is the State’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, a causal relationship between the defendant’s criminal conduct and the economic loss 

suffered by the victim. I.C. § 19-5304(7); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 

401 (2011); State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 212, 296 P.3d 412, 418 (Ct. App. 2012). 

We first note that the State did not present any evidence at the sentencing hearing in 

support of its restitution request. Instead, the State indicated it was requesting restitution and 

advised the district court of the amount requested. The request was also set forth in the 

“Memorandum of Restitution” filed approximately one month prior to sentencing, to which the 
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State attached the State Farm letter.

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 However, nothing in the memorandum or the State Farm 

letter shows a causal connection between the amount State Farm paid and Hamann’s criminal 

conduct. While the letter notes that State Farm’s insured’s vehicle was stolen and indicates the 

company was seeking payment for “damages sustained,” there was no evidence explaining what 

the damages were or how Hamann caused them. Nor did the State offer any explanation even 

after Hamann asked the district court to keep restitution “open” until more information was 

provided. The district court declined to defer its decision after concluding that the amounts 

requested were reasonable. There was insufficient evidence to make such a determination 

because the State did not present any evidence of what the expense was for or how it was 

connected to Hamann’s criminal conduct. 

The State argues the evidence was sufficient because the evidence (the letter) “shows that 

the insurer paid the directly injured victim for losses caused by the theft because she was their 

insured.” What the letter actually states is that an arrest was made “in connection with our 

insured’s vehicle which was stolen” and that State Farm was “requesting restitution from 

[Hamann] for the damages sustained by our insured to the extent we have made claim 

payments.” Even if the letter supports an inference that State Farm paid for damages it believed 

were incurred as a result of the theft, absent evidence of what those damages were, it is 

impossible to make a determination that any damages were the result of the theft. The State’s 

argument that this case is indistinguishable from State v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 71 P.3d 477 (Ct. 

App. 2003) is incorrect. 

In Taie, the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol and methamphetamine 

when he hit a motorcyclist. Taie fled the scene, resulting in a high-speed chase in which Taie

drove his pickup through a chain link fence owned by an equipment company. Taie pled guilty 

to aggravated assault, aggravated driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, felony 

eluding a peace officer, and aggravated assault upon a police officer. The State requested 

restitution for the damage caused to the motorcycle and the chain link fence. In support of its 

request, the State presented testimony from the motorcycle owner regarding the amount his 

 

2 As noted, the State also attached to its memorandum an invoice for reprogramming a 

Dodge key fob. Because the invoice relates only to the amount the State concedes was not 

properly awarded, the invoice is irrelevant to our analysis. 
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insurance company paid him to repair the damages, which was corroborated by a letter from the 

insurer. The State also presented a letter from an insurance company stating the amount it paid 

to repair the chain link fence and the fence owner’s deductible. Taie did not object to the 

evidence or present any evidence of his own. The district court ordered restitution in the full 

amount requested by the State. On appeal, Taie argued that the restitution award for the 

motorcycle repairs was unsupported by the evidence because the State failed to submit estimates 

from a professional repair shop and because Taie failed to keep track of his actual out-of-pocket 

expenses in making the repairs himself. Taie also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for 

the restitution related to the chain link fence because it was not substantiated by an estimate or 

invoice showing the actual or estimated cost of the repair. This Court rejected Taie’s challenges, 

noting Taie’s arguments were flawed because they did not recognize that the insurance 

companies were entitled to restitution for their economic losses, and the evidence presented 

showed the amount of that loss. Id. at 879-80, 71 P.3d at 478-79. 

Unlike Taie, Hamann challenges whether the damages claimed were caused by his 

criminal conduct, not the sufficiency of evidence with respect to the amount paid. Also, unlike 

in Taie, the State presented no testimony in support of its restitution request, and Hamann 

objected to the State’s request by asking the court to leave restitution open until the State 

presented additional information explaining the bases for the requested restitution. By our 

opinion, we do not suggest that invoices are required in all cases in order to support a restitution 

award, but the State must still present evidence that the restitution requested is based on 

economic loss caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct. Such evidence is absent in this case. 

Accordingly, the judgments and orders of restitution are vacated.

Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCUR.