1 Filed 7/7/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

CITIZENS FOR A SUSTAINABLE TREASURE ISLAND, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents; TREASURE ISLAND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, LLC et al., Real Parties in Interest. A137828
(San Francisco City & County Super. Ct. No. CPF-11-511452)

I.
INTRODUCTION In this petition for writ of mandate, appe llant Citizens for a Sustainable Treasure Island (CSTI) contends that respondents C ity and County of San Francisco (City) 1 and respondent and real party in interest Treasure Island Development Authority (TIDA) 2

1 Respondents consist of the City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco Board of Supervisors, San Francisco Munici pal Transportation Authority, San Francisco Planning Commission, San Francisco Pub lic Utilities Commission, and the Treasure Island Development Authority.

2 In 1997, the City’s Bo ard of Supervisors authori zed the creation of TIDA, a nonprofit corporation, to act as a single en tity focused on the plan ning, redevelopment, reconstruction, rehabilitation, reuse and conversion of form er Naval Station Treasure Island located on Treasure Island and Yerba Bu ena Island. For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to TIDA as the Project developer. TI DA, together with the City, are the lead agencies responsibl e for the Project.2 failed to certify a legally adequate environm ental impact report (E IR) for the Treasure Island/Yerba Buena Island Project (the Projec t), and therefore violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21000 et seq.). 3 The Project, which was unanimously approved by the City’s board of supervisors, is a comprehensive plan to redeve lop a former naval station lo cated on Treasure Island and
Yerba Buena Island in the middle of San Francisco Bay into a new, mixed-use community with updated infra structure and vastly increa sed open space and recreational
facilities. CSTI’s principal argument is that the EI R should have been prepared as a program EIR, not a project-level EIR, because there is insufficient detail about various aspects of the Project, including remediation of hazardou s materials, building and street layout, historical resources and tidal trust resources, for “project-level” re view. Furthermore, CSTI claims the project description was not sufficiently accurate and stable to meet CEQA’s requirements. CSTI also argues th at significant new information developed after the draft EIR was circulated for public review, thereby requiring recirculation of the EIR for additional public comment.
We conclude that CSTI has failed to ca rry its burden to prove that the EIR was inadequate. ( Barthelemy v. Chino Basin Mun. Water Dist. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1617 ( Barthelemy ).) Therefore, we affirm the ju dgment. This resolution makes it unnecessary to address the cross-appeal s, claiming that Treasure Island Homeless Development Initiative, Inc. (TIHDI) is an “indispensable” party to this action.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUNDS The area designated for the Project has an in teresting history. Treasure Island is a man-made island consisting of about 404 acres of landfill place d on former tidelands and submerged lands in the middle of San Fr ancisco Bay between San Francisco and Oakland, California. Yerba Buena Island is an adjacent, approximate 160-acre, natural

3 All unspecified section references are to the Public Resources Code.3 rock outcropping. Treasure Island and the causeway that connects it to Yerba Buena
Island were constructed in the late 1930’s fo r the Golden Gate Inte rnational Exposition. The exposition was held in 1939 to celebrate the completion of the Golden Gate Bridge
and the San Francisco/ Oakland Bay Bridge. Shortly thereafter, during World War II, th e United States Depa rtment of Defense converted the area into a naval station, whic h it operated for more than five decades.
Naval Station Treasure Island consisted of approximately 550 acres, including Yerba
Buena Island. Naval Station Treasure Isla nd was subsequently closed in 1993, and ceased operations in 1997. The existing conditions on the Project site are characterized by aging infrastructure, environmental contamination from former naval operations, deteriorated and vacant buildings, and as phalt and other impervio us surfaces which cover approximately 65 percent of the site. The C ity and the community have been formulating plans for the reuse of former Naval Sta tion Treasure Island, and the adjacent Yerba Buena Island, since its closure. In June 2011, after more than a decade of planning, study and community input, the City’s board of supervisor s approved the Project by a vote of 11-0. In approving the Project, the board amended the City’s general plan and planning code maps and text, and approved policies and standards for redevelo pment of Naval Station Treasure Island. The Project has been described implicitly as a veritable “Shining City on the Fill.” The EIR envisions the Project as including a new, mixed-use community, including up to 8,000 residential units (with at least 25 percent designated as affordab le units available at below-market prices); up to 140,000 square feet of new co mmercial and retail space; up to 100,000 square feet of new office space; restoration and re use of historic buildings on Treasure Island; about 500 hotel rooms; public utilitie s; 300 acres of pa rks, playgrounds, and public open space; bi ke and transit facilities; and a new ferry terminal and intermodal transit hub. An existing school buildi ng would be rehabilitated or rebuilt as a kindergarten through eighth grade public sc hool in coordination with the San Francisco
Unified School District. As de scribed by the City’s attorney at oral argument, when the4 Project is implemented, “Tre asure Island is going to go from being an underutilized naval
station to a whole new state-of-t he art section of the City.” Construction and buildout of the Project would be phased, and anticipated to be completed over an approximate 15- to 20-year period. On July 18, 2011, CSTI filed this petition for writ of mandate challenging the City’s decision to certify the EIR for the Proj ect. The hearing on the petition took place over four days. On December 14, 2012, the trial court issued a decision denying the petition in its entirety. Judgment was entere d on January 28, 2013. CSTI filed a notice of appeal on February 7, 2013. TIHDI filed its cross-appeal on Februa ry 25. 2013. Treas ure Island Community Development (TICD), the master developer se lected by TIDA for the Project, filed its cross-appeal on February 27, 2013. The cro ss-appeals focus on the trial court’s decision to deny TIHDI’s motion to dismiss CSTI’s petition for writ of mandate on the grounds TIHDI was an indispensable party to this action.
III.
DISCUSSION A. General CEQA Principles and Standard of Review “ ‘The EIR is the heart of CEQA’ and the integrity of the pro cess is dependent on the adequacy of the EI R. [Citations.]” ( Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 117.) “The purpose of an [EIR] is to provide public agencies and the public in general with detailed information about the effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of such a proj ect might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project. ” (§ 21061.) “An EIR should be prepared with a sufficient degree of analysis to provide decisionmaker s with information wh ich enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes accou nt of environmental consequences. An
evaluation of the environmental effects of a proposed project need not be exhaustive, but the sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible. . . .5 The courts have looked not for perfection but for adequacy, completeness, and a good
faith effort at full disclosu re.” (Guidelines, § 15151.) 4 We review an agency’s de terminations and decisions fo r abuse of discretion. An agency abuses its discretion wh en it fails to proceed in a manner required by law, or
when its determination or decision is not su pported by substantial evidence. (§§ 21168, 21168.5; Vineyard Area Citizen s for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 426-427 ( Vineyard ).) Judicial review of these two types of error differs significantly: While we determine de novo whether the agen cy has employed the correct procedures, scrupulously enfo rcing all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements, we accord greater deferenc e to the agency’s substantive factual conclusions. ( Preserve Wild Santee v. City of Santee (2012) 210 Cal. App.4th 260, 275 ( Santee ).) In CEQA cases, as in other mandamus cases, we indepe ndently review the
administrative record under the same standard of review that governs the trial court. ( Federation of Hillside & Canyon Asso ciations v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1259.) CSTI claims its “challenge to the EIR’s adequacy as an info rmation disclosure document is a procedural claim reviewed de novo by the cour ts, and thus the question of
whether ‘substantial evidence’ su pports the City’s determinati ons is irrelevant.” (Italics omitted.) Despite CSTI’s strenuous efforts to reframe the issues to allege procedural violations under CEQA, virtually all of th e issues it raises on appeal challenge the sufficiency of the informa tion provided to the public and the decision makers. Because the “fundamental purpose of an EIR is ‘to provide public agencies and the public in general with detailed informatio n about the effect which a proposed project is likely to have on the environment,’ ” absenc e of information in an EIR may be a failure to proceed in a manner required by law. ( Vineyard
, supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 428, quoting

4 All references to Guid elines are to the CEQA Gu idelines (Guidelines) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.). In in terpreting CEQA, we a ccord the Guidelines great weight except where they are clearly unauthorized or erroneous. ( Vineyard
, supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 428, fn. 5; Santee , supra , 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 276, fn. 10.)6 § 21061.) But, failing to includ e information “normally will rise to the level of a failure to proceed in the manner re quired by law only if the anal ysis in the EIR is clearly inadequate or unsupported. [Citation.]” ( Barthelemy
, supra , 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1620.) CEQA requires an EIR to reflect a good fa ith effort at full disclosure; it does not mandate perfection, nor does it require an analysis to be exhaustive. ( Barthelemy
, supra , 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1617.) As was stressed in Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay v. Board of Port Cmrs . (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1355 ( Berkeley Jets ), the “determination of EIR adequacy is essent ially pragmatic.” ( Id. at p. 1356.) “Preparing an EIR requires the exercise of judgment, and the court in its review may not substitute its judgment, but instead is limited to ensuring that the decision makers have considered the environmental consequences of their action.” ( Ibid. ) Hence, an EIR must be upheld if it “reasonably
sets forth sufficient information to foster informed public pa rticipation and to enable the
decision makers to consider the environmen tal factors necessary to make a reasoned decision.” ( Ibid. ) Consequently, the “absence of information in an EIR does not per se constitute a prejudicial abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Instead, ‘ “[a] prejudicial abuse of discretion
occurs if the failure to incl ude relevant information precludes informed decisionmaking and informed public participation, there by thwarting the statutory goals of the EIR process . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of
Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 925; Berkeley Jets
, supra , 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355; Barthelemy
, supra , 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1620.) Under this standard, despite CSTI’s ar guments to the contrary, “[n]oncompliance with CEQA’s information disclosure requireme nts is not per se reversible . . . .” ( Association of Irritated Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1391.) A challenger, such as CSTI, asserti ng inadequacies in an EIR must show the
omitted information “is both re quired by CEQA and necessary to informed discussion. [Citations.]” ( California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 986.)7 B. Did the Project Require a Prog ram EIR Instead of a Project EIR? CSTI’s main argument on appeal is that the City prejudicially abused its discretion by preparing a project EIR instead of a program EIR. Here, the EIR states it is a “project EIR” that analyzes all phases of the Project at maximum buildout. A “project EIR” is prepared for a construction-level project, a nd “should focus primarily on the changes in
the environment that would re sult from the development proj ect [and] examine all phases of the project including planning, constructio n, and operation.” (Guidelines, § 15161; In re Bay Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1169 ( Bay Delta ).) In contrast, a “program EIR” evaluates the broad policy direction of a planning document, such as a general plan, but does not examine the potential site-specific impacts of the many individual projects that may be pr oposed in the future consistent with the plan. (§§ 21068.5, 21093; Guidelines, §§ 151 68, 15385.) Program EIRs play a key role in a “tiered” CEQA analysis. 5 (Guidelines, § 15152, subd. (h).) CSTI argues “at best, the EIR constitu tes conceptual, program-level CEQA analysis” which functions as a first-tier doc ument, and anticipates later environmental review on specific projects. CSTI claims th e most appropriate way to address the Project is by “tiered environmental review . . . where, as here, the proposal being advanced is an overarching, conceptual plan or program, th e project-level details of which will only become known as they are later formulated and presented in a series of later, project-level proposals intended to implement the conc eptual plan or program. [Citations.]”

5 “ ‘Tiering’ refers to using the analysis of general matters contained in a broader EIR (such as one prepared for a general plan or policy statement) with later EIRs and negative declarations on narrower projects; incorporating by reference the general discussions from the broader EIR; and concentr ating the later EIR or negative declaration solely on the issues specific to the later project.” (Guidelin es, § 15152, subd. (a); see, e.g., Al Larson Boat Shop, Inc. v. Board of Harbor Commissioners (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 729, 743 ( Al Larson ) [first-tier EIR adequate when it analyzed goal of increased port capacity while deferring full analysis of an ticipated future projects, discussing them only “for the purposes of gi ving a reasonably detailed consideration to the overall five-year plan”].)8 CSTI’s contention that the EIR was im properly prepared as a “project EIR” instead of a “program EIR” improperly focuses on the EIR’s title rather than its substance. There are many different names that have been applied to EIRs. For example, there are project EIRs (Guidelines, § 15161), program EIRs (Guidelines, § 15168), staged EIRs (Guidelines, § 15167), master EIRs (Guidelines, § 15175), subsequent EIRs (Guidelines, § 15162), focused EIRs (Guidelines, §§ 15178; 15179.5), and supplemental EIRs (Guidelines, § 15163). For this reason, courts strive to avoid attaching too much significance to titles in ascertaining whether a legally adequate EIR ha s been prepared for a particular project. As explained in Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 511 ( Friends of Mammoth ): “Designating an EIR as a program EIR . . . does not by itself decrease the level of analysis otherwise required in the EIR. ‘All EIR’s must cover the same general c ontent. (Guidelines, §§ 15120–15132.) The level of specificity of an EIR is determined by the nature of the project and the “rule of reason” [citation], rather than any semantic la bel accorded to the EI R.’ [Citation.]” ( Id

. at p. 533, quoting Al Larson
, supra , 18 Cal.App.4th at pp . 741-742, fn. omitted.) As Division Three of this court reiterated, in language particularly pertinent to the issue before us, the “fact that this EIR is la beled a ‘project’ rather than a ‘program’ EIR matters little” for purposes of its suffici ency as an inform ative document. ( California Oak Foundation v. Regents of University of California (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 227, 271, fn. 25 ( California Oak ).) “ ‘The level of specificity of an EIR is determined by the nature of the project and the “rule of reason” [citati on], rather than any semantic label accorded to the EIR.’ [Citations.]” ( Ibid .) Similarly, the court in Dusek v. Redevelopment Agency (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1029, rejected claims of noncompliance w ith CEQA as relating “m ore to labeling and
form than . . . to the underl ying objectives of CEQA.” ( Id. at p. 1038.) “ ‘In reviewing an EIR a paramount considerati on is the right of the public to be informed in such a way that it can intelligently weigh the environm ental consequences of any contemplated action and have an appropriate voice in the formulation of any decision.’ ” ( Id. at9 p. 1039.) “Our search is for reasonableness, an objective good faith effort to follow the requirements, and substantial compliance with CEQA.” ( Id. at p. 1040.)
These cases are consistent with the Guide lines, which provide that a lead agency may use EIR variations other than those listed in the Guidelines, so long as they meet “the content requirements discussed in Ar ticle 9 beginning with Section 15120.” (Guidelines, § 15160.) Article 9, in turn, requ ires that EIRs must contain (i) a table of contents or index (Guidelines , § 15122); (ii) a summary (G uidelines, § 15123); (iii) a project description (Guidelines, § 15124); (iv) a discussion of the environmental setting (Guidelines, § 15125); (v) consideration and discussion of environmental impacts (Guidelines, § 15126); (vi) consideration a nd discussion of significant environmental impacts (Guidelines, § 15126.2); (vii) c onsideration and disc ussion of mitigation measures proposed to minimize signifi cant effects (Guidelines, § 15126.4); (viii) consideration and discussion of altern atives to the proposed project (Guidelines, § 15126.6); (ix) a discussion of effects not found to be significant (Guidelines, § 15128); (x) a list of organizations a nd persons consulted (Guidelines , § 15129); (xi) a discussion of cumulative impacts (Guidelin es, § 15130); (xii) to a lim ited extent, a discussion of
economic and social effect s of the proposed project (Guidelines, § 15131); and (xiii) revisions to the draft EIR, comments on the draft EIR, a list of commenters on the
draft EIR, and the lead agency’s responses to comments on the draft EIR (Guidelines, § 15132). The EIR before us c ontains all of the required elem ents of an EIR, and CSTI
does not claim otherwise. CSTI fails to cite any authority supp orting its argument that the objective of creating a legally adequate EIR for this Proj ect could only be accom plished by the use of a program EIR. No such authority exists. In the end, CSTI improperly tries to convert a discretionary decision that shou ld properly be made by the l ead agency into a legal issue that should be resolved by th e courts. (See § 21083.1; Chaparral Greens v. City of Chula
Vista (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1145 [cour ts should not interpret CEQA to impose procedural or substantive requi rements beyond those explicitly required in the statutes or the Guidelines].)10 CSTI also repeatedly make s the argument that the EIR was prepared as a project EIR to circumvent the fair argum ent standard of review that would have been applied to a program EIR for evaluating whether subsequent environmental review is necessary. The fair argument standard creates a low threshol d favoring future environmental review and differs markedly from the deferential substan tial evidence standard of review normally enjoyed by agencies. (See Sierra Club v. California Dept . of Forestry & Fire Protection (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 370, 381 [distinguis hing fair argument standard from usual substantial evidence standard].) CSTI’s argument is based on a flawed lega l premise. For purposes of the standard of review, the same substantial evidence st andard applies to subsequent environmental review for a project reviewed in a program EIR or a project EIR. (See Citizens for Responsible Equitable Environmental Developme nt v. City of San Diego Redevelopment Agency (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 5 98, 610 [“Once an agency has prepared [a program] EIR, its decision not to prepare a supplemental or subsequent EIR for a later project is
reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard” (fn. omitted)]; accord, Latinos Unidos de Napa v. City of Napa (2013) 221 Cal.App. 4th 192, 201-202 ( Latinos
Unidos ) [substantial evidence standa rd applies in reviewing an agency’s determination that a project’s potential environmental impa cts were adequately analyzed in a prior program EIR]; Santa Teresa Citizen Action Gr oup v. City of San Jose (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 689, 704 ( Santa Teresa ) [substantial evidence sta ndard applies when agency has already prepared program EIR and the qu estion is whether implementing later phases of the program will re sult in new impacts]

. ) Nothing in Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307 ( Sierra
Club ), which is heavily relied upon by CSTI, ma ndates that the fair argument standard should be unilaterally a pplied to later projects proposed under a program EIR. That case found the fair argument standard applied when a program EIR had been certified covering mining in connection with the county’s resource management plan, and the company was proposing to mine on land th at had been designated in the resource management plan as agricultural. ( Id . at p. 1320.) Because this new project had never11 previously been asse ssed and was entirely different from the project that had been considered in the EIR, the c ourt held the fair argument standard applied because, in effect, no prior environmental review had taken place. ( Id . at pp. 1320-1321.) The court’s analysis in Sierra Club does not suggest that the fair argument standard automatically applies to subsequent discreti onary actions in every case where a program EIR has been prepared. (See Latinos Unidos
, supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at pp. 201-202 [court that decided Sierra Club endorses substantial evidence as the normal standard of review].) 6 It should also be emphasized that in revi ewing this EIR, we detect no attempt to avoid supplemental review under section 21166, nor does the designation of this EIR as a project EIR create any shortcut around the envi ronmental review proce ss as it applies to future site-specific approvals. Section 211 66 provides: “When an environmental impact report has been prepared for a project pursu ant to this division, no subsequent or supplemental environmental impact report sha ll be required by the lead agency or by any responsible agency, unless one or more of th e following events occurs : [¶] (a) Substantial changes are proposed in the project wh ich will require major revisions of the environmental impact report. [¶] (b) Subs tantial changes occur with respect to the circumstances under which the project is be ing undertaken which will require major revisions in the environmental impact report. [¶] (c) New information, which was not
known and could not have been known at th e time the environmental impact report was certified as complete, becomes available.”

6 We recognize that when an agency attempts to tier it s environmental review for a materially different project onto a prior program EIR, then the fair argument test is required under section 210 94, subdivision (c). ( Sierra Club
, supra , 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319.) In that situation, the initial study “shall analyze whether the later project may cause significant effects on the environment that were not examined in the prior [EIR].” (§ 21094, subd. (c), italics added; see, e.g., Santa Teresa , supra , 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 704, fn. 11.) The low threshold for requiring preparation of a subsequent or supplemental EIR for a new project that wa s not addressed in the prior program EIR reflects a preference for resolving doubts in favor of environmental review. ( Sierra Club
, supra , 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1316-1317.)12 The obligation to conduct supplemental review under section 21166 applies regardless of whether the project under cons ideration has undergon e previous, projectspecific environmental review, or is being ca rried out under a plan for which the agency has previously certified a program EIR. (See Guidelines, §§ 15162, 15168, subd. (c)(2);

see May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1326 [“Where environmental review has been conducted through a program EIR, CEQA requires further review” in the
“limited circumstances” described in section 21166].) Conversely, “ ‘[i]f a program EIR is sufficiently comprehensive, the lead agency may dispense with further environmental
review for later activities within the program that are adequa tely covered in the program EIR. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( California Clean Energy Comm ittee v. City of Woodland (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 173, 200.) Therefore, CSTI’s repeated argument that the lead agency’s decision to prepare a project EIR, as opposed to a progra m EIR, constituted an “unlawful attempt to prospectively evade” th e possibility of future CEQA review is baseless. The EIR repeatedly acknowledge s the duty to perform supplemental review under section 21166 as the Project builds out over 15 to 20 years, and that duty exists regardless of whether the EIR was prepared as a project EIR, or as a program EIR. CSTI repeatedly claims that CEQA was vi olated because “the EIR fails to provide project-level disclosure or analysis.” But, th e level of detail in an EIR is driven by the nature of the project, not the label attached. “I t is the substance, rath er than the form, of [the environmental] document which determin es its nature and validity. [Citations.]” ( Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. California Coastal Zo ne Conservation Com. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 76, 91.) As a general stat ement of CEQA practice, “[t]he degree of specificity required in an EIR will correspond to the degree of specificity involved in the underlying activity which is desc ribed in the EIR. . . . An EIR on a construction project will necessarily be more detailed in the specific effects of the project than will be an EIR on the adoption of a local general plan . . . .” (Guidelines, § 15146.) Recently, it was reaffirmed, “ ‘the sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed in the light of what is reasonably feasible.’ [Citation.]” ( San Diego Citizenry Group v. County of San Diego (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1, 21, quoting Guidelines, § 15151.)13 These legal standards, which apply to a ll EIRs, set the approp riate focus for our review here. Courts have looked not for pe rfection but for adequacy, completeness, and a good faith effort at full disclo sure. (Guidelines, § 15151; see Eureka Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Eureka (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 357, 372; Rio Vista
Farm Bureau Center v. County of Solano (1992) 5 Cal.A pp.4th 351, 368 ( Rio Vista Farm
Bureau ).) Accordingly, the question is not wh ether a program EIR should have been prepared for this Project, but instead, wh ether the EIR addressed the environmental impacts of this Project to a “degree of specif icity” consistent with the underlying activity being approved through the EIR. (Guidelines, §§ 15 146, 15168, subd. (c)(5).) Additionally, in reviewing CSTI’s challenge to this EIR, it is unconstructive to ask whether the EIR provided “p roject-level” as opposed to “program-level” detail and analysis. Instead, we focus on whether the EIR provided “decision makers with sufficient analysis to intellig ently consider the environmen tal consequences of [the] project.” ( Bay Delta
, supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 1175.) If these questions are answered affirmatively, the EIR is lega lly sufficient, regardless of whether it is a project or a program EIR.
C. Is the Project Descriptio n Accurate and Stable ? This court is among the many which have recognized that a project description that gives conflicting signals to decision ma kers and the public about the nature and scope of the project is fundamenta lly inadequate and misleading. ( Communities for a Better Environment v. City of Richmond (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 70, 84 ( CBE ).) “Only through an accurate view of the project ma y affected outsiders and public decisionmakers balance the proposal’s benefit agains t its environmental cost, consider mitigation measures, assess the advantage of termin ating the proposal i.e., the ‘no project’ alternative), and weigh other alte rnatives in the balance.” ( County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185, 192-193 ( County of Inyo ).) Therefore, we have no quarrel with CSTI’s citation to case law ar ticulating the general CEQA principle that “[a]n accurate, stable and finite project description is the si ne qua non of an informative and legally sufficient EIR.” ( Id. at p. 193, italics omitted.)14 In arguing that the EIR’s project de scription is unstable and erratic, CSTI characterizes the project as a 20-year long-ra nge development plan that is nothing more than a “conceptual land use map.” Illustra tive of these arguments, CSTI asserts “[t]he EIR here . . . analyzes an abstract and in determinate ‘conceptual’ development scenario that lacks the ‘accurate, finite and stable’ pr oject-level details necessary to fully analyze potentially significant impacts.” As an example, CSTI clai ms the specific configuration and design of particular buildings is left for fu ture review. It also contends the Project’s street network and layout is only conceptual at this point, with the final layout subject to review by applicable agen cies, such as the San Francisco Fire Department. Contrary to these criticisms, the EIR made an extensive effort to provide meaningful information about the project, while providing for flexibility needed to respond to changing conditions and unforeseen events that could possibly impact the Project’s final design. In fact, the design el ements CSTI claims ar e lacking in this EIR are found in several documents that will gui de future development. First, the EIR describes the creation of a special use distri ct (SUD), which establishes zoning districts throughout the project area, identifies perm itted uses, and provide s detailed standards applicable to developmen t within each district. Implementing the SUD is a document en titled “Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island Design for Development” (D4D). The D4D contains binding, detailed standards governing virtually every aspect of Projec t development, includi ng new construction. The D4D includes a plan show ing both “fixed” elements, such as street layouts, and “conceptual elements,” such as “shapes of new buildings or specific landscape designs.” Taken together, the SUD and D4D provi de concrete information regarding building heights, mass, bulk, and design specifi cations CSTI claims is lacking. The D4D establishes specific “flex zones”––zoning dist ricts in which a limited number of towers (taller buildings) may be located, subject to the maximum height limit in that zoning district. The towers are also subject to qua ntitative standards dictat ing separation, bulk, and massing; these standards dictate the bu ildings’ relationship to one another. For analysis purposes, in the s ection on urban design and visu al impacts, representative15 towers were placed in each tower flex zone at the maximum height proposed. The EIR states that, for purposes of analysis, maxi mum development is assumed to evaluate the environmental impacts, including impact s of the Project on scenic vistas. 7 As designed, the “zoning rules provide lim ited flexibility about siting pa rticular buildings, while maintaining tight controls on absolute bu ilding heights and development patterns.” The SUD and D4D also include specificati ons for the street grid, street angles, street widths, block dimensions, setbacks, curb cuts, and a host of other issues, all in great detail. The Project’s proposed street networ k and layout are shown in Figure II.10 of the EIR. The D4D provide s additional details in a section entitled “Specific Street Design Layouts.” To be sure, as a matter of necessity at th is stage in the planning process, there are many Project features that ar e subject to future revision, and quite likely will be the subjects of supplemental review before th e final Project design is implemented. However, the EIR cannot be faulted for not provi ding detail that, due to the nature of the Project, simply does not now exist. (Guide lines, § 15146 [“The de gree of specificity

7 The EIR analyzes the greatest potential impacts expected to occur to various resources at full buildout. Citing Environmental Planning & Information Council v. County of El Dorado (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 350 ( EPIC ), CSTI challenges this worstcase-scenario methodology. EPIC and its progeny hold that in establishing the baseline for assessing environmental impacts, the ag ency preparing the EI R should compare the existing environment (little or no development) with the total amount of development permitted under the proposed plan. ( Id . at p. 358; City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1986)183 Cal.App.3d 229, 246-247; Christward Ministry v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 180, 186-187.) As our Supreme Court recently emphasized in Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 57 Cal.4th 439, “[N]othing in CEQA law preclu des an agency . . . from considering both types of baseline—existing and future condition—in its primar y analysis of the project’s significant adverse effects. [Citations.]” ( Id . at p. 454.) The EIR in this case did that. The Project that is being reviewed is expe cted to be built over a very long timeframe, during which great change is expected to th is largely undeveloped area for which there needs to be a future accounting. The EIR’s focus on the maximum impacts expected to occur at full buildout promot ed informed decisionmaking, and evidences a good-faith effort at forecasting what is expected to occur if the Project is approved.16 required in an EIR will correspon d to the degree of specificity involved in the underlying activity which is described in the EIR”].) No r have the courts required resolution of all hypothetical details prior to approval of an EIR, as CSTI implies. (See this division’s
decision in Oakland Heritage Alliance v. City of Oakland (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 884, 909-910 ( Oakland Heritage ) [EIR for mixed-use develo pment sufficiently addressed seismic safety when the “preparers of the EI R” committed themselves to conduct a more thorough “site-specific investiga tions” that would be used to formulate the final structural designs prior to issuance of all relevant construction permits]; City of Antioch v. City
Council (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1325, 1336-1337 [it was unreasonable and unrealistic to
demand that an EIR “must describe in deta il each and every conceivable development scenario”].)
CSTI claims that because the EIR does no t anticipate every permutation or analyze every possibility, the project description is misleading, inaccurate and vague. However, the legal authority it relies on to support this argument, County of Inyo
, supra , 71 Cal.App.3d 185, did not address a situation where the project description was rendered unstable simply because specific building and desi gn decisions were not made in the EIR. Rather, in County of Inyo , the parameters of the proposed project itself were unclear. Initially, that EIR described the project as a 51-cubic-feet-per-second increase in subsurface pumping to supply wate r used in the Owens Valley. ( Id. at p. 189.) The EIR, however, went on to analyze a project far grea ter in scope, including much higher rates of pumping and vast infrastructure needed to deliver water to Los Angeles County. ( Id. at. p. 190.) Thus, the problem with the EIR in County of Inyo was that the project description changed throughout the document its elf. Many of the environmental impacts
described in the EIR were related to the much broader project, rather than the smaller project described at various other points in the EIR. ( Id. at pp. 190-191; accord, Western Placer Citizens for an Agriculture & Ru ral Environment v. County of Placer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 890, 898 [the project description sh ould be stable and “ ‘[t]he defined project and not some different project must be the EIR’s bona fide subject’ ”] ( Western Placer ).)17 Plainly, County of Inyo is inapposite. Unlike that ca se, the basic characteristics of the Project under consideration in this ca se remained accurate, stable, and finite throughout the EIR process. The EIR in this case contai ns an 84-page chapter entitled “Project Description.” This chapter incl udes maps showing the project location, the existing character of the site, project featur es, site plans, project objectives, needed permits, and agencies with jurisdiction––in s hort, all of the information required by CEQA. CSTI has not argued, nor could it, that the EIR’s Project Description was deficient or misleading. Nor does it contend the integral components of the Project, as described in the EIR, have changed in any material way as the EIR went through the environmental review and approval process. Indeed, while repeatedly arguing the Project lacked a stable and finite project descripti on, CSTI fails to refer to the EIR’s Project Description at all. It appears an open questi on whether the adequacy of a project’s description is analyzed as a question of law or an issue of fact. A leading treatise seems to assign it to the latter category. (1 Kostka & Zischke, Practice Under the California Environmental Quality Act (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed . Mar. 2014 Update) § 11.39, p. 11-35.) There is no need
for this court to decide which standard is correct, because the Project Description here clearly satisfies both standards. Viewed as an informational document, the EIR’s Project Description provided sufficien t information about the Proj ect to allow the public and reviewing agencies to evaluate and review its environmental impacts, and also provided the required “main features ” of the Project. (See Dry Creek Citizens Coalition v. County of Tulare (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 20, 28 ( Dry Creek ).)
D. Does the EIR Contain an Adequate Discussion About the Presence and Remediation of Hazardous Substances? CSTI claims “the EIR does not describe, at a project-level degree of detail, the existing location and nature of all hazardous ma terials [in the Project area] . . . or whether and how the City will remediate such toxi c material as part of the Project.” It is well documented that soil, gro undwater, and existing structures on Treasure
Island are contaminated with hazardous materials. Su rveys conducted by the United18 States Navy (Navy) in 1994 and 2005 reveal ed soil and groundwate r contaminants, such as petroleum, hydrocarbons, volatile or ganic compounds, semi-volatile organic compounds, poly-aromatic hydrocarbons, dioxin s, pesticides, herbicides, PCBs, heavy metals (primarily lead), asbestos, and low-le vel radiological material. Buildings are
contaminated with lead-bas ed paint and asbestos. The EIR contains extensive information on the presence and loca tion of these hazar dous substances.
It should be stressed at the outset of th is discussion that at the time the EIR was being prepared, the cleanup of the site was the sole responsibility of the Navy and was subject to detailed federal, state, and loca l laws and regulations, including laws that specifically apply to remediation of military bases designated for closure, like Naval
Station Treasure Island. As th e EIR explains, the Navy will co mplete the cleanup of each parcel of land before it is transferred to TI DA, the Project developer. Prior to transfer, the Navy will issue a “Finding of Suitability to Transfer” (FOST) to document that the Navy has investigated the parcel, that remedi al efforts (if needed) have been completed, and that the parcel is ready to be transfe rred. The EIR explains: “These activities are ongoing and will occur with or without th e Proposed Project. These activities are a precursor to future transfer and redevelopment of the area, either as the Proposed Project or for some other use.” The Navy’s cl eanup activities are discu ssed in the EIR for informational purposes only. 8 The Navy has completed its investigation of hazardous substances on the entirety of Treasure Island; and at oral argument held before the trial court on June 15, 2012, it was reported that out of approximately 400 acres, about 170 acres had been cleared by the Navy “and don’t contain any contaminants at all, or if they did, it’s already been cleaned up.” The Navy is sc heduled to continue issuing FO STs for additional parcels in coming years.

8 In fact, the Navy has taken the position that it is not a “pub lic agency” of the State of California within the meaning of CE QA (see § 21063) and therefore, it is not subject to CEQA’s requirements.19 Therefore, the “operating assumption” is that the Navy will complete the cleanup before the property is conveyed to the City. Although no early tr ansfer is planned, the EIR acknowledges that under certain circumst ances the TIDA or its affiliated agency, TICD, could enter into an agreement with the Navy to assume responsibility for remediation of a particular site. CSTI cites Site 30 as a “vivid example” of a scenario in which TIDA or TICD would have to enga ge in cleanup activities. Site 30 tota ls 1.5 acres and is a former trash dump laden with hazardous materials, such as dioxins and lead. In 2003, the Navy capped Site 30 with a concrete pad, measur ing approximately 10,000 square feet. The concrete pad is the foundation of a building that currently se rves as a daycare facility. The Navy has decided to leave the building in place because, as it currently exists, it poses no significant risk to human health an d the environment. However, after the Navy transfers this property, it is possible that the building on Site 30 w ill be demolished along with its concrete pad, thereby disturbing the underlying contaminated soil, in which case
TIDA or TICD would have to assume responsibility for investigating, evaluating, and remediating any hazar dous substances.
The EIR identified and the City approved, Mitigation Me asure M-HZ-1 to address this contingency. The EIR describes the fede ral, state, and local laws and regulations governing any cleanup, identifie s the agencies (including California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control) responsible for ov ersight, and describes the standards used to conclude that a site does not pose a significant risk to human health or the environment. It is emphasized that in the event TICD or TIDA assumes responsibility for cleanup efforts, it would be subject to the same environmental regulations and regulatory oversight as the Navy. Despite these provisions, CSTI claims the trial court erred because the EIR “provides no project-level details as to pr ecisely where, when or to what extent [remediation] activities may be required.” Additionally, CSTI argues the “City unlawfully deferred the development and adoptio n of mitigation measures for significant,20 adverse impacts resulting from the disturbance of contaminated soil and groundwater . . . .” In arguing the EIR did not adequately address hazardous substances, CSTI compares this case with McQueen v. Board of Directors (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1136 ( McQueen ), disapproved on other grounds in Western States Petroleu m Assn. v. Superior
Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 570, footnote 2. In McQueen , the court rejected the
contention that the district’s acquisition of surplus federa l property containing toxic and hazardous substances was entirely exempt from CEQA review. The purchase of the contaminated land was made in conjunction with the adoption of an interim use and management plan, where the district was “immed iately obliged to properly store, use, or dispose of PCB upon acquiring this property . . . .” ( Id. at p. 1147.) The McQueen court found the district had employed an incomplete and misleading description of its project in determining that it was exempt from CEQA. The court stated , “While there is evidence the district gave notice of the proposed proper ty acquisition, there is no evidence that the notice mentioned the acquisition of t oxic, hazardous substances.” ( Id. at p. 1150.) The court required CEQA analysis because it was fo reseeable that the district would need to do something––store the toxic materials or di spose of them––once it acquired the land. ( Id . at p. 1147.)
CSTI claims this case is the same as McQueen because “the City violated CEQA by certifying its EIR as constitu ting project-level review wher e the EIR fails to disclose and analyze how it would store, manage, and/or dispose of the hazardous materials it would knowingly acquire.” Howeve r, unlike the situation profiled in McQueen, where
environmental review of hazardous substances was avoided entirely, the EIR in this case contains exhaustive information on the pres ence of hazardous materials on Treasure Island, and the ongoing cleanup efforts conducted by the Navy. Furthermore, unlike McQueen , the approval of the EIR for this Project does not
assume TIDA or TICD will undertake a ny responsibility for the cleanup. McQueen has been distinguished by a number of cases that note that it was the actual environmental effect of foreseeable cleanup activities––not the mere acquisition of contaminated land––21 that triggered the need for CEQA review. (See, e.g., Maintain Our Dese rt Environment v. Town of Apple Valley (2004) 124 Cal. App.4th 430, 442; Silveira v. Las Gallinas Valley
Sanitation Dist. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 980, 991; Baird v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1468-1469.) This is a distinguishing featur e that is present in this case as well. At this point in time, the speci fic features of any cleanup effort that will have to be undertaken by TI DA or TICD are merely abstract and speculative. Nevertheless, out of an abunda nce of caution, the EIR sets out mitigation measures that “are a backup, a contingent mitigation in the ev ent that [t]he City as sumes control of the cleanup.” Our Supreme Court has clarified that under circumstances similar to those presented here, CEQA analysis is not required, and instead may be postponed to “a later planning stage [for] the evaluation of thos e project details that are not reasonably
foreseeable when the agency first approves the project.” ( Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 139; see Guide lines, § 15145 [EIR need not engage in speculation].) Curren tly, TIDA or TICD cannot possibly know whether it will be called upon to undertake a more activ e role in the investigation and cleanup of an y portion of the Project site; and where “an EIR cannot provide meaningful information about a speculative future project, de ferral of an environmental assessment does not violate CEQA. [Citations.]” ( Rio Vista Farm Bureau , supra , 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 373.) CSTI also criticizes Mitigation Measure M- HZ-1, which was set out in the EIR in
the event TIDA or TICD has to assume control of portions of the cleanup, as containing “only a ‘generalized goal’ that the develope r devise protocols and criteria for managing
contaminated soil and water.” In making this argument, CSTI compares this mitigation plan with the mitigation plan we struck down in CBE , supra , 184 Cal.App.4th 70. In CBE , the lead agency approved an EIR for a refinery project that deferred formulation of a mitigation plan for greenhouse gas emissions (to be approved by the City Council) until one year after project approval. ( Id. at p. 92.) This court found that deferring the formulation of greenhouse gas mitigation measur es was improper; particularly where the delay was due22 to the agency’s reluctance to make a findi ng early in the EIR process that emissions generated by the project would create a significant effect on the environment. Moreover, the mitigation plan “offered no assurance that the plan for how the [p]roject’s greenhouse gas emissions would be mitig ated to a net-zero standa rd was both feasible and efficacious, and [it] create d no objective criteria for measuring success.” ( Id. at p. 95.) More recently, in Oakland Heritage
, supra , 195 Cal.App.4th 884 this court upheld deferring site-specific seismic impact m itigation measures when the EIR relied on compliance with “a regulatory scheme designe d to ensure seismic safety” that gave “adequate assurance that seismic impacts will be mitigated through engineering methods known to be feasible and effective.” ( Id . at p. 912.) Relying heavily on Oakland Heritage , the court in City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 362 ( City of Maywood ), upheld a mitigation plan in which the School District committed itself to perform additiona l analysis of hazardous waste contamination and to remediate any existing contamination pursuant to state and local statutory and regulatory requirements and under the supe rvision of the Department of Toxic Substances Control. ( Id. at p. 412.)
This case has more in common with Oakland Heritage and City of Maywood than
it has with CBE. In contrast to the nascent plan for mitigation we examined in CBE , the EIR here provides ample inform ation regarding the standards that will be applied, the techniques used, and the oversight provided in the event the C ity assumes future responsibility for remediation. Specifically, the EIR identifies the standards used by regulatory agencies to determine the efficacy of the cleanup efforts undertaken at each parcel. The EIR also describes the analytical process used to ensure those standards are achieved. Furthermore, the EIR identifies the agencies involved , particularly the Department of Toxic Substan ces Control and the Regional Water Quality Control Board, and describes their regulatory authority. These regulatory st andards and agency oversight apply, regardless of whether the cleanup is performed by the Navy, TIDA or TICD. The Guidelines specifica lly recognize that mitigation measures requiring adherence to regulatory re quirements or other perform ance criteria are permitted.23 (Guidelines, § 15126.4, subd. (a)(1)(B); see Oakland Heritage
, supra , 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 906 [“[A] condition requiring complia nce with regulations is a common and reasonable mitigation measure, and may be proper where it is reasonable to expect compliance”].) The court revi ews the adequacy of these measures under the “substantial evidence” standard of review. ( Id. at p. 905; California Native Plant Society v. City of
Rancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4t h 603, 625-626 [same].) CSTI has failed to identify any evidence in the record suggesting that re quiring regulatory compliance as mitigation would be infeasible or ineffective. We thus reject CSTI’s challenge to the EIR’s mitigation measures. CSTI next claims “[a]nother example of the lack of project-specific details
associated with hazardous mate rials” is the possibility for a need for a redesign to move development from Site 12 to Site 24. Sec tion 6.2 of the Dispos ition and Development Agreement (DDA) describes the understanding of the City, TIDA and TICD regarding the manner in which parcels are expected to become available from the Navy. Section 6.2.5 of the DDA, entitled “Redesign Trigger Event,” addresses the possibility that the transfer of Site 12 may be delayed, or its use restricted, because of the presence of hazardous substances, so as to preclude development of this area. Section 6.2.5(b) states that if this occurs, TICD ha s the right to submit applications to shift development from
Site 12 to Site 24. CSTI argues because such a redesign is possi ble, the EIR should have analyzed it. Specifically, CSTI complains, the EIR “does not include any such ‘redesign’ plans––the new design would be left up to the Developer after pr oject approval [citation]—and the EIR does not analyze the impacts of sh ifting development to this location.” However, at this point, the potential fo r redesign based on the presence of hazardous substances at Site 12 is entirely spec ulative. An EIR is not required to engage in speculative analysis. (Guidelines, § 151 45.) Indeed, this core principle is well
established in the Guidelines and case law. While a lead agency must use its “best efforts” to evaluate environmental effects, including the use of reasonable forecasting, “foreseeing the unforeseeable” is not required, nor is pred icting the unpredictable or24 quantifying the unquantifiable. (Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (d)(3) [“A change which is speculative or unlikely to occur is not reas onably foreseeable”]; Cadiz Land Co. v. Rail Cycle (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 74, 107-108 [“ ‘age ncy is required to forecast only to the extent that an activity could be reasonabl y expected under the circumstances’ ”].) This rule rests on both economic and prac tical considerations. It has long been recognized that premature atte mpts to evaluate effects that are uncertain to occur or whose severity cannot reliably be measured is “a needlessly wasteful drain of the public fisc. [Citation.]” ( Environmental Council of Sacra mento v. City of Sacramento (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1031; see, e.g., Save Round Valley Allian ce v. County of Inyo (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1450-1451 [an EIR for a subdivision of single-family
residences was not deficient in failing to consider the possibility that the future lot owners might build a second dwelling on their lot pursu ant to a local ordinance allowing such dwellings, because the possibility was remote and speculative].) It should also be pointed out that Site 12 is designated for residential and openspace uses. Site 24 is zone d as open space. Thus, to accommodate the shift of development from Site 12 to Site 24, the Ci ty would have to amend its zoning map for the site. Such a shift, sh ould it occur, would be a discretionary action requiring supplemental environmental review. (§ 21 166.) The EIR acknowledges the need for supplemental environmental review in the event such a rezone is proposed. Thus, at this stage, the EIR was not required to analyze th e specific impacts of a theoretical shift in development from Site 12 to Site 24.
E. Should the Draft EIR Have Been Recirc ulated in Light of New Information ?
CSTI next claims the EIR should have be en recirculated in light of “significant new information” developed during the pub lic comment period from the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) indicating the pr oject may interfere with vessel safety and homeland security on San Francisco Bay.
The Coast Guard’s Vessel Traffic Servic e (VTS) regulates ship traffic on San Francisco Bay and is “an essential component of the Coast Guard’s [Maritime Homeland Security] mission.” The draft EIR acknowledg es the existence of the Coast Guard’s VTS25 system and states the Project sponsors will en ter into an agreement with the Coast Guard with respect to the construction schedule, co nstruction activities, and access to the Coast Guard facility. In response to its review of the dr aft EIR, the Coast Guard submitted a letter indicating the VTS system’s “line of sight wo uld potentially be broken by several of the buildings proposed in the [Development Pl an].” Specifically, the Coast Guard was concerned that any building co nstructed on Treasure Island exceeding heights of 300 feet could interfere with the VTS system, “creati ng an unacceptable mari time risk to both the vessels and the public without mitigation.” To resolve this i ssue, the Coast Guard expressed its willingness “to work with the de velopers to identify appropriate locations
on Treasure Island for additional [Coast Guard] facilities to maintain direct radio and
radar contact with vessels in th e navigable waters of the Bay.” In reply to the letter, the City, TICD an d TIDA met privately with the Coast Guard after the draft EIR comment period closed. TICD and TIDA conducted technical studies
to determine the minimum build ing height which could poten tially affect VTS equipment operations. These heights are shown in “H eights Requiring Consultation Plan” in the
D4D. The final EIR amended the D4D to re quire consultation with the Coast Guard if future proposals are made for the construction of buildings ta ller than heights specified in
the D4D to determine “whether interfere nce would occur; identify appropriate modifications to any proposed buildings that could cause interference; and require the building developer to make space available and provide access to the Coast Guard to place equipment on the roof of the building . . . or establish some ot her similar solution, as necessary, for the purpose of maintaining direct radar and radio contact between the VTS and vessels in the navigable waters of San Francisco Bay.” A May 25, 2011 letter
from the Coast Guard indicated it “reviewed and is comfortable with the proposed consultation process which addressed the conc erns raised in our September 3, 2010
letter.” We first address CSTI’s argument that private meetings between the Coast Guard and the City, TICD and TIDA somehow s ubverted CEQA’s public disclosure and26 participation procedures. CEQA allows, if not encourages , public agencies to revise projects in light of new information reve aled during the CEQA pr ocess. “The CEQA reporting process is not designed to freeze the ultimate proposal in the precise mold of the initial project; indeed, new and unforeseen insights may emerge during investigation, evoking revision of the original proposal. [Citation.]” ( County of Inyo
, supra , 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 199; see also River Valley Preservation Proj ect v. Metropolitan Transit Development Bd. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 154, 168, fn. 11.) One court found the changes made in the project in response to concerns raised in the extended environmental review process showed “CEQA fulfilled its purpose.” ( Western Placer
, supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 905.) In short, this is the way CEQA is supposed to work ––the public comment process may reveal new and unforeseen insights about the project that will affect the final Project design. CSTI argues these “modifications to th e [P]roject” triggered CEQA’s mandatory recirculation procedures, so that the inte rested public could be informed “of such undisclosed, potentially significant adve rse impacts on vessel safety and Homeland security impacts on the Bay, and review an d respond to them in a renewed public comment period.” When the matter was raised below, the decision not to recirculate the EIR was explained as follows: “Consultation prior to fi nal building design would assure that the Coast Guard operations would not be affe cted by proposed development on Treasure Island, and therefore no im pacts would occur to vessel safety on the Bay.” CSTI disagrees with this assessment and claims the information in the final EIR was significant enough to warrant recirculation. The Guidelines describe the types of “significant new information” requiring
recirculation of a draft EIR. These incl ude disclosure of “[a] significant new environmental impact,” “[a] s ubstantial increase in the severity of an environmental impact,” and the addition of a “feasible project alternative or mitigation measure considerably different from the others prev iously analyzed.” (Guidelines, §§ 15088.5, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) Th e Guidelines state that “[n]ew information ad ded to an EIR is not27 ‘significant’ unless the EIR is changed in a wa y that deprives the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment upon a substantial adve rse environmental effect of the project or a feasible way to mitigate or avoid such an effect . . . .” (G uidelines, § 15088.5, subd. (a).)
The trial court found the Coast Guard’s le tter raising the VTS issue and the City’s response to that letter did not result in “significant new info rmation” within the meaning of CEQA that would require reci rculation of the EIR. The tria l court held: “[T]he record contains substantial evidence indicating that the Coast Guard’s VTS sy stem is compatible with urban development, and that adjustment s to that system can be accommodated in a
manner that ensures the continued effectivene ss of that system, without giving rise to environmental impacts.” In claiming the trial court erred, CSTI contends the City’s decision not to recirculate the EIR “involve[s] a procedural violation of CEQA’s pub lic participation and informed decisionmaking procedures that is reviewed de novo by th e courts.” (Italics omitted.) This argument ignores well-establ ished law that courts must defer to an agency’s explicit or implicit decision not to recirculate a draft EIR so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. ( Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1112, 1135 ( Laurel Heights II ); see also South County Citizens for Smart Gr owth v. County of Nevada (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 316, 330 ( South County Citizens ) [appellant bears burden of proving decision not to recirculate the final EIR is not supported by substantial evidence]; Clover Valley Foundation v. City of
Rocklin (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 200, 223.) Indeed, as the court stated in Western Placer
, supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at pa ge 903, an agency’s determina tion not to recirculate is given “substantial deference” and is presumed “to be correct.” CSTI not only ignores the standard of review; it never mentions that, in approving the Project and certifying the EIR, the City ex plicitly found “[c]onsultation prior to final building design would assure that the Coast Guard operations would not be affected by proposed development on Treas ure Island, and therefore no impacts would occur to vessel safety on the Bay.” (It alics added.) CSTI’s burden on appeal is to set forth the28 evidence supporting this finding, and th en to show why it is lacking. ( South County Citizens , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 330; Defend the Bay v. City of Irvine (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1266; Tracy First v. City of Tracy (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 912, 935; Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App. 4th 523, 540-541.) CSTI does not even attempt to make an ar gument that the consultation pr ocess incorporated into the final EIR, which would avoid any potential impacts to the VTS system, would be ineffective or would not be carried out as designed. (See Dry Creek
, supra , 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 34 [EIR reasonably a ssumes integral project features would be implemented].) “This is fatal to its claim.” ( South County Citizens
, supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 331.)
When all of these circumstances are c onsidered, CSTI has failed to show that meaningful public comment was thwarted. In Laurel Heights II , the court considered whether several categories of new inform ation added to the final EIR constituted “significant new information” triggering recirculation. ( Laurel Heights II
, supra , 6 Cal.4th at p. 1136.) The draft EIR in Laurel Heights II did not discuss the potential visual effects of the light glare from the projec t, but in response to public comments, the
final EIR included a discussion of the impact, concluded it was less than significant, but nonetheless imposed a mitigation measure. ( Id . at p. 1140.) The court found that the impact from the light was insignificant and thus did not trigger a requi rement that the EIR be recirculated. ( Id. at pp. 1140-1141.) Like the light glare in Laurel Heights II , the new information about the Project’s potential impacts on the Coast Guard’s VTS sy stem, and the modification of the D4D to add a consultation requirement, did not show any new significant adverse impacts. 9

9 CSTI surmises that “mitigation measur es calling for the relocation of [Coast Guard’s] VTS to the top of private, high-ri se residential towers in the middle of San Francisco Bay may, themselves, have signif icant adverse effects triggering a mandatory finding of significance under CEQA.” (Origi nal underscoring, fn. omitted.) There is no evidence supporting this conjecture. ( Pala Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 556, 577 [speculative possi bilities are not substantial evidence of enviro nmental impact].)29 Here, the refinements that occurred in the EIR at the Coast Guard’s behest do not constitute the type of significant new inform ation requiring recirculation. (See, e.g., California Oak
, supra , 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 266-268 [seismic studies and requests for further investigation by regulat ors did not trigger duty to recirculate draft EIR absent evidence of new seismic risks]; Western Placer
, supra , 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 904-905 [no recirculation required despite changes in project phasing in response to concerns expressed after draft EIR was circulated].)
F. Does the EIR Adequately Discuss Pr eservation of Historic Resources?
CSTI next claims the EI R “failed to analyze or m itigate impacts to historic resources at a project-level of detail, b ecause it does not disclose or analyze the prospective end reuses of Buildings 1 a nd 3, which all parties agree are qualifying
historic resources . . . .” Historic resources are accorded special protection under CEQA, and the state must “take all action necessary to protect, rehab ilitate, and enhance th e environmental quality of the state” including the prot ection and rehabilitation of “objects of historic or aesthetic significance.” (§§ 21001, subd. (a), 21060.5.) “ ‘ “Historical resource” includes, but is not limited to, any object, building, structur e, site, area, [or] place . . . which is historically or archaeologically significant, or is significant in the architectural, engineering, scientific , economic, agricultural, educationa l, social, political, military, or cultural annals of California.’ ” (§ 5020.1, subd. (j); see Friends of Sierra Madre v. City of Sierra Madre (2001) 25 Cal.4th 165, 186.) Buildings 1 and 3 were constructed in an Art Moderne style as permanent
structures for an international exhibition cele brating the construction of the Golden Gate and Bay Bridges. They have historical significance and will be retained. However, at the time the EIR was prepared, specific uses for these buildings had not been identified, although it was envisioned “the large, open exposition/hangar spaces within [these buildings] would flexibly acco mmodate a wide variety of potential uses” with minimal changes to the buildings’ distinctive featur es. Once specific architectural design proposals are selected, the D4D requires th at Buildings 1 and 3 be rehabilitated in30 accordance with the United St ates Secretary of the Interior’s Standards for the
Rehabilitation and Guidelines for Rehabilitating Historic Buildings (Secretary’s Standards). The Secretary’s Standards are the benchm ark that CEQA uses to establish whether a project will have a significant adverse impact to a historic property. Guidelines section 15064.5, subdivision (b)(3) reads as follows: “Generally, a project that follows the [Secretary’s Standards] shall be considered as mitigated to a level of less than a significant impact on the historical resource.”
CSTI claims that because there is no documentation showing actual proposed architectural designs for Buildi ngs 1 and 3, the EIR failed “t o analyze or mitigate impacts to historic resources at a project-level of detail.” However, as we have emphasized, the Guidelines provide that if th e Secretary’s Standards are adhered to, any impact to these historical structures that might otherwise be regarded as adverse will be considered to have been mitigated to insignificant levels. The EI R clearly prohibits making any physical alterations to Build ings 1 and 3 that do not co mply with the Secretary’s Standards. It is difficult to imagine any mo re specific criteria protecting the architectural integrity of these structures. Although CSTI claims there are proposal s for the reuse of these building that could potentially violate the Secretary’s Stan dards, it does not cite evidence supporting
this claim. This court can a ssume that the Project will be built as proposed, and that any adaptive reuses for Buildings 1 an d 3 will retain their historic features in accordance with the Secretary’s Standards. ( Dry Creek
, supra , 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 33-34 [EIR could assume project features w ould function as designed].) In this regard, we note that a pub lic comment was submitte d asking what would happen if a reuse was proposed for one of th e historic buildings that was inconsistent with the Secretary’s Standards. The City responded that “a future project that does not conform to the Secretary’s Standards is not covered in the EIR and therefore would require additional environmental review under CEQA.” Consequently, the door is left open for future, supplemental environmental re view if the final project design does not31 meet the Secretary’s Standards, potentially creating a significant adverse impact on a historic resource. CEQA requires nothing more. (See Towards Responsibility in Planning v. City Council (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 671, 681 [“It would be unreasonable to expect this EIR to produce de tailed information about the environmental impacts of a future [building] whose scope is uncertain an d which will in any case be subject to its own environmental review”].)
G. Does the EIR Assure Consiste ncy with the Tidelands Trust?
It is well settled that tidelands remain s ubject to a reserved easement in the State for common law public trust purposes. (See generally Marks v. Whitney (1971) 6 Cal.3d 251, 259-261.) Under the common law public tr ust doctrine, the state has title as trustee to all tidelands and is charged with “ ‘the pres ervation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units fo r scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and clim ate of the area.’ [Citation.]” ( National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 434-435.) There is also a statutory trust imposed by the Treasure Island Conversion Act of 1997 (1997 Conversion Act). (Health & Saf. Code, § 33492.5, Stats. 1997, ch. 898, § 12, p. 6456, as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 429, § 2, pp. 4511-4512.) Both the tr ust doctrine and the 1997 Conversion Act are referred to collectively as the Tidelands Tr ust (Trust). The Trust generally prohibits residential, general office, non-maritime indust rial, and certain recreational uses on lands that are subject to the Trust.
CSTI claims the EIR “failed to disclose and analyze the impacts of proposed nontrust uses on portions of T[reas ure] I[sland]” that are subject to the Trust. To the extent CSTI frames its argument to imply that no n-trust uses would be permitted on lands restricted by the Trust, CSTI is wrong. As the EIR explains, there will be no in consistencies between the Project and the Trust because the project is legally requi red to conform to the Trust. The EIR acknowledges “[a]ny portion of th e Project Area that consists of tidelands and submerged lands, or former tidelands and submerged lands that have been filled, will become subject32 to the use restrictions imposed under th e Tidelands Trust upon conveyance from the Navy to TIDA.” TIDA, the trustee of Trust pr operties in the Project area, “has a statutory duty to ensure that uses on Public Trust propert y are consistent with the Public Trust” and “may not approve any use that it finds to be inconsistent with the trust or otherwise not
allowed under the Conversion Act.” To ensure consistency, the D4D esta blishes a Tidelands Trust Overlay Zone governing all property subject to the Public Tr ust. TIDA must review all uses proposed within the overlay zone for c onsistency with the Trust. It was also envisioned, “as a matter of practice, TIDA and the State La nds Commission will continue to cooperate throughout planning, design, and buildou t of the Proposed Project.” The EIR’s
conclusion that the uses of ar eas subject to the Trust will not impact Trust values is therefore supported by evidence in the reco rd, and CSTI has not pointed to evidence indicating otherwise. CSTI’s argument appears to be that be cause certain proposed uses are not yet known to be consistent with the Trust, the project description is not sufficiently “accurate, finite and stable” to understand the Pr oject’s impacts. CSTI identifies some of the many uses proposed for the property subject to the Trust, i.e, “solar panels, dog parks, and permanent recreation fields . . . .” In response to public comments, the final EIR
addresses whether these uses would be consider ed permissible public trust uses. “[U]ses such as commercial, open sp ace, recreational or energy uses may be found to be consistent depending on the extent to which such uses further Public Trust purposes.” (Underscoring added.) Howeve r, “[b]ecause each use on Pub lic Trust property must be evaluated in light of all of the surrounding circumstances, it is premature to conclude whether a particular energy, commer cial, open space and recreation, or
cultural/institutional use . . . would be consistent with the Public Trust.” There is nothing in this record to indica te that the Project would fail to achieve the required consistency with the Trust. Th e EIR’s analysis, summarized above, complied with the Guidelines, as it included “a sufficient degree of analysis to provide
decisionmakers with information which en ables them to make a decision which33 intelligently takes account of environmental consequences.” (Guidelines, § 15151.) Nothing more was required. (See Napa Citizens for Honest Go vernment v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 91 Cal.App.4t h 342, 373 [CEQA does not require lead agencies “to engage in speculation in orde r to analyze a ‘worst case scenario’ ”].)
H. The Cross-Appeals As TICD and TIHDI set out in the pr eambles to their cross-appeals, it is only if we reverse the trial court’s d ecision denying CSTI’s petition for writ of mandate that we need concern ourselves with their cross-appeal s. Having determined that the trial court’s denial of CSTI’s petition for writ of mandate should be affirmed, we need not, and do not, reach the issues presen ted in the cross-appeals.
IV.
DISPOSITION The judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. In light of this conclusion, we need not, and therefore do no t address the issues raised in the crossappeals. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.

_ ____________ ____________ RUVOLO, P. J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ REARDON, J.

_____________ ____________ RIVERA, J.1 Trial Court: San Francisco Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Teri L. Jackson
Counsel for Appellant Lippe Gaffney Wagner, LLP Citizens for a Sustainable Keith G. Wagner, Brian Gaffney, Treasure Island Thomas N. Lippe, Kelly A. Franger
Counsel for Respondents Dennis J. Herrera City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco City Attorney San Francisco Board of Supervis ors, Andrea Ruiz-Esquide San Francisco Municipal Transpor tation Deputy City Attorney Authority, San Francisco Planning Commission, San Francisco Public Utilities Commission, and Treasure Island Development Authority [TIDA is also a Real Party in Interest]
Counsel for Real Party in Interest and Cox, Castle & Nicholson Cross-Appellant Treasure Island Michael H. Zischke Homeless Development Initiative, Inc. Andrew B. Sabey

Counsel for Real Party in Inte rest and Remy Moose Manley Cross-Appellant Treasure Island Whitman F. Manley Community Development, LLC Howard F. Wilkins III

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher Mary G. Murphy Neil H. Sekhri