FRED LADD,

Pla int if

f / Counte rc la im- De fe nd ant,
v. CHEMONI CS I

NTERNATI ONAL , I

NC., Def endant / Counterc laim-Plaintiff.

UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 07–1360 (CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Mar ch 26, 2009) Pla int if f F re d L a dd

(“ Pla int if

f” or “ L a dd ” ) b ri ng s th e a

bo ve -c a pti on e d la ws uit a g a ins t hi s former employ er, D efe ndant Chemonics International, Inc. (“ Def endant” or “Chemonics” ), alleg ing that Chemonics brea ched the parties’ employ ment ag ree ment (“Contra ct”) . In October of 20 03 , s ho rt ly

a ft e r P la int if

f b e g an w or

kin gfo r C he mon ic s, he su sta ine d s ig nif ic ant i nju ri e s in an on-the -job automobile ac cident, as a result of whic h he is no long er a ble to work. Plaintiff’s complaint alleg es that: (1) Chemonics’ contra ctually ag ree d to continue to pay Plaintiff his salary in t he e ve nt h e wa s in

jur e d a nd no lon g e r a

ble to w or

k, and that Ch e mon ic s b re a c he d th e pa rt ie s’ Contract by

failingto pay

Plaintiff his salary

afte r his automobile acc ident; (2) Chemonics agree d to provide Plaintiff with life insuranc e bene fits and to pay Plaintiff’s COBRA pre miums after he
wa s te rm inate d f

ro m Ch e mon ic s, but ha s f a ile d to do so and

is the re fo re in b re a c h o f t he pa rt ie s’ ag ree ment; (3) Plaintiff is owed a dditional compensation and/or be nefits under the re levant worke rs’ c ompensation scheme —the Def ense B ase A ct, 42 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (“D BA ”); a nd (4) Plaintiff is entitled to rec over f or intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon Chemonics’ bre ach of

contra ct. Chemonics in turn has filed a counter claim ag ainst Plainti ff,2

alleg ing that Plainti ff br eac hed the f orum selec tion clause in the pa rties’ Contrac t and that Che mon ic s is the re fo re e nti tle d to liq uid ate d d ama g e s a s p ro vid e d f or in t he Contr a c t. Currently pendingbefor e the Court ar e Plaintiff’s [27] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment, in which Plaintiff seeks judg ment in its favor only as to his claim for br eac h of contra ct base d upon Chemonics’ fa ilure to continue to pay his salary

afte r he w as injured a

nd no longe r able to work, and D efe ndant’s [28] Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment, in which Chemonics seeks judg ment in its favor as to all of Plaintiff’s c laims as well as to its own counter claim. Afte r thoroug hly revie wingthe par

ties’ submissions, applicable ca se law, statutory authority , and the e ntire re cord of the ca se as a

whole, the Court shall DENYPlaintiff’s Partial Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt a

nd sh a ll G RA

NT De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt, for the r easons that f

ollow. I. BACKG ROUND A. Plaintif

f’s Repe ated and Ine

xcusableFailure to Comply with L ocal Civil Rules an d th is C

ou rt’ s O rd e rs As a pr e lim ina

ry matte r, the Court

sh a ll a dd re ss P la int if

f’ s c ontin ue d a nd ine xplic a ble failure to comply

with the L ocal Civil Rules and this C ourt’s orde rs, an issue whic h the Court has previously

addre ssed in g reat detail in its S eptember 4, 2008 Orde r, which is fully incorporated here in. See 9/4 /08 Or de r, Do c ke t N o. [37]. Th e Court the re fo re se ts f

or th o nly tho se fa c ts
nece ssary to provide conte x t for Plaintiff’s fa ilure—yet ag ain—to adher e to the L ocal Civil Rules and this Court’s directives. L ocal Civil Rules 7(h)(1) a nd 56.1 set forth the r equire ments that parties must follow wh e n f ili ngor op po sin ga

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt:As explained in the Court’s September 4, 2008 Or der, Plaintiff’s Colora do counsel 1 submitt ed a sw orn and nota rized aff idavit in support of his moti on for lea ve to appe ar pro hac vice , in which, inte r a lia , he stated: Ihave r eviewe d L ocal Civil Rule 83.2(c), L Cvr 83.2(c) and L ocal Civil Rule 83.2(d) L Cvr 83.2(d). Pursuant to those rule s Ihave r etained loc al counse l to assist i n the repr esentation in t h i s ca s e, and I ag ree that local counse l will si gn all pleading s or other pa pers a nd participate meaning fully in the prepa

ration and tria l of the case or pr oc e e din g s to the e xtent r e qu ir e d b y the Court . See 9/4/08 Order ( citing D ocket No. [10-2]). Ba sed larg ely upon that repr esentation, the Court g rante d Plaintiff’s Colorado counse l’s motion for leave to appea r pro hac vic e . See id. (citing 9/21/07 Minut e Or der)
. 3 Eac h motion for summary judgme nt shall be accompanie d by a st atement of materia l fa c ts a s to wh ic h the mov ing pa rt y c onte nd s the re is no g e nu ine iss ue , which shal l include refer ence s to the parts of t he record relied on to support the s tatement. An opposition t o such a motion shall be ac companied by a sepa rate concise statement of g e nu ine iss ue s se tti ngfo rt h a ll m ate ri a l f

a c ts a s to wh ic h it is c onte nd e d th e re e xists a g e nu ine iss ue ne c e ssa

ry to be lit ig ate d, wh ic h sh a ll i nc lud e re fe re nc e s to the pa rt s of the r ec o rd re lied on to support the statement . . . In deter mining a motion for summa ry jud g me nt, the c ourt

may a ssume that fa c ts ide nti fi e d b y the mov ingpa

rt y in its st atement of materia l f acts a re a dmitted, unless such a fa ct is controver ted in the statement of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion. L CvR 7(h)(1) & 56.1. The Court has r epeatedly instructed the pa

rties to comply

with these loca l rules. See 1 0 /1 5 /0 7 O r d e r , D o c k e t N o . [1 5 ] at 4
- 5 ( r e qu ir in gth e p arti e s “ to c o mp ly f u ll y w it h[] L CvR 7(h),” and a dvising the pa rties that “[t] he Court assumes fa cts identified by the moving party in its st atement of

materia l fac ts are a dmitted, unless such a fa ct is controver ted in the statement of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion”); 5/28/08 Order, Doc ket No. [26] (i ns tr uc tin gthe pa

rt ie s to “ c omp ly

fu lly wi th [] L CvR

7( h) ,” wh ic h r e qu ir e s th e pa rt ie s to “ fu

rn ish prec ise citations to the portions of the re cord on which they rely”). Notwithstanding those instruc tions, and despite Plaintiff’s Colorado counse l havingsworn familiarity

with the L ocal Civil Rules, Plaintiff failed to include a statement of mate rial fa cts not 14

in dispute in his m otion for par tial summary

judgme nt. See Docke t No. [27] . This error was immediately

pointed out to Pl aintiff by Chemonics in its cross-motion for summary judgme nt and opposition, filed in response to Plaintiff’s motion. See Do ck etNo s . [ 2 8 ] , [ 2 9 ]
. C h em o n i cs ’ f i l i n gs thus clear ly

place d Plaintiff’s counsel on notice that the fa ilure to submit a statement of mater ial fac ts constituted a violation of the L ocal Civil Rules. Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s combined opposition to Chemonics’ motion for summary judgme nt and re ply

in support of his own motion for partial summary judgme nt neither spec ifically responde d to Chemonics’ fac tual asser tions, as require d by the L ocal Civil Rules and this C ourt’s re peate d order s, nor attempted to belatedly proff er a statement of mate rial fa cts in support of Plaintiff’s own motion for par tial summary

judgme nt. See Docke t No. [32]
. Indeed, it wa s only

afte r brief

ing on the parties’ instant cross-motions had bee n completed that Pla int if

f b e late dly

fi le d a mot ion fo r l e ave to f

ile a state me nt o f m ate ri a l f

a c ts i n s up po rt

of his cross-motion and a

statement re sponding to Chemonics’ statement of mate rial fa cts in support of its cross-motion. Pl aintiff did not attach e ither statement, but re quested more time to prepar e and file them. See Docke t No. [25] (filed 9/2/08). The only excuse offe red by

Plaintiff’s Colorado
c ouns e l f or thi s f la g ra nt o mis sio n w a s to e xpla in t ha t he pr a c tic e s in

a va ri e ty of fe de ra l jurisdictions and “inadve rtently overlooke d the spec ific L ocal Rules in question for this Court.” Id. at 2. As the Court empha siz ed in its September 4, 2008 Or der granting -in-par t and deny

ing- in-part Plaintiff’s motion for leave , “[t] his ex cuse is altog ether unavailing .” 9/4/08 Orde r at 6. Consequently , the Court ref used to g rant the c omplete re lief re quested in Plaintiff’s belated motion for lea ve, per mitti ngPlaintiff to respond to Chemonics’ statement of materia l fac ts, but denying Plaintiff’s reque st to submi t a statement of material fa cts in support of his own motion for partialAs is d isc us se d b e low , Ch e mon ic s f ile d a re vis e d r e ply

and , in a c c or da nc e wi th t his 2 Court’s September 4, 2008 O rder , provided the Court with an a ffidavit settingforth the f ees incurre d in connec tion with the filing of its reply
. Se e inf ra p. 38. 5 summary judgme nt. Id. at 7- 8. Spe c if ic a lly , g ive n Ch e mon ic s’ a g re e me nt t hat th e mate ri a l f

a c ts bear ing on Plaintiff’ s motion for partial summary judgme nt are not in disput e, the Court conc luded that there was no ne ed to allow Plaintiff to file an e x traordina rily belated statement of mate rial fac ts in support of his mot ion at such a late date a fter the briefinghad alr eady been c ompleted without refe renc e to a state ment of fa cts. Id. Withre sp e c t to the fa c ts und e rl yingChe mon ic s’ motion for summary

judgme nt, however , the Court require d Plaintiff to file a statement r esponding to Chemonics’ statement. Id. at 8. The Court ther efor e struck Plaintiff’ s [32] initial opposition/ reply

and re quired Plaintiff to file a r evised plea ding that included appr opriate c itations to Chemonics’ statement and/or his own responsive state ment. Id. In addition, the Court mandated that Plainti ff’ s local counse l “ca ref ully revie w all filing s prepa

red by Plaintiff’s Colorado counsel in orde r to ensure strict compliance with the L ocal Civil Rules and this C ourt’s orde rs.” Id. F ina lly , th e Court

pr ov ide d th at Ch e mon ic s w a s p e rm itt e d to fi le a re vis e d r e ply , if

it deter mined it was nec essar

y in light of Plaintiff’s re visions. Id. at 8. In th e e ve nt C he mon ic s d id so, the Court order ed that Plaintiff’s Colorado c ounsel was r equire d to pay all costs and attorne y ’s f e e s i n c ur r e d b y C h e m o n i c s i nc o n n e c t i o nw i thi t s r e v i s e d r e p l y. Id. at 8.

2 Incre dibly , despite the Court’s re peate d instructions that both P laintiff’s Colorado c ounsel and loca l counsel must ensure f uture plea dings a

re in “ strict compliance with the L ocal Civil Rules and this Court’s order s,” id. , Plaintiff’s counsel onc e ag ain disreg arde d both the Court’s order and the L ocal Civil Rules, filing a r evised plea ding that blatantly fails to confor

m with this Court’s clea r direc tives, as set for

th in its September 4, 2008 O rder . Specifica lly , Plaintiff’s revised e ffor t6

to provide a r esponse to Chemonics’ state ment of mater ial fac ts suffer s from three main defe cts. First, the r esponse doe s not comply with the Court’s repe ated instructions that “a party responding to a statement of material fa cts must respond to eac h para g raph w ith a corr esponding ly numbere d para g raph, indicating whe ther that pa ragraph is admitted or de nied,” a nd “should include a

ny information re levant to its response in that par ag raph.” See, e .g. , 5/28/08 Order at 2. Plainti ff’ s response does not indicate whether he admits or denie s eac h of Chemonics’ f actua l assertions and, as Chemonics notes in its revised re ply , “[t] he number ing of L add’s state ment of mater ial fac ts that he conte nds are g enuinely disputed does not corr espond to the numbere d para g raphs of Che mon ic s’ state me nt o f m ate ri a l f a c ts n ot i n d isp ute ,” su c h th at it is “ no t [] po ssi ble to p re c ise ly identify what L add is attemptingto respond to.” De f.’s Rev. Reply at 2-3. Sec ond, Plaintiff’s response does not, “[a]t all poi nts . . . furnish prec ise citations to the portions of the re cord on which [he] rel[i es].” See, e .g. , 5 /28 /08 Or de r a t 2. F or e xamp le , Pl a int if

f s tate s th at he we nt t o Chemonics’ hea dquarte rs in Washington, D.C. for “ the purpose of executing the ag ree ment,” and cites g ener ally

to Ex hibit 3 of his revised re sponse, which he states is a copy of his aff idavit, as support for this asser

tion. See Pl. ’s Re sp . ¶

3. Exhi bit

3, ho we ve r, is a

c op y of the pa rt ie s’ Contract, not Plaintiff’s af fidavit, and it does not provide a ny support for Plaintiff’s a ssertion. See id. , Ex . 3. Neither

does Plaintiff’s af

fidavit, which is cor

rec tly cited as Exhibit 4, provide any support for this asser

tion. See id. , Ex . 4. Third, Plaintiff’s re sponse includes impermissible leg al arguments dressed up a s “fa cts.” See, e .g., Pl. ’s Re sp . ¶ 6 ( “ I t c e rt a inl y

mus t be un dis pute d a s a materia l fac t that Plainti ff did, indee d, perf orm his duties faithfully

and to the best of his a

bility .”). Ac c or din g ly , it

is c le ar t hat Pla int if

f’ s r e vis e d r e sp on se to C he mon ic s’ state me nt o f m ate ri a l f a c ts is wholly inadequate.7

As the D.C. Circuit has empha siz ed, “[L CvR 56.1] place s the burden on the parties a nd their counse l, who are most familiar with the litigation and the rec ord, to cry stalliz e for the district court the material fa cts and re levant portions of the r ecor d.” Jack son v. Finnegan, He nderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner , 1 0 1 F. 3 d 1 4 5 , 1 5 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Twis t v . M e ese , 854 F.2d 14 21 , 1 42 5 ( D. C. C ir . 1 98 8) ; Guarino v. Brookfield Township T rustees , 9 80 F .2 d 3 99 , 4 06 (6 th Cir. 1992)). B eca

use of the significanc e of this task and the potential hardship plac ed on the c ourt if the par ties are dere lict in their duty , courts re quire strict c ompliance with L CvR 56.1. Se e id . at 1 5 0 (c i t at i o n s o m i t t ed ). As th i s C o urth as re p ea t ed l y ad v i s edth e p art i es , i t“m ay s tri k e p l ea d i n gs not in conformity

with these rules.” See, e .g., 10/15/07 Order a t 4; 5/28/08 Order at 3. Plaintiff has nonethe less failed to c omply with the L ocal Civil Rules and this C ourt’s orde rs, despite the f act the Court permitted Plaintiff y et another opportunity

to do so even a fter pr incipal brief ing on the parties’ cross-motions had be en complete d. Given Plaintiff’s counse l’s inexcusable and re peate d failure to adher e to the L ocal Civil Rules, the Court, in i ts discretion, shall disreg ard a ll assertions contained in Plaintiff’s r esponse to Chemonics’ state ment that are in violation of L CvR 7(h)(1) a nd L CvrR 56.1. Accor dingly , wher e Chemonics’ f actua l assertions ar e prope rly supported by

the
rec ord, as c onfirmed by

the Court’s own indepe ndent re view, the Court shall treat such fac ts as
a dmi tte d. Thus , in

se tti ngfo rt

h th e re le va

nt f a c tua l ba c kgro un d b e low , th e Court c ite s p ri mari ly

to Chemonics’ statement of

materia l fac ts, with direct citations to the rec ord whe re a ppropriate
. B. Factual Back

ground Chemonics is an international de velopment consultingfirm that provides tec hnical
a ssi sta nc e and su pp or t in a va ri e ty of dis c ipl ine s ( inc lud ingpr ivate fi na nc ia l se c tor

de ve lop me nt, he a lth , e nv ir onme nta l ma na g e me nt, a g ri c ult

ur e and g ov e rn anc e ), to g ov e rnme nts and bu sin e sse s inAs Chemonics notes in its statement, the rec ord conta ins two versions of Plaintiff’s 3 employ ment contra ct with Chemonics. Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 10, n.1. One copy is signed by

Plaintiff and Richar d Br eitenstein, Chemonics’ Projec t Administrator f or the Middle Ea st, and indicates that both signatures we re ma de on September 5, 2003. Id. The sec ond copy is also signe d by bo th P la int if

f a nd B re ite ns te in, but in dic ate s th at Pla int if f d id n ot s ig n th e Contr a c t until September 11, 2003. See id. Plaintiff does not rec all why there is a second ve rsion of the Contract with his signature dated September 11, 2003. Id. (citingEx . 3 (L add De p.) at 33:6-12. Th is d isc re pa

nc y , h ow e ve r, is n ot m ate ri a l be c a us e bo th v e rs ion s o f t

he Contr a c t are oth e rw ise identical, see id. , and the timing of the Contract’ s signature ha s not been ra ised in either pa rty ’s cross-motion. 8 developingcountries. De f.’s Stmt. ¶ 1. Chemonics freque ntly works in deve loping c ountries under c ontrac t to the U.S. Age ncy of International Development ( “USAI D”)
. Id. ¶ 2. In 2003, Chemonics enter ed into a subcontra ct with the Resea rch Tr iang le Institut e (“ RTI ”), g ener al contra ctor on the U SAI D’s Iraq L ocal Gove rnanc e Projec t Civi c Institut ion Support P rog ram (“L GP Progr am”) , to provide per sonnel to work on the L GP Progr am in Iraq unde r RTI ’s control. Id. ¶¶ 3- 5. Chemonics was re sponsible for locating, sc ree ning a nd hiringthe nec essar

y personne l and wa s also responsible for administeringthe pay

and bene fits of those hired. See De f. ’s Cr os sMSJ /Opp’n, Ex. 1 (Decl. of Pete r B ittner) (he reina fter “ Bittner D ecl.” ) ¶¶ 5-6. In addition, purs ua nt t o Ch e mon ic s’ su

bc ontr a c t w ithRTI , Ch e mon ic s w a s r e qu ir e d to pr oc ur e wo rk e rs ’
c omp e ns atio n in sura

nc e fo r t he e mpl oye e s p ur su ant t o th e DB A, the a pp lic a ble wo rk e rs ’ compensation statute. Def.’ s Stm t. ¶ 5. In M arc h o f 2 00 3, Che mon ic s c onta c te d Pl a int if f, a c ivi l e ng ine e r, to s e e wh e the r h e wo uld be intere sted in workingfor Chemonics in Iraq. Id. ¶¶ 6- 7. Plaintiff indicated that he w as interested in the position. Id. ¶ 8. Ther eaf ter, in September

of 2003, Plaintiff and Chemonics
e nte re d into t

he Contr a c t, un de r whic h Pl a int if f w a s h ir e d b y

Che mon ic s a s a

Munic ipa l U til ity 3 Specialist for the L GP in I raq. Id. ¶ 10. As the Contrac t’s languag e is key to the instant lit iga

tion,9

the Court sets forth the r eleva nt passag es at issue, whic h provide, inte r a lia : I V. Salary The ba se sala ry fo r t he employee f or the fir st y ear

of the proje ct work ha s been pr op os e d at U S $1 31 ,2 50 pe r year, or a mo nth ly rate of US $ 10 ,9 37 .5 0. Sa lary

is pe nd inga

pp ro va l by

RTI /U SAI D. Annu a l sa lary

inc re a se s ma

y be g ra nte d in acc orda n ce wi t h Chemonics’ customar y policy and ar e subjec t to the approva l of USA I D. Ne ith e r t

he rate no r a

mou nt o f s a lary

inc re a se is g ua

ra nte e d und e r the te rm s of this a g ree ment. Salary incre ases are also subject to company guidelines, individual pe rf or manc e , a nd c lie nt a pp ro va ls. VI
. Em

plo y me nt at w ill The e mploy ee sha ll be considere d an employee at will for the duration of employ ment cover ed under this a g ree ment. Employ ment may be terminated by the employ

mee or by Chemonics at any

time and for a

ny rea son. . . . VI I
. Termination of e mploy ment Employ ment may be terminated at any time by Chemonics or by the employ ee f

or any rea son. Should t he employee be terminated f or misconduct, derel i ct i o n o f duty , or gro s s fa i l ure t o p er fo rm s at i s fa ct o ri l y , o r s h o u l d th e e mp l o y ee v o l un t ar i l y re s i gn wi tho ut o bta ini ngpr ior wr itt e n c on se nt o f C he mon ic s’ ho me of fi c e , Ch e mon ic s w ill not be liable for

salary or re lated costs beyond the date of employ m en t termination. When terminated for rea sons list ed her e in [section] VI I , the employ ee sha ll also be liable for a

ny reloc ati o n co s ts not allowable for U.S. gove rnment re imbursement, as state d in [se c tio n] V I I I .5 of

thi s a g re e me nt. * * * XI I
. L eg al agree ment

. . . . Th is a g re e me nt s ha ll b e int e rp re te d a nd c on str ue d und e r an d in a c c or da nc e wi th the laws of the District of Columbia. The par ties here by

express l y

ag ree and acknow ledg e that the courts of t he Dist rict of Col umbia shall have sole a nd exclusive jurisdiction over any

dispute arisingunder or

otherwise relatingto this agr eeme nt. The pa rt ie s a g re e that any su c h dis pute s sh a ll no t be br ou g ht be fo re any fo re ig n co urt, administrative ag ency , or other le g al body , but shall b e under the sole and e x clusive jurisdiction of t h e courts of the District of Columbia as stated above . Should either party brea ch this clause by

bring ing a

dispute befor e a f

oreign court, a dminist rative a g e nc y , or oth e r le g a l bo dy , the pa rt ie s a gre e a s f

oll ow s: the no n- br e a c hin gpa rt y sh a ll be e n ti tl e d

to li qu id ate d

d ama g e s at a

s um e qu a l t o thr e e ( 3 ) mo n th s s a la r y o f theAs Che mon ic s e xpla ins , it pr e pa re d a nd fi lle d o ut a

F ir st R e po rt

of Inju ry , whic h it 4 su bmi tte d to the OWCP . D e f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 21 . T he date of

inj ur y on the F ir st R e po rt

of Inju ry is listed as October

26, 2003. Def

.’s Stmt. ¶ 21, n. 2. P laintiff, howeve r, testified that the injury actua lly occur red on O ctober

23, 2003. See id. Th e Court c on c lud e s th at th is d isc re pa nc y is immaterial to the par

ties’ cr oss-motions. I t did not affec t Plainti ff’ s elig ibilit y for be nefits under the DB A, a s it

un dis pute d th at he ha s r e c e ive d ( and c ontin ue s to re c e ive ) t

he maximumbe ne fi t allowed, see id. , and Plaintiff has not ra ised the issue in his briefing s now befor e the Court, see ge ne ra lly P l
. ’ s M S J ; P l
. ’ s R e v . O p p ’ n/ R e p l y. 10 employ ee’ s last wag e under this ag ree ment and pre cedingthe bre ach. Contract, §§ IV, VI -VI I& X I I
. On Octobe r 23, 2003, shortly afte r he w as hired by

Chemonics, Plaintiff was injured in an automobile acc ident while workingin Al Kut, Iraq. D ef.’ s Stm t. ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff sustained a number of injurie s as a r esult of the ac cident, and ha s been una ble to work since the Octobe r 23, 2003 acc ident. Id. All parties agree that Plaintiff remains totally disabled bec ause of

his injuries. Id. ¶ 19. As it is required to do, Chemonics immediately repor ted Plaintiff’s injury

to the Depa rtment of L abor, O ffice of Workers’ Compensation Progr ams (“O WC P”), in order to ensure that Plaintiff rec eived the a ppropriate benef

its under the DB A. Id. ¶ 21. On Nove mber 7, 2003, 4 the OWCP District Offic e of N ew Yor k sent Plaintiff a notice a dvising him that the OWCP had
rec eived Chemonics’ First Report of Injury , and advisinghim of the worke rs’ c ompensation benef its available to him under the D BA
. Id. ¶ 22. It is undisput ed that Plaintiff has be en
re c e ivi ngte mpo ra

ry tot a l di sa bil ity c omp e ns atio n p ur su ant t o th e DB A s inc e the date of his
acc ident. Id. ¶ 2 6; see also Pl.’s MS J at 4 (a dmitti ngthat Plaintiff has rec eived be nefits under the DB A). Spec ifically , he re ceive s $1,030.78 per we ek, which is pa id on a bi-we ekly basis and which is the max imum compensation rate a vailable unde r the DB A for L add’s injury
. Id. ¶¶ 26- 27.Although Plaintiff a dmits t hat he is g ener ally rec eivingmedical c are from 5 CNA—Chemonics’ wor

kers’ compensation insurer—there appea rs to be a dispute be tween CNA and Plaintiff re g ardingan unpaid hospital bill coveringchar g es incurr ed for Plaintiff’s treatment while hospitaliz ed in L anstuhl Hospital in Germany
. See De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 28 , n . 3 ; Pl. ’s Re v. Re ply at 12 (a lleg ing that neither Chemonics nor CNAhas paid the L anstuhl hospital bill ). The Court addre sses this disput e below. Se e inf ra pp. 33-34. Plaintiff appea

rs to dispute Chemonics’ asser tion that it kept P laintiff on the employ ment 6 ro ll f oll ow inghis inj ur ie s, in p art so that he and

his fa mil y wo uld re ma in c ov e re d b y

Che mon ic s’ g roup hea lth insurance. See Pl.’s Rev. Resp. at 3, ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleg es that Chemonics’ a ssertion is contradicte d by

Chemonics’ subseque nt corre spondence to Plainti ff. See id. Contr ary to Plaintiff’s asser

tion, however , the cor

responde nce c ited by

Plaintiff in fact c onfirms that he rema ined enr olled in Chemonics gr oup health insuranc e duringthe time period in question. See, e.g., Pl.s’ Rev. Opp’n/Reply , Ex . 2 (De cembe r 8, 2004 L etter) (conf irming that Plainti ff’ s cover ag e under

Chemonics insurance would terminate a s of midnight on De cembe r 31, 2004). Mo re signif

ic antl y , Pl a int if

f d oe s n ot i n f

a c t di sp ute that he re ma ine d c ov e re d b y Che mon ic s’ insurance until Decembe r of 2004 a nd that Chemonics continued to pay for the e mploy er por

tion of the pre mium during that time per iod. See ge nerally P l
. ’ s R e v . O p p ’ n/ R e p l y. 11 Plaintiff also rec eives medic al ca re f or his work-r elated injury under the DB A. Id. ¶ 28. 5 Che mon ic s a lso de c ide d to ke e p Pl a int if f o n it s e mpl oy

me nt r oll fo llo wi nghis inj ur y , in pa rt to e ns ur e that Pla int if

f a nd his fa mil y wo uld re ma in c ov e re d b y

Che mon ic s’ g ro up he a lth insurance and to ena

ble Chemonics to continue to pay the employ er’ s portion of the pre mium. Id. ¶ 29; Bittner

Dec l. ¶¶ 9-10. A s a Chemonics’ e mploy ee, the total health insuranc e pre mium for Pla int if f a nd his fa mil y wa s $ 67 4. 74 pe r m onth, wi th P la int if f c ontr ibutin g$1 58 .0 0 o f t he monthl y premium. Id. ¶ 3 0. B e tw e e n O c tob e r 2 00 3 a nd De c e mbe r 2 00 4 ( wh e n Pl a int if f w a s o ff ic ia lly te rm inate d f

ro m Ch e mon ic s’ e mpl oy

me nt, a s d isc us se d b e low ), Pla int if f r e ma ine d e nr oll e d in Che mon ic s’ g ro up he a lthins ur anc e and Che mon ic s c ontin

ue d to pa y its po rt ion

of the he a lth i n s ur an c e p r e m i um s f

o r P l a i n t i f f an d h i s f am i l y. Id.

6 On Novembe r 23, 2004, more tha n a year afte r Plaintiff’s ac cident, Peter Bittner, Che mon ic s’ Se nio r V ic e Pr e sid e nt, Mid dle Ea st R e g ion , h a d a te le ph on e c onve rs atio n w ithAt deposition, Pl aintiff testified that he “may have” talked to B ittner, but that he does not 7 reme mber. See Def

.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n, Ex. 3 (L add’s De po.) at 141:24-142:3 (“ Q. Do you r e m e mb e r

t a l k i n gw i thP e t e r

B i t tn e r o nth e t e l e p h o n e i nl at e N o v e mb e r , e ar l y D e c e mb e r

2 0 0 4 ? A. No. I may have, but I

do not remembe r it.”). Plaintiff’s state ment that he does not re member the conve rsation, howeve r, does not contr adict B ittner’s sworn de clar ation, and Plaintiff offe rs no other e vidence disputing B ittner’s testimony reg ardingthe substance of the Nove mber 23, 2004 telephone c onversation. 12 Plaintiff conce rninghis employ ment status with Chemonics. Id. ¶ 31. B ittner ave rs that, by that date, “ it was appa

rent that Mr. L add would not re turn to work at Chemonics.” Bittner D ecl. ¶ 11. Acc ording ly , Bittner states that, “[b] eca use he ha d not worked f

or more tha

n one year

and it was unclea r whe n he would be a

ble to return to wor

k,” B ittner advised Plaintiff that his employ ment with Chemonics would be terminate d eff ective D ece mber 23, 2004. Id. ¶ 1 3; se e als o Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 3 1. B ittne r f

ur the r a dv ise d Pl a int if

f t hat he c ou ld a

pp ly fo r C OB RAc ov e ra g e to e xten d h is he a lthins ur anc e c ov e ra g e fo r 2 9 mo nth s b e y on d h is t e rm inatio n d ate at a c os t of a pp ro ximate ly $7 35 .0 0 p e r m onth, and

that Ch e mon ic s w ou ld p ay Pla int if f’ s CO B RApa

y me nts fo r t

hat ti me pe ri od if Pla int if f s ig ne d a re le a se a g re e ingno t to su e Che mon ic s. De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 32 ; se e als o Bittner D ecl. ¶

¶ 14-15, 17. 7 Bittner subse quently

sent a letter

to Plainti ff, dated Dec ember 8, 2004, in which B ittner confirme d the substance of their Nove mber 23, 2004 tele phone. See De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 31 ; see also E x. B. to B ittner Dec l. (12/8/04 L etter f rom Bittner

to L add) ( here inafter

“De cembe r 8, 2004 L etter” ), at 1 (“ This letter ser

ves to summarize y our discussion on November 23, 2004, reg ardingy our end of assig nment and employ ment with Chemonics International.”). In particula r, the letter

confirme d that Plaintiff’s employ

ment with Chemonics would be terminate d eff ective D ece mber 23, 2004, a s Bittner a nd Plaintiff had discussed. De f.’s Stmt. ¶ 33. The letter a lso advised Plaintiff that,“[a]lt houg h y ou will no longer be employed with Chemonics, so longas you are disabled and13

y ou continue to satisfy

the terms and c onditions under DB A, the DB A insuranc e provide r, CNA, will continue to pay

y ou this benefit.” Id . In addition, Plainti ff wa s informed that his “r emaining g roup insuranc es of he alth, company paid and ( additional) optional life insuranc e, and a ccide ntal death a nd dismemberment will terminate a s of midnight De cembe r 23, 2004.” Id. Howeve r, Bittner r eiterated that Plaintiff could continue his Chemonics’ he alth insurance cover ag e by applying f

or the c overa g e throug h COBRA, a nd indicated that he should fill out and return the appropr iate for

ms attache d to the letter to apply for COB RA benef

its, if he wished to do so. Id. ; see also Def

.’s Stmt. ¶ 33. I n addition, Bittner a dvised Plaintiff that his “company paid life ins ur anc e may

be c onve rt e d to ind ivi du a l po lic ie s, ” and that Pla int if

f s ho uld c onta c t Ch e mon ic s if h e “ wi s h [ ed ] t o p urs u e i n s ura n ce co n v er s i o n s . ” D ec em b er 2 3 , 2 0 0 4 L et t er

at1
. Fi n al l y , al th o u gh the letter itself did not spec ifically ref ere nce the rele ase a g ree ment that Bittner ha d discussed duringthe Novembe r 23, 2004 telephone conver sation—stating only that “Chemonics has a g ree d to pay for the c ost of the pre mium (both the employ ee a nd the employ er por

tions) duringy our entire COB RA elig ibilit y”—B ittner attac hed a c opy of the re lease to the letter (he reina fter, “Relea se”)
. See De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 35 ; see also Dec ember

8, 2004 L etter a

nd Att. In rele vant par

t, the
re l ea s e p ro v i d es th atC h em o n i cs wo u l d agr ee t o p ay

fo r P l ai n t i ff

’s C OB RA p re m i um s i nex ch an ge fo r P la int if

f’ s a g re e me nt n ot t o s ue Che mon ic s: 2. I f you sign a

nd do not revoke this ag ree ment, y ou wi l l re ce i v e twenty -nine months of COBRA cove rag e beg inning on January 1, 2005. 3. In th is a g re e me nt, in e xch ang e fo r t he pa y me nts and

be ne fi ts d e sc ri be d in para g raph 2, you are ag ree ing not to sue [Chemonics] and waiving and re le a sin gc la ims and

c a us e s o f a c tio n y ou may hav e , o n th e da y y ou sign th is a g re e me nt, a g a ins t [Che mon ic s] ari sin gout of y our e mpl oy

me nt. See Att. to Dece mber 8, 2004 L etter ( here inafter “Relea se”) . The Relea se wa s signe d by Bittner14

and date d Dec ember

8, 2004. See id. On that same da

y (De cembe r 8, 2004), B ittner also provided Plaintiff with copie s of the De c e mbe r 8 , 2 00 4 L e tte r a nd Re le a se via

e -m a il. De f. ’s Stmt . ¶

37 ; see also Ex. Ato B ittne r D e c l. (12/8/04 e-mail fr om Bittner to L add) ( here inafter “De cembe r 8, 2004 E-ma il”). B ittner explained in the e-ma il that he was attachinga “le tter . . . that summarizes our Nove mber 23rd disc ussion” as well as “ a re lease ag ree ment for you to sign, should you agree with the terms listed in the letter.” Id. B ittne r f

ur the r i ns tr uc te d Pl a int if

f t o “ [p]le a se sign a

nd se nd ba c k o ne c op y

of the re le a se to [C hemonics]” and to “ke ep the other for your file.” Id. Bittner f urther a dvised Plaintiff that he should “also fill out the attache d COBRA notification and application and se nd [t he for ms] back with the rele ase a g ree ment.” Id. Pla int if f, fo r h is p art , d e nie s th at he wa s to ld b y B ittne r t hat Ch e mon ic s’ of

fe r t o p ay his COBRA pre miums was continge nt on Plainti ff’ s ag ree ment not to sue Chemonics. See Pl.’s Rev. Op p’ n/R e ply

at 4- 5, ¶ 8 . Rathe r, Pla int if f c onte nd s th at he wa s in ste a d to ld t hat Ch e mon ic s “ [wa s] g oing to c ontinue paying his COB RA premiums beca use of his g ood service and injuries.” Id. Plaintiff, however , has not provided a ny aff irmative evide nce c ontradictingChemonics’ fa ctual
asser tions and supporting e vidence . Rather, Plaintiff’s only support for his cla im that Chemonics g ratuitously

ag ree d to pay

his COBRA pre miums i s a sing le citation to his own deposition testimony
. See Pl.’s Rev./Opp’n/Reply at 4-5, ¶ 8 ( citing E x . 6 (L add De p.) at 142-43) . But upon closer r eview of

the cited testimony , it is clear that the c ited testimony does not ac tually

provide support for Plaintiff’s a ssertion. Indeed, in the c ited portion of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony , he testifies only

that: (1) he “ believe[s] [ he has] seen” the Dec ember 8, 2004 L etter, but doe s not know when e x actly

he sawor whe ther he rec eived it via U.S. mail or e- mail; (2) he r emember s15

se e ingthe Re le a se “ [a]t s ome tim e in t he re ,” at w hic h p oint he “ qu e sti on e d it and se nt i t to [his
c o un s e l i nC o l o r a d o ] ; an d ( 3 ) th ath e “ un d e r s t o o d

b e f o r e [ h e s a wth e R e l e a s e ] th atth e y [ i.e. , Che mon ic s] w e re pa

yingfo r i t [ i.e. , h is C OB RApr e imi ums ] . . . be c a us e Iwa s in

jur e d o n th e ir projec ts on the job.” See Def .’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n, Ex. 3 (L add’s De po.) at 142:4-144:21. Thus, at most, P laintiff’s testimony provides only

that he does not re member r ece iving the Re lease and that he under stood (on what basis he doe s not say ) that he did not nee d to do any thing in re turn for Chemonics’ promise to pay his COBRA pre miums. P laintiff did not testify , howeve r, that he w as aff irmatively

told by Chemonics that it would “continue pay ing his COB RA premiums beca use of his good se rvice and injuries,” a s Plainti ff c laims in his revised reply
. See Pl. ’s Re v. Op p’ n/R e ply at 4-5, ¶ 8. Moreove r, Chemonics has pr esente d aff irmative evide nce, unc ontradicte d by Plaintiff, de mon str atin gthat Pla int if f i n f a c t r e c e ive d B ittne r’ s D e c e mbe r 8 , 2 00 4 E -m a il o n th e same da y it was sent a

nd that Plaintiff immediately forwa rded the e-ma il to his counsel that ve ry same da y . See Ex . A to Bittner D ecl. ( Dec ember 8, 2004 E-Mail) ( showingit was forw arde d on Dec ember 8, 2004 from L add to his counsel). Sig nificantly , Chemonics also provides a copy of a le tter sent from Plaintiff’s Colorado c ounsel to Bittner, dated Dec ember 13, 2004, in which Plaintiff’s
co un s el af

fi rm at i v el y

s t at es : “R ec en t l y

[ L ad d ] h as p ro v i d edm e w i tha l et t er fr o my o uen cl o s i n g a rele ase f orm intended to settle his employ ment situation with C hemonics.” See Ex . C to Bittner Dec l. (Dec ember

13, 2004 L etter f

rom Plaintiff’s Colorado counse l to Bittner) at 2. Plainti ff’ s Colorado counse l further

continues by

expressly acknow ledg ing that Chemonics has conditioned pay ment of the COB RA premiums on Plainti ff’ s ag ree ment to relea se Chemonics fr om future liability , stating that “althoug h [L add] certa inly must have the COB RA benef its, we do not agreeAs fu rt he r s up po rt , Ch e mon ic s n ote s th at, o n Jan ua ry 10 , 2 00 5, in r e sp on se to a n e -m a il 8 fr om P la int if

f, it a g a in a dv ise d Pl a int if f t hat he ne e de d to sign a

nd re tur n th e Re le a se in o rd e r t o rec eive pa

y ments for his COBRA pr emiums. See De f. ’s Cr os s- MSJ/O pp ’n , E x. 12 (E -m a il c ha in betwee n Amanda Rig hi and L add date d Dec ember 21, 2004 and January

10, 2005) (a dvising Plaintiff that Chemonics “had r ece ived the information about COBRA,” but fur ther infor ming him that, “[i ]n order to beg in the 29 months of cover ag e by Chemonics, we ne ed to . . . settle the issue of the re lease statement. Onc e that is settled, we w ill being to cove r the c ost of COBRA.” ).
16 that he sh ou ld b e re qu ir e d to re le a se the c omp any fr om o the r l e g iti mate c la ims a s r e fe rr e d to above.” See id. at 2. The undisputed e vidence in the rec ord thus clea rly demonstrates that Plainti ff
rec eived a

copy of the Relea se and w as we ll awar e that Chemonics off ere d to pay

Plaintiff’s CO B RApr e miums i f, and on ly if , Pl a int if f a g re e d n ot t o s ue Che mon ic s. 8 C. Proc e du ra l H

istor y Plaintiff orig inally

filed his complaint ag ainst Chemonics on November 30, 2006 in the District Court for the County of El Paso, Colorado. See C o mp l
. , Do ck etNo
. [ 1 -4 ] at3 8
. Al th o u gh not drafte d pr o s e , Plaintiff’s complaint is by no means a

model of ar

tful pleading . The c omplaint on its face asser

ts only one cla im for re lief, but, upon closer revie w, appe ars to nonethe less set forth four distinct theories of re cover y . See ge nerally Docke t No. [1-4] at 5-7 (he reina fter

“ Com pl. ” ). F ir st, Pla int if

f’ s c omp la int

a lle g e s th at Ch e mon ic s w a s c ontr a c tua lly ob lig ate d to continue to pay

him his full s alar

y even a fter he was no long er a ble to work be cause of injuries sustained in the Octobe r 23, 2003 ac cident. See id. ¶¶ 4- 11. Second, Plaintiff’s complaint alleg es that Chemonics “also a g ree d to provide life insura nce be nefits and [] t o pay for the c ost of the premiums to cover

COBRA e ligibility

for a s long a s [P laintiff] was disabled up to 29 months from J anuar y 1, 2005.” Id. ¶ 1 2. Th ir d, Pla int if f’ s c omp la int

a lso a pp e ars to a lle g e that Pla int if f i s
e nti tle d to a dd iti on a l c omp e ns atio n a nd be ne fi ts und e r t

he DB A, c la imi ngthat, “ un de r t he De fe ns eAl tho ug h th e Court wo uld no rm a lly re qu ir e Pla int if

f t o f ile an a me nd e d c omp la int

to 9 c lari fy the pr e c ise c la ims so ug ht a nd the le g a l ba sis fo r s uc h c la ims , g ive n th e dis po sit ion of thi s c a se on the pa rt ie s’ c ro ss- mot ion s f

or summa ry jud g me nt, the fi lin gof

an ame nd e d c omp la int

is obviously unnece ssary . 17 Ba se Ac t, he was a lso to be paid compensation for par tial compensation for

loss of ear

nings, but has neve r re ceive d any

additional compensation for loss of ea rning s.” Id. ¶

9
. F o urthan d

f i n a l l y, Plaintiff appea

rs to asser t a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleg ing that “[t] he bre ache s of contra ct . . . on the par t of defe ndant have been de liberate and intentional and have c onstitut ed outra g eous conduc t causingplaintiff to also suffe r seve re e motional and mental distress as we ll as financia l hardship.” Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff’s instant motion for partial summary jud g me nt, a s is dis c us se d b e low , c on fi rm s th at he int e nd s to a sse rt mor e tha n o ne c la im a g a ins t Chemonics. Acc ording ly , the Court shall proce ed with the under standingthat Plaintiff asserts four
c la ims fo r r e lie f: (1 ) a

c la im f or br e a c h o f c ontr a c t ba se d u po n Ch e mon ic s’ a lle g e d f a ilure to continue to pay

his salary

afte r his October

23, 2003 injury ; (2) a c laim for bre ach of contra ct base d up on Che mon ic s’ a lle g e d f

a ilure to p ro vid e lif

e ins ur anc e be ne fi ts a

nd to p ay Pla int if f’ s CO B RA premiums; (3) a c laim that Plainti ff is owe d additional compensation and/or bene fits under the DB A; and

(4 ) a c la im f or int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss b a se d u po n Ch e mon ic s’ br e a c h o f c ontr a c t. 9 Chemonics subsequently

remove d the lawsuit to fede ral c ourt in the United States District Court for the District of

Colorado, and then f

iled an unopposed motion to transfe r the c ase to the United States District Court for the D istrict of Columbia. See ge nerally Do c ke t N o. [1]. T he c a se was tra nsfer red to this Court on J uly

26, 2007. See ge nerally Docke t No. [1]
. Shortly there afte r, on August 2, 2007, Chemonics filed its answer a nd counter claim. See18

Docke t No. [3] . Specifica lly , Chemonics asser ts a counter claim ag ainst Plainti ff f or bre ach of

the Contract’s f

orum selec tion clause, whic h provides that all disputes under the Contract must be broug ht in the Courts of the District of Columbia. See id. at 4-5. Chemonics ther efor e see ks $32,812.50 in liquidated damag es for Plaintiff’s alleg ed bre ach, a s provided for in the Contract. See id. On May

29, 2008, Plaintiff filed his motion for partial summary judgme nt. See P l
. ’ s M S J, Do c ke t N o. [27]. As e xpla ine d in his mot ion , Pl a int if

f m ov e s f or summa ry jud g me nt o nly

a s to his claim that Chemonics bre ache d its contractua l obligation to continue to pay Plaintiff his salary afte r his injury
. See id. at 1, 4-5. As to Plaintiff’s re maining c laims, Pl aintiff asse rts that summary judgme nt is not appropriate a s material que stions of disputed fact e x ist with respect to those issues. See id. at 1, 4- 5. On

June 27 , 2 00 8, Che mon ic s f ile d it s c ro ss- mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt ( bo th as to Plaintiff’s complaint and Chemonics’ c ounterc laim) and opposition to Pl aintiff’s pa rtial motion for summary

judgme nt. See Def

.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n, Doc ket No. [28] . Plaintiff therea fter filed his opposition/ reply , see P l
. ’ s O p p ’ n/ R e p l y, D o c k e tN o . [ 3 2 ] , an d C h e m o n i c s f

i l e d i t s r e p l y,
see Def .’s Reply , Docke t No. [34] . As discussed above , Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for leave to file a stateme nt of materia l fac ts in support of his cross-motion and a stateme nt responding to Chemonics’ statement of material fa cts in support of its cross-motion, see D o c k e t N o . [2 5 ], which the Court g rante d-in-par t and denied- in-part, see Docke t No. [37] . Specifica lly , the Court str uc k Pl a int if

f’ s o pp os iti on/r e ply , D oc ke t N o. [32], and re qu ir e d Pl a int if

f t o f ile a re sp on se to Chemonics’ statement of

materia l fac ts, alongwith a re vised opposition/reply , which Plaintiff subsequently

filed on September

11, 2008, seePl.’s Rev. Opp’n/Reply , Docke t No. [38] . As permitted by

this Court’s order, Chemonics then f iled a re vised reply

in support of its moti on for19

summary judgme nt. See Def

.’s Rev. Reply , Docke t No. [40] . Acc ording ly , briefingis now complete a

nd the par ties’ cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt are ripe for

the Court’s re view and resolution. II. LEGAL STANDARDS In th is c a se the Court

is p re se nte d w ithc ro ss m oti on s f or summa ry jud g me nt. A p art

y is
e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt i f t

he ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, and a ff ida vit s d e mon str ate that th e re is
no g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t in dis pute and

that th e mov ingpa

rt y is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matter of la

w. SeeF ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c) ; Tao v. Freeh , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the movingparty “bea rs the initial responsibility of informingthe dis tr ic t c ourt

of the ba sis fo r i ts m oti on , a nd ide nti fy ingtho se po rt ion s o f ‘ the ple a din g s, d e p o s i t i o n s , an s w e r s t o i n t e r r o g at o r i e s , an d

a dm i s s i o n s o nf

i l e , t o g e th e r

w i thth e a f

f i d av i t s , i f an y’ which it believes de monstrate the a bsence of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t.” Celotex Corp. v. Cat re tt , 4 7 7 U. S
. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1 9 8 6 ). Inre s p o n s e, th e o p p o s i n g p arty mu s t“go b ey o n d

th e p l ea d i n gs and by [i ts] own af

fidavits, or by

the ‘de positions, answers to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file,’ de signate ‘spec ific fa cts showingthat there is a g enuine issue f or trial.’” Id. at 324. Although a

court should dra

w all infer ence s from the supportingrec ords submitted by the nonmoving pa

rty , the mere exis tence of a f actua l dispute, by

itself, is not sufficient to bar summar y judgme nt. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). To be materia l, the fac tual asser

tion mustbe ca

pable of aff ectingthe substantive outcome of the litigation; to be g enuine, the issue must be suppor ted by sufficie nt admissible evidence that a re asonable trier- offac t could find for the nonmoving pa rty . Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 8 13 F .2 d 1 23 6, 12 42 -4 3 ( D. C. Cir . 1 98 7) ; Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251-52 (the c ourt must determine “ whether the evidenc e20

prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w”) . “I f the e vidence is merely colora ble, or is not sufficie ntly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (interna l citations omit ted). “ Mere alleg ations or denials of the adver se par ty ’s pleadingare not enoug h to preve nt the issuance of summary judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Call aghan , 938 F. Supp. 46, 49 (D .D .C. 19 96 ). Th e a dv e rs e pa rt y “ mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly sh owthat th e re is s ome metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, while the movant bear s the initial responsibilit y of identifying those portions of the re cord that demonstrate the a bsence of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t, the burd e n s hif

ts t o th e no n- mov ant t o “ c ome fo rw ard wi th ‘ sp e c if

ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a genuine issue for trial .’” Id. at5 8 7 (c i t i n g F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(e) ) (e mphasis in origina l). III . LEGAL DI SCU SSIO N A. Plain tif

f’ s B re ac h o

f Co ntrac t Cla im Al le

ging th at C

he mo nic s F aile d to Con tin ueto Pay Plaintiff’s Salary After his October 23, 2003 Acc ident As e xpla ine d a

bo ve , Pl a int if

f’ s c omp la int

a lle g e s th at Ch e mon ic s c ontr a c tua lly a g re e d to pay Plaintiff his full salary , even if Plaintiff was injured a

nd no longe r able to work, and that Chemonics’ fa ilure to pay Plaintiff his full salary

afte r his October

23, 2003 injury

was a brea ch of the par ties’ Contract. Compl. ¶¶ 4-11. Che monics responds that Plaintiff’s cla im mustfail for three rea sons. First, Chemonics ar gues that Plaintiff’s bre ach of contra ct claim is barr ed by the exclusive remedy

provision of the DB A. See Def .’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 10-14. Sec ond, Chemonics contends that e ven if Plaintiff’s bre ach of contra ct claim is not barr ed by the DB A, Chemonics is stil l entitled to summ ary judgme nt beca

use it did not contractua lly ag ree to pay21

Plaintiff his salary

even if he could not wor

k and ther efor e did not brea ch the pa rties’ Contrac t. Id. at 14. Fina lly , Chemonics argues that eve n if the Contrac t could be interpr eted a s requiring Chemonics to continue to pay Plaintiff his salary

afte r he w as no long er a

ble to work, a

ny such ag ree ment is void for lack of consideration. Id. at 15-16. The Court shall ex amine ea ch of Chemonics’ ar guments in turn. First, Chemonics asse rts that Plaintiff’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim is barre d by the exclusive
reme dy provision of the DB A. See Def .’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 10-14. T he DB A provides that the provisions of the L ong hshore a nd Har bor Workers’ Compensation Act (“ L HWCA”), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq ., apply

with respec t to any

injury or death of an e mploy ee who is employ ed, inte r a lia , “under a contr act a

pproved a nd financ ed by

the United States . . . or a g ency there of . . . or a

ny subcontrac t or subordinate c ontrac t with respec t to such contrac t, where such contra ct is to be pe rf or me d o uts ide the c ontin e nta l U nit e d St ate s . . . .” 42 U. S.C. § 1 65 1( a )( 5) ; see also Ross v. Dy nCo rp , 3 62 F . Su

pp . 2 d 3 44 , 3 51 -5 2 ( D. D. C. 2 00 5) . T he DB A a lso pr ov ide s th at “ [t]he lia bil ity of an e mploy er . . . unde r this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employ er . . . unde r the wor kmen’s compe nsation law of a ny State, Terr itory , or other jur isdiction . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1651(c) . Acc ording ly , “[f]or any contra ct cove red by

the DB A that ‘is to be pe rf or me d o uts ide the c ontin e nta l U nit e d St ate s, ’ t he re le va nt w or ke rs ’ c omp e ns atio n s c he me made a pplicable to cla ims related to the injury or death of an e mploy ee of the contra ctor is the [L HWCA] , which also e x pressly excludes all other for

ms of reme dial action ag ainst the contra ctor.” Ro ss , 3 62 F . Su pp . 2 d at 35 2; see also 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (providingthat “liability of an employer pr escr ibed [under the L HWCA] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employ er to the e mploy ee . . . a nd anyone other

wise entitled to rec over da mag es fr om such22

e mpl oye r at la

w . . . on a c c ount o f [a

n e mpl oye e ’s ] inj ur

y or de ath” ). Thus , if

the DB A i s applicable , “it nece ssarily displaces a ll derivative c ommon-law ca uses of a ction based on the injury or death of a c overe d employ ee c aused by employ er ne g lige nce, inc luding wr ong ful death and survivorship actions.” Ro ss , 362 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (f inding that DB A bar

red pla intiff’s neg lige nce- based c laims). Th e re is n o d isp ute that th e DB A a pp lie s in thi s c a se , th at Ch e mon ic s o bta ine d w or ke rs ’ compensation insurance f or Plaintiff under the DB A, and that Plaintiff has in fa ct re ceive d (and continues to rec eive) benef its pursuant to the DBA . Def .’s Stmt. ¶¶ 5 , 2 6- 28 ; see also Pl.’s MS J at 4. The only

question at issue is whether the DB A pre cludes Plaintiff’s bre ach of contra ct claim. Che mon ic s a sse rt s th at th e DB A’ s e xclu siv e re me dy pr ov isi on

sh ou ld b e br oa dly

int e rp re te d to prec lude a law suit by

an injured e mploy ee a g ainst his or her e mploy er that arises out of the w orkrelated injury , even where , as her e, Plaintiff cha rac terizes his claim as base d in contrac t. Def.’ s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 12-13. T hat is, Chemonics argues that Plaintiff’s cla im, although pa ckag ed as a bre ach of

contra ct claim, is rea lly

seekingto rec over e arning s he lost betwee n October 23, 2003
and De c e mbe r 2 3, 20 04 be c a us e of the wo rk -r e late d in

jur ie s h e su sta ine d in

the a uto mob ile
acc ident in Iraq. See id. Acc ording ly , Chemonics contends that Plaintiff’s c laim is barre d by the exclusive remedy

provision of the DB A. Id. Plaintiff responds that the DB A should not be interpre ted to prec lude contra ct-ba sed cla ims brought by an injured e mploy ee a g ainst his employ er. SeePl.’s Rev. Opp’n/Reply at 6-12. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the que stion does not appear to be as c lear

cut as Chemonics urg es. Indeed, Che monics has not direc ted the Court to any decision direc tly

holding that the DB A (or the L HWCA) prec ludes an injured e mploy ee f rom bring ing a

brea ch of c ontrac tIndeed, Plaintiff pr ovides only one leg al citation in support of his argument that the 10 DB A should not be rea d to prec lude his contrac t-based c laims. See Pl.’s Rev. Opp’n/Reply at 1 1 -1 2 (c i t i n g Gary Foster v . Subsea Int’l, Inc

. 101 F. Supp. 2d 454 (E.D. L a. 1998)) . As Chemonics notes, howeve r, Foster involved an ac tion for indemnity —not an ac tion by

an injured employ ee a g ainst his or her e mploy er f or bre ach of

contra ct. See Def

.’s Rev. Opp’n at 7, n. 5. The Court is there fore not persuade d the ca se is rele vant to the matter at hand, par ticularly g iven Plaintiff’s failure to provide any detailed e x planation of the de cision’s rele vance to the case at hand. 23 claim, as opposed to a

tort-base d claim, ag ainst his or her e mploy er. See Def .’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n
at 10 -1 4. Pla int if

f f or his pa rt , h ow e ve r, pr ov ide s li ttl e a ssi sta nc e to t he Court in r e so lvi ngthi s iss ue , p os iti ngon ly

that “ we do ub t th at su c h a n is su e ha s e ve r b e e n b ro ught b e fo re the Ap pe llate Courts.” See Pl. ’s Re v. Op p’ n/R e ply at 8. I t is Pla int if

f’ s b ur de n, ho we ve r, and

no t th is C ourt ’s ,to provide leg al authority

in support of his claim—and his own per sonal musings on whe ther such
case law is likely

to exi st are of

no assistance to this C ourt. Plaintiff’s failure to provide a more 10 thoroug h and we ll-supported ana ly sis of the issue thus hinders the Court’s ability to resolve what appea rs to be a nove l question of law. Ultimately , howeve r, the Court conc ludes that it need not resolve this issue, bec ause Plaintiff’s c laim—even if not ba rre d by the DB A—is wholly

without merit. Acc ording ly , g iven that Plaintiff has no cla im for bre ach of contra ct, the Court shall g rant Chemonics summary

judgme nt on that basis, and shall not attempt to resolve the que stion of the scope of the DB A’s exclusivity

provision on the rec ord now be fore it. The Court turns then to Chemonics’ se cond ar gument that it did not, i n fac t, brea ch the parties’ Contract. De f.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 14. Spec ifically , Chemonics argues that it did not
c ontr a c tua lly

a g re e to p ay

Pla int if f h is s a lary

e ve n if he c ou ld n ot w or

k a nd , th e re fo re , it s f

a ilure to do so is not a brea ch of the parties’ Contract. Id. at 14. The Court a g ree s. The District of C o l umb i a a dh er es t o an “o b j ec t i v e” l aw o f c o n tra ct s , m ea n i n g th at“‘ th e w ri t t en l an gu ageAl tho ug h th e pa rt ie s d o n ot s pe c if

ic a lly a dd re ss t he iss ue , th e Court

is p e rs ua de d th at it 11 sh ou ld a pp ly Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

law i n inte rp re tin gthe pa rt ie s’ Contr a c t. T he Contr a c t it se lf contains an e x plicit choice of law provision, which pr ovides that “[t] his ag ree ment shall be interpre ted and c onstrued under and in ac corda

nce w ith the laws of the District of Columbi a.” Contract, § XI I . Plaintiff has not challeng ed application of this provision nor asserted that a ny other state la

w is releva

nt to resolution of this case. See ge nerally Pl.’s MS J ; Pl.’s R ev. Opp’n/Reply . Fur

ther, “ District of Columbia courts g ive ef fec t to contrac tual choice of laws provisions ‘as longas there is some rea sonable re lationship with t he state spe cified.’ ” Elemary v

. Philipp Holzmann A.G. , 5 3 3 F. S u p p . 2 d 1 4 4 , 1 5 3 -5 4 n . 3 (2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Nor ris v . No rri

s , 419 A.2d 982, 984 (D.C. 1980)) . Her e, Chemonics has its principa l place of business in the District of Columbia. See Docke t No. [1-4] at 38. Acc ording ly , the Court shall apply the District of Col umb ia ’s ru le s o f c ontr a c t inte rp re tatio n in re so lvi ngthe iss ue s r a ise d in the pa rt ie s’ c ro ssmot ion s. 24 embodying the terms of a n ag ree ment will gove rn the rights and liabiliti es of the pa rties [reg ardle ss] of the intent of the pa rties at the time they

enter ed into the contra ct, unless the wr itten languag e is not susceptible of a clea r and de finite undertaking, or unless there is fraud, dur ess, or mutual mist ake.’ ” Till ery v . District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd. , 912 A.2d 1169, 1176 (D
. C
. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g DSP VentureGroup, Ins. v. Allen , 830 A.2d 850, 852 (D.C. 2003))
. 11 “Ambiguities ex ist only

if the term is ‘r easona

bly susceptible of diff

ere nt constructions or interpre tations,’” and “ [i ]tis not enoug h that the par ties disag ree about the ter m’s meaning .” Nationw ide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l REO M gmt., Inc. , 205 F.R.D. 1, 12 (D .D.C. 2000) (quoting Cameron v. USAA Property and Cas. Ins. Co. , 7 33 A. 2d 96 5, 96 8 ( D. C. 1 99 9) ); see also Mittal Steel USA I

SG, Inc . v. Bodman , 435 F. Supp. 2d 106, 109 (D.D .C. 2006) (“Acontra ct is ambig uous wh en i ti s ‘r ea s o n ab l y

s u s ce p t i b l e o f d i ff

er en tco n s tru ct i o n s o r i n t er p re t at i o n s . ’” ) ( qu o t i n g 1901 W yoming Av e. Coop. Assoc. v. Lee , 345 A.2d 456, 461 n. 7 (D.C. 1975))
. Section VI

of the pa rties’ Contrac t provides the ter ms of Plaintiff’s salary , and provide s as fo llo ws :25

The ba se salar

y for t h e em p l o y ee f

or the fir st y ear

of the proje ct work ha s been pr op os e d at U S $1 31 ,2 50 pe r ye ar, or a mo nt hly

rate of US $ 10 ,9 37 .5 0. Sa lary

is pe nd inga

pp ro va l by

RTI /U SAI D. Annu a l sa lary

inc re a se s ma

y be g ra nte d in acco rd an ce with Chemonics’ customary policy and ar e subjec t to the approva l of USA I D. Ne ith e r t

he rate no r amou

nt of sa lary inc re a se is gua ra nte e d un de r the te rm s of this ag ree ment. Salary

incre ases are also subject t o company guidelines, individual pe rf or manc e , a nd c lie nt a pp ro va ls. Contr a c t, § I V. Whe re , a s h e re , “ the [] co ntr a c t do e s n ot d e fi ne sa lary , [but] th e re is n oth ingto ind ic ate that it

is w a s u se d in

any sp e c ia l c onte xt,” c ourt s r outin e ly int e rp re t th e wo rd

a s it commonly

understood. McI

ntosh v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. , 268 A.2d 518, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Acc ording ly , in interpretingthe term “ salary” in a c ontrac t, courts consistently rely upon the common definition of the ter m. See, e .g., id. (r e fe rr ingto t he de fi nit ion

of “ sa lary” a s se t f

or th i n Webster’s Third Ne w International Dictionary and in B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary in interpretingthe te rm a s u se d in

a c ontr a c t) ; Nob lev . S

om brotto , 5 25 F .3 d 1 23 0, 12 49 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 8) (r e fe rr ingto the def inition of “salary” in Webster’s Third N ew International Dictionary and in the Oxford En g lis h D ic tio na

ry in i nte rp re tin gthe te rm ’s me anin gin a c ontr a c t) ; cf Crandon v. United States , 494 U.S. 152, 171-72 (1990) ( relying upon the definition of the ter m “salar y” in Webster’s Sec ond International Dictionary

to interpret statutory

languag e). A s these cour ts have e ach r ecognized, “sala ry” is commonly

define d as “f

ix ed compe nsation paid regularly (as by the y ear , quarte r, month, or wee k) for service s .” Web ste r’ s T hir d Inte rn atio na l D ic tio na ry 20 03 (1 96 9) (e mph a sis
a dd e d) ; see also Oxford Eng lish Dictionary (1989 2d Ed.) ( defining“sala ry” as “ [f] ix ed pay

ment
ma de pe ri od ic a lly

to a pe rs on a s c omp e ns atio n f

or re gula r w or k” ). Th e Contr a c t’ s la

ngua g e its e lf confirms that the te rm was intende d to be used a s it is commonl y understood, as the Contract pr ov ide s f

or a ba se sa lary

fo r t he “ fi rs t y e ar o f t

he pr oje c t wor

k .” Contrac t, § I V (e mphasis added)
. I t is therefor e cle ar that the parties’ ag ree d that Chemonics would pay Plaintiff a salar

y as that term26

is commonly

understood— i.e. , in exchang e for service s rende red. Nothing in this provision even sug g ests that Chemonics ag ree d to continue to pay Plaintiff his salary

even if Plaintiff perfor

med no work for

Chemonics. Indeed, Plaintiff implicitly acknow ledg es as much, a s he re lies primarily —not on section VI of the Contrac t, which dea ls squarely with Plainti ff’ s salary

terms—but on section VI I , see Pl.’s MSJ at 5- 7, wh ic h a dd

re sse s Ch e mon ic s’ te rm inatio n p ro c e dure s a nd pr ov ide s th at: Employ ment may be ter minated at any time by Chemonics or by the employ ee f

or any rea son. Should t he e m p l o y ee b e ter minated for misconduc t, dere liction of duty , or gro s s fa i l ure t o p er fo rm s at i s fa ct o ri l y , o r s h o u l d th e e m p l o y ee v o l un t ar i l y re s i gn wi tho ut o bta ini ngpr ior

wr itt e n c on se nt o f C he mon ic s’ ho me of fi c e , Che mon ic s w ill not be liable for

salary or re lated costs beyond t h e date of employ ment termination. Whe n te r mi n ate d f o r r e a s o n s li s te d h e r e in [s e c ti o n ] V I I , th e e mp lo y e e s h a ll a ls o be liable for any reloc ation costs not a llowable for U.S. g overnme nt r eimbursem en t , as stated in [section] VI I I .5 of this ag ree ment. Contract, § VI I . Plaintiff focuses on the second se ntence of the pa ragraph in pa

rticular, which provides that “Che monics will not be liable for sala ry or re lated costs beyond the date of
e mpl oy me nt t e rm inatio n” in c e rt a in s itu atio ns wh e re the e mpl oye e is t e rm inate d f or mis c on du c t, etc. Id. Be cause Plaintiff was not eff ectively terminated— i.e. , officia lly remove d from Chemonics’ employ

ment roll—until Decembe r 23, 2004, see Def .’s Stmt. ¶ 13, P laintiff ar gues that the hig hlighted la

nguag e in sec tion VI Iprovides that “de fenda nt is clearly

liable for at least the admitted salary

due to the plaintiff f

rom Novembe r 2003 throug h Dec ember 2004.” Pl.’s MSJ at 6. Essentially , Plaintiff argues that, (a ) bec ause Chemonics e x plicitly states that, in cer

tain instances wh e re an e mpl oye e is t e rm inate d f or mis c on du c t, e tc ., it i s not liable for sa lary

or other r elated
c os ts that are inc ur

re d a ft e r t he date of te rm inatio n, the n ( b) Che mon ic s h a s a lso “ c le arl y” a g re e d to be liable f

or the sala

ry of all of its employ ees—r eg ardle ss of whethe r or not they actua lly perf ormAs su pp or t f or thi s argume nt, Pla int if

f a lso a pp e ars to r e ly

on se c tio n V Iof

the Contr a c t, 12 which provide s that an “e mploy ee sha ll be considere d an employee at will for the duration of employ ment cover ed under

this ag ree ment.” See Pl. ’s MSJ at 5- 6; see also Pl.’s Rev. Opp’n/Reply

at 10. Plaintiff argues that this section supports his contention that he re mained an e mpl oye e of

Che mon ic s unti l he wa s o ff ic ia lly te rm inate d in

De c e mbe r o f 2 00 4. Th at po int , howeve r, is not in disput e, nor doe s Plainti ff’ s employ ment status shed light on whe ther the qu e sti on at is su e —whe the r h e wa s e nti tle d to sa lary duri ng that ti me pe ri od , e ve n th ou g h h e did no perf orm any work. To the c ontrary , the fa ct that Plaintiff was “ an at- will employ ee w ith no leg itimate expectation of continued e mploy ment,” Ha ll v . F

or d , 856 F.2d 255, 265- 66 (D.C. Cir. 19 88 ), wo uld

se e m to we ig h a g a ins t Pla int if f’ s a rgume nt t hat he is e nti tle d to sa lary , r e g ard le ss of wh e the r h e pe rf

or me d a ny wo rk fo r C he mon ic s.

27 any work—until they

are officia lly

terminated a

nd remove d from Chemonics’ e mploy ment roll. Plaintiff’s argument not only contra dicts the plain meaningof the Contrac t’s salary provisions and the re le va nt c a se law, but it

is, in a wo rd , n on se ns ic a l. 12 Plaintiff’s other a

rguments are equally

without merit. For e x ample, Plaintiff ar gues at leng th that an employ er “ might” c ontrac t with an employ ee to c ontinue to pay that employ ee his or her sa lary in the event the e mploy ee is injured. See Pl. ’s Re v. Re ply at 8. I t is e nti re ly

ir re le va nt, howeve r, what ty

pe of c ontrac t the parties “ might” ha ve ente red into, as the c ontrac t they signe d do e s n ot p ro vid e that Ch e mon ic s w ill c ontin ue to p ay Pla int if f h is s a lary

e ve n if he is una ble to work. Similarly , Plaintiff aver s, without citation to any leg al authority , that profe ssional athletes routinely enter into ag ree ments of this ty pe, in which their

employ er a g ree s to continue to pay the athlete his or he r full salar y even if the athlete is injured. See id. Rathe r t ha n p ro ve his po int , th is analogy in fac t demonstrates the e rror of Plaintiff’s re asoning

—beca use in those instance s, the profe ssional athlete’s c ontrac t contains expli cit languag e bindingthe employ er to pa y the athlete’ s salary even if injured. Se e, e .g., Lin c oln Ho c k e yLLC v . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 810 A.2d 862, 864 (D.C. 2002) (notingthat the player’ s contrac t specifica lly contained la

nguag e that “[a] play er unde r
c ontr a c t w ho is d isa

ble d a nd un a ble to p e rf

or m hi s d uti e s a s a ho c ke y pla y e r . . . sh a ll b e e nti tle d toHa vin gre a c he d th e c on c lus ion that th e pa

rt ie s’ Contr a c t di d n ot o bli g ate Che mon ic s to 13 continue to pay

Plaintiff his salary

even a fter he was no long er a ble to perf

orm any work, the Court need not addr ess Def endant’ s third argument in the alternative—that even if the Contract could be inter

prete d as re quiringChemonics to continue to pay Plaintiff his salary

afte r he w as no lon g e r a ble to w or

k, any su c h a g re e me nt i s v oid

fo r l a c k o f c on sid e ra

tio n. De f. ’s Cr os sMSJ /Opp’n at 15-16. 28 re c e ive his re ma ini ngsa lary du e in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he te rm s o f h is c ontr a c t a s lo nga s th e sa id dis a bil ity and ina bil ity to p e rf or m c ontin ue ” ); see also Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc. , 528 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (D.D.C. 1981) ( citing e x cer pt of play er’ s contrac t that provides that “[i] n the eve nt that Play er is injured in the pe rfor mance of his service s under this contra ct, . . . the Club will . . .
c ontin ue , d ur ingthe te rm

of thi s c ontr a c t, t o p ay

Pla y e r h is s a lary” ). Suc h la

ngua g e is c le arl y absent in the Contrac t at hand. F inally , Plaintiff argues that the Contrac t should be interpre ted ag ainst Chemonics, who, Plaintiff argues, wa s solely responsible for

draf ting the a g ree ment. See Pl.’s Rev. Opp’n/Reply

at 11. This principle, howe ver, a pplies only

when a contra ct is ambig uous. See Came ron , 733 A.2d at 968. As the Court ha s alrea dy found that the Contrac t is not ambiguous
as a matter of law , the plain languag e of the Contract g overns, r eg ardle ss of who dra fted the Contract. Plaintiff’s brea ch of c ontrac t claim there fore fails. The pla in languag e of the Contract p r o v i d e s th atC h e m o n i c s a g r e e d t o p ay P l a i n t i f

f a s a l ar y i ne x c h an g e f

o r h i s s e r v i c e s . A c c o r d i n g l y, once Plaintiff wa s no longe r able to perfor m those service s, Chemonics was under no contra ctual obligation to continue to pay Plaintiff a salar

y , and the Court ther efor e finds in favor of Chemonics. The Court thus g rants Chemonics’ motion for summar y and denie s Plainti ff’ s 13 pa rt ia l mo tio n f

or summa ry jud g me nt, wi th r e sp e c t to Pla int if f’ s c la im t

hat Ch e mon ic s’ fa ilure to pay his salary

afte r the date of his injury was a brea ch of the parties’ Contract.29

B. Plaintif

f’s Claim that

Chemonics Agree d to Provide Plaintiff w ith Li fe Insurance Bene fits and t o Pay for the Cost of his C OBRA Pre miums Pla int if f n e xt al le g e s th at Ch e mon ic s “ a g re e d to pr ov ide lif e ins ur anc e be ne fi ts a

nd [] to pay for the c ost of the pre miums t o cover COBRA e ligibility

for a s long a s [P laintiff] was disabled up to 29 months from J anuar y 1, 2005.” Id. ¶ 12. Chemonics counte rs that it never offe red to pa

y Pla int if f’ s li fe ins ur anc e be ne fi ts a nd that, a lth ou g h it

did of fe r t o p ay Pla int if f’ s CO B RA pr e miums, that of

fe r w a s c ontin g e nt u

po n Pl a int if

f’ s si g natur e on

the Re le a se . D e f. ’s Cr os sMSJ /Opp’n at 16-18. A s Plainti ff did not sig n the Relea se, Chemonics wa s not obligate d to pay Plaintiff’s COBRA pre miums. See id. The Court agree s with Chemonics on both counts. F ir st, Pla int if

f’ s c la im that Ch e mon ic s a g re e d to pr ov ide Pla int if f w ithlif e ins ur anc e is wholly without merit. I ndeed, Plaintiff ha s failed to show that Chemonics e ven off ere d to provide Plaintiff with life insurance benef its, let alone that a bindingcontra ct supported by consideration
e xists . Und e r D istri c t of

Col umb ia

law, “ the pa

rt y se e kin gto e nf

or c e a c ontr a c t mu st p ro ve that a contra ct exist s by

demonstrating : ‘(1) a g ree ment as to all materia l terms; and (2) intention of the parties to be bound.’ ” New Economy Capital , LLC v. New Marke ts Capit al Group , 881 A.2d 1 0 8 7 , 1 0 9 4 (D
. C
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Jack Bauer, Inc . v. Office Spac e De v. Corp. , 664 A.2d 1236, 12 38 (D .C. 19 85 )) . H e re , Pl a int if f h a s f a ile d to pr of

fe r a ny e vid e nc e that Ch e mon ic s o ff e re d to provide Plaintiff with life insuranc e bene fits, much less that there was “ ag ree ment as to all materia l te rm s. ” As Che mon ic s n ote s in its c ro ss- mot ion

fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a

nd op po sit ion , th e on ly
re fe re nc e to l if

e ins ur anc e in a

ny of the c omm

un ic atio ns in t

he re c or d n owbe fo re the Court is f o un d i nth e D e c e mb e r

8 , 2 0 0 4 Le t t e r

f r o mB i t tn e r

t o P l a i n t i f

f
. D e f
. ’ s C r o s s - M S J / O p p ’ nat1 8
. In that letter, howe ver, B ittner mere ly informs Plaintiff that, if he wished, his “c ompany paid life30

ins ur anc e may

be c onve rt e d to ind ivi du a l po lic ie s” and that Pla int if

f s ho uld c onta c t Ch e mon ic s if he wa s interested in doingso. Dec ember 8, 2004 L etter at 1-2. This is plainly not an offe r by Chemonics to provide life insura nce be nefits to Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff a ppare ntly conce des as much, g iven that he f

ails to address these arguments in his revised opposition/reply
. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl. ’s Re v. Op p’ n/R e ply ; see also Franklin v. P otter , _ _ F
. 2 d _ _ _ , Ci v . A c t. N o . 0 7
- 1 2 0 5 , 2 0 0 9 Wl 533071, *13 (D.D.C. Mar . 24, 2009) (tre atingdefe ndant’s ar gument in motion for summary jud g me nt a s c on c e de d whe re pla int if f f a ile d to a dd

re ss i n h is r e sp on se ); Hopkins v. W omen’ s Div., Gene ral Bd. of Global Minist ries, 28 4 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 5, 25 (D .D .C. 20 03 ) ( “ I t is we ll und e rs too d in thi s Ci rc uit

that w he n a

pla int if f f ile s an o pp os iti on

to a dis po sit ive mot ion

and a dd re sse s o nly
cer tain arguments raised by

the def endant, a court may

treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to a ddress a s conce ded.”) , aff’d 98 Fe d. Appx. 8 (D.C. C ir. 2004). Reg ardle ss, Plainti ff’ s argument is wholly

without merit, and the Court finds in favor of Chemonics that there is no contra ctual agree ment betwee n the par ties that Chemonics would provide Plaintiff with life insurance benef

its. Se c on d, Pla int if

f’ s a lle g atio n th at Ch e mon ic s a g re e d to pa y fo r t he c os t of his CO B RA premiums, reg ardle ss of whethe r he sig ned the Rele ase or not, is equally

without merit. The evidenc e in the re cord e stablishes that Chemonics offe red to pa y Plaintiff’s COBRA pre miums i f, and only if, he sig ned the Rele ase. A s expl ained a bove, B ittner first ra ised the issue of the COBRA pre miums i n his November 23, 2004 te lephone c onversation with P laintiff, in which he informed Plaintiff that Chemonics would pay Plaintiff’s COBRA pre miums i f Plaintiff agree d not to s ue Che mon ic s. De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 32 ; se e als o B ittne r D e c l. ¶ ¶ 1 4- 15 , 1 7. B ittne r s ub se qu e ntl y provided Plaintiff a c opy

of the Relea se, attac hing it both to the Dec ember 8, 2004 L etter a

nd31

se nd ingit v ia

e -m a il t o Pl a int if

f t hat sa me da y . D e f. ’s Stmt . ¶

¶ 3 2, 37 ; see also Dec ember 8, 2004 L etter; De cembe r 8, 2004 E-ma il. The Release clea rly provided that Chemonics’ of fer was conting ent upon Plaintiff’s sig ning the Release : “I f you sign a nd do not revoke this ag ree ment, y ou will rece ive twenty -nine months of COB RA cover ag e beg inning January 1, 2005.” See Dec ember 8, 2004 L etter; De cembe r 8, 2004 E-ma il. Pl aintiff does not a lleg e, nor is ther e any evidenc e in the
rec ord, that he a cce pted Chemonics’ off er a nd signe d the Relea se. Ac cording ly , as Plaintiff did not
acc ept Chemonics’ off

er, no bindingcontra ct exist s. See Ne w Economy Capital , 881 A.2d at 1094. Pla int if f’ s uns up po rt e d a sse rt ion to t he c ontr ary

—th at Ch e mon ic s o ff

e re d to pa y fo r h is COBRA pre miums si mply beca use of his injury

and that he w as neve r told that he had to sig n the Release in order to r ece ive the COB RA benef its, see Pl. ’s Re v O pp ’n

/Re ply at 4- 5, ¶ 8 —is fl atly contra dicted by

the evidenc e in the re cord. I ndeed, written statements by Plaintiff’s counsel
c on fi rm that bo th P la int if

f a nd his c ouns e l r e c e ive d th e Re le a se and we re awa

re that Ch e mon ic s’ offe r to pay

Plaintiff’s COBRA pa

y ments was conting ent upon Plaintiff’s agree ment not to sue Chemonics. See supra pp. 12-15. Plaintiff’s counse l acknowle dg ed in his Dec ember 13, 2004 letter to B ittner that Plaintiff had provided him with “a letter fr om y ou enclosinga re lease form intended to settle his employ ment situation.” See Dec ember 13, 2004 L etter. A lthough Plaintiff’s counsel ultimately

reje cted Chemonics’ offe r, he c lear ly acknow ledg ed that the of fer was
c ontin g e nt u

po n Pl a int if

f’ s a g re e ingno t to su e Che mon ic s, statin gthat, “ a lth ou g h [L a dd ] ce rt a inl y must have the COB RA benef its, we do not ag ree that he should be re quired to re lease the company from other

leg itimate claims as re fer red to a bove.” See id. at 2. Thus, the re cord e vidence establishes that Chemonics off ere d to pay

for Plaintiff’s COB RA premiums if, and only if, Plaintiff ag ree d not to sue Chemonics, and that Plaintiff and his counse l were well awa re of the substance of32

Chemonics’ off

er. F or Plaintiff to now sug g est otherwise is disingenuous a nd wholly unsupported by the evidenc e in the re cord. Moreove r, any

attempt to avoid this conclusion by focusingsolely

on the Dec ember

8, 2004 L etter is unava iling. Admittedly , the Dec ember 8, 2004 L etter doe s not specifica lly ref ere nce the
atta c he d Re le a se . B ut e ve n a ssumin gthat th e le tte r c ou ld b e re a d in iso latio n f

ro m th e Re le a se itself and the pa

rties’ va rious other c ommunications confirmingthat the offe r wa s conting ent upon Pla int if f’ s a g re e me nt n ot t o s ue Che mon ic s, the le tte r i tse lf c onta ins on ly

a g ra tui tou s p ro mis e to pay Plaintiff’s COBRA be nefits—that is, a promise that is not supported by consideration. The
re c or d c on fi rm s th at Pla int if f t e nd e re d n oth ingin r e tur n f or Che mon ic s’ a lle g e d p ro mis e to p ay his CO B RApr e miums, and

Pla int if f h ims e lf c on c e de d in

his de po sit ion

that, e ve n a c c e pti nghis
un su pp or te d v ie w o f e ve nts , h e “ did no t ha ve to d o a ny thi ngfo r [Ch e mon ic s]” in r e tur n f or the ir promise to pay

his COBRA pre miums. See Def .’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n, Ex. 3 (L add De p.) at 144:22- 145:2. Thus, “[t] here is no evidence prese nted that plaintiff off ere d to perfor

m or forbe ar f

rom any action that would constitute suffic ient consideration. A mere pr omise to pay unsupported by consideration is an unenforc eable g ratuitous promise under District of Columbia law.” Haney v. Ma rri ott , C i v . Ac t . No
. 0 5 -2 5 0 1 , 2 0 0 7 W L2 9 3 6 0 8 7 , * 9 (D
. D. C
. Oc t . 9 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Zoob v. Jordan , 8 41 A. 2d

76 1, 76 5 ( D. C. 2 00 4) (“ [A] me re pr omi se to m ake a g if t is un e nf or c e a ble .” )) ; see also Goozh v. Capitol Souvenir Co., Inc. , 462 A.2d 1140, 1142 n. 3 (D.C. 1983) ( “The ref ore, unde r contra ct law, to cr eate a valid settlement a g ree ment, there must be an off er a nd an ac cepta

nce a nd the agree ment must be supported by consideration.”). Plaintiff appa rently conce des this point, as he has ma de no attempt to addr ess this argument in his revised opposition/reply
. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl. ’s Re v. Op p’ n/R e ply ; se e als o F ra nk lin , 2 00 9 Wl 5 33 07 1, *1 3; Hopkins , 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25.33

The Court there fore finds in favor of Chemonics, and ac cording ly , g rants Chemonics’ motion for summary with respec t to Pl aintiff’s a lleg ation that Chemonics brea ched a n ag ree ment to provide Plaintiff with life insurance benef its or to pay

his COBRA pre miums. C
. Plaintif

f’s Claim that

he is Entitled to Additi onal Compensation Under the DBA Plaintiff nextclaims that he is entitled to additional compensation and benef its under the DB A, alleg ing that, “under the Def ense B ase A ct, he wa s also to be paid compe nsation for pa rtial compensation for loss of ea rning s, but has never

rec eived a

ny additional compensation for loss of
ear nings.” Id. ¶ 9 . A lth ou g h n ot i nc lud e d in Pla int if f’ s c omp la int , it

a pp e ars that Pla int if

f i s a lso
se e kin gdama g e s in

the amou nt o f t he bil l f or the tr e atme nt h e re c e ive d at a mil ita ry ho sp ita l in Ger many . SeePl.’s MS J at 4; Pl.’s Rev. Opp’n/Reply at 12. Chemonics re sponds that, to the extent P laintiff is seekingsuch re lief, it is entitled to sum mary judgme nt beca

use this Court is not the prope r for

um to adjudicate Plaintiff’s c laims, as claims reg ardingcompensation or medical benef its under the DB A must be administratively broug ht before the Depa

rtment of L abor. D ef.’ s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 18-20. T he Court agree s with Chemonics that this C ourt is not the proper forum for Plaintiff’s claims relating to bene fits under the D BA
. As Chemonics explains, the DBA inc orporates the L HWCA’s claim adjudication proce dures. Se e Di re c tor , O ff. of W or k e rs’ Com pe ns ati on Prog

ra ms v . Ne wpo rt N

e ws Shipbuilding & Dry Doc k Co. , 514 U.S. 122, 141-42 (1995) ( Ginsburg , J ., concur ring ) (e x plaining that claims under the DB A and the L HWCA “are handled by the same a dminist rative a ctors” a nd g e ne ra lly a pp ly “ the sa me pr oc e dure s” ). Withc e rt a in l imi te d e xce pti on s, the L HWCAis administered by

the Secr etar

y of L abor through the OWCP
. Id. at 125. A wor ker se eking
c omp e ns atio n und e r t

he L HWCA(a

nd the re fo re un de r t

he DB A) mus t f

ile a c la im w ithan O WCP34

district director, who holds an informal c onfer ence in an attempt to amicably resolve disputed issues. Id. (citing33 U.S.C. § 919(a) a nd 20 C.F.R. §§ 701.301(a) , 702.105 & 702.311)
. I f the disputed issues are not resolved by the district direc tor, the cla im is t ransf err ed to the De partment of L a bo r’ s O ff ic e of Ad min istrativ e L aw Jud g e s f or an e vid e nti ary

he ari ngc on du c te d in
acc ordanc e with the Administrative Proce dures Ac t. Id. (citing32 U.S.C. § 919(d)). The AL J ’s decision is revie wable by the B enef

its Review Boa

rd, whose me mbers ar e appointed by the Secre tary . Id. (citing33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(1)) . Any party ag g rieve d by

the B enef

its Review Boa

rd’s decision may

in turn obtain review

of that dec ision in t he appr opriate United States Courts of Appea ls. Id. (citing33 U.S.C. § 921(c)). This Court, therefor e, is not the corr ect f orum for Plaintiff’s c laims for bene fits under the DB A. Ind e e d, Pla int if

f a pp are ntl y c on c e de s th is p oint, a s h e ha s ma de no atte mpt to a dd re ss t his argument in his revised opposition/reply
. See ge nerally Pl. ’s Re v. Op p’ n/R e ply ; se e als o F ra nk lin , 20 09 Wl 53 30 71 , * 13 ; Hopkins , 284 F. Supp.2d at 25. The Court theref ore f inds in favor of Chemonics, and ac cording ly , g rants Chemonics’ motion for summar y with respec t to Pl aintiff’s claim that he is entitled to additional compensation and/or bene fits under the D BA
. D. Plain tif

f’ s Claim for

In te nti on al I

nfl ic tio n o f E mo tio na l D ist

re ss F ina lly , Pl a int if

f a pp e ars to a sse rt

a c la im f or int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss, alleg ing that “[t] he bre ache s of contra ct . . . on the par t of defe ndant have been de liberate and intentional and have constituted outrag eous conduc t causingplaintiff to also suffe r seve re
e mot ion a l and

me nta l di str e ss a s w e ll a s f ina nc ia l ha rd sh ip. ” Pl. ’s Com

pl. ¶ 1 3. To pr ov e a

c la im of intentional infliction of emotional distress, “a plaintiff must show (1) extreme a nd outrag eous conduct on the pa

rt of the de fenda

nt which (2) intentionally or re cklessly

(3) c auses the pla intiff35

sever e emotional distress.” Larij ani v. George town Univ. , 7 91 A. 2d 41 , 4 4 ( D. C. 2 00 2) ; se e als o Ho war d U niv . v . B est , 4 84 A. 2d

95 8, 98 5 ( D. C. 1 98 4) (s ame ). “ Th e c on du c t a lle g e d mu st b e ‘s o
o u tr a g e o u s i nc h ar a c t e r , an d s o e x tr e m e i nd e g r e e , a s t o g o b e yo n d a l l p o s s i b l e b o un d s o f

d e c e n c y, and to be r eg arde d as atroc ious, and utterly intolerable in a

civiliz ed community .’” Larij ani , 791 A. 2 d at4 4 (qu o t i n g Homan v. G oyal , 711 A.2d 812, 818 (D.C. 1998)) . “In g ener al, a c ase of intentional infliction of emotional distress is made out only if the re citation of the fa cts to an
ave ra g e me mbe r o f t

he c omm un ity wo uld aro us e his re se ntm e nt a g a ins t th e a c tor , a nd le a d h im t o exclaim ‘Outrag eous!’ ” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). As an in iti a l matte r, g ive n th e Court ’s c on c lus ion a bo ve that Ch e mon ic s d id n ot, in f a c t, brea ch the pa

rties’ Contrac t, Plainti ff’ s alleg ed basis for his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not eve n exis t. Reg ardle ss, Plainti ff ha s failed to prof fer any evidenc e from which a

rea sonable jury

could conc lude that Chemonics’ c onduct was “ extreme and outrag eous.” To the contra ry , the re cord e vidence demonstrates that Chemonics went above and beyond its contractua l obligations, kee ping Plaintiff on its employ ment roll for more than a year afte r his injury , in part so that he a nd his family

would rema in cover ed under Chemonics’ g roup health insuranc e (at a substantial cost to Chemonics, who continued to pay the employ er’ s portion of the pre mium). Se e su

pra p. 11 & n. 6. Che monics also promptly prepa red a nd filed the
nece ssary paper work with the OWCP in order to ensure that Plaintiff rec eived be nefits under the DB A. See De f. ’s Stmt . ¶ 21 . Pl a int if

f a pp e ars to c on c e de that he ha s n o me ri tor iou s c la im, a s h is revised opposition/reply

does not addre ss Chemonics’ arguments that its conduct was not outrag eous and that Plainti ff ha s not suffer ed seve re e motional dist ress. See ge nerally Pl.’s Rev. Op p’ n/R e ply ; se e als o F ra nk lin , 2 00 9 Wl 5 33 07 1, *1 3; Hopkins , 284 F. Supp. 2d at 25. As ther e36

is no evidence in the rec ord fr om which a r easona ble jury could find that Chemonics’ c onduct was “extreme a

nd outrag eous” or

that Plaintiff suffer ed “se vere emotional distress” as a result of Che mon ic s’ be havio r, the fi nd s in fa vo r o f C he mon ic s. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court g ra nts Che mon ic s’ mot ion fo r s umm ary

wi th r e sp e c t to Pla int if

f’ s c la im f

or int e nti on a l in fl ic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss. E. Chemonics’ Counterc laim that Plai ntiff Breached the Contract’s Forum Se lection Cla us e The Court next turns to C hemonics’ c ounterc laim ag ainst Plainti ff f or bre ach of

the Contract’s f

orum selec tion clause. See Answer & Counter claim, at 4-5. D ocket No. [3]. Chemonics’ counte rcla im center s on languag e in sec tion XI Iof the pa rties’ Contrac t, which provides, inte r a lia : The pa rties her eby

expressly ag ree and ac knowledg e that the c ourts of the District of Columbi a shall have sole and e x clusive jurisdiction over a ny dispute arisingunder or otherwise r elatingto this agr eeme nt. The parties ag ree that any such disputes shall not b e b roug ht before any

fore ign c ourt, administrative ag ency , or other le g al body , but s h al l b e under

the sole and e x clusive jurisdiction of the cour ts of the District of Col umb ia a s st ate d a

bo ve . Sh ou ld e ith e r p art

y br e a c h this c la

us e by br ini nga dis pute befor e a f oreign court, a dminist rative a g ency , or other le g al body , the parties ag ree as follows: the non-bre achingparty shall be entit led t o liquidated damag es at a sum equa l to three ( 3) months salary of the e mploy ee’ s l as t wag e under this ag ree ment and prec edingthe bre ach. Contr a c t, § XI I . A s Ch e mon ic s p oints o ut, it i s und isp ute d th at in e xplic a bly Pla int if f o ri g ina lly filed his complaint ag ainst Chemonics for bre ach of contra ct in the District Court for the County of El Paso, Colorado. See Compl., Docket No. [1-4] at 38. C hemonics there afte r re moved the lawsuit to feder al cour

t in the United States District Court for the District of Colora do, and then filed an unoppose d motion to t ransf er the case to the United States District Court for the D istrict of Columbi a. See ge nerally Do c ke t N o. [1]. A c c or din g ly , Ch e mon ic s c onte nd s it is e nti tle d to $3 2, 81 2. 50 in l iqu ida

te d d ama g e s ( i.e. , Pl a int if f’ s mo nth ly

sa lary of $1 0, 93 7. 50 , a s p ro vid e d f or in37

section IV of the Contra ct, multipli ed by 3). De f.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 22-23. Plaintiff’s entire r esponse to Chemonics’ a rgument is lim ited to three se ntence s, which the Court qu ote s in fu ll: De fe nd ant h a s a sse rt e d a c ounte rc la im b e c aus e of Pla int if f’ s f ili ngin t he El Pa so Distric t C o urt o f

Co lo r a d o . I t i s tr

u e th at P la inti f

f d id f il e in th at c o urt; h o w e ver, Pla int if f a lso the n c on se nte d to the tr ans fe r o f t hat c ase to th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia jurisdiction and, there fore , the filingwas pure ly minist eria l and constituted no prejudice to the Def

endant be cause of the c o n s en sual transfe r to this jurisdiction. Plaintiff a lso c ontends that, even if transfe r had not be en made, th at t h e i n tentional nature of the breac h of contract claim would prec lude any such pena lty attachme nt for fi l i n g. Pl.’s Rev. Opp’n/Reply

at 12-13. Sig nificantly , Plaintiff makes no ar gument that the forum selec tion clause is void or unenf orce able, a

nd admits that he filed the instant lawsuit in a cour t
outsi de of the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia . T hu s, the re is n o d isp ute that Pla int if f b re a c he d th e pa

rt ie s’ forum sele ction clause
. The only question that remains, ther efor e, is whethe r Chemonics is entitled to liquidated damag es in the amount of $32,812.50. Unde r District of Columbia law, “ [i ]tis well-settled that parties to a c ontrac t may

ag ree in advanc e to a sum ce rtain to be for feited a s liquidated damag es for brea ch of c ontrac t.” Burns v. Hanoe ver I ns. Co. , 454 A.2d 325, 327 (D.C. 1982). “ Such a barg ained- for liquidated damag es cla use is valid unless it is found to constitute a pe nalty .” Id. Significa ntly , the par

ty challeng ing the enfor cea bility of a liquidated da

mag es cla use has the burden of provingthat it is penalty
. S. Brooke P urll, Inc. v. Vailes , 8 50 A. 2d 11 35 , 1 13 8 ( D. C. 2004) (e x plicitly

adoptingrule that burde n of proof reg ardingenfor cea

bility of liquidated dama g es clause is on party

challeng ing the clause ). As demonstrate d by

the quoted languag e above , howeve r, Plaintiff has not cha lleng ed the38

enfor cea bility of the liquidated damag es cla use. Rather , he conte nds only that: (a) his subseque nt consent to transf

er somehow

“voids” his bre ach of

the forum se lection clause ; and (b) the alleg ed intentional nature of

Chemonics’ bre ach pr eclude s imposit ion of any damag es for

Plaintiff’s brea ch of the for um selection cla

use. Notably , Plaintiff offer s no case law or le g al authority to support either a rgument. Moreove r, as the Court ha s alrea dy conclude d that Chemonics did not breac h the parties’ Contract (intentionally or otherw ise), Plaintiff’s latter argument is clear ly

unavailing
. Simp ly put, P la int if

f h a s f a ile d to de mon str ate that th e liq uid ate d d ama g e s c la

us e is v oid

a s a penalty or otherw ise unenfor cea

ble—a bur den he be ars. Nor does Plaintiff explain why he orig inally filed the law suit in t he District Court for the County of El Paso, Colorado, whe ther due to leg al er ror or other re ason. Ac cording ly , as there are no materia l fac ts in disput e and a s Plainti ff has not argued that the liquidated damag es provision is unenforc eable , the Court finds in favor of Chemonics that it is entit led to a monetar y judgme nt in the amount of $32,812.50. The Court thus g rants Chemonics’ motion for summar y judgme nt as to its countercla im for Plaintiff’s bre ach of the par ties’ forum se lection clause
. Finally , as discussed a

bove, the Court’s Septembe r 4, 2008 Orde r provided that Plainti ff’ s Colorado counse l is required to pa y attorney s’ fe es and c osts associated with Chemonics’ r evised reply
. See supra p. 5. In acc ordanc e with that orde r, Chemonics attac hed to its revised re ply the sworn af fidavit of James M. Mesnard, lea d attorney for Chemonics, whic h aver s that Chemonics incurre d a total of $1,209.50 in attorne y s’ fe es and c osts with respect to the f iling of its re vised Reply . Def

.’s Rev. Reply , Att. 2. Plainti ff ha s not put the Court on noti ce thr oug h a motion or otherwise that the amount reque sted is contested. Ac cording ly , the Court awa rds Chemonics attorney s’ fe es and c osts in the amount of $1,209.50, which amount is to be paid solely by39

Plaintiff’s Colorado counse l. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set for

th above, the Court he reby DENI ES Pl aintiff’s [27] M otion for Part ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt a

nd GR AN TS D e fe nd ant’ s [28 ] Cro ss- Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt, findingin Defe ndant’s fa vor both as to Plaintiff’s claims and a s to Defe ndant’s counte rcla im and
awa rd s Ch e mon ic s a

mon e tary jud g me nt i n th e amou

nt o f $ 32 ,8 12 .5 0. In a dd iti on , Ch e mon ic s is
awa rded attorney s’ fe es and c osts totaling $1,209.50, which amount is t o be paid solely by Pla int if f’ s Co lor a do c ouns e l. Date: Marc h 26, 2009

/s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge