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57–935 PDF 2011

S. Hrg. 111–1079 

TERRORISTS AND GUNS: THE NATURE OF THE 

THREAT AND PROPOSED REFORMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 5, 2010 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

KEVIN J. LANDY, Chief Counsel 

CHARLES F. MARTEL, Counsel 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

IVY A. JOHNSON, Minority Deputy General Counsel 

LUKE P. BELLOCCHI, Minority Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Graham ............................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 39 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 41 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 2010 

Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg, a U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ........ 5 

Hon. Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress from the State of New 

York ....................................................................................................................... 7 

Hon. Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor, City of New York ........................................ 10 

Hon. Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner, City of New York ..................... 12 

Daniel D. Roberts, Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services 

Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice ......... 24 

Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 26 

Sandy Jo MacArthur, Assistant Chief, Office of Administrative Services, Los 

Angeles Police Department ................................................................................. 29 

Aaron Titus, Privacy Director, Liberty Coalition .................................................. 31 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bloomberg, Hon. Michael R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 48 

Kelly, Hon. Raymond W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

King, Hon. Peter T.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Larence, Eileen R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 55 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

MacArthur, Sandy Jo: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69 

Roberts, Daniel D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

Titus, Aaron: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 

Page

IV 

APPENDIX 

American Civil Liberties Union, prepared statement ........................................... 87 

Responses to post-hearing questions submitted for the Record from: 

Mayor Bloomberg .............................................................................................. 97 

Mr. Kelly ........................................................................................................... 101 

Mr. Roberts ....................................................................................................... 103 

Ms. MacArthur ................................................................................................. 110 

Mr. Titus ........................................................................................................... 111 

(1) 

TERRORISTS AND GUNS: THE NATURE OF 

THE THREAT AND PROPOSED REFORMS 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 5, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:16 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Pryor, Burris, Kaufman, Collins, 

and Graham. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. The hearing will come to 

order. We welcome the witnesses. Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Commissioner Raymond Kelly, I know you were held up in Washington 

traffic. I am sure this never happens in New York City. But I do 

want to just assure you that the last person to appear late at a 

hearing because she was held up in Washington traffic was Secretary Janet Napolitano. So there is good precedent here. 

We thank all the witnesses for being here today. Of course, I 

want to begin by extending, on behalf, I am sure, of all the Members of our Committee and really the entire American family, our 

special thanks to Mayor Bloomberg, Commissioner Kelly, and all 

who work with you in New York City government and live in that 

great city for their grace under pressure, which remains still about 

the best definition I know of courage. I’d also like to thank you for 

the brilliant law enforcement investigative work that you and your 

colleagues in the Federal, State, and local law enforcement communities did to bring Faisal Shahzad to justice just 53 hours after his 

attempted terrorist attack on Times Square. 

This hearing on what Congress and the Federal Government can 

do to keep firearms out of the hands of terrorists was scheduled 

long ago, but its urgency has certainly been made clear by the 

events of the past 4 days. 

In fact, our growing understanding of the dimensions of the plot 

to attack Times Square certainly should remind us of a reality that 

I fear we sometimes forget, which is that global Islamist extremism 

terrorists have declared war on America, and they are attacking 

our homeland with increasing frequency. In fact, they have attempted to carry out more than a dozen attacks on America in just 

the last year. Most of them have been stopped before any damage 

could be done, again, by extraordinary law enforcement work. But 

2 

four of the attempted attacks broke through our homeland defenses, including the failed attempts on Christmas Day over Detroit and last Saturday night in New York City. 

And here is the fact that I hope will focus our concern and attention and hopefully motivate our action this morning: The only two 

terrorist attacks on America since September 11, 2001, that have 

been carried out successfully and taken American lives were carried out with firearms. 

The most lethal was in November of last year when an Army 

doctor, Nidal Hasan, opened fire with a semiautomatic pistol at a 

processing center at Fort Hood, Texas, killing 13 Americans and 

wounding 30 others. Fort Hood was the deadliest terrorist attack 

on America since September 11, 2001, and the deadliest domestic 

terrorist attack against American troops in the history of our country. It was carried out by one man with two guns: An FN 5.7-millimeter pistol and an older Smith and Wesson revolver. 

In June of last year, in an event that not too many people remember, an American named Carlos Bledsoe, who changed his 

name to Abdulhakim Muhammad, shot and killed a U.S. Army recruiter and seriously wounded another at an Army-Navy Recruiting 

Station in Little Rock, Arkansas, simply because they were wearing the uniform of the U.S. military. He did so with a SKS semiautomatic rifle. 

In other recent cases, homegrown terrorist cells have stockpiled 

firearms while planning attacks specifically against personnel at 

Fort Dix, New Jersey, and at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, 

Virginia. 

Thankfully, again, great law enforcement work stopped both of 

those plots. But had these planned attacks succeeded, many other 

Americans would surely have lost their lives, as over 160 did in the 

attacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008, which were also carried out largely with firearms. 

So the threat we meet to discuss and attempt to prevent is real. 

Terrorists armed with semiautomatic and high-powered weapons 

can inflict heavy casualties in seconds. While it is true that homegrown terrorists, which we are seeing increasingly in this country, 

are generally—but not always—less sophisticated than those sponsored and trained overseas by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, 

the truth is that they may also be harder to detect and stop, particularly if they are operating essentially on their own. And the 

easy availability of lethal weapons ensures that these homegrown 

terrorists can legally obtain sufficient firepower to cause terrible 

damage. 

As Senator Frank Lautenberg, Congressman Peter King, Mayor 

Bloomberg, and Commissioner Kelly know and will make clear this 

morning, we are simply not doing all we can do to stop terrorists 

from buying guns. 

The stark fact is that the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has 

no authority to block the sale of firearms to suspected terrorists 

even when the Department knows they are about to purchase guns. 

This, unfortunately, is not a rare occurrence. The number of 

times suspected terrorists have been allowed, with the government’s knowledge, to buy guns in recent years is stunning and infuriating. This morning, the Government Accountability Office 

3 

(GAO) will testify that in the last 6 years, terrorist suspects, people 

on watchlists, have tried to buy guns more than 1,200 times, and 

in 91 percent of those cases, they did buy guns. In the other 9 percent, they were stopped because they were on some other list, such 

as having had a criminal record of some kind. 

I think most Americans understand and once they hear these 

facts certainly will agree that this has to change, and that we can 

block terrorists from obtaining guns without compromising constitutional Second Amendment rights. In fact, a recent survey done 

by Republican pollster Frank Luntz showed that over 80 percent of 

National Rifle Association (NRA) members believe that suspected 

terrorists should not be allowed to buy guns. 

In 2007, the Bush Administration proposed legislation to give the 

Attorney General the discretion to prevent the sale of firearms to 

watchlisted terrorists. It was not enacted. Senator Lautenberg and 

Congressman King had previously introduced legislation to do exactly that, and they have introduced that legislation in this Congress. It is, in my opinion, a straightforward, bipartisan bill supported by mayors and others all over the country, but particularly 

the mayors whose cities are prime targets of terrorists, including 

the large, diverse coalition of mayors that Mike Bloomberg leads. 

In my personal opinion, the bill should be enacted as quickly as 

possible to close this dangerous loophole before another suspected 

terrorist is able to buy firearms legally and use them to kill Americans. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our Nation remains a target for terrorists. Whether sent from 

overseas or radicalized within the United States, terrorists continue to target innocent men, women, and children. Their callous 

disregard for life was on full display in New York City this past 

Saturday. 

Had it not been for an alert street vendor and the courageous action of the New York Police Department (NYPD), many lives would 

have been lost, and many people would have been injured. 

I applaud the quick and effective investigative work by Federal, 

State, and local authorities that led quickly to the identification 

and arrest of the suspect who allegedly placed the car bomb in the 

midst of Times Square. 

This attempted attack reminds us once again that terrorists are 

unrelenting in their desire to kill Americans. We cannot let down 

our guard, and we must continue to meet this ongoing threat with 

strength and resilience. 

From Fort Hood to the skies over Detroit and now to Times 

Square, our Nation must come to grips with the terrorist threat, 

particularly the threat of homegrown terrorism. 

An alert citizenry is one of the best defenses against terrorist attacks. Signs in the New York City subway system read: ‘‘If You See 

Something, Say Something.’’ The U.S. Capitol Police ask those of 

us who work on Capitol Hill to pay close attention to ‘‘help be the 

eyes and ears with our local law enforcement.’’ And as we saw in 

4 

Times Square, an alert citizen can be our best line of defense 

against terrorist attacks. 

Senator Lieberman and I have introduced bipartisan legislation 

that would encourage individuals to report suspicious activity to 

the appropriate officials. The legislation is straightforward: It 

would protect individuals from lawsuits when they, in good faith, 

report suspicious behavior that may indicate terrorist activity. Our 

colleague Peter King has introduced the bill on the House side. 

Given the recent events in New York City, I encourage the Senate 

Judiciary Committee to pass this important bill. 

During the past 8 years, significant resources have been devoted 

to the prevention of a terrorist attack using a biological, chemical, 

or nuclear weapon. But as recent attacks have shown, the improvised explosive device (IED) remains the weapon of choice for most 

terrorists. Indeed, in 2009 alone, there were more than 3,700 terrorist incidents involving an IED worldwide. 

The materials used to construct IEDs are ubiquitous. Gas cans 

and propane tanks, available at any home improvement store, allegedly formed the core of the Times Square bomb. When terrorists 

can turn items that can be found in an average family’s garage into 

a weapon of death and destruction, it underscores the need for intelligence collection to identify threats as well as the need for vigilance by State and local authorities, business owners, and all citizens to learn the warning signs that distinguish legitimate activity 

from the precursors to a terrorist attack. 

Of course, terrorists can also choose to use firearms, and that is 

the issue that brings us here today. 

For many Americans, including many Maine families, the right 

to own guns is part of their heritage and way of life. This right is 

protected by the Second Amendment. 

And so this Committee and this Congress face a difficult issue 

today: How do we protect the constitutional right of Americans to 

bear arms, while preventing terrorists from using guns to carry out 

their murderous plans? 

Let me note that this dilemma does not arise when we apply the 

terrorist watchlist to the purchase of explosives. 

One of the more important accomplishments since September 11, 

2001, has been the creation of a consolidated terrorist watchlist 

based on information from all parts of the intelligence community 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

Our watchlist system, properly implemented, can be an effective 

mechanism for preventing individuals with suspected terrorist ties 

from boarding an aircraft. It also alerts law enforcement and border protection officials to more carefully screen potential terrorists, 

and it allows the State Department to revoke visas of foreign individuals with terrorist ties who are attempting to travel to the 

United States. 

But the fact remains that the evidence used to compile the 

watchlist is often fragmentary and can be of varying degrees of 

credibility. As our late colleague Senator Ted Kennedy discovered 

when his name was included, the watchlist can be inaccurate. It is 

not, in other words, the equivalent of a criminal history report. 

And, indeed, the latest DOJ Inspector General’s report concluded 

that approximately 35 percent of those sampled from the list were 

5 

1The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg appears in the Appendix on page 44. 

left on the list based on outdated information or material unrelated 

to terrorism. 

Incidents of mistaken application of the terrorist watchlist are 

very unfortunate, but those errors usually result only in the restriction of a privilege, such as the right to board a plane or to 

travel to the United States from overseas. The expansion of the 

watchlist system to potentially deprive law-abiding Americans of a 

constitutional right is wholly different and raises many critical 

questions. 

So as we consider what at first blush seems to be an obvious step 

that we should take, we must carefully consider these questions: 

Are appropriate protections included within the watchlisting 

process to justify the potential denial of a constitutional right? 

If not, what procedural protections should be afforded those who 

are erroneously denied the ability to purchase a firearm? 

What guidelines are needed to constrain the Attorney General’s 

discretion to prevent law-abiding Americans from purchasing a 

firearm? 

Let me emphasize that none of us wants a terrorist to be able 

to purchase a gun. But neither should we want to infringe upon a 

constitutional right of law-abiding Americans. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

We will begin with Senator Lautenberg and Congressman King 

to describe the legislation, and then be honored to hear responses 

to this and anything else they want to testify to from Mayor 

Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly. 

Senator Lautenberg, you have been a real leader on this. The bill 

you have introduced, I want to say for the record, has been referred 

to the committee of legislative jurisdiction, the Judiciary Committee. We are holding this hearing today in the dispatch of our responsibility to inquire as to the impact passage of your legislation 

could have on our homeland security. So I thank you very much for 

being here, and we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,1 A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the Committee. I want to 

offer my welcome to Mayor Bloomberg and to Commissioner Kelly. 

Each of them has enormous responsibility, conducted very well 

across the river from New Jersey, and one cannot help but note, 

as has been done amply, I think, by Senator Collins as well as 

yourself, the incredibly brilliant police work that went on to get 

this guy before he was able to leave the country. It was fantastic. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this critical hearing, and I would like to thank my fellow witnesses for joining us 

here today. And I thank Representative Peter King for introducing 

the legislation in the House. 

This past Saturday, we were reminded yet again that terrorists 

are determined to kill Americans on American soil. This story is 

now a little old, but shocking enough to further review it. It is so 

6 

hard to believe. An empty sport utility vehicle (SUV) packed with 

explosives and a timing device was discovered in Times Square, 

one of the most visited places in America. 

The terrorist behind this plot planned to set off an explosion and 

murder as many innocent Americans as possible. We were fortunate that this makeshift car bomb did not explode this time. 

But as officials claim they will do everything they can to stop a 

future terror attack, a loophole in our guns and explosives laws 

gives terrorists the upper hand. 

This loophole—known as the ‘‘terror gap’’—allows known and 

suspected terrorists to purchase military-grade explosives and firearms legally in our country. And mindful of what Senator Collins 

said so clearly, we do not want to rob people of a constitutional 

right, but I kind of do not like saying but I am going to do it, and 

that is, to err on the side of protection is the chance sometimes we 

have to take. And it can be challenged in our court system without 

a problem. 

As GAO will testify today, just last year, a person on the terror 

watchlist was cleared to buy explosives by the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Well, how can that be? 

To put it simply, right now the Federal Government cannot block 

the sale of explosives or firearms to someone simply because they 

are on the terrorist watchlist. It sounds pretty frightening to me. 

It defies common sense, but it is the law of the land. 

In fact, some of the very same explosive agents that are used to 

make roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan are available for 

sale legally to known and suspected terrorists here in our country. 

But we know that terrorists do not only use explosives, firearms 

are also a weapon of choice. In fact, the U.S. citizen who was arrested at John F. Kennedy (JFK) Airport in connection with the 

Times Square car bomb had a loaded gun in the car as he drove 

to the airport. And if you look at Mumbai and other recent terrorist 

attacks, we see that assault weapons and small explosives are 

being used more and more times. The fact is that they are able to 

compact these horrible weapons into smaller packages, and that is 

why we need to change this law. 

Convicted felons, domestic abusers, and the mentally ill are forbidden from buying guns and explosives, but nothing in our laws 

keeps fanatics on the terror watchlist from purchasing guns and 

explosives. That is hard to believe, but unfortunately, it is true. 

And now this terror gap in our laws is not some theoretical concept. Not only can documented terrorists buy firearms legally in 

our country, they do. 

I have requested reports from the GAO about the number of 

times that the terror gap has been exploited, and here is what we 

have learned to date: From 2004 to February of this year, terrorists 

tried to buy guns and explosives 1,228 times. I think the Chairman 

referred to this—in 91 percent of those cases they were given the 

OK to buy a gun. Imagine. So 10 percent, roughly, of these people 

were unable to buy guns. 

But because of this terror gap, America is effectively hanging out 

the welcome sign for terrorists to arm themselves. Now, I have introduced legislation in the Senate to close the terror gap, and RepVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:53 Oct 19, 2011 Jkt 057935 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57935.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. King appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

resentative King has offered, as I mentioned, a nearly identical 

proposal in the House. 

Our legislation very simply would give the U.S. Attorney General 

the power to review and deny guns and explosives to known and 

suspected terrorists. It does not sound like it is an impediment to 

living in this country. This common-sense legislation is not antigun. It is anti-terrorist. 

In fact, a gun owner who objects to the Attorney General’s finding has the power under my legislation to challenge the ruling. And 

that is why support for the legislation is widespread. 

The Bush Administration, which fiercely defended gun rights, 

asked Congress to pass my legislation. Attorney General Eric Holder has indicated his support for our legislation. Former Governor 

of New Jersey Tom Kean, the Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, 

has urged Congress to close this dangerous loophole. And police 

chiefs across the country have endorsed our legislation. 

Now the gun lobby tries to argue that gun owners opposed the 

bill. Not true. 

Republican pollster, Mr. Luntz, mentioned before, recently found 

that 82 percent of the NRA members want Congress to close the 

terror gap. 

Mr. Chairman, everyone talks about making our country safer 

from terrorism. This is our chance to actually do it. And I thank 

you again for holding this hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lautenberg. 

Congressman King, welcome. He is the Ranking Member of 

Homeland Security on the House side, a real stalwart fighter for 

the security of the American people. We welcome your testimony 

now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. PETER T. KING,1 A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Mr. KING. Thank you very much, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking 

Member Collins. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be here 

today. I want to thank you publicly and tell you what a privilege 

it has been to be able to work with you on matters of homeland 

security in a totally bipartisan manner, always putting the country 

first. It has really been an honor for me to be able to work with 

you closely on these issues. 

I also want to commend Senator Lautenberg for his legislation, 

and I would, of course, pay special tribute to Mayor Bloomberg and 

Commissioner Kelly. The actions of the last 72 to 96 hours in apprehending the terrorist in New York, really showing 100 percent 

police professionalism, is really a testament to the work that goes 

on day in and day out by the NYPD under the leadership of Commissioner Kelly and Mayor Bloomberg and all that the city has 

done in spending literally hundreds and hundreds of millions of 

dollars to protect itself against Islamist terrorist attack. Again, the 

whole world and the whole country observed this over the last several days, but this is really just a manifestation of what goes on 

8 

every day in New York under the leadership of Commissioner Kelly 

and Mayor Bloomberg. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my testimony be inserted into 

the record. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Without objection. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I concur with all the remarks of Senator Lautenberg, and to me it is an issue of common sense. As you 

stated, we are at war with Islamist terrorism. It is an enemy which 

is coming at us overseas and now more recently and more frequently right here at home. 

One of the reasons for that is our product overseas has been effective under both administrations in stopping terrorists from coming into the country, and that has been a success. Al-Qaeda, 

though, is always adapting, and what they are now doing is attempting to find Americans in this country, people who are legally 

in the country, whether it was the Najibullah Zazi case back in 

September, or this recent case on Saturday evening, and others 

where they recruit Americans who are under the radar screen, that 

do not have known ties to al-Qaeda. It is harder for us to follow 

them, so we have to expect more attacks from those already within 

the country. 

Now, the plus side is that, again, it is harder for terrorists to 

come in, and also it means that those who are here, those who 

have not received the sophisticated training overseas are more likely to rely on whatever weapons they can get a hold of. And when 

we see that terrorists can have access to guns, to explosives, as 

Senator Lautenberg said, I would ask—all of us were here on September 11, 2001, and we remember that afternoon of September 11 

and the next day saying: What could we have done to prevent this? 

How could we have stopped this attack from happening? 

I would just say if we find out that Islamist terrorists such as 

we saw on Saturday night or others who actually have terrorist 

connections even more than someone who is not known, someone 

who actually has terrorist connections, has gone out and bought 

weapons and carries out a massacre, whether it is in Times 

Square, Chicago, New Jersey, Tennessee, or anywhere, carries out 

an attack, or as we saw at the recruiting station in Arkansas, we 

would say, How did we allow this to happen? And then we have 

to explain to the American people even though we knew this person 

was a terrorist, even though we know that al-Qaeda has declared 

war against us, even though we knew that we were facing a threat 

here at home, we still allowed that person who is on a terrorist list 

to buy a weapon and go out and slaughter people. I mean, just 

think what the American people would think of us. If there is the 

extent of lack of faith in government today, can you imagine what 

it would be if we allowed that to happen? There would be blood on 

our hands. We would be responsible for the deaths of all those people. 

That is why this legislation is common sense, and Senator Collins mentioned the fact that, there is the possible violation of a constitutional right. I agree with that completely. In the legislation 

that I have, we provide legal mechanisms that after a person is notified they are on the terrorist watchlist, they can go to court and 

they can challenge it. I think Senator Lautenberg even has more 

9 

extensive protections. His legislation was drawn up after the GAO 

report. I would certainly be willing to adapt my legislation to comport entirely with Senator Lautenberg’s. No one wants somebody to 

be on a list wrongly. But the fact is that if we balance the equities, 

if we look at what we are facing, we are facing a possible slaughter 

of American citizens, possible murder of American citizens by alQaeda supporters, by Islamist militants, by Islamist terrorists, to 

me there is no real debate here, so long as there are sufficient protections in here. The protections are here, but to me if we balance 

the equities, it is on the side of protecting the American people. 

We saw guns were bought for the potential attacks at Fort Dix. 

Senator Lieberman mentioned the attacks at the recruiting station 

in Arkansas. We saw Major Hasan with the attack that he carried 

out at Fort Hood. So these were domestic terrorists. They were people who did not even have, as I said, a terrorist record. Just think 

how much worse it would be if we allowed someone with a terrorist 

record to buy those weapons. And when we realize that 91 percent 

of those who are on the terrorist watchlist were able to apply for 

weapons and were able to purchase them, it seems to me outrageous. 

And this should not be a partisan issue in any way. As Senator 

Lautenberg said, the Bush Administration was certainly as pro-gun 

as any Administration we have had. They strongly supported this 

legislation. They asked for this legislation and my understanding 

is the Obama Administration supports it as well. 

With bipartisan legislation such as this is targeted and is dealing 

with a real and present danger. Maybe if this were the year 2000, 

we would say, well, OK, it is a Tom Clancy novel or someone who 

is speculating. How many more attacks and potential attacks do we 

have to have before all the American people and, more importantly, 

all of the House and Senate realize this is a real enemy that is 

here, it is amongst us, and we have to do what we can to protect 

the American people? 

So I thank you very much for holding this hearing. I look forward 

to working in a bipartisan way, whatever adjustments we have to 

make, Senator, to make sure that the legislation is entirely compatible, if there are other reasonable protections that people want in 

the legislation. This is not a work of art. There is no pride of authorship here. I will be glad to change it in any way we can so long 

as the bottom line is the American people are protected from domestic terrorists who have guns, and that is the essence of where 

I am coming from. To me, it is common sense. It is the only logical 

step we can take, especially after seeing what happened on Saturday night, how close this enemy is. 

So with that, I thank you for allowing me to testify, and as we 

say in the House, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I accept it. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Please excuse me. I must run. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I understand, Senator. Thank you very 

much. 

Mayor Bloomberg, thanks for being here. This was scheduled a 

long time ago, and I appreciate the fact that, notwithstanding the 

events of recent days, you have taken the time to come here. I 

10 

1The prepared statement of Mayor Bloomberg appears in the Appendix on page 48. 

could say a lot about you. All of it is good. Well, most of it is good. 

[Laughter.] 

At a time when it is clear that the American people have lost 

confidence in so many ways in so much of their government, I 

think you set a standard of leadership and competence in making 

the government work, and I thank you for that, as well as everything else we have thanked you for this morning. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG,1 MAYOR, CITY 

OF NEW YORK 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Well, thank you very much. I can say some 

good things about you, Senator Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, Senator Pryor, and Senator Graham. Thank you for having us 

today. It is a great opportunity for us to tell the Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Committee what is going on in our city 

and why we need some help from Washington. 

As Senator Lautenberg and you said, today the Government Accountability Office released new data showing that suspects on the 

terrorist watchlists were able to buy guns and explosives from licensed U.S. dealers well over 1,000 times. That is a serious and 

dangerous breach of national security, and it really raises a very 

basic question: When gun dealers run background checks that they 

have to by law send to the FBI, shouldn’t FBI agents have the authority to block sales of guns and explosives to those on the terrorist watchlists and deemed to dangerous to fly? I actually believe 

that they should. And so do the 500 mayors who are part of our 

bipartisan coalition of Mayors Against Illegal Guns. 

But right now, the fact is they do not. And as Senator Lautenberg and Congressman King have just said, it is time to close this 

terror gap in our gun laws. 

At a time when the threat of terrorism is still very real, as we 

in New York City know all too well, I think it is imperative that 

Congress close this terror gap in our gun laws, and close it quickly. 

The car bomb the NYPD found in Times Square on Saturday night 

was not the only attempted terrorist attack on our city since September 11, 2001. Far from it. And sadly, we do not think it will 

be the last. 

Since 1990, there have been more than 20 terrorist plots—or actual attacks—against our city and that is why it is so critical for 

Congress to fully fund homeland security programs like the Securing the Cities Initiative, and to take other steps that will help us 

fight terrorists and make it even harder for them to attack us. 

In the last year alone, the NYPD, working closely with Federal 

authorities, prevented two major planned attacks on our city. The 

first was last May, when terrorists purchased guns and explosives 

as part of a planned attack on a temple and Jewish center in the 

Bronx. The second was in September, when the city and Federal 

authorities broke up a plot to detonate explosives in the New York 

City subway system. And, of course, attacks and planned attacks 

have not been limited to New York. 

As everyone sadly knows, in 2007, six men were arrested for 

plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey, about 60 miles outside 

11 

of New York City, with an arsenal of high-powered firearms. Last 

June in Little Rock, Arkansas, a man opened fire at a military recruiting station, killing one private and wounding another. At the 

time of the shooting, the FBI was already investigating this man 

after his arrest in Yemen with a fake Somali passport. He was 

charged with murder and 16 counts of terrorist acts. 

And on November 5, 2009, Major Nidal Hasan shot 43 people at 

Fort Hood, killing 13. We know Hasan was able to buy a handgun 

despite having been under investigation by the FBI for links to terrorism. After the Fort Hood shooting, I wrote an op-ed with Governor Tom Kean, Chair of the 9/11 Commission, urging Congress 

to close the terror gap. Our message was that we cannot wait for 

another Fort Hood to happen before we take action. 

As Mr. King said, the Bush Administration first proposed closing 

the gap in 2007. But because nothing has happened, people who 

may want to do our country harm have had no trouble buying guns 

and explosives, as the GAO report clearly shows. 

It is important to note that the legislation before you today 

would give FBI agents the ability to make exceptions when they 

determine that blocking a sale might tip off a suspect who is under 

investigation. It is exactly the reverse issue. And the bill also allows those on the list to appeal their status to the Justice Department and to challenge the determination in court. 

Attorney General Eric Holder supported closing the terror gap in 

testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee last year, and so 

does the vast majority of Americans. And, Senator Lieberman, as 

you pointed out and so did Senator Lautenberg, a December poll 

by Republican pollster Mr. Luntz found that 82 percent of NRA 

members support closing the terror gap. 

Of course, it is true that even if the terror gap in our background 

check system were to be fixed, terror suspects and other dangerous 

people would still be able to go to gun shows to buy guns without 

any background check at all, and that is why our coalition of mayors is also urging Congress to close the gun show loophole. 

I might point out that Mr. Luntz also found the same 82 percent 

in favor of closing the gun show loophole as well as the terror gap. 

In New York City, we are doing everything humanly possible to 

prevent another terrorist attack. Under Commissioner Kelly’s leadership, the New York City Police Department has developed one of 

the world’s most advanced counterterrorism programs, and thousands of our best police officers work on counterterrorism and intelligence every day. 

A key element of any smart counterterrorism strategy is to make 

it harder for terrorists to strike. That is why air passengers walk 

through metal detectors. That is why our police officers randomly 

check bags in the subway. That is why our police patrol sensitive 

locations. And that is why it is just common sense to give the FBI 

the authority to keep terror suspects from buying guns and explosives. 

Let me close by saying something about the Second Amendment. 

Our Founding Fathers did not write the Second Amendment to empower people who wanted to terrorize a free state; they wrote it to 

protect people who could defend ‘‘the security of a free state.’’ 

12 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly appears in the Appendix on page 50. 

Today the security of our free state is being tested by terrorists, 

and I urge you to take common-sense steps in this law to strengthen law enforcement—including closing the terror gap—and to protect the American people from more attacks. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mayor Bloomberg. 

That was excellent testimony. 

Commissioner Kelly, thanks for being here. I know I have said 

it to you before, but when I talk to law enforcement people around 

the country, they all feel that the standard of law enforcement in 

this country is set by the NYPD, and if anything under your leadership, you have raised that banner even higher. Thank you for 

being here. We welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. RAYMOND W. KELLY,1 POLICE 

COMMISSIONER, CITY OF NEW YORK 

Mr. KELLY. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Collins, and Senator Graham, thank you for the opportunity to be 

here. 

Terrorists are determined to attack this country by any means. 

Saturday’s attempted car bomb attack on Times Square is but the 

latest example. 

Since September 11, 2001, New York City has been the subject 

of 11 plots of which we know. Each of them was defeated through 

close cooperation between the NYPD and our Federal partners. 

Each highlights one of the myriad ways terrorists might try to attack New York: With homemade bombs, by torching bridge cables, 

or releasing cyanide in the subways. 

The police department trains constantly to defend against every 

type of threat, especially those from guns and explosives. Obviously, the more we can do to deny would-be terrorists access to 

these weapons, the safer we will all be. That is why it is urgent 

that we close the terror gap in our Nation’s gun laws. Failure to 

do so places this country at even greater risk. 

Last year, I testified before this Committee about the NYPD’s response to the commando-style assault on Mumbai, India, in November 2008. As you may recall, that attack was carried out by 

small teams of operatives using AK–56 assault rifles. By sustaining 

the operation for hours, they maximized the casualties. 

As part of our comprehensive response to what happened in 

Mumbai, we have held tactical drills and tabletop exercises with officers from our Special Operations Division based on that scenario. 

We have trained more than 250 additional officers in the use of 

heavy weapons so that they will be able to supplement the work 

of our emergency service officers in a crisis. 

We have also decided to use the instructors in our Firearms and 

Tactics Unit as another reserve force. 

All of our police recruits now receive basic instruction in three 

types of heavy weapons. 

We have taken these and other measures because we believe an 

attack involving active shooters is always a possibility. Likewise, 

we must also guard against terrorists armed with homemade 

13 

bombs, whether a car bomb like the one we saw in Times Square 

or stashed inside backpacks for a suicide mission like the one 

planned for last September in New York City subways. Our subway bag search program, which we implemented immediately after 

the 2005 London bombings, is designed to counter such a threat. 

In recent years, we have also conducted undercover operations 

demonstrating the ease with which terrorists in this country can 

purchase explosive ingredients such as chlorine and ammonium nitrate. 

These efforts are part of a robust counterterrorism program we 

built from the ground up in 2002 when we realized that it, in addition to our focus on crime-fighting, the police department needed 

to build the intelligence collection, analysis, and infrastructure protection capabilities to defend New York City from another terrorist 

attack. 

We established the Nation’s first municipal Counterterrorism Bureau, and we restructured our Intelligence Division. 

We recruited the best that the Federal Government had to offer 

to head those two operations. 

We created a new civilian intelligence program to support our 

field commanders with timely information and analysis. 

We tapped the incredible linguistic diversity of the police department. We assigned native speakers of languages such as Urdu, Arabic, and Pashto to counterterrorism duties. 

We strengthened our patrols of key infrastructure in the city, including bridges, tunnels, and a host of landmarks and other sensitive locations. 

We forged collaborative relationships with the private sector, 

with law enforcement organizations up and down the east coast, 

and with Federal agencies, especially the FBI and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). 

All of our collective efforts would benefit from the passage of this 

bill, which would exclude anyone who is on a terrorist watchlist 

from being able to legally purchase a gun, obtain a permit to buy 

explosives, or a license to sell them. 

From the standpoint of the NYPD, it would also complement the 

aggressive anti-gun strategies we already have in place. Under 

Mayor Bloomberg’s leadership, New York City has become a national leader in combating gun violence. And the police department 

has made significant progress in stemming the flow of illegal guns 

into the city. 

It is a principal reason we have been able to drive conventional 

crime down by 40 percent since the beginning of 2002, even after 

we took on the additional responsibility of counterterrorism. But 

we are by no means declaring victory. We know there are still far 

too many guns available to criminals who are determined to obtain 

them. The same is true for international terrorist organizations, 

which in all likelihood are plotting the next attack as we speak. 

This legislation would go a long way in stopping them from exploiting a dangerous loophole and succeeding in their mission. For 

that reason, I hope that Congress will pass this legislation without 

delay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Commissioner Kelly. 

We will do 7-minute rounds of questioning. 

14 

The fact that you are here so soon after the events of the last 

4 days gives us an opportunity, before we get to the terror gap and 

the gun bill, just to ask you if you have any immediate, I might 

say, lessons learned from the last 4 days. From my perspective 

looking at it, a lot of what we hoped would happen in a post-terrorism attempt situation with cooperation between Federal, State, 

and local government happened, and it happened brilliantly. But, 

Mayor and Commissioner, you were there, you were on the ground. 

Give us your reaction first to the cooperation between levels of government and, second, if you came away this early with any lessons 

learned. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Well, I came away pleased in the sense that 

the public saw something and did something, as Senator Collins 

pointed out, we keep telling the public what to do, turn security 

over to the professionals. You can be the eyes and the ears, but 

they are the ones with boots on the ground that we want to defend 

us. And, two, that all of the training that Commissioner Kelly and 

the NYPD, Commissioner Cassano and the Fire Department of 

New York (FDNY), and Commissioner Bruno in our Office of Emergency Management do together and with Federal agencies and 

State agencies showed itself instantly. A police officer was called 

over. It happened to be a mounted cop on his horse, saw there was 

something wrong, right away got the other police officers in the 

area to start pulling people back. They were well trained in doing 

that. They called in the fire department, and you saw a group of 

people working together. Thank God it was not worse than it was. 

The explosives did not go off. But had they gone off, I think it is 

fair to say that the professionals that were called in did what they 

had to do to protect us, and that should give us comfort for the future. But I think as Commissioner Kelly will tell you, we are the 

target. We are going to be the target again. And the next attack 

or attempted attack will be different. We do not know what that 

is, but that is why we keep training for any eventuality. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Commissioner Kelly. 

Mr. KELLY. Mr. Chairman, it was clearly a team effort. The Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 

in New York City, is the largest in the country, and the oldest. And 

we worked seamlessly on this case, as we have on many others, although sometimes people seem to question that. But the relationship is strong and certainly a very productive one, as this investigation showed. 

I think it also illustrated the benefits of technology. We were 

able to cull information from databases that was very helpful. The 

key finding in this case was the vehicle identifaction number (VIN), 

the hidden VIN on the vehicle, and then very quickly we identified 

the owner; and also through using the Federal databases, we were 

able to link up telephone numbers that led us to this suspect in 

short order. 

So as a lot of people have said, 53 hours, I think, is a remarkable 

amount of time at least as far as the arrest process is concerned, 

to bring this case to closure. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I could not agree more. I was pleased to 

understand that some of the databases that are within the Department of Homeland Security, which, of course, this Committee overVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:53 Oct 19, 2011 Jkt 057935 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57935.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
15 

sees—Congressman King’s does in the House—were very helpful to 

you: Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), of course, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). And they were able to bring that to bear very 

quickly in the case. Correct? 

Mr. KELLY. Yes, sir. Very true. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Incidentally, I want to say to you, Mayor, 

I was thinking about those two street vendors, and I was comparing them—I am getting to an age where I remember things that 

a lot of people who are around who are younger do not remember, 

but I remember the Kitty Genovese case, the horrible case where 

a lot of people watched a woman being attacked and did nothing. 

This was the dramatic contrast to that. Two people seeing something suspicious, not really clearly the problem, immediately going 

to the police officer on the scene, and that prevented something 

worse from happening. 

So whatever has changed—and I give you credit for the campaign that you have conducted in New York to alert citizens to 

their role, because we are an open country, we have an enemy coming at us at home. They care not about their own lives and certainly not about the lives of innocent American civilians. We simply 

cannot stop, no matter how hard we try, every attempt, and that 

is where the citizenry becomes 300 million plus more security providers for our country. So I thank you for that. 

Commissioner Kelly, let me ask you a question about this proposal here, and I want to say very briefly that I think people understand it. The Brady gun law now says if you apply from a federally licensed gun seller, your name is run across databases. Some 

of them automatically disqualify you, if, for instance, you have a 

criminal record. Others, including the terrorism watchlist, essentially raise a red flag that delays the purchase for 3 days, during 

which law enforcement is informed. 

Oddly, strangely, in this case, though the Department of Justice 

may be informed that your name is on a terrorism watchlist, they 

cannot stop you from buying a gun. That is a gap we are trying 

to fill here with this legislation. 

Commissioner, apart from the obvious fact that you want to keep 

a gun out of the hands of somebody who is a suspected terrorist, 

talk a little bit about what the purchase of a gun may say about 

the moment in a would-be terrorist activity. In other words, might 

it suggest that person is about to go operational? 

Mr. KELLY. Certainly that is a possibility. Now, we are still gathering information about Faisal Shahzad’s purchase of a gun, but we 

know that he purchased a weapon in March in Connecticut, and he 

had it with him in the car that he drove to JFK Airport on Monday 

night. So it appears from some of his other activities that March 

is when he decided to put this plan in motion. He came back from 

Pakistan February 3, 2010, this year, so it may very well be an indicator of putting something, catastrophic in motion. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. My time is up, and I am going to yield to 

Senator Graham in a minute. I just want to stress what I think 

has been said, that in the Lautenberg-King legislation, it does not 

mandate that the person on the terrorism watchlist be prohibited 

from buying a gun. It gives the Department of Justice the authority 

16 

to do so. Obviously, there may be cases where the Justice Department decides it wants the gun purchase to go forward because they 

are following that individual and he or she may lead to other coconspirators. 

Senator Graham. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GRAHAM 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for the record, 

we have a chance here to have a really good discussion about some 

very important issues. You took time away from a very busy day 

job, both of you, to come and help the country focus, I think. And, 

Mr. King, I have really enjoyed working with you, and we have a 

little difference of opinion on this particular issue. But the idea 

that America has gaps in her defenses is really a timely topic. And 

we do. We have gaps in our defenses in securing our Southern Border. We have gaps in our defenses by allowing people to overstay 

their visas. All 19 hijackers were here illegally, but they did not 

cross the border of Mexico. They came here on a visa. They had 

multiple driver’s licenses. It is so easy to fake documents. And we 

are still, almost 10 years out now and I do not think we have 

learned all the lessons we should have learned. 

But there is one thing we can agree on here. I was in New York 

Sunday night at the Marriott Marquis, the very place where this 

SUV was found, and I could not have been better treated by the 

police department and by the people at the hotel. I went to a Yankees game Monday, and they won 4 to 1. So to anybody who is worried about going to New York, go. I have never seen a more professional group of people other than the U.S. military, at the ball 

game, on the streets, all over the place. And it was a wonderful experience. So New York is open for business, and you are going to 

be well taken care of. But there is a risk to getting out of bed. 

Maybe a meteorite hits you at home. 

So it is a responsible thing to do for Americans to be talking 

about topics such as this, but there has to be balance here, and I 

am in the camp that I am not so sure this is the right solution to 

what the dangers are. 

The D.C. gun ban law was an experiment that if you had a law 

against owning a hand gun, you would be safer. I do not think that 

worked. And the Supreme Court said that went too far, and they 

are about to issue a ruling here soon to determine whether or not 

gun ownership is an individuals right. I would argue that will affect the outcome of this legislation. 

I am not going to ask you to give me specific numbers, but here 

is a general question. There are 1,228 people on the watchlist that 

tried to purchase a handgun. Is that right? 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Numbers like that. 

Senator GRAHAM. What percentage of those people are facing terrorism charges now? 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. I do not know, Senator, but let me start out 

by saying I could not agree with you more. Border security—this 

country does not have control of its borders, and it should. Forty 

percent of the undocumented here are visa overstays. Forged documents, anybody can forge a passport or a green card or a Social Security card. 

17 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. And we should do something about that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Amen. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. We should get control of our borders. We 

track people when they come through immigration. We do not track 

them when they leave. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. So we do not know who is overstaying. We 

should fix that. We have documents that are too easy to fake, and 

it is a joke. We have to get control of immigration in this country. 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. We need immigrants, but we should be 

choosing who comes here, what skills they have, where they are 

coming from, and not let who wants to come here determine that. 

So I am 100 percent with you. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, and you have been very forward-leaning 

in a balanced way, and that is why I look forward to working with 

you on fixing immigration comprehensively. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. When it comes to reasonable restrictions, 

which the Supreme Court said are acceptable and consistent with 

the Second Amendment, I think this is a reasonable restriction. I 

do not know whether any of the 1,100 or 1,200 on the watchlist are 

facing charges at the moment, those that bought guns. Maybe Mr. 

Kelly can tell you, but I do know that if society decides that these 

people are too dangerous to get on an airplane with other people, 

then it is probably appropriate to look very hard before you let 

them buy a gun. 

Senator GRAHAM. I totally understand what you are saying, but 

we are talking about a constitutional right here, and the reason I 

brought that up, Mayor and Mr. Kelly, if all of these people are fanatics and every one of them on the watchlist is a terrorist planning an attack, it would be odd that 1,228 who we know tried to 

buy a gun, none of them are being charged with a terrorism-related 

offense. So there is a disconnect here between what we are saying 

and reality. There are 400,000 people on the terrorist watchlist. 

What percentage of them are American citizens? 

Mr. KELLY. I could not give you an answer. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, the law prohibits purchase of a gun unless you are an American citizen or a legal resident alien. So I 

think we are talking about a fairly small percentage of 400,000 

people. And the NRA—some people believe banning handguns is 

the right answer to the gun violence problem. I am not in that 

camp. I believe my right to own a gun should not be infringed because some nut is going to take a gun and use it wrongfully. I just 

think you should prosecute him very swiftly and forcefully. I am all 

into national security. I want us to take our Social Security cards 

and make them biometric. I want to stop reading these guys their 

Miranda rights. Mr. King and I are so much on board here. Your 

son is a former marine. Is that right? He was a fighter pilot, right? 

Mr. KELLY. My son? 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

Mr. KELLY. My son is a former fighter pilot. 

Mr. KING. The commissioner is a marine also, from Vietnam. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I knew I liked you. Now I know why. 

18 

At the end of the day, Mr. Chairman, you have been great on 

this issue. Nobody in their right mind would expect a marine to 

read someone caught on the battlefield their rights. You catch them 

and you interrogate them lawfully to gather intelligence. Your special unit is probably the best in the world at this. But I do not 

think it is smart for us to say that the homeland is not part of the 

battlefield. You get to America, you get a much better deal, you get 

rewarded? If you can be caught in Pakistan and intelligence gathering can happen with the intelligence agency without your Miranda warnings being given, why should you get a better deal 

when you get here. Even if you are an American citizen helping the 

enemy, you should be viewed as a potential military threat, not 

some guy who tried to commit a crime in Times Square. 

So I will look forward to working with the New York City Police 

Department, the Mayor of New York, and Peter King to devise a 

law that recognizes we are at war, that when you capture someone 

like you all did—and it was a marvelous piece of not police work 

alone but of a combination of intelligence gathering and police 

work—that you would have the opportunity to hold the suspect because they represent a military threat to our country even though 

they are a citizen. You ought to be able to gather intelligence before you did anything else, because what I want to know more 

about this guy is not how he committed the crime, but what led 

him to commit the crime and who he worked with, and Miranda 

warnings are counterproductive, in my view. So we need a law that 

would allow you to go to a judge somewhere, like a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) judge, and hold a suspect like this 

and working with the intelligence officials of this country to gather 

intelligence, then make a good prosecutorial decision. 

Now, back to this issue at hand. The problem I have is that the 

watchlist, when you look at the numbers, has so many problems 

with it that I think it is not appropriate to go down the road that 

we are going because a constitutional right is involved. That is my 

only concern, and I understand from the Mayor’s perspective and 

the police chief’s perspective how you feel about this issue. But 

please understand that I feel differently not because I care less 

about terrorism. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Senator, perhaps we can allay your fears a 

little bit. The watchlist is accessed a billion times a year, and the 

error rate is probably as low as on any large list. Keep in mind, 

you in Congress have passed laws preventing convicted felons from 

buying a gun. That does not mean every convicted felon is going 

to commit another crime. You have a law that says you cannot sell 

guns to minors. That does not mean that if we gave guns to every 

minor they would all use them and kill somebody. But I think— 

I know we disagree on this—it is a reasonable position to take, and 

there is the ability to contest if you are on the list. And if there 

are problems with the list, let us fix the list rather than not use 

it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, maybe we will have a good discussion 

about how to fix the list, and I would just end with this. I know 

my time is up. It is hard for me to believe that if 1,228 people have 

tried to buy guns who are on the list and 91 percent of them are 

allowed to buy guns and none of them are being prosecuted for any 

19 

terrorism-related offense, we have a good connect here. There is a 

disconnect somewhere between the people on the list and people we 

are actually going to prosecute. And before we subject innocent 

Americans who have done nothing but have the wrong name at the 

wrong time to having to go into court and pay the cost of going to 

court to get their gun rights back, I want to slow down and think 

about this. 

Mr. KING. Senator Graham, could I just reply to something you 

said about Mirandizing? 

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. 

Mr. KING. I agree with you and I believe Senator Lieberman 

completely on this. My reading of the Supreme Court decisions is 

that you can declare an American citizen an enemy combatant because they have moved the battlefield from Afghanistan and Pakistan here to the United States, and we should find legislation to 

refine that and define it. Jose ́ Padilla, as far as I am concerned, 

he was an enemy combatant. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. Let me just set the record straight from 

my perspective. The Fourth Circuit held that Padilla, an American 

citizen, could be held as an enemy combatant. We have had case 

law that says an American citizens overseas could be held as an 

enemy combatant. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue. 

It is my belief that the Supreme Court would allow the Congress 

to write a law that said the homeland is part of the battlefield. I 

cannot imagine the Supreme Court of the United States saying 

that the homeland is not part of the battlefield and that when it 

comes to an American citizen, they have a responsibility under the 

Constitution not to betray their country. And once you go down 

that road, then you should be viewed not as a common criminal but 

a military threat, and you cannot try an American citizen in military commissions. I helped write that law. But they can be tried 

in Federal court. There is a place for Federal court, and the charge 

of treason should always be on the table. No one was killed in this 

instance, thank God. But if it is proven that this man committed 

an act of treason against his fellow citizens, I want to keep that 

charge available to our government. So that is my view of that. 

Mr. KING. Senator, I believe Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in the 

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld case did say that Americans can be held as 

enemy combatants. I agree with you there is some question. Obviously, they cannot be tried in a tribunal. I think a method should 

be laid out where they can be interrogated—— 

Senator GRAHAM. I totally agree with you. 

Mr. KING [continuing]. And we get all the intelligence we possibly can. 

Senator GRAHAM. And let the people in New York help us write 

this law because they know more about it than anybody in the 

country, quite frankly. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Graham. I must say I 

am troubled by your concerns about this proposal because I think 

it is very limited. And what can I say? 

In this Committee, I have argued that we should more broadly 

apply the terrorism watchlist to give secondary screening to people 

before they board airplanes. This was something a lot of us reached 

20 

a conclusion about after the Abdulmutallab case, the Detroit bomber, because in the current state of operation, only people on two of 

the more limited lists—the No Fly and Selectee List—are actually 

given secondary screening when they show up for an airplane. It 

seems to me that if anybody is on a terrorism watchlist because 

somebody suspects that they may be a terrorist, it is in the interest 

of everybody else on that plane and of society to at least stop them 

and give them a secondary screening. 

Incidentally, that would have presumably found that Abdulmutallab had the explosives on his person, but leave the specifics 

of that aside. 

To me, the same is true here. If somebody is on a terrorism 

watchlist—most of the people on the terrorism watchlist are foreign 

nationals, but there are a good number of Americans. And why 

would we not want to give the Department of Justice discretionary 

authority when one of them comes in to buy a gun, a suspected terrorist, that after review of this during the 3-day waiting period to 

say, no, he cannot have a gun, or she cannot have a gun, they may 

be about to go out and try to kill some Americans? I just do not 

see an argument that is based on the rights of law-abiding citizens 

to own guns. 

Listen, if you have a criminal record today and that turns up 

when you go in to buy a gun in a federally licensed gun dealer, you 

cannot buy that gun. You do not have a choice. Now, that does not 

compromise the rights of law-abiding citizens to buy guns. Here we 

are not even making it that strong. Senator Lautenberg and Mr. 

King are not even trying to make it that strong. They are just saying give the Department of Justice discretionary authority—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Can I take a shot at that? No pun intended. 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You are my friend so—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Probably a bad choice of words. No, you are my 

friend, and, quite frankly—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But I do not get your concern about—— 

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let me try to explain it to you. I know 

I talk slowly. I will talk slower. I have got an accent. I assume that 

your inability to understand my argument is based on me, not you, 

and I will—— 

Mr. KING. Senator Graham, you are talking slowly enough. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I think I understand it. I just do not 

agree with it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Here is the argument, Mr. Lieberman. There 

is no constitutional right to get on an airplane without being 

screened of which I know. When the Founders sat down and wrote 

the Constitution, they did not consider flying. And I do not believe 

that the Constitution protects any of us from being able to get on 

an airplane without being screened, and here is the big elephant 

in the room. What if all of the secondary screening happens to be 

99 percent Muslim males? And that is where we are headed with 

this thing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Only if they are on the terrorism watchlist. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, but here is the issue about profiling. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Not because they are Muslim males. 

21 

Senator GRAHAM. We are at war, and we have to realize the profile of the enemy, and you do not want to focus on law-abiding 

American Muslim males who are serving in the military 

unjustifiably. So as you said, Mayor Bloomberg, this is not about 

a religion. There are plenty of people in this country of the Muslim 

faith who are fighting and dying for this country. So we have to 

watch what we are doing and what we are saying here. 

But, Senator Lieberman, we are talking about a Second Amendment right, and some of the people pushing this idea are also pushing the idea of banning handguns. And I do not think banning 

handguns makes me safer, because every criminal who wants a 

gun seems to be able to get one. And I do not believe taking this 

concept of gun ownership and denying it, after you have not been 

convicted in a lawful court of a felony, where you get your day in 

court with a lawyer and a jury. I think you are going too far here, 

because there is a huge difference between losing your gun rights 

based on a felony charge that was proven by a court of law and appealed and is a conviction on the books than being on some list 

that is at best suspect. And if everybody is that dangerous on the 

list, those who tried to buy a gun, nobody can tell me how many 

are being prosecuted. So I have a lot of concern that this is not 

going in the right direction because we are dealing with a constitutional right. And I am very concerned about our gaps in our defenses, but maybe I am not making a good argument here to you, 

but it makes perfect sense to me that losing the ability to own a 

gun, which is a constitutional right, using this list the way it is 

constructed is unnerving at best. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, you and I will continue this argument. But no one is trying to ban handguns here. I am not, and 

I certainly would not support that. Some may, but this is far from 

that. 

The Second Amendment constitutional right, just like the First, 

our most prized right—free speech, assembly, petitioning your government, freedom of religion—they are not unlimited. And to me, 

this is an extraordinarily limited law that is being proposed by 

Congressman King and others to say that somebody who is a suspected terrorist cannot buy a gun. We will continue that discussion, 

I am sure. 

I want to ask just a few more questions, and actually what I am 

about to ask would be to slightly expand the databases against 

which gun purchasers are related. 

Mayor Bloomberg, you said, quite correctly, that Nidal Hasan 

was not on a terrorism watchlist, but he was the subject of an active Joint Terrorism Task Force investigation. Because of reportedly the email contact that he had with Anwar al-Awlaki, the radical cleric in Yemen, there is a larger FBI database of people who 

are subjects of investigation. 

Congressman King, I was going to ask you—and, of course, this 

does not need to be done by law. It could be done by the FBI, by 

regulation, and I am going to ask him about in the second panel. 

For this precautionary system that we are talking about, 

wouldn’t it make sense to also ask that somebody coming in to purchase a gun be run through the larger database that the FBI has 

of people under active investigation? 

22 

Mr. KING. Senator, I would fully agree with that, and like you, 

being somewhat familiar with the case of Major Hasan, even 

though all the records have not been made available to us, yes, 

using that case as a classic example, I agree with you completely. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Commissioner, just a couple more questions quickly. NYPD has 

a program called Operation Nexus. It reaches out to businesses 

that sell or lease certain types of material and equipment that can 

be used to facilitate terrorist activities. I wanted to ask you to just 

talk a little bit about it and how it has worked and whether you 

think the Federal Government ought to try to encourage other communities to adopt the same kind of program. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, I was the U.S. Customs Service commissioner 

before I was police commissioner, and there actually is a program 

roughly similar to that in Customs. It had to do specifically with 

the airplane parts leaving the country, and that is, quite frankly, 

where I got the idea. 

Nexus is an outreach program on the part of the department 

where we go to businesses that may unwittingly be used by terrorists, even garden supply stores as far as fertilizer is concerned. We 

go to marinas and insecticide spraying companies. We have gone 

to conventions of storage facility owners, that sort of thing. And we 

have made about probably 50,000 visits since the beginning of this 

program, which started in 2002. It gives them a certificate and 

gives them a way of notifying us if they see something of a suspicious nature. 

As a matter of fact, the British authorities came here in 2003 

and said quite openly that they looked at this program and copied 

it, and it was helpful in Operation Crevice, which I am sure you 

are familiar with, in which there was ammonium nitrate stored in 

the storage facility in the United Kingdom. 

I see no downside in doing a similar program. People are under 

no obligation to call us, but the business owners who are approached seem to be supportive, seem to like it. They feel like they 

are sort of in the game, you might say. We give them a certificate 

that says NYPD, and it has been helpful in a series of leads. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that, and I think we are 

going to look at it and see if we can urge other communities to 

adopt it. 

There has been some reference here to the so-called gun show 

loophole, and that is not specifically the topic of this hearing, but 

it obviously is another concern that we have about the ability of 

would-be terrorists to buy firearms at gun shows without having to 

go through the checks, including the ones that we are trying to expand and toughen here, that they would if they walked into a federally licensed gun shop. 

I am going to ask both the Commissioner and the Mayor, I believe the NYPD did an investigation of gun shows recently and 

reached what I thought were some very important conclusions 

about it. I wonder if either of you wanted to share that with our 

Committee. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Senator, it was a private group that we had 

hired that did the investigation, but let me just for the record explain what the gun show loophole is. 

23 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Please. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. The Federal laws require background checks 

if you buy a gun from a dealer. There is an exemption at a gun 

show, ostensibly so that if you owned one gun and you wanted to 

sell it to me, we would not have to go through any of the investigatory process. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. The trouble is that if you go to gun shows, 

you will find people coming in not with one gun to sell but with 

hundreds of guns to sell. They are fundamentally dealers. They 

have the same size inventory as the legally registered gun dealers 

who go to these gun shows, but the law does not apply to them. 

I do not think that Congress meant that loophole to be a way 

around having professional sellers of guns avoid the regulation that 

you have to do a background check. It was meant for individual 

purchases, for one gun or two, and it has been used for something 

different. And so closing that gun show loophole, requiring the 

same processes for non-registered dealers, but who are effectively 

dealers, as you do for registered dealers would just help the government keep guns out of those that the Federal Government has 

already legislated should not have them—convicted felons and minors, people with severe mental problems. And there are some categories, and I think the terror gap is just another one of the categories. 

I am sympathetic to Senator Graham’s concerns. I think he is a 

very thoughtful Senator, and he has put a lot of time into this. I 

would argue, and hopefully will be able to convince him and everybody else in Congress, that this is consistent with the other laws 

that the Congress has passed and that the Supreme Court has said 

are reasonable. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Commissioner, tell us a little, 

as best you recall, about some of the findings of that study. I saw 

something about it, and I was struck by, frankly, just how willing 

a lot of the gun show dealers are to break the law. 

Mr. KELLY. Well, again, as the Mayor said, this investigation was 

done by private investigators, but we are obviously concerned about 

the gun show loophole. It has been known. You know, it is talked 

about on the street. Certainly, in some States it is more of a problem than others. We have certain States that seem to contribute 

excessively to the guns that we find on the streets of our city, and 

gun shows sort of predominate in a lot of those States. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. Let me just add one other thing, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. In our investigation at these gun shows, we 

made sure that the seller of the gun, who was somebody that we 

had hired, said to the potential buyer, ‘‘If you had to go through 

a background check, would you pass?’’ And 63 percent—and we 

have them all on tape—said, ‘‘Absolutely not. I would not pass.’’ 

So there is no question what is happening here. People who could 

not go to a reputable dealer—and 99 percent of the gun dealers in 

this country are reputable. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mayor BLOOMBERG. And they do insist on the background check. 

People who cannot buy guns that way go to gun shows to avoid the 

24 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Roberts appears in the Appendix on page 52. 

Federal law, and I do not think that Congress wants that to happen. They in their good judgment passed the law. It should be enforced. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I agree. Congressman King, Mayor 

Bloomberg, Commissioner Kelly, thanks very much for your testimony. Thanks for taking the time in the middle of everything else 

you are doing to come. It truly helps us draw attention to this gap, 

and hopefully it will encourage our colleagues to vote to close the 

gap. Have a good day. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. We will call the second panel. 

We will give the first panel a moment or two to find their way out. 

[Pause.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come back to order, and 

we will call the second panel: Daniel D. Roberts, Assistant Director, 

Criminal Justice Information Services Division (CJIS) of the FBI; 

Eileen Larence, Director of Homeland Security and Justice at the 

U.S. Government Accountability Office; Sandy Jo MacArthur, Assistant Chief of Administrative Services at the Los Angeles Police 

Department; and Aaron Titus, who is the Privacy Director at the 

Liberty Coalition. 

I thank all of you for being here. While the room is not quite as 

crowded as it was for the first panel, your testimony is very important to us. The statements you submitted for the record will all be 

made, without objection, part of the record of this hearing, and we 

would welcome your testimony now. We will begin with Mr. Roberts. 

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL D. ROBERTS,1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 

CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE 

Mr. ROBERTS. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking 

Member Collins, and Members of the Committee. It is my pleasure 

to address you today regarding the FBI’s efforts to respond to attempted purchases of firearms from licensed dealers and applications for firearms and explosives permits from State agencies by 

Known or Appropriately Suspected Terrorists (KSTs) listed on the 

Nation’s consolidated watchlist. 

First, I want to make it clear that the FBI does not take a passive approach to persons suspected of being involved or associated 

with terrorism. Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces are engaged every 

day, and across the country, in following up leads, monitoring intelligence, and otherwise pursuing information about suspected terrorists who may be trying to obtain the means by which they and 

their associates can do harm to this country and its citizens. 

Our efforts to identify watchlisted KSTs attempting to obtain 

firearms includes, but is not limited to, the use of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) process. The 

Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 requires a Federal 

Firearms Licensee (FFL) to contact the NICS before any firearm 

transfer to a non-licensee so the NICS can perform a background 

25 

check to determine whether the receipt of a firearm by the prospective transferee would violate Federal or State law. Background 

checks are initiated through one of three NICS Contracted Call 

Centers, a State-designated Point of Contact, or through the NICS 

E-Check Web site via the Internet. 

When the NICS was first established, each State either elected 

to perform their own checks, have the FBI perform the checks, or 

share the responsibility with the FBI. Some States charge a fee for 

firearms checks while the FBI NICS section by law cannot. In calendar year 2009, over 14.3 million checks were conducted by the 

FBI and State Points of Contact. From February 2004 to December 

2009, there were 1,225 total valid KST matches and 109 total denials of KST matches. 

Once the descriptive information for the proposed transferee is 

entered into the NICS system, the NICS personnel conduct a name 

search for the matching records in three databases. The databases 

are the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which contains, among other things, information on wanted persons and protection orders; the Interstate Identification Index (III), which contains criminal history records; and the NICS Index, which contains 

the names and information concerning persons subject to one or 

more of the disqualifiers contained in the Brady Act. The NICS 

Index includes individuals who have been determined to be prohibited from possessing a firearm by Federal law for reasons that are 

not reflected in the NCIC or III systems, such as mental health 

concerns. If the transferee indicates that he or she is not a U.S. citizen, then the NICS also queries databases of the Department of 

Homeland Security to ensure that the transferee’s immigration status does not preclude them from obtaining a firearm. 

One of the files queried by the NICS contained within the NCIC 

is the KST file. The KST file is populated by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) with descriptive identities maintained on persons 

who are known terrorists or for whom there is a reasonable suspicion that they are terrorists. This file is managed by the Terrorism Screening Center and is known as the Terrorist Screening 

Database (TSDB). The FBI NICS Command Center examiner will 

contact TSC immediately to inform them a NICS hit to an NCIC 

KST record has occurred and to attempt to confirm the transferee’s 

identity to further validate an accurate match has been made. If 

the TSC and the FBI NICS Section determines the subject of the 

NICS transaction does appear to be a match, then the TSC will forward the information to the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division. 

Within the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI, the first step 

performed immediately is to determine if there is an active FBI investigation on the KST. If there is, the FBI case agent is immediately notified and placed in direct contact with the FBI NICS examiner to determine whether there is any information in the case 

file, or known to the case agent, that would disqualify the KST 

under the Brady Act from possessing a firearm. Since this process 

was initiated in 2004, approximately 1,200 such encounters have 

occurred, and in approximately 90 percent of those, no prohibiting 

information was found to deny the transfer. 

If the FBI case agent does not provide any State or federally prohibitive information and no prohibitive information was returned 

26 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Larence appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

from the query of the NICS databases, then the FBI NICS Command Center examiner contacts the FFL and changes the transaction status from delay to proceed. If the determination cannot be 

made in 3 business days, the FFL is entitled by law to transfer the 

firearm. If prohibiting information is discovered after 3 business 

days and the firearm has been transferred, the ATF is contacted 

and initiates a separate process to retrieve the firearm. In a case 

involving a watchlisted KST, this would occur in coordination with 

the JTTF. 

If an individual believes they have been erroneously denied a 

firearm transfer, they may submit a request to appeal their denial 

decision. As mandated by law and Federal regulation, the FBI 

NICS Section will respond to the individual’s written request by 

providing the general reason for their denial within 5 business 

days after receiving the individual’s correspondence. Under the current procedures, the individual’s reason for denial will be one of the 

10 Federal prohibitors and never the KST hit itself. 

In summary, the FBI has and will use every lawful and appropriate investigative and analytical tool at its disposal to scrutinize 

and monitor any attempt by a watchlisted KST to acquire a firearm or to obtain an alternate firearm or an explosives permit. 

While those tools and techniques have their limits, we believe they 

have been highly effective when dealing with the regulated sale of 

firearms. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Roberts. That was actually 

very helpful to be taken through the steps, and I will have some 

questions for you when we get to that point. 

Ms. Larence, thanks for being here, and obviously we are citing 

your work a lot, so please tell us more about it. 

TESTIMONY OF EILEEN R. LARENCE,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. LARENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our review of how the Federal Government uses 

the terrorist watchlist when checking the backgrounds of individuals who want to buy a firearm or obtain certain firearm or explosives licenses or permits, as well as the results of these checks. 

As discussed earlier, being on the watchlist does not automatically disqualify someone from possessing or receiving firearms or 

explosives; rather, there must be a disqualifying factor, such as a 

felony conviction or immigration violation. 

Over the years, Mr. Chairman, as you recognized in your opening 

statement, this condition has raised concerns about individuals 

using firearms and explosive to conduct acts of terror in the United 

States, concerns that have grown with recent incidents. GAO began 

in 2005 to review the use of the watchlist for these background 

checks and made a number of recommendations which the FBI has 

implemented. For example, the Bureau now handles all checks, including those from State and local law enforcement agencies, that 

are potential or actual matches to the watchlist. 

27 

My testimony today will give an update on three areas of our 

work. First, I will provide current statistics on how often individuals on the watchlist have been deemed eligible to possess or 

receive firearms or explosives. Second, I will describe how the information from background checks is used and shared to support investigations and counterterrorism activities. And, finally, I will discuss factors to consider if the Attorney General is given the authority to deem individuals ineligible to possess or receive firearms or 

explosives based on an assessment of the terrorist threat posed. 

As has been stated, since February 2004, when the FBI began 

running background checks against watchlist records, through February of this year, in 1,119 cases, or about 91 percent of the time, 

individuals on the watchlist were deemed eligible to possess or receive firearms or explosives. Three of these cases involved explosives. About 9 percent of the time, watchlisted individuals were 

deemed ineligible or denied. Data the FBI collected between April 

2009 and February of this year show denials were due most often 

to prohibiting factors in State law, felony convictions, and indictments, among other things. 

According to the FBI, the 1,119 cases involved about 650 unique 

people because 450 of them tried to make purchases or obtain licenses or permits more than once and 6 of them more than 10 

times. In addition, we learned that several of the individuals 

matched to the watchlist during background checks were also on 

the Transportation Security Administration’s No Fly List. As you 

know, people on this list are deemed to be a threat to civil aviation 

or national security and are, therefore, stopped from boarding a 

plane. But none of these individuals were deemed ineligible for firearms or explosives because there were no legally disqualifying factors. 

Our work also showed that the FBI does not check all records in 

the watchlist, and we asked if this posed a security vulnerability. 

According to officials with the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, the 

database used to conduct checks only accepts those records from 

the watchlist that contain enough biographic information to readily 

determine if the person being checked is an exact match to the person on the watchlist. Not all watchlist records contain sufficient information such as a full name and date of birth. The officials stated 

that the majority of records not checked, however, are related to 

foreign nationals, who would not be prospective purchasers of firearms or explosives within the United States. We are continuing to 

assess this issue. 

We also learned that if a check results in a positive match to the 

watchlist, FBI counterterrorism officials can work with FBI personnel who conduct the checks, the Bureau’s Terrorist Screening 

Center, ATF, gun dealers, and State and local law enforcement 

agencies to obtain more information to verify a match, confirm eligibility, and enhance case files and investigations. The FBI issued 

guidance in 2005 to its field units explaining how to do this. 

We do know that once a dealer is informed that an individual is 

deemed eligible to purchase a firearm, the FBI section conducting 

the checks must destroy certain identifying information about that 

individual within 24 hours, and if deemed eligible for a permit 

within 90 days. Information on denials can be retained indefinitely. 

28 

In contrast, information obtained by FBI case agents or counterterrorism officials to support investigations and counterterrorism 

efforts can be retained and shared. The 2005 guidance explains to 

case agents in the field how they can share information with other 

Federal, State, and local entities consistent with State law. In addition, the FBI Counterterrorism Division now routinely analyzes 

background check information for watchlisted individuals to identify patterns and threats and disseminates monthly reports 

throughout the Bureau. FBI officials noticed that the individuals 

discussed in these reports range from those who are somewhat of 

a concern to those who represent a significant threat. Similarly, the 

Terrorist Screening Center shares information on positive watchlist 

encounters daily with some Federal, State, and local entities. 

Finally, as the Congress debates whether to give the Attorney 

General authority to deem individuals ineligible for firearms or explosives because information indicates that the person might use 

them in connection with terrorism, we continue to maintain that 

the Attorney General should be required to develop guidelines for 

these decisions. The development of such guidelines delineating 

under what circumstances he would deem someone ineligible would 

be consistent with the development of standards, criteria, and examples used for determining when to deny a person entry to the 

country or the boarding of a plane. Guidelines would also provide 

a means for holding the Attorney General accountable for using 

this authority carefully and help to ensure that private and civil 

liberties are protected. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy 

to answer any questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much. 

I just want to draw attention to something you said, and we will 

come back to it because it really is important, that several—the 

term you used—of the people on the list that applied to purchase 

a gun were on the No Fly List, and that is a very small list. My 

recollection—I do not know if you know, Mr. Roberts, but it is 

about 2,000. In other words, those are the ones that if they show 

up to go on a plane, they are immediately pulled aside, not for secondary screening but they grab them. And it is amazing that some 

of those have not been stopped from buying a gun. So I will come 

back to that because I want to get into the inner workings of what 

happens after the hit is made. 

The next witness is Sandy Jo MacArthur, Assistant Chief of the 

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). I really appreciate your 

taking the time and making the effort to come across the country. 

LAPD has another great counterterrorism program and a great police department, and I thank you for representing all the members 

of the department here this morning. 

29 

1The prepared statement of Ms. MacArthur appears in the Appendix on page 69. 

TESTIMONY OF SANDY JO MACARTHUR,1 ASSISTANT CHIEF, 

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 

Ms. MACARTHUR. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished Committee Members. 

Thank you for holding this hearing on firearms and terrorism. 

I represent the city of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police 

Department. I have been an LAPD officer for 30 years, and I am 

now an Assistant Chief. During the years that I have served, we 

have dealt with extraordinary violence in the streets of Los Angeles 

involving hard-core criminals, gang members, and weapons. We 

have been the target of terrorist threats, including threats to our 

airports and threats by domestic terrorist groups. Our experience 

with responding to and investigating such violent crimes has 

helped us define how to most effectively stop such violence through 

prevention efforts. Our efforts allow our city today to boast of crime 

rates not seen in Los Angeles since the 1950s. This has not occurred by accident but rather by using our experiences and continuously improving our policing efforts. Today I am going to address three issues of interest to this Committee. 

First, there is a belief that it is not a matter of if, but when, one 

of our national urban communities is once again attacked either by 

a foreign or domestic terrorist in the form of gang members, hardened criminals, Islamist terrorists, or the lone wolf. 

Second, I want to explain the scope of the term ‘‘prevention’’ and 

what the LAPD has incorporated into our first responder training 

to address a terrorist incident or multiple location attack. 

And, third, I want to talk about the role legislation can play in 

support of local law enforcement’s fight against terrorism and violence and closing the terror gap. 

In February 1997, two armed gunmen held over 100 LAPD officers at bay for nearly an hour in the infamous North Hollywood 

Bank shootout. They utilized rifles and expended hundreds of 

rounds of ammunition, similar to the weaponry used by terrorist 

cells today. It was local law enforcement that finally ended the confrontation. 

In May 2005, four Muslim radical suspects, armed with shotguns, went on a crime spree in Southern California. As a result of 

local law enforcement and the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, they uncovered a larger and greater conspiracy and prevented the suspects’ planned attacks to maximize the number of 

casualties in Southern California. 

In November 2008, we watched in horror as terrorists executed 

multiple attacks in Mumbai, India, with rifles and explosives. This 

past week in Times Square, we had yet another near miss, and 

thanks to vigilant citizens and the New York police officers, the 

plot was foiled. In all cases, it was local law enforcement who responded first. 

The potential for an attack on the United States exists. Continued threats from foreign or domestic terrorist groups or a Mumbaistyle attack is a real danger. Radical prison gangs direct gang 

members not incarcerated to target innocent individuals, law enVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:53 Oct 19, 2011 Jkt 057935 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57935.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30 

forcement, and government entities for violence. Individual extremists such as Timothy McVeigh demonstrated just how violent and 

devastating one angry, deranged individual can be. 

After Mumbai, the LAPD realized that our street officers were 

not prepared to respond to a simultaneous multi-event attack on 

the City of Los Angeles and worked with other law enforcement 

agencies to evolve the first responders’ capabilities to defend the region. We realized that local law enforcement is the first line of defense to prevent and to respond to violent or potentially violent incidents. 

Prevention is far greater than simply preventing a crime from occurring. It includes the mandate that during a violent event patrol 

officers must prevent further mayhem or loss of life. The patrol officer is key to preventing violent incidents from escalating into 

events that end in mass casualties such as Mumbai. We cannot 

solely rely on SWAT teams or counterterrorism officers. 

To address this gap in tactical patrol capabilities, we embarked 

on a multi-agency, regional effort to evolve our first responder tactics. We understand that our ability to react in minutes rather 

than hours saves lives. The result of our efforts are new patrol tactics we refer to as our Multiple Assault Counter-Terrorism Action 

Capabilities (MACTAC). These tactics are similar to our military’s 

tactics that have been perfected and are currently in use overseas 

as we fight terrorism. 

To date, we have trained over 6,000 of the LAPD’s officers and 

approximately 200 officers from around the country. We have over 

1,100 officers now trained in the use of patrol rifles. This training 

can standardize local law enforcement’s tactics and allow seamless 

support in the event that a city has the need to call in mutual aid 

to resolve an incident. These 21st Century policing tactics are key 

to the successful prevention of casualties during a violent encounter and to provide officers the ability to engage indiscriminate 

shooters, respond rapidly to an unfolding violent incident, and has 

significantly raised the tactical competency of our street-level officers in Los Angeles. 

Finally, we need government to support the continued development of an integrated intelligence capability and standardized tactical training to keep our Nation safe. Training is costly but critically important in the prevention and the fight against terror and 

violence. The training we have developed has the potential to 

standardize the tactics used by over 700,000 local law enforcement 

officers throughout the country. 

As we know, the first several hours of any violent terrorist incident will be the responsibility of the local law enforcement who will 

be placed in harm’s way and expected to neutralize an attack. Providing these front-line officers standardized tactical training will 

transform these first responders into a coordinated team, able to 

prevent further violence; a true force multiplier against domestic or 

international terrorism. The cost of providing that training is well 

worth the lives that are certain to be saved, and Federal and financial support would be an investment in our Nation’s safety. 

Training is only part of the equation. It is of paramount importance that we continue to improve our information-sharing capabilities between Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies 

31 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Titus appears in the Appendix on page 75. 

regarding intelligence collection, to prevent weapons from getting 

into the hands of the potential terrorist, while offering law-abiding 

citizens their constitutional protections. This can stop terrorist attacks in their tracks. Thank you for this opportunity to speak 

today. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Ms. MacArthur. 

Thanks for being here representing the Liberty Coalition. The 

Minority recommended you as a witness, and we are glad to have 

you and look forward to hearing you now. 

TESTIMONY OF AARON TITUS,1 PRIVACY DIRECTOR, LIBERTY 

COALITION 

Mr. TITUS. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member 

Collins, and Members of the Committee. My name is Aaron Titus. 

I am the Privacy Director for the Liberty Coalition. 

The Liberty Coalition works with more than 80 partner organization from across the political spectrum to preserve the Bill of 

Rights, personal autonomy, and individual privacy. The Liberty Coalition works with but does not speak for our partners. 

I am aware that many in this audience have been personally affected by gun violence. Managing guns and other weapons is a matter of public concern. Regardless of one’s position on gun safety and 

gun control, the Supreme Court has unambiguously ruled that the 

right to bear arms is an individual, constitutionally enumerated 

right. The Second Amendment is not absolute, and the government 

may regulate the right to bear arms in many ways. 

But S. 1317 goes too far. The bill should be titled ‘‘The Gun Owners Are Probably All Terrorists Act’’ because it strips citizens of 

their constitutional right to keep and bear arms without any meaningful due process. And S. 2820 should be called the ‘‘National Firearm Registry Act’’ because it creates a national firearm registry. So 

I suggest that we call it what it is. If you would like to make a 

national firearm registry, then go through the proper process, call 

it what it is, and have a meaningful public debate. 

S. 2820 creates a massive database of names and detailed personal information of every law-abiding citizen who purchases a 

gun. The bill disingenuously purports to target terrorists. But in 

fact, only one ten-thousandth of 1 percent of these records belong 

to people on watchlists. Every year, only 200 new watchlist records 

will be created, but the system will generate more than 14 million 

records on law-abiding citizens. Once collected, there is no limit on 

what the information may be used for and no legal requirement to 

ever delete it. At the very least, we should call this bill what it is. 

It is a National Gun Registry Act. 

Reading S. 1317, one would think that it is lawful for convicted 

terrorists to own guns. That is simply not true. Convicted terrorists 

cannot own guns. Not only that, but today’s discussion totally 

misses the point. This Committee should not spend time debating 

on whether to take away terrorists’ guns, bombs, cell phones, or 

any other instruments of terror. If a person is a dangerous terrorist, then he should be thrown in jail. The only things a real, conVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:53 Oct 19, 2011 Jkt 057935 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\57935.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
32 

victed terrorist should own are an orange jumpsuit and a pair of 

leg chains. 

Assuming for a moment that everyone on a watchlist is a terrorist, as this bill suggests, then I propose that this Committee 

start throwing every single one of those hundreds of thousands of 

people in jail, starting today. But you and I know that the Constitution will not let you do that. And if you cannot throw citizens 

in jail for being on a watchlist, you cannot revoke their Second 

Amendment rights either. 

Right now, a citizen who is denied a firearms purchase has the 

right to know exactly why, and appeal. But S. 1317 changes that. 

If a citizen’s name is on a watchlist, the Attorney General does not 

have to tell him why he was denied, if he thinks that tipping off 

the citizen might compromise national security. 

If a citizen is able to appeal the decision in court, things only get 

harder and more confusing. Neither the citizen nor his attorney 

can see the evidence against him. They can only see summaries 

and redacted versions. Not even the judge may consider the 

unredacted evidence. 

A citizen will lose his appeal if the Attorney General can prove, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, not that the individual poses 

a risk, or that the person is a terrorist, or even that the person is 

under investigation; rather, the Attorney General must only demonstrate that the citizen has been placed on a watchlist. Once that 

has been proven, the appeal is over, and the citizen loses his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. 

The citizen will not have a chance to introduce evidence of innocence, abuse of executive discretion, or mount any other meaningful 

defense. I have heard of this type of judicial system being applied 

to non-citizens, but never to citizens of the United States, and especially on a matter of constitutional importance. 

Times may have changed, Mr. Chairman, but fortunately the 

Constitution has not. 

Criminal and terrorist investigations must be kept confidential. 

But S. 1317 misunderstands that investigation is not guilt. Suspicion is not a conviction. And the law has a technical word for people who have not been convicted of a crime. It is called ‘‘innocent.’’ 

Terror watchlists have no meaningful element of due process and 

are, therefore, fundamentally different from other lists scanned by 

the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. Terror 

watchlists by their nature are designed to be overbroad. A name 

on a terror watchlist is evidence of government interest in a person, not proof of terrorism. 

The bald allegation of a suspicion of terrorist inclinations is insufficient evidence to overcome an individual’s right to bear arms. 

Mr. Chairman, suspicion is not a conviction. 

S. 1317 takes away a citizen’s right to face his accusers. This bill 

takes away a citizen’s right to appeal. This bill takes away a citizen’s right to due process. And if you cannot throw them in jail because they are on a watchlist, then you cannot revoke their Second 

Amendment rights either. 

Mr. Chairman, this bill is unconstitutional, and I urge this Committee to reject S. 1317 and S. 2820. 

I am happy to respond to questions. 

33 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Titus. You will not be surprised to hear that I disagree with you, but I appreciate the fact 

that you stated your case and did it thoughtfully. 

Let me begin by picking up on your testimony, Mr. Roberts, and 

using some of the numbers in the study that GAO and Ms. Larence 

did of the 1,225 or 1,228 cases that we have talked about where 

there was a match by a potential gun purchaser with the terrorism 

watchlist, and this goes down—the 91 percent of those who were 

not stopped because they hit some mandatory rejection database 

like a criminal record, 650 unique people. 

So what happened? And I would just state for the record, I am 

not sure we have ever said this. As I understand it—and please 

confirm it for me—it was by executive action that the Department 

of Justice, not by legislative action, began to apply the names of 

people applying for gun licenses to the terrorism watchlist. Is that 

correct? In other words, it was not legislatively mandated. 

Mr. ROBERTS. In terms of the database that we check? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is correct. There is no mandate that we check 

certain databases. We are open to checking many of them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Correct. And so to some extent, the reason why this hit on the terrorism watchlist from a potential gun 

purchaser is not reason of itself, as other hits are on other 

watchlists, to deny the gun permit is because Congress has never 

legislated on that. In other words, you do not have the authority 

by executive order, without congressional authorization, to not only 

apply to additional watchlists but to then prohibit a gun purchase, 

correct? 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is correct. We are limited to the 10 prohibitors that are in the Brady Act. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Now, as I mentioned, the Bush Administration attempted, in 2007, to add that discretionary authority, and 

obviously the legislation that we have discussed today would do the 

same. What, generally speaking, happens to those 650 unique people? In other words, when somebody on a terrorism watchlist comes 

in to apply for a gun permit to buy a gun, the FBI, we know now, 

cannot deny that purchase. 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But what happens? I presume that some 

extra attention is paid to those people. Can you talk about that? 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is absolutely correct. The FFL gets a notice 

from our NICS section that they are to delay the transaction, 

which buys us basically 3 days to do some additional investigation, 

at which point we immediately notify the Terrorism Screening Center of the KST hit that we found in NCIC. 

We work with the Terrorism Screening Center and then the 

FBI’s Counterterrorism Division to make sure everybody is in the 

loop and that everybody knows that this person on the KST list is 

attempting to buy a firearm. 

We then talk to the FBI case agent, and find out if there is additional information that he or she may have in his or her possession 

that would preclude the firearms transaction. In other words, the 

case agent may know that individual is under sealed indictments, 

may know that there was an arrest that we did not know about 

34 

that was not in III or something to that effect, a prohibitor that 

is under the Brady Act now. So we would explore that, and we 

would also provide to him the information about the KST attempting to purchase a firearm and the FFL that he or she was using 

to do that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Fine. Let me ask the next question. The 

3 days passes. The individual on the terrorism watchlist purchases 

the gun. For the information of the public, let alone the Committee, 

I presume that is not the end of it for the FBI. In other words, can 

the public have some reassurance that these people are being 

watched, basically? 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is absolutely correct. It could be a key piece 

of evidence for the JTTF agent who is working that case. And let 

me just say that of the times that we have had the 3-day waiting 

period expire and the individual on the KST list was subsequently 

transferred a firearm, we have never had to go back to ATF to have 

that gun retrieved for a KST hit. We have in other instances, but 

not in a KST hit. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So the question was raised earlier, what 

has happened to those people? In other words, we have no evidence 

that they have gone ahead and committed a terrorist act. Is that 

a fair conclusion or do we not really know? 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I think it is a case-by-case basis, and I think 

it is up to the individual case and the individual case agent to determine where it goes from there and whether the fact that the individual on the KST list is attempting to buy a firearm is relevant 

to his or her case or not. Each case is going to be completely different. It could very well be that the JTTF agent decides that additional scrutiny is necessary of that individual and, for example, put 

additional surveillance on that individual or some other investigative technique. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I presume that if somebody who had risen 

to a high enough level of concern to be on the No Fly List comes 

in to buy a gun, the FBI is going to pay special attention to that. 

Mr. ROBERTS. I can assure you that all of these KSTs get special 

attention and are immediately dealt with, both at our office in the 

CJIS Division as well as at the Counterterrorism Division. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Do I understand that today you are not 

authorized to say whether the FBI is in favor or against this legislation? 

Mr. ROBERTS. I am not authorized to do that. That is a Department of Justice call, and I have not been authorized to do so. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I gather from previous testimony and just 

hearsay that Attorney General Holder has said he would support 

such legislation, but I gather that that has not been specifically 

conveyed to you. 

Mr. ROBERTS. It has not. I have not been part of those discussions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you then the next question, 

which I asked Commissioner Kelly. Maybe it is self-evident. To 

what extent can one conclude that the purchase of a firearm by 

somebody who is a terrorism suspect and, therefore, on the 

watchlist may indicate that person is moving to activate, to be 

operational, to actually carry out a terrorist attack? 

35 

Mr. ROBERTS. It is probably a better question for our Counterterrorism Division to answer than me, but I will say that it could very 

well be or it may not be. There is a whole host of range of answers 

there regarding each separate case. But I think I would have to 

defer to the Counterterrorism Division of the FBI for a better answer to that question. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Am I right that everybody who is a KST 

has a case officer? 

Mr. ROBERTS. It may not be an FBI case officer, but most of them 

are. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. So presumably somebody on the No 

Fly List who came in to purchase a gun—— 

Mr. ROBERTS. Should have an FBI case agent. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Would have an FBI case officer. 

Mr. ROBERTS. Or a JTTF case agent. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, exactly. So, in other words, if this 

was a person being followed and the gun was purchased, there 

would be up to each case officer to determine whether that was an 

indication that this individual, based on the full range of information they had, was about to go active. 

Mr. ROBERTS. That is correct, because it is my understanding 

that many or at least some of the individuals on the KST list may 

be those types of cases where they are providing material support 

in the form of funding to, say, Hezbollah and not necessarily an 

operational type of case. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Let me ask you a different kind of 

question, which is about potentially expanding the list that the FBI 

runs the potential gun purchasers against, which is cases—I used 

the words ‘‘active investigation.’’ I know that is a term of art, and 

I may have overused it. But those are cases where there is some 

interest in an individual, but not to the level that they have made 

it to the terrorism watchlist. And here, mindful of the kinds of constitutional concerns, it just seems to me that knowing that any action here can ultimately be brought to court by a defendant, that 

you would want to know whether that person has gone in to buy 

a gun. 

So I do not know whether you are able to indicate what you 

think about the idea that we have been talking about, about urging 

the FBI to expand the list that runs the potential gun purchasers 

against. 

Mr. ROBERTS. Well, I will start by saying that the law does not 

preclude us or limit us to checking any databases. The challenge 

here is—and I think you are generally talking about querying the 

FBI’s Automated Case Support (ACS) system. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The ACS list, and I gather you are going 

to a new system called Sentinel. 

Mr. ROBERTS. At some point, right. The problem there is that, as 

I mentioned in my testimony, several of the States do the gun 

checks themselves, Point of Contact States such as Connecticut. 

They would not have access to ACS. There are security issues, 

there are a host of technical concerns, but mostly security issues 

since ACS is a classified network and contains classified information. So it is a difficult question and a very technically challenging 

question. 

36 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will continue this discussion. I may 

send a letter over just asking some questions about it to see if it 

can be helpful in preventing terrorists from obtaining guns. 

Ms. MacArthur, let me ask a related question. I understand that 

the LAPD has been tracking purchases of weapons and ammunition for purposes of developing intelligence regarding imminent violence and criminal use of firearms. I wonder if you could describe 

what the Department has been doing and whether your results 

have been successful, and obviously particularly whether they have 

all been related to attempts to prevent firearms from being acquired by terrorists. 

Ms. MACARTHUR. We have been tracking both the firearms purchases as well as the ammunition purchases, and the ammunition 

purchases are not yet automated in the State. So what we have 

right now is several of our task forces that are particularly successful have been our violent crime task forces that actually will go out 

to various dealers on a random basis and sometimes not so random 

basis, depending on the investigations that may be going on, pull 

their files and bring them in, and then we begin to run who has 

purchased the ammunition. What we have found in particular is 

that there are many times when we have actually been able to flag 

people who have criminal convictions that would prevent them 

from buying the ammunition if they had been run into a system. 

We do follow-ups. We have arrested people. We have sent people 

back to prison. We find people on felony probation and parole, people who have domestic violence, which is a big problem in Los Angeles—I think it is across the country—that have purchased ammunition and should not have been able to purchase it. 

So we find that these lists have become very valuable in terms 

of not just the terrorism front, but the violence front in general. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very good. In your testimony, you described how the Mumbai attacks demonstrated to the LAPD that 

reliance on SWAT teams would not be sufficient to prevent a violent event like Mumbai from escalating. I wonder if you could explain what the LAPD has done to better prepare front-line police 

officers to respond to that kind of attack. 

Ms. MACARTHUR. Yes. As we watched Mumbai, and several incidents, actually, across the world over the last 10 or 15 years, we 

started to understand—as you know, we developed the SWAT 

team. We are the first one in the country to have it. We are very 

proud of it, and we find it very useful. 

However, watching Mumbai in particular, having multiple incidents occur is really counter to what SWAT teams are designed for. 

We have a SWAT team, and they respond to one incident at one 

time, contain, control, and manage it hopefully in a safe manner. 

What you saw with Mumbai is multiple attacks almost simultaneously, and we saw the first responders were the people who were 

going to run into harm’s way. 

Typically, what we have trained our officers in law enforcement 

across the country for years is to get to the situation, assess it, contain it, control it, and then hopefully call in additional units for assessment. We understand that is where we are going to lose lives. 

So what we did is we brought together a multi-agency and multidisciplinary approach when we were developing the new tactics. We 

37 

brought in law enforcement from across Southern California, including Las Vegas. We brought in tactical team members from our 

SWAT teams. And we also brought in several of our officers who 

have just returned from Iraq and Afghanistan. And we looked at 

how to better police in an urban environment in a terrorist attack 

situation. 

What we found was typically our officers, as most officers, either 

ride as a one-person car or a two-person car, and two people are 

not sufficient to go down range to deal with the threat. But at the 

same time, we do not have the opportunity to wait for 40 people 

to respond in a SWAT configuration. So we are utilizing the tactics 

that are used by our military. We have designed a total different 

approach for what we now ask officers to do when you have a violent incident unfolding, is to assess, announce through communications what you have, assemble a team of no less than four, and 

then act, which is quite different than what we have been training 

in the past. 

We have now been doing training with our region, and it allows 

an officer from Los Angeles Police Department with our port police, 

with our school police, with our sheriffs, and with Las Vegas, as 

officers arrive on scene, to marry up with other officers from other 

agencies, all being trained in the same tactics in what we consider 

going down range and dealing with the threat, neutralizing the 

threat, and hopefully preventing additional mayhem and loss of 

life. 

What we also found when we were looking at this is that we 

were sorely underrepresented in the weapons system. We have officers out there with sidearms, and we had very few officers that 

were out there with rifles. So we have really stepped up our approach to arming our officers so that our officers can meet the terrorists with equal or superior weaponry. 

So as I stated earlier, we have over 1,100 officers that are now 

trained with the police rifle. They carry them in their police cars 

every single day. And we understand that they are going to probably have to use those in an environment that we have described 

earlier. 

So we have presented at the International Association of Chiefs 

of Police and several other agencies throughout the country, and 

everybody from our police administrators to our tacticians have acknowledged that this was a gap for some time now. So we invite 

people to come into our agency to do the training. We have sent 

people to other agencies, to the East Coast as well, to do training. 

And we see this as protecting our line officers and protecting the 

citizens who will be victims of such attacks. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very impressive and reassuring. 

Ms. Larence, just one question. I appreciate the recommendations that GAO made from its study in this regard, and I was interested in your call for some guidelines for the action of the Justice 

Department here. And I wanted to ask you to just talk a little bit 

more, flesh out a little bit the general idea that you have here. 

Ms. LARENCE. Well, as you know, people can be nominated to the 

terrorist watchlist based on a reasonable suspicion they pose a terrorist threat but are not necessarily directly linked to terrorism. 

And so the concept of guidelines would be for the Department of 

38 

Justice to determine what kinds of links, what kinds of evidence, 

or what information in the record would raise to the level of concern that the person would be a threat that would merit a denial 

of a firearm or explosive. 

We have guidelines, criteria, and examples that the Department 

uses to place people on the No Fly List. So depending, for example, 

on a person’s affiliation with certain organizations, the strength of 

that affiliation might determine what level of threat the person 

poses. 

I think sometimes people may be concerned if someone has unfettered discretion, so we think guidelines on using this discretion 

would be consistent with the way the government operates other 

screening processes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Roberts, what do you think about 

that? 

Mr. ROBERTS. It is not my call. It is a policy call at the Department of Justice, and we will be glad at the NICS process to handle 

it any way that the policy and the law requires. 

You had asked earlier about the numbers on the No Fly List, and 

the number is about 8,600 people on that No Fly List, which is 

quite a bit smaller than what is on the KST list currently, which 

is some 270,000 on the KST list right now. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. Thanks. I am afraid that I have to 

go on to another meeting. I thank all of you for your prepared testimony and for your delivered testimony. It has been to me an interesting, informative hearing. There is some disagreement, but it is 

healthy, and I think we have had a good airing of it here today. 

As I mentioned briefly earlier, this is for our Committee a subject 

matter oversight hearing pursuant to our homeland security authority. The actual legislation in this regard is in the Judiciary 

Committee, and so what happens to it depends on that committee. 

But I hope that they will see fit to bring it out soon. 

The record of the hearing will remain open for 15 days for additional statements or questions from the witnesses or the Members 

of the Committee. Usually it is the Members of the Committee who 

ask the questions and the witnesses who provide the answers and 

statements. But I thank you very much for your testimony, and 

with that the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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