# C_2008162EN.01007902.xml

| 25.6.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 162/79 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.6.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 162/79

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Rights-based management tools in fisheries

(2008/C 162/16)

On 27 September 2007, the European Economic and Social Committee decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion, under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, on

Rights-based management tools in fisheries.

Rights-based management tools in fisheries.

The Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 22 January 2008. The rapporteur was Mr Sarró Iparraguirre.

At its 442nd plenary session, held on 13 and 14 February 2008 (meeting of 13 February), the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 110 votes to two with five abstentions.

1.   Conclusions

| 1.1 | The EESC considers that, once the discussion phase is over, the Commission should conduct a study focusing on the current capacities of Community fleets and the quotas needed to ensure their competitiveness, whilst respecting the sustainability of Community fishing grounds. |
| --- | --- |

1.1

The EESC considers that, once the discussion phase is over, the Commission should conduct a study focusing on the current capacities of Community fleets and the quotas needed to ensure their competitiveness, whilst respecting the sustainability of Community fishing grounds.

| 1.2 | This study should address the updating of Member States' rights acquired on the basis of the principle of relative stability and taking account of the 24 years that have elapsed since 1983. |
| --- | --- |

1.2

This study should address the updating of Member States' rights acquired on the basis of the principle of relative stability and taking account of the 24 years that have elapsed since 1983.

| 1.3 | This update should allow for the periodical allocation of quotas, e.g. for a period of five years, so that quotas can be redistributed in the event of any imbalances re-emerging. |
| --- | --- |

1.3

This update should allow for the periodical allocation of quotas, e.g. for a period of five years, so that quotas can be redistributed in the event of any imbalances re-emerging.

| 1.4 | The update should work out the best solutions for eliminating the imbalances currently affecting quotas for certain pelagic and demersal species in specific fishing zones, which for most Member States result in excessive quotas or deficient quotas. |
| --- | --- |

1.4

The update should work out the best solutions for eliminating the imbalances currently affecting quotas for certain pelagic and demersal species in specific fishing zones, which for most Member States result in excessive quotas or deficient quotas.

| 1.5 | In any case, the quotas involved should be based on scientifically proven data. The EESC therefore believes that greater efforts should be made to improve scientific knowledge of resources. Currently, most quotas are established on the basis of the precautionary approach, due to a lack of sufficient scientific data. |
| --- | --- |

1.5

In any case, the quotas involved should be based on scientifically proven data. The EESC therefore believes that greater efforts should be made to improve scientific knowledge of resources. Currently, most quotas are established on the basis of the precautionary approach, due to a lack of sufficient scientific data.

| 1.6 | Moreover, the EESC considers that the relative stability criterion entails certain acquired rights for Member States. These rights should not disappear without trace, but could be updated in line with the sustainability of resources and competitiveness of Community fleets currently required by the Common Fisheries Policy. |
| --- | --- |

1.6

Moreover, the EESC considers that the relative stability criterion entails certain acquired rights for Member States. These rights should not disappear without trace, but could be updated in line with the sustainability of resources and competitiveness of Community fleets currently required by the Common Fisheries Policy.

| 1.7 | The EESC believes that if the Commission finds that a rights-based management system in fisheries is necessary, then this should be at Community level. |
| --- | --- |

1.7

The EESC believes that if the Commission finds that a rights-based management system in fisheries is necessary, then this should be at Community level.

| 1.8 | The EESC believes that duly updated fishing rights could help cut down overfishing and discards at sea substantially. |
| --- | --- |

1.8

The EESC believes that duly updated fishing rights could help cut down overfishing and discards at sea substantially.

| 1.9 | However, taking the rights of small-scale fishermen as a priority, owing to their particular importance in island Member States and island regions, the Committee believes that small-scale fishing (understood as being that carried out by fishing vessels of an overall length of less than 12 metres (1)) should be excluded from a Community-wide rights-based management system in fisheries. |
| --- | --- |

1.9

However, taking the rights of small-scale fishermen as a priority, owing to their particular importance in island Member States and island regions, the Committee believes that small-scale fishing (understood as being that carried out by fishing vessels of an overall length of less than 12 metres (1)) should be excluded from a Community-wide rights-based management system in fisheries.

1

| 1.10 | The Committee believes that if the Commission were to establish a rights-based management system in fisheries, it should start with those fisheries for which, owing to discrepancies between excessive and deficient quotas, there is a broad consensus among the Member States concerned. |
| --- | --- |

1.10

The Committee believes that if the Commission were to establish a rights-based management system in fisheries, it should start with those fisheries for which, owing to discrepancies between excessive and deficient quotas, there is a broad consensus among the Member States concerned.

| 1.11 | In this case, the Committee believes that it would be the Commission's duty to set the level at which fishing rights could be traded (i.e. at the level of the Community, Member States, organisations of producers or businesses), and to monitor transactions. |
| --- | --- |

1.11

In this case, the Committee believes that it would be the Commission's duty to set the level at which fishing rights could be traded (i.e. at the level of the Community, Member States, organisations of producers or businesses), and to monitor transactions.

| 1.12 | The Committee believes that, if the current imbalances are redressed in accordance with the criterion of relative stability, a major step will be taken towards a rights-based management system in fisheries. |
| --- | --- |

1.12

The Committee believes that, if the current imbalances are redressed in accordance with the criterion of relative stability, a major step will be taken towards a rights-based management system in fisheries.

2.   Introduction

| 2.1 | In its Communication on Rights-based management tools in fisheries
   (2), the Commission aimed to open discussion, for a period of around one year (27/02/2008), on the need to find ways to effectively achieve the goals set down in the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), i.e. sustainability of resources and competitiveness of Community fleets. |
| --- | --- |

2.1

In its Communication on Rights-based management tools in fisheries
   (2), the Commission aimed to open discussion, for a period of around one year (27/02/2008), on the need to find ways to effectively achieve the goals set down in the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), i.e. sustainability of resources and competitiveness of Community fleets.

Communication on Rights-based management tools in fisheries

2

| 2.2 | In its Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy
   (3) the Commission called for new management methods to be explored, such as ‘market-based systems for allocation of quotas, such as individual transferable quotas and auctions, which generate a market in fishing rights and may increase the interest of right-holders in long-term sustainability of fishing’. |
| --- | --- |

2.2

In its Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy
   (3) the Commission called for new management methods to be explored, such as ‘market-based systems for allocation of quotas, such as individual transferable quotas and auctions, which generate a market in fishing rights and may increase the interest of right-holders in long-term sustainability of fishing’.

Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy

3

| 2.3 | In the Roadmap on the reform of the CFP
   (4), the Commission considered that ‘the fisheries sector is still characterised by specific features which make the application of normal economic conditions, such as free competition between producers and freedom of investment, difficult to apply in the short term’. These features relate to the structural imbalance between scarce fisheries resources and the size of Community fishing fleets and the continuing dependence of certain coastal communities on fisheries. In the roadmap, the Commission set down a calendar of initiatives, starting in 2002 with the organisation of workshops on economic management, in order to discuss a system of tradable fishing rights (individual or collective). In 2003, the Commission was to inform the Council of the outcome of these discussions. A workshop was held, somewhat later than planned, in 2007, on the economic dimension of fisheries, at which, inter alia, the subject of fishing rights was discussed (5). |
| --- | --- |

2.3

In the Roadmap on the reform of the CFP
   (4), the Commission considered that ‘the fisheries sector is still characterised by specific features which make the application of normal economic conditions, such as free competition between producers and freedom of investment, difficult to apply in the short term’. These features relate to the structural imbalance between scarce fisheries resources and the size of Community fishing fleets and the continuing dependence of certain coastal communities on fisheries. In the roadmap, the Commission set down a calendar of initiatives, starting in 2002 with the organisation of workshops on economic management, in order to discuss a system of tradable fishing rights (individual or collective). In 2003, the Commission was to inform the Council of the outcome of these discussions. A workshop was held, somewhat later than planned, in 2007, on the economic dimension of fisheries, at which, inter alia, the subject of fishing rights was discussed (5).

Roadmap on the reform of the CFP

4

5

| 2.4 | The EESC felt that this own-initiative opinion should be drawn up order to add its views to the discussion initiated by the Commission on how to move towards more effective resource management, which should be the basic pillar of the CFP, in order to guarantee the long-term sustainability of resources while ensuring the competitiveness of Community fleets. |
| --- | --- |

2.4

The EESC felt that this own-initiative opinion should be drawn up order to add its views to the discussion initiated by the Commission on how to move towards more effective resource management, which should be the basic pillar of the CFP, in order to guarantee the long-term sustainability of resources while ensuring the competitiveness of Community fleets.

| 2.5 | This opinion aims to highlight the problems that exist in implementing effective rights-based management of fishing resources and to propose possible solutions to these problems. |
| --- | --- |

2.5

This opinion aims to highlight the problems that exist in implementing effective rights-based management of fishing resources and to propose possible solutions to these problems.

| 2.6 | The EESC endorses the Commission's view that a climate must be created ‘that will be more favourable to the introduction of more normal economic conditions and the elimination of such barriers to normal economic activity as national allocations of fishing possibilities and the principle of relative stability’ (6). |
| --- | --- |

2.6

The EESC endorses the Commission's view that a climate must be created ‘that will be more favourable to the introduction of more normal economic conditions and the elimination of such barriers to normal economic activity as national allocations of fishing possibilities and the principle of relative stability’ (6).

6

| 2.7 | Therefore, this opinion aims, firstly, to further the analysis of the criterion of relative stability which, according to the main professional fishing associations (7) and the Commission, is one of the main obstacles to the implementation of an EU-wide system of fishing rights: the trading or transfer of definitive ownership of rights between companies in Member States would modify the current quota distribution percentages between States and would, therefore, affect relative stability. Secondly, the opinion aims to provide information to help set up this management system, which is already operating on a national scale in some Member States and in some non-EU countries competing in the Community market. |
| --- | --- |

2.7

Therefore, this opinion aims, firstly, to further the analysis of the criterion of relative stability which, according to the main professional fishing associations (7) and the Commission, is one of the main obstacles to the implementation of an EU-wide system of fishing rights: the trading or transfer of definitive ownership of rights between companies in Member States would modify the current quota distribution percentages between States and would, therefore, affect relative stability. Secondly, the opinion aims to provide information to help set up this management system, which is already operating on a national scale in some Member States and in some non-EU countries competing in the Community market.

7

2.8   Background

| 2.8.1 | In 1972 (8), the principle of equal access to Member States' fisheries resources, established in 1970 (9), was repealed by the Council for a transitional period scheduled to end on 31.12.1982. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.1

In 1972 (8), the principle of equal access to Member States' fisheries resources, established in 1970 (9), was repealed by the Council for a transitional period scheduled to end on 31.12.1982.

8

9

| 2.8.2 | Consequently, and in order to protect coastal regions when this transitional period came to an end, in 1976 the Council approved the ‘Hague Preferences’ (10) which, on an internal level, aimed to protect coastal fisheries by taking into account the ‘vital needs’ of local communities dependent on fishing. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.2

Consequently, and in order to protect coastal regions when this transitional period came to an end, in 1976 the Council approved the ‘Hague Preferences’ (10) which, on an internal level, aimed to protect coastal fisheries by taking into account the ‘vital needs’ of local communities dependent on fishing.

10

| 2.8.3 | Negotiations between the Commission and the Member States on the distribution of total allowable catches (TACs) continued until 1983, when Regulation (EEC) No 170/1983 was approved, which established a Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources (11) and set down the definitive distribution in accordance with the following criteria: the traditional fishing activities of each Member State, the particular needs of regions where local populations are especially dependent on fisheries (taking the Hague preferences into consideration) and the potential loss of catches in third-country waters as a result of the extension of the exclusive economic zones to 200 nautical miles. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.3

Negotiations between the Commission and the Member States on the distribution of total allowable catches (TACs) continued until 1983, when Regulation (EEC) No 170/1983 was approved, which established a Community system for the conservation and management of fishery resources (11) and set down the definitive distribution in accordance with the following criteria: the traditional fishing activities of each Member State, the particular needs of regions where local populations are especially dependent on fisheries (taking the Hague preferences into consideration) and the potential loss of catches in third-country waters as a result of the extension of the exclusive economic zones to 200 nautical miles.

11

| 2.8.4 | This distribution scheme, recognised as a criterion for relative stability, guaranteed each Member State (12) an invariable percentage of the TAC for each species. The Council understood ‘relative stability’ as being a concept which, ‘given the temporary biological situation of stocks, must safeguard the particular needs of regions where local populations are especially dependent on fisheries and related industries’ (13). In other words, the Hague preferences, as established by the Council in 1976, were maintained, extending the derogation of the equal access principle. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.4

This distribution scheme, recognised as a criterion for relative stability, guaranteed each Member State (12) an invariable percentage of the TAC for each species. The Council understood ‘relative stability’ as being a concept which, ‘given the temporary biological situation of stocks, must safeguard the particular needs of regions where local populations are especially dependent on fisheries and related industries’ (13). In other words, the Hague preferences, as established by the Council in 1976, were maintained, extending the derogation of the equal access principle.

12

13

| 2.8.5 | Under Regulation (EEC) No 170/83, the Commission was to draw up a report on the socio-economic situation of coastal regions by 31 December 1991. Based on this, the Council would decide on the necessary adjustments, although it would be possible to extend the system of access conditions and quota distribution criteria until 31 December 2002. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.5

Under Regulation (EEC) No 170/83, the Commission was to draw up a report on the socio-economic situation of coastal regions by 31 December 1991. Based on this, the Council would decide on the necessary adjustments, although it would be possible to extend the system of access conditions and quota distribution criteria until 31 December 2002.

| 2.8.6 | In the light of the report submitted by the Commission, the Council made the political decision to extend the system of access conditions and quota distribution criteria until 31.12.2002 (14). |
| --- | --- |

2.8.6

In the light of the report submitted by the Commission, the Council made the political decision to extend the system of access conditions and quota distribution criteria until 31.12.2002 (14).

14

| 2.8.7 | Finally, Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy stated that ‘fishing opportunities shall be distributed among Member States in such a way as to assure each Member State relative stability of fishing activities for each stock or fishery.’ Article 17 of the regulation further extended the derogation of the equal access principle, until 31.12.2012, and again provided for a report to be drafted on the derogation of this principle. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.7

Finally, Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy stated that ‘fishing opportunities shall be distributed among Member States in such a way as to assure each Member State relative stability of fishing activities for each stock or fishery.’ Article 17 of the regulation further extended the derogation of the equal access principle, until 31.12.2012, and again provided for a report to be drafted on the derogation of this principle.

3.   General remarks

| 3.1 | The EESC believes that the relative stability criterion, i.e. the invariable percentage of TACs allocated to each Member State 24 years ago, does not take account of the economic and social development of populations which are currently dependent on fishing and its related industries. The present capacity of Community fleets, current exploitation of resources and the investments made in coastal regions have little in common with the situation in 1983, when certain Member States with fishing interests had not yet joined the Community. |
| --- | --- |

3.1

The EESC believes that the relative stability criterion, i.e. the invariable percentage of TACs allocated to each Member State 24 years ago, does not take account of the economic and social development of populations which are currently dependent on fishing and its related industries. The present capacity of Community fleets, current exploitation of resources and the investments made in coastal regions have little in common with the situation in 1983, when certain Member States with fishing interests had not yet joined the Community.

| 3.2 | In the Commission regulations on the adjustment of quotas (15), it is clear that in some fisheries and Community fishing areas every year there are significant discrepancies between the quotas allocated to Member States and the catches made by them, in terms of both pelagic and demersal species. These imbalances — which generate excessive quotas, deficient quotas and even, due to a lack of fleets, unusable quotas — affect most Member States for specific fisheries and fishing areas, and are due not only to biological reasons but also to the consequences of implementing the relative stability principle. |
| --- | --- |

3.2

In the Commission regulations on the adjustment of quotas (15), it is clear that in some fisheries and Community fishing areas every year there are significant discrepancies between the quotas allocated to Member States and the catches made by them, in terms of both pelagic and demersal species. These imbalances — which generate excessive quotas, deficient quotas and even, due to a lack of fleets, unusable quotas — affect most Member States for specific fisheries and fishing areas, and are due not only to biological reasons but also to the consequences of implementing the relative stability principle.

15

| 3.3 | The EESC believes that the primary consideration in allocating rights within the TAC framework must be to ensure the recovery (and maintenance) of the stocks of the different fish species and other marine resources at higher and more sustainable levels. The EESC recommends that greater efforts should be made to improve scientific knowledge of the state of fish stocks, and how allocations and fishing practices can best be managed to ensure the optimum results both for the maintenance of the fish stocks themselves and of the economic prosperity of the fishing communities that depend on them. Total allocations need to be kept well within scientifically established maximum sustainable yields and individual allocation limits need to be effectively policed and enforced. |
| --- | --- |

3.3

The EESC believes that the primary consideration in allocating rights within the TAC framework must be to ensure the recovery (and maintenance) of the stocks of the different fish species and other marine resources at higher and more sustainable levels. The EESC recommends that greater efforts should be made to improve scientific knowledge of the state of fish stocks, and how allocations and fishing practices can best be managed to ensure the optimum results both for the maintenance of the fish stocks themselves and of the economic prosperity of the fishing communities that depend on them. Total allocations need to be kept well within scientifically established maximum sustainable yields and individual allocation limits need to be effectively policed and enforced.

| 3.4 | The EESC therefore considers that the Commission should conduct a study focusing on the current capacities of Community fleets and the quotas needed to ensure their competitiveness and the sustainability of fish stocks. This study should address the updating of Member States' acquired rights, based on the principle of relative stability, in order to work out the best solutions for eliminating the imbalances currently affecting quotas for certain pelagic and demersal species in specific fishing zones. The overall aim should be to ensure the long-term sustainability of resources and the competitiveness of Community fleets — which are the main objectives of the CFP. |
| --- | --- |

3.4

The EESC therefore considers that the Commission should conduct a study focusing on the current capacities of Community fleets and the quotas needed to ensure their competitiveness and the sustainability of fish stocks. This study should address the updating of Member States' acquired rights, based on the principle of relative stability, in order to work out the best solutions for eliminating the imbalances currently affecting quotas for certain pelagic and demersal species in specific fishing zones. The overall aim should be to ensure the long-term sustainability of resources and the competitiveness of Community fleets — which are the main objectives of the CFP.

| 3.5 | Moreover, the Committee considers that the relative stability criterion entails certain acquired rights for Member States. These rights should not disappear without trace, but could be updated in line with the sustainability of resources and competitiveness of Community fleets currently required by the Common Fisheries Policy. |
| --- | --- |

3.5

Moreover, the Committee considers that the relative stability criterion entails certain acquired rights for Member States. These rights should not disappear without trace, but could be updated in line with the sustainability of resources and competitiveness of Community fleets currently required by the Common Fisheries Policy.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1 | The EESC believes that the Commission should carry out the requested study as soon as possible, once the discussion phase is over. Given the current situation of Community fisheries resources and the competitiveness of the Community fleet, it should not be necessary to wait until 2012 for a new Commission report to be drafted and the imbalances currently affecting catch quotas and the Community fleet to be redressed. |
| --- | --- |

4.1

The EESC believes that the Commission should carry out the requested study as soon as possible, once the discussion phase is over. Given the current situation of Community fisheries resources and the competitiveness of the Community fleet, it should not be necessary to wait until 2012 for a new Commission report to be drafted and the imbalances currently affecting catch quotas and the Community fleet to be redressed.

| 4.2 | This update should allow for the periodical allocation of quotas, e.g. for a period of five years, so that quotas can be redistributed in the event of any imbalances re-emerging. |
| --- | --- |

4.2

This update should allow for the periodical allocation of quotas, e.g. for a period of five years, so that quotas can be redistributed in the event of any imbalances re-emerging.

| 4.3 | The Committee believes that if, as a result of the discussion about solutions to the current situation, the Commission finds that a management system should be established on the basis of the updated fishing rights of the Member States, then this should be done at Community level. |
| --- | --- |

4.3

The Committee believes that if, as a result of the discussion about solutions to the current situation, the Commission finds that a management system should be established on the basis of the updated fishing rights of the Member States, then this should be done at Community level.

| 4.4 | The Committee considers that, since the Reform Treaty (Lisbon Treaty) was signed in December 2007, there is a very favourable attitude among the Member States towards such a management system for fisheries. |
| --- | --- |

4.4

The Committee considers that, since the Reform Treaty (Lisbon Treaty) was signed in December 2007, there is a very favourable attitude among the Member States towards such a management system for fisheries.

| 4.5 | The Committee is aware of the difficulties that would be entailed by setting up a Community-wide management system, based on tradable fishing rights, but considers that it could be a means of achieving ‘exploitation of living aquatic resources in a manner that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions’ (16) if, inter alia, the criteria below are taken into account. |
| --- | --- |

4.5

The Committee is aware of the difficulties that would be entailed by setting up a Community-wide management system, based on tradable fishing rights, but considers that it could be a means of achieving ‘exploitation of living aquatic resources in a manner that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions’ (16) if, inter alia, the criteria below are taken into account.

16

| 4.5.1 | In order to protect the rights of small-scale fishermen (17), any Community-level rights-based management system in fisheries should exclude small-scale fishing, it being an activity on which many coastal communities — particularly in island States and regions — depend. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.1

In order to protect the rights of small-scale fishermen (17), any Community-level rights-based management system in fisheries should exclude small-scale fishing, it being an activity on which many coastal communities — particularly in island States and regions — depend.

17

| 4.5.2 | So as to avoid dominant market positions arising from the possibility of buying and selling fishing rights, this could be restricted to a percentage of the maximum annual total catch per species in each Member State. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.2

So as to avoid dominant market positions arising from the possibility of buying and selling fishing rights, this could be restricted to a percentage of the maximum annual total catch per species in each Member State.

| 4.5.3 | The Committee believes this management system should be implemented across the different Community fisheries on a gradual, step-by-step basis, starting with those for which, owing to discrepancies between excessive and deficient quotas, there is a broad consensus among the Member States concerned. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.3

The Committee believes this management system should be implemented across the different Community fisheries on a gradual, step-by-step basis, starting with those for which, owing to discrepancies between excessive and deficient quotas, there is a broad consensus among the Member States concerned.

| 4.5.4 | The Commission would have to determine, for a fishery affected by the rights-based management system, whether trading would be at the level of the Community, the Member States, organisations of producers or businesses, and clearly set out how these transactions would be monitored. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.4

The Commission would have to determine, for a fishery affected by the rights-based management system, whether trading would be at the level of the Community, the Member States, organisations of producers or businesses, and clearly set out how these transactions would be monitored.

| 4.6 | The EESC believes that duly updated fishing rights could help cut down overfishing and discards at sea substantially. |
| --- | --- |

4.6

The EESC believes that duly updated fishing rights could help cut down overfishing and discards at sea substantially.

| 4.7 | The Committee believes that, if the current imbalances are redressed in accordance with the criterion of relative stability, a major step will be taken towards a rights-based management system in fisheries. This system, duly regulated to prevent dominant market positions, will make it possible to distribute resources more fairly and evenly among the various Community fleets, which will help to achieve greater sustainability of resources and ensure the competitiveness of Community fleets. |
| --- | --- |

4.7

The Committee believes that, if the current imbalances are redressed in accordance with the criterion of relative stability, a major step will be taken towards a rights-based management system in fisheries. This system, duly regulated to prevent dominant market positions, will make it possible to distribute resources more fairly and evenly among the various Community fleets, which will help to achieve greater sustainability of resources and ensure the competitiveness of Community fleets.

Brussels, 13 February 2008.

The President

of the European Economic and Social Committee

Dimitris DIMITRIADIS

---

(1)  Article 26 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006 on the European Fisheries Fund (OJ L 223 of 15.8.2006).

1

(2)  COM(2007) 73 final, 26/02/2007.

2

(3)  COM(2001) 135 final, 20/03/2001.

3

(4)  COM(2002) 181 final, 28.5.2002.

4

(5)  Workshop held by the Commission, in Brussels, on 14 and 15 May 2007.

5

(6)  COM(2002) 181 final, p. 25.

6

(7)  At the meeting of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries' Working Group on Resources on 18.9.2007, EAPO and EUROPECHE/COGECA both presented documents (Ref. EAPO 07-29 of 17.9.2007; Ref. EUROPECHE/COGECA EP(07)119F/CP(07)1053.3, of 17.9.2007) mentioning this concern about fishing rights.

7

(8)  Under the Acts of Accession signed by the Community and by Denmark, the UK and Ireland, the transitional period expired on 31 December 1982. See OJ L 73, 27.3.1972.

8

(9)  Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70, published in OJ L236 of 27.10.1970.

9

(10)  Council Resolution of 3.11.1976 (OJ C 105 of 7.5.1981).

10

(11)  OJ L 24 of 27.1.1983.

11

(12)  In 1983, the Community comprised Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, the UK, Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg.

12

(13)  Recitals 6 and 7 of Regulation (EC) No 170/1983. OJ L 24 of 27.1.1983.

13

(14)  Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 170/1983.

14

(15)  Those relating to the last three years are: Commission Regulations (EC) No 776/2005, OJ L 130, 24.5.2005; (EC) No 742/2006, OJ L 130, 18/05/2006, and (EC) No 609/2007, OJ L 141, 2.6.2007.

15

(16)  Council Regulation (EC) 2371/2002 on the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, OJ L 358, 31.12.2002.

16

(17)  ‘Small-scale fishing’ is considered as being that defined by Article 26 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006, i.e. carried out by fishing vessels of an overall length of less than 12 metres.

17

---