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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-cr-20419 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

TILMAN WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant. 

_________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND DISMISS INDICTMENT (ECF #17) 

Defendant Tilman Williams chose to decorate his apartment with sexually 

explicit photographs of young girls. In doing so, he assumed serious risks. One 

such risk: if he had a medical emergency and allowed first responders into his 

apartment to render aid, they might discover the photographs and notify the police. 

And that is exactly what happened. 

The police eventually obtained a warrant to search Williams’ apartment, and 

they seized the photographs and other evidence. A federal grand jury later indicted 

Williams on two counts of receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2252A(a)(2) and two counts of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). (See the “Indictment,” ECF #12.) 

Williams has moved to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment and 

to dismiss the Indictment. (See the “Motion,” ECF #17.) Williams raises two 

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challenges to the seizure of the photographs and other evidence. First, Williams 

argues that the affidavit supporting the search warrant was tainted because it 

contained information the police unlawfully obtained during an earlier warrantless 

search of his apartment. Second, Williams contends that the affidavit supporting 

the search warrant failed to establish probable cause to believe that he committed 

any criminal offense. 

The Court declines to suppress the evidence seized from Williams’ 

apartment. It is far from clear that the warrantless entry about which Williams 

complains violated the Fourth Amendment, and, even if it did, the conduct of the 

police was not sufficiently culpable to warrant the exclusion of the evidence they 

eventually seized pursuant to the warrant. Moreover, the affidavit supporting the 

search warrant did establish probable cause to believe that Williams unlawfully 

possessed child pornography, and the police acted in good faith in relying upon the 

affidavit and warrant. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Williams’ Motion. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 The Court held evidentiary hearings on Williams’ Motion on October 9 and 

October 24, 2014.1

 Based on evidence presented at the hearings, the Court now 

finds the relevant facts as follows: 

 

                                                            

1

 Williams was present for, but did not testify at, the evidentiary hearings. 

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1. Williams lives alone in a one-bedroom apartment at the Village Park 

Apartments in Southgate, Michigan. (See id. at 20-22, Pg. ID 156-58.)2

2. Williams suffers from several health conditions for which he takes certain 

prescription medications. (See Oct. 9 Tr., ECF #23 at 25, Pg. ID 161.) 

3. At all times relevant here, Williams’ apartment was in an “extreme 

hoarding” state. (Oct. 24 Tr., ECF #22 at 9, 16; Pg. ID 98, 105.) 

4. Photographs of Williams’ apartment depict large piles of garbage stacked on 

nearly every surface. (See Govt. Ex. 1, 2, and 4.) In the photographs, empty 

soda bottles and milk containers are spilling out of the sink onto the kitchen 

floor. Boxes of food – primarily Hot Pockets and Little Debbie snack cakes 

– are strewn about the kitchen. Piles of overstuffed white garbage bags in 

the living room reach almost to the ceiling. Throughout the entire 

apartment, there appears to be virtually no open space in which to walk. 

5. Williams’ apartment was virtually uninhabitable. 

6. There was another distinguishing feature of Williams’ apartment: the 

prominent display of child pornography and sexually-suggestive material as 

décor elements. 

7. On the walls in the bedroom, Williams displayed photographs of girls 

estimated to be between the ages of 8 and 12 exposing their genitalia in a 

sexually suggestive manner and engaged in explicit sexual acts. (See Oct. 9 

Tr. at 27-28, 39-40, 65; Pg. ID 163-64, 175-76, 201.) 

8. In plain view in the living room, Williams displayed framed photographs of 

young girls in various stages of undress. (See id. at 64, Pg. ID 200. See also

Oct. 24 Tr. at 16, Pg. ID 105.) 

9. Early in the morning of January 4, 2013, Williams slipped and fell on soda 

bottles strewn about the floor of his living room. (See Oct. 9 Tr. at 25, Pg. 

ID 161.) 

                                                            

2

 The Court provides supporting citations as examples of material in the record that 

supports the Court’s findings. By giving a specific citation, the Court does not 

mean to imply that the cited evidence is the sole support in the record for a 

particular finding. The Court’s findings are based upon the totality of the evidence 

presented at the two evidentiary hearings. 

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10. Williams was injured as a result of the fall and was unable to stand up by 

himself. (See id. at 22, Pg. ID 158.) 

11. One of Williams’ neighbors at the Village Park Apartments called 911 to 

report Williams’ accident. (See id. at 20, Pg. ID 156.) 

12. Jason Ferrell (“Ferrell”) and Matthew Sisty (“Sisty”), paramedics for 

Community EMS (“CEMS”) – a private, non-profit organization that 

contracts with local governments to provide emergency medical services – 

responded to the 911 call. (See id. at 14, 20; Pg. ID 150, 156.) Two 

members of the Southgate Fire Department (“SFD”) also responded to the 

call. (See id. at 20, Pg. ID 156.) 

13. Ferrell, Sisty, and the SFD personnel (collectively, the “Initial Responders”) 

arrived at Williams’ apartment at approximately 5:30 a.m. on January 4, 

2013. (See id.) 

14. The front door to Williams’ apartment was chained, and Williams was 

unable to reach the door to unlock it. (See id. at 21-22, Pg. ID 157-58.) 

15. Williams gave the Initial Responders permission to cut the chain in order to 

enter the apartment and attend to his medical needs. (See id.) 

16. Upon entering the apartment, Ferrell found Williams lying on the floor in 

the living room. (See id. at 22, Pg. ID 158.) 

17. Ferrell immediately noticed that the apartment was a “hoarder house,” with 

“food debris, clothes, [and] other various items ... all over the apartment” in 

piles four-to-five feet high. (Id. at 22-23, Pg. ID 158-59.) 

18. Ferrell approached Williams and began to render first aid. (See id. at 24, 

Pg. ID 160.) Ferrell found that Williams’ blood pressure was elevated, and 

Williams was having difficulty breathing. (See id.) 

19. Ferrell then asked Williams whether he took any medications. (See id.) 

Ferrell needed to know which medications Williams was taking in order to 

(a) properly assess Williams’ condition, (b) determine an appropriate course 

of emergency medical treatment, and (c) provide full information to 

physicians in the event that he transported Williams to the hospital. (See id.

at 26-27, Pg. ID 162-63.) 

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20. Williams told Ferrell that he did take medications, but he could not 

remember their names. (See id. at 25, Pg. ID 161.) 

21. Williams told Ferrell that the medications were in his bedroom. (See id.) 

22. Ferrell then entered the bedroom for two reasons: to locate Williams’ 

medications and to observe the living conditions so that he could file a 

report with the Department of Human Services detailing the hoarding 

conditions. (See id. at 16-18, 26; Pg. ID 152-54, 162.) 

23. Williams did not tell Ferrell not to enter the bedroom. (See id. at 27, Pg. ID 

163.) 

24. Upon opening the bedroom door (which had been closed up until this 

point), Ferrell saw that the bedroom was “like the rest of the house, a 

hoarder house.” (Id.) 

25. Ferrell also observed on the bedroom walls the photographs described 

above depicting young naked girls. (See id.) Some of the girls appeared to 

be prepubescent, and others appeared to be teenagers under the age of 15. 

(See id.) One picture appeared to depict a prepubescent girl having sex with 

a man. (See id. at 27-28, Pg. ID 163-64.) 

26. Ferrell immediately called one of the SFD representatives into the bedroom 

and asked him to telephone the police. (See id. at 30, Pg. ID 166.) 

27. Thereafter, the Southgate Police Department dispatched Officer John 

Veldhuis (“Veldhuis”) to Williams’ apartment. (See id. at 59, Pg. ID 195.) 

28. The dispatcher instructed Veldhuis to meet CEMS personnel who were at 

the apartment to treat a slip-and-fall victim. (See id.) Accordingly, 

Veldhuis thought that he was responding to “an ongoing medical 

emergency.” (Oct. 24 Tr. at 22, Pg. ID 111.) 

29. Veldhuis met Ferrell outside of Williams’ apartment. (See id. at 8, Pg. ID 

97.) 

30. Ferrell told Veldhuis that CEMS had been sent to the apartment on a 

“rescue run” and discovered an “extreme hoarding” situation. (Id. at 9, Pg. 

ID 98.) Ferrell further explained that the living condition were “untenable.” 

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(Id. at 8, Pg. ID 97.) Finally, Ferrell told Veldhuis that he thought there 

might be child pornography in the apartment. (See id.) 

31. Based on Ferrell’s description of the apartment as an “extreme hoarding” 

situation, Veldhuis was concerned for the safety of the Initial Responders, 

Williams, and anyone else who might have been in the apartment. (See id.

at 12, Pg. ID 101.) Veldhuis was also concerned about the safety of the 

individuals in the neighboring apartments. (See id.) Veldhuis understood 

that extreme hoarding could pose a threat to occupants of Williams’ 

apartment and to his neighbors. (See id. at 13, Pg. ID 102.) 

32. Veldhuis decided to enter Williams’ apartment. He made that decision: 

because of the medical emergency that was ongoing at 

the time, which was why [he] was originally sent there, 

and then for the safety, to determine the safety of the 

situation.... [Veldhuis] didn’t know at the time whether 

the person that was being medically treated, if they were 

going to go to the hospital, if they were going to stay, 

then [he] needed to assess whether it was safe for them to 

stay or not. If there were children, [he] needed to see if it 

was a safe condition for them to be in, if the building was 

a danger, if the apartment was a danger to neighboring 

apartments on either side, on top of or below, as it is an 

older apartment building. 

(Id.)

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33. The possible presence of child pornography in Williams’ apartment played 

only a de minimis role, if any, in Veldhuis’ decision to enter Williams’ 

apartment. Although Veldhuis was aware that the apartment contained 

suspected child pornography before he entered, his “overriding concern” 

that led to his entry “was safety and security.” (Id. at 14, Pg. ID 103.) 

Given the reported condition of the apartment, Veldhuis believed that “it 

would have been a dereliction of [his] duty to not go in.” (Id. at 15, Pg. ID 

104.) 

                                                            

3

 The block quote above is an excerpt from Veldhuis’ testimony. The Court finds 

that testimony – and all of Veldhuis’ testimony – to be credible. 

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34. Veldhuis did not enter the apartment in order to gather information to 

support a later request for a warrant to search for and seize suspected child 

pornography. On the contrary, Veldhuis believed that Ferrell’s description 

of the suspected child pornography, standing alone, was sufficient to 

support a request for a search warrant. (See Oct. 9 Tr. at 71, Pg. ID 207.) 

35. When Veldhuis went to enter the apartment, the door was open. (See id. at 

73, Pg. ID 209.) Veldhuis walked in and stood in the entryway. (See id. at 

63-64, Pg. ID 199-200.) From that vantage point, Veldhuis noticed that the 

living room was in a hoarding state. (See id. at 64, Pg. ID 200.) Veldhuis 

considered the hoarding to be “extreme,” and the condition of the apartment 

seriously concerned him. (Oct. 24 Tr. at 16, Pg. ID 105. See also Oct. 9 Tr. 

at 64, Pg. ID 200.) 

36. While still standing in the entryway, Veldhuis was also able to see, in plain 

view in the living room, “stacks of framed pictures ... of young girls in 

[various stages of] undress.” (Oct. 24 Tr. at 16-17, Pg. ID 105-06.) From 

the entryway, Veldhuis could also see into the bedroom (the door to which 

had been left open by Ferrell), where he noticed “framed color pictures of 

child pornography and [children] engaged in explicit sexual acts.” (Oct. 9 

Tr. at 64-65, Pg. ID 200-01.) 

37. Veldhuis found Williams seated on the couch in the living room. (See id. at 

63, Pg. ID 199.) Veldhuis asked Williams a series of questions designed to 

elicit information that would allow Veldhuis “to get into contact with a 

family member regarding [Williams’] medical condition.” (See Oct. 24 Tr. 

at 15, Pg. ID 104.) Veldhuis wanted to determine “if there was somebody, 

if [Williams] did not go to the hospital, that I could have – maybe take him 

somewhere that would be a safer condition.” (Oct. 9 Tr. at 67, Pg. ID 203.) 

38. When Veldhuis spoke with Williams, Veldhuis was “concerned about the 

state in which Mr. Williams was living at that point.” (Id.) 

39. During this conversation, Williams did not tell Veldhuis to leave the 

apartment. (See id. at 63, 68; Pg. ID 199, 204.) Williams never told 

Veldhuis not to enter the apartment, nor did Williams ever ask Veldhuis to 

leave. (See id.) 

40. After Veldhuis’ initial conversation with Williams, Veldhuis entered the 

bedroom “to see if it was safe for [Williams] to stay there” if CEMS did not 

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take Williams to the hospital. (Id. at 66, Pg. ID 202.) Veldhuis needed to 

determine if “it was safe for [Williams] to stay there or if we needed to find 

other accommodations for him.” (Id.) 

41. Veldhuis observed “framed color[] pictures of child pornography” 

displayed on the walls in the bedroom. (Id. at 65, Pg. ID 201.) Some of the 

photographs depicted children “engaged in explicit sexual acts.” (Id.) 

Veldhuis estimated that the children depicted in the photographs were 

between the ages of 8 and 12 years old. (See id.) 

42. Veldhuis spent only a total of 5-10 minutes in Williams’ apartment. (See id.

at 68, Pg. ID 204.) Williams was transported to the hospital as Veldhuis 

was finishing his inspection of the apartment. (See id.) 

43. After Williams had been taken out of his apartment on a stretcher, Veldhuis 

called his superior officer, Sergeant Chris Cassette (“Cassette”), exited the 

apartment, and stood in the hallway outside the apartment. (See id. at 68-

69, Pg. ID 204-05.) Veldhuis told Cassette about the hoarding situation and 

the presence of child pornography. (See Oct. 9 Tr. at 68-69, Pg. ID 204-

05.) 

44. Thereafter, Southgate Police Department Detective Sergeant Matthew 

Flynn (“Flynn”) arrived at the Village Park Apartments to assist Veldhuis. 

(See Oct. 24 Tr. at 29, Pg. ID 118.) 

45. Veldhuis met Flynn outside of Williams’ apartment. (See id.) Veldhuis did 

not re-enter the apartment after stepping into the hallway. (See Oct. 9 Tr. at 

77, Pg. ID 213.) Flynn did not enter the apartment at that point. 

46. While standing in the hallway, Veldhuis explained to Flynn that he 

(Veldhuis) had responded to a medical emergency. Veldhuis further 

explained that when he arrived at the apartment complex, Ferrell told him 

that he (Ferrell) had observed nude photographs of young girls inside 

Williams’ apartment. (See Oct. 24 Tr. at 29, Pg. ID 118.) 

47. Veldhuis also informed Flynn that he (Veldhuis) had observed the 

photographs. (See id.) 

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48. Flynn concluded that there was sufficient probable cause to seek a search 

warrant for Williams’ apartment. (See id. at 32-33, Pg. ID 121-22.) 

49. Flynn did not enter Williams’ apartment to view the pictures. (See id. at 29, 

Pg. ID 118.) Rather, Flynn returned to his office to seek a search warrant. 

(See id. at 31, Pg. ID 120.) 

50. Flynn prepared an affidavit in support his request for a warrant. In relevant 

part, it provided as follows: 

At approximately 6:25 a.m. on 1/14/2013, Affiant was 

contacted by the shift Lieutenant who advised a rescue 

had been dispatched to [redacted] Village Park Drive Apt 

#2070 on a male who had fallen and couldn’t get up. 

Upon arrival, Southgate FD and Community EMS found 

the door unlocked, but chained. The victim identified as 

Tilman Williams was down in the hallway and unable to 

open the door. Southgate FD had to cut the chain so first 

aid could be rendered. 

Upon entry, Southgate FD and Community EMS found 

the living conditions to be very poor, and EMS 

paramedic Jason Ferrell entered the only bedroom 

looking for possible medications the victim may be 

taking. Upon entering the only bedroom, [Ferrell] 

observed numerous pictures of young children 

specifically girls in the nude. [Ferrell] immediately 

requested police assistance and Ofc John Veldhuis and 

Sgt Chris Cassette responded. 

Responding officers arrived while the victim was being 

treated and being prepared for transport. They observed 

numerous pictures framed and unframed of nude female 

children, as well as children underwear in the only 

bedroom. Numerous Barbie dolls undressed were also 

observed in sexual positions. Responding officers 

believing this to be child pornography secured the 

apartment and contacted the detective bureau.... 

(The “Supporting Affidavit,” ECF #20-2 at 2-3, Pg. ID 81-82.) 

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51. Flynn wanted to confirm that the Supporting Affidavit sufficiently 

established probable cause, so he faxed a copy of it to the Wayne County 

Prosecutor’s Office for review by an assistant prosecuting attorney. (See

Oct. 24 Tr. at 31-32, Pg. ID 120-21.) The Wayne County Prosecutor’s 

Office sent a return fax approving the Supporting Affidavit without 

modification. (See id.) 

52. Flynn then submitted the Supporting Affidavit to a magistrate in Michigan’s 

20th District Court. The magistrate issued a warrant authorizing the police 

to search Williams’ apartment and seize “any photographs of nude children, 

any children[’s] underwear[,] as well as any and all Barbie dolls,” and 

computer equipment. (The “Search Warrant,” ECF #20-2 at 4-5, Pg. ID 83-

84.) 

53. Officers from Southgate Police Department, including Flynn, executed the 

Search Warrant and seized numerous framed photographs, several photo 

albums, four naked Barbie dolls, computer equipment, and other items from 

Williams’ apartment. (See id. at 6-8, Pg. ID 85-87. See also Oct. 24 Tr. at 

29, Pg. ID 118.) 

54. Veldhuis was not present for, and did not play any role in, the execution of 

the Search Warrant. (See Oct. 9 Tr. at 77, Pg. ID 213.) 

55. Veldhuis played no role in the decision to seek the Search Warrant nor in 

the drafting of the Supporting Affidavit. (See id. at 80, Pg. ID 216.) 

Veldhuis’ actions were limited to his entry into the apartment, his 

conversation with Williams, his brief inspection of the conditions of the 

apartment, and his communications with Cassette and Flynn. 

ANALYSIS 

Williams now moves to suppress all of the evidence seized from his 

apartment and to dismiss the Indictment. Williams argues that the Search Warrant 

was invalid for two reasons: (1) the Supporting Affidavit contained information 

gathered during Veldhuis’ unlawful warrantless entry into his apartment, and (2) 

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the Supporting Affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that he had 

committed a crime. Williams insists that the Court must therefore suppress the 

evidence that the police unlawfully seized pursuant to the Search Warrant. For the 

reasons explained below, the Court declines to suppress the evidence. 

1. The Legality of Veldhuis’ Warrantless Entry into Williams’ Apartment 

is a Very Close Question 

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” U.S. CONST. Amend. IV. The “physical entry of the home is the chief 

evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United 

States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). Thus, “a search 

carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless 

the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions 

based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances.’” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 

403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971). 

The Sixth Circuit has recognized that an exigency justifying a warrantless 

entry into a home may exist “in cases involving community caretaking [by police] 

such as when a warrantless home-entry is the only way for the police to put an 

immediate stop to an ongoing nuisance.” United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 

279, 288 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir. 

1996)). The Sixth Circuit applies three factors to determine whether a warrantless 

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entry by an officer performing a caretaking function is permitted under this 

exception: “(1) whether immediate government action was required, (2) whether 

the governmental interest was sufficiently compelling to justify a warrantless 

intrusion, and (3) whether the citizen’s expectation of privacy was diminished in 

some way.” Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1521 (applying factors and upholding police’s 

warrantless entry to address an ongoing nuisance caused by loud music). In this 

case, it is a very close question whether Veldhuis’ warrantless entry into Williams’ 

apartment was justified under the community caretaker/exigency exception to the 

warrant requirement recognized by the Sixth Circuit.4

The government makes a reasonably persuasive case that Veldhuis’ entry 

was justified under this exception. First, the government highlights the evidence 

                                                            

4

The community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement and the exigent 

circumstances exception are separate and distinct from one another. The 

community caretaker exception, recognized in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 

(1973), authorizes warrantless police actions taken “not for any criminal law 

enforcement purpose but rather to protect members of the public.” Sutterfield v. 

City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). The “primary focus” of this 

exception is on “the purpose of police action rather than on its urgency.” Id. In 

contrast, the exigent circumstances exception, as its name suggests, focuses on the 

need for immediate police action. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 

(1978). The exception described by the Sixth Circuit in Washington and applied 

by the Sixth Circuit in Rohrig is neither a traditional exigent circumstances 

exception nor a standard community caretaker exception. It has been aptly labeled 

“a modified exigent circumstances test, with perhaps a lower threshold for 

exigency if the officer is acting in a community caretaking role.” Ray v. Township 

of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing test applied by the Sixth 

Circuit in Rohrig). Throughout this Opinion and Order, the Court, therefore, refers 

to the exception as the “community caretaker/exigency exception.” 

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that Veldhuis was performing a community caretaking function, rather than a 

traditional law enforcement function, when he entered Williams’ apartment. As 

the government properly notes, Veldhuis testified that he entered Williams 

apartment in order to address (1) what he perceived as a medical emergency and 

(2) a severe hoarding situation that could have posed a threat to both Williams and 

his neighbors. Veldhuis also insisted that he had no need to enter the apartment to 

search for evidence of a crime because he believed that Ferrell’s observations of 

suspected child pornography, as reported to him, would have been sufficient to 

support a request for a warrant to search the apartment. The Court finds all of this 

testimony to have been credible, and the Court shares the government’s view that 

this testimony supports a finding that Veldhuis was primarily performing a 

community caretaking function. 

Second, the government points to a legitimate need to take immediate action. 

The government fairly notes that the hoarding situation that Veldhuis encountered 

posed a real threat to the Initial Responders, to Williams, and to the other residents 

of Williams’ apartment building. Indeed, the press has reported on several fires 

and other public health risks caused by hoarding and has noted that the threat is 

especially serious when the hoarding occurs in an apartment building with multiple 

residents. See, e.g, Firefighters Respond to Another House Fire Involving 

Hoarding in Lansing, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 27, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 

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8414362 (reporting “third house fire in a month involving hoarding” in Lansing 

area); Living and Dying in Chaos and Clutter, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 29, 

2010, available at 2010 WLNR 23701153 (noting that hoarded materials can 

become “a fuel source” for fire); Task Forces Offer Hoarders a Way to Dig Out, 

NEW YORK TIMES, May 27, 2013, at A1 (hoarding creates contagion risk for 

viruses, “particularly when a home shares walls with neighbors in an apartment 

building or a condo complex”). Veldhuis did have some reason to enter the 

apartment in order to make a prompt assessment of the hoarding threat and, in 

addition, to assess whether Williams could safely remain in the apartment if the 

Initial Responders decided not to transport him to the hospital. 

Third, the government reasonably argues that given the potentially serious 

threat posed by Williams’ hoarding, Veldhuis’ entry into Williams’ apartment 

served an important governmental interest. Indeed, the government plainly has a 

strong interest in protecting residents of apartment buildings from the fire hazards 

and contagion risks created by severe hoarding conditions, such as those found in 

Williams’ apartment. Likewise, the government has a strong interest in ensuring 

that vulnerable elderly citizens like Williams are not living in squalor and in unsafe 

quarters. Veldhuis attempted to further these interests by entering Williams’ 

apartment to inspect the living conditions. 

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Finally, the government properly insists that Williams had a substantially 

diminished expectation of privacy in those areas of his apartment that were in plain 

view of the Initial Responders – including the areas in which he displayed his 

sexually explicit photographs of young girls. While a person normally has a high 

expectation of privacy in his dwelling, see, e.g. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 

37 (2001), Williams sacrificed much of that expectation when he invited the Initial 

Responders into his apartment to tend to his immediate medical needs. As the 

Sixth Circuit has explained, a homeowner who seeks aid “from an emergency 

team” including paramedics, “clearly” has a “diminished” expectation of privacy in 

those areas of his home that the team must enter in order to render assistance. 

Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2003). Other federal 

and state courts have similarly concluded that a person who seeks emergency 

assistance has a reduced expectation of privacy with respect to items in plain view 

of the responders as they are performing their emergency functions. See, e.g., 

United States v. Telfair, 507 Fed. App’x. 164, 175 n.15 (3d Cir. 2012) (when a 

person summons emergency aid to his home “and one of the individual’s 

possessions in plain view contains obvious evidence of [a] crime, under the plain 

view doctrine [he] has a reduced expectation of privacy in that possession”); State 

v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170, 182 (W. Va. 2002) (“a person who summons the police 

for help ... relinquishes his/her constitutionally protected right to privacy, to the 

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extent necessary for the police to effectively respond to facts presented by the call 

for help”); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 41 P.3d 275, 279 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) 

(recognizing that a person who summons emergency assistance diminishes his 

reasonable expectation of privacy in his home).5

 When Williams invited the Initial 

Responders into his apartment in order to render medical assistance, he 

substantially relinquished any expectation of privacy he may have had in items that 

the responders could see in plain view as they rendered aid. 

 Williams argues that while his invitation to the Initial Responders may have 

diminished his expectation of privacy in his living room – where he was positioned 

when he authorized them to break the chain on his door and enter his apartment – 

he did not relinquish an expectation of privacy in his bedroom – where Ferrell first 

discovered the child pornography. However, Williams’ invitation to the Initial 

Responders diminished his expectation of privacy in those areas that Williams 

knew or should have known the responders would need to enter in order to assess 

and treat him, and Williams’ bedroom was just such an area. Indeed, when 

Williams invited the Initial Responders into his unit, Williams knew or should 

have known that (1) the Initial Responders would need to know what medications 

                                                            

5

 To be sure, a person does not entirely forfeit his expectation of privacy in his 

dwelling by summoning emergency aid or calling 911, and the police may not 

justify a broad warrantless search of a residence on the ground that the occupant 

sought emergency aid. See Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984). But by 

summoning emergency aid, a person authorizes police to observe and seize items 

in plain view. See id. at 22. 

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17

he was taking; (2) he was unable to identify his medications from memory; (3) the 

medications were located in the bedroom; (4) he might be physically unable to 

retrieve the medications from his bedroom due to his injuries; and (5) the Initial 

Responders might therefore need to enter the bedroom to locate and identify the 

medications. Thus, when Williams sought emergency assistance, he relinquished 

his expectation of privacy in those portions of his bedroom in plain view. 

Under all of these circumstances, the government makes a reasonably strong 

case that Veldhuis’ warrantless entry into Williams’ apartment was justified by the 

community caretaker/exigency exception to the warrant requirement. 

 Nonetheless, several considerations weigh against a finding that the 

community caretaker/exigency exception applies here. First, although the Rohrig 

court upheld an officer’s warrantless entry into a private home under that 

exception, the Sixth Circuit has since expressed “doubt that community caretaking 

will generally justify warrantless entries into private homes.” U.S. v. Williams, 354 

F.3d 497, 508 (6th Cir. 2003). In fact, this Court has not found any post-Rohrig

Sixth Circuit cases upholding a warrantless entry into a private residence based 

upon community caretaking considerations. Moreover, other courts of appeals 

have held that community caretaking considerations may justify warrantless 

searches of automobiles, but not warrantless searches of private residences. See, 

e.g., Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 556 (7th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); but see United 

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18

States v. Quezada, 448 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (8th Cir. 2006) (relying on community 

caretaker/exigency exception to justify warrantless search of home). 

 Second, the Supreme Court has explained that community caretaking 

functions justify warrantless searches only when the functions are “totally divorced 

from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 

violation of a criminal statute.” Cady, 413 U.S. at 441. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit 

has cautioned that “[t]he community caretaking function of the police cannot apply 

where ... there is significant suspicion of criminal activity.” Williams, 354 F.3d at 

508. In this case, before Veldhuis entered Williams’ apartment, he suspected that 

Williams may have possessed child pornography. Thus, even though Veldhuis 

entered the apartment primarily to perform a community caretaking function, it is 

at least arguable that Veldhuis’ entry was not “totally divorced” from the detection 

or investigation of criminal activity and that the community caretaker/exigency 

exception would not apply.6

 

                                                            

6

 Veldhuis candidly admits that he knew about the suspected child pornography 

before entering Williams’ apartment and that the pornography was a “secondary 

reason” for his presence at the apartment complex. As noted above, Veldhuis 

nonetheless insists, in testimony the Court finds credible, that he entered Williams’ 

apartment to address what he perceived to be the ongoing “emergency” posed by 

the hoarding and by Williams’ health condition. (Oct. 9 Tr. at 81, Pg. ID 217. See 

also Oct. 24 Tr. at 13, Pg. ID 102.) There is thus a legitimate argument that while 

Veldhuis’ presence at the apartment complex was not “totally divorced” from law 

enforcement activities, his actual entry into the apartment was.

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19

 Third, there is reason to question the true immediacy of Veldhuis’ need to 

enter Williams’ apartment without a warrant. By the time Veldhuis arrived, the 

Initial Responders were already tending to Williams’ medical needs, and they did 

not indicate to Veldhuis in any way that they needed his help in assessing or 

treating Williams. And while Williams’ hoarding may have posed a risk to both 

Williams and his neighbors, one could fairly ask whether that risk stood a realistic 

chance of quickly ripening into an actual harm. For instance, Williams’ hoarding 

seems unlike a bomb making operation or a “meth lab” that could easily go up in 

flames. See, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 850-51 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(dangers associated with suspected methamphetamine lab justified warrantless 

entry). 

 For all of the reasons explained above, it is a very close question in this case 

whether the community caretaker/exigency exception justified Veldhuis’ 

warrantless entry into Williams’ apartment. The fact that Williams invited the 

Initial Responders to enter into his apartment perhaps tips the balance in favor 

applying the exception and upholding the constitutionality of Veldhuis’ entry.7

 

That invitation – and the concomitant substantial reduction in Williams’ 

                                                            

7

 The Court does not conclude that Williams’ invitation to the Initial Responders 

rose to the level of consent for Veldhuis to conduct a search of Williams’ 

apartment for evidence of suspected child pornography. Rather than establishing 

Williams’ formal consent to a law enforcement search, the invitation evidences 

Williams’ substantially diminished expectation of privacy. 

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20

expectation of privacy in the areas of his apartment in plain view – sharply 

distinguishes this case from those in which the Sixth Circuit and other courts have 

declined to apply the community caretaker/exigency exception to warrantless 

entries of dwellings. Ultimately, however, the Court need not decide whether the 

community caretaker/exigency exception justified Veldhuis’ entry into the 

apartment. As explained below, for the purposes of resolving Williams’ Motion, it 

is sufficient to conclude that Veldhuis’ warrantless entry, if not constitutional, was 

at least very close to the line of constitutionality. 

2. Suppression of the Evidence Seized Pursuant to the Search Warrant is 

Not Warranted 

Even if Veldhuis’ warrantless entry into Williams’ apartment violated the 

Fourth Amendment, Williams would not be entitled to suppression of the evidence 

seized pursuant to the Search Warrant. The Supreme Court has recently (and 

repeatedly) stressed that “suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth 

Amendment violation.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) 

(emphasis added). Suppression is warranted only where “exclusion would result in 

appreciable deterrence” of police misconduct and “the benefits of exclusion 

outweigh its costs.” Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (2011). And the 

Sixth Circuit has held that under the exact circumstances present here – where an 

affidavit supporting a search warrant is tainted by evidence obtained during an 

unlawful warrantless entry – suppression is not appropriate if the initial warrantless 

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21

entry was close to the line of constitutionality and if the officers who executed the 

warrant acted in good faith. See United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 

2006). This Court declines to suppress the evidence seized from Williams’ 

apartment because Veldhuis’ warrantless entry into the apartment was close to the 

line of constitutionality (if not constitutional) and because the officers who 

obtained and executed the Search Warrant acted in the utmost good faith. 

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in McClain controls here. In McClain, police 

officers responded to a 911 call reporting a possible break-in at a house that the 

caller believed to be vacant. After arriving at the house, the police officers 

observed that the front door was slightly ajar and the interior lights were on. The 

officers – acting without a warrant – entered the house to search for potential 

intruders. The officers did not find any intruders inside the house, but they did 

discover marijuana-growing paraphernalia. One of the officers reported the 

paraphernalia to his supervisor, who had not participated in the warrantless entry. 

The supervisor then contacted a third officer (“Officer Murphy”), who also had not 

participated in the warrantless entry. Officer Murphy prepared a search warrant 

affidavit based, in part, on the responding officers’ observations from inside the 

house. In the affidavit, Officer Murphy described the circumstances surrounding 

the initial warrantless search of the house. Officer Murphy presented the affidavit 

to a magistrate, and the judicial officer issued the requested search warrant. A 

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22

different team of officers executed the warrant, and they seized marijuana plants 

and growing equipment from the house. After the owners of the house were 

charged with several drug-related offenses, they moved to suppress the evidence 

seized from the house. The district court held that the officers’ initial entry into the 

home “violated the Fourth Amendment, necessitating the suppression of all 

evidence derivative of that warrantless search.” Id. at 561. 

The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Sixth Circuit first observed that under the 

good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897 (1984), exclusion is not appropriate where police officers act in 

reasonable reliance on a search warrant later determined to be defective. See

McClain, 444 F.3d at 564-65. The Sixth Circuit held that the Leon good-faith 

exception was applicable even though the officers’ initial entry into the house 

violated the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit applied the good-faith 

exception because the officers who sought and executed the search warrants “acted 

in good faith[] and ... the facts surrounding the initial warrantless search were 

close enough to the line of validity to make the executing officers’ belief in the 

validity of the search warrants objectively reasonable.” Id. at 566. 

The Sixth Circuit emphasized that the executing officers had no reason to 

doubt the validity of the search warrant because, among other things, a neutral and 

detached magistrate issued the warrant in reliance on an affidavit that “fully 

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23

disclosed ... the circumstances surrounding the initial warrantless search.” Id. 

The Sixth Circuit also emphasized that “the officers who sought and executed the 

search warrant[] were not the same officers who performed the initial warrantless 

search.” Id. The Sixth Circuit further highlighted that even though the initial 

warrantless entry was unconstitutional, it was a close call, and the officers who 

initially entered the home were not “objectively unreasonable” in concluding that 

their entry was justified. Id. 

This case is exactly like McClain. As discussed above, even if Veldhuis’ 

entry into Williams’ apartment violated the Fourth Amendment, it was an 

extremely close call, and Veldhuis’ conclusion that he could lawfully enter the 

apartment was not unreasonable. Likewise, Detective Flynn and the officers 

executing the Search Warrant acted in the utmost good faith. In the Supporting 

Affidavit, Flynn clearly disclosed to the magistrate that Veldhuis’ observations 

were made during a warrantless entry into Williams’ apartment, and the magistrate 

did not raise any objections to, nor questions concerning, that warrantless entry. 

Under these circumstances, Flynn had no reason to question the validity of 

Veldhuis’ entry into the apartment nor the propriety of including Veldhuis’ 

observations in the Supporting Affidavit.8

 Moreover, Flynn sent the Supporting 

                                                            

8

 In United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit 

applied the good faith exception under analogous circumstances. In Thomas, an 

affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant contained information gathered 

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24

Affidavit to the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office for approval before he 

presented it to the magistrate, and the prosecutor did not voice any concerns about 

Veldhuis’ warrantless entry. While the lack of an objection from the prosecutor 

certainly does not establish the validity of the Supporting Affidavit, it does support 

this Court’s finding that Flynn acted in complete good faith. Finally, as in 

McClain, the officers (including Flynn) who executed the Search Warrant did not 

participate in the initial warrantless entry of Williams’ apartment, and, moreover, 

they had no reason to question the validity of the Search Warrant that had been 

duly issued by a judicial officer. As explained below, the Search Warrant was 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

during an earlier search that, according to the Second Circuit, violated the Fourth 

Amendment. The Second Circuit nonetheless held that evidence seized pursuant to 

the warrant should not be suppressed. The court stressed that the circumstances of 

the prior search had been disclosed to the magistrate, who nonetheless issued the 

warrant. Accordingly, the police had a good faith basis to believe that the evidence 

obtained during the prior search could be used to establish probable cause for the 

warrant, and the Leon good-faith exception applied: 

Th[e] magistrate determined that probable cause to 

search existed, and issued a search warrant. There is 

nothing more the officer could have or should have done 

under these circumstances to be sure his search would be 

legal. The magistrate, whose duty it is to interpret the 

law, determined that the [evidence obtained during the 

prior unlawful search] could form the basis for probable 

cause; it was reasonable for the officer to rely on this 

determination. The Leon Court announced a “good 

faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, and we find that 

the exception applies to this case.

Id. at 1368 (emphasis added). 

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25

amply supported by probable cause. Under these circumstances, McClain compels 

the conclusion that exclusion is not an appropriate remedy here. 

Two Supreme Court cases decided after McClain reinforce this Court’s 

holding that suppression is not appropriate here given the good faith of all of the 

officers involved. In Herring, supra, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]o trigger 

the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion 

can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth 

the price” of “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.” Herring, 

555 U.S. at 141, 144 (evidence should not be suppressed where officer who 

stopped suspect did not act deliberately, recklessly, or grossly negligently). 

Similarly, in Davis, supra, the Supreme Court explained that exclusion is not 

appropriate “when the police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief 

that their conduct is lawful ... or when their conduct involves only simple, isolated 

negligence.” Id. at 2427-28 (internal citations and punctuation omitted) (declining 

to apply exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to search conducted in 

compliance with binding precedent that was later overturned). 

Herring and Davis underscore that police culpability is an essential 

prerequisite to suppression. There is simply no such culpability here. Veldhuis 

acted reasonably and in good faith when he entered the apartment out of his 

“overriding concern” for safety. Likewise, Flynn had an objectively reasonable, 

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26

good-faith belief in the validity of the Search Warrant. Indeed, having disclosed 

the circumstances of Veldhuis’ warrantless entry to a neutral magistrate, there was 

“nothing more [Flynn] could have or should have done ... to be sure his search 

would be legal.” Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1368. Where, as here, the police did not act 

culpably, suppression is not warranted. See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428 (citing Leon, 

468 U.S. at 919).9

3. Sufficiency of the Supporting Affidavit 

The Leon good-faith exception does not apply where the affidavit submitted 

in support of a search warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 

render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 

923. Here, Williams contends that the descriptions of Williams’ photographs in 

the Supporting Affidavit were patently insufficient to establish probable cause that 

the photographs constituted child pornography as defined under Michigan law, and 

he thus insists that the good-faith exception does not apply. This Court disagrees. 

Michigan law prohibits the possession of “child sexually abusive material,” 

which is defined as a depiction of a person who is less than 18 years of age 

                                                            

9

 The government argues against suppression on two additional grounds: (1) that 

Veldhuis’ initial, warrantless entry into Williams’ apartment was justified under 

the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g., Michigan v. 

Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009), and (2) that even if Veldhuis’ initial entry was 

unlawful, the seizure was valid pursuant to the independent source doctrine. The 

Court need not address these arguments because it finds suppression unwarranted 

for the reasons discussed above. 

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27

engaged in “listed sexual acts.” M.C.L. §§ 750.145c(1)(o), 750.145c(4). “Listed 

sexual acts” include “sexual intercourse, erotic fondling, sadomasochistic abuse, 

masturbation, passive sexual involvement, sexual excitement, or erotic nudity.” 

M.C.L. § 750.145c(1)(i). “Erotic nudity” is “the lascivious exhibition of the 

genital, public, or rectal area.” M.C.L. § 750.145c(1)(h). And “lascivious” is 

defined as “wanton, lewd, and lustful and tending to produce voluptuous or lewd 

emotions.” Id. 

The Supporting Affidavit stated that Ferrell “observed numerous pictures of 

young children[,] specifically girls in the nude” inside Williams’ apartment. The 

Supporting Affidavit further noted that Veldhuis “observed numerous pictures 

framed and unframed of nude female children.” Williams contends that these 

statements do not constitute probable cause to believe that the photographs 

depicted “erotic nudity” or any other listed sexual act. Williams argues that 

Ferrell’s and Veldhuis’ observations could have described innocuous “bath time” 

pictures that parents occasionally take of their children, rather than illegal child 

pornography. 

When read in its entirety, however, the Supporting Affidavit established 

probable cause to believe that the photographs depicted “erotic nudity” and were 

not simply innocent “bath time” images. See, e.g., United States v. Plemmons, 336 

F.2d 731, 734 (affidavit supporting a search warrant “must be read as a whole” and 

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28

statements therein must be read in context); Tolbert v. United States, 112 Fed. 

App’x 440, 443 (6th Cir. 2004) (same). Importantly, the Supporting Affidavit 

stated that Veldhuis “believ[ed] th[e photographs] to be child pornography.” 

While Veldhuis’ description certainly did not prove that the photographs were, in 

fact, “erotic nudity,” his use of the term “child pornography” (in conjunction with 

his description of the naked young girls) did provide a basis for the magistrate to 

find probable cause that the photographs were not innocent bathing snapshots. 

Moreover, the Supporting Affidavit indicated that Veldhuis also observed 

“[n]umerous Barbie dolls undressed ... in sexual positions” as well as children’s 

underwear in Williams’ bedroom. These additional facts provide important 

context for Ferrell’s and Veldhuis’ descriptions of the photographs in Williams’ 

apartment. 

Furthermore, the description of the photographs in the Supporting Affidavit 

is not all that different from photographs deemed by the Michigan Court of 

Appeals to constitute “erotic nudity” under Michigan law. See People v. Holbrook, 

No. 298869, 2011 WL 5064266 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011). The defendantappellant in Holbrook challenged his conviction for possession of child sexually 

abusive material on the ground that the photographs he possessed did not display 

erotic nudity. The Holbrook court described the photographs as depicting (1) a girl 

“sitting naked on a chair ... covering herself up, with her arms crossed,” and her 

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29

“genitals and breasts ... visible” and (2) a girl “standing naked in a shower.” Id. at 

*5. The Holbrook court found “no reason to upset the jury’s determination that the 

pictures constituted” erotic nudity. Id. 

In light of Holbrook, a reasonable argument could be made that the 

statements in the Supporting Affidavit regarding “numerous pictures of ... girls in 

the nude” and “nude female children” would be sufficient to establish probable 

cause to believe that Williams possessed child pornography. At a minimum, these 

statements would be sufficient to allow Flynn to reasonably conclude that probable 

cause had been established. Indeed, if the jury in Holbrook could reasonably find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that photographs of a girl “sitting naked on a chair” and 

“standing naked in a shower” depicted “erotic nudity,” then Flynn could 

reasonably rely on the magistrate’s determination that the statements in the 

Supporting Affidavit established probable cause to believe that Williams’ photos 

depicted “erotic nudity.” 

Under these circumstances, the Court has little difficulty concluding that the 

statements in the Supporting Affidavit, when read in context and in their entirety, 

established probable cause to support the issuance of the Search Warrant. And 

even if the Court were to conclude that the Supporting Affidavit fell short of 

establishing probable cause, the deficiency would not be so great as to preclude 

application of the Leon good-faith exception. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (good2:14-cr-20419-MFL-MKM Doc # 27 Filed 02/19/15 Pg 29 of 30 Pg ID 312
30

faith exception does not apply when a warrant is “so facially deficient ... that the 

executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid”). 

CONCLUSION 

 For all the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, IT IS HEREBY 

ORDERED that Williams’ Motion (ECF #17) is DENIED. 

       s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: February 19, 2015 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties 

and/or counsel of record on February 19, 2015, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113

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