UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MORRIS WEATHERSPOON, #471817, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 14-12789 

 Honorable Matthew F. Leitman 

v. Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

 

GEORGE LNU, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [33, 34, 35, 36, 37] 

On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff Morris Weatherspoon, an inmate at the Muskegon Correctional 

Facility, filed his complaint in this case, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, against several defendants. 

(Doc. #1). On October 30, 2014, this case was referred to the undersigned for all pretrial 

purposes. (Doc. #16). 

Presently before the Court are Weatherspoon’s Motions for Default Judgment against the 

following defendants: George LNU (psychiatrist), Angie LNU (nurse), Tammy LNU (nurse), 

Dr. Abdullateef, and Woern (social worker). (Docs. #33, 34, 35, 36, 37). Weatherspoon argues 

that default judgments are appropriate because he claims that: more than 90 days have elapsed 

since service upon these defendants; these defendants have not filed an answer or otherwise 

responded to Weatherspoon’s complaint; and defaults have been entered against these 

defendants. (Id.). 

Even assuming that these five defendants were properly served (which does not appear to 

be the case1

), Weatherspoon would not be entitled to default judgments. Weatherspoon’s 

 

1

 Although the United States Marshal Service attempted service on these defendants, the docket 

indicates that waivers of service were returned unexecuted for these five defendants on 

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2 

motions for default judgment ignore that this case is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997e, and that under that statute a prison official sued by an inmate 

is not required to file a response to the inmate’s complaint unless and until ordered to do so by 

the Court. The relevant section of the PLRA provides as follows: 

(g) Waiver of reply 

(1) Any defendant may waive the right to reply to any action brought by a 

prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility under 

section 1983 of this title or any other Federal law. Notwithstanding any 

other law or rule of procedure, such waiver shall not constitute an 

admission of the allegations contained in the complaint. No relief shall be 

granted to the plaintiff unless a reply has been filed. 

(2) The court may require any defendant to reply to a complaint brought 

under this section if it finds that the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity 

to prevail on the merits. 

42 U.S.C. §1997e(g). “While the Court ‘may require any defendant to reply to a complaint 

brought under this section if it finds that the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on 

the merits,’ until such time as this happens, none of the defendants in this [prisoner case] are 

obligated to answer the complaint.” Boling v. Corrections Medical Service, 2007 WL 2515222, 

at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2007) (internal citations omitted). Thus, because none of the five 

defendants at issue in the pending motions (George LNU (psychiatrist), Angie LNU (nurse), 

Tammy LNU (nurse), Dr. Abdullateef, and Woern (social worker)) have been directed by the 

Court to reply to Weatherspoon’s complaint, they had no obligation to do so, and the fact that 

none of them has yet filed such an answer does not subject them to entry of default judgments. 

See 42 U.S.C. §1997e(g)(2).2

 

September 18, 2014. (Doc. #10). There is no indication that proper service has since been 

accomplished. On today’s date, the Court issued a separate Order directing the MDOC to 

provide additional information about these unserved defendants. (Doc. #43). 

2

 Moreover, Weatherspoon’s motions for default judgment are procedurally inappropriate. It is 

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For the reasons stated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Weatherspoon’s Motions 

for Default Judgment (Docs. #33, 34, 35, 36, 37) be DENIED. 

Dated: January 9, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

 The parties’ attention is drawn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which provides a period of 

fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order within which to file objections 

for consideration by the district judge under 28 U.S. C. §636(b)(1). 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 9, 2015. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

 

clear that the entry of a default under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) is a prerequisite to entry of a default 

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). See Lewis v. Detroit Pub. Sch., 2013 WL 5785777, at *2 

(E.D. Mich. May 6, 2013). Here, despite Weatherspoon’s assertions to the contrary, there is no 

indication on the docket that defaults have been entered by the Clerk of Court against the five 

defendants at issue in the pending motions. Thus, entry of default judgment is inappropriate. 

See Colston v. Cramer, 2008 WL 559579, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2008) (noting that the court 

follows “the majority of courts” holding that Rule 55 “requires a clerk’s entry of default before a 

court can enter a default judgment.”).

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