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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

AHDAWANTAZALAM AARON,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED December 11, 2014

v No. 317552 Wayne Circuit Court CBS OUTDOORS, INC., LC No. 13-003927-CZ

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: R IORDAN , P.J., and S AAD and T ALBOT , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Plaintiff appeals the trial c ourt’s order, which granted summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case involves a dispute over a billboa rd. In December 2003, defendant, which owns and maintains billboards throughout the metro ar ea, signed a lease with a property owner on Grand River Boulevard in Detroi t. The agreement had a five-y ear term, and allowed defendant to maintain and operate a billboard on the propert y. It further specif ied that all signs and structures (i.e., billboards) placed on the proper ty were trade fixtures, which defendant had a right to remove anytime during the lease, or for a reasonable period after its expiration.

Wachovia Bank foreclosed on the property in 2005, and plaintiff purchased it in 2007, with intent to use the billboard. He took down defendant’s existing advertisements on the billboard, and posted his contact information to solicit customers. When defendant contacted him and protested, plaintiff insist ed that he owned the billboard and refused to agree to a new lease agreement. After bringing suit against plaintiff, defendant eventually removed the billboard with plaintiff’s consent. 1 Defendant informed plaintiff that local ordinances prohibited him from placing a new billboard on his property, as defendant was the owner of the billboard permit at that location.

1 After defendant removed the billboard, both pl aintiff and defendant st ipulated to dismiss defendant’s lawsuit, and the action wa s dismissed with prejudice in August 2007.-2- Despite this notice, plaintiff erected his ow n billboard on the property. It was promptly deemed illegal by the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT), because plaintiff lacked the proper permits, and the MDOT ordered him to remove the signage.

Plaintiff, representing himself, then brought this suit in the Wayne Circuit Court. He asserted that defendant unlawfully removed th e billboard from his prop erty, and demanded its return. Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), and argued that plaintiff coul d not prevail under Michigan’s claim and delivery statute 2 because he: (1) consented to the billboard’s removal; and (2) did not (and never did) own the billboard. The trial court agreed, and held that: (1) defendant owned the bill board; and (2) plaintiff’s action under MCL 600.2920 necessarily failed, because he coul d not raise this claim as to property that he did not (and had never) owned. It accordin gly granted defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10).

Plaintiff appealed the case to our Court, and argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition to defendant becau se: (1) defendant’s 2003 lease on the property was terminated by the 2005 foreclosure; and (2) de fendant violated the Highway Advertising Act (“HAA”) 3 and Detroit City Code. 4 He also brings a plethora of other claims, many of which he did not raise at trial.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Ligon v City of Detroit , 276 Mich App 120, 124; 739 NW2d 900 (2007). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint based on the pleadings alone. Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed , 470 Mich 274, 277; 681 NW2d 342 (2004). All factual allegations in support of the claim are accepted as true and are constr ued in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v Rozwood , 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) . In deciding a summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C )(10), we consider all the evidence, affidavits, pleadings, admissions, and other information available in the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Rice v Auto Club Ins Ass’n , 252 Mich App 25, 30–31; 651 NW2d 188 (2002).

2 MCL 600.2920.

3 MCL 252.301, et seq

. 4 Plaintiff’s argument regarding the HAA and Detr oit City Code does not merit analysis for two reasons: (1) he merely asserts th at defendant violated the HAA and Detroit City Code without providing any evidence to support his asserti ons; and (2) his ultima te claim is under MCL 600.2920, which involves the ownership of the bill board, not whether defe ndant violated the HAA or Detroit City Code. In other words, de fendant’s supposed violation of the HAA or the Detroit City Code has no bearing on whether plai ntiff owns the billboard. Moreover, plaintiff’s suggestion that defendant had a duty to foll ow the HAA and Detroit C ity Code implies that defendant owned the billboard at issue, which undermines his claim that defendant wrongfully took the billboard.-3- Where the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden , 461 Mich at 120.

“Issues raised for the first time on appeal are not ordinarily subject to review.” Booth Newspapers, Inc v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents , 444 Mich 211, 234; 507 NW2d 422 (1993). Our Court has repeatedly declined to consider argu ments not presented at the trial court, and only deviates from that rule in “exceptional circumstances.” Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Null , 304 Mich App 508, 518; 847 NW2d 657 (2014). However, we may consider unpreserved issues “when they involve questions of law, and the facts nece ssary for their resolution have been presented. Our review of any unpreserved issu es is limited to plain error.” Hogg v Four Lakes Ass’n, Inc

, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___; slip op at 3 (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

In relevant part, MCL 600.2920 states:

(1) A civil action may be brought to recover possession of any goods or chattels which have been unlawfully taken or unlaw fully detained and to recover damages sustained by the unlawful taking or unlaw ful detention, subject to the following conditions:

* * *

(c) An action may not be maintained unde r this section by a person who, at the time the action is commenced, does not have a right to possession of the goods or chattels taken or detained.

When a lessee places a billboard on a property pursuant to a lease agreement, the billboard is a trade fixture. Outdoor Sys Advertising, Inc v Korth , 238 Mich App 664, 667; 607 NW2d 729 (1999). “A trade fixture is merely a fixture which has be en annexed to leased realty by a lessee for the purpose of enab ling him to engage in a busine ss. The trade fixture doctrine permits the lessee, upon the termination of the leas e, to remove such a fixture from the lessor’s real property.” Id . at 667–668.

Here, plaintiff claims the 2005 foreclosure te rminated defendant’s 2003 lease, and that the foreclosure gave him ownership of the billboa rd. Because the billboard was rightfully his, plaintiff says, defendant’s removal of the bi llboard violated MCL 600.2920. This argument is incorrect as a matter of law. Regardless of whether the lease terminated with the property’s foreclosure in 2005, the billboard is a trade fixture. It thus is defendant’s property, and defendant is entitled, “upon the termination of the lease, to remove [the billboard] from [plaintiff’s] real property.” Id . Plaintiff’s claims to th e contrary have no merit. 5

5 Plaintiff also makes a number of unsupported and meritless argumen ts that vaguely relate to the billboard’s ownership status. First, he clai ms that “Viacom” is the named lessee on the document, and that defendant was not a party to the lease. But, as defenda nt explained, it is the-4- Therefore, the circuit court properly grante d summary disposition to defendant, because: (1) plaintiff failed to state a claim under MCR 2. 116(C)(8); and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact under MCR 2.116(C)(10). 6

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan /s/ Henry William Saad /s/ Michael J. Talbot

corporate successor to Viacom an d is thus the lessee in the 2003 agreement and owner of the billboard.

Plaintiff further asserts that de fendant did not pay city and stat e taxes for operating the billboard, but fails to explain how non-payment of taxes equa ls non-ownership of the billboard. “It is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationa lize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” Mitcham v Detroit , 355 Mich 182, 203; 94 NW2d 388 (1959). In any event, if defendant did not pay the relevant taxes, an d was required to do so, it would imply that defendant owns the billboard—undermi ning plaintiff’s entire appeal.

6 Plaintiff also raises a number of issues that he di d not raise at trial. They are therefore unpreserved and we need not address them. Booth Newspapers

, 444 Mich at 234. In any event, they are unsupported and without merit. See Mitcham , 355 Mich at 203.