UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

David Coleman, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael Story, et al., 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

Case No. 14-cv-13860 

Hon. Judith E. Levy 

Mag. Judge David R. Grand 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [11] 

 This case arises from plaintiff David Coleman’s arrest and the 

confiscation of weapons and other personal property from his home. 

Defendants are the chief and several officers of the police department in 

the Village of Holly, Michigan. Before the Court is defendants’ motion 

for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (Dkt. 11.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion. 

I. Background 

 On October 1, 2011, eight officers from the Holly, Michigan police 

department executed a search warrant at plaintiff’s residence. (Compl. 

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¶ 6.) Among them were the defendants: Officer Michael Story, Officer 

Kenneth Bean, Officer Coleman, Officer Simpson, Officer Garcia, and 

Officer Bob. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 7.) Plaintiff alleges the search warrant was 

mistakenly executed at his residence, as the warrant was for a different 

David Coleman. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges defendants seized a 

number of weapons belonging to him. (Id. ¶ 7.) Although some of the 

weapons were returned, plaintiff alleges a .22-caliber Smith& Wesson 

revolver, a Remington rifle, two crossbows, and an unspecified amount 

of ammunition have not been returned. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

 On March 7, 2013, plaintiff, along with Candace Coleman, brought 

suit against the Holly Police Department and Holly Township in the 52-

2 District Court in Oakland County, Michigan. (See Dkt. 8, Ex. A to 

Defs.’ Answer 19-20; Dkt. 14-2, Ex. 1 to Defs.’ Reply.) Plaintiff sought 

recovery of the seized property – namely, weapons, ammunition, and 

cash – as well as $20,000 in damages. (Dkt. 14-2, Ex. 1 to Defs.’ Reply.) 

The court entered a stipulated order on July 20, 2013, by which “any 

claims for money damages Plaintiffs have (or could have) brought as 

part of this lawsuit” were dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. 8, Ex. A to 

Defs.’ Ans. 19-20.) On August 29, 2013, the court entered an order that 

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“any and all guns, rifles, and ammunition . . . seized from David Paul 

Coleman on October 1, 2011 (at 4041 Grange Hall Rd., #22 in Holly 

Michigan) by the Holly Police Department, Shall [sic] be immediately 

returned to the [sic] David Paul Coleman upon the date of entry of this 

Order.” (Dkt. 11-3, Ex. 2 to Defs.’ Mot.) This was a final order that 

closed the case. (Id.) 

 Plaintiff filed this action on October 6, 2014. (Dkt. 1.) He brings a 

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights (Count I), as well as state-law claims for malicious 

prosecution (Count II) and conversion (Count III). 

II. Standard 

 “After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay 

trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(c). The standard is the same as that for motions under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 

(6th Cir. 2010). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the 

opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted 

only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” 

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Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 

240 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). A motion for judgment on the 

pleadings should be granted “when no material issue of fact exists and 

the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 

2007). 

 In deciding a 12(c) motion, the court may consider the pleadings, 

exhibits attached to the pleadings, matters incorporated by reference 

into the pleadings, and judicially-noticed facts. See Henry v. 

Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 739 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to Rule 12(c) motion); Hawthorne v. 

Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998) (judgment on 

the pleadings “can be rendered by looking to the substance of the 

pleadings and any judicially noticed facts” (quoting Hebert Abstract Co., 

Inc. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990))). 

III. Analysis 

A. Res judicata and waiver 

Defendants argue that all of plaintiff’s claims are barred by res 

judicata, based on the 52-2 District Court action, and by plaintiff’s 

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waiver of all claims for monetary damages that could have been brought 

in that action. 

 “Federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to a statecourt judgment as that judgment receives in the rendering state.” Buck 

v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2010). 

This Court must accordingly apply Michigan res judicata law in 

determining whether plaintiff’s claims are barred. See Doe v. Jackson 

Local Schs. Sch. District, 422 F. App’x 497, 500 (6th Cir. 2011). 

 Under Michigan law, res judicata “bars a second, subsequent 

action when (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both 

actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the matter in 

the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first.” Adair v. 

State, 470 Mich. 105, 121 (2004). 

 The first two factors are easily met here. The state court action 

was decided on the merits: a final order was entered and the case 

closed. (See Dkt. 11-3, Ex. 2 to Defs.’ Mot.) 

As to the parties, David Coleman is the plaintiff in both cases. 

The defendants in the state court action were Holly Township and the 

Holly Police Department; here the defendants are individual officers 

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employed by the Holly Police Department. As such, the defendants 

here are in privity with the defendants in the state court action. 

Crawford v. Chabot, 202 F.R.D. 223, 227 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (holding 

that “[a] government official sued in his or her official capacity is 

considered to be in privity with the government”); see also Adair, 470 

Mich. at 102 (holding that “a perfect identity of the parties is not 

required, only a substantial identity of interests that are adequately 

presented and protected by the first litigant”). 

As for the third factor, Michigan courts apply res judicata broadly, 

“holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but also every 

claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising 

reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not.” Id. (citing Dart v. 

Dart, 460 Mich. 573, 586 (1999)). “[T]he determinative question is 

whether the claims in the instant case arose as part of the same 

transaction as” the claims in the 52-2 District Court case. Id. at 125. 

“Whether a factual grouping constitutes a transaction for purposes of 

res judicata is to be determined pragmatically, by considering whether 

the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, [and] whether 

they form a convenient trial unit . . . ” Id. (citation omitted). 

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 Here, the facts giving rise to plaintiff’s claims are clearly related 

in time, space, origin, and motivation to the facts that gave rise to his 

claim in the state court action. In fact, all of the claims here arise from 

the same set of facts as did plaintiff’s state court claim: namely, the 

October 1, 2011 execution of the search warrant, arrest of plaintiff, and 

seizure of plaintiff’s weapons. As pleaded, there is no reason why 

plaintiff, with due diligence, could not have asserted his present claims 

in the state court action. 

 Plaintiff’s argument regarding the limited scope of the state court 

action is unavailing. The state court did not compel plaintiff to file a 

complaint only for claim and delivery; plaintiff chose to limit his 

complaint in that manner. In other words, plaintiff’s constitutional, 

malicious prosecution, and conversion claims could easily have been 

resolved in the state court action. Plaintiff’s claims are thus barred by 

res judicata. 

Plaintiff’s waiver, in the state court action, of “any claims for 

money damages Plaintiffs have (or could have) brought as part of this 

lawsuit” likewise bars his claims here. (Dkt. 8, Ex. A to Defs.’ Ans. 19-

20.) As discussed above, the facts supporting plaintiff’s claims here 

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were readily known to him at the time of the state court action. The 

claims here thus qualify as claims for money damages plaintiff could 

have brought as part of his state court suit. 

B. Statute of limitations 

 Plaintiff’s constitutional claims (Count I) must be dismissed for 

the additional reason that those claims are time-barred.1 Michigan’s 

personal injury statute of limitations applies to § 1983 actions. See 

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The relevant statute of 

limitations is three years. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805. Plaintiff’s 

constitutional claims accrued on October 1, 2011, and he filed his 

complaint in this matter over three years later, on October 6, 2014. 

(Dkt. 1.) 

IV. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings 

(Dkt. 11) is GRANTED; and 

                                                            

1 Defendants also argue that plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is time-barred. 

But the Court cannot determine, from the record on this motion, when the criminal 

proceedings against plaintiff were resolved, and thus when plaintiff’s malicious 

prosecution claim accrued. Likewise, because no records have been submitted 

relating to plaintiff’s plea and conviction in the criminal proceedings, the Court 

cannot consider defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s guilty plea prevents him from 

establishing an element – lack of probable cause – of his malicious prosecution 

claim. 

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 Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 1, 2015 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on July 1, 2015. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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