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Anthony Herman 

David Kolker 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Harry J. Summers (CA Bar #147929) 

Seth Nesin 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

(202) 219-0260 (facsimile) 

Email: dkolker@fec.gov 

 hsummers@fec.gov 

 snesin@fec.gov 

Local Counsel: Roger E. West (CA Bar # 58609) 

Assistant United States Attorney 

First Assistant Chief, Civil Division 

300 North Los Angeles Street, Suite 7516 

Los Angeles, California 90012 

(213) 894-2461 

(213) 894-7819 (facsimile) 

Email: roger.west4@usdoj.gov 

ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANT

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

 ) 

GARY E. JOHNSON, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) Civ. No. 8:12-1626 (ODW-JC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) MEMORANDUM IN 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) OPPOSITION 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 
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DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 

TO PLAINTIFFS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR MANDATORY 

INJUNCTION, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE, OR 

OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF 

INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiffs have filed an “application for a mandatory injunction, writ of 

mandate, or other appropriate relief” requesting a three-judge panel of this 

Court to direct the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) to 

disburse $747,115.34 to their Presidential campaign. The application should be 

denied for at least three reasons: (1) This Court lacks jurisdiction because the 

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review in the 

first instance the Commission’s administrative determinations under the 

Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001 et seq. 

(“Fund Act”); (2) plaintiffs have failed to meet the Court’s procedural and 

substantive requirements for ex parte relief; and (3) the claims in this lawsuit 

are frivolous. 

 Plaintiffs Gary E. Johnson, James P. Gray, and Gary Johnson 2012, Inc. 

are, respectively, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees of the 

Libertarian Party and their campaign committee. Plaintiffs Johnson and Gray 

(“the candidates”) applied for pre-general election funding pursuant to the Fund 

Act, which provides for the grant of public funds to eligible campaigns for 

President. The Commission is the agency of the United States government 

empowered with exclusive jurisdiction to administer and interpret the Fund Act, 

in addition to the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 

26 U.S.C. §§ 9031 et seq., and the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as 

amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57. See generally 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(b)(1), 437d(a) 
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and 437g. 

 In a final determination made pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9005(b), the 

Commission on September 18, 2012, ruled that the candidates “are not entitled 

to receive any pre-election payments of public funds for the general election 

pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a) and 11 C.F.R. § 9004.2.” (FEC, Statement of 

Reasons in Support of Final Determination on Eligibility and Entitlement (In 

the Matter of Governor Gary Johnson and Judge James Gray, LRA #905) at 1 

(“Statement of Reasons”), Exhibit (“Exh.”) 5 to Declaration of James P. Gray 

(“Gray Decl.”).) In its Statement of Reasons, the Commission explained that 

the candidates were ineligible for such funding because neither they nor the 

Libertarian Party had received 5% or more of the vote in the 2008 Presidential 

election, as expressly required by the Fund Act. 

 Plaintiffs have now filed this lawsuit and a contemporaneous ex parte 

application. For the reasons discussed in this opposition, the ex parte 

application should be denied. 

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE CONGRESS 

GRANTED ONLY THE D.C. CIRCUIT JURISDICTION TO 

REVIEW A COMMISSION DETERMINATION UNDER THE 

FUND ACT 

 This Court should first deny plaintiffs’ application because the Court 

lacks statutory jurisdiction to hear this matter. Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts that 

this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2), but that 

extraordinary provision — calling for a three-judge district court and a direct 

appeal to the Supreme Court — is inapplicable to judicial review of 

determinations and other actions by the Commission under the Fund Act. Here, 

there is no dispute that the Commission has made a “final determination” 

declining pre-election funding for Johnson and Gray. (Gray Decl. ¶ 12 & 
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Exh. 5 (FEC Statement of Reasons).) Such determinations are subject to review 

only under section 9011(a), which states: “Any certification, determination, or 

other action by the Commission made or taken pursuant to the provisions of 

[the Fund Act] shall be subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia . . . .” 26 U.S.C. § 9011(a) (emphases added). The 

D.C. Circuit thus has exclusive jurisdiction to review actions brought to review 

the kind of Commission determination at issue here. 

 As the Eleventh Circuit stated when addressing the identical issue: 

The statutory text clearly designates the D.C. Circuit as the forum 

for judicial review of “[a]ny certification, determination, or other 

action” by the Commission. 26 U.S.C. § 9011(a). Furthermore, a 

thirty-day time period is established for any petition seeking 

judicial review of such action by the Commission. Id. Section 

9011(b), in contrast, gives district courts jurisdiction over suits that 

seek to implement the chapter. In order for the two subsections of 

section 9011 to have meaning, those actions covered by subsection 

(b), which may be entertained by courts other than the D.C. 

Circuit, must be suits that do not concern review of certifications, 

determinations, or other actions by the Commission. 

FEC v. Reform Party of the United States, 479 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 

2007). 

 “It is well settled that if Congress, as here, specifically designates a 

forum for judicial review of administrative action, that forum is exclusive, and 

this result does not depend upon the use of the word ‘exclusive’ in the statute 

providing for a forum for judicial review.” UMC Indus., Inc. v. Seaborg, 439 

F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 1971); Peck v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 535 F.3d 1053, 

1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]ith regard to final FCC actions, a statute which vests 
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jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off original jurisdiction in other courts in 

all cases covered by that statute.” (quoting Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. 

v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted)). Allowing 

litigants to file for review of an agency action in multiple jurisdictions runs the 

risk of duplicative litigation. Whitney Nat. Bank in Jefferson Parish v. Bank of 

New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 422, 85 S. Ct. 551, 558, 13 L. Ed. 2d 

386, 13 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1965) (“A rejection of this [exclusive jurisdiction] 

doctrine here would result in unnecessary duplication and conflicting 

litigation.”).1

 

 Plaintiffs’ filing before this Court is an attempt to evade section 9011(a)’s 

explicit and exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit for review of 

determinations under the Fund Act, precisely what plaintiffs seek to review here. 

Plaintiffs wrongly assert that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 

9011(b)’s jurisdictional grant, which allows the “Commission, the national 

committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President” to 

bring actions “as may be appropriate to implement or construe any provisions of 

this chapter.” 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(1) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court 

has explained, however, “‘appropriate’ actions [under § 9011(b)] by private parties 

are actions that do not interfere with the FEC’s responsibilities for administering

and enforcing the Act.” FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 

U.S. 480, 486-87, 105 S. Ct. 1459, 84 L. Ed. 2d 455, 53 U.S.L.W. 4293 (1985) 

 

1

 This case presents exactly this kind of unnecessarily duplicative and conflicting 

litigation. On September 26, 2012, FEC counsel left a voicemail for plaintiffs’ counsel Paul 

Rolf Jensen after learning that plaintiffs intended to file this case in the Central District of 

California. (See Declaration of Paul Rolf Jensen at ¶ 3.) The voicemail indicated to Jensen 

that the case should be filed in the D.C. Circuit and even provided him with the citation to 

FEC v. Reform Party of the United States, 479 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2007), which 

makes clear that there is no district court jurisdiction for this case. Plaintiffs nonetheless 

filed in this Court. On October 3, 2012, FEC counsel Seth Nesin had another telephone 

conversation with plaintiffs’ counsel, who informed Mr. Nesin that plaintiffs would also be 

filing a separate action in the D.C. Circuit regarding the same legal issues.
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(emphasis added). The kind of routine determination at issue here — whether a 

particular candidate is eligible for public funding, and if so, for what amount — is 

not the kind of issue of “great importance” that Congress intended be resolved by a 

three-judge court and direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 487. Rather, it is 

precisely the kind of ordinary administrative determination identified in section 

9011(a) that must be reviewed by the D.C. Circuit. 

 Plaintiffs also rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs Act, as a source of 

jurisdiction for their ex parte application. The All Writs Act, however, is not an 

independent source of jurisdiction. See Malone v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1234, 

1237 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Contrary to Malone’s argument, the All Writs Act does 

not operate to confer jurisdiction and may only be invoked in aid of jurisdiction 

which already exists.”); Stafford v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 272 F.2d 407, 409 (9th 

Cir. 1959) (“The All Writs Act . . . does not operate to confer jurisdiction . . . 

since it may be invoked by a district court only in aid of jurisdiction which it 

already has.”). The All Writs Act “‘is not a grant of plenary power to the 

federal courts. Rather, it is designed to aid the courts in the exercise of their 

jurisdiction.’ An order is not authorized under the Act unless it is designed to 

preserve jurisdiction that the court has acquired from some other independent 

source in law.” Jackson v. Vasquez, 1 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation 

omitted). Because this Court has no source of statutory jurisdiction, the All 

Writs Act cannot provide jurisdiction or otherwise be invoked to “preserve” 

jurisdiction that does not exist. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ application must be 

dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO MEET THE STANDARDS FOR 

EX PARTE RELIEF 

 Plaintiffs have filed their application on an ex parte basis, but ignore the 

well-settled law in this district regarding the appropriate procedural and 
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substantive requirements for ex parte relief. 

 First, plaintiffs have not met the most basic procedural requirement of 

filing — separately from its motion requesting relief — a motion explaining 

“why the regular noticed motion procedures must be bypassed.” See Mission 

Power Eng’g Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 883 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 

1995) (“These are separate, distinct elements for presenting an ex parte motion 

and should never be combined. The parts should be separated physically and 

submitted as separate documents” (emphasis in original, footnote omitted)). 

Instead, plaintiffs have filed a single document that purports to be a combined 

“ex parte application” for an injunction or “writ of mandate” and memorandum 

in support. 

 Second, ex parte relief is appropriate in this district, if the Court has 

jurisdiction, only if the moving party can establish both (1) that its cause will be 

irreparably prejudiced if the underlying motion is heard according to regular 

noticed motion procedures, and (2) that it is without fault in creating the crisis 

that requires ex parte relief, or that the crisis occurred as a result of excusable 

neglect. Id. Plaintiffs have failed to meet either prong of this two-part test. 

 Regarding the “irreparable prejudice” prong, “it will usually be necessary 

to refer to the merits of the accompanying proposed motion, because if it is 

meritless, failure to hear it cannot be prejudicial.” Id. Here, as discussed in 

Parts I & III, there are two independent reasons why plaintiffs’ application must 

be denied, so plaintiffs would not be irreparably prejudiced if this Court were to 

hear their motion under the regular procedures: the Court lacks jurisdiction and 

plaintiffs’ legal position is completely meritless. In other words, because 

plaintiffs have brought suit in the wrong court and because their legal 

arguments are not colorable, they would suffer no prejudice if the Court were to 

deny them ex parte relief and instead hear this matter according to normal 
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procedures. Regarding the “fault” prong, plaintiffs also fail to establish that 

they are “without fault, or guilty only of excusable neglect” for the alleged 

crisis in which they now find themselves. Id. at 493. As described in the 

Declaration of James P. Gray and plaintiffs’ exhibits, plaintiffs’ own choices 

and dilatory actions led to the timing problem plaintiffs now perceive. Johnson 

and Gray received the nominations of the Libertarian Party on May 5, 2012. 

(Gray Decl. ¶ 5). Three days later, on May 8, 2012, their counsel sent a letter to 

the FEC’s General Counsel requesting funding and acknowledging that the FEC 

“website states that no third party candidate this cycle will qualify for federal 

general election public funding, because during the 2008 cycle, no third party 

candidate received 5% of the vote in the general election.” (Gray Decl. Exh. 1.) 

Thus, plaintiffs were put on notice at that time that the Commission’s 

interpretation of the relevant statute precluded the funding they now request. 

 Even if plaintiffs were justified in waiting for a final determination by the 

Commission before filing suit, that determination was substantially delayed by 

plaintiffs’ failure to follow the appropriate procedures before the Commission. 

The Fund Act specifies the exact steps that candidates must take to apply for 

funding. 26 U.S.C. § 9003. In particular, the candidates themselves must 

certify to the Commission in writing that they will abide by certain 

bookkeeping, audit, and other requirements to be eligible for public funds. 26 

U.S.C. §§ 9003(a), (c); 11 C.F.R. §§ 9003.1, 9003.2. Rather than complying 

with these requirements in the first instance, plaintiffs instead had their counsel 

send a letter to the FEC General Counsel dated May 8, 2012, which purported 

to request the disbursement of funds. (Gray Decl. Exh. 1.) Commission staff 

contacted plaintiffs’ counsel and referred him to the applicable requirements. 

Johnson and Gray then submitted a letter dated June 11, 2012, applying for 

public funds for the general election, but that letter also failed to meet all the 
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necessary requirements. (Gray Decl. Exh. 2.) Commission staff informed 

counsel that the candidates’ letter was deficient in several respects, and 

provided a draft letter for the candidates to complete and submit. The 

candidates submitted an amended letter dated June 27, 2012, which was 

received on July 5, 2012. (Gray Decl. Exh. 3.) In sum, Johnson and Gray 

delayed the processing of their funding request by nearly two months by failing 

to follow the appropriate steps mandated by the statute and regulations.2

 Thus, 

plaintiffs’ purported need for immediate judicial review is due largely to their 

own earlier conduct. 

III. PLAINTIFFS’ LEGAL ARGUMENT IS FRIVOLOUS 

 Even if the Court were to find that it has jurisdiction, it should deny 

plaintiffs’ relief because their argument is completely inconsistent with the 

plain language of the Fund Act. Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to pre-election 

funding based on 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(A), which provides funding for 

“eligible candidates of a minor party in a presidential election” (emphasis 

added). But the Libertarian Party is not a “minor party” as defined by the 

Fund Act. 

 According to the Fund Act, a “minor party” is a “political party whose 

candidate for the office of President in the preceding presidential election 

received, as the candidate of such party, 5 percent or more but less than 25 

percent of the total number of popular votes received by all candidates for such 

office.” 26 U.S.C. § 9002(7); see 11 C.F.R. § 9002.7. See also Hassan v. FEC, 

No. 11-2189-EGS, 2012 WL 4470304, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2012) 

(“A ‘minor’ party is one whose candidate received between 5 and 25 percent of 

 

2

 On August 6, 2012, the Commission notified plaintiffs of an initial determination 

denying Johnson and Gray’s application for pre-election funding, although the Commission 

indicated that it was willing to consider any additional information before finalizing the 

determination. (Gray Decl. Exh. 4.) Plaintiffs responded on August 18, 2012, and stated that 

they had “nothing more to submit.” (Gray Decl. Exh. 4 at final page (unnumbered).) 
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the total popular vote in the preceding presidential election . . . . Candidates of 

parties receiving less than five percent of the vote receive nothing.” (citations 

omitted)). Because the Libertarian Party received less than 5% of the vote in 

2008, it does not meet the Fund Act’s definition of a “minor party.” Thus, it is 

a “new party,” which the Fund Act defines as “a political party which is neither 

a major party nor a minor party.” 26 U.S.C. § 9002(8). And section 

9004(a)(2)(A), upon which plaintiffs rely, provides no pre-election funding to 

candidates of new parties. 

Despite the Fund Act’s clear definitions, plaintiffs argue that Congress 

did not intend for the term “minor party,” as used in section 9004(a)(2)(A), to 

incorporate the meaning of the term “minor party” as defined in section 9002(7) 

of the same statute. Accordingly, they claim they are eligible for funding 

because, even though the Libertarian Party is not a “minor party” as defined in 

the Fund Act, that definition is purportedly “not relevant” to the minor party 

funding mechanism in 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(A). (Ex Parte App. at 5.) The 

Court should reject plaintiffs’ completely unsupported attempt to rewrite the 

Fund Act. 

 Plaintiffs’ filing with this Court does not attempt to explain why the 

definition of “minor party” should be ignored when interpreting 

section 9004(a)(2)(A), but their reasoning was previously explained in 

correspondence to the Commission. In sum, plaintiffs argue that the 

Commission’s interpretation would render sections 9004(a)(2)(A) and 

9004(a)(2)(B) redundant (see Gray Decl. Exh. 1), but as explained in the 

Commission’s Statement of Reasons, plaintiffs’ argument misunderstands the 

difference between these two subparagraphs. (See Gray Decl. Exh. 5 at 3-8.) 

 Subparagraph (A) turns on the party’s previous nominee’s performance 

in the last election, no matter who that nominee was. If a party’s nominee 
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received between 5% and 25% of the popular vote in the prior presidential 

election, then the minor party’s candidate in the upcoming election is entitled to 

pre-election funding, regardless of whether the nominee is the same person in 

both elections. Thus, the entitlement belongs to “the eligible candidates of a 

minor party in a presidential election,” 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(A), with status 

as a “minor party” dependent on the party’s past performance, 26 U.S.C. 

§ 9002(7). Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Libertarian Party does not meet this 

definition. (See Gray Decl. ¶ 7.) 

 In contrast, subparagraph (B) turns on the current nominee’s individual 

performance in the past election. The entitlement belongs to “the candidate of 

one or more political parties (not including a major party) for the office of 

President” if the candidate “was a candidate for such office in the preceding 

presidential election” and “received 5 percent or more but less than 25 percent 

of the” popular vote. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(B). Thus, for example, because 

Ross Perot received more than 5% of the popular vote in 1992, he was eligible 

for pre-election funding in 1996 if he obtained the nomination of any new or 

minor party, assuming he met the other conditions for eligibility. See FEC 

Advisory Opinion 1996-22, 1996 WL 341164, at *1. 

 Therefore, rather than being redundant, subparagraphs (A) and (B) 

expressly contemplate two different scenarios where an eligible candidate of a 

non-major party may qualify for funding — based either on a minor party’s 

performance or a candidate’s personal performance in the prior presidential 

election — and adjust the formula for funding accordingly. The Commission’s 

regulations at 11 C.F.R. § 9004.2 further clarify the statutory requirements for 

pre-election funding. Section 9004.2(b), applying 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(A), 

provides that the eligible candidate of a “minor party whose candidate for the 

office of President in the preceding election received at least 5% but less than 
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25% of the total popular vote is eligible to receive pre-election payments.” 

11 C.F.R. § 9004.2(b) (emphasis added). Section 9004.2(c), implementing 26 

U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(B), provides that the nominee of a new party is entitled to 

funds only “if he or she received at least 5% but less than 25% of the total 

popular vote in the preceding election” (emphasis added). 

 The Fund Act makes repeated references in numerous provisions to 

major parties, minor parties, and new parties. These three terms are separately 

and explicitly defined by the statute. Plaintiffs offer absolutely no basis for 

disregarding the plain language and meaning of “minor party” as defined in 

section 9002(7) and implemented in section 9004(a)(2).

IV. PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATION FOR A THREE-JUDGE PANEL 

SHOULD BE DENIED 

 Plaintiffs have asked for a three-judge court to decide this case, pursuant 

to 26 U.S.C. § 9011(b)(2), which provides that cases brought under the 

provision “shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in 

accordance with the provisions of [28 U.S.C. § 2284].” However, because this 

Court lacks jurisdiction and plaintiffs’ claim is frivolous, a three-judge panel 

would be inappropriate. 

 As explained supra Part I, plaintiffs’ challenge should have been brought 

before the D.C. Circuit, and this Court lacks statutory jurisdiction. “[A]n 

individual district court judge may consider threshold jurisdictional challenges 

prior to convening a three-judge panel.” Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 

1072 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (suit brought under 2 U.S.C. § 9011(b)) (citing Gonzalez 

v. Automatic Emps. Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 95 S.Ct. 289 (1974); Reuss v. 

Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 464 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). A three-judge court is not 

required “where the district court itself lacks jurisdiction of the complaint or the 

complaint is not justiciable in the federal courts.” Gonzalez, 419 U.S. at 100; 
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Carrigan v. Sunland-Tujunga Tel. Co., 263 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1959) 

(“A fortiori, it is not required that the additional judges be summoned, when, as 

here, it appears from the complaint itself that the case is not one within the 

jurisdiction of the court.”); Giles v. Ashcroft, 193 F. Supp. 2d 258, 262-63 

(D.D.C. 2002) (finding that convening a three-judge court was unwarranted 

since plaintiff lacked standing to bring his constitutional claims); see also 

Gonzalez, 419 U.S. at 96-97 (“interpretation of the three-judge-court statutes 

has frequently deviated from the path of literalism. If the opaque terms and 

prolix syntax of these statutes were given their full play, three-judge courts 

would be convened . . . in many circumstances where such extraordinary 

procedures would serve no discernible purpose.” (internal footnote omitted). 

 Moreover, even if this Court had jurisdiction, plaintiffs’ request for a 

three-judge court should be denied because this case fails to present a 

substantial claim. Section 9011(b) explicitly requires that it be construed in 

accordance with the three-judge-court provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Courts 

have interpreted Section 2284 to require a three-judge court only if the 

complaint states a “substantial” claim. Giles, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 262. A threejudge court is not necessary if the claim is “wholly insubstantial,” “frivolous,” 

or “obviously without merit.” Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973); see 

also Wicks v. S. Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1956) (“We believe that a 

single district judge may dismiss a complaint [brought under a three-judge court 

statute] if he decides that a substantial constitutional issue is not raised 

therein.”). For the reasons stated supra Part III, plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous 

and therefore a three-judge panel is unwarranted. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ ex parte application should be 

denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 

Anthony Herman 

General Counsel 

David Kolker 

Associate General Counsel 

Lisa J. Stevenson 

Special Counsel to the General Counsel 

H3t~ers Assistant General Counsel 

(CA Bar #147929) 

Seth Nesin 

Attorney 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

(202) 219-0260 (fax) 

Is/ Roger E. West 

Local Counsel: Roger E. West 

(CA Bar# 58609) 

Assistant United States Attorney 

First Assistant Chief, Civil Division 

300 North Los Angeles Street, Suite 7516 

Los Angeles, California 90012 

(213) 894-2461/(213) 894-7819 (facsimile) 

Email: roger.west4@usdoj.gov 

FOR THE DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

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