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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: S.T.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: M.S., FATHER

No. 1682 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree May 7, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-9016-36

IN RE: A.M.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: M.S., FATHER

No. 1683 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree May 7, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Orphans' Court at No.: 2015-9017-36

BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 30, 2015

In these consolidated appeals1, M.S. (Father) appeals from the decrees 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court), entered May 7, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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2015, that terminated his parental rights to his daughters, S.T.S., born in 

December of 2002, and A.M.S., born in January of 2000 (Children). Father’s 

counsel has filed an application to withdraw as counsel. We grant counsel’s 

petition to withdraw, and we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

Father was arrested on March 20, 2013, and charged with sexually 

assaulting A.M.S. Bucks County Children and Youth Social Services Agency 

(BCCY) took the Children into care that day pursuant to an emergency order. 

The Children have remained in the legal and physical custody of BCCY since 

that date. The trial court adjudicated the Children dependent on July 1, 

2013.2

On October 24, 2013, Father pleaded no contest to charges of rape of 

a child, rape by forcible compulsion, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 

aggravated indecent assault of a child, indecent assault, endangering the 

welfare of children and corruption of minors. The criminal court sentenced 

Father to an aggregate term of not less than twenty nor more than forty 

years’ incarceration in a state correctional institution. Father’s sentence 

prohibits him from any contact with A.M.S. An order of the trial court also 

prohibits Father from any contact with S.T.S. Father has had no contact 

with the Children since March 20, 2013, the day of his arrest.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

1

 Father filed a motion to have these appeals consolidated on June 18, 

2015. This Court granted Father’s motion on July 13, 2015.

2 The Children’s mother is deceased.
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Father did not attempt to revoke his plea, nor did he appeal his 

sentence. He did however, file for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. In his petition, which was still pending at the 

time of the hearing in this matter, Father claims ineffective assistance of 

plea counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. 

In addition to the charges related to his daughter, charges of burglary 

and related offenses from 2011 are pending against Father in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. 

The Children have been living in the same foster home since they 

came into care, where they are doing “amazingly well.” (N.T. Hearing, 

5/07/15, at 8). Their foster parents, who wish to adopt the Children, 

continue to meet the Children’s needs. (See id. at 9). The Children 

strongly wish to be adopted by their foster parents. (See id. at 10).

BCCY filed its petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights on 

February 5, 2015. The trial court held hearings on those petitions on May 7, 

2015, and at their conclusions, it entered its decrees terminating Father’s 

parental rights, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). 

Father filed his notices of appeal and statements of errors complained of on 

appeal on May 18, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The trial court filed 

two identical opinions, one regarding S.T.S., and one supporting its decision 

as to A.M.S. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 
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On August 21, 2015, Father’s attorney, Stuart Wilder, filed a petition 

to withdraw his representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), and an Anders brief. In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 

1992), this Court extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the 

termination of parental rights. See In re V.E., supra at 1275. We stated 

that counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first appeal from 

a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights may, after a conscientious 

and thorough review of the record, petition this Court for leave to withdraw 

representation and must submit an Anders brief. See id. 

Before reaching the merits of the issues raised in the Anders brief, we 

must address counsel’s request to withdraw. See Commonwealth v. 

Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (stating, “[w]hen faced with a 

purported Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the 

underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw[]”) 

(citation omitted). 

To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must perform each of the 

following tasks: 

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after 

making a conscientious examination of the record and 

interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the appeal 

would be frivolous;

(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support 

the appeal, but which does not resemble a “no merit” letter or 

amicus curiae brief; and
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(3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and advise him of his 

right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any 

additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s attention.

In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004). Thereafter, this 

Court examines the record and determines whether the appeal is wholly 

frivolous. See id. 

Our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 

(Pa. 2009), stated that an Anders brief must comply with the following 

factors:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably 

supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; 

and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is 

frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, 

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to 

the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, supra at 361. 

With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform 

the defendant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court 

has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the 

letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” 

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). We 

may not address the merits of the appeal without first reviewing the petition 

to withdraw. See id.
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Herein, Attorney Wilder’s petition to withdraw from representation 

states he has made a conscientious review of the record and has concluded 

that the appeal is wholly frivolous. (See Petition for Leave to Withdraw, 

8/21/15, at unnumbered pages 1-2). In addition, on August 21, 2015, 

Attorney Wilder mailed Father (1) a copy of the petition to withdraw; (2) a 

copy of the Anders brief; and (3) a letter advising Father of his rights to 

proceed pro se or to retain private counsel if the petition is granted and to 

raise any additional issues that he deems worthy of consideration. (See id.

at Exhibit A). On August 24, 2015, Attorney Wilder filed the Anders brief in 

this Court setting forth one issue that he believed might arguably support 

Father’s appeal. Thus, counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements of 

Anders, and we must decide if counsel properly found that Appellant’s 

claims are wholly frivolous. See S.M.B., supra at 1237.

The Anders brief raises the following questions on appeal:

A. Should Appellant’s counsel be permitted to withdraw his 

appearance because the appeal is wholly frivolous?

B. Were the Appellant’s parental rights terminated prematurely 

before he had an opportunity to complete his post-conviction 

challenge to his criminal conviction?

(Father’s Brief, at 3). 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court we conclude 

that there are no issues of arguable merit. The trial court opinion properly 

disposes of the issue presented regarding the termination of Father’s 
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parental rights. (See Trial Court Opinion, 6/30/15,3at 4-10) (finding that 

BCCY clearly and convincingly established the criteria of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a) and (b) where it proved: (1) Father has been unable to provide 

essential care and subsistence needs for the Children for more than two 

years since his arrest, and will continue to be unable to do so for the 

indefinite future; (2) the Children have been in care for six months or more; 

(3) the Children have been in care for at least twelve months; (4) the 

reasons for placement continue to exist and cannot be remedied within a 

reasonable time; and (5) the termination of Father’s parental rights is in the 

Children’s best interest because of the court-imposed preclusion of Father’s 

contact with them, their bond with their foster parents, and foster parents’ 

desire to adopt them). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw his 

representation.

Decrees affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.

____________________________________________

3 We note that because the trial court filed two identical opinions in this 

matter we only have attached the opinion that references S.T.S., but the 

court made the exact same findings in reference to both Children.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/30/2015
I At the conclusion of the May 7, 2015 evidentiary hearing, Father's parental rights were terminated as to two (2) 

children, S.T.S. as discussed herein, and A .M.S. (Bucks County Orphans' Court Docket 20I5A9017), whom we 

discuss in a separate Opinion. We provide two separate Opinions to accommodate the two docket numbers that have 

been initiated in the Superior Court in regard to these appeals. 

2 We note that the biological mother of Child died on March 5, 2011. (N.T. 517115, p. 17). 

and endangering the welfare of children. On ~ilr1rch 12, 2014, Father was sentenced to 

intercourse, aggravated indecent assault of a child, corruption of minors, indecent assault 

of Bucks County to rape of a child, rape by forcible compulsion, involuntary deviate sexual 

On October 24, 20L. r=ather pied nolo contendere in the Court of Common Pleas 

that decision .2 

?111 :: At the conclusion or an ev'dentlary hearing on May 7, 20·1 s, we granted rl ,;:., 

1, 

:-,.;ietnai'ter referred to as ~he 'Agency"). She has been in foster care since March 20, 

physical custody of the Bucks County' Children :~1nd Youth Socia! Services f-.,-0nr;: 

.. , 

• 

: was adjudicated dependent on July ·i, 201 :1 rind. was. placed in temporary leg ·11 ar-,:; 

S I .. ~ t'here"1nafter referrer. 

01) 

,._.,. ·'·'·1r.:-. "C~1;10"'" .• ,., '.' ·v·. , ... ,.,,,., on January 2~ 2· 000 c1-, rl • ~,,).i .-.'I -,1 ... · ~ ;; .. i:t t, \j r.il~.:- t / , ... ,"._: \)1·:~·...,~ c...~~)1,f cir 1: . I· 1 

.. 

M T.S. (hereinafter ;.··:f,;.HrEJd to as "f\ppellant or "Father") is the biol:-,;~;,~al father of 

I. INTRODUCTION 

INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF M.T.S. 

NO.: 1015-9016 

IN RE: S.T.S. 

H\1 TH:~ COURT Of COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

Circulated 12/23/2015 10:41 AM
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or 

under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have 

elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination· of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

· (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or 

under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six 

months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions 

within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of 

the child. · 

·--'! .,. 

·! 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused _qr 

failed to perform parental duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the 

parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect·or refusal cannot or . will not be remedied by the parent. · 

(a) General rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated 

after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: 

as follows:· 

noted provisions of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §2511, which provide in pertinent part - 

The Agency petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to the below- 

(40) years in a state correctional institution. (N.T. 5f7/15, p. 5). 

years, yielding an aggregate sentence of not less than twenty (20)-.nor rnore than forty 

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two (2) consecutive sentences of not less than ten (10) years normore than twenty (20) 

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The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that 

is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to 

rights. The Superior Court has stated: 

clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed for terminating Father's parental 

As the party seeking termination, the Agency bore the burden of establishing by 

A.2d 224 (Pa.Super.2002). 

trier of fact, is the sole judge of credibility of witnesses." In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 

by competent evidence. In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super 2008). "The trial court, as 

record is employed in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported 

deference that they would give to a jury verdict. A broad, comprehensive review of the 

parental rights, the appellate courts must accord the hearing judge's decision the same 

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the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate 

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, 

i courts are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by 

competent evidence. Our findings are entitled to reasonable deference. Absent an abuse 

When reviewing an appeal from a decree tenninating parental rights, the appellate 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

1. The best interests of the children are not served by termination of 

parental rights while the Respondent is challenging his criminal 

conviction, as there is a chance he will be found innocent of the 

crimes he was charged with and thereafter be able to reunite with his 

children. · 

follows: 

by a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal which we repeat verbatim, as 

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2), appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, accompanied ,/ 

II I. APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL 

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one of the most serious and severe steps a court can take, it is well-established that a 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005). As the complete and irrevocable termination of parental rights is 

environment." In re. B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe 

upon the failure to fulfill parental duties, that right is converted to the child's "right to have 

There is a basic constitutional right to conceive and rear one's own child. However, 

A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super.2007) (citations omitted). 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2015) citing In re L.M., 923 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking 

termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's 

conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 

2511 (a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second 

part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511 (b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. 

One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature 

and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close 

attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any .such 

·bond. 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis, as follows: 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 

v. DISCUSSION 

In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 117 (Pa. Super. 2014)(internal citations and quotations omitted) 

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue ... The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. If competent evidence 

supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even if the record could also' 

support the opposite result. ... Additionally, this Court need only agree with 

[the trial court's] decision as to any one subsection in order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights. 

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requirements in only one of the subsections of Section 2511 (a), along with consideration 

longer exist, or hinder rather than benefit the child. In re Z.P., supra .. "Satisfaction of the 

existing, necessary, beneficial connection. Termination is warranted where family ties no 

parent and the child to determine whether terminating parental rights would destroy an . 

(Pa. Super. 2000). The court must examine the status of the bond between the natural 

child relationship, as well as the tangible dimension." In re C.S. 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 I 

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and welfare of a child - the love, comfort, security, and closeness entailed in a parent- 

"It is imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible dimension of the needs I 

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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent 

shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or(&~. the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

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provides as follows: I 

needs and welfare. In re Mastock, 611 A.2d 737 (Pa. 1992). 23 Pa. C.S. §2511(b) 

comes into consideration. Courts must reflect on whether termination will serve the child's 

the welfare of the child becomes the court's paramount consideration and §2511 (b) I 

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Once the statutory grounds for termination are established pursuant to §2511 (a), 

R.I.S., 36 A3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011 ). 

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explanations offered by the parent facing termination to determine if the evidence, in light 

of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination: In re 

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court must examine the individual circumstances of each and every. case and consider all 

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of the provisions in Section 2511 (b), is sufficient for termination." In re Z.S.W. 946 A. 2d 

726, 729 (brackets omitted; emphasis in original). 

The following pertinent facts were developed at the May 7, 2015 evidentiary 

hearing in this matter. Father pied nolo contendere in his criminal matter and was 

sentenced accordingly, as described above. Father's only issue complained of on appeal 

is that he is "challenging his criminal conviction" and were he to be found "innocent" upon 

consideration of his PCRA petition, then he should be able to reunite with his children. 

We infer from the appellate issue as articulated by Father's counsel that he suggests the 

Court should have deferred its decision to terminate his rights until his collateral challenge 

' in his criminal case is fully addressed and resolved. 

We heard testimony from Jodi Hertzberg, an Agency social worker. Ms. Hertzberg 

testified that A.M.S. is the victim of Father's crimes. Since the date of Father's arrest on 

March 20, 2013, he has had no contact with his two (2) daughters, presently ages fifteen 

(15) and twelve (12). Ms. Hertzberg's testimony confirmed that Father's contact ~ith 

A.M.S. has been precluded by the Bucks County Criminal Court, and that the Bucks 

County Juvenile Court has precluded his contact with S.T.S .. (N.T. 5/7/15, p. 7). 

We also heard Father's testimony that he has filed a PCRA petition asserting 

ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal matter. Father testified that he was 

coerced by his trial counsel into the nolo contendere plea, and that his plea was not only 

involuntary, but unknowing. (N.T. 5/7/15, pp. 14-15, 21). Father maintains that none of 

the prosecution's underlying "story or theory" about the crimes makes sense. Father 

testified that the prosecutor submitted a false criminal record, using his name, although 

the record actually "belongs to his brother." (N.T. 5/7/15, pp. 21-22). Father also testified 

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parental duties as outlined in§ 2511(a)(1). 

sexual crimes perpetrated by Father, it is beyond doubt that Father has failed to perform 

including the background relevant to this specific case, where A.M.S. was the victim of 

2008). Based upon the compelling evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, 

herein. In re Z.P. supra at 1120, citing In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa. Super. 

were "part of the original reasons for the removal" of the child. This is the circumstance 

analysis, where imprisonment arises as a direct result of the parent's actions which 

holds that the cause of incarceration may be particularly relevant to the§ 2511 (a) 

brought its petition to terminate Father's rights, we are cognizant of decisional law which 

his child. In considering the various sections of 2511 (a) under which the Aqency .. 

The focus of a termination case is the actions and ability of the parent to care for 

A.2d 502,513 (Pa. Super 2006). 

Adoption of C.D.R. 111 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2015), citing In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901' 

Super. 2010). "The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for 

'permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future." In re 

with [the child's] physical and emotional _needs." In re Z.P. 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. 

convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the child 

We disagree. "Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

parental rights should not have been terminated. 

and the suggestion that his PCRA petition might be granted, Father maintains that his 

which dictated that they proceed with the case against him or "they could have been 

facing charges themselves." (N. T. 5[1/15, p. 15). Based on these assertions of innocence 

that it was the failures of his trial counsel and the constitutional errors of the prosecutor 

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the cost of a child's need for permanence and stability, for a parent's claims of progress 

and hope for the future to ripen. In re Adoption of C.D.R. supra. Here, it would be 

Decisional law, as noted above, mandates that the court not wait indefinitely, at 

continue to exist. 

having begun on March 20, 2013), and that the conditions which led to placement 

Agency proved that Child has been in care for at least twelve (12) months (placement 

remedied within a reasonable time, 23 P.S. §2511 (a)(5). Pursuant to §2511 (a)(8), the 

that the reasons for such placement continue to exist, and that those reasons cannot be 

by clear and convincing evidence that Child has been in care for six (6) months or more, 

As noted, given Father's lengthy incarceration, the Agency was also able to prove 

2033, when his daughters will be thirty-three (33) and thirty (30) years of age. 

considered as highly relevant to whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

'abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent, sufficient to 

provide grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a) (2). In re Adoption of 

S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012). Here, Father's minimum release date is not until 

parental care, control or subsistence." The length of the remaining confinement can be 

and convincingly. "Incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be 

determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of providing "essential 

indefinite future. The requirements outlined in §2511 (a)(2), then, have been met clearly 

that he will continue to be unable to provide essential parenting for Child for the 

Further, based on the evidence and testimony presented, and in conformity with 

I- / the relevant statutory law, we found that Father has been unable to provide essential 

care and subsistence needs for Child for more than two (2) years since his arrest; 'and 

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3 We reiterate that the Superior Court need only agree with the trial court's decision as to any one subsection of §2511, 

in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re M.M., supra. 

welfare, must examine the status of the natural parental bond and whether terminating 

A trial court, in considering what situation would best serve a child's needs and 

the evidence of Child's bond with the foster family to be more than clear and convincing. 

strong desire to be adopted by the foster family. (N.T. 5/7/15, pp. 8-10, 12-13). We found 

foster parents have expressed an interest in adopting Child, and Child has expressed a 

speaks about enthusiastically. She has attended summer camp through the church. The 

youth group activities at church, as well as a choir and dance group, all of which she 

advocating for Child's needs. (N.T. 517/15, p. 9). Outside of school, Child is involved in 

does have an IEP. Foster mother is a retired school teacher and has been strongly 

love Child and "treat her as their own." S.T.S. has some special needs in school and 

and grandchildren, who are in and out of the home with frequency. The foster parents 

Child interacts and has bonded well with all of the family members, including the children 

with her biological sister, A.M.S., for more than two (2) years. The foster parents are a 

' loving couple with grown children, two (2) older adopted children and many grandchildren. 

The Child has been placed with her current foster family, where she has resided 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare. Section §2511 (b). We found that it did. 

Father's parental rights served the best interests of Child, considering her developmental, 

forth in 23 Pa.C.S.§2511(a),(1),(2),(5), and (8),3 we examined whether the termination of 

As the Agency clearly and convincingly established the criteria for termination set 

PCRA petition is successful. In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, supra. 

until some unknown date, when Father might be able to provide for her on the chance his 

unconscionable to allow Child's needs for permanence and stability to remain in limbo 

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N.B. It is your responsibility 

to notify all interested parties 

of the above action. 

Date: J. 

BY THE COURT: 

be affirmed. 

the Agency's Petition to Involuntarily Terminate Father's parental rights as to Child should 

For all of the reasons noted above, we respectfully submit that our decision to grant 

CONCLUSION 

rights would, in fact, hinder, rather than benefit Child. In re Z.P., supra. 

to adopt Child and Child's reciprocal desire, we found that the failure to terminate Father's 

imposed absolute preclusion as to contact with Child, and given the foster parents' desire 

of a positive relationship between Father and Child. Noting Father's criminal courtthe natural parents' rights would destroy something in existence that is necessary and 

beneficial. Here we found termination was warranted, having heard rto credible evidence 

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