### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

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Cl if f or d Ze if ma n, App e lla nt
v. Sheryl Diane Michels, Appellee

444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444444444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 44 FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COU NTY, 126TH J UDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. 97-0 9369 , HONO RABLE W. JEANNE MEURER, J UDGE PRESIDING

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O P I N I O N Clifford Zeifman appea ls the trial court’s modification order of a divorc e dec ree g ivi nga pp e lle e She ry

l D iane Mic he ls the e xclu siv e ri g ht t o ma ke de c ision s c on c e rn ingthe ir daug hter’s e ducation. In two issues, he complains that the trial court abused its discr etion in finding
a ma te ri a l and

su bstanti a l c ha

ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s su ff ic ie nt t o w arr ant a

mod if ic a tio n a nd in de t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e m o d i f

i c a t i o n w a s i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f th e c h i l d
. B e c a u s e t h e e v i de nc e is leg ally insufficient to support a modification, we re verse and re nder.

F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND Z eifman a nd Michels wer e mar

ried on J anuar

y 12, 1992. Two childre n wer e born of their marr iag e: G.L ., a son, on August 13, 1994, an d A. A. , a d aughter , on Fe bruar y 16, 1997. A2

divorce decr ee was signe d on Aug ust 4, 1998, based upon an “irre vocable mediated s et t l ement ag ree ment” that was filed with the court and incorporated into the de cre e. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6
. 6 0 2 ( W e s t2 0 0 6 )
. In t h e d e c r e e , t h e p art i e s a g r e e d t h a ti t s p r o v i s i o n s c o u l d b e m o d i f i e d b y a court of c ompetent jurisdiction.

The decre e named both pare nts as j oint manag ing conservators. As to the children’ s
e du c a tio n, the de c re e inc lud e d a ne g oti a te d a g re e me nt:
The Court finds that the parties have ag ree d and I T I S THEREFORE ORDERED that the childre n shall attend the Unive rsity of Texas L ab School until such a time as the children a re of the ag e to a

ttend elementa

ry school. The Court finds that the pa rties have a g re e d an d I T I S TH ERE F OR E O RD ERE D that, a t th a t ti me , th e c hil dr e n s ha ll attend the public sc hool in the following or der of priority for elementar y school: (1) B r y k e r Wo o d s ; o r ( 2 ) Ca s is ; p r o v id e d , h o w e v e r , th a t if n e it h e r p arty li v e s in a resi d en t i al area e ligible to attend e ither B ry ker Woods or Casis, then the childre n sh a ll atte nd

e le me nta ry sc ho ol whic h th e c hil dr e n ar e e lig ibl e to atte nd , at th e hig he st rate d school, the hi g hest rating being deter mined by the annual TAAS testing, using the pre vious y ear ’s ra

nkings, or shall attend another elementary school to which the p art i e s a g r e e i nw r i t i n g . T h e C o u rtf i n d s t h a tt h e p art i e s h a v e a g r e e d an d IT IS THEREFO RE ORDERED that for middle s ch o o l, the children sha ll attend the middle sc h o o l i n to w h ic h th e c h il dr e n ’ s e le me n ta r y s c h o o l f e e d s . T h e Co u rt f

inds that th e pa rt ie s h a ve a g re e d a

nd I T I S TH ERE F OR E O RD ERE D that f or hig h s c ho ol, the childre n shall attend the hig h school into which the childre n’s mid d le school fe e ds
. The de cre e also c ontained a pr ovision specifying a mecha nism if the parties we re una ble to ag ree :
The Court finds that the parties have ag ree d and I T I S THEREFORE ORDERED that if the pa rt ie s c ann ot a g re e on

e du c a tio na l de c isi on s f

or a c hil d, th e parties sh a ll follow the recommendations of the person that is the child’s teac her at the time of the decision. I T I S ORDERED that, as child support, Clifford Z eifman and Sheryl Diane Michels Z eifman sha ll each pa y . . . half (1⁄2) of the c osts refe rable to the children’ s a tte nd anc e a t th e Un ive rs ity of Te xas L a b Sc ho ol.3

At the time of the divorce , Michels lived in the house that had been the couple’ s home prior to the divorce , which was within the g eog raphic al boundarie s for enrollment at Br y ker Woods elementa

ry
sc ho ol. Z e if

man mo ve d in to a

ho us e a c ro ss t

he str e e t f ro m th e sc ho ol. Although the parties i n t ended f or their son, G.L ., to attend B ry ker Woods, they le arn e d w hil e he wa s atte nd ingkin de rg art e n th a t he ha d le arnin g dif fi c ult ie s. Th e y

we re a ble to
re a c h a n a g re e me nt t o mo ve him to a pr ivate sc ho ol that both pa re nts a g re e d w a s mo re su ita ble to his sp e c ia l ne e ds
.

A. A. e nte re d th e fi rs t g ra de a t B ry ke r Wo od s. I n Ap ri l 20 04 , wh e n A. A. wa s sti ll i n th e f ir s t g r a d e , M ic h e ls a

p p li e d f o r h e r a d mi s s io nto St
. A n dr e w ’ s E piscopal Sc h o o l f o r th e n e xt
sc ho ol y e ar. She did no t no tif y Z e if man of the a

pp lic a tio n. As pa

rt of he r appl ica ti on , M iche ls included a r ecommenda

tion from A.A.’s f

irst-g rade teac her at Br

y ker Woods, and A.A. w as tested to determine he r ac ademic suitability . On May 3, A.A. wa s place d on a wa iting list for admission
an d M i c h e l s n o t i f

i e d Z e i f m ano f h e r d e c i s i o nt o a

p p l y f o r A
. A
. ’ s a d m i s s i o nt o S t
. A n dr e w ’ s . In June , A .A . w a s a c c e pte d f or a dmi ssi on

to t he sc ho ol. Z eifman obje cted to the c hang e of sc hools and insisted that the parties follow the de c re e , w hic h p ro vid e d f

or A. A. to c on tin

ue he r e du c atio n a t B ry

ke r Woo ds . M ic he ls c on su lte d w ith A.A.’s f irst-g rade teac her at Bry

ker Woods who had supplied the application recommendation. The teac her a dvised Michels she thoug ht “it would be best if [A.A.] st ay ed at B ry ker Woods.” On J uly 19, 2004, Michels filed a Petition t o Modify

Parent-Child Relationship, asking the cour t t o m o d i fy the dec ree and aw ard he r the e x clusive rig ht to make educ ational decisions re g ardingA. A. T he petition stated that the orde r to be modified wa s the Ag ree d Final4

Dec ree of Divorc e that wa s rende red on Aug ust 4, 1998. Michels alleg ed that (i) the circ umstances of “t h e c h il dr e n o r o f o n e o r b o th o f th e jo in t ma n a g in g c o n s e r

v a to r s h a v e mate rially

and substantially

chang ed since the re ndition of the order such that the provisions of the Ag ree d Final Dec ree of Divorc e re g ardingeduca tion are no long er a

ppropriate an d in the best interest of the
c hil dr e n w ho are the su

bje c t of thi s su it, ” and

(i i) A. A. ha d b e e n a c c e pte d f or a dmi ss io n to S t. An dr e w’ s w hic h w a s a “ mor e e xce pti on a l edu c a tio na l oppo rt un ity tha n e ith e r [h e r c ur

re nt s c ho ol] Br y ker Woods or Casis elementa ry schools.” After a hea ring , the trial cour

t modified the dec ree to provide that Miche l s has the sole rig ht to make educ ational dec i sions for their da ug hter. The trial court de termined that the circ umstances of the child had materially and subst antially chang ed si nce the date of the rendition of the orig inal divorce decr ee. F inding only that “A.A. is diff

ere nt, times are d i ff

erent, y ou’re
rema rried, life is differe nt,” the trial court concluded that these circ umstances c onstitut ed mater ial
and su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e s. Turn ingto t

he c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st, the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t it

wa s in the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st f

or Mic he ls t o h a ve the e xclu siv e re sp on sib ili ty fo r e du c a tio na l de c isi on s. Although Z eifman r equeste d finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law, the trial court fa ile d to fi le the m.
AN AL YSI S

I n two issues on appea l, Z eifman co n t en d s that the trial cour t abused its discretion in modify ing the d i v o rce decr ee g iving Miche ls the exclusive right to make decisions conc erning A.A.’s e ducatio n . Sp e cifica lly , Z eifman c omplains that the trial court a bused its discretion in finding a mater ial and subst antial chang e in circ umstances sufficient t o war rant a modification and that the5

modification would be in the be st interest of the c hild beca u s e t h e evide nce pr esente d at trial wa s le g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt a s to bo th r e qu ir e me nts
. Stand ard of Review

We review a trial court’ s decision to modify conser vatorship under

an abuse of discretion standa

rd. Gi lle sp ie v . G ill esp ie , 6 44 S.W. 2d 44 9, 45 1 ( Te x. 19 82 ); In t h e In t erest of P.M.B. , 2 S.W .3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1999, no pet.). The trial c ourt’s orde r will not be disturbed on appeal unless the complainingparty can showa cle ar a

buse of discr etion. Id . A trial judg e is wisely vested with this d i s cr etion beca use she is best able to observe the witnesses’ de meanor

and per sonalities. A trial court a buses its discretion if it acts ar b i trarily and
u n r e a s o n a

b ly o r w it h o u t r e g ar d

to g u id in g r

u le s o r p r in c ip le s. K- Mar t Cor p. v . H on e y c utt , 24 S.W. 3d 35 7, 36 0 ( Te x. 20 00 ); W orford v. Stamper , 801 S
. W
. 2 d 1 0 8 , 109 (Tex. 1990) (apply ing abuse of discre tion standard with re g ard to c hild support order) ; Do wne r v. A qu am ar ineOp e ra tor s, Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (T ex. 1985). The mere fac t that a trial cour t decided a

n issue in a
manner differ ently

than an appellate court would under simil ar circ umstances does not establish an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discre tion does not occur a s long a s some evidenc e of a substantive and probative char acte r exists to support the trial court’ s decision. P.M.B. , 2 S.W .3d at 622.

Under an abuse of discre tion standard, leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy challeng es to the evidenc e ar e not independe nt g rounds of err or, but are rele vant fa ctors in assessingwhether the trial court a bused its disc retion. In re D.M

. , 191 S.W .3d 381, 393 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied); Dunn v. Dunn , 177 S.W .3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Distr i ct ] 2 0 0 5, pet. denied)
. Be cause we a

pply an abuse-of- discretion st andar d to a modification suit, the traditional sufficie ncy6

sta nd ard s of re vie w ov e rl a

p the a bu se of dis c re tio n sta

nd ard , a nd a pp e llate c ourt s a

pp ly a hy br id analy sis. Echols v. Olivare z , 85 S.W. 3d 47 5, 47 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 02 , n o p e t.) ; In re D.S. , 76 S.W .3d 512, 516 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

Once it ha s been deter

mined that the abuse- of-discr etion standard applies, an appellate court e ng ag es in a two-pr ong ed inquiry : (1) whe ther th e t ri al court ha d sufficie nt information on which to exerc ise its discretion; and (2) w hether the trial cour

t erre d in its application of discre tion. Ec ho ls , 85 S.W .3d at 477-78; Lindsey v. Lindsey , 9 6 5 S.W.2d 589, 5 9 2 ( T e x. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.). The traditional sufficie ncy revie w comes into play

with reg ard to the fi rs t q u es t i o n ; howeve r, the inquiry does not end ther e. Ec ho ls , 8 5 S. W.3 d at 47 8. Th e a pp e llate
c ourt the n p ro c e e ds to d e te rm ine wh e the r, ba se d o n th e e vid e nc e , th e tr ia l c ourt ma de a re a so na ble decision, that is, that the cour t’s decision wa s neither a rbitrar y nor unre asonable
. Id
. I f f ind ing s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw a

re pr op e rl y re qu e ste d, the tr ia l c ourt ’s du ty to file finding s and conclusions is m andator y , and the f

ailure to re spond when a ll requests have been proper ly made is presumed harmful unless the r ecor d shows that the complaining party has suffe red no injury
. See Te x. R. Civ . P. 29 6; Te ne ry v . Te ne ry , 932 S.W .2d 29, 30 (Tex. 1996); Cherne Indus., Inc. v . Magallanes , 763 S.W .2d 768, 7 7 2 (T ex . 1989). The c ourt must make finding s on eac h materia l issue r aised by the pleading s and evide nce, but not on evide ntiary issues. In re Da v is , 30 S.W. 3d 60 9, 61 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; Ro be rts v . R ob e rts , 999 S.W .2d 424, 434 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.). B eca use the trial c ourt did not issue any finding s of fa ct or conclusions of law , all fac ts nece ssary to support the trial court’ s ruli ng and supported by the evidenc e ar e implied in favor of the trial cour

t’s decision. BMC So

f t w a r e B el

g i um, N.V. v.7

M a r c hand , 8 3 S.W .3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). But whe n the appe llate re cord inc ludes both the repor ter’s rec ord and the c lerk’s r ecor d, as it does her e, the implied finding s are not conclusive a nd may be cha lleng ed for

leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y . Vicke ry v. Commission for Law yer D iscipline , 5 S.W .3 d 2 4 1 , 2 5 1 ( T e x. A p p . — H o u s to n [1 4 th D is t. ] 1 9 9 9 , p e t. d e n ie d )
. We th u s tu r n to the standard f or a c halleng e to the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence
. When an appe llant attacks the le g al suffic iency of an adve rse f inding on a

n issue on wh ic h h e did

no t ha ve the burd e n o f p ro of

, th e app ell ant m

us t de mon str a te on

a pp e a l th a t th e re is no evidenc e to support the adve rse f inding. Croucher v. Crouche r , 660 S.W .2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). A l eg al s ufficie ncy

challeng e may

be sustained whe n (1) the r ecor d discloses a c omplete abse nce of
e vid e nc e of

a vit a l fa c t; (2 ) the c ourt is b arr e d b y ru le s o f l aw o r o f e vid e nc e fr om g ivi ngwe ig ht t o the only evidenc e off

ere d to prove a

vital fac t; (3) the evide nce offe red to prove a vital fa ct is no
mor e tha n a me re sc int ill a ; or

(4 ) t he e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh e s c on c lus ive ly

the op po sit e of

a vit a l f a c t. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez , 977 S.W .2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998) . I n deter mining whe ther there is leg ally

sufficie nt evidence to support the finding under r eview, w e examine t he record f or
ev id e n ce a

nd infere nces that support the challeng ed finding , while disreg ardingall contra ry evidenc e and infe renc es. We must c onsider evidenc e favor able to the f inding if a rea sonable fa ctfinder

could, and disreg ard e vidence contra ry to the finding unless a re asonable fac tfinder c o u l d n o t
. City of Keller v. W

ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 828 (Tex. 2005). I n deter mining a f actua l sufficienc y question, we weig h and conside r all the e vidence in the rec ord. Holt A therton Indus., Inc. v. He ine , 835 S.W .2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992). When an appellant attacks the fa ctual suff iciency of an adver se finding on an issue on which he did not have8

the burde n of proof

, the appellant must de monstrate the finding is so contra ry to the overw helming weig ht of the evide nce a s to be clea rly wrong and manife stly

unjust. Se e Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). When conducting a fa ctual suff iciency revie w, a c ourt of appe als must not
mere ly substitut e its judgme nt for that of the trier of fac t. Golden Eagle Arc hery, I nc. v. J ackson , 116 S.W .3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).
Modif ication of Con servat orship B ecause of Mate rial and S ubs tantial Change To support modification of an order reg ardingconser vatorship, a tria l court must find that the modification would be in the best interest of the child and, as it applies to this case, that the circ umstances of

the child, a c onservator, or other party aff ecte d by the orde r have m at er i all y and substantially

chang ed si nce the date of the rendition of t he order. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101(1) (West Supp. 2005). The party seeking modification has the bur den to establish these e lements by a prepondera

nce of the evidenc e. Agraz v. Carnley , 143 S.W .3d 547, 552 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004,
no pe t.) ; In re T.D .C. , 91 S.W. 3d 86 5, 87 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 00 2, pe t. d e nie d) ; Considine v. Considine , 7 26 S.W. 2d

25 3, 25 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —A

us tin 19 87 , n o wri t) . T he be st i nte re st o f t he c hil d is a lw ay s th e pr ima

ry c on sid e ratio n o f t

he c ourt in d e te rm ini ngiss ue s o f c on se rv a tor sh ip. Te x. F a m. Code Ann. § 153.002 (West 2002).

I n a c on se rv a tor sh ip m od if

ica tio n a c tio n, a

thr e sh old

inq uir y of the tr ia l c ourt

is whether the moving pa

rty has met the burde n imposed upon him of showing a m at eria l and
s u b s t antial cha

ng e; otherw ise the trial cour t must deny

the motion to modi fy
. B a te s v . Tesar , 81 S.W. 3d 41 1, 42 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —El Pa so 20 02 , n o p e t.) . T o p ro ve that a ma te ri a l c ha

ng e in circ umstances ha s occur

red, the petitioner must de monstrate what conditions e x isted at the time of9

the entry of t he prior order a s compare d to the circ umstances e x isting at the time of the hear ing on t h e mot ion to modify
. Agraz , 1 43 S.W. 3d a t 55 4; Considine , 7 2 6 S. W. 2 d a t 2 5 5
. T h e petitioner must show what materia l chang es have occur red in the inter

vening period. Id
. (1 ) T he Pe tit ion to M od if y Pa re nt- Chil

d Re lat ion ship The only basis asser

ted in the modification petition to suppor t the require ment of a materia l and substantial chang e wa s A.A.’s ap p l ication and a dmission t o St. Andrew’s. H aving g ained he r daug hter’s a dmission t o St. Andrew’s Episc opal School , M i ch els filed a modification petition seeking a d ep arture from the ne g otiated ag ree ment conce rning her da ug hter’s e ducation
c on ta ine d in

the a g re e d d ivo rc e de g re e . Z e if man o pp os e d th e mod if

ic a tio n, se e kin g to c on tin

ue the ir daug hter’s e ducation at B ry ker Woods, the public school to which the pa rties h ad agr ee d and set forth in the divorce decr ee. Although the petition r efe renc es both c hildren, the parties ag ree that the modification at issue and the court’s or der r elate only to A.A. (2) The Evide nce

The testimony

showed that t h e d i s p u t e that led to the f iling of the petition for modification arose when Miche ls appli ed for and obtained A .A.’s admittance to St. Andrew’s Episcopal School. As a J ew raising J ewish children, Z eifman oppose d the modification bec ause he did not want the child t o attend a Christian school a nd she wa s thriving at the public school the parties ha d ag ree d to in the divorce de cre e.

T h e u n d i s p u t edev i d en c e s h o we d t h at A. A. p ro gre s s eds u cc es s fu l l y t h ro u gh kin de rg art e n, fi rs t g ra de and the be g inn ingof se c on d g ra de a t B ry ke r Woo ds pr ior

to t ri a l. I n Apr il10

2004, Z eifman a

nd Michels discussed en ro l l i n g A.A. at a private sc hool. Z eifman pr oposed that A. A. a tte nd

the Au sti n Jew ish

Ac a de my , b ut M ic he ls d isa g re e d a nd re je c te d th e pr op os a l. M ic he ls did not believe the a cade my had “the aca demic streng ths that Iwould require for he r to be ther e.” Wit hout notify ing Z eifman, Michels contac ted and applied to S t. Andrew ’s for a dmission, had A.A. tested, and a sked A.A.’ s curr ent first-g rade teac her f or a rec ommendation. After A.A. wa s place d
on a wa iting list on May

3 subject to ava ilable opening s at the school, Miche ls notified Z eifman. A.A. wa s acc epted f

or admission on J une 28. On J une 30, Michels executed the sc hool’s enrollment
c on tr a c t and

fo rw ard e d a tui tio n c he c k. She inf or me d the sc ho ol, “ I a m wo rk ing wi th he r f a the r t o g e t h is a gr e e ment reg ardingher attendance . Otherw ise her e nrollment will be subject to modification of our divorc e dec ree .”

Z eifman did not ag ree to enroll A.A. at St. Andrew’s, insisting that the par ties follow the ag ree ment to send her to B ry ker W oods, the publ ic s chool t o which the pa rties had a g ree d, and at which the pa

rties ag ree d she wa s doing w ell. Z eifman te stified, My da ug hte r i s th ri vin g a t th e c omm un ity pu bli c sc ho ol a c ro ss t

he str e e t f ro m my home. An d I wo u l d o nly ag ree to enroll her in something that she had a d e m o n s t r a

b l e n e e d f o r , l i k e [ G
. L
. ] h a s a

n e e d f o r a s p e c i a l i z e d

s c h o o l , o r

t h a tS h e r yl [Mi chels] and I

ag ree d was a

place th at wa s g oing to be tter fit our idea of how we wa nt t o r a ise our k ids
. As lon g a s A. A. wa s thr ivi ng a t B ry ke r Woo ds , and the re wa s no de mon str a ble ne e d to se nd

he r t o a spec ialized private school, Z eifman w ould not ag ree to send A.A. to a pr ivate school other than the Austin J ewish Ac ademy , a school with the re ligious af filiation in which the parties a g ree d A.A. wa s being raised.11 To support her petition that a materia l a nd substantial c hang e had occur red since the rendition of the orig inal divorce decr ee, Mic hels offe red e vidence that in the y ear s since the time of the par ties’ divorce , A.A. had g rown “ from an inf ant to a bea

utiful, smart, lovely

7-y ear old gir l.” She ur g e d th a t A .A .’ s a c a de mic a b i l i t i e s a n d o p p o rt un iti e s h a d s ur

pa sse d th e e xpe c ta tio ns the pa re nts had at the time of

the divorce decr ee. I

n support of the modification order, Miche ls testified, Q: At the tim e , did y ou have any ide a that th e re wo uld be an o pp or

tun ity fo r h e r t o a tte nd St. An dr e w’ s sc ho ol? A: No Idid

no t.

. . . . Q: What other—now other tha n the mere passag e of phy sical time, ha ve there been oth e r c ha ng e s th a t ha

ve oc c ur re d— sig nif

ic ant c ha ng e s th a t ha

ve oc c ur re d in either your life or

in Mr. Z eifman’ s life? A: Ibe lie ve the re have be e n s ig nif ic a nt c ha ng e s. Q: And could y ou tell the Court what those ar e. A: I n my

life or— Q: Well, let’s start with y our life. A: Okay . Well, si nce the —since Septembe r of ‘97, that’s bee n quite a bit of time, Ithink I ’ve g rown in a lot of wa y s. My ch ildren have g rown up, a nd I ’ve cer tainly lear ned fr om them. I ’ve g rown a s a pare nt. Hopef ully , as a bigsister, a s a d aught er, as a

fr ie nd , a s a

pe rs on , a s a

ph y sic ian, a s a ll o f t

ho se thi ng s in these y ear s of life e x perie nce. I think I ’m happier

and hopef

ully smarter
. Q: How has your daug hter c hang ed? A: She ’s g ro wn up fr om an inf ant to a be a

uti fu l, s mart , lo ve ly

se ve n- y e ar- old

g ir l. She ’s pr ov e d h e rs e lf

to b e so c ia l, a

g y mna st, a c he e rl e a de r, sma

rt in s c ho ol. Aca demically , she’s ve ry , very brig ht. She’s basica lly g rown up fr om an infant to a y oungc hil d w ithe xtra or din ary po te nti a l.12

Q: An d h a s sh e —at th e tim e that sh e wa s 1 4 mo nth s o ld a nd y ou e nte re d in to t

his ag ree d divorce decr ee, did you have any idea for s ure howshe wa s g oing to turn ou t? A: No.

. . . . Q: And did you come to a—w hat about y our daug hter, did y ou have ide a how smar t she wa s g oing to be ? A: No. I

had hoped, but I

didn’t know.
Mic he ls a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he r d a ug hte r w a s d oin g ve ry

we ll at B ry

ke r Wo od s. Much of the te stimony

adduce d by Michels centere d on St. Andrew’s r eputation as a h i gh ac h i ev i n g s ch o o l an d t h e d es i rab i l i t y

o f a ch i l d

re m ai n i n g i na s i n gl e s c h o o l t h r o u g h h i gh school as she w ould be able to do at St. Andr ew’ s. Michels’s partne r in he r medical g roup testified that he ser

ved on the St. Andre w’s boar d of trustee s, that his children attende d S t
. An drew ’s, that the sc h o o l s e ts a

h ig h a c a d e mi c s ta

n d ar d an d p r o v id e s a

d iv e r s e c u lt

u r e r e s p e c tf

u l o f v ar io us relig ions, and that he is familiar with A.A. but has not “see n [her] i n y ear s, but Iknow who she is.”

Education consultant Christopher Koce rik testified that he w as first conta cted by Michels on J uly

8, 2004. Michels advised him that “she had identified a school that she thoug ht was be st, and wa nt ed me to con c ur

if —o r g ive my

op ini on on a s to wh e the r o r n ot t

hat w a s th e be st school for he r.” Miche ls told Kocerik that a “ custody ” matter was involved a

nd t h at he mig ht be called upon to testify . Koce rik did not investigate o t h er s chools or make a re commendation reg ardingschools. He testified, “ She asked us to look at her daug hter’s ne eds, and look at the option13

of St . Andre w’s.” K ocer ik concluded that St. Andrew’s would be a “g ood match” a nd a “g ood opportunity ” for

A.A. The law y er w ho repr esente d Michels in her divorce also testified on her behalf. She had obser ved A.A. sinc e the divorc e and te stified that “she’ s gro wn u p , s h e’ s become a lot more articulate and it is striking how bright she is.” She also testified t o the bene fits of private sc hool over pu bli c sc ho ol. Luc y Na zro , the he a d of St. An dr e w’ s, te sti fi e d that, ba se d u po n A .A .’ s te st s c or e s,
s h e w o u l d

d o we l l at S t
. An dre w’ s . S h e e x p l ai n edt h at t h e s ch o o l o ff er s co n t i n u i t y

t h ro u gh h i gh
sc ho ol t o it s stu de nts a s we ll a s oth e r op po rt un iti e s no t of

fe re d b y the pu bli c sc ho ols su c h a s p ub lic service opportunities, foreig n langua ges , an d ethics cour ses. Dr. N azro testified that she ha d a teleph o n e c o n v e r s a ti o n w it h Z e if ma n in w h ic h th e y d is c u s s e d th e a c a d e mi c s o f th e s c h o o l an d he inq uir e d in to t

he re lig iou s li fe of

the sc ho ol, pa

rt ic ula rl y the pr a c tic e of

da ily c ha pe l. Z eifman te stifi edt h at h e l i v es ac ro s s t h e s t re et fr o m Br y k er W o o d s an d

h as re m arri ed. Be cause he lives so close, he drops by the sch o o l o n ce o r t wi ce a wee k and “bump[s] into the principal fa irly

often.” He testified to his son’s lea rning disability

and that he a

nd Michels ag ree d to deviate f

rom the ag ree ment to meet their son’s specia l e ducational needs. Z eifman te stified that A.A.’s a cade mic and socia l needs we re being met at B ry ker Woods and that she w as thriving there
. When Michels reje cted his sug g esti o n t h at A. A. attend the Austin J ewish Ac ademy and applied instead to St. Andrew’ s without his knowledge or conse nt, Z eifma n i n s i sted upon following the decr ee a nd having A.A. continue he r educ ation at B ry ker Woods. He testified that the acad emi cs of the schools was never an issue: “ You know, we ’re in a ver y g ood public school, and my daug hter,14

as evi d en ce d by

all the re sults that have bee n admitted, has bee n pretty well serve d by

whateve r we’ re doing .” Casey

Her rin, A.A.’s f

irst-g rade teac her te stif

i ed t h at s he had ta

ug ht first g rade at Br y ker Woods for five y ear s and that A.A. ha d been in he r cla ss. Herr in describe d A.A. as a “ver y pleasa nt, very brig ht” “ty

pical first g rade r.” She was among the top students in the class but had not been a cce pted for the g ifted and ta lented prog ram. He rrin testified that both par ents wer e involved
and c on c e rn e d a

bo ut the ir da

ug hte r’ s a c a de mic pr og re ss: “ Th e y bo th d id m a ke sure to f

re qu e ntl y
c he c k w ithme to m a ke sure sh e was pr og re ssi nga s sh e sh ou ld b e .” A. A. ’s ste pmo the r w a s a lso inv olv e d at th e sc ho ol.

At Michels’s re quest , Herrin had complete d the re commendation for m that
a c c om p anie d A .A .’ s a

pp lic a tio n f

or a dmi ssi on

to S t. A nd

re w’ s. At the tim e of

its su bmi ssi on , H e rr in lear ned that Z eifman w as not awa re that Michels had aske d her to fill out the recommendation. She k n ew t h at M i chels wa s interested in sendingher da ug hter to St. Andrew’ s: “And I felt like, obviously , this wa s something that her pare nts w ere g oing to de cide, and that it wa s my obligation as her former teac her to g o ahea d and fill this out for her.” Over the summer, proba

bly in J une, Michels aske d for he r assistance in helping th e p ar ents dec ide which sc hool A.A. should attend. Her rin testified,
Itol d h e r that I ’d

have to t hink a bo ut i t and

g e t ba c k to he r. An d w he n I e ve ntu a lly g ot back to her , Iinformed he r that I thought it would be be st if [ she] stay ed at B ry ker Woods. . . . I felt like at one point both pare nts, obviously , ag ree d that Br y ker Woods was a g ood school for [her]. And so Ithought be st just l eave it alo n e. . . . Ididn’t fe e l li ke the re wa s any

str on g ne e d th a t w a sn ’t

be ingme t a t B ry

ke r Wo od s.15

Her ri n testified that she told Michels that “I thought it would be be st if A.A. stay ed at B ry ker Woods.” They had no further conver sations. I n response to cross examination, Herr in testified that Z eifman e x presse d conce rns to her that he thought Br y ker W oods was a g ood school for his daug hter
and he ha d s ome c on c e rn s th a t St. An dr e w’ s w a s a re lig iou sly

a ff ili a te d s c ho ol. A B ry ker Woods counselor a

nd the principa l also testified to the s u i t ab i l i t y of the school for A .A.’s nee ds and its standing in the aca demic community
. The counselor testified that A.A.’s ne eds were “absolutely ” met at t he school and that her curre nt second grade teac her w as “one of the most highly

profe ssional teache rs I ’ve e ver w orked wi t h
. ” The principal testified that the school is a “wonderf

ul littl e school” that is unique because it is a school of c hoice f or half of its 378 enrolled students. The school was ge nera lly rate d “exemplary” in its aca demic ranking by the Texas Educational Association but had droppe d to “re cog nized” in the 2003/2004 y ear . He attributed the chang e to the addition of the sc ience portion of the test. All of the other te st scores ha d been in the
e xemp lary

ra ng e ov e r t

he c ut- of f s c or e of nin e ty pe rc e nt. He testif

ie d th a t th e sc ho ol i s a

we llreg arde d school with ext ensive pa renta l involvement and small class sizes. He knows most of the stu de nts by

name and is f a mil iar w ithA. A. He te sti fi e d th a t sh e “ se e ms l ike a g re a t chi ld” wh o g e ts along well with other students. He testified,
Ifee l that [ she] is doi ng a fine job, y ou know, in second g rade
. Ithink that she has a wonde r f

u l c la s s r o o m t e a c h e r , v e r y c ar in g c la s s r o o m t e a c h e r , an d a very experience d teac her. Tha t’s the other g ood thing that Iwill like to share also a bout Br y ker Woods i s we have ver y littl e tea cher

turnover. T he tea cher s who have been there have be en ther e for many , many y ear s. . . . [I ]t ’s a wonde rful envir onment. I t’s a small school . . . a g rea

t place.16

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judg e told the par ties that she was “ puzz led to have suc h an issue broug ht be fore this Court” and that she ha d “strug g led listening to the te stimony ” that “ve ere d
o ff co u rs e i ns o m e w ay s ” f

ro m t h e i s s u es , s t at i n g,
Ibe c a me e xtre me ly

fr us tr a te d w iththe c on c e pt that I ’m su pp os e d to de c ide that St. Andre w’s is be tter than the AI SD sc hool sy stem for y our child. Even if Iacc ept that St. And re w’s is a pre mier school and be tter than AI SD, is that really the issue? Be cause it r eally isn’t a

bout w hether Har

vard is be tter than UT. I t r ea l l y i s about wher e the c hild will actually flourish. And I ’m not su re I u n derstand or know that ans we r. An d I

str ug g le d a ll l a st e ve nin g wi th wha t my ro le wa s to da

y . A m I su pp os e d to te ll you

y our c hil d w ill be mor e su c c e ssf ul a t St. An dr e w’ s, or

y our c hil d wi ll b e mor e su c c e ssf

ul i n th e AI SD S c ho ol D ist ri c t. Legal Su ff

iciency of the Evid ence The i s s u e is w h e th e r th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e te r mi n a ti o n th a t th e r e w a s a mate r ia l a nd substantial chang e in circ umstances wa s an abuse of discretion. Ba sed on the evidenc e, we conclude that it wa s. A cour

t’s deter mination as to whether a mater ial and substantial cha ng e of circ umstances ha s occur

red is not g uided by rig id r ules and is fac t specific. In re Z.B.P. , 109 S.W .3d 77 2, 77 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 03 , no pet .) . E vid e nc e of a pa re nt’ s su bs e qu e nt m arr ia g e to another can c onstitut e a r eleva

nt, material c hang e of c ircum s t ances afte r re ndition of the decr ee soug ht to be modified. In re C.Q.T.M. , 25 S.W .3d 730, 735 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denie d). L ikewise, chang e in the age of a child may constitute a mater ial chang e. In re Da v is , 30 S.W .3d 609, 615 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.); se e als o H or ne v . H ar dwe ll , 5 3 3 S. W. 2 d

4 5 0 , 4 5 2 ( T e x. Civ . App .—

Au sti n 1 97 6, wr it r e f’ d n .r .e .)
. I nc re a se in ag e a lon e is not a c ha ng e d c ir c ums tanc e to justify modification unless cha

ng ed nee ds are shown. E.g. , Voros v. Turnage , 856 S.W .2d 759, 76217

(T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 93 , w ri t de nie d) ; Ra nd le v . R an dle , 700 S.W .2d 314, 316-17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1985, no writ).

I n any ev en t , the ca ses finding a mater ial chang e base d on a cha ng e in the ag e of a child are distinguishable f rom this case . None of

the ca ses in which a c ourt found the c hang e in the
a g e of a c hil d to su

pp or t a mod if ic a tio n in c lud e d a ne g oti a te d a g re e me nt t hat sp e c if

ic a lly contemplated the chang e and pr ovided a dispute re solution m echa nism as in this case . T o allow ag ing a lone to constitute a mater ial and substantial cha ng e in the fa ce of the ag ree ment would rende r bo th t he a g re e me nt a

nd the langua g e of

the statut e me anin g le ss. Although courts have allowed chang es to be proved in a varie ty of wa y s, they have
c on sis te ntl y

re qu ir e d th a t a

c ha ng e be proved and th at it be sh ow n to be su bs tanti a l and

ma te ri a l. See , e.g. , A graz , 143 S.W .3d at 554 (e vidence that fathe r not participating in ra ising c hildren insufficient to show prior conditions or mater ial chang e); London v. London , 94 S.W .3d 139, 144 (Tex. App
. — H o u s to n[1 4 th D is t. ] 2 0 0 2 , n o p e t. ) ( c o u rt c o mp ar e d f in an c ia l c ir c u ms ta

n c e s o f the aff ecte d parties at time of orig inal order with circumstanc es at time modification soug ht finding chang ed cir cumstance s); Ec ho ls , 85 S.W .3d at 479 (c ourt fo u n d chang ed cir cumstance s included ag ing of child, rema

rriag es and additional children in both families); Considine , 726 S.W .2d at 255 (re -marr iag e by one par

ty and re location to Canada

held insufficie nt). I n Considine , this Court st ated that “ to p ro ve that a

ma te ri a l c ha

ng e of c ir c ums tanc e s has oc c ur re d, the mov ant m

us t de mon str a te what conditions exist ed at the time of the entry of the prior order . Once such conditions have be en established, the movant must show what materia l c hang es have occur red in the interveningperiod.”F or the tr ia l c ourt

to d e te rm ine if

a ma te ri a l and

su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e ha s o c curr e d, mos t 1 courts re quire a

compar ison betwee n the orig inal circ umstances of the child and the a ffe cted pa rties a t th e tim e the e xistin g orde r w a s e nte re d w iththe ir c ir c ums tanc e s at th e tim e the mod if ic a tio n is soug ht. E.g. , London v. London , 94 S.W .3d 139, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Thus, the r ecor d must contain both historical and cur rent ev i d ence of the r eleva nt circ umstances. Without both sets of data, the court has not hing to compare and ca nnot determine whether a cha ng e has oc curr ed. Id . at 144-45.
18 726 S.W .2d at 255. I n that case , we concluded that a parent’s remarr iag e and chang e of residenc e 1 to Canada did not constitute a mate rial and substa n t i al ch an g e as to support the modification of
conser vatorship. Id
. Z e if man c on te nd s tha t the re wa s n o s ho wi ngthat th e c ir c ums tanc e s w ithre sp e c t to A.A.’s e ducation have materia lly and substantially

chang ed. We ag ree . A.A. wa s an infant whe n the par ties divorced a

nd in second g rade when the case was tr ie d in Oc tob e r 2 00 4. Th e c ha

ng e a lle g e d in the pe tit ion wa s h e r a pp lic a tio n a

nd a dmi ssi on

to S t. An dr e w’ s. At

tr ia l, i n r e sp on se to s pe c if ic qu e sti on inga s to the c ha ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s, Mic he ls te sti fi ed o nly

that th e c ha

ng e wa s th a t A .A . h a d g ro wn fr om a n in fa nt i nto a “ be a uti fu l, s mart , lovely ” seve n-y ear -old and that he r ac ademic a bility had surpa ssed Michels’s e x pectations at the time of the divorce . At the time of the divorce , the parties enter ed into a neg otiated ag ree ment that their childre n would attend certain schools. They further ag ree d that if they wer e unable to ag ree on educational decisions, they would follow the recommendations of the te ache r of the c hild at issue. Thus, the ag ree ment contemplated that the child would ag e, specifie d the schools ag ree d upon and even the alternatives, and provided a mecha nism for dispute resolution should a disag ree ment arise.19

When a disag ree ment ar o s e in the instance of their son’s spe cial educ ational nee ds, the parties
re so lve d th e c ha

ng e purs ua

nt t o th e te rm s o f t

he a g re e me nt. Th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d tha t af te r the pa rt ie s d ivo rc e d th e y

c on tin ue d to ra ise A. A. in the J ewish fa i t h an d they continue to adhe re to that fa ith. A.A. attends re ligious school at Con g re g a tio n Aguda s A c him and purs ue s o the r a c tiv iti e s and c a mps sp on so re d b y

the Jew ish Com mun ity

Ce nte r. Th e pa

rt ie s a g re e sh e is bein g ra ise d Jew ish and is p art of the Jew ish community , as she ha s been since she wa s born. The modification sought spec ifically to allow Michels to send A.A. to St. Andrew ’s would mark a signific an t ch an ge in t he child’s se cular and relig ious e ducation. That Z eifman obje cted to A.A. attending a relig ious private school ba sed upon
a dif fe re nt f a ithis c on sis te nt w iththe pa rt ie s’ int e nt t o s pe c if

y the se e du c a tio na l de c isi on s in the ir
a g re e me nt t o a

nti c ipate and

a vo id s uc h c on fl ic ts. Th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t A .A . is a br ig ht a nd a c a de mic a lly

ta le nte d g ir l w ho is thriving at Bry

ker Woods, a school located acr oss the street f rom her f ather ’s home. The undisputed evidenc e also showed that she did ve ry well aca demically and socially at Br y ker Woods, and that her
a c a de mic and

so c ia l ne e ds we re be ingme t. T he on ly e vid ence th at she m ig ht d o b e tte r at St. An dr e w’ s o r t h a t i t m i g h t b e m o r e “ s u i t a b l e ” i s s p e c u l a t i v e an d , i n an y e v e n t , n o t s u f f i c ie nt t o constitute a mater ial and substantial cha ng e. We do not ag ree that this evidence shows a cha ng e in c ircumstance s as conte mplated by section 156.101. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101. To a cce pt Michels’s interpre tation of the
re qu i re m en to f a “m at er i al an d s u b s t an t i a l ” c h a n g e w o u l d

re n d er i t s l an gu age m ea n i n gl es s i f a ge alone we re suf

ficient in lig ht of the par

ties’ prior a g ree ment. Although the re ma y be a va riety of20

methods of showing materia l and substantial chang e, the r equire men t i s t h at a chang e must be shown. We conclude Michels’s evide nce is no e vidence of a c hang e in conditions. Even assuming that the St. Andr ew ’s application and admission or A.A.’s c hang e of a g e constituted cha ng es not
c on te mpl a te d by the a g re e me nt, the re wa s no evi de nc e that eith e r ch ang e wa s mate ri a l or su bs tanti a l. Moreove r, as in all suits reg arding the conservatorship of a child, the c ourt’s primar y
c on sid e ratio n “ sh a ll a lw ay s b e the be st i nte re st of the c hil d. ” Te x. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 1 53 .0 02 ; In

re V. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d 338, 342 (Tex. 2000)
. A cour t may use the none x haustive list of Holley fac tors to deter mine the child’s best intere st. Holley v . Adams , 55 4 S.W. 2d 36 7, 37 1- 71 (T e x. 19 76 ). Th os e fac tors include the desires of the c hild, the emotional and phy sical nee ds of the child now a nd in the future, the emotional and phy sical dang er to the child now and in the future, the parental abilities of the ind iv id ual s s eeki ng cus to dy , t he p rogram s av ail abl e to ass is t t hes e in di vi du als to pro mo te t he be st interest of the child, t h e p l ans for the child, the stability of the home, the acts or omissions of the pare nt, which may

in d i ca t e t h at t he existi ng pare nt-child relationship i s not a proper one, and a

ny excuse for the acts or omissions of the par ent. Id
. at 371-72. In the context of custody modification, other fa ctors to be c onsidered include t he child’s need for st ability and the need to pre vent constant litigation in child-custody case s. V. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d at 343. The policy

behind the re quirement of a materia l a

nd substantial chang e is to preve nt constant re litigation with respe ct to children. In re M .N.G. , 113 S.W .3d 27, 33 (T ex . App.—Fort Wor th 2 00 3, no pe t.) ; W

att s v . W att s , 563 S.W .2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, writ re f’d n.r.e.) (re quirement of materia l and substantial cha ng e pre dicated upon doc trine of re s ju dic ata as to best interest of child at t ime of original decre e awarding conser vatorship). When establishing the21

me ans to m od if

y c us tod y or de rs , the le g isl a tur e e sta bli sh e d a sy ste m th a t a tte mpt s to c re a te sta bil ity in the conser

vatorship. Se e Bu rk

ha rt v . B ur

k ha rt , 96 0 S.W. 2d 32 1, 32 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Dist.] 1997, pet. denied) . Thus, the par ty seekingmodification bea rs the burde n of demonstrating a mater ial and substantial cha ng e in circ umstances since the orig inal decr ee. Bates , 81 S.W .3d at 423. The re quirement of this showing “ser ves a va lid purpose o f s i gn i fica ntly limit ing the trial judge ’s discretion and preve nts the modification statute from being unconstitutionally b ro ad .” M.N.G. , 113 S.W .3d at 34.

Although the trial court he ard c ontradictory testimony about eve nts that had occ urre d betwee n the par

ties, the undisputed evidenc e esta blished that A.A. wa s thriving at Bry ker Woods under the educa

tional plan ag ree d to in the divorce decr ee. Much of the testimony focuse d on the relative aca demic standing of the two schools a s well as the a dvantag es of a priv ate school over a public school. Michels ac knowledg ed that A.A. was doing ver y well at B ry

ker Woods and that she would not be har

med by staying at Bry

ker Woods. A.A.’s tea cher , wh o p ro v i d ed the
re c omm e nd a tio n f

or he r a dmi ssi on

to S t. A nd

re w’ s, tes ti fi ed th at she be lie ve d th a t it wo uld be in A.A.’s be st interest to stay at Br y ker Woods. There was no expert testimony or other e vidence that the cha ng e in schools would be in A .A.’s best intere st. Bec ause A .A. was making g ood g rade s and thr ivi ng a t B r

y k e r W o o d s , an d t h e r e w a s n o e v i d e n c e t o s h o w t h a t i t w a s i n h e r b e s t i n t e r e st t o chang e schools, a review of the record does not establish that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s.

At the tim e of the ir div or c e , the pa rt ie s c ho se to s e nd

the ir c hil dr e n to pu

bli c sc ho ols unless they

ag ree d otherwise. They also corr ectly

anticipated tha

t they might disag ree aboutBe cause of our disposi tion of t he lega l sufficie ncy issue, we need not addr ess the re maining 2 i s s u e s r e g ar d i n g f

a c t u a l s u f f i c i e n c y. 22 educational decisions conce rning the childre n in the future a nd included an a g ree d mecha nism in t he de c re e fo r r e so lvi ngany

su c h d isa g re e me nts
. We would be re miss if we did not observe that, with the passag e of the Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, it be came public policy to “enc ourag e the pe ace able r esolution of disputes, with special c onsideratio n gi v en to di sputes involving the pa rent-c hild relationship, including the mediat i o no f i s s u es i n v o l v i n g co n s er v at o rs h i p , p o s s es s i o n , an d s u p p o rt o f c h i l dre n , and the ear ly settlement of pendinglitigation throug h voluntary settlement proce dures.” Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 154.002 (West 2005). I t would undermine the e ffor ts of mediated se ttlement ag ree ments for us to allow a modification on circumstance s that were clea rly contemplated by

the parties at the time of the re ndition of the orig inal divorce decr ee. W e also obser ve, howe ver, that the exist ence of a me diated settlement a g ree ment does not alter the require ments of sec tion 156.101; we hold only

that, on the re cord be fore us, the petit ioner failed to car ry her bur den of de monstrating
a ma te ri al and su

bs tanti a l c ha

ng e of c ir c ums tanc e s a

nd that th e mod if

ic a tio n w ou ld b e in t

he be st interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101. 2
CO NC LU SION We conclude that th e evidenc e is leg ally insufficient to support the trial c ourt’s finding that the circ umstances of the child, as s p ec i fi cally alleg ed in the petition, or of e ither
c on se rv a tor have ma te ri a lly and su bs tanti a lly c ha

ng e d. We hol d tha t, b a se d o n th e re c or d b e fo re us , the trial court abused its discretion in orde ring modification. We sustain appellant’s c halleng e to the23

leg al suffic iency

of t h e m o d i fi cation. W e re verse the trial cour t’s order to modify

and re nder judgme nt in favor of

Z eifman.

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J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton: Opinion by J ustice Patterson; ConcurringOpinion by

J ustice Pemberton Reverse d and Rende red Filed: August 4, 2006