IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JACK BEAM and RENEE BEAM, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

MATTHEW S. PETERSEN, FEDERAL 

ELECTION COMMISSION CHAIRMAN, 

 Defendant. 

Civil No. 07cv1227 

Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer 

Magistrate Judge Cole 

LR56.1(a) Statement 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

LOCAL RULE 56.1(a)(3) STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 

AS TO WHICH THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE 

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed this date, defendant Federal 

Election Commission (“Commission” or “FEC”) herewith submits its Local Rule 

56.1(a)(3) Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue and which 

entitle the Commission to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Commission’s 

Statement also includes a description of the parties and all facts supporting this Court’s 

venue and jurisdiction. LR 56.1(a)(3)(A) & (B). For the reasons stated in the FEC’s 

memorandum of law, there is no genuine dispute that the Department of Justice 

(“Department” or “DOJ”) never transferred to the Commission, and that the FEC never 

received, any of the plaintiffs’ private financial information in violation of the Right to 

Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401 et seq. As a result, this Honorable 

Court should enter a finding of summary judgment for the Commission. 

Case 1:07-cv-01227 Document 162 Filed 03/29/10 Page 1 of 5
A. The Parties, Venue and the Court’s Jurisdiction 

1. Plaintiffs Jack and Renee Beam are residents of Cook County, Illinois, 

located in the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Second Amended 

Complaint at ¶ 1 (Docket #91). Plaintiffs allege that they have “documentary proof” that 

“federal agents of the Justice Department and/or FBI had, in fact, obtained [and 

transferred to the FEC their private] financial records in violation of the RFPA.” Id. at ¶¶ 

16 & 19. 

2. The Federal Election Commission is the independent agency of the United 

States government empowered to administer, interpret and enforce three federal statutes 

— the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-55 (“FECA” or “Act”),1 the 

Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013,2 and the Presidential 

Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042.3 Pursuant to the 

FECA, the Commission has “exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement” 

 

1

 The FECA imposes extensive requirements for comprehensive public disclosure 

of contributions and expenditures in connection with federal election campaigns. 

2 U.S.C. §§ 432-434. The Act places dollar limitations on contributions by individuals 

and multi-candidate political committees to candidates for federal office, 2 U.S.C. 

§ 441a(a), and prohibits campaign contributions by corporations and unions from their 

treasury funds. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). The Act also prohibits contributions made in the 

name of another. 2 U.S.C. § 441f. Contributing money to a candidate in one’s own name 

using funds provided by someone else is an example of activity that violates 2 U.S.C. 

§ 441f. 11 C.F.R. § 110.4(b)(2)(i). 

2

 The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013, provides 

for a voluntary program of public financing of the general election campaigns of eligible 

major and minor party nominees for the offices of President and Vice President of the 

United States. 

3

 The Presidential Primary Matching Payment Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042, 

provides partial federal financing for the campaigns of presidential primary candidates 

who choose to participate and satisfy certain eligibility requirements. 

2 

Case 1:07-cv-01227 Document 162 Filed 03/29/10 Page 2 of 5
of the Act and the two presidential public funding statutes. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b)(1). 

3. Matthew S. Petersen is the current Chairman of the Commission and is 

sued here in his official capacity. But if plaintiffs have any cause of action, it is against 

the Commission itself, which alone has the powers and duties at issue in this case. See, 

e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(b), 437d(a), 437g(a). 

 4. Plaintiffs assert that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon this 

Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under the laws of the United States. 

Venue in the Northern District of Illinois is proper because the plaintiffs all reside here. 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(e) and 1402(a). 

B. The Department of Justice Never Transferred Any Private Bank 

Records of Jack or Renee Beam to the Commission 

5. The Commission incorporates by reference ¶¶ 5-24 of the FEC’s 

LR56.1(a) Statement filed July 10, 2009 and Exhibits 1-7 attached thereto. (Doc. 

#142-3). 

 6. “Merrill Lynch” is a trade name of certain entities owned at the time 

relevant to this lawsuit by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., whose primary business was as a 

broker-dealer of securities. See AMERICA’S CORPORATE FAMILIES, Dunn & Bradstreet, 

Vol. 1 (2008) at 1121-1122. At that time 15 entities, owned by the corporate parent or 

one of its subsidiaries, used the trade name “Merrill Lynch.” Of these 15 entities, only 

one, along with one of its subsidiaries, was a “bank,” namely, Merrill Lynch Bank USA 

and its subsidiary Merrill Lynch Business Financial Services, Inc., and both listed their 

business as “national commercial banks.” Id. at 1121. 

3 

Case 1:07-cv-01227 Document 162 Filed 03/29/10 Page 3 of 5
 7. FEC staff attorney Phillip Olaya was deposed on March 11, 2009. 

Deposition of Phillip A. Olaya, attached as Exh. 8. 

 8. In a declaration executed on March 11, 2010, Mr. Olaya clarified his 

deposition testimony and explained that he saw two types of information from DOJ 

related to this matter: summaries of non-grand jury law enforcement interviews (“302” 

interviews), and public trial materials (testimony and exhibits) from the 2008 criminal 

trial of Geoffrey Fieger that DOJ provided to the Commission on a CD after the trial 

concluded. Declaration of Phillip A. Olaya ¶¶ 4-5, attached as Exh. 9. 

9. Mr. Olaya explained that the trial exhibits consisted of two categories of 

information, specifically summaries of the timeline of relevant events for each conduit 

reimbursed by the criminal defendants, and financial records reflecting each conduit’s 

relevant contributions and reimbursements. Olaya Decl. ¶¶ 7-8 (Exh. 9). Mr. Olaya 

confirmed that none of this material contains any financial information about the Beams. 

Id. ¶¶ 4-9. 

10. Mr. Olaya explained that in his deposition, he mistakenly stated that he 

had seen financial information related to the Beams on the CD of Fieger trial exhibits, but 

that he did so due to a lapse in concentration after having answered in the affirmative to 

questions about two other individuals’ information, and “without fully considering 

Counsel’s questions.” Olaya Decl. ¶¶ 11-12 (Exh. 9). 

11. Mr. Olaya also stated that “[t]he records DOJ transmitted to the 

Commission do not include any financial information that related to Jack or Renee 

Beam.” Olaya Decl. ¶ 13 (Exh. 9). In addition, Mr. Olaya testified that he saw no other 

4 

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5 

private financial information relating to the Beams in any other form or context. Id. ¶¶ 9, 

13. 

12. Mr. Dezsi, plaintiffs’ attorney, was offered the opportunity to depose Mr. 

Olaya about the testimony in his declaration, but counsel declined. Letter from Holly 

Baker to Michael Dezsi, dated March 12, 2010, attached as Exh. 10. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan* 

 General Counsel 

 David Kolker* 

Associate General Counsel 

Harry J. Summers* 

Assistant General Counsel 

/s/ Holly J. Baker

Holly J. Baker* 

 Attorney 

 

 *Admitted pro hac vice 

 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

AND ITS CHAIRMAN 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

 202-694-1650 

March 29, 2010 

Case 1:07-cv-01227 Document 162 Filed 03/29/10 Page 5 of 5