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i 

64–862 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–6] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 16, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

JENNESS SIMLER, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN HOWARD, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 16, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense ..................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 16, 2011 .............................................................................. 57 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense; 

accompanied by Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 

and Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Defense ................................ 4 

Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gates, Hon. Robert M. ...................................................................................... 65 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 61 

Mullen, ADM Michael G. ................................................................................. 75 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 63 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 100 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 104 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 112 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 109 

Mr. Griffin ......................................................................................................... 112 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 105 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 108 

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 108 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 105 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 112 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 110 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Smith on behalf of Ms. Giffords ............................................................... 100 

Ms. Sutton ......................................................................................................... 109 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 106 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Young ......................................................................................................... 113 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 16, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you 

for joining us today as we consider the President’s fiscal year 2012 

budget request for the Department of Defense. 

On Monday I had the opportunity to sit down with Secretary 

Gates to discuss this request. Based on the information I received, 

I am pleased to see that the budget continues to support our military men and women fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. 

The budget provides much needed increases in several key areas 

such as military personnel and missile defense. 

I am also pleased that the Department is taking our Nation’s financial position into account and has identified savings from lower 

priority programs and efficiencies that can be reinvested into force 

structure and modernization. As chairman, I, too, am concerned 

that every dollar be invested in core missions of the Department. 

Now it will be up to us, the members of the Armed Services Committee, to take up this proposal and scrutinize it with a fine-tooth 

comb. 

We must ensure that every dollar is spent on the right equipment, training and support needed by our troops, their families and 

the Nation’s defense. Understandably, there will be winners and 

losers in this process. Tough choices must be made, but I will not 

support initiatives that will leave our military less capable and less 

ready to fight. 

In the request before us, most concerning is the reduction of an additional $78 billion from the Department’s funding top line, including a $13 billion cut in 2012, ultimately leading to zero percent 

real growth in the outyears. Much of this savings appears to be 

generated with the reductions to Army and Marine Corps end 

strength in the 2015 to 2016 timeframe. The decision to reduce end 

strength seems premature given the uncertainty in predicting the 

full range of force and manpower requirements in Afghanistan 

after 2014. 
2 

Furthermore, while some claim the reductions are not budgetdriven, I note that the savings from these reductions were included 

in the Future Years Defense Plan even before the Marine Corps 

completed its force structure review and before the Army had even 

begun one. Both services have borne the brunt of two wars for the 

past decade, and neither has reached its objectives for Active Component dwell time of 1 to 3. I cannot in good conscience ask them 

to do more with less. 

There are additional proposals that immediately warrant special 

scrutiny, like the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, for which an 

unfulfilled requirement remains. We must understand in greater 

detail how the Department proposes to address this capability gap 

before we can support abandoning a $4 billion investment we have 

already made. 

On a slightly different note, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that the new Congress must finish work on defense appropriations legislation that was left unfinished in the 111th Congress. I have concerns about the implications to our troops of funding the Department of Defense at fiscal year 2010 funding levels 

in a yearlong continuing resolution [CR]. Therefore, I am pleased 

that the House has taken up a defense appropriation for fiscal year 

2011 this week. While I am disappointed there were not higher 

funding levels for defense in this legislation, I support all efforts 

by this Congress to avoid crippling the Department with a continuing resolution. 

I would like to conclude by welcoming our witnesses, the Honorable Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense; and Admiral Michael 

G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

I look forward to continuing an open dialogue with you on these 

issues. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Now I will turn to my colleague and good friend 

Ranking Member Smith for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates, Secretary Hale. I appreciate you being here. 

And I want to begin by echoing the chairman’s last comment 

there about the need to pass a 2011 defense appropriations bill. 

You all have done an excellent job of explaining to us just how 

hamstrung you are by having to live with the CR for the last, I 

guess it has been, almost 5 months now, the impact that has. And 

I would urge all Members here to talk with folks at the Department of Defense to get a full understanding of just how that undermines our ability to carry out our national security requirements, 

and how it even reaches over and potentially impacts what our 

troops are doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. A critical issue to get an 

appropriations bill done so we are not operating with the CR. 

And on this budget I want to congratulate the Secretary and the 

Department of Defense for again, you know, making sure that they 
3 

provide our troops with the equipment and the support they need 

to do the missions that we all have asked them to do. And compliments to this committee as well. Through the years they have 

also stepped up to that task, particularly as the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan required much greater speed in meeting those needs. 

This budget, I think, again reflects that top priority: Make sure our 

troops get the equipment and support that they need. 

I also feel that this budget does a good job of trying to confront 

the budget realities that we are all aware of. I took a very hard 

and close look at the Department of Defense across the board to try 

to find savings and efficiencies, places where we can do better with 

less money. We absolutely can do that. 

And I think that is the most critical point that I want to make. 

Simply spending money doesn’t make us safer. We have to make 

sure that that money is spent well and efficiently, and I don’t think 

there is anyone who would disagree, looking back at the last 15 

years and some of the decisions that have been made, with the notion that we can do better, that we can get more for the money that 

we are spending, particularly when you look at the acquisition and 

the procurement process. 

Again, I want to compliment this Secretary of Defense and his 

team for really taking a hard look at some of the lessons that we 

have learned through systems like Future Combat Systems, the F– 

35, other programs that have been more expensive than we would 

have liked. I think we have learned a lot, and I think we are moving forward in a very positive direction. 

And we also have to remember, as we look at this budget, two 

other important factors. The defense budget has grown enormously: 

2001, in current dollars, it was $316 billion; it went all the way up 

to 708-. So we have had enormous growth, and we now need to figure out how to manage that. 

And we also need to be mindful of the fact that a strong national 

economy is critical also to our national security. An out-of-control 

deficit jeopardizes that economy. So we have to try to make sure 

that we can live within our means and do the job that we all have 

been asked to do. And I appreciate the hard work that has been 

done on that. 

I want to just add one specific comment before I close. That is 

the importance going forward of stability operations and understanding sort of our broad national security interests. I think we 

have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan that development programs 

can be every little bit as important as military programs in creating a stable and secure environment that protects our interests. 

And I know the Secretary has spoken out strongly about the need 

not just to have a strong military, but also to have a strong State 

Department and a strong whole-of-government approach as we go 

forward and try to figure out some of these stability operations. So 

I appreciate your leadership on that and believe that those two will 

be important issues. 

With that, I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 
4 

The CHAIRMAN. Before we begin, let me comment that we do 

have a full crowd here today, and I notice there are people out in 

the hallway that would like to be in here, so I would request that 

anyone who disrupts this hearing be removed by the Capitol Police. 

This includes outbursts and holding signs. 

This is a very important hearing and the decorum should be 

maintained, and I would appreciate that that be held that way. We 

will have no—I have a very low tolerance level. 

Let me, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, Chairman, let me thank you, 

to begin with, for your many years of service, both of you, to the 

country, and we all appreciate greatly the efforts and the things 

that you are doing. I know that you are in a very, very tough job, 

and I just want to, at the outset, let you know how much every 

member of this committee appreciates your service to the Nation. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY 

ROBERT F. HALE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, members of the 

committee—he doesn’t get to talk very much anyway. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, members of the committee, I would 

like to start with a few words about Congresswoman Giffords, who, 

of course, should be with us today were it not for the tragic and 

senseless attack in Tucson last month. 

I have enjoyed working with Congresswoman Giffords in her capacity as a member this committee. She is a strong supporter of 

the national defense and cares deeply about our troops and their 

families, and she has pursued her oversight responsibilities with 

dedication. 

Our thoughts and condolences continue to be with the families 

and victims of that attack. We send our best to the Congresswoman’s husband, Navy Captain Mark Kelly, for his upcoming 

space shuttle mission and as he helps Mrs. Giffords through her recovery. We will miss Representative Giffords’ contributions today 

and in the weeks and months ahead, and we, in the Department 

of Defense, wish her a speedy and full rehabilitation. 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the 

President’s budget request for the Department of Defense for fiscal 

year 2012, my fifth and final budget testimony for the Department 

of Defense before this committee. 

I want to thank the members of this committee for your support 

of men and women in uniform serving in a time of war. I know you 

join me in doing everything to ensure that they have all they need 

to accomplish their mission and come home safely. 

The budget request for the Department of Defense today includes 

a base budget request of $553 billion and an Overseas Contingency 

Operations request of $117.8 billion. These budget decisions took 

place in the context of a nearly 2-year effort by this Department 

to reduce overhead, cull troubled and excess programs, and rein in 

personnel and contractor costs, all for the purpose of preserving the 
5 

global reach and fighting strength of America’s military in a time 

of fiscal stress for our country. 

In all, these budget requests, if enacted by Congress, will continue our efforts to reform the way the Department does business, 

fund modernization programs needed to prepare for future conflicts, reaffirm and strengthen the Nation’s commitment to care for 

the All-Volunteer Force, and ensure that are our troops and commanders on the front lines have the resources and support they 

need to accomplish their mission. 

My submitted statement includes more details of this request, 

but I want to take this opportunity to address several issues that 

I know have been a subject of debate and concern since I announced the outlines of our budget proposal last month: First, the 

serious damage our military will suffer by operating under a continuing resolution or receiving a significant funding cut during fiscal year 2011; second, the recommended termination of the extra 

engine for the Joint Strike Fighter; third, the projected slowing and 

eventual flattening of the growth of the defense budget over the 

next 5 years; fourth, the planned future reductions in the size of 

the ground forces; and, fifth, the proposed reform and savings to 

the TRICARE program for working-age retirees. 

I want to start by making it quite clear that the Department of 

Defense will face a crisis if we end up with a yearlong continuing 

resolution or a significant funding cut for 2011. The President’s defense budget request for 2011 was $549 billion. A full-year continuing resolution would fund the Department at about $526 billion, a cut of $23 billion. The damage done across the force from 

such reductions would be further magnified as they would come 

halfway through the fiscal year. 

Let me be clear, operating under a yearlong continuing resolution or significantly reduced funding, with severe shortfalls that entails, would damage procurement and research programs, causing 

delays, rising costs, no new program starts, and serious disruptions 

in the production of some of our most high-demand assets, including UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. Cuts in maintenance could 

force parts of our aircraft fleet to be grounded and delay needed facilities improvements. Cuts in operations would mean fewer flying 

hours, fewer steaming days, and cutbacks in training for home-stationed forces, all of which directly impacts readiness. 

Similarly, some of the appropriations proposals under debate in 

Congress contemplate reductions of up to $15 billion from the 

President’s original fiscal year 2011 request. I recognize that given 

the current political and fiscal environment, it is unlikely that the 

Defense Department will receive the full fiscal year 2011 request. 

Based on a number of factors, including policy changes that led 

to lower personnel costs and reduced activity forced by the continuing resolution, I believe the Department can get by with a 

lower number. However, it is my judgment that the Department of 

Defense needs an appropriation of at least $540 billion for fiscal 

year 2011 for the U.S. military to properly carry out its mission, 

maintain readiness and prepare for the future. 

At this point I would like to address the ongoing debate over the 

JSF [Joint Strike Fighter] extra engine. As most of you know, the 

President and I, and the previous President and his Secretary of 
6 

Defense, as well as the Department’s senior military leadership 

have consistently and firmly expressed our opposition to continuing 

this costly program. We consider it an unnecessary and extravagant expense, particularly during a period of fiscal contraction. 

Congress has not spoken with one voice on this matter, and the Department has been operating this fiscal year under ambiguous 

guidance at best. 

Under those circumstances, I decided to continue funding the 

JSF extra engine effort on a month-to-month basis. I did this not 

because we had to, but because we chose to give Congress the opportunity to resolve this matter as a part of its ongoing debate on 

the budget. However, this also means the American taxpayers are 

spending $28 million a month for an excess and unjustified program that is slated for termination. 

The President, the military services and I continue to oppose this 

extra engine, and when the current CR expires, I will look at all 

available legal options to close down this program. It would be a 

waste of nearly $3 billion in a time of economic distress, and the 

money is needed for higher-priority defense efforts. Which brings me to this proposed $78 billion reduction in the defense budget top line over the next 5 years. To begin with, this socalled cut is, in fact, to the rate of predicted growth. The size of 

the base defense budget is still projected to increase in real inflation-adjusted dollars before eventually flattening out over the next 

5 years. 

More significantly, as a result of the efficiencies and reforms undertaken over the past year, we have protected programs that support military people, readiness and modernization. These efforts 

have made it possible for the Department to absorb lower projected 

growth in the defense budget without, as Chairman McKeon 

warned last month, leaving our military less capable and less able 

to fight. In fact, the savings identified by the services have allowed 

our military to add some $70 billion toward priority needs and new 

capabilities. 

And of the $78 billion in proposed reductions to the 5-year defense budget plan, about $68 billion comes from a combination of 

shedding excess overhead, improving business practices, reducing 

personnel costs, and from changes to economic assumptions. So in 

reality only $10 billion of that 5-year total is directly related to 

military combat capability. Four billion of that 10- comes from restructuring the Joint Strike Fighter program, a step driven by this 

program’s development and testing schedule that would have taken 

place irrespective of the budget top line. And so the rest, about $6 

billion out of 78-, results from the proposed decrease in the end 

strength of the Army and the Marine Corps starting in fiscal year 

2015. 

Just over 4 years ago, one of my first acts as Defense Secretary 

was to increase the permanent end strength of our ground forces, 

the Army by 65,000 for a total of 547,000 and the Marine Corps 

by 27,000 to 202,000. At the time the increase was needed to relieve the severe stress on the force from the Iraq war as the surge 

was getting under way. To support the later plus-up of troops in 

Afghanistan, I subsequently authorized a temporary further increase in the Army of some 22,000, an increase always planned to 
7 

end in fiscal year 2013. The objective was to reduce stress on the 

force, limit and eventually end the practice of stop-loss, and to increase troop home dwell time. 

As we end the U.S. presence in Iraq this year, according to our 

agreement with the Iraqi Government, the overall deployment demands on our force are decreasing significantly. Just 3 years ago 

we had 190,000 troops combined in Iraq and Afghanistan. By the 

end of this calendar year, we expect there to be less than 100,000 

troops deployed in both of the major post-9/11 combat theaters, virtually all of those forces in Afghanistan. That is why we believe 

that beginning in fiscal year 2015 the U.S. can, with minimal risk, 

begin reducing Army Active Duty end strength by 27,000, and the 

Marine Corps by somewhere between 15- and 20,000. These projections assume that the number of troops in Afghanistan will be significantly reduced by the end of 2014 in accordance with the President’s and NATO’s [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] strategy. 

If our assumptions prove incorrect, or world conditions change for 

the worse, there is plenty of time to adjust the size and schedule 

of this change. 

It is important to remember that even after the planned reductions, the Active Army end strength would continue to be larger by 

nearly 40,000 soldiers than it was when I became Defense Secretary 4 years ago. I should also note that these reductions are also 

supported by both the Army and Marine Corps leadership. 

Finally, as you know, sharply rising health care costs are consuming an ever larger share of this Department’s budget, growing 

from $19 billion in 2001 to $52.5 billion in this request. Among 

other reforms, this fiscal year 2012 budget includes modest increases to TRICARE enrollment fees, later indexed to Medicare 

premium increases for working-age retirees, most of whom are employed while receiving full pensions. All six members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff have strongly endorsed these and other cost-saving 

TRICARE reforms in a letter to Congress. 

I understand that any change to these kinds of benefits prompts 

vigorous political opposition. But let us be clear, the current 

TRICARE arrangement, one in which fees have not increased for 

15 years, is simply unsustainable, and, if allowed to continue, the 

Defense Department risks the fate of other corporate and government bureaucracies that were ultimately crippled by personnel 

costs, in particular their retiree benefit packages. 

All told, the cumulative effect of the Department’s savings and 

reforms, combined with a host of new investments, will make it 

possible to protect the military’s combat power despite the declining rate of growth and eventual flattening of the defense budget 

over the next 5 years. 

As a result of the savings identified and reinvested by the services, our military will be able to meet unforeseen expenses, refurbish war-worn equipment, buy new ships and fighters, begin development of a new long-range bomber, boost our cyberwarfare capability, strengthen missile defense, and buy more of the most advanced UAVs. But I should note this will only be possible if the efficiencies, reforms and savings are followed through to completion. 

In closing, I want to address the calls from some quarters for 

deeper cuts in defense spending to address this country’s fiscal 
8 

challenges. I would remind them that over the last two defense 

budgets submitted by President Obama, we have curtailed or canceled troubled or excess programs that would have cost more than 

$330 billion if seen through to completion. Additionally, total defense spending, including war costs, will decline further as the U.S. 

military withdraws from Iraq. 

We still live in a very dangerous and very unstable world. Our 

military must remain strong and agile enough to face a diverse 

range of threats from nonstate actors attempting to acquire and 

use weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated missiles to the 

more traditional threats of other states both building up their conventional forces and developing new capabilities that target our 

traditional strengths. 

We shrink from our global security responsibilities at our peril. 

Retrenchment brought about by shortsighted cuts could well lead 

to costlier and more tragic consequences later, indeed as they always have in the past. Surely we should learn from our national 

experience since World War I that drastic reductions in the size 

and strength of the U.S. military make armed conflict all the more 

likely, with an unacceptably high cost in American blood and treasure. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working through this next phase 

of the President’s defense reform effort with you in the weeks and 

months ahead to do what is right for our Armed Forces and to do 

what is right for our country. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, and distinguished members of this committee. I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the President’s fiscal year 2012 defense 

budget. Before I do, however, let me echo Secretary Gates’ comments about the very real dangers inherent in failing to pass this 

year’s budget. 

The fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution, if carried forward, would not only reduce our account by $23 billion, it would deprive 

us of the flexibility we need to support our troops and their families. The services have already taken disruptive and in some cases 

irreversible steps to live within the confines of the CR, steps that 

ultimately make us less effective at what we are supposed to do for 

the Nation. 

The Navy did not procure, as planned, a second Virginia class 

submarine by the end of last month, nor was it able to buy government-furnished equipment for another Arleigh Burke class destroyer. The Army and the Marine Corps have curtailed or altogether frozen civilian hiring, and all the services are now prevented 

from issuing contracts for new major military construction projects. 

Some programs may take years to recover if the CR is extended 

through the end of September. So I urge you to pass the fiscal year 

2011 defense bill immediately. Even at a reduced top line, it will 
9 

provide us the tools we need to accomplish the bulk of the missions 

we have been assigned. 

Accomplishing those missions into the future demands as well 

support of the President’s fiscal year 2012 proposal. As the Secretary laid out, this budget, combined with the efficiencies effort he 

led, provides for the well-being of our troops and families, fully 

funds current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and helps balance global risk through streamlined organization, smarter acquisition and prudent modernization. 

The Army, for instance, will cancel procurement of a surface-toair missile in the non-line-of-sight launch system, but it will continue production of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and spearhead 

the development of a whole new family of armored vehicles. 

The Navy will give up its Second Fleet headquarters, reduce its 

manpower ashore, and increase its use of multiyear procurement 

for ships and aircraft, allowing it to continue development of the 

next-generation ballistic missile submarine, purchase 40 new F– 

18s, 4 littoral combat ships and another LPD–17. 

The Marines will cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle 

[EFV] and, like the Army, reduce their end strength starting in 

2015, but they will reinvest the EFV savings to sustain and modernize the Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the Light-Armored Vehicle, even as they advance a new concept of operations and restore 

much of their naval expeditionary skills. 

And the Air Force will be able to continue development of the 

next tanker, a new bomber, and modernize its aging fleet of F–15 

fighters, all the while finding savings of more than $33 billion 

through reorganization, consolidation and reduced facilities requirements. 

None of this balancing will come on the backs of our deployed troops. We are asking for more than $84 billion for readiness and 

training, nearly $5 billion for increased ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capabilities, and more than $10 billion 

to recapitalize our rotary aircraft fleet. 

These funds, plus those we are requesting to help build partner 

capacity in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen, all 

speak to the emphasis we are placing on giving our troops and 

their partners in the field everything they need to do the difficult 

jobs we have asked of them. 

We must also give them and their families everything they need 

to cope with the stress and strain of 10 years at war. That is why 

I am so pleased with the funds devoted in this proposal, almost 

three-quarters as much as the $200 billion budgeted for operations 

and maintenance, to personnel, housing and health care issues. 

As you may know, the Chiefs and I penned a rare 24-star letter 

to the Senate Armed Services Committee this week expressing our 

unqualified support for the military health care program changes 

included in this budget. We have sought equity across all health 

care programs, with beneficiaries and health care delivery providers having the same benefits as equivalent payment systems regardless of where they live or work. That, in turn, led us to propose 

increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for working-age retirees. 

These increases are modest and manageable and leave fees well 

below inflation-adjusted out-of-pocket costs set in 1995 when the 
10 

current fees were established. We sincerely hope you will see fit to 

pass them. 

Please know that we will continue to invest wisely in critical care 

areas to include research; diagnosis and treatment of mental health 

issues and traumatic brain injury; enhanced access to health services and new battlefield technologies. We understand that changes 

to health care benefits cause concern among the people we serve 

and the communities from which we receive care, but we also understand and hold sacred our obligation to care completely for 

those who have borne the brunt of these wars, as well as those for 

whom the war never ends. 

I am convinced that we haven’t even begun to understand the 

toll in dollars and in dreams that war extracts from people. As the 

grandsons and granddaughters of the World War II vets still struggle to comprehend the full scope of the horror those men yet conceal, so, too, will our grandchildren have to come to grips with the 

wounds unseen and the grief unspoken unless, of course, we get it 

right. 

And I believe the investments we are making in wounded care 

and family readiness will pay off in that regard, but it will take 

time and patience and money, three things we seem so rarely to 

possess in this town. 

That brings me back to this particular budget request. With limited resources and two wars in progress, we should be prudent in 

defining our priorities, in slaking our thirst for more and better 

systems, and in controlling costs. 

We should also be clear about what the joint force can and cannot do, just as we should be clear about what we expect from our 

interagency and our international partners. Our global commitments have not shrunk. If anything, they have grown, and the 

world is a lot less predictable now than we could have ever imagined. You need look no further than Tahrir Square to see the truth 

in that. 

Foolhardy would it be for us to make hasty judgments about the 

benefits, tangible and intangible, that are about to be derived from 

forging strong military relationships overseas, such as the one we 

enjoy with Egypt. Changes to those relationships in either aid or 

assistance ought to be considered only with an abundance of caution and a thorough appreciation for the long view, rather than in 

the flush of public passion and the urgency to save a buck. The 

$1.3 billion we provide the Egyptian military each year has helped 

them become the capable, professional force they are, and, in that 

regard, has been of incalculable value. 

Of equal or greater value is increased appropriations for the 

State Department and our request in this budget for something 

called the Global Security Contingency Fund, a 3-year pooled fund 

between the Pentagon and State that will be used to build partner 

capacity, prevent conflicts and prepare for emerging threats. The 

request is modest, an initial $50 million appropriation, along with 

a request for authority to reprogram an additional $450 million if 

needed. But what it will buy us is an agile and cost-effective way 

to better respond to unforeseen needs and take advantage of 

emerging opportunities for partners to secure their own territories 

and regions. 
11 

We must get more efficient, yes, but we also must get more pragmatic about the world we live in. We can no longer afford bloated 

programs or unnecessary organizations without sacrificing fighting 

power. And we can no longer afford to put off investments in future 

capabilities or relationships that preserve that power across the 

spectrum of conflicts. 

I have long said we must not be exempt in the Defense Department from belt tightening, but in truth there is little discretionary 

about the security we provide our fellow citizens. Cuts can reasonably only go so far without hollowing the force. In my view, then, 

this proposed budget builds on the balance we started to achieve 

last year and represents the best of both fiscal responsibility and 

sound national security. 

Now, I don’t know what sorts of questions Representative Giffords would ask me if she were sitting here today, but I do know 

she wouldn’t let me leave until I lauded the incredible effort of our 

troops overseas as they finish one war in Iraq and begin to turn 

corners in Afghanistan. I know you share my pride in them and 

their families, and I know you will keep them foremost in mind as 

you consider the elements of this proposal. 

I thank you for your continued support of our men and women 

in uniform and their families, and I look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in the 

Appendix on page 75.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, as I stated earlier, 

I think everyone on this committee strongly supports your request 

for an appropriation bill that will take care of the work that should 

have been done last year, but if it had been done last year by Congress and the administration, we wouldn’t even be having this argument, this fight, the thing that we are trying to resolve right 

now on the floor. 

So I am hopeful that we can wrap this up just as quickly as possible, and I know that all of the defense industry, all of the men 

and women who wear the uniform, and all of your colleagues in the 

Department are strongly behind that, as are all of the members on 

the committee. So I hope we can get that done quickly. 

The $78 billion that—you know, that we are talking about as a 

cut, I understand that it is not a cut as we would propose something being cut this year from last year’s budget. But last year, 

when we were holding these hearings, and you projected out the 

budget for the 5 years, the $78 billion was included in it. 

Now, I commend you for what you have asked the services to do 

to find efficiencies and save that $100 billion that they will be able 

to mostly reinvest into more important items going forward. And 

I guess we will continue to talk about the outgoing years in outgoing years, but we all understand we are in a tough financial situation in the country, and I think we all need to work together to 

make sure that whatever reductions in future spending, we all 

work together to make sure that it doesn’t cut into our men and 

women serving in harm’s way and their families. 

One of the concerns I have had, as we have gone through the 

QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and hearings last year and 

this year, it seems to me that the budgets are not driven by so 
12 

much defense needs—or procurement and the things that we are 

talking about spending aren’t driven by threat needs, they are driven more by budgetary concerns. And as I indicated in my opening 

statement, reductions to the Army and the Marine Corps end 

strength, I can remember when you came, Mr. Secretary, and how 

hard it was to increase the size of the force. And I understand that 

even with these reductions, there still will be a larger force than 

when you became Secretary 4 years ago. But as I look around the 

world and see what is happening, the recent events in Egypt, 

Yemen, Asia and other threats around the world, I have great concern about cutting the end strength. 

And so my question is revolving around that. Is a reduction in 

end strength conditions-based? If so, what metrics will the Department use to reevaluate this decision going forward? At what point 

will we decide and what measurement will we use to decide if this 

is the correct number to decrease our strength, and when will that 

decision be made? 

What was the 2016 end strength presumed by the QDR and during development of the National Military Strategy? And, finally, 

how will this reduction in end strength affect the objective of 1-to3 dwell time for the Active Force? 

Secretary GATES. Let me start and then ask the chairman to add 

in. 

First of all, I would say that it is conditions-based. And as I said 

in my opening statement, if our assumptions about, for example, 

the drawdown in Iraq prove incorrect, then I think we will be in 

a position to change this decision and add to end strength further, 

well before 2015, or at least find other ways to deal with the dollar 

so that there isn’t a reduction in end strength. 

I would say the key metric is, and the most predictable variable 

is, in fact, the drawdown in Afghanistan. A big assumption in this 

is that we have a very much smaller presence in Afghanistan at 

the end of 2014 than we do now, and I think you will know as early 

as the end of 2012, beginning of 2013 whether that is going to happen, which allows plenty of time to alter these decisions. 

The good thing about this approach is that because you don’t 

start to cut anything until 2015, you don’t have to go out and recruit anybody; all you have to do is find other sources of the money. 

And, you know, what was described to me a long time ago about 

the outyears, the outyears are where everybody’s dreams come 

true. 

And so just as an example, when I took this job, the forecast, the 

projected budget for fiscal year 2012 in the 2007 Bush budget was 

$519 billion. Our submission is for 553-. So these things do change 

over time, and there is a lot of flexibility. 

But I will say this about the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps 

actually came forward with their proposal, and it was really unrelated to the budget. Both the previous Commandant and the current Commandant believe that when the Marines are out of Afghanistan, that the Marine Corps is both too large and too heavy 

to fulfill its traditional missions going forward. And so they were 

talking about reductions in Marine Corps end strength a year or 

two ago, and so that—they tie that very much to their mission. 
13 

And, as I say, we can revisit the Army’s—you can revisit the 

Army’s end strength depending on the conditions in 2013 or 2014. 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, all of us in the leadership, in 

leadership positions in the military believe that we live in a time 

of what we call persistent conflicts. It is very difficult to know, obviously, what is going to happen in 2015, 2016 timeframe. But to 

your point and to the Secretary’s answer, I think this really is conditions-based per se. 

And in addition to the metric of certainly Afghanistan and Iraq, 

and, you know, we will be in a position there in 2015, 2016, where 

our force is substantially reduced, and to include in that the 25,000 

marines or so who are there now. I would just echo what the Secretary said with Jim Conway, who was the previous Commandant; 

Jim Amos, the current Commandant. They had been planning to 

get smaller and lighter. They are too heavy. They are the Nation’s 

second land force, which is not what they want to be, and they 

have got to get back to some degree as we move ahead to their 

roots, which is lighter and smaller. 

With respect to the Army in particular, we have looked out 

through the QDR at how many brigades would we have out there. 

And the answer is, we are not sure. We planned around 6 to 10 

or some number like that. We don’t know where to look prudently 

at the future as actually the Army has become much more expeditionary. And that is where we are headed, and I am very comfortable with that. 

Each of the service chiefs—all of us, but each of the service 

chiefs, depending on which service you are talking about, some 60 

to 70 percent—when you add civilians, direct support contractors, 

60 to 70 percent of our budget goes to people. 

And so and as the Secretary said in his statement, you know, we 

are on a way, on our way of becoming almost immobilized by just 

what it costs in terms of our people. The health care piece is just— 

it is not an insignificant part of it, but it is an example. So we have 

tried to achieve balance. 

Probably the metric I would use is the one you suggested, which 

is dwell time. We are now in this budget, as we look out a few 

years, we will get to about in the 2015 timeframe where we are, 

1 and 2. I think the Commandant would sit here and say that is 

probably about where he wants to be in terms of rotating his force. 

I think the Chief of the Army would say 1 and 3. And obviously 

that will then depend on what the obligations will be. 

But you can see now, in various examples, where we have our 

troops home a lot longer than we used to, starting to be significantly longer than they were deployed. We are just in the beginning of that. We have got to get out to 1 to 2 and then in the case 

look at really decisions around getting to 1 to 3 with respect to the 

Army. 

So I am comfortable that we have time, we can look at it. And 

certainly the service chiefs would come in and change their recommendation, if you will, based on what I know about them, if the 

conditions warranted it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ranking Member Smith. 
14 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I have two sets 

of questions. 

Congresswoman Giffords’ staff has submitted to me some questions that she has, and I thank both of you for your kind words on 

her behalf. And they focus on Department of Defense energy issues, 

something that Congresswoman Giffords has worked a great deal 

on, and basically using efficiencies and alternative to deal with our 

energy needs and reduce our energy consumption. 

She had introduced a bill, the Department of Defense Energy Security Act, in 2010. Many of those provisions were contained in our 

fiscal year 2011 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], and 

I wanted to follow up on that. And then specifically there is a program that the Marine Corps is using at a forward-operating base 

in Afghanistan to use solar as a way to reduce their fuel consumption. 

And I think the biggest point here to make is this isn’t just about 

saving money or dealing with the energy challenges, this also does 

save lives. And the specific example there is that because they used 

solar, they were able to significantly reduce their fuel consumption, 

as I understand it, from like 20 gallons a day down to 2.5. And that 

reduction means that fewer convoys have to come and go and bring 

fuel in, which means that fewer people are exposed to the IED [improvised explosive device] threat. So there are very specific implications of this policy. 

And going forward, I want to know, first of all, how the Department of Defense is doing implementing these programs, finding efficiencies, reducing our energy consumption through the use of efficiencies and alternatives; and then, second of all, what more we in 

Congress legislatively need to do or can do to help you. 

And if you could on those two questions, I would like to hear 

some brief comments from you, but submit the answers for the 

record to both Congresswoman Giffords’ office and to mine. But if 

you could take a stab at that now, that would be great. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that the example that you actually give 

of the Marines in Afghanistan is a terrific example, and it does exactly what you just described. And, actually, Marines in Anbar 

Province several years ago started that, looking at the length of 

their convoys, the number of people that were actually put in 

harm’s way because of the logistics and transportation requirements. That has kicked in over to the Army and actually across all 

the services. 

So I think the efforts with respect to improving and reducing energy dependency are significant. The Secretary stood up a very, 

very strong office to oversee this to both integrate the efforts, the 

investments are there. The Air Force has, from my perspective, led 

the way with respect to synthetic fuel, use of synthetic fuels in aircraft. The Navy has picked up on that. So there is a significant effort across the board. 

There are green investments taking place in the Marine Corps 

out in Twentynine Palms, for instance, just straight, solar energy. 

The reductions that that base commander is seeing are significant 

as well. That is also starting to be put in place in other bases 

around the country. 
15 

So we are sharing the ideas. We know that we have got to reduce 

our dependence significantly, and the leaders are focused on that. 

We have seen some of the results, but we have expectations they 

will be significantly greater in the future. 

Mr. SMITH. I think—Mr. Secretary, go ahead. 

Secretary GATES. I was just going to make two quick comments. 

First I think credit needs to be given particularly to the Secretary 

of the Navy, Ray Mabus, because I think the Navy has a really aggressive program in terms of reducing energy use. 

Second, I would just note that I read just a few days ago that 

the C–17 was just certified for use of synthetic fuels. 

Mr. SMITH. And that is why—just two points in closing on this 

issue before asking another question—is, number one, how much 

difference this can make. I think there is generally in the energy 

field I feel like, well, yes, they are talking about this and that and 

the other thing, but when is it ever going to happen? It is happening. And I think the military is out front. Every base that I 

visit, and there are many, they always talk about how they are 

doing this, that, or the other thing on energy, and how much they 

have reduced their energy consumption, and how much more efficient it is. 

And then I think the challenge really is to get it to scale. As all 

these experiments are happening, sort of quickly find out, okay, 

here are the three things that just work the best. Let us get them 

servicewide and get them implemented. So I think you are making 

enormous progress then. 

And we thank you, and like I said, if you could submit a more 

detailed answer to Congresswoman Giffords’ office and mine, that 

would be great. I would appreciate it. 

Just two quick areas I want to ask about. One, as I mentioned 

in my opening remarks, you know, development assistance is becoming a greater part of our national security. Stability is the goal 

here. You know, our enemies now prey on ungoverned or ungovernable spaces. They find openings, places. It has certainly happened 

in Afghanistan. It is happening in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen 

to some extent. 

So figuring out how to do stability is going to be critical. And I 

know of necessity the Department of Defense has taken on a lot of 

responsibility in this area through CERP [Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program] funds, through 1206, 1208. And part of the 

problem there is these are responsibilities better done by, in some 

cases, the State Department or Department of Agriculture or other 

areas that know more about those. 

But you guys have the money, and you have got—you know, you 

were the forward-leading folks. You are out there in the field having to figure this out. And, you know, frankly, there was not sufficient support elsewhere, so you had to do it. 

The question is how do we begin to transition that responsibility, 

because it is not a core responsibility of the military in many instances. It is a core responsibility of folks in other agencies. But 

how do you make that work? How do we make sure those other 

agencies have the support they need? How do we transfer the 

funds? How do you envision that playing out? 
16 

Secretary GATES. Well, we have been advocating for much greater civilian involvement in these kinds of activities, not only in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, but in global stability operations, at least since 

I gave the Landon Lecture at Kansas State in 2007. 

The biggest part of the problem, quite frankly, is jurisdictions 

here on the Hill, and it is the difficulty the State Department has 

in getting their appropriations and getting the money they need to 

do their job. 

If you took every Foreign Service officer in the State Department, 

you would not have a large enough number to crew a single aircraft carrier. So finding the resources for the State Department— 

because many of these areas, what we have done is worked with 

you, and you have been very helpful to us in developing some workarounds. 

So on 1206, for example, we have dual-key arrangements. We basically leave the initiative up to the State Department in terms of 

what we should do on some of those, and then we fund it, and we 

partner with them. By rights that money should probably be in the 

State Department to start with. 

And so, I think this is an area where legislation, but especially 

appropriations, are really important, because these stability operations—and there is a military component to it because it is developing partner security capability so that they can take care of the 

security in their own countries so we don’t have to send American 

troops to do it. 

And you can just tell from the costs in Iraq and Afghanistan the 

differential in cost between our training somebody else to do it and 

the State Department then providing the civilian support in terms 

of governance and various other kinds of assistance compared with 

having to use U.S. troops. So it is a challenge. 

I think we have developed, over the last several years, very close 

working relationships between State and Defense in these workarounds and in these jerry-rigged operations. But a long-term solution is the kind of global fund that Admiral Mullen was talking 

about and so on. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, and you are absolutely right. I mean, security has to be a key component of any sort of development going 

forward. You don’t have security, you can’t do that. And I think, 

you know, the Philippines is an excellent example of where a very 

small number of our forces trained the local security forces. And, 

you know, you don’t hear much about what is going on in the Philippines, and that is a good thing, and then you look at Iraq and 

Afghanistan, and you can see the alternative is just so much more 

costly, it is beyond imagination. 

Just one final comment. When we are trying to figure out going 

forward dealing with the difficult budget environment that we have 

and trying to anticipate threats, you know, trying to make sure 

that we are ready for whatever comes next, I just want to make 

sure that people are aware of the fact that you cannot be ready for 

everything. You know, from my earliest days on this committee, 

one of the things that struck me was every day we would come and 

talk about some threat, and then we would talk about how we are 

not doing enough to be ready for it, and I get that. 
17 

But if you were to look out at the world and imagine every possible threat and say the job of this committee, or your job, is to 

make sure that we spend enough money to be ready for any and 

all contingencies, the defense budget—well, it might not be infinite, 

but it would be darn close. So we have to prioritize those threats 

going forward with the budget, and we can’t walk too far down the 

road that if we can imagine a threat, we have to spend whatever 

we possibly can to make sure that we are protected against it, because that sinks us in a different way. 

We really have to prioritize. And towards that end I think that 

the key going forward to get the right budget is to really look at 

the requirements. I mean, it starts with the QDR. Once we decide 

that there is a requirement, we then have to fund it. If we don’t 

fund it, we are not giving our troops the support that they need 

to do the job that we, by definition, have asked them to do. 

But I would like to think that we can also go back to the start 

of that process, not just the end, not just the end, and say, gosh, 

we have to fund this; but go back to the start and say, well, is that 

really a requirement, or is that something we developed 10 or 15 

years ago that is no longer appropriate? So getting there I think 

we need to move in that direction. 

Secretary GATES. Let me make just two quick comments about 

that. First of all, if you look back to every time we have engaged 

in a military operation since the Vietnam war, we have a perfect 

record. Six months to a year before we engaged in that operation, 

nobody had any idea we were going to do it. 

And so the mantra for the Department that I have tried to inculcate is in the current budget environment, we have to be exceptionally careful about buying niche capabilities, very expensive weapons systems that have application in only one scenario. There may 

be some of those that we need, but we need to be extremely judicious about those investments. 

But our overall approach ought to be the broadest—the most 

flexible range of capabilities to cover the broadest range of conflict 

so that, you know, a C–17 is going to be applicable whether we are 

dealing with a near peer or whether we are taking aid into Pakistan. So, having capabilities that can form many missions is where 

we need to focus most of our procurement dollars for the very reason you cited. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, can I just make one comment? I think one 

of the ways you do protect against the unknowns is to make sure 

that your S&T [science and technology] and what I would call pure 

R&D [research and development] budgets are both comprehensive 

and broad and not—and sometimes those become very easy targets. 

You need the innovation, you need the kind of investment for the 

capabilities of the future that really starts there, and the Secretary 

has led this. 

There has been a, you know, very focused effort to make sure 

that is sustained. And in the totality of the budget, it is not a huge 

amount of money, but its long-term leverage is just, you know, almost off the charts. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both witnesses. 

You are doing an outstanding job for our country. We appreciate 

it. 
18 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to put my comments in context. To the 

best of my knowledge, the only interest in the engine for the F– 

35 in the district I have the honor to represent is an interest in 

the 135. As far as I know there is no interest in the 136. 

The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires 

that you ensure that the acquisition strategy for each major defense acquisition program includes measures to ensure competition 

or the option of competition at both the prime contract level and 

the subcontract level of such program throughout the life cycle of 

such program as a means to improve contractor performance. 

The current F–35 acquisition strategy states, and I quote, ‘‘To 

preclude excessive reliance on a single engine supplier, an alternative engine program was established,’’ unquote. The F–35 could 

represent up to 95 percent of the entire U.S. fighter fleet in the future. Use of a single engine could result in grounding of essentially 

all of the fighters in all of the services. 

The 2010 Hadley-Perry Quadrennial Defense Review Panel endorsed dual-procurement competition, and I quote, ‘‘as the only way 

to control program costs.’’ 

The senior Pentagon procurement official cited competition as 

the cornerstone of defense acquisition. The Pentagon’s last update 

of the F–35 alternative engine business case indicated the competitive engine is at the break-even point in net present value. After 

having opposed dual-source procurement for the littoral combat 

ship [LCS] as not being, quote, ‘‘real competition,’’ unquote, the 

Pentagon signed a dual-source procurement contract at the end of 

last year with the two bidders for the LCS. 

Sir, for the past 2 days, two papers have been circulated to Congress here, one of them on Monday, one of them on Tuesday. They 

are unsigned and undated. It simply says, ‘‘Prepared by the Department of Defense.’’ The Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Legislative Affairs has refused to respond over the past 3 days to 

why these papers are not dated or why they were not provided to 

the Armed Services Committee. 

Sir, when I was a little boy, my mother impressed on me that 

an intent to deceive was the same thing as a lie. In each of these 

papers, there is a statement, the F–136 alternate engine is currently 3 to 4 years behind in development compared to the current 

engine program, and yesterday’s paper said, and the F–136 engine 

is already 3 to 4 years behind in its development phase. 

Sir, the second engine, as you know, was started 4 years after 

the first engine. As you know, the first engine is now about 24 

months behind in its development. I understand that the second 

engine is just 2 to 3 months behind in its development cycle. So in 

reality, had they both been started at the same time, the second 

engine would now be well ahead of the first engine. 

Sir, are you comfortable that these two missiles that have gone 

through Congress for the last couple of days do not constitute a violation of the statute that prohibits the Pentagon from lobbying 

Congress? 
19 

Secretary GATES. I am not in the slightest aware of either one 

of those documents. The only document that I am aware of is a letter that I sent to Representative Rooney, I think, yesterday or the 

day before, and I can assure you it was both signed and dated. 

I will just tell you—well, that was your question. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, these two papers are circulated. I will have 

them bring copies down to you. They are unsigned and undated, 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs refused to respond over the last 3 days as to why these papers are 

not signed or why they were not provided. They were provided to 

everybody else in the Congress except the Armed Services Committee is my understanding. 

Are you comfortable, sir, that this does not constitute a violation 

of the statute that says that the Pentagon cannot lobby Congress? 

Secretary GATES. Let me see the papers and find out the background before I make a judgment on them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. After you have a chance to peruse 

those, if you would please respond to the gentleman in writing, we 

would appreciate that. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for your service. 

Let me add my concern to the issue of the reductions in end 

strength for both the Army and the Marines, given some of the 

challenges that we know we are going to have in the next few years 

in the Horn of Africa and other areas. So I do hope we are careful 

with those reductions, because in the final analysis, the ones that 

pay the price are the service men and women and their families. 

And most recently we have learned over the last 8 years in activating and using the Reserve forces, a lot of unintended negative 

consequences impacted those families. So I also want to urge caution there. 

The other concern that I have is yesterday it became a national 

story about a lawsuit filed by former veteran women that are alleging what I think is a hostile work environment, and sexual harassment and other things. I know you are probably not in a position 

to comment on that, Mr. Secretary, but I would like to work with 

your office to better understand exactly the circumstances that led 

to this lawsuit. 

Secretary GATES. If I may, let me just say—and obviously what 

I can say is limited by the fact of the lawsuit, but let me just say 

a couple of things, because this is a matter of grave concern, I suspect, to everybody in the room. 

First of all, I have zero tolerance for sexual assault. And I 

worked with Chairman Mullen and the Joint Chiefs and the service 

secretaries to see if we are doing all we can to prevent and respond 

to sexual assaults. I have had multiple meetings with the senior 

leadership of the Department on this issue over the past 4 years. 

I have established four critical areas of departmental focus: reducing stigma associated with reporting, ensuring sufficient commander training, ensuring investigator training and resources, and 

ensuring trial counsel training and resourcing. 
20 

We have hired dozen more investigators, field instructors, pros- ecutors and lab examiners. We have spent close to $2 million over 

the last 2 years to train our prosecutors so that they are better 

able to be successful. We have expanded the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator and Victim Advocates tenfold from 300 to 

3,000, and we now have those advocates at every base and installation in the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. The court 

martial percentages have increased from 30 percent to 52 percent. 

So we are making headway. The fact is we aren’t where we 

should be. It is a matter of grave concern, and we will keep working at it. 

Mr. REYES. Yes. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I would certainly more than just echo 

what the Secretary said in terms of zero tolerance. This has been 

an issue actually over the course of the last 6 or 7 years. It has 

been an issue of great focus. And it is unacceptable that we haven’t 

gotten where we need to be on this. 

We know this is an extraordinarily difficult issue, and I know, 

both as a former service chief as well as knowing the current service chief, it is an area of focus. It wasn’t that long ago it was a significant area both in the combat zone in Iraq. There still is enough 

anecdotal information coming out of both Iraq and particularly in 

Afghanistan to certainly be of concern. 

What the Secretary said in terms of the investments in terms of 

improvements in education, focus on leadership is exactly right, but 

we also have, I think—we still have significant work to do, and the 

leadership is focused on that. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

Let me just mention quickly two other things. First of all, I represent Fort Bliss, who in the area of green energy is hoping to be 

off the grid by the 2015–2016 timeframe. That is a huge compliment to the work that you are both supporting in terms of alternative energy. 

And then the last thing is I would urge you, Mr. Secretary, to 

work closely with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to find a way 

to computerize as service men and women come out of Active Duty 

into the Veterans Administration jurisdiction, that there be a way 

of doing a better job through automation. 

Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I thought that the sentence you added towards 

the close of your statement, that retrenchment brought about by 

short-sighted cuts could well lead to costlier, more tragic consequences later, indeed as they always have in the past, is a very 

powerful statement to me. I think it is a warning to all of us somewhat related to the conversation you were having with Mr. Smith 

about 6 months out, we never know what we are about to get into. 

And I guess it is that feeling that really you express better than 

I could that leads me to be concerned about not just end strength, 

but force structure in the future. 

I notice that the independent panel of the QDR, chaired by Steve 

Hadley and former Secretary Perry, with all these people you know 
21 

well on it, expressed their concern about a growing gap between 

our interests and our military capability to protect those interests 

in a complex, challenging security environment. That is along the 

very same lines you were talking about with our diverse, complicated, difficult threats. And their conclusion was that they believe the current size and current end strengths of the Army and 

Marine Corps should be retained. 

And I heard what both of you said, that this is conditions-based, 

and we will see how it goes, and we can change our mind, but I 

am under the impression that the end strength and force structure 

is not something that you can just flip a switch and say on/off, that 

it is the kind of thing that you have got to plan ahead for, both 

in budgets and equipment, in the personnel pipeline for training. 

It is something that has to be planned for. 

And so I guess I would appreciate a little more—especially since 

this is, as you say, your last appearance before us—a little more 

of your thoughts about not just end strength, but the force structure moving ahead with the kinds of threats that at least we understand are on the horizon, failed states, trouble in the Middle 

East, the kinds of stability operations that you all were talking 

about from a financial standpoint. But all of that is very manpower-intensive. And so I would appreciate your thoughts about 

how we on this committee can best prepare us to deal with those 

kinds of challenges ahead, even if we don’t know exactly what they 

are. 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, as I look ahead, I think, as 

I say, and as both the chairman and I have said, the end strength 

that I approved in 2007 for both services will remain in place at 

least until 2015, and those plans could be altered depending on circumstances. 

As I look around the world—and we were talking about stability 

operations—one of the areas where we have had a significant expansion of capabilities over the last few years has been in our Special Operations Forces. And they often play the training role that 

Mr. Smith was talking about in these stability operations. And one 

of the big moves we have made that has not been noticed very 

much is that this increase in soft capabilities over the last 2 or 3 

years has been moved out of the supplementals and into the base 

budget so that those soft capabilities that we will use in a lot of 

these unstable conditions that we look around the world and see 

will be sustained even once we stop getting overseas contingency 

appropriations and so on. 

I will tell you the areas of force structure that worry me a lot, 

and they are areas that this committee in the years to come is 

going to have to address. For example, the number of our surface 

ships, the number—a number of the Navy ships that were built 

during the Reagan years will basically reach the end of their 

planned life in the 2020s. And where the money comes from to replace those surface ships or to get to 313, which is the Navy’s goal 

from the 287 we have now, I think is going to be a challenge. And 

especially if you put it alongside for the Navy acquiring a new ballistic missile submarine for the Air Force, is the Air Force, in fact, 

in 2020 or 2025 going to be able to afford a new tanker, an F–35, 

and a new penetrating bomber? 
22 

So there are some tough choices in terms of big capabilities that 

are coming down the road. They are not facing us right now, and 

what we have been able to do is to give future Congresses and future Presidents choices because we are making investments in 

things like the SSBN–X [next-generation ballistic missile submarine], like the new bomber and so on. But down the road when 

procurement starts, there are going to be some very tough decisions 

that are going to have to be made. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Admiral and Secretary, for being before us again 

today. 

And, Secretary Gates, I just would like to thank you for your 

service because you, obviously serving under two Presidents just 

have been really wonderful to work with. And I think so many of 

us here who have been on this committee for a long time really appreciate your candor and your desire to work with us to make 

things better at the Pentagon. So thank you for that. 

You know, we find ourselves in two wars, and it has been, I don’t 

know—I am losing track—maybe about 8 years. And when you are 

in a time of war, there is always the, you know, fog of war, and 

you want to fund, you want to make sure you win, you want to 

make sure your soldiers and airmen and seamen and marines and 

Coast Guard and all are taken care of and have what they need 

when they are on the front lines. So I think what we have seen is 

really an increase in monies, at least over the 14 years, now 15 

years, that I have been on this committee. 

But, you know, just in January, the Department of Defense came 

out with the report stating that in the past 3 years, the Pentagon 

had awarded $285 billion to companies that were defrauding the 

Pentagon; $285 billion in 3 years. And I know when I looked 

through your budgets, and I have talked to you, and we have 

worked through that you are taking extensive initiatives to bring 

efficiency and savings to the Department. And I know we set up 

the task force with Mr. Andrews on this committee to do acquisition in a different manner, and we believe that we will find some 

of this fraud, and we will contract in a different way, and we will 

begin to see some savings from that. 

But when something like $285 billion over 3 years occurs, it really is working against all the hard work that you and others and 

some in this Congress have done in terms of getting rid of the 

waste in the Department. And what really concerns me is that Senator Sanders requested that investigation. If he had not, we would 

have never seen that $285 billion report. 

So my question is, what is in place for the Department of Defense to catch those types of things? Were they not in place? Do we 

have new guidelines now that we have seen that that came forward? And what can you do, and what can we do together, to ensure that these types of companies never get a contract again from 

the Federal Government? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I am not familiar with the study that you 

cite, but I will tell you that there have been a number of changes 

made over the last year or so in terms of our approach to acquisi-
23 

tion, beginning with the legislation that the Congress passed on acquisition reform. The one exception that I have made to the freeze 

on civilian hiring for the next 5 years in the Department is, in fact, 

in the acquisition area and in hiring professional—building up our 

own professional cadre of acquisition experts. Part of the reason for 

that is we have had too many instances where we have contractors 

letting contracts to contractors instead of people who have the interests of the Department of Defense and the U.S. taxpayer at 

heart. So professionalizing our acquisition workforce is a very high 

priority. 

We have really changed a lot in the last year or so in terms of 

our procedures and our processes, first of all, just in negotiating 

smarter contracts, and we have seen some real benefits from that. 

And the example was used in another context of the littoral combat 

ship. Being able to get these two into a real competition got the 

price down far enough that we were actually able to buy more 

ships because of that. 

So I think we have a lot of efforts underway. We have thousands 

of auditors. We have about 10,000 lawyers. And so the key is, I 

think, having the acquisition professionals who can discern these 

bad behaviors and, first of all, prevent them from happening in the 

first place, but then be quicker and more effective in catching 

them. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. My time is over. We will make sure 

we get that Department of Defense report to you so you can take 

a look at that. And I have some other questions, but I will submit 

them for the record because of the time. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to start by saying I really respect your decisiveness. Nobody could say that you are afraid to wade in and 

make the tough decisions, and certainly we need that kind of leadership. 

I don’t always appreciate the communication strategy of letting 

us know. You say that sometimes you don’t know for 6 months before whether you are going to be into a conflict. Sometimes we don’t 

know whether a program is going or not, and it is a matter of 

about a day or so that we find out. So sometimes on this committee, it would be helpful if you worked on the communications 

and give some of us a heads-up as to what you are thinking and 

where we are going because we are trying to play as a team with 

you. 

Particularly in that regard, I have shifted over, I am now on the 

Budget Committee and trying to help people to understand the difference in growth of entitlements and what has happened to the 

defense budget as a percent of GDP [gross domestic product]. As 

you know, the defense budget has gone very much down since 

1965, and the entitlements are, whatever it is, 6- or 700 percent 

increase. But we need to make the case to make sure that you are 

not so pinched on money that you can’t get the job done. 

So I hope that you look at us as partners and helpers. If you are 

going to all of a sudden, for instance, going to whack the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle [EFV], which happens to be in our com-
24 

mittee, it would be helpful to have some idea that you are thinking 

about that as we move from full speed ahead to all stop. You know, 

it is a little helpful to have a heads-up on it. 

I was interested to hear you reflect on where you were concerned 

about where we are overall. I also am concerned about the number 

of ships. I had a chance to spend 3 hours in one of those situation 

rooms that was designed to give us a picture from ‘‘Hail Britannia, 

Ruler of the Seas,’’ and all through our history. And one of the big 

lessons from that was you fight the war with the ships that you 

have, or at least the ones you have on the waves. You can’t design 

a new ship and build it because the war will be over by the time 

you get there. 

My concern was we were talking about a 313-ship Navy. We are 

down to 287, and as you pointed out, when you put the ballistic 

missile submarine or something in there, boy, that budget just 

blows up. So I certainly hope we can work on whatever we can do 

to try to continue on the building. 

The other thing, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, I don’t really give a rip what particular platforms we have, but it seems to be 

nonnegotiable that marines have to get from the ocean to the land, 

and they have to get there quick enough, and not seasick enough, 

and not full of diesel fumes enough that they can actually fight 

when they get to shore. And I am not convinced that we have an 

adequate strategy without having that vehicle or something to fill 

that gap. So it is something we are going to take a look at, but I 

would hope that you would at least allow us to go through that and 

be flexible with us in saying if we don’t have a good strategy, let 

us make sure we have a good one, because I think the Brits decided they weren’t going to do that capability, and then they got 

in the Falkland Island war and just about lost it because they 

hadn’t planned to be able to get their marines on the shore. 

So I just wanted to allow you to respond to my rambling here a 

little bit. But we want to work with a team. That is my main point 

with you. But we need a little bit of a heads-up before you make 

your decisive moves. Thank you, sir. 

Secretary GATES. First of all, on the EFV, let me just say publicly 

and for the record, the Department of Defense totally supports the 

Marine Corps in a firm requirement for an amphibious assault capability for the Marines. We just don’t want to spend $15 billion, 

which is virtually all of the Marine Corps’ ground vehicle procurement budget, for enough vehicles to take 4,000 out of 202,000 Marines from ship to shore. 

Now, I think the Commandant—and it should be clear, this was 

a recommendation from the Commandant to the Secretary of the 

Navy, and from them to me. And I think we should also understand the Commandant does have an alternative plan in terms of 

first accelerating the Marine personnel carrier; second, upgrading 

part of the existing amphibious assault vehicle fleet; and then 

third, designing a new assault—amphibious assault vehicle, but 

one without the expensive exquisite capabilities of the EFV. So 

there is a commitment to this, and there is money in the fiscal year 

2012 budget to begin pursuing this. 

And with respect to your first observation, I would just say that, 

first of all, I think that most of the members of this committee be-
25 

lieve that I have been pretty honest, pretty forthcoming, and candid and transparent ever since taking this job, and I fully recognize 

the constitutional role of Congress with respect to our military 

forces. And, in fact, in my first commencement address at the 

Naval Academy, I spoke to the midshipmen about that very fact 

and the importance of Congress and for them to stay apolitical, 

among other things. 

But at the same time, I have to have a disciplined decision process inside the Department of Defense. And to tell you the truth, 

until a few years ago, the place leaked like a sieve, and I couldn’t 

make an internal decision without it being in the newspapers or 

that process being in the newspapers. And so I have tried to instill 

some discipline in the Department, and the truth is that by going 

out on January 6th with what we have in mind for the fiscal year 

2012 budget, this committee and its counterpart in the Senate got 

a 6-week head start in evaluating the fiscal year 2012 budget over 

every other committee in Congress and every other part of the 

President’s budget. And I got the President’s approval to go ahead 

and do that. 

The same thing happened in the spring of 2009 when I came up. 

I made a lot of decisions in the spring of 2009 on programs. Thirtythree of them came up here, all of the major ones, And in every 

single one of those, Congress had an opportunity to evaluate it and 

decide whether to go forward or not. Right now, 32 of the 33 are 

in law. 

So I think that I absolutely agree with you, we need to do this 

as a team. But I also have to have a disciplined decision process 

inside the Department of Defense so that I can get everybody’s 

point of view, people can speak up in meetings, can disagree, and 

we can work things out before making a decision. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. The highest compliment 

I can pay you is that you reflect the same level of excellence of the 

men and women that you lead, and we appreciate all three of your 

service to our country. 

I apologize for not being personally present for your testimony, 

but I have read it. And, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to direct your attention to page 4 of your written testimony, which goes into a list 

of the savings that you are proposing. 

First let me thank you for proposing them. I think too often the 

debate here has been trivialized by people who, I think incorrectly, 

say our military budget is just too large because it looks too large 

without being able to talk about the needs the country has, and 

then others who would look at any reduction as somehow a threat 

to national security without real and fair analysis. I cannot think 

of a person better suited to lead us to a mature discussion of this 

than you, and I thank you for taking that leadership role. 

I want to ask you a couple of questions. You talk about $11 billion over the, I guess, the 5-year window from resetting missions, 

priorities, functions for defense agencies and OSD [Office of the 

Secretary of Defense]. What does that mean more specifically? 
26 

Secretary GATES. Let me answer quickly and then ask Mr. Hale 

to elaborate. 

What we have asked every defense agency and every part of the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense to do is to what we call rebaseline their activities; just start with a clean sheet of paper, what are 

you doing, what should you be doing, and how many people does 

it take to do that. And so this is one of the areas in which we are 

able to shed staff contractors, in which we are able to reduce the 

number of people that are working in these areas. We are consolidating some activities. We are eliminating other activities. And so 

it really has to do on the civilian side of the Department how do 

we make the defense agencies and OSD itself more efficient and 

find savings. So that is the basic umbrella. 

Mr. ANDREWS. If I may, this goes to your premise of your earlier 

arguments, which I understand as being finding ways to make 

more efficient what we do in our logistical operations so that we 

can become more effective in our actual defense activities. Is that 

a fair summary of what you are trying to do? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. And the defense agencies have a lot 

of people and a lot of money, and they have grown a lot over the 

last decade. And frankly, we thought that it was time to take a 

fresh look at all of this, and I think it has been a long time since 

anybody has really gone into this in the way we have. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Because I am one who would be eager to try to 

work with you to find more savings in these and other areas. And, 

in fact, I think you will find that there are members of both parties 

willing to do that. 

Secretary GATES. I think there are two areas where we have not 

realized the opportunities that we have. After all, we came up with 

$178 billion worth of structural changes, overhead changes, economic changes in the space of about 6 or 8 months. There are two 

areas, for example, where I think we have the opportunity to save 

a great deal more money. One is in acquisitions, which we have 

just been talking about, but in negotiating smarter, better contracts. And we have seen this already on the SSBN–X, on the LCS, 

on several different programs, on space satellites. 

The other, though, is in information technology. And we have got 

to start on that in this effort, but it is just complex enough that 

we haven’t gotten as far as we would like. 

But I think those are just two areas where we could do a lot 

more. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Many of us, Mr. Secretary, are eager to be your 

partner in that effort. 

I want to thank Secretary Hale in particular for being very accessible and very precise whenever we need to speak to him. 

Let me say one thing that I would leave you with that I would 

take some personal responsibility for and hope that some of our colleagues would. You have a billion dollars for eliminating unnecessary studies and internal reports. A lot of them emanate from us. 

And there is a tendency when we want to try to change the law 

to settle for, well, we will just put a provision in and ask the Pentagon to do a report. As someone who has violated that rule myself, 

I would be willing to try to not do that in the future and try to 

urge our colleagues to do the same thing. 
27 

Secretary GATES. We will give you some ammunition. From now 

on all reports, whether they are internally commissioned or externally commissioned, will on the front page have what it costs to 

prepare the report. 

Mr. ANDREWS. You should also put the name of the person who 

asked for it. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. And I want 

to just say how much we respect your office. And I hope that you 

won’t conclude that it is disrespectful if we try to get your answers 

concise enough to fit into the 5 minutes we have, but it is just oftentimes so difficult for many of us, at least on this side, to get information from the Department of Defense. 

One of the things that we saw on January the 26th when your 

Deputy Secretary Mr. Lynn was here, he testified that the Department had failed to comply with the law requiring audited financial 

statements be filed annually in the years 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 

all years, of course, that you were Secretary of Defense. And my 

first question is, for any of those years, 2007, 2008, 2009 or 2010, 

were you unaware that the law required that DOD [Department of 

Defense] file audited financial statements? 

Secretary GATES. I certainly did not—was not aware that we 

were in violation of the law. 

Mr. FORBES. So you did not know that you were in violation of 

the law. 

The second question. Mr. Lynn further testified that no such 

statements would be filed this year, but he said that it was a priority of the Department of Defense that you get in compliance, and 

that you had a plan to do it. Has that always been a priority of 

yours since you have been Secretary of Defense? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, it has. And, in fact, I think if you go back 

to testimony 4 years ago, the person who had the job before Mr. 

Hale had begun the planning and execution of getting us to a position where we could comply with the CFO [Chief Financial Officer] 

law—— 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, if I could—I don’t know if we have 

the opportunity to put it up on the screen, but hopefully we will, 

and on the monitors; but if not, there is a chart right over here— 

and there it is. It might be hard to see, but you can see this screen 

over here, and I am wondering if you recognize that Web site at 

all. And the reason I say—just to refresh your memory, there is a 

copy of it here. I know it is hard to see. But this is your Web site, 

and this is live. This is not something on the screen that we made 

a copy of. This is what you would have seen at that testimony you 

are talking about in 2007, or if we had done it in 2008, 2009, 2010, 

or if anybody were to go to it today. And it says, this Web site is 

designed to provide all the information you need to understand the 

budget and financial management policy of the Department of Defense. 

Mr. Secretary, what it clearly states on there, if we had had that 

testimony then, is that the Department of Defense would have been 
28 

in 100 percent compliance and given 100 percent audited financial 

statements by the year 2010. But in point of fact, according to what 

Mr. Lynn testified, the Department was off 100 percent. Is that not 

accurate in that we have filed no audited financial statements? 

Secretary GATES. We certainly have not filed clean audits. That 

is for sure. 

Mr. FORBES. And, Mr. Secretary, the question I would have for 

you is would you authorize—you have been given by the taxpayers 

of this country $2.5 trillion essentially since you have been Secretary of Defense. Would you authorize the expenditures of these 

sums if you were not convinced there were adequate accounting 

systems in place to note where they were being spent? 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Forbes, I am confident that we have the financial processes, all of which were, by the way, designed for budgetary planning and which the Congress has relied on for a long 

time, that give me confidence that we know where the money is 

going. Can we do the kind of audits that are required by the CFO? 

No. But we are spending between 200- and $300 million a year to 

get in compliance. We have a short-term and a long-term plan to 

get there, which I would be happy to share with the committee. 

So we understand our obligation to get to this, but the reality is 

we do have systems in place to deal with fraud, to deal with other 

issues, and that provide us with the tools to do financial management. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, I don’t want to cut you off, but I only 

have about 40 seconds left. And the reality is this: You were 100 

percent off. And I want to be kind, and I want to be respectful, but 

the reality is that taxpayers have entrusted your Department with 

$2.5 trillion. And here is the way we basically repay them with the 

accounting. You call it disciplined decisionmaking, but we have 

issued gag orders to stop people from the Pentagon in talking to 

Members of Congress about where those dollars are; didn’t get a 

shipbuilding plan in the year it was required by law; didn’t get the 

aviation plan in the year it was required by law; haven’t had the 

audited financial statements required by law; and the cuts that you 

give us, Mr. Secretary, we only get backfilled information. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up, so I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen, I think we all applaud you for your extraordinary service, and I certainly want to 

add my voice as well. 

Since you said, Secretary Gates, that this is your last budget, I 

believe also, Chairman Mullen, is this your last budget as well? 

Admiral MULLEN. As far as I know. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Given that, several of my colleagues have asked 

some questions, I think, that have asked you to kind of take out 

of your notes and what is it that concerns you the most, whether 

it is in the budget or outside the budget? And I wonder if you could 

speak just a bit to any disconnect that you see between what the 

needs are and what the budget actually reflects? It is a little bit 

of the ‘‘what keeps you up at night’’ question, but I would hope that 
29 

as this is your final, if there is anything in particular that you 

would like to focus our attention on that may not have been stated. 

Admiral MULLEN. I will take a crack at it. As I look at the future, there has been a discussion today about force structure, and 

I worry in the longer run. I think we are okay right now, but I 

worry in the longer run that we align our force structure with the 

national security requirements we have as a country. And at some 

point in time, with the force structure we have, we are going to 

have to start saying there is going to be some stuff we are going 

to need to stop doing. 

I worry about resetting from these wars. And it is going to take 

us—we will get 2 years of dwell time here in the next few years, 

but we are not really reset for 2 years as opposed to instantaneously when that starts. And so I worry about properly resetting 

during a time where the challenges in the world continue to grow. 

There is no better example than just the last couple of weeks, and 

I think that will continue. You track crises back over the course of 

the time the Secretary has been here and I have been in this job, 

they continue to grow. 

I am comfortable that we have the best military we have ever 

had, our young men and women, and we just need to make sure 

that we sustain that over the long term. 

We will talk a lot about equipment in these hearings. If we get 

it right for our people and our families, we will be fine; and if we 

don’t, it will be a real struggle. 

And then in two specific areas, not that we don’t have challenges, 

as have been mentioned, but two specific areas that are of great 

concern to me. One is space, and the other is cyber. And those are 

areas that are what I would call too often niche areas. They are 

not anymore. They are domains without boundaries, without rules. 

We have international players as well as individuals, particularly 

on the cyber side; extremely dangerous in both realms, particularly 

in cyber. We have invested in that heavily. We have stood up a 

command. Those are initial steps. We have got a long way to go. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Mr. Secretary, did you want to respond to that? 

Secretary GATES. Since this is my last hearing, I will be bold and 

tell you two things that worry me, and they both have to do with 

Congress. One is the disconnect between the roles and missions 

that have been given to the military by Congress and the President, and the discussion of the defense budget now and in the future here on the Hill, where it is treated more often than not as 

a math problem. 

You have 18.9 percent of Federal outlays, which, I might add, is 

the lowest percentage of Federal outlays for defense other than the 

late 1990s, early 2000s, since before World War II, and yet because 

we have a half a trillion dollars, then we must be part of the problem in terms of the Nation’s debt and the deficit. I would tell you 

that on a $1.6 trillion deficit, if you cut the Defense Department 

by 10 percent, which operationally would be catastrophic, that is 

$50 billion. You haven’t gotten very far toward dealing with the 

deficit. 

The second thing that I worry about is that what we have found 

in the executive branch is that the elements of the different parts 

of the executive branch are increasingly integrated in the way they 
30 

deal with problems, the State Department and the Defense Department and AID [Agency for International Development], and yet the 

jurisdictional lines here on the Hill are such that you don’t get to 

see the overall national security picture that we see in the situation room or that the President sees that brings intelligence, and 

the State Department, and Defense and these different elements 

together and integrate those. And I think it is a challenge because 

this is becoming more and more the case in the problems that the 

Nation is dealing with in national security, and yet Congress continues to have essentially a stovepipe approach to dealing with 

these issues. And this is one of the reasons the State Department 

doesn’t get enough money. 

So as you all think about the future, those are two things that 

concern me. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will submit other questions for the 

record. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We are going to turn to Mr. Wilson, and then we are going to 

take a 5-minute short break. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Admiral, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being 

here today. In particular, Admiral and Secretary Gates, I want to 

thank you for your service as you highlight the conclusion of your 

careers in the military, serving our service members. 

I do have the same concern of our chairman. It is a bipartisan 

concern, I was listening to Congressman Reyes, and that is with 

the drawdown, with the force reduction in the Army and Marine 

Corps, I am very concerned on the effect on dwell time. I am very 

concerned about the effect on morale, morale of the service members, on their families, the consequence of them not feeling secure 

as to their military futures, of people who have been so dedicated 

to our country. 

With that in mind—and it has been stated that it is going to be 

conditions-based—Mr. Secretary, what flexibility will there be for 

the service chiefs in terms of the conditions? And it is my view that 

the conditions have even changed in the last month with the instability in the Middle East, the potential facing an asymmetric 

enemy on a broader scale that would require more boots on the 

ground. 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that your concern about an asymmetric threat is correct, and I would tell you that I think that those 

who will face this asymmetric threat to the greatest extent are, in 

fact, the Air Force and the Navy, particularly as we look at capabilities that China and others are developing, the kinds of activities 

that the Iranians are engaged in, and the North Koreans and so 

on. That is why we put a freeze on—both the Air Force and the 

Navy in 2007 were drawing down their personnel, and we stopped 

that. So there are no drawdowns planned for the Air Force and the 

Navy. 

As I have said earlier, the Marine Corps, this is their idea, and 

I think you need to talk to General Amos and get his thinking and 
31 

his logic in terms of why the Marine Corps ought to be smaller and 

lighter, assuming we come out of Afghanistan. 

And I would tell you the kinds of instability that we are seeing 

in the Middle East now, it is difficult for me to imagine circumstances in which we would send U.S. ground forces in any of 

those situations. Those are problems that are emanating from within those countries, and it is primarily a diplomatic challenge for us, 

although I would say if you ever wanted proof of the value—as the 

chairman said in his opening statement, of the value of our military assistance to Egypt over the past 30 years, it has been in the 

behavior of the Egyptian Army over the past 3 weeks and their 

professionalism in dealing with the kinds of situations they have. 

But, look, 2015 is a long way away, and I think that the Department—and we are talking about $6 billion. So I think that the 

service chiefs have a lot of flexibility in terms of—if they determine 

in 2013, 2014, thereabouts that drawing down from 547,000 or 

from 187,000 in the case of the Marine Corps is—or 202,000, rather, then they can obviously make that pitch. 

I would tell you, though, a lot is going to depend on who is the 

Secretary of Defense and who is the President, because there had 

been opposition within the Department of Defense to increasing 

end strength when I arrived, and that is why it hasn’t happened. 

The previous chairman of this committee had been a strong advocate of increasing end strength, and many of you had been as well, 

but it didn’t happen until you had a different Secretary of Defense. 

So that will matter, too, as well as the service chiefs. 

Mr. WILSON. And I do want to commend the surge, I think successful, in Afghanistan. I am very grateful that so many of the 

Army personnel were trained at Fort Jackson, and I represent Parris Island Marines, making such a difference. 

Also in regard, Secretary, to the National Guard, what is the status of our equipping of the National Guard for their domestic and 

foreign capabilities? 

Secretary GATES. This is a real success story. This is something 

that I am pretty proud of. When I came to this job, the equipment 

on hand across the Nation on average for the National Guard was 

about 40 percent. It is now in the mid-70s. The historical equipment on hand for the Guard is about 70 percent. So we are well 

above that. But more importantly than that is that they are getting 

first-line equipment. They are not getting hand-me-downs from the 

Active Force. They are getting the same high-quality, high-tech 

equipment that the Active Force is. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will take a 5-minute recess and 

reconvene at 10 minutes to 12:00. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Gates, the first question is for you. Do you have a date for 

the tanker decision? Sorry. Secretary Gates. Do you have a date for 

the tanker decision? 

Secretary GATES. Sorry? 

Mr. LARSEN. Do you have a date for the tanker decision? 
32 

Secretary GATES. No. But I would say within the next 2 to 3 

weeks, something like that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thanks. 

Admiral Mullen, your written testimony discussed the pooled resources idea. Your oral testimony actually gave a title, and that is 

about as much right now as we have. You both have testified even 

today about the need to combine State and Defense activities. Can 

you talk a little bit more about how you envision this collaborative 

full resource idea and when we can expect to see actual language? 

Admiral MULLEN. From my perspective, I think what has worked 

with State—between State and DOD is what I would call this dualkey capability that assigns responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State to both agree that we are going to spend 

the money a certain way. And I think that is reflective of the requirements which continue to emerge. I mean, it gets focused on 

Iraq and, to some degree, in Afghanistan, but it is really the preventive aspect of this, the investment ahead of time so we are not 

in conflict. In great part, to the Special Forces, for us, for example, 

is one area. But we can’t do it all, and that is really what this 

speaks to. 

I think in terms of the, you know, level of detail and proposal, 

I mean, I think we can get that to you, you know, relatively quickly. The language is there right now, as I said. It is $50 million initially with the language we would like, language which would 

allow us to reprogram an additional 450-, you know, out of our 

money as needs emerge. Often times this is a speed issue, I mean, 

as opposed to we need to do it now as these emerge, as opposed 

to take months or maybe even a year. 

Mr. LARSEN. Do you envision that you need additional authorities, or do you just need reprogramming authority? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think we need both. We will need authorities 

for the $50 million and then reprogramming money on top of that. 

Authorities. Sorry. 

Mr. LARSEN. And then authorities for a decision structure as 

well? 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. Yeah. And support for a decision structure. 

Secretary GATES. So you can influence your colleagues and the other committee, the $50 million is the State Department contribution. The larger number is ours. 

Mr. LARSEN. That was the next question. I think it is important 

that both agencies have skin in the game, if you will, to make this 

work, and I think probably for it to work around here, it is going 

to have to look that way as well. 

So I will look forward to some actual language and help from you 

all on that. 

The continuing resolution on the floor today and the next day includes a hit to the Department of Energy’s [DOE] budget on nonproliferation of about $600 million, if I am not mistaken, below the 

2011 request. This is for nuclear nonproliferation. And this is the 

loose nuclear materials piece, in addition to some other things, 

which is something that is in our jurisdiction as well. 

Can you talk about or have you looked at what the impact of that 

hit will be on our ability? 
33 

Admiral MULLEN. No, I have not. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Can you—well, we only have a couple of days. 

I won’t ask you to get back to me in the next 2 days on that one 

because we are voting, presumably tomorrow, on that one. Yeah. 

Can you speak, though, to the 2012 request for the Department 

of Energy’s nuclear non—the nonproliferation budget request as it 

applies to our jurisdiction? 

Secretary GATES. To be honest, Mr. Larsen, the only part of the 

energy budget that I have any familiarity with is for the NNSA 

[National Nuclear Security Administration] stuff on the nuclear 

weapons. I am just not familiar. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, pieces of that is in NNSA. Okay. That is fine. 

Can you then finally discuss the budget request perhaps, Secretary Gates, here in the last couple of seconds, about the budget 

request for the phased adaptive approach [PAA] for missile defense, supporting not only phase 1, which started implementation 

this year, but what the budget request looks like for PAA on 

phases 2 through 4, what kind of dollars are in there to continue 

moving this along? 

Secretary GATES. I can’t parse the specific elements of it. I do 

know that the overall budget for missile defense is going from 

$10.2- to $10.7 billion. So we are putting another half a billion dollars into it. And there is money for more Aegis ships, more of the 

transportable radars like we have in Egypt, like we have in Israel 

and Japan right now. And then there are also continuing investments in the Ground-Based Interceptor [GBI] system. So there is 

money—as well as some of the high-level technologies like high-energy lasers and precision tracking from space. So there is a significant increase in missile defense, including being able to go forward 

with the phased adaptive array defense in Europe. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you. Thank you for your letter yesterday in 

which you announced your support for a Federal uniform standard 

of custody protection for our men and women in uniform. I get to 

thank you on behalf of myself; this committee; the staff of this committee; and Eva Slusher from Kentucky, who had lost her daughter 

in a custody battle as a result of a family law court judge using 

her time of service against her in a custody battle that she ultimately won and got her daughter back. 

I know that you know that unfortunately throughout our country, there are family law courts where the judge will use the time 

away that someone has been deployed, or even the threat of deployment, as a sole factor for determining custody, resulting in our men 

and women who should be being honored for their service actually 

being disadvantaged for their service. 

I know that you know that this House has passed this in legislation form five times, four as part of the National Defense Authorization Act and once as part of a stand-alone bill. Your letter indicates that you will be assigning your staff with the responsibility 

to negotiate language that can ultimately be enacted in legislation 

to provide that protection. 

This is a battle that has been going on for 5 years now in legislation, and I know that you know this doesn’t just affect our service 
34 

members who are currently in custody battles—and we are not asking for them to be advantaged; we just don’t want them to be disadvantaged—but it also affects our service members who have the 

stress of the concern that they may be subject to a custody battle 

and don’t have a national standard of which they can have confidence. 

Many of these custody battles involve three States; the State in 

which the original custody order was issued, the State where the 

service member is currently assigned, and the State in which the 

child currently lives. So the national standard is going to be so important to provide them that confidence. 

So my first question to you—and I have two other topics I want 

to get to—is I believe that this should not wait for the National Defense Authorization Act this year. This House has passed it as a 

stand-alone bill. It has passed it on suspension on the House floor. 

We passed it four other times as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. If we roll up our sleeves, we can get this done and 

pass this very quickly through the House. I would like to have your 

support for us to get to work on this right away. 

Secretary GATES. We certainly will do that. Whether you can get 

it through the House or not in a hurry, I guess, is up to you all. 

Mr. TURNER. That would be excellent. 

The second thing I want to talk to you about is the issue of sexual assault. In my district we had a woman, Maria Lauterbach, 

who was tragically murdered after making allegations of sexual assault. I have worked with Jane Harman and Representative Tsongas on provisions that we have gotten enacted over the past several 

years that addressed the issue of sexual assault. 

A New York Times article, in reporting the lawsuit that has been 

filed, identifies that the legislative accomplishments so far are 

modest. We actually had in this last National Defense Authorization Act provisions that went to the issue of sexual assault, one of 

which would have provided a mechanism for expedited consideration and priority for base transfers for those who have been subject to sexual assault, another providing privileged communication 

between a victim and an assigned victim advocate. 

All of those did not make it into the final bill. I just want to 

bring them to your attention and hope that we would have DOD’s 

support as we move to try to place those provisions in the National 

Defense Authorization Act this year. 

And then my third topic is NNSA. I am chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. One of the things that I have been concerned about with this continuing resolution process and then the 

upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget is that NNSA, being part of 

DOE, has not been recognized as really being part of the defense 

infrastructure. So when people talk about cutting everything that 

is non-security-related, so many times they are missed and actually 

subject to a cut. 

As we look to the importance of NNSA and the additional funding that they need to respond to supporting our nuclear infrastructure, I would appreciate your comments on certainly both their importance, the importance of this funding, and also the characterization that should be made that NNSA is certainly part of our na-
35 

tional security infrastructure and certainly does very important defense work. 

Secretary GATES. Well, I simply can endorse the last two statements. I mean, it is incredibly important, and it clearly is intimately tied to our national security and should be regarded as part 

of the security component. 

Secretary HALE. I would just add one point from a budgetary 

standpoint. From 2013 to 2016, we actually have some money in 

the defense budget, which on an annual basis will be transferred. 

And in NNSA the desire was to emphasize the partnership between 

our two organizations. As the Secretary said, they are very important to meeting our nuclear needs. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. Thank you both. 

Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen. Thank you for appearing today and 

providing us with your testimony as well as your service. 

First, I just have one simple question. I guess it would be an upand-down answer. I want to thank you for your support of H.R. 44, 

the Guam war claims bill that was introduced last Congress. This 

proposed legislation is very important to the Chamorros on Guam, 

who survived the brutal enemy occupation during World War II. 

Although we were unsuccessful last Congress in the Senate, I have 

reintroduced the compromise version of H.R. 44, which eliminates 

the payment of claims to descendants of those that suffered personal injury during the occupation. 

Now, can we expect the same level of support from the Department of Defense as we did in the 111th Congress? The people of 

Guam, Mr. Secretary, are being asked to provide additional land 

for firing ranges and the main base area for the current buildup. 

And resolution of Guam war claims is going to be critical to overcoming historical injustices. 

Secretary GATES. Well, as Deputy Secretary Lynn testified, we 

continue to support the Department of Justice position on this. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So I guess the answer would be yes. 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. My second question. I am encouraged to see the 

administration continuing to support the so-called Guam International Agreement with military construction funding for the realignment of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. I am also encouraged by the funding of civilian infrastructure needs in Guam. 

My question is for Secretary Gates. Given the strategic importance of Guam and our Nation’s ongoing efforts to reshape our military presence in the Pacific theater, can you tell me what the status is of the Department of Defense’s roadmap for realigning U.S. 

forces in Japan? Specifically, how is the reconfiguration of Camp 

Schwab facilities and the adjacent water surface areas to accommodate the Futenma replacement facility project proceeding? And 

when can we expect to see tangible progress on Okinawa for a 

Futenma replacement facility? 

Secretary GATES. My hope is—well, I discussed this when I was 

in Japan just a few weeks ago. I feel like the Japanese Government 
36 

is making a serious effort to resolve the Futenma issue. My hope 

is that we will get resolution, particularly on the configuration of 

the airfield or the runways, perhaps later this spring, and that 

would then allow us to go forward with our planning. 

Until we get the Futenma replacement facility issue settled, we 

really are not in a position to go forward. Without resolution of 

that issue, troops don’t leave Okinawa; lands don’t get returned to 

the Japanese, to the Okinawans. So these are points that I made 

both publicly and privately when I was in Tokyo. 

And so my hope is that we will get resolution of this to a sufficient point by sometime later this spring, and we then can go forward and work with this committee in terms of that planning. And 

just to clarify a statement that I made to Mr. Thornberry, I expect 

to be around for some months to be able to work with you on that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, good. That is good. All right. 

My third question is for either Secretary Gates or Chairman 

Mullen. I was pleased to see about $200 million in research and development for a next-generation bomber, and I think this is a key 

platform in maintaining a robust long-range strike capability. 

Can you explain the rationale behind your decision to build a 

long-range manned bomber with the ability to penetrate defended 

air space? And why is stand-off insufficient to meet future combatant command requirements? What are the inherent limitations 

within our existing legacy bomber fleet? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually you almost, ma’am, said it in your 

question. We actually went through a very, very vigorous debate, 

review and analysis to get to the conclusion that this should be— 

that we should invest in a new penetrating stealth bomber, and we 

think that capability is vital for the future. We certainly—there is 

great focus, obviously, on this with respect to the Pacific. 

But in a lot of these capabilities that we have developed over the 

years, oftentimes even the area of focus that we might use it in 

changes. So we think it is actually broader than that. 

And it was reviewed for both its ability to be developed from 

evolving technology, so it goes to—I think there is a very smart acquisition strategy associated with this. This isn’t going to be exquisite in every way. It is bounded in cost and, we think, terrific 

capabilities that, when combined in the platform, will actually result in a revolutionary capability, not just overall in terms of our 

requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a 

couple of other questions, but I will enter them into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen 

for your service, for being here, et cetera, et cetera, adding on. 

At the risk of a 15-yard penalty for piling on, I am going to go 

back to the audit issue that Mr. Forbes brought up. It is not going 

to happen. I mean, neither one of you gentlemen—well, actually 

none of the three of you will be in place when this gets done. That 

is inherent with the system that we have in place where no one 

is there, and that helps explain somewhat why we are not there 

is because unless it is a key component of what you want to get 

done, it is not going to get done. 
37 

I wish we had the same kind of commitment to auditing this Department of Defense’s financial statements and/or—or just the 

statement of receipts and disbursements that we have to greening 

the military. I don’t think greening the military is a core competency of the fight. But yet we all heard testimony this morning 

about all the wonderful things that were done with respect to that, 

and you can’t tell us what the differential in cost is between doing 

it that way versus what the standard way of doing it, what did it 

cost us? Do we get a cost benefit for, as Mr. Reyes said, taking Fort 

Bliss off the grid? We don’t know what that costs and those differentials. 

The story in the Washington Post that Ms. Sanchez mentioned 

where folks who have defrauded the government have been awarded additional contracts for some $285 billion, that is an internal 

control issue. Internal controls are an integral part of a good financial system that allows you to know where your money is going and 

know where your money is not going. So every time we have these 

kinds of stories, it adds to the confusion in the area. 

I go home to folks in west Texas, and when they find out the Department of Defense can’t be audited, they are stunned. It has been 

on the books a long, long time. And, you know, Mr. Gates, your revelation that you’ve got thousands of auditors and 10,000 lawyers 

was kind of eye-opening for those of us on this side of the deal. 

I want to brag on the Marine Corps. They got very close this 

year—let me step back. Secretary Hale and I and his team and others, I have had extensive conversations with them, briefings. I have 

been over to the Pentagon and talked to them. They get it. They 

are working really hard, but as Petraeus said last year, hard is not 

impossible. And as Keith Alexander says, nothing is impossible for 

those who don’t have to do it, and I am one of those who don’t have 

to do it, but you do. So I want to brag on the guys that are working. The Marine Corps is getting close. 

But the question is, how do you leave a legacy—which everybody 

wants to leave good legacies—how do you leave a legacy in place 

that keeps this process moving, that you hand off, you get it so systemically ingrained into the team that this is important? We need 

to know where the money is going. We need to be able to have the, 

quote/unquote, ‘‘Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval’’ so that the 

general public gains additional confidence in the one entity of government that the general public generally has great confidence in, 

and that is in the Department of Defense. So how do you leave that 

legacy in place to make sure of this, we don’t lose ground because 

you are not going to be responsible when 2017 rolls around and it 

is not done? 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, I think that Mr. Hale and I 

have talked about this. He has asked for my support in terms of 

communicating to the rest of the Department that this is a high 

priority, and I have provided that support. 

But to answer your question of how I know that this will continue after I am gone, that is because Mr. Hale will not be gone, 

and he will continue in this, and he is committed to this, and I 

think he has the plan in place, as I have mentioned earlier, both 

short term and longer term, in terms of getting us to a point where 

we are in compliance by 2017. 
38 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, we are going to keep tracking it. I hope to 

be able to get the matrix in place so that you can measure progress 

against that timeline, and we can see it as well. But it also begs 

the question you have got $100 billion of reprogramming money; in 

effect, dollars you say your team has come together and said we 

don’t need to do $100 billion worth of this, we would rather do $100 

billion worth of that over that timeframe. How are you going to 

track that? How are you going to make sure that that $100 billion 

of reprogramming doesn’t morph into the $78 billion—the commitment to save the $78 billion over these next timeframes? Because 

I can see very easily where you would wind up with—you fulfill the 

78- number by siphoning off numbers, monies that would have otherwise been reprogrammed within the Department of Defense. 

Secretary HALE. Mr. Conaway, I would like to offer a defense of 

the defense financial management system that may be unpopular. 

First, I am fully committed to audits. I understand we need them 

for public confidence. But the fact that we can’t pass commercial 

audit standards does not mean we have no idea where we are 

spending the money that you send us. 

We have got 55,000 people in the defense community, the financial community. They are well trained, and that is one of their 

prime jobs, as is the job of many others. We have several thousand 

auditors watching us. And I note if we had no idea what we were 

doing with the money, we would have rampant Antideficiency Act 

[ADA] violations. 

Over the last 5 years, about two-tenths of our budget has been 

associated with ADAs. That is more than I would like, but it is 

pretty small, and it is smaller, I might add, than the percentages 

of the nondefense agencies, all of whom have clean audit opinions. 

So I think we do know what we are doing with the money you 

give us, and we can account for it. We can’t pass commercial audit 

standards, and we need to do that to reassure the public we are 

good stewards of their money, and I am committed to doing it, and 

I am working hard. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

the witnesses for their testimony today. 

I was at the first hearing after you were appointed Secretary. I 

was a brand-new Member of Congress, remember well the fact you 

walked in and announced we were going to increase end strength, 

which has been referred to here this morning. 

I also just would note that that was also the hearing where you 

announced that we were going to make a commitment to MRAP 

[Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle] deployment in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, which only a handful, relatively speaking, were in 

theater. 

I just want to share with you that last Easter there was a Connecticut National Guard unit that was riding in an MRAP in 

Laghman Province, that unfortunately a 200-pound IED was detonated. It lifted the MRAP many feet in the air, came crashing 

down. Everyone survived. There were some pretty bad injuries, but 

everyone is alive. There was no question that if a flat-bottom 
39 

Humvee had been part of that type of event, it wouldn’t have been 

the case. 

I am friends with one of the mothers of one of those soldiers who, 

you know, is a lawyer in practice in the New Haven area, and, you 

know, she said to me she didn’t know what an MRAP was to M&M. 

But she said whoever was responsible for making sure that those 

types of units were in the theater, just thank them for her. And 

I am doing that publicly, and to you, too, Admiral Mullen, because 

you were a part of that extraordinary effort to finally get those 

things over there to protect our troops. So thank you. 

I want to just touch on two quick things that people talk a little 

bit about in Connecticut. The alternate engine, that was part of the 

debate last night. And one of the comments that was made by Admiral Roughead last year when this issue came up was that aside 

from, you know, the claims that the up-front production costs of a 

second engine would pay off over time, I mean, he pointed out the 

fact that on aircraft carriers, there is just no space capacity to deal 

with repairing and maintaining two separate engine systems. 

Obviously we have an admiral here who knows these ships quite 

well. And I just wonder if you could sort of comment on the, I 

think, overstated claims of savings when you think about the operational headaches that a second engine would create. 

Admiral MULLEN. One of the things we do in this town is we 

focus on getting stuff out the door, as opposed to what it costs for 

a life cycle. And it certainly applies on aircraft carriers, but it applies actually in all three services. This is two separate lines, two 

separate training, two separate maintenance manuals, two separate supply sources, all those kinds of things, and they lag each 

other significantly. 

I mean, I have been doing money a long time. I cannot make 

sense out of this second engine. It is 2 to 3 years behind. It is not 

going to compete, quite frankly. 

We cannot afford to buy the second engine, I mean, from my perspective, and there have been multiple airplanes that are singleengine airplanes that are single-sourced. So I don’t accept that 95 

percent of the fleet is going to go down at once. It just doesn’t happen. We are better than that. 

You know, the first engine will be, I think, more than adequate 

to meet the needs that we have for that airplane. And if I thought 

any different, I would, you know, be encouraging this engine, the 

second engine. 

I just categorically can’t see that it is going to make any difference. It is going to cost us a lot of money not just to get it out 

of the door, but over the life of its—over the life cycle. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And for the proponents who keep bringing up the 

F–16, I mean, the fact is we are in a different world than 25 years 

ago as far as testing these engines, right? I mean, the risk level 

is just not what it was. 

Admiral MULLEN. Absolutely. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I just wanted to at least get your statement on 

the record on that. 

Secretary GATES. It is worth noting that not only the F–16 have 

a single source, but also the F–22—or the F–18, rather, have a single source, but also the F–22. And the F–135 engine is a derivative 
40 

of the F–22 engine. So the likelihood of any kind of a serious design 

failure is very small. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Real quick. I have only got a minute left, but I just want to at 

least note for the record again, a year ago we were talking about 

a $7 billion SSBN submarine. Obviously, we were at milestone A. 

We have now brought that figure down to $4.9 billion. Congratulations. 

It is still, as you point out, going to be a long-term challenge for 

the shipbuilding budget. Admiral Roughead makes the argument 

that it should be treated as a national strategic asset, which—I see 

you smiling because I think you smiled last time I asked you about 

this. 

But the fact is, you know, there is precedent with missile defense 

for treating it outside of a normal defense budget. And I just—that 

is a solution, isn’t it, if we could figure out a way to make it happen? 

Admiral MULLEN. It is a third of the shipbuilding budget. I 

mean, if the shipbuilding budget has to absorb that, that is this 

year, it would break the shipbuilding budget. 

And to the Secretary’s point earlier about building other capabilities, that solution that you describe has been talked about for 

years. But what it boils down to is obviously resourcing this, 

resourcing a shipbuilding plan which is going to get us to 313 and 

beyond, and with the SSBN arrival, that is not going to happen. 

So how you resource it is the question. One way to do it is literally at the national level as opposed to inside the service budget, 

but it is a huge challenge just because of the money that we are 

going to have to devote to it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, Chairman Mullen, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you for your service. 

I want to begin with Chairman Mullen and follow up on my colleague’s question concerning shipbuilding. As you know, if you go 

back to 2006, the shipbuilding plan there said 313 ships, and we 

have heard that number year after year after year. We find ourselves today with 286 ships. We find ourselves with an aging class 

of Perry frigates that are going to be phasing out. We find ourselves with six Los Angeles class submarines that are 30 years or 

older. We find ourselves in an environment with a very, very high 

ops tempo putting ships to sea, pushing maintenance schedules, 

pushing life cycle capability management elements. 

My question is this: Is it anywhere in the spectrum of reality 

that we will have a 313-ship Navy, and, if so, how are we going 

to integrate these older ships that are coming to the end of their 

service lives and making sure that we are building at a pace where 

we are building more ships than what we are retiring? And as you 

know now, we are at a pace where we are retiring more ships than 

what we are bringing into the fleet. And I just wanted to get your 

perspective on that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, actually this budget, which is, I think, 10 ships and $15 billion is not insignificant compared to where we 

were a few years ago. 
41 

Secondly, I have been someone that I believe we have to get 

ships to their service life. That is an easy thing to say. It is hard 

to do, because you have to make that investment over the course 

of a ship’s service life, and oftentimes the Navy hasn’t done that 

specifically. 

What gets lost in this discussion about the number of ships that 

we have, and I actually, as a CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], did 

the analysis that created the minimum level for the Navy of 313 

ships, but it was my belief back then we were on a glide slope to 

get to 220 or 230 or 240 because it was just out of control going 

down because of the cost and lots of other things, the number of 

ships that we were going to have to decommission. So it is not at 

313, but it actually has grown, and I think we have to just keep 

heading in that direction. That is key; a number of ways to do that. 

So, and as the Secretary has spoken—and he and I have talked 

about this many times—you know, as these wars wind down, we 

are going to, I think, have to depend more and more on our Air 

Force and our Navy in the world that we are living in. And so how 

do we make those investments? Because what gets lost in the discussion here is their op tempo has been pretty high. And we talk 

about the op tempo for the Army and the Marine Corps and the 

Special Forces. That is at the top, I understand that. That is the 

toughest op tempo. But if you look at the op tempo of the Air Force 

and the Navy since 9/11, it is up as well. They weren’t sitting back 

at that point in time. So we are wearing them out, and we have 

to focus on those modernization programs. They provide an enormous strategic capability for us, given the world that we are living 

in, and we have to invest in it as well. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Are you in the position to make the commitment 

to make sure that on life cycle management that you are doing everything, including the inspection programs to make sure they are 

robust and the financial commitment to make sure these ships get 

to the yard on time? Because as you know, any little glitch in the 

schedule there really affects a sub-zero. 

Is the commitment there to make sure that we are going to get 

to the end of the service life of these ships to make sure that we 

are getting that, or have some chance of getting to the 313? 

Secretary GATES. Before the chairman answers that question, 

may I say that if we end up with a yearlong continuing resolution, 

those ships are not going to make it into maintenance. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Admiral MULLEN. I also, actually, just to the CR, I was struck 

that you lost a DDG [guided missile destroyer] and a submarine. 

We worked for years to get to two submarines a year, and literally 

within a few months it falls out. You are not going to get that back 

certainly in this budget. This is a really a discussion better had by 

Admiral Roughead specifically. 

I know the Navy has invested more in terms of its maintenance 

in order to sustain or get to extended life. That said, he has also 

made a decision to decommission some ships before that so that he 

can invest in some of the ships that he thinks he needs for the future. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary, I want to follow up quickly with you. 

We talk about the QDR being the issue in the National Military 
42 

Strategy. In their current projections, do they keep in mind where 

end strength may be with your projections about reducing end 

strength for both the Marine Corps and the Army in how the QDR 

estimates that in National Military Strategy? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, they do. 

Mr. WITTMAN. They do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, we have a very strong agreement on the CR. We 

have a very strong disagreement on the second engine. In my district, it doesn’t matter, so I don’t have a parochial interest in this, 

but I do have a strong opinion. 

But I would like to ask you, you both said this is your last hearing. I could probably say with great certainty that none of us, none 

of the three of us, will be here in 10 years. How long are we going 

to be buying the engine for the F–35? 

Admiral MULLEN. Oh, I would say over the course of 2 to 3 decades. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So 20, 30 years. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ten years from now if we have decided on the 

one engine, if, for whatever reason, the company comes to us and 

says, I have to raise my costs substantially, what do you do? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually I look at it—I mean, you are getting 

at the competition piece, and I understand. 

The CHAIRMAN. I am. 

Admiral MULLEN. But as I look—and let me shift quickly—F– 

18Es, you get rate and you get savings by production levels. That 

is how you create it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have a fixed cost on this, or will they, 

being a sole-source engine, be able to raise their prices 10 years 

out? 

Admiral MULLEN. I actually think that with the kind of production line we are talking about, they will come down. 

The CHAIRMAN. We hope. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for 

your testimony and your very thorough responses to our many diverse questions. 

I would like to come back again to the issue of sexual assault in 

the military. It is obviously one that is much in the news today, 

but really has been a long-standing issue, and I think, as Representative Turner mentioned, something that this committee has 

worked hard to deal with and find a way forward. But despite that, 

despite—and we have heard testimony from the various services as 

to all their efforts, but despite that, in 2010, there were 3,230 reported sexual assaults in the military. But by the Pentagon’s own 

estimate, as few as 10 percent of sexual assaults were reported. 

And the VA [Department of Veterans Affairs] estimates that one in 

three women veterans report experiencing some form of military 

sexual trauma. 

I can remember several years ago meeting with some people active in the VA in the State of Massachusetts and having a gen-
43 

tleman comment and say that that was one of their dominant 

issues that they had to deal with. 

The fiscal year 2011 Defense Authorization Act required that the 

Department look into the feasibility of providing a military lawyer 

to all victims of sexual assault. While this is a good first step, I was 

disappointed that provisions which guarantee all victims the right 

to legal counsel and protect the confidentiality of conversations between victims and victim advocates were not included in the final 

version of the 2011 NDAA, though they were in the House version. 

We would be shocked if conversations between their client or advocate were not privileged in the civilian world, and similar rights 

must be afforded to service members who may be the victim of a 

crime. Why would the Department resist such a commonsense 

measure? And I ask this of Secretary Gates. 

Secretary GATES. I hadn’t realized the Department had resisted 

it, and I must say, along with Mr. Turner’s comments, these things 

sound to me like reasonable actions. And so I will take out of this 

hearing the charge to look into whether—why—if we opposed it, 

why we opposed it, and why we should not go forward on our own, 

even without legislation. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And I would appreciate, once you do that, of getting back to me in some form so that I and others who felt this was 

very important. 

I mean, one of the things we have found is that despite all the 

good efforts on the part of the services, that the follow-up procedures, legally, do not support—undermine all of the efforts you 

have made around sort of preventing this in the first place, providing access to medical care. But if the follow-up legal processes 

do not sufficiently protect a victim, make them feel comfortable in 

coming forward, that it undermines all the good work you have 

done. They become suspect of the entire process, feel very much at 

risk. And this was one very commonsense way, going forward in a 

legal process alone, that we felt we could better protect victims as 

they try to assert their rights. 

Secretary GATES. This is one of the reasons why we have invested, as I mentioned earlier, over the last couple of years almost 

$2 million in training our prosecutors. We found, when I started 

looking into this several years ago, that the defendants hire lawyers who are specialized in this area, and our prosecutors tended 

to be—not have that specialty. And it is complex law, and it is difficult to prosecute successfully, particularly if you don’t have the 

right training. 

And so that is one of the reasons we have undertaken that. And, 

as I say, we have expanded the Victim Advocate Program dramatically from about 300 to 3,000 around the world over the last few 

years in every base and installation. And I will press on the question of why we cannot assure confidentiality. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And the other issue we have learned, too, is as all 

the services have dealt with this, each has done it in its own way 

reflective of its culture and different processes. That becomes very 

difficult to oversee as a Member of Congress. So in the defense authorization bill we ask for a comprehensive approach across all of 

the services, and I know that the Defense Department is working 

on that, and we look forward to what you come up with. 
44 

So thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank you so much for the great job that both of you 

have done on behalf of our country. 

Let me first thank you for standing firm on the issue about the 

second engine for the F–35. I just think that we have got to make 

some tough decisions with limited resources, and that is certainly 

one of them that I think is wasteful that I certainly support you 

on. 

Also, in your position on the Combined Forces Command, Joint 

Forces Command, I think that its time has gone, and I certainly 

support you in that effort. 

But in terms of looking at the—I am concerned about still the 

top-heavy nature of the Department of Defense. And I noted that 

right now I think we have 268 ships, if that is the proper number. 

I believe it is. We have 253 admirals right now. That is almost one 

admiral per ship, and I think that the Navy is authorized to go to 

283 admirals. 

And so can you tell me, give me some more visibility as to what 

could be done to try and streamline the military? 

Secretary GATES. One of the things that we have done as part 

of the efficiencies efforts is we have eliminated—out of 900 flagrank officers in the military, we will eliminate 100 general officer 

positions over the next couple of years, and that includes admirals. 

And we also will be eliminating somewhere over 200 senior civilian 

executive positions. So I was asked earlier about the $11 billion for 

rebaselining OSD and the defense agencies and so on. That is 

where a lot of those positions are coming from. 

But we are also downgrading positions. We are not only eliminating positions, we are downgrading a number. For example, the 

component commanders in Europe will be downgraded from four 

stars to three stars, except for the Navy because there is a NATO 

connection on that side, so that will take longer. 

But we are trying to come at it both from the standpoint of is 

the level of flag-rank officer for the job right, given passage of history, and can we get rid of these positions? And we have done so 

on both civilian and the uniform side. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, thank you. 

If I could just briefly, and this is inside baseball, but I think it 

is one of the things I told the Secretary when we started to review 

this. You know, when budgets get tight, people start taking shots 

at how many admirals and generals there are. That is historic. 

What the Secretary led was a very thorough review—and actually the services did this—a very thorough review of need, what 

level for what job. And that will continue to go on. 

There is also, at least over the course of the last 15 years for me, 

all of which I have been an admiral—far beyond anything I ever 

expected, believe me—there is also just a growing complexity that 

requires some level of senior civilian and uniformed leadership in 

the world that we are living in. 
45 

So I am all for the reductions that make sense, but too often it 

is also a very easy target. And I just would like—as we have tried 

to be careful about it. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, thank you. It is an easy target, and I certainly think it is one we are willing to take. 

Let me talk about what is the Department of Defense doing in 

terms of reexamining our foreign basing commitments or our forward presence in terms of whether or not it is necessary? 

And let me refer, right now we have 28,500 U.S. personnel, I believe, on the Korean Peninsula in South Korea. It seems that when 

the North Koreans get upset, it is when we do the major joint military exercises. And when we look at our allies across the globe, 

can’t we better demonstrate our support for our commitments with 

them by doing periodic joint military exercises? For instance, four 

brigade combat teams in Europe at this point in time, is that really 

necessary? 

So I am wondering if there has been an ongoing analysis to determine the cost-effectiveness of redeploying those forces back to 

the United States. 

Secretary GATES. We have spent a lot of time on this. We have 

just completed a global posture review examining our positioning 

in Europe, our position in the Pacific and also in the Middle East. 

It is now being discussed in the interagency because obviously 

there are political implications for any changes. 

But I would tell you that we have examined this very closely, 

and we will probably make some adjustments. I think I mentioned 

in a speech that our force structure, as well as our rank structure 

in Europe, is still a legacy from the Cold War. 

But that said, I am a firm believer that our forward posture in 

Europe, in Asia, is fundamental to our alliance relationships. It 

provides them with the assurance that, in fact, we will be there, 

and we will support them, and I think dramatic changes in our 

overseas posture would be very destabilizing to a lot of these relationships. 

And I think that one of the reasons that, for example, South 

Korea and Japan have not tried to develop nuclear weapons of 

their own is because of their confidence that our presence in their 

country provides a trip wire and a guarantee that if they are attacked, the United States will support them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Pingree. 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for your testimony today and for your service. I appreciate it. And a couple of things, I also want to tell you I appreciate your stand on the second engine, and also was glad to hear 

your explanation and your thoughtful remarks about the continuing resolution. Coming from the State of Maine where people 

pay a lot of attention to the construction of DDGs, we are very interested in what is going to happen there, so I appreciate your 

bringing all of our attention to the importance of the challenges of 

a continuing resolution. 

And I also want to thank you for your remarks to Representative 

Tsongas. I, too, am very concerned about some of the issues around 

sexual harassment and am concerned that we haven’t moved far 
46 

enough. So I am glad you have taken her charge and think particularly, now that we have increased dependence on women in the 

military, we have to be very respectful of the issues that they are 

raising and the fact that it hasn’t changed sufficiently to make 

women comfortable at serving their country. 

But my question is somewhat different. You brought this up earlier, and I want to talk about TRICARE. As you know and you stated, the U.S. Family Health Care Plan designed by Congress in 

1996 provides the full TRICARE Prime benefit for military beneficiaries in 16 States and D.C. for over 115,000 beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are highly satisfied with this option. 

I come from Maine, as I said. In Maine it is administered by 

Martin’s Point Health Care, and they have a customer satisfaction 

rating of 93 percent. I have visited their facility. They stress preventive care. It is exactly the model that we want for health care 

in this country. 

As you have already mentioned, the President’s budget request 

has a huge proposed change that would preclude enrollment in 

U.S. Family Health Plan for beneficiaries who reach 65 years of 

age, and if we enact that, it would immediately force over 3,000 

military beneficiaries to disenroll from the plan they have chosen. 

First, I think this recommendation contradicts President 

Obama’s position regarding health care reform, that you should be 

able to keep the plan you have if you are happy with it. But perhaps a greater concern, you mentioned a cost savings. This proposal would have a cost saving for DOD, but it really just shifts 

the costs to the Department of Health and Human Services. So I 

don’t see how overall we are anticipating a cost savings as a whole, 

and I think it is going to be very detrimental to the beneficiaries. 

So can you address my concerns on this? 

Secretary HALE. Let me respond. First, there would be some net 

savings of government because we are paying these hospitals at 

significantly higher than Medicare rates. And part of the goal of 

this overall effort is that we treat all the hospitals similarly in 

terms of the rate paying. 

I also want to clarify, yes, we would—as people reached age 65, 

they would need to join TRICARE For Life. They could stay at the 

hospital where they were being treated. They wouldn’t be required 

to leave that; they could use that as their primary provider. But 

they would need to do what every other retiree does in the Department of Defense when they reach age 65, and that is join the 

TRICARE For Life program. 

So we are trying to treat everybody the same. Yes, there would 

be savings, modest, to the government. And you are right, there are 

some costs shifted to Medicare. But there is a net savings because 

we would now be paying Medicare rates, and we are paying much 

higher. 

I also want to work with the hospitals involved. We are not looking to reduce the quality of care. We are phasing this in very slowly. It would be everybody in the program now is grandfathered, 

grandmothered. It is only as you come into the programs, so there 

would be very gradual change, and our goal is to be sure these hospitals, that their care is not harmed. 
47 

Ms. PINGREE. So just to follow up, it is my understanding that 

Public Law 104–201, section 726(b), which I am sure you are well 

aware of, mandates that government cannot pay more for the care 

of U.S. Family Health Care Plan enrollees than it would if a beneficiary were receiving care from other government programs. 

So it seems to me that we should already be paying equivalent 

of what Medicare costs are. And, again, I would just stress, based 

on observing my own TRICARE program—and I don’t have any 

particular stake in it—but having been very involved in the health 

care debate, knowing how important preventative care is, knowing 

that there is very high customer satisfaction with that, but also it 

is a different model of care, I am just greatly concerned with shifting people out of that model if it doesn’t really result in cost savings and if it is only a cost shift. 

I mean, for us, I know you have to look at your budget, but we 

have to look at the overall costs here. And if it is just going over 

to Medicare, and it is not a significant savings, and it goes back 

to an old model of care, not a new preventative model of care, I 

don’t think we have improved care for these families. 

Secretary HALE. Well, we need to get with you. I am not familiar 

with the details of the provisions. I do know that there are some 

requirements we are not meeting in the sole community hospitals 

with regard to Medicare rates. And that may be that we are also 

proposing to move toward that, toward Medicare rates. So we need 

to get back to you on the details. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Secretary HALE. There would be some modest net savings to the 

government. We work carefully with OMB [Office of Management 

and Budget], and they fully support this proposal in terms of shifting the funds. 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you. I would be happy to follow up with you 

on that, so thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, Mr. Secretary, sorry that I missed the last hour of testimony. I had to vote in markup. 

First question is this. Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Davis, my colleague 

from San Diego, when you were answering her questions, you 

talked about the defense budget. You talked about the total layouts 

and how this is the lowest point since the 1990s, since before World 

War II, where we are at the low part where we are at now, where 

there is so little being spent on defense. 

And I would argue and ask your opinion of this: If you don’t give 

us a top line, if you don’t ask for what it would cost to erase all 

risk, literally, or as much risk as possible, then we have no baseline to cut defense from or to add to really, because the numbers 

that we are using are limbo numbers really. Because if you were 

to fully fund defense—this is my question. If you were to fully fund 

defense and take away 100 percent as best as you could, 100 percent of risk, using your own threat assessment tools and analysis, 

what would that funding be? What would you ask for? 
48 

Secretary GATES. I have only half jokingly said in meetings in 

the Department that if we had a trillion dollar budget, I would still 

have unfunded requirements. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, that is right. 

Secretary GATES. The services would still be able to come up 

with a list of things that they really need. I think that the budget that we have provided at $553 billion for 

fiscal year 2012 mitigates risk to the extent that I think is reasonably possible, and I think that we have—we are investing in new 

capabilities. The $70 billion that the services are going to be able 

to invest from their savings in new capabilities or in added numbers, I think, help mitigate that risk. 

You can never reach a point—just as there is no such thing as 

perfect security, there is no such thing as eliminating risk. 

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Secretary, if I may, I am going to run out of 

time, and I have one more totally separate question. If you got to 

that highest point that you could where you start getting diminished rate of return, what would that number be, roughly? 

Secretary GATES. I think that we are at a point with the 553- 

where we can do that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So fully funding defense in every requirement is at 553-? 

Secretary GATES. We will never fund every request—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But if you did, sir, what I am asking is what that 

number might be. 

Secretary GATES. I have no idea how much it would be. 

Mr. HUNTER. You haven’t thought about what it would cost to 

really satisfy the requirements of all the different services? 

Secretary GATES. Nobody lives in that world. 

Mr. HUNTER. No. But what you are supposed to do is tell us how 

we get to zero threat, and Congress then decides what to fund. 

Secretary GATES. And I am telling you, you are never going to 

get to zero threat. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, we could try. 

Secretary GATES. You could spend $2 trillion, and you will never 

get to zero threat. 

Mr. HUNTER. But that is what we would like to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, is that if it cost $2 trillion, and we could cut that 

by 75 percent, and here we are at the 550-. 

All right. On a totally separate note, let us talk about Iraq for 

a minute. If the status of forces agreement is not changed, and/or 

the Iraqis don’t ask for our help and ask us to stay, what is our 

plan for 2012? At the end of this year, what is going to happen? 

Secretary GATES. We will have all of our forces out of Iraq. We 

will have an Office of Security Cooperation for Iraq that will have 

probably on the order of 150 to 160 Department of Defense employees and several hundred contractors who are working FMS [Foreign Military Sales] cases. 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you think that that represents the correct approach for this country after the blood and treasure that we have 

spent in Iraq, my own personal time of two tours in Iraq? There 

is going to be fewer people there than, that 150, than there are in 

Egypt right now, somewhere around 6-, 700 of those same types of 

folks in Egypt. 
49 

How can we maintain all of these gains that we have made 

through so much effort if we only have 150 people, and we don’t 

have any military there whatsoever? We would have more military 

in Western European countries at that point than we have in Iraq, 

one of the most central states, as everybody knows, in the Middle 

East. 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that there is certainly, on our 

part, an interest in having an additional presence, and the truth 

of the matter is the Iraqis are going to have some problems that 

they are going to have to deal with if we are not there in some 

numbers. They will not be able to do the kind of job in intelligence 

fusion, they won’t be able to protect their own airspace, they will 

not—they will have problems with logistics and maintenance. 

But it is their country, it is a sovereign country. This is the 

agreement that was signed by President Bush and the Iraqi Government, and we will abide by the agreement unless the Iraqis ask 

us to have additional people there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary and 

Admiral Mullen. Thank you so very much for your forthright and 

very compelling arguments. 

First I want to compliment you on going green. The Navy is 

doing extraordinary things, as are the other forces, and it is very, 

very important for your energy programs. I hope you continue that. 

I encourage you to do so, and many of us around here will do everything we can around here to support that effort. 

My question, though, goes to the Afghanistan war and Pakistan, 

and the question is this: Does our war in Afghanistan destabilize 

Pakistan; and, if so, what should we be doing about that problem 

in Pakistan? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t believe that the war in Afghanistan is 

destabilizing to Pakistan. I think that what is destabilizing to Pakistan, among other things, is a group of terrorist—several terrorist 

organizations in the western part, northwestern part of Pakistan 

that are intent on destabilizing Pakistan and overthrowing its government. And I think our efforts, combined with the Pakistani efforts on both sides of the border, in fact, help reduce that terrorist 

risk to the Pakistanis. 

I think that extreme economic problems are a huge factor in 

Pakistan. So I don’t think our presence in Afghanistan is destabilizing. In fact, I think it helps the Pakistanis long term. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will let it go at that. I am certainly not going 

to place my knowledge in intelligence ahead of yours, but there 

seems to be considerable others who would question that conclusion. 

Admiral. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I would say this is not a very stable region. I mean, that is part of the problem we have. Al Qaeda lives 

there, leadership lives there. They are still trying to kill as many 

Americans and Western citizens as they can. 

There are multiple terrorist organizations—I call it the epicenter 

of terrorism in the world—that are now working much more closely 

together than they have historically. 
50 

So from my perspective, I try to talk about this as a region as 

opposed to one country or another. They are very much integrated 

in ways that sometimes they don’t even like, but clearly they are. 

And so I think we have to have, and we seek, you know, a strategic partnership with both these countries, really the region, to 

look at long-term stability there. That is, from my perspective, 

whether we are at war at the level we are at right now or in the 

future when we have far fewer troops in the area, can we support 

stability in a way that doesn’t endanger us in the long run, in addition to the citizens of those two countries? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you. I don’t want to engage in a debate 

with you, so I will let it go at that and thank you for that information. 

My final question has to do with missile defense, which is significantly augmented in the budget. Why? 

Secretary GATES. Part of the half-billion dollar increase is to implement the phased adaptive array missile defense that we have 

agreed to in Europe; but also, frankly, to increase our ability to defend our ships and our troops against theater-level threats, missile 

threats. 

Hezbollah alone has 40,000 rockets and missiles at this point, including anti-ship cruise missiles that have a range of 65 miles. So 

we are putting more money into Aegis-capable ships. We will have 

41 of these by the end of 2016, 28 by the end of 2012. They defend 

our ships. They defend, have the potential to defend, our ground 

troops. We are developing additional generations of the Standard 

Missile-3 that have enhanced capabilities to deal with Iranian, 

North Korean and other kinds of missiles. And we are making 

baseline—continuing to make baseline investments in the GroundBased Interceptor program, which protects the continental United 

States. 

So I think all of these are contributing to our own security, but 

also help protect our allies as well. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rigell. 

Mr. RIGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good afternoon, Secretary Gates, Secretary Hale and Admiral 

Mullen. In your chain of command, many, many levels down is my 

son. And I just want you to know on behalf of the Second District 

of Virginia, if it is, in fact, your last testimony before the House 

Armed Services Committee, that we are just really deeply, deeply 

grateful for your service. I know you have sacrificed a lot, and your 

families have, to allow you to serve in the way you have. I know 

that you are doing everything you can to accomplish the mission 

and to protect our young people. I thank you for that. 

I come from a private-sector background, and I have learned in 

life that communication is extraordinarily difficult and it is absolutely essential for an organization to succeed. And I don’t speak 

for the committee, but just for myself. It sure seems to me that 

communication between the DOD and HASC is lacking, it is poor. 

I regret that I have to rate it that way. 

It is acute in our own district, in the Second District of Virginia, 

with respect to the disestablishment of JFCOM [Joint Forces Com-
51 

mand]. Even today I have yet to receive the detailed analysis, the 

supporting documents, that would help me, representing the Second District, to properly understand and respond to the disestablishment of JFCOM, and that is disappointing to me. And I trust 

that we will move forward both on the House side and on the Pentagon side to improve, sharply, communication. 

One area that I would like to shift to here is TRICARE, and it 

is widely understood when someone enlists in the military that 

health care is for life, it is free. I have asked many people, I served 

in the Marine Corps Reserve myself, and just it is widely understood. 

And so as tempting as it is to look at that area as an area for 

cost savings, I truly believe, and I don’t use these words lightly, 

that it is a breach of trust to change the deal because maybe we 

don’t like the deal, or the government doesn’t like the deal. 

Mr. Chairman, Admiral Mullen, what initiative, if any, is being 

undertaken to ensure or make a more full disclosure to those who 

are considering a military career with respect to benefits that may 

be offered at their retirement? 

Admiral MULLEN. Honestly, when young people come in the military, they are 20-something, 17, 18, 19 years old. And certainly 

while the material is available, and recruiters may use this as 

something in terms of, you know, a health care plan, and I have 

talked about it to our young people forever, I think that the military health care plan is the gold standard in the country, quite 

frankly. 

But it is not something, at least I have found in those on Active 

Duty, they have focused heavily on, more so recently than in the 

past. But it is not something they focus on when they are that 

young. I didn’t, and many others haven’t. 

Mr. RIGELL. Admiral, with all due respect, my time is so short. 

Secretary GATES. There is a larger point, so let me respond to 

this. Congress actually settled this issue in 1995, that it wasn’t free 

for life. They imposed fees, and they imposed a fee of $460 a year. 

So the issue of whether it was free or not was settled by Congress 

in 1995. 

Once you have acknowledged that there is going to be a fee, the 

notion that the fee would never change is certainly nowhere in the 

legislation. 

Mr. RIGELL. Well, Mr. Secretary, my question was what initiative, if any, was undertaken to ensure a full disclosure of those who 

are entering the service? I believe in full disclosure; I know we all 

do. And I am submitting to you today that, in countless conversations with our veterans, that there is a disconnect between what 

is being told by the recruiter and what reality is. And I just respectfully, as one American to another, am asking that that be addressed within the commands. It is not an expensive initiative. It 

would just be to ensure better disclosure. 

You know, as we look—and I will close with this. As we look at 

the profound challenges that are facing our military that you have 

discussed today and the shortage of funds for ship repair, for shipbuilding, the reduction in end strength, troop levels, it is just stunning to me—and, I think, a misplaced priority—that we are still 

talking about sending a carrier to Mayport, which is a risk that is 
52 

minimal and could be mitigated with far less funds than it takes 

to move that carrier to Mayport. And I would ask you to reconsider 

that, respectfully. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Hanabusa. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, Admiral, for being 

here. 

I have a basic question regarding the budget. I read, I thought 

I read it correctly in the budget documents from the President, that 

the total amount of outlay was about $700 billion. And I do know 

that 553- is the base budget, and Mr. Secretary has said that. And 

the Overseas Contingency Operation budget of about 117-, plus or 

minus, I think, is not included in the base, if I am reading that correctly. But I am still short about $30 billion. So do you know where 

that $30 billion is? 

Secretary HALE. I need to get with you and see where the numbers are. There are various ways of adding up the budgets. The figures we are discussing here are 051. You could be including the 

National Nuclear Security Administration figures in there, which is 

something called function 050. 

I don’t know if we want to take a lot of time here, but I would 

be glad to get with you, and we will sort out the numbers for you. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Please do. But the 553- and the 117- is correct, 

though. We are not just really talking about 553—— 

Secretary HALE. Yes. That is the DOD portion of the budget. But 

as I say, there are various ways of adding this up. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Secretary, Congresswoman Bordallo has left, but I am also 

very curious about the position with Okinawa. And I have read 

what was given to us beginning on page 15 and continuing on to 

page 16. 

There seems to not be a firm statement about what Japan’s position is, and I think one of the things that is pointed out is that the 

$472 million for Guam was not included in, I guess, the Japanese 

budget. 

So how critical is their contribution to what happens? And I kind 

of would like to know, as best as I can, what is the bottom line? 

Are they going to move from Okinawa? Are they not going to move? 

It looks like a reduction of about 10,000 troops from Okinawa. So 

what do we plan to do? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, the Japanese actually have fulfilled 

all their commitments to date. They have given us, I think, a little 

over $700 million for infrastructure. When I was there, they told 

me they were putting together a program that will include something on the same order of further infrastructure investments. 

And as I mentioned earlier, we really can’t go forward on Guam. 

In fact, the Congress has withheld money for going forward on 

Guam until we have greater clarity on what happens on Okinawa. 

My hope is, based on my conversations in Japan, that we will 

have some resolution of this by later this spring or early this summer, and then we will be able to come to you with our plans. But 

absent—absent resolution of the Futenma replacement facility 

issue, our troops aren’t coming out of Okinawa, land is not being 
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returned to the Okinawans, and we have to sort of start all over 

again. 

But I do believe we will find some positive resolution to the 

Futenma issue. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. So when you say the Futenma issue and the 

resolution of where the troops are going to go, are you talking 

about within Okinawa itself or some variation of Okinawa and 

Guam? 

Secretary GATES. On Okinawa itself. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. On Okinawa itself? 

And finally, this whole concept of end strength, I want to know 

whether that is some kind of a magical number into the future, to 

a time specific, or is that something that we are looking at given 

the information that we have today? 

Secretary GATES. It is basically looking at the information that 

we have today. 

And, as I have said, the end strength in 2015 and 2016 will, at 

the end of the day, be determined by the conditions in the world 

and, above all, have we come out of Afghanistan, by and large, by 

the end of 2014. That would enable us to have a lower end 

strength. 

Now, as we have talked about in this hearing, the Marine Corps 

believes that it needs to come down about 15,000 because they 

think they have gotten too big and too heavy in terms of their 

equipment. So this is a proposal that actually is divorced from the 

budget and is more based on the Marine Corps’ own view of their 

force structure and what they need to complete their mission going 

forward. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. And how about the other services? Do they 

share—— 

Secretary GATES. The only other service affected at this point is 

the Army. And, again, depending on the circumstances, the Army 

leadership supports this proposal, but the Army leadership is also 

fully aware that they will have the opportunity to revisit this decision if conditions in the world change. 

Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have one, two, three, four, five Members that 

have been waiting patiently now for 3 hours, and we just got the 

first series of votes called, and I am concerned that they will go for 

45 minutes or an hour. And I know, Mr. Secretary, you said that 

you had until 1:30. I appreciate that you have given us that time, 

but I think we only have time probably for one more. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Chairman, and I thank the distinguished panelists for their leadership and for being here today. 

And I also want to express my admiration for all the men and 

women that you lead and for their families on what they do on behalf of our freedom. 

I also would like to express my appreciation for the budget submission, not easy work, and I have some experience in it, and I 

know it has been challenging for the team, especially in relation to 

the last decade with regard to prioritization. I look forward to 

being supportive going forward. 
54 

My concern has been touched on here today, but I would like to 

address it more directly, and it has to do with, generally, requirements and resources, but, more broadly, with the prefacing discussion of what kind of country we are, what interests we have, or 

what commitments we think are appropriate for a republic. 

You know, I think on this committee there would be wide agreement and beyond that we need to protect our cherished way of life, 

and that we need the world’s best military to do that, but I think 

there is a wide variety of views and opinions as to precisely what 

that means. Some believe that we should embrace some kind of isolationism; others, perhaps, a near endless global commitment strategy. 

I reject the extremes of both sides. I personally think that we are 

overcommitted and that we ask too much of our military, but it is 

a debatable point. Which gets to my point. We have processes, 

NDP, the QDR, primarily for internal or D.C. consumption, when 

I think it really needs to be more of a national conversation. 

I know you both travel widely and you speak. I am curious to 

know, does this topic come up when you are with the American 

people, and what ideas that you have, if you agree, that this should 

be more of a national discussion going forward? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I have traveled fairly extensively over 

the course of the last year, and I have found, and I worry about, 

the sort of growing disconnect between the American people and 

the military. And I don’t mean that—I mean, they are enormously 

supportive of our men and women and their families. They know 

we are in two wars. They know we are sacrificing enormously as 

well. 

More and more, we come from 40 percent fewer places. I mean, 

we are 40 percent smaller than we were in 1989. We have BRACed 

[Base Realignment and Closure] out of many parts of the country. 

And so our day-to-day connections are significantly reduced from 

what they used to be. And it is the breadth and the depth of understanding of who we are and what we are doing, the number of deployments, sacrifices of the family, the changes that have occurred 

over the course of the last decade. 

So it is not going to happen overnight, but it is a long-term concern that I have. And particularly when you overlay that with the 

enormous fiscal challenges that the country has right now, it is one 

of the reasons I have talked about—I actually do think the debt is 

a huge issue for national security, because we are going to be affected by that. You can see it in this budget. It is going to continue 

to happen. 

So that is probably the worry, and having a conversation with 

America about those challenges, and particularly individuals who 

serve, then go on to return to communities throughout the country, 

the veterans issues. I mean, we see an increasing homeless population in our veterans, increasing number of female homeless veterans, for example. How do they return to—you pick the area. They 

are enormously capable people. They are wired to serve in the future. They will make a big difference. They are 20-something. But 

how do we invest just a little bit in them so that, taking advantage 

of the GI bill, they will then take off and make a huge difference 
55 

in the future? And I think they will. That connection is something 

that I think is really important. 

Secretary GATES. But at the end of the day, Mr. Gibson, from our 

perspective, the dialogue, the conversation that you are describing 

is a dialogue that needs to take place between the executive branch 

and the legislative branch. You represent the American people. You 

have your finger on the pulse of the people in your district better 

than any of us ever could. And so, as was intended by the Founders, we basically rely on you as the surrogates for the American 

people in terms of that dialogue. 

Mr. GIBSON. I appreciate the comments, and I do believe that it 

is an area that we are going to need to address. And I look forward 

to working with the DOD and also the chairman and the committee 

moving forward. 

And I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you again for being here, for your 

service. And this committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 16, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 16, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 16, 2011 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

The CHAIRMAN. On January 6th you stated that this budget request, ‘‘Represents, 

in my view, the minimum level of defense spending that is necessary given the complex and unpredictable array of security challenges the United States faces around 

the globe.’’ You went on to explain why further cuts to force structure would be calamitous. 

However, last year you indicated that given topline real growth of approximately 

1%, force structure and modernization accounts need to grow by 2–3% beyond 2015 

to prevent cuts to force structure. The budget request before us does not achieve 

that level of topline growth. 

• How will you maintain the level of modernization you believe is necessary to 

protect our national security? 

• Does this budget request guarantee cuts to force structure beyond 2015, as you 

predicted might happen? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

The CHAIRMAN. What was the 2016 end strength for the Army and the Marine 

Corps presumed by the QDR and during development of the national military strategy? 

• Going forward, what specific metrics will the Department use to evaluate the 

decision to reduce Army and Marine Corps end strength? 

• How will this reduction in end strength affect the objective of 1:3 dwell time 

for the active force? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. The US Family Health Plan designed by Congress in 1996 provides 

the full TRICARE Prime benefit for military beneficiaries in 16 states and the District of Columbia for over 115 thousand beneficiaries. Beneficiaries are highly satisfied with this health care option. In fact, the Committee understands that in 2010 

over 91% of US Family Health Plan beneficiaries were highly satisfied with the care 

they received, making it the highest rated health care plan in the military health 

system. 

• The FY 12 President’s Budget Request includes a proposed legislative provision 

that future enrollees in US Family Health Plan would not remain in the plan 

upon reaching age 65. Do you realize that this proposal would eliminate access 

for our beneficiaries who are elderly and in the most need of health care from 

the highest rated health care plan in the military? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Public Law 104–201 Sec 726(b)) mandates the Government cannot pay 

more for the care of a US Family Health Plan enrollee than it would if that beneficiary were receiving care from other government programs. Is DOD in compliance 

with that provision? If you are not in compliance with the law or disagree with the 

above, please explain. Is the proposal simply to shift cost to Medicare? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The US Family Health Plan provides prevention and wellness programs as well as effective disease and care management programs designed to care 

for beneficiaries’ health care needs over their lifespan. Given the longitudinal approach of the program in managing the health care needs of the US Family Health 

Plan beneficiaries, and the Department’s interest in the medical home model, why 

would you not consider expanding such innovative techniques in health care delivery? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. The proposed legislation, if enacted, would force future enrollees to 

disenroll from this effective and well managed program upon reaching age 65. The 

remaining beneficiaries would be at risk because the ability to sustain disease management and prevention programs would be compromised, effectively removing the 

option of continued participation in this plan. Is this consistent with the DOD’s stat-
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ed priorities of population health, improved health management and continuity of 

care? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH ON BEHALF OF MS. GIFFORDS 

Mr. SMITH. DOD Operational Energy Strategy • As a follow-up to the 29 Sept 2010 letter (attached) issued by the Committee 

(to Sec Gates) last year, how is the Department achieving efficiencies in Operational Energy, saving lives and taxpayer dollars by saving fuel? • In his 1 Nov 2010 response (attached) Secretary Gates stated he would be releasing the Department of Defense’s Operational Energy Strategy. What is the 

status of this report and anticipated date of release? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the 

time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Operational Renewable Electricity • Following the impressive success of the USMC’s Afghanistan Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB), what steps is the Department taking to increase 

the use of renewable energy sources in the battlefield? • How much does the ExFOB cost? • What advantage do portable renewable energy sources add to mission effectiveness? • Is the rest of the expeditionary force doing something similar? • What are the barriers to successful wide-spread deployment of ExFOB-like technologies? • What is the strategy, cost, and timeline of such a deployment? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the 

time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Renewable Electricity Goals • The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007 directed DOD to 

produce or procure 25% of all electricity consumed by the Department from renewable energy sources by 2025. What is the Department’s strategy for achieving this goal? What impediments does the Department foresee to achieving this 

goal? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the 

time of printing.] 

Mr. SMITH. Energy Research and Development • What is the Department of Defense’s energy investment strategy for R&D? Specifically: 

o implementing high efficiency drive technologies, such as hybrid drive, into 

tactical vehicles; 

o increasing the energy efficiency of facilities in garrison and in theater; and 

o developing alternative fuels. • How does the Department coordinate R&D efforts between each of the Services, 

DOD agencies such as DARPA, and independent Service research labs such as 

the Office of Naval Research and the Air Force Research Lab? And, how do they 

coordinate investments with DOE to avoid duplication—particularly under the 

auspices of the DOD/DOE MOU? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the 

time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. After your appearance before the committee, your public affairs office sent the following email on February 16, regarding the subject of the undated, 

unsigned, and unsolicited documents on the subject of the JSF alternate engine sent 

by your legislative affairs office to select Members of Congress on February 14 and 

15: ‘‘The Department, through its office of Legislative Affairs, routinely provides papers to members of Congress and their staffs, to inform them of the Department’s 

position on important issues. Because of the nature of those documents (fact sheets 

and information papers), they are not normally signed or dated. While the Secretary 

may not be aware of these routine communications, the documents themselves represent the Secretary’s and Department’s position. His, and our, opposition to the F– 

35 extra engine is well-known and a matter of record. These documents are not inconsistent with our previous public statements.’’ 

• Please provide the committee a list of all unsolicited, undated and unsigned 

background or information papers provided by your Department to select mem-
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bers of Congress during 2010 and 2011. Please provide the subject matter, the 

approximate date, and the members’ names, and to whom the information papers were sent. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your testimony, in responding to a question regarding the F– 

35 alternate engine, you made a statement that the F–18 and F–22 engines come 

from a single source. Also, a Department of Defense (DoD) information paper provided to select members of Congress the day before the House of Representatives 

voted on an amendment to strike funding for the F–35 competitive engine stated: 

‘‘A single engine is not a new approach and does not create unacceptable levels of 

risk. The Department maintains two current tactical aircraft programs, the F–22 

and the F/A–18/F, which both utilize a single engine provider.’’ 

The F–22 and F/A–18 are twin engine aircraft. The F–35 is a single engine aircraft. As you are aware, there are significant differences in design and operational 

requirements for engines intended to power single engine aircraft from those that 

are designed to power multi-engine aircraft. We understand that engines designed 

to power single engine aircraft require component and software redundancies; increased component reliability; higher production quality standards; and larger air 

start envelope requirements. 

Also, as we understand it, only two U.S. military operational aircraft are single 

engine aircraft: the Air Force F–16 and the Marine Corps AV–8B. The F–16 was 

the first aircraft to use an alternate engine, beginning in the mid-80s and still does 

so today. According to DOD information, accident rates for the F–16 have trended 

from 14 mishaps/100,000 flight hours in 1980 with the Pratt & Whitney engine, 

when the alternate engine program was first funded, to less than 2 mishaps/100,000 

flight hours in 2009 for both the Pratt & Whitney and GE engines. A review of DOD 

AV–8B accident data last year by the committee indicated an accident rate (FY 05– 

09) six times that of the other Navy fighter aircraft (F–18) and over 3 and 1⁄2 times 

the rate of the F–16 (FY 04–08). The AV–8B will be replaced by the F–35B. It will 

not be operational until at least 2016. The Institutes for Defense Analysis estimated 

in 2007 that up to 95 percent of the U.S. fighter fleet could be composed of F–35 

aircraft by 2035. 

No fighter aircraft engine has ever been required to do what the F–35 engine is 

required to do—provide powered flight and also power a lift fan for the short takeoff 

and vertical landing F–35B. You have indicated that you have placed the F–35B on 

‘‘probation,’’ requiring redesign of the F–35B unique engine components. The current estimate to complete development of the F135 primary engine has been extended several years and the estimated cost to complete the development program 

is 450 percent above the February 2008 estimated completion cost. Five months into 

fiscal year 2011, the fiscal year 2010 engine contract has yet to be signed. The F– 

35 primary engine has, as of the end of 2010, 680 total flight test hours and has 

90 percent of its flight testing to go. 

• What were the planned initial operational capability dates for the F–35A, B, 

and C when you testified before our committee last year? What were the 

planned initial operational capability dates for the F–35A, B, and C as of July 

2010? What are the current planned initial operational capability dates for the 

F–35A, B, and C? 

• Do you believe your testimony and the DOD information paper provide a balanced representation of the risks in programs costs as well as operational risks 

to DOD of dependence on a single engine source for the F–35 aircraft for up 

to 95 percent of the future U.S. fighter fleet? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your testimony, in responding to a question regarding the F– 

35 F135 alternate engine, you made a point that the F–35 primary engine is a derivative of the F–22 F119 engine. 

We understand the Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) for the F– 

35 F135 engine was to have been completed in FY 08 and still has several years 

to go to complete development. We also understand SDD for the F135 primary engine is now 70 percent over the original 2001 estimated cost, been slipped several 

years, and is 450 percent over the estimated cost to complete since the FY10-to complete estimate of February of 2008. 

• When the F119/F135 engine entered Systems Development and Demonstration 

(SDD) were any of the ground or flight test requirements waived because the 

F135 ‘‘is a derivative of the F–22 engine?’’ 

• Dr. Carter directed an Integrated Manufacturing Readiness Review of the F135 

contractor in 2009 because of concerns over escalating costs and parts production productivity. If the F135 is a derivative of the F119 why do you believe 

the review team discovered several of the major components for the F135 with 
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manufacturing readiness levels of 3 and 4, when low rate initial production of 

the engine had begun in fiscal year 2007? • If the F135 is a derivative of the F–22 engine, why do you believe the completion of testing has been delayed and costs have continued to increase for development? • What was the planned development time period for the F135? How long has the 

F135 been in development and how many more years of development are required? • What was the original estimate for the cost of F135 development and what is 

the current FY12 –to-complete, development? • Is the Department able to segment planned and actual development costs for 

the F135 and those solely associated with the lift fan and associated components? If so, please provide that information to the committee. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 17, 2011, you were quoted as stating: ‘‘The Air Force version flew twice as 

many flight tests as had been originally planned.’’ 

My understanding from DOD sources is that the F–35A flew 171 flights in 2010 

versus a planned 112 flights, 53 percent more than planned, not 100 percent more 

than planned, as you are quoted as saying. • Could you provide the committee the correct information on the issue of 

planned versus actual flight tests sorties flown by the F–35A test aircraft in 

2010? • Under the FY 2007 F–35 flight test schedule, when DOD requested funds to initiate F–35 production, how many flights should have been flown from the beginning of the F–35 test program through December 2010 and what were the actual number of flight tests flown (please show AA–1 separately)? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. A Department of Defense (DoD) information paper provided to select members of Congress the day before the House of Representatives voted on an 

amendment to strike funding for the F–35 competitive engine stated: ‘‘. . . the F136 

engine is already three to four behind in its development phase.’’ 

The last information provided to the committee, in April 2010, indicated the F136 

engine was two to three months behind its originally planned development schedule, 

not three to four years. 

We understand the original acquisition strategy for the F–35 engine was to award 

two separate sole source engine contracts, four years apart, using a leader-follower 

acquisition strategy, the first contract being awarded to P&W for the F135 in 2001; 

the second contract being awarded to GE for the F136 in 2005, 46 months apart. 

The November 8, 2000 DOD F–35 acquisition strategy stated: ‘‘The contract strategy for the JSF119 [now F135] propulsion system entails a single, sole source contract to P&W. P&W will complete propulsion system development in FY08.’’ JSF Acquisition Strategy, 8 November 2000. The acquisition strategy document also stated: 

‘‘The contract strategy for the alternate JSF F120 [now F136] propulsion system entails awarding a single, sole source contract . . . in FY 05 . . . ’’ JSF Acquisition 

Strategy, 8 November 2000. Finally the acquisition strategy stated: ‘‘This competitive engine environment will ensure long-term industrial base support with two production lines and will keep JSF engine costs down and reliability up.’’ 

An April 12, 2010, response to question for the record, March 24, 2010, Hearing 

before the Air and Land Forces and Seapower subcommittees of the House Committee on Armed Services stated: ‘‘The original F135 contract signed 26 October 

2001 had an initial service release set for November 2007.’’ That objective was met 

24 months late: ‘‘The current F135 program has achieved conventional takeoff and 

landing ISR the 1st quarter FY2010 [October–December 2009] and short takeoff and 

vertical landing ISR is planned for 4th quarter FY2010 . . . The F136 is 2–3 

months behind schedule to the original plan.’’ 

The current estimate to complete development of the F135 primary engine has 

been extended several years and the estimated cost to complete the development 

program is 450 percent above the February 2008 estimated completion cost. 

Five months into fiscal year 2011, the fiscal year 2010 engine contract has yet 

to be signed. 

The F–35 primary engine has, as of the end of 2010, 680 total flight test hours 

and has 90 percent of its flight testing to go. 

What has been the level of funding obligated, including other government costs, 

for the F136 development from FY 07 to date, by fiscal year, and what was the level 

of funding determined by the F–35 Joint Program Office as being required, including other government costs, by fiscal year, to maintain the F136 development schedule. 
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• Do you believe the DOD information paper provides a balanced representation 

of the F–35 acquisition strategy and F136 and F135 development schedules? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. A Department of Defense (DoD) information paper provided to select members of Congress two days before the House of Representatives voted on 

an amendment to strike funding for the F–35 competitive engine stated: ‘‘A 2010 

update of the 2007 cost benefit analysis concluded, through very optimistic assumptions, that the second engine is currently at the breakeven point in net present 

value.’’ 

In testimony before the Air and Land Forces and Seapower Subcommittees of the 

House Committee on Armed Services on March 24, 2010, the Honorable Christine 

Fox, Director of the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office [CAPE], Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, was asked by Representative Jim Marshall regarding 

her testimony that the DOD 2007 cost benefit analysis on the F–35 engine program 

used ‘‘optimistic assumptions’’: ‘‘So back in 2007, were you trying to prove a case 

or were you just trying to do a study?’’ Ms. Fox responded: ‘‘We were trying to do 

a study, sir.’’ In addition, the 2007 DOD engine cost benefit analysis cites six 

sources that it indicates were methodologically consistent with the 2007 DOD study, 

including RAND, the Institute for Defense Analysis, The Analytical Services Corporation, and the Defense Systems Management College. The GAO has noted that key assumptions in the Pentagon’s estimate of the $2.9 

billion six year cost to complete the F136 competitive engine and prepare for competition were unnecessarily pessimistic based on historic experience with the original alternate engine program. ‘‘Those assumptions were (1) 4 years of noncompetitive procurements of both engines would be needed to allow the alternate engine 

contractor sufficient time to gain production experience and complete developmental 

qualification of the engine, and (2) the government would need to fund quality and 

reliability improvements for engine components. Past studies and historical data we 

examined indicate that it may take less than 4 years of noncompetitive procurements and that competition may obviate the need for the government to fund component improvement programs. If these conditions hold true for the alternate engine, the funding projection for the alternate engine could be lower than DOD’s projection.’’ • Do you believe the DOD information paper provides a balanced representation 

of the F–35 engine acquisition strategy and F136 and F135 development schedules? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your testimony, in responding to a question regarding the F– 

35 alternate engine, you stated the F–35 alternate engine is ‘‘two to three years behind [the primary engine].’’ 

The last information provided to the committee by DOD, in April 2010, indicated 

the F136 engine was two-to-three months behind its originally planned development 

schedule, not ‘‘two to three years behind.’’ 

We understand that the original acquisition strategy for the F–35 engine was to 

award two separate sole source engine contracts, four years apart, using a leaderfollower acquisition strategy, the first contract being awarded to P&W for the F135 

in 2001; the second contract being awarded to GE for the F136 in 2005, 46 months 

apart. 

The November 8, 2000 DOD F–35 acquisition strategy stated: ‘‘The contract strategy for the JSF119 [now F135] propulsion system entails a single, sole source contract to P&W. P&W will complete propulsion system development in FY08.’’ JSF Acquisition Strategy, 8 November 2000. The acquisition strategy document also stated: 

‘‘The contract strategy for the alternate JSF F120 [now F136] propulsion system entails awarding a single, sole source contract . . . in FY 05 . . .’’ JSF Acquisition 

Strategy, 8 November 2000. Finally, the acquisition strategy stated: ‘‘This competitive engine environment will ensure long-term industrial base support with two production lines and will keep JSF engine costs down and reliability up.’’ 

An April 12, 2010, response to question for the record, March 24, 2010, Hearing 

before the Air and Land Forces and Seapower subcommittees of the House Committee on Armed Services stated: ‘‘The original F135 contract signed 26 October 

2001 had an initial service release set for November 2007.’’ That objective was met 

24 months late: ‘‘The current F135 program has achieved conventional takeoff and 

landing ISR the 1st quarter FY2010 [October–December 2009] and short takeoff and 

vertical landing ISR is planned for 4th quarter FY2010 . . . The F136 is 2–3 

months behind schedule to the original plan.’’ 

The current estimate to complete development of the F135 primary engine has 

been extended several years and the estimated cost to complete the development 

program is 450 percent above the February 2008 estimated completion cost. 
104 

Five months into fiscal year 2011, the fiscal year 2010 engine contract has yet 

to be signed. 

The F–35 primary engine has, as of the end of 2010, 680 total flight test hours 

and has 90 percent of its flight testing to go. 

What has been the level of funding obligated, including other government costs, 

for the F136 development from FY 07 to date, by fiscal year, and what was the level 

of funding determined by the F–35 Joint Program Office as to be required, including 

other government costs, to maintain the F136 development schedule. 

• Do you believe your testimony before the committee provided a balanced representation of the F–35 engine acquisition strategy and F136 and F135 development schedules? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. In responding to the question on the F–35 alternate engine, you 

said ‘‘there have been multiple airplanes that are single-engine airplanes that are 

single source.’’ 

The F–22 and F/A–18 are twin engine aircraft. The F–35 is a single engine aircraft. We understand that only two U.S. military operational aircraft are single engine aircraft: the Air Force F–16 and the Marine Corps AV–8B. The F–16 was the 

first aircraft to use an alternate engine, beginning in the mid-80s and still does so 

today. DOD information indicates accident rates have trended from 14 mishaps/ 

100,000 flight hours in 1980 with the Pratt & Whitney engine, when the alternate 

engine program was first funded, to less than 2 mishaps/100,000 flight hours in 

2009 for both the Pratt & Whitney and GE engines. A review of the AV–8B DOD 

accident data last year indicated an accident rate (FY 05–09) six times that of the 

other Navy fighter aircraft (F–18) and over 3 and 1⁄2 times the rate of the F–16 (FY 

04–08). The AV–8B will be replaced by the F–35B. The F–35 is a single engine aircraft. It will not be operational until at least 2016. The Institutes for Defense Analysis estimated in 2007 that up to 95 percent of the U.S. fighter fleet could be composed of F–35 aircraft by 2035. 

No fighter aircraft engine has ever been required to do what the F–35 engine is 

required to do—provide powered flight and also power a lift fan for the short takeoff 

and vertical landing F–35B. Secretary Gates placed the F–35B on ‘‘probation,’’ requiring redesign of the F–35B unique engine components. The current estimate to 

complete development of the F135 primary engine has been extended several years 

and the estimated cost to complete the development program is 450 percent above 

the February 2008 estimated completion cost. Five months into fiscal year 2011, the 

fiscal year 2010 engine contract has yet to be signed. The F–35 primary engine has, 

as of the end of 2010, 680 total flight test hours and has 90 percent of its flight 

testing to go. 

• Do you believe your testimony provides a balanced representation of the risks 

in programs costs as well as operational risks to DOD of dependence on a single 

engine source for the F–35 for up to 95 percent of the future U.S. fighter fleet? 

• How many single engine fighter aircraft, by type and quantity, are there in the 

U.S. inventory at present and what percent of the primary active and total active inventory do they represent of the total fighter force? 

• Please provide the major/Class A accident rates for these aircraft for the past 

five and ten years through FY 10 or CY2010. Also, please provide the major/ 

Class A accident rates for these aircraft for the past five and ten years, with 

the primary cause being the engine, through FY/CY 10. Finally, please provide 

what the experience has been with the DOD single engine aircraft with regard 

to groundings related to the engine of more than one aircraft at a time? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. I have re-introduced the compromise version of H.R. 44 which 

eliminates the payment of claims to descendants of those that suffered personal injury during the occupation. Can we expect the same level of support from the Department of Defense as we did in the 111th Congress? The people of Guam are 

being asked to provide additional land for a firing range and the main base area 

and resolution of Guam war claims is going to be critical to overcoming historical 

injustices. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. U.S. Force Realignment in Japan 

• Given the strategic importance of Guam and our nation’s on-going efforts to reshape our military presence in the Pacific theater, can you tell me what the sta-
105 

tus is of the Department of Defense’s roadmap for realigning U.S. forces in 

Japan? • Specifically, how is the reconfiguration of the Camp Schwab facilities and the 

adjacent water surface areas to accommodate the Futenma Replacement Facility project proceeding? • When can we expect to see tangible progress on Okinawa for a Futenma Replacement Facility? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. I was pleased to see about $200 million in research and development for a next generation bomber. I think this is a key platform to maintaining 

a robust long range strike capability. • Can you explain the rationale behind your decision to build a long range 

manned bomber with the ability to penetrate defended air space? • Why is standoff insufficient to meet future Combatant Command requirements? • What are the inherent limitations within our existing legacy bomber fleet? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Army & Marine Corps Equipment Reset • Please put the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request for equipment reset for the 

Army and Marine Corps in context with the Fiscal Year 2011 President’s budget 

request and the continuing resolution being discussed today, or if the Department were forced to continue with a year-long Continuing Resolution at Fiscal 

Year 2010 funding levels. • Please discuss the movement of depot maintenance funding from Overseas Contingency Operations to the base budget. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. What guidance were the services given to distinguish between 

base and O–C–O budget reset? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. BORDALLO. Given the high level of attention the CENTCOM theater continues 

to receive due to on-going combat operations, I am concerned that we may have inadvertently created unnecessary risk in our Pacific Theater readiness, capabilities, 

and particularly in our I–S–R capacity because of a CENTCOM focus. • Given the number of threats in the Pacific area of operations what are we doing 

to address these risks? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. Affordable F–35 recapitalization is dependent on capturing economies 

of commonality and scale as quickly as possible. Yet, basic economics tells us that 

if you continue to reduce the number of aircraft, unit costs will grow. This does concern me. • What actions will the Department take to help ensure that this critical 5th generation aircraft does not quickly become another B–2 or F–22? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. MILLER. You expressed the Department’s support for an amphibious assault 

capability for the Marine Corps, and suggested that a plan exists to fill that capability gap; however, we have been asked to cancel the EFV without seeing a detailed 

plan for replacing the 40+ year old AAV. The Marine Personnel Carrier does not 

offer a ship-to-shore capability, and the obsolete AAV is incapable of providing the 

swift, over the horizon delivery needed to conduct amphibious operations in the face 

of modern threats. • When will we see a detailed plan for an AAV replacement? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. I was pleased to see the FY12 budget reflect the Administration’s 

commitment to modernizing the nuclear weapon infrastructure. 

The $1.2 billion increase over FY10 will make the necessary investments to ensure our laboratories have the resources they need to maintain our nuclear deterrent while helping secure loose nuclear material around the world. 

This is in stark contrast to the Continuing Resolution which includes a $325M 

cut to weapons activities and a $647M cut to nuclear nonproliferation. 

• How would the funding levels included in the CR impact NNSA’s modernization 

plans and our ability to meet our obligations under the New START Treaty? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
106 

Mr. HEINRICH. I also have serious concerns about how the CR will impact civilian 

assistance on the ground in Afghanistan. 

The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development would 

face over a 20 percent reduction when compared to the President’s FY11 request. • How would the funding levels in the CR impact the front lines in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan where our civilians are working side by side with our military? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. Your proposal includes several measures aimed at reducing the cost 

of providing health care to our service members and their families and military retirees. While I appreciate that your plan is a more comprehensive approach than 

previous cost cutting efforts, the challenge here is finding the balance between fiscal 

responsibility while maintaining a viable and robust military health system. We 

must be sure to remember these proposals have complex implications and go ‘beyond 

beneficiaries.’ They also will affect the people such as pharmacists, hospital employees and vendors who support the defense health system. The military health system 

has a robust acquisition workforce within the TRICARE Management Activity that 

appears to replicate the acquisition expertise in other Defense agencies such as the 

Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and Defense Logistic Agencies. 

• Why does the military health system need its own acquisition workforce? 

• How much money would you save by embedding medical expertise in existing 

Defense acquisition agencies? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Regarding the cancellation of the F–22, given the recent 

Chinese developments, please discuss the recent developments in 5th generation 

technologies and the need to invest in 5th gen aircraft. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. F–35 is slated to ramp up production to over 20 aircraft a 

month. Given that the Independent Manufacturing Review Team you chartered 

came to the conclusions that the industry team is currently capable of producing between 48 and 60 aircraft per year and that a production ramp up of 1.5X per year 

is optimum, please discuss the decision to produce only approximately 32 aircraft 

for three straight years? 

• Does this achieve production efficiency? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Though the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) falls 

under the Department of Energy and it’s largely non-security budget, can you please 

discuss NNSA’s role in meeting our nation’s national security needs? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In your preface to the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, you 

‘‘asked for nearly $5 billion to be transferred from the Department of Defense to the 

Department of Energy over the next several years.’’ Can you discuss why this was 

necessary and how you prioritize this investment? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. As stated in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President 

Obama ‘‘has directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons below New START levels.’’ 

• Have you received such direction? 

• What conditions would the Department of Defense need to see met in order to 

consider further reductions beyond New START levels? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. When the White House announced the Phased Adaptive Approach 

(PAA) to missile defense in Europe last September, it said the new approach was 

based upon an assumption that the long-range missile threat was ‘‘slower to develop.’’ However, in comments last month, you both expressed concern about the 

pace of North Korea’s ICBM and nuclear developments. 

• Do you have a similar assessment of Iran’s missile and nuclear programs? 
107 

• Also, as discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, what hedging strategy will you pursue to defend the U.S. homeland in case the threat comes earlier or the new Next Generation Aegis Missile has technical problems? • At what point would the Department make a decision to employ the hedge? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. In 2006, the Director of National Intelligence issued a five-year strategic human capital plan that pointed to a number of gaps in mission-critical areas 

of analysis and human intelligence. Among the recommendations, the report called 

on looking at the needs of the ‘‘total force’’—including civilians, military members, 

contractors, and international and academic partners. • What is the Defense Department doing to meet the growing demands for 

trained military, civilian, and contractor workers who perform intelligence analysis? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Research and development, testing, and training for Unmanned Aerial Systems to meet national defense needs have been hampered for many years by 

lack of special use airspace. Of course, the safety of our airspace is paramount. But 

there is a growing feeling that national defense needs are being compromised by 

this impasse. • What is the Department of Defense doing to expedite the integration of UAS 

into the National Airspace? • Do you recommend any changes in regulation, statute, or agreements between 

the Defense Department and the FAA in order to expedite the process—to meet 

both safety and national defense needs? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 required that a 

flexible personnel practice available to one defense laboratory under the Laboratory 

Personnel Demonstration Project should be available for use at any other laboratory. • Can you tell us how many defense laboratories have taken advantage of this 

provision? • How can the Department better implement this authority to improve the flexibility of personnel practices in Defense laboratories? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. Recent Department of Defense reports indicate an increase in sexual 

assaults in the Armed Services and Military Academies. This increase highlights an 

urgent need for improvements to the way Defense Department officials respond to 

sexual assault cases. Below is a list of improvements that I feel are necessary to 

safeguard against military sexual assault and protect its victims. • What is the Department’s position on providing the following rights to victims 

of sexual assault (please explain): 

o Victim Access to Judge Advocate General (JAG) and privileged communication with a Victim Advocate. 

o Professionalize and standardize sexual assault programs based on what we 

have already learned from the success of Equal Employment Opportunity program at the DOD. 

o Require a Sexual Assault training module at each level of Professional Military Education (PME). 

o Provide a mechanism for expedited consideration and priority for base transfers. 

o Provide a system of data collection on sexual assaults, reported assaults, and 

for the ongoing quality of performance of victims after the assault. 

o Giving a victim advocate more independence from the victim’s chain of command. 

o Adopt measures that truly create separation between the victim and the alleged perpetrator at the base level, and not merely accept separation ‘‘on 

paper.’’ 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. As stated in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, President 

Obama ‘‘has directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons below New START levels.’’ 

• Have you received such direction? 

• What conditions would the Department of Defense need to see met in order to 

consider further reductions beyond New START levels? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. TURNER. When the White House announced the Phased Adaptive Approach 

(PAA) to missile defense in Europe last September, it said the new approach was 

based upon an assumption that the long-range missile threat was ‘‘slower to de-
108 

velop.’’ However, in comments last month, you both expressed concern about the 

pace of North Korea’s ICBM and nuclear developments. • Do you have a similar assessment of Iran’s missile and nuclear programs? • Also, as discussed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, what hedging strategy will you pursue to defend the U.S. homeland in case the threat comes earlier or the new Next Generation Aegis Missile has technical problems? • At what point would the Department make a decision to employ the hedge? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you believe your successor should commit to following the recent 

efficiency initiative with further efficiency drives to maintain momentum in cost-cutting and reform of the Department of Defense? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you anticipate that any U.S. forces will remain in Afghanistan 

in 2017? If you do not explicitly answer in the affirmative, I will presume that the 

Department of Defense plans and anticipates to remove all U.S. forces from Afghanistan by 2017. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. I am aware you have outlined several criteria for reconciliation of 

Taliban and anti-government forces in Afghanistan, including renunciation of al 

Qaeda, acceptance of the Afghan national constitution, and renunciation of violence. • Can you provide detailed information regarding specific reconciliation outreach 

efforts to Taliban fighters for each ISAF Regional Command? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Can your end force strength goals for the middle of the next decade 

be reconciled with your commitment to fairer dwell times for our men and women 

in uniform? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you assess that cancelling the F–35 second engine program 

would pose any operational risk in the event the primary engine were stricken by 

unforeseen, widespread failures? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. When will DDG–1000 hulls #2 and #3 be put under contract? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Why will full ship shock trials of the Littoral Combat Ship not be 

conducted on hulls #1 or #2, in light of persistent questions raised by the Department of Operational Testing & Evaluation regarding whether LCS meets its Level 

1 Survivability requirements? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. General Spencer on January 14, 2011, stated the importance of securing the ‘‘global commons’’ as a defense priority of the U.S., signaling our continued commitment as the world’s primary defender of key trade routes. • How can we share this burden among our allies and emerging powers to spare 

the U.S. taxpayer from footing the full bill for global security? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is less than 200 F–22s adequate to ensure U.S. air superiority for 

the next three decades? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE 

Mr. KLINE. The United States Government has been operating from the same 

NRO Charter for 46 years. I understand the Department intends to produce a Directive rather than a Charter as required. We began this process over 2 years ago. The 

Charter was not delivered by the February 1, 2010 deadline. In last year’s Armed 

Services Committee defense posture hearing (February 3, 2010), I asked you when 

the Department intended to complete the Charter. I am concerned that it has been 

more than a year, and a Charter has still not been delivered in accordance with legislative requirements. Our committee has received conflicting information from the 

Department as to whether we will receive the Charter, a DOD Directive in place 

of the Charter, or no additional product whatsoever because the MOA essentially 

serves as the Charter. The law requires a Charter, not an MOA or Directive. 

• The FY10 NDAA required the Department of Defense and the DNI to submit 

a revised NRO charter by Feb 1, 2010 to the Committee on Armed Services. It 

is now 2011, where is the Charter? 
109 

• If the Department intends to comply with the law, when will the actual Charter 

be delivered to the Committee? 

• If the Department will issue a product other than the Charter, please provide 

that intent in writing as well as details on when the Committee should expect 

to receive such a product. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SUTTON 

Ms. SUTTON. I’d like to hear from you about funding levels for the DOD Office 

of Corrosion Policy and Oversight and how the budget reflects the importance of this 

issue. A key component of modernizing our infrastructure, preserving our military 

assets, and saving money in the process is adopting a robust corrosion prevention 

and mitigation strategy. It is not a glamorous topic, but it’s one that is worth our 

time and attention, especially given the potential savings if we address it in a smart 

and appropriate way. 

• Given the demonstrated successes of this corrosion office, how do you foresee 

the proposed funding level supporting the future role of this office, and what 

are the intentions for the evolution of this work within DOD in the future? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SUTTON. The Navy estimates that executing the 30-year shipbuilding plan 

would require an average of $15.9 billion per year, however a May 2010 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimates that figure to be an average of $19 billion per year—or about 18% more than the Navy estimates. The CBO report states 

that if the Navy receives an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars in 

the next 30 years—it will not be able to afford all the purchases in the 2011 shipbuilding plan. 

• Given the proposals for minimal to no real budget growth in the upcoming 

years, are you concerned with the Navy’s ability to reach its required force 

structure? How will this affect the Navy’s shipbuilding plan? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SUTTON. I believe that one of our priorities should be to consider how our decisions and policies impact the welfare of service members and their families. Reduced dwell time and stop loss are two situations that have caused much strain for 

our military. One of the proposals is the reduction of the permanent end strength 

of the Active Army and Marine Corps. 

• Do you anticipate that these cuts will reduce the amount of dwell time for our 

soldiers or risk a return to the utilization of the stop-loss for our soldiers? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. SUTTON. I believe that one of our priorities should be to consider how our decisions and policies impact the welfare of service members and their families. Reduced dwell time and stop loss are two situations that have caused much strain for 

our military. One of the proposals is the reduction of the permanent end strength 

of the Active Army and Marine Corps. 

• Do you anticipate that these cuts will reduce the amount of dwell time for our 

soldiers or risk a return to the utilization of the stop-loss for our soldiers? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. When the Phased Adaptive Approach was first introduced, deadlines 

for each phase were set under the impression that long-range missile threats were 

‘‘slow to develop.’’ Recently you made remarks that suggest North Korea’s ICBM and 

nuclear developments are proceeding faster than expected. This raises concerns that 

the PAA will not be available to defend against long-range ICBMs before North 

Korea develops this capability. 

• In the interim, there must be a hedging strategy. Please identify the hedging 

strategy you will pursue to defend our Nation’s Homeland in the event that 

North Korea or another rogue nation acquires ICBM capability earlier than expected or if the new Next Generation Aegis Missile has technical problems. 

o Particularly, does the GMD two stage interceptor remain a realistic and flexible hedge against these advancing threats? 

o Also, what is the timeline for a decision on this strategy? 

• Furthermore, do you have an assessment of other nations’ timeline of achieving 

ICBM and nuclear capabilities able to threaten our homeland, particularly 

Iran’s program. 
110 

o If not, what is being done to make an accurate assessment of their developments? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Concerns about whether the New START Treaty limited missile defense figured prominently in the Senate’s debate on the Treaty. You both continue 

to engage in missile defense discussions with your Russian counterparts. • Please describe the nature of those discussions and what you see as areas of 

concern. 

o Particularly, do you find the lack of agreement in the interpretation of the 

preamble as having unforeseen consequences for a Missile Defense Capabilities? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in Alaska and 

California is currently the only missile defense system that protects the United 

States homeland from long-range ballistic missile attacks. However, the last two 

flight intercept tests of the GMD system failed to achieve intercept. 

• What actions and/or investments do you believe are necessary to ensure GMD 

is a reliable and operationally effective system to protect the U.S. homeland 

against evolving threats? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Have you seen any changes among our allies in Europe or elsewhere 

on their view of U.S. extended deterrence and the role the U.S. nuclear weapons 

in providing that extended deterrence guarantee? If so, please discuss these 

changes. 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Concerns about whether the New START Treaty limited missile defense figured prominently in the Senate’s debate on the Treaty. You both continue 

to engage in missile defense discussions with your Russian counterparts. 

• Please describe the nature of those discussions and what you see as areas of 

concern. 

o Particularly, do you find the lack of agreement in the interpretation of the 

preamble as having unforeseen consequences for a Missile Defense Capabilities? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in Alaska and 

California is currently the only missile defense system that protects the United 

States homeland from long-range ballistic missile attacks. However, the last two 

flight intercept tests of the GMD system failed to achieve intercept. 

• What actions and/or investments do you believe are necessary to ensure GMD 

is a reliable and operationally effective system to protect the U.S. homeland 

against evolving threats? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. FRANKS. Have you seen any changes among our allies in Europe or elsewhere 

on their view of U.S. extended deterrence and the role the U.S. nuclear weapons 

in providing that extended deterrence guarantee? If so, please discuss these 

changes. 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. I applaud you for your decision not to proceed to procurement of 

the MEADS missile defense system. As noted in the DOD memo, the program is 

substantially over budget and behind schedule. It would take an additional $974M 

just to complete the Design and Development of the program. It does not make 

sense to continue to waste $800 hundred million on a system we are not going to 

procure. 

• Will DOD go back to the drawing board and try to find a way to ring out some 

additional savings out of this $800M for MEADS? Will you ask your team to 

brief me on what this $800M is for, and if we can least find some more substantial savings? 

• The DOD memo indicates that it will be necessary to allocate funds for Patriot 

upgrades. At a minimum, will DOD work to reallocate funds for Design and Development for upgrades to the Patriot system? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. In the Memo accompanying your recent decision not to proceed to 

procurement of MEADS, you specifically highlighted the Army’s inability to afford 

to procure MEADS and make required Patriot upgrades as rationale for the deci-
111 

sion. I agree wholeheartedly with that assessment and commend you on your decision. It is vital that we continue to upgrade the Patriot system, which can provide 

added capability much sooner and at a fraction of the cost. • In light of your decision and the vital importance of air and missile defense; 

can you please provide any insight on accelerating Patriot modernization? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. SHUSTER. Azerbaijan is an important partner of the United States and Israel 

in the region. It has contributed troops and resources to our missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kosovo; and the country is a key component of the Northern Distribution Network. Azerbaijan was first to open Caspian energy resources to U.S. 

companies and has emerged as a key partner for diversifying European energy markets. Azerbaijan also cooperates closely with the United States in the areas of intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

and counternarcotics trafficking. The importance of Azerbaijan will only continue to 

grow, particularly given rising tensions with Iran. 

• How would you describe the current level of military cooperation between the 

United States and Azerbaijan, as well as your future expectations for that cooperation? What steps must the United States and Azerbaijan take to further 

strengthen this relationship? 

• Section 907 of Freedom Support Act of 1992 limits the U.S. Government’s ability to provide direct assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan. In what ways 

does this interfere with the Department of Defense’s long-term planning regarding Azerbaijan and its efforts to deepen bilateral relations with respect to security and defense matters? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Regarding the F–35 alternate engine, both the Pentagon’s F–35 acquisition strategy documents, one completed 10 years ago and an update completed 

2 years ago noted: 

‘‘to preclude excessive reliance on a single engine supplier, an alternate engine 

program was established.’’ 

The F–35 acquisition strategy document published in December 2008, nearly 

three years after the Pentagon quit requesting funding for the F136 stated that: 

‘‘dependent on F136 propulsion system maturity and funding availability . . . 

the goal is to reach full competition between Pratt & Whitney and GE in FY12 

or 13’’ 

In addition, the most recent business case analysis completed by the Department 

of Defense indicated the competitive engine is at the breakeven point in net present 

value. 

• Given the Department’s acquisition strategy documents’ concerns on excessive 

reliance on a single contractor to provide the F–35 engine, the stated goal of 

reaching full competition between the two manufacturers, and the business case 

analysis stating it was no more expensive to have a competitive engine, why 

are you so opposed to the alternate engine? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. In January, you announced a significant reduction in the original 

order for F–35s for the FYDP. According to your statement, a reduction of 124 F– 

35s, bringing the total to 325, will pay for the $4.6 billion needed to extend the development period and adding additional flight tests. You further stated that an additional $4 billion from this reduction will be used for other purposes, such as acquiring more F/A–18s, one of the planes the F–35 is supposed to replace. Furthermore, 

you have stated the impact of removing 124 F–35 A & C variants from the FYDP 

will have little impact to unit cost over the life of the program. I am concerned 

about the impact to unit cost this reduction will have to the remaining A and C 

variants throughout the FYDP. 

• Given the information about the progress of the Chinese stealth fighter aircraft 

technology, what is the justification for cutting 124 fifth generation F–35s and 

buying 41 additional obsolete fourth generation aircraft? 

• Please comment on the immediate or near term cost impacts of the reduction? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. In the recent restructuring of the F–35 program, the F–35B, was 

put on a two year probation. It is my understanding that the technical issues on 

this variant appear to be typical at this stage in a development program. 

• Would you remove the F–35B variant from probation before the FY13 budget 

submission if the aircraft’s performance improves? 
112 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. The requirement for the ship to shore distance for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle was 25 miles. Now, the Marine Corps and the Navy have 

stated the requirement now is more like 12 to 25 miles. • Can you please elaborate for the committee what the new ship to shore requirement will be for a potential New Amphibious Vehicle? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. What steps is the Department of Defense taking to eliminate our 

military’s dependence on China for critical rare earth elements? How is the Department of Defense helping to reestablish a viable domestic supply chain? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. The FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act required a report 

that evaluates supply options, determines aggregate defense demand, and establishes a plan to address vulnerabilities in the area of rare earth elements. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Strategic Materials Stockpile—formerly the national 

stockpile center—has a successful program that can easily include stockpiling critical rare earth metals and alloys. • What thought have you given to this? 

• Do you agree that the DLA office has a key role to play in the required report 

and plan? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. In November 2010, I was informed by senior Department of Defense officials that our reliance on China for rare earth oxides, metals, alloys, and 

magnets did not constitute a national security threat. Officials from the Office of 

Industrial Policy noted that the Department of Defense was a small user and that 

they could not aggregate the Department’s demand and usage of these materials. 

• If the Department of Defense uses 7% of total rare earth demand, as noted by 

senior officials, aren’t you still concerned if you cannot access that 7%? 

• DoD representatives noted that new sources of supply for rare earth elements 

will be coming online in late 2011 and 2012. Has the Office of Industrial Policy 

taken note that the majority of this new supply is committed to non-U.S. 

sources such as Japan, who may not provide this material to the U.S. defense 

supply-chain, instead opting to supply the larger commercial market? 

• If so, how can you conclude there is no national security risk if you cannot guarantee access to the rare earth oxides, metals, alloys, and magnets needed by 

the Department of Defense? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Given that we are engaged in two protracted wars, how would you 

characterize the performance and practicality of the all-volunteer force? 

• Do you have any concerns regarding the future of the all-volunteer force? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Section 1243 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act 

for FY11 states: ‘‘The Secretary of Defense shall develop a strategy to be known as 

the ‘National Military Strategy to Counter Iran.’ ’’ Among other requirements, the 

NDAA mandates that this strategy ‘‘undertake a review of the ability of the Department of Defense to counter threats to the United States, its forces, allies, and interests from Iran,’’ and specifically requires the Secretary to brief Congress within 180 

days of the NDAA’s enactment ‘‘regarding any resources, capabilities, or changes to 

current law’’ he believes are necessary to address any gave identified in the strategy. 

• Is the Joint Staff currently preparing this strategy, which will be a high priority 

for this committee and receive as much or greater attention as any military report we receive? 

• Will we receive this report within the mandated 180 day? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. The Navy estimates that its average annual shipbuilding requirement is $15 billion per year to attain its minimum floor of 313 battle-force ships. 
113 

However the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Navy will require, on average, $19 billion per year to attain its minimum floor of 313 ships. 

• Given that there will be minimal to no real budget growth in the upcoming 

years, are you concerned with the Navy’s ability to reach its required force 

structure? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. As you know, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 requires that 

all Federal Agencies perform a financial audit each year. The DOD has not complied 

and even the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has labeled the DOD’s books 

as ‘‘unauditable’’ because of the complexity of this problem. Many people view this 

as a complete lack of accountability and transparency in one of our Government’s 

largest agencies. Now colleagues of mine have even introduced legislation to cut portions of the DOD budget until the audits are complete. 

• Has there been any recent attempt to correct this problem, change the accounting systems or develop a course of action to get this problem fixed? Is it reasonable to expect a full audit in the foreseeable future? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. The role of the US military in recent years has had an increased 

focus on humanitarian response missions such as earthquake response in Haiti and 

response to the Indonesian tsunami. These contingency efforts, particularly by the 

Navy and Marine Corps due to their specific strengths and mobility, are changing 

the role of the force. 

• Given these new requirements, what do you see as the future of the Navy and 

Marine Corps? 

• Does this new focus on humanitarian missions weaken the force and our capability to respond to emerging threats such as China? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. It is no secret that our National Guard has played an extremely important role in our military operations over the last decade, and as a national 

guardsman, I believe in the importance of thanking my fellow citizen soldiers and 

the families that make sacrifices every day to protect our great nation. In the past, 

proposals have been introduced to add a representative of the National Guard to 

the Joint Chiefs. 

• Do you believe that this is a feasible and logical addition? 

• How do you believe that adding a representative to the Joint Chiefs will affect 

the service chiefs and the role of the National Guard? 

• Do you foresee any additional costs associated with this change? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. The role of the US military in recent years has had an increased 

focus on humanitarian response missions such as earthquake response in Haiti and 

response to the Indonesian tsunami. These contingency efforts, particularly by the 

Navy and Marine Corps due to their specific strengths and mobility, are changing 

the role of the force. 

• Given these new requirements, what do you see as the future of the Navy and 

Marine Corps? 

• Does this new focus on humanitarian missions weaken the force and our capability to respond to emerging threats such as China? 

Admiral MULLEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. YOUNG 

Mr. YOUNG. Our budget constraints are significant. ADM Mullen has described 

our debt as our nation’s ‘‘greatest national security challenge.’’ 

Within this environment, President Obama has proposed an increase in our defense budget—albeit a slight increase—over FY10 enacted levels. This comes on top 

of a doubling of defense expenditures over the last 12 years, in real inflation-adjusted dollars. 

Meanwhile, ADM Mullen’s comments indicated that we ‘‘must face the reality of 

less spending by our partners.’’ Essentially, our allies are cutting spending and, one 

might say, free-riding off of our military investments. 

We, understandably, don’t want to use our military to do more without more, or 

even ask it to do more with less. 

• In light of our growing fiscal challenges and steady investments in defense, and 

steady disinvestment in defense by our allies, how do you respond to those who 

argue that our ambitions now outstrip our capacities to fund them at home and 

abroad? 
114 

• Aside from creating conditions for more robust economic growth, including reforming our nation’s entitlement programs, might we also address the gap between our ambitions and capacities by scaling back our global commitments— 

i.e., by setting priorities among missions rather than by layering additional missions on top of existing missions (as we have done in recent history)? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. YOUNG. Regarding the alternate engine of the F–35, the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF), how do you refute the findings of the GAO study (GAO–09–711T, May 20, 

2009) that savings generated from having a competitive engine would recoup or exceed investment costs across the life cycle of the engine, and that its non-financial 

benefits were enough to continue the program, even if considering only marginal financial benefits? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. YOUNG. Considering that 95 percent of our fighter force is projected to be 

comprised of F–35s within the next 25 years, how do you answer to concerns that 

our operational capabilities could be drastically compromised, as we would have 

very little redundancy in our fighter force, as we would be dependent upon one engine and vulnerable to a fleet-wide grounding? 

Secretary GATES. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

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