FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUNE 1, 2005

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

 [PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-10040

 

D. C. Docket No. 01-00202-CV-WCO-2

HAROLD BRUCE LONDON,

CHRISTINE SAUNDERS LONDON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

FIELDALE FARMS CORPORATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

 

 (June 1, 2005)

Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

DUBINA, Circuit Judge:
 A broiler is a baby chick. 1

Appellants, Harold Bruce London and Christine London, appeal the district

court’s order granting summary judgment to appellee/defendant, Fieldale Farms

Corporation, on the Londons’ Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.,

(“PSA”) retaliation and improper weighing claims. The Londons also appeal the

district court’s order granting Fieldale’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on

the Londons’ PSA termination claim and state law breach of contract and fraud

claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s orders.

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Fieldale is an integrated poultry company which enters into poultry growing

contracts with growers. Fieldale owns various poultry feed mills, hatcheries, and

processing plants. Fieldale’s processing operations emanate from a business

paradigm known as “contract farming.” 

Harold London worked as a broiler flock supervisor and broiler manager 1

for three different companies from 1979 until 1995. Christine London managed

hen houses in the 1970’s and worked as a chicken vaccinator for a poultry

company in the 1980’s. In 1987, the Londons purchased a nine acre farm that

contained one chicken house for growing broilers (“Green Meadows No. 1”). In

addition to this one broiler house on their residence, the Londons leased two other
3

farms, the J.W. Peck Farm, which had one poultry house, and the Merritt Martin

Farm (later known as “Green Meadows No. 2”), which had two chicken houses. 

At the time the Londons purchased their farm, Mar-Jac Poultry Company

employed Harold and agreed to place broilers on the Londons’ farm. In 1990,

Fieldale offered Harold a job as a broiler serviceman. After Harold commenced

his employment with Fieldale, the Londons switched their grower contracts from

Mar-Jac to Fieldale. In 1995, Fieldale terminated Harold’s employment.

The Londons and Fieldale entered into three contracts that governed their

grower arrangement. The contracts are similar in content. Each contract is a

separate agreement for the Londons’ various farms: (1) contract for Green

Meadows No. 1; (2) contract for Green Meadows No. 2; and (3) contract for the

J.W. Peck Farm. The contracts are to run indefinitely or until thirty days after

notice of termination by either party. The contracts also give Fieldale the option

to terminate on only seven days notice when continuing the contractual

relationship would have detrimental effects on Fieldale’s business.

Pursuant to its contracts with the Londons, Fieldale provides them with

broilers, as well as the feed and medication necessary for successful growth. In

return, the Londons are responsible for providing care and oversight for the

broilers during the full term of the growth cycle, which normally lasts for forty to
4

forty-nine days. The Londons’ responsibility is vital to the success of the business

and encompasses a variety of duties, such as maintaining adequate water and

temperature for the baby chicks and “culling” out birds that are behind in growth. 

At the end of the grow-out period, Fieldale crates the broilers and ships them to its

processing plants. After Fieldale delivers the broilers to the processing plants,

Fieldale weighs the birds, crates, and trucks on scales specifically designed to

determine the birds’ live weight.

Fieldale pays its broiler growers based upon a complex formula, primarily

taking into account the weight of the birds upon their arrival at the plant and the

feed consumed by the birds during the grow-out period. Fieldale compares its

growers based upon the cost of producing the finished broilers. This comparison

determines the relative performance of the grower. Fieldale determines the

average cost per pound for all of the birds processed during a one week period. 

Fieldale then determines the cost per pound for each grower whose birds were

processed during that week. Fieldale deducts money from the grower’s check if

his cost is above average, and adds money back to the grower’s check if the cost of

producing the broilers is below average. In other words, Fieldale gives those

growers who are most cost efficient a higher per-pound rate than those growers

who cost Fieldale more money in food and medicine.
 Christine testified that she understood the word “they” to mean Fieldale. [R. Vol. 7 p. 263]. 2

5

As part of its contractual duty to provide technical service, Fieldale assigns

flock supervisors to visit the grower farms on a weekly basis to assist the growers

with the management of the broilers. Fieldale’s flock supervisors are required to

maintain service reports on each grower farm. Fieldale also requires the flock

supervisors to document any problems they find on the grower farms that

endanger the broilers’ welfare. 

In 1997, Harold gave a deposition in a lawsuit against Fieldale. In that case,

an African-American prospective chicken grower alleged that Fieldale denied him

a contract to grow chickens because of his race. Fieldale had never contracted

with an African-American grower. In his deposition, Harold testified that his

supervisor, Doug Hatley, made racially derogatory comments. After Harold’s

testimony, the Londons allege that they began to notice that their flock supervisor

was increasingly critical of their farm management. The Londons contend that in

the spring of 1998, the flock supervisor checked on the Green Meadows No. 2

Farm and informed Christine that if they were not above average on the present

flock then “they” would terminate the grower contract. When the flock came in 2

below average, Fieldale stopped delivering broilers to the farm. Later, another

flock supervisor told the Londons that the remaining two farms would only get
 Gumboro, or infectious bursal disease, is a viral disease that attacks young broiler chickens,

3

usually between 18 and 26 days of age. The disease attacks the immune system, particularly the B

cells, which produce antibodies. [R. Vol. 6 p. 179-81].

6

one more bunch of birds. The Londons assert that the last flocks Fieldale

delivered were infected with a disease known as gumboro.3

B. Procedural History

On November 20, 2001, the Londons filed suit against Fieldale asserting

claims under the PSA for wrongful termination of their poultry growing contracts,

alleging that the termination was without economic justification and in retaliation

for Harold London’s testimony in a racial discrimination lawsuit against Fieldale. 

The Londons asserted a PSA misweighing claim, alleging that Fieldale failed to

transport promptly the Londons’ birds after loading and failed immediately to

weigh the birds upon arrival at the processing plant. The Londons also asserted

state law claims for breach of contract and fraud. After discovery, Fieldale filed a

motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion for summary

judgment on the Londons’ contention that Fieldale provided them with

substandard chicks in retaliation for Harold’s testimony in the race discrimination

lawsuit; on the Londons’ claim that Fieldale improperly failed to make fuel weight

adjustments on the flocks from the Green Meadows Farms; on two other vague

weighing claims; on the Londons’ retaliation claim; and on the Londons’ prompt
7

weighing and transportation claim. The case proceeded to trial with the following

issues presented to the jury: (1) whether Fieldale violated the PSA in terminating

the Londons’ poultry growing contracts without economic justification; (2)

whether Fieldale violated the PSA by failing to make a fuel weight adjustment on

the flocks from the J.W. Peck Farm; (3) whether Fieldale violated the PSA by

failing to make a wet bird adjustment to the weight of the flocks; and (4) whether

Fieldale breached its contract with the Londons or defrauded the Londons by

sending them settlement documents containing inaccurate weights.

After the Londons presented their case, Fieldale moved for a judgment as a

matter of law on all claims. The district court granted the motion on the Londons’

state law claims, on any PSA wet bird claim that arose prior to November 20,

1997, and on each PSA fuel adjustment claim except for those related to the J.W.

Peck Farm. The district court reserved ruling on the termination claim. At the

close of the evidence, Fieldale renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law

as to the post-November 20, 1997, wet birds claims, the J.W. Peck Farm fuel

adjustment claim, and the PSA termination claim. The district court denied the

motion, again reserving consideration of the motion as to the PSA termination

claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Londons on their termination

claim and awarded them $164,000.00. The jury also returned a verdict for the
8

Londons on the wet bird claim, awarding them $225.00, and on the fuel

adjustment claim, awarding them $32.00. After trial, Fieldale filed a renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, a motion for a new

trial. The district court entered an order granting Fieldale’s motion for judgment

as a matter of law on the Londons’ termination claim, setting aside $164,000.00 of

the judgment. The Londons timely appealed.

ISSUES

1. Whether the district court properly granted Fieldale’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the Londons’ PSA termination claim because the

Londons did not show that the termination had an adverse effect on competition.

2. Whether the district court properly granted Fieldale’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the Londons’ state law claims for breach of

contract and fraud.

3. Whether the district court properly granted Fieldale’s motion for

summary judgment on the Londons’ PSA retaliation claim.

4. Whether the district court properly granted Fieldale’s motion for

summary judgment on the Londons’ PSA improper weighing claims.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
9

This court reviews de novo the district court’s order granting a party’s

motion for judgment as a matter of law. Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d

1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). “A judgment as a matter of law is warranted only

‘[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no

legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on

that issue.’” U.S.S.E.C. v. Ginsburg, 362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). This court also reviews de novo the district

court’s order granting summary judgment, applying the same legal standards that

governed the district court’s decision. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of

Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Provision

At issue in this case is Section 202 of the PSA which provides that:

It shall be unlawful for any packer or swine contractor with respect to

livestock, meats, meat food products, or livestock products in

unmanufactured form, or for any live poultry dealer with respect to

live poultry, to:

(a) Engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory,

or deceptive practice or device; or

(b) Make or give any undue or unreasonable preference

or advantage to any particular person or locality in any

respect, or subject any particular person or locality to any
10

undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any

respect; or

(c) Sell or otherwise transfer to or for any other packer,

swine contractor, or any live poultry dealer, or buy or

otherwise receive from or for any other packer, swine

contractor, or any live poultry dealer, any article for the

purpose or with the effect of apportioning the supply

between any such persons, if such apportionment has the

tendency or effect of restraining commerce or of creating

a monopoly; or

(d) Sell or otherwise transfer to or for any other person,

or buy or otherwise receive from or for any other person,

any article for the purpose or with the effect of

manipulating or controlling prices, or of creating a

monopoly in the acquisition of, buying, selling, or

dealing in, any article, or of restraining commerce; or

(e) Engage in any course of business or do any act for the

purpose or with the effect of manipulating or controlling

prices, or of creating a monopoly in the acquisition of,

buying, selling, or dealing in, any article, or of

restraining commerce; or

(f) Conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any other

person (1) to apportion territory for carrying on business,

or (2) to apportion purchases or sales of any article, or

(3) to manipulate or control prices; or

(g) Conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any other

person to do, or aid or abet the doing of, any act made

unlawful by subdivisions (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of this

section.

7 U.S.C. § 192 (2004).
There is no question that Fieldale is a “poultry dealer” under the PSA. A “live poultry

4

dealer” is “any person engaged in the business of obtaining live poultry by purchase or under a

poultry growing arrangement for the purpose of either slaughtering it or selling it for slaughter by

another.” 7 U.S.C. § 182(10).

11

The PSA was enacted in 1921 “to comprehensively regulate packers,

stockyards, marketing agents and dealers.” Hays Livestock Comm’n Co. v. Maly

Livestock Comm’n Co., 498 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir. 1974). At the time Congress

enacted the PSA, “[t]he chief evil feared [was] the monopoly of the packers,

enabling them unduly and arbitrarily to lower prices to the shipper, who sells, and

unduly and arbitrarily to increase the price to the consumer, who buys.” Stafford

v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 514-15, 42 S. Ct. 397, 401 (1922). “Section 202 of the

original Act made it unlawful for any ‘packer’ to engage in any anticompetitive,

monopolistic, discriminatory, or deceptive practices.” United States v. Perdue

Farms, Inc., 680 F.2d 277, 281 (2nd Cir. 1982). In 1935, Congress amended the

PSA to include “live poultry dealers and handlers,” see id. at 280-82, and later

included swine contractors. The PSA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to

enjoin violations of Section 202(a) by packers and swine contractors. See 7

U.S.C. § 193. The PSA does not, however, authorize the Secretary to enjoin

violations by live poultry dealers. See id. Persons injured as a result of a 4

violation by a live poultry dealer may bring an action in federal district court to
12

recover “the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation.” 

7 U.S.C. § 209(a).

B. Issues

1. Section 202(a) requires an anti-competitive effect.

The Londons contend that the district court erred in granting Fieldale’s

motion for judgment as a matter of law on their PSA termination claim because

Fieldale terminated their grower contracts without sufficient economic

justification in violation of 7 U.S.C. § § 192(a) and (b). Section 192(a) prohibits

packers from engaging in or using any “unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or

deceptive practice or device.” 7 U.S.C. § 192(a). Section 192(b) prohibits packers

from subjecting “any particular person or locality to any undue or unreasonable

prejudice or disadvantage in any respect.” 7 U.S.C. § 192(b). The statute does not

define what constitutes an “unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practice.” 

The Londons and amicus United States Department of Agriculture (“DOA”)

contend that the plain language of the statute, the purpose of the PSA, and the

DOA’s interpretation all indicate that in order to prove that any practice is “unfair”

under § 202(a), it is not necessary to prove predatory intent, competitive injury, or

likelihood of injury. Fieldale and amicus National Chicken Council counter that

the district court properly determined that plaintiffs must show that the unfair,
13

discriminatory or deceptive practice adversely affected competition in order to

prevail under the PSA. This is an issue of first impression for our circuit.

“As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words

of the[] statute[] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve.” Norfolk

Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30,

36, 104 S. Ct. 304, 307 (1983) (quotation and citation omitted); see also United

States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441, 443 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that “this court’s

task is to construe the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve”). 

Along those lines, courts have construed the PSA “against the backdrop of

corruption the Act was intended to prevent.” Philson v. Cold Creek Farms, 947 F.

Supp. 197, 200 (E.D. N.C. 1996). The primary purpose of the PSA was “to assure

fair competition and fair trade practices in livestock marketing and in the

meatpacking industry.” H.R. Rep. No. 85-1048 at p.1 (1958) reprinted in 1958

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5212, 5213. At the time of enactment, the chief evil Congress

feared was the monopoly of the packers. Stafford, 258 U.S. at 514-15, 42 S. Ct. at

401. The Act “was aimed at halting ‘a general course of action for the purpose of

destroying competition.’” Armour & Co. v. United States, 402 F.2d 712, 720 (7th

Cir. 1968) (quoting House Report No. 1297, 66th Cong. 3d Sess. (1921), p. 11). 

Relying upon the PSA’s antitrust ancestry, several courts have held that
The Londons and the Government rely on Wilson for their contention that Section 202(a)

5

does not require an adverse effect on competition. However, as the district court noted, Wilson did

not abdicate the need for a competitive injury. The Armour court held that “the Wilson case does

not support the . . . view that neither intent nor some kind of competitive injury is necessary for the

operation of Section 202(a).” Armour, 402 F.2d at 718.

14

only those unfair, discriminatory or deceptive practices adversely affecting

competition are prohibited by the PSA. See Farrow v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.2d

211, 214 (8th Cir. 1985); Pacific Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367, 369-

70 (7th Cir. 1976); Armour & Co., 402 F.2d at 722-23; Griffin v. Smithfield Foods,

Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 824, 827 (E.D. Va. 2002); Cold Creek Farm, 947 F. Supp. at

200; see also Philson v. Goldsboro Milling Co., 164 F.3d 625, No. 96-2542, 96-

2631, 1998 WL 709324, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1998) (finding that the district

court did not err in instructing the jury that the plaintiffs were required to prove

that the defendants’ conduct was likely to adversely affect competition in order to

prevail on their claims under the PSA and noting that the plaintiff must establish

that the challenged act is likely to produce the type of injury that the Act was

designed to prevent). But see Spencer Livestock Comm’n Co. v. Dep’t of Agric.,

841 F.2d 1451, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1988); Wilson & Co. v. Benson, 286 F.2d 891,

895-96 (7th Cir. 1961). We join those circuits that hold that in order to succeed 5

on a claim under the PSA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s unfair,
15

discriminatory or deceptive practice adversely affects or is likely to adversely

affect competition. 

The Armour decision is instructive on this issue. In Armour, the Seventh

Circuit considered the legislative history of the PSA and noted its antitrust roots. 

The court inferred that the PSA might be broader than antecedent antitrust

legislation, but found that “there [was] no showing that there was any intent to

give the Secretary of Agriculture complete and unbridled discretion to regulate the

operations of packers.” 402 F.2d at 722. The court reasoned:

Section 202(a) should be read liberally enough to take care of the

types of anti-competitive practices properly deemed ‘unfair’ by the

Federal Trade Commission (15 U.S.C. § 45) and also to reach any of

the special mischiefs and injuries inherent in livestock and poultry

traffic. However, in Section 202(a) Congress gave the Secretary no

mandate to ignore the general outline of long-time antitrust policy by

condemning practices which are neither deceptive nor injurious to

competition nor intended to be so by the party charged.

Id.

Recognizing that Section 202(a) “authorize[s] the Secretary of Agriculture

to regulate anticompetitive trade practices in the livestock and meat industry,” the

Eighth Circuit held that “[a] practice is ‘unfair’ . . . if it injures or is likely to injure

competition.” Farrow, 760 F.2d at 214. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that,

at the very least, Section 202(a) requires “a reasonable likelihood that . . . the
16

result [of a practice] will be an undue restraint of competition.” De Jong Packing

Co. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 618 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1980). The

Fourth Circuit likewise has held that a Section 202(a) plaintiff must establish at

least “the likelihood that an arrangement will result in competitive injury.”

Philson v. Goldsboro Milling Co., 1998 WL 709324, at *4 (quotation omitted).

Policy considerations also weigh in our decision-making. We note that

elimination of a competitive impact requirement would subvert the policy

justifications for the PSA’s adoption. As the Armour court noted, the main

Congressional motivation for the PSA’s passage was the need for “specialized

regulation of the many-tiered packing industry, with its unique problems.” 

Armour, 402 F.2d at 721. Thus, Congress selected the Secretary as overseer, but

established some restrictions with regard to the Secretary’s authority. “Congress

gave the Secretary no mandate to ignore the general outline of long-time antitrust

policy by condemning practices which are neither deceptive nor injurious to

competition nor intended to be so by the party charged.” Id. at 722. Eliminating

the competitive impact requirement would ignore the long-time antitrust policies

which formed the backbone of the PSA’s creation. Failure to require a

competitive impact showing would subject dealers to liability under the PSA for
 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). 6

17

simple breach of contract or for justifiably terminating a contract with a grower

who has failed to perform as promised. 

Moreover, we do not give Chevron deference to the Secretary’s

6

interpretation of Section 202(a). This court gives Chevron deference to agency

interpretations of regulations promulgated pursuant to congressional authority. 

NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.

Ct. 413, 421 (1987). The PSA does not delegate authority to the Secretary to

adjudicate alleged violations of Section 202 by live poultry dealers. See 7 U.S.C.

§ 193(a). Congress left that task exclusively to the federal courts. See Jackson v.

Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1452, 1456-57 (8th Cir. 1995). The absence of such

delegation compels courts to afford no Chevron deference to the Secretary’s

construction of Section 202(a). See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.

218, 226-27, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2171 (2001) (stating that “administrative

implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference

when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make

rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming

deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”). Because Congress

plainly intended to prohibit “only those unfair, discriminatory or deceptive
 We note that the Government contends that the Secretary “has consistently interpreted the 7

[PSA] to prohibit all unfair practices, regardless of whether those practices cause a competitive

injury.” Gov’t. Brief p. 10. In support of this “consistent view,” the Government relies on one

agency decision: In re Ozark County Cattle Co., 49 Agric. Dec. 336 (1990). We do not consider one

agency decision to establish a “consistent view;” rather, this one agency decision only supports the

Government’s litigating position.

 We decline to adopt a disjunctive test for proving Section 202(a) violations:

8

anticompetitive injury or predatory intent. We decline such a test because the Londons failed to

preserve the question of predatory intent for appellate review. They did not argue in the district court

that their case was a special circumstances case from which predatory intent could be inferred.

Because the question of predatory intent was not preserved for appeal, we deem it to be abandoned.

See Rogero v. B.M. Noone, 704 F.2d 518, 520 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983). However, assuming arguendo

that we did adopt a disjunctive test for proving Section 202(a) violations, the Londons still would

not prevail in this case. At trial, they did not present any evidence of Fieldale’s alleged predatory

intent in terminating the grower contracts.

18

practices adversely affecting competition,” see Philson, 947 F. Supp. at 200, a

contrary interpretation of Section 202(a) deserves no deference. See

Heimmermann v. First Union Mortgage Corp., 305 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir.

2002) (“No deference is to be given to an agency interpretation that is at odds with

the plain meaning of the statute being interpreted.”), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 970,

123 S. Ct. 2641 (2003).7

In conclusion, we hold that in order to prevail under the PSA, a plaintiff

must show that the defendant’s deceptive or unfair practice adversely affects

competition or is likely to adversely affect competition. Therefore, the district 8

court properly granted Fieldale’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

Londons’ PSA termination claim because the Londons did not present any
 The Londons based their claim on their contention that Fieldale wrongfully terminated their 9

contract because Harold testified in a race discrimination case against Fieldale. From this, the

Londons asserted that the jury could infer an anticompetitive effect; i.e., the growers would not

complain about any adverse Fieldale business practice for fear that Fieldale would terminate their

contracts. For the reasons stated in our opinion, the district court properly granted summary

judgment on the Londons’ retaliation claim. They did not present any evidence that Fieldale

retaliated against them after Harold testified in the discrimination lawsuit. Because the Londons did

not present any evidence to support their claim of retaliation, the jury could not infer that such a

deceptive, unfair practice (termination of contracts in retaliation for Harold’s testimony) had an

anticompetitive effect. 

19

evidence at trial that Fieldale’s termination of their grower contracts adversely

affected or was likely to adversely affect competition. The Londons did not

present any evidence as to the total number of chicken growers or buyers in the

north Georgia area. The Londons did not present any evidence regarding the

percentage of the chicken market Fieldale controlled. Furthermore, the Londons

did not present any evidence of their or Fieldale’s relative stature within the

chicken industry. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting

Fieldale’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Londons’ PSA

termination claim.9

2. Judgment as a Matter of Law was proper on state law claims.

The Londons claimed that Fieldale breached the broiler contracts by

providing poor quality and sick birds, failing to weigh the chickens accurately, and

failing to provide sufficient medication and vaccinations for the flocks. The

Londons did not support their claim with any reference to a specific contract
20

provision that they allege Fieldale breached. At the close of the Londons’ case,

the district court granted Fieldale’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

breach of contract claim. The district court did not err in so ruling. The broiler

contracts only obligated Fieldale to provide to the grower the “necessary feed,

vaccines, medications, and boot wash supplies” for raising the birds to processing

age. [Plaintiff’s Ex. 36]. Contrary to the Londons’ assertion, Fieldale did not

have a specific contractual duty to vaccinate the birds for gumboro prior to

delivery. In sum, as the district court found, the Londons did not present any

evidence to support their breach of contract claim. [R. Vol. 8 p. 468].

The Londons alleged that Fieldale supplied them with settlement statements

that Fieldale knew to be false, and they relied on those statements in accepting the

sums Fieldale paid for the broilers. The Londons claimed they were damaged as a

result of their reliance on these false settlement statements. At the close of the

Londons’ case, the district court granted Fieldale’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law on the Londons’ fraud claim. The district court correctly found that

there was no evidence of an affirmative act or injury to support the Londons’ fraud

claim. Furthermore, the Londons proffered no evidence from which a jury could

calculate any alleged loss with reasonable certainty. See Brooks v. Dime Saving

Bank of New York, 457 S.E. 2d 706, 708 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a
21

plaintiff must show that he has been damaged and he must “establish the amount

of [his] damages by providing the factfinder with evidence from which it can

calculate the amount of loss with reasonable certainty”). Accordingly, the district

court properly granted Fieldale’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

Londons’ state law breach of contract and fraud claims.

3. Summary Judgment was proper on PSA retaliation claim.

The Londons argue that the district court improperly granted Fieldale’s

motion for summary judgment on their PSA retaliation claim. The Londons

contend that they presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that

because of Harold’s adverse testimony in the racial discrimination case, Fieldale

retaliated against the Londons by terminating their grower contracts. The

Londons claim that they presented evidence that their flock performance was

average prior to Harold’s testimony; that after his testimony, their flock

supervisors became increasingly critical on their service reports; that the Londons’

chick quality declined and Fieldale delivered sick birds; and that the Londons

were not Fieldale’s worse performing growers when Fieldale terminated their

contracts.

The district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the

Londons’ PSA retaliation claim. The Londons failed to provide any evidence of
22

causation: that Fieldale terminated their contracts because of Harold’s testimony in

the racial discrimination. First, the evidence shows that for the flocks where the

ages of the supplying hens are available, all of the Londons’ chicks came from

hens between 26 and 66 weeks old, which is within industry age standards. Thus,

the Londons had no evidence to support their assertion that Fieldale was

purposefully supplying them with substandard chicks. Moreover, the Londons

failed to show that they were singled out to receive poor chicks as a form of

retaliation. See Philson, 947 F. Supp. at 201-02 (noting that providing low quality

birds can violate the PSA when it is done for an illegal reason, but requiring some

proof that the illegal reason was the motivation behind the decision to supply the

substandard birds).

Second, the evidence shows that the Londons’ production declined

significantly in 1997 and 1998. Of their 35 flocks in that time period, only nine

were above average. Thus, the Londons’ below average flocks during that time

frame support Fieldale’s assertion that it terminated the contract with the Londons

due to sub-standard performance. In sum, the Londons did not present any

evidence showing a causal connection between the contract termination and

Harold London’s testimony. Hence, the district court did not err in granting

Fieldale’s motion for summary judgment on the Londons’ PSA retaliation claim.
23

4. Summary Judgment was proper on PSA misweighing claims.

The Londons argue that the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to Fieldale on their misweighing claims for the loss of fuel weight in

transit of the birds from their Green Meadows No. 1 Farm and their Green

Meadows No. 2 Farm. The two contracts that cover these farms both provided

that the weighing procedure would not include any adjustment for vehicle fuel

used during transportation. The Londons do not provide any case law to indicate

that two contracting parties would violate the PSA by inserting a provision

regarding whether fuel usage would be considered during the weighing process. 

Instead, they rely on a regulation promulgated by the Grain, Inspection, and

Packers and Stockyards Administration, pursuant to the PSA, that requires that

poultry growers be paid based on the actual weight of the live poultry. See 9

C.F.R. § 201.55.

Congress passed the PSA to protect farmers and growers, but Congress did

not intend for the PSA to supplant the “traditional principles of freedom of

contract.” Jackson, 53 F.3d at 1458. The Londons presented no evidence that

they did not enter into these contract voluntarily, and throughout most of their

growing relationship with Fieldale, the Londons never complained about the

weighing of the birds. Moreover, we find the Londons’ reliance on the regulation
24

to be unavailing because that section notes that any adjustment to the actual

weight shall be explained on any statements. Fieldale did just that: it inserted

contractual provisions in their grower contracts informing the Londons that no

fuel adjustment would be made at weigh-in. Accordingly, the district court

properly granted summary judgment to Fieldale on the Londons’ fuel adjustment

claims on their grower contracts for the Green Meadows Farms. 

CONCLUSION

In deciding the question whether Section 202(a) of the PSA requires a

showing of anti-competitive effect, we are guided by the PSA’s antitrust ancestry,

case law, and policy considerations in holding that in order to prevail under the

PSA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s “unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or

deceptive practices” either had an adverse economic impact or were likely to

produce an adverse economic impact. To hold otherwise would subvert the

purpose of the PSA. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting

judgment as a matter of law on the Londons’ PSA termination claim. We also

affirm the district court’s orders granting judgment as a matter of law to Fieldale

on the Londons’ state law claims, and granting summary judgment to Fieldale on

the Londons’ PSA retaliation and misweighing claims.

AFFIRMED.
25