UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 

 Plaintiff, Criminal Action No. 14-20417 

 Honorable Victoria A. Roberts 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

D-1 THOMAS MACKEY, 

D-2 KENNETH GREEN, 

D-3 ALAN CLEMONS, 

D-4 JOHN FAYAD, 

D-5 DOUGLAS DEMARIA, 

D-6 URBAN HOTTS, 

D-7 THEODORE LASATER, 

D-8 JOSEPH MELCHER, 

D-9 DAVID MILAZZO, 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY DEFENDANT KENNETH GREEN’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE BECAUSE OF FAILURE 

TO ESTABLISH AN ADEQUATE SHOWING OF NECESSITY [106] 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

 Before the Court for a Report and Recommendation is Defendant Kenneth Green’s 

Motion to Suppress Electronic Surveillance Because of the Failure to Establish an Adequate 

Showing of Necessity [106], in which all other Defendants have joined [108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 

114, 116, 134]. The government filed a response to the motion on March 12, 2015, and Green 

filed a reply. [149, 155]. Having reviewed the parties’ filings, the Court dispenses with oral 

argument pursuant to E.D. Mich. LCrR 12.1(a) and E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). 

 For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motion to suppress 

[106] be denied. 

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II. REPORT 

 A. Background 

 In this criminal case, Defendants Thomas Mackey, Kenneth Green, Alan Clemons, John 

Fayad, Douglas Demaria, Urban Hotts, Theodore Lasater, Joseph Melcher, and David Milazzo 

were indicted on charges related to their alleged participation in an illegal gambling operation. 

More specifically, they are charged with violating (1) 18 U.S.C. § 371 – Conspiracy to Commit 

Offenses Against the United States (to wit, to conduct an illegal gambling business; to engage in 

the business of betting and wagering and knowingly use a wire communication facility for the 

transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets and wagers and information assisting in 

the placing of bets and wagers of any sporting contest; and to use the mail or any facility in 

interstate or foreign commerce to distribute the proceeds of an unlawful activity, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1955, 1084, and 1952); and (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1955 – Illegal Gambling Business. 

 Defendants have moved to suppress electronic surveillance which the government 

obtained pursuant to four Title III wiretap applications – an initial one and three extensions –

which were approved by the Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds on September 7, 2012, October 10, 

2012, November 8, 2012, and January 29, 2013, respectively.1

 Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Special Agent Marc A. Silski submitted each of the applications and accompanying affidavits in 

support. The question before this Court is whether Silski’s affidavits provided sufficient 

information to satisfy the “necessity” requirement for approving wiretap applications.2

 

 

1

 Defendants specifically challenge only the initial and first two extensions. [106 at 1, 13-16]. 

However, they do argue that “[t]he original and each succeeding Affidavit are inadequate,” [id.

at 18,] and the government has provided the Court with all four affidavits. Accordingly, the 

Court will address all four affidavits in this Report and Recommendation. 

2

 Defendants do not challenge whether the affidavits in question provided probable cause for the 

Title III wiretaps, and the Court will not address that issue. [106 at 4]. 

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 B. Applicable Law 

 “Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 

2510–2520 (the “Act”), has established a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of 

government electronic surveillance, prohibiting all secret interception of communications except 

as authorized by the courts in response to applications from law enforcement officials.” United 

States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 90 (6th Cir. 1985). One provision in that Act provides that a 

wiretap application must contain: 

 ... a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative 

procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be 

unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 

18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). While this provision is known as the “necessity” requirement, as the 

Sixth Circuit has explained, 

... the purpose of the necessity requirement “is not to foreclose electronic 

surveillance until every other imaginable method of investigation has been 

unsuccessfully attempted, but simply to inform the issuing judge of the 

difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques.” 

United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 539 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 

Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir. 1977)). See also United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 

305 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In endeavoring to secure a wiretap warrant, the government need not prove 

the impossibility of other means of obtaining information. Instead, the necessity provisions 

merely require that law enforcement officials ‘give serious consideration to the non-wiretap 

techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and that the court be informed of the reasons 

for the investigators’ belief that such non-wiretap techniques have been or will likely be 

inadequate.’” (quoting Lambert, 771 F.2d at 91)). In short, “the court may grant the [Title III 

application] if it determines [from the affidavit presented to it] that ‘normal investigative 

procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried 

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or to be too dangerous.’” Lambert, 771 F.2d at 91 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c)). The 

provisions do not require a showing that investigators have “exhaust[ed] every conceivable nonwiretap investigative technique.” Id.3

 

 “A wiretap authorization order is presumed proper and the defendants have the burden of 

overcoming that presumption.” United States v. Darrah, 2014 WL 5311534, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 

Oct. 17, 2014). A court reviewing the validity of an electronic surveillance order must accord 

“great deference” to the issuing judge’s determination, and “the fact that a later trial judge or 

reviewing court may feel that a different conclusion was appropriate does not require, nor even 

authorize, the suppression of evidence gained through such a warrant.” Corrado, 227 F.3d at 

539 (quoting United States v. Alfano, 838 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir.1988)). 

C. Analysis4

 i. The Initial Application and Affidavit 

 The government contends that Silski’s initial affidavit “set forth the extent of evidence 

 

3

 In light of the Sixth Circuit’s clear interpretation of the statutes in question, the Court rejects 

Defendants’ argument that the government must show “exhaustion” of all or any particular 

investigative procedures before a wiretap application may be approved. [106 at 17]. 

4 As a preliminary matter, the Court declines to conduct an evidentiary hearing with respect to 

the instant motion. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978), a defendant is 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he makes a “substantial preliminary showing” that a 

“false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was 

included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to 

the finding of probable cause.” See also United States v. Mastromatteo, 538 F.3d 535, 545 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (defendant must “make[ ] a substantial preliminary showing” of false statements in 

affidavit to warrant holding an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 574 

(6th Cir. 2006) (the “burden is on the defendant to show such falsehoods in the affidavit”). 

Defendants’ motion makes no such showing, but merely argues that the affidavit in question 

failed to establish the “necessity” for a wiretap. See also U.S. v. Watson, 2011 WL 1565798, at 

*8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 25, 2011) (declining to hold a Franks hearing on motion to suppress based 

on alleged failure to show necessity where Defendant had not sufficiently identified intentionally 

false statements). Thus, the motion poses a strictly legal question that can be resolved by 

evaluating “the information presented in the four corners of the affidavit[s].” United States v. 

Jackson, 470 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2006). 

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collected in the investigation at the time of the application and the reasons why continued use of 

traditional investigative techniques would likely fail to uncover the true scope of the crime under 

investigation – a telephonic and internet-based gambling conspiracy.” [149 at 10]. The Court 

concurs with that statement, and finds that Silski’s affidavit satisfied the Act’s “necessity” 

requirement. 

 Silski’s affidavit begins by describing the offenses being investigated, including 18 

U.S.C. § 1084, which makes it illegal for a person “engaged in the business of betting or 

wagering” to “knowingly use[] a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or 

foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on 

any sporting event or contest...” 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a); Aff. at ¶3. The affidavit identifies the 

persons whose communications are being sought, two of whom – Thomas Mackey and Kenneth 

Green – are defendants in this case. Aff. at ¶¶2-3. The affidavit spends about two pages 

describing “The Detroit La Cosa Nostra,” which information the Defendants argue was 

improperly included “to create some mystique of dangerousness and divert attention from 

[Silski’s] obligation to overcome the statutory presumption against wiretapping.” Id. at ¶¶11-13. 

While the three paragraphs related to the Detroit La Cosa Nostra Family may not contain the

most germane information in the affidavit, they far from unfairly tainted it. Indeed, one of the 

affidavit’s targets is identified as a member (who holds the rank of capo) of the Detroit La Cosa 

Nostra Family, Aff. at ¶¶12, 20, and later in the affidavit, Silski avers that “all of the informants 

[with whom agents spoke] have stated that they are afraid of bodily harm to either themselves or 

members of their families if their identities are revealed.” Id. at ¶150; see also infra at 8. The 

affidavit contains other factual references linking the Detroit La Cosa Nostra Family to one of 

the targets and target offenses. E.g., Aff. at ¶28. 

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 The affidavit then discusses various alternative forms of investigative techniques to wire 

intercepts. First, the affidavit discusses the information received from four confidential human 

sources (“CHS”), identified as FBI-1, 2, 3 and 4, and an informant identified by name. Aff. at 

¶¶25-69. Generally speaking, the affidavit recounts information provided by the five individuals 

which link the targets of the investigation to the target offenses. Id. FBI-1 reported to Silski that 

he “witnessed [Defendant] Mackey take bets on [one of the target telephones],” and that even 

though “most bettors place bets on websites utilized by their bookmaker, [they] still need to 

telephonically contact bookmakers to either raise their credit limit on the website, or place a bet 

on a sport they typically do not bet on.” Id. at ¶41. 

 Silski’s affidavit then described physical surveillance which had taken place, much of 

which was from a 2007-2010 undercover investigation conducted by the Eastpointe Police 

Department. Id. at ¶¶70-89. The undercover officer (“UCO”) reported that Mackey agreed to 

serve as his bookie, and instructed the UCO as to how bets were to be made. Id. at ¶70. Mackey 

provided the UCO with his own telephone number, as well as two numbers for an associate of 

his, Ronald Yourofsky, who died two years into the undercover investigation. Id. at ¶¶70-74. 

 Silski’s affidavit next described the use of telephone toll and pen register information in 

the investigation. Id. at ¶¶90-122. The information showed numerous calls between the targets 

of the investigation and the target telephones, and an increase in the volume of those calls around 

major sporting events. Id. at ¶¶90-92, 113-117. 

 Finally, Silski listed approximately 20 prior authorized wiretaps (including extensions) 

for many of the same persons who are identified in Special Agent Silski’s instant affidavit. Id. at 

¶¶124-144. Silski averred that monitoring of those wiretaps had ceased as of the date of his 

affidavit. Id. at ¶145. 

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 Silski’s affidavit then made a proffer regarding the “unavailability of alternative 

investigative techniques.” Id. at ¶¶149-161. It is this section that forms the basis for the bulk of 

Defendants’ arguments, including that: (1) “[m]any of [Silski’s] conclusions [regarding 

unavailability] are not predicated upon specific, documented facts but rather on [his and other 

unnamed agents’] ‘experience’ ...” and on purported “self-serving prognostication”; (2) Silski 

“undermines his own claim [by referencing a] lengthy list of potential witnesses” throughout his 

affidavit; and (3) Silski improperly suggested that undercover operations would not be successful 

when they previously had been utilized with some success. 

 The Court will address these arguments in turn, but it should be clear that it does so in 

light of the binding legal authority and standards described above. Supra at 3-4. Thus, the 

Court’s task is not to determine whether Silski’s affidavit showed a complete “exhaustion” of all 

other potential investigative techniques, but rather, whether, giving proper deference to the 

issuing judge’s determination, it is supported by a showing that “the investigators [gave] serious 

consideration to the non-wiretap techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority and that the 

court [was] informed of the reasons for the investigators’ belief that such non-wiretap techniques 

have been or will likely be inadequate.” Lambert, 771 F.2d at 91. 

 Turning to Defendants’ specific arguments, the Court finds that they lack merit. First, 

although it is true that Silski relies on his (and his colleagues’) “experience” in investigating the 

types of alleged illegal operations described in his affidavit, e.g., Aff. at ¶¶ 153, his conclusions 

regarding the unavailability and ineffectiveness of non-wire tap investigation methods are far 

from conclusory “self-serving prognostications.” Rather, Silski supported his conclusions with 

specific information and details. Silski’s discussion of his conclusion that attempting to infiltrate 

Defendant Mackey’s alleged operation would be ineffective is a good example. Far from simply 

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referring to his own general “experience,” Silski referenced “the clandestine nature by which the 

subjects conduct their activities, the close-knit relationship of the participants, and their distrust 

of strangers.” Aff. at ¶153. Silski stated that although the “Detroit Division of the FBI has 

attempted to infiltrate gambling houses in the Detroit area; this technique will not assist in the 

infiltration of an illegal sports bookmaking operation, which is usually conducted by telephone 

and computers.” Id.5

 And, while Silski stated that the Eastpointe Police Department “had some 

success placing wagers with Mackey’s bookmaking operation,” he noted that the undercover 

operation failed to uncover the scope of Mackey’s operation.” Id. (emphasis added). Silski also 

averred that, “All of the CHS’s referred to [in his affidavit] have stated that even if immunized 

from prosecution and given protective custody, they would be unwilling to testify concerning 

[the targets and target offenses]. Furthermore, all of the informants have stated that they are 

afraid of bodily harm to either themselves or members of their families if their identities are 

revealed.” Id. at ¶150. The affidavit provides other concrete information that is consistent with 

the fears expressed by the CHS’s; when the UCO reported to Defendant Mackey that he was 

having difficulty collecting money from another bettor who owed money to Mackey, Mackey 

asked the UCO, “Why don’t you go ball bat him,” which Silski interpreted as “encouraging the 

UCO to engage in an act of violence, or threaten an act of violence, with a baseball bat to obtain 

the money owed to Mackey...” Id. at ¶76.6

 In sum, far from being mere “self-serving 

 

5

 The affidavit’s multiple references to Mackey and others using the telephone to conduct the 

gambling operation further underscores the necessity of utilizing a wiretap as part of the 

investigation. E.g., Aff. at ¶41 (FBI-1 “witnessed Mackey take bets on the telephone...”); see 

Landmesser, 553 F.2d at 20 (“wiretapping is particularly appropriate when the telephone is 

routinely relied on to conduct the criminal enterprise under investigation.”) (quoting United 

States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1975)). 

6

 Defendants’ argument that the affidavit’s identification of one informant by name “impeaches 

[Silski’s] claims of danger, violence and inability to investigate” is not persuasive. [106 at 9]. 

The affidavit does not indicate that the named informant knew or considered whether his name 

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prognostication,” Silski’s conclusions were supported by specific details and information. 

 Second, the Court disagrees that by referencing a “lengthy list of potential witnesses” in 

his affidavit, Silski “undermines his own claim” that “a grand jury could not likely ‘unearth’ the 

illegal activities of [the targets].” [106 at 7]. Here, Defendants are referring to Paragraph 158 of 

Silski’s affidavit, which provides: 

The prospects of conducting a successful grand jury investigation at this 

time, to unearth the illegal activities of the conspirators are poor...at this 

time, there is not enough evidence in the government’s possession 

concerning the criminal associates of [the targets] and/or the details of 

their operation for a grand jury investigation [] to be effective. 

Furthermore, such a grand jury investigation would likely alert the [targets 

of] this pending investigation and thereby cause them to alter their modus 

operandi, thereby frustrating the operation. 

Aff. at ¶158. Thus, Silski articulated valid reasons why the grand jury could not simply call to 

testify the various “potential witnesses” referenced by Defendants, and Defendants proffered no 

information which would show Silski’s concerns to be unfounded.7

 

 Finally, Defendants’ argument that Silski improperly suggested that undercover 

operations would not be successful when they were utilized previously lacks merit. Silski 

indicated that investigators had “given thorough consideration to attempting to infiltrate the 

gambling operation,” but concluded that such method was unlikely to succeed. Aff. at ¶153. As 

 

would become public. And, even if that one individual did not fear being outed as an informant, 

that would not disprove that other informants expressed fear and refused to testify. 

7

 Silski also proffered that, “Interviews of individuals involved with the illegal gambling 

activities under investigation would not be feasible at this time, inasmuch as any individual 

identified (e.g., bettors), would likely fear bodily harm to himself or his family, and would be 

unlikely to have knowledge of the upper echelon responsible for the operation.” Id. at ¶159. See 

also, id. at ¶151 (“Interviews with any of the [] subjects or their associates concerning [the 

alleged criminal activity] would alert the suspects, both known and unknown, of this pending 

investigation and result in frustration of the instant investigation and possibly the destruction of 

evidence.”). 

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noted above, supra at 7-8, Silski gave detailed reasons supporting his conclusion, and the 

Defendants have not shown any of those reasons to be pretextual.8

 

 The Court also rejects Defendants’ reliance on cases like United States v. Gonzalez, 412 

F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2001). In 

Blackmon, a government agent submitted a necessity affidavit to conduct electronic surveillance 

against an initial narcotics trafficking suspect, Maurice Miller. In that affidavit, the agent 

averred that numerous attempts to use traditional surveillance to investigate Miller had failed. 

That averment was accurate as to Miller. However, six weeks after obtaining the Miller wiretap, 

the government submitted a “carbon copy” necessity affidavit against a second target, Rodney 

Blackmon. Blackmon, 273 F.3d at 1208. Thus, the Blackmon affidavit, on its face, raised 

concerns as to whether the proffered facts supporting the claimed necessity as to him were 

truthful. Importantly, “no further investigative efforts were attempted in between the application 

for the Miller wiretap and that for the Blackmon wiretap.” Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the 

Blackmon affidavit’s reference to failed traditional surveillance techniques as to him were 

materially false and “worked to conceal the fact that necessity had not been established” as to 

him. Id. The court also found that, removing those false statements, the affidavit was left with 

only “generalized statements that would be true of any narcotics investigation, [which] fails to 

contain sufficiently specific facts to satisfy the requirements of § 2518(1)(c).” Id. at 1211. Here, 

in contrast, the Defendants do not point to any materially false statement contained in Silski’s 

 

8

 Silski’s affidavit also discussed the shortcomings of other types of surveillance. For instance, 

he explained that physical surveillance was successful in neither identifying all of the persons 

involved in the alleged criminal activity, nor the individuals’ specific roles. Aff. at ¶154. He 

also noted that “Mackey has become surveillance conscious,” and that a recent attempt (and 

more remote ones) yielded “nothing of note to observe ... [as] the operation occurs exclusively 

outside the public view.” Id. He also explained why GPS trackers and pole cameras would be 

ineffective. Id. at ¶¶155-56. 

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affidavit, and Silski’s detailed explanation as to why other investigative methods were or would 

be ineffective can hardly be characterized as “generalized statements.” 

 Similarly, in Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit found the wiretap affidavit in question to be 

invalid because it indicated that the only investigative methods agents had previously attempted 

were “(1) five-days-worth of pen register analysis; (2) an equally short use of trap-and-trace 

analysis; and (3) limited physical surveillance,” and because other unutilized procedures were 

reasonably likely to succeed. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d at 1112-13. Here, in contrast, Silski showed 

that agents had attempted an extremely wide array of non-wiretap investigative procedures, and 

explained their past and likely future shortcomings in terms of aiding the investigation. 

 For all of these reasons, the Court recommends that, as it relates to Silski’s initial 

application and affidavit, Defendants’ motion to suppress be denied. 

 ii. The Extension Requests

 Defendants also argue that the affidavits Silski used to support his requests to extend the 

wiretap authorization fail to establish the “necessity” of continued use of wiretaps. But 

Defendants’ argument rests on a series of incorrect premises. First, Defendants’ suggestion that 

the law imposes an exhaustion “reset” requiring the government to show, anew, that all possible 

other investigative means have been attempted to no avail, is simply an inaccurate statement of 

the law. Just as no such exhaustion requirement exists with an initial wiretap application, see 

supra at 4, “[a]n application for an extension of a wiretap order requires ‘a statement setting 

forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure 

to obtain such results.’” United States v. Gebara, 2010 WL 728556, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 

2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(f)). 

 Second, Defendants’ assertion that investigators did not undertake further traditional 

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investigative techniques after the initial wiretap was authorized is also incorrect. For instance, in 

Special Agent Silski’s first extension affidavit (which, like the other extension requests 

incorporated his prior affidavits), he explained that, in addition to obtaining wiretap evidence, 

investigators “attempted several physical surveillances of [] Mackey.” 1st Ext. Aff. at ¶90. Silski 

went on to describe surveillance of Mackey and other individuals driving to meet locations and 

engaging in apparent brief conversations. E.g., id. at ¶93. As Silski explained later in his 

affidavit, these “observations reveal who is meeting, but not the reason for the meeting, or 

whether anything is being exchanged at the meeting. It is only through a combination of the 

interception of wire communications and the surveillance that [agents] were able to learn the 

nature of the meeting.” Id. at ¶126; see also 2nd Ext. Aff. at ¶111; 3rd Ext. Aff. at ¶150 (“Since 

the cessation of interception on December 7, 2012, physical surveillance has been conducted on 

Mackey on three separate occasions. None of these have yielded any further information 

indicating where Mackey maintains monies to facilitate the gambling operation...[also since that 

time] subpoenas have been issued or returns received for subscriber information from service 

providers. While valuable, subscriber information does not always definitively identify the user 

of a telephone.”). Silski’s extension affidavits thus made clear that while agents were continuing 

to employ non-wiretap investigative methods, “it does not appear that the government could have 

uncovered the full scope of the conspiracy, especially not in a relatively safe manner, without the 

wiretaps.” Gebara, 2010 WL 728556, at *5 (quoting Stewart, 306 F.3d at 306). Importantly, the 

extension affidavits also made clear that the alleged criminal enterprise being investigated 

continued to rely heavily on the telephone to conduct its affairs. 1st Ext. Aff. at ¶¶58-89; 2nd Ext. 

Aff. at ¶¶50-75; 3rd Ext. Aff. at ¶¶39-77. Thus, Landmesser’s reasoning that “wiretapping is 

particularly appropriate when the telephone is routinely relied on to conduct the criminal 

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enterprise under investigation” applies as much to Silski’s extension affidavits as it did to his 

initial affidavit. See Landmesser, 553 F.2d at 20; see also supra, fn. 5. 

 Defendants also incorrectly claim that Silski failed, in his extension affidavits, to analyze 

“the abundant amount of evidence and information acquired in the [intervening periods].” [106 

at 13]. Defendants claim that in the first thirty days after the initial wiretap was approved, “the 

identity of numerous bettors was ascertained,” and argue that before the government could 

establish the “necessity” of continuing the wiretap, it was required to either bring “many or all of 

those bettors, sub books and others” to the grand jury, or send agents to their homes to interview 

them in person. [Id.]. But this argument fails for much the same reason it failed with respect to 

Silski’s initial affidavit; Silski explained the limited information that individual bettors were 

likely to be able to provide agents about the overall gambling operation, and the risk that 

approaching any of them would negatively impact the investigation. See supra at 9; see also 

e.g., 1st Ext. Aff. at ¶130. Silski also explained that “there is not enough evidence in the 

government’s possession concerning the criminal associates [] for a grand jury investigation [] to 

be effective. Furthermore, a grand jury investigation would likely alert the subjects to this 

pending investigation and thereby cause them to alter their modus operandi, thereby frustrating 

the investigation.” 1st Ext. Aff. at ¶129. 

 In sum, Defendants’ characterization of the extension affidavits as providing “the same 

boilerplate, hackneyed, unsupported clichés and conclusions” found in his initial affidavit is not 

a fair description of either the initial or subsequent affidavits’ contents. Rather, Silski’s initial 

and extension affidavits show that the government gave “serious consideration to the nonwiretap techniques prior to applying for wiretap authority” and provided the court reasonably 

detailed information as to why he believed that non-wiretap techniques “have been or will likely 

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be inadequate.’” Lambert, 771 F.2d at 91. Accordingly, Defendants’ instant motion to suppress 

should be denied. 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the aforementioned reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Suppress Electronic Surveillance Because of the Failure to Establish an Adequate Showing of 

Necessity [106] be DENIED. 

Dated: June 5, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir.1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues, but fail 

to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this 

Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.1991); 

Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.1987). Pursuant to 

E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate judge. A 

party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such response should be concise, and 

should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the objections. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

via email addresses the court has on file. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager

Dated: June 5, 2015 

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