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AXIS OF ABUSE: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

TOWARD IRAN AND SYRIA, PART 2

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011

Serial No. 112–73

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Michael Singh, managing director, Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 6

Mr. Mehdi Khalaji, senior fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy .. 17

Mr. Alireza Nader, international policy analyst, RAND Corporation ................. 25

Mr. Tony Badran, research fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies ..................................................................................................................... 32

Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D., director and senior fellow of the Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies ...................................... 39

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Michael Singh: Prepared statement ................................................................ 9

Mr. Mehdi Khalaji: Prepared statement ................................................................ 19

Mr. Alireza Nader: Prepared statement ................................................................ 27

Mr. Tony Badran: Prepared statement .................................................................. 34

Jon B. Alterman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 41

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

(1)

AXIS OF ABUSE: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 

TOWARD IRAN AND SYRIA, PART 2

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come to order. I want to thank 

everyone for being here this afternoon. I apologize for being a couple minutes late. We had a big conference over there. I left early 

to get here. And I want to thank Mr. Ackerman for being here so 

early. Thank you. 

I want to welcome my colleagues to this hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, as well as our witnesses here and those in the audience. As our witnesses noted in 

their written statements, the human rights abuses being perpetrated at the hands of regimes in Tehran and Damascus are as 

horrifying as they are widespread. 

In the aftermath of the stolen June 2009 so-called election in 

Tehran, the world watched as the Iranian regime beat, tortured, 

and raped and murdered its way through the protest that followed. 

Just over 6 months ago Syria, the Iranian regime’s closest ally in 

the region, joined Tehran in its ruthless repression of prodemocracy 

protests. 

As protests intensified, the Assad regime initiated a brutal crackdown that continues even as we speak. It is now estimated that 

over 2,700 Syrians have been killed and reports coming out of 

Syria speak of unconscionably heinous human rights abuses. 

Today’s hearing, however, was called to examine U.S. policy. Two 

months ago this subcommittee had the privilege of hearing Assistant Secretaries Feltman and Posner discuss the Obama administration’s human rights policies toward Iran and Syria. Since our 

last meeting, the Obama administration has taken a number of 

steps for which they deserve credit, especially on Syria. 

Although it took far too much time and far too many dead bodies, 

the administration has finally come out and called for Bashar alAsasad’s departure from power. It also implemented sanctions 

against various high-ranking Syrian regime authorities, many of 

which have been mirrored by our allies abroad. 

2

Unfortunately, despite these recent developments, my concerns 

about our policy remains. This administration, the Obama administration human rights policies toward Iran and Syria have been, in 

my opinion, both feeble and late. Rather than seizing the historic 

opportunity presented to it, the administration dithers by slowly 

inching toward challenging the legitimacy of these regimes in any 

meaningful way. Why, for example, have we sanctioned the leadership in Damascus and not the leadership in Tehran? 

When the administration does take action, it is usually in the 

form of a strong statement such as President Obama’s statement 

at the State Department in May. Yesterday at the General Assembly, for example, the President noted that we have, ‘‘sanctioned 

those who trample on human rights abroad.’’

But we haven’t. At least not thoroughly enough. Indeed my concern is not as much with what the administration is doing as it is 

with what the administration is not doing. The result is a growing 

disconnect between our words and our actions. 

As I am sure our witnesses will discuss, there are many steps 

which we should be taking which we are not, individuals we should 

be sanctioning, opposition groups we should be standing with, and 

regimes we should be condemning at every possible opportunity. 

That the administration continues to avoid calling for a transition 

to a democratic government in Iran is evidence of one of two possibilities: Either it still believes that a grand bargain on the illicit 

nuclear program is possible, or it is concerned that to do so will, 

like in Libya, create a situation in which it must then ensure that 

the regime actually falls. 

The fine line that the administration is walking by condemning, 

but not seriously challenging the regime in Tehran, puts it in an 

untenable position. And from the outside it appears to be hedging 

rather than leading. And although the administration may think 

that to do so puts itself in an advantageous position, it seriously 

underestimates the impact its actions, or lack thereof, have on actual outcomes. 

Indeed, the perception that calling for a democratic transition requires U.S. military operations to forcibly depose those in power is 

an excuse to avoid making a more permanent break with regimes 

like the one in Tehran. Words, like many things, have a currency, 

and that currency is action. To highlight human rights abuses and 

then sanction only 11 individuals and 3 entities is unacceptable. To 

vacillate between condemning the Iranian regime and then later offering it a lifeline pits us against the people of those countries. 

I fear, however, these missteps reflect a deeper problem: That 

the administration lacks any overarching strategy toward the region. The administration is fond of saying that although its foreign 

policy is guided by core principles such as the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights, each country is different and, 

as such, requires a tailored approach. Although it is certainly true 

that no two countries have the identical set of circumstances, this 

argument must not be an excuse for inaction or lack of strategic 

vision. 

Until very recently, the Obama administration’s policy toward 

Iran and Syria was characterized chiefly by its engagement with 

the ruling regimes. Although I did not agree with this policy at the 

3

time, it is all the more wrong today. The Obama administration 

must realize that the U.S. can no longer do business with either 

of these regimes, they are both beyond salvation. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chabot follows:] 

******** INSERT 1-1 ********

Mr. CHABOT. At this time I would like to recognize the distinguished gentleman, the ranking member from New York, my colleague and friend Mr. Ackerman, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman and appreciate his remarks. 

I would like to thank him for scheduling this second hearing on 

the subject of human rights in Syria and Iran. 

While much of the world’s attention is focused on the Palestinian’s foolish and dangerous gambit to find a shortcut to statehood 

at the United Nations, the violence in Syria and the ongoing oppression in Iran, as well as that country’s illegitimate nuclear ambitions which must be stopped, continue unabated and thrive in the 

absence of focused international attention. 

As a global power and guarantor of security in the Middle East, 

the United States can’t afford to take timeouts on critical issues 

such as these. The tyrants, torturers, and theocrats would all prefer we did. But our interest and responsibilities require us to be 

able to walk and chew gum at the same time, so they say. 

Our interests in the Middle East are varied, but all of them are 

improved by the weakening of the regimes in Tehran and Damascus, and all would be significantly aided by the collapse of the axis 

between Syria and Iran. Whether it is aiding Israel’s search for 

peace and security, or protecting Lebanon’s sovereignty, or preventing Iranian hegemony, or undercutting Hezbollah and Hamas, 

or nurturing Iraq’s development, or sustaining our partnership 

with Turkey, or just promoting the spread of democracy and 

human rights, every loss for these regimes is a gain for us and innocent people as well throughout the region. 

The strategic partnership between these two criminal regimes 

has produced instability, terror, and violence in Lebanon, Israel, 

and Iraq, as well as frontally challenging the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

These two disgraceful, blood-soaked regimes must, and I believe 

they will, end up on history’s trash heap with other discarded and 

disgraced models of government based on coercion, violence, and 

brutality. Iran’s Ayatollahs will not rule Iran forever, and Bashar 

al-Asssad’s days in Syria are likewise numbered. The collapse and 

failure of these regimes, when it occurs, will not be the product of 

our efforts or our intervention, but we will surely welcome these 

developments when they occur. 

The jails or nooses that will hold the remains of Iran’s misanthropic theocrats or the Assad mafia will be in the hands of free 

Iranians and Syrians, and we will celebrate from afar their liberation from the darkness of tyranny. 

The question for us today is twofold: First, to consider what options are available for us to aid the people of Syria and Iran in 

their struggle to free themselves from the insidious parasites that 

have seized control of their government; and second, to think about 

the strategic implications of the Arab Spring on these two countries 

4

and their so-called ‘‘axis of resistance,’’ which has caused so much 

destruction in the region. 

When it comes to providing direct aid to the people of Syria and 

Iran, I am leery about our prospects of doing too much. A great 

deal of our contribution to the freedom of these nations will come 

in the form of stringent economic and political sanctions to choke 

the life out of these oppressive regimes and prevent their efforts to 

acquire or proliferate weapons of mass destruction. 

As much assistance as we can provide we should make available. 

We should provide technical assistance to undermine government 

control and surveillance of cyberspace. We should use the influence 

of the United States to name and shame and punish companies 

that break or backfill sanctions, or that provide critical enabling 

technologies or consulting services to the Syrian and Iranian mechanisms of oppression. We should help facilitate efforts by Iranians, 

Syrians, to organize themselves and encourage cooperation between 

different groups with the same objective of freedom. We must continue to advocate universal human rights and rule of law as essential underpinnings for true democracy. 

But as essential as speaking for what we support, we must also 

denounce these regimes for their repression at home and their instigation of violence and terrorism abroad. Constantly pointing out 

that these regimes are devoid of legitimacy, that their leaders are 

murderers and torturers of innocents is not an expression of our 

opinion, it is a statement of fact. Ayatollah Khomeini is not a cleric, he is a butcher. Bashar al-Assad is not a political leader, he is 

a mob boss. 

The motives of protesters in Syria and their predecessors in Iran 

are fundamentally the same as those of people everywhere; they 

want democracy, freedom, dignity, jobs, and respect for their 

human civil and political rights. 

These things, we Americans know, are not gifts from governments to the people, but they are the very rationale for people to 

institute governments in the first place. These ideas which empowered our own Revolution are now transforming the Middle East, 

and we should have no compunctions about speeding the work in 

Syria and Iran. 

I thank the chairman for the time, and the witnesses who I look 

forward to reviewing their testimony. And I apologize, I am going 

to be shuffling back and forth between two hearings at this time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We appreciate your opening 

statement, Mr. Ackerman. And let me mention that my colleagues 

are in a meeting now in the Capitol Building, going over the fact 

that our keeping the government funded for the next 6 or 7 weeks 

went down in flames yesterday. And what do we do, where do we 

go from here? And that was sort of a problem. So that is where 

they are. We will probably have members trickle in. 

We also will have votes on the floor in the very near future as 

well. Rather than keep everyone waiting, we thought we would go 

ahead and move and then the members will be able to hear your 

testimony and read your statements as well at their own leisure. 

So without further ado, I would like to go ahead and introduce 

our distinguished panel here this afternoon. If I mispronounce any 

names, please accept apologies in advance. 

5

We first have Mr. Michael Singh, who is the managing director 

of the Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle 

East Affairs at the National Security Council. He served in the 

NSC for 3 years as senior director for Middle East Affairs, and as 

director for Iran and for Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and North Africa. 

Previously Mr. Singh served as special assistant to Secretary of 

State Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell, and was staff assistant 

to then-Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer at the U.S. Embassy in Tel 

Aviv. A member of the Harvard International Review’s board of advisors, Mr. Singh has written extensively on Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. National Security Strategy and Management. Mr. Singh holds an M.B.A. from Harvard University and 

earned his B.A. at Princeton University. We welcome you here this 

afternoon. 

Mr. Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute 

for Near East Policy, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shiite 

groups in the Middle East. Prior to his work at the Washington Institute, he was a political analyst on Iranian affairs for BBC-Persian, and later became a broadcaster for the Prague-based radio 

Farda. Mr. Khalaji is the author of five books. His most recent 

book, ‘‘The New Order of the Clerical Establishment in Iran,’’ written in Farsi, was published in 2010, and we hope it is a big seller. 

And our next witness is Alireza Nader who is an international 

policy analyst at the Rand Corporation and the author of ‘‘The 

Next Supreme Leader Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran 

2011.’’ His research has focused on Iran’s political dynamics, elite 

decision making, and Iranian foreign policy. His commentaries and 

articles have appeared in a variety of publications and he is widely 

cited by the U.S. and international media. Prior to joining RAND, 

Nader served as a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis. He is a native speaker of Farsi, and we welcome you here this 

afternoon as well. 

Next is Tony Badran who a research fellow at the—you know I 

am going to butcher your name, then, if I got all of these right—

at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC. He focuses on Lebanon, Syria, and Hezbollah. His research includes U.S. policy toward Lebanon and Syria and Syrian 

foreign policy. Mr. Badran’s other research has dealt with Syria’s 

use of information warfare as well as with the Syrian opposition 

movement. Mr. Badran also specializes in Lebanese affairs and Islamic groups in the Levant. Mr. Badran appears regularly in the 

media both in the U.S. and abroad. Mr. Badran is currently completing his doctorate at American University. He is fluent in 

English, French, Arabic, and Greek and has working knowledge of 

German and Hebrew. Thank you so much for being here this afternoon. 

Last but not least, we have Jon B. Alterman, who is the director 

and senior fellow of the Middle East program at CSIS. Prior to 

joining CSIS, he served as a member of the policy planning staff 

at the Department of State and as a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. He is member of 

the Chief of Naval Operations executive panel and served as an expert advisor to the Iraq study group, also known as the BakerHamilton Commission. In addition, he teaches Middle Eastern 

6

studies at the Johns Hopkins school of Advanced and International 

Studies and George Washington University. Before entering government he was a scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace and at the 

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. From 1993 to 1997, 

Alterman was an award-winning teacher at Harvard University 

where he received his Ph.D. in history. He also worked as a legislative aide to Senator Daniel P. Moynahan, Democrat, New York, responsible for foreign policy and defense. 

As I said, we have a very distinguished panel here this afternoon. It is obvious just by reading their bios. As I am sure the 

members of the panel may be aware, we have a 5-minute rule here. 

You have 5 minutes to address the committee. There is a lighting 

system. The yellow light will come on when 4 of the 5 minutes is 

up, and a red light comes on when you are done. We would ask you 

to conclude by that time if at all possible. 

So, Mr. Singh, we will begin with you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL SINGH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. SINGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman, and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thanks very much for the opportunity to talk about the alarming 

state of human rights and freedom in Iran and Syria. It is a matter 

not only of moral urgency but also vital national security importance to the United States. 

I am going to deliver a condensed version of my remarks in the 

interest of time. I would like to discuss the role that the systematic 

abuses of human rights play in the strategy of these two countries. 

We need to be clear, this is not a recent phenomenon in Iran or 

Syria, nor are any human rights violations there, some sort of excessive—just an excessive response to the recent uprisings in these 

countries. 

These violations are not deviations from normal practice for 

these regimes. These are normal practices for these regimes. It is 

a matter of policy to abuse human rights both for Tehran and Damascus, and these things are instrumental in the establishment 

and maintenance of control, which is at the heart of their versions 

of authoritarianism. 

It is vital that we in the U.S. foreign policy community arrive at 

a proper understanding for the nature of the regimes in Tehran 

and Damascus, and therefore why they engage in these atrocious 

human rights abuses we are here to discuss. The abuses are fundamentally about establishing and maintaining control and are 

common to most authoritarian regimes, past and present, in one 

form or another. 

We must not only condemn the abuses that are a symptom of 

this authoritarianism, but the systems themselves which give rise 

to them. We must not only seek to prevent the abuses from happening, but to break the control of these regimes over their populations. Opposing human rights abuses in Iran and Syria, if such 

opposition is to be meaningful, means supporting democracy in 

these countries. 

At first glance, these two regimes, Iran and Syria, seem quite different. One is a radical secular regime in Syria, one a radical reliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 01, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\092211\68447 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gious regime in Iran. Yet these regimes are close allies, and in 

many ways their superficial dissimilarities mask fundamental similarities underneath the surface. Like so many authoritarian regimes, both of their systems of government are based on careful 

cultivation of certain illusions. I want to briefly mention three illusions, and then talk about what we can do. 

The first is the illusion of democracy. Despite their deeply autocratic natures, both the Syrian and Iranian regimes have adopted 

the language and trappings of democracy which is troublingly common in modern authoritarian states. For its part, Syria has an 

elected Parliament and has a President who is confirmed, quoteunquote, by a referendum. Despite the fact that they have these 

trappings of democracy, they still have manipulation. A ridiculous 

97.62 percent of Syrians reportedly voted to confirm President 

Assad in the last Presidential referendum. 

Iran has the same democratic pretensions. It holds elections for 

both the Presidency as well as the Parliament, but in both cases 

there are parallel structures which are unelected and which trump 

the supposedly elected officials; that is, the Supreme Leader and 

the Guardian Council. 

Even with these authoritarian safeguards in place, however, Iranian leaders still feel compelled to manipulate the results of these 

elections despite the fact the elected officials have little power. We 

saw this in June 2009 with the rigged Presidential election to 

which you referred, Mr. Chairman. 

To be clear, however, even these trappings of democracy, meager 

as they may be, are illusory. True power in Iran and Syria lies not 

in the hands of elected officials, but with small cliques who enjoy 

the backing of massive and well-rewarded security apparatuses. 

The second illusion is the illusion of prosperity. Both of these regimes have long-trumpeted a message of wealth redistribution, of 

championing the poor and dispossessed, and they still propound 

this message. We have seen this especially with Iranian President 

Ahmadinejad. He was mocked in Iran during a Presidential election for handing out potatoes in the countryside, but in fact he was 

able to generate some support through this sort of populism. 

It is essential as well to the Supreme Leader of Iran, who talks 

a lot about class warfare in the way that he frames issues to his 

population. The reality, of course, is completely different. Despite 

the massive national resource wealth in Iran and despite the relatively significant economic growth that has happened in Syria, 

both of these countries are riddled with economic problems, poverty, income inequality, unemployment, and of course have massive 

corruption. They rank 127th and 146th, Syria and Iran respectively, out of 178 countries, according to Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index. 

Third is the illusion of stability. Both of these countries have 

known only two rulers apiece over the last several decades and 

both of these men, Bashar al-Assad and Ali Khamenei, Supreme 

Leader of Iran, have managed to increase their power over their 

tenures rather than see it wane. In a region notable for its tumult, 

these leaders can claim, superficially at least, stability in their 

countries. But this is also illusory, because they lack any mechanisms from which to release pressure, pressure for political change, 

8

pressure that comes from economic discontent. And so the way they 

deal with this pressure is, of course, through repression and 

through human rights abuses which we are here to talk about. 

The accomplishment of the protesters and the opposition in Syria 

and Iran is not just coming out of the streets and not just facing 

the bullets, which they have done courageously, especially in Syria, 

over these last since 6 months, but also in Iran after the June 2009 

elections. Their great accomplishment is they have shattered these 

illusions and have exposed these illusions, and these regimes can 

no longer claim to be democratic, prosperous, or stable. And they 

won’t be able to reconstruct those illusions or those images. 

Let me just say very briefly what the United States can do to 

support them in trying to expose these illusions and trying to expose what the regimes truly are. First of all——

Mr. CHABOT. We want to follow up in questions, because we have 

gone over 5 full minutes at this point. We want to make sure we 

have enough time. We are going to be called for votes, but hopefully I will ask you that end question, what were your conclusions 

going to be? Maybe start off with that. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Singh follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Khalaji, you are next and we would ask the 

members, if possible, to stay within the 5 minutes. Thank you very 

much.

STATEMENT OF MR. MEHDI KHALAJI, SENIOR FELLOW, 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. KHALAJI. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman, distinguished members of the committee, thanks very much for providing 

me this great opportunity to witness on the critical situation of 

human rights in Iran. I am not going to read my written testimony. 

I would like to summarize it and especially emphasize on two 

major points. The announcement by U.S. Government and other 

Western governments in condemning Iran’s violation of human 

rights are very effective and necessary. But I think that it is not 

enough, because the problem in Iran is not accidental violation of 

human rights. The violation of human rights is systematic and especially it is coming from the legal system of the country. For example, despite the fact that Iran has signed the International Convention of Children’s Rights, Iran continues to execute teenagers 

and underage people for various accusations. Yesterday in Karaj 

City near Tehran, a 17-year-old teenager was executed on the 

streets before the eyes of 15,000 people. So the problem is that the 

legal system of Iran legitimates such violations of human rights. 

The other example is stoning women and men for committing adultery. 

Another important example is the anti-Bahai policies of the government. You know that the Iranian legal system is against Bahais 

and it deprives them of their basic rights. So it is very important 

not just to react to specific cases of the violation of human rights, 

but we have to encourage Iranian regimes to reform and change 

the legal system to adapt it more to human rights and democratic 

rules. 

Another issue is that the sanctions on individuals for being involved in violation of human rights. It is very important. Especially 

a joint effort by the United States and European Union have been 

very effective. But first of all we have to publicize cases that these 

people have applied for visa and their visa application was rejected. 

In other words, we have to get benefit from these sanctions. We 

cannot just sanction them. Wee have to tell Iranian people and 

other people in the region that their activities and human rights 

activities have practical consequences. 

The other issue is that it is good to target the Revolutionary 

Guard, the Basij militia, Iranian police, or Iranian judiciary officials who violate human rights in Iran. But we all know that the 

power in Iran is centralized around the Supreme Leader, and this 

is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei who is in charge of domestic and foreign policy. And he is the final decision maker. The violation of human rights is primarily initiated and implemented by the 

Office of the Supreme Leader. 

And I would suggest that important members of this office 

should be sanctioned, like Hossein Shariatmadari, Khamenei’s representative at Kayhan newspaper, who is a famous person in oppressing critics, intellectuals, students and women’s rights activists. 

18

Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of Khamenei, who mainly runs his 

office. 

Asghar Mir Hrjazi, another important member of his office, who 

is the security deputy of the office. 

Vahid Haghanian, who is the right-hand person for Ayatollah 

Khamenei. 

Muhammad Shirazi, who is the military advisor of Ayatollah 

Khamenei, and he supervises both the Revolutionary Guard and 

Army. 

Ahmad Marvi, who is head of the clergy department in the Supreme Leader’s office. And especially he is in charge of intimidating 

political opposition inside and outside Iran. 

And finally, Hossein Mohammadi, who is in charge of designing 

censorship on different kind of media. 

I think these are important people that should be singled out and 

be subject of sanction by the United States and European Union. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. And I especially thank you 

for being so specific about who those are that you believe should 

be sanctioned. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalaji follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. I would like to note the presence of the gentleman 

from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, who has joined us here this 

afternoon. 

Mr. Nader, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ALIREZA NADER, INTERNATIONAL 

POLICY ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. NADER. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

me to appear before you today to discuss Islamic Republic of Iran’s 

human rights abuses. In addition I would like to discuss the Iranian regime’s behavior in light of the Arab Spring, and current 

state and the future prospects of the opposition Green Movement. 

I will conclude with U.S. policy recommendations. And I will summarize my written testimony. 

The Islamic Republic is one of the worst human rights abusers 

in the Middle East. The 2009 Iranian Presidential election, widely 

perceived in Iran as fraudulent, led to a dramatic increase in Iranian State repression. Iranians who opposed a clerical-led regime 

are routinely harassed, jailed, tortured, raped and executed. The 

Iranian regime has stepped up its use of force as it faces upcoming 

parliamentary elections in March 2012 and Presidential elections 

in 2013 that could become occasions for public demonstrations. The 

regime is also afflicted by deep internal divisions. 

The Arab Spring has also heightened the regime’s fears of similar revolts in Iran. The Islamic Republic has depicted the downfall 

of pro-American governments in Tunisia and Egypt as a major setback to American power in the region. That has also claimed that 

Iran’s own revolution served as the Arab Spring’s source of inspiration. But the reality is quite different. Arab populations are increasingly critical of Islamic Republic for poor treatment of Iranians and for the support it provides Basar al-Assad’s regime as it 

commits mass violence against the Syrian people. 

More importantly, the Iranian regime remains vulnerable to the 

very same forces that have led to the toppling of Arab dictatorships. Although the regime may have been successful in silencing 

the Green Movement’s leadership, it has not been able to crush Iranian aspirations for freer and more democratic system of government. 

Like many of their Arab neighbors, Iranians face a daily indignity bred by an increasingly oppressive system. Women in Iran are 

denied equal rights despite their educational, economic, and civic 

accomplishments. Iranian youth languish in frustration, bereft of 

the opportunities and freedoms afforded to their peers across the 

world. Ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities live in constant fear. 

Conditions in Iran suggest that a Persian Spring is quite possible. But Iranians have not so far followed the footprints of the 

Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionaries. One reason for this is that 

the Green Movement is divided and leaderless. But the Green 

Movement faces an even more fundamental flaw. It seeks to preserve the very same Islam Republic that oppresses it. Regardless, 

the Green Movement’s inherent weaknesses have not given way to 

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pendently of the Green Movement and its leadership. They need 

moral support more than ever before. 

The intense U.S. focus on the Iranian nuclear program convinced 

many Iranian democracy activists that the United States is solely 

concerned with the security interest in their region rather than the 

plight of ordinary Iranians. 

I would assert that a more balanced U.S. policy, with a greater 

emphasis on the regime’s human rights abuses, could counter negative Iranian perceptions of U.S policies and intentions. 

The United States has recently begun a shift in this direction by 

supporting the establishment of a U.N. human rights monitor for 

Iran. In addition, the United States has sanctioned higher-ranking 

Iranian security officials for their involvement in human rights 

abuses. However, additional steps should be taken. U.S. officials 

should denounce the regime’s abuses more vigorously and more 

often. Stronger condemnations from senior U.S. officials, including 

President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, will be reviewed by 

Iranian democracy activists as a sign of encouragement. 

In tandem they naturally should sanction additional members of 

the Iranian security services, especially top-ranking and mid-ranking members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. and the 

Basij paramilitary forces. 

Finally, the United States should also strongly question the legitimacy of Iran’s upcoming parliamentary and Presidential elections. 

The 2009 Presidential election, which remains in dispute, effectively taints the results of future elections. The Islamic Republic 

has historically depicted elections in Iran as sign that it is a democracy and is therefore particularly vulnerable to internal and external accusations of legitimacy. 

The Iranian regime faces great challenges today. Its survival as 

a cohesive and functioning system is hardly guaranteed. The 

United States can demonstrate that it is on the side of Iranian 

democrats who may rule Iran one day. 

Again, I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify 

before you today and I look forward to taking your questions. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, we appreciate it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nader follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Badran, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF MR. TONY BADRAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. BADRAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman and 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me 

to today’s hearing. I will keep my comments brief and ask that my 

lengthier statement be part of the record. 

We have reached a critical moment in the Syrian revolution. 

Seven months after it erupted, the Syrian protest movement has 

shown remarkable resilience and bravery. There are now questions 

as to whether peaceful protest will be enough to dislodge Bashar 

al-Assad as his regime’s brutal repression persists and pressure to 

arm the revolution intensifies. 

Since President Obama’s August 22nd statement calling on 

Assad to step down, there has been little high-level movement on 

Syria. The President has publicly shown little personal investment 

in the Syrian uprising. His remarks at the U.N. yesterday were the 

first he has made publicly in months. The administration deserves 

credit for slapping a series of sanctions on the Syrian regime. However, it is unclear whether new ideas and contingency plans are 

being developed. Given the strategic importance of the Syrian revolution and its impact on Iranian influence in the region, U.S. leadership is critical. 

Though they have had some impact, sanctions cannot substitute 

for an integrated American policy guided by clear strategic goal. 

That goal can only be Assad’s departure and breaking up the Iranian alliance system. At the outset, the Obama administration 

adopted a hands-off approach to the Syrian revolution. One reason 

was deference to Turkey. Reticent to take the lead, the administration effectively subcontracted the policy to the Turks, who for 

months urged President Obama not to call on Assad to step down. 

To its credit, the administration finally broke with Turkey and 

endorsed the policy of regime change in Syria. It has not, however, 

pressed Ankara to follow suit. Nor has the administration convinced Turkey to take punitive measures against Assad. In the 

past 2 days the Turks have said that they would be discussing 

sanctions with the State Department. What specific measures they 

will adopt or when they will do so remains to be seen. 

The administration has recently done a commendable job in 

working with the European allies to increase the heat on the Syrian regimes, but has not done the same with regional allies such 

as Jordan and Iraq. The Syrian Central Bank recently executed a 

number of cash transfers in Jordan designed to help evade future 

sanctions and potential asset freezes. The Syrians have also turned 

to the Iraqis to secure cheap oil. Convincing our Jordanian allies 

to freeze such accounts and dissuading Iraq from extending a helping hand to Assad are but two options the administration could 

pursue. 

The New York Times reported on Monday that the administration remains apprehensive about appearing to try to ‘‘orchestrate 

the outcome in Syria.’’ The absence of U.S. Leadership opens the 

door for regional middle-range powers to vie for position and adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 01, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\092211\68447 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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vance their own agendas which could come into conflict with U.S. 

Interests. 

Washington should be quarterbacking the transition and directing the actions of players like Turkey and Qatar. Qatar, for instance, has recently advanced its own political initiative to end the 

crisis in Syria, but it had to run this initiative with the Iranians 

and assure them that their interests in Syria’s ‘‘security doctrine,’’ 

meaning its support for resistance movements that Iranian supports will be insured. Without U.S. leadership, Iranian will fill the 

role. 

The administration has been working toward a peaceful transition to democracy, mainly relying on tools such as sanctions, while 

urging the opposition to unite around a platform that all Syrians 

could endorse. But the mechanism for this transition has not been 

properly articulated. The administration’s assessment now is that 

the current stalemate could last for a while, increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. 

The strategic stakes high, the Iranians note this is a war for 

their position in the eastern Mediterranean. The Obama administration needs to frame the Syrian situation in such strategic terms 

and to make it a priority in its regional agenda. 

Mr. Chairman, the strategic calculus is simple. An outcome other 

than Assad’s ouster would be a blow to U.S. Interests and a boost 

to Iran. The administration should continue with hard economic 

pressure. Specifically, it should pressure regional allies to impose 

sanctions. It should also consider targeting banks in the region 

used by the regime to circumvent sanctions. Moreover, the ban on 

investment in Syria should be expanded to include foreign companies. Finally, as the probability of an armed conflagration in Syria 

increases, the administration needs contingency plans. Deferring 

such difficult decisions by subcontracting policy to regional players 

is likely to fail again. The U.S. has to take the lead. 

Mr. Chairman, I will conclude. Ensuring the end of the Assad regime in Syria must be viewed as an opportunity to break the Iranian alliance system, which will do a great deal to advance the interests of the United States and its allies in the region. 

I thank you again for the opportunity to testify here today. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Badran follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. And our final witness here this afternoon will be 

Mr. Alterman, and you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JON B. ALTERMAN, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND 

SENIOR FELLOW OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. ALTERMAN. Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman 

and distinguished members of the committee. Syria and Iran have 

a big problem. On the one hand they have crafted strategies that 

cast themselves as the voice of the common man in the Middle 

East, standing up against Western oppression and protecting Palestinians. On the other, they are emerging as oppressors of their 

own people, cynical authoritarian holdouts in a world increasingly 

inspired by popular protests against oppressors. 

Now the Middle East is changing. The caricatures they drew of 

other regional leaders are dissolving, as those leaders either lead 

efforts toward reform or are swept away by a tide of protests. 

Meanwhile, the leaderships of Syria and Iran themselves have 

come to typify a rotten status quo that manipulates public emotions but does not serve them. 

Shifting circumstances in the Middle East begged the question of 

what the United States should do about it. There is an understandable instinct to revel in hostile countries’ difficulties, to capitalize 

on their weaknesses, and to exploit their contradictions. Few in 

these populations would mourn the fall of their governments, and 

the United States should do nothing to prop them up. 

At the same time, the greatest favor the United States could do 

for these regimes is to somehow make their problems into a confrontation with the United States rather than ones that arise out 

of the internal contradictions of these countries’ own governance. 

An ability to concentrate attention on the United States and a foreign power would be a lifeline to these governments, shifting the 

focus from their own repression and allowing them to sound nationalist themes and boost their own popular support. An overt U.S. 

Embrace of opposition groups would certainly lead to accusations 

that these groups are agents of the United States or that their success somehow serves Israel’s interests, thereby reducing their influence and their credibility. 

To be clear the United States should not remain passive or mute 

in the face of sustained repression; our history and our values call 

for us to do more. Yet no government looks anxiously at finely 

honed U.S. Statements when its very survival is at risk, nor do 

protesters look to Washington for a sign when deciding whether or 

not to risk their lives in the street. Ultimately it is not about us; 

it is about them, and we do a disservice to them when we act as 

if it is all about us. Instead we need to do what we do in the company of other governments, especially from the Middle East, which 

are distressed by events in Syria and Iran and have sounded the 

alarm. 

The key strategic asset that these governments have to nurture 

is their legitimacy. Regional voices have far more credibility with 

a targeted population than governments halfway around the world. 

This is not abdicating leadership nor leading from behind; rather, 

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standing that these governments’ repression stripped them of their 

legitimacy, and that in today’s world it is increasingly hard to 

maintain control merely through repression. 

None of this is to say that anti-Americanism or anti-Israel sentiment in the Middle East is about to go away. What we have seen 

in Egypt and elsewhere is an important indicator that many of 

these trends will be with us for some time. But it does signal trouble for the particularly murderous and vociferous forms of antiAmerican and anti-Israeli sentiment that these governments have 

tried to nurture through proxies in the Levant and elsewhere. I 

would be the last to forecast the date and manner of the change 

of government in Syria and Iran. 

The Government of Egypt which was a more robust government 

than either Syria or Iran fell in a mere 18 days, but dislodging 

Muammar Qadhafi took 6 months and considerable NATO airpower. 

Even so, these systems are increasing frayed. Regional trends are 

clearly moving against them and the demands of their own populations are rising. The contradictions of their rule are apparent, 

and protestations in favor of the oppressed ring increasingly hollow 

as it becomes apparent that they oppress their own people. 

A dictum of politics is if your opponent is shooting himself, don’t 

stop him. We would do ourselves a disservice if we threw all the 

instruments of a national power into hastening the demise of these 

regimes. Such an effort would be more likely to have the opposite 

affect. Because we have been so appalled by the actions of these 

regimes over the last several decades, we have only very few ties 

with them and there is little else of value to them that we can jeopardize on our own. 

Our instinct is surely to trumpet our disapproval. Our interests 

require a different strategy, however. The quiet and difficult work 

of building broad coalitions is likely to yield much better results 

than noisy condemnations that can be easily tuned out. There is little we can achieve immediately but much we must accomplish in 

the longer term. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Alterman. 

[The statement Mr. Alterman follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. I would like to thank all five of the witnesses here 

this afternoon for what I felt were excellent statements from each 

and every one of you. We appreciate that. Your full statements will 

be made a part of the public record, without objection. 

I also note the presence now of the distinguished gentleman from 

the Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Connolly, this afternoon as 

well. 

Now we are going to begin our 5-minute questioning and I will 

start with myself, and we will also hold ourselves to the same 5 

minutes that we held you all to. We may go to a second round depending on votes on the floor, which could happen at any time. 

Mr. Nader, I will begin with you if I can. In your testimony you 

note that ‘‘The Islamic Republican has portrayed U.S. And international policies on the Iranian nuclear program as part of an effort to deny Iran both advanced technology and its perceived place 

among the world’s great nations. Thus, U.S. opposition to the Iranian nuclear program, while necessary given the threats posted by 

a potential Iranian nuclear weapons capability, has also had the effect of strengthening the regime among its core supporters.’’

Mr. Khalaji, you also I believe raised a similar point, noting that 

it is very important that we convey to the people of Iran ‘‘that the 

Iranian Government organizations primarily involved in human 

rights abuses are the same organizations that run the military and 

the nuclear program.’’

The concern you both raise that the American policy toward the 

nuclear program could inherently weaken our credibility with Iranian people is a real and legitimate concern. Both issues, however, 

are central to U.S. interests, and neither can nor should be abandoned at the expense of the other. 

Can you and anyone else who is interested suggest how we can 

strike a balance between these two priorities? How can we best 

manage this tension? And I would like to hear from both of you if 

we could, Mr. Nader. 

Mr. NADER. Thank you. I do think there has been for obvious and 

necessary reasons a focus on the nuclear program. It presents a 

fundamental challenge to U.S. and allied interests in the Middle 

East. However, the Islamic Republic has used this issue to portray 

the U.S. policy toward the nuclear program as part of an effort 

against the Iranian people, against Iran’s perceived rightful place 

in the Middle East. 

And I do think that recently, as I suggested, there has been a 

shift in terms of focusing on human rights, depicting the regimes 

abuses. I think the United States needs to do more of this in terms 

of striking a balance. 

You mentioned the possibility of a grand bargain between the 

United States and Iran. I do not think a grand bargain per se is 

a possibility at this stage. I don’t think we should give up efforts 

of engagement with the Islamic Republic. It is a valuable tactic in 

terms of the United States achieving its objectives. I think Iran’s 

total diplomatic isolation benefits the regime actually, because it 

isolates the Iranian people. But, again, I think engagement is increasingly an unsuccessful strategy, if you will. 

So highlighting human rights is very important. I do think that 

the Islamic Republic is very unstable. It is not going to escape the 

46

effects of the Arab Spring. To some extent, I do think that the 2009 

election in Iran influenced the Arab populations. The Iranians have 

been influenced by Arab populations in return, and the Islamic Republic is not going to last forever. 

We have the opportunity to slow down the Iranian nuclear program through sanctions, through political pressure, and other 

means. Various U.S. assessments have shown that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is not eminent. 

So if we come out on the side of the Iranian people and the side 

of Iranian democrats and strike a balance in a U.S. policy, we could 

achieve our objectives in a more efficient manner. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Mr. Khalaji. 

Mr. KHALAJI. It has been 32 years that Iranian Government tries 

to portray the United States as the main enemy of the Iranian people rather than an enemy of the Iranian regime’s policy. So it is 

very important to strengthen public diplomacy for the Iranian people. 

Since we don’t have a diplomatic relationship with Iran and we 

don’t have physical presence in Iran, it is very important to capitalize on different sources of the public diplomacy we have. Especially I think it is very important to raise the budget for the Persian section of Voice of America and try to make it more professional and convey our messages to Iranians. It is very important 

to communicate with the Iranian people and explain to them if we 

are critical of Iranian policy, why is this criticism and why is the 

international community so concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambition. 

Also we have to be more supportive to different groups of human 

rights activists in the United States and in Europe who work on 

Iran issue. It is very important that people-to-people exchanges, it 

is important to facilitate visas for Iranian citizens. You know that 

Iranians are among the few nations in the world that cannot get 

visa for the United States very easily. And when they get it, it is 

only one entry. The initiation by the State Department to give 

some—to let Iranian students to get multiple visa was very important, and it sends a message to the Iranian people that United 

States is a friend with Iranians, and only we have problem with 

the government. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My time has expired. I 

would like to yield now 5 minutes to the gentleman, also from a 

commonwealth, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I think four 

of our States are commonwealths and two of them are represented 

here today. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, I come from both of them. I was 

born in Boston. 

Mr. CHABOT. There you go. Amazing. What do you have against 

States anyway? 

The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Mr. 

Keating, is recognized. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Quickly I just want to 

go back with Mr. Bedran just to clarify something, I’m not sure. 

You used the term that the U.S. should direct Turkey in terms of 

joining with us in our efforts in Syria and with Iran. Could you deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 01, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\092211\68447 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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scribe the means by which we could do that or what actions we 

could take in that regard? 

Mr. BADRAN. Thank you. I did say that we should be directing 

the actions of Turkey and Qatar in the sense as we saw in August, 

as recently as early August, the Turks took an initiative on their 

own to go to Syria to talk to Assad, extend him a 2-week window 

with which to ostensibly change his behavior, after we had already 

come out and said he has lost his legitimacy and so on. So that 

kind of action undermined our policy at the time. 

What tools do we have? Obviously, quiet diplomacy among allies 

is clearly the most effective, but also the Turks have been asking 

the United States for a number of asks with regards to their fight 

with the PKK, for instance. In Iraq, they have asked for predator 

drones to be based in Turkey to use against the PKK, and other 

intelligence cooperation. 

So there are multiple avenues that we share with the Turks that 

could be easily used to establish a mutual relationship in that regard. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you. This question to any of panelists. 

One of the concerns, despite the despicable treatment Syria has 

shown to the demonstrators, has been the treatment and detainment of innocent journalists at the hands of the Assad regime. 

Can the United States do more to use its leverage to protect foreign and domestic journalists on the ground, to help make sure 

that there is free press—a freer press? Certainly the second part 

of the question is, do you think the social media can be helpful in 

that regard, too?

Mr. BADRAN. It would be great to be able to assist foreign journalists in Syria were they able to go to Syria. The problem is the 

regime has shut down the ability of the foreign observers except 

the ones that it picks and chooses. They even invited CNN reporters and others to come in, but they have very severely curtailed 

their ability to move. 

With regard to domestic journalists, they have definitely born the 

brunt of the repression, those who have actually come out. But 

what is interesting about the Syrian uprising is that it has developed really remarkable creativity and other creative methods to lay 

out its version of the events or the facts of the brutality of the regime to the outside world, using, as you mentioned, the social networks and YouTube and Facebook and other such instruments. 

And that would be one of the ways we could help them by establishing, say, WiFi zones in neighboring countries that could extend 

their ability to continue to do that in other secure communications 

so they could continue to report. 

Mr. KEATING. Good point. Thank you. 

Mr. ALTERMAN. Mr. Keating, one of the things that I think has 

been of increasing concern in the last several weeks is the number 

of reports of Western countries who have sold equipment and software to intelligence services in the Middle East, which were then 

used to report—monitor all these groups. There was a report recently about a British firm who sold equipment to the Government 

of Egypt. Certainly with Libya, we have understood the extent of 

the monitoring. 

48

I am sure that an open hearing is not the place to discuss it, but 

I certainly would hope that people in Congress would think about 

what ways Congress has to the influence the ability of authoritarian regimes to use these tools unmonitored. 

Mr. KEATING. The deep packet, technology. 

Mr. ALTERMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. I don’t think I have much time for response, but just the apparent contradiction with the Arab lead, 

where they joined in a multilateral action in Libya, but their inability to act here. 

Any thoughts on how that could be encouraged at all or if that 

is at all in the offing? 

Mr. ALTERMAN. I think it is much harder because Muammar Qadhafi had always walked away from his Arabism, only to come 

back. Bashar al-Assad has always tried to wrap himself in his 

Arabism. 

With that being said, I think we have seen a number of indicators in the last several months. Certainly the Gulf States, Saudis, 

and others have grown increasingly alarmed at the direction that 

Bashar al-Assad has taken. I think you are not going to see the 

same repudiation that you saw of Muammar Qadhafi, because in 

many ways it followed many episodes of repudiation by Qadhafi 

himself, but certainly there are opportunities to get more solidarity 

on a number of issues from the Arab league that I think we should 

actively pursue. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Thank you. The gentleman’s 

time has expired. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to ask all of you a simple question—I know it is not 

a simple analysis—and then I want to talk about Iran. A simple 

question rating high, medium, low, the probability of regime 

change in Syria given the events going on. Mr. Singh, why don’t 

we start with you? 

Mr. ALTERMAN. What time frame, Mr. Connolly? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You can pick one. Let’s say in the next 3 to 6 

months. But if you want to say a year, I will need a year, that is 

fine too. Mr. Singh. 

Mr. SINGH. I would say medium. That sounds like a safe response. What we haven’t seen so far—we have seen great courage 

by the protestors coming out, facing the bullets every day, which 

is a remarkable decision to make. I think we need to recognize 

that. What we haven’t seen yet is what we saw very quickly in 

Libya, which are sort of the high-level defections, the real cracks 

forming in the regime, and that is frankly what I would look for. 

My hope is that it falls tomorrow, but I think so far it has proven 

that it is able to hold itself together so far. And there are lots of 

reasons for that which I won’t go into right now. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Mr. Khalaji. 

Mr. KHALAJI. I am not an expert on Syria. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much. Mr. Nader? 

Mr. NADER. I would like to pass on that, please. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Badran. 

49

Mr. BADRAN. I believe that the Assad regime will fall. The assessment now of the United States administration is that he has 

a good chance of hanging on for a while, although he has no ability 

to come back from the trajectory he is on. It all depends on the 

course that the revolution is going to take. For now it has been 

peaceful. 

There is a lot of, you know, agitation now and questions whether 

it should be armed, moving forward. And this is the thing that I 

raised, the issue that I raised with regard to the mechanism that 

the administration has in mind for how to move forward. As Mike 

said, basically now the hope is that there will be cracks in the regime, a unified opposition that could rally support from members 

within the regime and the elites, and hopefully somehow that will 

translate into a transition. Unfortunately, there is a good possibility that it doesn’t work out that way and that it goes into a 

much more violent course, in which case we will see regional players involved. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But in any case, your bet is we will see regime 

change? 

Mr. BADRAN. I do believe so. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Mr. Alterman. 

Mr. ALTERMAN. I think the odds are low in the near term. I think 

they get up as we move out the timeline. Because I know you well 

enough from our working together 25 years ago, you like the creative stuff. I think at some point—see, it is true. At some point it 

is not unlikely there is a military coup in Syria. I don’t know what 

precipitates it. I don’t know what part of the military does what. 

I don’t know if there is any external involvement in any of this. 

But I would say it is very likely sometime over the next 5 years 

that there is a different government in Syria, probably over the 

next 2. 

Whether they are much different in their orientation is unclear, 

because it seems to me that a huge number of the external actors, 

including the Israelis, would actually be okay with a government 

that is not terribly, terribly different from the government of 

Bashar Al-Assad in its orientation toward regional foreign policy. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And if I may, Dr. Alterman, start 

with you on this one. What are we to make of the apparent friction, 

if not break, between the ruling Muslim clerics in Tehran and 

President Ahmadinejad? After all, he began as their guy. And we 

see all kinds of political statements and actions seem to rein him 

in and maybe even isolate and embarrass him. Or is that just wishful thinking by a western press? 

Mr. ALTERMAN. I know my friends well enough that I am just 

going to talk very briefly, and Mehdi and others can talk eloquently 

about this. It seems to me two things are going on. One is 

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad isn’t who he was when he first came up. 

They feel he has gotten too big for his britches, that he doesn’t understand what his role is, and there is an effort to provide a comeuppance. 

It seems to me as well, there is a genuine possibility of a split 

in the clerical establishment in Iran, that it is not just 

Ahmadinejad against the clerics, to some extent it is cleric against 

cleric. And again, if you want to be creative and look forward, it 

50

seems to me the most likely cause of a change of Government in 

Iran is some sort of split in the clerical establishment which takes 

down the legitimacy of this regime which he has been clinging to 

since the Islamic Revolution. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Can I just interrupt you 1 second? I really think 

this is an important question, Mr. Chairman, but I do not wish to 

impose on the chair. Would he indulge the panel to be able to answer this question? 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. Thank you, Mr. Nader. 

Mr. NADER. I do think that the divisions between Ahmadinejad, 

President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader are very serious 

and indicate the deep trouble the Islamic Republic is in today. 

President Ahmadinejad is challenging the Supreme Leader’s authority. And the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has been 

challenged from the left and the right. And this shows that the Islamic Republic as a system lacks legitimacy. 

When you have somebody like Ahmadinejad, who owes his Presidency to a large degree to Khamenei, challenge him in this fashion 

shows that even figures like Ahmadinejad realize that the system 

is in trouble. And I think this provides opportunities for the United 

States. Not direct action necessarily, but it shows that Iran, which 

is I think sometimes portrayed as a more—as a stronger form of 

government than it is, faces a very uncertain future. 

Mr. KHALAJI. I have a structuralist understanding of Iran politics. I think that the fate of Mr. Ahmadinejad is not much different 

than the fate of other Iranian Presidents. Even Ayatollah 

Khamenei, when he was President in the first decade of Islamic 

Republic, he had lots of problems with the Supreme Leader at that 

time, and he was weakened by different mechanisms implemented 

by the Supreme Leader. 

All Iranian Presidents come to office with an ambitious agenda, 

whether economic or political, reformist or hardliner, but they 

leave the office very, very weak. And the story of Mr. Khatami, the 

foreign former President, and the story of Rafsanjani is repeating 

again this time. The hard core of power in the Islamic Republic is 

the Supreme Leader. Supreme Leader relies on Revolutionary 

Guard and armed forces, intelligence, and judiciary. That would 

not change. And I think as long as the Islamic Republic is in place, 

we would not see any major political shift in Iran. 

Mr. SINGH. I will just say I am in large agreement with Mehdi. 

I think that the Iranians in many ways are their own worst enemy. 

I think that President Ahmadinejad is a good example of that. He 

is his own worst enemy. He also has made life very difficult for the 

Iranian regime in many ways. 

I do think, though, that we tend to focus too much on President 

Ahmadinejad. And it is worth looking underneath the surface at 

what has actually happened inside the regime. Their base of support inside Iran, inside Iranian elites, has narrowed. It is a regime 

that now relies largely on simply the hardliners and the IRGC and 

the broader security apparatus, and you don’t have the reformists 

and the traditional conservatives inside the inner circle anymore. 

To me this is both dangerous for the regime itself, because it suggests a regime that is more brittle and has less support. It is also 

51

dangerous for the world and for us, however, because that element 

which still supports the Supreme Leader is the most dangerous element, the most militarized element. 

Mr. CHABOT. Did you get everybody, Gerry? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Pardon me? 

Mr. CHABOT. Did you get everybody? 

Mr. BADRAN. I am going to pass. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much. And thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for your indulgence. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We will go to a second 

round. And I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Let me begin, if I could give you maybe a minute, minute and 

a half, Mr. Singh, I cut you off right at the beginning, and you were 

getting ready to say here is what the United States can do to meet 

these challenges, one, two, three, or whatever. Now I would like to 

hear what we can do to meet those challenges—and if you can recall what the challenges were. 

Mr. SINGH. There are so many. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will 

say I want to say something in response to your earlier question 

about balance. And I think that balance is the wrong way for us 

to think about our policy with respect to Iran. I don’t think it is 

a matter of there is a spectrum between the nuclear issue on the 

one hand and human rights on the other. I think we need to be 

fully focused on both issues. 

You know, the goal is not to get, frankly, the Iranian opposition 

on board with our agenda. They, frankly, will not have the same 

view we have on the nuclear issue. And frankly, Mir Hossein 

Mousavi, the opposition leader, probably scored some political 

points by taking a position which was against ours on the nuclear 

issue. 

Our goal really is to just help them do what they want do anyway, which is to topple their regime, frankly, which is to change 

the nature of the system of government in Iran. And I think we can 

do both. 

My points about sort of what should we be doing with Iran and 

Syria are fourfold. And I will just go through them extremely 

quickly so my colleagues have a chance to talk. 

First, I do think we need to use our bully pulpit, the White 

House, the State Department, Security Council, to shed greater 

light on what is happening inside these countries. You know, I take 

a slightly different view from some of my fellow panelists here that 

sanctions are great, but they are—frankly, it is very hard to reach 

many of these individuals through sanctions. And I think we need 

to be frequently making statements about individual cases, individual situations of human rights activists and dissidents inside 

these countries. 

Second, I think we need to try to break the control that these regimes exercise over information. And this gets to a couple of the 

questions which have been asked. And that has both offensive and 

defensive components. I think we need to push back on the propaganda effort of these regimes, which is now extremely aggressive. 

And we need to deny them space on satellites and so forth to the 

extent we can. But we also need to give people inside these countries, actors inside these countries, the tools they need. Frankly, 

52

the Obama administration has done some good things on that 

front, and that deserves more support and more funding to the extent it is available. 

Third, I think we need to deny the Iranian and Syrian regimes 

the tools of repression to the extent we can. And here I agree with 

Dr. Alterman about trying to deny them technologies, and trying 

to provide technologies to the activists. 

And then fourth, very simply, I think we need to deny these regimes international cover. They seek support outside when they 

can’t find it inside or in their region. So they seek support at the 

United Nations, in multilateral institutions, with proxies and allies 

and so forth, and we need to be very aggressive all over the world 

in pushing back on that. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I guess there is about 

enough time to get one more question in here. Mr. Badran, in your 

testimony you note that, and I will quote this, ‘‘In sharp contrast 

with its handling of the Egyptian revolution, the Obama administration appeared very reticent to take the lead on Syria. Instead, 

it effectively subcontracted the policy to Turkey, under the belief 

that Ankara had the most influence with Assad, and could persuade him to respond to the protesters’ demands. It was a critical 

mistake to cede leadership to the Turks, just as it was in error to 

assume they shared our interests.’’

Could you expand on that a bit? How do our interests and those 

of the Turks, especially vis—vis Syria, diverge? And what has been 

the consequence of this retreat of American leadership? And I 

would invite your response, and maybe yours, Mr. Singh, as well 

on this, if you would like to comment on that. 

Mr. BADRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that the assessment by the administration on Turkey’s—the extent of Turkey’s influence and leverage, and also the misassessment of their 

vulnerability with regard to Syria, was at the basis of their ceding 

the leadership to Turkey. Meaning they thought that because Turkey had established such a close relationship because of its engagement with Syria—I mean Syria was really at the heart of Turkey’s 

‘‘no problems with neighbors,’’ or zero problems with neighbors policy. And Prime Minister Erdogan and Assad developed even a close 

friendship. So it was assumed that somehow Turkey could persuade him to change course and that its soft-power ‘‘influence’’ 

would be able to make him reform and so on. And the administration went with that for a while. 

It was a critical error from the beginning. On the one hand, and 

as we saw, Turkish soft power really was completely irrelevant in 

this case. And for the last 6, 7 months now, we have not yet seen 

a single actual concrete punitive measure by Turkey against Assad, 

economic or military or otherwise until now. Now we are starting 

to hear that Turkey may consider doing sanctions and so on. So 

that was the error, I believe. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Singh, would you comment very briefly on that, because my 

time is exhausted at this point, so like 30 seconds. 

Mr. SINGH. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I think that Turkey is simply 

not in a position to assemble or lead any kind of regional or international coalition on Syria. That is something the United States is 

53

going to have to do. And we are going to have to be at the front 

of that effort. And there is a trade-off here between trying to seek 

regional and international cover, and being willing to stick our 

necks out and provide leadership to this effort. And I think we 

have to do the latter. 

You know, to the member’s point about waiting for the Arab 

League, we would be waiting for the Arab League for a very long 

time to provide us cover on Syria. And I think the same is true 

with Turkey. So U.S. leadership is really needed here. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My time has expired. And 

I would go back to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, if 

he would like an additional 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. Did the chair want to finish 

his line? 

Mr. CHABOT. No, I am good. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. Let me ask, what should we read in recent statements and actions by the Turkish Government? And let 

me preface it by saying that, you know, we are elected officials, 

sometimes called politicians. We surely can understand domestic 

political pressures and why somebody says or does something that 

may not be for international consumption. Nonetheless, we are big 

boys and girls, and we understand that our words can have consequences nonetheless. 

What should we read in recent Turkish actions and words? And 

how serious do you think the breach between Turkey and Israel is? 

I happen to believe a serious breach between the two is very harmful to Middle East peace prospects, and that the relationship is 

critical for the United States and for the two partners. Dr. 

Alterman, begin with you. 

Mr. ALTERMAN. Thank you. I think Turkey is trying to reposition 

itself. Turkey had been a fellow non-Arab power in the Middle 

East, trying to get into Europe, and saw itself as a natural ally of 

Israel. As Turkey has been rethinking its role in the Middle East, 

its relationship to the Middle East, its relationship to Europe, I 

think it has decided to rethink its relationship to Israel, among 

others, not because it wants to cut its relationship with Israel, but 

it wants to be less close. I think what we have seen in many ways 

is an alignment less toward Israel, more toward Saudi Arabia, 

which in the case of Syria and Iran is not all against U.S. interests. 

Because having Turkey, a country on the border of Syria and Iran, 

with trade with Syria and Iran, a lot they can hold hostage to Syria 

and Iran, creates an opportunity to have tremendous influence on 

the calculations of these governments as they think about the relationship to the outside world. 

I don’t think Turkey is a lost cause. I think Turkey is repositioning itself. I think Turkey is perceived, in the absence of a 

strong government in Iraq, in the absence of a strong government 

in Egypt, is perceived as the only potential Middle Eastern power 

which can really help the Saudis, in expanding power in the Middle 

East. I think we have to guide the development of Turkey’s outreach into the Middle East, partly looking at how its relationship 

with Saudi Arabia develops, partly how its relationship to Egypt 

develops. I think Turkey is going to be a growing factor in the Middle East over the next decade or so. And we are well to try to enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 01, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\092211\68447 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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gage with that in a constructive way rather than getting into a 

name-calling exercise that tries to have them respond to our 

diktats. At a time when we had much more power in the Middle 

East, we tried to have our troops go into Iraq from Turkey, and we 

were unsuccessful. 

Mr. BADRAN. Thank you. I think something that Mr. Singh said 

earlier is very pertinent here, that Turkey is a regional power, but 

Turkey is not a great power. But nevertheless, Turkey has self-conceptions of itself as a great power. And the problem that Syria exposed with regard to Turkish foreign policy was how fragile its central doctrine of zero problems with neighbors was. 

If you now survey Turkey’s relationships with Cyprus, with 

Greece, with Israel, with Syria, and to a certain extent uneasiness 

with Iran, you see that you have a set of failures, or definitely 

much more failure than success in all of them. So a lot of this is 

due to Turkish domestic constraints, the civil-military relationship, 

the very deep structural identity issue that Turkey has, is trying 

to redefine itself, specifically with regard to its relationship with its 

Kurdish minority. 

And as now Erdogan and the AKP government lead a campaign 

against the PKK and Iraq, for instance, this is coming to the fore, 

exposing the rifts inside Turkish society. So I think to make Turkey into a regional pillar has to be very delicately handled, because 

it is a very vulnerable regional ally. 

Mr. NADER. Turkey increasingly sees itself as a major regional 

power. And especially under the Justice and Development Party, 

Turkish foreign policy has changed quite a bit in response to domestic issues. But I do think that Turkey and its ruling party now 

have this vision of perhaps a new Ottoman policy, that Turkey can 

have influence in the Middle East in areas where it ruled before, 

whether in Syria and Iraq, or in Libya. 

I do think that sometimes our interests converge, and sometimes 

they diverge. Turkey is a NATO ally, but at the same time it has 

used hostility toward Israel in the region to gain popularity among 

the Arab populations. In some ways, it may be even trying to take 

Iran’s place as one of the key players on the Israeli-Palestinian 

issue. At the same time, as it challenges Iran, it has strengthening 

relations with Iran, economic relations, security relations. So this 

shows in a lot of ways that, although Turkey is a U.S. ally, its path 

may diverge from our interests in the future. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Without objection, members will have 5 days to submit statements or questions 

for the record, or make revisions thereof. 

I want to thank this very distinguished panel for their statements this afternoon and answering the questions. We appreciate 

it. You have given us, I think, tremendous insight. 

And if there is no further business to come before the committee, 

we are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:22 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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