If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

April 9, 2019

In re HENDERSON/KEYS, Minors.

No. 345054

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 15-519710-NA

Before: LETICA, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent father appeals as of right the order terminating his parental rights to YH, ZH, 

and ZK under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) (desertion for 91 or more days without seeking custody), 

(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other 

conditions that cause the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction), (g) (failure to provide 

proper care and custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to custody of the 

parent). We affirm.

Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by finding statutory grounds to terminate 

his parental rights. Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s findings as to any particular 

statutory ground and, instead, generally asserts that petitioner failed to prove his unfitness as a 

parent. We disagree.

“This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s factual findings and ultimate 

determinations on the statutory grounds for termination.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 

846 NW2d 61 (2014). To be clearly erroneous, a trial court’s determination must be more than 

possibly or probably incorrect. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). “A 

finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. In reviewing the trial court’s 

determination, this Court must give due regard to the unique opportunity of the trial court to 

judge the credibility of those witnesses who appeared before it. Id.; see also MCR 2.613(C).

The trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) if it finds 

clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he child’s parent has deserted the child for 91 or more 

days and has not sought custody of the child during that period.” Consistent with the foster care 
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worker’s testimony at the termination hearing, the trial court found that respondent had not 

visited or supported his children since December 2017. More than 91 days passed between 

December 2017 and the trial court’s termination of respondent’s parental rights on June 12, 

2018. Thus, the trial court did not err by terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(a)(ii). “Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing 

evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights, even if the court erroneously found 

sufficient evidence under other statutory grounds.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32. 

Accordingly, we need not address the trial court’s findings concerning the remaining statutory 

grounds.

Respondent also argues that termination of his parental rights was not in the best interests 

of the children. We disagree.

“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that 

termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “[W]hether termination of 

parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The trial court’s finding

regarding best interests is reviewed for clear error. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890 

NW2d 676 (2016). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, 

this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Ellis, 

294 Mich App at 33. 

“The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best 

interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. In considering the child’s best interests, the trial 

court’s focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. “[T]he 

court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need 

for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s 

home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). “The trial court 

may also consider . . . the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s 

visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of 

adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. Furthermore, “a child’s placement with relatives 

weighs against termination,” In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), and 

relative placement must be explicitly considered in evaluating the child’s best interests, In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 43.

Respondent’s only participation in the lower court proceedings was to appear at the 

adjudicatory hearing and enter a plea of admission to the allegations in the petition. Respondent 

did not appear at any other hearings and completely failed to participate in any of the services 

that would have helped him reunite with the children. The last visit between respondent and the 

children that the foster care worker was aware of took place in December 2017, approximately 

six months before termination of his parental rights. Respondent failed to maintain contact with 

the foster care worker and, to the best of the foster care worker’s knowledge, respondent 

continued to lack a legal source of income or appropriate housing by the time of the termination 

hearing. In contrast, the children were thriving in the care of their paternal grandparents and 

were familiar with and comfortable in that environment. The paternal grandparents were also 

open to adoption, which would provide the children with the stability and permanence they 
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deserved. In light of the foregoing, we find no clear error in the trial court’s conclusion that 

termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Anica Letica 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra