1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

PETER J. VROOM, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 12-143 (RMC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) MOTION TO DISMISS 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S REPLY IN 

SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Peter Vroom’s opposition to defendant Federal Election Commission’s motion 

to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to rebut the Commission’s showing that plaintiff 

has not sustained any informational injury, much less any injury that is redressable by this Court. 

Plaintiff contends that the Commission’s dismissal of his administrative complaint against GE 

PAC and Penske PAC prevents him from “accurately” knowing how much those PACs have 

contributed to federal candidates. As the Commission has explained, however, plaintiff lacks 

Article III standing because (1) the information he claims to desire is already publicly available, 

and (2) granting him the relief he requests would not lead to the disclosure of any new 

information. Accordingly, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court grant the 

Commission’s motion and dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint with prejudice. 

I. PLAINTIFF ALREADY POSSESSES ALL THE INFORMATION HE CLAIMS 

TO SEEK 

A plaintiff suffers informational injury only when he is actually deprived of relevant 

information. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998); see also Common Cause v. FEC, 

108 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he nature of the information allegedly withheld is 

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critical to the standing analysis.”). Thus, the Court in Akins found the plaintiffs there had 

suffered informational injury because they were totally in the dark about which federal 

candidates the organization in question was supporting. 524 U.S. at 16, 20-21. 

Vroom has identified no such absence of information. In his opposition, plaintiff argues 

that he is like the plaintiffs in Akins because he has been “denied . . . the ability to accurately 

determine which corporate entity, GE or Penske, is the actual source of the financial 

contributions being made to federal candidates.” (Pl.’s Opp’n to FEC’s Mot. to Dismiss Am. 

Compl. at 3 (Doc. No. 17) (“Pl.’s Opp’n”).) But as the Commission demonstrated in its opening 

memorandum, plaintiff has complete access to — and has repeatedly invoked — the details of 

GE PAC’s and Penske PAC’s respective contributions to candidates, all of which the PACs have 

reported separately to the Commission. (Def. FEC’s Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Mot. to 

Dismiss at 10 & n.4 (Doc. No. 15) (“FEC Mem.”).) Plaintiff’s opposition brief reconfirms his 

possession of that information; indeed, his opposition includes a table neatly summarizing six 

years’ worth of GE PAC’s and Penske PAC’s separate contributions to a member of Congress. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 11.)1

 Plaintiff’s claim of injury, which he attempts to support with the very 

information he allegedly lacks, thus falls of its own weight. 

Vroom also claims that he lacks “accurate” information regarding GE PAC’s and Penske 

PAC’s political contributions. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 2-3.) Yet plaintiff has never challenged the 

accuracy of any of the financial figures reported by the PACs. To the contrary, plaintiff’s 

argument is particularly self-defeating because his primary claim — that GE PAC and Penske 

PAC disaffiliated illegally, so their aggregate reported contributions in the 2010 and 2012 

 

1

 Plaintiff’s data table also belies his assertion that he is somehow “ethically” barred from 

“aggregat[ing]” the PACs’ contribution amounts or communicating those amounts publicly. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 2.) 

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election cycles exceeded the legal limit (Pl.’s Opp’n at 10-11) — is premised upon the accuracy 

of the contribution amounts reported by GE PAC and Penske PAC. Without accepting those 

reported amounts as correct, there would be no “excess” contributions for plaintiff to complain 

about.2

 Thus, in reality, plaintiff’s claim regarding “inaccurate” information merely repackages 

his claim that GE PAC’s and Penske PAC’s properly reported contributions were illegal. (See

id. at 2-5.) This is not a request for information; it is a request for “a legal determination that 

General Electric and Penske are in violation of the law,” which the Court explained in its earlier 

dismissal order is “not a remedy to an injury.” Order, Dec. 6, 2012 (“Order”) at 3 (Doc. No. 12); 

Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding no informational injury 

where “each transaction appellants allege is illegal is reported in some form”). 

Because plaintiff already has the information he seeks through this lawsuit, the 

inescapable conclusion is that he has suffered no informational injury and therefore lacks 

standing. His effort to have the Commission “‘get the bad guys,’” Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 

418, by obtaining an advisory legal declaration that GE and Penske have violated the law must 

therefore fail for lack of jurisdiction under the binding precedent of Common Cause and 

Wertheimer (see Order at 4 (holding that plaintiff has no “‘justiciable interest in the [FEC’s] 

enforcement of the law’” (quoting Common Cause, 108 F.3d at 418))), as well as the other 

indistinguishable cases decided by the courts of this Circuit (see FEC Mem. at 12-14 (citing 

cases dismissing lawsuits against the Commission seeking information the plaintiffs already 

possessed)). 

 

2

 While plaintiff’s new allegations regarding the 2012 election cycle are outside the scope 

of his amended complaint and thus cannot be the basis of Article III standing, FW/PBS, Inc. v. 

City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 235 (1990), these new allegations further highlight that he 

already has all the information he purportedly seeks. 

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II. THE RELIEF PLAINTIFF SEEKS WOULD NOT REDRESS HIS 

ALLEGED INJURY 

Even if the Court were to find that plaintiff faces informational injury, he has failed to 

identify any relief the Court could grant to redress such injury. Plaintiff asks the Court to order 

the Commission to reconsider the permissibility of GE PAC’s and Penske PAC’s disaffiliation, 

or for the Court itself to decide that the Commission’s decision on that question was arbitrary 

and capricious. (Am. Compl. at 17.) Were the Court to do either of these things, however, the 

most that could happen is that the PACs would be subject to a single $5,000 contribution limit 

going forward, and their past contributions might be deemed excessive. But see 2 U.S.C. 

§ 437f(c)(2) (providing that entity acting in reliance on advisory opinion “shall not, as a result of 

any such act, be subject to any sanction”). Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, concluding that the 

contributions were “illegal” would not make them “inaccurate”: Vroom would receive no new 

factual information because the past contribution amounts that were reported would not change 

even if they were “[re-]attributed” to GE PAC (Pl.’s Opp’n at 5) or re-disclosed in another way. 

See Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1074-75 (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to seek disclosure of 

already-reported information). 

Furthermore, even if plaintiff were somehow to achieve everything he seeks in this case 

— including the forced reaffiliation of GE PAC and Penske PAC — the net effect would be that 

plaintiff and the public would end up with less information about the respective political 

activities of GE and Penske. Currently, as a result of the Commission’s decision to permit the 

PACs’ disaffiliation, plaintiff and the public know what each PAC does on its own. Were the 

PACs required to reaffiliate, however, they would have more leeway to blur their activities in the 

manner plaintiff allegedly seeks to prevent. For example, the PACs could consolidate into a 

single entity that makes biennial $5,000 contributions to candidates. It would be impossible 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 18 Filed 03/07/13 Page 4 of 7
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under this scenario to determine the very thing plaintiff claims to want to know: whether the 

contributions are attributable to GE or Penske. In addition, affiliated PACs can transfer 

unlimited funds to each other. 11 C.F.R. § 102.6(a); 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(c)(1). Thus, the PACs 

could continue to operate separately — with one of them contributing up to $5,000 to each 

candidate and the other contributing $0 — but with the funding for the contributions being 

transferred from GE PAC to Penske PAC or vice-versa. In that case plaintiff really would be

“denied . . . the ability to accurately determine which corporate entity . . . is the actual source of 

the financial contributions” and the “true extent of GE’s political . . . influence.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 

at 3-4.) Reaffiliation would therefore decrease the information available to plaintiff and others 

about GE’s and Penske’s separate political activities. 

Finally, plaintiff’s new request (which is not mentioned in his amended complaint) that 

the Court order the Commission’s Inspector General to initiate an investigation into these matters 

must be rejected. The only relief to which plaintiff could be entitled here is a declaration that the 

Commission’s dismissal of plaintiff’s administrative complaint was “contrary to law.” See

2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (providing for judicial review of dismissal of an administrative 

complaint); Alliance for Democracy v. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 (D.D.C. 2004) (quoting 

§ 437g(a)(8)). Plaintiff cites no statute or judicial precedent authorizing the Court to intrude 

upon the Commission’s internal processes in the manner he belatedly requests.3

 Cf. Hr’g on 

 

3

 In making this request, plaintiff reiterates his accusations concerning the Commission’s 

supposed misconduct in the handling of the underlying advisory opinion and administrative 

complaint. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-10.) While the allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint must 

be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss (and only for those purposes), these 

specific allegations have nothing to do with the instant motion because they are irrelevant to 

whether plaintiff has sustained an injury by having been “prevented from seeking information 

that will help him to evaluate candidates for office.” (Order at 4.) And the allegations have 

already been found wanting by the Court for jurisdictional purposes (id. at 3-4) in a ruling that is 

law of the case (see FEC Mem. at 15 n.6). 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 18 Filed 03/07/13 Page 5 of 7
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Mots. at 22, Vroom v. Gen. Electric, Inc., Civ. No. 1:10-1250 (E.D. Va. Jan. 28, 2011), ECF No. 

44 (dismissing Vroom’s complaint and citing his legal proceedings involving other government 

agencies as “evidence” of “a borderline bad faith attempt” to seek redress of unrelated issues). 

III. CONCLUSION 

Vroom lacks standing to maintain this case. He has “failed to establish that the ruling 

sought would yield anything more than a legal characterization or duplicative” — or reduced — 

“reporting of information that under existing rules is already required to be disclosed.” 

Wertheimer, 268 F.3d at 1075. Under Common Cause and Wertheimer and their progeny, the 

Court has no jurisdiction to hear a case seeking an advisory ruling that a third party has violated 

federal campaign finance law. For these reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the FEC’s 

initial memorandum, the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint with prejudice. 

Dated: March 7, 2013 

Respectfully submitted, 

Anthony Herman (D.C. Bar No. 424643) 

General Counsel 

Lisa J. Stevenson (D.C. Bar No. 457628) 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

David Kolker (D.C. Bar No. 394558) 

Associate General Counsel 

Adav Noti (D.C. Bar No. 490714) 

Acting Assistant General Counsel 

/s/ Charles Kitcher 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

Attorney 

ckitcher@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

Telephone: (202) 694-1650 

Fax: (202) 219-0260 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 18 Filed 03/07/13 Page 6 of 7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

 ) 

PETER J. VROOM, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Civ. No. 12-143 (RMC) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that on March 7, 2013, I caused to be electronically filed with the Court 

the Federal Election Commission’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint. I also certify that on that same date, I caused to be sent by UPS a copy of 

the same materials to plaintiff at the following address: 

Peter J. Vroom 

611 Oakley Place 

Alexandria, VA 22302 

/s/ Charles Kitcher 

Charles Kitcher (D.C. Bar No. 986226) 

Attorney 

ckitcher@fec.gov 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

Telephone: (202) 694-1650 

Fax: (202) 219-0260 

Case 1:12-cv-00143-RMC Document 18 Filed 03/07/13 Page 7 of 7