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THE BROKEN BUDGET PROCESS: 

PERSPECTIVES FROM BUDGET EXPERTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

Serial No. 112–16 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget 

( 

Available on the Internet: 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/committee.action?chamber=house&committee=budget 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin, Chairman 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

KEN CALVERT, California 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

TOM PRICE, Georgia 

TOM MCCLINTOCK, California 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

MARLIN A. STUTZMAN, Indiana 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

DIANE BLACK, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

TIM HUELSKAMP, Kansas 

TODD C. YOUNG, Indiana 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

FRANK C. GUINTA, New Hampshire 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland, 

Ranking Minority Member 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

HEATH SHULER, North Carolina 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

AUSTIN SMYTHE, Staff Director 

THOMAS S. KAHN, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, September 22, 2011 ........................................ 1 

Hon. Paul Ryan, Chairman, Committee on the Budget ................................ 1 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 2 

Hon. Allyson Y. Schwartz, a representative in Congress from the State 

of Pennsylvania ............................................................................................. 2 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4 

Hon. Jim Nussle, president, COO Growth Energy; former Chairman, 

House Committee on the Budget ................................................................. 5 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 8 

Hon. Phil Gramm, vice chairman, UBS Investment Bank; former U.S. 

Senator from the State of Texas .................................................................. 11 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 14 

Philip G. Joyce, professor of management, finance, and leadership, Maryland School of Public Policy, University of Maryland ................................ 16 

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 19 

(1) 

THE BROKEN BUDGET PROCESS: 

PERSPECTIVES FROM BUDGET EXPERTS 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Paul Ryan, [Chairman of the 

Committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Ryan, Garrett, Campbell, Price, Stutzman, Lankford, Black, Ribble, Flores, Mulvaney, Huelskamp, 

Young, Amash, Schwartz, Doggett, Pascrell. 

Chairman RYAN. The hearing will come to order. Welcome all to 

this hearing. The purpose of this hearing is to continue the work 

we started yesterday, highlighting the need to repair our broken 

budget process, and we have a great panel of witnesses with us 

here today to give us their insights and help guide us in our work. 

During his time in congress, Senator Phil Gramm was a tireless 

advocate for budget process reforms aimed at reigning in out of 

control spending. Senator Gramm co-authored the balance budget 

in the Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, otherwise known as 

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 

This law established, under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, deficit 

limits and a sequester as a means for enforcing them. Over the 

years, Congress has used the sequester with varying degrees of 

success, and it is currently playing a role in the work being done 

by the Joint Selection Committee on deficit reduction. I look forward to hearing from Senator Gramm on this topic and on many 

other areas in which he can share his deep well of wisdom. 

We also have former Chairman Jim Nussle with us here today; 

Jim, really nice to have you back. I have never seen you on that 

side. I am not used to seeing you on that side of the microphone 

when you were the OMB director, and that is the next point that 

I wanted to make. Jim served three straight terms leading this 

very committee as the chairman and then in President Bush’s Cabinet as director of the Office of Management and Budget. 

During his time in Congress, Chairman Nussle worked in a very 

bipartisan way to reform the budget process, particularly, The 

Nussle-Cardin Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of 1999, 

which many of us took part in. He can also share some valuable 

insights on many of the topics of interest to this committee. 

Finally, we have Professor Philip Joyce of GW, author of the recent book, ‘‘The Congressional Budget Office: Honest Numbers, 

Power and Policymaking.’’ Dr. Joyce will be able to offer a wide- 
2 

ranging expertise on what works and what does not work in the 

current budget process, and I also look forward to his testimony as 

well. 

With that, I would like to yield to the gentle lady from the Philadelphia area, Pennsylvania, Ms. Schwartz. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Ryan follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL RYAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

Welcome all, to this hearing. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to continue the work we started yesterday— 

highlighting the need to repair our broken budget process. 

We have three witnesses here who can provide us with valuable insights that will 

help guide our work. 

During his time in Congress, Senator Phil Gramm was a tireless advocate for 

budget-process reforms aimed at reining in out-of-control spending. 

Senator Gramm co-authored the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 

Act of 1985, otherwise known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. 

This law established deficit limits and the sequester as a means of enforcing 

them. Over the years, Congress has used the sequester with varying degrees of success, and it is currently playing a role in the work being done by the Joint Select 

Committee on Deficit Reduction. 

I look forward to hearing from Senator Gramm on this topic, and on many other 

areas in which he can share his wisdom. 

We also have Chairman Jim Nussle here today—Welcome back, Jim! 

Chairman Nussle served three straight terms leading this very committee, and he 

also served in the cabinet of President George W. Bush as the Director of the Office 

of Management and Budget. 

During his time in Congress, Chairman Nussle worked in a bipartisan way to reform the budget process, particularly in the Nussle-Cardin Comprehensive Budget 

Process Reform Act of 1999, and he can share valuable insights on many topics of 

interest to this committee. 

Finally, we have Professor Phillip Joyce of George Washington University, author 

of the recent book, The Congressional Budget Office: Honest Numbers, Power, and 

Policy Making. 

Dr. Joyce will be able to offer a wide-ranging expertise on what works and what 

doesn’t in the current budget process, and I look forward to his testimony. 

With that, I yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. Van Hollen. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Good morning, it is good to see you senator, congressmen, good to see you. And Dr. Joyce, thank you very much for 

joining us. I do want to thank the Chairman for calling these hearings for raising ideas, thoughts on how we can improve the budget 

process; it is always useful. 

I do want to say that ranking member, Chris Van Hollen, is unable to be here. As you know there is something now which we 

refer to as a super committee. This is occupying some of his time 

and there is a hearing at exactly the same time. So apologies from 

our ranking member that he could not be with us this morning, so 

he has asked me sit in his stead, which I am very pleased to do. 

I do appreciate the Chairman’s focus on the budget process as a 

way to move towards restoring fiscal balance in our government. 

We all acknowledge that the budget process is complex. I know 

that Mr. Nussle knows this well. 

Just two quick things that I going to mention before I get started. When assuming the budget process many of us acknowledge 

that it neglects to adequately review different parts of the budget, 

particularly spending through our tax code. There has been some 

discussion about that and the current process does not account for 

some fundamental changes that are outside the federal budget control at all, such as in significant changes in demographics, the age 
3 

of the populations is one example, or increases in health care cost 

due to technology and advances. And, of course, our new federal responsibilities related to things such as homeland security or the 

growing costs of new veterans. Almost two million Americans have 

served overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan and they are adding to the 

number of veterans and, of course, the costs related to that. 

So, I look at these hearings as a valuable step forward in better 

understanding the possible changes in the process. Questions will 

likely arise, and what I would ask you to address is will any 

changes lead to a better understanding of the budget and what we 

are doing to greater predictability, to greater accuracy, to improve 

transparency or simplification? Will it enable us to, on behalf of the 

American people, to make sure the budget does reflect our priorities and our policy goals? 

We all acknowledge that the federal budget is on an 

unsustainable path under current policies where our deficit will 

continue to grow over the next decade and that the debt held by 

the public will rise as a percentage of the GDP. We are deeply concerned about these realities, and we agree that action needs to be 

taken. 

But the question I will have for you, too, is will the budget process truly improve this situation? Is it a question of budget process? 

Or, in fact, is the question more about substance and disagreement 

on how to actually meet these goals? And they are two very different elements. 

And of course we are very concerned about job creation and economic growth. Do you both agree that a change in the budget process help us in any way to meet those goals? The economy is fragile 

and we want to be sure that what we do in the short term does 

not hurt our fragile economic recovery or our effort to grow jobs in 

the long haul. 

I do want to acknowledge that we have made some changes in 

the budget process in the last couple of years. One is we enacted 

Statutory PayGo; Pay-As-You-Go, not a term that use much outside 

the walls of Congress, but we want to be sure that any new spending or new revenue proposals were in fact, deficit neutral, and we 

did do that. We used Statutory PayGo. Of course, the rules change 

in this session so that only spending has to be paid for, tax expenditures do not. So that is the gap in making sure we do not add to 

the deficit, as well. That is something that you may want to address. So, that is just one example of what we have done. 

So, let me close by saying the budget process, again, it is not, in 

my mind, an answer, to what is really a substantive debate that 

we have to have. The budget process is that; it is a process; it is 

a mechanism that we can use. It works when we have reached 

agreement that we know how to use it. It can be used, of course, 

to not help us either, but that is the process. 

So, I just want to be clear that we all agree that we need to leaner and more focused government. It does require us to be clear of 

that efficiency in our government. I believe it is an important time 

in our nation’s history, we have an opportunity to make sure that 

we actually tackle this deficit, grow the economy, expand opportunity and security for all Americans. 
4 

The key to this, again, it is not that the budget process itself; it 

is compromise, it is fundamental fairness, it is a recognition that 

the most important and immediate action we take to address the 

deficit has to put Americans back to work and set the federal government on a path towards fiscal balance. Agreement on this really 

requires us to find a way forward, to find that common ground, and 

to meet our obligations to Americans, grow the economy and invest 

for the future. Maybe you will mention some of those things as 

well. I look forward to your testimony. And I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Allyson Schwartz follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA

Thank you, Chairman Ryan, for calling these hearings to discuss ways to improve 

the budget process. I appreciate the Chairman’s focus on this component in the effort to restore fiscal balance to our government. The budget process is complex. It 

neglects to incorporate adequate review of the different parts of the budget, such 

as spending through the tax code. The current process does not account for some 

fundamental changes outside the federal budget that can have a significant effect 

on the federal budget such as the aging of the population, substantial increases in 

health care costs, due to technology and advances, new federal responsibilities in 

areas such as homeland security and, the growing need and costs of veterans’ health 

care. I view these hearings as a valuable step in moving toward better understanding of possible changes on the process. Questions that will arise will certainly 

include: will any changes to better understanding, greater predictability, greater accuracy, improved transparency/simplification and overall better enable us to act on 

behalf of the American people to ensure that the Budget reflect our nation’s priorities and acknowledges our policy goals. 

We all agree that the federal budget is on an unsustainable path. If we continue 

current policies, deficits will remain high throughout the decade, and the debt held 

by the public will rise as a percentage of GDP. We agree action needs to be taken. 

Will changes in the budget process improve this situation? Will changes better enable us to promote job creation and economic growth? 

The economy is still fragile. With millions of people still out of work and families 

struggling to make ends meet, our lagging economy runs the risk of compounding 

our debt problem for future generations. Increased employment is the best and most 

effective way to reduce our deficit. To promote job creation, we must restore confidence in our government and create an environment so the private sector can 

grow. 

Efforts to create jobs and improve our economy in the short-term must be coupled 

with a long-term plan to reduce the deficit. Budget process reform can be a useful 

tool in helping control growing deficits and I am pleased that the last two Congresses actually made progress by adopting two budget process reform items. 

For example, we enacted Statutory Pay-As—You Go, which assured that new 

spending and revenue proposals were deficit neutral. Statutory Pay-As-You-Go was 

one of the most valuable tools during the 1990s in helping to achieve budget surpluses for four years in a row. We renewed Pay-Go last session; unfortunately, this 

law was watered down in the current Congress by a change that made the House 

Rule asymmetrical, prohibiting new spending without spending offsets but allowing 

for the consideration of tax cuts without offsets. 

We also made changes to the House Rules during the 110th and 111th sessions 

of congress that helped to control spending through earmarks in annual appropriations bills. The elimination of the earmark rule remains in force today. 

While the budgetary impact of these kinds of changes may be small, a process 

that is stream-lined, transparent, and uses the most conceptually sound approaches 

may lead to more informed budget decisions and promote increased trust in our government. Perhaps it is also time to review scorekeeping practices including accrual 

accounting for pensions and health benefits, risk-adjusted credit reform, program integrity, and baseline concepts. 

As we consider reform proposals, we must remember that process reform is no 

substitute for making the hard choices. Budget agreements can drive budget process, but budget process cannot drive agreements. The three times budget process 

has been most effective are in 1990, 1993 and 1997. 

Each time, the Congress and President reached an agreement on spending and 

tax levels and the Congress enacted budget rules to enforce the agreement. Looking 
5 

back at the 1990 Act, Former Congressional Budget Office Director Robert 

Reischauer concluded that ‘‘budget procedures are much better at enforcing deficit 

reduction agreements * * * than at forcing such agreements to be reached. * * *’’ 

The American people have sent a message loud and clear: It is time for us to work 

together for the good of the country. We have to get our fiscal house in order. This 

means a leaner, more focused government. Congress must demand greater efficiency 

by cutting programs that no longer work, streamlining wherever we can, and investing in the right priorities for Americans. 

We stand at an important moment in our nation’s history, and we have the opportunity to rebuild our economy in the short-term and make responsive, balanced decisions to change the current budget trajectory in the long-term. Congress has tough 

choices ahead as we meet these challenges. To rebuild the American dream of security and opportunity for all Americans, we must make the right choices now. 

The key will not be process reform. It will be compromise, fundamental fairness, 

and recognition that the most important and immediate action we can take to address the deficit is to put America back to work, and set the federal government 

on a path towards fiscal balance. This will take agreement on how best to do this— 

agreement resolved not by changes in the budget process—which is the mechanism—but rather by finding common ground on the spending and revenues so can 

meet our obligations to the American people, grow the economy and invest for the 

future. 

Chairman RYAN. Thank you. Chairman Nussle, we will start 

with you because you have the honor of having led this committee, 

and then we will go to Senator Gramm and then Dr. Joyce. 

STATEMENTS OF JIM NUSSLE, FORMER CHAIRMAN, HOUSE 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, PRESIDENT, COO GROWTH 

ENERGY; PHIL GRAMM, FORMER CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATE 

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 

VICE CHAIRMAN OF INVESTMENT BANK, UBS AG; PHILIP 

JOYCE, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF MANAGEMENT, FINANCE AND 

LEADERSHIP, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF 

MARYLAND 

STATEMENT OF JIM NUSSLE 

Mr. NUSSLE. I have to admit Mr. Chairman that the vantage 

point here is much different than the one up there, so I think I like 

yours better but I am honored to be back and honored to be before 

you, not only as a friend, but as somebody that I encourage to join 

the budget committee, and it did not take much encouragement 

having started here as a staffer yourself. But I am honored to before you and the rest of the members of the committee. I am sorry 

Chris is not here, but I know he has got big fish to fry. And I always thought this was a super committee by the way. I do not 

quite understand this whole new super committee stuff, but at any 

rate, this is a super committee as far as I am concerned. I am glad 

to be back here. I just want to acknowledge Tom Kahn and Austin 

Smythe and their terrific staff. They do a great job on your behalf 

and on behalf of the country. They are patriots, they are experts. 

Many of them are good friends of mine and I just want to say congratulations on the work that you do. 

The subject of today’s hearing reminds me of something my dad 

always taught me. He had a sheet metal shop and he made cabinets out of sheet metal and everything from spot welding and rivets and everything else. He always used to give me grief whenever 

I complained about anything. He said, ‘‘You know, it is not the 

tools, it is the craftsman. It is not the tools you look at in the tool 

box to make the difference; it is the person using them.’’ My old 
6 

uncle Felix who work at my dad’s shop who could make anything 

out of a hammer and I am not sure if that is true of today’s craftsmen. It is the craftsman that seems to be a difference in all of this. 

I suppose the same could be said of the fiscal toolbox that you 

have. Over the last 20 years that I had the opportunity and the 

honor to write budgets at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. I 

have to say that the tools have not changed that much; they are 

pretty much the same. We may call them different things; they 

may come up in different contexts, but by and large they have not 

changed all that much. They are pretty much the same tools that 

we have always used. 

So as I look at that and I think about what could we do in today’s context in order to change it? The first thing I would say is 

what is broken? The chairman mentioned that the budget process 

is broken. I would suggest to you, respectfully, that may not be the 

case. It may not be that the budget process is broken. It may not 

be, in other words, that tools are broken, but it may be the fact 

that the tools are not even being used. I was doing a quick scan 

of the roster of the budget committee members, and with all due 

respect, very few of you have seen the budget process even used, 

let alone work. The chairman has, certainly, and many of the more 

senior members, but for the freshman in particular you have never 

seen the budget. You have never seen modern budget process put 

into effect. You have passed one here in this committee. You passed 

one on the floor, but the entire budget process start to finish these 

days is rarely used. 

And, I suppose you could say could we look for one or two things 

to improve that budget process and yes, I have been through that 

process as the chairmen mentioned together with then house member and member of this committee Ben Cardin. I, along with the 

sanction of our leadership, we tried to put together a reform to the 

budget process. We did so, by the way, in a context of a balanced 

budget. In fact, in 1999 when we were balanced and there was no 

urgency to change the process because it was broken as if we had 

to rush in like a fire department and put it out. We did it in a time 

when it was calm and there was some stability, and so I would be 

concerned to suggest to you to be careful rushing in and assuming 

that one or two fixes to the budget process may make this any less 

difficult because, in fact, it may not be the budget process at all. 

So, I tried to think of some things that might work as I looked 

at this. I thought, and the same could be true of a driver pulling 

up to an intersection with a stop sign, rolling through that stop 

sign. We now see stop signs with the red lights blinking around 

them as a way to try to get people to stop. If the driver’s disrespect 

the stop sign and just keep rolling through and do not obey the 

rules of the road. I mean, what can you really do to stop somebody, 

or stop a driver from rolling through a stop sign? The same could 

be said of Congress; you set the rules, you set the processes. If you 

choose to roll through the stop sign, and if you choose to change 

it on a whim, and you choose not to follow it or to, I would say, 

in some instances, disrespect that process, there is nobody that can 

do anything about it; there is no budget prison. I always wanted 

to find a budget prison, you know, and send a few people to it. And 

I looked at the bottom of the capitol; there is no budget prison if 
7 

you do not follow the rules. So I tried to think of some things that 

might work. So, I went back to what Ben and I came up with back 

in 1998 and 1999 and I looked at those, and I thought of some 

other things; so I came up with five. 

The first is leadership. The budget process shows, and I believe 

it is less important in the political leadership provided. It is that 

simple; you either provide it or you do not. You either establish 

clear, fair and non-outcome determinant rules that you follow, and 

allow the Congress to work its will, or you do not. Please remember 

what I mean when I say ‘‘non-outcome determinant.’’ It is just like 

playing football, or playing baseball, or whatever it is. The rules 

are not there to determine the outcome of the game. The rules are 

there to make sure that both sides, both teams, if in fact were on 

different teams, can play the game, make the determination and 

get to an outcome. The process should determine the substance; the 

substance should not determine the process. 

Second, before you fix the current process, try it. Before you fix 

the current budget process really try it, stick to it, make a commitment to follow the rules because they are not all bad. Many of 

them are very good, and if implemented, I think, many of them 

would work. 

Third, I would suggest making the budget process real; making 

it a law. And, in fact, you do not need a change, as I understand 

it; I will defer to Paul Restuccia and the consel’s office, which we 

did at that time. My understanding is you do not need to make any 

change at all to go from a concurrent resolution on the budget to 

a joint resolution on the budget. It is a matter of just filing it as 

a joint resolution and making it a law requiring the president to 

sign the law as opposed to passing it only between both bodies [inaudible]. 

The reason why I think that is important is because so often 

nowadays the budget process breaks down, we think, toward the 

end of the year, toward the end of the fiscal year. When, in fact, 

if you really think of this as a blueprint, going back to the toolbox 

and making some analogy, if you do not have a design, if you do 

not have a blueprint upfront, you may not know until the end how 

broken it is. What I am suggesting by this is by making it a law, 

making sure that both the House and the Senate and the president 

have skin in the game, they have made an agreement up front. You 

have made a consideration as Allyson said, as Congresswoman 

Schwartz said, you decide what the compromises are, what the 

agreements and disagreements are up front, and you get it sealed 

into law. You establish the fences. You design the blueprint. Now, 

the plumbers and the carpenters and everybody can rush in and 

finish the work; but if you do not have that design up front, you 

may not know until the end that it is broken. And in fact, the 1974 

Act was based on that very concept. There was a breakdown in the 

late 1960s, well, actually before that, by the late 1960s, early 

1970s, they decided we not only have a design up front, but we 

need reconciliation at the end to kind of make sure it all fits together and followed that design. 

And so that gets me into my fourth point, and that is use reconciliation. I call it weeding the garden, and it is just like the garden out back that you and your wife might have. If you go out 
8 

there every Saturday and pull the weeds that have popped up during that week, it is not too tough, and plants flourish and you get 

good tomatoes. But if you wait until the end of summer to weed 

the garden you might as well go in with a tiller and plow it under 

because you cannot possibly control it. Every time I tried to create 

a budget we put reconciliation instructions into the document, not 

because we were trying to determine one thing or another, but because we thought it would be important for the committees of jurisdiction to actually go in and make reforms on a step-by-step basis, 

pulling those weeds out as we went, as opposed to where we are 

now, which is a super committee having to go in and try and put 

everything back together. 

Last but not least, let me suggest a proposal that the Commission on Fiscal Responsibility that the Pew Peterson Foundation put 

together and the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. A 

bunch of us has-beens, budget directors and chairmen and ranking 

members and all of us has-been budgeters got together bipartisan 

and argued through what could we do. The number one recommendation that we came up with that is missing in the budget 

process was a fiscal goal. What was horizon that you are trying to 

accomplish? Just going year by year, we all know in business, in 

family, and in our common sense, that you will not reach that final 

goal, A) if you do not have one, and B) if you cannot measure along 

the way to know if you are heading toward that fiscal goal. And 

we determined that a good fiscal goal would be setting a certain 

debt to GDP ratio; we picked 60 percent. Pick whatever number 

you want, but we also put in some triggers and some targets along 

the way so we knew if we were on target, and if we were not on 

target we had some automatic triggers that took effect that said, 

‘‘Okay, Congress cannot get it done, this is what automatically happens.’’ It is not that dissimilar to what you decided in the super 

committee process with sequestration. So, those are my five I put 

in the website, and some of the information to direct you to it, but, 

leadership is number one; try the current process is number two; 

number three, make it real; number four, use reconciliation to help 

weed the garden; and number five, set some good goals and targets 

as part of this process so you know that you are actually heading 

toward a goal as opposed to this year by year kind of waiting for 

the next election more than really waiting for the next fiscal year 

as part of this process. 

So I commend that to you Mr. Chairman and friends and members and I do it with sincerity that if somebody knows that from 

a substantive standpoint how we got here; there is a lot of blame 

to go around. Having sat on both that side as a chairman and this 

side as an OMB director, I accept my portion of that, and I think 

all of us accept the responsibility including those beyond this committee who did not, to do something about it. So I commend that 

to you in that spirit, and I hope that you can use it to improve the 

process in whatever way that you see fit. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Jim Nussle follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM NUSSLE, PRESIDENT, COO GROWTH ENERGY; 

FORMER CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member Van Hollen and Members of the Committee 

thank you for the privilege of appearing before you today. It’s great to be back be-
9 

fore the House Budget Committee at the witness table but, your vantage point is 

better. I commend you and the entire professional staff here at the committee including Tom Kahn and Austin Smythe; true experts, patriots and friends. 

In my testimony here today I hope to make the following points: 

1. The budget process chosen is less important than the political leadership provided. 

2. Before you search for a new budget process to fix the current process, actually 

give the current process a try. 

3. Make the budget process real by considering making the budget a law and 

binding on Congress and the President. 

4. ‘‘Weed the garden’’ of public policy every year by using the budget reconciliation 

process while keeping everything on the table. 

5. Determine long and short-term fiscal sustainability goals within the Budget 

Resolution to assure a path to fiscal responsibility. 

THE BUDGET REFORM ‘‘TOOL BOX’’ 

The subject of this hearing reminds me of the tool box on my Dad’s old workbench. I’ve looked inside that toolbox over the years and today I still recognize the 

same tools in his handyman arsenal from when I was a kid. Some are worn, some 

a little rusty, some show the markings of use, but they are largely the same tools 

he’s always had and always used. My Dad would tell me that ‘‘it’s not the tools, 

but the craftsman’’ that make the difference in the outcome. 

I suppose the same could be said of our fiscal toolbox. I’ve observed, participated, 

testified and chaired these important hearings over my now 20 years in federal 

budget matters and I’ve used or recommended using just about all the various budget process tools in the fiscal tool box as I wrote federal budgets from both ends of 

Pennsylvania Avenue. The ‘‘tools’’ themselves remain largely unchanged. 

And, as the fiscal challenges continue to become more severe, it might seem obvious to some that the budget process is what is broken and making this effort so 

challenging. I suggest that would be incorrect. That is not to suggest that a process 

change here or there might be an improvement or that a completely different process would be the perfect solution 

I recall how Senator Ben Cardin (then house budget committee member) and I 

met together back in 1999 with budget staffs for months writing our budget reform 

plan with the sanction of our leadership, tinkering with ideas from the very bold 

to the very minor. We held hearings just like this and examined every possible alternative tool. 

Congress ended up now passing our budget reform plan by a slim margin made 

up of appropriators who didn’t want a budget process to ‘‘fence them in’’ and other 

members from authorizing committees who were concerned about shining the light 

on their growing entitlement sustainability issues within their jurisdiction. That day 

our plan failed on the floor of the House, we had a balanced budget. Our reform 

wouldn’t have worked any better without leadership. 

Here again, I would provide my Dad’s advice, I suggest that there may not be any 

‘‘new tool’’ but rather what’s needed is the skilled ‘‘craftsperson’’ and leader to put 

them to good use. 

One might easily argue that the process used to create the budget is broken. But, 

I could easily argue that the budget process isn’t broken at all; today the budget 

process is not even being used or and at best is simply being ignored. 

I wish our nations fiscal challenges could be repaired by a process adjustment. 

And, if a ‘‘new and improved’’ budget process is treated with the same disrespect 

as the current process, good luck having a rebirth of success. 

If an intersection of streets with a big bright red sign that says STOP doesn’t 

cause drivers to STOP, (they just keep rolling right through) what can you do? Make 

the sign bigger, redder, affix flashing lights all around it. It still requires the respect 

of the driver to adhere to the ‘‘rules of the road’’. 

Over the years Congress and the President have been simply rolling through the 

‘‘stop signs’’ and not adhering to the rules of the road in seemingly small ways. But 

now that disrespect and lack of leadership has resulted in the very lack of a budget 

whatsoever. And all sorts of fiscal accidents are waiting to happen as a result. 

So what can be done? I would make the following recommendations: 

1. My first is leadership. The budget process chosen is less important than the 

political leadership provided. You all either provide it or you don’t. You either establish clear, fair, and a non-outcome determinate budget process rules that you follow 

and that allow the Congress to work its will and determine the nation’s priorities 

or you don’t. 
10 

2. Before you search for new budget procedures to ‘‘fix’’ the current process, actually give the current process a try. Prove that Congress and the President can follow 

the current process and rules before you decide that a new process or rule will somehow do the trick. Most of you have yet to see the current process work because most 

haven’t even seen it fully attempt or implemented! 

3. Make the budget process real by considering making the budget a law and 

binding on Congress and the President. A Joint Resolution approach for the budget 

rather than a Concurrent Resolution can establish clarity, buy-in and commitment 

up front in the budget process calendar determining quickly whether there are 

issues and challenges making agreement difficult or impossible rather than waiting 

until the year end for the train wreck to be realized. Plus a law makes it real, binding, enforceable and controlling in an era where everything seems out of control and 

unsustainable. It forces the President to participate which I believe would improve 

the process and shines the light on inaction to assist in preventing one body from 

simply ignoring the realities. 

4. ‘‘Weed the garden’’ of public policy every year by using the budget reconciliation 

process while keeping everything on the table. Just like a garden, if you pull the 

weeds of waste, fraud, abuse, ineffectiveness, and duplicative ness in the entitlements that now make up two-thirds of the budget, you make it easier to accomplish 

rather than letting those weeds take over. When I was Chair we placed reconciliation in every budget in an attempt to accomplish that very reasonable and gradual 

reform. And put everything on the table. We all have our areas where we have 

strong beliefs but that should not preclude the search for constant improvement. 

5. Fifth and finally, determine long and short-term fiscal sustainability goals 

within the budget to assure a path to fiscal responsibility. 

At our Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Summer conference, Chairman Bernanke said ‘‘A straightforward way to define fiscal sustainability is as a situation in which the ratio of federal debt to national income is stable or moving down 

over the longer term.’’ 

Just as there are many policy tools to reduce spending there are choices for how 

to achieve, measure and maintain fiscal sustainability. I offer the choices arrived 

at after thoughtful deliberation and calculation from The Bipartisan Committee for 

a Responsible Federal Budget and the Pew-Peterson Commission on Budget Reform 

where I am a co-chair and honored to participate. 

The Commission determined three broad recommendations of targets, triggers and 

transparency, beginning with the establishment of a fiscal goal and then adopting 

budget limits that would be enforced through broad automatic spending cuts and 

even tax increases if policy makers fail to make the necessary legislative changes 

to meet that goal. 

Our Commission recommended that Congress and the President: Adopt mediumterm, long-term and annual limits on the amount the government can borrow as a 

share of national income. The targets are intended to commit the government in advance to a path of borrowing consistent with economic stability; debt to GDP target 

of 60% recommended to begin and reduced over time. 

Links to the Pew Peterson Commission report ‘‘Red Ink Rising’’: 

http://budgetreform.org/sites/default/files/Red_Ink_Rising_hyperlinked.pdf 

and report ‘‘Getting Black in the Black’’: 

http://budgetreform.org/document/peterson-pew-commission-recommends-majorrevisions-federal-budget-process 

CONCLUSION

Having written, negotiating and passing budgets at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, I well understand how difficult the challenges are that lay ahead for you as 

our nation’s leaders. The budget tools you have at your disposal are largely similar 

to tools we have used or contemplated using in the past. However, some tools are 

simply being neglected and the process ignored. I believe the most important commodity at this juncture is leadership. Leadership or ‘‘craftsmanship’’; is desperately 

needed to skillfully use the tools in the fiscal tool box, in these complicated and difficult circumstances, educating and challenging the American people, and finally 

placing the United States finally on a sustainable fiscal path. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman RYAN. Thank you so much Jim. Senator Gramm. 
11 

STATEMENT OF PHIL GRAMM 

Mr. GRAMM. Mr. Chairman, first of all it is a great privilege to 

be here. I had the opportunity for two terms in the House to serve 

on this committee. I would like to begin by saying that I think the 

action of this committee and this Congress is the exemplar of what 

good government is about. In my adult lifetime, nobody has done 

more to move us toward fiscal responsibility, and no one has acted 

more courageously than this committee under your leadership, Mr. 

Chairman. I think it is an indication of what can be done with dull 

tools with strong leadership. I think we are often mistaken when 

we design government to count on strong leadership, and that is 

basically what I would like to talk about. 

First of all, if you are going to talk about the budget process, you 

need to understand that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was never written to control spending. It 

was written in order to stop Richard Nixon from impounding 

spending that had been adopted by Congress. It was written to 

shift the control of the budget from the executive branch to the legislative branch. And even though the objective of the budget was 

to increase spending, the senior members of Congress were very 

concerned about this: the creation of this committee, and as a result they structured the committee in such a way as to make it 

weak. They made membership temporary, they wrote the bill in 

such a way as to limit the ability to use it effectively, and that is 

the budget process we started with. 

Now, over time, that budget process has been strengthened, and 

why does it matter? I mean, I could not disagree more with Jim 

about the tools issue. I find that working around my place I generally have the wrong tool. I find that I am a lot better craftsman 

when I have the right tool. 

And let me try to set the budget process in that perspective; it 

is a process I think I know. I was the co-author of the Reagan 

budget in the House and that was the first time we used reconciliation to any significant extent. I was the co-author of Gramm-Rudman and that was the first time we ever set binding targets and 

enforced them with automatic spending cuts, which we call sequesters. 

But the budget process is never going to be a four-sided fort, 

where you can pull up the draw-bridge and go back to sleep. The 

budget process, at its best, is simply a stone wall to your back in 

a gun fight. It is very relevant, however, because it changes the 

battle field. It changes the contour of the battlefield and it tilts it 

toward at its best. It tilts it toward responsibility and accountability. 

Now there were two things that made me interested in the budget. The first occurred when I had been here about a week, and I 

was sitting at my desk and I had my inbox, and it just kept getting 

higher and higher and higher and I kept saying to myself, ‘‘My 

God, did I give up a perfectly good life at a perfectly good job to 

suffer the tyranny of the inbox?’’ You have all experienced it. I 

hated days here when I was looking at that inbox. 

So anyway, I got up and just wandered over to the floor of the 

House and by sheer happenstance Jim Wright was speaking in 

favor of raising the debt ceiling. And his basic pitch was your fam-
12 

ily has rung up these bills, and what gentleman is not going to pay 

his bills. So it suddenly struck me that that was true but that was 

just the beginning of the story. So, I held up my hand and got recognized and basically made the point that it is true; everything the 

majority leader said was true, but families do not just pay their 

bills. They then get out an envelope and pencil and sit down at the 

kitchen table. They figure out where they got off track, as the Congressman Hensarling says, they get out your credit card and butcher knife and cut up the credit card. And I said I do not think we 

ought to raise the debt ceiling and not try to address the underlying problem. Well, I then wondered off. Well, the debt ceiling 

failed, which was remarkable in those days. 

And so anyway, the debt ceiling came up again in two weeks to 

offer an amendment to try to tie the debt-ceiling to the deficit. I 

think I got about 160 votes and it failed, but that was the beginning of my recognition of this problem. 

The second was watching the appropriations process. I figured 

out that with amendments offered on the floor that the average 

amendment was costing somewhere between 50 and $90 million. 

There were 100 million taxpayers so that each taxpayer was paying 

between .50 and .90 cents, which was not enough to fool with, certainly not enough to fund writing a letter to say, ‘‘Hey, it is my 

money.’’ 

But the beneficiaries were getting substantial amounts of money 

so that on every vote the beneficiaries were looking over their left 

shoulder holding members of Congress accountable. Nobody was 

looking over their right shoulder. And I found in watching the debate that it was not sufficient, nobody cared whether the amendment was worth what it cost. You could only defeat a spending 

amendment if you could make a very coherent and convincing argument that it was a bad thing. So we were consuming the taxpayer’s money up to the point where its value was zero, often it 

was negative, but we could not make a strong enough argument. 

Those two experiences convinced me that the process had to change 

and that led to what became the Reagan budget and the use of reconciliation and Gramm-Rudman. 

Let me say I think your Budget Control Act was a substantial 

improvement over Gramm-Rudman and I think the principle you 

set down that if you are going to raise the debt-ceiling you ought 

to have reduce the deficit over a 10-year period by a comparable 

amount. It is a good principle and I think it should never be violated again. 

Now, if today’s question is ‘‘What can we do to make this process 

better?’’ I want to share with you a big idea. It is an old idea; it 

is not my idea, obviously. If it is a big idea, it clearly is not my 

idea, but interestingly enough it was Jimmy Carter’s idea. I want 

to give you an updated version of it in terms of my thinking. The 

idea that Jimmy Carter brought to Washington was zero based 

budgeting. The idea was that every appropriated program should 

periodically be comprehensively reviewed and modernized and Congress should be required to reauthorize it or it would die. 

Now, Carter came in 1997 and I did not come until 1999. So by 

the time I got here, poor Carter was so beaten down, and this idea 
13 

was hated by Congress immediately, but I tried to get President 

Carter to come forward again with the idea but it never happened. 

Here is what I want to propose: I want to propose that beginning 

with the election of the new president, could be the same person, 

but the beginning of the new presidency in 2013, that the administration be required in its second year to evaluate and submit reauthorization legislation for every discretionary program in the American government. Now they may decide not to resubmit certain programs. The authorizing committees could decide on dramatically 

changing programs. The authorizing committees will now have lead 

in their pencil and they would be in a position where each program 

has to be reauthorized or at the end of the year it cannot be appropriated. We have programs that serve no purpose, and in some 

cases have really outlived their beneficiaries but inertia just keeps 

them in place. This is a very powerful idea. 

I would go further. I would also, once every 10 years, require the 

reauthorization of all unearned entitlements. These are entitlements where people get benefits that they have not, at least in 

part, paid for. And each decade they would work exactly the same 

way. AFDC, food stamps, many other programs would have to be 

resubmitted, they would have to be reauthorized, they would be 

comprehensively reviewed, they would be voted on by Congress 

that did not write the bill to begin with, looking at it from the perspective of the world they are living in and the constraints they 

face. And if they reauthorized it, if they changed it, it would be 

changed, if they did not reauthorize it would not be funded. 

Now, I would go whole hog myself and that is I would require 

that earned entitlements, entitlements where you either provide 

service, or you pay at least in part for it, that would be veterans’ 

benefits, Social Security and Medicare, I would require that every 

10 years you require the administration to have a comprehensive 

review and a propose the reauthorization program. 

I would require that Congress comprehensively review the program. I would not sunset unearned entitlements but I would give 

the review process a privileged motion under expedited rules so 

that the reauthorization could not be filibustered, and where it 

would be subject to rules that would allow the process to work. 

I would even go further. For every provision of the tax code that 

was not a rate I would sunset it every 10 years and require that 

it be reauthorized. If it did not reauthorize it would be one we authorized it would go away. 

I think I would treat rates like earned entitlements. I would be 

a little bit afraid to require the reauthorization of tax rates because 

if you did not get the job done you would be out of business. Now, 

some people might view that as a good thing. When I was a young 

man I would have made a joke that it might be a good thing but 

now I am not as ignorant as I once was. 

But in any case this is the kind of thing that we really need to 

do. Reagan used to talk about nothing is immortal on earth except 

the programs of the federal government. And as all of you know it 

is sinful looking at our tax code. 

Finally, let me just say we are already changing entitlements, 

now somebody is going to jumop up and down and say ‘‘You mean 

every 10 years you are really going to have a process to look at 
14 

*The opinions expressed in this testimony are solely my own. 

Medicare and Social Security?’’ Well, look we have amended Medicare 13 times with major changes since 1965, so every three and 

a half years we are rewriting Medicare. Why not do it in a systematic way where we can look at what has happened actuarially. 

What has happened in terms of our ability to pay for the program 

and the potential miracle that we might have learned something? 

In terms of Social Security, it has been amended substantially 17 

times. Every 4.4 years we have changed Social Security in some 

very meaningful way. Why not have an orderly process to look at 

it every decade? I have to believe that would be a good idea. I also 

believe that we need to convert to all of these programs to actuarial 

accounting. I mean we talk about programs that have a positive 

cash flow, that have huge accrual accounting deficits. We have a 

complete misconception that the public has about the ability of a 

trust fund to pay Social Security benefits when the trust fund is 

a bunch of IOUs in a metal file cabinet in West Virginia where it 

is the debt of the government to itself. 

And we require accrual accounting of every private business in 

America. Why do we do it? Because we are trying to protect individuals by giving them information, but yet government does not 

apply accrual accounting to itself. Makes no sense. 

Finally, let me say this special interest groups would hate these 

proposals that I have made. They would fear them because it 

means that you would really, honest-to-God, going to look at these 

programs to see if they are achieving what you want them to 

achieve. I would say that it is worth the effort to do it. I think it 

is important to remember that America does not have any special 

dispensation that guarantees that we are always going to be the 

greatest, freest and richest country in the world. We are going to 

be as great and as free as we make ourselves. And we are going 

to be as poor and un-free as we allow ourselves to become. 

One of the reasons that this is an important committee is because this is the only committee of Congress where you really talk 

about the role of government. How big should the government be? 

How should it be funded? What do we expect our government to 

do? Those are critically important decisions because they really determine who we are. If you have France’s government, your people 

are going to become Frenchmen. If you have America’s traditional 

government, they are going to be Americans. So these are very important decisions and I commend them to you and I just urge you 

to choose wisely. 

[The prepared statement of Phil Gramm follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PHIL GRAMM,* VICE CHAIRMAN, 

UBS INVESTMENT BANK; FORMER U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. Chairman, I am honored to testify today before the House Budget Committee, 

a committee that I was privileged to serve on when I was in the House of Representatives. In Washington, D.C., where the buck is frequently passed and dodging is the 

norm, the House Budget Committee in this Congress has provided extraordinary 

leadership in addressing the Nation’s fiscal crisis. In my adult life, of all the efforts 

undertaken to address government spending and debt, the budget you passed in 

2011 is the most significant and the most courageous. 

Any review of the Congressional budget process must begin with the recognition 

that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was never de-
15 

signed to control spending. Its primary objective was to stop the Presidential impoundment of spending, and shift the control of spending from the Executive branch 

to Congress. But even the most senior members of Congress were fearful of its potential power and worked to insure that both the Budget Act and the Budget Committee were weak. 

As co-author of the Reagan Budget, which employed the first major use of the reconciliation process, and as the co-author of the Gramm-Rudman law, which set the 

first binding deficit reduction targets and enforced them by automatic spending cuts 

called sequesters, I can clearly and unequivocally say that there is no budget law 

that is a four-sided fort where we can pull up the drawbridge and go back to sleep. 

The best that any budget mechanism can provide is to help force action and tilt the 

process toward encouraging hard choices and compromise. At its best, the budget 

process can become a good stone wall to your back in a gunfight. 

I believe the Budget Control Act recently enacted into law sets out a good process 

for handling the debt limit increase. It corrects many deficiencies in the GrammRudman law and the Budget Enforcement Act. The principle that any increase in 

the debt ceiling should be fully offset by a permanent reduction in the deficit of an 

equal or greater amount is sound and should always be the guiding principle in the 

future. 

If the question today is how we strengthen the congressional budget process, I 

want to recommend for your consideration a permanent reform structure for ALL 

government spending. One of the best ideas ever on the budget came from former 

President Jimmy Carter, and that was zero-based budgeting. His idea was simple 

and logical: all discretionary spending should be periodically re-authorized by Congress. I would recommend that beginning in January of 2013 we require whoever 

is President to submit re-authorizations of all discretionary programs at the beginning of the second year of their Administration. This would mean that every program would be reviewed and reauthorized or it would sunset and not be eligible for 

funding. There should be no exceptions to this rule. 

In addition, every 10 years I would sunset all entitlement programs which are unearned, i.e. not based at least in part on contributions made by the beneficiary, 

starting in 2014. For those entitlement programs which are based in part on beneficiary contributions, I would require a comprehensive review every 10 years with 

an expedited and privileged consideration of the reform process. Entitlement programs are now changed on a haphazard basis, with the Medicare law having undergone 13 major changes since its inception in 1965—that’s once every 3.5 years— 

while Social Security has been subject to 17 major changes over 75 years, a rate 

of once every 4.4 years. By sun-setting unearned entitlements and by requiring a 

comprehensive review with expedited and privileged procedures for reforming 

earned entitlements, we could begin a systematic review and modernization based 

on demographics, the financial status of the government and the state of economic 

knowledge. 

All federal entitlement programs should be maintained on the books using accrual 

accounts. We continue to talk of programs in terms of cash-basis ‘‘surpluses,’’ which 

are in fact running massive deficits under accrual-accounting. The government demands accrual accounting in the private sector to protect individuals but remarkably we do not apply the same laws to government itself. I believe Senator Lieberman introduced such a bill a few years ago, and it would be a good reform. Further, 

we should require States to use the same accounting methods for their pension programs and health care retirement benefits. Only then can we ensure transparency 

and accountability in the process. 

While special interest groups will fear and oppose systematic review of all federal 

spending programs, it is clear that the nation and its people will benefit. America 

has no special dispensation that guarantees we will always be the greatest, richest, 

and freest people in the world. America can be as strong as we make it or as weak 

as we allow it to become. When Thomas Jefferson said that the price of liberty is 

eternal vigilance, he was not talking about Indians coming over the mountain or the 

British coming across the ocean. He was talking about vigilance against the encroachment of our freedoms by our own government. It is this committee that sets 

the limits on government and that duty makes the Budget Committee—and your 

actions -significant. Behind all the numbers and the budget scoring and projections, 

you are determining what kind of America we want to live in. Please choose wisely. 

Chairman RYAN. Dr. Joyce, I understand in my opening I said 

you are from George Washington University, however, my understanding is you recently left George Washington and you are now 

at the University of Maryland, correct? 
16 

Mr. JOYCE. That is correct and my dean thanks you for reading 

my qualifications. 

Chairman RYAN. Dr Joyce. 

STATEMENT OF PHILIP JOYCE 

Mr. JOYCE. Thank you Chairman Ryan, Representative 

Schwartz, members of the Budget Committee. I am pleased to be 

here today to share my views on the federal budget process. I have 

a relatively long written statement which I would like put into the 

record and I am mindful of the fact that when you say an academic 

is going to offer wide-ranging views it may just be an invitation to 

be long-winded. 

Chairman RYAN. Without objection it will be in the record, so you 

can summarize your comments. 

Mr. JOYCE. I will summarize. What I am going to tell you is 

based on my 20 years of both participating in and studying the 

budget process. I think it is an understatement to say that the 

budget process does not appear to working very well. I would 

argue, however, that the main problem is not that the budget process itself is broken, and in fact I agree with Mr. Nussle that the 

main issue is that tools that are available have not been recently 

used to devise solutions to the fiscal mess we are in. 

So my main message to you, and I will amplify on this but not 

too much, is that you should avoid the temptation of assuming that 

fiscal rules are going to solve our budgetary problems. The goal is 

to deal with the larger fiscal imbalance that faces us. I think that 

the most important thing to do is to make effective use of the tools 

that you already have. 

I think it is useful from my vantage point of somebody who studies the budget process and has participated in it to sort of review 

what our historical experience may offer in this regard, so I am 

going to try to call out some lessons from the last 25 years; it is 

really the last 25 years that we have attempted to use the budget 

process to try to get some control over the deficit. 

In 1974, of course, we had the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. The fact that we have the Budget Committee and a budget resolution at all stems from a desire by the 

Congress to deal with the whole budget and to deal with the budget on a multi-year basis. Prior to that point, the budget was dealt 

with only on a piecemeal basis, the budget was really very much 

year at the time; so I think that was a giant step forward when 

it was used, and sometimes it used and sometimes it is not. 

The main vehicle to do multi-year budgeting has historically 

been, as both of the previous speakers said, the reconciliation process. I think, in fact, the reconciliation process is the success story 

of the federal budget process. 

But I agree with Senator Gramm that there was nothing about 

the original 1974 budget process that was really designed to get 

control over spending or the deficit. And in fact in 1985, when the 

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Law was passed, that represented the 

first real attempt to use the budget process to reduce the deficit. 

I think there is a credible argument that this law had some effect 

on spending and deficits; however, it did not come close to meeting 

its overall goals. In fact the fiscal year 1993 budget, which was one 
17 

that was supposed to be balanced under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 

had a deficit of $255 billion. I only mention this to say that historically this is why after the late 1980s it sort of led us to a place 

where we looked for another approach to try to get a handle on the 

deficit. And that ultimately culminated in what was called the 

Budget Agreement of 1990; this is where the president and a few 

members of the president’s staff and key members of Congress 

went to Andrews Air Force Base and they sort of hammered out 

an agreement to reduce the deficit. Part of that agreement did involve the budget process. There was a new procedure called the 

Budget Enforcement Act, and the Budget Enforcement Act is where 

we first saw discretionary spending caps similar to the ones that 

are now the Budget Control Act and the pay-as-you-go process 

which was for mandatory spending and revenues. 

The BEA approach differed from Gramm-Rudman in two main 

respects: first, it focused on the policy actions first and then used 

the budget process to attempt to enforce compliance with those actions. That is, to try to keep the Congress from undoing the decisions that had previously been made. 

Second, it created separate enforcement regimes, as opposed to 

an overall sequestration covering discretionary spending on the one 

hand, and mandatory spending and taxes on the other hand. This 

BEA type process was repeated in 1993 and 1997 with the passage 

of yet new reconciliation bills. The reconciliation process again was 

central to deficit reduction. 

The BEA fell apart in the early 2000s. What killed the BEA? 

Surpluses killed the BEA, because at the point at which you had 

discretionary spending caps, you had a pay-as-you-go process, but 

you also had surpluses and it was sort of asking the political system to walk and chew gum at the same time. It was sort of hard 

to maintain that discipline. 

The 1997 Act, in fact, represented the last time, prior to this 

year, that the congressional budget process was used to try to enact 

a multi-year deficit reduction deal. Reconciliation was used plenty 

of times in the 2000s, but when it was used in the 2000s it tended 

to be used to add to deficits rather than subtract from them. This 

year, though, there was a movement in the Budget Control Act toward multiyear deficit reduction because of the discretionary 

spending caps; so all of that is history. 

What does that history tell us about any lessons, about the relationship of the budget process to deficit reduction? 

I would like to highlight four lessons. The first lesson is setting 

targets without simultaneously reaching consensus on policy actions to reach those targets is likely to be an empty promise. The 

major failing of the Gramm-Rudman law was that it did not really 

require anything of people who voted for it, other than to promise 

to do something in the future. When the future came, they did not 

do it. 

This is also a problem with constitutional amendments requiring 

annual balanced budgets; they are not self-enforcing; something 

needs to happen after them in order to make them come true. If 

they are going to be targets then they should be accompanied by 

at least a substantial down payment on the policy actions that are 
18 

necessary in order to meet them if those targets are going to be 

credible. 

Second, and related to this, the budget process is better, I would 

say much better at enforcing compliance with agreements that 

have already been made than making those agreements happen. 

All of the successful efforts at deficit reduction in the last quarter 

century had one basic thing in common, the president and the Congress agreed on a future path for the budget and a set of policy actions and then the process was used to try to enforce compliance 

with those actions. That is the BEA approach, I think it largely 

worked, until the consensus around reducing the debt fell apart, 

which it did in the late 1990s, early 2000s. 

Third lesson, any enforcement regime must be comprehensive 

and must encourage participants to make policies in order to avoid 

the consequences. Sequestration is something that should be designed so that it is not actually used. That is, it should encourage 

people to do things, what we will call the old-fashioned way, which 

is to actually increase revenues, cut spending in order to meet targets. The problem is that if many parts of the budget are excluded 

from enforcement, as was true with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and 

as is true with the Budget Control Act, then the ability of the enforcement process to promote policy agreement is more limited. Put 

simply, people will calculate whether they think they are better off 

letting the automatic cuts take effect than they would be actually 

reaching policy agreement. I would therefore encourage that any 

enforcement regime not only include all spending, but also include 

automatic revenue increases, not because I think automatic revenue increases are a good idea, but because people might actually 

want to enact policy actions in order to avoid having them go into 

effect. 

Fourth, the budget process should hold policy makers accountable for things they can control. I think this was one of the important characteristics of the BEA is that it held appropriators responsible for those actions that dealt with appropriated spending, that 

is appropriated spending exceeded the caps it was appropriated 

spending that got cut. If it was authorizing spending that was the 

problem, then the pay-as-you-go process would kick in to try to put 

a sequestration on mandatory spending. 

So what do I think, in addition to enforcement, which I think is 

important, if you have any set of budget changes that are put into 

effect I think they need to be enforced, what are the most fruitful 

areas of potential reform? I would advise you, in addition to enforcement, to concentrate on those that give the Congress and the 

president appropriate information on the fiscal impact of the budget choices that you make. There are actually a few examples of this 

from the past, one of them is the 1990 Federal Credit Reform Act, 

if you want to talk about approvals, that was sort of the first movement to try to bring accrual concept into the budget for loan guarantees and direct loans. Prior to that point, direct loans were treated as if they were grants, loan guarantees were treated as if they 

were free. 

The 1995 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act was an attempt to try 

to bring information into the process to try to keep things from 

happening that appeared to have no cost, when in fact they did 
19 

have a cost, they just did not necessarily have a cost to the federal 

government. 

The various score-keeping rules, which are arcane and will put 

you to sleep, but they were put together in 1990, codified in 1997, 

I think they reduced the overall level of what we call technically 

budget chicanery. They have encouraged recognition of cost at a 

point where I think they can be controlled. Issues like this which 

are not sexy and are really about budget concepts and budgetary 

accounting seem much more fruitful to focus on than larger fiscal 

rules or many institutional reforms and there are lots of other 

issues out there that could fit this category of providing additional 

information, such as for example the expansion of accrual concepts 

to other areas, deposit insurance, pension insurance, flood insurance, et cetera and also budgeting for disasters and emergencies, 

which is not just this year that this has been an issue, this has 

been an issue probably for the last 25 or 30 years, the fact that we 

systematically underfund emergencies in the regular process and 

then when there are emergencies we have to add money to the 

budget. 

So in closing, the budget process can be good, in my view, at two 

things. The first is to force policy makers to confront the real cost 

of their actions and provide information that is necessary for them 

to make budget decisions. The second is to enforce compliance with 

budget decisions that have already been made. Unfortunately, it is 

not very good at forcing the political system to deal with fiscal 

problems if it does not have the political will to do so. So again, 

much of the current budget process infrastructure that is needed 

to deal with your current budget problems exists today. I would 

join Mr. Nussle in saying that I think the most important thing to 

do is to make use of those processes and those rules that you already have. I think that is going to have much better payoff than 

establishing fiscal rules without establishing the policy changes 

that are necessary to comply with those rules. So thanks again for 

inviting me. 

[The prepared statement of Philip Joyce follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILIP G. JOYCE, PROFESSOR OF MANAGEMENT, FINANCE, 

AND LEADERSHIP, MARYLAND SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Chairman Ryan, Ranking Member Van Hollen, and members of the Budget Committee, thank you for inviting me to share my views on the federal budget process. 

The views I will express today are informed by 20 years of both participating in— 

and studying—the budget process. Based on this observation, I would agree with 

many who would say that the budget process certainly does not appear to have done 

a very good job of helping us to solve the current budget problems that we face. I 

would argue, however, that the main problem is not that the budget process is broken—it is that the tools that are available have not—at least recently—been used 

to devise solutions to the problems that we face. 

I would like to start by observing that I think taking a long look at the budget 

process and (particularly) budget concepts can have a positive effect. It is, however, 

a big job—one that is fraught with difficulty. This difficulty takes at least two forms. 

The first is that there are entrenched interests who like the budget process just the 

way it is because it enables them to achieve their desired policy ends. The second 

is that, because there are so many directions that you could go, the Congress might 

spend its time on tempting reform targets that will not really have much payoff. 

I don’t think there is much that can be done about the first problem, and in any 

event I don’t mean to suggest that you duck difficult reforms that may work because 

they would be opposed by entrenched interests. But I do advise you to steer you 

away from reform ideas that we have already tried and we know not to work. In 
20 

particular, I hope that you avoid the temptation of assuming that fiscal rules will 

solve our macrobudgetary problems. In fact, my main message is that most of the 

tools that you need to solve the budget problems faced by the country are already 

in your toolbox. If the goal is to deal with the larger fiscal imbalance that faces us, 

the most important thing to do is to make use of them, not search for more tools. 

WHAT IS OUR EXPERIENCE WITH FISCAL RULES SINCE 1974?

First, I think it is useful to remind ourselves of where we have been. Since 1974 

we have attempted a number of approaches to deal with the budget, and later the 

budget deficit. These efforts have yielded some lessons that I think are useful to 

consider in the context of budget reforms that the committee might consider this 

year. 

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which established the budget resolution and this committee, was designed to address at least 

two major flaws in the process as it existed at that time. First, the budget was 

adopted on a piecemeal basis. That is, there was no point at which the Congress 

focused on the whole budget. Rather, many separate bills—covering tax legislation, 

mandatory spending, and discretionary appropriations—were considered. In total, 

these made up the ‘‘budget’’, but the totals were more or less the accidental result 

of these many separate legislative actions. Second, the budget was only a one-yearat-a-time phenomenon, with little attention paid to the medium-or-long term budgetary or economic effects of policy. 

The Budget Act of 1974 attempted to address these shortcomings by establishing 

a budget resolution, which would represent a comprehensive statement by the Congress of its priorities, and would cover multiple years. The notion here was that the 

Congress would first decide on a path for aggregate fiscal policy, and then would 

impose limits that its committees would be required to adhere that would be consistent with these aggregate limits. Institutionally, the establishment and enforcement of the budget resolution would be under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Budget Committees. They would be supported in this by the Congressional 

Budget Office (CBO), which would both establish a multi-year budget baseline 

(starting point) for budget deliberations, and would track the economic and fiscal 

effects of legislation over multiple years, in part to ensure that the strictures established by the budget resolution were adhered to. 

This was all well and good, except that there was nothing about the budget process created in 1974 that necessarily forced it to confront the large deficits that 

began to surface by the mid-1980s. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 

Control Act of 1985 (later revised in 1987), also known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 

(GRH), attempted to put the budget on a glide path to balance by setting fixed deficit targets, over multiple years. The bill was passed as an amendment to a bill to 

increase the government’s debt limit, partially to give some cover to those who voted 

for the debt increase. Adherence to these targets was enforced through sequestration. If estimated deficits (as enacted in the budget resolution) would exceed the 

GRH targets, across-the-board spending cuts were enacted. The sequestration process excluded a significant number of programs, however, including Social Security 

and most of Medicare. 

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation was a watershed event, because it explicitly focused the budget process, for the first time, on attempting to get a handle 

on out of control budget deficits. The law set annual targets for budget deficits, with 

an ultimate goal of a balanced budget within five years. While there is a credible 

argument that GRH had some effect on spending and deficits, it did not come close 

to meeting its overall goals. In fact, the fiscal year 1993 budget, which was to be 

balanced under the revised 1987 targets, had a deficit of $255 billion. The failure 

of GRH to meet it objectives stemmed primarily from its focus on estimated, rather 

than actual, deficits. Policymakers tended to meet the projected deficit targets 

through systematically optimistic forecasts, particularly of economic growth. These 

optimistic forecasts were embraced by both the President and Congress, and by both 

Republicans and Democrats. Further, the sequestration process lacked credibility, in 

part because it exempted large portions of the budget on the spending side, and in 

part because it included only spending changes, and not automatic tax increases. 

The failure of GRH to reduce deficits to manageable levels contributed to the 

search for a different approach, which ultimately culminated in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. This act combined spending cuts and tax increases to 

reduce 1991-1995 deficits by an estimated $500 billion. It also included a new procedure, called the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), which combined statutory caps on 

discretionary programs with a new pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system designed to prevent new actions from undoing the effect of the deficit-reducing actions enacted in 
21 

1990. Under PAYGO, if mandatory spending was increased or taxes decreased, this 

needed to be accompanied by action to reduce mandatory spending or increase taxes 

in order to make the overall effect ‘‘deficit neutral’’. Both the caps and PAYGO were 

enforced on a multi-year basis. 

The BEA approach differed from GRH in two main respects. First, it focused on 

the policy actions first, and THEN enforcing those actions—attempting to prevent 

the Congress from undoing the actions already agreed to. Thus, the option of avoiding the deficit-reducing policy actions by assuming that the problem had been solved 

was not available. Second, rather than one sequestration, there were two, focused 

on the distinction between discretionary and mandatory spending (and taxes), under 

the assumption that policymakers should be held accountable for things that they 

could control. For example, a failure to meet the discretionary caps would lead to 

a sequestration of discretionary spending rather than all spending. 

The BEA approach survived the 1990s. New five-year reconciliation bills were 

passed in 1993, and again in 1997. These new bills tended to be passed before the 

prior multi-year agreement expired, in an effort to make changes necessary to respond to changing budget or political realities. The BEA process itself was extended 

until 2002, but the onset of budget surpluses in fiscal year 1998 ultimately led to 

its downfall. Congress and the President resorted to loopholes starting in the late 

1990s, such as declaring funding for the conduct of the 2000 census to be an emergency. (This seemed to many to stretch the emergency designation more than a little, since the requirement for the decennial census is in the U.S. constitution.) 

The 1997 Act represented the final time until 2011 that the Congressional budget 

process was used to enact a multi-year deficit reduction deal. While there were subsequent uses of reconciliation during the 2000s, all of them had the effect of adding 

to deficits rather than reducing them. These included the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax 

cuts, and the 2003 Medicare prescription drug bill. While a statutory PAYGO law 

was enacted in 2010, it includes a number of sequestration exemptions that limit 

its usefulness. In 2011, there was some movement toward multi-year deficit reduction through the enactment of the discretionary spending caps included in the Budget Control Act. 

In the end, there are a number of lessons about the relationship of the budget 

process to deficit reduction that emerges from the experience of GRH, the BEA, and 

the post-BEA era. 

1. Setting targets without simultaneously reaching consensus on policy actions to 

reach those targets may be an empty promise. The major failing of GRH was that 

it did not require anything of its drafters, other than a promise to do something 

later. This is also a major failing of constitutional amendments requiring annual 

balanced budgets. If there are going to be targets, they should be accompanied by 

(at least a substantial down payment on) the policy actions that are required to 

meet them. 

2. Even if we are going to set future targets, promises to reduce projected deficits, 

with no attention to actual deficits, invites unrealistic projections. Meeting projected 

targets is not that hard. Under GRH, doing something later ended up often meaning 

cooking the numbers to appear to meet the goals, rather than actually meeting 

them. 

3. Enforcement must be comprehensive, and must encourage participants to reach 

agreement. A major shortcoming of the GRH process was that some participants 

(particularly those who opposed tax increases or cuts in major entitlement programs) believed that they were better off with sequestration than they would have 

been actually agreeing to a deal. If many policies are excluded from enforcement, 

then the ability of the enforcement process to promote a deal is more limited. I 

would therefore encourage that any enforcement regime not only include all spending, but automatic revenue increases. 

4. The budget process is better at enforcing compliance with agreements than to 

make those agreements happen. Any process is limited in its ability to actually 

make something happen, if the participants to not have the incentive to act. All of 

the successful efforts at deficit reduction in the last three decades have one basic 

thing in common. The President and the Congress agreed on a future path for the 

budget and on a set of policy actions, and then the process was used to enforce compliance with those actions. 

5. The budget process must recognize the particular responsibility that the federal 

government has to respond to economic downturns and other emergencies. It is important that the federal budget process remain flexible. Thus, when the deficit rises 

because of the deterioration of the economy, it is important that this not require 

spending cuts and tax increases, at precisely the time that they would be most difficult, and economically and politically harmful, to enact. If it had been imperative 

that the government reduce its deficit during the recent recession, it would have 
22 

made state and local governments and individual citizens much more vulnerable to 

the effects of the economic downturn. While there have been tendencies in the past 

for emergency designations to be abused, it is important to maintain the ability of 

the process to respond to unforeseen circumstances. 

6. Enforcement mechanisms should hold policymakers accountable for things that 

they can control. The BEA, by focusing on enforcing actions that had already been 

taken, and by holding Congressional committees responsible for actions under their 

control (appropriators for discretionary spending, and authorizing committees for 

PAYGO actions) was more successful in maintaining budget discipline, at least until 

deficits were replaced by surpluses, at which point the consensus that had developed 

around deficit reduction had fallen apart. 

THE PROBLEM WITH OVERALL FISCAL RULES

There is no real disagreement about the larger budget problems that we face. 

They have been well documented. The numerous commissions, in addition to several 

directors of CBO, Comptrollers General, and even some (but not all) Presidents and 

many members of Congress have delivered the consistent message that we eventually have to confront the fiscal challenges that we face. 

I am VERY skeptical, however, about how useful budget process reforms can be 

in making us confront those challenges. Thus, I would advise against spending a 

lot of time and energy trying to come up with rules that force people to act more 

responsibly later. It is better to spend time and energy searching for a set of policies 

that will reduce projected deficits and debt, and then use the budget process to enforce adherence to the fiscal path implied by those policy changes. 

It is in this context that I think the balanced budget amendment to the constitution is ill-advised. Certainly there are many arguments against a balanced budget 

amendment, including that it often is not sufficiently flexible to allow the federal 

government to respond in times of economic and other emergencies, and that it is 

problematic to put spending limits into such an amendment. I would mainly stress 

two flaws in the balanced budget amendment. 

The first is that it is a distraction from the problem that we face right now. It 

would take perhaps seven years to figure out whether the state legislatures would 

ratify it (they would not, in my view, since many would figure out that it is not in 

their interest for the federal government to balance its budget on an annual basis). 

Moreover, it is not self-enforcing. It would take legislation to enact the changes in 

laws necessary to increase revenues and reduce spending, and further to enforce 

compliance with the amendment. If we could enact those policy and budget enforcement changes, we would not need the amendment. If we were to pass the amendment, we would still need to do those two things. 

Secondly, it relies on erroneous ideas about debt in our society. It turns out that 

it is not only the federal government that does not balance its budget. Families have 

mortgages; they have car payments; they have student loans. State and local governments balance their operating budgets, but they borrow to build highways, or 

dormitories, or prisons. Equally, businesses carry debt. Borrowing is a fundamental 

part of the financial model for families, governments, and corporations. Used correctly it can be very productive and result in measurable gains. The problem is not 

that the U.S. government has debt: it is rather that the fiscal imbalance is too large, 

and is too heavily weighted towards debt that does not make us better off in the 

long-run. These would both be good things for the Congress to address. Neither of 

them is addressed by a requirement that the government balance its budget on an 

annual basis. 

If the goal is reducing the current level of debt in the medium-term and enacting 

budgets that maintain budget discipline in the longer term, it is my view that the 

Congress already has the major tools that it needs. The budget resolution itself is 

designed to set targets for multiple years, and those targets can (and should) reflect 

the desire to reduce deficits to a manageable level of GDP. Moreover, it is the reconciliation process that has been most successful, if success is defined as assisting 

the country to deal with deficits on a multiple-year basis. Particularly during the 

decade of the 1990s (with separate reconciliation bills passed in 1990, 1993, and 

1997) reconciliation was used to enact policies that reduced the deficit over multiple 

years. Certainly reconciliation can have the opposite effect on the deficit, as we saw 

during the 2000s. That does not have to do with the structure of reconciliation, but 

the political consensus around the actions that it is used to make. 

In the end, this demonstrates one of the limitations of reconciliation, and indeed 

the whole budget process. It can act as a vehicle to enact policies, but it cannot force 

a particular set of policies to be enacted, or a particular economic or fiscal path to 

be followed. Thus, in the 1990s, it was used to promote fiscally responsible policies, 
23 

because there was a political consensus around that fiscal direction. In the 2000s, 

there was a consensus around lower taxes and more spending, and the process was 

used to promote these outcomes. Thus the process does not demonstrably encourage 

fiscal responsibility, but can make that responsibility easier to achieve if there is 

a consensus to follow such a path. I certainly think that if the Supercommittee is 

successful in coming up with policies to reduce future deficits, that accompanying 

that with BEA-like enforcement mechanisms that attempt to prevent future Presidents and Congresses from undoing those policy actions will be essential. Even 

there, however, history demonstrates that if a future President and future Congress 

want to get around those rules, they will find a way to do so. 

WHAT ABOUT OTHER REFORM IDEAS?

There are, of course, lots of other things that you could focus on that are not directly related to the short terms deficit problems facing the country. There are, as 

is true in most years, seemingly as many of these ideas as there are members of 

Congress to propose them. While I will not attempt to look at all of these proposed 

reforms, there are four current proposals that this committee may be asked to consider that I have thought about—biennial budgeting, a joint budget resolution, sunset review, and expedited rescission. I will share at least some summary thoughts 

on these. 

Biennial Budgeting—One frequently mentioned proposal is to change from an annual to a biennial budget. Since Congress has such difficulty acting on a budget, 

why not simplify the problem by requiring action only every other year? Most biennial budgeting proposals would have the president submit his budget biennially and 

would also feature biennial budget resolutions and appropriations. Perhaps the 

high-water mark for biennial budgeting came in 1993, when both the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress and Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review recommended that the federal government adopt a biennial timetable 

for the process. Proponents of biennial budgeting argue that the current annual 

process features repetitive votes on many fiscal issues that eat up valuable committee and floor time. Second, in a related issue, supporters note that time spent 

on budgeting cannot be spent on other activities, particularly detailed oversight of 

federal programs. 

While enthusiasm for a biennial budget is understandable, given the distaste with 

the continual nature of the budget process, this reform probably would not have 

much effect on either the time spent on budgeting or on the level of oversight exercised by Congress. On the first issue, the federal government has a rather checkered 

history of budget forecasting. Producing a budget every two years would increase 

the probability that budgets would be based on erroneous information, and would 

therefore need to be redone. The biennial process may degenerate into an annual 

process, given the uncertainties associated with budgeting for a $4 trillion enterprise. Further, an increase in oversight under biennial budgeting would occur only 

if the current lack of oversight results from a lack of time. Even if members of Congress had more time to do oversight, they would not be likely to do more of it simply 

because they do not have any incentives to spend precious time understanding more 

about how federal programs work in great detail. 

Joint Budget Resolutions—Unlike the present requirement for a concurrent budget resolution, a joint resolution would require the President’s signature, and thus 

would be a law and binding on subsequent Congresses. With a joint budget resolution, the President would be given the authority to veto the budget resolution as 

passed by Congress. Requiring that the budget resolution be a law in order to take 

effect would give it more weight than it bears as just a set of rules the Congress 

creates for its own use. Further, if a joint budget resolution worked as advertised, 

it would improve the timeliness of the process by facilitating agreement earlier in 

the Congressional session. 

While I think that promoting earlier agreement is a laudable goal, it seems unlikely that a joint resolution would make earlier agreement between the President 

and Congress more likely to occur. In years in which the President and the Congress are inclined to agree with each other on the outlines of the budget, requiring 

the President’s formal approval is not likely to change much. Therefore, during periods of unified government (that would represent 14 of the 37 years between 1975 

and 2011), a joint budget resolution would have been unlikely to influence timeliness of the budget process. The President and the Congress already have incentives 

to agree on the broad outlines of policy in those years. Alternately, if the President 

and the Congress do not agree on even the broad outlines of policy (as seems likely 

during periods of divided government—the other 23 years since 1975), requirement 

for a joint budget resolution could stop the budget process dead in its tracks, to an 
24 

even greater degree than exists today. To the extent policy and priority conflicts define Presidential-Congressional relations, a joint budget resolution would simply 

front-load those conflicts, increasing chances that the budget resolution would be delayed or that there would be no budget resolution at all. 

Sunset Provisions—Sunset review proposals put government programs on a set 

timetable for review and possible abolition. In a sense, many federal programs and 

agencies are already subject to sunset review, since they have to be periodically reauthorized. The reauthorization process, however, frequently does not focus comprehensively on whether programs work or not. In fact, examples of programs that 

are abolished because they do not work are few and far between. States have often 

used sunset review, with mixed results. If sunset review was to be used at the federal level, it would be most effective if it was accompanied by systematic efforts to 

assess the performance of the programs under review. This type of performance 

measurement is anticipated under the Government Performance and Results Act 

Modernization Act of 2010, which attempts to build on the last 20 years of progress 

in establishing performance measures for federal programs. If sunset review becomes just another forum for political disagreements that are not supported by evidence on either side, it is hard to imagine how it would be an improvement. 

The last three administrations have attempted, with some success, to increase the 

supply of, and demand for, performance data that can be used for resource allocation and management. It is worth at least considering how we could move beyond 

a simple discussion of how much it COSTS to pursue particular policy alternatives 

to more explicitly considering the effects of these policies. In my view, the federal 

budget is pretty good at this point at telling us how much things cost, but pretty 

bad at telling us what the benefits are. This is, unfortunately, symptomatic of a 

larger problem afflicting the federal budget, which is that not nearly enough consideration is given to whether policies or programs work (as opposed to, say, in whose 

Congressional district the money gets spent). This seems a glaring omission in a $4 

trillion budget. 

Expedited Rescission—Proposals to give a line item veto to the President have 

abounded since Ulysses S. Grant first proposed such a veto in the 1870s. In 1995, 

the Congress passed, and the President signed, the Line Item Veto Act, which was 

a legislative equivalent of a line item veto that was ultimately declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1997. Subsequently, Presidents Bush and Obama 

each proposed that he be granted a reduced form of line-item veto authority through 

what is referred to as ‘‘expedited rescission.’’ Under this proposal, a president would 

be guaranteed a vote on rescission proposals that he proposed, and individual items 

would be subjected to an ‘‘up-or-down’’ vote on the Senate or House floor. The presumption is that these items would be subject to greater scrutiny, making it harder 

for the more egregious pork barrel projects to survive. In the 111th Congress, the 

expedited rescission approach is probably best exemplified by S. 102, sponsored by 

Senators Carper and McCain. There is nothing, in my view, particularly wrong with 

expedited rescission proposals. There is no particular reason that a President should 

not be able to obtain a vote on his proposed rescissions. I do think that, if proposals 

to ensure votes on Presidential proposals to reduce earmarks are going to be enacted, they should find a way to include targeted tax benefits as well as spending, 

as the Line Item Veto Act of 1995 did. 

There are other proposals that have gotten less attention that I think represent 

useful areas of focus for the Congress. In particular, I think that reforms that force 

the Congress and the President to recognize the cost of individual policy choices will 

promote greater attention to policies that have costly future budgetary effects. That 

is, that if policymakers have to recognize the cost of their actions, it may encourage 

them to behave otherwise. There are a few examples of this: 

• The Federal Credit Reform Act discouraged the notions that loan guarantees 

are costless and direct loans are like grants; 

• The 1995 unfunded mandate legislation has discouraged the imposition of costly 

new mandates by forcing the Congress to at least consider their cost. Very few mandates have been enacted since this law took effect. 

• The various scorekeeping rules agreed to after 1990 and codified in 1997 have 

reduced the level of budget chicanery. The lease-purchase rule, for example, has 

been used to explicitly recognize long-term acquisition costs (a good example of this 

was the Boeing tanker charade from the mid-2000s, which was eventually seen for 

the costly federal commitment that it was). 

Issues like this (which are really about budget concepts and budgetary accounting) seem much more fruitful to focus on than larger fiscal rules, or even institutional reforms. There are lots of these issues that could be the focus of your discussion, but such as list would clearly include: 
25 

• What to do with the transactions of the GSEs now that we have, in practice, 

removed the word ‘‘sponsored’’ from their title. • Whether there are other places where accrual concepts, such as used for credit 

programs, would send more appropriate signals to policymakers than the current 

cash treatment (such as deposit insurance, pension guarantees, flood insurance, or 

natural disaster policies). • Whether changes should be made in the way that we budget for natural disasters and other ‘‘emergencies’’ (the tendency has been to underfund them in the regular appropriations process because we won’t be able to help ourselves later). 

This is by no means a comprehensive list of possible reforms. These are certainly 

other examples that others might be able to identify. The important point is that 

these micro-level incentives are liable to have far greater payoff than larger fiscal 

rules that try to get us to balance the budget, or reduce entitlements, or achieve 

world peace, or any number of other lofty goals we might consider. 

CONCLUSION

The budget process is important. It allocates more than 20 percent of the goods 

and services produced in the U.S. economy. It can be good, in my view, at two 

things. The first is to force policymakers to confront the real costs of their actions, 

and to provide information that is necessary for them to make budget decisions. The 

second is to enforce compliance with budget decisions that have already been made. 

Unfortunately, however, it is not very good at forcing the political system to deal 

with fiscal problems, if it lacks the political will to do so. 

Much of the budget process infrastructure that is needed to deal with our current 

budget problems already exists today. The President, through his budget, can propose a comprehensive plan. The Congress, through the budget resolution and reconciliation, can enact legislation that will, on a multi-year basis, reduce the current 

debt and promote fiscally responsible actions in the future. I would urge the Congress to focus on developing the consensus, passing legislation to reduce the deficit, 

and enacting budget reforms that focus on micro-level budgetary incentives and 

budget enforcement procedures. This will have much greater payoff than getting 

sidetracked by establishing fiscal rules without enacting the necessary policy 

changes to meet those targets. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share these views. I look forward to answering 

whatever questions you may have. 

Chairman RYAN. Thank you very much. This actually is a very 

sexy and exciting hearing. That is how sick and twisted I am. 

There is lot to get into. The last reconciliation I was involved in 

as a staffer that was really meaingful was in 1997. That was a 

pretty big deal. Democrat president, Republican Congress, and 

then the gentleman to your right did DRA, which was real savings 

in the process. The process has broken down as reconciliation, particularly, has been used to do things other than what it was originally intended, expanding government programs, like student loans 

and others. That was sort of a contortion of the process and I think 

that the tax side and I think that was your point there. 

First the process is as good as the people who use it and whether 

we have courage in leadership and conviction to actually fix these 

problems is what matters more than anything. So the question that 

we ask ourselves is the process making it harder for us to show 

leadership and discipline, or easier? If men were angels, quoting 

James Madison, we would not need all of these controls. Well the 

problem is that we are not and so we need to find the right system 

to make it as easy as possible for discipline and leadership to flourish and continue so we can tackle these enormous challenges that 

are really threatening our system unlike any challenge we have 

had in the past. 

So there are a lot of concepts that have grown over time and 

reached consensus and I do not know where everyone stands on 

these things, but I am pretty much sure I know where Jim stands 

on these things because he and I have had so many conversations. 
26 

Emergencies, Jim Nussle, you created the idea of budgeting for 

emergencies when you have caps and discipline, it strikes me as a 

good way of having a pressure valve so that the enforcement system does not break down because you have already prefunded 

emergencies, and predefined emergencies to stop the gimmicks 

from getting out of control. 

Senator Gramm and Dr. Joyce, do you agree that a proper emergency spending regime and the definition of prefunding, rolling average or whatever, is very important to our preserving the integrity 

of the rest of the system. 

Mr. GRAMM. Well let me say on the emergency system I think 

setting aside money that has to be replenished by taking away 

from some other place is a good approach. When families have 

emergencies, it does not give them a license to simply go out and 

spend. They have to make hard choices, they have to decide that 

they are not going on vacation; they are not going to buy a new 

refrigerator. I do not understand this debate about the fact that we 

have had emergencies so we do not have to pay to deal with them. 

That is an alien concept. 

I want to go back to your process about reform and leadership 

because this is an area where I have strong feelings. Leadership 

and courage are things you cannot count on. Process really matters. The Constitution of the United States is process. Is there anybody here who thinks that it does not matter that we have the 

Constitution of the United States? So God grant that we should always have plenty of smart, courageous leaders, but I think process 

is very important and the outcome of so many debates depends on 

the process. So I would make it as strong as I could make it to 

make it possible for people to show leadership and exhibit courage 

but I would not underestimate the importance of process. 

Chairman RYAN. Let me tack on two points for the rest of you: 

joint resolution and biennial. What are your thoughts on those in 

addition to the emergency? 

Mr. JOYCE. I will try to be brief on each one of those. On emergencies, I think that the issue is, as you know, that emergencies 

have been systematically underfunded in the regular appropriations process and there is no reason in my mind why you could not 

put something in place that says you are going to fund disaster relief spending at sort of its average level over the last X number of 

years, because that way you would not have a sort of systematic 

bias towards having supplementals for emergencies almost every 

year. I think we had at least one supplemental appropriation, not 

all for emergencies or disasters, but every year in at least the last 

30 years. Some of the those years would not have needed to have 

one if we had budgeted at a more reasonable level for disaster systems. 

On the joint budget resolution, I am very sensitive to the argument that says it would be better if we could reach agreement earlier and so it would be better if the president was involved and we 

could reach agreement earlier. My hesitation about it is that if you 

do not reach agreement, and I think if you add the president into 

the mix, where you already have difficulty reaching agreement between the Senate and the House you may just increase the chances 

that you will not have a budget resolution at all. I think there is 
27 

already enough impediments apparently to getting a budget resolution through since there has not been a budget resolution in six of 

the last fourteen fiscal years. So my concern would be that you 

would frontload the conflict, in addition to frontloading the possible 

agreement. 

On biennial budgeting, I have a longer sort of discussion about 

biennial budgeting and joint budget resolution in my testimony. 

But on biennial budgeting, the two big payoffs that people argue 

for biennial budgeting, are first that you are going to spend less 

time on budgeting and second that you will be able spend more 

time on oversight. I think both of those claims are overblown and 

I think the reason they are overblown is because what it implies 

is that in the non-budget year, you will just take a year off from 

budgeting. I think there are a lot of things working against the 

possibility of being able to take a year off, not the least of which 

is that there is just too much unpredictability out there. So what 

you are likely to have is a budget year and then a second year 

where you have some omnibus on the supplemental. That is what 

I think. 

Mr. NUSSLE. I would agree. I would not want it to be a panacea, 

that somehow that would fix a one year broken process and then 

a two year broken process; I mean they are basically the same 

thing. So it is a matter of expectations. 

Can I just point out too, all of those recommendations that I 

made, and I tried to be careful about this, because I am the last 

one who tried and failed miserably in trying to pass budget process 

reform. All of the things that I suggested, Mr. Chairman, are 

things that you can do now by fiat. You could make it a joint resolution rather than a concurrent, as I understand it. You can use 

reconciliation now, as I understand it. You can put in fiscal goals 

right now and mark to those goals. You can actually even make it 

a two year biennial budget process. I mean you do it now, arguably, 

you could say you just ignore the second year. Well you are ignoring it now. You could arguably do all of those things right now 

without any change to the 1974 Act as I understand it. 

So I guess part of what I am suggesting, and while I do not disagree with the good Senator, but I think it is a marriage of both 

process and leadership, I am not suggesting the process does not 

matter, but all I would suggest to you is the process without leadership is impossible and obviously without a process any leader 

would have a difficult time going through it. 

Right now, the way I see it is we have a pretty good process; it 

could be improved on the edges. I think right now, as he said, this 

committee demonstrated that leadership and has in the past, and 

has not in the past. I could not get some things done that I wanted 

to get done. I think it is bold and it is a marriage of that leadership 

and process. 

Chairman RYAN. Ms. Schwartz. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you for your 

testimony. It seems to me that while there were some different 

ideas that each of you shared, but there quite a bit of bipartisan 

agreement here on the fact that our budget process is not broken. 

As Mr. Nussle just said, as I think Senator Gramm and Dr. Joyce 

all said, process does not address political will and I think that it 
28 

was made even clearer that without real agreement between the 

president and Congress we can choose to ignore our own decisions. 

So you need that agreement on substantive issues on how we are 

going to tackle the deficit and that is really key to how we then 

use the process to implement those decisions. You are all nodding, 

so I think that was really quite stark and I just have to agree with 

you. 

So, my questions for you are, some of the decisions and issues 

that you raised I think would be helpful for us to reach some agreement on and have to be in the discussions. We have seen bipartisan commissions, now one after the other. You each have been in 

some of these discussions if not on the commissions about what 

does have to be on the table so that we can reach agreement on 

them and that we are not then avoiding big pieces that we are pretending either for ourselves, or to the American people that they 

do not matter. 

So here are my really straightforward questions. Senator Gramm 

you actually said everything has to be on the table. We have to 

look at every discretionary program and you have even suggested 

as to what works and what does not and how can we improve 

them. 

When you are talking about, and I think this is a yes or no answer, but when you are talking about discretionary programs that 

ought to be reviewed, or efficiency effectiveness, or changes it 

might need, we have only heard the other side of that: non-defense 

discretionary. Would you include defense in that? 

Mr. GRAMM. Sure I would. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. That is what I was assuming you meant, because 

I assumed you could be more efficient and more effective and more 

accountable and more transparent as well. 

Mr. GRAMM. Listen, anybody who does not realize that we waste 

tremendous amounts of money in defense is unaware of what is 

happening in American government. I had the great privilege of 

serving on the Armed Services Committee in the Senate for six 

years. I was on Defense Appropriations for four years. And anytime 

a decision making unit is spending somebody else’s money there is 

going to be tremendous waste. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. We have work to do on that. Thank you. The 

other point that was also made was the issue of just spending, or 

are tax provisions also a cost to our budget. I will ask Mr. Nussle 

this question. I served on Ways and Means and I do believe that 

using the tax code to incentivize certain behaviors, some early industries that need some help, R&D, and saving for retirement, 

there are tax provisions I actually think are important to principles 

that many of us do believe in and will help incentivize certain behaviors and performance. But there are some tax provisions for 

special interests that I think many of us, in a bipartisan way, agree 

that are no longer effective and are just a cost to government. 

Would you say that they ought to be honest about what our cost 

to our budget is and how we bring down the deficit? And should 

they not be on the table as well? 

Mr. NUSSLE. Everything should be on the table. The way I look 

at is trust the votes. Trust the votes. Let me illustrate it with a 

story. My very first day as chairman of this committee I gave this 
29 

rousing opening argument as my maiden speech as the Chairman. 

I was pretty passionate about it. I do not know if you were here 

Paul or not, but I was pretty passionate about it. I got this note 

slipped to me; it was slid over from I think three chairs down, from 

Jimmy McDermott who slipped this note to me and I opened it and 

it said ‘‘Smile. You have got the votes.’’ What he was saying was 

that you are going to win; you are the chairman. You are going to 

win. You have got more people on your side than any other side; 

You are going to win. 

Mr. GRAMM. I do not think that is a guarantee. 

Mr. NUSSLE. It is not a guarantee, but here is the guarantee: 

trust in our democracy, we trust the votes and you have the votes, 

you ought to be able to make your case and everything ought to 

be on the table and this committee should not ignore taxes anymore than it should ignore Social Security, which is unfortunately 

not on the table. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Whether we do all of that in the next few weeks 

or not is obviously a question, but we have work to do to get there. 

I think Dr. Joyce you added good information as well in how we 

might tackle this going forward. So thank you so much for being 

so straightforward and being here about our need to look at everything, both on the spending and revenue side. Thank you. 

Chairman RYAN. Thanks. Mr. Garrett. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you to the entire panel. Jim Nussle, when 

you talk about budget prison, what immediately came to my mind 

was the late night 1:00 a.m. markups in the committee. That felt 

like budget prison to me. Going to your comments, to your very 

first point, the budget process you chose is less important than the 

political leadership. Take that apart and I tend to agree with you, 

but what came to my mind as soon as you said that was the debate 

that was historically made between John Locke and I think it was 

William Penn where what John Locke said: ‘‘It is not the character 

of the man that is important but rather the laws that I have in 

order to get an efficient government’’ whereas William Penn said 

just the opposite: ‘‘Give me good character men, and I care not 

what type of laws I have, we will have a good government.’’ I think 

that is the same here today, regardless of which party, as long you 

have the right leadership in place you are able to do what you 

need. 

Mr. GRAMM. Can I respond to that? 

Mr. GARRETT. Sure. 

Mr. GRAMM. Laws make men, systems generate character. Americans are proud and independent because of our system. People in 

other countries are dependent because of their system. I would 

never underestimate the power of government and laws to affect 

the character of the people and I think our country is living proof 

that it makes a difference. So there are sort of two sides to the argument, obviously I am hard over on the side that process and the 

rules and the rule of law make a big difference and one of the reasons I do not want socialism in America is I do not want the people 

that it generates. The guy who runs a bulldozer on my ranch is the 

equal of any man. He knows bulldozing better than I know economics and he is proud and he is independent. He was a Marine. He 

was produced by our system is the point that I am making. He did 
30 

not just appear. The system of responsibility, of rule of law, accountability made him who he is. 

Mr. GARRETT. I would never want to disagree with you. I think 

that also with what it Washington or Adams who said that ‘‘This 

country was made for a moral and religious people and it is totally 

inadequate for any other kind.’’ So I think that the underpinning 

of our founders understood that in order to have the government 

that we want to have, whether by the rule of law that it required 

a moral people, a moral and religious people in order to sustain 

itself. 

On the issue of spending, then, Jefferson is quoted as saying 

with regard to budget process reform that if he continued on in 

that respect, alluding to the fact that morality is necessary for the 

people of the day to say that: ‘‘There are those who wish spend 

more based on the funding of our prosperity, but that is just another name for stealing from our futurity,’’ meaning stealing from 

the future generations. Perhaps we saw that in the vote last night, 

for those who wish to steal from future generations by the spending 

that we do today and actually we see that on many votes when we 

wish to put the burden on future generations because we are not 

willing to make the hard decisions, as Chairman Nussle did when 

I was here, trying to say how do we basically live within our 

means. 

Let me tack on to that the question of practical effect. Within the 

budget process here there are a number of programs here, some of 

which I deal a lot with: the GSEs, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the 

TARP program that we have spent money on, the Federal Reserve 

as far as the remission of funds that come back, as far as their interest payments back on to the federal government. What else is 

there? The DIF, with regard to the FDIC as well, all of which have 

some degree, better or worse, with regard to transparency and reflectiveness on the federal budget. Can any or all of you comment 

with regard to the adequacy of the budget process as far as the revenue aspect goes and also, maybe more importantly, the liability 

portion that right now has not adequately addressed through our 

budget process. 

Mr. NUSSLE. Dr. Phil made this comment, earlier. We agree because this is part of my budget reform as well, with Senator Cardin 

and that is using accrual accounting. So yes, aside from whether 

or not the program should have been authorized in the first place, 

but once it is, this goes to Congresswoman Schwartz’s comment, everything should be on the table, nothing should be off the table, 

and it should be depicted honestly, transparently, and accurately 

when it is on the table. And giving that information, not only to 

you the representatives of the people, but also to the people themselves, which that transparency has to be able provide as well and 

is vitally important for you to not only to have a full picture of the 

decisions but then to put that into the final decision of a budget 

or a fiscal blueprint. 

Mr. JOYCE. I would just add to that the most important thing to 

me is that when you make a decision that is going to cost lots of 

money in the future, that it does not appear as if it does not cost 

anything. I think that really is the lesson, if you want to look back 

at what happened prior to 1990 when Credit Reform was passed, 
31 

and after 1990 I think there is a lesson there, which is that loan 

guarantees were treated as if they did not cost any money even 

though you might be making a decision now that would lead to lots 

of defaults down the road. 

Mr. NUSSLE. Can I just mention one other comment, and again, 

this is not to be disagreeable, I think it is just a matter of your 

perspective. I know where Phil Gramm stands on these issues, having known him personally, professionally, and politically and I not 

only respect it but I tend to agree with him on a lot of those issues, 

but I also know my good friend Bill who also has a perspective and 

it is different than mine. The difference, though is that I want the 

process to respect both of our positions and allow the vote to occur 

and hopefully I am going to be able beat him and he hopes he can 

beat me but regardless it is a process that allows that decision to 

occur and the votes fall where they may and the decision made on 

the future of our country. I do not think that process should close 

him out or close me out or predetermine the outcome of that decision and I would caution against any rules that tilt the balance of 

the playing field. As much as I would love for that balance to be 

tilted in my direction and my philosophy, that is not how the rules 

and the laws our founders were designed. It was designed in fundamental fairness for the American people to make decisions about 

their future. 

Mr. GRAMM. Well now wait a minute. First of all, is accrual accounting unfair? Does accrual accounting tilt the playing field? Is 

the debate different if people know what something really costs? 

You bet your life it is. Would Medicare have passed in its current 

form had people not systematically underestimated the cost of it by 

almost a factor of 100. Requiring accrual accounting has a profound 

effect on a debate because it then requires you to debate what 

something really costs. Now if requiring real costs predetermines 

the outcome of the debate, then I just have a different concept. My 

view is that you need a process where people are choosing based 

on what things really cost and on what their real effects are going 

to be. I think whether or not you want budgets binding, is that a 

predetermining factor? Again, I think there are some people who 

do not want budgets binding; there are people who do. My view is 

if you are going to have a budget it ought to be binding, if it is not 

going to be then do not have it. 

Chairman RYAN. I do not know whether those are necessarily 

mutually exclusive positions. 

Mr. GRAMM. I know, I just simply was trying to be emphatic. 

Chairman RYAN. Going from John Locke to William Penn to Dr. 

Phil. Now we are going to go to Bill Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I would say, Mr. Chairman, I would usually accept my recommendations, but I think that yesterday’s panel and 

today’s panel, you deserve a lot of credit because we probably 

should have had these two panels six months ago, just a thought. 

Because I think it is pretty basic to have three distinguished gentlemen and I do not blow smoke, as you know. I really mean it. But 

I have to take exception, since you guys brought the subject up of 

emergencies, you each had a different slice of it and then my brother from Sussex County talked about that we do not want to pretend, we do not want to have all of these things on the backs of 
32 

future generations, but an emergency is an emergency, the word is 

very definitive in any language that you use. And if we are going 

to go back and say let’s not pretend what programs really cost, who 

the heck figured out in 2001 and 2003, who really played out Senator, with all due respect, what these programs would cost American taxpayers, because it cost us like this, if you can picture the 

graph, and then in 2019 and 2020, this is what it is going to cost 

us because that is what you will have ballooned to. So we can get 

so caught up in process and not look at results and I think we all 

want to address that and I cannot agree more with my good friend 

Mr. Nussle, we all should be heard, we all should be listening. 

I listen very, very carefully to what Tea Party members say and 

I may not agree with much of what they say but I do agree with 

some things, believe it or not. Let’s not predict what we are going 

to think before people even open their mouths. So we do not, my 

friend from Sussex County, steal from future generations. 

Individuals and family-centered income are very different than 

the government’s. When you have a problem within your family, 

and perhaps you did not budget for it, you cannot predict that it 

is going to happen, but when a flood happens or a tornado happens, 

you are talking about a universal situation and you begin to peel 

away at the onion, and you see what existed beforehand. You see 

people who had something and you see people who had nothing. 

We were so caught up in the Katrina thing, think of how do you 

budget for Katrina ahead of time? But we as Americans did not 

worry about whether it was a blue state or a green state or a 

brown state; we responded in kind perhaps poorly at that time but 

we did the best with the resources that we had. 

These families today are suffering; Irene and Lee came pounding 

down the trail: 12 states, 52 congressional districts, billions and billions of dollars. We do not even know the cost of this because 

health problems and environmental problems are going to grow in 

magnitude. I think it is more important to respond to our citizens 

than it is to worry about what it is going to cost down the road. 

I believe in accountability. You must account for every dime that 

we pay, certainly we did not do that in the wars. We are just figuring out what the heck the thing cost, and will cost. Talk about 

growing gaps, talking about figuring out what a program’s going to 

cost down the road, well it cost us this now, and figuring out how 

it contributes to the deficit, which we are all responsible and guilty 

for, no party is privy to virtue on this issue. No party is privy to 

virtue. 

So to make a political point is to demean the very meaning of 

emergency spending. People are out of their homes. Thousands 

have been evacuated, in my district 5,000 people were evacuated 

out of their homes. Some of them are not going to be able to go 

back into their homes because they are not ready for them or they 

are gone. The environmental health problems are dramatic. Businesses: people have been shut down since this storm, and laid off. 

They are not able to do business. If I do not have an obligation or 

a responsibility, first as a human being, then as a member of Congress, we are all wet. So we can put up whatever processes we 

want. I do not think your perception of it though is very different 

from mine. 
33 

Let’s set aside the political differences and nuances. I think you 

want for America what I want for America, I really mean that, or 

else I would not say it, as you know. These people are hurting. Accountability and contacted that these are emergencies, and Mr. 

Chairman, you want to talk about emergencies, we will set aside, 

it is certainly timely, is it not? 

Chairman RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You are quite welcome. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I actually have a question. I have tried to look at this and I may have this wrong but 

I believe in the last 20 years that only once has a concurrent resolution been passed by both Houses and all 12 appropriations bills 

passed in regular order prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. I 

believe that has only happened once. If that is the case, my question for you is, if we talked a lot about the concurrent resolution 

part, but then there is also supposed to be appropriations built 

within that resolution, 12 of them, and all of those appropriations 

are supposed to be authorized and I am not even going to get into 

how many appropriations are not authorized because the authorizing committee did not get to it. 

Can you give me your views on that and of the process? If you 

only get it right once in 20 years does that mean that needs to be 

changed too and that is a problem, or is it not a problem that we 

do CRs and omnibuses as well as the authorizations, what are your 

views on that because it looks like we have a process that cannot 

ever actually be done and when it is done it takes up months on 

the floor, et cetera, which is why some people talk about my biennial budget. Dr. Joyce, you seem ready to jump. 

Mr. JOYCE. Well that is always true, I guess. I would make one 

point. I would observe that the fiscal year used to start with the 

federal government on July 1, and in the 1974 Budget Act one of 

the things they did was move the fiscal year start from July 1 to 

October 1. Why did they do that? It is because the Congress could 

not get everything done by July 1. So they added three months, 

and still we have the same problem. So it may be once in the last 

20 years, I think it is four times in the last 34 years or something 

like that, that all the appropriations bills have been passed and 

signed into law. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. And by the way that is in a lot of cases where 

there was no divided governments. 

Mr. JOYCE. Correct. So what this has led me to believe is that 

the beginning of the fiscal year is not a real deadline. What is a 

real deadline? A real deadline turns out to be when the Congress 

does not want to be here anymore. I mean there are those people 

that say that the real problem was caused when air conditioning 

was invented. So the issue is that you have to have something that 

is actually viewed as a real consequence for failing to get this done 

and the beginning of the fiscal year does not turn out to be that 

so long as there are systematic continuing resolutions that pass 

without consequence. 

Mr. NUSSLE. There is no surprise that the super committee deadline coincide with Thanksgiving and Christmas. So I think going to 

your point, that is exactly right: number one. Number two, in a 

perfect world I would suggest, and it will not be a perfect world, 
34 

but in a perfect world if you, for instance, used a joint resolution, 

a joint resolution would need to be created first, that would give 

the marching orders to the authorizing committees and the appropriation committees to do their work based on the fences created 

by the budget resolution, that joint resolution, and that given those 

instructions and given the finality of such a decision enacted in law 

and made real where you know where the fences are, at least in 

the 302A, even if the 302Bs get knocked around here and there, 

at least if that 302A number, then the committees know when they 

are inside the boundaries and outside the boundaries and can act 

accordingly. 

Part of the challenge during those years, as you know, is that the 

committees were never given final instructions. I mean as much as 

we like to trash the Appropriations Committee here at the Budget 

Committee from time to time, it is pretty hard to do your work 

when you do not know what number is. It is pretty hard to say to 

a member of that committee, ‘‘No, you cannot have that amendment, because we would be over our allocation’’, if in fact you do 

not know what that number is, or if it is a moving target, from 

time to time. 

So I think that is why I believe having that decision forced up 

front to provide the fences for the rest of the decision, going to Senator Gramm’s point, having those rules and having those constructs for the rest of that process, I think would make it easier 

for legislators, members to make those decisions and get their work 

done on time. 

Mr. GRAMM. Let me just say that I think a joint resolution would 

be great if you could get it because then the president’s signed on 

to the process. The problem is going to be very hard to get under 

many circumstances and there is always the trade-off. It may very 

well be that you want a process that allows you to do it either way, 

if you cannot get the joint resolution then you have the concurrent 

resolution. My guess is under current circumstances there is no 

way you could get to a joint resolution on the budget, and so, you 

are better off with a concurrent resolution than you are with nothing. 

Mr. NUSSLE. And that is exactly how the provision that I wrote 

works. 

Chairman RYAN. Mr. Ribble. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been informative for me. I have been here a whopping nine months and I will 

tell you that I wish Mr. Nussle that you were correct, that it is just 

a leadership problem. We have, maybe not in the process so much 

of a problem, as we have a history of problems. 

Dr. Joyce, the last time this country actually paid off its national 

debt was when Andrew Jackson was president. I am concerned 

about debt. If debt in this country looked like it did from 1787 to 

1946 it would not be that big of a problem, but debt does not look 

like it did for the first 150 years or so. Right now our growth in 

debt is on a curve that is nearly vertical. And if we continue along 

these lines it will, in fact, I believe be catastrophic. We cannot continue. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. JOYCE. Yes. 

Mr. RIBBLE. At that the current rate of growth? 
35 

Mr. JOYCE. Yes. 

Mr. RIBBLE. What do you think is actually sustainable for an 

economy our size? 

Mr. JOYCE. Well, I actually agree. I think there is a remarkable 

amount of concurrence between these different groups like the one 

that Mr. Nussle talked about, these sort of bipartisan groups or 

private groups that look at this problem, and they all seem to be 

settled around this 60 percent of GDP number in terms of what is 

sustainable. As you know, on the current path we would get to 80, 

90, 100 percent of GDP. 

Mr. RIBBLE. We are about there now, would you not say? 

Mr. JOYCE. We are projected to get there if we follow current 

policies. 

Mr. RIBBLE. What is GDP? 

Mr. JOYCE. What is GDP? Well, GDP is about $15 trillion. 

Mr. RIBBLE. What is our national debt right now? 

Mr. JOYCE. Well, it depends on whether you look at what is 

called the gross debt. 

Mr. RIBBLE. I want to look at all debt. I do not want to play the 

shell games. We are at $14.7 trillion and 100 percent GDP. 

Mr. JOYCE. Well, you can pick whichever number you want to 

look at. The point is that stabilizing that at a smaller number and 

60 percent seems to be what theses various groups are coalescing 

around. 

Mr. RIBBLE. About a year ago I would have agreed with most of 

your testimony; today I disagree with some of it. I want to talk a 

little bit about the balanced budget amendment. You mentioned in 

your testimony if we could enact those policy and budget enforcement changes we would not need the amendment. I totally agree, 

but we cannot. It is obvious we cannot. 

As I have watch this whole thing unfold this year, we are still 

projecting trillions and trillions and trillions of dollars of debt, with 

additional billions and billions of dollars of interest payment. At 

some point there will have to be a future tax on future generations. 

With all debt, somebody is going to pay this bill. 

Then, you go on to say, secondly, it relies on erroneous ideas 

about debt in our society. To a certain degree I agree, however, as 

a former business owner I will tell you when my company drew 

debt, or when I did it on a personal level it is always with the intention that at some point I am going to have to pay if off, and in 

fact, the lender recognizes that there is a trust, a credit agreement, 

a credo that we made with each other to pay it off. Right now, the 

credo is we will just pay the interests and continue to borrow, and 

there is a significance difference between the two, do you not 

agree? 

Mr. JOYCE. What I would say is, that there is nothing inherently 

wrong with debt. What the problem is that if you have a debt that 

is too large, the debt load is too large, and that is what we just 

talked about, the fact that we are getting to a level of debt that 

is unsustainable, I think that is the problem, and if your debt is 

not productive debt. That is that you would say, I think, you would 

agree with me that there is a difference between borrowing money 

for your mortgage where at the end of the process you are going 

to have a house and borrowing money to put it on your credit card 
36 

because you want to take a nice vacation. So, I think we have to 

think in terms of there are different kinds of debt, and my point 

here was that there is nothing inherently wrong with debt, and in 

fact, if you say, for example, that states balance their budgets, well 

the truth is the states balance their operating budgets; states have 

a lot of capital. So the federal government’s accounting is not the 

same. But, that is separable from whether the debt is too large or 

whether the debt is going to pay for things that may not be productive. 

Mr. RIBBLE. I would also extend to you the idea that debt in 

business, debt in private sector is significantly different because at 

the end of the day you are writing the check with your own money, 

debt in government you are writing a check with some else’s money 

and it is much easier to do that. You can pretend and hide behind 

the importance and value of it at some point. 

You mentioned also that if used correctly it can be very productive and result in measurable gains. Do you believe the debt in this 

country is being used correctly right now? 

Mr. JOYCE. I would say some is and some is not. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Therein, sir, I would contend you realized the problem. Thank you again, all of you, for being here. It has been very 

informative. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Flores. 

Mr. FLORES. I would like to thank the panel for joining us today, 

it has been beneficial. I think both elements are important: process 

and leadership. And I think the process needs to trump in the case 

the leadership does not show up at the table. And I have seen that 

happen in the history of this Congress. 

I would like to change the topic a little bit and talk about truth 

and budgeting. Truth so we get to the right results, and, I think 

Senator Gramm started down this pathway when he started talking accrual accounting. I guess the way I add it, the national debt, 

we have about $15 trillion of just direct debt; whether or not we 

count debt held by the public is irrelevant to me. We have got 

about 10 to $11 trillion of unfunded liability, Social Security about 

60 to 70 of unfunded liabilities in Medicare, and another 10 or so 

of Medicaid and everything else. So if you add it all up it is 100, 

which to me is six times GDP that is a problem for me. 

So, I believe whole heartedly we need to go with accrual accounting. Well, let’s say we are in the next building and can see exactly 

what we are talking about, but more importantly, the American 

people can see what is happening to their children and their grandchildren’s future. 

The second element about truth in budgeting or truth in the financial playing field is the way we score. I think we, as the Congress, provide input into a process, like this is what we want to do 

with a piece of legislation, but what we get out of the scoring is 

bad information, and therefore we make decisions that do not reflect real world realities. A couple of examples: We assume that we 

can raise taxes to high levels and still grow GDP at four percent 

real rates. That puppy does not hunt in any world. 

The second one is that, CBO scored Medicare cuts for about a 

third, and says we are still going to have the health care infrastructure providers that we are going to have and also that we are 
37 

going to have high school seniors that still want to go into health 

care even though their pay is going to essentially set by the federal 

government. We all know in the real world that does not happen. 

So, my question is this: How do you get to a point where you can 

use real world scoring on these things, like on taxes and also on 

the expenditure side? If you guys had a magic wand, how would 

you wave it so that they fix the scoring so that when we are trying 

to make a decision we make decisions with real information? 

Mr. GRAMM. I think that it would be a good policy to establish 

a simple law that says that accounting standards that are applicable to the private sector should all apply equally to government. I 

think you would want to do that both in the federal government 

and in the state governments so that people in state governments, 

for example, would know what their pension liabilities are, what 

their health care liabilities are. The problem is the way we score 

things now. We have debates without having relevant information 

as to what we are talking about. Socrates said, ‘‘A man is only as 

good as his facts.’’ And if you do not have the facts, you are not 

going to make good decisions no matter how brilliant you are, no 

matter how much leadership you have, no matter how good the 

process is, if you do not know what something costs, it is hard to 

make a decision about how much you want of it, because you are 

missing one of the key ingredients. 

Mr. FLORES. Right. I am trying to dig in the weeds a little bit 

more and say, ‘‘Okay we know we have today does not work, do you 

blow up CBO and start over. Or do you go to outside firms to get 

some corroborating evidence. 

What I am trying to get to is what is the way to get the right 

answer so that when we are looking at the cost of health care reform, we get the real cost instead of this goofy stuff we get? 

Mr. NUSSLE. Senator Gramm just said when I was younger I was 

ignorant. I do not remember how you said it. I, ignorantly, said at 

one point in time in my career that CBO sucks, and I have been 

apologizing for that for some time because these are good people 

who do a good job and try their hardest to get the numbers right. 

And they are constrained by certain conventions, on one hand, and 

just human nature and probability on the other. 

We have looked at the possibility of using more dynamic scoring. 

The challenge with dynamic scoring is you are using the same people, and you could go outside the process, but you are using people, 

using economic factors here and there, and trying to make it all 

add up and they do the best they can. It is an inexact science predicting the weather next month, and that is what you are doing. 

You know it is going to be a little colder around here, you know, 

generally, what the trends have been, but do you know exactly 

what that number is going to do? 

Mr. FLORES. We are not even in the same continent. 

Mr. NUSSLE. You actually are. You actually are. I would challenge you on that. They do a better job than the guestimates, and 

they generally have done a better job than some of the dynamic 

score-keeping. That has been part of the challenge of moving to 

something called dynamic scoring is that we have not found anything that was any more accurate than the current way. That was 

the challenge. 
38 

Mr. FLORES. Let me give you exact example. 

Chairman RYAN. That is time. Sorry Bill, but people have a 

schedule to keep and time to keep. And I always tell people when 

we think about dynamic scoring we are talking about tax policy; 

that is the Joint Committee on Taxation; that is not CBO. 

Spending scoring is a little different and easier with respect to 

reality bases scoring, probably not on actuarial stuff on health care, 

but taxes is Joint Taxes. All CBO does is take their data. 

With that, since we do have time limits here, I want to thank 

the three of you for taking time out of your busy lives and busy 

days to join us. This has been very enlightening, very helpful and 

it will help us do a better job of trying to improve upon the process, 

so we can be better stewards with tax payers dollars. Thank you. 

And this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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