UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DAVID VISNER, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

 

MICHIGAN STEEL INDUSTRIES, 

INC., d/b/a MICHIGAN STEEL 

STRAPPING and SEQUOIA 

STRAPPING, and GARY GALLIERS, 

 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 14-cv-12786 

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan 

 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

Plaintiff David Visner instituted this lawsuit claiming that his former 

employer, Defendants Michigan Steel Industries, Inc., d/b/a Michigan Steel 

Strapping and Sequoia Strapping, and the owner thereof, Gary Galliers, violated 

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, by failing to pay 

him time-and-a-half for hours worked in a given week in excess of forty hours 

(Count I) and for unlawful retaliation (Count II). 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In this motion, 

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the issue of liability with respect to his claim 

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for overtime wages, as well as on the issues of his entitlement to liquidated 

damages and whether Defendants should be jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff 

as “joint employers” under the FLSA. The motion has been fully briefed. Having 

determined that oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process, 

the Court dispensed with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan 

Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will grant 

Plaintiff’s Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual 

Defendant Michigan Steel Industries, Inc. (“Michigan Steel”) was founded 

in 1977 by Defendant Gary Galliers, the sole owner of the entity at all times since. 

(Galliers Dep. 7-8.) Although Michigan Steel began as a steel broker in the 

automotive sector, over time, the business evolved into a manufacturing company, 

machining and bending steel parts such as steel strapping, seals, and bucklers, as 

ordered by customers. (Id. at 10.) When operating in the automotive sector, 

Michigan Steel paid its employees overtime at one-and-a-half times their hourly 

rate. (Id. at 28.) However, since becoming a steel manufacturing operation, 

employees of Michigan Steel rarely work overtime and, if they do, they are not 

paid for that overtime at one-and-a-half times their hourly rate. (Id.; Dodge Dep. 

60-61.) 

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Michigan Steel has thirteen employees, but does not maintain written 

employment policies. (Galliers Dep. 11.) When Michigan Steel has a hiring need, 

it will typically place an advertisement in a newspaper or on the internet. (Id. at 

11-12.) The individual conducting the initial interview is dependent upon which 

position is being filled; however, Galliers, as the owner, reserves the right to “put 

[his] two cents in[,]” and “generally will do a follow-up interview before [an 

individual is hired].” (Id. at 12-13.) 

In June of 2013, Plaintiff David Visner responded to a Michigan Steel job 

posting for a toolmaker, machinery builder position. (Visner Dep. 37-39.) Within 

a few days of submitting his resume, Michigan Steel tool room supervisor Steve 

Dodge called Plaintiff to schedule an interview. (Id. at 38.) During this interview, 

Dodge learned how much Plaintiff was making at his previous job – $12.50 an 

hour for the first forty hours per workweek, and then time-and-a-half for any 

overtime, which Plaintiff indicated was at least an additional twenty hours per 

week. (Id. at 40-41.) Although the base amount offered by Michigan Steel was 

similar, employees at Michigan Steel worked forty-hour weeks, and were, 

therefore, ineligible for overtime. (Id. at 41.) Based on this reduction in overall 

earnings, neither Plaintiff nor Dodge left the interview with an impression that 

Plaintiff would ultimately end up there. (Id. at 42.) 

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Shortly after the interview, Dodge discussed Plaintiff’s interview with 

Galliers. (Galliers Dep. 14; Dodge Dep. 42-43.) Although Dodge liked Plaintiff’s 

technical abilities and was excited about the prospect of hiring someone who 

would not need training, he did not believe that Galliers would be interested in 

spending in excess of $ 13.00 per hour to hire someone for the available position. 

(Galliers Dep. 14, 16; Dodge Dep. 42-43.) To Dodge’s surprise, however, Galliers 

appeared amenable, and spoke with Plaintiff on two separate occasions to 

determine if they could reach a deal. (Galliers Dep. 16.) Ultimately, Galliers 

determined that he could offer Plaintiff $15.00 per hour, a $0.50 raise every six 

months for two years, and up to fifty-six hours of work per workweek at the fixed 

hourly wage. (Id. at 15-16; Visner Dep. 44.) When Galliers called Plaintiff to 

make him this offer, there was no discussion of overtime or time-and-a-half. 

(Galliers Dep. 16.) Plaintiff accepted Galliers’s offer and Galliers informed Dodge 

that he had struck a deal with Plaintiff to work up to fifty-six hours per week at his 

straight hourly rate and instructed Dodge to make accommodations for Plaintiff to 

work up to sixteen additional hours per week. (Dodge Dep. 45-46.) 

After accepting the position, Plaintiff met with Defendants’ office staff in 

order to sign the necessary employment documents, including a written 

employment agreement for fifty-six hours per week without an overtime premium. 

(Visner Dep. 52-23, 105-06; Galliers Dep. 17-18, 24-25.) Defendants’ then 

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finance manager, Hollie Rybicki, memorialized this agreement in a document 

entitled “Employee Notes” and placed it in Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Galliers 

Dep. 12, 17-18; see also Employee Notes, Pl.’s Mot. Ex. A (“allowed to work up 

to 16 extra hours per week, not overtime, extra hours.”).) 

Pursuant to the above-referenced agreement, Plaintiff commenced 

employment with Michigan Steel as a toolmaker at their Detroit location in July of 

2013, and worked there until June 26, 2014. (Visner Dep. 46, 65; Dodge Dep. 52.) 

Plaintiff’s job duties included working as a machinist to perform repairs and 

maintenance on Defendants’ dies and machines as needed. (Dodge Dep. 52-53.) 

During his tenure at Michigan Steel, Plaintiff regularly worked in excess of fortyhours per week,1

 but never received overtime compensation. 

B. Procedural 

Plaintiff instituted the present civil action by filing a two-count complaint on 

July 16, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) Both counts implicate the FLSA: in Count I, Plaintiff 

complains of overtime wage violations committed by Michigan Steel and its owner 

Galliers, and in Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against 

Plaintiff for exercising his rights under the FLSA. Defendants answered the 

complaint and filed affirmative defenses on July 29, 2014. (ECF No. 4.) On 

 1

 There appears to be a dispute over the average hours Plaintiff worked, 

however, because this motion seeks summary judgment solely on the issue of 

liability, the dispute regarding how many overtime hours Plaintiff worked is not 

material. 

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January 15, 2015, after the conclusion of discovery, Plaintiff filed a Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In this 

motion, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Count I, and only on the issue of 

liability. Indeed, Plaintiff indicates in a footnote that “[s]hould the Court grant this 

Motion, Plaintiff will submit a separate motion for final judgment to include an 

assessment of total damages, attorneys‟ fees, and costs.” (Pl.’s Br. 1 n.1.) 

Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s Motion on January 29, 2015, (ECF No. 19), 

and Plaintiff replied on February 6, 2015, (ECF No. 20). 

II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs courts to “grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a) (2012). A court assessing the appropriateness of summary judgment asks 

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a 

jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 

Amway Distribs. Benefits Ass’n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 

2505, 2512 (1986)). In making this assessment, a court “must view the evidence 

and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party[.]” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). 

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendants Violated the FLSA’s Overtime Compensation Provision 

The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees time-and-a-half (“one 

and one-half times the regular rate”) for work performed in excess of forty hours 

per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).2

 An employee’s “regular rate” of pay is defined 

as “all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee.” Id. § 

207(e). Where an employee is paid by the hour, the hourly wage is the regular 

rate. 29 C.F.R. § 778.110. 

By employing Plaintiff in excess of forty hours per week without 

compensating Plaintiff for the excess hours at a rate of one-and-one-half of his 

usual pay, Defendants violated the FLSA. Indeed, Defendants concede as much in 

their brief. (Defs.’ Br. 14 (“Because Defendants concede that they were mistaken 

in their understanding of the FLSA as it pertains to optional extra hours beyond the 

forty-hour work week . . . , the only issues presently before the Court are the 

appropriateness of liquidated damages and whether Defendant Galliers should be 

 2

 Title 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) provides: 

 

Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall 

employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is 

employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production 

of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless 

such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess 

of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half 

times the regular rate at which he is employed. 

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jointly and severally liable with Michigan Steel[.]”).3) 

B. Plaintiff is Entitled to Liquidated Damages for the FLSA Violation 

Plaintiff contends that because Defendants violated the FLSA’s basic 

overtime requirements, the Court should enter summary judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff’s claim for liquidated damages. “Section 16(b) of the FLSA provides that 

an employer who violates the overtime compensation provisions of the FLSA 

‘shall be liable’ for liquidated damages in an amount equal to unpaid back wages.” 

Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 967 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b)4

). “[U]nder the Act, liquidated damages ‘are compensation, not a 

penalty or punishment,’ Elwell v. University Hospitals Home Care Services, 276 

 3

 Having made this concession, the Court does not understand why 

Defendants go on to argue that “there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether the extra hours Plaintiff was working were ‘necessarily and primarily for 

the benefit of the employer’ or were, as Defendants argue, primarily for the 

financial benefit of Plaintiff.” (Defs.’ Br. 15.) This line of argumentation is 

necessarily addressed at whether the FLSA’s protections apply to Plaintiff; that is, 

whether Plaintiff was an employee employed by an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 

203(e)(1) (defining “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer”); id.

§ 203(g) (defining “employ” as “to suffer or permit to work”). Despite being a red 

herring, this argument is easily disposed of, as logic suggests that if Plaintiff’s 

work was not of benefit to the employer, Galliers would not have spent the extra 

money to hire him. 

4

 Title 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides, in pertinent part: 

Any employer who violations the provisions of section 6 or section 7 

of this Act shall be liable to the employee . . . in the amount of their . . 

. unpaid overtime compensation . . . , and in an additional equal 

amount as liquidated damages. 

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F.3d 832, 840 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted), and no special showing 

is necessary for the awarding of such damages.” Solis v. Min Fang Yang, 345 F. 

App’x 35, 38 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (per curiam). “Rather, they are 

considered ‘the norm’[.]” Id. (quoting Martin v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 

574, 585 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

While an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA is presumed, such 

damages are not strictly mandated; rather, Congress provided the judiciary with 

some discretion to limit or deny liquidated damages. A “court may, in its 

discretion, refuse to award liquidated damages ‘if, and only if, the employer shows 

that he acted in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that he 

was not violating the Act.’” Dole, 942 F.2d at 967 (emphasis in original) (quoting 

Marshall v. Brunner, 668 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1982) and citing 29 U.S.C. § 

2605

). “To be relieved of liability for liquidated damages, the employer ‘has the 

 5

 Title 29 U.S.C. § 260 provides: 

 

In any action commenced prior to or on or after the date of the 

enactment of this Act to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid 

overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, as amended, if the employer shows to the 

satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such 

action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for 

believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound 

discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof 

not to exceed the amount specified in section 16 of such Act. 

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“substantial burden” of proving to the trial court that its acts giving rise to the suit 

are both in good faith and reasonable.’” Dole, 942 F.2d at 968 (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Miereles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1415 (5th Cir. 

1990)). “In the absence of such proof[, however,] a district court has no power or 

discretion to reduce an employer’s liability for the equivalent of double unpaid 

wages.” Elwell, 276 F.3d at 840 (quotation omitted). 

Defendants contend that their good faith intention not to violate the FLSA 

and the reasonableness of their ultimately erroneous belief about whether overtime 

compensation was required are questions of fact which cannot be resolved by way 

of summary judgment.6

 Specifically, Defendants claim ignorance of the law as 

their basis for invoking the good-faith standard delineated in § 260. Although 

Galliers repeatedly testified during his deposition that he believed that the overtime 

compensation component of the FLSA only applied to employees forced to work 

overtime, as opposed to employees permitted to work overtime, ignorance of the 

law is not demonstrative of good faith. (See, e.g., Galliers Dep. 28, 53.) 

 6

 The Court notes that Defendants, in opposing Plaintiff’s request for 

liquidated damages, have inserted an utterly irrelevant argument about whether or 

not the FLSA violation was “willful.” (Defs.’ Br. 16 (“This Court here is faced 

with a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the knowledge or negligence of 

Defendants necessary to establish willfulness to warrant liquidated damages which 

precludes summary judgment on this issue.”).) Whether a FLSA violation was 

“willful” is only relevant to determining whether a two- or three-year statute of 

limitations applies. Dole, 942 F.2d at 966 (“An ordinary violation of the FLSA is 

subject to a two-year statute of limitations. . . . However, where a violation is 

‘willful’ a three-year statute of limitations applies.”) (quotations omitted). 

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“The good faith standard under the FLSA is more stringent than it is in many 

other contexts. Even negligent, as opposed to willful mis-classification of an 

employee is enough to prevent the application of the good faith exception.” Chao 

v. First Nat’l Lending Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 895, 902 (N.D. Ohio 2006). “To 

prove that it acted in good faith, an employer ‘must show that [it] took affirmative 

steps to ascertain the Act’s requirements, but nonetheless violated its provisions.’” 

Martin, 381 F.3d at 584 (quotation omitted). “The employer has an affirmative 

duty to ascertain and meet the FLSA’s requirements[.]” Id.; Chao, 516 F. Supp. 2d 

at 902 (describing an employer’s “duty to investigate potential liability under the 

FLSA”) (citation omitted). 

This affirmative duty makes sense in light of the authority standing for the 

proposition that in order to avoid liquidated damages, “a failure to comply with 

provisions of the Act must be based on objectively reasonable grounds.” Solis, 345 

F. App’x at 38; Elwell, 276 F.3d at 842 n.5 (“[A]n employer who acted negligently 

– but not willfully – in violating the FLSA would not be able to satisfy the 

objective standard of reasonableness required to demonstrate good faith.”) (citation 

omitted). Thus, contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, a FLSA violation “does not 

have to be intentional for [Plaintiff] to recover liquidated damages[.]” Martin, 381 

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F.3d at 584;7 Solis, 345 F. App’x at 38 (“[D]emonstrating good faith requires more 

than the absence of intent or knowledge.”) (citation omitted). 

In this case, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that they acted in good 

faith. Specifically, Defendants have failed to point to any evidence rebutting the 

pertinent deposition testimony indicating that no research or investigation was 

conducted to determine whether the overtime compensation law applied to 

Michigan Steel employees. 

Galliers testified as follows during his deposition: 

 

Q: Did you ever do, at anytime (sic) do any research about the overtime 

laws? 

 

A: No. 

 

Q: Do you know if anybody in your company ever researched that issue? 

 

A: Nobody else would do it. If anybody was going to, it would be me 

and I never did. 

 

Q: Okay. Did you ever go to the Department of Labor and ask if you 

were paying people correctly? 

 

A: No. 

 

. . . 

 

Q: What about the State of Michigan, did you ever go to them and ask? 

 7

 The Court notes that although Martin was a case involving the improper 

classification of an employee as exempt from FLSA’s protections, a panel of the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied this affirmative 

inquiry duty to overtime violations in Solis. 345 F. App’x at 38. 

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A: No. 

 

Q: Did you ever before this lawsuit go to a private attorney and ask 

whether you were paying people properly? 

 

A: No. 

 

(Galliers Dep. 27-28.) Dodge, Plaintiff’s supervisor, provided remarkably similar 

testimony during his deposition: 

Q: . . . Did you ever have a discussion with anybody at Michigan Steel 

about whether not paying time and a half was illegal? 

 

A: No. You mean -- I take that back. Certainly after this has happened. 

 

Q: Before [Plaintiff] quit? 

 

A: No. No. Yeah. I need to qualify that. I guess technically, yes, I 

have, but every time it was discussed, it was justified that because it 

was voluntary, it was okay. You didn’t -- if you don’t -- we weren’t 

requiring the employees to work those extra hours, therefore, it was 

okay. 

 

Q: Okay. Who did you have those discussions with? 

 

A: Well, Gary, the owner and then Mike, the production manager. 

 

. . . 

 

Q: Okay. Do you know if Michigan Steel ever made any inquiries with 

the Department of Labor or with the Michigan Wage and Hour 

Division about whether or not it was legal or not? 

 

A: I don’t know if they did or not. . . . I just took [Gary] at his word, 

Gary’s word that if they did it voluntarily, it was fine. 

 

(Dodge Dep. 63-64.) 

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Having pointed to this uncontroverted testimony on the question of good 

faith, Plaintiff has discharged his initial summary judgment burden. Defendants 

have failed to point to any evidence to rebut this testimony or that would create a 

genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Defendants took any 

affirmative steps to ensure compliance with the FLSA’s overtime compensation 

requirement. The only alleged proof of good faith or reasonableness offered by 

Defendants is the assertion that once Defendants learned of the violation, they 

offered Plaintiff monetary compensation. This offer of settlement is irrelevant, as 

the good faith inquiry is not a retrospective one. 

Further undercutting Defendants’ argument is that “[i]gnorance of the FLSA 

requirements is not a defense to liquidated damages.” Chao, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 

902 (citation omitted). Because the overtime requirements of the FLSA do not 

vary based on whether an employer requires or simply permits an employee to 

work overtime, it is no excuse that Defendants thought otherwise. 29 U.S.C. § 

203(g); 29 C.F.R. § 785.211 (“Work not requested but suffered or permitted is 

work time.”). In other words, ignorance will not exonerate an employer from 

complying with the FLSA. 

There being no genuine dispute of material facts on the issue of whether 

liquidated damages are proper in this case, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law as to Defendants’ liability for liquidated damages. 

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C. Defendants are Jointly and Severally Liable to Plaintiff 

Plaintiff contends that the Court should enter summary judgment on his 

claim that Defendants Michigan Steel and Galliers should be held jointly and 

severally liable to Plaintiff for the FLSA overtime compensation violation. 

The FLSA defines the term “employer” broadly to include “any person 

acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 

employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). “The FLSA contemplates there being several 

simultaneous employers who may be responsible for compliance with the FLSA.” 

Dole, 942 F.2d at 965 (citing Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 94 S. Ct. 427 (1973)). 

“‘The remedial purposes of the FLSA require the courts to define “employer” more 

broadly than the term would be interpreted in traditional common law 

applications.’” Id. (quoting McLaughlin v. Seafood, Inc., 867 F.3d 875, 877 (5th 

Cir. 1989) (per curiam)); cf. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 

326, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1350 (1992) (explaining that the FLSA has broader coverage 

than ERISA and that FLSA’s statutory definitions “stretch[] the meaning of 

‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict 

application of traditional agency law principles[]”). Thus, an individual who acts 

directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee may 

be subject to individual liability under the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(2); see also 

Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 827 (6th Cir. 2003) (“This Court has 

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16 

interpreted the FLSA’s ‘any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest 

of the employer’ language to impose individual liability on private-sector 

employers.”) (citing United States DOL v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 

1995) and Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

In assessing whether a party is an employer within FLSA’s broad definition 

of that term, “‘economic reality’ controls rather than common law concepts of 

agency.” Dole, 942 F.2d at 965 (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 

U.S. 28, 33, 81 S. Ct. 933, 936 (1961)). Notably, “‘[t]he overwhelming weight of 

authority is that a corporate officer with operational control of a corporation’s 

covered enterprise is an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally 

liable under the FLSA for unpaid wages.’” Id. (quoting Donovan v. Agnew, 712 

F.2d 1509, 1511 (1st Cir. 1983)). Resolution of the inquiry into whether a party 

falls within the ambit of the FLSA’s definition of “employer” requires a court to 

assess a variety of factors, such as the individual’s position within the company, 

their ownership interest, and the degree of that individual’s “operational control of 

significant aspects of the corporation’s day to day functions, including 

compensation of employees[.]” Dole, 942 F.2d at 965 (quotation omitted). No 

single consideration is dispositive. Id. (quotation omitted). 

The record in this case reveals that Galliers, the sole owner of Michigan 

Steel since 1977, is involved in the business operations of the corporation and that 

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he controls the purse strings of the corporation. Id. at 966; (Galliers Dep. 7-8). 

While his precise title within the company is not entirely clear, he has run the 

company since its inception. Despite a period of time during which his son was 

the acting president of the company, this occurred sometime prior to 1998. (Dodge 

Dep. 27-28.) Further, Galliers testified during his deposition that if anybody was 

going to research FLSA compliance issues, that responsibility would have fallen 

on him. (Galliers Dep. 27.) 

Galliers also testified that while he does not necessarily make every hiring 

decision, he reserves the right to “put [his] two cents in[,]” and “generally will do a 

follow-up interview before [an individual is hired].” (Id. at 12-13.) He also played 

a significant role in hiring Plaintiff, crunching numbers to determine how much 

Michigan Steel could offer Plaintiff in order to bring him on board. (Id. at 15-16.) 

Indeed, it was Galliers who ultimately extended an offer of employment to 

Plaintiff. That Galliers may have delegated some decision-making responsibilities 

to other employees does not, in this Court’s opinion, negate a finding that Galliers 

is an employer as that term is used in the FLSA context. This is particularly true in 

the face of Defendants’ failure to rebut the evidence pointed to by Plaintiff. 

Defendants’ arguments regarding the impropriety of a finding of joint and 

several liability are unavailing. First, Defendants argue that Galliers was not 

responsible for hiring and firing decisions. (Defs.’ Br. 19.) However, as explained 

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18 

immediately above, Galliers did participate in personnel decisions. Second, 

Defendants contend that Galliers did not have control over the day to day 

operations of Michigan Steel, “particularly while one of his sons was the 

President.” (Id.) However, the deposition testimony indicates that Galliers’s son 

was president sometime prior to 1998, approximately seventeen years ago. 

Third, and lastly, Defendants cite authority standing for the proposition that 

whether a party is an employer is a question of fact. (Id. (citing Donovan v. Sabine 

Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1983).) As an initial matter, this citation is 

misleading, as in the Sixth Circuit, “[w]hether a party is an employer within the 

meaning of the FLSA is a legal determination.” Dole, 942 F.2d at 965 (citing, 

inter alia, Donovan v. Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1116 (6th Cir. 1984) (“The 

determination of whether a particular factual setting gives rise to coverage under 

the FLSA is a matter of law.”)). Further, Plaintiff has discharged his initial 

summary judgment burden using the materials specified in Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 56(c), meaning the burden of defeating summary judgment has shifted 

to Defendants. Defendants must point to specific material facts – beyond mere 

allegation – that give rise to a genuine issue of law for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

256, 106 S. Ct. at 2514. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-movant’s 

claim will not prevent summary judgment; rather, there must be evidence on which 

a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 

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19 

F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2011). Defendants have not pointed to any such evidence. 

Having failed to discharge their summary judgment burden, the Court 

concludes that Galliers is an employer within the meaning of the FLSA and that he 

may, therefore, be held jointly and severally liable with Michigan Steel for the 

FLSA violation involved in this case. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled 

to summary judgment as to Defendants’ liability for the FLSA overtime wage as 

well as for liquidated damages. Defendants Michigan Steel and Gary Galliers shall 

be jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff as joint employers under the FLSA. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 

GRANTED. 

Dated: July 23, 2015 

 

 s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Copies to: 

Jesse L. Young, Esq. 

Lawrence S. Gadd, Esq.

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