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i 

68–162 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–54] 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVESTMENT 

IN TECHNOLOGY AND CAPABILITY TO 

MEET EMERGING SECURITY THREATS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

JULY 26, 2011 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

ALEX KUGAJEVSKY, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

JEFF CULLEN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, July 26, 2011, Department of Defense Investment in Technology 

and Capability To Meet Emerging Security Threats ........................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, July 26, 2011 ............................................................................................ 31 

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2011 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND 

CAPABILITY TO MEET EMERGING SECURITY THREATS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 9 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Berkeley, Alfred R., III, Chairman, Pipeline Financial Group, Inc., Member, 

Business Executives For National Security ....................................................... 7 

Mark, Dr. Hans, Professor, Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics, John J. McKetta Centennial Energy Chair in Engineering, University 

of Texas at Austin ................................................................................................ 3 

Reed, Jean, Distinguished Research Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University ......................................... 5 

Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments ............................................................................... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Berkeley, Alfred R., III ..................................................................................... 74 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 35 

Mark, Dr. Hans ................................................................................................. 49 

Reed, Jean ......................................................................................................... 63 

Thomas, Jim ...................................................................................................... 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVESTMENT IN TECHNOLOGY AND CAPABILITY TO MEET EMERGING SECURITY THREATS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 26, 2011. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing will come to order. 

And let me first express our appreciation to the witnesses for 

your patience, as we have finished votes. The bad news is that we 

are late. The good news is, now we are not going to be interrupted 

for a while. So I appreciate, again, you all’s patience. 

This hearing should shed light on matters that are squarely 

within the center of this subcommittee’s jurisdiction. Namely, what 

are the emerging threats to the national security of the United 

States? And what are the emerging capabilities in which we need 

to invest in order to meet those threats? 

The one fact of which we can all be assured in national security 

is that there will be change and there will be uncertainty. We can’t 

predict the future, but we can watch for trends and we can develop 

technologies that can help meet a variety of challenges in a rapidly 

changing world. 

Of course, the Department of Defense is not the only place where 

those trends can be detected, or where those technologies can be 

identified. And we have certainly assembled a top-rate panel today 

to help us with that task of detecting those trends and identifying 

those technologies. And we appreciate each of you being here. 

I understand that Mr. Langevin is on his way. We will give him 

the full opportunity to make his opening statement and whatever 

he would like to do when he—later when he arrives. But for now, 

I think we should proceed with the summary of the witness statements. 

Without objection, your full statements will be made part of the 

record. But I would be delighted to hear your summary of your 

statements before we go to questions. 

Before us today we have Mr. Jim Thomas, Vice President and Director of Studies for The Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 
2 

We have Dr. Hans Mark with The University of Texas at Austin. 

We have Mr. Jean Reed, Distinguished Research Fellow at National Defense University, with some prior association with this 

committee. 

And Mr. Alfred Berkeley, chairman of Pipeline Financial Group, 

who is a member of BENS, Business Associates—Business Executives for National Security. 

Again, we appreciate all of you being here. 

Mr. Thomas, if you would like to begin. 

STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

appear before the subcommittee today. 

In my testimony this afternoon, I will describe some of the major 

security challenges we are likely to face over the next 2 decades, 

outline potential discontinuities in future warfare and their implications for defense planning. And finally, I will suggest some capability areas that may appear as growth opportunities for investment. 

The United States, as you know, is facing a multitude of threats. 

But three principal securities challenges stand out: Dealing with 

the rise of China, defeating violence extremism, coping with 

radicalization and destabilization in key countries around the 

world. 

And finally, preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear armed powers. The geographic nexus of these three challenges is the Indo-Pacific Region, stretching from the Persian Gulf 

around the Malay Peninsula to the Sea of Japan, where high economic growth rates are likely to fuel continued regional increases 

in armaments and intense resource competitions that could jump 

the track into the military domain. 

Potential changes in warfare will also affect how we deal with 

these challenges. 

First of all, American power projection in its familiar forms could 

become obsolete as countries like China and Iran acquire extendedrange, precision-guided weapons, advanced sensors, and the means 

to attack opposing electronic systems, thereby creating anti-access 

or area denial zones. 

The second is that proliferation of guided weaponry and nuclear 

weapons makes the prospect of large armies invading other countries less likely, while coercive missile campaigns and cyber warfare may become far more likely. 

The third is that conflicts will extend into the global commons 

of the high seas, air, space and cyberspace. These are areas where 

the United States traditionally has dominated. 

And the fourth is that the United States is in danger of losing 

its lead in critical military technology competitions, such as cyber, 

precision warfare and directed energy. 

These continuities have several implications. Above all, future 

environments in which U.S. forces are likely to be—above all, future environments in which U.S. forces operate are likely to be far 

less permissive than in the recent past. 
3 

High signature forces that depend on theater air bases, large 

naval surface combatants, sizable ground formations, and large 

footprints of logistical supply through ports and airfields, as well 

as satellites and low earth orbit and geostationary orbits and computer networks, will all be far more vulnerable. 

DOD [Department of Defense] should maximize investments and 

systems to perform under a range of nonpermissive conditions 

while minimizing investments and systems whose optimal performance depends on relatively benign operating conditions. 

The United States and its allies must also improve their ability 

to counter coercion and more ambiguous forms of aggression, encouraging allies and friends around the world to field their own 

anti-access and area denial systems, including active and passive 

defenses, as well as precision weaponry, could enable them to withstand coercive efforts by local hegemonic aspirants. 

Finally, U.S. research and development and intelligence efforts 

will need to be more closely intertwined to prevent technological 

surprise. Fostering creativity and experimentation within the U.S. 

military will maximize the odds of discovering the next big thing 

in military innovation before our adversaries do. In light of these 

implications, eight capability areas look particularly attractive: 

Countering or eliminating nuclear and biological weapons; operating from range and penetrating into denied areas to conduct surveillance and strike missions; defending against ballistic missile 

and shorter range guided rocket artillery, mortars, and missiles, 

otherwise known as G–RAMM systems; conducting special reconnaissance, direct action, and unconventional warfare in denied 

areas; conducting unwarned land attack, sea denial, and reconnaissance from undersea; channeling or controlling access and movement via non-lethal weapons; disrupting, deceiving, or negating the 

sensors and processing capabilities of hostile powers; and finally, 

building up the capacities of key allies in friendly states around the 

world, not only for internal defense, but for external defense increasingly as time goes on. 

In closing, let me express my appreciation to the committee for 

its efforts to raise the level of discourse and awareness on these important issues. There is absolutely no question as we—looking at 

our current fiscal woes—that we are entering an age of austerity 

and that tough choices face DOD in the years ahead. But there still 

will be an imperative on protecting the seed corn of the Department, especially in R&D [Research & Development] and making 

sure that we are making prudent investments to maintain our military edge. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Dr. Mark. 

STATEMENT OF DR. HANS MARK, PROFESSOR, AEROSPACE 

ENGINEERING AND ENGINEERING MECHANICS, JOHN J. 

MCKETTA CENTENNIAL ENERGY CHAIR IN ENGINEERING, 

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Dr. MARK. Here we go. 
4 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am very honored and humbled to be here. I don’t have a broad view of this situation. 

I am a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, Mr. Chairman. And I used to be chancellor; I think I may have signed your 

degree, if you are—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think you may be right, Dr. Mark. So it 

makes it even more valuable. 

Dr. MARK. Look it up, all right? 

So what I am going to do is talk about some personal things and 

personal opinions. I don’t have a background in organized things 

like this. 

I do agree with my predecessor here that China and terrorism 

and the Persian Gulf are important issues. China, I think, is the 

most serious existential threat to the United States, because if they 

decided to do so, they would become another Soviet Union. Fortunately, they are very different from the Soviet Union. They don’t 

have an ideology that had some purchase around the world for 

some years. 

And I think that their strategy will rather be to become, first of 

all, the world’s first economic power. And then what they are going 

to try to do, I think, limit our access to the western Pacific and 

maybe even more. In short, they are going to build a navy. 

We have ways to respond to that and I think that the issue of 

sea power in terms of military capability has to be—has to have 

the highest priority in what we are going to have to do, and that 

is supported by air and space power. 

The policy I think we should adopt toward China is what the 

principal Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, once said, that 

the best way to defeat an adversary is to persuade him not to fight. 

And I think that we ought to take positions that reflect that view. 

And finally, I think we need to make alliances. We have a strong 

alliance with Japan. I think we ought to make a very strategic 

strong alliance with India. Technology has a place in that, in India 

especially. We should share technology with them. 

In the Persian Gulf, the case of course is very different. There 

is also an existential threat there, which is not now based on the 

possession of nuclear weapons, but based on the possession of an 

oil resource that we may lose. And what that would mean to the 

industrial world is serious. 

The United States doesn’t depend that much on Middle Eastern 

oil, but the rest of the world is more dependent, Europe and other 

regions. 

I think in the case of the Persian Gulf, we need to go back to 

what President Carter said in his 1980 State of the Union message 

where he said, ‘‘The Persian Gulf is an area of vital interest to the 

United States. And we will see to it that the flow of oil will be 

maintained, even if it takes military force.’’ That was in the record, 

said in so many words. And I think that is still true, two-thirds of 

the world’s known easily recoverable oil resource is still there. 

And you will remember that perhaps back in 1987 or 1988 we 

actually did put our ships at risk. And we kept the pipelines—the 

communication line—open. I think that the Persian Gulf eventually 

will solve itself as other energy sources become available. 
5 

And so it will decrease in importance, but we still need to keep 

the 5th fleet there, for example. And make sure that we are in a 

position to influence things in a military fashion if we have to. 

Finally, there is terrorism, and I have been very uncomfortable 

with the formulation of the war on terror. But terrorism is a military tactic, it is not an enemy. And there are terrorist groups 

around the world that we deal with, have to deal with. We have 

the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] in Colombia. 

You have the Mexican drug cartels. You have got Al Qaeda, of 

course. But there are lots of terrorist groups. 

And I think the civilized world has to say, ‘‘Look, terrorism is unacceptable.’’ And we have to make that an international effort 

somehow. I think we have done pretty well at it, as a matter of 

fact. 

I think if you look at the various terrorist movements that have 

come and gone, it is a record of some success. I notice there is a 

red light blinking here, which I think tells me that I am overrunning my time. 

What I want to do in the question period, if I may, is to talk 

about some technologies that are on the horizon, that are relevant 

to the points that I have made and that you have also made. 

So, thank you very much, and I will quit here. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mark can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Dr. Mark. 

The time is to try to give you a guidance for how far you are. 

But I do want to get back in questions to the capabilities you 

talked about in your written statement, quantum computing and 

other things. 

Mr. Reed. 

STATEMENT OF JEAN REED, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH FELLOW, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 

POLICY, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it 

is an honor to be here today. And a personal pleasure to be back 

in this room to speak to you about some of the potential emerging 

and future security threats and challenges facing the United States 

and the Department of Defense. 

My remarks today will focus on future technology threats that I 

see and general trends with regards to areas of emphasis. They reflect my own views, not necessarily those of the National Defense 

University, the Department of Defense, or any other organizations 

with which I am affiliated. 

Throughout history, planners and strategists have had a tendency to consider future threats within the context of what they 

knew about the current threat. Thinking about science and technology has been similarly linear and compartmentalized, with projections within any scientific discipline being based on past 

progress. 

As a result, planners and strategists have been repeatedly surprised by the application of new technology to warfare, whether actual or economic, by the advantages conferred, by the unique com-
6 

binations of different technologies, and by the non-linear, often exponential, advances in science and technology. 

Examples abound. In 1921, General Billy Mitchell demonstrated 

the vulnerability of battle ships to bombs, but our navies of the 

world ignored that. And then the combination of aircraft, highly 

mobile armor, and radio, known as Blitzkrieg, took the allied armies by surprise at the beginning of World War II. 

More recently, the use of precision-guided munitions, armed 

drone aircraft, and satellite GPS [Global Positioning System] positioning has changed the complexion of today’s battlefield. 

Unfortunately, we have also experienced the advantages that can 

be gained by ingenious use of low technology as well, such as delivering biological agents via the postal service, flying passenger 

planes into buildings, or improvising roadside bombs. 

Within the context of the Cold War, planners on both sides had 

a degree of confidence in the technological capabilities of their 

counterparts. Science for its part was highly disciplinary and 

progress was largely made in incremental fashion within a given 

discipline that allowed for reasonably accurate planning and the 

ability to integrate new advances into weapons platforms and defensive systems. 

Times have changed and three things have changed with that. 

First, the demise of the Soviet Union and its replacement by new 

transnational adversaries. Secondly, science underwent a dramatic 

paradigm shift in which trans-disciplinary research with its ability 

to affect exponential advances within disciplines, and in fact create 

entirely new disciplines, became the norm. 

And then third, information has become ubiquitous, allowing individuals access to technology on an unprecedented scale. The 

world, in short, is a much more unpredictable and chaotic place, 

and the emerging threats are equally problematic. 

The spectrum of emerging threats has been enlarged by both the 

exponential advances in scientific knowledge and its availability to 

a broader range of potential bad actors that no longer need to have 

advanced scientific training. Deciphering this threat spectrum requires a robust investment in science and technology, particular in 

its evolving trans-disciplinary paradigm. 

The concept of technological convergence is critical to understanding future threats, as there are some scientific disciplines 

which will be radically shaped by their convergence with other 

areas. 

The disciplines of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information 

technology, and cognitive neuroscience are four areas which will be 

pivotal in this anticipating and countering future threats, and I 

have addressed them in my written statements. 

In the interests of time, I will confine my oral remarks to biology, 

where convergence—where the classic example of technological convergence—is the convergence of genomics and information technology, which has led to the sequencing of the human genome, and 

which will be the basis for personalized medicine. 

But the flip side is the ability to alter the genomes of pathogenic 

organisms to create entirely new biological threat agents not found 

in nature. The ability to predict and plan for such optimal techno-
7 

logical convergences will largely determine the technological leaders of the 21st century. 

How to predict and plan for such an outcome is the question, and 

some of my colleagues at the National Defense University have 

suggested navigating through this increasingly complex environment using foresight, a structured way to think about evolving 

trends and security challenges, a disciplined analysis of alternative 

futures that could provide decision makers with the understanding 

needed to better influence the future environment. 

I believe that the DOD has recognized the changes in the threat 

landscape and understands the paradigm shifts, which have 

changed both the way science is conducted, and also its potential 

to generate new threats. 

There is also a clear awareness that the DOD needs to continually invest in its laboratory infrastructure, both physical and 

human capital, in order to stay abreast of exponentially increasing 

scientific advances. And perhaps more important, to invest in training the next generations of scientists and engineers. 

While it is virtually impossible to predict a priori what the future 

threats will be, maintaining clearer scientific superiority with the 

strategic investment based on strategy—technology convergence— 

offers the best chance to drive and exploit scientific advances and 

to anticipate and respond to new threats. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared remarks. And I will 

be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reed can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Berkeley, thanks for being with us. 

STATEMENT OF ALFRED R. BERKELEY III, CHAIRMAN, PIPELINE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., MEMBER, BUSINESS EXECUTIVES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 

Mr. BERKELEY. Thank you for having me, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. If I could get you to hit your microphone, 

please? 

Mr. BERKELEY. Sorry. 

Thank you for having me. 

My name is Alfred Berkeley. I am here as a private citizen. I 

have not read the Quadrennial Defense Review. I was asked to 

come and give the perspective of businesses, particularly businesses in the technology arena. 

I have had the privilege in my life of being an investment banker 

and a research analyst following such companies for 24 years and 

working at the NASDAQ [National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations] stock market for 7 years, essentially 

raising capital and providing a secondary market for some of the 

leading technology companies in the world. 

I will tell you that I hope my comments will complement the remarks you have heard before. They are going to be a little bit different. The businessmen that I talk to see six threats. 
8 

They see one goal. They see six capabilities that ought to be developed. And they have a very specific ‘‘ask’’ of what the Government needs to do to make it all work for business. 

The six threats, first, there is an enormous concern that as a 

country we are not providing enough economic opportunity to build 

a committed citizenship, a committed populace. 

We had the wisdom 100 years ago of the Homestead Acts where 

our forefathers knew that wave after wave of immigration, particularly from class-stratified and disenfranchised people in Europe, 

was not a good basis for building a sound citizenship—citizenry 

here. We wanted to get into the hands of as many people as we 

could the ability to make a living and the ability to own some productive assets. 

And in the agricultural age, 40 acres and a mule was a good way 

to do that. In the industrial age, stock options were a good way to 

get people a piece of the pie. In the information age, it is probably 

all about education. 

I had dinner last night with yet another large company executive, who—and I was telling him why I was in Washington—and 

he said, well, you are going to talk about the education problem, 

aren’t you? 

And that is the recurring theme that I hear from business that 

we are losing our edge, not just in STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics], but also in the basic desire to hold 

education as a revered, respected use of time for young people. 

So I would encourage you, using the tremendous analytical capabilities and the enormous educational requirements that the military has, is to learn what the science is of how people actually 

learn. 

Where is the science in our States’ implementation? We have a 

federalism issue, obviously, with education. But we need to figure 

out how to get more people actually learning. 

And that is the biggest single business concern that I bring. I realize it is not typically thought of as a DOD issue. But because 

DOD has such massive intellectual capability to do good science 

and get good analysis, I bring it to you. 

The second thing that businessmen talk about repeatedly is in 

energy independence. I won’t elaborate on that. The third problem 

is cyber espionage, particularly theft of our intellectual property. 

In my industry, the financial services industry, the big topic is 

cyber theft of money and the trillion dollar drain that we have on 

our financial system just by rampant theft. 

So the two cyber issues, cyber industrial espionage and cyber 

theft, are high on businesses’ list. 

The War on Drugs is next. We are not winning the War on 

Drugs. We are doing something wrong; we need to rethink that. 

And the last point would be that we are in a long economic war. 

That the warfare is a continuum and it starts with economic war. 

It is a relentless—it is 24 hours a day—it doesn’t stop, and we need 

to figure out what to do about it. 

In terms of capabilities, in preparation for coming here I asked 

a number of businessmen what they thought the opportunities 

were for capabilities and one of them said to me, ‘‘Why don’t we 

wipe out the language barrier?’’ Ever since the Tower of Babel and 
9 

the philosophy of the mythology of languages being developed, the 

strangeness of language has led to fear and uncertainty among peoples. 

We are on the edge of computer science that will allow every language to be translated into every other language. We should think 

about language not as something that is just there, but as something that we can take and make a positive tool out of—a weapon 

for good, if you would—by making it clear to people. 

The education issue I already talked about. We can, in the digital 

world, take education all over the planet. We can provide the best 

education that ever existed. We can do the same for medicine. 

An enormous new battlefront is growing up in what is called 

near-field communications. It is the next generation of cell phones. 

All the current cell phones are now being built with the capability 

to hold the cell phone close to an RFID [Radio-Frequency Identification] tag and read from that RFID tag. And it is going to create 

billions, if not trillions, of new addressable locations and information associated with them. 

We should think of that as a brand new opportunity where we 

have the opportunity to seize the hearts and minds of people by 

adding value to their lives by not letting someone else usurp our 

lead there. 

So I am out of time, and I will take questions whenever you 

want. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berkeley can be found in the Appendix on page 74.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

I appreciate it, all of you. 

Mr. Berkeley, I can’t help but reflect that in the mid to late 

1990s, President Clinton and Speaker Gingrich put together a commission that worked over 3 years to look at national security challenges. 

At the end of that time, the top two they came up with is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and recommended a Department of Homeland Security as a result. 

But the other one of the top two was math and science education 

as a national security issue. So you are, you know, in good company, not that we have improved since in the last decade, but I 

think it is important to keep talking about that as a national security issue. 

At this point I would yield to Mr. Langevin for any opening 

statement, as well as questions he would like to ask. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want thank our panel for being here and for your very 

thoughtful presentations here today. I certainly look forward to 

hearing more about your expert views on how the Department of 

Defense might shape the strategic planning efforts to maximize research and development investments to meet our future national 

security needs in a fiscally constrained environment. 
10 

This year, of course, our subcommittees has held a number of 

hearings to better understand the Department’s near-term investments in technology capabilities that address current threats in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and a number of other countries. 

Now, a significant portion of those investments over the last decade have been focused on technologies to transform our military to 

prosecute the war on terrorism. Now, we have had some successes 

with fielding MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles], 

UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance] and medical capabilities. 

However, we have stepped back from fully developing major 

transformational technologies, such as the future combat system, 

joint strike fighter, and the presidential helicopter, just to name a 

few. 

And as you know, these programs and others are likely to have 

cost us billions, now with little to show for it. Considering the cuts 

in the defense budget are currently projected to be over $400 billion 

during the next decade, I believe it is absolutely vital to spend 

more wisely. Now these prudent and deep cuts, however, must not 

undermine our capability and our ability to maintain our current 

defense posture globally. 

They must not jeopardize our ability to quickly adapt to future 

geopolitical environments that are stressed by rising powers, population changes, competition for resources such as food, water, energy, climate change, and other shaping factors that we hope to 

hear about from our experts today. 

Again, from our earlier hearings, this subcommittee is familiar 

with the Department’s current investments in technologies to combat violent extremists. We have heard a lot about investments and 

policy directions with regard to cyber security, as well as the Department of Defense’s efforts addressing the threats of weapons of 

mass destruction and our challenges with global strategic communications. 

These are all critically important problems and security challenges that are facing us today. However, given the factors I mentioned earlier and the potential impact on our future national security needs, we are investing—we have to make sure that we are investing in the right technologies and that is a significant question 

that we posed, to meet the future threats as well. 

Are our national security and defense strategies are aligned appropriately to guide future investments? And should we develop an 

interim Quadrennial Defense Review now, or wait until the next 

full review? Your thoughts on how DOD might reform its current 

cumbersome program, budget decision process, to plan future technology development strategies and investments would be helpful. 

And I know the members of this subcommittee would benefit from 

your expert opinion. 

I also would be interested in your thoughts on how the Department might improve the overall management of the defense research, engineering, test and evaluation program, both within the 

Pentagon and throughout the research engineering enterprise. 

For example, what technologies should the DOD continue to lead 

investments in, and where might we better leverage industry and 

our foreign partners instead. 
11 

With that, I just want to thank you once again for being here, 

for your time today. And I look forward to the questions and answers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Chairman. Again, Chairman, I want 

to thank you for holding this very important hearing and it is a 

very timely topic. 

My first question for the panel, what are some of the technology 

areas in which the U.S. no longer leads, or will lose the lead in the 

next 5 years? 

Whoever would like to start. 

Mr. BERKELEY. Well, I would start with one, which is ballistic 

missile lift capability for satellites in international laboratories. 

Mr. REED. Almost all the U.S. semi-conductor production is offshore. The production within the United States of advanced semiconductors is sorely limited. 

Mr. BERKELEY. Virtually no computer screens are manufactured 

in the United States. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Anyone else. 

Mr. THOMAS. I would just touch on directed energy. And this is 

an area which has enormous potential as a military game changer 

as we look ahead. 

But the scenario which the United States probably is underinvesting in relative to some of its competitors out there, countries 

like China and even Russia. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do we no longer lead in these areas, or are we— 

would you assess that we are in danger of losing the lead within 

an area in the next 5 years? 

Mr. THOMAS. I think in with respect narrowly to directed energy, 

I think our lead in there is questionable at best. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

For which technologies does the DOD need to lead research and 

development? And for which technologies can the DOD rely on industry and the commercial sector to lead research and development? 

Dr. MARK. May I try to answer that? I think that on the directed 

energy question, my colleague here is a little pessimistic. I think 

we have done things that are truly unique and I think have future 

potential. 

I am talking here now about a program in which I was personally involved, and that is to put a big laser on an airplane and to 

shoot down some ballistic missiles. We have done that. And we 

have done it for ranges that are of military interest. They are classified. I can’t tell you what they are. 

But we have shut the program down and we did it to ourselves. 

We have a lead in that area and we stopped. So I think that you 

agreed? Yes. 

Let me talk about some things that I personally have been involved in in the computer area. The computer is nothing but an assembly of switches and storage devices, information storage devices. 
12 

And the ability to make very capable computers depends on how 

many of these you can put in a volume that you can handle that 

is small enough. And the technology that is on the horizon today 

I think is, in my mind, anyway, the most interesting new step that 

we are taking, or we can take, where we have the clear lead. And 

I am talking about what has come to be called Quantum Computing. 

I don’t want to go into the technical details, but just to confirm 

that we are in the lead, our current Secretary of Energy, Steve 

Chu, won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1997 for essentially inventing the—I shouldn’t say invent—for discovering the phenomenon 

that makes these devices perhaps possible. 

Now, what I am talking about? A current transistor on a chip is 

about a nanometer in dimensions, between 1 and 10 nanometers. 

That means it is between a 100,000 and 1 million atoms. You need 

that many atoms to control a current, an electric current. 

What Steve Chu showed is that you can influence single atoms 

if you can capture them and keep them steady to store information. 

Our estimates are that you might be able to make computer elements, not out of a million atoms, but about of a few hundred. And 

so, you have orders of magnitude of computer capability that we 

may be able to get. 

The interesting thing is that some tantalizing experiments have 

already been done. A fellow by the name of Shore built one of these 

devices that works with a very small number of atoms and discovered that you can factor large numbers very much more rapidly 

than you can with an existing computer. The National Security 

Agency is very interested in random number tables, because it is 

these tables that allow you to initialize a decoding procedure. Well, 

this guy has a computer that can generate these tables in a time 

that is much shorter than what we have now. 

So I think there is something on the horizon here that we are 

pursuing and we will continue to pursue. But I think my guess 

right now is we are investing probably about $70 million a year in 

that. 

It is not really necessary to put a lot more money into it, but 

there are some things that aren’t being funded. And the point is 

that by increasing that by 50 percent, you might find the one person that has the good idea. 

We are not at the place where money is terribly important yet. 

We are at a place where I think we—by doubling the investment 

that we have for something like that—we might make more rapid 

step-wise progress. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Any other member of the panel? 

Mr. REED. In my statement, I talked about nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive neuroscience as 

being areas of emphasis, an increasing emphasis within our research and development program, our science and technology program. 

But the fact that you can get things for good coming out of that, 

as well as things for bad, depending upon how the technologies are 

applied, it is important that we take means to ensure that the 

things for good are coming out and that we can detect when there 

are cases of the potential for things bad coming out. And the tech-
13 

nology getting into the hands are being put to use by someone who 

can do us harm. 

That is a both an intelligence problem, but it is also a problem 

within the teaching and the education process. We are still the 

focal point for education of sciences, scientists, and technology in 

the United States. We have that edge. 

But if you look at the youngsters, if you will, who are participating in that, there are a number of Third World countries represented and they come, they go to school, they may stay. But they 

may very well go back to their own home. 

What we want to do is to make it, I think, in one case, is to make 

it attractive for them to stay within the United States and work 

within the U.S. research and development infrastructure. Problem, 

look at the industrial research and development infrastructure in 

the United States, what was there and what is not there today. 

The General Electric laboratory in Pittsburgh, the last time I 

was in there about 10 years ago when I was on the staff of this 

committee, there was an activity associated with, I believe, General 

Dynamics, that was doing chip-growing there. They were canceled 

out. But the only other thing in that massive research and development facility was a Siemens research activity. 

All of that activity, gone. Bell Laboratories in Whippany, New 

Jersey. When I was commanding a laboratory at the Picatinny Arsenal back in the mid-1980s, that was a mecca. It was a mecca for 

research for years and years and years, and it is gone and in the 

hands of another activity. 

Certainly industry has to build to the bottom line, but there is 

a—we are not doing something right in this area if we are letting 

our research and development—industrial research and development—and the departmental and interagency research and development lose the support that it must have if we are to maintain 

the cutting edge of technology in this globalized world. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I thank the panel. 

Unless there is someone else who wants to add in, I will yield 

back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentlemen. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am trying to figure out the order of procedure here with this 

new process. I guess I got here before anyone else does. So I will 

be glad to defer to Mr. West, if he is prepared for questions? 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Franks. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And also our Ranking Member. 

Thank the panel for being here today. 

And I am glad, Dr. Mark, that you and I agree on something. I 

think war on terror is a terrible misnomer. We did not go into 

World War II to fight the Blitzkrieg nor the kamikaze. So we have 

to have a strategic level perspective. 

This past weekend I had the great opportunity to go visit the 

Special Operations Command and Admiral Olson, who as you know 

will be changing out command and retiring in about a couple of 

weeks. 
14 

And what we ruminated on was the incredible advance in technology. When you go back and you think about the failure of Desert 

One, to now today where we were able to execute a zero illumination cross-border attack into Pakistan and take out the world’s 

number one terrorist. And also capture that completely on video 

and also the use of the new biometrics. 

I recall going—I spent 22 years in the United States Army, just 

so everyone understands my background. But I remember, you 

know, sitting down, reading writings such as Francis Fukuyama 

about the end of history. And then also Samuel Huntington, who 

talked about the clash of civilizations remaking the world order. 

And a lot of people didn’t pay any attention to that. When the 

Soviet Union collapsed, everyone was cheering and talking about 

how that was going to be a new state and no one projected out 

what would happen as far as the world and how that order would 

change. 

So, my question to you looking at where we are today and from 

a warrior’s perspective on the ground, if I were to lock you four 

very astute gentlemen into a room, as we should/would do army 

planners, and tell you that you could not come out until you gave 

me the top two or three threats to this country and its national security as you move forward, what would be those top two or three 

threats that you would present? 

Mr. THOMAS. Sir, if I might begin and I guess to answer your 

question, I would start by saying the United States is in a very different time than we were in 1950, as people like Paul Nitze were 

writing NSC–68 [National Security Council Report 68]. And you 

could focus on one overarching threat for your defense planning. 

We face a panoply of threats, and we are going to for the future. 

So then I think you would start to think about, well, what 

threats are essentially overarching? And if you are able to deal 

with those challenges, it actually buys you fungible capabilities and 

forces that you can apply elsewhere. 

And there, I guess I would really say there are three. I mean, 

if you have the capabilities to maintain a stable military balance 

vis-a`-vis China, those capabilities are fungible for other source of 

anti-access, area denial challenges you would face around the 

world. 

If you have the capabilities to locate, tag, and track dangerous 

individuals and to pursue groups like Al Qaeda and other non-state 

actors, those capabilities are fungible for a range of other problems 

that you might face as with radical elements around the world. 

And finally, we once thought a lot about nuclear weapons and 

guys like Thomas Schelling, more than half a century ago, and Bernard Burney, thought about what our strategies would be in a nuclear world. 

We are now entering a second nuclear era with new nuclear powers, such as North Korea and Iran, and we are going to have to 

think about regional nuclear balances. And this is an area where 

we are going to have to do it. And building those strategies for 

countries like North Korea or Iran, again, will be fungible in other 

areas. 

Dr. MARK. Yes, let me continue the discussion of nuclear weapons, because I spent 14 years in that business between 1956 and 
15 

1960—1970, I am sorry. And you are absolutely right. That is, nuclear weapons are not going to wait. And our problem is to maintain, under very difficult technical circumstances, the stockpile that 

we have. 

We have not tested a nuclear weapon since 1993, and we have 

not developed a new design in spite of the fact that there is a vast 

increase of knowledge in technologies that pertain to nuclear weapons in that same period. 

I served as Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the 

second term of the Clinton Administration, and I, for various reasons, I also wore the nuclear hat, because the president decided to 

abolish the nuclear job in the Pentagon. And they came to me and 

they said, ‘‘You are the guy that knows something about nuclear 

weapons, so you do the job.’’ So I had two jobs, actually. 

The reason I make this point is that we started the program in 

that time which said our nuclear stockpile today is decaying. We 

never built a nuclear weapon with a shelf life in mind, how long 

we would keep them, because as soon as we deployed one set, we 

would start a new generation. 

We managed to persuade the Clinton administration to put a fair 

amount of money into refurbishing the stockpile, and then we also 

initiated an idea of building a new weapon entirely without having 

to test it. 

That is, the weapon would have to be compatible with our delivery systems, it would have to be safer than the current weapons 

that we have in the stockpile, it would have to work without being 

tested. 

We started that program. We put some money into it and actually ran a competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratory, and we have a completed design, and then we stopped it. 

I think that the nuclear issue has to do with the fact that we 

need to maintain technological leadership in that area, and that is 

the only way that we will be able to, I think, deal with people who 

try to threaten us. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentlemen. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, all for being here. 

I wonder if you could, Mr. Berkeley particularly, go a little further in terms of the education piece and, perhaps people would suggest that we are talking more about soft power, smart power? And 

how do you think that the Department of Defense could be or 

should be using that intellectual capability that you speak of to add 

greater value to our learning, to the schools and, perhaps, you are 

speaking more in the sciences? 

But where do you see that piece? And where have we either felt 

that it is not appropriate perhaps for the Defense Department to 

be adding that value in some ways? Or what is it that kind of 

keeps us from looking at this particular issue in this way? 

Mr. BERKELEY. I think you are on to one of the most interesting 

questions. I don’t, for a second, want to give the impression that 
16 

I don’t think we shouldn’t have a steel fist, a nuclear capability, a 

directed energy capability, whatever it is. 

I think we need steel fists, but I think that maybe a short story 

will illuminate the thinking. I ran into John Negroponte in the Zurich Airport last January, and I happened to have another fellow 

there with me that I didn’t know well, but I had met. And I said, 

‘‘John, I would like to introduce you to the most powerful man you 

have never met.’’ 

And he had looked at me sort of startled, and there was a young 

man there in is 30s. And I said, ‘‘I want to introduce you to the 

director of research at Facebook. He can talk to 500,000 million at 

once.’’ 

I actually think that the battle space is being dramatically expanded and the most powerful weapon that we have is something 

called the cell phone, and it is because so many hundreds of millions of people are going to be able to get information through it. 

And I think that the idea of having an ‘‘All Education, All the 

Time’’—remember ‘‘All News, All the Time’’ at KYW in Philadelphia? ‘‘All Education, All the Time,’’ where no matter where you 

are in the world, you could get yourself educated. Or ‘‘All Medicine, 

All the Time,’’ where no matter where you are in the world, you 

can get yourself some knowledge about diagnosing symptoms. 

Those kinds of soft power issues may be able to preclude the fear 

and uncertainty, the doubt, mistrust and jealousies that lead to 

simple ideological conflict. 

So the question about where the military fits in is that the military has—it is a nation-state unto itself, in that it has schools, it 

has to train its people, it has to be sure its people’s children are 

trained and it can do the science. It can lead the way. I am not 

saying replace what the States are doing, or replace what the Department of Education is doing. 

I am saying give a shining example that is so visibly powerful 

because it is intellectually rigorous and proven, that it becomes a 

standard if it deserves to be the standard. So I want the science 

done. I want the research done, and it doesn’t take marshalling all 

the States to do that. 

I happen to have been on this issue of the 18- to 24-year-old cohort. I happen to have been responsive to General George Casey’s 

call for a number of business people to come to West Point and 

spend 36 hours talking about this issue. And you should take a 

look at what Lieutenant General Ben Freakley is doing in South 

Carolina and several other states, Oklahoma also I think, to bring 

some Army resources into the elementary and secondary school 

system for the purpose of keeping people in school. 

It is not necessarily a STEM effort, but it is of the 25 or 30 programs that the Army does offer school systems, ranging from 

ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training Corps] to send you some pamphlets. They are trying to push the limits and say, ‘‘Okay, can we 

affect the staying-in-school issue?’’ 

I want to go a lot farther than that. I want to understand the 

neuroscience of how people learn. How many repetitions does it 

take to get something into long-term memory? It is a physical 

thing—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. In politics, seven, the rule of thumb, so that is—— 
17 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BERKELEY. But the Army—okay, you understand. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. Yes. 

Mr. BERKELEY. It takes a lot of repetitions to get things into 

long-term memory. My understanding is that most American curricula give about half the repetitions it takes to get something into 

long-term memory. Therefore, 3 weeks later, the child doesn’t remember. 

Dr. MARK. I wonder if I could follow up your comments, because 

I teach the freshman course in our Aerospace Department. I have 

140 students every year, every semester. Their question is, ‘‘What 

is the DOD doing about education?’’ And the answer is a lot. 

For example, we have defined—I was on a committee a couple of 

years ago or more, 4 years ago—that defined the area of systems 

engineering to be something that is in trouble within the Department of Defense, because we have spent much too much time on 

the process, rather than on the technology. 

And so, if you look at the schools that are looking at systems engineering, I think they are probably part of the problem by making 

complicated rules. 

This same Defense Department, then, when we pointed this out 

to them, gave us a grant of half a million dollars to get started on 

a systems engineering course in our department that we are just 

starting to teach, that will be the other end of this freshman course 

that I teach, where we will do hands-on problems, where the students must learn how to do engineering tradeoffs, where they must 

learn how to work in engineering teams, where they must learn 

how to influence a customer. That is, how you sell your product? 

And I think that the Defense Department is aware of the importance of education and if you do the right things, they will provide 

the money. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you, gentlemen, for being here. You are sort of that 

invisible frontline of freedom, and we appreciate your intellect and 

your commitment very much. 

I was intrigued, Mr. Thomas, when you mentioned earlier about 

the threat from technological surprise, and I guess the line of questions I would like to begin with is just to suggest that perhaps the 

surprise may be from an old technology that is applied in a new 

way. 

And as you know, there has been some recent reports, or recent 

information declassified, related to China’s EMP [Electromagnetic 

Pulse] capability, not only to create IEMI [Intentional Electromagnetic Interference], but also their preparations for hardening 

their own grid and other facilities in case there is some type of disagreement over the Taiwan territory. So with that in mind, I guess, 

I would ask a couple of questions. 

First of all, in light of the last few reports on EMP and its potential danger to our electric grid from FERC [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission], from National Academy of Sciences, from the 
18 

Department of Defense, and there is just six or seven of them that 

all seem to have come to a very common conclusion that this represents a pretty profound threat to us. 

Now I would like to, first of all, find out if there are anyone on 

the Committee that either agrees significantly with that or disagrees with it. What do you think the potential threat to our grid? 

What does EMP represent in terms of potential threat to our grid 

if it was—say we will start off from a geomagnetic storm and then 

progress to a high-altitude nuclear burst? 

Mr. THOMAS. I think it would be very difficult to overestimate 

the severity of the threat that could be posed by electromagnetic 

pulse devices. What is particularly interesting is research that is 

going on around the world looking at non-nuclear electromagnetic 

pulse and, particularly, microwave devices. 

Given our dependence not only as a society, but as a military on 

advanced telecommunications and networking capabilities, we, of 

course, are particularly vulnerable both in the civil regard as well 

as in a military regard. 

And this is something on the military side I know is really an 

animated point right now in terms of how we think about conducting operations in the future, potentially in denied communications environments. 

This is not only a technical challenge in terms of how we think 

about going back to old-fashioned modes of communication, like 

line of sight, but also for our precision navigation and timing, how 

we will operate, but also how we will adopt mission-type orders, as 

we did in the past, so that our forces can self-form networks and 

continue with commander’s intent long after their communications 

back to higher headquarters had been eliminated. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well it seems to me that if Iran gained a nuclear 

weapons capability today, that our—we would be fairly intent on 

trying to harden our grid immediately. It seems like that will be 

something that we would want to do right away. 

Given some of the technology discussed in some of the released 

information related to China, that is much smaller warheads can 

be enhanced and have a much greater capability in terms of its 

EMP application. 

I am going to run out of time here. By the time I ask this question, you guys will—what I would like to do is let me ask one question and hope that each of you, as you feel led, will address the 

question. 

What do you believe that we should be doing about either defending against or preparing for the Iranian nation or others that could 

potentially gain this capability? I am going to stop there. 

In other words, I know that even with China’s growing capability, that perhaps the indications are that we might not have as 

much to worry about their intent, as we may have to worry about 

Iran. 

If Iran gained a nuclear capability today, knowing that they have 

done some exercises that seem to be EMP related, what would be 

the best thing that we could do to defend ourselves against that, 

and how serious do you take this threat? And I will start over here 

with Mr. Berkeley and go left, even though it is hard for me to do 

that. 
19 

Mr. BERKELEY. Well, I think the structure of that answer it gets 

at the question of what is the right role of Government and what 

is the right role of business? And if you look back to the example 

of Civil Reserve Air Fleet, where the jet fleet was introduced with 

a lot of Federal help to build capacity and those planes where then 

available, for example, during Vietnam for troop transport, are 

available during national emergencies. That was a pretty good 

tradeoff between the public and the private. 

So if you want a hardened grid over and above what the economics dictate from the business community, I think it is sensible for 

the Government to pay for that hardening and then have a call on 

that capacity when they need it. 

Mr. REED. I would branch on the threat as you have portrayed 

it by saying that one of the things you also need to be very concerned about is the potential threat to the electronic grid, and to 

almost every place that we are using electronics, from cyber warfare. 

And that that, in my personal view, is probably a more likely 

threat that we ought to be—or let me say equally as frightening 

in terms of the overall effect that we could—that would occur, and 

it could be done a lot more surreptitiously than in an overt nuclear 

strike. 

Dr. MARK. Yes, I would agree with that, and I have spent a fair 

amount of time thinking about EMP. And it is not as easy as it 

sounds. The problem is that an electromagnetic pulse is hard to 

control. It is not clear whether you can do what you want to do. 

I was present at the Starfish event in 1962, where we first discovered electromagnetic pulses. And let me tell you what happened, 

because it was very interesting. 

The explosion was at 400 kilometers altitude and we could see 

it. I was sitting on the beach in Kauai at Barking Sands at the 

range there. And you could see it above the horizon. And we got 

word that the streetlights in Honolulu had been taken out. But 

nothing happened to the power system. The reason for this is that 

the particular pulse that this device emitted was tuned to the 

streetlights, and so it deposited a lot of energy there, but didn’t do 

anything else. 

So I am not sure that it is a weapon that you could rely on to 

do what you think it will do, what you want it to do. So it is there. 

We know how to harden things against it. The problem has always 

been how much do we spend on that? 

Mr. THOMAS. I will just say, picking up on that, I mean at a minimum, you certainly want to harden your nuclear command and 

control—— 

Mr. FRANKS. They are already hardened. 

Mr. THOMAS. And a lot of your strategic capabilities so that you 

have a retaliatory capability. And then when I think it comes to 

infrastructure, I think that, as Dr. Mark suggests, you are going 

to have to think about some of the tradeoffs in terms of how much 

is enough relative to other threats that you have to prepare 

against, such as cyber attacks, to take down your critical infrastructure. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
20 

I think this is a subject that should be discussed a lot more. Of 

course if we have a nuclear burst, Mr. Chairman, you know the 

cyber, it’s ubiquitous. We don’t computer capability at all without 

electricity. And I hope that in the ways you all deem fit that you 

will look at some of the new vulnerabilities of our new grid. 

The old grid during Starfish Prime was pretty much impervious 

to EMP, whereas the one that we have today, we have engineered 

ourselves into just profound vulnerability, I think. 

Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, sir. 

Let me go back and pick up on several things that each of you 

said. 

Mr. Thomas, in the beginning of your comments, you talked 

about, perhaps, power projection becoming obsolete and a variety 

of things, and then I am listening to Mr. Langevin’s statement 

about the severe budget situation we are in and the necessity to 

make tough tradeoffs. 

And while, obviously, the purpose of today’s hearing is to think 

ahead, part of our brain is in the here and now and the challenges 

we face with spending. But my impression from your comments is 

that we are spending money in the wrong places now. 

That a big percentage of our defense budget is going to things 

that are or are becoming obsolete. Is that what I should conclude? 

Do we need a fairly drastic overhaul of our spending priorities and 

to meet the emerging threats in national security and to develop 

the capabilities we need? 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is a terrific 

question. 

Around Washington, especially in defense circles, you hear a lot 

of talk about tradeoffs between high-end and low-end threats. How 

much should we be spending and preparing for irregular warfare? 

How much should we be thinking about China? I really think this 

is the wrong way to frame a very important debate. 

As we look to the future, what we see and what has come out 

of a lot of war gaming that we have done is that environments 

across the board, whether it is in thinking about advanced military 

states and the kinds of challenges they will pose, or it is thinking 

about non-state actors and what they will do, all of those environments become increasingly nonpermissive. And that is going to be 

true both at the high end and the low end. 

And what we see is that our feeder bases are going to be more 

vulnerable in the future. Our long-haul communications are going 

to be more vulnerable. Our global logistics systems are going to be 

more vulnerable. 

A navy that operates very close to the shores of an adversary 

may be more vulnerable to threats like anti-ship cruise missiles 

and submarines, and our ability to not only operate at range, but 

to penetrate into denied airspaces, remains quite limited. 

So across the board, we look and see that we face these challenges. And even in the realm of a irregular warfare, as we think 

about groups like Hezbollah, and what they were able to do in 2006 

with unguided rockets, the potential escalation in terms of the severity of their attack should they have guided systems in the future is pretty profound. 
21 

And I think if there is one theme that I really could hit on in 

terms of how we think about a big strategic review, it will be we 

really want to think about how we optimize ourselves for nastier 

environments in the future. And we really take a hard look at what 

capabilities are we acquiring or are we developing, which really depend on some very benign assumptions? 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. Berkeley, I am not sure you got to fully develop your point 

that you made in your written statement that what business is 

looking for from the Government seems—is predictability. And I 

take it that is your primary—you mentioned one thing, business is 

looking to for us for. Would you elaborate on that, I mean particularly in this environment? 

Mr. BERKELEY. Yes. I would be delighted to, Mr. Chairman. 

The certainties that business needs come because so much about 

competition is uncertain. And if Government wants funding for 

commercially risky technology, it needs to provide some certainty 

that that funding will be there. And we have funded an awful lot 

of research on earmarks and we have done it through the grant 

process with relatively small, relatively short-term grants that are 

then have to be reapplied for. And an awful lot of the universitybased science leverage that is available to the Government. 

Business always looks at things as where is the leverage? Where 

can I get at low marginal cost get high marginal value? The single 

thing that the Government could do, in my opinion, would be to 

provide longer term predictability for funding for things that the 

businesses are not going to invest their own funds in, but are needed by the country. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, and Mr. Reed, let me ask you to pick up 

on that, because you talk about the need to invest in labs. From 

your vantage point, what grade would you give us on investing in 

the right things for the long term? Or has more and more of our 

investment been focused on short-term immediate payoff, which is 

an impression I have in recent years? 

Mr. REED. Clearly, a lot of our current investment has been focused on the war at hand, if you look at the amount of money going 

in to both development of technology, for instance in terms of mineproof or mine-protected vehicles and in the procurement associated 

with that. I look at the overall science and technology account and, 

of course, I worked that in this committee for a number of years. 

I have been focused rather narrowly for about the past 5 years 

on the biological side of that and the medical countermeasures, and 

I think for the most part that, that area we have got just about 

right, right now. Because there is a very strong funding stream 

going into the biomedical arena, both within the Department and 

within the Department of Health and Human Services, with respect to the medical counter-measures technology development effort. And with some very smashing success. And of course, Andrew 

Weber appeared before this committee and talked about that earlier this year. 

It is important that be sustained, because right after the nuclear 

threat is, in many ways, a more probable biological threat that we 

have got to be ready to deal with. 
22 

And that implies both the defense at the personal level in terms 

of therapeutics and vaccines, but also in the surveillance area and 

the establishment of surveillance networks worldwide, aimed not 

only at a potential bad actor, but also at the threat of naturally occurring diseases, and of course, that is the focus of that program, 

as you know. 

The laboratory sustainment area, I think, is absolutely critical, 

and we need to ensure that we are putting enough money into the 

Government side of the Government laboratories, the Department 

of Defense laboratories, to ensure the ability to attain and retain 

some really world-class youngsters that are coming out of the academic environment now. And are, in fact, going to work for some 

of the Government laboratories. 

It is almost eye-watering to see the sort of work they are going 

to do, but that is a fragile resource. And it is not in a time of the 

force coming back and having to rebuild and recock from the two 

wars. It is an area that will not be high priority for the military 

departments, for the Services, in terms of what they feel they have 

to spend their money on. You need to look very seriously at that, 

and I feel that very, very strongly. And of course, I commanded an 

RD&E [Research, Development & Engineering] center myself, back 

in the 1980s. 

I know the kind of work that we were doing then. The work that 

is being done in the various laboratories, not only in the Department of Defense, but also in Health and Human Services and then 

Homeland Security and the rest of the Federal establishment, and 

in the universities from the standpoint of multidisciplinary research universities and in the smaller schools, as well, that needs 

to be sustained. 

That is where the seed corn is grown, and that is where—and we 

need to mature or nurture and then mature that seed corn and 

have places for them to go to work in support of the Nation. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay, thank you. 

Mr. REED. I will get off my soapbox now—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. You are making a point strongly, and I appreciate that. 

Dr. MARK. Mr. Chairman, may I add something—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Sure. 

Dr. MARK [continuing]. To what my old friend, really old friend 

Jean, has said? 

And from the point of view now of the university, where do our 

students go to work today? Now engineering happens to be a profession where jobs are available, not only available, they are actually looking for people to take them. 

About 15 years ago, the then-new dot.com business was where 

the brightest kids went. Today, when my students leave and where 

do they want recommendations to? I can tell you the two largest, 

most popular places are the MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Laboratory and the California Institute of Technology’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

The best students now want to go into Government-supported 

laboratories, some of them related to national defense. For example, Lincoln is an Air Force laboratory, or mostly Air Force. So I 
23 

think that we are in a position now to take advantage of a renewed 

interest in service to the Nation in one way or another. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Mark, let me ask you to can you just touch 

on the potential national security implications of quantum computing? And then, give us, for laymen who are technologically challenged, touch on your other key capability, hypersonics? 

Dr. MARK. Well, certainly, I would be glad to. I am also technologically challenged by these things. The question of size in the elements out of which a computer is made is the critical one. The 

number of computers—the number of switches, the number of elements that you can put in a small volume is key. 

The human brain has something like 10 to the ninth, or is that 

100? A trillion. A trillion what we would call transistors. And that 

is because the switching elements in our neurons have approximately between 300 and 1,000 atoms, instead of the million or 

more that you now have in the computers that we build. 

What you can do with that is to essentially make a redundant 

computer and teach it to find its own paths to come to conclusions. 

That is what the human brain does, and it does it because it is 

highly redundant. A very small number of the neurons that we actually have are used at any one time. And we would be able to program that into our computers. 

See, I was involved in the beginning of the advent of parallel 

computing. You know we ran into a limit in the 1970s of the speed 

of light. If a computer has one central processor, then what determines its speed is how fast the signals can go from one element to 

another. 

And what we said—or Dan Slotnick was the one who really had 

this idea was, ‘‘Why don’t we have several of these run in parallel 

on the same program?’’ 

And we actually were able to put together a computer that had 

64 of these things running in parallel. And we were able to show, 

after a lot of mistakes, that by God, yes! You could increase the 

speed simply by having more CPUs [Central Processing Units] 

work on the same problem. 

Today, thousands of CPUs work in the large computers on the 

same problem. And that was a real breakthrough. I think this 

breakthrough I see coming anyway in size of the processing elements are—they are going to be equally important. And I think 

that we have talked about robots, the capability of robots, I think 

that is where the first big application is going to be. 

But the one thing I am sure of is that we sure didn’t predict 

what we could do with computers when we put that first 64 processor machine together. So it is hard to say much more. 

With respect to hypersonic propulsion, that is a practical engineering problem. We have not been able to really do it, because we 

do not have—we have computers that can calculate hypersonic flow 

in the machines that we have built. What we don’t have are 

ground-based test facilities to verify the computer codes. 

In all of the other aeronautical advances, we have been able to 

build wind tunnels where today we design our airplanes on the 

computer, but every once in a while you want to go make a test 

and make sure that your computer program actually reflects what 

happens. 
24 

In the case of hypersonics, that is a very heavy investment. In 

my prepared statement, I have put a picture of a facility that was 

built in 1962, or started in 1962, and it was used only once, really, 

to test a ram jet run by a nuclear reactor. 

We ran that reactor for 5 minutes, and it had a total energy capacity of 500 megawatts, and we had a hypersonic wind tunnel 

there. I think some of it is actually still at the Nevada test site. 

I am not sure of that now, but—— 

We would need to build something like that and make a commitment to develop hypersonic propulsion. Hypersonic means beyond 

five times the speed of sound. 

People have talked about it now for decades. We have never 

made one work, because we didn’t have the knowledge. We have 

now made two hypersonic tests in the last 2 or 3 years that were 

partially successful, and they were partially successful because we 

are beginning to learn how to do this. 

The people that do these things, when I go talk to them, they tell 

me that if we could have a ground-based facility, where we could 

vary parameters. You see, these flights are pretty expensive. These 

are things that are dropped by that B–52 [Boeing Stratofortress 

strategic bomber] we have down at Edwards Air Force Base. 

We had the X–51 [Boeing unmanned scramjet demonstration aircraft] on and we had the X–43 [NASA unmanned experimental 

hypersonic aircraft] in the last two or three—and I guess the 51 

has the record of a couple of hundred seconds of hypersonic flight 

above Mach 5. And I think that I would seriously recommend that 

we consider putting a facility together and establish a leadership 

in this area. 

Now, what do you get for that? If we could have hypersonic 

cruise missiles, rather than the subsonic once we have, the 

hypersonic cruise missile would travel at about a mile a second. So 

60 miles would be a minute, you would have—and nobody could 

shoot that down, by the way. There aren’t any missiles that maneuver fast enough to do that. 

The other important application is space launch. You know, there 

is a company now that launches space vehicles starting with an 

airplane, it is an old Lockheed 1011 [TriStar airliner] that flies at 

40,000 feet, and the Pegasus rockets are dropped from that airplane and then go into space. If that airplane, instead of running 

at Mach 0.8, which is 3 or 4 percent of what it takes to go into 

orbit, ran at Mach 5 or Mach 7, say, then you are a third of the 

way there in space. 

We have a good rocket industry. That rocket industry has nothing to do now, because we have done away with the shuttle, they 

don’t have to maintain those engines, and we are using Russian engines on our big rockets. 

I think if we made a concerted effort to build an air-breathing 

rocket, which is what a hypersonic engine really is, and get sustained flight—and remember if you have a hypersonic vehicle and 

it flies for an hour, you have gone around the world pretty much, 

or close to it. Well, you have done what, 3,600 miles in 1 hour. 

So that is something we ought to do. That ought to be a national 

program. 
25 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Could I ask a question? I will be very brief. Just 

for clarification. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Sure, sure. 

Mr. LANGEVIN [continuing]. When you are talking about—when 

you are talking about hypersonic kind of—are you talking about 

Scramjet technology, or is that something—— 

Dr. MARK. Scramjets, yes. Scramjet means supersonic cruise ram 

jet, scramjet. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Because I know we had a successful test of that, 

then we had to table it. 

Dr. MARK. Yes, we did. We had two initially. Well, we had two 

vehicles, but several flights. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. All right, thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Great. 

Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just had one question that maybe all of you can kind of touch 

upon. I am sorry for being late. 

And as we are talking about the issue of hypersonic or we were 

talking about the labs that you were talking about and some of the 

technologies that you have brought forth in this hearing, one of the 

issues in a lot of areas around the country now is that this technology as it evolves doesn’t necessarily get transferred into American jobs like it used to. 

And where the Defense bill was always seen many, many years 

ago as a jobs bill throughout the country and almost every congressional district could identify very easily how those jobs were happening from the investment that the Pentagon was making. 

And I find it very interesting that young people now are going 

into these labs, because some of the most cutting-edge research is 

being done there. And so, if you could just throw out some suggestions to us of some things that we can do from our end to invest 

in things like you were just mentioning, that I think capture the 

imagination of young people to want to be a part of something like 

that, which I was fascinated just listening you talk about it and I 

can imagine if I was an engineer how much I would want to be a 

part of that. 

So what are those things that we need to invest in that have the 

practical appeal to achieve some of the goals that we need to 

achieve in the military? But also, will draw in the best and brightest back into the Government? And then how, when we develop 

that technology, what can we do from our end to help transfer the 

manufacturing and commercialization of those products to happen 

here in the United States? 

And I know there is a lot of people who now want to manufacture near the research in order to continue to try improve the products. So I am just going to throw that out there? And if all of you 

can just kind of comment on it, I would appreciate it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. MARK. May I follow about what Mr. Reed said about the 

labs? I think that the algorithm that we used to have was that we 

tried to lead in those technical fields that are on the cutting edge 

of something that lead to some new capabilities. And then, we do 

the—we build the first airplanes or the first military vehicles, 
26 

ships, whatever, but you cannot after that prevent other folks from 

building these things, and so we actually invest also in foreign 

countries to get them built elsewhere. 

But the key is to have the laboratories and to have the universities that can maintain that lead. I mentioned that our current 

Secretary of Energy performed the experiments when he was a professor at Stanford that led to this concept of quantum computing. 

Now, you hear somebody who is now in the position to do something about it and to make sure that the initial production, the initial big investments are made in the United States. 

I was at a meeting the other day when we talked about this. 

When we built the first parallel computer, we didn’t know how to 

program it. 

But Burroughs company took the risk to build it. It was funded 

by the Government, but they put their best people on it, and so 

they actually had these people off the projects on which they were 

making their current profits, you see. And the Federal money allowed them to put this 64 CPU computer together. 

Then they gave it to us at our research center, a federal research 

center, the NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] 

Ames Research Center, and we made it work. And we made it 

work, because we had the time and we had the Federal employees 

who could do that. They didn’t have to go somewhere else into a 

profit-making activity. 

So that system works, and what has happened recently is, as I 

mentioned a couple of things, where we have deliberately stopped. 

And I think that, you know, when I was in the Pentagon in the 

1970s, when we had relatively more freedom and more money than 

we have now, we used to fund some high-risk projects by simply 

taking some airplanes off the production line. 

You know, remember, we stopped the 141 [Lockheed C–141 

Starlifter strategic airlifter] program for a while to get something 

started that we wanted to. And I think that, that we don’t have as 

many airplanes anymore to do that now. But somehow we need to 

get back to the point where we can establish and maintain leadership in the critical technologies, and I have mentioned two of them. 

There are more. 

Mr. BERKELEY. I would think that your question might lead to 

geography by geography, starting out with what are the strategic 

advantages that State or that region has? And then, offering some 

predictability for the businesses that are there, and there are two 

aspects to this. 

I am less interested, I think, in grants than I am in revenues. 

You want to have a customer, and so the steps to being a customer 

is having access to having your product evaluated. 

Atlanta’s business community about 15 years ago got together 

and the large companies agreed to allow the small entrepreneurial 

companies that by any normal procurement officer’s approach 

would never have qualified to be a customer of that large company. 

But they agreed to put those small companies through the procurement process and to give them honest evaluations as to where 

their technology stood and why they were going to get the business, 

or why they were not going to get the business. 
27 

So that they had a feedback loop that shortened the period of uncertainty as to whether they had a viable product or not. That was 

very popular with entrepreneurial and venture-backed companies 

in the Atlanta region in that period of time. This is when I was 

working at NASDAQ and I heard about this, because the venture 

capital community brought it into us as a very interesting idea. 

The Government could help with that, not only by asking Government contractors to entertain the look at this product process, 

the procurement process, but also to look at how the Government 

itself has barriers to new companies getting started, because of the 

concept of size, concept of viability. I don’t have—I am just thinking this out in response to your question. 

But I think there is a lot here that doesn’t cost a lot of money, 

it just costs a commitment to giving people a chance to have access 

and then after they have access, if they have got something, some 

acceptance process that may not be in the normal Federal procurement model, but could get a good technology, a customer that 

might ultimately be—— 

Mr. RYAN. And would you say most of those folks in the supply 

chain, or if they are not on the supply chain, then trying to get into 

the supply chain with some of the bigger companies, with a little 

bit of help from the large company, could quickly meet the standards that they would expect a supplier to meet? 

Because I have seen this with other company where a G.E. comes 

in and says, ‘‘We want to buy something from you. You are not 

quite doing it right. Here is how we need you to do it.’’ And within 

a few weeks, they have it retooled. And is that something that 

could be fairly easy to do? 

Mr. BERKELEY. Yes, yes. It is important in the learning cycle by 

having—your shortening the time at risk. Looking at it from an investor’s point of view, you are helping figure out whether there is 

a ‘‘there’’ there to that product. Is there ultimately a chance to be 

somebody’s supplier? 

And I think there is something to this. I mean, your comments 

sparked my mind, that you can reduce risk and reduce time and, 

therefore, reduce capital costs by getting somebody’s product evaluated honestly, quickly. And then if there is something there, help 

them get through this complicated federal procurement process, or 

even the complicated commercial procurement process for large 

companies. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If I could just make one comment, too? I mean a lot of these, the 

labs and the investments, I think I get worried sometimes that the 

national discussion is that there isn’t anything, any investments, 

that the Government makes are good. 

And I think that is the backdrop of the national discussion right 

now. And I think when we are looking at competing with China 

and some of these other countries that are putting a lot of money 

behind a lot of different initiatives, we are playing the short game 

here. We are not playing the long game. And I just get worried. 

So if you can help us say, ‘‘Hey, well, here is some Government 

investment that really had this ripple effect through the economy,’’ 

I think that could be helpful for those of us who were trying to at 

least bring that to the discussion that we are having, nationally. 
28 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis, did you have other—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, just briefly, Mr. Chairman. 

I think that we have really touched on a lot of very important 

issues, and I think just that the title of this hearing—you know, 

looking at the Department of Defense’s investment in technology 

and the capability to meet emerging security threats. Can you correct me if I, you know, I have a sense from this that you would 

not necessarily give us terribly high marks, or the Department of 

Defense, I guess, terribly high marks, for aligning the technology 

investments with real threats today. 

Is that correct? Or it is somewhere in the middle there of how 

those investments that we are making today really align with the 

security threats? 

Mr. BERKELEY. Well, I think it is important to not to ask basic 

research to find a home too early. I do think we have spent a lot 

of time gearing to applied research, because of the conflicts we are 

in, and because of the need to solve a particular new set of problems, IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] for example. 

But I would protect that basic research and fight like that like 

a fierce cornered dog to protect that basic research. And it will not 

have an obvious answer, but you need to task well-meaning, welleducated responsible judgment to make those decisions. It cannot 

be put in a formula. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. And I guess I don’t want to ask you what kind 

of a grade you would give us doing that and protecting that basic 

R&D, because I think over the last few years, I have certainly seen 

where we actually did have to work hard to protect it. And I am 

not sure that in the end we did a fabulous job at it. So—— 

Mr. THOMAS. If I could just pick up on that last comment. I think 

that is absolutely right that you want to cast a very wide net in 

terms of basic science and technology research that you are doing. 

One of the challenges we face, though, is that the program of 

record is so entrenched that programs get stuck in a development 

vortex, and it is wasting taxpayer dollars. 

And it is a lot of these programs that are in development that 

really would very directly address some of the specific sorts of security challenges and emerging threats that we have been talking 

about. 

But the problem is just that it is a zero sum game, and that they 

are going to displace some program which is far more mature, it 

has jobs across a number of congressional districts, and is very 

close to—or is in procurement. And so, how we strike that balance 

in the future will be tricky. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. No, I appreciate that. We know that is difficult 

on a host of different levels. And I think in the past, I know I have 

been interested and I think my colleagues, too, is at what point do 

you necessarily pull the plug on some things that really aren’t developing in the way that they should? And how are those decisions 

made? 

But I think the other issue was really around human capital, and 

the extent to which we are—number one, I think keeping people 

in the military who have phenomenal skills who are going into in-
29 

dustry and we lose them. We may keep them because they are in 

those fields. That is a dilemma at times. 

And the other one is how we use the resources and particularly 

coming out of the Iraq and Afghani wars today are service members who are quite capable of developing further in some of these 

areas. And yet, sometimes I am not sure we capture them and help 

them to do that as best we should. I don’t know if you have any 

other thoughts on that? 

And the other issue that you have talked about certainly is the 

SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] grants, the role that 

they play in terms of helping people to move, you know, through 

a so-called ‘‘Valley of Death’’ to really develop in a way that is important. And we can’t get too far along in that, but I appreciate it 

because you have talked a lot about of those different issues. 

Do you want to comment on—— 

Mr. REED. I was just going comment that the Department in its 

2012 budget request, I think as you are aware, has significantly increased its funding for—or its request for basic research. Now, the 

advanced 6.2, the next stage up, that is down a little bit. And there 

may be reasons for that intrinsically as far as the programs are 

concerned, that they are targeted towards. 

But it is imperative, in my view, and I think the view that this 

committee has had in the past and I think maintains today, to ensure the funding in the basic research programs and in the S&T 

[science and technology] in general. Because you have got to move 

that-through that in order to get what is ultimately going to go into 

development. And you have to make the—provide the wherewithal 

so that there is a bridge across that ‘‘Valley of Death’’ for something to get into development. And we could go on all day about 

that, and I won’t bore you with that. 

But I think the Department has made, at least, as I read the 

budget and both getting ready for this and previously. It is on the 

right track as far as the 6.1 program. And it needs to—we need to 

continue that and taking all of them to the next stage. 

Mr. BERKELEY. Just on the human capital side, I would say that 

I would encourage you to look at a differential incentive. For example, servicemen to go into advanced degrees in the G.I. bill, and 

other approaches. 

I am not so much steering it to STEM necessarily, but I would 

steer it to advanced degrees in an engineering model. 

The other thing that, as an outsider to this process and never 

having read the Quadrennial Defense Review, I am glad you are 

asking the question about basic research. So don’t fail to—just asking the question is important, getting it on the table. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well I think this committee, on a bipartisan 

basis, will continue to, as Mr. Reed said, argue for basic research. 

But I don’t think any of us ought to underestimate the challenges 

of the fiscal environment we are in either. And it will be relatively 

easy to cut and it would be a great mistake, I think, to do so. 

You all have been very helpful, as Mrs. Davis said, lots to think 

about here, and we have just touched the surface. But it is very 

helpful in our deliberations. 
30 

Thank you all for being here. 

And with that, the hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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