UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WENDY WAGNER, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 11-cv-1841 (JEB)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs hereby move this Court, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, for summary judgment and an order permanently enjoining the 

defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) from enforcing 2 U.S.C. § 441c against 

the plaintiffs. A proposed Order is submitted with this motion. Also submitted with this 

Motion is Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, with references to the 

portions of the record that support it, including the portions that were previously 

submitted in support of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. In addition, the 

parties have agreed that Plaintiffs’ Responses to the FEC’s Discovery Requests, the 

FEC’s Responses to Plaintiffs’ Discovery Requests, copies of the current contracts of 

each of the plaintiffs, and the deposition of Steven L. Schooner, all of which either have 

been or will be filed with the Court, may be properly considered by the Court on this 

motion and the cross-motion that the FEC will file.

Case 1:11-cv-01841-JEB Document 30 Filed 07/12/12 Page 1 of 2
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Alan B. Morrison /s/ Arthur B. Spitzer

Alan B. Morrison Arthur B. Spitzer

D. C. Bar No. 073114 D.C. Bar No. 235960

George Washington Law School American Civil Liberties Union of 

2000 H Street NW the Nation’s Capital

Washington D.C. 20052 4301 Connecticut Ave, N.W., 

(202) 994 7120 Suite 434

(202) 994 5157 (fax) Washington, D.C. 20008

abmorrison@law.gwu.edu (202) 457 0800

(202) 452-1868 (fax)

artspitzer@gmail.com

July 12, 2012

Case 1:11-cv-01841-JEB Document 30 Filed 07/12/12 Page 2 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WENDY WAGNER, et al., 

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 11-cv-1841 (JEB)

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant.

PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

 IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Introduction

This memorandum is submitted in support of plaintiffs’ motion for summary 

judgment. It is agreed by the parties that this memorandum and that to be submitted by 

the defendant Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) supplement the prior memoranda of 

the parties submitted in connection with plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. It 

is further agreed that the failure of either party to raise an argument in these summary 

judgment memoranda shall not constitute a waiver of any argument previously raised. In 

addition to the Statement of Material Facts submitted herewith (and the FEC’s response 

to it and any additional properly supported statement by the FEC), either party may rely 

on the declarations previously filed by plaintiffs; the responses of the plaintiffs to the 

Requests for Admission made by the FEC (including their current contracts); the 

Supplement to Responses of Plaintiffs to Requests for Admission; the response of the 

FEC to the Requests for Admission made by the plaintiffs; and the deposition of Steven 

L. Schooner taken on June 12, 2012 (“Schooner Dep.”), all of which are being filed with 

this motion or will be filed by the FEC.

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2

On June 29, 2012, just days before the close of discovery, the FEC filed a 

Supplemental Disclosure to its January 17, 2012 initial disclosures, in which it stated that 

it may rely on “Declarations, Reports, Studies, and other exhibits” filed in three cases that 

it cited there. Plaintiffs have the most serious doubts that the FEC has adequately 

described these documents, as required by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), because in theory they 

could comprise the entire record in three fully litigated cases. From discussions with 

FEC counsel, plaintiffs’ counsel believes that these documents are likely to be used to 

establish legislative facts because they contain information of a kind that courts may 

judicially notice and/or are found in appellate briefs, including those of amici. As so 

limited, we agree that the Court may give them such weight as seems appropriate, and we 

would not interpose an objection to that limited use. However, plaintiffs do object if 

those documents are to be used to establish material facts, or to oppose those facts that 

plaintiffs have designed as material facts not in dispute, because those documents are 

unlikely to be admissible evidence in the record as required by Rule 56(c). 

Before turning to the specific reasons why section 441c is unconstitutional, 

plaintiffs believe that the Court may not be fully aware of the breadth of application of 

section 441c, beyond plaintiffs themselves. Today there are millions of individuals 

providing a wide range of services for the federal government. As of 2003 – and the 

number has grown since then (Schooner Dep. 34-36) – there were in excess of five

million individuals providing services under contract to the federal government. 

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2003/9/05politics%20light/light

20030905.pdf . That number includes manufacturing contracts that create jobs, as well as 

the very large number of corporate contractors that employ individuals who, in turn, 

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3

provide services to the government. According to Professor Schooner (Dep. 45-48), 

individuals working for corporations constitute by far the largest group of individuals 

(FTE equivalents) that provide their services under a federal contract. They comprise the 

first category of service providers described in paragraph 5 of his declaration, but because 

they are employed by the contractor, they are unaffected by section 441c. 

By contrast, plaintiffs Brown and Miller are retired federal employees who have 

returned to their agency as contractors to work alongside of regular federal employees 

under contracts of several years duration. They are paid by their agency on a regular 

basis, just like regular employees, and their taxes are withheld from their paychecks. 

They fall into the second category in Professor Schooner’s declaration (¶ 6) and are, for 

all practical purposes, federal employees except that they have contracts that take them 

out of employee status and civil service protection. Among the many others who fall into 

that category are retired FBI agents who are regularly hired in place of active duty agents, 

to do background checks on those applying for federal employment or who need a federal 

security clearance. Schooner Dep. at 65-66, 88. 

The third Schooner category (described in paragraphs 7 & 8 of his declaration) is 

the more diverse, and as the FEC has admitted in its response to Request for Admission # 

4, it includes individuals who contract in all of the following circumstances and hence are 

subject to section 441c: (a) the individual is hired by an agency, including but not limited 

to the Department of Justice, or by a federal court, to be an expert witness in either 

administrative or court litigation; (b) the individual is an attorney hired to represent the 

United States, a federal agency, officer, or employee, where the Department of Justice 

may have a conflict of interest or in other circumstances authorized by law; (c) the 

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4

individual is hired by the Judicial Conference or another entity within the Judicial Branch 

to be a reporter for one of the Rules Committees or to provide training to judges; (d) the 

individual is hired to provide expert advice to the federal government in law, medicine, 

the hard or social sciences, or in any other area where the government lacks the necessary 

expertise among its officers or employees; and (e) the individual is hired to provide

translation or interpretation services in federal court or at a federal agency proceeding.

There is one other important aspect of the hiring of plaintiffs and many (although 

not all) of the individual contractors who are subject to the ban in section 441c. For most 

large government contracts, there is an open process by which interested persons can 

apply and their applications are assessed according to the terms of the proposal. 

However, contractors like plaintiff Wagner, who is doing a special study for ACUS, and 

Professor Schooner, who has served as an expert witness, a mediator, and a special 

investigator (Dep. 29-30), typically do not apply for a contract or even know that there is 

a contract that will be let (Dep. 27, 130-132). Instead, they are initially approached by an 

agency because the agency has concluded that they are able to fill a particular need of the 

government. 

The situation for plaintiffs Brown and Miller is different but far closer to that of 

plaintiff Wagner and Professor Schooner than to large scale corporate suppliers of 

employers who provide support and other services to federal agencies. Brown and Miller

are former employees of their agency, whose work was well known before they retired. 

They (and the retired FBI agents who now regularly conduct background investigations) 

may have “applied” for their contracts, in the sense that they made their desires known to 

their agency, but the notion that they or anyone else would conceivably think that their 

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5

chances of obtaining a contract would be enhanced at all by making a contribution to 

anyone – let alone to the wide range of entities covered by section 441c – is not 

believable. Indeed, the FEC has offered no evidence of any federal contracts held by 

individuals for which there is anything like a bidding process for major corporate 

contracts, let alone a process that is susceptible to influence because a bidder might have 

made a political contribution.

I. SECTION 441C IS NOT “CLOSELY DRAWN”

 TO MEET ITS ASSERTED PURPOSES.

The Court concluded in connection with the preliminary injunction motion that 

section 441c must be “closely drawn” to satisfy the First Amendment. Plaintiffs agree 

that section 441c must at least meet that standard, but disagree with the Court’s 

conclusion that it does so. 

Initially, plaintiffs note that the Court did not discuss the most recent Supreme 

Court decision on the issue of banning all contributions by a category of individuals,

which is the portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 231-32 

(2003), in which the Court, applying “heightened scrutiny,” held that the federal law that 

banned all contributions by individuals under the age of 18 violated the First 

Amendment. There the FEC posited that parents would make contributions in the names 

of their minor children, using them as “conduits” in an effort to avoid the contribution 

limits applicable to the parents. However, the Court found that concern to be insufficient

to justify any limits on contributions by persons under the age of 18 beyond the $2300 

limit then applicable to all contributors. It did so with almost no need for discussion 

because the law was not close to being “closely drawn” to meet its asserted purposes. Id. 

Like the under-18 ban struck down in McConnell, this case involves a ban, not simply a 

Case 1:11-cv-01841-JEB Document 30-1 Filed 07/12/12 Page 5 of 26
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limit, on all contributions by a specific group of individuals. Therefore, under Federal 

Election Commission v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161-63 (2003), that fact must be taken 

into account when assessing whether section 441c is “closely drawn” to meet its asserted 

goals. Compare Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F. 3d 174, 178-79 (2d Cir), cert. denied, ___ 

S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 950086 (June 25, 2012), where individuals “doing business” with 

New York City were only subject to lower limits on campaign contributions (but not a 

ban like section 441c), and their contributions were not eligible for the 6 to 1 match that 

is available to participating candidates for other contributions of up to $175.1

In this case, the FEC asserts two justifications for section 441c, which precludes

individuals such as plaintiffs from making any contributions to any person or entity in 

connection with federal elections. The first – avoidance of coercion of actual or wouldbe contractors – can be disposed of quite quickly. Initially, there is no reason to believe 

that individuals like plaintiffs need or want any such “protection” from coercion. 

Second, and more significant, coercing another to make a political contribution is already 

a criminal offense as applied to federal employees. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602, 603, 606, 

607 & 610. There is no indication that those laws are ineffective as applied to employees 

or any reason to believe that extending them to individuals who have or are negotiating 

for federal contracts (which section 601 already reaches) would not take care of any 

problem of coercion. At the very least, section 441c is not “closely drawn” to prevent 

coercion and thus cannot be sustained on that basis.

 1

 The fact that children are not allowed to vote is irrelevant because they nonetheless 

have First Amendment rights. The same is true for convicted felons who cannot vote in 

many states, but who are allowed to contribute to candidates for federal office.

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The FEC’s second (and principal) justification for the ban is that it allegedly 

prevents the appearance of corruption that would arise if individuals who had federal 

contracts also made political contributions in connection with federal elections. Plaintiffs 

do not argue that avoiding the appearance of “pay-to-play” is not an important

government interest, which is the applicable standard. See McConnell at 231. Nor do 

they dispute that it is possible that a Member of Congress, the President, or a political 

appointee might attempt to influence the award of a federal contract, although the 

likelihood of that happening for contracts for individuals, as contrasted with major 

corporations, is, in plaintiffs’ view, extremely small. As the response of plaintiff Brown 

to the FEC’s Interrogatory No. 2 makes clear, the process by which contracts are awarded 

to individuals at USAID is designed to preclude improper outside influence, and 

generally succeeds in doing so. Similarly, Professor Schooner in his deposition (24-28, 

52-53, 54, 56-60, 110-115, & 133-37) confirms that the special qualifications and the 

independence of the contracting officers at all agencies are vital parts of the contracting 

process. See Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 4 & 14 and record 

citations therein. The FEC has offered no evidence that the contrary is true, but only 

speculation that Members of Congress and the President (acting through his political 

appointees) might at some time try to influence some federal contracts based on making, 

or failing to make, a political contribution. And even then, it has offered no actual 

examples of that occurring for contracts such as those held by plaintiffs. In short, there is 

no basis on which to conclude that a reasonable person, who understands how federal 

contracts are let, would conclude that allowing plaintiffs to make the same kinds and 

Case 1:11-cv-01841-JEB Document 30-1 Filed 07/12/12 Page 7 of 26
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amounts of contributions that every other individual is permitted to make would create an 

appearance of corruption.

Moreover, section 441c is not “closely drawn” enough to satisfy the First 

Amendment for three additional sets of reasons: (1) it applies to many contributions to 

various categories of recipients that could not reasonably, or even possibly, give rise to 

the appearances sought to be avoided; (2) the ban could readily be modified to 

substantially reduce the harm to plaintiffs without increasing in any meaningful respect 

the prospect of creating an appearance of corruption; and (3) the ban is significantly 

under-inclusive by omitting from its coverage very similar kinds of transactions by 

individuals who are not federal contractors, where there are similar if not greater 

prospects of creating an appearance of corruption (beyond those discussed in plaintiffs’

Equal Protection claim below). We deal with each in turn and urge the Court to evaluate 

the likelihood of an appearance of “pay to play” from each of them.2

(1) As we have established (Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 

4, 14), federal contracts are negotiated, approved and implemented at the agency level, 

with no role for the President or any Member of Congress. As a result, the possibility 

that either the President, a person appointed by the President, or a Member of Congress 

might attempt to influence the award of a contract to an individual is so remote that it 

cannot satisfy the First Amendment. By contrast, the “pay-to-play” rule upheld in Blount 

 2

 The Court in McConnell found the ban on contributions by minors to be overinclusive, 

which is another way of saying that it is not closely drawn: “The States have adopted a 

variety of more tailored approaches— e.g., counting contributions by minors against the 

total permitted for a parent or family unit, imposing a lower cap on contributions by 

minors, and prohibiting contributions by very young children. Without deciding whether 

any of these alternatives is sufficiently tailored, we hold that the provision here sweeps 

too broadly.” 541 U.S. at 232.

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v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1995), applied only to the state officials from 

whom the contributors obtained business. See also the branch-specific law at issue in 

Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, 616 F. 3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2010). Even if all of 

the elected officials covered by section 441c had comparable contracting authority to 

those covered by the rules in Blount and Green Party, the ban in section 441c extends far 

beyond actual officeholders and includes the following categories of contribution 

recipients, none of whom is in a position to influence the award of a federal contract:

(A) Political parties, especially the party whose leader does not currently 

occupy the Office of the President. The Court in Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 627 

(Col. 2010), set aside the law in part because it applied to contributions to political parties 

and to all candidates for office, regardless of their connection to the contributor’s actual 

or potential contract. 

(B) A “minor party” or a “new party, as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 9002 (7) 

& (8), candidates of a minor or new party, and political committees supporting candidates 

of a minor or new party.

(C) Political committees that are independent of any party or candidate, 

such as Emily’s List, the various Right to Life Committees, political committees of trade 

associations and labor unions, and ideological organizations such as the Sierra Club and 

the National Rifle Association. North Carolina’s ban on contribution by lobbyists allows 

them to make contributions of up to $4000 (N.C. Stat. 163-278.13(a)) to political 

committees and even allows them to suggest to whom the contribution should be made. 

Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 739 (4th Cir. 2011). 

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(D) Candidates for Congress or for President who are not incumbents, 

including those who had already been defeated at the time that the contribution was 

made.

(E) Members of Congress who are not in a leadership position or on a 

committee with either substantive or appropriations jurisdiction over the subject of the 

federal contract that the individual is seeking or already has.

(2) The second way in which section 441c is not “closely drawn” is that the ban 

could be relaxed in at least some of the various ways set forth below that would still 

provide meaningful protection against the appearance of improper “pay-to-play.” 

(A) Exclude individuals such as plaintiffs Brown and Miller who are the 

functional equivalent of federal employees (to whom section 441c does not apply). As 

far as plaintiffs have been able to determine, laws banning or limiting contributions by 

contractors applicable to state and local contracts do not include individuals who are in a 

status similar to plaintiffs Brown and Miller. 

(B) Exclude smaller contracts, such as plaintiff Wagner’s $12,000 

contract, from the ban. For example, the Connecticut law at issue in Green Party

contains an exception for contracts under $50,000, or a series of contracts under $100,000 

in a given year. C.G.S.A. § 9-612(g)(1)(C). Similarly, the New York City law at issue in 

Ognibene applied only to contracts of at least $100,000, 671 F.3d at 180, as did the law at 

issue in Dallman, 225 P.3d at 618. No reasonable person would believe that anyone 

would make a contribution of any amount in order to obtain a contract of the size of 

Wagner’s. Under federal law, small contract are excluded from competitive bidding 

Case 1:11-cv-01841-JEB Document 30-1 Filed 07/12/12 Page 10 of 26
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(Schooner Dep. 107-108, 142-143), with no evidence that those contracts are any more 

subject to improper influence than any other contract.

(C) Allow individual contractors to make modest size contributions as the 

SEC did with its exclusion of up to $250. Blount, supra, at 948. The concept of small 

contribution exclusions is already a feature of federal election law under which only 

contributions totaling more than $200 in an election cycle have to be reported to the FEC 

and the name of the contributor publicly disclosed. No reasonable person would believe 

that anyone would make a contribution of $200 or less in order to obtain a federal 

contract, even assuming that the identity of the contributor were made known to the 

recipient.

(D) Attack the problem of “pay-to-play” from the contract side and not 

ban contributions. This is what the SEC does: its “pay-to-play” rule only forbids entering 

into contracts within a period of time (two years) after making of a disqualifying 

contribution. Blount, supra, at 939-40. Under such a rule, once an individual signed a 

contract with a federal agency, he or she could make contributions, unless the individual 

wanted to obtain other contracts within the time period covered by the ban.

(E) Exclude contracts that are entered into by a process of open 

competitive bids, as the SEC did in Blount, supra, at 940 n.1, because that process is 

designed to eliminate the possibility of the kind of favoritism that “pay-to-play” might 

undermine.

(F) Exclude sole source contracts because the requirements to enter them 

are sufficiently rigorous that they provide reasonable assurances of eliminating the 

possibility of the kind of favoritism that “pay-to-play” might undermine. As Professor 

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Schooner testified (Dep. 27, 130-132, 139-140), in many such cases the government 

initiates the contact with an individual to be an expert (like plaintiff Wagner), a mediator

(where a private party must also consent and pay, Dep.127, 132), or an investigator for 

the agency, and the individual does not even know that there is a possible contract under 

consideration. In such cases the notion that a political contribution even to a candidate 

for President, let alone to independent political committees, would influence the selection 

of a contractor is beyond fanciful.

Plaintiffs recognize that the FEC’s responses to their Requests for Admission took 

the position that each of the situations discussed in parts (1) & (2) above could give rise 

to the appearance of corruption, as could a ban on contributions by all registered 

lobbyists (Response to Request 35), and that, accordingly, Congress’s failure to create 

exceptions for them does not make section 441c over-inclusive. The FEC’s 

unwillingness to recognize section 441c’s over-inclusiveness further demonstrates how 

extreme the FEC’s position is and how far its understanding falls short of recognizing 

what satisfies the “closely drawn” test applicable to section 441c.

(3) Section 441c is also under-inclusive in a number of ways, which suggests that 

the actual purpose of the law is not to prevent the kind of “pay-to-play” rationale that the 

FEC suggests. Indeed, the legislative history of section 441c shows that in 1940, when it 

was passed, its supporters relied on the now-discredited approach of Justice Holmes, 

under which someone seeking government employment was treated as seeking a 

privilege to which Congress could attach any conditions.3 As plaintiffs observed in their 

 3

 Remarks of Senator Hatch (sponsor of the Bill) quoting Holmes, 86 Cong. Rec. 2563 

(March 8, 1940): “There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute to prevent 

the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a condition to the office of

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reply memorandum on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the notion that individuals 

who “choose” to become federal contractors thereby surrender their constitutional rights 

cannot be sustained because the Supreme Court’s “precedents have long since rejected 

Justice Holmes’ famous dictum” quoted in note 3, supra. Board of County 

Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996). 

On the under-inclusion side, there are a number of potential “pay-to-play” 

situations that are not covered by section 441c, but in all material respects are subject to 

the same arguable potential for the appearance of corruption from making a contribution, 

as the FEC admits in its response to Plaintiffs’ Requests 24-27:

(A) Federal grants, such as the one that plaintiff Wagner has in an amount 

nearly four times the amount of her federal contract. Wagner Dec. ¶ 4. By contrast, the 

New York City law at issue in Ognibene applied only to grants in excess of $100,000,

671 F. 3d at 180, and while the Connecticut law in Green Party included grants, loans, 

and loan guarantees, it applied the same small-size exemption as applied to contracts.

C.G.S.A. § 9-612(g)(1)(C)(vi). According to one study completed in 2003, there were 

nearly 3 million individuals providing services pursuant to federal grants. 

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2003/9/05politics%20light/light

20030905.pdf. Professor Schooner testified that the government gives away more money 

in grants in most years than it expends for contracts (Dep. 38-39), yet only contracts are

 

policeman and making it part of the good conduct required. The petitioner may 

have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be

a policeman.” See also id. at 2623 (March 11, 1940) colloquy between Senators 

Hatch and Pepper relying on Holmes, pointing out that employees “have the right 

to express their opinions on all political subjects,” and observing that if there is a 

curtailment of freedom of speech by the Hatch Act, it is a “constitutional 

curtailment” because there is a “waiver of his rights when he accepts the 

conditions attached to his employment” and, plaintiffs would add, his contract.

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covered by section 441c. He also explained that the protections against improper 

influence under federal contracting law (Dep. 72-73, 136, 141-142) are inapplicable to 

federal grants (Dep. 40-42).

(B) Federal loans and federal guarantees, which can be in very large 

amounts. Those include loans and guarantees for homes given by the VA or FHA, as 

well as “small business” and “economic injury disaster loans,” both of which can be as 

much as $2 million.4 Moreover, “business and industrial loans” can be as large as $40 

million.

5

(C) Admission, tuition free, to one of the four United States Military

Academies. Applicants need a recommendation from a Member of Congress or the 

President, and their parents may lawfully contribute to them or their party while a request 

for a recommendation is pending. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 6954(a); United States Naval 

Academy, http://www.usna.edu/Admissions/steps4.htm.

6

(D) Individuals who make contributions to a presidential candidate and to 

the candidate’s party up to the limits allowed by law, who assist the campaign by 

collecting contributions from others, and who hope to be are rewarded with government

 4 http://www.govloans.gov/loans/loan-details/1497; http://www.govloans.gov/loans/loandetails/1504. 

5 http://www.govloans.gov/loans/loan-details/4735. 

6

 A similar opportunity for contributions to influence discretionary decisions involves 

Presidential pardons, for which letters from Members of Congress can be persuasive. See

http://www.propublica.org/article/pardon-attorney-torpedoes-plea-for-presidential-mercy

(citing support of Senator Dick Durbin to obtain only Obama commutation). Thus, there 

are real incentives for individuals with pardon matters to make generous contributions, as 

the case of Marc Rich and President Clinton illustrates, yet no ban like 441c applies in 

that situation. http://www.propublica.org/article/the-shadow-of-marc-rich. 

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positions, including coveted ambassadorships. See, e.g., Washington Post, March 8, 2012 

(A-15) “Obama Gives Administration Jobs to Some Big Fundraisers.” 

The FEC responds by pointing out that plaintiffs and other individual contractors 

can still hold fundraisers and solicit contributions for candidates and political parties 

because such voluntary activity is excluded from the definition of contribution by 2 

U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(i). That argument is flawed for several reasons. First, it is the right 

of the individual, not the government, to choose how she or he wishes to exercise his or 

her First Amendment rights, which means, in this context, deciding how to express his or 

her political preferences. Some individuals may prefer to give money, while others may 

prefer to donate their time, but absent some exceptional justification, it is not the role of 

government to decide how individuals exercise their First Amendment rights.7 

Second, the purported reason for the ban in section 441c is that allowing 

contractors to contribute might give the appearance that they obtain their contracts 

because of those contributions. But if making a contribution of $100 to a political 

committee that has no connection to a candidate or political party can be banned by 

section 441c on the “pay-to-play” theory, it makes no sense to allow individual 

contractors to raise tens of thousands of dollars (if not more) by bundling contributions 

from others for a candidate for President or Congress, as section 441c permits. 

 7

 The FEC makes a similar argument in the Equal Protection context, which this Court 

embraced. Preliminary Injunction Opinion (“P.I. Opinion”) at 24. Federal employees 

may not engage in soliciting contributions for federal elections, and so, according to the 

FEC, plaintiffs are better off in this respect than are federal employees, even though they 

are worse off because of section 441c. Plaintiffs are unaware of any authority that allows 

the government to require individuals to trade one First Amendment right for another in 

order to avoid Equal Protection flaws in a statutory scheme. Each restriction must be 

independently justified, and permission to speak in one manner cannot be used to offset a 

ban of another when the First Amendment is involved.

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Although the ban on contributions by individuals who are federal contractors has 

been in effect since 1940, and although Congress began imposing contribution limitations 

on individuals in 1971, Congress has never once debated any amendment that would be 

in any way responsive to the vastly over- and under- inclusiveness of section 441c. To be 

sure, the Court first applied the First Amendment to campaign contributions in Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), but since then it has been clear that the ability to contribute 

money to political campaigns is not a privilege and requires careful attention to assure 

compliance with the Constitution. Congress has also amended the Hatch Act, of which 

section 441c was a part when it was enacted, to remove or modify certain restrictions 

applicable to federal employees but, so far as we can determine, it has never considered

whether the ban in section 441c applicable to individuals such as plaintiffs could be 

loosened, or whether these closely analogous areas ought not to be brought within the 

same “pay-to-play” prohibition. The rough justice approach to the ban on contributions 

urged by the FEC here might be sustained if this were purely economic legislation, see

Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073 (2012), but it is not. The ban on 

contributions by individual federal contractors in section 441c is a direct assault on First 

Amendment rights, and like the ban on contributions by individuals under the age of 18 

in McConnell, supra, it fails to satisfy the requirement that such bans be “closely drawn” 

to meet the purposes behind the law. Accordingly, plaintiffs cannot be limited in making 

contributions in connection with federal elections except by laws that apply to all other 

individual American citizens.8

 8

 In its Discovery Requests to plaintiffs, the FEC used two terms in ways that might cause 

confusion to the Court regarding the scope of the legitimate concerns at which section 

441c might be directed. First, although the only federal officials who are elected are the 

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II. SECTION 441C ALSO VIOLATES

 EQUAL PROTECTION.

In analyzing plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim, the Court properly rejected the 

FEC’s contention that the Court should apply rational basis, but instead applied an 

intermediate form of scrutiny. P.I. Opinion at 20-22. Because the FEC defended the 

discriminatory treatment of individual contractors vis-à-vis federal employees and 

corporate contractors (and in particular their PACs, officers, directors, and shareholders)

only under rational basis, it has, in effect, conceded that it could not justify the 

discrimination under any higher standard. The Court nonetheless reviewed the 

differences and rejected plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim. In doing so, the Court 

apparently overlooked or misapprehended certain of plaintiffs’ contentions, and it is on 

those aspects of Equal Protection that this memorandum will focus.

Equal Protection claims are not analyzed in a vacuum. Rather, they arise in the 

context of specific laws that have specific goals. For example, in Kramer v. Union Free 

School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), the Equal Protection issue was the validity 

of the law that denied the plaintiff the right to vote in a school board election, and in Bush 

v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), the issue was whether the method chosen for a recount was 

proper in light of the goal of producing an accurate vote for President. In this case, the 

 

President, Vice-President, and Members of Congress, the FEC asked about the role of 

political appointees in the contracting process. Its definition included not only persons 

appointed by the President, but also persons whom those appointees in turn appointed. 

Second, its inquiries used the term “influence” in connection with the awarding of 

contracts, without defining the term, and without indicating whether such influence was 

proper (because, for example, a person made a recommendation based on actual 

knowledge of the potential contractor’s qualifications) or improper (because the potential 

contractor was the member of a political party). These problems are more fully discussed 

in the April 30, 2012, Supplement to Responses of Plaintiffs to Requests for Admission 

that is filed with the Court.

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issue is not whether individuals like plaintiffs are similar in all respects to federal 

employees or to federal corporate contractors and their PACS, their officers, and their 

shareholders, but whether they are similarly situated and treated comparably with respect 

to the asserted goals of section 441c: to prevent coercion of contributions and to limit the 

appearance of corruption by avoiding situations that might give rise to an inference that 

contracts were given as rewards for contributions to federal elections by persons in 

positions to influence the awards of federal contracts or, in the case of federal employees, 

employment decisions such as raises, promotions, job locations, and other conditions of 

federal employment. We do not understand the FEC to argue (or the Court to have 

found) that the avoidance of coercion rationale is different for plaintiffs than for the 

others, and so we will focus on the avoidance of the appearance of “pay-to-play” to 

determine whether that rationale can support the very unequal treatment of plaintiffs.

Because both corporate contractors and individual contractors are subject to 

section 441c, we begin our Equal Protection analysis by acknowledging that section 441c 

does not facially discriminate between corporate and individual contractors: both are 

subject to the ban. However, whereas individuals have no means by which to accomplish 

their goal of making political contributions, there is a direct and easy path for 

corporations to do that. Subsection (b) of section 441c specifically authorizes a 

corporation to set up a separate segregated fund (PAC), for which the corporation may

pay administrative and fundraising expenses despite the general ban in subsection (a). 

That fund can make any contribution that any other PAC can make, using funds that are 

solicited from the corporation’s officers, directors, and shareholders – i.e., the individuals 

with the greatest stake in the corporation. Section 432(e)(5) requires that the separate 

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fund bear the name of the sponsoring corporation, and there is no requirement that 

anyone outside the corporation manage the sponsored PAC. However, the separate fund 

route is not available to individuals, as subsection (b) does not mention them. In 

addition, the FEC has made clear in Advisory Opinion 2008-11 (Exhibit B to the Brown

declaration) and in 11 CFR § 115.5 that the ban on individual contractor contributions 

applies not only to money earned under a federal contract, but includes any funds owned 

by the individual, regardless of when or how acquired, for as long as that individual holds 

a federal contract or is negotiating for one.

Plaintiffs recognize, as this Court observed (P.I. Opinion at 25), that a corporation 

that has the federal contract and the PAC that it has established are separate legal entities. 

However, the question in this context is whether an appearance of corruption based on 

“pay-to-play” would be any different if the contribution came from the PAC (as is 

allowed) or from the contractor-sponsor, which is forbidden. In our view, no person with 

knowledge of the facts would perceive a contribution to a federal candidate from The 

Boeing Company PAC to be any different from a “pay-to-play” perspective than if it 

came from The Boeing Company itself. In effect, allowing a corporate contractor to 

accomplish through its PAC what it cannot do directly, while denying plaintiffs a 

comparable opportunity, is inconsistent with the majority’s rationale in Citizens United v. 

FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), which held that corporations and individuals have equal 

rights to make independent expenditures. And it is even more inconsistent with the 

positions of the FEC and the dissent in Citizens United, under which corporations could 

be treated less favorably than individuals. Treating corporations the same as individuals 

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under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause is one thing, but giving them 

better treatment, as section 441c does, is quite another.

 The same Equal Protection problem exists, although perhaps to a slightly lesser 

degree, if the contribution came, for example, from the Chairman of The Boeing

Company, the Director of Government Relations, or the Director of the Division that sells 

airplanes to the Pentagon, rather than The Boeing PAC. The FEC recognizes (correctly 

in our view) that section 441c does not apply to an individual officer, director, 

shareholder, or employee of any corporate contractor, even though it applies to 

individuals such as plaintiffs. Indeed, the FEC concedes that if plaintiff Wagner had 

chosen to spend the time and money to establish an LLC (or whatever the form of a 

personal service corporation exists in her home state), and her same contract were 

between ACUS and that corporation, she could make any contribution permitted by any 

individual – even if she were the sole officer, shareholder, director, and employee of her 

LLC. To be sure, as the Court observed (P.I. Opinion at 25), those contributions are not 

made as officials of the corporate contractor, but the plaintiffs would likewise be 

contributing as individuals, not as government contractors, if section 441c allowed them

to do so. Accordingly, from the only perspective that is relevant to this Equal Protection 

challenge – are plaintiffs being treated equally as compared to corporate contractors and 

their officers, directors, shareholders, and employees in terms of avoiding the appearance 

of “pay-to-play” from the making of political contributions – the answer must be “No.”

The comparison for Equal Protection purposes regarding federal employees is 

different, but the outcome should be the same. Plaintiffs and federal employees all 

regularly work for the federal government, often alongside of one another, doing identical 

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or nearly identical work, for which the government regularly pays them and withholds

taxes. Unlike section 441c which is applicable to plaintiffs, there is no law forbidding 

federal employees from making political contributions to any proper recipient, although 

18 U.S.C. § 603 does preclude federal employees from delivering their contribution to 

their superiors, which is designed to prevent coercion and has nothing to do with “pay-toplay” in any of its incarnations. In fact, applicable federal regulations are clear that, 

despite other restrictions on political activities by employees, making contributions is 

perfectly legal: “An employee may make a political contribution to a political party, 

political group, campaign committee of a candidate for public office in a partisan election 

and multicandidate political committee of a Federal labor or Federal employee 

organization.” 5 C.F.R. § 734.208(a). Indeed, even employees of the FEC, including the 

lawyers who are defending it in this case, can freely make contributions in amounts as 

great as any other citizen, although they (but not the FEC commissioners) may not 

“receive from or give” a contribution to “an employee, a Member of Congress, or an 

officer of a uniformed service.” 5 C.F.R. § 734.413. Although not entirely clear, the use 

of the term “give,” as well as the phrase “receive from,” appear to be solely a limit on 

physical and other forms of delivery, and do not preclude federal employees from 

financially supporting a Member of Congress so long as the contribution is made through 

a means such as the Internet or the mail, so that the Member would never see or touch it. 

But even if section 734.413 banned contributions to Members of Congress, FEC 

employees could still give to challengers, candidates for President, political parties, and 

political committees, all of which are out of bounds for plaintiffs.

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The problem of coercion by superiors was very much on the mind of Senator Carl 

Hatch, the sponsor of the 1940 bill that included the predecessor of section 441c, as well 

as his colleagues, yet that concern cannot support the differing treatment of federal 

employees and individual federal contractors like plaintiffs. The main purpose of the bill 

was to extend the prohibitions against political activities contained in the 1939 Hatch Act 

that covered only federal employees to include state employees funded with federal 

dollars. The debates are replete with examples of state employees being required to 

contribute to political campaigns as a condition of retaining their jobs. See e.g., 86 Cong. 

Rec. 2433, 2567-69, 2574, 2579, 2625 & 2626 (1940). The Senators also recognized 

that existing law at the time (now 18 U.S.C. § 603) prohibited solicitation and receipt of 

contributions by a superior federal official (and some others), id. at 2559-61, 2575, but 

neither the 1939 law applicable to federal employees, nor the 1940 state employee

extension, banned employees from making contributions entirely, so long as they were 

voluntary. Id. at 2576, 2623. Yet when it came to federal contractors, who were far less 

at the mercy of those who sought their political contributions than were the state 

employees protected by the 1940 extension, Congress enacted a total contribution ban, 

almost certainly because, as shown on pages 12-13, supra, it believed that a person 

accepting federal dollars as an employee or a federal contractor had no right to object to 

any conditions imposed, including a waiver of First Amendment rights. For these 

reasons, the anti-coercion measures enacted to protect vulnerable government employees 

were surely sufficient to protect federal contractors like plaintiffs, and yet Congress went 

much further in limiting their First Amendment rights.

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The remaining question is whether there is some other justification applicable to 

plaintiffs that is not also applicable to federal employees generally. Plaintiffs recognize 

that most, but not all, federal employees have civil service protections that are significant 

safeguards against arbitrary action by their agencies. But federal contractors are not 

simply subject to the whims of agency officials; they have contractual and statutory rights

that provide protections and guard against arbitrary agency action (Schooner Dep. 72-73, 

136, 141-42), as well as the Due Process Clause. Given those protections, section 441c 

can not reasonably be justified on the ground that it is needed to prevent early and 

perhaps unlawful termination of federal contracts, any more than a ban on federal 

employee contributions could be justified on that rationale.

As we understand the FEC’s argument, it is that the ban is intended to prevent the 

appearance of corruption that would arise if individual contractors were to make 

contributions in order enhance their chances of being awarded future contracts (or 

renewals of existing contracts). Because federal employees do not need new contracts or 

renewals, the FEC argues, they would have nothing to gain from making contributions or 

lose from not making them, which makes the situations not comparable. This argument 

overlooks the fact that federal employees are not in a static situation. Almost all of them 

would like to have pay raises, obtain promotions, or at least receive good annual 

evaluations by their superiors. There are also some locations that are more desirable than 

others, and within a given office, there are better and worse jobs, in terms of quality of 

work, the hours during the day when the employee must be present, the availability of 

flextime, the identity of the supervisor, and the ability to enhance one’s experience as a 

means of advancing in the future. And in contrast to contractors like plaintiff Wagner, 

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for whom the ACUS work is only part time and for a limited duration, or like plaintiffs 

Miller and Brown, who are retired employees for whom their contract work supplements 

their retirement, full time federal employees have a great deal to gain or lose even if their 

“contracts” cannot readily be terminated. Thus, to the extent that they too have 

incentives to please (or not displease) their supervisors by making “appropriate” political 

contributions, they are just like individual contractors, especially those like plaintiffs 

Brown and Miller who literally work along side of, supervise, or are supervised by 

federal employees. We do not argue that the situations are identical, but under the 

heightened standard of review that this Court has concluded applies to this Equal 

Protection challenge, they are sufficiently close that the FEC must supply a far greater 

justification than it has to date to explain why the Constitution permits Congress to forbid 

plaintiffs from making contributions in federal elections, but does not apply a similar ban 

to federal employees.

Finally, this Court suggested (P.I. Opinion at 23) that Congress had made a 

“reasonable legislative judgment” that the contribution limits applicable to all 

individuals, including federal employees, were not adequate to protect the federal interest 

allegedly advanced by the ban in section 441c applicable to individual federal 

contractors. The difficulty with that assertion is that it assumes that Congress actually 

considered the issue in that way, but there is nothing to support that hypothesis. 

Congress imposed the ban on individual contributions in section 441c in 1940, and the 

only changes to that provision since then made it easier for corporations to make 

contributions, through their PACs. Even when Congress implemented the current 

contribution system in 1971, and imposed contributions limits on all individuals, it never 

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considered making those limits applicable to individual contractors. And when it 

loosened restrictions in the Hatch Act after 1940, there is no indication that it ever 

considered loosening or eliminating the ban in section 441c applicable to plaintiffs and 

others. In short, even if a considered legislative judgment could overcome the kind of 

First Amendment and Equal Protection problems that exist here, the relation of section 

441c to the lack of restrictions on the making of contributions by federal employees and 

by PACs, officers, directors and shareholders of corporate contractors is entirely one of 

happenstance that has never been considered, let alone reconsidered in light of other 

directly relative changes in campaign finance law since the ban applicable to plaintiffs 

was enacted in 1940. See Miller v. Alabama, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2012 WL 2368659 at *14 -

*15 (June 25, 2012) (when mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole 

for juveniles resulted from the interaction of separate statutes enacted at different times, 

“it [is] impossible to say whether a legislature had endorsed a given penalty for children 

(or would do so if presented with the choice).” Id. at *15).

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in plaintiffs’ prior submissions, the 

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be granted. Therefore, the Court should 

enter an order declaring that 2 U.S.C. § 441c as applied to plaintiffs violates the First 

Amendment and the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment and enjoining 

defendant from enforcing section 441c against plaintiffs.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Alan B. Morrison /s/ Arthur B. Spitzer

Alan B. Morrison Arthur B. Spitzer

D. C. Bar No. 073114 D.C. Bar No. 235960

George Washington Law School American Civil Liberties Union of 

2000 H Street NW the Nation’s Capital

Washington D.C. 20052 4301 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 434

(202) 994 7120 Washington, D.C. 20008

(202) 994 5157 (fax) (202) 457-0800

abmorrison@law.gwu.edu (202) 457-0805

artspitzer@gmail.com

July 12, 2012

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