U

C

O

U.S. Marines In Iraq, 2003: COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Mihocko
Cover: Motor transport drivers navigate in full

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture clothing

and masks. (USMC Photo)
U.S. MARINES IN IRAQ, 2003

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

DURING OPERATION

IRAQI FREEDOM

U.S. Marines in the

Global War on Terrorism

by

Lieutenant Colonel Melissa D. Mihocko

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2011
Other Publications in the Series

U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond

Det One: U.S. Marine Corps U.S. Special Operations Command

Detachment, 2003–2006

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2005: Into the Fray

PCN 106 0000 8000

ii
iii

Foreword

The story of combat service support during Operation Iraqi Freedom–I is one that could have been easily

overlooked by history, except what would have been lost is more than a simple tale of Marines performing

exceptionally during a time of war. Lost would have been a recollection of historical firsts, an account of extraordinary vision and insight from some of the Marine Corps’ top leaders, and a chronicle of miracles performed in the heat of battle by individuals who rarely receive the glory and praise of their front-line combat

counterparts. This monograph tells the story of the Marines and sailors from 1st Force Service Support Group

and 2d Force Service Support Group, whose combined efforts helped pave the way for the Marine Corps’ success during Operation Iraqi Freedom–I. 

The author, Lieutenant Colonel Melissa D. Mihocko, is a supply officer who has served as a field historian

with the History Division since 2002. Before this service, LtCol Mihocko was assigned to 4th Civil Affairs

Group and deployed twice to the Balkans and once during a MEU’s Mediterranean deployment. In 2003, just

months after joining the detachment, she mobilized and deployed as a field historian in support of Operation

Iraqi Freedom. Between February and May of that year, LtCol Mihocko was assigned to 1st Force Service Support Group and traveled to Kuwait and Iraq to collect more than 130 oral history interviews, along with documents, artifacts, and photos. More important, however, she gained a firsthand look at the Marines Corps’

combat service support in action. Following her deployment, she remained on active duty and mobilized again

to work on this monograph. 

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History
v

Preface

It is never easy to honor and recognize Marines and sailors for simply doing their jobs, even when those

jobs are performed in an exemplary manner. And when those jobs span a wide spectrum of distinct combat

support specialties, they are often overshadowed by the stories of frontline combat troops. Combat service support Marines are not the traditional “trigger-pullers;” they are the ones who help pave the path for successful

Marine Corps operations. They are the ones pushing fuel through a hose across 60 miles of battlefield, building bridges under fire to allow the infantry to fight through to Baghdad, supplying ammunition throughout

the night to support a barrage of U.S. artillery fire, turning wrenches in sweltering heat to ensure vehicles and

equipment are combat ready, purifying water from a polluted canal, and providing rations to sustain combat

troops. 

Behind the historical firsts and monumental feats stand leaders and individuals who exercised a level of innovation and ingenuity that merit both recognition and praise. The goal of this monograph is to honor those

combat service support Marines and sailors who selflessly performed their jobs, and doing so in such an extraordinary manner, ensured the success of the Marine Corps during Operation Iraqi Freedom–I. This monograph represents an operational history developed from a collection of oral history interviews and perspectives

on the ground from a wide range of resources. It is not an official history, but rather a segment of a story that

will be written and told for many years to come of Marine Corps operations during the Global War on Terrorism. This monograph covers the combat service support operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom–I between November 2002 and October 2003. The main characters are 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups

(FSSGs), and in its eight chapters, the manuscript tells a story of reorganization, preparation, and execution.

For me, this project began in early 2003, when I was assigned as a field historian to 1st Force Service Support Group. As a fairly inexperienced field historian, I quickly realized that my assignment depended less on

formal training and advanced history degrees than it did on my own adaptability, flexibility, and capacity to

listen. I interviewed Marines and sailors from lance corporal to commanding general, and each interview was

different. Some would answer the question at hand and only the question at hand, offering no further details

unless specifically asked. Others would respond to the question and continue to elaborate freely, often moving into new topics. Each interview though—including those collected by my colleagues from other logistics

units—provided a piece of the overall story. Each personal account added texture and color to the narrative

pieced together from command chronologies, unit reports, and operational summaries. After demobilizing

and letting the proverbial dust settle, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to write the History Division’s

monograph on combat service support during OIF-I. Thus began my long journey of mobilizations, research,

writing, editing, more research, and more writing. During the past five years since my last demobilization, I

have continued writing and editing, with tremendous help throughout the review and editing process.

There are so many individuals without whom I’d never have been able to complete this monograph. First

and foremost, I would like to thank my fellow Marines in the Marine Corps History Division Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Detachment, who allowed me the opportunity, not only to join the IMA unit, but

to go forward and collect history in the field: retired Colonel Nicholas Reynolds, a real mentor to me, both in

his brilliant writing and his humble leadership style; retired Colonel David Watters, who recruited me into the

History Division and was a constant source of motivation; Colonel Michael Visconage, whose sense of humor

and Starbuck’s frappaccino from the air wing went a long way in dry sweltering desert heat; retired Colonel

Reed Bonadonna, who captured the soul of Task Force Tarawa’s struggles and heartache through his interviews and historian’s journal; and Chief Warrant Officer–3 William Hutson, an intelligent and humble individual

who conducted interviews with Marines from 2d Marine Logistics Command, thereby providing the building

blocks to their story as part of this monograph. 

My experience with 1st Force Service Support Group was marked with support, cooperation, and enthusiasm for my mission as a field historian. Now-retired Major General Edward Usher allowed me access to his
vi

staff, his battalions, and his organization as a whole, clearly articulating the challenges they faced at every phase

of the fight. Notably, Major General Darrell Moore, retired Colonel John Sweeney, Major General Tracy (Mork)

Garrett, all battalion commanding officers, and group staff were instrumental in my collection efforts. Colonel

Adrian Burke, a veteran of the first Gulf War, was a key architect in the reorganization of 1st FSSG to its battlefield configuration, and he also took over command of CSSB-12 just prior to the start of the war. He provided a great deal of insight into 1st FSSG’s transformation. Colonel Niel Nelson, commander of an engineer

battalion who accomplished significant bridging feats during OIF-I, provided key information during the research and writing phase of this project. LtCol John Cassady, the mortuary affairs officer-in-charge, afforded

me the opportunity to witness firsthand the care and reverence he and his Marines took in processing each

and every fallen Marine. I’d like to thank the liaison officers of 1st FSSG, Lieutnant Colonel (retired) Valerie

Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Miller, and Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Tom Leonard, who helped me maintain my sanity in the desert. I would also like to thank Master Sergeant (retired) Edward Kniery, combat cameraman, who deployed with me and captured the majority of photographs in this monograph. 

During my second period of mobilization, I was afforded the opportunity to work offsite, and I’d like to

extend my appreciation to Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Kirchner and his staff at MACS-24 in Virginia Beach, Virginia for graciously providing me with office space and administrative support while I researched and wrote

the initial draft of this manuscript. In the early editing phase, several individuals generously lent their time to

review and edit numerous drafts of my manuscript: Colonel Nathan Lowrey, Colonel Kurtis Wheeler, Lieutenant

Colonel Valerie Jackson, and Gunnery Sergeant Brad Wineman. At the Marine Corps History Division, I would

like to express my appreciation to several individuals, without whom this monograph would never have happened: the late Colonel John W. Ripley, the former director of the History Division; Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer,

the current director; and Charles Melson, the division’s chief historian. I would also like to thank the outstanding editing and design staff led by Kenneth Williams, to include Wanda Renfrow, Jim Caiella, and W.

Stephen Hill, as well as Annette Amerman in the reference section. I owe them a debt of gratitude for the time

and care they took in ensuring the monograph’s accuracy, readability, and graphic design. 

Lastly, I would like to thank my husband, Dave, who himself deployed with I MEF during OIF–I and twice

since then. He has continued to support and encourage me throughout this entire process. 

There are those who may not agree with the story exactly as I have told it; they may remember things differently because their perspective was different. Despite my utmost desire to provide an accurate and comprehensive historical account, the sheer complexity of the situation makes it unlikely that every perspective

will be adequately represented in this monograph. However, it is undeniable that the Marines and sailors who

served with 1st and 2d FSSGs during this period served honorably and performed miraculously. My hope is

that this monograph will simply tell their story, and in doing so, capture the innovation and ingenuity, not only

of the leaders and the planners, but the individual Marine at every level, who has earned a place in Marine

Corps history.

Melissa D. Mihocko

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Quantico, Virginia
vii

Table of Contents

Foreword..................................................................................................................................iii

Preface.......................................................................................................................................v

Table of Contents....................................................................................................................vii

Map...........................................................................................................................................ix

Chapter 1 Setting the Stage for War......................................................................................1

Chapter 2 Arrival in Theater................................................................................................19

Chapter 3 Opening Days of the War (17-22 March 2003).................................................39

Chapter 4 Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond (23-26 March 2003) .............................53

Chapter 5 Northern Support Areas (27 March-3 April 2003).............................................69

Chapter 6 Taking Baghdad and Tikrit (4-22 April 2003) ...................................................79

Chapter 7 Security and Stabilization Operations................................................................93

Chapter 8 The Special Purpose MAGTF ...........................................................................101

Epilogue.................................................................................................................................107

Notes .....................................................................................................................................109

Appendix A Chronology of Significant Events ..................................................................115

Appendix B Command and Staff List.................................................................................119

Appendix C Unit List...........................................................................................................123

Appendix D Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations...........................................................125

Appendix E Presidential Unit Citation ...............................................................................131

Appendix F Navy Unit Commendation..............................................................................133

Index......................................................................................................................................135
ix

Base 802669AI (R00667)12-99
1

“Recently, General [Tommy] Franks, (Combatant

Commander, Central Command) visited with the staff

of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). After the

standard brief and discussions, General Franks asked

the MEF staff what the biggest success for the MEF was

during OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom]. Much praise

was given to the successful use of combined arms,

close air support, and those warfighting functions that

one would assume are the ingredients for success on

the battlefield. When it was Lieutenant General [James

T.] Conway’s (Commanding General, I MEF) turn to

provide his insight, he said one word . . . ‘LOGISTICS’!”1

In June 2002, President George W. Bush introduced a new defense doctrine based on the concept

of preemption. In his first commencement address

following the attacks on 11 September 2001, President Bush described his vision for the war against

terrorism and beyond in a speech to cadets at the

U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. He

stated, “Our security will require all Americans to be

forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty

and to defend our lives.”2 In the fall of that year, after

President Bush challenged the United Nations to enforce its own resolutions against Iraq, Congress authorized an attack on that country, and the United

States moved one step closer to war. In late December, President Bush approved the deployment of U.S.

troops to the Persian Gulf region, and by March 2003,

approximately 200,000 American servicemen and

women were stationed there in support of Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

For the Marine Corps’ part, OIF not only called for

the largest deployment of Marine forces since Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, but it also required they move rapidly over unprecedented

distances. Without a doubt, the Marine Corps’ success was largely dependent on combat service support. Although often overshadowed in the history

books by stories of air and ground combat, the logistical aspect of warfare, often described as the

range of tasks necessary to man, arm, fuel, fix, and

move a force, played a major role during OIF. In addition to facing many traditional obstacles to providing logistics support, 1st and 2d Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs), which are highlighted in this

monograph, were also required to develop innovative solutions to new challenges and frequently redefine the familiar concepts, processes, and

organizational structures during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Rethinking Combat Service Support

Operations

The basic role of an FSSG is to provide logistical

support for a Marine expeditionary force while in

garrison, employed by itself, or as part of a traditional

Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operation.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,

Brigadier General James A. Brabham, commanding

general of 1st Force Service Support Group (1st

FSSG), drew from his experiences involving direct

and general support missions in Vietnam to suggest

a reorganization of both the 1st and 2d FSSGs for

wartime operations.3 The resulting “general support”

and “direct support” group concepts were endorsed

by the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) commanding general, Lieutenant General Walter E.

Boomer; however, he wanted the changes implemented through a single FSSG with one commander.

To accommodate this request, the two FSSGs combined into a single group, and General Brabham,

who was senior to Brigadier General Charles C. Krulak, the commanding general of 2d FSSG, assumed

command.4

The new organization was extremely successful,

and following the Persian Gulf War, many articles

were published discussing the role of the FSSG during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although there was an initial push to implement

permanent organizational changes based on the lessons learned in the desert, inertia was lost as time

passed, and few changes actually occurred.5 The

FSSGs each resumed their former garrison configurations, and for more than a decade, they pursued

traditional peacetime roles.

Fortunately, logistics planners in both FSSGs continued to think about the future of combat service

Chapter 1

Setting the Stage for War
support operations. Recapturing concepts developed

by Generals Brabham and Krulak, they used them as

the genesis for defining the functional relationship

between 1st FSSG and 2d FSSG during Operation

Iraqi Freedom; 1st FSSG would provide direct support and 2d FSSG would provide general support.

There were, however, two distinct differences from

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. First,

each FSSG retained its own command identity. Second, while 1st FSSG served under I MEF, 2d FSSG

deployed into theater as the Marine Logistics Command (MLC), a subordinate element of Marine Forces

Central Command (MarCent). As the service component representative, MarCent was responsible for ensuring that Marine forces were employed

appropriately in Central Command’s theater of operations and that they received necessary administrative and logistical support.

Restructuring the 1st Force Service

Support Group

While planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom,

Brigadier General Edward G. Usher, commanding

general of 1st Force Service Support Group, faced a

number of challenges: great distances across the battlefield, a shortened timeline, extensive lines of communication from operational level logistics to the

FSSG’s most forward units, potentially severe

weather, and unpredictable enemy forces. The

biggest obstacle in 1st FSSG’s path to success, however, was the basic nature of its organizational structure.6

While operating in a peacetime garrison environment, 1st FSSG had always emphasized efficiency

over effectiveness, having focused primarily on providing cost-effective logistics support. The battalions

were organized by function: headquarters and service, supply, maintenance, engineer support, transportation, medical, and dental. General Usher

understood that this functional structure would not

work in wartime, and that he needed to task organize his command to support I MEF’s mission on the

battlefield. Although this was similar to the problem

faced by the FSSGs during the Persian Gulf War, this

time around, General Usher’s goal was not only to

reorganize, but also to minimize the amount of restructuring that would have to occur once in theater.

Ultimately, he wanted to avoid the difficulties and

challenges that General Brabham encountered while

organizing in theater, and therefore planned the reorganization to take place prior to deployment.7

Lieutenant Colonel Adrian W. Burke, 1st FSSG future

operations officer, understood the significance of

General Usher’s intent to solidify the organization as

early as possible, and he emphasized the importance

of developing habitual relationships between the

supporting and supported commanders.

One of the things that cause things to survive or work well on the battlefield is relationships. Relationships can solve 8/10ths of all

your problems. Commanders know each others’ limitations and capabilities. They have

friendships with each other; they work and train

together through various exercises before they

go into combat together. You can’t buy that anywhere, and if you have ad hoc organizations

that form up on the battlefield, all of the depth

of respect and trust and instinct that those commanders develop with each other, is not there.8

For General Usher, a third-generation Marine who

had previously commanded a Marine expeditionary

unit service support group and a transportation support battalion, the idea of reorganizing the FSSG into

combat service support elements emerged two years

earlier when I MEF began planning for contingency

2 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Courtesy of CSSB-10

BGen Edward G. Usher III, Commanding General 1st

FSSG, speaks to Marines prior to the start of the war.
Setting the Stage for War 3

operations in Iraq. Shortly after 9/11, operational

planning teams consisting of key staff officers within

the FSSG, liaison officers from adjacent commands

and attachments, and subject matter experts gathered

to plan for the eventual U.S. response to the terrorist

attacks. General Usher realized that to fulfill the full

range of combat service support responsibilities and

enter the theater as an integrated operational command, a solid commitment from all of his commanders was paramount.9 What developed during the

next 19 months reflected extensive planning and coordination on the part of the FSSG staff and the battalion commanders.

A garrison organization of functional battalions

was once again transformed into a structure based

on an operational template reflecting the need to provide both direct and general support combat service

support to I MEF’s ground combat element, 1st Marine Division. An emphasis was placed on the mobility of the direct support units, as well as the ability

for the larger general support units to move in echelon across the battlefield. With augmentation from

both 2d and 4th FSSGs, as well as the U.S. Army,

other areas also underwent change. During initial

mission analysis, planners determined that the FSSG’s

most critical asset was its distribution capability and

as a result, formed the Transportation Support Group.

Commanded by Colonel David G. Reist, the group

was three battalions deep and included various transportation, bulk fuel, and maintenance elements. En1st FSSG

BSSG-1

HQSVC Bn 1st Supply Bn 1st Maint Bn 1st TSB 7th ESB 1st Medical Bn 1st Dental Bn

CSSG 16 6th ESB

7th ESB CSSB 10

CSSC 111

CSSC 115

CSSC 133

CSSC 134

CSSC 135

CSSC 117

HSB

CSSB 12

CSSB 18

6th MT Bn

619 Med

Trk (POL)

727 Med

Trk (PLS)

CSSB 22

CSSC 151

204 MP Co

977 MP Co

194 MP Co

442 MP Co

MP Co

(USMC)

459 MRBC

(USA)

299 MRBC

(USA)

Bridge Co

(USMC)

Bridge Co

(USMC)

Bridge Co

(USMC)

101 Chemical Co

CSSG11 CSSG 13 CSSG 15 TSG 716 MP Bn

(+) (USA) 8th ESB

1st FSSG

1st FSSG T/O 14,474

BSSG-1 Security Co

Pre-OIF 1st FSSG Organization

1st FSSG Task Organized for OIF

Courtesy of 1st FSSG

In garrison, 1st FSSG consisted of seven functional battalions and a brigade service support group (BSSG).

With augmentation from both 2d and 4th FSSGs, as well as the U.S. Army, 1st FSSG reorganized its functional

battalions into task-organized units for OIF. Courtesy of 1st FSSG
gineering missions were segregated and assigned to

three engineer support battalions, largely mirroring

their original formation. Medical support underwent

several innovative changes, resulting in a number of

firsts in both organization and implementation. Military police and motor transport were each critical in

nature, but short in numbers. As a result, new units

augmented 1st FSSG’s organic capabilities in these

areas. Colonel Darrell L. Moore, 1st FSSG’s chief of

staff, called it “the largest FSSG ever assembled during wartime.”10 Without question, this newly reorganized FSSG was a considerable force, carefully

tailored to sustain combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Direct and General Support

The core of 1st FSSG’s warfighting organization

was Combat Service Support Group 11 (CSSG-11).

Commanded by Colonel John J. Pomfret, CSSG-11

provided direct combat service support to approximately 22,000 Marines in the 1st Marine Division.

While the concept of direct support was not new, the

units employed during the Persian Gulf War were

smaller and less mobile than CSSG-11. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group actually maneuvered

across the battlefield, moving in conjunction with elements of 1st Marine Division.11

During the planning phase, General Usher and his

deputy commander, Colonel John L. Sweeney Jr., who

himself had served in 1st FSSG during Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, recognized several

areas in need of improvement and implemented a

plan that emphasized enhancements in transportation

availability and relationship building. Combat service

support commanders and ground combat commanders initiated planning well in advance of the war and

began joint training as early as July 2002. As a result,

there was a greater amount of trust between the division and FSSG.12 Lieutenant Colonel John J. Broadmeadow, the 1st Marine Division logistics officer

stated,

With foresight and innovativeness, 1st FSSG

developed an agile, capable, and wholly unique

combat service support (CSS) structure to interface with the division and I MEF. This structure

did more than support our high-tempo operations. It made the regimental combat team S-4s

the linchpins of logistics for the division . . . and

provided a critical link between division and the

FSSGs and MLC sources of supply. Within this

framework, division had the first fully embedded CSS capability in recent history.13

The headquarters element of CSSG-11 maintained

command and control of the group while a combat

service support battalion (CSSB) and three combat

service support companies (CSSCs) executed the

daily operations. The three combat service support

companies, approximately 230 Marines each, supported the three regimental combat teams in the 1st

Marine Division. Required to hold two days of supplies, they provided medical, supply, maintenance,

motor transport, fuel, water, food, and command and

control support.14 Combat Service Support Company

111 (CSSC-111), commanded by Captain Grant R.

Shottenkirk, sailed over on amphibious shipping, in

support of Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1), while

both Combat Service Support Company 115 (CSSC115), commanded by Captain Suzan F. Thompson,

and Combat Service Support Company 117 (CSSC117), commanded by Captain Andrew J. Bergen, flew

into theater with Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5)

and Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7). The CSSCs

formed from the three transport companies of 1st

Transportation Support Battalion and traveled directly

in trace, if not right alongside the fast-moving regimental combat teams. In essence, these companies

were the forward edge of combat service support.

Operationally controlled by 1st FSSG, the companies

were tactically controlled by their respective regimental combat teams for reasons of practicality.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert K.

Weinkle Jr., Combat Service Support Battalion 10

(CSSB-10) consisted of approximately 947 Marines.

Its mission was to provide direct support to 1st Marine Division units aside from the three regimental

combat teams, such as 11th Marine Regiment, as well

as general support to the three companies in CSSG11.15 With a more robust capability than the companies, CSSB-10 carried three to five days worth of

supply, and together with CSSG-11, established several repair and replenishment points as forces moved

up the battlefield.16 This often put them close to, if

not on, the frontlines. The battalion strategically

placed its repair and replenishment points to best

support the ground combat forces while also setting

the stage for the establishment of more permanent

follow-on support areas.

In garrison, Lieutenant Colonel Weinkle commanded Combat Service Support Group 1 at Twentynine Palms, California. In December 2002, he had

the daunting task of building a battalion from scratch.

Training and integration were difficult from the start,

because the majority of his Marines, including most

of his company commanders, were located at Camp

Pendleton, California, while his core staff was at

4 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Setting the Stage for War 5

Twentynine Palms. The Marines, who possessed various military occupational specialties, came from

each existing FSSG battalion and included augments

from both the Marine Corps Reserves and the U.S.

Army who had to be trained and integrated within a

short pre-deployment workup period.17

For General Usher, implementation of the direct

support combat elements was critical to the FSSG’s

ability to support 1st Marine Division and I MEF as

they maneuvered across the battlefield. He described

the challenges of combat service support as analogous to a game of chess. “You’ve got to think ahead

four or five moves, because when the division needs

ammunition/fuel resupply, it’s too late for us to then

get trucks on the road. Therefore, situational awareness and flexibility to make changes on the fly have

allowed for some smart decision making.”18

While CSSG-11 supported 1st Marine Division,

Combat Service Support Battalion 13 (CSSB-13) was

created to provide direct combat service support to

the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW). Often confused with the Marine wing support groups, which

provide, among other things, engineers to build runways and airfields, CSSB-13 was the air wing’s

ground combat service support element, providing

not only supply and maintenance support, but also

postal, disbursing, exchange, and legal services.

CSSB-13’s headquarters was made up entirely of the

headquarters personnel from 4th Landing Support

Battalion (4th LSB), 4th FSSG.* Based out of Fort

Lewis, Washington, 4th LSB, a reserve battalion, was

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Malone, an attorney by training and a certified public accountant and business executive by trade.

When headquarters and service company at 4th

LSB was activated in February 2003, Colonel Malone

assumed command of CSSB-13 and three diverse

companies. Combat Service Support Company 133

(CSSC-133) was largely composed of Marines from

Combat Service Support Detachment 16, an aviation

support element in Yuma, Arizona. Combat Service

Support Company 134 (CSSC-134) was formed from

an intermediate maintenance element out of Miramar,

California. Combat Service Support Company 135

(CSSC-135) was an ad hoc unit comprised mostly of

reserve Marines from the headquarters and service

and alpha companies of 4th LSB. Although the mixCourtesy of CSSB-10

LtCol Robert K. Weinkle, a logistics officer commissioned in 1985, commanded CSSG-1 based in Twentynine

Palms, CA, before it reorganized into CSSB-10.

* During OIF, other elements of 4th LSB deployed to various ports

and airfields throughout the United States to prepare and transport personnel and equipment to war. In total, 700 of the 1,200

Marines and sailors in LtCol Malone’s reserve battalion were called

to active duty during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
ing of regular companies and reserve Marines under

a reserve command was uncommon, integration

within the battalion was seamless. The inclusion of

reserve Marines, who comprised one-third of the battalion’s personnel, was a key factor in CSSB-13’s success.19

Operationally, CSSC-133 and CSSC-134 were assigned to provide support on the two air bases in

Kuwait: al-Jaber, where the headquarters of CSSB-13

was also located, and Ali al-Salem. CSSC-135 deployed to Iraq to support Marine wing support

squadrons that were constructing forward operating

bases and forward arming and refueling points. In an

interview with the command historian, Colonel Malone commented on the geographical dispersion of

his companies across the battlefield and how it was

similar to the dispersion of his reserve companies in

garrison, which are as far apart as Fort Lewis, Washington and Puerto Rico. In actuality, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the various elements of his

battalion were closer.20

While CSSG-11 was at the core of 1st FSSG’s direct

support capability, Combat Service Support Group 15

(CSSG-15) was at the center of the FSSG’s general

support effort. CSSG-15 provided an entry point for

CSSG-11 and CSSB-13 to access the larger logistics

operations. Colonel Bruce E. Bissett, commanding officer of 1st Supply Battalion, 1st FSSG, took charge of

CSSG-15 and formed his staff from the headquarters

of his garrison battalion. A 28-year Marine veteran,

Colonel Bissett had spent ten of the last 14 years with

1st FSSG, to include a previous assignment as the

group’s operations officer.21 As a result, he was very

familiar with the intricacies of the FSSG’s transformation from a garrison to a warfighting organization, the

lessons learned during Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm, and the importance of CSSG-15’s general support mission. Holding a doctrinal five to

seven days of supply, CSSG-15’s primary mission was

to push supplies forward to strategic points on the

battlefield, where they could be readily accessible to

I MEF ground units.22*

CSSG-15’s general support mission required the

establishment of several combat service support areas

in the vicinity of 3d Marine Aircraft Wing forward operating bases. Two subordinate general support battalions carried out this mission. Combat Service

Support Battalions 12 (CSSB-12) and 18 (CSSB-18)

were transformed from two 1st FSSG garrison battalions—the 1st Maintenance Battalion and the Headquarters and Service Battalion—into task organized

combat service support organizations. The battalion

commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Kathleen M. Murney and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Collins, assumed their new roles as the workhorses of 1st

FSSG’s general support mission. Leapfrogging across

the battlefield, these general support battalions established the combat service support areas–also

known as logistics support areas–and utilized both

push and pull techniques to provide I MEF forces

with sustained logistical support.

Another subordinate element within CSSG-15 was

Combat Service Support Company 151 (CSSC-151).

Smaller in size than the two combat service support

battalions, its mission was to provide inorganic logistics support to the I MEF command element and its

headquarters group. Commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Robert W. Higbee,** CSSC-151 provided rations, water, fuel, ammunition, and repair parts, and

6 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

USMC Photo

Col Bruce E. Bissett, commanding officer of CSSG-15,

deployed in support of both Desert Shield/Desert Storm

and Somalia as the XO and then CO of MSSG-15.

* CSSG-15 was assigned numerous auxiliary missions to include

limited vehicle evacuation and recovery, the establishment of salvage points, and the development of temporary enemy prisoner of

war holding facilities.

** Although CSSC-151 was a company-sized element with just

under 130 Marines and sailors, it was determined that the commanding officer should be a lieutenant colonel due to the nature

of its close relationship with I MEF. (LtCol Robert W. Higbee, USMC

intvw, 7Mar03, USMC [Oral HistColl], Quantico, VA.)
Setting the Stage for War 7

acted as I MEF’s conduit to the higher maintenance

echelons.23

Also subordinate to CSSG-15 was Combat Service

Support Battalion 22 (CSSB-22), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Goben. While CSSG-11

supported 1st Marine Division, CSSB-22 provided direct combat service support to Task Force Tarawa,

comprised of a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB)

headquarters and Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT2). Although the total number of personnel fluctuated throughout the war, Task Force Tarawa initially

deployed with just over 7,000 Marines and sailors.24

While Task Force Tarawa and CSSB-22 were part of

the II Marine Expeditionary Force, based at Camp

Lejeune, North Carolina, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, they fell under the operational command of I

MEF. Like the other combat service support units in

1st FSSG, CSSB-22 was specifically formed for OIF.

Unlike the functional battalions in 1st FSSG, however,

CSSB-22 had already been task-organized as a Marine expeditionary unit service support group

(MSSG).*

With only 12 days to reorganize his staff into a deployable combat service support battalion, Colonel

Goben faced a number of challenges within his new

mission to support Task Force Tarawa. For one, the

MSSG had been designed to support a battalion landing team, a unit considerably smaller than the regimental combat team serving with Task Force Tarawa.

One of the major changes he made to accommodate

the larger force was to increase his transportation assets by doubling the number of vehicles and drivers.

His medical capability also grew from a small detachment to a shock trauma platoon.* In other areas,

such as maintenance, engineering, communications,

and supply, Colonel Goben lost resources; with less

robust capabilities in these areas, he had to rely on

additional support from CSSB-12, CSSB-18, 1st FSSG,

and Task Force Tarawa.25

Distribution: The Critical Key to Success

Speed, distance, environment, and weather all

challenged the FSSG’s ability to distribute supplies

across the battlefield. Early in the planning process,

at one of General Usher’s “Council of Colonels”**

meetings, it was agreed that smooth and uninterrupted distribution was the key to ensuring 1st FSSG’s

success. The council recognized that if distribution

failed, all other areas of combat service support

would also be ineffective, and it made several organizational changes to maximize the FSSG’s distribution capabilities. In December of 2002, one such

change involved the transformation of the 1st Transportation Support Battalion (1st TSB) into a larger

transportation support group (TSG).26

Colonel David G. Reist, the original commanding

officer of 1st TSB, remained in charge and was responsible for restructuring his unit to meet the massive transportation requirements of I MEF. The

peacetime structure of 1st TSB included seven companies: headquarters and service, three truck, support, landing support, and maintenance. Before

leaving Camp Pendleton, four of these companies

migrated to CSSG-11. Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie Companies formed the core of the three mobile combat

service support companies in direct support of the

three regimental combat teams in 1st Marine Division, while the majority of Support Company transferred to CSSB-10. This left Colonel Reist with

Headquarters and Service, Landing Support, and

Maintenance Companies.27

Anticipating the challenges of moving large convoys through open desert, as well as the threat of

enemy attacks on soft targets such as trucks carrying

fuel or supplies, the headquarters element of the

Maintenance Company was sectioned off to form a

new company specifically focused on convoy control and security. Convoy Control Company provided

additional security personnel and vehicles to all convoys; they also conducted mission planning for convoy security, routes, fires, and estimates of time and

* In October 2002, LtCol Goben assumed command of MEU Service Support Group 22 (MSSG-22). The combat service support arm

of the deploying Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), 22 Marine

Expeditionary Unit (22d MEU), MSSG-22 was scheduled for a routine six-month deployment. When it was determined in January

2003 that all elements of the 22d MEU would integrate and deploy

as part of TF Tarawa, LtCol Goben’s 231 Marines were initially redesignated as Combat Service Support Company 222 (CSSC-222).

On 9 January 2003, CSSC-222 boarded the USS Saipan (LHA 2)

and sailed from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, a week later. While

making the four-week-long transit to the Persian Gulf, LtCol

Goben’s Marines focused on nuclear, biological, and chemical responsiveness training, weapons familiarization, immediate action

drills, and basic Arabic phrases. During the ship’s transit across the

Arabian Gulf, LtCol Goben experienced yet another change: although CSSC-222’s organization mirrored that of the three CSSCs

supporting 1st Marine Division’s regimental combat teams, the

commanding general, 1st FSSG redesignated them as CSS Battalion 22, largely because its commanding officer was a lieutenant

colonel. When CSSB-22 arrived in theater in mid-February, the battalion was reassigned under 1st FSSG. (Combat Service Support

Battalion 22 ComdC, 1Jan03–30Jun03; LtCol Thomas N. Goben,

USMC intvw, 27Apr03, USMC [Oral HistColl], Quantico, VA.)

* Shock trauma platoons are discussed in the “Medical Support”

section of this chapter.

** The Council of Colonels was a periodic meeting that Gen Usher

held with his colonels in 1st FSSG to gain insight and conduct

planning on a particular topic.
distance. In essence, the new company planned for

the “mechanics” of the convoys, allowing the vehicle

operators to focus solely on their task at hand: driving.28

Having lost his three line companies and the bulk

of his transportation assets, Colonel Reist needed

augmentation from another unit to perform the multitude of distribution missions required during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In late January, he received this

from 6th Motor Transport Battalion (6th MTBn), a reserve unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Patrick

J. Hermesmann and headquartered out of Redbank,

New Jersey. Bringing over 300 vehicles and several

hundred drivers, 6th MTBn mobilized quickly and

became the core of the TSG’s distribution capability.*

One challenge the battalion faced was that the equipment the Marines had been training on was outdated.

Because the Marine Corps had fielded the new

seven-ton medium tactical vehicle replacement, all

reserve Marines had to be retrained and relicensed.29

Another attachment to the TSG was the U.S.

Army’s 319th Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Company. A great asset to Colonel Reist, it more than

doubled his fuel distribution capability. At full capacity, these soldiers could transport 300,000 gallons

of fuel in a single lift. This proved to be invaluable

during combat operations, as both ground and air

forces covered distances unmatched in any previous

operation.30

One key factor contributing to 1st FSSG’s effective

distribution during combat operations was the tasking procedures established between 1st FSSG and

TSG. Early in the planning process, a logistics movement control center (LMCC) was established to coordinate the FSSG’s transportation assets in garrison. It

was expected that the three engineer battalions

would require the bulk of available transportation assets, and the scope of the engineering support missions had grown beyond the capabilities of its

engineer support element (ESE) within in the operations section.31 As a result, the LMCC combined with

the ESE to form the logistics movement and engineering coordination center (LMECC), which was colocated with the TSG to afford better integration and

coordination of operations. In this configuration,

LMECC was the staff agent and the transportation

support group was the executing agent. Lieutenant

Colonel Jorge Ascunce, officer-in-charge of the

LMECC, described the importance of this relationship:

The distribution mission, the success or failure of that, the ability to have the right stuff at

the right place at the right time, is what makes

or breaks the FSSG’s mission. What General

Usher was trying to do with the creation of the

Transportation Support Group and the focus of

the LMECC was to have that central, localized

pool of assets, resources, and staff coordination,

to be best managed . . . this center of gravity.32

The mission of the LMECC, which included just

over 100 Marines and sailors, was to coordinate and

control the movement of all I MEF assets. Their focus

was on the three engineer support battalions, the unit

movement coordination centers, and an air movement coordination element. Although Colonel Ascunce had initially questioned the decision to focus

on the engineering missions, he later acknowledged

that integrating these efforts had been crucial, as the

three battalions were key to the successful movement

of the ground forces, and the FSSG’s distribution capability directly affected the sustainment of the bat8 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

* 6th Motor Transport Battalion had been mobilized during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, earning the title “Baghdad

Express.”

USMC Photo

Shown here as a brigadier general, Col David G. Reist,

commanding officer of 1st Transportation Support

Group, had previously served two company command and one battalion command tours with landing support battalions, as well as with 3d Marine

Division and Marine Barracks, Washington, DC.
Setting the Stage for War 9

talions’ missions.33 Additional elements in the LMECC

were communications assets, an intelligence section,

and a small medical evacuation team.

The Engineer Battalions

To the planners of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the

three main engineering missions were obvious: bulk

liquids, general engineering (including construction,

mobility, and counter-mobility), and bridging. It was

also clear that no one battalion could handle all three

functions, thus unlike the other combat service support functions, which were task organized to provide

a comprehensive support approach to ground forces,

engineering missions were distinguished and assigned at the battalion level. While battalions such as

headquarters and service, supply, and maintenance

were divided and redistributed in smaller segments to

various 1st FSSG task-organized units, 6th, 7th, and

8th Engineer Support Battalions (ESBs) generally

maintained unit integrity and were assigned a specific mission that capitalized on their special skills

and expertise. As General Usher explained during an

interview with the command historian, “the discreet

tasks just manifest themselves in the planning process

and mission analysis, and . . . to do it any other way,

I would think would be very confusing for an ESB

commander to try and plan against.”34

The 6th Engineer Support Battalion (6th ESB), a

reserve unit from Portland, Oregon, was assigned the

bulk liquids mission. Commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Roger R. Machut, the battalion was responsible for the unique implementation of the hose-reel

system. The hose reel, one of the 1st FSSG’s greatest

success stories from the war, was comprised of segments of six-inch-diameter rubber hose, manually

connected and laid in the sand, through which engineers would pump millions of gallons of fuel. This

concept, which had never been implemented in

greater than 10-mile lengths, originated with 7th Engineer Support Battalion (7th ESB) at Camp Pendleton, California, but was assigned to 6th ESB, which

had four companies dedicated to handling bulk liquids and possessed the highest number of trained

Marines in this field.35 As a result, Colonel Machut

was one of only a few reservists who retained command of his original battalion during the war.

The 7th Engineer Support Battalion, organic to 1st

FSSG, was assigned the general engineering mission.

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Scott H. Poindexter, the battalion’s broad taskings included breaching

operations at the border between Kuwait and Iraq,

construction of combat service support areas and

enemy prisoner of war holding facilities, and continuous route maintenance. The 7th ESB’s habitual garrison relationship with 1st Marine Division and ample

joint training and planning in California enhanced the

battalion’s ability to provide both direct and general

engineering support to ground combat forces.

The 8th Engineer Support Battalion (8th ESB),

based out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and organic to 2d FSSG, was assigned the expeditionary

bridging mission. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

Niel E. Nelson, it was the only remaining battalion in

the Marine Corps with bridging assets, and as such,

was the obvious choice for this mission. In garrison,

8th ESB was structured like a typical multifunctional

engineering battalion, and prior to deploying,

Colonel Nelson had to rebuild his table of organization and table of equipment to that of a battalionsized bridging force. This included adding two

A convoy of vehicles from 6th Motor Transport Battalion begin their move north into Iraq 21 March 2003.

Courtesy of 6th MT BN
reserve bridge companies from 6th ESB and recruiting bridging experts throughout the Marine Corps.36

Medical Support

Task organized to meet the medical support requirements during OIF, Health Services Battalion* also

fell under CSSG-15. Its mission was to provide MEF

units with level-two healthcare, which was the first

level of medical care to include surgical support. Several surgical companies, organized from personnel in

1st, 2d, and 4th FSSG, were co-located with the FSSG

support areas, where they provided a more permanent capability. In addition to the surgical companies,

the battalion deployed 12 shock trauma platoons

(STPs) and 6 forward resuscitative surgical systems

(FRSSs).37 Commander Gregory M. Huet (USN), commanding officer of 1st Medical Battalion, had spent

several tours with Marine units and knew that the deployment of STPs and FRSSs was significant for the

medical support field. Along with the traditional surgical support companies, these STPs and FRSSs,

which were lighter and more mobile, were positioned

across the battlefield, providing a critical level-two

surgical medical capability.38 

The STPs, whose functions were previously performed by collecting and clearing companies, were

an outgrowth of the medical battalion. Their mission

was stabilization, triage, and holding of patients. In

terms of capability, they fit between a battalion aid

station and a surgical company. Often called a “superBAS,” (battalion aid station) the STPs consisted of approximately 25 individuals, to include two emergency

physicians, one critical care nurse, one physician’s assistant, one independent duty corpsman, several additional corpsmen, enlisted Marine electricians,

drivers, and security. The typical STP possessed

everything that a modern-day emergency room would

have, less a surgeon. While their mission dictated that

they set up in less than one hour, most of the time

they were able to accomplish this in less than 40 minutes, immediately treating patients upon arrival. At

each repair and replenishment point, they worked

closely with the landing support Marines because

many of their casualties arrived by helicopter.39

A Forward Resuscitative Surgical System (FRSS),

which could be moved by two High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs or humvees) or

sling-loaded by CH-53, was small, self-contained, and

mobile. The teams consisted of eight individuals: one

general surgeon, one orthopedic surgeon, a critical

care nurse, an anesthesiologist, and four hospital

corpsmen (two of whom were operating room technicians).40 They worked out of two shelters, each weighing about 6,000 pounds; possessed oxygen generation,

laboratory, and ultrasound capabilities; and carried

their own blood supplies. Characterized by minimal

cubic weight and footage, the FRSS was a self-contained operating room designed to forward displace to

treat those casualties who were not stable enough to

survive a flight to a rearward surgical company. As it

was not designed to handle all surgical patients, it was

estimated that less than 10 percent of the surgical patients requiring an emergency evacuation would actually be treated by the FRSS. Its main purpose was to

stabilize patients enough to evacuate them to the rear,

and most treated by the FRSS required a second surgery once evacuated. With the supplies included in an

FRSS, the eight individuals could perform approximately 18 surgeries in a 48-hour period. Both flexible

and mobile, the forward surgical systems could be established within an hour of hitting the ground. However, without its own communications or security

capability, it would have to be employed with a shock

trauma platoon and another combat service support element. A necessary part of the FRSS concept was the

en route care capability (someone to travel with the

patient during a medical evacuation), however, the

table of organization did not support this.41

The concept of combining and deploying STPs and

FRSSs was pioneered by Navy Captain Harold R.

Bohman and Lieutenant Commander Tracy R. Bilski.

Borne on the need to be able to keep up with the

rapid pace and flexibility of combat operations, the

combined capabilities of an STP and FRSS was equal to

that of a level-two medical care facility. After its initial

conception in 1997, the STP/FRSS system experienced

limited use during Exercise Bright Star in Egypt and

again during Operation Enduring Freedom in

Afghanistan. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the STPs

and FRSSs experienced their first full implementation

and became one of the most significant accomplishments for I MEF.

716th Military Police Battalion

Largely due to the extensive command and control

capabilities within its military police organizations,

the U.S. Army was tasked by I MEF to provide military police support. The U.S. Army’s 716th Military

Police Battalion, one of the most decorated military

police units in its service, has a rich history. An active

duty battalion from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, it had

always maintained a close relationship with the

Army’s 101st Airborne Division. For this operation,

10 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

* There was no number designation given to Health Services Battalion, because this was the only such organization that existed

throughout the Marine Corps. 
Setting the Stage for War 11

however, the battalion was assigned to provide I MEF

with security support of convoys, enemy prisoners

of war, and established support areas. Upon assignment to I MEF, Lieutenant Colonel Kim S. Orlando

and his staff began to develop a relationship with the

1st FSSG and started to integrate all of the unit’s personnel, skills, and assets into the FSSG’s organization.42 He described several meetings that took place

during January and February of 2003. “We did a series of coordination visits to Camp Pendleton; we got

to know the command group, started to work with

them in terms of how to best use Army military police and what we could bring to the table. That was

really, in terms of spelling success, the most important step.”43 General Usher recognized that the Army

brought capabilities that the Marine Corps either did

not have or did not have in sufficient numbers. He

also recognized the importance of properly integrating the Army battalion into 1st FSSG’s operations.

You just position them and engineer them

for success instead of looking at them as a

bucket of resources that you can realign elsewhere to fit an operational scenario that might

not be advantageous for them to operate in. So

I just simply let the 716th execute its mission

with guidance and some direction, and it

seemed to work very well . . . . what they want

to do, like everybody else, including the

Marines, is to be given a mission, given an area

of focus, and be given authority to make decisions to match up with each individual’s responsibilities.44

In total, the battalion had more than 1,200 military

police personnel supporting 1st FSSG, organized into

seven companies. Originally, only the headquarters

and one military police company from Colonel Orlando’s battalion deployed into theater. Eventually,

other military police companies arrived in theater to

augment the 716th. These included several regular

Army and Army reserve companies, as well as two

Marine reserve companies: Company A deployed

from Lexington, Kentucky, and Company C came

from Dayton, Ohio.*

Its mission was to provide security throughout the

1st FSSG’s area of responsibility, to include the

routes of movement for supplies and equipment.

The battalion also handled enemy prisoners of war,

processing more than 1,400 captives for I MEF. Its

mission in Iraqi towns included both acting as the

police force and maintaining order so that local civilPhoto by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

BGen Edward G. Usher poses with LTC Kim Orlando, USA, (left and right center), commanding officer of the 716th

Military Police Battalion, USA, and his commanders. The battalion was attached to 1st FSSG during OIF-I.

* Company B, from Pittsburgh, PA, was attached to CSSB-10.
ians could rebuild their infrastructure and reestablish

a stable existence. Their presence alone helped prevent combat looting. One of the challenges the MPs

faced was the constant evolution of rules of engagement. As difficult as it was during combat operations to distinguish between the “good guys” and

the “bad guys,” it became even more difficult during

stabilization operations. Colonel Orlando considered

one of his primary responsibilities to work with company and platoon commanders ensuring that they always emphasized situational awareness and prudent

application of force. With multiple force levels, his

battalion had to be prepared to transition from the

use of extreme lethal weaponry, such as AT4s

(shoulder launched, anti-armor weapons), to nonlethal riot and crowd control weapons, such as pepper spray.45

Ultimately, integration of the U.S. Army’s 716th

Military Police Battalion into 1st FSSG’s organization

and operations was a success. Colonel Orlando*

praised the relationship and cooperation between

his battalion and the 1st FSSG:

Our integration with the group has been

nothing short of spectacular. They have been

just wonderful professionals to work with . . .

what laid the groundwork for that is our coordination and liaison visits that took place in the

months preceding the deployment. That, in addition to the fact that they’re just a fine bunch

of professionals that want to give you the shirt

off their backs, and they have . . . that has been

a complete success story. Never once has anybody ever said anything about any differences

between the Army or Marine way.46

Headquarters and 4th FSSG Forward West

With the reorganization of 1st FSSG well underway, General Usher had to think about the composition of his own staff. Maintaining the typical staff

sections and functions, the greatest change was in

regard to personnel and increasing the staff size to

support the FSSG’s critical mission during OIF. A

major part of this included the integration of 4th

FSSG Forward West.

In December of 2001, Colonel James P. Sheahan,

12 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Marines monitor local civilians as they pass through a checkpoint near Logistics Support Area Viper.

* Tragically, LTC Orlando was killed on 16Oct03, while attempting to

negotiate with a group of armed men near a mosque in Karbala. The

716th Military Battalion had been turned over by 1st FSSG to 1st Marine Division, and at the time, LTC Orlando was the highest-ranking

Army officer killed by hostile fire in Iraq. (Associated Press, “Army

LTC Kim S. Orlando,” www.militarycity.com/valor/256881.html)
Setting the Stage for War 13

a reservist out of Saint Louis, Missouri, was serving as

the executive officer of 4th FSSG Forward West when

he was brought back on active duty. In January,

Colonel Sheahan and 19 of his Marines from 4th

FSSG Forward West were assigned to augment the

headquarters staff of the 1st FSSG, which had already

begun planning for possible contingency operations

in both the Middle East and Korea. The FSSG’s operations section had a tremendous need for augmentation, and the majority of the detachment

immediately assumed key billets in this area. Colonel

Sheahan, who later served as the 1st FSSG’s liaison

officer to the I MEF, became the deputy assistant

chief of staff, operations, 1st FSSG. Then, in February

2002, I MEF began detailed planning for Operations

Plan 1003V, and subsequent MEF exercises, called

Desert Spear, were held in May and October. Colonel

Sheahan’s focus at this point was the daunting task of

identifying which reserve units would be mobilized

in the event of a contingency. As the key units were

identified, their commanders were gradually brought

into the planning. By the exercise that October, commanders of several reserve battalions, including 6th

ESB, 6th MTBn, and 4th LSB, were participating.48

Colonel Darrell L. Moore, the commander of 4th

FSSG Forward West and Colonel Sheahan’s boss, had

not been activated initially. However, in January

2003, General Usher spoke to General John W.

Bergman, commanding general, 4th FSSG, and requested Colonel Moore’s assignment as his Chief of

Staff, 1st FSSG. Colonel Moore, an attorney from

Pryor, Oklahoma, was subsequently activated on 20

February and flown directly to Kuwait, arriving on

the evening of the next day.49

General Usher believed that augmenting the 1st

FSSG with reservists was the only way they could go

to war in support of a full MEF. “The integration of

the reserves is an enduring requirement for our

FSSGs. Over the years the active force structure has

been lost in the FSSGs. It’s really felt when we go to

the battlefield as a MEF, and the only way to overcome that is through smart integration of our reserve

force capability.”50

While 1st FSSG was planning and reorganizing

in anticipation of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group

11 (MSSG-11) was preparing for a scheduled sixmonth deployment as part of the 11th MEU. However, like the east coast MEU, the deployment cycle

of western Pacific Marines was interrupted and elements were reassigned in accordance with I MEF’s

war plans. The 11th MEU and its ground combat

element were redesignated as Task Force Yankee,

the air combat element was absorbed into 3d MAW,

and MSSG-11, which had been conducting port operations for the Amphibious Task Force West at 32d

Naval Station in San Diego, California, redesignated

as Combat Service Support Battalion 19 (CSSB-19).

Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David M.

Kluegel, the battalion’s assigned tasks involved

enemy prisoner of war handling and processing in

coordination with Task Force Yankee. Combat

Service Support Company 191 (CSSC-191), commanded by Captain Christopher R. Lucas, was established and provided limited service to Task

Force Yankee elements by constructing the I MEF

prisoner holding area. Soon after the war’s commencement, I MEF decided not to open this facility, and CSSB-19’s focus of effort shifted to convoy

and area security. For the duration of the war,

CSSB-19 augmented existing force protection elements and traveled with more than a dozen convoys throughout southern and central Iraq.47

Before he was assigned as the chief of staff, 1st FSSG,

Col Darrell L. Moore was the deputy commander, 4th

FSSG. While in the reserves, he spent tours as a company and battalion commander, as well as the G-3

Plans Officer, 4th FSSG Forward West.

Courtesy of 1st FSSG

CSSB-19
There were eventually over 4,000 4th FSSG reservists mobilized to support 1st FSSG, whose total

table of organization was approximately 11,000; reservists accounted for roughly 36 percent of the personnel in 1st FSSG. One of the major factors that

contributed to the overall success of reservist integration was that several key personnel had been involved in the planning process and subsequently had

the opportunity to spend several months preparing

for their specific missions. The entire process was a

collaborative one, with 4th FSSG deeply involved

with the planning.51

Establishing the Marine Logistics Command

Although the concept of a Marine Logistics Command (MLC) was established during the first Gulf

War, when 1st and 2d FSSGs provided general and

direct support logistics to I MEF, Brigadier General

Michael R. Lehnert, commanding general of 2d Force

Service Support Group (2d FSSG), had limited doctrine to work from when forming the Marine Logistics Command.53 As General Usher explained, “the

MLC concept has been whittled away at over the

years . . . this is the first time we’ve employed an

MLC in the true sense.”54 General Lehnert possessed

a widely diverse Marine Corps background, including

tours as both a maintenance and engineer officer, assignments within all four FSSGs, and several joint

tours, to include both Operation Just Cause and Operation Sea Signal in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As a

result, he was well equipped with the flexibility and

creativity required to build such a critical, yet ambiguous organization. In developing the MLC, he

drew from a Center for Naval Analyses study on the

Marine Logistics Command and focused on the mission at hand. General Lehnert did not want the shape

and size of the FSSG to drive the mission, but rather

14 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

During the weeks following 9/11, Lance Corporal Joseph J. Klan, a New York City police officer,

went to Ground Zero on his own time to help with

the ongoing recovery and cleanup efforts. During

those dark moments facing death and destruction,

a chance meeting occurred with a fellow Marine.

Klan felt that meeting and working with the gunnery sergeant—who happened to be a recruiter—

was a bit of fate, as he had already been thinking

about getting back into the Marine Corps. After his

service in the first Gulf War, he felt that events

would eventually lead him back to the Middle East,

as there was a certain level of unfinished business.

He later learned that two police officers that he

knew had been killed in the 9/11 attack. These

men were also Marine reservists, and Klan made it

his personal mission to honor them by rejoining

the Marine Corps. One of the two fallen Marines

was retired Sergeant Major Michael Curtin, who

had been the sergeant major of Klan’s former unit,

the 6th Communications Battalion. It took a year

and a half of badgering the recruiter before he was

able to rejoin. Finally, after contacting the career

management team in Quantico, Virginia, and accepting a reduction from his previous rank, he was

able to rejoin the Corps as a lance corporal. He was

reassigned to 6th Communications Battalion, which

had already been activated in late January 2003. It

deployed to the Middle East before Klan had officially joined, but he flew over on 14 March with its

rear party. He was 39 years old at the time.52

One Reservist’s Story

Prior to assuming command of 2d FSSG, then BGen

Michael R. Lehnert, an engineering officer, served as

head of the joint task force charged with the custody

of Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba.

USMC Photo
Setting the Stage for War 15

the tenets of expeditionary maneuver warfare

and advanced seabasing. Coming of age in the

sands of Kuwait and Iraq, the MLC allows the

warfighter to focus on the near battle.57

While the majority of its tasks centered around receiving, storing, fixing, and moving logistics in general support of I MEF, the MLC’s direct reporting

relationship to Marine Forces Central Command

(MarCent) gave them an even broader logistics mission during OIF. Specific tasks included establishing

and operating required infrastructure, terminals, and

facilities to provide general support to MarCent; coordinating arrival, assembly, and other force closure

operations; coordinating with existing theater support systems; integrating host nation support; interservice, common item, and cross-service support; and

developing Marine Forces logistics requirements.

Transforming the 2d FSSG

Even before the planning of OIF began, 2d FSSG

had already been undergoing transformation. For

one, it had implemented parts of the integrated logistics capability (ILC) concept. The main points of

this centered around supply consolidation, the realignment of maintenance processes—including

bumper-to-bumper maintenance support—overall

process improvements, and the development of integrated information technology. In short, ILC was an

attempt at modernizing and improving the doctrine,

organization, equipment, and technology of Marine

Corps logistics.58

The 2d FSSG had also executed CSS migration,

which focused on the consolidation of its units

around skill groups. As a result, the battalions within

2d FSSG were structured strictly along functional

alignments: all maintenance personnel were in 2d

Maintenance Battalion, all supply personnel were in

2d Supply Battalion, all engineers were in 8th Engineer Support Battalion. In many ways, this organization made 2d FSSG’s transition to the Marine Logistics

Command easier. As each battalion restructured to

meet its deployed logistics requirements, they only

had to look to one battalion for a specific functional

resource, and the augmentees received offered much

more depth in their training and skill levels.

One difficulty that 2d FSSG encountered was a

shortage of planning staff and resources. Even as it

transitioned into the MLC, the service group had to

maintain its garrison role in support of II Marine Expeditionary Force. An illustration of this planning

shortfall emerged in late January 2003, when the

group had equipment staged on a train heading out

* Ironically, Gen Lehnert had often described I MEF as the wholesale MEF, due to the fact that II MEF, which he referred to as the

retail MEF, often had many contingencies and small-scale response

forces on their plate. Now, as commander of the MLC, he was the

wholesale logistics provider and 1st FSSG was the retail logistics

provider.

** During combat and sustainment operations, the 377th Theater

Support Command forces numbered 43,000 and included a Transportation Command, Medical Command, Personnel Command, Finance Command, Movement Control Agency, Material

Management Center, two Military Police Brigades, four Area Support Groups, a Transportation Group, a Petroleum Group, and an

Ammunition Group. These forces provided combat service and

combat service support, as well as life support operations in

Kuwait and Southern Iraq.

for the mission requirements to drive the design of

the MLC. He wanted a flat organization with minimal

hierarchy: an organization that fulfilled its functional

requirements without any nonessential components.55

We looked at the various logistics nodes of

what was going to be expected of us and who

we thought we were going to be doing business with, particularly within the Theater Support Command, and we did essentially a troop

to-task redesign of the 2d FSSG . . . I didn’t

want a lot of hierarchy in it, and I wanted it focused on the functions that we were expected

to provide and those tasks that we were expected to do. So if you believe in the concept

of form following function, we took nothing

with us for which we did not have a specific

and identified mission and task.56

The MLC’s main function during OIF was operational level logistics. While 1st FSSG was the retaillevel logistics organization, 2d FSSG or MLC was the

wholesale-level logistics organization.* In large part,

MLC interfaced between the 1st FSSG and the U.S.

Army’s 377th Theater Support Command,** the senior

logistics command within the Coalition Forces Land

Component Command. In specific terms, the MLC

was responsible for brokering the gross sustainment

requirements, such as ammunition, fuel, and water

to the supporting theater agencies and pushing that

sustainment out to the tactical logistics support areas

across the battlefield. In an article that appeared in

the August 2003 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette,

co-authors General Lehnert and Colonel John E.

Wissler, commanding officer of 2d Transportation

Support Battalion, stated:

The MLC manages the resources necessary

to sustain the operational tempo of the modern

campaign and extend Marine Forces’ operational reach to distances more in keeping with
to Twentynine Palms, California, to support a combined arms exercise. At the last minute, this movement was cancelled and the equipment was

off-loaded to support the MLC missions instead.59

In garrison, 2d FSSG consisted of eight functional

battalions: Headquarters and Service Battalion, 2d

Supply Battalion, 2d Maintenance Battalion, 8th Engineer Battalion, 2d Medical Battalion, 2d Dental Battalion, 2d Transportation Support Battalion, and 2d

Military Police Battalion. By table of organization, the

FSSG typically carried between 8,000 to 10,000

Marines and sailors. By December 2002, 2d FSSG was

reorganized and slimmed down to a lean, functionally aligned organization, totaling 4,500 personnel

and officially assigned the MLC mission. The new operational structure consisted of an FSSG forward, and

headquarters and service, transportation support,

maintenance, supply, and military police battalions;

as well as detachments from the engineer support,

medical, and dental battalions.

Headquarters and Service Battalion, commanded

by Lieutenant Colonel Craig C. Crenshaw, supported

the command and control structure of the MLC. The

three main units within H&S battalion were the services, communications, and food services companies.

Deploying approximately one-quarter of its personnel, services company’s operational tasks included

the provision of a post exchange facility, postal, disbursing, and legal services in support of all Marine

Forces Central Command (MarCent). The communications company, 2d FSSG’s only organic communications capability, deployed its entire “footprint,” to

include $70 million of communications assets. Once

in theater, the company integrated into the communications architecture, largely supported by augmentees from 8th Communications Battalion.* When

the food services company arrived, it was apparent

that most such services would be contracted out;

therefore, the majority of the company was retrained

and assigned to serve in a guard and security capacity.60

The 2d Transportation Support Battalion (2d TSB),

commanded by Colonel John E. Wissler, had the

broad, albeit critical mission of planning and executing battlefield distribution operations, providing both

local- and line-haul distribution capabilities for MarCent theater stocks. In essence, 2d TSB was responsible for pushing sustainment items forward to the

1st FSSG’s units, who were providing tactical combat

service support to 1st Marine Division. In the initial

planning, 2d TSB’s distribution piece was limited in

scope, based on assumptions that the MLC would be

providing support at the operational level. Planners

realized, however, even in the early stages, that there

had to be a connection between MLC’s operational

and 1st FSSG’s tactical level logistics, and MLC might

have to fill this gap. As 1st FSSG moved further up

16 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Chart by CNA

The U.S. Army's 377th Theater Support Command (TSC), the Marine Logistics Command (MLC), and the 1st

Force Service Support Group (FSSG) represented three levels of logistics support during OIF. 

* The communications architecture that MLC setup during OIF is

further discussed in Chapter 2.
Setting the Stage for War 17

the battlefield, setting up support areas to provide

tactical support to ground units, MLC still had to deliver its support to their back door.61 The important

question was where on the battlefield this hand-off

between operational and tactical level logistics would

take place. In the weeks to follow, Colonel Wissler’s

battalion would be augmented with maintenance,

supply, military police, engineer, communications,

and intelligence capabilities. 2d TSB would push its

own limits to provide the crucial link in the distribution of sustainment throughout the battlefield.

The 2d Maintenance Battalion, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Brent P. Goddard, was the largest

and most diverse battalion to deploy within the Marine Logistics Command. With approximately 1,975

Marines and sailors, the battalion covered a wide

range of functional areas, to include motor transport,

ordnance, electronics and communications, engineer

and utilities, and general support maintenance. Leaving a sizeable rear element, 900 Marines remained at

Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to provide continuous support to remain-behind units and equipment,

while seven companies deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Disbursed throughout Kuwait

and Iraq, the battalion’s mission was to execute recovery, evacuation, and repair capabilities for Marine

forces in theater, as well as internally focused maintenance support to MLC.

The 2d Supply Battalion, commanded by Colonel

William F. Johnson, deployed five units in support of

OIF: headquarters, supply, support, medical logistics,

and ammunition companies. Operating at the wholesale level, the supply battalion managed a general

account and intermediate supply support activity in

theater and was responsible for maintaining theater

stocks, to include all classes of supply. 

The 2d Military Police Battalion, commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Christopher B. Martin, was a relatively new garrison battalion under 2d FSSG. During

the past decade, there had been various attempts to

reorganize the military police community within the

Marine Corps. The latest attempt began in 1999,

when the Force Structure Planning Group recommended that military police personnel be consolidated into single battalions. Within II Marine

Expeditionary Force (II MEF), it was determined that

this functionally organized battalion of three companies would fall under the FSSG. During the initial

phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, military police

companies from 2d FSSG provided support during

the Maritime Prepositioning Force offload and eventually, augmented by a reserve rifle company from

1st Battalion, 24th Marines, provided convoy and

camp security. In addition to being the first time a

military police battalion deployed intact, this was also

the first time military working dogs were deployed to

a tactical environment since the Vietnam War. The

dogs possessed the ability to detect explosives and

were primarily used for entry control points. Additional tasks assigned to 2d Military Police Battalion

included enemy prisoner of war management, area

and main supply route security, and traffic control at

ports and terminals.62

While the majority of 8th Engineer Support Battalion was assigned to 1st FSSG as the “bridge battalion,” Detachment Alpha was assigned to support

MLC. Commanded by Navy Lieutenant Timothy A.

Wallace, a Seabee exchange officer with the 8th ESB,

the detachment’s missions consisted of general construction of basic infrastructure and installation of

power, water, and other utilities. Lieutenant Wallace

was in a unique position as one of the first Seabee officers to command a Marine Corps engineer detachment. Adding to his challenges, he was also required

to oversee the operations of bulk fuel and explosive

ordnance disposal: two missions not traditionally performed by a standard Seabee unit.

Most of 2d Medical Battalion was split up during

Photo by LCpl Victor A. Barrera, USMC

An honor graduate of the United States Naval Academy and a distinguished graduate from the Marine

Corps Command and Staff College, then-Col John E.

Wissler was commanding officer, 2d TSB. He also

served on the Commandant’s Amphibious Plans

Study Group in support of Operation Desert Storm. 
18 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

OIF. Early on, Company A had been disbanded and

divided among Companies B and C. By the end of

January, having received personnel from the medical

augmentation program,* those companies, as well as

five shock trauma platoons from H&S Company, 2d

Medical Battalion, deployed. They were immediately

transferred to the Health Services Battalion, 1st FSSG,

and integrated to support I MEF. The remaining personnel were combined into a single detachment, led

by the battalion’s commanding officer, Navy Commander Benjamin G. M. Feril, and deployed throughout January and February to set up an aid station at

MLC’s support area. They also provided overflow

support to I MEF and medical regulating for MarCent.

2d Dental Battalion was also reorganized. During

the deployment of the Marine Logistics Command,

the battalion commanding officer, Navy Captain

Stephen J. Connelly, was assigned as 2d FSSG’s chief

of staff and acted in this capacity at Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina. Meanwhile, Captain Stephen M.

Pachuta (USN), executive officer of Dental Battalion,

deployed forward as the officer-in-charge of Dental

Battalion Forward. Of the three expeditionary dental

platoons, each of which had six dental officers and

nine dental technicians, Bravo and Charlie platoons

were assigned to augment the two surgical companies that were transferred to 1st FSSG’s Health Services Battalion. The third, Alpha platoon, deployed in

support of MLC and shared facilities at Camp Fox

with the medical detachment.63

With operational flexibility and innovation, 2d

FSSG transformed itself into the Marine Logistics

Command. Although the concept was not new, there

was limited doctrine, which made the task of reorganization and transformation a major challenge.

However, this was just one of a series of challenges

that General Lehnert and his operational level logistics command would face and overcome during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

USMC Photo

Marines of 2d FSSG Military Police Battalion conduct canine training at Camp Fox, Kuwait.

Remain Behind Staff

While 1st and 2d FSSGs were deployed in

support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, their remain-behind staffs were augmented with

Marines from 4th FSSG to continue performing

their mission in garrison. This included the

management of a large quantity of remain-behind equipment, as well as continued training

and the area commander responsibility.

Marines from both 4th Supply Battalion and 4th

Maintenance Battalion were activated to support the continental U.S. requirements during

Operation Iraqi Freedom].64

* In the rear, the medical battalion is only approximately 65 percent staffed and is augmented through the medical augmentation

program in times of war.
19

By the fall of 2002, 1st Force Service Support

Group’s (FSSG) transition to its wartime organization

and 2d FSSG’s transformation to the Marine Logistics

Command were well underway. The main task at

hand was getting Marine forces and all their equipment into theater and ready to fight.

The Offload

While in garrison, the 2d FSSG maintained a forward element, consisting of approximately 30 permanent personnel. Led by Colonel Stephen W. Otto,

the 2d FSSG Forward mirrored a brigade service support group (BSSG) command and control structure.

Yet when task organized for OIF, it was a flexible organization of more than 1,500 Marines and sailors.*

During the fall of 2002, Colonel Otto and his staff

planned for the spectrum of missions they might face,

but it was difficult at best to pinpoint exactly how

many Marines were needed to deploy at any given

time.

In late November, the FSSG Forward received its

first mission: to offload one ship bearing aviation ordnance materials, and be prepared to offload a second

ship. Because this mission assignment was not a part

of the request for forces associated with Operations

Plan 1003V, Colonel Otto had to rapidly deploy an

initial force to execute the ammunition offload, while

maintaining the capability to handle other missions

that would come their way. His planning proved to

be on target; even as an eight-person advanced party

was en route to Kuwait to prepare for the ammunition

offload, Colonel Otto received another mission for his

Marines: to offload two Maritime Prepositioning Ship

Squadrons (MPSRONs).* The initial plan had called

for 1st FSSG to conduct the first offload and 2d FSSG

to handle the second; however, after lengthy discussions, it was decided that 2d FSSG would conduct

both Maritime Prepositioning Force offloads, freeing

up 1st FSSG to move forward and establish sustainment bases in support of the MEF.

Prior to the offload, General Lehnert and a small

staff visited Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, to liaise with the

377th Theater Support Command. Intuitively, the

FSSG’s commanding general established a formal relationship between his Marines and the Army’s theater

logistics providers, ultimately deploying a command

liaison element to Camp Arifjan to conduct continuous coordination with the Army throughout the war.1

As one of the first Marine Corps units to arrive in

Kuwait, the 2d FSSG Forward’s advanced party, led

by Major Arthur J. Pasagian, the unit’s executive officer, spent several days liaising with host nation contractors, the Kuwaiti government, U.S. Embassy

officials, and other service organizations. Predeployment planning had the Army’s theater support command providing basic infrastructure, transportation

support, stevedore support at the port, cargo movement at the airfield, and general life support. To the

FSSG’s dismay, the Army had not yet received its

own force enablers in theater, and short-fused

Chapter 2

Arrival in Theater

* Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, the table of organization

of the FSSG Forward continued to fluctuate to meet the changing

missions, at one point reaching almost 1,900 Marines and sailors,

task organized from their parent battalions within 2d FSSG

Vehicles are offloaded from one of eleven Maritime

Prepositioned Force ships in Kuwait.

Photo by CNA
arrangements had to be made with local contractors

and third country nationals in Kuwait.2

On 27 December, the main body of the 2d FSSG

Forward arrived in theater. Re-designated as Combat

Service Support Detachment Kuwait Naval Base,

these 450 Marines worked tirelessly to offload five

ships carrying aviation ordnance. A total of 13,198

pallets of ordnance material was offloaded and distributed to various munitions storage areas by way of

153 convoys. This enormous responsibility became

an even greater challenge when the Marines realized

that locally contracted drivers and vehicles were not

allowed on Kuwaiti bases. To overcome this obstacle, the Marines quickly began to train their own drivers to operate commercial vehicles on base. At the

same time, 2d FSSG Forward created a beach operations group to support the reception, staging, onward

movement, and integration (RSO&I) of the 15th and

24th Marine Expeditionary Units, as well as both Amphibious Task Forces West and East with initial sustainment and operational support. During the beach

operations, they processed 7,717 personnel, 1,500 vehicles, and 6,182 pieces of cargo through the Kuwait

Naval Base.

On 5 January, additional augmentees from 2d FSSG

arrived in Kuwait, transforming the FSSG Forward

into the Landing Force Support Party. Marines from

Bravo Company, 2d Transportation Support Battalion

provided the nucleus of the transportation support

detachment, supporting the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration operations in

Kuwait. The shore party’s mission, to offload two MPSRONs consisting of 11 ships, presented 2d FSSG with

an interesting command and control situation. Essentially, they were now answering to two separate commands: first as an operational force for MarCent,

supporting the ordnance offload, and second as a tactical enabling force for I MEF, supporting the RSO&I

of equipment to assembly areas throughout Kuwait.

To offload the MPSRONs, 2d FSSG established and

maintained a seaport of debarkation at the Kuwaiti

Port of Ash Shuaybah, where they offloaded, staged,

and conducted throughput of 8,452 containers, 8,617

wheeled vehicles, 964 tracked vehicles, 5,112 trailers,

2,714 lifts of general cargo, 64 aircraft, and 18,000 personnel. The original goal, to complete the offload in

21 days, required that one ship be completed every

72 hours. Although few individuals believed that this

was possible, given the shortfalls in vehicle drivers

and equipment operators, both squadrons were unloaded in 17.5 days. This offload, one squadron in

support of I MEF and a second in support of 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, was the largest Maritime

Prepositioning Force offload since the first Gulf War

and believed to be the most expedient in Marine

Corps history, finishing four days ahead of schedule.3

While the offloads of the ammunition ships, as well

as the Maritime Prepositioning Force Squadron ships,

were underway, another element of 2d FSSG Forward

was dispatched to the Kuwait City International Air20 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by CNA 

The USNS PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK-3002) docks at the Kuwaiti Naval Base, awaiting offload. The MPF

ship was named in honor of the first African American Marine recipient of the Medal of Honor, which was

awarded posthumously to PFC Anderson during the Vietnam War.
port. Their mission was to establish an aerial port of

debarkation to receive and process all Marine Corps

personnel and cargo arriving on inbound flights.

Working around the clock, these Marines were able to

handle 3,000 to 4,000 incoming Marines each day. Receiving minimal support from the Army, 2d FSSG Forward once again looked to commercial contractors

for 20 buses to transport personnel and equipment to

their assembly areas throughout the region. From the

Kuwait Naval Base, the Port of Ash Shuaybah and the

airport, 2d FSSG Forward facilitated the flow of Marine forces. Marines arrived in theater one day and

were ready for war the next.4

Establishing a Base of Operations

in Kuwait

During January and February of 2003, Marines

arrived in Kuwait by the thousands. Following a

series of requests for forces* and subsequent deployment orders, units arrived by both sea and air.

Two 17-ship amphibious task forces brought 2d

I MEF Command Element–4,638

1st Marine Division–20,606 Secure the southern oil fields; conduct a passage of lines through

Task Force Tarawa, and attack toward Baghdad.

3d Marine Aircraft Wing–14,381 Shape I MEF’s

battle space; screen the ground combat element

from attacks; support CFACC.

1st Force Service Support Group–10,504 Provide direct combat service support to I MEF; interface with the Marine Logistics Command, a

theater-level command under operational control of

MarCent.

I MEF Engineer Group–3,121 Maintain roads

and bridges along the I MEF lines of communication; this unit was a composite of U.S. Navy construction battalions and Marine engineers.

Task Force Tarawa (2d Marine Expeditionary

Brigade)–5,091 Secure An-Nasiriyah and crossings

across the Euphrates River; secure lines of communication.

15th MEU–1,739 Attach to 1 (UK) Armored Division for Opening Gambit; attach to Task Force

Tarawa.

1 (UK) Armored Division–21,045 Attack north

from Kuwait; conduct relief in place in oil fields

with 1st Marine Division; secure Basrah and vicinity.

I MEF Total–81,125

Other Marine Forces in Theater:

MarCent Command Element (Bahrain)–385

Marine Logistics Command (Kuwait)–4,525

CJTF/Consequence Management (Kuwait)–742

MarCent Total–86,777*

* This is the rendition of the MarCent morning report, 17Mar03,

captured by the field historian attached to MarCent, LtCol Jeffery

Acosta, and sent to the author by e-mail. The total does not

show the Marines committed to CJTF Horn of Africa.

Marine Order of Battle

By 0800 on 17 March 2003, the order of battle for I MEF, and the individual components strength andmissions, were depicted in briefing charts at MarCent.

Arrival in Theater 21

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) and Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1), while the remainder of I MEF flew by a combination of military and

civilian contracted aircraft. Eventually, more than

80,000 Marines and their equipment deployed into

theater in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

When they arrived, the Marines dispersed to one

of many camps built throughout the vast desert between Kuwait’s capital city and its border with Iraq.

The preponderance of I MEF headquarters was located at Camp Commando, a section of a Kuwaiti

commando training facility that Marines and civilian contractors had transformed into a fortress of

buildings, tents, and guard towers. 1st Marine Division and Task Force Tarawa were located at

Camp Matilda and Camp Ryan respectively, large

camps that had been erected in the Kuwaiti desert

with hundreds of giant canvas tents and parking

lots filled with equipment. 3d Marine Air Wing established its base of operations at two existing

Kuwait Air Force bases located in al-Jaber and Ali

al-Salem. Although still considered to be a field environment, where Marines lived and worked in

tents, these two bases had been supplemented

with such amenities as air-conditioned mess halls

* The Pentagon’s decision to use deployment orders instead of the

more sequential time-phased force deployment data (TPFFD)

process to move forces into theater was not a popular one among

many planners in the field. 
with ice cream machines, showers, and post exchange facilities.

Camp Wake Island

1st FSSG had begun planning for campsites in

Kuwait almost one and a half years prior to the war;

actual execution of this plan, however, did not begin

until November 2002. Before the first ship arrived at

the port, Marines from the 1st FSSG established a 42-

square mile arrival and assembly operations element

in the Kuwaiti desert. Just a few days after their arrival in the first week of November, Major William L.

Babcock Jr., assistant logistics officer for the 1st FSSG,

and his Marines turned what was once an empty tract

of desert into a receiving point for all 1st FSSG equipment. Camp Wake Island, as the area was named,

served as the rallying point for all 1st FSSG personnel to link up with equipment and supplies from military aircraft and vessels. Major Babcock described

their arrival to the area:

We walked in looking at a flat area with an

undeveloped road network. What we've done

is completely shaped the terrain and the arrival

and assembly area to accept Marine Corps assets quickly. It's the same concept that has been

repeated and successful for the Marine Corps.

The way we employ forces provides the Marine

Corps the ability to assemble combat power

quickly into a combined air-ground task force.5

Camp Coyote

While Camp Wake Island served as 1st FSSG’s rallying point for personnel and equipment arriving in

theater, Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Coyote became its staging area while making the final preparations for war. On 3 January 2003, General Usher

flew all of his commanders to Kuwait, to conduct a

site survey of TAA Coyote. For five days, the commanders traveled extensively through the area, to include a trip up to the Iraqi border, and then returned

to the United States to prepare their battalions for deployment. Construction began on 10 January, after a

lengthy process of acquiring Kuwaiti approval. The

La Nouvelle Company won the contract to build the

camp and largely used locals for the actual construction. All supplies had to be flown into Kuwait from

other countries; even the gravel being used for dust

control was imported from the United Arab Emirates.

There were challenges with weather, supplies, and

shortened timelines, made all the more difficult because of the Muslim holidays local contractors celebrated. All in all, though, the camps were well

equipped. For food services the Marines contracted

ESS Support Services, a food subcontractor of Halliburton, to provide, construct, and manage large

field kitchens and chow halls. While the original plan

had the food services company supporting up to

30,000 troops, they ended up accommodating upwards of 60,000 with seven kitchens.

Complete with an expeditionary airfield,* TAA

Coyote encompassed 58 square miles and was divided into 20 individual camps, each housing more

22 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by DVIC DM-SD-04-00296

Originally a barren patch of desert in northern Kuwait, Camp Coyote rapidly became a massive logistics hub

for 1st Force Service Support Group.

* In February of 2003, an expeditionary airfield was constructed

within TAA Coyote. Marine Corps Air Station, Joe Foss was named

in honor of Maj Joseph J. Foss, World War II Marine pilot and

Medal of Honor recipient. At age 87, he had just died on 1 January of that year.
Arrival in Theater 23

than 500 personnel. The camps were designed with

dispersion in mind, yet allowed for secure movement

between them. All 20 were completed in 33 days,

and 59 miles of security berm were constructed in 12

days.6 All but two of the camps were named for Marine battles from the famous island hopping campaign of World War II; it was thought that each

individual camp, housing one of several FSSG units,

was like “an island or a self-contained and sufficient

entity in the vast desert sand.”7

By February 2003, the 1st FSSG Headquarters established itself at Camp Iwo Jima, Tactical Assembly

Area Coyote. Although the smallest in geographical

size, Camp Iwo Jima was the first of 11 built on Coyote and considered to be the “model home” for the

remaining 1st FSSG camps to be built in area. Complete with hot shower trailers, portable commodes,

and billeting tents with wood floors and electricity,

the camp offered many amenities to the Marines that

they did not expect to find in the Kuwaiti desert.

Major David V. Raimo,* Camp Iwo Jima commandant,

stated that “from the junior troops up to senior officers, a lot of them said [that] this is the best field living [they’ve] ever experienced.”8

Marines from Combat Service Support Group 11

(CSSG-11) arrived at Camp Bougainville, 1st FSSG’s

northernmost camp in Kuwait, during late January

and early February. The Marines were largely impressed with what they found. As one described, “instead of a vast wasteland, there was a

berm-surrounded area that had Bedouin tents with

lights and wooden decks, shower trailers, and a

chow tent that served two hot meals daily. These

were a welcome surprise to the Marines and sailors

so recently removed from the conveniences of the

United States and expecting to live in two-man

tents.”9

In mid-February, the 1st FSSG staff was directed

to establish a forward command post. Captain Kevin

P. Coughlin, a staff judge advocate who had initially

been assigned as a prosecutor for the Legal Support

Services Section, was pulled from his job working in

operational law and rules of engagement to be the

camp commandant. Together with Gunnery Sergeant

Wesley M. Wentz, the company gunnery sergeant,

Captain Coughlin successfully developed tables of organization and equipment that would support the requirements for a forward headquarters camp. They

established Camp Midway just a few hundred meters

away from the main FSSG camp. This was a practice

run for the 1st FSSG Forward, testing their ability to

conduct independent operations while split from the

main element and to remain self-sufficient for an exTAA Coyote

Camp Iwo Jima 1st FSSG Headquarters

Camp Betio 7th Engineer Support Battalion

Camp Okinawa Combat Service Support Battalion 18

Camp Tarawa Combat Service Support Group 15

Combat Service Support Battalion 12

Camp Guadalcanal Health Services Battalion

Camp Peleliu 8th Engineer Support Battalion

Camp Bougainville Combat Service Support Group 11

Combat Service Support Battalion 10

Camp Solomon Islands 6th Engineer Support Battalion

Camp Guam Transportation Support Group

* Maj Raimo, like many officers in 1st FSSG, had arrived in Kuwait

under the auspices of Exercise Internal Look, a CentCom exercise

based on the current version of the plan for the invasion of Iraq.
tended period of time. This satellite camp, which became the blueprint for future FSSG Forward constructs, housed the operations center that directed all

of 1st FSSG’s combat service support on the battlefield.10

Camp Fox

While 1st FSSG established Tactical Assembly Area

Coyote, the Marine Logistics Command was busy developing its own logistics support area. Colonel

William A. Meier, a 27-year combat engineer veteran,

was given the task of building Logistics Support Area

(LSA) Fox. Having previously served as General

Lehnert’s chief of staff in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,

Colonel Meier was transferred from his current assignment at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North

Carolina, to serve as the deputy operations officer for

2d FSSG. After arriving in Kuwait during January

2003, he was assigned as the “area” or “camp commander”* of what became a sprawling logistics support area. Two-hundred-fifty Marines from the FSSG

Forward were reassigned as a quartering party to assist in the buildup of LSA Fox, a 50-square-mile area

in the vast Kuwaiti desert.

While a more northern location was originally designated as the site for LSA Fox—also known as Camp

Fox—this area was home to a large number of

Bedouins. To avoid any added conflicts or complications in the construction of the camp, the FSSG opted

to move and find a new site. A vast stretch of empty

desert to the south was eventually selected as an alternative. The engineer detachment from 8th Engineer Support Battalion (8th ESB) worked on the basic

infrastructure of the camp, including utilities, water,

power, and fuel. Additionally, the detachment’s small

explosive ordnance disposal team worked to uncover

and remove a large quantity of ordnance discovered

during the construction of Camp Fox. The size and

breadth of the camp required the engineers to work

long, often 18-hour days for the first six weeks. During the initial construction phases, 2d Military Police

Battalion provided command and control to integrate

security elements from the Marine, Navy, and British

units. This combined security force implemented a

comprehensive, multi-layered anti-terrorism/force

protection plan.13

The camp’s new location was extremely remote,

and the lack of trafficable roads and a usable airfield*

presented an enormous challenge. Ultimately, an entire road network had to be laid down. For Colonel

Meier, this proved to be one of the most challenging

aspects of developing Camp Fox. Materials available

through local contractors, a combination of a claylike substance called “getch” and a low-grade gravel,

did not hold up well when wet, and severe rainstorms made the roads unusable for days at a time.

Another challenge that Colonel Meier and his Marines

24 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR

The FSSG Forward headquarters is assembled at Camp Coyote February 2003. 

* Because the decision to build the camp came prior to the official “stand-up” of the Marine Logistics Command, the camp commander managed all internal aspects of the camp, to include

several million-dollar contracts, which would normally have been

the responsibility of the G-4. After the MLC was officially in place,

these internal functions remained under the camp commander’s

responsibilities, therefore overshadowing the need for a G-4 on

the MLC staff. With the exception of military police, all internal logistical requirements continued to be managed by the camp commander. 

* Although there was no formal airfield at LSA Fox, two helicopter landing zones were constructed.
Arrival in Theater 25

faced was working with the Kuwaitis and foreign

contractors, who generally did not work at the same

pace or maintain the same work habits as Marines.14

Within Camp Fox, there were seven self-contained

subordinate camps, a large ammunition supply point

encompassing 18 square miles, a perimeter berm

with guard towers and Arabic warning signs, a post

exchange, a post office, and medical facility. Complete with warehouses, maintenance pads, hardstand

billeting areas, a road network, and a command and

control network, it became the base of operations for

the Marine Logistics Command and its subordinate

units. Additionally, the camp was home to two tenant units: the British Army’s 6th Supply Regiment and

Seabees from the Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 4 and the I MEF Engineer Group.

Headquarters and Service Battalion, 2d FSSG focused its efforts on establishing a variety of services,

such as mail, exchange facilities, disbursing, administration, and communications. The battalion established a joint military mail terminal at Subhan,

Kuwait, as well as subordinate post offices at the

Kuwait City International Airport, the Kuwait Naval

Base, and Camp Fox. Although the food services

company was originally prepared to feed Marines

within MLC, they were transformed into a provisional

rifle company and used for internal camp security

after their food service mission was contracted out

to local civilian companies.

The Buildup of Sustainment Capability

Once in theater, MLC focused their efforts on developing its sustainment capabilities. Nobody could

predict how long operations would continue, and ultimately, it was MLC’s responsibility to provide logistics support for the duration of the war. It had only

Classes of Supply

Class I Subsistence (food), gratuitous (free) health and comfort items

Class II Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, hand tools, unclassified maps, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment

Class III Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) (package and bulk): Petroleum, fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants,

deicer and antifreeze compounds,components,and additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal

Class IV Construction materials, including installed equipment and all fortification and barrier materials

Class V Ammunition of all types,bombs,explosives,mines,fuzes,detonators,pyrotechnics,missiles,

rockets, propellants, and associated items

Class VI Personal demand items (such as health and hygiene products,soaps and toothpaste,writing

material, snack food, beverages, cigarettes, batteries, alcohol, and cameras—nonmilitary sales

items)

Class VII Major end items such as launchers, tanks, mobile machine shops, and vehicles

Class VIII Medical material (equipment and consummables) including repair parts peculiar to medical equipment

Class IX Repair parts and components to include kits, assemblies, and subassemblies (repairable or

non-repairable) required for maintenance support of all equipment

Class X Material to support nonmilitary programs such as agriculture and economic development

(not included in Classes I through IX)
been a few months earlier when the decision was

made to deploy 2d Supply Battalion as part of the Marine Logistics Command. Led by Colonel William F.

Johnson, a 28-year veteran of Marine Corps supply,

this battalion was tasked to provide operational supply support to I MEF and 1st FSSG, to include all

classes of supply. However, by the time Colonel Johnson was finally able to deploy his Marines into theater

and begin to build the battalion’s stocks of supplies,

he already faced one obstacle: a large backlog of orders for repair parts that I MEF units had been accumulating during the past few months. With priority

placed on ammunition, rations, and medical supplies,

emerging requirements for repair parts became a secondary concern. The challenge presented by this

early backlog of requests was amplified by a major

system challenge: 1st and 2d FSSGs were operating

within two incompatible supply systems, which prohibited the ability to maintain visibility across the battlespace. Another challenge that Colonel Johnson

faced was that as 2d Supply Battalion built its supply

stocks in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it remained responsible for providing consumable repair

parts support to all II MEF, 22d and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units, Combined Armed Exercises, Unitas, Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Rolling Thunder,

and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Support Company, 2d Supply Battalion, was responsible for managing the MLC’s container operations terminal lot. Having recently transferred the

equipment record keeping of more than $200 million worth of 2d FSSG assets to the battalion level,

Support Company, 2d Supply Battalion, was now

able to focus its time and effort on building and

maintaining this lot, which housed high usage items,

to include over $1.5 million of office and administrative supplies, construction equipment, personal

hygiene items, and large equipment.

In addition to building sustainment stocks in support of the war effort, Colonel Johnson took the opportunity to address problems encountered during

Desert Storm. Coordinating with the British 14th Geographic Squadron, 2d Supply Battalion established

a field map depot to facilitate the issue of paper and

26 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Historically, during combat operations, logisticians

deal with challenges such as poor visibility of supply

requisitions and subsequent status updates. This was

certainly no different during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In a testimony given to the House Armed Services Committee, Brigadier General Usher commented

on this deficiency: 

Our greatest shortfall during OIF was the

lack of in-transit visibility information to incorporate into our command and control effort.

The FSSG had large, extended convoys moving

hundreds of miles in unsecured terrain supporting Marine forces spread across thousands

of square miles in demanding weather conditions. The lack of asset visibility on unit stocks

and in-transit visibility on ordered items made

it difficult to identify actual shortages, to locate

needed items within stocks for reallocation,

and to direct and track the movement of ordered items to requesting units. This lack of

visibility resulted in delays, shortages, and at

times an inability to expedite critical parts.15

With the long distances the MEF was traveling and

the number of units spread out across the battlefield,

visibility of supply requisitions was poor. Additionally, because 1st and 2d FSSG were using different

versions of the Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply

System (ATLASS), there were problems with the supply system from the start. Technical workarounds

provided temporary solutions, but the big disconnect

and frustration was in the lack of visibility. Ultimately, it did not hamper the execution of the mission; however, the mission accomplished was often

done so through “brute force logistics,” which General Usher described as “simply a way of applying

what had to be done . . . not pretty . . . not elegant

. . . and not sophisticated. Sheer adrenaline pushed

to move sustainment and to provide other elements

of combat service support as quickly as possible

across an increasing line of communication.”16

Demonstrating the kind of initiative and ingenuity that allowed the 1st FSSG to step so far outside its

doctrinal box, Major Brandon D. McGowan, CSSB18 supply company commander in 1st FSSG, helped

alleviate the problem of poor visibility by marrying

the ATLASS system with satellite phone technology

to provide supply units hundreds of miles apart on

the battlefield the ability to send and receive supply

requisitions. Working closely with systems command

and 2d FSSG, he also aligned the separate systems

being used by the two FSSGs to facilitate data flow

between them.17

The Supply System
Arrival in Theater 27

digital maps to all Marine forces in theater. This facility warehoused over two million maps and imagery products, and during Operation Iraqi Freedom,

it issued more than 330,000 maps to I MEF and Coalition forces. 

MLC’s Growing Distribution Mission

The original distribution plan for moving supplies

throughout the theater had MLC vehicles concentrated on transportation from the ports of entry to Logistics Support Area Fox and Tactical Assembly Area

Coyote. The preponderance of the long-haul requirement of moving supplies forward into Iraq had

initially been allocated to U.S. Army theater assets.

Although the Army provided limited resources, such

as heavy tank haulers and fuel trucks, the theater assets did not materialize in the expected numbers, because the Army’s 377th Theater Support Command

could not support both V Corps and I MEF. It was

also determined that 1st FSSG did not possess the vehicles to reach back to TAA Coyote from their forward support areas in Iraq. Additionally, the original

flow of forces into theater focused on the push for

combat troops; deployment enablers, to include truck

drivers, were limited. General Lehnert, Commander

of MLC recognized the shortfall early on:

As soon as we got into country, it became

very obvious that the distribution assets that

had been promised by the theater support

command were not available at that time and

were not likely to be available for some time.

So what we had to do was use our expeditionary contracting capability to contract for almost 300 tractor-trailers driven by third country

nationals.18

When 2d FSSG had begun operating in Kuwait they

had contracted with local vendors to help support the

offload of equipment from the ports to LSA Fox. When

this contract was due to expire they had renewed it,

but shifted the fleet of vehicles and drivers to new

transportation missions within Kuwait. As the plan unfolded, and it became more obvious that 2d Transportation Support Battalion would move forward into

Iraq, stretching the logistical lines even further up the

battlefield, another missing link in the distribution

chain became clear. As a result, the Marine Logistics

Command established another contract for third country national drivers, vehicles, and maintenance support to cover the distance between TAA Coyote and

forward bases in Iraq. General Lehnert described:

If you’re a student of history, you’ll know

that that was done during Desert Storm, and

this wasn’t particularly an original concept.

What was original in this particular case is not

only were they initially contracted to move the

over 5,000 containers that came off the MPS

shipping—because once again, we could not

get that support from the Theater Support Command in at least the speed and the quantities

that we desired—but after that mission was

over with the TCNs, the third country nationals

in the contracted vehicles actually were integrated into our battlefield distribution plan and

went all the way north and actually up to about

250 to 300 miles into Iraq.20

To manage and support contracts with over 230

third country national drivers from 11 nations and

their large fleet of commercial vehicles, General

Lehnert established the MLC Support Detachment 1

(MSD-1). This 545–Marine and sailor unit, commanded by Major Tyson B. Geisendorff, was staged

at Camp Tarawa, TAA Coyote, where it could move

supply convoys north to points in Iraq. MSD-1 also

fulfilled a number of other functions to include providing military police, medical, communications, utility engineers, bulk fuel, maintenance, supply, and

ammunition.

Courtesy of 2d FSSG

Gen Michael R. Lehnert greets a locally contracted

driver at Camp Fox.
General Lehnert recognized that hiring third country national (TCN) drivers from Kuwait and asking

them to drive into Iraq posed new challenges and

potential for mission abandonment. He quickly implemented a program of team building among the

foreign drivers to address the human dimension and

allay any fears they had regarding their mission. He

understood the criticality of the third country national

truck force and focused on their well-being and selfconfidence. To start, the drivers were provided with

shelter, food, and fuel for their trucks. Additionally,

they were given Geneva Convention photo identification cards, gas masks, and an armed Marine as an

assistant driver. This helped to boost their confidence. General Lehnert also believed that the foreign

drivers would excel at their mission more if given additional incentives. Besides visiting the camp, sharing meals and taking photographs with the drivers,

he implemented a simple reward system where Marine Corps emblem decals would be affixed to the

vehicles to reflect a driver’s successful mission into

Iraq. A seemingly trivial program paid dividends in

the end, as the drivers were motivated and demonstrated great resolve in supporting the MLC team.21

Setting up a Communications Architecture

By table of organization, each FSSG possessed its

own communications company. 2d FSSG’s communications company supported connectivity between

MLC’s multiple sites, to include the beach operations

group at Kuwait Naval Base, the seaport of debarkation at the Port of Ash Shuaybah, the aerial port of

debarkation at Kuwait City International Airport, the

Arifjan Army Base, and Camp Fox. Although this

worked during the build-up of forces, it was obvious

to Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth S. Helfrich, 2d FSSG’s

communications officer, that for Operation Iraqi Freedom this would not suffice. For example, the communications company did not possess satellite

capability, which was an absolute necessity for longrange and distributed operations.

As a result of this shortfall, the Marine Logistics

Command relied heavily on assets from 8th Communications Battalion, II MEF,* commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Roarke L. Anderson. Almost

immediately upon receiving its mission to conduct

the ammunition offload, 2d FSSG received the support of an additional communications company from

8th Communications Battalion, which did possess the

satellite capability. Although the battalion had not

been considered in the initial planning for Operation

Iraqi Freedom, various missions developed over the

course of several months, including a requirement to

provide basic communications support to 2d Marine

Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa). During

subsequent planning conferences, the communica28 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

In early 2003, when forces began arriving into theater, it was not by the time-phased force deployment

data (TPFDD) process, but rather through the request

for forces (RFF)/deployment orders. The more traditional TPFDD process formed the basis for all deployments in support of Operations Plan 1003V and

was based on force planning, support planning, and

transportation planning; it addressed both force requirements and prioritized transportation movement.

On the other hand, the RFF/deployment orders

process required Central Command to request packages of forces, each of which had to be approved by

the Secretary of Defense. General Lehnert commented

on the impact of this decision on the Marine Corps’

ability to provide logistics support to its own forces: 

When the force came here, the decision was

made at the highest levels to move the forces:

the RFF as opposed to TPFDD, and the net impact of that was that in many cases the deployment enablers were not moved in the right sequence. So you had combat forces that showed

up expecting sustainment, expecting the maintenance, the transportation and the food to be

in place when the deployment enablers were

still moving . . . We worked through that, but

having the RFF process rather than a TPFDD

was not a plus, and it certainly made the level

of difficulty much harder than it needed to be.19

Another challenge posed by the decision to use

deployment orders was that units could not be alerted

until the deployment order was signed. This was especially difficult for the large number of reservists

who supported 1st FSSG during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Final decisions often came very late and left

units scrambling to deploy.

Request for Forces

* 8th Communications Battalion had at one time been a part of

the FSSG, but was now a standalone battalion within the II MEF

Headquarters Group.
Arrival in Theater 29

tions requirements for both Marine Forces Central

Command (MarCent) and MLC were identified, and

as a result, Support Company was assigned to MarCent’s command element, and Bravo and Charlie

Companies were assigned in direct support of MLC.

This presented a complicated command structure, as

the battalion’s headquarters element was attached to

MarCent, which was located in Bahrain, but the majority of the battalion was co-located with, and tactically controlled by, MLC at Camp Fox in Kuwait.22

In addition to the support provided by 8th Communications Battalion, the MLC received assistance

from both the U.S. Army and Air Force to address the

emerging communications requirements. In the interim, however, while the communications architecture was being built, cellular phones were a critical,

but temporary and expensive, solution.

During the next several weeks, the focus of 2d

FSSG shifted from the offload of the ammunition and

MPF ships to the construction of Logistics Support

Area Fox and the establishment of the MLC. To make

this happen, 2d FSSG required additional aid from

8th Communications Battalion. Arriving in theater

during the second week of February, advanced planners for the battalion began to tackle the complex

problems of setting up a communications network.

Essentially, two companies had to create a communications network to link multiple locations in the

southern area of operations, which encompassed

Kuwait’s ports, its airport, and MLC’s expansive Camp

Fox. Problems included interference caused by

power lines and city structures. Adding to this, the

complicated command relationships meant that the

battalion headquarters could not task its own companies. 

It was immediately identified that MLC required a

more substantial communications architecture than it

had originally anticipated and the communications

planners established a centralized Operation Systems

Control Center (OSCC). Major Julie L. Nethercot, the

communications battalion operations officer and director of the OSCC described their operations: 

We pulled open a couple of doctrinal pubs,

and we found what would best fit this situation.

Usually when the battalion would deploy, I, as

the [S-3], would run the systems control. In this

instance, we have not only 8th Comm Bn, but

we have 2d FSSG communications company,

and Marine Wing Communications Squadron

48: three very unique groups, units, missions .

. . so what we did is we stood up what’s called

an Operations Systems Control Center, which

takes all three units and gives communications

control to one entity, the OSCC . . . and by putting that in place, that gave MarCent one unit

that they talked to, one organization that they

tasked.23

While the concept of the OSCC was well conceived, its implementation was not. The original plan

had the OSCC co-located with the MLC’s Combat

Service Support Operations Center and positioned at

the center of “the hub and spoke” setup, with communications lines stretching out to battalions. Although this plan would have optimized the

communications capabilities support, when units

began to arrive in Kuwait and set up at Camp Fox,

the arrangement was more linear, prohibiting execution of the original plan.24 Despite these limitations

and a number of other challenges, including new

gear, environmental obstacles, and command and

control complications, the OSCC was able to process

a daily average of 12,000 phone calls.25

Preparing for Battle

In the weeks leading up to the start of Operation

Iraqi Freedom, both 1st and 2d FSSG shifted their

focus from “getting into country” to “preparing for

battle.” Rehearsing realistic scenarios and identifying

unknown factors helped prepare the Marines for

what was to come. Training was emphasized at all

levels, from senior staff officers down to the individual Marines. At the upper levels this materialized as

rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills.

Recognizing the complexities associated with the

logistics and combat service support missions, General Lehnert orchestrated a ROC drill on 23 February

2003. The purpose was to test supportability concepts, introduce trafficability and distance limitations

and probable enemy responses, and to challenge

preconceived unit employment plans. This drill, attended by general and senior officers from the Marine Logistics Command, the 377th Theater Support

Command, I Marine Expeditionary Force, 1st Marine

Division, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, and 1st Force Service Support Group, forced units to address potential

problems and alternate solutions, while establishing

a common baseline for theater, operational, and tactical level logistics forces.

On 5 March, the 1st FSSG hosted its own drill at

Camp Midway. Lasting five hours, this exercise allowed members of the group staff and other major

commands, such as the Marine Logistics Command

and 3d Marine Air Wing, an opportunity to identify

discrepancies in their plan and coordinate support
requirements and deconfliction of movement and

mission. Lieutenant Colonel Adrian W. Burke, 1st

FSSG future operations officer and a veteran combat

service support commander from the first Gulf War,

orchestrated the rehearsal. Representatives from each

battalion and group briefed their schemes of maneuver for multiple phases of the war, providing the attendees with an opportunity to view the entire

picture of combat service support across the battlefield.26

Combat Service Support Group 11

At the unit level, training focused on both job proficiency and general battle skills. Because they were

in direct support of 1st Marine Division, it was highly

likely that Marines in Combat Service Support Group

11 would find themselves in combat situations. CSSG11 had conducted close cooperative planning efforts

with 1st Marine Division through constant exercises

and rehearsal of concept drills. These events, occurring both stateside and in Kuwait, had begun in the

summer of 2002 and continued up to the day prior to

crossing the line of departure into Iraq. Additionally,

the commanding officer, Colonel John J. Pomfret,

conducted a Marine Corps combat readiness evaluation system test to ensure that his Marines were well

prepared in both their combat skills and military occupational specialty skills. Combat skills included firing, maneuver, movement, chemical decontamination,

and security. Further, the colonel and his subordinate

commanders continuously conveyed to each Marine

the importance of realistic preparations for war. The

uniform of the day for Marines at Camp Bougainville

included helmet, flak jacket, and gas mask carried at

one’s side. Because of the potential for biological and

chemical attacks, mission oriented protective posture

(MOPP) suits were required to be accessible within

60 seconds. This uniform standard, which mirrored

that of 1st Marine Division, was above and beyond

that of other units within 1st FSSG. Reaction drills for

both enemy conventional and chemical attacks were

also conducted on a regular basis.

Training was emphasized during the weeks leading

up to the war, and all units within CSSG-11 participated. For example, within the group’s five shock

trauma platoons were many medical augmentation

personnel who were not accustomed to being in the

field. Prior to the war, their training in Kuwait focused

on being able to set up quickly both day and night.

High standards were set, and the Marines and sailors

in CSSG-11 met all of them.27

Meanwhile, as the group’s Marines were preparing

30 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR

BGen Edward G. Usher III listens during a rehearsal of concept drill at Camp Midway, TAA Coyote, Kuwait.
Arrival in Theater 31

for potential combat operations, they began providing combat service support to division units. One tool

that provided Colonel Pomfret and his staff with the

ability to better track incoming requests and outgoing

support was the logistics tasking order. Created by

Major James C. Caley, executive officer of CSSG-11,

this tool was loosely based on the aviation community’s air tasking order and was designed to take

rapid requests, consolidate requirements, and produce an order that would lead to mission accomplishment.28

In Combat Service Support Battalion 10 (CSSB10), Colonel Weinkle had great concerns for his

Marines’ safety. Although his battalion normally followed closely behind 1st Marine Division, setting up

repair and replenishment points in anticipation of

ground combat advances required that the combat

service support convoys move in between and in

front of division units, which increased the potential

for friendly fire incidents.29 One thing that helped to

minimize this danger was that CSSG-11 had already

begun providing direct support to 1st Marine Division in Kuwait, and procedures were already in

place. Even as they prepared their own equipment

and personnel for operations in Iraq, CSSG-11 and

CSSB-10 had the mission of providing 22,000 Marines

and sailors in 1st Marine Division with their water,

food, and fuel, as well as preparing their ammunition loads for combat. This early implementation of

support helped strengthen the bonds that had already been established through months of integrated

planning.

Combat Service Support Battalion 22

While elements of I MEF arrived from the West

Coast, forces from II MEF began arriving from the

East Coast. On 16 February, one of the eastern units,

Combat Service Support Battalion 22 (CSSB-22), arrived at the Kuwait Naval Base and immediately

began offloading their personnel and equipment

from the USS Saipan (LHA 2). They then headed to

Camp Ryan, the new desert home for Task Force

Tarawa. Operational tempo was extremely high, as

the Marines in CSSB-22 not only prepared for upcoming combat operations, which included last

minute planning and reshuffling of support capabilities, but also spent long days providing combat service support to both Task Force Tarawa and

Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2), which consisted

of three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and

companies attached from the combat engineer, light

Chemical Protection

The higher the MOPP—Mission Oriented

Protective Posture—level, the greater the threat

of chemical attack. There are four levels MOPP,

which require the wearing of different protective items of clothing. Level I consists of wearing a protective suit (trousers and jacket) and

carrying the suit’s boots, gloves, mask, and

hood. Level II includes wearing the boots,

while carrying the gloves and mask with hood.

Level III adds the wearing of the mask with

hood. Level IV requires the entire outfit, including the gloves, to be worn.

Marines from CSSG-11 train in search and seizure

techniques. Courtesy of CSSB-10

Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR
armored reconnaissance, assault amphibian, tank,

and reconnaissance battalions.30

One of the most significant efforts for CSSB-22 in

the weeks leading up to war was the reorganization

and establishment of mobile resupply teams in direct

support of combat operations. In essence, these

teams, which augmented the battalion logistics trains

with one day of food, water, fuel, and ammunition

resupply, served the same purpose for RCT-2 as the

combat service support companies in CSSG-11 did

for the regimental combat teams of 1st Marine Division. Similar to CSSG-11, the battalion had to balance

both their responsibility to provide combat service

support to Task Force Tarawa and RCT-2 with their

need to train for upcoming operations. During the

weeks following their arrival, the Marines of CSSB22 continued the training they had been conducting

on ship, but also added many live-fire weapon shoots

on Udairi Range, Kuwait, while training daily for immediate action drills and convoy procedures.

Another significant CSSB-22 element was its shock

trauma platoon. While preparing for combat operations, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Goben, commander of CSSB-22, recognized the importance of his

medical unit. “Our shock trauma unit has the capability to reinforce any Task Force Tarawa combat

unit. During the fight, their mission is to stabilize any

casualty for follow on medical care.”31 Unfortunately,

in the days to come, the platoon’s capabilities would

indeed be tested.

General Support Arrives in Country

In early February 2003, Combat Service Support

Group 15’s (CSSG-15) main body arrived in Kuwait.

Throughout the month, the Marines conducted reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

operations, moving both equipment and personnel

to their designated locations. They also began to

32 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Courtesy of CSSB-10

During the weeks prior to the start of the war, MajGen James N. Mattis, commanding general of 1st Marine Division, made several visits to Camp Bougainville to emphasize the critical relationship between the division

Marines and those of CSSG-11 and CSSB-10.
Arrival in Theater 33

focus training on combat operations center procedures, reporting processes and actions, force protection, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)

detection and personal defensive measures. War

seemed imminent during February and March. The

Marines observed a number of senior leaders, to include the Commandant, General Michael W. Hagee;

the Marine Forces Central Command, Lieutenant

General Earl B. Hailston; and the I MEF Commanding General, Lieutenant General James T. Conway,

who visited at that time to deliver motivational “go to

war” speeches.32

Falling beneath the CSSG-15 headquarters, Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (CSSB-12), Combat

Service Support Battalion 18 (CSSB-18), and Health

Services Battalion* also began to arrive in country

during February. When they reached their respective

camps at Tactical Assembly Area Coyote, CSSB-12

and CSSB-18 each established a base of operations,

focusing heavily on training in areas such as combat

service support operations center procedures; nuclear, biological, and chemical alerts; force protection drills; media handling; mortuary affairs;

explosive ordnance disposal; rules of engagement;

and civil affairs. During this period, CSSB-12, however, had the additional responsibility of providing

combat service support to I MEF, which had already

arrived in Kuwait. This support included food, water,

fuel, ammunition, repair parts, medical supplies, and

maintenance capabilities. Additionally, CSSB-12 provided full-service capabilities to include disbursing,

postal, legal, and a post exchange selling sundries,

hygiene products, and junk food. Two Boeing 747s

with $2 million worth of Army and Air Force Exchange Services material were brought in to supply

the post exchange. Services were stationary at CSSB12’s camp, but a small mobile services unit was

pushed out to support the Marines at other camps.33

Meanwhile, CSSB-18 remained “in the box,” to be

prepared for a short notice order to move into Iraq.

Similarly, Health Services Battalion had one of its

companies establish a fully operational surgical capability, while the two other companies awaited orders to move north into Iraq.

6th Engineer Support Battalion

Lieutenant Colonel Roger R. Machut, the commanding officer of 6th Engineer Support Battalion

(6th ESB), arrived in Kuwait on 8 February and assembled his battalion at Camp Solomon Islands, Tactical Assembly Area Coyote. Although he had

completed several tours with 6th ESB during his career, this was the first time the entire battalion had

been mobilized. To support its massive mission to

generate, transport, and provide both fuel and water

to I MEF forces, the battalion received numerous augments from other units, including a utilities platoon

and bulk fuel company from 7th Engineer Support

Battalion (7th ESB). Among them, Bulk Fuel Company, 7th ESB, commanded by Captain Jennifer A.

Esch, had previously been involved in the planning

of the tactical fuel system, and logically transferred

over to 6th ESB as Delta Company. The complement

of 6th ESB eventually totaled more than 1,600

Marines and sailors, a large battalion by Marine Corps

standards. 

Having been assigned the mission to construct

and maintain a tactical fuel system, the battalion immediately began conducting extensive training on

the procedures surrounding the implementation of

the hose-reel system. This included route reconnaissance and land clearing, digging the required V-ditch,

laying the hose, and establishing booster stations.

This training was critical as few of the Marines possessed practical experience acquired while working

in a deployed environment. Anticipating the inevitable movement of forces into Iraq, Colonel

Machut was confident that his Marines would be able

to accomplish the mission and establish the hose-reel

system in the required four days; his concern was focused more on the enemy. While they would not be

laying hose in populated areas where intense fighting was expected, any random insurgent wielding a

knife could easily sabotage the success of the entire

tactical fuel system.34

While most Marines in 6th ESB trained in the

Kuwaiti desert, others continued to receive gear from

MPF ships, as the battalion had initially arrived with

only 19 percent of its standard equipment. It received

more than 6,000 short tons of cargo over the next

few weeks, which included over 1,000 large pieces of

equipment, from five ships arriving at the Port of

Ash-Shuaybah.

On 17 February, Colonel Machut’s Marines

reached Breach Point West, where the battalion’s

command, security, and construction elements had

been prepositioned. Just five miles from the border

* During Operation Iraqi Freedom, CSSG-15 also received many

augments to their organization, including the U.S. Army 7th Biological Integrated Detection System Platoon, 7th Chemical Company, 83d Chemical Battalion; A Company, 63d Signal Battalion;

the 1st Platoon, 51st Chemical Company, 83d Chemical Battalion;

and the U.S. Air Force Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team and

Mobile Air Staging Facility Team, 320th Expeditionary Aeromedical

Evacuation Squadron. (Combat Service Support Group 15 ComdC,

1Jan03–30Jun03.)
between Kuwait and Iraq, these Marines were among

the forward-most positioned units of I MEF. In early

March, when the arrival of some U.S. Army bulk fuel

units was delayed, Colonel Machut received a request

from the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander to provide a bulk fuel company to operate

the Army’s tactical petroleum terminal at Breach

Point West. This last-minute tasking yielded the

largest field fuel farm ever operated by Marines and

it became the primary source of fuel for both I MEF

and the Army’s 3d Infantry Division.35

7th Engineer Support Battalion

By 5 February, the 7th Engineer Support Battalion

had arrived in Kuwait. Located at Camp Betio, Tactical Assembly Area Coyote, their designated engineering mission consisted of construction, mobility

and countermobility, and survivability. As a result,

the Marines had an endless number of engineering

projects to pursue as the 1st FSSG’s new home at TAA

Coyote was being developed. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Scott H. Poindexter, the Marines constructed 14-foot berms, 10-foot-by-15-foot anti-tank

ditches, trenches and bunkers, and portable commodes for the array of camps supporting the Marine

Expeditionary Force. Concurrently, elements of 7th

ESB conducted various training exercises to prepare

for what would become their primary tasks during

the war: combat service support area construction,

main supply route maintenance, breaching, and follow-on breaching.

Bravo and Charlie Companies, which were responsible for the initial breaching and obstacle reduction along the Kuwait-Iraq border, trained

continuously for this critical task. To simulate the actions that were required at the commencement of

combat operations, the Marines constructed a replica

of the enemy’s Kuwait-Iraq border obstacle belt.

Such innovations provided more realistic training

than had been received prior to this deployment.

Other areas of training included chemical and biological decontamination drills, convoy operations,

small arms and crew served weapons employment,

nighttime equipment operation, first aid, patrolling,

and perimeter defense. Captain Susan Bird had Charlie company conduct combined training with 11th

Marines and 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, further solidifying integration with their sup34 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Corpsmen of Alpha Surgical Company, Health Services Battalion set up Forward Resuscitative Surgical System

#5 for incoming casualties.
Arrival in Theater 35

ported combat units. These mounted rehearsals and

training in tactical convoy operations would pay dividends in the near future.36

8th Engineer Support Battalion

Like many other battalions, 8th Engineer Support

Battalion had the daunting task of reorganizing late in

the game and retraining its Marines to work together as

a team. Additionally, because the battalion fell under of

2d FSSG, which was designated as the Marine Logistics

Command for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Lieutenant

Colonel Niel E. Nelson, the battalion commander, also

faced unique manpower challenges. Many of his personnel and equipment, especially in the area of transportation and maintenance, had already been attached

to other battalions within 2d FSSG. Additionally, because 2d FSSG had been assigned the operational logistics role in the Marine Logistics Command (MLC),

he had forfeited resources to meet the MLC’s requirement for an organic engineering capability. Colonel

Nelson looked to 1st FSSG’s commanding general,

Brigadier General Usher, to help fill the gaps in his battalion’s manning structure and received augmentation

from 1st Transportation Battalion, 1st Supply Battalion,

6th ESB, 7th ESB, 6th Motor Transport Battalion, 1st

and 2d Combat Engineer Battalions, and Headquarters

and Service Battalion, 1st FSSG. Lieutenant Colonel

Nelson described the reorganization process:

This loss of core competencies from within

the battalion is analogous to an infantry battalion

consolidating its mortars and crews at the regiment or division level and then getting back a

pick up team of mortar men who did not have

the culture and training of the infantry battalion.

The Marines and sailors that were placed under

the command of 8th ESB were highly motivated,

but required extensive training in order to be independent bridge builders under wartime conditions.37

An additional challenge faced by 8th ESB was the

lack of transportation assets. Arguing the need for

two mobile-loaded bridge companies to support

movement of both 1st Marine Division and Task

Force Tarawa, Colonel Nelson was faced with the

fact that his battalion simply did not possess the asMarines of 8th Engineer Support Battalion build Lake Coyote in Kuwait to train in building bridges across

rivers.

Courtesy of 8th ESB
sets required to transport the necessary equipment.

Ultimately, the burden was lessened by the use of

commercially procured trailers to move ten bridge

erection boats and the adaptation of a new loading

method for the MK48/14 logistics vehicles system/container transporter rear body unit. By rotating

the bridge pallets 90 degrees, the Marines were able

to load twice the equipment on a single vehicle. This

type of resourcefulness was a testament to the battalion’s motto, Whatever It Takes.38

The bridging mission was unique and required

master skills down to the squad level. With an unknown number of potential crossings and the added

loss of both equipment and personnel to man each

of the crossings emplaced, the battalion trained and

prepared by building and removing three full-scale

70-ton capacity medium-girder bridges every 48

hours for more than four weeks. The companies also

conducted numerous day and night convoys around

Camp Coyote to practice loading, unloading, and

transporting the combat loads, as well as to prepare

immediate action plans. During the month of February, 8th ESB Marines conducted training in the middle of the Kuwaiti desert. As many of the battalion’s

boats came from all parts of the United States and off

the Marine Corps maritime preposition shipping, it

was important to water test each one to ensure its reliability and functionality. As a result, their training

centered on simulated water crossings, a unique challenge to overcome in a desert environment. The

Marines exercised ingenuity by successfully creating

both a dry-gap pit and large pond, called Lake Coyote, to test both their bridging skills and equipment.

Extensive training in the art of bridge building culminated in a battalion competition, which Charlie

Company won. The company, commanded by Captain Christopher M. Haar, later helped construct a

medium-girder bridge across the Diyala River, allowing 1st Marine Division to cross the river and continue their final assault into Baghdad.39

Transportation Support Group

No training was more critical to the Marines of

Transportation Support Group (TSG) and 6th Motor

Transport Battalion (6th MTBn) than that of convoy

control procedures. To identify and work through uncertainties that they would inevitably face during

combat operations, Colonel David G. Reist and Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J. Hermesmann had the newly

formed Convoy Control Company escort actual sustainment convoys being run in support of I MEF. Together, drivers from the TSG and 6th MTBn began

transporting equipment from the port to the arrival

assembly operations group, and then to their new

home at Camp Guam and Camp Saipan in Tactical

Assembly Area Coyote.

As the operational tempo increased, it became obvious that even combined, TSG and 6th MTBn lacked

the equipment necessary to support I MEF. Although

they contracted for host nation support vehicles,

most were different from the tactical vehicles the

Marines normally operated. An eight-day licensing

program was subsequently established and Marine

drivers from both 6th MTBn and TSG, as well as all

officers and staff noncommissioned officers, were

trained to operate large tractor trailers, lowboys,

buses, and fuel and water tankers.40

Another TSG unit that provided a critical capability was the Landing Support Company. To complement the successes of the Marine forces on the

36 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

A helicopter support team member guides a CH-53

Super Stallion to land near the ammunition supply

point, LSA Viper.

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC
Arrival in Theater 37

battlefield, the Landing Support Company would provide air support to transport sustainment items to forward units. Major Matthew S. Cook, landing support

company commander, understood the potential for

his 282 Marines to enhance ground combat effectiveness and focused their attention on training helicopter teams, arrival/departure airfield control

groups, and shipping and receiving platoons. In buttressing Combat Service Support Battalion 10, many

of the company’s Marines were assigned traffic control duties in their repair and replenishment points.

Others provided critical service to the mobile medical

units by coordinating and controlling landing zones

for lifesaving evacuations. Additionally, Combat Service Support Battalions 12 and 18 used shipping and

receiving platoons to track the movement of battlefield sustainment.

As the commencement of combat operations

loomed, vessels carrying critical equipment continued to arrive at the port in Kuwait. Two ships arriving on 14 and 18 March provided TSG with 93 percent of its table of equipment, most of which was

cargo trucks.41 Until the start of hostilities, the TSG

Marines continued to load these trucks in support of

units preparing for war. Of note, 91 of them were

loaded with bridging equipment for 8th ESB, in anticipation of assault bridging requirements, and 68

carried critical hose-reel equipment in support of 6th

ESB’s tactical fuel system mission.

Breach Point West

On 18 March, Colonel John L. Sweeney Jr., deputy

commander of 1st FSSG, and the group’s Sergeant

Major Manuel J. Sanchez, travelled to Breach Point

West to visit each group element staged at the frontline. Poised just a few miles south of the Kuwait/Iraq

border, several of these units had been staged in this

remote location for days. If and when the war began,

they would be among the first 1st FSSG Marines to

cross the line of departure. Colonel Sweeney and SerPhoto by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR

1st FSSG deputy commander, Col John Sweeney (second from left) speaks to Marines at Breachpoint West prior

to the commencement of the war.
geant Major Sanchez delivered words of praise and

encouragement to the Marines, as they stood informally in groups beneath camouflage netting. The

colonel also provided much-appreciated updates on

current events and the impending conflict. The

Marines were motivated; they had been “away from

the flagpole” and enjoying a bit of independence and

solitude, all the while preparing themselves and their

equipment for the moment they would cross the border into Iraq. Colonel Sweeney knew this would be

the last command visit to the frontlines before the

start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and he took the opportunity to give the Marines some of his own advice on the days to come.42

38 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
39

On 17 March 2003, President George W. Bush issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Saddam Hussein and his

sons to leave Iraq. For most Marines, the significance

of this broadcast was that G-day—the start of the

ground war—was now imminent. In one long-awaited

speech, a timeline for war emerged. Following the announcement, the forces in I MEF began to move to

their dispersal areas.

For Operation Iraqi Freedom, Lieutenant General

James T. Conway, Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, concisely laid out the Marines’ mission in his Operations Plan 1003V:

The purpose of this operation is to remove

the Iraqi regime. We will support the CFLCC

(Coalition forces land component commander)

by rapidly defeating Iraqi forces in the MEF AO

(area of operation) in order to protect the Main

Effort’s (V Corps’) eastern flank throughout the

operation, and by isolating Baghdad from the

east. Additionally, the early seizure of the key

oil infrastructure will be central to preventing environmental disaster in the region while facilitating a smooth transition to a new Iraqi

government.1

The 1st Marine Division’s first task at hand was to

move north into Iraq and secure key oil infrastructures. During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Iraqi forces

retreating from Kuwait set fire to Kuwaiti oil wells.

Many of these fires burned out of control for months,

primarily because it was too dangerous to dispatch

firefighting crews to areas surrounding the oil wells

that had not been cleared of mines and unexploded

ordnance. The result was widespread pollution of

Kuwait’s soil and air. In the current operation, it was

feared that the roughly 500 oil wells located in Iraq’s

southern Rumaylah oil fields would be targets of destruction or sabotage by the Iraqi forces, and the goal

was to secure them immediately, preventing any destruction and mitigating environmental disaster. Beyond this initial task, 1st Marine Division would focus

on defeating Iraqi forces in their area of operations

and clearing main supply routes to allow follow-on

forces and logistical support to flow north of the Euphrates River to al-Kut and eventually Baghdad.

Movement to the Dispersal Areas

On 18 March, 1st Marine Division received the

order to move to its dispersal areas in preparation

for attack. In close coordination, all three combat

service support companies from Combat Service Support Group 11 (CSSG-11) followed their respective

regimental combat teams as they moved to their own

dispersal areas. Combat Service Support Battalion 10

(CSSB-10), the unit within CSSG-11 that aided the

combat service support companies also began to

move. To evenly support all three companies, Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Weinkle Jr., split his battalion into three functional elements. Two were named

“Repair and Replenishment Point 3 Opening Package”* or “East Opening Package” and “Repair and Replenishment Point 4 Opening Package” or “West

Opening Package,” and were designed to follow in

trace of Regimental Combat Teams 5 (RCT-5) and 7

(RCT-7) and their direct support combat service support companies. The third element, which did not

Chapter 3

Opening Days of the War (17–22 March 2003)

Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR

Marines in the 1st FSSG Combat Operations Center

watch a live broadcast of President George W. Bush as

he delivers the ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave

Iraq or face war.

* In the pre-deployment phase, the commanding officer of CSSG11, Col J. J. Pomfret, frequently utilized the term “Opening Package” to refer to the advance capability set. The term became the

standard of usage after CSSB-10 crossed the line of departure into

Iraq.
have a designation of “opening package,” was specifically designed and configured to support the

preparatory and ensuing fires of the 11th Marines.

Combat Service Support Company 111 was followed

in trace by the CSSG-11 tactical command post.

The initial movement of the combat service support companies to their dispersal areas and CSSB-10

to Repair and Replenishment Points 1 and 2 was the

first real test of convoy movement, command and

control, and communications. One CSSB-10 convoy

had a vehicle footprint of more than seven miles.

This lengthy stretch of vehicles was common

throughout the rest of the war. Although the designated repair and replenishment points were just 30

miles north of Camp Bougainville and still on the

Kuwait side of the border, the Marines were anxious

to move to their new locations. First Sergeant Gonzalo A. “Butch” Vasquez of Transportation Support

Company described the atmosphere as they moved

north. “The Marines were apprehensive about what

they were about to encounter, but more than ready

to get out of Bougainville. They didn’t know what

they were asking for, but ready to get out of the situation they were currently in.”2 Located near the

RCT-5 and RCT-7 dispersal areas, just south of the

Kuwait/Iraq border, Repair and Replenishment Points

1 and 2 were designed to provide division units with

a final resupply prior to crossing the line of departure. For the most part, the regimental combat teams

used these points as an opportunity to top off on fuel

prior to moving north toward the enemy.3

While elements of CSSG-11 stayed in close coordination with 1st Marine Division’s units, other elements of the 1st FSSG were assembled at Breach

Point West, preparing for movement across the border. Just a few miles from the border between Kuwait

and Iraq, Breach Point West served as a staging area

for vehicles, equipment, and personnel from the

most forward elements of 6th, 7th, and 8th Engineer

Support Battalions, Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (CSSB-12), Combat Service Support Battalion

18 (CSSB-18), Transportation Support Group, and the

1st FSSG Forward. Here they waited and prepared

for the inevitable command to cross into Iraq.

On the evening of 19 March, 11th Marines unleashed a bombardment of artillery on Safwan Hill,

an Iraqi observation post overlooking the Kuwaiti

border. Just a few miles north of the border, this position sat on a raised point, 551 feet in elevation, offering the Iraqis an unobstructed view of advancing

Coalition forces. Additionally, it was suspected of

having sophisticated surveillance equipment oriented

toward the main highway, which runs north from

Kuwait to al-Basrah and on to Baghdad. Destruction

of the observation post was imperative before Coalition troops could begin crossing into Iraq. The attack, supported by both U.S. Marine and Navy

aircraft, continued through the night, ultimately destroying the post beyond recognition.4

While elements of 1st FSSG along the border prepared for the move north into Iraq, elements of the

Marine Logistics Command (MLC) also began to shift.

40 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

A convoy of Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement seven-ton trucks from Transportation Support Group moves

into Support Area Chesty, 1st FSSG Forward Headquarters, IMEF, Iraq. Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC
Opening Days of the War 41

2d Transportation Support Battalion (2d TSB) or Task

Force Pegasus, commanded by Colonel John E.

Wissler, moved from Logistics Support Area (LSA)

Fox to Camp Solomon Islands, Tactical Assembly

Area (TAA) Coyote. This move, which occurred over

the course of three days, better positioned their assets

to augment 1st FSSG’s transportation capabilities and

provide responsive battlefield distribution. Throughout the three days, continuous Iraqi missile attacks

on Kuwait forced the drivers to be on constant alert
for any attack and often required them to drive while

dressed in the highest mission-oriented protective

posture level.

Meanwhile, the Marine Logistics Command Support Detachment 1 (MSD-1), which had been developed to manage and support the contracted

commercial vehicles and drivers at TAA Coyote, had

also begun conducting convoys. During the previous week, Major Tyson B. Geisendorff and his detachment had worked tirelessly to build up a combat

service support operations center and a billeting

camp for the third country national drivers.

Back at LSA Fox, the MLC amassed stocks of combat service support supplies in anticipation of a requirement to help maintain the velocity of I MEF’s

combat units. Meals ready-to-eat (MREs), engineering

equipment, and repair parts were among the supplies that the MLC pushed forward to Combat Service Support Battalions 12 and 18, which would be

providing general combat service support to all

ground forces on the battlefield. Similarly, they

pushed supplies to Combat Service Support Company 151 (CSSC-151), the MEF’s direct support element, as well as Combat Service Support Companies

133 (CSSC-133) and 134 (CSSC-134), the direct support elements of 3d Marine Air Wing. Colonel

Wissler’s Beach and Terminal Operations Company,

led by Major Robert A. Kaminski, took over responsibility for the transportation battalion’s convoy operations originating out of LSA Fox. With this came

the mission to manage all host nation transportation

assets, including 121 commercial tractor trailers and

third country national drivers. Helicopter support

teams were also used for deliveries by air and had

been conducting multiple helicopter support missions during the past few weeks to build their proficiency. 

On 20 March, the United States began launching

air attacks at strategic targets in Baghdad. What some

Marines had expected to be a heavy-hitting air campaign to shape the battlefield, similar to the 43-day

air war of Desert Storm turned out to be a precise

and almost restrained approach in the use of Coalition air forces.

42 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by CNA 

A U.S. and British helicopter support team waits to

hook up fuel bladders to a British CH-47 Chinook at

Camp Fox.

A Reminder

On 20 March, at approximately 1030, an

enemy HY-2 Seersucker missile flew directly

overhead at TAA Coyote. Several 1st FSSG

Marines watched as the missile slowly flew

overhead at an unbelievably low altitude. More

than one Marine reported later that they had

initially thought it to be a low flying cargo jet.

The missile continued on and impacted just

outside the perimeter of Camp Commando, the

I MEF headquarters in Kuwait. Fortunately,

there were no casualties. Although the explosion caused a loud boom and shook the

camp’s extensive infrastructure, it did not cause

much damage. The shock value of the missile

itself and the fact that it had literally come in

under the radar had the greatest impact. As if

to symbolize the Iraqis’ determination to fight

the Coalition’s inevitable offensive, this missile

was a reminder that even those Marines who

would remain in Kuwait were on the verge of

war; one with a technologically inferior, yet unpredictable and desperate enemy. More than

anything, the event caused chaos and disbelief

that the Iraqis could get that close to hitting a

major Coalition headquarters.5
Opening Days of the War 43

Later that same evening, the ground attack began

with 1st Marine Division’s Regimental Combat Team

5 moving across the border into Iraq to secure the

Rumaylah gas and oil separation plants. Intelligence

reports had indicated that Iraqi sabotage of their own

oil resources was likely, and when reconnaissance

photos began to show several wellheads on fire in

the Rumaylah oil fields, the United States responded

with a preemptive attack that occurred 10 hours earlier than the initial plan specified.6 In February 2004,

Lieutenant General Conway, I MEF commander,

spoke in an interview with PBS Frontline about the

intelligence he and his Marines had prior to the start

of the war.

We knew that there were seven or eight key

nodes in the southern oil fields that we needed

to preserve in order to establish the reconstitution of oil production in the wake of the war.

So when we saw that Saddam was starting to

destroy some of those oil heads, I think that's

principally what prompted our higher headquarters to tell us to attack.7

About six hours after the first battalion in RCT-5

entered Iraq, Combat Service Support Company 115

(CSSC-115) crossed the line of departure at the Route

Dallas breach site and traveled north to their first objective near the intersection of Routes Dallas and

Tampa. Company commander Captain Suzan F.

Thompson and her 240 Marines typically traveled

with the regimental combat team’s fuel trains; however, she often sent small convoys of supplies forward to support individual battalions within the

regiment. As RCT-5 maneuvered to its objective at

the southern gas oil separation platforms of the Rumaylah oil fields, CSSC-115 followed closely behind,

ready to provide combat service support at a moment’s notice. They moved with the regiment at all

times except when the infantry forces were heading

directly into a combat mission.8

Just behind Captain Thompson’s company, Combat Service Support Battalion 10’s Repair and Replenishment Point Opening Package 4, led by the

battalion’s military police company commander,

Major Edward P. Wojnaroski Jr., left its position at Repair and Replenishment Point 2 and crossed the border into Iraq. En route to its next location, Major

Wojnaroski’s convoy maneuvered through blazing oil

fires. Moving through enemy territory, the Marines

saw for the first time a number of dead Iraqi soldiers

strewn along the roadside, the unfortunate casualties

of 5th Marines’ deadly firepower. Upon arrival at Repair and Replenishment Point 4, the Marines established a hasty security perimeter, with oil fires

Photo by LCpl Dick Kocketi, USMC

Firefighters work to plug a burning oil well in the Rumaylah Oil Fields, Iraq, on 27 March 2003.
marking both the northern and southern ends of the

area. One element of the major’s unit, a military police company, constructed a 2,000-man prisoner collection point during the night and set up a control

center to support prisoner operations. No prisoners

would be processed at this location; however, a surplus of enemy weaponry, including AK-47s, rocketpropelled grenades, and mortars were found within

200 yards of the repair and replenishment point, and

it was determined that a number of the enemy had

recently occupied the same area.10

Meanwhile, two companies from 7th Engineer

Support Battalion (7th ESB), augmented by 2d Transportation Support Battalion’s Support Company, had

moved forward to the Iraqi border to conduct breaching operations for 1st Marine Division and Task Force

Tarawa. Their mission involved removing berms, tank

ditches, and electrical fences, marking the lanes, and

providing security and mobility through the breach.

On 20 March, Company B, led by Captain Andrew R.

Winthrop, breached the Kuwait and Iraq obstacle belt

at Breach Point West, opening four lanes for Task

Force Tarawa to cross. Company C, commanded by

Captain Susan Bird, breached the Green Breach Zone

or Breach Point North, allowing 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and 11th Marines to pass

through. Once all forces had pushed through Breach

Point North, Charlie Company closed the breach and

moved back to Breach Point West, where they joined

the rest of 7th Engineer Support Battalion. Bravo

Company remained at Breach Point West for the next

four days, maintaining the open lanes to allow other

units, including 7th ESB to pass through.11

Crossing the Breach

While Combat Service Support Group 11’s direct

combat service support elements entered Iraq trailing

their supported regimental combat teams, the general support elements had a different objective to

meet: setting up Logistics Support Area Viper, the Marine expeditionary force’s first logistical support area

in Iraq. On 20 March, Combat Service Support Battalion 18’s advanced party and a smaller quartering

party crossed the line of departure and moved north

towards Jalibah, a town along the eastern flank of

the Task Force Tarawa and 1st Marine Division advances. The role of these elements was to arrive at

the objective ahead of the battalion, clear the area of

mines and unexploded ordnance, set up initial communications capabilities, and coordinate prearranged camp areas for all supported units.

While CSSB-18 managed the overall buildup of the

logistics support area, there were several other tenant organizations occupying the vast desert of nearby

Jalibah. I MEF set up their forward base, 3d Marine

Air Wing established an airfield, and several units

from 1st FSSG built camps within LSA Viper. At the

start of the war, General Usher knew that he needed

to move a command element from the 1st FSSG

headquarters forward to establish command and control. In the evening on the first day of the war, he

had his chief of staff, Colonel Darrell L. Moore, lead

an advanced party across the border toward Jalibah.

Their convoy experience through the breach was

similar to that of most units trying to make their way

into Iraq. Breach lanes were crowded, especially the

few that were hard surfaced and allowed for commercial vehicle passage. All units were jockeying for

position and movement through the breach, and the

convoy was stretched out across distances too great

to maintain a consistent speed and direction. As con44 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Women at War

Captain Suzan F. Thompson was one of

many female Marines simply doing their job as

they filled billets traditionally assigned to men.

However, an overarching policy put in place

by General Usher, which may have gone unnoticed by many, was very significant to

women in the Marine Corps. During the

months of pre-war planning at Camp Pendleton, California, the general felt it was important to outline a definitive policy regarding

women in the 1st FSSG. It stated that, aside

from those areas specifically identified by Department of Defense policy, the FSSG would

employ all of its Marines (including women) to

the fullest extent possible. Ultimately, the direct combat service support elements within

CSSG-11, that would be integrated with 1st Marine Division and its regimental combat teams,

would be provided with the most qualified

Marines, regardless of gender. Women would

be very close to, or even at times right on, the

frontline. With the aid of 1st FSSG’s Staff Judge

Advocate, Lieutenant Colonel Vaughn A. Ary,

General Usher researched the existing policies

to ensure that his employment of women, especially in the direct support elements, was

legal. While there may have been some apprehension from division in the beginning, especially at the battalion and regimental level,

no issues ever surfaced regarding women in

the FSSG.9
Opening Days of the War 45

voy commander Captain Kevin P. Coughlin described, speeds that seemed feasible to the lead vehicles left the trailing end of the convoy literally in

the dust. Visibility was poor, communications mechanisms were scarce, and vehicles broke down. Several times during the night, the convoy split up and

regrouped, covering only 60 miles during 13 to 14

hours of travel.12 The security threat during this initial

movement through Iraqi desert was unknown, but

most drivers and passengers were too busy dealing

with the challenges of the convoy movement itself to

even worry.

On 21 March, the remaining forces of 1st Marine

Division began their attack into Iraq. Regimental

Combat Team 7 attacked west of al-Basrah to secure

Safwan and the Az Zubayr Pumping Station, while

Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) attacked to the

east.13 Combat Service Support Company 117 (CSSC117) crossed the line of departure and followed RCT7 up Highway 1. That evening, Combat Service

Support Battalion 10’s Repair and Replenishment

Point 3 Opening Package, led by Lieutenant Colonel

Weinkle, departed their initial repair and replenishment point and followed closely behind CSSC-117.

Crossing the border just before midnight, Colonel

Weinkle’s Marines saw firsthand the path of destruction left by 1st Marine Division en route to their objective near al-Basrah. The Marines drove in complete

blackout conditions, with only the light from fire

trenches and burning oil wells ignited by the retreating Iraqis, to guide their way. As they crossed the

line of departure, the colonel observed the eerie atmosphere and noted that his Marines now found

themselves alone. This would be indicative of their

experiences throughout the war, as their logistics vehicles often drove into areas that had only been recently cleared by the division’s lead elements.14

Movement during this convoy was difficult. Blackout

light conditions and the speed required to keep up

with 1st Marine Division’s momentum were two

major factors in a serious vehicle accident that occurred just 40 miles north the border. A troop-carrying seven-ton truck rammed the rear end of a

communications vehicle, which in turn collided with

a high-back humvee. As one Marine in the battalion

described, “one minute we were racing north, and

the next I was running toward our wounded Marines

trying to provide what medical support I could.”15

Once the injured Marines were stabilized by the

shock trauma platoon, the convoy continued on toward its objective. A second accident occurred in a

later serial of the convoy, as they crossed the border.

Because of the narrow highway and border gate, the

convoy slowed. Despite this, several vehicles that

had not been traveling with the proper distance between them crashed into the vehicles to their front.

Injuries to personnel were minor, but the convoy suffered damage to several vehicles, and Marines were

reminded that even without direct enemy contact,

they faced many dangers.

At approximately 0300, the convoy halted once

again for Colonel Weinkle to lead a small reconnaissance party forward on Route Tampa (Highway 80).

Having received a warning from CSSC-117 that they

were entering an area that had not been secured by

RCT-7, the team, comprised of Colonel Weinkle, Captain Forrest C. Poole III (battalion operations officer),

Captain Jamie Jones (transportation company commander), and First Lieutenant Leith R. Habayeb (military police platoon commander), cautiously

dismounted their humvees and walked the terrain in

the dark. While seeking a suitable repair and replenishment point ingress/egress route, they surprised a small Iraqi Army contingent that hastily

departed, abandoning their command post and three

ZU-23 antiaircraft positions. Later, an Iraqi sheep

herding family was found wandering the area, and

through translators, told the Marines they had been

held hostage by the Iraqi contingent that used them

as a human shield to avoid helicopter strafing. After

receiving humanitarian rations and cigarettes from

the Marines, the family gladly provided useful intelligence on weapons caches and the absence of

mines in the area.

The battalion arrived at Repair and Replenishment

Point 3 early the next morning. Located just south of

Highway 80, the site was geographically well suited

for their mission of providing combat service support. With ample space, each section had its own

area to set up. The Marines in CSSB-10 worked tirePhoto by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

A fleet of seven-ton trucks from 6th Motor Transport

Battalion are staged at LSA Viper.
lessly to emplace their combat service support capabilities, but found that the requirements for support

were fairly minimal. Meanwhile, CSSG-11’s tactical

command post, led by Colonel Pomfret, trailed RCT1 and Combat Service Support Company 111 (CSSC111) as they crossed the Iraqi border early in the

morning on 21 March. Their objective was to establish Repair and Replenishment Point 7, in the vicinity of Jalibah. 

To the west of 1st Marine Division, Task Force

Tarawa followed closely behind the U.S. Army’s 3d

Infantry Division. The task force’s role was to secure

the bridge crossings in an-Nasiriyah to allow movement through to Highways 1 and 7. Accompanying

Task Force Tarawa, 8th Engineer Support Battalion

(8th ESB) was assigned to provide direct support

bridging to the ground combat forces. Just days earlier, the engineer battalion had been under the administrative control of 2d FSSG, the operational

control of 1st FSSG, and assigned in direct support of

1st Marine Division; a complex command and control

situation in any circumstance. The difficulties would

not lessen. Just 72 hours prior to the commencement

of fighting, 8th ESB was reassigned to the operational

control of Task Force Tarawa. Facing these last

minute organizational changes was only part of the

engineers’ challenges. Because of the battalion’s specific bridging mission, there was always a level of uncertainty as to when and where they would be

required to execute a mission. For every crossing that

the ground forces approached, the battalion would

have to design a complete plan as if the existing

bridgehead had been destroyed. Lieutenant Colonel

Niel E. Nelson, commanding officer of 8th ESB, was

designated as the force crossing engineer and located

his battalion with Task Force Tarawa, in preparation

for movement across the line of departure on G-day

and potential bridging missions across the Euphrates

River in the vicinity of an-Nasiriyah. He described the

roadblocks associated with his battalion’s unique and

changing assignments. “It is difficult to describe the

chaos that took place in this crossroads of maneuver,

but with the 3d Infantry Division, Task Force Tarawa,

and the 1st Marine Division’s simultaneous usage of

Route Tampa, all with a different mission, the small

unit command and control became paramount to the

success of the battalion.”16

Getting Fuel to the Fight

As units were still crossing through the breach and

slowly making their way to their objectives, Lieutenant Colonel Roger R. Machut and his Marines in

6th Engineer Support Battalion (6th ESB) began to

build the hose-reel system that would enable the

flow of fuel from Kuwait to forward bases in Iraq.

These Marines had been staged at Breach Point West

for several days, preparing their equipment and planning the execution of the 60-mile tactical fuel system.

The line would run from a six million-gallon U.S.

Army bulk fuel farm at Breach Point West to a location deep inside Iraq, where Marines would establish their own bulk fuel farm. “It’s a way of

transporting fuel without motorized support,” commented Chief Warrant Officer–4 Thomas M. Cierley,

a bulk fueler who had served in Vietnam over three

decades earlier. Back then, they were using slower

pumps, smaller fuel bladders, and relying on trucks

for transport. “We’re getting bigger, better, and more

efficient.” A significant part of this improvement

came with the implementation of the hose reel,

which would alleviate much of the need for trucks in

transporting fuel to forward based units.17

The Marine Corps’ hose reel, better suited for implementation in a hostile environment than the U.S.

Army’s more permanent Inland Petroleum Distribution System, consisted of three steps. First, Marines

conducted a reconnaissance of the route to find and

dispose of any unexploded ordnance. Second, a

team of Marines operating heavy equipment, such as

graders and excavators, followed the route to grade

46 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

USMC Photo

Shown here as a colonel, LtCol Robert R. Machut

worked in his civilian career as a civil engineer before

being activated to command 6th Engineer Support

Battalion during OIF-I.
Opening Days of the War 47

the surface and dig a V-ditch. Third, another team of

Marines pulled the six-inch diameter rubber hose off

of large, truck-loaded spools and carefully laid it

down into the V-ditch, actually walking on the hose

to ensure its emplacement. Two teams worked simultaneously on this task. One started at Breach

Point West and the other at the halfway point between that point and Jalibah, the fuel system’s destination. Colonel Machut designated this midpoint as

the “Golden Spike,” a reference to the historic

Promontory Point, Utah, where the eastern and western portions of the transcontinental railroad were

linked in 1869.18 By the next day, 151⁄2 miles of hose

reel had been laid. Meanwhile, 6th ESB’s Bulk Fuel

Company Alpha moved across the line of departure

up to Logistics Support Area Viper, where they established a 1.2 million-gallon fuel farm.19

Logistics Support Area Viper

When Combat Service Support Battalion 18 (CSSB18) arrived at Jalibah, it immediately initiated the establishment of Logistics Support Area Viper. With

Alpha Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion in

direct support to provide engineering capabilities, the

battalion began the daunting task of clearing the vast

area. The engineers, led by Captain Jose M. Lopez,

worked to clear unexploded ordnance and mines,

built an ammunition supply point, constructed guard

towers, and created security berms.20 At this time,

CSSB-18 expected to have four days to setup, while

Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (CSSB-12) continued to provide support to I MEF from Tactical Assembly Area Coyote. On the day of its arrival,

however, CSSB-18 immediately began receiving requests from customers such as 1st Marine Division,

Task Force Tarawa, and units within 3d Marine Air

Wing. The challenges of moving over 70 miles from

points in Kuwait to Jalibah had been great. Fuel had

been quickly depleted, and equipment had broken

down, causing a surge in the requirement for repair

parts.

Arriving on the morning of 21 March, Colonel

Moore’s advanced party waited throughout the day

to get clearance from explosive ordnance disposal

personnel to set up their camp at LSA Viper. Unfortunately, because several units were trying to establish camps simultaneously, these highly trained and

skilled Marines were in short supply. The area was

absolutely barren, but the ground was visibly littered

with unexploded ordnance. Using a global positioning system (GPS) receiver, he and Captain Coughlin

selected a grid square for the 1st FSSG Forward to

setup. Unable to obtain a team of explosive ordnance

disposal personnel, Colonel Moore decided to have

the Marines walk the ground looking for unexploded

ordnance. If anything suspicious was found, they

marked the ground with a flag and moved forward.

Although this was a somewhat risky approach, time

constraints and operational necessity dictated that the

Marines could not sit and wait. It was imperative that

Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR

A Marine from 6th ESB indicates the beginning of the hose-reel system at Breachpoint West.
the 1st FSSG Forward establish itself and initiate communications with General Usher back at Camp Coyote. After marking the area and retrieving the rest of

the convoy, they finally obtained the explosive ordnance disposal personnel, who were able to more

expeditiously clear the site by investigating the

marked ground. Numerous pieces of ordnance were

found, and due to a lack of heavy-lift equipment, the

Marines had to manually remove some of it. In at

least one incident, they chained an unexploded warhead to the back of a humvee and dragged it to a

deserted spot two miles away. By the end of the first

evening, they occupied the area and began setting

up the camp. At the end of the second day, the camp

was up and running, and the forward element was

able to communicate with the 1st FSSG at Tactical Assembly Area Coyote. Although there may have been

some security threats in their area of operations, the

Marines were minimally concerned about them because they were so busy. However, despite their

focus on providing combat service support, they set

up a perimeter security and dug fighting holes

around the camp.

One of the largest support areas built in enemy

territory, LSA Viper was constructed within the first

four days of the war, during a severe sandstorm, and

simultaneously with combat operations occurring in

southeast Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N. Collins,

commander of CSSB-18, was the designated base

cluster commander, responsible for the area/terrain

management and force protection and security coordination with both I MEF and the 3d Infantry Division

units. Ultimately, LSA Viper encompassed a 3d Marine Air Wing forward operating base, the I MEF

command element, an expeditionary medical facility,

and the majority of 1st FSSG units. It was the major

logistics hub for I MEF operations up to the Tigris

River. From a temporary combat service support operations center, Colonel Collins and his Marines provided critical and timely ammunition and medical

support to Task Force Tarawa during intense combat operations in an-Nasiriyah. Simultaneously, his

Marines established an equipment collection and salvage point, conducting recovery operations to retrieve invaluable 1st Marine Division equipment,

such as M1A1 Abrams tanks and light armored vehicles that had become inoperable during combat operations. Bulk fuel, bulk water, medical, and supply

support rounded out the capabilities that CSSB-18

put in place to support I MEF through a period of intense fighting, extreme weather, and fast-paced

movement.21

Another critical capability that Colonel Collins possessed at LSA Viper was maintenance. The mission of

1st FSSG’s maintenance companies was to provide

third- and fourth-echelon maintenance to units on

the battlefield, as well as first- and second-echelon

maintenance, as needed. For the maintenance companies of both CSSB-18 and CSSB-12, their primary

customer was Combat Service Support Battalion 10,

however, they supported any and all units who requested help. Each company was divided into several functional areas including motor transport,

engineer, communications and electronics, and ordnance maintenance.22

CSSB-18’s maintenance company did not waste

any time moving its Marines and equipment up to

LSA Viper; they knew their expertise would be

greatly needed in the harsh desert environment.

Movement up to Viper, though, was extremely difficult due to the general conditions of the roads. When

they arrived there, they found the area to be quiet

and unpopulated and proceeded to set up. Because

some of their contracted civilian vehicles got stuck,

numerous pieces of their equipment were left behind, limiting their maintenance capabilities. Marines

had to piece together the limited tools and resources

they had to repair as many vehicles and other equip48 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Marines from CSSB-18 sandbag a bunker at LSA

Viper.
Opening Days of the War 49

ment as possible. The mechanics borrowed shipping

containers from supply to live in because they did

not have tents. Unfortunately, the influx of broken

equipment was almost immediate. Less than a day

after the start of the ground war, several assault amphibian vehicles were turned in for maintenance due,

at least in part, to the fact that the vehicles had recently come off ships, where they had been sitting

unused for a long time. The sheer age of some

equipment was one of the root causes of some maintenance problems, but Captain Mark F. Birk, the company’s executive officer, also noted that the

infiltration of fine desert sand was causing problems

with nearly all equipment. The company’s goal was

to repair equipment and return it to the owning unit

within seven days, however, with a shortage of tools,

this was not always feasible. If they were not able to

fix a piece of equipment within seven days, the

Marines evacuated it to higher echelon maintenance

at Marine Logistics Command. One challenge with

this process, however, was the lack of transportation.

Because they did not have an organic transportation

capability, they were competing with every other unit

for transportation support.23

On 21 March, elements of the transportation support group (TSG) crossed the border into Iraq. They

had been staged at Breach Point West for the past

three days and were now on the move to LSA Viper.

Portions of both TSG and 6th Motor Transport Battalion were heading up to the large support area near

Jalibah, so they could quickly establish a forward operations capability. From there, TSG would be in a

better position to conduct distribution operations in

support of combat forces fighting in and around the

city of an-Nasiriyah, which held a key crossing on

the Euphrates River. Additionally, a small element

consisting of Marines from the landing support company crossed the breach on 21 March and moved to

Viper, where they established a landing zone, an arrival/departure airfield control group, and a helicopter support team capability. This critical capability

assisted in the opening of the airfield at Jalibah and

allowed for continued integration of Marine air and

ground assets. From this point on, supplies and personnel could be directly transported by air to points

within Iraq.

The next day, Alpha Company, 2d Transportation

Support Battalion, also moved to LSA Viper. Hauling

over 1,000 short tons of ground ammunition, this

121-vehicle convoy, Task Force Pegasus’ largest conPhoto by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

A Marine with CSSB-18’s Maintenance Company works on a disabled LVTP-7 at LSA Viper.
voy of the war, established a command and control

center for the task force.24 The company’s presence

at LSA Viper allowed for quick convoy turnaround.

Concurrently, the battalion’s support company established a trans-load point at Tactical Assembly Area

Coyote, enabling the rapid transfer of cargo and

equipment between host nation trucks and tactical

vehicles within the task force.

Early in the morning that same day, Colonel Pomfret, commanding officer of Combat Service Support

Group 11, and his Marines conducted a site reconnaissance and established Repair and Replenishment

Point 7 (RRP-7). This was located north of Jalibah and

in the vicinity of LSA Viper, and it was here that elements of CSSG-11’s tactical command post came

under direct small-arms fire from a squad-sized

enemy unit while conducting reverse osmosis water

purification unit reconnaissance operations. The

Marines returned fire and forced the enemy to withdraw, but a 75-meter wide canal* denied the Marines

the ability to pursue the enemy. A report was immediately submitted to Regimental Combat Team 1, and

shortly after, two UH-1N helicopters arrived on scene

to conduct an aerial reconnaissance, observing personnel in civilian clothes. Later in the afternoon, both

CSSG-11 Forward and CSSG-11 Main elements linked

up with the tactical command post at RRP-7. The following day, after spending roughly 24 hours at Repair and Replenishment Points 3 and 4, both elements of CSSB-10 moved north to link up with

CSSG-11’s tactical command post. Upon arriving the

evening of 23 March, they joined CSSG-11 and faced

their first crisis: 1st Marine Division was experiencing

major fuel shortages. The division’s momentum at

this point needed to be maintained, and the CSSG11/CSSB-10 staff worked tirelessly to provide the

160,000 gallons of fuel needed. While they were able

to acquire small amounts of fuel from LSA Viper, it

was a large convoy from the Transportation Support

Group traveling from Kuwait that arrived early the

next morning and delivered the much-needed fuel

“just in time.” The 1st Marine Division had dubbed

the first 96 hours of the war the “Opening Gambit,”

and all resupply during this period followed a precise

execution matrix. This critical delivery of fuel was the

last preplanned resupply for 1st Marine Division, as

they approached the Euphrates River. Also, while at

RRP 7, CSSG-11 began receiving their first prisoners

from various combat units. In response to this, CSSB10 established a prisoner collection and holding facility under a bridge. In total, they processed 232

Iraqis (88 enlisted and 144 officers). Less than 24

hours after their initial arrival and setup of RRP 7,

CSSG-11/CSSB-10 prepared to depart for their next

location.25

Civil Affairs

During the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom,

there was no doubt that the Marines would come in

contact with civilians. Among many potential prob50 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR

Marines board a CH-53 near their base camp in Kuwait for transportation to Iraq. 

* This canal (southeast of the Euphrates River in the vicinity of

an-Nasiriyah) was the same location where two Marines in 6th

Engineer Support Battalion drowned, trying to swim across and

secure the far side of what they ended up using as a reverse osmosis water purification unit site. This incident is described in

more detail in Chapter 4.
Opening Days of the War 51

lems, this could hinder the mobility of commanders

as they tried to advance rapidly across the battlefield.

To aide commanders in their responsibility to deal

with civilians, civil affairs teams were integrated into

each command. These teams, mainly assigned at the

battalion level, came from one of the two existing Marine Corps civil affairs groups, and advised commanders on issues relating to civilians. They served as

eyes and ears on the ground to forewarn commanders about prospective civilian problems or issues. They

ultimately developed a civil-military operations center

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

A convoy of civilian fuel trucks contracted by Transportation Support Group moves north in Iraq.

Khuder al Emeri

Civil affairs Marines worked directly with

members of a program called the Free Iraqi

Forces. This program enlisted several Iraqi opposition volunteers to assist U.S. and Coalition

forces in civil-military operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Among the Free Iraqi

Forces attached to 1st FSSG was a man named

Khuder al Emeri. Following Operation Desert

Storm in 1991, he had led his Shiite town of

Qalat Sikar in an uprising against Saddam Hussein. The rebellion was crushed, and he soon

had a 50,000 Iraqi dinar bounty on his head.

With nowhere to hide from the Ba’ath party’s

vengeance, he sought refuge in the United

States with relatives in Seattle, leaving his wife

and sons behind with a promise that someday

he would return. Twelve years later during

OIF, Al Emeri was finally able to return to his

hometown with Marine forces and reunite with

his family.

Civil affairs Marines hand out radios to local civilians to promote good will and open communications.

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC
to coordinate interaction with the local population.

Lieutenant Colonel Valerie E. Thomas, a detachment commander from the West Coast 3d Civil Affairs

Group, was responsible for eight four-man teams, assigned specifically to 1st FSSG. In addition to advising

commanders, the teams acted as the focal point for

local civilian interaction. 

As reservists, civil affairs Marines were well suited

for their mission; their training had prepared them to

interact with civilians, and they came across as less

threatening to the locals than average Marines. Bringing a multitude of specialties and civilian career experience to their mission including Environmental

Protection Agency specialists, law enforcement officers, businessmen, and cultural anthropologists, their

goal was often to win the hearts and minds of the

local population. Two of the primary missions they

conducted were large-scale humanitarian projects and

handling displaced civilians. On a smaller scale, they

were involved in numerous goodwill projects with

local communities, hospitals, and the general population. They sought opportunities to demonstrate to

civilians that U.S. Marines were there to help them. In

return, the civil affairs teams received useful information from the local populace, which they turned over

to the intelligence section. In the end, the real value

of civil affairs was that it gave the commander one

less thing to worry about.26

52 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
53

A Day to Remember

As 1st Marine Division advanced north to secure

Iraq’s vulnerable Rumaylah oil fields, Task Force

Tarawa was fast on the move toward an-Nasiriyah.

Traveling through open desert because the U.S.

Army’s 3d Infantry Division’s convoys filled the

roads, the task force, led by Brigadier General

Richard F. Natonski, was tasked with securing the

city’s bridge crossings on the Euphrates River and

Saddam Canal. This would allow 1st Marine Division’s Regimental Combat Team 1 passage to move

north on Highway 7 towards al-Kut. A second bridge

lay further west in a more rural area outside the city

limits of an-Nasiriyah. Under the control of the 3d Infantry Division, this crossing would provide Regimental Combat Teams 5 and 7 access to Highway 1,

leading northwest to ad-Diwaniyah.

Combat Service Support Battalion 22 (CSSB-22),

Task Force Tarawa’s combat service support element,

had crossed into Iraq late in the day on 21 March.

During two days of movement, the main element of

CSSB-22, led by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N.

Goben, followed in trace of Regimental Combat

Team 2 (RCT-2), periodically sending smaller mobile

elements to travel in direct support of the individual

infantry battalions. By 23 March, they had arrived at

a location near Jalibah Airfield, where they co-located

with RCT-2’s administrative and logistics operations

area.1

It was largely believed that the people of anNasiriyah would support the Coalition’s presence,

due to the large Shia* population. Not anticipated,

however, were the high numbers of Fedayeen, regular Iraqi soldiers, and an assortment of Ba’ath loyalists already dispersed among the thousands of fearful

Iraqi civilians. In the early morning hours of 23

March, elements of RCT-2 departed Jalibah to enter

the city and take control of the key bridge crossings.

From the start, there were signs that the plan would

not go smoothly. Even as they approached the outskirts of an-Nasiriyah, lead elements of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, came under attack by Iraqis. To

make matters worse, the same day Task Force

Tarawa entered an-Nasiriyah, an Army convoy from

the 507th Maintenance Company had gotten lost and

erroneously traveled into the heart of city, alerting

the Fedayeen fighters of the Americans’ approach.

This fatal mistake set off a series of tragic events, including several enemy ambushes and a suspected A10 Warthog friendly fire incident that resulted in 18

Marines from Company C, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines,

killed in action—the single worst day of casualties

for Coalition forces during the war.*

By the end of the day on the 23rd, CSSB-22’s

shock trauma platoon had sprung into action, receiving and treating 14 casualties from 1st Battalion,

2d Marines. They also treated five wounded soldiers

from the 507th Maintenance Company who were rescued from an-Nasiriyah by a team of Marines. This

was a difficult test for Lieutenant Colonel Goben’s

Marines and sailors, as it was their first encounter

with casualties during the war. The battalion commander described the events of that night:

It was some of the most horrific sights I had

ever seen . . . the AAVs that were attacked, just

blown up completely and burned to the ground.

I later saw the remnants of the hulls. . . . that

was a very long day; that was a very trying day

for everybody. . . . if anything is going to be remembered [about CSSB-22] it’s the efforts of

every one of my Marines who assisted in that

whole process . . . dragging litters in and off of

helicopters and moving around for the medical

folks . . . . I can’t say enough about how well the

medical folks performed . . . it was just absolutely phenomenal . . . everybody was going

here, there, and everywhere, talking to the

Marines, comforting them. It’s a day I will never

forget.2

Days later, the bodies of the Marines killed during

the battle at an-Nasiriyah became the first group of

Chapter 4

Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond (23–26 March 2003)

* The Shia constitute more than 50 percent of the Iraqi population

and suffered extensive discrimination and brutality during the

regime of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party.

* Although none of the casualties were officially ascribed to the A10s, as investigated by Central Command, many Marines in Charlie, 1/2 suspected that rounds from the airplanes hit some of the

Marines. 
combat remains the mortuary affairs detachment received back at Camp Iwo Jima, Tactical Assembly

Area Coyote. Transported by air from Jalibah Airfield

to Joe Foss Airfield, they arrived late at night. Working through the night and making several sprints to

the Scud bunkers as a result of frequent incoming

missile alerts, Lieutenant Colonel John M. Cassady Jr.,

officer-in-charge of the mortuary affairs team and his

deputy, Chief Warrant Officer–4 Cheryl G. Ites, a reserve Marine and mortician in her civilian career, focused on identifying the individuals and processing

the required paperwork. Marines trained in mortuary

affairs had not yet arrived in theater; as a result, a

group of volunteers worked side-by-side with

Colonel Cassady and relied on his expertise and experience to guide them through an otherwise overwhelming procedure. CWO-4 Ites described the

challenges in having Marines work such a difficult

job. “For many of them, this was the first remains

they had ever seen . . . and it wasn’t ‘grandpa at the

funeral home’ type remains. These are someone

who’s roughly their age group; they see themselves

in that same situation, so it’s a little more stressful for

them; harder for them to deal with.”3 Carefully and

reverently, they opened each body bag to view the

remains inside. As one body bag was opened, a Marine with no obvious wounds on his front lay peacefully with an American flag crumpled in his hands.

The sight was more emotional than any amount of

blood or open wounds. One could imagine his comrades hastily stuffing the flag in their friend’s hands as

his body was being carried away. His fatal injury, a

large exit wound in his back, was later found when

mortuary affairs Marines carefully turned the body

over.4

Positive identification was the most critical part of

the process, as the inevitable confusion during combat casualty evacuation often prevented a unit from

distinguishing individuals killed in combat from those

who lay injured in a field medical facility. Unit commanders often relied on the timeliness of the mortuary affairs processing to aid in unit accountability and

54 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR

Marines killed in An-Nasiriyah were brought to the mortuary affairs tent at Camp Iwo Jima, TAA Coyote, for

processing. 
Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond 55

Lieutenant Colonel John M. Cassady Jr., officerin-charge of mortuary affairs in Operation Iraqi

Freedom, became involved in the formerly named

“graves registration” in 1989 while assigned as head

of the combat service support doctrine at Marine

Corps’ Warfighting Center. He was the leading mortuary affairs officer during Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm, and throughout his career, did

much to both document and advance mortuary affairs operations. The Marine Corps’ foremost expert in this field, Colonel Cassady came out of

retirement to head up the mortuary affairs mission

in Iraq. This was to “establish mortuary affairs collection points which receive, process, and expeditiously evacuate I MEF remains to the theater

mortuary evacuation point; and be prepared to assist in the search, recovery, and tentative identification of I MEF remains and decontaminated

remains as they are moved to the mortuary affairs

collections points.” 

The original concept of operations included the

employment of five 50-man platoons, all of which

would be operationally controlled by Colonel Cassady. This was to maintain adaptability on the battlefield; in essence, to have the flexibility to move

the platoons where the necessity existed. This was

a lesson learned from Desert Storm. For this campaign, there would be one fixed collection point

at Camp Iwo Jima, Tactical Assembly Area Coyote,

in support of Surgical Company Alpha. The numbers at this point were expected to be lower, due

to the high survival rate in the surgical companies.

At this collection point, the remains would also be

processed for shipment by way of the Joe Foss Airfield at Camp Coyote to the U.S. Army’s theater

mortuary and evacuation point. Three other collection points would be forward positioned in support of maneuver elements and mobile, so they

could leapfrog across the battlefield to support mission requirements. This concept of operations characterized the “rapid response” approach unique to

the Marine Corps’ mortuary affairs program. 

During the weeks preceding the start of the war,

a U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter crashed

in the Kuwaiti desert, resulting in the deaths of four

soldiers. Although the Army handled the initial recovery of the remains, the Marine Corps mortuary

affairs platoon was assigned the secondary recovery mission. This tragic event for the Army turned

out to be useful training for the mortuary affairs

Marines, as it would be the first operational experience for many of the Marines in the platoon. For

five days, they conducted a site assessment, involving gridding and locating the debris field, and

cataloguing and flagging items found on the site.

Due to sandstorms, many pieces of the remains

were already covered by sand, and the Marines, in

their protective gear, conducted operations by

hand and on their knees to recover any elements

of human remains and personal effects. Every fragment of the helicopter was inspected and sand was

sifted to a depth of six inches, in hopes of recovering remains not visible to the untrained eye.6

Mortuary Affairs

Mortuary affairs Marines sift through the wreckage

of a downed U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter.

Photo by LtCol John M. Cassady Jr., USMC

accurate casualty rates. Beyond this, however, mortuary affairs, supported by more than 200 years of

tradition among Marines, ensured that those who

paid the ultimate price in combat would be rapidly

and respectfully returned to their loved ones.5

1st Marine Division’s Advance North

As Task Force Tarawa fought through the streets

of an-Nasiriyah to secure the key bridge crossings

on the Euphrates River and Saddam Canal, which

would open the passageway for Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1), the rest of 1st Marine Division

continued to execute its plan, which called for 3d

Light Armored Reconnaissance (3d LAR) Battalion

to lead an attack up Highway 1. West of anNasiriyah, Regimental Combat Teams 5 (RCT-5) and

7 (RCT-7) moved through the countryside, challenged mostly by traffic jams and poor weather.
Their objective was the intersection between the

Hantush Airstrip and Highway 27, from where RCT5 would move in and seize the airstrip. Up until this

point, all resupply missions into Iraq had been accomplished through ground transportation and were

not without challenges. Securing control of the

airstrip would enable the KC-130 Hercules aircraft

to provide resupply and guarantee the uninterrupted momentum of 1st Marine Division toward

their ultimate objective, Baghdad.7

On 23 March, 3d LAR Battalion moved cautiously

up Highway 1, where they fully anticipated enemy

contact. By nightfall, the battalion was engaged by

a large element of Fedayeen fighters that was

quickly defeated by the Marines’ overwhelming firepower. By the next morning, RCT-5 completed a

forward passage of lines with 3d LAR Battalion and

continued north as the division’s main effort. Meanwhile, Combat Service Support Company 115

(CSSC-115), which had been at Repair and Replenishment Point 7 retrieving supplies from Combat

Service Support Battalion 10 (CSSB-10), moved to

an area north of the Euphrates River, where they

continued to jump between the regimental combat

team’s individual battalions to provide much needed

resupply of fuel and maintenance contact team support. To maintain effective command and control,

Combat Service Support Group 11 (CSSG-11) forward command post traveled with the 1st Marine

Division forward command post, just behind RCT-5.

They remained there all the way to Baghdad.

As CSSB-10 departed Repair and Replenishment

Point 7 and continued north toward the Euphrates

River, its movement was slow because of road congestion and broken-down vehicles, both enemy and

friendly. Just south of the river, the battalion established Repair and Replenishment Point 10 near the

intersection of Highways 1 and 8. CSSB-10 remained

in this position only long enough to provide an

overnight refueling point for division units as they

waited to cross the Euphrates River bridge. During

the next 16 hours, the battalion supported an endless stream of division units, meanwhile, living sideby-side with an Iraqi family and its yard of donkeys,

dogs, and sheep. Second Lieutenant Sarah M. Stokes,

a watch officer for CSSB-10, described the location

of this repair and replenishment point, which was

strategically important to the mission, yet unpopular

among the Marines.8

After spending two months in Kuwait, we

were beginning to wonder whether the Fertile

Crescent actually existed. As we neared the Euphrates, we quickly discovered all of this green

stuff came with a price. The RRP was set on a

mile-long triangular plot of rich, dark earth—

an abandoned manure lot. The gnats were

thrilled with our arrival. The crawling black

specks soon covered our face and hands.9

Fortunately for the Marines in CSSB-10, they

56 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

On 23 March, Air Delivery Platoon, 2d Transportation Support Battalion, conducted its first

combat air delivery mission since the Vietnam

War. Two drops, made from C-130s, were scheduled for the same time at two different locations.

One site was on the far bank of the Euphrates

River where Highway 8 crosses. The other was at

a repair and replenishment point about 12 miles

northwest of Viper. Each drop consisted of approximately 88 warehouse pallets or 3,780 cases

of meals ready-to-eat, prepared and rigged with a

parachute by air delivery Marines. About three

hours before the aircraft were to take off, Major

Matthew S. Cook, company commander of 1st

Landing Support Company, called the Logistics

Movement Control Center to notify them that the

1st Marine Division was not across the Euphrates

yet and to divert that drop to a location near LSA

Viper. He later learned that his request never

made it to the pilots, and they made the drop at

the original grid. Putting a positive spin on it with

his Marines, he told them to view it as the first

humanitarian drop of the war. The second drop

went better, but had its own problems. The original grid that was provided had changed, and the

location was further away from Logistics Support

Area Viper than expected. Marines on the ground

saw the helicopters and suspected that because

the original drop zone at the repair and replenishment point was so crowded with gear and personnel, the pilots diverted a few miles away to

avoid injury or damage to personnel on the

ground. The supplies ended up in a marshy area

nearby, and seven-ton trucks were sent to the location, where Marines loaded pallets of MREs by

hand.10

Air Delivery
Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond 57

packed up and headed for their next location less

than 24 hours from the time they arrived at Repair

and Replenishment Point 10. They crossed the Euphrates River, but another major obstacle that would

hinder the movement of all forces on the ground and

in the air stood in their path. 

The Sandstorm

During the evening of 24 March, a severe sandstorm blew through southern Iraq, slowing the momentum the Marines had gained since crossing the

line of departure. The harsh combination of severe

winds, sand, and rain prompted General Usher to

label it “the worst sandstorm in 20 years.” Marines

faced gusts of wind up to 50 knots, blowing clouds

of fine sand, and visibility so limited that navigating,

driving, and other essential functions become impossible. Major Michael J. Callanan, Combat Service

Support Group 11 operations officer commented on

the harsh conditions. “The sky went black and then

red . . . visibility was zero. Vehicles continued to

move north at [three miles per hour] and then ground

to a halt. Compasses couldn’t be seen, and GPS receivers were no longer able to track satellites for reference.”11

Convoy movement, which had been slow to begin

with, suffered the most from the storms smothering

effects. Essentially, all movement came to a halt, as

drivers, who donned gas masks to keep their eyes

open in the blowing sand, could not see two feet in

front of their vehicles. During a 24-hour period, Combat Service Support Battalion 10, struggling to maintain pace with the ground combat forces, moved a

total of approximately 24 miles.12 Major Edward P.

Wojnaroski, one of CSSB-10’s convoy commanders,

commented on their efforts to move during the

storm. “After crossing the Euphrates, . . . [we] stopped

at points along the side of the road where a hellacious sandstorm ensued. The blinding effects of the

storm were so severe that night vision goggles

proved useless.”13 Many of Colonel Weinkle’s Marines

in CSSB-10 were from Twentynine Palms, California,

where they were “used to riding out these conditions,” but even he conceded that this sandstorm was

unlike any they had experienced before, and that

their convoys back in California were never this

large.14 The next day, when they were finally able to

move again, the air was filled with a yellowish hue

from the previous night’s storm.

By this point, Task Force Tarawa had seized control of both bridge crossings in an-Nasiriyah, opening

up access, albeit along the dangerous route dubbed

“ambush alley,” for Regimental Combat Team 1’s

movement toward al-Kut. Combat Service Support

Battalion 22 moved from Jalibah to a location south

of an-Nasiriyah, where they set up a defensive

Harsh conditions and zero visibility during a sandstorm debilitated the Marines’ ability to continue movement

forward. USMC Photo
perimeter. During the next 10 days, they continuously convoyed back-and-forth between their location and Logistics Support Area Viper, obtaining

necessary support from Combat Service Support Battalion 18 to keep Regimental Combat Team 2 fully

supplied. Each trip, which consisted of approximately 60 to 70 miles, took a convoy 13 to 15 hours.

Additionally, CSSB-22 Marines augmented the regimental combat team in guarding more than 400 prisoners. On the night of 26 March, the battalion took

part in a firefight where one cargo truck was damaged, but the battalion sustained no casualties. Unfortunately, other Marines in the task force were

wounded, and once again, CSSB-22’s shock trauma

platoon came into action, treating 32 Marines.15

On 24 March, 6th Engineer Support Battalion (6th

ESB) continued its task of laying the tactical fuel system down across barren desert, and as the debilitating sandstorm blew through the area, the challenges

became even more daunting. The Marines laying the

hose reel had to seek cover behind the truck deploying it, and the trucks could only inch along,

guided by Marines walking directly in front of them.

Basically, the Marines had to take a “touch and feel”

approach to laying the hose reel, continuing on with

the mission in 20-hour shifts despite the high winds,

blinding sand, and minimal communications. Even

with these added complications, the Marines were

able to complete the tactical hose reel within three

days, one day less than the original estimated completion time. On 25 March, the tactical fuel system

was complete. Measuring 57 miles from Breach Point

West to Jalibah Airfield, the pipeline included 17

booster stations located 3.5 miles apart. At the

booster stations, two 600-gallons-per-minute pumps

and two 20,000-gallon fuel bags helped ensure that

the flow of fuel to LSA Viper, which began on 26

March, would be continuous.16

According to Colonel Machut, “no one thought it

would work, but we made it work.”17 In reality, if the

hose reel had failed, there would have been significant consequences on the entire war effort. Coalition

forces were advancing at such a rapid rate that any

lapse in the fuel supply would have caused a delay

in operations. For the first three weeks of the war,

while the Army was still installing their hard-line fuel

system, the Marine Corps had “the only fuel in

town.”18

While the hose reel took care of fuel requirements, another group of 6th ESB Marines worked on

the bulk water requirement. On 24 March, water operations began at LSA Viper with the utilities platoon

from 6th ESB’s Engineer Support Company establishing a water point 10 miles north of the battalion’s

combat operations center on the Saddam Canal. Engineer Company C, commanded by Major Michael P.

58 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

During a sandstorm, Marines from 6th ESB install the second portion of the hose reel system north of LSA Viper,

Iraq.
Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond 59

Photos by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

The bulk fuel point (above)—Replenishment Point 26—operated by CSSB-10 was located at Camp Daley, south

of Baghdad. Water is pumped from the Euphrates River into 3,000-gallon water bladders at the LSA Viper water

point (below). Marines in 6th ESB set up the water point to operate their reverse osmosis water purification units.
McCarthy, provided security. It was on this day that

tragedy first struck the reserve engineers. While

swimming across the canal to provide security on the

far bank, two Marines, Sergeant Bradley S. Korthaus

and Corporal Evan T. James, drowned. Major McCarthy led a small team of Marines in an attempt to

recover their bodies, but was unsuccessful. Later in

the day, as the sandstorm blew through with full

force, Navy Seabees were enlisted to help find the

bodies. As weather conditions made it nearly impossible to see, the divers continued to search the canal

for the two Marines, ultimately recovering them that

evening.19

Since their activation in January and throughout

the opening sequence of the war, 6th ESB had surpassed all expectations, and beat all scheduled deadlines. Perhaps the lowest point for an otherwise

successful deployment, the tragic deaths of the two

reservists reminded the engineers that in their critical

mission, the enemy was not the only threat to their

safety. Determined not to allow this tragic event to

disrupt its support to the troops, Colonel Machut’s

battalion once again excelled—beating projected

timelines and exceeding planned production of fresh

water. Fourteen reverse osmosis water purification

units at LSA Viper produced a one-day supply of

120,000 gallons of water, allowing 6th ESB to support the 1st Marine Division, Task Force Tarawa, 1st

FSSG, and 3d MAW, as well as U.S. Army units passing through the area.20

Treating the Casualties

While shock trauma platoons and forward resuscitative surgical systems moved across the battlefield

attached to their combat service support elements,

another type of medical support arrived at LSA Viper

within the first few days of the war to provide much

needed surgical support. 1st FSSG’s Surgical Support

Company C flew in by helicopter on 24 March, just

in time to feel the full effects of the sandstorm. Even

60 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Corpsmen and doctors in Charlie Surgical Support Company provide medical aid to an Iraqi prisoner at LSA

Viper.
Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond 61

in the blinding and debilitating weather, the surgical

company experienced an extremely busy first three

days. They treated close to 150 patients and conducted 25 to 30 operations, including complex abdominal and chest procedures. The majority of the

patients treated by Company C were Iraqis. This was

the same night that they had a large number of incoming patients, and the difficulty in treating patients

was devastating for some of the troops. The breakdown of Marine and Iraqi patients was about 50/50,

and while patient care was the first priority, Iraqi

combatants, who were now U.S. prisoners had to be

specifically identified during the process and guarded

by Marines. This was a difficult task, as it was not always easy to distinguish the prisoners from Iraqi civilians. Navy Commander James P. Flint, a surgeon from

Jacksonville, Florida, who had been mobilized as part

of the medical augmentation program, commented

on the challenge that a Marine faced in keeping his

calm when a prisoner antagonized him by talking

about “his shooting of two Americans.” Aside from

that incident, Commander Flint thought the prisoners had been fairly well behaved and had been giving valuable information to the intelligence

interrogators. They saw several gunshot and shrapnel

wounds, as well as injuries from vehicle accidents.21

One night, they received several casualties from a

landmine, requiring amputations. Included was a

two-year-old child who did not survive.

The surgical company was limited in dealing with

the post-treatment phase of patient care. They were

equipped to provide a maximum of 48 hours care

before moving the patient to another facility or discharging them. Most patients were medically evacuated to the next higher level of care at facilities such

as the Army combat support hospital or the Navy

Hospital Ship USNS Comfort (T-AH 20). The majority

of the Iraqi captives were sent to the ship.23

Another significant capability of Surgical Company

C resided in its combat stress platoon. Double the

size of a normal combat stress platoon, which typically has one psychiatrist, two psychologists, and

three psychiatric technicians, it treated cases of combat stress, which was considered to be a normal reaction to a combat environment. Commanded by

Navy captain Glenn M. Goldberg, a clinical psychologist from Naval Hospital Jacksonville, Florida, the

combat stress platoon’s main goal was to provide its

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Litter bearers move a wounded Marine from an Army Black Hawk medevac helicopter to Charlie Surgical Support Company at LSA Viper.
patients respite and relief from the danger, noise, and

activity of combat and enable them to return to their

units within 72 hours. Additional roles of the combat

stress platoon included treatment and evacuation of

patients with psychiatric disorders as well as counseling and supportive services to the Marines and

sailors. While the platoon was still in Kuwait, they

provided ample training to the surgical company on

combat stress, and opened a wellness center. Once

the war began, the combat stress platoon moved forward to LSA Viper with Surgical Company C. After

just one week, the doctors noted that, surprisingly,

62 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

A Muslim Burial

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Ali Hassam, a volunteer translator, leads prayers

during a burial service conducted for a two-year

old boy killed when he stepped on a land mine. The

boy was brought to the Charlie Surgical Support

Company at LSA Viper, where he died of his

wounds.

On 29 March, a two-year-old little Iraqi boy

who had been brought to Surgical Company Charlie, died from wounds he obtained after stepping

on a landmine. Without any identification or family members, he had been medically evacuated to

Surgical Support Company C and underwent surgery to amputate both of his legs; sadly, he did

not survive the trauma. After a cautious investigation of the proper Muslim burial procedures, the

1st FSSG civil affairs liaison officer, Lieutenant

Colonel Valerie E. Thomas, arranged to have three

Muslim gentlemen, Khuder Al Emeri, a Free Iraqi

Force member; Ali Hassam, a Kuwaiti interpreter;

and a third unidentified Muslim perform the burial in a prescribed location. The location was designated ahead of time, just outside of the Viper

Logistics Support Area, to facilitate civilian visitation without incident. The grave was dug about

six feet deep and oriented such that the child

could be placed on his side, facing in the direction

of Mecca. Next to the grave, a smaller shallow area

was prepared. At the gravesite, Ali Hassam, who

went by Sam, prepped the area by pouring water

into the shallow area next to the grave. Meanwhile, Khuder stepped down into the grave to dig

a side hole facing Mecca. When the child’s body

was removed from the ambulance on a stretcher,

it was immediately placed on the ground. The first

part of the burial ceremony took place, as the

three Muslims knelt in front of the child’s body,

facing Mecca. Sam knelt in front of the other two

and led them in Muslim prayers. When they were

done, they unwrapped the child’s body to ensure

that there was no plastic inside the shroud and

that his face was covered. Sam then picked up the

child’s body and handed it to Khuder, who was

standing in the grave. The child’s body was placed

in the grave with his right shoulder down and his

face towards Mecca. Wet sand formed into balls

(about the size of oranges) were used to encase

the child’s body in the grave. Once the child’s

body was in place, Sam, Khuder, and the third

Muslim man began shoveling sand into the grave.

After a short while, they asked for any Christians to

help out by shoveling sand into the grave. When

the grave was completely filled, the sand was kept

flat and a line of rocks was laid at the head of the

grave. This was left primarily to mark the grave site.

At the conclusion of the burial, Sam sprinkled water

over the grave.22
Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond 63

they had only treated a handful of classic combat

stress cases.* Navy Commander Patrick H. Bowers, a

doctor with the combat stress platoon, discussed their

initial caseload:

We’ve only been here for one week, so it’s

still kind of early on to really know exactly

what all we’re going to be seeing and what our

success rate will be getting people back to the

front. So far, as far as classic combat stress type

patients, we’ve seen relatively few . . . we’ve

seen maybe half a dozen or so true combat

stress type of patients and overall . . . it looks

like our success rate with sending people back

to their units is . . . a little bit less than 50 percent, which is lower than the numbers we were

told we should expect. . . . We had [thought]

we should be able to return up to 70 percent

back to the front.24

Doctors noted that they had not received any

undue pressure from the units to have their Marines

returned to the frontlines. In contrast, one mentioned

that in a particular case, the unit was very supportive

of getting the Marine necessary medical support back

in the rear area.25

Level-two medical care consisted of the FSSG’s

surgical companies, shock trauma platoons, and forward resuscitative surgical systems. However, another more robust capability was added when Fleet

Hospital 3 arrived and constructed the Navy and Marine Corps’ first expeditionary medical facility (EMF).

On 25 March, elements of the EMF moved north to

LSA Viper and began construction of the field hospital. The doctrinal timeline for setting up a facility of

this size is ten days, but Navy Captain Peter F.

O’Connor (USN), the EMF commanding officer, set

an aggressive schedule to be up and running because of the impending battle and its expected number of casualties.26 He commented that “the result is

a significant increase in our ability to save lives. The

sooner our forces receive the robust care available

here at a fleet hospital, the better their chances.”27

After working 24-hour days for five days straight,

* In a recent study conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute

of Research Land Combat Study Team, Marines from two battalions

in I MEF were assessed for the condition of their mental health

following operations between March and May 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. While many gaps still exist in the understanding of the full psychosocial effect of combat, results generally

showed that there was a higher occurrence of major depression,

generalized anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder among individuals who served in Iraq during this period than those who

had served in Afghanistan. There has been difficulty in comparing

these results to other past wars, due to the lack of subjects studied so soon after their involvement in combat operations. Previous

methods of such studies were often conducted years after the individuals’ military service had ended. (Charles W. Hoge, MD; Carl

A. Castro, PhD; Stephen C. Messer, PhD; Dennis McGurk, PhD;

Dave I. Cotting, PhD; and Robert L. Koffman, MD; MPH, “Combat

Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Problems, and Barriers to Care,” New England Journal of Medicine, 1Jul04,)

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Members of Fleet Hospital 3 construct the first expeditionary medical facility in Iraq at LSA Viper.
they opened the expeditionary medical facility on 1

April and immediately began receiving patients. The

facility had a 20-bed intensive care unit, as well as 96

additional beds. It was configured with two operating

rooms and four operating beds. During the course of

the next seven days, they received 220 admissions

and performed 119 surgeries. Similar to the surgical

support companies, the expeditionary medical facility

received both American and Iraqi patients whose injuries and need for medical care varied widely. It did

not take long for the physicians and corpsmen to understand and accept the complexities of their unique

role as medical care providers. One hospital corpsman described his initial thoughts when receiving simultaneous American and Iraqi patients. 

It took me a split second. I was assisting an

injured Marine who was just outside our CasRec

(casualty receiving) door. Just then, another gurney came around me with an Iraqi. For a split

second, I thought it was wrong to let our guy

wait. But then I looked closer and saw the Iraqi

was in worse shape. Right then and there, it was

crystal clear to me. We’re here as healers. It

made perfect sense to me from that point on.28

By the end of April, the expeditionary medical facility had received more than 500 patients, and performed 280 surgical procedures.

8th Engineer Support Battalion

Reorganizing on the Move

At the start of the war, 8th Engineer Support Battalion (8th ESB) was in direct support of Task Force

Tarawa. Once the western bridges were secured,

however, it planned to detach and join the 1st Marine Division as they passed south of an-Nasiriyah.

Task Force Tarawa was becoming engaged in the

fight for the eastern bridges and was reluctant to release the bridge force. After some persuasion, 8th

ESB was released and moved quickly to the western

bridges over the Euphrates River, where it met up

with two multi-role bridge companies (MRBCs) from

the 3d Infantry Division.* While they were a welcome addition to the bridge battalion, the Army units

were out of fuel and now the responsibility of 8th

ESB. With some quick thinking, Major Timothy B.

Seamon secured Marine CH-53 support and had fuel

airlifted to the MRBCs. Once refueled, the battalion

moved up Highway 1, emplacing four medium

girder bridges over large gaps and supporting elements of the combat engineer battalions with bulldozers and bucket loaders to fill in more than 35

culverts and small gaps. This support ultimately led

to the improvement of the logistics throughput required to sustain 1st Marine Division. The 8th ESB

continued to support 1st Marine Division’s attack up

Highways 1 and 7, in the vicinity of the western Euphrates Bridge. With the two U.S. Army companies

adding to their end strength of personnel and equipment, the engineers could now be divided and provide dual-axis support to 1st Marine Division. One

element designated as Crossing Area Engineer 5

(CAE-5) was formed with Bridge Company C and

the Army’s 459th Multi-Role Bridge Company. They

supported Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) as

they traveled up Highway 7.29

Another element, designated as Crossing Area Engineer 1 (CAE-1)* was formed with Bridge Companies A and B, and supported Regimental Combat

Teams 5 and 7 traveling up Highway 1. Colonel Nelson and his engineer command element were co-located with the 1st Marine Division forward

command post also on the highway. The battalion’s

headquarters and engineer support companies, containing spare bridge parts, maintenance and service

capabilities vital to the battalion, combined to form

a third separate command under Major Joseph J.

Klocek, the battalion executive officer and followed

in trace of 1st Marine Division. Essentially three commands under one battalion—CAE-5, CAE-1, and the

battalion main—provided Colonel Nelson, who had

also been designated as the force crossing engineer,

the maneuverability and flexibility needed to sup64 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

* The U.S. Army’s 3ID requested the return of one of the MRBCs

within days of its assignment to 8th ESB. This bridge company,

the 574th MRBC had just employed its medium girder bridge on

Hwy 1 and was moving north when the call came for their detachment. With the volume of combat and combat support vehicles moving forward in support of 1st Marine Division, the Army

company, minus its medium girder bridge components, was ordered out of the line of march and subsequently had to wait several days prior to being able to travel south on Hwy 1 to rejoin the

3ID’s westward movement. 

* The crossing area engineer is a doctrinal concept that puts a river

crossing command and control unit co-located with the supported

regimental combat team headquarters. The idea behind this is the

force crossing engineer (battalion commander and support staff)

would be co-located with the Division forward headquarters and

provide over-arching command and control of all of the bridge assets assigned to the FSSG/Division, allocating companies to crossing area engineers where and when they are needed. Each

supported regimental combat team would have a crossing area

engineer, who would provide command and control over the

bridge build and then control the crossing area as the regiments

passed through the river crossing area. They would also coordinate

all resupply of bridge assets through the force crossing engineer.

Crossing area engineers would report directly to the regimental

combat team’s operations officer or commanding officer, and to

the force crossing engineer.
Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond 65

port 1st Marine Division’s wide front and quick advance.*

As they followed RCT-1 along Highway 7 through

an-Nasiriyah, CAE-5, commanded by Major Thomas

M. Pratt, ran a gauntlet of indiscriminant small arms

and rocket-propelled grenade fire. The extensive

combat skills training that the Marines in 8th ESB had

conducted prior to the war paid dividends for themselves and for their army counterparts. In an article

written by Colonel Nelson and his executive officer,

Major Joseph J. Klocek, the authors described the

Marines’ actions:

The Army’s 459th [Multi-Role Bridge Company], encountering its first enemy contact and

* A third crossing area engineer, CAE-7, had been part of the original plan to support each regimental combat team with a CAE, but

never materialized for two reasons. There were not sufficient lift

assets to mobile load additional bridging companies, and because

RCT-7 and RCT-5 took the same axis of advance, they could be

supported by one CAE, CAE-1. Maj Brian W. Ecarius, originally assigned to command CAE-7, worked as a liaison for the force crossing engineer.

Courtesy of 8th ESB

Marines of 8th Engineer Support Battalion constructed medium girder bridges along Iraq's Route 1.
unfamiliar with the execution of immediate action drills, required direct supervision from the

Marines of CAE-5 in order to conserve ammunition and continue its forward movement. To

ensure the unit was ready for their next contact, CAE-5 Marines provided immediate action

drill training and stressed the need for small

unit leaders to take charge and effectively employ their organic weapons to neutralize the

threat.30

This would prove useful several days later, as the

459th Multi-Role Bridge Company built an improved

ribbon bridge across the Diyala River while under

enemy fire.

Meanwhile, Colonel Nelson and CAE-1, commanded by Major Timothy B. Seamon, traveled with

the 1st Marine Division main assault force up Highway 1, and during the sandstorm on 25 March, installed four medium girder bridges over box culverts

along the highway to improve trafficability. Sections

of this main supply route were under construction at

the time of attack and existing bypasses proved extremely difficult for logistics vehicles to pass. Without

8th ESB’s construction of the four medium girder

bridges, Marine forces would have suffered a signif66 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Marines of 7th Engineer Support Battalion repair the runway at a former Iraqi air base near Al Kut.

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC
Battling for An-Nasiriyah and Beyond 67

icant degradation of logistics throughput, ultimately

affecting the division’s speed and momentum.

Early in March, Lieutenant Colonel Nelson had

commented that one of his greatest concerns was depleting his inventory of bridging supplies before

being able to complete all required missions.31 By 26

March, just six days into the war, the two companies

in CAE-1 had already exhausted their entire inventory of medium girder bridges.32

Movement Following the Storm

All combat service support companies suffered the

disabling effects of the sandstorm, but continued to

provide resupply support to their regimental combat

teams. Combat Service Support Company 111 (CSSC111), following in trace of Regimental Combat Team

1, moved forward in the early morning of 25 March,

and as it moved through an-Nasiriyah with light armored reconnaissance support, came under attack of

sustained enemy machine gun fire. Returning fire, the

company eventually crossed the Euphrates River and

arrived at RCT-1’s location. Later that evening, it also

came under mortar and small-arms fire.

Combat Service Support Battalion 10 had now

joined up with the Combat Service Support Group

11 Forward element and established a hasty repair

and replenishment point along Highway 1 just north

of the Tigris River near al-Mu’aytyah. Meanwhile,

CSSG-11 main departed Repair and Replenishment

Point 7 and followed closely behind. Plagued by the

harsh conditions of the sandstorm and poor road

conditions, many units traveling up Highway 1 were

intermingled with one another. CSSG-11’s main command post, co-located with 1st Marine Division’s

main, was strung out along Highway 1.

Once the sandstorm began to clear, CSSB-10, together as a single battalion again, moved to its next

designated location, Repair and Replenishment Point

24 (RRP-24), which had previously been an Iraqi ambush site and only recently cleared by 3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. Along with

CSSG-11’s forward element and Combat Service Support Company 115, it arrived in the late afternoon of

26 March to the sight of over 20 dead Iraqi soldiers

lining the roadway and their ambush positions. Still

in convoy formation, the Marines immediately began

taking mortar, machine gun, and small-arms fire from

the surrounding area. Staff Sergeant Perry H. Shane,

the ordnance maintenance chief for CSSB-10, riding

atop an M88 Hercules tank recovery vehicle, spotted

three enemy gunmen to his flank and neutralized

them with his M240G medium machine gun. All remaining enemy instantly fled the area, but they

would continually provide harassing fire throughout

the battalion’s next six days at RRP-24. This was the

first experience of close combat for the CSSB-10

Marines.33

CSSG-11’s main command post, following behind

the 1st Marine Division main, meanwhile, was scattered along Highway 1 during the sandstorm, but by

26 March, had arrived at a position south of Repair

and Replenishment Point 24, a location that became

known as the “mud hole.” Combat Service Support

Company 117 (CSSC-117) halted along Highway 1,

where they conducted resupply operations with Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7). While at this position, the company came under enemy machine gun

and small arms attack. The Marines repulsed the attack by forming a skirmish line and using the firepower of the nearby 1st Tank Battalion. Combat

Service Support Company 111 followed closely behind RCT-1, which continued to fight its way through

numerous Fedayeen and sniper attacks along Highway 7.

CSSG-11 and CSSB-10 continued to build logistical

stockpiles at Repair and Replenishment Point 24. This

position, which would eventually be named Support

Area Anderson, provided the support Marines their

first break from constant movement. They remained

there for approximately six days, providing division

units with a continuous supply of food, water, petroleum, oils and lubricants, ammunition, and medical supplies. At this point in the war, the requirement

for repair parts had become a priority. Because critical parts were in short supply in theater, units began

stripping disabled vehicles and equipment for necessary parts. CSSB-10 collected these “carcasses” and

established its first “junkyard.”

Dividing and Conquering the General

Engineering Missions

While 6th and 8th Engineer Support Battalions had

their specific missions of the hose reel and bridging,

7th Engineer Support Battalion had a more general

engineering mission. As a result, the battalion was

often split, conducting several different missions

across the battlefield. Alpha Company, led by Captain Jose M. Lopez, continued to construct the massive Logistics Support Area Viper, while Charlie

Company, led by Captain Susan Bird, was assigned

a new mission. They would move north to Qalat

Sikar and conduct rapid runway repairs and potentially construct Support Area Basilone. Captain Bird

and her company staff planned this convoy movement with elements of Combat Service Support Battalion 12 and Marine Wing Support Squadron 373.
Meanwhile, a small contingent from Support Company, named Task Force Dirt Pig, conducted road repairs along Highway 1 to allow for better movement

of ground forces. Bravo Company, 7th ESB provided

security. Throughout the war, 7th ESB’s missions

were diverse and often segmented at the company

level. Later in the war, in addition to their construction efforts, elements of 7th ESB were also tasked

with providing security, conducting urban mobility

and counter-mobility engineering.*34

68 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

* Due to a shortage of vehicles, 7th ESB experienced some difficulty in movement forward. As a result, the more mobile Seabee

units under the MEF Engineer Group helped fill the gaps within

general engineering missions across the battlefield.
69

Establishing Support Area Anderson

As ground forces moved north toward Baghdad,

logistical lines were stretched. The distance between

the direct support elements trailing 1st Marine Division and Logistical Support Area Viper (LSA), the forward-most logistical support area on the battlefield,

was increasing by the day. The hundreds of miles

equated to lengthy and time-consuming convoy operations, often stretching the already limited supply of

trucks and threatening the precious momentum

achieved by the maneuver forces. The result was that

repair and replenishment points and subsequent support areas had to be repositioned to keep up with the

maneuver forces. Combat Service Support Company

181 (CSSC-181), commanded by Captain Patryck J.

Durham, became the supply node that would extend

further north to support forces moving forward. A

miniature version of Combat Service Support Battalion 18 (CSSB-18), which had opened up LSA Viper,

CSSC-181 had been planned long before the battalion’s arrival in theater. However, it was not until they

were at Viper that Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N.

Collins received the order from FSSG headquarters to

stand up the company and have them displace to

Combat Service Support Group 11’s (CSSG-11) forward location near ad-Diwaniyah, Repair and Replenishment Point 24. The company did not have the

same robust capability as the CSSB-18, but it would

be able to provide more direct support to Combat

Service Support Battalion 10 (CSSB-10) and 1st Marine Division.1

Although CSSC-181 had been formed prior to the

start of the war, Captain Durham, an infantry officer

by trade, crossed the line of departure with Combat

Service Support Battalion 22 (CSSB-22), accompanied

only by an explosive ordnance disposal detachment

and a handful of communicators. Without a specific

pre-assigned mission at the onset, his other detachments had rejoined their own companies while at

Breach Point West and remained with them when

they arrived at LSA Viper. Just days later and during

the sandstorm, Captain Durham received word to reunite his company in preparation for movement to a

forward position. He spent the next 24 hours coordinating and constructing the 100-vehicle convoy that

he would lead up to CSSG-11’s position. Within his

company were detachments representing all of CSSB18’s companies including headquarters, engineering,

supply, maintenance, and motor transport. He also

had attachments that were in direct support of the

company, including an engineer company from 7th

Engineer Support Battalion (7th ESB), a shock trauma

platoon, two forward resuscitative surgical systems,

and a bulk fuel company. After departing on the

morning of 26 March, they traveled for 24 hours

across approximately 150 miles of desert, often having no communication with anyone outside the convoy. This lack of communications had become the

norm for 1st FSSG operators. The only means of onthe-move communications was the limited supply of

blue-force tracker systems.

On 27 March, CSSC-181 arrived at its destination

and linked up with CSSG-11, which was especially

thrilled to see that they carried with them a 75,000-

gallon supply of fuel. Immediately, the company

took over a section of the repair and replenishment

point’s defensive perimeter, where it received enemy

small arms and mortar fire. Enemy probing actions

continued throughout the night, but Captain

Durham’s Marines maintained their position. The

next morning, their focus shifted to establishing communications and setting up a combat service support

operations center. Simultaneously, Captain Durham

and his Marines began providing support to CSSB-10

and other division units. During the next few days,

the Marines of CSSC-181 integrated with CSSG-11’s

operations at Repair and Replenishment Point 24.

From this location, later known as Support Area Anderson, the company also sent out maintenance contact teams to retrieve disabled equipment. In the

immediate surrounding area, Captain Durham’s

Marines retrieved more than 200 vehicle hulls.5

Rumor of an Operational Pause

By 27 March, all three combat service support

companies had resumed movement and followed in

trace of their regimental combat teams. Regimental

Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) had passed through a narrow and treacherous edge of an-Nasiriyah and was

Chapter 5

Northern Support Areas (27 March–3 April 2003)
70 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

now advancing toward the city of al-Kut. Regimental

Combat Teams 5 (RCT-5) and 7 (RCT-7) had attacked

up Highway 1, repeatedly engaging enemy elements,

and were poised to seize the Hantush airstrip. As the

sandstorm subsided, the Marines resumed their

movement across the battlefield. At this point, the

rumor of an operational pause began to filter its way

down to the individual units and troops. Within a

day, this rumor became a reality, and ground movement virtually halted for four days. No definitive reason or cause was revealed, leading to much

speculation among the Marines. One of the more

popular beliefs was that the suspension of movement

was caused by the inability of U.S. Army logistics to

keep pace with their supported ground troops. In reality, logistics support for both the Marine Corps and

Army had already been stretched. Long, slow-moving

convoys across miles of open desert were vulnerable

to attack and rear areas were still swarming with

pockets of enemy resistance.

Giving insight into the challenges that Marine logistics faced, Captain Suzan F. Thompson, commander of Combat Service Support Company 115

(CSSC-115), commented on the ongoing predicaments as her company struggled to maintain the fast

pace of their regimental combat team while continuously obtaining their own resupply. “The regimental

commander would brief his scheme of maneuver and

Many commanders within 1st and 2d FSSG, including the two commanding generals, often commented on the major communications shortfalls

that severely challenged their mission and frequently put Marines at additional risk during Operation Iraqi Freedom. General Lehnert spoke

plainly about the implication of this shortfall:

I will say that the decision by the Marine

Corps as an institution not to properly resource the FSSGs with the appropriate communications to be able to go 600 miles is an

institutional failure and it is a situation that

has me very concerned, because what it says

institutionally is that the life of a grunt is

worth a great deal more than the life of a

truck driver.2

General Usher also recognized the problem

early on:

We always knew that we were going to be

stretching our communications capability. We

certainly did in a very real sense during the

execution of the operation. We relied on a lot

of ingenuity and individual effort, but institutionally we just did not have the communications architecture to be able to operate in

such a broad environment as we found ourselves in Operation Iraqi Freedom.3

He added that because e-mail had become such

a dominant means of communications in this day

and age, any limitation in that area created real

problems; command and control could essentially

breakdown without e-mail capability. Even beyond

the issues of safety and security, improvements in

information processes and assets would need to be

implemented to replace the “iron mountains” that

General Lehnert described as hindering the FSSG’s

ability to keep up with modern warfare. 

We have iron mountains because operators don’t trust us to get it right, and they

don’t trust us to get it right because there

have been times when they have gone without food and they have gone without a repair part. With that said, ultimately we cannot

afford to continue to move piles of stuff

across the battlefield and still achieve the

speed that modern warfare dictates. So what

do you use to replace the iron mountains?

You replace it with information.4

Despite the shortfalls experienced in the FSSGs,

the Marine Corps had experienced many communications improvements since the first Gulf War.

For instance, the blue force tracker system, which

consisted of a laptop computer utilizing a global

positioning system to automatically broadcast a vehicle’s 10-digit grid coordinate every five minutes,

as well as a limited e-mail capability, was reported

to be possibly the most effective means of communicating with and locating logistics forces. Without the tracker, command and control of the

transportation link of combat service support

would have been nearly impossible. Unfortunately,

where technology had advanced, supply could not

keep up with demand; similar to other communications assets, the blue force tracker was in short

supply.

Shortfalls in Communications
Northern Support Areas 71

his concept of [operations] and he would ask, ‘Captain Thompson and Major Bryant (who was the Regimental S-4), are we going to outrun the logistics?’

And we usually told him, ‘Yes, sir, you are.’ But we .

. . executed the mission anyway.”6 The reality was

that because all three regimental combat teams and

their support companies were so spread out, the support battalions, which provided general support were

not always positioned on the battlefield to best accommodate every maneuver element. To overcome

this challenge, the combat service support companies,

which struggled to keep up with their regimental

combat teams and provide them with sustained resupply, often had to break off and form independent

convoys back to the support battalion to maintain

their own needs. They would then have to catch up

to the regimental combat team, which was continuously on the move. In some ways, it was 1st Marine

Division’s successes that pushed the logistics near—

but not quite to—the point of failure. The Marine logisticians were able to sustain the ground forces,

however, largely due to their intrinsic ability to adapt

to any situation, even as each day brought new challenges. Throughout the war, General Usher recognized that the logisticians’ original plan had to be

constantly re-evaluated for its ability to support the

ground forces.

The success of the operation has been more

significant than planned and so therefore we’ve

got the division a little further out ahead of us

. . . it’s caused us, in the planning cycle, to go

back to our base plan and re-look at some of

those planning assumptions and at the allocation of equipment and reposition and refocus.7

During the four-day operational pause, although

there was minimal movement forward, 1st Marine Division continued to fight. All three regimental combat

teams conducted aggressive security and ambush patrols to their flanks. They secured their zones and

sought out any remnants of retreating enemy forces.

RCT-5 suffered regular attacks by hit-and-run enemy

elements firing mortars and artillery, and enemy ambushes, although not very effective, were frequent.

The combat service support companies continued to

conduct convoy movement to retrieve and deliver

much needed supplies to their regimental combat

teams. Combat Service Support Companies 115 and

117 (CSSC-117) remained spread out along Highway

1 and continued to pull logistical support from Repair

and Replenishment Point 24, while Combat Service

Support Company 111 (CSSC-111) moved to a location north of Qalat Sikar, establishing another repair

and replenishment point. En route to this location,

near ar-Rifa, they received heavy and sustained fire,

and when they initially set up their repair and replenishment point, they faced a group of hostile civilians, causing them to once again move to a location

south of the intersection between Highways 7 and

17. This new site, Repair and Replenishment Point

14, later became Support Area Basilone.

Turnover of Combat Service Support

Battalion 12

On 27 March, Lieutenant Colonel Adrian W.

Burke, future operations officer of 1st FSSG, assumed

command of Combat Service Support Battalion 12

(CSSB-12)*, one of the two general support battalions

under Combat Service Support Group 15. Lieutenant

Colonel Burke, who had commanded a mobile combat service support detachment during Desert

Shield/Desert Storm, took the assignment in stride,

focusing on his new mission: to command the battalion and lead his Marines as they supported I MEF.

With good reason, his efforts were concentrated on

the unknown that his Marines would face in Iraq.8

The same day that Colonel Burke took command

of CSSB-12, the battalion’s advanced party, led by

Major John E. Vincent, the unit’s executive officer,

and about 60 Marines, moved north to set up Support

Area Basilone, near Qalat Sikar. With Charlie Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion attached, they

planned to link up with Combat Service Support

Company 111, which had set up near Qalat Sikar,

and expand their capabilities to include a forward resuscitative surgical system, a shock trauma platoon,

an aeromedical evacuation liaison team, and a mobile aeromedical staging facility. As they moved north

of an-Nasiriyah, elements of Marine Wing Support

Squadron 371 (MWSS-371) joined their already

lengthy convoy, bringing the total number of vehicles

to more than 200 and the number of Marines to over

700. MWSS-371 was tasked with repairing and rebuilding the runway at the Qalat Sikar Airfield, to create the possibility of resupply operations by air.

In the vicinity of Ash Shatrah, the convoy began

receiving small arms, machine gun, mortar, and

rocket-propelled grenade fire. Although they had

light armored vehicle support from the 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit dispersed throughout, the risk of

damage to the convoy was too great, and they decided to turn around, move south to a point just outside of an-Nasiriyah, and await air support. In the

evening, they made another attempt to move north,

* LtCol Burke replaced LtCol Kathleen M. Murney.
72 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

but again, the enemy was waiting for them. This

time, Major Vincent’s convoy was moving in blackout

conditions, and the Marines did not have night vision

goggles; however, they had the added security of

four AH-1 Cobra gunships as escorts. Major Vincent

described the sight: 

I was the lead vehicle. Right off to my side,

about 75-100 yards, one of the Cobras shot a van

. . . and this thing blew up and lit up the whole

sky. . . . the Cobras were firing the rockets and

the sparks from the rockets were falling across

the hood of the vehicle. . . . when this thing

blew up, you could feel the heat. We could hear

the bullets dinging off the LAVs. . . . it was probably more exciting than anything . . . just because we knew we had air support and those

guys would take care of us.9

Major Vincent’s Marines made it through the ambush without any casualties. Further back in the convoy, however, MWSS-371 suffered casualties of both

personnel and vehicles. Gunnery Sergeant Melba L.

Garza, the squadron operations chief, commented on

the fog of war they experienced during the attack on

their convoy:

We could hear on the radio, ‘one humvee

down, one LVS [logistics vehicle system] broken’

and in the kill zone, we can’t do anything but

abandon the vehicle. There’s nothing we can do

mechanical-wise to go ahead and try to get them

up. We actually didn’t have the casualty count

till we were in the RCT section . . . when we

stopped at the RCT-1 site, we actually found out

that one of our seven-tons had rolled over, we

had one leg casualty . . . and we lost a Marine.

That was the most gut-wrenching moment.10

Sergeant Fernando Padilla-Ramirez was the Marine whose status was initially classified as missing

in action. He was later classified as killed in action

when members of the 24th Marine Expeditionary

Unit recovered his body nine days later.11

Around 0100 in the morning, the convoy finally

arrived at 1st Marine Regiment’s position near Qalat

Sikar. Once the Marines arrived, they established

Support Area Basilone with the hope of utilizing the

nearby Qalat Sikar Airfield for resupply by air. This

location would primarily support I MEF forces moving toward al-Kut.12

Two days later, Lieutenant Colonel Burke and his

command element from CSSB-12 arrived at Support

Area (SA) Anderson. They assumed tactical comCourtesy of LtCol Adrian W. Burke, USMC

LtCol Adrian W. Burke, commanding officer of CSSB-12, conducts a berm reconnaissance in Iraq. Prior to assuming command of the battalion, LtCol Burke served as the 1st FSSG future operations officer and was instrumental in the reorganization of the group for OIF. 
Northern Support Areas 73

mand of Captain Durham’s company and responsibility for the support area once CSSG-11 departed. In

addition to providing general combat service support,

SA Anderson housed several medical units, which received and treated numerous casualties from the

front lines of the battlefield. Additionally, while maintaining both the massive hose-reel system and water

supply point at Logistics Support Area Viper, 6th ESB

once again stretched its capabilities even further up

the battlefield by sending a bulk fuel company to SA

Anderson. Here, they were in direct support of CSSB12 and were tasked to establish a 300,000-gallon fuel

farm. While en route to their destination, the convoy

came under enemy attack just north of an-Nasiriyah,

but it was able to continue without casualties. 

1st FSSG Headquarters Moves to Logistics

Support Area Viper

Traditionally, at the FSSG headquarters level, the

“main” and the “forward” were terms that largely reflected the structures required to echelon an organization’s command and control forward. However,

during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1st FSSG implemented a different utility of the main and forward elements. The forward element of the FSSG, where

General Usher remained throughout the war, was

structured to support the combat operations center,

which managed the daily operations of the combat

service support forces moving across the battlefield.

In the forward element, portions of all staff sections

were consolidated into the combat operations center

to shape the future operations, or next 72 hours, of

combat service support. This structure significantly

reduced the decision-making time and allowed General Usher to make the critical decisions when necessary. A major challenge that surfaced with this

structure was the culture change for the staff sections.

General Usher noted that: 

Some sections, like the G-3 and G-4, are

used to having immediate issues that have to

be resolved. Other staff sections, by the very

nature of the business they do, are more deliberate. And so doing things quickly is a cultural

shift, and that is not a negative connotation because some of the things you just have to do

some research before you can make a decision.15

The FSSG main consisted of the staff that provided

the sustained support, such as the administration (G1) and the comptroller. Colonel John L. Sweeney Jr.,

the group’s deputy commander,* remained with its

main element at Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Coyote, Kuwait. These functions were important to the

day-to-day operations of the FSSG, however, were

not critical to the immediate decisions being made

on the battlefield.

On 28 March, General Usher and his forward

headquarters element left Camp Iwo Jima, TAA Coyote, and moved forward to Logistics Support Area

Viper. With elements of 1st Marine Division pushing

farther up the battlefield toward Baghdad, the lines

of communication were stretched to nearly 400 miles.

Additionally, with 1st FSSG’s direct support units set

up hundreds of miles into Iraq and Combat Service

Support Battalion 18 positioned at LSA Viper to provide general support to I MEF, it was imperative that

the general and his staff have better visibility and

control over what occurred on the battlefield. This

new location would provide both. It was also at this

* In garrison, Colonel Sweeney was the 1st FSSG chief of staff,

however, given the large expansion of the FSSG’s forces, General

Usher thought it was appropriate to implement the position of a

deputy commander.

Loved Ones in Combat

Among the many stresses that a Marine

might go through during combat operations is

the loss of a comrade or friend. There were

several Marines participating in OIF, though,

that had the additional stress of worrying about

their loved ones: siblings, spouses, and even

children. Major Vincent was one of many

Marines who had a close relative deployed to

Iraq at the same time. His brother was a helicopter pilot with the 101st Airborne Division,

and the night Major Vincent went into Iraq, he

heard that an Apache from his brother’s battalion had been shot down. For five days he kept

in the back of his mind the possibility that his

brother had been hurt or killed; fortunately, he

was later informed that his brother was safe.13

Captain Patryck J. Durham, commander of

CSSC-181 remembers that when his wife, a helicopter pilot with 15th MEU, initially left Camp

Pendleton in the fall, he had a pretty good idea

that he would also be heading out to the

desert. Among his most memorable moments

from the war were the three chance meetings

when he was able to see his wife; on the flip

side, some of the most stressful moments occurred when he would hear about a helicopter

crash, but not know the identity of the pilot.14
74 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

point when 1st FSSG recognized that its own combat

operations center needed to be reshaped to better

manage the combat service support operations on

the ground. Colonel Darrell L. Moore, 1st FSSG’s

chief of staff, described the new design:

We flattened the [Forward] organization and

pulled the MLC rep [Marine Logistics Command

representative], air rep [air wing representative],

CSSG reps [Combat Service Support Group representatives], and the 1st FSSG Fwd commodity

managers (fuel, food, ammo, spare parts) into

a “killer U” designed by Lieutenant Colonel

Aaron T. Amey. Inside the “U,” we then had all

the levers right at arm’s length for the final couple of weeks of active combat. We found that to

be a nimble and responsive approach. Every

rep seated at the “U” was right on at the same

time as to decisions being made and emphasis

being shifted.16

This new setup mirrored the function of a combat

service support operations center and allowed the

FSSG to be more responsive to the priorities of the

commanders on the battlefield.17 As a result, the direct and general support elements in place could be

more effective. In the days ahead, however, 1st FSSG

would experience an even greater stretch to their logistics chain, ultimately testing a capability that had

become known as its center of gravity—distribution.

Transportation—Security, Intelligence,

and Maintenance

Although the Transportation Support Group had

planned on utilizing their robust distribution capability to support long-haul sustainment runs, they

quickly found that their large fleet of vehicles had

been greatly depleted by requirements to move the

three engineer battalions and their equipment forward on the battlefield. Drivers and equipment were

already overworked, but even longer hours became

necessary to support the ever extending lines of communications and support. One critical requirement,

the movement of fuel, was aided greatly by the

Army’s 319th Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Company. With their fleet of fuel tankers, they were able

to transport twice as much fuel as Marine Corps assets were capable of in a single convoy.18

Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Ascunce, officer in

charge of 1st FSSG’s Logistics Movement and Engineering Coordination Center described the movement as the farthest inland in Marine Corps history.

He commented that it was often ugly and conducted

with brute force, but the performance of the individLack of Line Haul Transportation 

With three battalions of tanks, four battalions of

amphibious assault vehicles, and ample heavy engineer equipment, the line haul transportation requirement or the ability to transport heavy vehicles

and equipment with large tractor trailers, exceeded

the FSSGs’ capabilities. Even within three major

commands—1st FSSG, the Marine Logistics Command, and 4th FSSG—this capability simply did not

exist. Reliance on the pledged support from the

U.S. Army’s 377th Theater Support Command to

handle the line haul transportation of heavy equipment, which did not materialize, resulted in a shortfall that had to be filled by civilian contracted

vehicles. Unfortunately, these vehicles were not

suited to the desert environment, and many of

these tractor trailers and lowboys got stuck in the

sand along the main supply routes. In an interview,

General Lehnert commented on the Marine Corps’

shortage of line haul transportation. “The Marine

Corps has zero ability to move one single tank. The

reason that the tanks today are sitting at 34 percent

readiness is that we did not have the same access

to super HETs [heavy equipment transporter] and

tank haulers that the U.S. Army did, so we drove

them 600 to 1,000 miles and we drove the tracks

right off them.”19

Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Ascunce, the officerin-charge of 1st FSSG’s Logistics Movement and Engineering Coordination Center, also recognized the

need for line haul transportation assets, a capability he felt the Marine Corps should have, possibly

in the reserves, to pull out and use during operations such as this one. Similarly, he discussed the

shortage of petroleum, oil, and lubricants trucks

that forced the Marines to rely on the Army. Overall, they faced daily challenges with the non-availability of vehicle assets to cover so much ground

and so many missions and the organization and

communication capabilities. At times, several days

would pass with no available vehicles in Transportation Support Group’s lot. When asked about

lessons learned, Colonel Ascunce jokingly commented that bringing more trucks would have

helped.20
Northern Support Areas 75

ual Marines allowed them to accomplish their missions. He specifically complimented the drivers and

their conduct during the operations. One of the most

inspirational moments of the war for the colonel was

the second night of the war, when he went from

truck to truck to speak to the Marines, most of whom

had been up for days and were driving on less than

four hours of sleep. Not a single Marine complained

about his or her job or the conditions in which they

were working. Their perseverance and dedication

were significant, even though their contribution often

went unnoticed.21

With forces spread out across hundreds of miles of

desert, both 1st FSSG and the Marine Logistics Command (MLC) were heavily engaged in distribution efforts. This collaboration between the two commands

may not have been detailed in the original operations

plan, but with the campaign’s exceptional speed and

distance, all available distribution assets were required

to accomplish the mission. General Usher discussed

the need to share the distribution burden during an

interview in early April 2003.

Transportation Support Group’s mission has

become so broad; both in terms of the area in

which they operate and the depth in volume of

what we have to push forward, that how we

synchronize efforts between the Transportation

Support Group and the supporting MLC distribution push, is an area that we’re refining now,

but certainly was a little more demanding than

I had envisioned. . . . we’re working to kind of

sort out that division of labor.22

Similarly, the MLC came to recognize that their role

in distribution, which had been somewhat minimized

during the original planning with I MEF, would be

much broader and extensive. In an interview conducted in early May 2003, General Lehnert, commander of the MLC, reflected on his command’s

original framework under which he was to develop a

plan for his transportation assets. “It was described as

‘Get it to the Kuwaiti border, perhaps as much as 50

miles inland . . .’ and by 50 miles inland meaning 50

miles into Iraq ‘. . . and we’ll take it from there.’”23

Doctrinally, this had been a correct assumption. As

the war unfolded, however, everything changed. By

the end of March, the Marine Logistics Command Support Detachment-1, which was largely responsible for

managing the contracted third country national vehicles and drivers at Camp Coyote in Kuwait, was conducting convoys into Iraq, and 2d Transportation

Support Battalion (2d TSB) was routinely sent to Logistics Support Area Viper and beyond. On 31 March,

Captain James R. Grooms, executive officer of 2d

TSB’s Company B, and the battalion operations officer, Major Patrick N. Kelleher, led a convoy carrying

critical Health Services Battalion personnel and equipment to Support Area Anderson. There, a critical field

medical facility was established to support I MEF

forces on the forward edge of the battlefield. Upon arrival at SA Anderson, the battalion’s convoy was

quickly tasked with a return mission of carrying 128

enemy prisoners back to LSA Viper for interrogation.

During the three-day period that the convoy was on

the road, it covered a distance of more than 500

miles.

The rapid pace of operations required that quick

and decisive actions be taken to ensure that supplies

could reach forces in a timely manner. General Lehnert and his transportation commanders conducted

continuous mission analysis and altered their original

plans to best employ their precious distribution assets.

We thought a lot about our culminating

point. Initially when we were doing our planning, we thought that [it] would be [LSA] Viper,

but then later on we moved that . . . point

about—and I’d have to check the map—about

100 or 120 miles north of [SA] Anderson. Then

the MEF asked us again if we could move further north. We moved the culminating point all

the way to [SA] Chesty.24

By the first week of April, 2d TSB had moved to

LSA Viper and began conducting operational level

sustainment and resupply convoys to I MEF units at

Anderson, Chesty, Geiger, Edson, and Forward Operating Base Fenway. Far exceeding their originally

agreed upon responsibilities, 2d TSB logged nearly

1.2 million miles during the first 30 days of conflict,

reaching more than 300 miles further into Iraq than

originally planned.

One of the many innovations developed during

Operation Iraqi Freedom came from Captain Michael

F. Olness of 2d Transportation Support Battalion. He

developed an innovative web-based application to

track the battalion personnel, vehicles, fueling assets,

communications, and critical information requirements.25 The “Big Board,” as it was known, provided

the commander with a capacity readout of his battlefield distribution capabilities. At a glance, he and

the higher headquarters of the Marine Logistics Command could not only view their asset availability, but

also monitor the progress of convoys across time.26

With both 1st FSSG and the Marine Logistics Command conducting numerous large convoys across
76 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

great distances, security had to be taken seriously. I

MEF’s focus on operational momentum had resulted

in 1st Marine Division’s concentrated efforts to rapidly close in on Baghdad, often breaking contact with

smaller elements of enemy forces along the way.

While these company- or smaller-sized enemy units

were not a major threat to I MEF’s overall operation,

they caused problems for rear areas and harassed

slow-moving convoys. From the commencement of

hostilities in March, convoys routinely came under

sniper fire, as well as small, organized attacks from

enemy forces. In 1st FSSG, the Transportation Support Group (TSG) mitigated this problem by establishing a convoy control company, specifically

designed to manage the security, as well as the command and control, of all convoy movement. From receipt of the mission order to completion of the

movement, the convoy control elements—ranging

from team to platoon size—managed the traffic. The

drivers from 6th Motor Transport Battalion were responsible for the administration of the convoy loads,

but it was the convoy control team that focused its

efforts on suppressing any hostile actions to ensure

the convoy’s safe arrival at its destination. One of the

benefits of this concept was the continuity of convoy

commanders and teams. Despite this, though, they

faced many challenges in their mission, to include a

shortage of communications assets, civilian contracted

vehicles not equipped to keep up with Marine convoys, and numerous weather and distance factors.27

Similar to the TSG’s concept of using convoy control teams, the Marine Logistics Command convoys

were augmented with additional security elements of

the 2d Military Police (MP) Battalion. Reconfiguring

their equipment and personnel to support the convoy security requirements, the members of the MP

Battalion escorted more than 1,400 convoys, coordinating with both U.S. Army and British military police

to maintain the overall security of main supply routes

in both Kuwait and Iraq and sustain operational

throughput in especially congested and unstable

areas.28

In the first week of the war, 2d TSB’s headquarters and service company commander Captain Marta

M. DeVries had been tasked to lead a route reconnaissance in search of an alternate road bypassing

Safwan. There had been continuous low-level threats

from civilians who laid minor obstacles in the road in

an effort to stall the convoys and steal from the vehicles. The route reconnaissance took two days and ultimately resulted in a safer bypass route that Coalition

forces continued to use throughout the war. The

MLC’s intelligence section recognized that useful intelligence data could be gathered, not only during

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Light armored vehicles are staged in preparation for providing security to a combat service support convoy in

Iraq.
Northern Support Areas 77

route reconnaissance missions, but also during convoys. Seeking to address security challenges as well as

enhance intelligence gathering, the section implemented an intelligence collection and reporting system that employed truck drivers, military police

Marines, convoy commanders, and other members of

the MLC. This system was appropriately named

“TruckInt.” Modeled after the aviation community’s

pilot briefing and debriefing process, this intelligence

tool was incorporated into the mission planning and

standard operating procedures of all 2d FSSG units

conducting convoys. There were two main components in the process. First, prior to a convoy mission,

drivers and passengers would receive a briefing from

an intelligence analyst, consisting of weather forecasts, weather effects analysis, an updated enemy activity report, and a trafficability assessment of primary

and alternate routes. In addition to this standard briefing, convoy members would also be given intelligence requirements to include in their subsequent

debriefing upon their return. The second component

was the extensive debrief. Through their observations,

interactions with locals, and contact with any enemy

forces, convoy members would provide information

to intelligence analysts, who would in turn, create formal intelligence reports. These reports were submitted to all units within the MLC, as well as the

headquarters of Marine Forces Central Command, I

Marine Expeditionary Force, the 377th Theater Support Command, and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command. As a result of these reports, the

Marine Logistics Command was able to divert convoys to alternate routes when necessary, fine-tune its

convoy defense posture, and continuously ensure that

resupply missions were successfully executed.29

With the nonstop stream of convoys traveling hundreds of miles through harsh desert conditions, vehicles, equipment, and personnel were all pushed to

their limits. General Lehnert noted though, that while

Marines, particularly young 22- to 25-year-old

Marines, were extraordinarily resilient, he was more

worried about the ability of the equipment to hold

up during the high operational tempo.30 As a result,

continuous and effective maintenance was never

more critical. Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom,

the MLC exercised a program of maintenance to

maximize timely response and full-range repair capability. At the unit level, Task Force Pegasus implemented a system that had a team of mechanics

execute bumper-to-bumper maintenance while drivers slept between frequent convoy operations. This

approach, which involved extensive corrective as

well as preventive maintenance, kept the MLC readiness rate over 90 percent throughout the war. 

Hantush: The Attack Resumes

As 1st FSSG continued to stretch its arc of sustainment across the battlefield, Combat Service Support Group 11 concentrated its efforts on supporting

1st Marine Division’s immediate needs. While the majority of CSSG-11 and Combat Service Support Battalion 10 remained at Repair and Replenishment

Point 24 until 1 April, the battalion’s tactical command post and CSSG-11 forward departed on 31

March to conduct a leader’s reconnaissance to the

north near the town of Hantush. This site had been

identified by both CSSG-11 and Marine Wing Support Group 37 during planning for a potential highway runway, and just south of Highway 17, Repair

and Replenishment Point 25 was established. As they

arrived in the area, Marines from CSSG-11 and CSSB10 assumed the responsibility for security in the Hantush area. As a result, Colonel Pomfret received the

nickname “Mayor of Hantush.”31 Elements of MWSG37 and 1st Marine Division were nearby, converting

a portion of the highway into a runway that would

be used for both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.

Using armored earthmovers, the division’s combat

engineers knocked down light poles and swept out

guardrails to allow for the use of the highway as a

runway. This would be the first opportunity for logistical resupply by air. With limited space, CSSB-10

used creativity and flexibility to fit most of its combat

service support capability in this “lakeside property,”

marked by numerous stagnant irrigation ponds.32

On 2 April, as 1st Marine Division resumed its attack after the operational pause, CSSG-11 was positioned at Hantush to support the division’s fight

against the Baghdad Infantry Division. Combat Service Support Company 111 moved north on Highway

7, south of al-Hayy and continued to resupply Regimental Combat Team 1 in al-Kut. Combat Service

Support Company 115, the lead element for Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5) logistics, moved

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

A KC-130 taxies at Jalibah Airfield, LSA Viper, Iraq.
78 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

northeast along Highway 27 toward the Saddam

Canal, where it set up a hasty repair and replenishment point.33 As RCT-5 continued its attack toward

an-Numaniyah, it became apparent that the singlelane bridge crossing on the Saddam Canal would not

be sufficient for the regiment’s lengthy convoys.

Combat Service Support Company 117 moved north

past ad-Diwaniyah, continuing to resupply Regimental Combat Team 7, and later that night, arrived at a

location near an-Numaniyah Airfield, just south of the

Tigris River. The next day, following directly behind

RCT-7, the company crossed the river.34

8th Engineer Support Battalion’s (8th ESB) Crossing

Area Engineer-1, led by Major Timothy B. Seamon,

worked with elements of RCT-5 to find a site suitable

for constructing an alternate crossing. Late in the day,

Bridge Company A built an improved ribbon, or assault float bridge across the Saddam Canal. It was built

at night against light enemy opposition, but the greater

challenge for the engineers was maneuvering their

heavy equipment over steep entrance and exit banks.

Almost simultaneous to the construction of the alternate crossing on the Saddam Canal, another bridging

requirement emerged. The very next day, 8th ESB was

called upon to construct a bridge across the Tigris west

of an-Numaniyah. This crossing supported elements of

5th Marine Regiment and served as an alternate crossing site for the remainder of 1st Marine Division in the

event existing bridges in an-Numaniyah were destroyed by enemy forces. Still fatigued from the previous night’s bridge emplacement, Bridge Company A

initiated the building of a 508-foot improved ribbon

bridge and was later reinforced by Bridge Company C,

which completed the bridge emplacement that night.35

In the early hours on 3 April, after the division units

had cleared an-Numaniyah, CSSB-10 packed up and

departed Repair and Replenishment Point 25. Just west

of an-Numaniyah, the battalion established Repair and

Replenishment Point 19, a Quick Mart–type roadside

stop to provide fuel and other needed supplies to passing units. An otherwise routine and uneventful operation for CSSB-10, which had been moving and setting

up at unparalleled rates of speed, Repair and Replenishment Point 19 would be remembered by most as

the location where they heard the news about the

death of one of their own. Private First Class Chad E.

Bales died and several Marines were injured when a

troop-carrying MK48 logistics vehicle system collided

with a seven-ton truck. Although CSSB-10 left the area

less than 24 hours later, a small detachment, led by

CSSB-10 executive officer, Major Michael C. Varicak,

remained to continue conducting the critical refueling

mission. This repair and replenishment point was later

designated Support Area Chesty, one of the two main

support areas providing general logistical sustainment

to all of I MEF. Elements of CSSB-10 were now spread

between Repair and Replenishment Points 19, 24, and

25 due to continuing requirements to support elements

of 1st Marine Division and turnover issues with CSSB12 at Support Area Anderson.36

Courtesy of 8th ESB

Marines from Bridge Companies A and C of 8th Engineer Support Battalion construct an improved ribbon

bridge across the Tigris River to enable 5th Marine Regiment’s movement toward Baghdad.
79

By 3 April, Regimental Combat Teams 1 (RCT-1)

and 7 (RCT-7) had defeated the Baghdad Republican

Guard Division at al-Kut and waited on the northern

bank of the Tigris River for the order to attack into

Baghdad. Meanwhile, Regimental Combat Team 5

(RCT-5) continued to attack west to a town on the

southern bank of the Tigris River called al-Aziziyah.

In addition to housing the headquarters of the II Republican Guard Corp’s Anti-Armor Regiment, the

town held bridges, which were key logistics points

for the enemy. The enemy resistance was fierce, but

the combination of 2d Tank Battalion’s overwhelming

firepower and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines’ tenacity in

clearing the town gradually wore the enemy down.1

Meanwhile, the support companies in Combat

Service Support Group 11 (CSSG-11) focused their

efforts on resupplying their regimental combat teams

for the imminent attack into Baghdad. Combat Service Support Company 111 obtained fuel, water, and

rations from Combat Service Support Battalion 12 at

Support Area Anderson, after offloading Iraqi prisoners. They proceeded through an-Numaniyah and

established a repair and replenishment point to support RCT-1. Combat Service Support Company 115

crossed the Tigris River and traveled up Highway 6

to establish a roadside refueling station. The following night, they displaced further north, but were held

up after just 20 miles due to resistance along the

route. Combat Service Support Company 117 continued to follow in trace of RCT-7 along Highway 6.2

While elements of Combat Service Support Battalion 10 (CSSB-10) continued to provide support at Repair and Replenishment Points 19 and 25, the

remainder of Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Weinkle’s

battalion moved north, passing through RCT-7’s vehicles parked along both sides of Highway 6. Near

the city of al-Aziziyah, where RCT-5 had just cleared

out enemy forces, CSSB-10 established another repair and replenishment point, this time in an urban

environment. Just north of the Tigris River, Repair

and Replenishment Point 22 was set up in an abandoned service station along the highway. There were

many remnants of the fighting that had occurred less

than 24 hours prior to the establishment of the facility, including burning buildings, destroyed equipment, abandoned weapons, and curious civilians. In

the meantime, the Marines located and collected

large quantities of ordnance, which included mortar

tubes and rounds, recoilless rifles, grenades, and

large caches of small arms. These were identified to

follow-on elements for destruction.

Despite the fact that his battalion was now spread

across multiple repair and replenishment points,

Colonel Weinkle’s Marines managed to provide much

needed support of rations, fuel, and ammunition to

several division units. Often, this resupply occurred

“just in time.” Additionally, during the four days at

Repair and Replenishment Point 22, maintenance

Chapter 6

Taking Baghdad and Tikrit (4–22 April 2003)

The Marines of CSSB-10 labor to establish a repair and replenishment point outside of Baghdad.

Courtesy of CSSB-10
contact teams executed risky recovery missions with

minimal security. One team was even able to secure

and retrieve a damaged M1A1 Abrams tank. In another operation, military police and mortuary affairs

teams deployed to recover remains from an AH-1

Cobra helicopter crash, which occurred in close

proximity to CSSB-10 vehicles.3

On 5 April, CSSG-11 followed the main element

of 1st Marine Division to a suburb east of Baghdad

and conducted reconnaissance of an area in the

vicinity of Sarabadi Airfield and Highway 6. CSSB-10

also moved to this area, west of al-Aziziyah, and established Repair and Replenishment Point 23 in an

agricultural complex previously used as an Iraqi military command post. After clearing Iraqi looters from

the complex, they occupied the numerous abandoned houses and buildings for several different

functions, including a military police operations center, post office, Iraqi prisoner holding facility, ammunition supply point, maintenance bays, and a

motor pool. In addition to their combat service support functions, the battalion liaised with the local

civilian populace. Members of the 3d Civil Affairs

Group, who were attached to CSSB-10, interacted

with local civilians in an effort to identify local resources such as diesel fuel. The civilians were also

forthcoming about enemy activity and reported a

warehouse that supposedly stored antiaircraft guns

among several other types of weapons. After this report was confirmed, the civil affairs team secured the

building and awaited the arrival of explosive ordnance disposal Marines, who destroyed the cache.4

Buildup of Support Area Chesty

On 4 April, Combat Service Support Battalion 12’s

(CSSB-12) command element, advanced party, and

Combat Service Support Company 121 ended their

stay at Support Area Anderson and departed for Support Area (SA) Chesty, near the town of an-Numaniyah. The location, just over 100 miles outside of

Baghdad, was chosen during a leader’s reconnaissance the previous day, in which Lieutenant Colonel

Adrian W. Burke took a small team to look at a couple of sites near Repair and Replenishment Point 19

and 1st Marine Division’s headquarters. Centrally located between the 1st Marine Division’s main axis of

advance on Baghdad and the Task Force Tarawa area

of operations along Highway 7, the site chosen for

SA Chesty provided the much-needed general support to sustain operations in and around the capital

city. Where SA Chesty’s geographic location was an

advantage, its environmental features presented a

major challenge. The support area was largely a vast

area of barren land, with scarce infrastructure. The

lack of buildings and pavement, coupled with continuously blowing sand and dirt, challenged the

Marines in their efforts to establish large lots and

staging areas, as well as manage the nonstop flow of

convoys in and out of the area.

Also located at SA Chesty, Forward Resuscitative

80 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Support Area Chesty, a vast area of barren desert, is located outside the city of An Numaniyah, Iraq.
Taking Baghdad and Tikrit 81

Surgical System 2 and Shock Trauma Platoon 8,

which were now attached to CSSB-12, set up their

equipment to provide level-two medical support to

incoming casualties. Additionally, a detachment of

over 300 engineers congregated at SA Chesty to perform a variety of engineering missions. Compiled

from several engineer units and led by Major Todd D.

Hook of 6th Engineer Support Battalion, this group,

internally known as Task Force Hook, accomplished

several critical tasks over the course of several days,

which included building a 1.2-million-gallon fuel

storage facility and a 200,000-gallon water production and storage site.5 Just as Combat Service Support

Battalion 18 had set up Logistics Support Area Viper

to support I MEF’s initial push through southern Iraq,

CSSB-12 now established SA Chesty, a position 300

miles from its origin in Kuwait, to support operations

near Baghdad. This would be the northernmost support area established to provide general support for

I MEF and would greatly impact 1st Marine Division’s

fight in Baghdad.*

Midnight Run to Baghdad

On 5 April, on its first full day at Support Area

Chesty, Combat Service Support Battalion 12 was

tasked with an emergency resupply of more than

1,000 artillery projectiles, powder, and fuses to support a recent change in 11th Marines’ fire support requirements in and around Baghdad. The regiment’s

mission changed from an open terrain fight where

dual-purpose improved conventional munitions

would have a greater impact on area targets to an

urban fight that required the more precise high-explosive rounds. Because of the dispersion of transportaion assets across the battlefield, CSSB-12

recognized that they would have to form a convoy

using their own organic assets.6 In essence, CSSB-12,

a general support organization, would assemble and

execute a direct support resupply convoy. The destination for delivery was over 110 miles away,

through what still remained uncleared enemy territory. Enemy regular and Fedayeen forces were reported to have been bypassed and were operating

in the area. Colonel Burke led the convoy himself.

With our own assets, without being really

plugged into [CSSB] 10 yet, because they were

so far-leaning as well, we were able to put together our own convoy [and] a security package inside of an hour, and then travel the 110

miles from this site to where the artillery battalions were firing from inside of six hours,

through “Indian country.” We put 40 Marines,

15 vehicles, and 1,000 artillery rounds at risk to

make that run to meet a division “no kidding,

we need it now” requirement. . . . We took

fuses, powder, and round mixes so they could

put the stuff right on the gun line.7

At 0400 the next morning, Colonel Burke’s convoy reached its destination, just eight miles outside of

Baghdad. CSSB-12’s mantra during this operation was

to “lean forward.”8 Doing exactly that, the battalion

conducted a “just-in-time” delivery of munitions that

* Support Area Daly, which was located further north and closer

to Baghdad, was planned but never occupied by a sizeable combat service support force

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

A convoy of seven-ton trucks moves ammunition to forward units near Baghdad.
proved to be critical for regimental fire missions the

next morning.

Maintenance and Ingenuity

Originally located at Camp Coyote in Kuwait,

Combat Service Support Battalion 12’s Maintenance

Company, commanded by Major Ronald W. Sablan,

had begun preparing to move weeks before the start

of the war, and as that time got closer, they had systematically started shutting down their capabilities.

As the company’s convoys moved from Kuwait to Logistics Support Area Viper and eventually Support

Area Anderson, the maintenance Marines continued

to fix equipment. At Support Area Anderson for just

a few days, they were given the order to move to

Support Area Chesty. En route to their destination,

Major Sablan’s 91-vehicle convoy, which was escorted by light armored reconnaissance vehicles, was

ambushed at two locations in the vicinity of the Saddam Canal. The Saddam Canal Bridge, a natural

chokepoint along Route 27, caused the convoy to

slow down and left some vehicles in the kill zone.

Taking enemy fire from both sides of the road, members of the convoy returned fire and maneuvered

through the ambush as quickly as possible. Sustaining minor vehicle damage only, the CSSB-12 convoy

arrived at its destination with no casualties.

Once they arrived at SA Chesty, the maintenance

company focused on equipment retrieval and providing service through contact teams. The MEF had

designed an approach to handle unserviceable

equipment. Designated maintenance collection

points were set up for units to leave broken equipment behind, but unfortunately, these locations were

not used, and most broken vehicles and equipment

were left on the side of the road. The maintenance

company did not have enough retrieval equipment

to spread across the battlefield. Another major challenge the unit faced in sending out contact teams

centered on security issues; their approach was to

deploy with heavy security and intimidate or deter

the enemy from attacking by showing an overwhelming amount of firepower.9

Similar to the maintenance companies within 1st

FSSG, 2d Maintenance Battalion had immediately

begun providing intermediate level maintenance support once they arrived in theater. The battalion was

led by Lieutenant Colonel Brent P. Goddard, a former Field Supply Maintenance Analysis Office leader

and executive officer of the combat service support

element during Operation Uphold Democracy in

Haiti. Through both camp-based maintenance support and mobile contact teams, they attempted to repair equipment as close to the customer as possible.

As a result of this customer-focused approach,

Colonel Goddard’s Marines eventually dispatched

nearly 1,200 maintenance contact teams throughout

the Iraqi theater of operations. This forward concept

of operations and the battalion’s philosophy of

“maintain” versus “repair” enabled the maintenance

Marines to overcome a variety of challenges, which

included poor communications, limited system support, lack of field maintenance facilities, and a shortage of repair parts.10 With only half the personnel

during OIF compared to peacetime operations, 2d

Maintenance Battalion attained higher repair rates,

closing more than 5,500 work orders on nearly 7,000

principle end items. Additionally, repair cycle times

were shortened by nearly 200 percent from garrison

metrics.11

Even as the operational tempo reached its peak

during the war, the Marines continued to demonstrate creativity and ingenuity. In one instance, they

used a stripped humvee to test engines, transmissions, and drive trains; in another, they built a dunk

tank to test radiators and tires.12 Ultimately, the maintenance Marines understood that while not glamorous in the traditional warfighting sense, their roles

were critical in supporting the overall mission. Major

Devon C. Young, executive officer of the battalion,

described what most commanders in a support organization recognize in their Marines at one time or

another. “All the Marines wanted to be up on the

frontlines; they wanted to be up north, storming

Baghdad. . . . I think the majority of them realized

their role here was just as important as the Marines

up front. Because everybody has their little piece of

the puzzle they have to do.”13

‘Please Don’t Let Me Run Out’

From the start of the war, there was perhaps no

type of supply more critical than ammunition. Without it, the amazing speed and momentum accomplished by ground forces would have been pointless.

Even before the war started, the criticality of ammunition was evident to all, down to the individual Marine rifleman. One Marine in particular, when asked

by the I MEF ammunition officer if he needed anything else, simply said, “Sir, please don’t let me run

out.” The ammunition detachment of Combat Service

Support Battalion 12, led by Chief Warrant Officer–2

Bradley S. Baggiano, heard this story and adopted

the Marine’s plea as a constant reminder to his own

Marines of their critical mission.14 Doctrinally, their

mission was to build up ammunition supply points,

stock and issue ammunition to units on the ground.

82 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Taking Baghdad and Tikrit 83

Execution of this fairly straightforward mission, however, was met with numerous challenges. Poor

weather conditions, continuously changing requirements, and limited communications, material handling, and transportation assets all made their job

more difficult. Eventually ending up at Support Area

Chesty, the detachment continued 24-hour operations

to overcome these challenges and fulfill their mission. More importantly, though, they worked tirelessly to ensure that every Marine rifleman never ran

out. 

While CSSB-12’s ammunition detachment dealt

with tactical challenges, the ammunition detachment

within Marine Logistics Command faced a whole set

of other problems. Working at the wholesale level,

Chief Warrant Officer–2 Terry G. Norris, the Marine

Logistics Command’s ammunition officer, had the responsibility of getting the ammunition to all of the

1st FSSG support areas. Relying heavily on the Army

for support, he faced a shortage of ammunition, both

in quantity and type, even before the war began.

Original planning had estimated a requirement of

supplying only two regimental combat teams. This

grew into four regimental combat teams, and was increased by a number of unanticipated units, such as

three engineer support battalions and several Marine

wing support squadrons. These units, like elements

of 1st Marine Division and Task Force Tarawa, would

be near the front lines and moving far forward on

the battlefield. Once the war started, poor visibility of

battlefield distribution and limited reporting left Chief

Warrant Officer Norris and his Marines in the dark on

what they should be pushing forward. In the end,

there was enough ammunition; as many individuals

had often described other aspects of logistics support

during Operation Iraqi Freedom, “it wasn’t pretty,”

but the mission was accomplished and no Marine

went without. 

A Bridge Under Fire

On the eve of 1st Marine Division’s imminent attack into Baghdad, 8th Engineer Support Battalion

(8th ESB) was tasked to locate possible bridge crossings on the Diyala River. Lieutenant Colonel Niel E.

Nelson, commanding officer of 8th ESB and force

crossing engineer for 1st Marine Division, directed

the efforts of his Marines, as well as reconnaissance

elements from both Regimental Combat Teams 1 and

5, to locate all potential crossing points to the northeast of Baghdad. However, after 24 hours of intense

route reconnaissance, no suitable approaches to the

crossing sites had been found. All of the bridges

crossing the Diyala River to the eastern side of Baghdad had been damaged to some extent. If these

bridges were not fixed or suitable alternative routes

built, elements of 1st Marine Division would have

had to travel 35 kilometers north to another crossing

(provided that the bridge there was still intact), cross

into Baghdad and then travel in from the north.

Colonel Nelson determined five locations for bridge

emplacements to the southeast of Baghdad, just

north of the confluence of the Diyala and Tigris

Rivers, and it was decided that three crossings would

be completed. One medium girder bridge would be

placed overtop a bridge on Highway 6 that had been

destroyed by the enemy earlier in the week, and two

improved ribbon or assault float bridges would be

put in place to cross military traffic only.16 Major

Thomas M. Pratt, operations officer for 8th ESB commented on the challenges the engineers faced at this

particular crossing site:

Doctrinally it says, “the RCT crosses the

water obstacle and secures the bridgehead

line.” That was not able to happen because of

the banks on the other side of the river; the

tracks couldn’t swim. So essentially, we had to

build the bridges with two dismounted companies providing security for us. It’s something

that you always think you might do [but] you

Streamlined Ordering

At the tactical level, CSSG-11 had developed

a system in coordination with the 1st Marine

Division ammunition officer to streamline and

simplify on-call emergency resupplies of ammunition. A detailed listing of common ammunition requirements was compiled and broken

down into pallet-sized groupings. Each set of

items, whether for an artillery battalion, an infantry company, or a particular weapons section, was then assigned a specific name, such

as “sledgehammer” or “cannonball.” When a

unit needed a resupply of ammunition, it could

pass its requirement through radio transmission

with a simple call, such as “two cannonballs” or

“three sledgehammers.” CSSG-11 would immediately know what was requested and had the

pre-palletized items ready to deliver. Additionally, the list of these ammunition packages was

provided to both CSSB-12 and CSSB-18, which

were able to use them to reduce their preparation time.15
84 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

A medium girder bridge, built by Marines of the 8th Engineer Support Battalion, spans the Diyala River. The

original bridge leading into Baghdad, had been destroyed by Iraqi forces.

The commanding general of 1st FSSG, BGen Edward G. Usher III (left), and the commanding officer of 8th Engineer Support Battalion, Col Niel E. Nelson, stand near the medium girder bridge that the battalion built crossing into Baghdad. Photo by LtCol Melissa D. Mihocko, USMCR
Taking Baghdad and Tikrit 85

really aren’t prepared to go out there and build

bridges by hand, under . . . direct and indirect

fire.17

Once the crossing locations were determined,

Colonel Nelson and his assistant force crossing engineer, Captain Brian E. Gard, split the remaining

bridge assets and personnel into three bridge crossing units, supported by engineer maintenance assets

under the commands of CAE-1 and CAE-5. The force

crossing engineer command element coordinated the

complicated maneuver of allocating assets and personnel, and coordinating their night movements for

simultaneous bridge emplacements. The three

bridges that 8th ESB’s Bridge Company C, elements

of Bridge Company A, and the Army’s 459th MultiRole Bridge Company emplaced across the Diyala

River were completed within 36 hours and enabled

two regimental combat teams, Regimental Combat

Team 1 and 7, to cross into Baghdad. This southeastern approach into the capital city was critical to

sustaining the momentum of 1st Marine Division’s attack on Baghdad.18

Miraculously, the engineers suffered no fatalities

during the building of these bridges. One Army soldier, however, was injured from a close-range explosion of an enemy artillery shell, suffering a concussion and some temporary hearing loss.

Taking the Capital

On 6 April, Combat Service Support Group 11

units were positioned to support the 1st Marine Division’s cordoning of Baghdad. Combat Service Support Company 115 (CSSC-115) moved to a location

known as “The General’s Crossroads.” Two dead

Iraqis had been found at this site; one was later identified as the chief of staff of the Special Republican

Guard. While setting up a repair and replenishment

point, CSSC-115 received incoming mortar fire.

Meanwhile, Combat Service Support Company 117

(CSSC-117) established their position at a former Saddam Fedayeen training camp, where they uncovered

large arms caches. At this time, all CSSG-11 trucks

were dispatched to Support Area Chesty to support

an emergency resupply of artillery ammunition for

11th Marine Regiment.19

The next day, as 1st Marine Division was entering

Baghdad, the Marines of Combat Service Support

Battalion 10 once again departed for their next location, leaving just a small contingent at Repair and Replenishment Point 23. As the regimental combat

teams continued to secure the city and surrounding

Marines of 8th Engineer Support Battalion built an assault float bridge across the Diyala River while under

enemy fire. The engineers first built a pontoon bridge, then used bridging equipment to connect the remnants

of the original bridge, which had been destroyed by enemy forces. 

Courtesy of 8th ESB
areas, CSSB-10 established Repair and Replenishment

Point 26 in a Republican Guard maintenance facility.

Located just on the outskirts of Baghdad, this proved

to be a much more efficient combat service support

location, as it provided ideal access to the city while

remaining distant enough to avoid its congestion and

associated force protection concerns. Elements of 6th

Engineer Support Battalion and the Seabees also

chose to set up at this location, which eventually became Support Area Daly. Unlike previous repair and

replenishment points, where units were forced to set

up in the sand, this site had ample concrete surfaces

for maintenance bays and supply storage. It offered

several existing buildings in which elements of the

battalion were able to operate. The main building

provided an excellent structure to house the combat

service support operations center and company command posts. The Materiel Readiness Company, which

included both supply and maintenance, was able to

set up in actual maintenance bays.

A nearby landing strip, Salman Pak, which had just

been abandoned by Iraqi forces earlier in the morning, provided the Marines a much-needed capability

to have supplies flown in by KC-130s and helicopters. Piles of dirt and debris that had been strewn

across the runway in an effort to prohibit the runway’s use by Coalition forces, were quickly cleared

by CSSG-11. Given the name Repair and Replenishment Point 26A, the runway was only 30 minutes

away from the main repair and replenishment point.

It was maintained by a small element of Marines from

both CSSG-11 and CSSB-10. Post exchange supplies

and a disbursing capability were brought forward to

Repair and Replenishment Point 26, allowing the

Marines in 1st Marine Division their first opportunity

for much needed health and comfort items, as well

as a welcome resupply of mail, sundry packs, meal

enhancements, and fruit.

The facility was located just outside Baghdad, the

center of fighting, and CSSB-10 experienced nightly

attacks by enemy sniper fire. Despite this, the atmosphere at Repair and Replenishment Point 26 was

much more permissive than previous repair and replenishment points, and focus began to shift to supporting the impending security and stabilization

mission. While maintaining their ongoing combat

service support mission, the Marines also sought out

opportunities to conduct civil-military operations.

Out in town, civil affairs Marines searched for new

and innovative ways to draw captured fuel out of

abandoned tankers, while maintenance contact

teams were busy recovering more than 30 of 1st Marine Division’s abandoned tracked and wheeled vehicles. At the same time, the battalion shared water

produced by its reverse osmosis water purification

units with Iraqi civilians. Prisoners continued to flow

into the custody of the military police, including several high-ranking Iraqi military officials. Medical per86 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Courtesy of CSSB-10

Several combat service support elements set up at CSSB-10’s Repair and Replenishment Point 26, just on the outskirts of Baghdad. Previously a Republican Guard maintenance facility, the existing buildings provided ample

space for the battalion’s operations center, as well as maintenance and supply bays.
Taking Baghdad and Tikrit 87

sonnel in the battalion put their skills to good use,

treating both Marine casualties and the seemingly

endless numbers of Iraqi civilians seeking medical

care.20

CSSG-11’s forward command post set up with 1st

Marine Division Forward command post in the stadium within Baghdad’s Al Rasheed Airfield. Interestingly, the stadium scoreboard read “Iraq–0, USA–2.”

Also, in a museum at the airfield, displays showed

mannequins dressed as U.S. soldiers surrendering;

uniforms and equipment displayed were from the

Vietnam era.21 For three days while the small contingent of CSSG-11 forward was located inside the capital city, the combat service support companies

conducted resupply convoys from outside the city.

Initially, the crossings on the Diyala River did not

allow for their large convoys to pass, but by 10 April,

CSSC-111, CSSC-115, and CSSC-117 had moved and

established repair and replenishment points inside

Baghdad. The following day, CSSG-11’s main element relocated to the center of Baghdad and established itself at an Iraqi security compound.22

Meanwhile, during the first week of April, Combat Service Support Battalion 22 (CSSB-22) moved

from an-Nasiriyah to ad-Diwaniyah. On 7 April, Task

Force Tarawa was given a mission to attack east from

Qalat Sikar to al-Amarah in order to destroy the Iraqi

10th Armored Division. CSSB-22 split into two elements. The forward element moved to support units

at Qalat Sikar; the rear remained at ad-Diwaniyah.

Two days later, it was apparent that the Iraqis vacated

their positions, and the attack was called off. The following day, when several units within Task Force

Tarawa moved to an-Numaniyah, the battalion’s rear

element followed suit. On 11 April, its forward element joined the remainder of the battalion at SA

Chesty.23

Increasing Fuel Demands

The demand for fuel grew daily as the war waged

on. To accommodate this need, 6th Engineer Support

Battalion (6th ESB) was tasked to install a second

hose-reel system from Logistics Support Area Viper to

Logistics Support Area Cedar, an Army fuel base in

Iraq. This job, requiring an additional 27 miles of

hose reel and eight booster stations, would not only

supplement Marine forces, but all Coalition forces

fighting in Iraq. By 10 April, the second tactical fuel

system was completed and operational. The Army

was so grateful for the additional support that in return they loaned two companies to move fuel for Marine forces. Their own Inland Petroleum Distribution

System, which was based on rigid metallic pipe, had

required extensive engineering work and more time

to implement. In a conversation with some Army engineers, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Roger R. Machut, was told that even the civilian contractor from the company who built the system

thought that the Army would be better off replacing

their system with that of the Marine Corps’.24

After the second hose reel’s installation, Marines

from 6th ESB continued north to establish bulk liquid

storage and production at Repair and Replenishment

Point 26, which had been designated as Support Area

Daly. Major Hook, who had completed ground engineering requirements for bulk liquid operations at

Support Area Chesty, advanced to Repair and Replenishment Point 26, where he and his Marines built

a 300,000-gallon fuel site and a 100,000-gallon water

site. In addition, the engineers constructed a 48-man

shower facility within the city limits of Baghdad that

was used to provide showers for Marine Corps

ground combat units.25

Recovery at An-Nasiriyah

Throughout the war, maintenance units conducted

numerous recovery operations, repeatedly hauling

disabled and damaged equipment from the battlefield to safety. No recovery mission was more arduous than the recovery of vehicles, equipment, and

human remains from an-Nasiriyah on 10 April. Three

weeks earlier, the Coalition had suffered its deadliest

battle of the war thus far, and the emotional trauma

was still fresh in everyone’s mind. To perform this

difficult task, a maintenance recovery team from

Combat Service Support Company 121 (CSSC-121)

linked up with a mortuary affairs team from Logistics

Support Area Viper. Led by Captain Timothy M. Cooley, the maintenance team was tasked with the dangerous recovery of the damaged vehicles and

equipment from the site of an amphibious assault vehicle explosion. “We had to pry the MK19 out of the

turret weapons station and as we’re doing that the

round that was halfway down the barrel actually

came out, lucky for us it did not explode and EOD

came and retrieved the grenade.”26 Meanwhile, the

mortuary affairs Marines had the responsibility of

searching for human remains or personal effects of

the casualties. Sifting through the charred rubble,

Marines searched desperately for anything that could

help identify the victims of the tragedy. Crushed and

broken dog tags, while not an absolute proof of identity, were considered a precious find. The mission

took several days and was conducted under tense

conditions, as mobs of local Iraqis were assembling

nearby to watch. While the crowd was not initially
hostile toward the Marines, Lieutenant Colonel John

M. Cassady, officer in charge of the mortuary affairs

detachment, noted that some of the locals began

throwing stones at them as they departed the area.*27

Shifting Focus: Beans, Bullets, and

Band-Aids to Mail, Money, and Morale

As fighting began to decrease, the focus of combat service support began to shift. Food, water, fuel,

and ammunition had been the main focus of effort

during combat operations, but by the first week of

April, 1st FSSG recognized that it could simultaneously push various “services” towards the frontlines.

In past conflicts, post exchange and mail services had

always been a “nice to have;” mission accomplishment had never been dependent on the success of

providing such luxuries. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, however, this luxury was recognized as being

value added. Chief Warrant Officer–2 Carlos L. Holt,

the 1st FSSG post exchange officer, believed that providing exchange services to the Marines during operations should be viewed as a “force multiplier.”28

They made supplies available to the troops that

helped them perform their mission, and the impact

of the PX support on the morale of the Marines was

ten-fold, especially with the products in the area of

health and hygiene.

On 5 April, 1st FSSG opened what was determined to be the “first PX in enemy territory” at Logistics Support Area Viper. Two approaches to

providing exchange services were used. An actual

exchange facility was established in the field and 1st

FSSG warfighting express services teams, which in88 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Maintenance Marines from CSSB-18 retrieve an AAV destroyed in the battle of An Nasiryah while mortuary affairs Marines search for evidence of human remains. 

* Unlike the doctrine of U.S. Army mortuary affairs, which does not

typically have its soldiers deploy to an area until it has been secured, Marine Corps mortuary affairs executed recoveries in both

permissive and hostile environments. Timeliness was critical for

several reasons, but perhaps the most personally motivated reason

was the idea of protecting the remains of fallen Marines from being

desecrated at the hands of enemy forces. (LtCol John M. Cassady,

USMCR, Maj Jefferson L. Kaster, USMCR, and CWO-4 Cheryl G.

Ites, USMCR, “Caring for the Fallen–Mortuary Affairs in Operation

Iraqi Freedom,” Proceedings Apr04, 38)
Taking Baghdad and Tikrit 89

cluded exchange, postal, legal, and disbursing services were also dispatched to the frontlines. These

teams were sent out in response to a commander’s

request during an operational pause or to areas that

were just slightly to the rear of combat operations.29

As exchange services emerged in various locations

across the battlefield, it was obvious that 1st FSSG

would need to provide another resource to Marines

in the field—money. In the rear, the FSSG’s disbursing units were able to set up banks, affording Marines

the opportunity to obtain cash. During the war, however, disbursing agents did not have the luxury of setting up a stationary facility to which Marines could

come; they literally had to reach out across the battlefield to their customers. One disbursing agent, Sergeant Monica E. Eroh, was based at Support Area

Chesty where a post exchange and postal facility

were located, but she spent a good deal of her time

going out to various units in the field. On these frequent and often dangerous excursions, she carried

the money on her body, using either moneybags or

safes. Although the sergeant appeared as any typical

Marine carrying a backpack full of gear, she often

had up to $250,000 in cash strapped to her back.

Armed and extremely cautious, Sergeant Eroh had to

be escorted by a Marine guard wherever she went.

During the war, millions of dollars were paid to

Marines in I MEF, and the process of accountability

was impeccable.30

Extended Operations: Stretching the

Logistics Chain to Tikrit

On 11 April, 1st Marine Division organized a task

force to secure Tikrit, the hometown of Saddam Hussein. Tucked up in the northern area of Iraq, this city

was thought to be a key area for fleeing Iraqi military

officials, and the task force’s goal was to eliminate

the city as a possible place of refuge for Saddam loyalists, as well as a source of instability. Similar to Second Lieutenant Presley N. O’Bannon’s epic desert

journey in 1805, Task Force Tripoli would stretch Marine forces another 112 miles beyond Baghdad. Comprised of elements from three light armored

reconnaissance battalions, an artillery battalion (5th

Battalion, 11th Marines), a force reconnaissance company, and the division forward command post, the

task force, commanded by Brigadier General John F.

Kelly, was built for speed.

With the majority of Combat Service Support

Group 11 and its combat service support companies

located in Baghdad and being resupplied by Combat Service Support Battalion 10 at nearby Repair and

Replenishment Point 26, the provision of combat

service support for 1st Marine Division was now in

place. For Task Force Tripoli, CSSG-11 had to construct a new company capable of providing combat

service support to a task force of 1,300 Marines and

sailors. Led by Major Michael J. Callanan, CSSG-11’s

operations officer, this group of Marines from the

group headquarters and CSSB-10 was assembled

from across several locations in and around Baghdad

and was ready to go within 12 hours of notification.

After driving all night, Combat Service Support Company 101 (CSSC-101), also known as CSSC Tripoli,

initially provided combat service support to the task

force at its hastily established tactical assembly area

in the northern outskirts of the city, and then followed in trace, as Task Force Tripoli moved north to

secure one of the last serious strongholds of the war.

By the time CSSC Tripoli arrived in Tikrit, the majority of Marines and sailors had not slept in three

days. Regardless, they set up Repair and Replenishment Point 29 on the Tikrit South Airfield* and focused their efforts on providing food, water,

petroleum, oil and lubricants, and ammunition to the

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

1st Force Service Support Group opens the first PX in

Iraq at LSA Viper.

* A massive fence line enclosed the Tikrit South Airfield and the

field’s lush woods had been stocked with exotic hunting game for

the pleasure of Saddam Hussein and his sons. The first night they

arrived, many Marines enjoyed a dinner of wild game. (Maj

Michael J. Callanan comments on draft)
1,300 Marines in the task force. Although they carried only four days of supply due to limited lift capabilities, the reliable reverse osmosis water

purification units they carried were able to produce

an unlimited supply of fresh water. This not only sustained the Marines, but also provided a good will offering to returning Tikriti civilians in dire need of

water. On 14 April, just 56 hours after they had

stepped off, CSSC-Tripoli began taking rounds of indirect fire in close proximity to the company’s command post and steps away from the airfield itself.

While reporting the incoming rounds to the division

forward, Major Callanan concluded that an Iraqi mortar position was set up just outside of his company’s

position, shooting at the adjacent artillery positions of

5th Battalion, 11th Marines. This action caused the

artillery Marines in 5/11 to return fire within close

range of Major Callanan’s repair and replenishment

point. Realizing the potential danger in this situation,

Major Callanan immediately took action to neutralize

this threat. He and a few of his Marines quickly

jumped in their vehicles and headed in the direction

of the suspected enemy position. With two AH-1 Cobras flying above, they apprehended two Iraqi vehicles speeding away from the area. They detained 10

Iraqis, and although no weapons were found, they

never came under fire again in Tikrit.

During their eight days there, CSSC-Tripoli not

only provided combat service support to the Marines

on the ground, but also performed numerous humanitarian operations, helping to secure the support

and good will of the local Iraqis. They repaired a

generator, donated medical supplies, and offered the

shock trauma platoon and forward resuscitative surgical system’s medical services to help reopen the

city’s main hospital. Additionally, while the Task

Force Tripoli commander Brigadier General John F.

Kelly met with many prominent groups in Tikrit to

establish their post-Saddam existence, members of

CSSC-Tripoli helped destroy a statue of Saddam Hus90 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Courtesy of CSSB-10

Major Michael Callanan, commander of CSSC-Tripoli, speaks to his Marines prior to stepping off for Tikrit.
Taking Baghdad and Tikrit 91

sein* that stood in the city’s main square as well as all

images of Saddam Hussein throughout the city. The

unit also took possession of more than 150,000 small

arms discovered hidden in a single hospital, and

seized a number of French-made surface-to-surface

missiles. At the nearby airfield, engineers from Marine Wing Support Group 37 conducted critical rapid

runway repairs, much like the effective work they

had done on multiple occasions throughout the 1st

Marine Division’s assault in Iraq. These repairs allowed the arrival of KC-130 Hercules aircraft just 48

hours after their initial arrival and opened the doors

for continuous supply support. The initial Marine

flight landing at the airfield, on which Lieutenant

General James T. Conway traveled, delivered critical

light armored vehicle repair parts and symbolized

the overwhelming triumph of Task Force Tripoli in

Tikrit.

At the conclusion of his stay in Tikrit, with just 10

minutes notice, Major Callanan was ordered by the

Task Force Tripoli command post, which was setup

outside of Saddam Hussein’s palace, to intercept the

U.S. Army’s 4th Infantry Division, which had bypassed the task force’s screen to the south and was

rapidly moving to contact north toward Tikrit. The intent was to stop the division from attacking into the

city and get the planned linkup back on track. There

had been no communication with the 4th Infantry Division, and they were firing directly into the Task

* This statue was later melted down and used to build a memorial

for U.S. Army 4th Infantry Division soldiers lost during OIF. 
Force Tripoli zone in multiple areas with their close

air support. From his position, Major Callanan raced

in his vehicle into the path of the oncoming column

of M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicles and M1A2 Abrams

main battle tanks just outside the main gate to the

city. In a one-on-one, heated confrontation with the

commanding officer of Brigade Combat Team 1’s lead

battalion, Major Callanan maintained his composure

while convincing the overzealous commander, who

was ready to continue the attack into the city that the

fight was over. The Marines had already secured

Tikrit, and the situation was well in hand.31

92 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
93

After fighting its way to Baghdad and stretching

beyond its operational plan to secure Tikrit, 1st Marine Division settled into Phase IV of Operations Plan

1003V—security and stabilization operations. The

Coalition forces had effectively defeated the enemy,

pushing its battlefield successes all the way to Baghdad and beyond. Their role was now focused on securing and stabilizing a country whose recent loss of

a longtime dictator created a severe power vacuum.

They would still be responsible for rooting out the

bad guys, but in many ways, the situation would be

more complex. In large part, enemy forces not captured or killed had blended back into the civilian

population, and a state of looting, crime, and general lawlessness prevailed. To make matters more

complicated, the Marines now faced a situation

where their assigned battlespace had no clear front or

rear.

The Governates

On 18 April, 1st Marine Division’s relief in place in

Baghdad, with elements of the Army’s 3d Infantry Division began. By 20 April, 1st Marine Division had reorganized and relocated to seven governates in

southern Iraq: al-Qadisiyah, Babil, al-Muthanna, Karbala, an-Najaf, Wasit, and Dhi Qar. One infantry battalion was assigned to cover each governate, locating

its headquarters in the appropriate capital city. These

areas, which together accounted for half of Iraq’s

population, had their share of challenges. With an

overwhelming Shia population, these regions had suffered the most during the three decades of Saddam

Hussein’s regime. In most areas, the infrastructure was

extremely outdated, the result of willful neglect by

the dictator and deterioration from years of UN sanctions. Other infrastructure had been destroyed in recent combat operations. Basic services, such as water,

power, and sanitation, were scarce, and the security

situation was deteriorating as each day passed. Taking a decentralized approach to the problem, 1st Marine Division distributed the control of each governate

to the battalion commander assigned. Among the

commander’s immediate responsibilities was an assessment of the area’s infrastructure and identification

of threats to peace and good order, as well as local

authorities that could help suppress the ongoing

chaos. Setting up checkpoints to regulate movement

and conducting patrols to promote good will, the

Marines maintained a careful balance between maintaining a friendly presence on the streets and preserving a level of vigilance to react at any given

moment to violent uprisings. 1st Marine Division’s

motto—No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy—was

more fitting than ever. The battalions continued their

search for the “bad guys” and their weapons and ammunition caches, while also initiating more permanent solutions to help rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure.

Some projects included reconstituting the police

force, repairing or installing electricity, and reestablishing some semblance of local government.1

Support Area Edson

By the time Task Force Tripoli had successfully

secured its objective in Tikrit, it became obvious that

Logistics Support Area Viper was no longer the best

location for Brigadier General Usher and the 1st

FSSG Forward to control the combat service support operations of its many units across the battlefield. Through much analysis and several site

surveys led by the chief of staff, Colonel Moore,

General Usher determined that the town of ad-Diwaniyah would be the optimal position on the battlefield for his headquarters. Straddling one of I

MEF’s main supply routes, ad-Diwaniyah not only

gave 1st FSSG a central location within the I MEF

area of responsibility, but also offered ample opportunities for humanitarian assistance operations.

Al Qadisiyah University, a private Sunni institution,

which lay in the outskirts of the town, was chosen

as the site for the 1st FSSG headquarters’ final support area, Edson. The FSSG forward moved from

Viper to its new location on 19 April. A modest campus that had been looted during recent fighting, the

university provided adequate structures and facilities for the Marines.

Soon after 1st FSSG forward established Support

Area Edson, Combat Service Support Group 11

(CSSG-11) and Combat Service Support Battalion 10

(CSSB-10) began moving south to ad-Diwaniyah

from Baghdad to set up their final repair and reChapter 7

Security and Stabilization Operations
94 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

plenishment point prior to redeployment. Combat

Service Support Company Tripoli also returned from

Tikrit to rejoin CSSG-11 in ad-Diwaniyah. Co-located

with the 1st FSSG headquarters, CSSG-11 and CSSB10 set up Repair and Replenishment Point 30 on the

university campus to support the movement of all

MEF units from the north to tactical assembly areas

south of Baghdad. Numerous other 1st FSSG battalions, including 6th Engineer Support Battalion,

which established a 150,000-gallon fuel farm and

eight water purification units, 7th Engineer Support

Battalion, and the Army’s 716th Military Police Battalion, had already moved onto the campus, leaving minimal space for CSSB-10 to establish its site.

As a result, Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Weinkle’s

Marines launched another nearby location, designated Repair and Replenishment Point 30A, as their

primary resupply point.2

As combat transitioned into security and stabilization operations, Al Qadisiyah University became the

focal point of 1st FSSG’s humanitarian efforts.

Colonel Moore, the FSSG’s chief of staff, led efforts to

outline a series of projects to repair and improve the

university campus. Closed shortly before the commencement of the war, the science and technology

school fell victim to looters who stormed it shortly

after the fall of Baghdad, destroying or stealing anything of value, to include doors, windows, and electric wiring. The campus was left in ruins. With the

hope that the reopening of the school would help

the Iraqi citizens gain back a sense of normalcy,

Colonel Moore and several of his staff planned and

coordinated with local contractors to repair and rebuild the school. Nearly $130,000 in captured Iraqi

regime funds was obligated toward these contractors,

not only to enable the school’s opening, but also to

boost the local economy by hiring unemployed and

displaced workers.3

Support Area Geiger

In mid-April, Company C, 7th Engineer Support

Battalion, departed Support Area Chesty for al-Kut

Airfield, where they linked up with Task Force

Tarawa. They rapidly repaired the 6,000-foot KC-130-

capable runway by filling numerous craters, removing 40 dismantled vehicles, and clearing 30 other

obstacles and debris from the airfield. Other missions

included identifying and clearing ammunition caches

and unexploded ordnance, conducting reconnaissance for a water production site, stockpiling engineering equipment, repairing bridges and schools,

demilitarizing weapon systems and ordnance, establishing blocking positions, and constructing field hygiene facilities. Company C provided direct support

to Task Force Tarawa’s explosive ordnance disposal

section in the collection and destruction of 1,188

rocket-propelled grenades, 35 SA-7 shoulder-fired

surface-to-air missiles, 536 60mm mortars, 1,700 varPhoto by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

1st Force Service Support Group headquarters moves onto the Al Qadisiya University campus near Ad

Diyaniyah. Support Area Edson became the home for several FSSG units by late April, 2003.
Security and Stabilization Operations 95

ious artillery shells, and 30,000 pounds of P4 explosives. While sweeping three schools in al-Kut, they

located and collected more than 300 60mm mortar

rounds from a children’s soccer field. They further

swept 250 fighting positions, vehicle emplacements,

and bunkers along Highway 7, east of al-Kut. In one

location along Highway 1, they destroyed an enemy

T-54/55 tank with two bangalore torpedoes, typically

used to clear wire and antipersonnel mines. Company C recovered seven vehicles for Task Force

Tarawa and completed the reconnaissance of one

bridge, four schools, and two water points.

With a majority of its bridging missions complete,

8th Engineer Support Battalion (8th ESB) took on

other engineering assignments, as well as a new role.

1st FSSG was stretched thin with truck assets and

faced the continued forward expansion of the 1st Marine Division zone. It directed the battalion to convert

from its assigned mission of bridging to one of longhaul support. Colonel Nelson reformed the battalion,

reverted back to the operational control of 1st FSSG,

and formed a contingency bridging element to supPhoto by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

Iraqi workers sign contracts with the 1st FSSG headquarters to repair damage at Al Qadisiyah University. The

campus was looted and destroyed during fighting near Ad Diwaniyah.

Marines of the 8th ESB unload bridging equipment to convert their transport vehicles into much needed longhaul assets. Three companies within the battalion supported 1st FSSG between SA Chesty and Baghdad for ten

days. Photo by Courtesy of 8th ESB
96 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Courtesy of 8th ESB

Marines from 8th ESB worked with 2d Combat Engineer Battalion to remove and destroy unexploded ordnance throughout Baghdad. Shown here is two days worth of captured munitions.

Marines from 8th ESB work with Navy Seabees to repair the airfield at Al Kut.

Courtesy of 8th ESB
Security and Stabilization Operations 97

port any future bridging missions. Upon returning to

Support Area Chesty, the battalion unloaded its remaining bridge assets and formed three of its former

bridge companies into long-haul transport companies. These provided direct support to 1st FSSG between Chesty and the vicinity of Baghdad for ten

days.

While located at Support Area Chesty, elements of

8th ESB took on additional engineering assignments

while simultaneously conducting logistics transportation operations. Teams of engineers worked with 2d

Combat Engineer Battalion to remove and destroy

unexploded ordnance throughout Baghdad. Engineer

Support Company located and hauled more than

50,000 cubic yards of gravel to stem the dust on the

roadways and stabilize many of the work areas at SA

Chesty. On 17 April, the battalion redeployed to Support Area Geiger, where it supported Task Force

Tarawa by performing unexploded ordnance removal and captured enemy ammunition operations,

as well as airfield damage repair and general engineering missions. Additionally, during the month of

April, the Marines in 8th ESB took on several humanitarian engineering projects. Platoons were dispatched to areas in and around al-Kut to repair

playgrounds, determine military load classifications

for area bridges, and maintain local runways. As a

gesture of support and friendship, the battalion took

part in a project with Marines from Task Force

Tarawa to clean up and restore the British World War

I cemetery located there. This weeklong project,

which involved extensive trash cleanup and the piecing together of 50 headstones, ended in a symbolic

ceremony between UK forces and U.S. Marines

where the Union Jack was once again raised over the

cemetery. 8th ESB’s motto, Whatever It Takes, characterized its commitment during post-combat operations.4

On 20 April, 7th ESB’s Company C conducted a

relief in place with 8th ESB and moved to Support

Area Edson near ad-Diwaniyah.5 Three days later, the

company was tasked to provide direct general engineering support to Regimental Combat Team 1 and

1st Battalion, 4th Marines at al-Hillah. Company C, in

a humanitarian assistance effort, constructed 30

portable commodes, ten portable shower systems, 25

hygiene tables, and four dumpsters at the site of a

collapsed jailhouse. They also welded 30 barrels and

completed other metal work, recovered two armored

combat earthmovers, conducted reconnaissance of

soccer fields, schools, and two ammunition supply

points for potential enemy munitions, and constructed 150 markers which they used to delineate a

250-acre minefield outside the city.6

When 7th ESB departed al-Kut, Combat Service

Support Battalion 12 (CSSB-12) prepared to move in

and establish Support Area Geiger, a decision that

had been made during the preparation for Phase IV.

The battalion began to downsize its capabilities at

Support Area Chesty and sent an advanced party to

Courtesy of 8th ESB

Working on a goodwill project with Task Force Tarawa, Marines from 8th ESB cleaned and restored a British

World War I cemetery in Al Kut.
98 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

its final destination. While these Marines began establishing the new support area, CSSB-12’s explosive

ordnance disposal section was extremely busy in surrounding towns. In nearby al-Muwafaqiya and alHayy, the section recovered and destroyed hundreds

of mortar rounds and rocket-propelled grenades that

had been stored in local schools. Additionally, to further promote good will among the local population,

they cleared known areas containing hazardous unexploded ordnance. The engineers from 6th Engineer

Support Battalion joined CSSB-12 at al-Kut Airfield

and established a water production and storage site

with eight reverse osmosis water purification units as

well as a fuel farm with 300,000-gallons of fuel storage. These were used to support Task Force Tarawa.

On 25 April, the remainder of Colonel Burke’s battalion began the move from Support Area Chesty to

Support Area Geiger. It took five days to move the

battalion, which included more than 354 loads of

equipment and personnel. Support Area Geiger was

CSSB-12’s final support area prior to its return south,

and the location from which it provided combat service support to all forces in central Iraq, including 1st

Marine Division, Task Force Tarawa, 3d Marine Air

Wing, the I MEF Engineer Group, and 1st FSSG.7

Reorganizing Combat Service

Support Forces

By late May, Marines began the process of redeploying to their home bases in the United States.

While several battalions had been reassigned as battalion task forces throughout regions south of Baghdad, nearly one half of 1st Marine Division began the

trip home. Task Force Tarawa, which had sailed into

theater four months earlier, reboarded amphibious

ships for their month-long journey back to North Carolina, and elements of 1st FSSG began redeploying to

Camp Pendleton. Throughout the end of May and

June, the engineer support battalions, the transportation support group and Combat Service Support

Group 15 returned to the United States. The majority

of Combat Service Support 10 redeployed to Twentynine Palms, California, to prepare for the deployment of 7th Marine Regiment and other I MEF units

at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center. 

Meanwhile, Combat Service Support Group 11,

which had been the first unit of 1st FSSG in theater,

reorganized and transformed itself to support the

new security and stabilization operations mission. It

would be the last unit of 1st FSSG out of theater.

Gaining tactical control of Combat Service Support

Battalion 12 in al-Kut and Combat Service Support

Battalion 22 in an-Nasiriyah, as well as the remaining

personnel and resources from CSSB-10, CSSG-11 was

temporarily designated as Brigade Service Support

Group 1 (BSSG-1) and then, as the sole 1st FSSG element remaining in Iraq for Phase IV, provided all

direct and general combat service support to I MEF

forces in country. Other units that attached to BSSG1 included Charlie Company, 7th Engineer Support

Battalion, the Army’s 716th Military Police Battalion,

a civil affairs team, and a new mortuary affairs team.*

The three combat service support companies that

had supported their assigned regimental combat

teams throughout the war were reassigned to new

areas of responsibility: Combat Service Support Company 111 (CSSC-111) relocated to Tallil, where it supported 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, in an-Nasiriyah

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

It was not all work for the 7th ESB Marines who repaired amusement park equipment that was damaged during fighting in An Numaniyah. They later

had an opportunity to “test” their handiwork.

* Prior to the war, CSSG-11 had received a mortuary affairs team

as part of its table of organization. This team was dropped off to

Camp Bougainville in Kuwait 48 hours prior to CSSG-11 crossing

the line of departure. With limited equipment, these individuals

were still able to perform their mission in an exemplary manner.

On an interesting note, CSSG-11 also received two U.S. Army

chemical platoons about 72 hours prior to crossing the line of departure. Because one of the platoons had no trucks and no NBC

gear, they had to reorganize and redistribute the Marine Corps’

NBC equipment. In some cases, Marines were literally sitting on

one another’s laps. 
Security and Stabilization Operations 99

and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines in as-Samawah. Combat Service Support Company 117 (CSSC-117) was

tasked to provide general combat service support to

3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in Karbala; 1st Battalion,

7th Marines, in an-Najaf; and 1st Battalion, 4th

Marines, in al-Hillah. Combat Service Support Company 115 (CSSC-115) was assigned to support 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, in ad-Diwaniyah and 3d

Battalion, 23d Marines, in al-Kut. 

Additionally, three companies were created to support CSSG-11’s new mission during the security and

stabilization operations phase. With this mission, the

group faced new hurdles, including long distances for

transporting supplies and added difficulty in maintaining an already complex command and control scheme.

Operating in ad-Diwaniyah and pulling support from

CSSC-111 in Tallil, Combat Service Support Company

101, commanded by Captain Alonzo J. Jones III, was

tasked to provide general support to all three companies. Between mid-May and mid-June, two more companies were created. Combat Service Support Company

102, commanded by First Lieutenant Ryan L. Miller,

largely grew out of CSSC-115’s capabilities and was

specifically tasked to support 3d MAW elements, 3d

Battalion, 23d Marines, and 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion operating in the vicinity of al-Kut.

Combat Service Support Company 103, commanded by

Second Lieutenant Alan J. Solis, grew out of CSSC-117

and took over Combat Service Support Company 151,

which remained in place as a liaison cell to the I MEF

headquarters group located at al-Hillah.

By summertime, international forces began to arrive

in Iraq to relieve several battalions within 1st Marine

Division. In July 2003, as 2d Battalion, 25th Marines,

and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, were relieved in anNasiriyah and as-Samawah by Italian and Dutch troops,

CSSC-111 downsized and split into Combat Service

Support Company 104 (CSSC-104) and Combat Service

Support Company 105 (CSSC-105). These two smaller

companies enabled portions of CSSC-111 to redeploy

back to the United States, while maintaining the necessary level of support. CSSC-104, commanded by First

Lieutenant Minh D. Tran, provided bulk fuel storage,

combat service support to 2d Battalion, 25th Marines,

an in-stride refueling point to returning I MEF convoys,

an arrival/departure air control group, and liaison with

the Army’s 171st Area Support Group. Meanwhile,

CSSC-105, which had relocated to Kuwait, expedited

the procurement and distribution of high priority supplies and monitored the redeployment of Marines back

home.

Once 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, conducted a relief

in place with the Dutch, CSSC-115 moved south to

Kuwait, in order to establish CSSG-11’s retrograde control element. In this capacity, it facilitated the turn-in

and redeployment of all organic and MPF equipment.

When CSSC-115 moved back to Kuwait, CSSC-101 assumed the support missions of 3d Battalion, 5th

Marines, and Combat Service Support Company 102

(CSSC-102). In addition, it continued to provide motor

transport and heavy equipment assets. This served a

critical need in both the delivery of humanitarian supplies, as well as the return of CSSG-11’s equipment and

personnel. In the meantime, CSSC-117 continued to

support a large number of battalions still spread out in

an-Najaf, al-Hillah, Babylon, and Karbala.

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

EOD Marines in 7th ESB prepare demolitions to destroy captured Iraqi weapons and munitions near Al Kut.
During this period, while still providing combat

service support to all of the Coalition forces in the I

MEF area of operations, CSSG-11 also accomplished

several non-combat service support tasks. In July, it

supported the establishment of the military stipend

payment program in ad-Diwaniyah and an-Nasiriyah.

Through this program, captured Iraqi funds were used

to pay former Iraqi military personnel, so that they

could feed their families without turning to crime or

joining the insurgency. Additionally, elements of CSSG11 worked tirelessly to obtain AK-47 rifles and ammunition from Combined Joint Task Force 7,* for the

purpose of outfitting newly developed police departments throughout the MEF’s area of responsibility. The

Marines successfully acquired over 10,000 AK-47s,

1,700 pistols, and one million rounds of ammunition,

ultimately distributed to the Marine infantry battalions

to properly train and stand up the Iraqi police forces.

Several engineering and clean-up projects also kept

CSSG-11 busy. In August, CSSG-11’s Engineer Company, commanded by Navy Lieutenant Michael P.

Leonard*, completed force protection work on a bank

in downtown ad-Diwaniyah by building rebar fencing

and emplacing a concrete curb and driveway. Additionally, they destroyed a mural of Saddam Hussein at

the entrance of the Al Qadisiya University, replacing it

with an old Iraqi school bell, which they helped refurbish along with the entire university grounds, prior to

turning it over to the Iraqi Ministry of Education in October 2003.

100 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

On 11 July 2003, Brigadier General Usher relinquished command of the 1st FSSG to Brigadier

General Richard S. Kramlich. Following his twoyear command of 1st FSSG, General Usher was assigned as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for

Installations and Logistics at Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps. In a change-of-command ceremony

held back at Camp Pendleton, California, General

Usher spoke of the challenges that 1st FSSG faced

while serving in Kuwait and Iraq. He noted that the

key to their success was “the basic grit and determination of the individual Marine and sailor who

embraced the mission, embraced their jobs, leaned

forward, and never leaned back.”

Photo by MSgt Edward D. Kniery, USMC

BGen Edward G. Usher III, center, with his commanders at Support Area Edson.

1st FSSG Commanders

* With the turnover of several personnel, Lt Leonard, a Navy

Seabee who had been on exchange to the Marines of 7th ESB,

was transferred to CSSG-11 and given the opportunity to command a Marine company.

* Combined Joint Task Force 7, commanded by LtGen Ricardo S.

Sanchez, replaced Coalition forces Land Component Command

(CFLCC) on 14 June 2003 as the command controlling all military

ground forces, U.S. and non-U.S., deployed in occupied Iraq. Their

mission was to conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining

noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in the

area of operations (AO), to create a secure environment in direct

support of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and concurrently

conduct stability operations which support the establishment of

government and economic development to set the conditions for

a transfer of operations to designated follow on military or civilian authorities.
101

Initial planning for the reconstitution, regeneration, and re-embarkation (R3) of maritime prepositioning force (MPF) equipment began before troops

were even on the ground in the fall of 2002.

Throughout the offensive campaign in March and

April of 2003, planners continued to prepare for the

imminent retrograde operations that would occur at

the conclusion of the war, and even as they continued to sustain I MEF with logistical support, the Marine Logistics Command (MLC) began to shift its

focus to the mission of redeployment. The scope of

MPF R3 operations included the reloading of 11 MPF

ships with more than 450,000 individual items, 6,000

loaded containers, and 5,000 principle end items. To

assist in the handling of such an expansive task,

Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) task-organized

a reconstitution liaison support team (RLST) of approximately 20 to 25 military and civilian personnel.

This team was on-hand to assist the Marine Forces

Central Command in planning and coordinating R3

operations, as well as acting as HQMC’s liaison to resolve problems with MPF R3 policies and processes.

As the executive agent for MPF retrograde operations, 2d FSSG, which had been previously reorganized and renamed the Marine Logistics Command

(MLC), again worked for Marine Forces Central Command, but this time redesignated as the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). The

Special Purpose MAGTF formed to re-embark all assets used by Marines in Kuwait and Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Three Maritime Prepositioned

Ships Squadrons, consisting of 11 ships, needed to

be reconstituted with this equipment and restored to

the highest mission capable status in preparation for

future operations.

On 15 June, the Marine Logisitics Command offiChapter 8

The Special Purpose MAGTF

Maritime prepositioned force ships docked at Kuwait’s Port of Ash Shuayba. Eleven MPF ships were reloaded

between July and November of 2003. Photo by CNA
cially became the MPF Special Purpose MAGTF, consisting of 2,470 Marines, sailors, and contractors. One

week later, Brigadier General Ronald S. Coleman arrived in Kuwait and assumed command of the Special Purpose MAGTF from Brigadier General Lehnert

on 25 June. Having served a tour with the Navy in

Vietnam, General Coleman spent his 30-year Marine

Corps career in a variety of supply and logistics billets, including commanding officer of both 2d Maintenance and 2d Supply Battalions. During an

interview conducted in 2004 while he commanded

2d FSSG’s operations in Port-Au-Prince Haiti, General Coleman talked about the FSSG’s turnover during OIF-I; initially, the time and location of the

turnover was unknown.

We had both—I shouldn’t say we both—he

(General Lehnert) hoped it’d be in Lejeune, so

he could bring them back. Quite honestly, I’d

hoped we’d be in Kuwait, so I could get over

there. But it was his command, and I honestly

believe that it should have been; I would love

to have seen him bring them back home. You

take somebody to war, you want to bring them

home from war. It did not work out that way.

[It was decided by higher authority that] . . . our

special purpose MAGTF would be formed for

the regeneration of the MPF equipment.1

Limited guidance or doctrine existed to help form

the Special Purpose MAGTF, and similar to the MLC,

there was no model on which to base its organization. The core of the MAGTF came from 2d FSSG and

was augmented by personnel from 1st FSSG, Marine

Force Reserve, and Blount Island Command.* The organization of the Special Purpose MAGTF consisted

of five major subordinate organizations, including

area commander, supply battalion, maintenance battalion detachment, transportation support battalion,

and MP/security battalion.

With a small staff, the area commander, Lieutenant

Colonel David M. Smith, had the overall responsibility for maintaining Camp Fox, the primary location

for retrograde operations. Perhaps the most remote

and desolate of all the camps set up in Kuwait, Fox,

which was located southwest of Kuwait City, possessed both poor roadways and uncooperative terrain. As a result, a large investment had been made

in improving the camp’s infrastructure to support the

Marine Logistics Command’s operations, making it an

ideal location to base retrograde operations. Colonel

Smith’s mission broke down into four main areas: designing and organizing a plan for Camp Fox; serving

as primary contract manager for all life-support services, equipment, and materials; serving as project

manager for installation, operation, and maintenance

of non-organic/non-tactical structures and mechanical systems; and providing a camp fire department.2

Supply Battalion was comprised of four companies—ammunition; packing, preservation, and packaging; medical logistics; and supply. Commanded by

Colonel Peter J. Talleri, the battalion had two main

missions during retrograde operations: receiving,

storing, and accounting for the MPF equipment and

supplies being returned to the Special Purpose

MAGTF; and ordering, tracking, and delivering supplies, equipment, and parts needed for the reconstitution and regeneration portions of the entire

operation. The battalion required an extensive infrastructure on Camp Fox to hold and maintain the supplies needed for containerized storage on each ship,

as well as the repair parts required by the maintenance sections to repair equipment in theater.3

102 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

USMC Photo

Prior to assuming command of the Special Purpose

MAGTF in June 2003, BGen Ronald S. Coleman

served as the assistant deputy commandant for Installation and Logistics. 

* As the Commandant of the Marine Corps' Executive Agent for

Marine Corps Prepositioning Programs, Blount Island Command,

located in Jacksonville, Florida, plans, coordinates, and executes

the logistics efforts in support of maritime prepositioning ships.
The Special Purpose MAGTF 103

The maintenance battalion detachment, led by

Major Don A. Mills, reorganized from its general support maintenance structure in the Marine Logistics

Command to a new four-section organization: ordnance, motor transport, utilities, and engineer maintenance. Each maintenance area had its own focus,

but generally, the detachment’s mission was to perform second, third, and fourth echelon maintenance

on all returning MPF equipment. Additionally, the detachment was tasked to provide maintenance contact

teams as required, prioritize the repair of incoming

equipment, and build and prepare ship containers

and blocks to store and transport large equipment.4

As a follow-on organization from the MLC’s transportation support battalion, a transportation detachment was created to support the MPF reconstitution,

regeneration, and re-embarkation. This detachment,

led by Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Chiarotti, was

organized to manage command and control of transportation capabilities, physical assets to move personnel and equipment, and personnel to support all

transportation operations. Consisting of four main

sections—aerial port, port operations, theater distribution center, and the third country national liaison

section—the detachment’s missions included port

staging and ship loading of equipment, closing and

inspection of equipment and containers for MPF

loading and retrograde movement, and port and aircraft loading operations at the aerial port of embarkation.5

The military police battalion, led by Major Eric J.

Eldred, was responsible for assessing antiterrorist and

force protection requirements at the various retrograde sites throughout Kuwait and supervising the

implementation of security procedures and assets. In

addition to the five main areas of the Special Purpose

MAGTF, there was also an engineering detachment

that assisted in fuel system preparations, operated the

wash-down and staging facility, coordinated agricultural and customs inspections, and provided material

handling equipment operators, a communications element, a medical element, and a headquarters and

service battalion element to provide personnel and

administrative support.

Daily sandstorms at Camp Fox intensified the already harsh desert conditions during the SPMAGTF’s reconstitution and regeneration of MPF equipment.

Photo by CNA
By the summer of 2003, it was common knowledge that Marine forces might be called back to serve

in Iraq during 2004. In a conversation with Brigadier

General Coleman, Major General James N. Mattis,

commanding general of 1st Marine Division, stated

point blank that they would be back in the February

or March timeframe and would need the reconstituted MPF equipment for their follow-on operations.

The original R3 plan called for an eight-month timeline to repair equipment in theater and load 11 ships.

Brigadier General Coleman, however, proposed an

alternate course of action where the majority of

equipment would be loaded onto MPF ships immediately and returned to Blount Island Command for

repairs. He knew that desert conditions were not

ideal for the type of operations his Marines would be

performing.

Now it’s 125, we’re in the sand, you can expect a sandstorm every day. The long supply

line. At this point, when I first got there, it wasn’t opened yet, but there was one building

being built, so they could work inside. All the

repairs, regeneration was being done outside,

under tents. Brutal, brutal conditions. Between

that and the supply line, I called my people together and I said, “OK, let’s look into this.” Is

there any value added in loading up the ships

as best we can, fixing what we have, but in the

meantime, looking into, rather than ordering a

part, and having parts shipped over here, fix it,

and send it back. Are there any items, since

most of the ships had to go to Blount Island

anyway, is there any validity in, ordering a part,

LTI [limited technical inspection], have the part

sent to Blount Island, put the gear on board the

ship, send it back to Blount Island, and it gets

fixed there. Because the first order of business

was to get the ships that we thought may come

back to war right away, get those fixed. Those

were the ships that we thought General Mattis

would use again and he is, in fact, using them.6

At Blount Island Command, not only were conditions much more conducive to working on broken

equipment, but much-needed repair parts were more

accessible. This alternative approach cut the timeline

down by three months. From an operational per104 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Marines of the SPMAGTF clean equipment at the Nestle Washdown Site, one of three locations in Kuwait designated for this purpose. Photo by CNA
The Special Purpose MAGTF 105

spective, the benefits of this plan included leveraging

both locations, lowering overseas costs, and ultimately decreasing the amount of time required to get

the MPF back to full capability. From a personnel

perspective, General Coleman saw this course of action as benefiting the Marines. Not only would it minimize their exposure to the harsh desert conditions,

but it would get them home quicker.7

By mid-July, the commanding general issued a letter of instruction providing detailed guidance to each

operational area. Retrograde operations consisted of

three phases. Phase I, sourcing and preparation,

which occurred at Camp Fox, al-Jaber, and Ali alSalem, included receiving equipment, conducting

maintenance, inventorying and requisitioning required supplies, ensuring quality assurance, accepting and transporting the equipment. During Phase II,

movement and staging, the SPMAGTF moved equipment to wash-down facilities, conducted agricultural

and customs inspections, and set up staging for further movement to the port facilities. Three sites used

during this phase were the Kuwait Naval Base and

Nestle wash-down sites, and the Kuwait Public Transportation Center Bus Terminal. Phase III, embarkation, included loading the equipment onto the MPF

ships and took place primarily at Kuwait’s Port of Ash

Shuaybah.8

Reconstitution, regeneration, and re-embarkation

(R3) operations required the movement of thousands

of truckloads of vehicles, equipment, containers, and

supplies. The Special Purpose MAGTF’s logistics

movement control center (LMCC) scheduled and coordinated the movement of more than 200 trucks per

day. The control center, which was part of the SPMAGTF’s G-3 current operations section, used transportation assets from 2d FSSG and the Army’s 377th

Theater Support Command, but largely depended on

locally contracted transport equipment with third

country national drivers.9

In early September 2003, General Coleman

massed the troops to commend them on their hard

work and tell them that they would likely be home

by Thanksgiving. This was a major morale boost, as

the majority of these Marines had been in theater

since the fall of 2002, and earlier estimates had

pushed their return date as late as March of 2004.

Having an end in sight was an immeasurable relief.

A week later, in a private meeting with Lieutenant

General Conway, the I MEF Commanding General,

Brigadier General Coleman revealed that he in fact

Photo by CNA

Vehicles are embarked in the lower hold of the MPF ship USNS PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK-3002) to be

shipped back to Blount Island Command for necessary repair.
planned to have the troops home in time for the Marine Corps Birthday Ball in early November. After the

meeting, as he spoke to the troops of the Special Purpose MAGTF, General Conway candidly broke the

good news by announcing that they would likely be

home in time for the ball.10 General Coleman later

commented that in his almost 30 years of Marine

Corps service, the special purpose MAGTF was “the

most satisfying operation he had ever participated

in.” In large part, this was due to the sheer magnitude

of their mission and the unparalleled dedication

shown by his Marines.

We had Marines, because it was so hot, that

wore gloves to fix gear so they didn't burn their

hands. And you go out and talk to those

Marines, and they’re just as happy as they can

be. We went down in the well of one of the

ships we were loading, the weatherman takes

his thermometer in the well of the ship, and it

was 151. The Marines were just working.11

In the end, between 7 July and 4 November, the

Special Purpose MAGTF successfully loaded 11 MPF

ships to either full combat support capable status or a

status such that they could support combat operations

immediately if the identified shortfalls in their loadouts could be provided from CONUS. During this period, the Marines of the SPMAGTF also continued to

provide support to I MEF forces remaining in Iraq. In

the end, the mission was completed in approximately

190 days, well ahead of the original timeline of 240

days.12 The majority of 2d FSSG, including General

Coleman, was back in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,

on 8 November, and the final planeload of the Special

Purpose MAGTF Marines landed in CONUS the next

day. As promised, they were all home before the Marine Corps’ birthday on 10 November 2003.13

106 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
107

Epilogue

The Future for the FSSGs

One of the most significant aspects of combat

service support during Operation Iraqi Freedom was

the reorganization of both 1st and 2d FSSG. While

similar concepts were implemented throughout

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, during Operation Iraqi

Freedom-I, the FSSGs stretched beyond traditional

doctrine and reached a new level of achievement.

Whether their actions were necessitated by factors

such as speed, maneuver, and distance or inspired

by the sheer adrenaline of accomplishing the mission, the FSSGs pushed every boundary and limitation within the logistics arena. The future for the

FSSGs, however, remains uncertain. Several commanders, including Brigadier General Usher, Commanding General of 1st FSSG, recognized this fact:

I think we have some soul-searching to do,

and I think we have some realities we have to

just look at and address in a realistic manner. As

we leave this theater here, we’ve worked on a

notional return organizational structure that

we’re going to redeploy as we deployed over

here. To start switching people around now

would just turn it into total chaos. . . . I just

think that’s something we’re going to have to

address, both as 1st FSSG and I MEF, but in a

larger sense sort of some guidelines from the

logistics leadership of the Marine Corps on how

we structure ourselves for the next ten years.1

Brigadier General Lehnert, Commanding General

of 2d FSSG, commented on the broader picture of

both 1st and 2d FSSG:

Perhaps the FSSGs need to sit back for a

minute and say it isn’t a matter of “they have to

look alike.” One of them is going to have a

wholesale function, and one of them is going to

have a retail function; and if you accept that

and that you’re going to go to war as one big

MEF, and you’re going to travel long distances,

then one of the FSSGs is probably going to

have a tactical CSS function and the other one

is going to have an operational CSS function.2

It is a given that as warfare changes, the approach

to supporting the warfighter also needs to change.

Shortfalls in certain areas, such as communications

and line-haul transportation will need to be addressed. The organization of the FSSGs may be different the next go-around. The general wholesale

and retail assignments may shift between East Coast

and West Coast FSSGs, but there is one constant that

will always remain—the innate ability of Marines to

adapt and overcome any circumstance through hard

work, ingenuity, and sheer drive.

What will be remembered about combat service

support during Operation Iraqi Freedom may well

depend on who you ask in the future. Perhaps the

infantryman will remember that on certain days of

his three-week march to Baghdad, he only ate one

MRE in case replenishment was nowhere nearby; or

the supply officer will remember his frustration with

not knowing when a critical part would arrive at his

position. Perhaps though, the truck driver will remember his amazement when fuel was delivered to

him through a six-inch hose from 60 miles away, the

doctor will remember her satisfaction in knowing

that she saved the life of every Marine that entered

her tent, or the artilleryman will recall his relief at the

sight of a convoy carrying ammunition just as his unit

began to run low on the gun line. Individual memories may be anecdotal; some positive, some negative.

The big picture of Marine logistics in Operation Iraqi

Freedom is that they conducted a historic operation

far exceeding expectations of distance, speed, and

overall tenacity. In the end, despite all the obstacles

and challenges, the logistics came through and supported the maneuver units. Through innovations at

the highest staff levels and dogged determination by

the most junior Marine, the logisticians always found

a way to make it happen.
109

Chapter 1

1 Commanders and Staff of 1st FSSG, “Brute Force

Combat Service Support: 1st Force Service Support

Group in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Marine Corps

Gazette Aug03, 34; hereafter Commanders and Staff

of 1st FSSG article.

2 Transcript of President George W. Bush Commencement Speech at West Point, New York, 1 June

2002, Office of the Press Secretary (http://www

.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-

3.html).

3 LtCol Adrian W. Burke, intvw, 13Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Burke intvw, 13Mar03.

4 Maj Steven M. Zimmeck, (Ret.), US Marines in the

Persian Gulf, 1990-1991 Combat Service Support in

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, (Washington, D.C.:

Hist&MusDiv, 1999), 67.

5 Burke intvw, 13Mar03.

6 BGen Edward G. Usher, intvw, 19Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

7 Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

8 Burke intvw, 13Mar03.

9 Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

10 Col Darrell L. Moore, intvw, 29Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Moore intvw.

11 Col John J. Pomfret, intvw, 5Mar03, USMC (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Pomfret intvw,

5Mar03. 

12 Pomfret intvw, 5Mar03.

13 LtCol John J. Broadmeadow, “Logistics Support to

1st Marine Division During Operation Iraqi Freedom,”

Marine Corps Gazette Aug03, 44-45.

14 Pomfret intvw, 5Mar03.

15 Lt Robert K. Weinkle Jr., intvw, 6Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Weinkle intvw, 6Mar03.

16 Combat Service Support Group–11 ComdC,

1Jan.03–30Apr03; hereafter CSSG-11 ComdC.

17 Weinkle intvw, 6Mar03.

18 BGen Edward G. Usher, intvw, 4Apr04, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Usher intvw, 4Apr03.

19 LtCol Michael D. Malone, intvw, 7May03, (Oral

HistColl) Quantico, VA; hereafter Malone intvw. 

20 Malone intvw.

21 Col Bruce E. Bissett, intvw, 27Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

22 Combat Service Support Group 15 ComdC, 1Jan03–

30Jun03; hereafter CSSG-15 ComdC. 

23 LtCol Robert W. Higbee, intvw, 7Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

24 2d MEB ComdC, 1Jan–30Jun03.

25 Lt Thomas N. Goben, intvw, 27Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Goben intvw.

26 Col John L. Sweeney Jr., intvw, 21Mar03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Sweeney intvw.

27 Transportation Support Group ComdC, 1Jan03¬–

30Jun03; hereafter TSG ComdC.

28 Col David G. Reist, intvw, 10Mar03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA; hereafter Reist intvw.

29 LtCol Patrick J. Hermesmann, intvw, 10Mar03,

(Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

30 Reist intvw.

31 LtCol Adrian W. Burke, comments on draft, n.d.

[Aug05]. Author’s files. 

32 LtCol Jorge Ascunce, intvw, 24Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Ascunce intvw.

33 Ascunce intvw.

34 Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

35 LtCol Roger R. Machut, intvw, 8Apr03, (Oral HistColl) Quantico, VA; hereafter Machut intvw, 8Apr03. 

36 LtCol Niel E. Nelson, intvw, 6Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Nelson intvw.

37 Cdr Gregory M. Huet, USN intvw, 10Mar03, Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Huet intvw.

38 Commanders and Staff of 1st FSSG article, 35.

39 Capt Eric C. McDonald, USN intvw, 3May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

40 Cdr Miguel A. Cubano, USN intvw, 2May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

41 Huet intvw.

42 LtCol Kim S. Orlando, USA intvw, 23Apr03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Orlando intvw.

43 Orlando intvw.

44 BGen Edward G. Usher, intvw, 11May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Usher intvw,

11May03.

45 Orlando intvw.

46 Ibid.

47 Combat Service Support Battalion 19 ComdC, 1Jan–

30Jun03.

Notes
48 Col James P. Sheahan, intvw, 22Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

49 Moore intvw.

50 Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

51 Ibid.

52 LCpl Joseph J. Klan, intvw, 4May03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA.

53 BGen Michael R. Lehnert, intvw, 8May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Lehnert intvw.

54 Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

55 Lehnert intvw.

56 Lehnert intvw.

57 BGen Michael R. Lehnert and Col John E. Wissler,

“MLC: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield,” Marine Corps Gazette Aug03, 30.

58 Dr. Joseph Miciewicz, Center for Naval Analyses,

comments on draft, 1Sep05, author’s files; hereafter

Miciewicz comments.

59 Col Russell A. Eve, intvw, 5May03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA.

60 Headquarters and Service Battalion, 2d FSSG,

ComdC, 1Jan03–30Jun03.

61 Col John Wissler, intvw, 25Apr03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA; hereafter Wissler intvw.

62 LtCol Christopher B. Martin, intvw, 29Apr03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

63 Capt Stephen M. Pachuta, USN, intvw, 30Apr03,

(Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

64 Col Tracy L. Mork, intvw, 27Feb03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA; Col John T. Larson, intvw, 25Feb03,

(Oral HistColl) Quantico, VA. 

Chapter 2

1 2d FSSG Narrative Final

2 Col Stephen W. Otto intvw, 6May03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA; hereafter Otto intvw.

3 2d FSSG Narrative Final

4 Otto intvw; Maj Arthur J. Pasagian intvw, 2May03,

(Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; Maj Steve A. Plato

intvw, 6May03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; 2d

FSSG (Fwd) ComdC, 1Jan03–30Jun03.

5 Sgt Colin Wyers, “1st FSSG Custom-Tailors Units in

Kuwaiti Desert” Marine Corps News 23Jan03.

6 LtCol David M. McMiller, intvw, 25Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

7 Capt Charles A. Graybeal, and 2dLt Afinju O. McDowell, “Camp Bougainville,” CSSB-10 Cruisebook,

9.

8 Maj David V. Raimo, intvw, 3Mar03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA.

9 Capt Charles A. Graybeal, and 2dLt Afinju O. McDowell, “Camp Bougainville,” CSSB-10 Cruisebook,

9.

10 Author’s Journal. 24Feb03–19May03. Author’s files;

hereafter Author’s journal.

11 2dLt Jason C. Brezler, intvw, 30Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; Lt Timothy A. Wallace, USN

intvw, 30Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

12 Col Niel E. Nelson Notes, 5Sept07, author’s files;

hereafter Nelson notes.

13 MLC Narrative Final, n.d., author’s files; Meier

intvw; Maj Kevin P. Reilly, intvw, 1May03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

14 Col William A. Meier, intvw, 29Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Meier intvw.

15 BGen Edward G. Usher, Testimony to the House

Armed Services Committee, 30Mar04.

16 Usher intvw, 11May03.

17 Maj Emily J. Elder, intvw, 7May03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA; Maj Brandon D. McGowan Award Narrative

18 Lehnert intvw.

19 Lehnert intvw.

20 Lehnert intvw.

21 2d FSSG Narrative Final; MLC Support Detachment

1 ComdC 10Mar03–15Apr03; Lehnert intvw.

22 LtCol Roarke L. Anderson, intvw, 3May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

23 Maj Julie L. Nethercot, intvw, 3May03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Nethercot intvw.

24 LtCol Kenneth S. Helfrich, intvw, 3May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

25 Nethercot intvw. 

26 Author’s journal.

27 Pomfret intvw, 5Mar03.

28 CSSG–11 ComdC.

29 Weinkle intvw, 6Mar03.

30 Combat Service Support Battalion 22 ComdC,

1Jan03–30Jun03; Goben intvw.

31 Goben intvw.

32 CSSG-15 ComdC.

33 LtCol Kathleen M. Murney, intvw, 4Mar03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

34 LtCol Roger R. Machut, intvw, 4Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Machut intvw, 4Mar03.

35 6th Engineer Support Battalion ComdC, 1Jan03–

30Jun03; hereafter 6th ESB ComdC. 

36 7th Engineer Support Battalion ComdC, 1Jan03–

30Jun03; hereafter 7th ESB ComdC.

37 LtCol Niel E. Nelson, and Maj Joseph J. Klocek,

“8th Engineer Support Battalion’s Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom” Marine Corps Gazette Dec03, 39;

hereafter Nelson and Klocek article.

38 Nelson and Klocek article.

39 Nelson notes.

40 TSG ComdC, 6th Motor Transport Battalion

110 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Notes 111

ComdC, 1Jan03–30Jun03.

41 TSG ComdC.

42 Author’s journal.

Chapter 3

1 I Marine Expeditionary Force Operations Plan

1003V (Unclassified).

2 Capt Alonzo J. Jones, “RRP-1” CSSB-10 Cruisebook,

25. 

3 Combat Service Support Battalion 10 ComdC,

1Jan03–30Jun03; hereafter CSSB-10 ComdC.

4 Lindsay Murdoch, “Slaughter at Safwan Hill,” Sydney Morning Herald, 22Mar03. 

5 Author’s journal.

6 Steven Komarow, David J. Lynch and John Diamond, “Fine-Tuned On the Fly, War Plan Prevails,”

USA TODAY, 16Apr03.

7 LtGen James Conway, intvw, “The Invasion of Iraq,”

PBS Frontline 26Feb04.

8 Capt Suzan F. Thompson, intvw, 9May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Thompson intvw.

9 Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

10 CSSB-10 Cruisebook; CSSG-11 ComdC; CSSB-10

ComdC.

11 Lt Michael P. Leonard, USN intvw, 16Apr03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; 7th ComdC.

12 Capt Kevin P. Coughlin, intvw, 31Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

13 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) Cruisebook, No

Better Friend, No Worse Enemy. 14 LtCol Robert K. Weinkle Jr., intvw, 25Apr03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

15 Capt Alonzo J. Jones, “RRP-3” CSSB-10 Cruisebook,

27.

16 Nelson notes.

17 Cpl Jeff Hawk, “Profile: US Marine Corps Chief

Warrant Officer–4 Tom Cierley–Bulk Fueler Brings

Bulk of Experience to Iraq,” Defend America News

5Jan05 (http://www.defendamerica.mil/profiles/june

2003/pr060203a.

html).

18 Machut intvw, 8Apr03.

19 6th ESB ComdC.

20 7th ESB ComdC.

21 Maj Emily J. Elder, intvw, 7May03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA.

22 Maj Ronald W. Sablan, intvw, 14Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Sablan intvw. 

23 Capt Mark F. Birk, intvw, 30Mar03, (Oral HistColl),

Quantico, VA.

24 2d Transportation Support Battalion ComdC,

1Jan03–30Jun03.

25 CSSB-10 ComdC.

26 LtCol Valerie E. Thomas, intvw, 12Apr03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

Chapter 4

1 Goben intvw.

2 Goben intvw.

3 LtCol John M. Cassady, and CWO-4 Cheryl G. Ites,

intvw, 9May03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Cassady and Ites intvw.

4 Author’s journal. 

5 LtCol John M. Cassady, Maj Jefferson L. Kaster, and

CWO-4 Cheryl G. Ites, “Caring for the Fallen–Mortuary Affairs in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Proceedings

Apr04, 36-40; hereafter Cassady, Kaster, and Ites article.

6 LtCol John M. Cassady, intvw, 13Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; Cassady, Kaster, and Ites article.

7 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) Cruisebook, No

Better Friend, No Worse Enemy, ch. 5 summary.

8 CSSB-10 ComdC. CSSB-10 Cruisebook. 9 2dLt Sarah M. Stokes, “RRP-10,” CSSB-10 Cruisebook, 33.

10 2d TSB ComdC; 2d FSSG sig events; Maj Matthew

S. Cooke, e-mail, 7Jan05; Maj Michael J. Callanan,

comments on draft, n.d. [Aug05], author’s files; hereafter Callanan comments.

11 Callanan comments.

12 CSSB-10 ComdC.

13 Maj Edward P. Wojnaroski, “RRPs 2, 4, and 7; Sandstorm Stop: The Ride of the RRP4 Opening Package,”

CSSB-10 Cruisebook, 31. 

14 James Meek, “ US Advance Grinds to Halt in Teeth

of Storm,” The Guardian 26Mar03.

15 Combat Service Support Battalion 22 ComdC,

1Jan03–30Jun03; Goben intvw; Williamson Murray

and Robert H. Scales, The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003),110.

16 Machut intvw, 8Apr03.

17 Machut intvw, 8Apr03.

18 Machut intvw, 8Apr03.

19 Maj Michael P. McCarthy, intvw, 6May03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

20 6th ESB ComdC.

21 Cdr James P. Flint, USNR, intvw, 5Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Flint Intvw.

22 Author’s journal.

23 Flint intvw; Capt Kenneth E. Nixon, USN, intvw,

29Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

24 Capt Glen M. Goldberg, USN, Cdr Patrick H. Bowers, USN, and Lt Denisha L. Robbins, USN, intvw, 31

Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

25 Goldberg, Bowers, Robbins intvw.

26 Capt Peter F. O’Connor, USN, intvw, 9Apr03, (Oral
HistColl), Quantico, VA.

27 Al Bloom, “Fleet Hospital 3 Changes Navy Medicine,” Navy Newsstand, 9Apr03.

28 Al Bloom, “Fleet Hospital 3–Best Care in Iraq,”

Navy Newsstand, 30Apr03.

29 Nelson notes.

30 Nelson and Klocek article.

31 Nelson intvw.

32 Nelson and Klocek article, 41.

33 CSSB-10 ComdC; CSSB-10 Cruisebook. 34 7th ESB ComdC.

Chapter 5

1 LtCol Thomas N. Collins, intvw, 6Mar03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

2 Lehnert intvw.

3 Usher intvw, 11May03.

4 Lehnert intvw.

5 Combat Service Support Battalion 12 ComdC,

1Jan03–30Jun03; Combat Service Support Group 15

ComdC 1Jan03–30Jun03; Capt Patryck J. Durham,

intvw, 9Jul04, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Durham intvw.

6 Thompson intvw.

7 Usher intvw, 4Apr03.

8 LtCol Adrian W. Burke, intvw, 16Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Burke intvw, 16Apr03.

9 Maj John E. Vincent, intvw, 15Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Vincent intvw.

10 GySt Melba L. Garza, intvw, 26May03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

11 MWSS 371 ComdC, 1Jan03–30Jun03.

12 CSSG-15 ComdC.

13 Vincent intvw.

14 Durham intvw.

15 Usher intvw, 19Mar03.

16 Col Darrell L. Moore, e-mail, 9Feb06, author’s files.

17 Miciewicz comments.

18 1st TSG ComdC.

19 Lehnert intvw.

20 Ascunce intvw.

21 Ascunce intvw. 22 Usher intvw, 4Apr03.

23 Lehnert intvw.

24 Lehnert intvw.

25 2d TSB ComdC. 

26 Wissler intvw.

27 Capt Brook W. Barbour, and 1stLt Christopher D.

Waters, intvw, 1Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

28 2d FSSG Narrative Final.

29 2d FSSG Narrative Final.

30 Lehnert intvw.

31 Pomfret intvw, 7May03.

32 Callanan comments.

33 CSSG-11 ComdC.

34 CSSG-11 ComdC.

35 Nelson and Klocek article.

36 CSSB-10 ComdC.

Chapter 6

1 1st MarDiv ComdC, 1Jan03–30Jun03.

2 CSSG-11 ComdC.

3 CSSB-10 ComdC.

4 CSSB-10 Cruisebook. 5 Maj Todd D. Hook Award Summary of Action; hereafter Hook Award.

6 Burke intvw, 16Apr03.

7 Burke intvw, 16Apr03.

8 Burke intvw, 16Apr03.

9 Sablan intvw.

10 Marine Logistics Command Historical Interviews,

(Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

11 2d FSSG Narrative Final.

12 SgtMaj Richard R. Rawling, intvw, 27Apr03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

13 Maj Devin C. Young, intvw, 27Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

14 Chief Warrant Office-2 Bradley S. Baggiano, and

Chief Warrant Office-2 David Stevens, intvw,

16Apr03, USMC (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

15 1st Force Service Support Group Historical Interviews, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

16 Nelson notes.

17 Nelson notes; Maj Thomas M. Pratt, intvw,

16Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter

Pratt intvw.

18 Nelson notes; Pratt intvw; Capt Brian E. Gard,

intvw, 16Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; Capt

Timothy A. Vandeborne, USA intvw, 15Apr03, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; Nelson and Klocek article,

42.

19 CSSG-11 ComdC.

20 CSSB-10 ComdC; CSSB-10 Cruisebook. 21 Callanan comments.

22 CSSG-11 ComdC.

23 CSSB-22 ComdC.

24 Machut intvw, 8Apr03.

25 Hook Award.

26 Capt Timothy M. Cooley, e-mail, 21Oct04, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA.

27 Cassady and Ites intvw, 9May03.

28 CWO-2 Carlos L. Holt, intvw, 5Apr03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Holt intvw.

29 Holt intvw; LtCol Anthony E. Poletti, intvw, 8Apr03,

(Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA.

30 GySgt Terry L. Austin, and Sgt Monica E. Eroh,

112 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Notes 113

intvw, 8May03, (Oral History Collection, Quantico,

VA.

31 Maj Michael J. Callanan, Intvw, 7May03, (Oral HistColl), Quantico, VA; Callanan comments.

Chapter 7

1 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) Cruisebook, No

Better Friend, No Worse Enemy, Ch. 8.

2 CSSB-10 ComdC.

3 Cpl Jeremy M. Vought, “FSSG Marine Help Iraqis

Repair Looted, Damaged University,” Marine Corps

News, 13May03.

4 Nelson and Klocek article, 43-44.

5 7th ESB ComdC.

6 7th ESB ComdC.

7 CSSG-15 ComdC; CSSB-12 ComdC.

8 Cpl Jeremy M. Vought, “Usher Relinquishes Command to Kramlich,” Marine Corps News 17Jul03.

Chapter 8

1 BGen Ronald S. Coleman, intvw, 20Apr04, (Oral

HistColl), Quantico, VA; hereafter Coleman intvw.

2 John Reynolds, CNA Report CIM D0009987

.A2/Final, A Description of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Maritime Prepositioned Force Reconstruction, Regeneration, and Re-embarkation (OIF MPF R3), Jun.

2004, The CNA Corporation; hereafter Reynolds Report.

3 Reynolds Report.

4 Reynolds Report.

5 Reynolds Report.

6 Coleman intvw.

7 Coleman intvw.

8 Coleman intvw.

9 Reynolds Report.

10 Coleman intvw.

11 Coleman intvw.

12 Reynolds Report.

13 Coleman intvw.

Epilogue

1 Usher intvw, 11May03.

2 Lehnert intvw.
115

2001

11 September Al-Qaeda terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

25 November Marines of Task Force 58 land in Afghanistan as part of the operation to

deprive al-Qaeda of its base in that country.

2002

January Marine Forces, Pacific orders I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to

focus on preparing for contingencies in the U.S. CentCom theater; MEF

planners begin over a year of work on plans to invade Iraq.

11 October The Pentagon orders I MEF to deploy its headquarters staff to Kuwait for

service with Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) under

Army LtGen David D. McKiernan.

15 November I MEF headquarters deploys to Kuwait; newly appointed I MEF

Commander LtGen James T. Conway deploys with his headquarters.

24 November CFLCC exercise to test command and control links with I MEF and other

commands, “Lucky Warrior 03-1,” begins.

9 December CentCom exercise “Internal Look,” based on the current version of the plan

for the invasion of Iraq, begins.

2003

2 January Pentagon issues Deployment Order 177A, soon to be followed by 177B,

which orders the wholesale deployment of I MEF forces to theater.

5 January 2d FSSG Forward stands up to become the Landing Force Support Party

establishing Camp Fox, the sea port of debarkation (SPOD), and the

aerial port of debarkation in Kuwait.

13 January Gen Michael W. Hagee becomes the 33d Commandant of the Marine

Corps.

14 January 1st FSSG establishes its Combat Operations Center at Tactical Assembly

Area (TAA) Coyote.

15 January Amphibious Task Force (ATF) East departs Morehead City, North Carolina,

for Kuwait; the first of 11 MPSRON ships arrive at the SPOD in Kuwait;

offloading and transport of equipment to several locations in Kuwait begin.

Appendix A

Chronology of Significant Events
17 January Amphibious Task Force (ATF) West departs San Diego, California, for

Kuwait.

7 February The offload of the 11 MPSRON ships is completed in record time.

8 February CFLCC exercise “Lucky Warrior 03-2,” labeled “a dress rehearsal” for war,

begins with MEF participation.

16 February The 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB) with ATF East begins to go

ashore in Kuwait to reinforce I MEF; its aviation elements transfer to 3d

MAW control and the ground elements are redesignated Task Force Tarawa.

24 February Amphibious Task Force West begins offloading its west-coast Marine

units in Kuwait; most other Marines follow by air.

9 March First leaflets dropped in Baghdad urging non-interference with Coalition

operations and soliciting support from Iraqi people.

17 March President Bush issues an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within

48 hours. 

18 March Operation Southern Watch aircraft conduct airstrikes against Iraqi early

warning radars and command-and-control capabilities; Marine forces are

ordered to staging areas. 

Night of U.S. Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels conduct unplanned attack against

19-20 March Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leadership targets in what becomes popularly

known as the “decapitation strike,” which does not succeed but does initiate

hostilities.

20 March Iraq retaliates by firing surface-to-surface missiles against Coalition troops

in Kuwait; ground combat operations begin in the night; I MEF is supporting 

attack of Army’s V Corps; Regimental Combat Team 5 is leading Marine

unit. 

21 March Marines capture the Rumaylah oil fields, a key objective of the campaign;

Marines and British forces secure the port of Umm Qasr before moving on

the city of Basrah, their most important objective. 

23 March Task Force Tarawa begins to secure the city of an-Nasiriyah and its key

bridges over the Euphrates River and the Saddam Canal; heavy fighting

ensues; friendly fire incident occurs at bridge over canal; II MEF commander

MajGen Henry P. Osman deploys to northern Iraq to establish the

Military Coordination and Liaison Command (MCLC) under operational

control of CentCom in order to maintain political stability. 

Night of “Mother of all sandstorms” begins, slowing operational tempo for approxi24-25 March mately two days.

24-27 March 1st Marine Division continues to advance up Routes 1 and 7 toward

Baghdad. 

25 March 6th Engineer Support Battalion completes their 57-mile hose-reel tactical

116 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Appendix A 117

fuel system, capable of pumping fuel from the Kuwait-Iraq border to

Logistics Support Area Viper. 

27 March “Operational pause” begins to consolidate supply lines and address threats

by irregular Iraqi formations on the ground; 3d MAW air offensive

continues unimpeded, rendering many Iraqi combat units ineffective. 

29 March 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG) Forward assumes command and control at

Logistics Support Area

Viper near Jalibah, Iraq. 

1 April Division resumes progress toward Baghdad; FSSG continues to perform

resupply with cooperation of Wing and Marine Logistics Command. 

6-7 April 8th Engineer Support Battalion constructs three bridges across the Narh

Diyala River, allowing elements of 1st Marine Division to cross into

Baghdad.

7 April Regimental Combat Team (RCT)-7 crosses the Diyala River and moves on outskirts

of Baghdad from the east; Army conducts second “Thunder Run” into capital. 

9 April Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, part of RCT 7, assist Iraqi

civilians in toppling a large statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square in

Marine area of operations (AO), Eastern Baghdad. 

10 April RCT-5 engaged in heavy fighting at Almilyah Palace and Abu Hanifah

mosque in Baghdad; looting begins as fighting tapers off; Marines begin postcombat operations

13 April 1st FSSG Forward assumes command and control at Support Area Edson

near ad-Diwaniyah, Iraq. 

13-14 April Task Force Tripoli, out of 1st Marine Division, takes control of Tikrit,

Saddam Hussein’s hometown

20 April Relief in place with U.S. Army in eastern Baghdad is complete; MEF

redeploys its forces to the southern third of Iraq; mission is now security,

humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction; focus of effort is seven infantry

battalions from 1st Marine Division in seven governates (or districts). 

20 April The offload of all “black-bottom” ships is completed. 

1 May Under a banner reading “Mission Accomplished,” President Bush

announces that major combat operations are over. 

12 May Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III takes over as civil administrator in Iraq,

replacing Jay M. Garner. Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority soon

replaces Garner’s Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

19 May 2d Transportation Support Battalion completes the re-embarkation of ATF East at

Kuwait Naval Base. 
118 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

26 May 2d Transportation Support Battalion completes the re-embarkation of ATF West at

Kuwait Naval Base. 

3 June 2d FSSG Forward is relieved of duties as the Landing Force Support Party;

redeploys to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. 

15 June 2d FSSG stands down as the Marine Logistics Command and stands up the

Maritime Prepositioning Forces Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task

Force (MPF SPMAGTF); BGen Ronald S. Coleman assumes command of

the SPMAGTF. 

22 July Saddam Hussein’s sons Uday and Qusay are killed in firefight with U.S.

Army in Mosul. 

19 August A truck bomb explodes at the UN headquarters in Baghdad, killing 20

people, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

3 September At Camp Babylon, I MEF conducts a transfer of authority to a Polish-led

international Coalition force; most remaining Marines return to the United States. 

13 October CSSG-11 is the last unit within 1st FSSG to leave theater. 

10 November Marines of Special Purpose MAGTF celebrate the Marine Corps Birthday

in CONUS after completing the work of repatriating all Marine Corps

equipment from theater. 
119

1st Force Service Support Group

Commanding General BGen Edward G. Usher III (to 10 

July 03)

BGen Richard S. Kramlich

(from 10 July 03)

Deputy Commander Col John L. Sweeney Jr.

Chief of Staff Col Darrell L. Moore

AC/S G-1 LtCol Frank L. Tapia Jr.

AC/S G-2 Maj Brian G. Fitzpatrick

AC/S G-3 Col Gregory R. Dunlap

AC/S G-4 LtCol Thomas M. Vilas

AC/S G-6 LtCol David W. Smith

Combat Service Support Group 16

Commanding Officer LtCol Michael J. Taylor 

Combat Service Support Group 11

Commanding Officer Col John J. Pomfret (July 02–August 03)

Col Charles L. Hudson (from August 03)

Combat Service Support Battalion 10

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert K. Weinkle Jr.

Combat Service Support Company 111

Commanding Officer Capt Grant R. Shottenkirk

Combat Service Support Company 115

Commanding Officer Capt Suzan F. Thompson

Combat Service Support Company 117

Commanding Officer Capt Andrew J. Bergen

Combat Service Support Company Tripoli

Commanding Officer Maj Michael J. Callanan

Combat Service Support Battalion 22

Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas N. Goben

Combat Service Support Battalion 13 

Commanding Officer LtCol Michael D. Malone

Combat Service Support Company 133

Commanding Officer Maj Robert D. Dasch Jr.

Appendix B

Command and Staff List 
Combat Service Support Company 134

Commanding Officer Capt Henry K. Lyles

Combat Service Support Company 135

Commanding Officer Maj Kenneth A. Evans

Combat Service Support Group 14 

Commanding Officer: Col John T. Larson

Combat Service Support Group 15 

Commanding Officer: Col Bruce E. Bissett

Combat Service Support Company 151

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert W. Higbee 

Combat Service Support Battalion 12

Commanding Officer LtCol Kathleen M. Murney (to 27 March 03)

LtCol Adrian W. Burke (from 27 March 03)

Combat Service Support Company 121

Commanding Officer Maj Michael E. Bean

Combat Service Support Battalion 18

Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas N. Collins

Combat Service Support Company 181

Commanding Officer Capt Patryck J. Durham

Health Services Battalion

Commanding Officer CDR Gregory M. Huet, USN

Transportation Support Group 

Commanding Officer: Col David G. Reist

6th Motor Transport Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Patrick J. Hermesmann

6th Engineer Support Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Roger R. Machut

7th Engineer Support Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Scott H. Poindexter

8th Engineer Support Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Niel E. Nelson

716th Military Police Battalion, USA

Commanding Officer LTC Kim S. Orlando, USA

Combat Service Support Battalion 19

Commanding Officer LtCol David M. Kluegel

120 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Appendix B 121

Expeditionary Medical Facility 3

Commanding Officer CAPT Peter F. O’Connor, USN

2d Force Service Support Group / Marine Logistics Command

Commanding General BGen Michael R. Lehnert

Chief of Staff Col Robert L. Songer

AC/S G-1 Maj Craig E. Stephens

AC/S G-2 Maj Timothy W. Nichols

AC/S G-3 Col Russell A. Eve

AC/S G-6 LtCol Kenneth S. Helfrich

2d Force Service Support Group Forward

Commanding Officer Col Stephen W. Otto

Headquarters and Service Battalion (-)

Commanding Officer LtCol Craig C. Crenshaw

2d Supply Battalion (-)

Commanding Officer Col William F. Johnson

2d Maintenance Battalion (-)

Commanding Officer LtCol Brent P. Goddard

2d Transportation Support Battalion (-)

Commanding Officer Col John E. Wissler

Beach and Terminal Operations Company (-)

Commanding Officer Maj Robert A. Kaminski

MLC Support Detachment 1

Commanding Officer Maj Tyson Geisendorff

2d Military Police Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Christopher B. Martin

8th Communications Battalion

Commanding Officer LtCol Roarke L. Anderson

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 48

Commanding Officer LtCol Kavin G. Kowis

Detachment, 8th Engineer Support Battalion

Officer-In-Charge 1stLt Jeremy N. Henwood

2d Medical Battalion

Commanding Officer CDR Benjamin G. M. Feril, USN

Detachment, 2d Dental Battalion

Officer-In-Charge CAPT Stephen J. Connelly, USN
122 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Special Purpose MAGTF

Commanding General BGen Ronald S. Coleman

Chief of Staff Col Robert L. Songer

AC/S G-1 Capt Mark R. Schroeder

Capt Rennie R. Givens (26Aug03)

AC/S G-2 Capt Ryan Janiczek

AC/S G-3 Col Dennis M. Arinello

AC/S G-6 Maj David Forrest

Detachment, Headquarters and Service Battalion

Officer-In-Charge Maj Michael J. Prouty

2d Supply Battalion (-)

Commanding Officer Col Peter J. Talleri

Detachment, 2d Maintenance Battalion

Officer-In-Charge Maj Don A. Mills

Detachment, 2d Transportation Support Battalion

Officer-In-Charge LtCol Charles G. Chiarotti

Detachment, 2d Military Police Battalion

Officer-In-Charge Maj Eric J. Eldred

Detachment, 8th Engineer Support Battalion

Officer-In-Charge 1stLt Jeremy N. Henwood

Detachment, Marine Wing Communications Squadron 48

Officer-In-Charge Maj Sean D. Parker

Detachment, 2d Medical and 2d Dental Battalion

Officer-In-Charge Lt Ray Perez, USN
123

1st Force Service Support Group [1st FSSG]

Combat Service Support Group 11 [CSSG-11]

Combat Service Support Battalion 10 [CSSB-10]

Combat Service Support Company 111 [CSSC-111]

Combat Service Support Company 115 [CSSC-115]

Combat Service Support Company 117 [CSSC-117]

Combat Service Support Company Tripoli

Combat Service Support Battalion 22 [CSSB-22]

Combat Service Support Battalion 13 [CSSB-13]

Combat Service Support Company 133 [CSSC-133]

Combat Service Support Company 134 [CSSC-134]

Combat Service Support Company 135 [CSSC-135]

Combat Service Support Group 14 [CSSG-14]

Combat Service Support Group 15 [CSSG-15]

Combat Service Support Company 151 [CSSC-151]

Combat Service Support Battalion 12 [CSSB-12]

Combat Service Support Company 121 [CSSC-121]

Combat Service Support Battalion 18 [CSSB-18]

Combat Service Support Company 181 [CSSC-181]

Combat Service Support Group 16 [CSSG-16]

Health Services Battalion [H&SBn]

Transportation Support Group [TSG]

6th Motor Transport Battalion [6th MTBn]

6th Engineer Support Battalion [6th ESB]

7th Engineer Support Battalion [7th ESB]

8th Engineer Support Battalion [8th ESB]

716th Military Police Battalion, USA [716th MPBn]

Combat Service Support Battalion 19 [CSSB-19]

Expeditionary Medical Facility 3 [EMF-3]

2d Force Service Support Group / Marine Logistics Command

2d Force Service Support Group Forward [2d FSSG]

Headquarters and Service Battalion (-) [H&S Bn]

2d Supply Battalion (-) [2d SupBn]

2d Maintenance Battalion (-) [2d MaintBn]

Appendix C

Unit List
124 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

2d Transportation Support Battalion (-) [2d TSB]

Beach and Terminal Operations Company (-) [Bch&TermOpsCo]

MLC Support Detachment 1 [MLC SuptDet]

2d Military Police Battalion [2d MPBn]

8th Communications Battalion [8th CommBn]

Marine Wing Communications Squadron 48 [MWCS-48]

Detachment, 8th Engineer Support Battalion [Det, 8th ESB]

Detachment, 2d Medical Battalion [Det, 2d MedBn]

Detachment, 2d Dental Battalion [Det, 2d DentBn]

Special Purpose MAGTF

Detachment, Headquarters and Service Battalion [Det, H&SBn]

2d Supply Battalion (-) [2d SupBn]

Detachment, 2d Maintenance Battalion [Det, 2d MaintBn]

Detachment, 2d Transportation Support Battalion [2d TSB]

Detachment, 2d Military Police Battalion [Det, 2d MPBn]

Detachment, 8th Engineer Support Battalion [Det, 8th JESB]

Detachment, Marine Wing Communications Squadron 48 [Det, MWCS-48]

Detachment, 2d Medical and 2d Dental Battalion, [Det 2d Med&2dDenBn] 
125

Appendix D

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AAV Amphibious Assault Vehicle

AK-47 A Kalashnikov automatic rifle

AO Area of Operations 

ATLASS Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System

BAS Battalion Aid Station

Blue Force Tracker A satellite system that allowed commanders to see the locations of friendly

units on a computer screen

BSSG Brigade Service Support Group

CAE Crossing Area Engineer: an engineer (bridging) company designated as a river

crossing command and control unit, co-located with a supported regimental

combat team headquarters to provide command and control over the bridge build

and then control the crossing area as the regiments passed through the river

crossing area

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command, the joint (and sometimes combined) command

responsible for the Middle East, headed by the combatant commander

(formerly known as a regional commander-in-chief)

CFLCC Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, a functional command under the

combatant commander

CG Commanding General

CA Civil Affairs

CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force or Combined–Joint Task Force

CNA Center for Naval Analyses

CONUS Continental United States

CSS Combat Service Support

CSSA Combat Service Support Area

CSSB Combat Service Support Battalion

CSSC Combat Service Support Company

CSSE Combat Service Support Element
126 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

CSSG Combat Service Support Group

CSSOC Combat Service Support Operations Center

EMF Expeditionary Medical Facility

ESB Engineer Support Battalion

FCE Force Crossing Engineer: the engineer (bridging) battalion commanding officer

and his support staff, co-located with the division forward headquarters to

provide over-arching command and control of all of the bridge assets assigned

to the FSSG/Division

Fedayeen Arabic word meaning “men of sacrifice,” irregular fighters for Saddam Hussein 

FOB Forward Operating Base

FRSS Forward Resuscitative Surgical System: a small, self-contained, and mobile team

with surgical capabilities, designed to forward displace, to take care of

those casualties who were not stable enough to survive a flight rearward to a

surgical company

FSSG Force Service Support Group

HMMWV High-Mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (the jeep of this war, the humvee)

ID Infantry Division: as in the U.S. Army’s 3d ID

ILC Integrated Logistics Capability

IRB Improved Ribbon Bridge. A modular bridge with integral superstructure

and floating supports, consisting of a ramp bay at each bank and the required

number of interior bays to complete the span

LAR Light Armored Reconnaissance

LAV Light Armored Vehicle

LMECC Logistics Movement and Engineering Coordination Center

LSA Logistics Support Area

LSB Landing Support Battalion

LVS Logistics Vehicle System

MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force (the basic organization for committing Marines to

combat, with command, air, ground, and support elements)

MAP Medical Augmentation Program. A program that provides medical personnel to

the operating forces during situations requiring medical personnel augmentation

MarCent Marine Corps Forces Central Command
Appendix D 127

MAW Marine Aircraft Wing: rough equivalent of a ground division in size

MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade: a detachable part of the MEF

MGB Medium Girder Bridge. A hand-erectable, heavy-duty, prefabricated deck bridge

consisting of high strength components, which can be assembled into bridges of

varying lengths

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force: a corps-level MAGTF

MEU(SOC) Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable): a small MAGTF built

around a battalion landing team

MLC Marine Logistics Command: a theater-level component subordinate to MarCent

MOPP Mission-Oriented Protective Posture: a state of readiness with respect to the threat

of an NBC attack; levels run from 0 to IV and correspond to the amount of

protective clothing worn

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

MP Military Police

MPF Maritime Prepositioning Force (made up of MPS)

MPS Maritime Prepositioning Ship (staged in strategic locations, carrying equipment

for use in wartime contingencies)

MRBC Multi-Role Bridge Company; a U.S. Army company of engineers, specifically

trained and mobilized for the purpose of bridge building

MRE Meals ready-to-eat

MSD Marine Logistics Command Support Detachment

MSR Main Supply Route

MSSG Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group

MT Motor Transport

MTVR Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement; the mobile, high-performance, 7-

ton truck purchased by the Marine Corps to replace their aging fleet of 5-ton

trucks

MWSS Marine Wing Support Squadron

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (as in the “threat of an NBC attack,” or “NBC

protective gear”)

OIC Officer-In-Charge

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
128 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

OPCON Operational Control, command authority that is inherent in combatant

command authority (which is exercised by the combatant commander) and

which may be delegated. It is the authority to perform functions involving

organizing and employing subordinate commands. Compare TaCon. 

OPLAN Operations Plan

OPORD Operation Order

OSCC Operation Systems Control Center

POG Port Operations Group; a task-organized unit, located at the seaport of

embarkation and/or debarkation under the control of the landing force support

party and/or combat service support element, that assists and provides support

in the loading and/or unloading and staging of personnel, supplies, and equipment

from shipping

POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

PX Post Exchange

R3 Reconstitution, Regeneration, and Re-embarkation

RCT Regimental Combat Team

RFF Request for Forces

RIP Relief in place. When one unit replaces another in a given area

ROC Rehearsal of Concept

ROE Rules of Engagement

ROWPU Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit. A mechanical device that

produces potable water from a variety of raw water sources 

RRP Repair and Replenishment Point

RSO&I Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration: the phases which units

pass through upon reached a combat theater between disembarking from their transport

to being ready for combat

SA Support Area

SASO Security and Stabilization Operations

SEABEE Navy engineer: from “CB” for construction battalion

SJA Staff Judge Advocate

SPMAGTF Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Appendix D 129

SPOD Sea Port of Debarkation: a seaport designated in a theater of operations as the

point of debarkation for forces arriving by sea

STP Shock Trauma Platoon: a small, mobile medical unit similar to a forward

deployed emergency room, whose functions center around stabilization, triage,

and the holding of patients

TAA Tactical Assembly Area

TACON Tactical Control: detailed and local control of units, inherent in OpCon but may

be delegated

T/E Table of Equipment

TF Task Force

T/O Table of Organization

TPFDD Time–Phased Force Deployment Data 

TSB Transportation Support Battalion

TSC Theater Support Command

TSG Transportation Support Group

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

USA United States Army

USN United States Navy

UXO Unexploded Ordnance 
131

Appendix E

Presidential Unit Citation
133

Appendix F

Navy Unit Commendation

2D FORCE SERVICE SUPPORT GROUP

For service as set forth in following

CITATION:

For exceptionally meritorious service during assigned mission in action against enemy forces in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM from 15 December 2001 to 1 June 2003. Throughout

this period, 2d Force Service Support Group repeatedly demonstrated unprecedented operational flexibility,

innovation, and tactical expertise during near-simultaneous operations in Cuba, Kuwait, and Iraq. Receiving

urgent deployment orders to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 2d Force Service Support Group formed Joint Task

Force 160, responsible for receiving and holding al-Qaida and Taliban terrorists for further intelligence exploitation and prosecution. In less than 96 hours after arrival, they constructed a holding capability for 100 detainees. Detainee population grew to 320 in less than a month. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 2d Force

Service Support Group again demonstrated its operational flexibility by becoming the Marine Logistics Command, an operational logistics enabling force. As one of the first Marine Forces in theater, it offloaded over

70,000 Marines and associated equipment four days ahead of schedule, making it the most expedient offload

in Marine Corps History. During hostilities, the Marine Logistics Command delivered 4.2 million gallons of fuel,

10 million meals ready-to-eat, and 8,784 short tons of critical sustainment throughout a battlefield spanning

over 430 square miles. The commanding general deployed his headquarters twice, amassing nearly nine

months of combat service support in support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. By

their truly distinctive achievements, extensive enthusiasm, and unfailing devotion to duty, the Marines and

sailors of 2d Force Service Support Group reflected great credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
135

101st Airborne Division, 11, 73

377th Theater Support Command, 15-16, 19,

29, 74, 77, 105

63d Signal Battalion, 33

83d Chemical Battalion, 33

716th Military Police Battalion, 10-12, 94, 98

7th Chemical Company

7th Biological Integrated Detection

System Platoon, 33

51st Chemical Company, 33

319th Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants Company, 8, 74

459th Multi-Role Bridge Company, 64, 66, 85

507th Maintenance Company, 53

574th Multi-Role Bridge Company, 64

Ar-Rifa, 71

Ascunce, Lieutenant Colonel Jorge, 8, 74

Ash Shatrah, 71

Ash Shuaybah, Port of, 20-21, 28, 33, 105

As-Samawah, 99

Asset tracking logistics and supply system (ATLASS),

26

Ba’ath Party, 51, 53

Babcock, Major William L., Jr., 22

Babil, 93

Babylon, 99

Baggiano, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Bradley S., 82

Baghdad, 8, 21, 36, 39-40, 42, 56, 59, 69, 73, 76-87,

89, 93-98, 107

Bales, Private First Class Chad E., 78

Bergen, Captain Andrew J., 4

Bergman, General John W., 13

Big Board, The, 75

Bilski, Lieutenant Commander Tracy R. (USN), 10

Bird, Captain Susan, 34, 44, 67

Birk, Captain Mark F., 49

Bissett, Colonel Bruce E., 6

Index

Ad-Diwaniyah, 53, 69,78, 87, 93-95, 97, 99, 100

Aircraft

Bell AH-1 Cobra, 72, 80, 90 

Bell UH-1N Iroquois (Huey), 50

Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog, 53

Lockheed KC-130 Hercules, 56, 77, 86, 91,

94

Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion, 10, 36, 50, 64 

Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, 55

Air Force Units

320th Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation

Squadron, 33

Aeromedical Evacuation Liaison Team, 33

Mobile Air Staging Facility Team, 33

Al-Aziziyah, 79-80

Al-Emeri, Khuder, 51, 62

Al-Hayy, 77, 98

Al-Hillah, 97, 99

Ali Al Salem, 6, 21, 105

Ali Hassam, 62

Al-Jaber, 6, 21, 105

Al-Kut, 39, 53, 57, 70, 72, 77, 79, 94-95, 97-99

Al-Mu’aytyah, 67

Al-Muthanna, 93

Al-Qadisiyah University, 93-95, 100

Al-Rasheed Airfield, 87

Ambush Alley, 57

Amey, Lieutenant Colonel Aaron T., 74

Anderson, Lieutenant Colonel Roarke L., 28 

An-Najaf, 93, 99

An-Nasiriyah, 46, 48-50, 53, 55, 57, 64-65, 67, 69, 71,

73, 87, 98-100

An-Numaniyah, 78-80, 87, 98

Army, U.S.

V Corps, 27, 39

3d Infantry Division, 34, 46, 48, 53, 64, 93

4th Infantry Division, 91
Blount Island Command, 102, 104, 105

Bohman, Captain Harold R. (USN), 10

Boomer, Lieutenant General Walter E., 1

Bowers, Commander Patrick H. (USN), 63

Brabham, Brigadier General James A., 1, 2

Breach Point West, 33, 34, 37, 40, 44, 46-47, 49, 58,

69

Breach Point North, 44

bridging, 9, 10, 36-37, 46, 65, 67, 78, 85, 95, 97

British Units

1 (UK) Armored Division, 21

6th Supply Regiment, 25

14th Geographic Squadron, 26

British WWI cemetery, 97

Broadmeadow, Lieutenant Colonel John J., 4

Burke, Lieutenant Colonel Adrian W., 2, 30, 71-72,

80-81, 98

Bush, President George W., 1, 39

Caley, Major James C., 31

Callanan, Major Michael J., 57, 89-92

Camps

Arifjan, 19, 28

Betio, 23, 34

Bougainville, 23, 30, 32, 40, 98

Commando, 21, 42

Coyote, 22-24, 27, 30, 33-34, 36, 41-42, 47-48,

50, 54-55, 73, 75, 82

Fox, 18, 24-25, 27-29, 41-42, 102-103, 105

Guadalcanal, 23

Guam, 23

Iwo Jima, 23, 54-55, 73

Lejeune, NC, 7, 9, 17-18, 24, 102, 106

Matilda, 21

Midway, 23, 29-30

Okinawa, 23

Peleliu, 23

Pendleton, CA, 4, 7, 9, 11, 44, 73, 98, 100

Ryan, 21, 31

Saipan, 36

Solomon Islands, 23, 33, 41

Tarawa, 23, 27

Wake Island, 22

Cassady, Lieutenant Colonel John M., 54-55, 88

Center for Naval Analyses, 14

Chiarotti, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G., 103

Cierley, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Thomas M., 46

civil affairs, 33, 50-52, 62, 80, 86, 98

classes of supply, 17, 25-26

Coalition Forces Land Component Commander

(CFLCC), 15, 34, 39, 100

Coleman, Brigadier General Ronald S., 102, 104-106

Collins Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N., 6, 48, 69

combat stress, 61-63

Combined Joint Task Force 7, 100

Comfort (T-AH 20), 61

Connelly, Captain Stephen J. (USN), 18

convoys, 7-9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 26-27, 31-32, 34-36, 40,

42-45, 48-51, 53, 57-58, 67, 69-77, 80-82, 87, 99, 107 

Conway, General James T., 1, 33, 39, 43, 91, 106

Cook, Major Matthew S., 37, 56

Cooley, Captain Timothy M., 87 

Coughlin, Captain Kevin P., 23, 45, 47

Council of Colonels, 7

Crenshaw, Lieutenant Colonel Craig C., 16

Crossing Area Engineer (CAE), 64, 65, 78

Curtin, Sergeant Major Michael, 14

DeVries, Captain Marta M., 76

Dhi Qar, 93

direct support, 1-7, 14, 29-32, 39, 42, 44, 46-47, 53, 64,

69, 73, 81, 94, 97, 100

Diyala River, 36, 66, 83-85, 87

Durham, Captain Patrick J., 69, 73 

Eldred, Major Eric J., 103

engineer support element (ESE), 8

engineering, 7-9, 34-35, 47, 67-69, 81, 87, 95, 97, 100

Eroh, Sergeant Monica E., 89

Euphrates River, 21, 39, 46, 49-50, 53, 55-57, 59, 64,

67

Exercises

Combined Arms Exercises, 16

Rolling Thunder, 26

Unitas, 26

expeditionary medical facility (EMF), 48, 63, 64

Fedayeen, 53, 56, 67, 81, 85

Feril, Commander Benjamin G. M. (USN), 18

Flint, Commander James P. (USN), 61

136 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Index 137

Iraqi Units

Republican Guard, 79, 85-86

10th Armored Division, 87

Ites, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Cheryl G., 54, 88

Jalibah, 44, 46-47, 49-50, 57

Airfield, 53-54, 58, 77

James, Corporal Evan T., 60 

Johnson, Colonel William F., 17, 26

Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, 21, 26

Jones, Captain Alonzo J., III, 99

Jones, Captain Jamie, 45

Kaminski, Major Robert A., 42

Karbala, 12, 93, 99

Kelleher, Major Patrick N., 75 

Kelly, Brigadier General John F., 89-90

Klan, Lance Corporal Joseph J., 14

Klocek, Major Joseph J., 64-65

Kluegel, Lieutenant Colonel David M., 13

Korthaus, Sergeant Bradley S., 60

Kramlich, Brigadier General Richard S., 100

Krulak, Brigadier General Charles C., 1, 2

Kuwait, 6, 9, 13, 15, 17-24, 27-37, 39-42, 44, 46-47,

50, 55-56, 62, 73, 75-76, 81-82, 98-104

Kuwait City, 102 

Kuwait City International Airport, 20, 25, 28

Kuwait Naval Base, 20-21, 25, 28, 31, 105

Kuwait Public Transportation Center Bus Terminal III,

105

La Nouvelle Company, 22

Lehnert, Brigadier General Michael R., 14-15, 18-19,

24, 27-28, 70, 74-75, 77, 102, 107

Leonard, Lieutenant Michael P. (USN), 100

logistics movement and engineering coordination

center (LMECC), 8-9

logistics movement control center (LMCC), 8, 56, 105

Logistics Support Area Fox. See Camp Fox

Logistics Support Area Viper, 12, 27, 36, 44-45, 47-50,

56, 58-63, 67, 69, 73, 75, 77, 81-82, 87-89, 93

Lopez, Captain Jose M., 47, 67

Lucas, Captain Christopher R., 13

Machut, Lieutenant Colonel Roger R., 9, 33-34, 46-47,

58, 60, 87

maintenance, 2-5, 7, 9, 15-17, 27, 33, 48-49, 56, 67,

Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 10

Fort Lewis, Washington, 5, 6

forward resuscitative surgical system (FRSS), 10, 34,

60, 63, 69, 71, 80, 90

Foss, Major Joseph J., 22

Airfield, 54-55

Franks, General Tommy R. (USA), 1

friendly fire, 31, 53

Gard, Captain Brian E., 85

Garza, Gunnery Sergeant Melba L., 72

Geisendorff, Major Tyson B., 27, 42

general support, 1-4, 6, 15, 17, 32, 44, 71, 73-74, 80-

81, 99, 103

Goben, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas N., 7, 32, 53

Goddard, Lieutenant Colonel Brent P., 17, 82

Goldberg, Captain Glenn M. (USN), 61

Golden Spike, 47

Grooms, Captain James R., 75

Guantanamo Bay, 14, 24

Haar, Captain Christopher M., 36

Habayeb, First Lieutenant Leith R., 45

Hagee, General Michael W., 33

Hailston, Lieutenant General Earl B., 33

Hantush, 56, 70, 77

Helfrich, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth S., 28

Hermesmann, Lieutenant Colonel Patrick J., 8, 36

Higbee Lieutenant Colonel Robert W., 6

Highways

Highway 1, 45-46, 53, 55-56, 64, 66-68, 70-

71, 95

Highway 6, 79-80, 83

Highway 7, 46, 53, 64-65, 67, 71, 77, 80, 95

Highway 8, 56

Highway 17, 71, 77

Highway 27, 56, 78

Highway 80, 45

Holt, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Carlos L., 88

Hook, Major Todd D., 81, 87

hose reel system, 9, 33, 37, 46-47, 58, 67, 73, 87

Huet, Commander Gregory M. (USN), 10

Hussein, Saddam, 39, 51, 53, 89-91, 93, 100

inland petroleum distribution system (IPDS), 46, 87

integrated logistics capability (ILC), 15
69, 77, 80, 82, 86-88, 102-103, 105

Malone , Lieutenant Colonel Michael D., 5-6

Marine Corps, U.S.

Birthday Ball, 106

units (air)

3d Marine Aircraft Wing, 5-6, 13, 21, 29,

60, 99

Marine Wing Support Group 37, 77

Marine Wing Communications Squadron

48, 29

Marine Wing Support Squadron 371, 71

Marine Wing Support Squadron 373, 67

units (ground)

Marine Forces, Central Command (MarCent), 2, 15-16, 18, 20-21, 29

Marine Logistics Command, 2, 4, 14-18,

24-29, 35, 40, 42, 74-77, 101-103

I Marine Expeditionary Force, 1-8, 10-

11, 13-15, 18, 20-21, 26-27, 31, 33-34, 36, 39, 42-44,

47-48, 55, 63, 71-73, 75, 76, 78, 81-82, 89, 93, 98-101,

106-107

II Marine Expeditionary Force, 17, 26,

28, 31

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer

Group, 21, 25, 68, 98

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade, 20,

21, 28

1st Marine Division, 3-5, 7, 9, 12, 16, 21,

29-32, 35-36, 39-40, 43-48, 50, 53, 55-56, 60, 64-67,

69, 71, 73, 76-78, 80-81, 83, 85-87, 89, 91, 93, 95, 98,

104

Regimental Combat Team 1, 4, 21, 45-

46, 50, 53, 55, 57, 64-65, 67, 69, 72, 77, 79, 83, 85, 97

Regimental Combat Team 2, 7, 31-32,

53, 58

Regimental Combat Team 5, 4, 39-40,

43, 53, 55-56, 64-65, 70-71, 77-79

Regimental Combat Team 7, 4, 40, 45,

53, 55, 64-65, 67, 70, 78-79

4th Marines

1st Battalion, 99 

5th Marines

2d Battalion, 99

3d Battalion, 99

7th Marines

1st Battalion, 99

3d Battalion, 99 

11th Marines, 4, 34, 40, 44, 81, 85, 89,

90

23d Marines

3d Battalion, 99 

25th Marines

2d Battalion, 98

1st Force Service Support Group, 1-4,

6-9, 11-19, 21-24, 26-28, 30, 34-35, 37, 39-42, 44, 46-

48, 51-52, 60, 62, 69, 71-77, 82-84, 88-89, 93-95, 97-

98, 100, 102, 107

2d Force Service Support Group, 1-2, 9,

14, 15-21, 24-29, 35, 46, 70, 77, 101-102, 105-107

2d Force Service Support Group Forward, 19-21

4th Force Service Support Group, 3, 5,

10, 12-14, 18, 74

3d Civil Affairs Group, 52, 80

Brigade Service Support Group 1, 3, 98

Combat Service Support Group 1, 4-5

Combat Service Support Group 11, 3-7,

23, 30-32, 39-40, 44, 46, 50, 56-57, 67, 69, 73, 77, 79-

80, 83, 85-87, 89, 93-94, 98-100

Combat Service Support Group 15, 3, 6-

7, 10, 23, 32-33, 71, 98

Combat Service Support Group 16, 3

MEU Service Support Group 11, 13

MEU Service Support Group 22, 7

Transportation Support Group, 3, 7-8,

23, 36-37, 40, 49-51, 74-76, 98

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), 13

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), 20-21, 71, 73

22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), 7

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special

Operations Capable), 20, 26, 72

1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 35

1st Tank Battalion, 67

138 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Index 139

1st Transportation Support Battalion, 3,

4, 7, 35

2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 35, 96,

97

2d Dental Battalion, 16, 18

2d Maintenance Battalion, 15-17, 82,

102

2d Medical Battalion, 16, 18

2d Military Police Battalion, 16-17, 24,

76

2d Supply Battalion, 15-17, 26, 102

2d Transportation Support Battalion, 15-

17, 20, 27, 41, 44, 49, 56, 75-76

3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 34, 44, 55-56, 67

4th Landing Support Battalion, 5, 13

4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 99

4th Maintenance Battalion, 18

4th Supply Battalion, 18

6th Communications Battalion, 14

6th Engineer Support Battalion, 3, 9-10,

13, 23, 33, 35, 37, 46-37, 50, 58-60, 73, 81, 86-87, 94,

98

6th Motor Transport Battalion, 3, 8-9,

35-36, 45, 49, 76

7th Engineer Support Battalion, 3, 9, 23,

33-35, 44, 47, 66-69, 71, 94, 97-100

8th Communications Battalion, 16, 28-

29

8th Engineer Support Battalion, 3, 9, 15,

17, 23-24, 35-37, 40, 46, 64-67, 78, 83-85, 95-97

Combat Service Support Battalion 10, 3-

5, 11, 31-32, 37, 39-40, 43, 45, 48, 50, 56-57, 59, 67,

69, 77-81, 85-86, 89, 93-94, 98

Combat Service Support Battalion 12, 3,

6-7, 33, 37, 40, 42, 47-48, 67, 71-73, 78-83, 97-98

Combat Service Support Battalion 13, 3,

5, 6

Combat Service Support Battalion 18, 3,

6-7, 26, 33, 37, 40, 42, 44, 47-49, 58, 69, 73, 81, 83, 88

Combat Service Support Battalion 19,

13

Combat Service Support Battalion 22, 3,

7, 31-32, 53, 57-58, 69, 87, 98

Headquarters and Service Battalion (1st

FSSG), 3, 6, 35

Headquarters and Service Battalion (2d

FSSG), 16, 25

Health Services Battalion, 3, 10, 18, 23,

33-34, 75

Beach and Terminal Operations Company, 42

Combat Service Support Company 101,

89, 99

Combat Service Support Company 102,

99

Combat Service Support Company 103,

99

Combat Service Support Company 104,

99

Combat Service Support Company 105,

99

Combat Service Support Company 111,

3-4, 40, 46, 67, 71, 77, 79, 98

Combat Service Support Company 115,

3-4, 43, 56, 67, 70, 77, 79, 85, 99

Combat Service Support Company 117,

3-4, 45, 67, 78-79, 85, 99

Combat Service Support Company 121,

80, 87

Combat Service Support Company 133,

3, 5, 6

Combat Service Support Company 134,

3, 5, 6

Combat Service Support Company 135,

3, 5, 6

Combat Service Support Company 151,

3, 6, 42, 99

Combat Service Support Company 181,

69

Combat Service Support Company 191,

13

Combat Service Support Company 222,

7

Combat Service Support Company
140 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Tripoli, 89, 94

Marine Logistics Command Support Detachment 1, 27, 42

Warfighting Center, 55

Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), 17, 20, 29, 33,

99, 101-106

Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPSRONs),

19, 20 

Martin, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher B., 17

Mattis, Major General James N., 32, 104

McCarthy, Major Michael P., 59-60

McGowan, Major Brandon D., 26

medical augmentation program (MAP), 18, 61

medical support, 2, 4, 7, 9-10, 16-18, 25-27, 30, 32-33,

37, 45, 48, 53-54, 60-61, 63-64, 71, 73, 75, 81, 87, 90

Meier, Colonel William A., 24

military police, 4, 10-12, 17-18, 24, 27, 43-45, 76-77,

80, 86, 103

Miller, First Lieutenant Ryan L., 99

Mills, Major Don A., 103

mission oriented protective posture (MOPP), 30-31

Moore, Colonel Darrell L., 4, 13, 44, 47, 74, 93-94

mortuary affairs, 33, 54-55, 80, 87-88, 98

motor transport, 4, 8-9, 17, 48, 69, 99, 103

Murney, Lieutenant Colonel Kathleen M., 6, 71

Natonski, Brigadier General Richard F., 53

Naval Hospital Jacksonville, 61

Navy Units

Fleet Hospital Three, 63

Navy Mobile Construction Battalion 4, 25

Nelson, Lieutenant Colonel Niel E., 9, 35, 46, 64-67,

83-85, 95

Nestle Washdown Site, 104

Nethercot, Major Julie L., 29

Norris, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Terry G., 83

O’Bannon, Second Lieutenant Presley N., 89

O’Connor, Captain Peter F. (USN), 63

Olness, Captain Michael F., 75

opening package, 39-40, 43, 45

Operations

Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 1-2, 4, 6, 8, 55,

71, 107

Desert Spear, 13

Enduring Freedom, 10, 26

Iraqi Freedom, 1-2, 4-10, 13, 17-19, 21, 26-

29, 33, 35, 38-39, 50-51, 55, 63, 70, 73, 75, 77, 83, 88,

101, 107

Just Cause, 14

Sea Signal, 14

Uphold Democracy, 82

Operations Plan 1003V, 13, 19, 28, 39, 93

operation systems control center (OSCC), 29

Orlando, Lieutenant Colonel Kim S. (USA), 11, 12

Otto, Colonel Stephen W., 19

Pachuta, Captain Stephen M. (USN), 18

Padilla-Ramirez, Sergeant Fernando, 72

Pasagian, Major Arthur J., 19

Persian Gulf War, 1-2, 4, 39

PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK-3002), 20, 105

Poindexter, Lieutenant Colonel Scott H., 9, 34

Pomfret, Colonel John J., 4, 30-31, 39, 46, 50, 77

Poole, Captain Forrest C., III, 45

post exchange (PX), 16, 22, 25, 33, 86, 88-89

Pratt, Major Thomas M., 65, 83

Qalat Sikar, 51, 67, 71-72, 87

Raimo, Major David V., 23

reconstitution, regeneration, and re-embarkation

(R3), 101, 104-105

rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill, 29-30

Reist, Colonel David G., 3, 7-8, 36

Repair and Replenishment Points (RRPs)

RRP1, 40, 41

RRP2, 40, 41, 43

RRP3, 39, 41, 45, 50

RRP4, 39, 41, 43, 50

RRP7, 41, 46, 50, 56, 67

RRP10, 41, 56-57

RRP14, 71

RRP19, 41, 78-80

RRP22, 41, 79

RRP23, 41, 80, 85

RRP 24, 41, 67, 69, 71, 77-78

RRP25, 41, 77-79

RRP26, 41, 86-87, 89

RRP26A, 41, 86

RRP29, 89
Index 141

RRP30, 41, 94

RRP30A, 41, 94

reservists, 5-6, 8-11, 13-14, 17, 28, 52, 54, 60 

reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs),

50, 59-60, 86, 89, 98

Routes

Dallas, 43

Tampa, 43, 45-46

Rumaylah Oil Fields, 39, 43, 53

Sablan, Major Ronald W., 82

Saddam Canal, 53, 55, 58, 78, 82

Safwan Hill, 40

Saipan (LHA 2), 7, 31

Salman Pak, 86

Sanchez, Lieutenant General Ricardo S., 100

Sanchez, Sergeant Major Manual J., 37-38 

sandstorm, 48, 55, 57-58, 60, 66-67, 69-70, 103-104

Sarabadi Airfield, 80

Seabees, U.S. Navy 17, 25, 60, 68, 86, 96, 100

Seamon, Major Timothy B., 64, 66, 78

Shane, Staff Sergeant Perry H., 67 

Sheahan, Colonel James P., 12-13

Shia, 53, 93

shock trauma platoon (STP), 7, 10, 18, 30, 32, 45, 53,

58, 60, 63, 69, 71, 81, 90

Shottenkirk, Captain Grant R., 4

Smith, Lieutenant Colonel David M., 102

Solis, Second Lieutenant Alan J., 99 

Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF), 101-103, 105-106

Stokes, Second Lieutenant Sarah M., 56

supply, 4-6, 15, 17, 25-26, 32, 69, 70, 82, 86, 89, 91,

102

Support Area (SA)

Anderson, 67, 69, 72-73, 75, 79-80, 82

Basilone, 67, 71-72

Chesty, 40, 75, 78, 80-83, 85, 87, 89, 94-95,

97-98

Daly, 81, 86, 87

Edson, 75, 93-94, 97, 100

Geiger, 75

Sweeney, Colonel John L., 4, 37-38, 73

Tactical Assembly Area (TAA) Coyote. See Camp Coyote.

Talleri, Colonel Peter J., 102 

Task Forces 

Dirt Pig, 68

Hook, 81

Pegasus, 41, 49, 77

Tarawa, 7, 21, 28, 31-32, 35, 44, 46-48, 53,

55, 57, 60, 64, 80, 83, 87, 94-95, 97-98

Tripoli, 89-93

Yankee, 13

third country national (TCN), 20, 27-28, 42, 75, 103,

105

Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel Valerie E., 52, 62

Thompson, Captain Suzan F., 4, 43-44, 70-71

Tigris River, 48, 67, 78-79, 83

Tikrit, 79, 89-94

Tran, First Lieutenant Minh D., 99

TruckInt, 77

Twentynine Palms, CA, 4-5, 16, 57, 98

Udairi Range, 32

Usher, Brigadier General Edward G. III, 2-5, 7-9, 11-

14, 22, 26, 30, 35, 44, 48, 57, 70-71, 73, 75, 84, 93,

100, 107

U.S. Military Academy, West Point, 1

Varicak, Major Michael C., 78

Vasquez, First Sergeant Gonzalo A. “Butch”, 40

vehicles

amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), 49, 53, 74,

87-88

seven-ton truck, 8, 40, 45, 56, 72, 78, 81

heavy equipment transporter (HET), 74 

high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles

(HMMWV), 10

M1A1 Abrams tank, 48, 80

M1A2 Abrams tank, 92

M2A3 Bradley fighting vehicle, 92

M88 Hercules tank, 67

MK48 logistics vehicle system (LVS), 36, 78 

Vietnam War, 17, 20, 56

Vincent, Major John E., 71-73

Wallace, Lieutenant Timothy A. (USN), 17
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research Land Combat Study Team, 63

Wasit, 93

Weapons

60mm mortars, 94-95

AK-47, 44, 100

bangalore torpedoes, 95

M240G, 67

SA-7 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, 94

Weinkle, Lieutenant Colonel Robert K., 4-5, 31, 39,

45, 57, 79, 94

Wentz, Gunnery Sergeant Wesley M., 23

Winthrop, Captain Andrew R., 44

Wissler, Colonel John E., 15-17, 41-42

Wojnaroski, Major Edward P., 43, 57 

Young, Major Devon C., 82

142 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
Cover: Motor transport drivers navigate in full

Mission-Oriented Protective Posture clothing

and masks. (USMC Photo)