Nos. 15-5016 & 15-5017

_______________________________________________________

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

_______________________________________________________

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN,JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendant-Appellee,

CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM,

Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant,

HISPANIC LEADERSHIP FUND,

Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

No. 1:11-cv-00766-ABJ (Hon. Amy Berman Jackson)

RESPONSE BY APPELLANT CENTER FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 

TO PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Dated: April 5, 2016

Jan Witold Baran

Thomas W. Kirby

Caleb P. Burns

Claire J. Evans

WILEY REIN LLP

1776 K Street NW

Washington, DC 20006

Tel.: 202.719.7000

E-mail: tkirby@wileyrein.com

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... i

GLOSSARY............................................................................................................. iv

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................3

ARGUMENT.............................................................................................................7

I. THE PANEL OPINION IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME 

COURT PRECEDENT. ........................................................................7

II. THE PANEL OPINION IS CONSISTENT WITH CIRCUIT 

PRECEDENT......................................................................................10

III. THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF 

“EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE.”..................................................13

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................15

ADDENDUM: RULE 26.1 STATEMENT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

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Cases

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976)..................................................................................................9

CFIF v. Van Hollen,

694 F.3d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2012)..........................................................................1, 6

*Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984)..............................................................................................1

Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310 (2010)..............................................................................................9

*Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,

843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988)....................................................................12, 13

FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,

556 U.S. 502 (2009)............................................................................................13

FEC v. Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc.,

551 U.S. 449 (2007)..............................................................................................4

McConnell v. FEC,

540 U.S. 93 (2003)..........................................................................................9, 11

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,

514 U.S. 334 (1995)..............................................................................................9

*Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,

463 U.S. 29 (1983)................................................................................................7

National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. Jones,

716 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2013)............................................................................14

* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks.

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(Continued)

Page(s)

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Shays v. FEC,

528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008)......................................................................10, 11

Talley v. California, 

362 U.S. 60 (1960)................................................................................................8

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. 

Village of Stratton,

536 U.S. 150 (2002)..............................................................................................9

Statutes

52 U.S.C. § 30101..................................................................................................2, 3

52 U.S.C. § 30104..........................................................................................1, 2, 3, 5

Regulations 

11 C.F.R. § 104.20 ...........................................................................................1, 4, 12

Legislative Materials 

147 Cong. Rec. S3033 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001)....................................................12

Rules

Fed. R. App. P. 35......................................................................................................1

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GLOSSARY

APA Administrative Procedure Act

CFIF Center for Individual Freedom

FEC Federal Election Commission

FECA Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended

JA Joint Appendix

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INTRODUCTION

The Panel Opinion is a straightforward application of deferential agency 

review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and step two of Chevron, 

U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). It 

creates no conflict and resolves no issue of exceptional importance that warrants en 

banc review. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). The Petition should be denied.

A provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) requires the

disclosure of “all contributors who contributed” $1,000 or more to a speaker that 

spends more than $10,000 on electioneering communications (issue 

advertisements). 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(F). The Federal Election Commission 

(FEC) implemented the statute by requiring disclosure of those who contribute the 

required sums “for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications.” 11 

C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9). In 2012, this Court held at Chevron step one that the 

statutory language may be construed to include this purpose requirement. CFIF v. 

Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Panel Opinion simply holds at 

Chevron step two and under APA review that the FEC reasonably adopted that 

permissible purpose-based construction of the statute.

Petitioner disagrees with the FEC’s decision. He seeks disclosure of the 

identity of every individual who sent $1,000 or more to a corporation or labor 

union that spends $10,000 on electioneering communications even if the donor 

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does not support the message communicated (and regardless of whether the 

individual even knows about the message). The Panel held that the FEC had good 

reasons for rejecting this approach. The statute supports a purpose-based 

construction. It refers to a “contribution” as a donation “by any person for the 

purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” Op. at 10 (quoting 52 

U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)). A related and unchallenged FECA provision also 

supports the construction. For nearly forty years, it has limited disclosure for 

express advocacy to those who give “for the purpose of furthering” the 

advertisement. Id. at 12 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C)). And there are 

policy reasons for a purpose-based construction. Broader disclosure—the Panel 

and the FEC recognized—would impose costly recordkeeping and reporting 

burdens on corporations and labor unions, mislead the public about who, in fact, 

supports the advertisements, and threaten donor privacy. See id. at 19-28. 

The Panel’s straightforward and deferential agency review does not merit 

further consideration. The Petition’s contrary position rests on 

mischaracterizations of the Panel Opinion and unfounded claims of importance. 

For example, the Petition claims that the Panel’s APA holding depended solely on 

a donor-privacy rationale, when it did not, and faults the rationale for conflicting 

with Supreme Court precedent, which it does not. It also claims that the Panel 

acknowledged it was parting from Circuit precedent. To the contrary, the Panel 

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specifically and accurately distinguished that precedent. And the Petition ignores 

the practical limitations of any decision when claiming “exceptional importance.” 

Petitioner does not dispute, and does not challenge, the parallel purpose-based 

limitation on express advocacy disclosures. As a result, a reversal (even if 

justified) would not result in greater disclosure. It would only induce speakers to 

shift from implied to express advocacy, which will continue to be governed by the 

purpose-based disclosure standard that the FEC adopted here. The Petition should 

be denied.

BACKGROUND

At issue is the FEC’s implementation of a reporting provision for 

“electioneering communications,” which requires those who spend more than 

$10,000 on electioneering communications to publicly disclose both the spending 

and “the names and addresses of all contributors who contributed an aggregate 

amount of $1,000 or more” since the first day of the previous calendar year. 52 

U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(F). A “contribution” is a payment “made by any person for 

the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office.” Id. § 30101(8)(A).

When the statute was enacted in 2002, only unincorporated entities and 

individuals could fund electioneering contributions. See Op. at 5-6. But the 

landscape changed in 2007, when the Supreme Court held that corporations and 

unions could also make electioneering communications that were not the 

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“functional equivalent of express advocacy.” FEC v. Wisc. Right To Life, Inc., 551 

U.S. 449, 465 (2007). 

The FEC initiated a rulemaking to determine, among other things, the 

disclosures required of corporations and labor unions that make electioneering 

communications. See JA37. It proposed two alternatives: (1) disclosure of every

donor of the required amounts, regardless of purpose, or (2) no donor disclosure at 

all. JA37-38. The Notice also offered a middle course, seeking comment on 

whether the Commission should limit the reporting requirement to “funds that are 

donated for the express purpose of making electioneering communications.” JA37.

The FEC received twenty-seven comments and held two days of hearings. 

See Op. at 7. The agency then adopted the middle-ground approach, requiring

disclosure of those who contribute “for the purpose of furthering electioneering 

communications.” 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9). The bipartisan vote was 4-1, with 

three Democratic Commissioners and one Republican Commissioner voting in 

favor of the regulation (one seat was vacant). See Dist. Ct. Dkt. #17, at VH1130. 

The FEC concluded that Congress had not “spoken directly to this issue” 

because it enacted the statute at a time when corporations and labor unions could 

not fund electioneering communications. JA301. But the FEC also noted that 

Congress had spoken in a different, but related context. “[E]xpress advocacy”

(advertisements that advocate the election or defeat of an identified candidate by 

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using explicit magic words such as “vote for”) has, for nearly forty years, triggered 

disclosure of those who make qualifying contributions “for the purpose of 

furthering” the communication. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2)(C); see JA311.

The FEC decided to incorporate this express advocacy disclosure standard 

into the implied advocacy context for at least three reasons. First, purpose-based 

disclosure “appropriately provides the public with information about those persons 

who actually support the message conveyed.” JA311. Additional disclosure could 

mislead the public, as corporate “investors, customers, and donors do not 

necessarily support the corporation’s electioneering communications,” nor do 

members who pay labor union dues. Id. 

Second, purpose-based disclosure provides relevant information “without 

imposing on corporations and labor organizations the significant burden of 

disclosing the identities of the vast numbers of customers, investors, or members, 

who have provided funds for purposes entirely unrelated to [electioneering 

communications].” Id. Witnesses “testified that the effort necessary to identify 

those persons who provided funds totaling $1,000 or more to a corporation or labor 

organization would be very costly and require an inordinate amount of effort.” Id.

Third, purpose-based disclosure is a “narrowly tailored” approach that 

balances interests in disclosure against First Amendment interests in “individual 

donor privacy.” JA301. The FEC recognized that “nonprofit organizations and 

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their donors have privacy interests and that some donors request to remain 

anonymous,” but concluded that the “carefully designed reporting requirements” 

would “not create unreasonable burdens on the privacy rights of donors.” Id.

Petitioner challenged the FEC’s decision with this lawsuit, arguing that the 

purpose requirement was an impermissible construction of the statute and was

arbitrary and capricious. The district court ruled for Petitioner at Chevron step 

one, but this Court reversed. See CFIF v. Van Hollen, 694 F.3d 108 (D.C. Cir. 

2012). The Court did “not agree . . . that the words ‘contributors’ and ‘contributed’ 

. . . cannot be construed to include a ‘purpose’ requirement. . . . Therefore, the 

District Court erred in disposing of this case under Chevron Step One.” Id. at 110-

11. The Court remanded for the district court to consider “the parties’ arguments 

on whether [the regulation] is reasonable, and thus entitled to deference under 

Chevron Step Two” and “whether the regulation survives arbitrary and capricious 

review under Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983).” CFIF, 694 F.3d at 111-12.

On remand, the district court again vacated the regulation. JA404-50. The 

Panel reversed. Applying step two of Chevron, the Panel held that the FEC’s 

regulation reflected “more than just a permissible” choice; it was “a persuasive 

one.” Op. at 11-12. The Panel further held that the FEC’s explanation for its 

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regulation was sufficient to meet the “low hurdle” imposed by the APA on an 

agency to “adequately explain its action.” Op. at 16-18.

ARGUMENT

I. THE PANEL OPINION IS CONSISTENT WITH SUPREME COURT 

PRECEDENT.

The Petition argues that the Panel Opinion creates a conflict with Supreme 

Court precedent, relying on the Panel’s APA analysis of one rationale that the FEC 

used to support its regulation. Pet. at 7-9. Petitioner does not take issue with the 

Panel’s application of the Supreme Court precedent that drove its APA decision—

State Farm, which requires the Court to uphold a regulation when the agency has 

“examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its 

action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 

made.” See Op. at 18-19 (quoting 463 U.S. at 43). And Petitioner does not dispute 

any of the other rationales that the Panel found sufficient to adequately explain the 

FEC’s decision on APA review. Id. at 18-28. Instead, Petitioner only picks at the 

Panel’s discussion about the FEC’s donor-privacy rationale. Were there flaws in 

that non-case-determinative analysis, they would not warrant en banc review. But,

there were no flaws.

First, the Petition’s claim of conflict depends on a mischaracterization of the 

Panel Opinion. Petitioner asserts that the Panel found that “the FEC had to ‘tailor 

the disclosure requirements to satisfy constitutional interests in privacy’ because 

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any broader rule would harm First Amendment rights.” Pet. at 7 (citing Op. at 24, 

26, 27). Not so. The Panel instead found only that the FEC appropriately 

considered First Amendment privacy rights when determining the extent of the 

required disclosure. It explained that the FEC, which regulates core 

constitutionally protected activity, has a unique mandate to be sensitive to First 

Amendment concerns, Op. at 24, and that its “concerns about the competing 

interests in privacy and disclosure were legitimate” given the Supreme Court’s 

“vigorous protect[ion of] the public’s right to speak anonymously,” id. (citing 

Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960)). And it found that the FEC

adequately explained how its “tailoring was an able attempt to balance the 

competing values that lie at the heart of the campaign finance laws.” Id. at 27.

The question before the Panel was not whether the FEC must adopt the 

regulation it did, or even whether the FEC could have required more disclosure 

consistent with the First Amendment. The question instead was whether, on the 

facts of this case, the FEC rationally adopted and reasonably explained the 

challenged regulation. Op. at 18-28. By acknowledging the tension between

disclosure and privacy—and pointing to the FEC’s middle-ground resolution of 

that tension—the Panel confirmed the need to defer to the agency in this case. It 

created no new First Amendment law or “conflict” that warrants en banc review.

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Second, the Petition incorrectly implies that the Panel’s decision is based on 

“only dissents.” Pet. at 7. In fact, the Panel relied on at least five Supreme Court 

decisions that support the FEC’s decision to consider privacy interests and balance 

them with a tailored disclosure requirement. Op. at 24-27; see also Citizens United 

v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67 (2010) (“The Court has subjected these [disclosure] 

requirements to ‘exacting scrutiny,’ which requires a ‘substantial relation’ between 

the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.”); 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 231 (2003) (A “disclosure regime [must] bear[] a 

sufficient relationship to . . . ‘shed[ding] the light of publicity’ on campaign 

financing.”); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 

536 U.S. 150, 163 (2002) (“[T]here must be a balance between these 

[governmental] interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment 

rights.”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995) (“The 

simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant information does not 

justify a state requirement that a writer make . . . disclosures she would otherwise 

omit.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (“[C]ompelled disclosure, in 

itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the 

First Amendment” and must “survive exacting scrutiny.”). 

Finally, the Petition claims the FEC did not rely on the Panel’s privacy

rationale. Pet. at 8-9. But Petitioner admits the FEC did explain that its regulation 

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was “narrowly tailored to address many of the commenters’ concerns regarding 

individual donor privacy.” Id. at 8; see also Op. at 23; JA301. Petitioner also fails 

to dispute that the Panel pointed to other rationales for the regulation—that it is 

consistent with the statute’s definition of “contribution,” parallels the disclosure 

requirement that applies to express advocacy, avoids the unnecessary and costly 

recordkeeping and reporting burdens that unfettered disclosure would impose, and 

provides the electorate with the information needed (the identity of those who

support the electioneering communications) without misleading them into thinking 

that others (customers, shareholders, union members) also support that message. 

Op. at 9-28. The Panel rightly found the FEC’s statement of reasons was adequate. 

Certainly, there is no conflict with Supreme Court precedent.

II. THE PANEL OPINION IS CONSISTENT WITH CIRCUIT 

PRECEDENT.

The Petition argues that the Panel’s resolution of the Chevron and APA 

claims creates a conflict with one of this Court’s many campaign finance decisions, 

Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Pet. at 10. It does not.

First, the Petition wrongly claims that the Panel created a conflict with 

Shays by holding that a statute’s purpose should not be considered at step two of 

the Chevron analysis. Id. at 10-11. The Panel wrote the exact opposite: “[A]

statute’s purpose is relevant to Chevron’s Step Two inquiry.” Op. at 15 (emphasis 

in original). The Panel also considered the statutory purposes here. Id. at 13-16. 

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The Panel disagreed with Petitioner’s argument that Congress had only one 

statutory purpose—maximum disclosure above all else. Id. at 14. It explained that 

the fact Congress intended “more robust disclosure does not mean Congress wasn’t 

also concerned with . . . the conflicting privacy interests that hang in the balance.” 

Id. Petitioner thus presents a mere disagreement over the purposes of the statute—

and not an issue about the role of statutory purpose in the Chevron analysis. The 

Panel was clear: the regulation “easily clears the Chevron Step Two hurdle” 

because it is “consistent with [the statute]’s text, history, and purposes.” Id. at 16

(emphasis added).

Second, the Petition has no basis for its claim that the Panel failed to 

distinguish Shays and instead “acknowledged that Shays supports the district 

court’s decision.” Pet. at 10-11. The Panel considered Shays at length and 

distinguished it from this case. Op. at 13-16. In Shays, there was a direct conflict 

between the “fundamental purpose” of the statutory provision (to “prohibit” soft 

money) and a regulation, which allowed “candidates to evade—almost 

completely—[the statute’s] restrictions on the use of soft money.” 528 F.3d at 925 

(citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 177 n.69). Here, the Panel explained, there is no 

comparable singular statutory purpose of “disclosure at all costs.” Op. at 13-15. 

While the statute calls for “broader disclosure,” it also “limits disclosure in a 

number of ways.” Id. at 14-15. And the Congressional record shows “Congress 

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‘took great care in crafting . . . language to avoid violating the important 

p[]rinciples in the First Amendment.’” Id. at 14 (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. S3033 

(daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Jeffords)). This case thus presents 

several purposes that are “far more nuanced” than merely maximizing disclosure. 

Id. at 15. The regulation appropriately—and consistent with Shays—balances 

those various purposes in requiring disclosure of those who give “for the purpose 

of furthering electioneering communications.” 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9); Op. at 

16.

Finally, the Petition incorrectly faults the Panel for contradicting “the 

precedent on which [Shays] drew,” which also calls for the invalidation of agency 

action that “‘frustrate[s] the policies Congress was seeking to effectuate.’” Pet. at 

11-12 (quoting Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1453 

(D.C. Cir. 1988)). This argument also depends on Petitioner’s mistaken assertion

of a singular statutory purpose requiring unfettered disclosure. But even 

Petitioner’s counsel conceded the statute here does “not call for unbounded 

disclosure.” Op. at 14 n.4. The Panel Opinion thus conforms to the Circuit 

precedent that Petitioner cites. Because the FEC was “interpreting a statute

embodying conflicting demands,” it should be upheld if “the agency’s 

interpretation [is] ‘compatible’ with Congressional purposes.” Cont’l Air Lines, 

Inc., 843 F.2d at 1451-52. The FEC— not this Court—has the authority and 

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responsibility “to decide the exact trade-off among conflicting goals that ‘best 

promotes’ the Congressional ‘goal’ in question.” Id. at 1451. The Panel correctly 

upheld the FEC’s middle-ground, tailored approach to disclosure as reasonable and 

properly explained. Op. at 14-16. No Circuit conflict warrants further review.

III. THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT AN ISSUE OF 

“EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE.”

The Petition finally argues that review is needed to correct a “wrong result” 

in an “exceptionally important case.” Pet. at 12. But there is no “wrong result.” 

And even if there were, the Petition does not, and cannot, show that any error is so 

“exceptionally important” that it justifies en banc review. 

First, the Petition argues that the Panel reached the “wrong result” because it 

upheld a 2007 regulation the FEC decided not to promulgate in 2003. Id. at 13-14. 

But an agency may change policy if “the new policy is permissible under the 

statute, . . . there are good reasons for it, and . . . the agency believes it to be better, 

which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.” FCC v. Fox 

Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). The FEC amply met this 

standard. The 2007 rulemaking responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Wisconsin Right to Life, which, for the first time, allowed corporations and labor 

unions to fund electioneering communications. JA301. This change created “good 

reasons” to promulgate a purpose-driven disclosure requirement to address issues 

created by the new precedent. See, e.g., JA301, 311-12.

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Second, the Petition argues that the Panel reached the “wrong result” 

because the FEC rejected alternate approaches, such as one that would have

“clarif[ied] that shareholders and customers are not ‘donors’” or one that would 

have paired more disclosure with an option to pay for electioneering 

communications out of a purpose-specific segregated bank account—and disclose 

only those individuals who gave to that account. Pet. at 13-14. But an agency 

“need not consider every alternative proposed nor respond to every comment 

made.” Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones, 716 F.3d 200, 215 (D.C. Cir. 

2013). Here, the first alternative was not viable because it did not resolve issues 

surrounding non-profit corporations. Op. at 22-23. And the second alternative was

also unsuitable, as the FEC cited evidence that segregated bank accounts are often 

not a “meaningful alternative” to general-treasury spending. JA311. 

Finally, Petitioner asserts this Petition has “exceptional[] importan[ce]” 

because the Panel Opinion “cripples” and “facilitate[s] evasion” of the disclosure 

that is a “centerpiece” of the statute. Pet. at 12, 15. It does not. The statute does 

not require unbounded disclosure. See, e.g., Op. at 14 n.4. The Panel Opinion 

merely affirms the FEC’s reasonable decision to draw the same line for implied 

advocacy as Congress drew for express advocacy. See JA311. 

That parallel line-drawing negates Petitioner’s claim that any error here has 

“exceptional importance.” Pet. at 12-15. Petitioner has not challenged the 

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statute’s purpose-based disclosure limitation that applies to express advocacy—

which has existed for nearly forty years. And corporations and labor unions may 

now fund express advocacy. So, a reversal here will not lead to the unbounded 

disclosure that Petitioner seeks; it instead will induce speakers to shift from 

electioneering communications to express advocacy, where the purpose-based 

disclosure standard remains. Groups made such a switch after the district court 

vacated the regulation and while the first appeal was pending. See CFIF Br. at 29 

(Apr. 10, 2015) (citing authority). Petitioner acknowledged that speakers would 

retain this ability to adhere to the purpose-based disclosure requirement even if the 

regulation here is vacated. See Van Hollen Br. at 35 (May 11, 2015). A Petition 

about a Panel Opinion that, if reversed, will have no significant practical effect is 

not a petition of “exceptional importance.” 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny the Petition for Rehearing.

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 Respectfully submitted,

April 5, 2016

/s/ Thomas W. Kirby 

Jan Witold Baran 

Thomas W. Kirby

Caleb P. Burns

Claire J. Evans

WILEY REIN LLP

1776 K Street NW

Washington, DC 20006

Tel.: 202.719.7000

E-mail: tkirby@wileyrein.com

Counsel for Center for Individual 

Freedom

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ADDENDUM: RULE 26.1 STATEMENT

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 26.1, CFIF certifies that no publicly held company 

has a ten-percent-or-greater ownership interest in CFIF and that CFIF has no 

parent companies as defined in the Circuit Rule. CFIF is a non-partisan, non-profit 

§ 501(c)(4) organization whose mission is to protect and defend individual 

freedoms and individual rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 5, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system, thereby 

serving all persons required to be served.

/s/ Thomas W. Kirby 

Thomas W. Kirby

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