1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

TRACY L. CHILDRESS, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 2:14-cv-12399 

District Judge Victoria A. Roberts 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 11) AND TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 12) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (DE 11), GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

(DE 12), and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision. 

II. REPORT: 

 Plaintiff, Tracy L. Childress, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance benefits 

(DIB). This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report 

and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 11), 

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the Commissioner’s cross motion for summary judgment (DE 12), and the 

administrative record (DE 8). 

A. Background 

 Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on March 22, 2010, 

alleging that she has been disabled since August 10, 2007, at age 39. R at 

263-265; see also R at 210-211, 212-214. According to her disability report, 

Plaintiff’s ability to work is limited by a torn rotator cuff in her right 

shoulder, bulging discs, a pinched nerve in her right shoulder/neck/back, a 

ruptured disc in her neck which affects her right shoulder, and asthma. See

R at 267; see also R at 351. On July 29, 2010, disability examiner Debbi 

Marr determined that Plaintiff was not disabled at the initial level. R at 97-

107; see also R at 138-141. 

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 

(ALJ). See R at 142-148. ALJ John J. Rabaut held a hearing on June 23, 

2011, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and vocational expert 

(VE) Harry Cynowa testified. R at 58-96. On July 12, 2011, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act, §§ 216(i) and 223(d). R at 108-123. 

 On or about August 16, 2011, Plaintiff, via counsel, requested review 

of the ALJ’s decision. R at 170. On September 27, 2012, the Appeals 

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Council remanded the case to the ALJ. R at 124-129. In so doing, the 

Appeals Council noted that the July 12, 2011 RFC was “for less than the full 

range of sedentary work.” R at 126. 

ALJ Rabaut held another hearing on March 21, 2013, at which 

Plaintiff was represented by counsel and VE Annette Holder testified. R at 

31-57. Subsequently, on April 12, 2013, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act, §§ 216(i) 

and 223(d).1

 R at 11-30. 

Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision on May 2, 2013. R 

at 8-10. On May 30, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review. R at 1-6. Thus, ALJ Rabaut’s April 12, 2013 decision became 

the Commissioner’s final decision. 

Plaintiff timely commenced the instant action on June 19, 2014. DE 

1. The Commissioner filed an answer on August 22, 2014, along with a 

copy of the administrative record. DE 7, DE 8.2

 

1 See 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) and 42 U.S.C. § 423(d). 

2 This case was originally assigned to Judge Roberts and Magistrate Judge 

Whalen. This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Whalen for pretrial 

matters. DE 3. However, on January 13, 2015, the case was reassigned 

from Magistrate Judge Whalen to me. DE 13.

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B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

 Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since August 10, 2007, on 

which date Plaintiff fell while working at Marygrove College. See R at 351. 

Plaintiff’s medical records span the period of time from August 10, 2007 to 

February 20, 2013 and are extensive. See R at 330-784 (Exhibits 1F - 22F). 

The ALJ considered at least 32 of these records, which will be discussed 

below, as required. 

C. Hearing Testimony (March 21, 2013) 

 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

 Plaintiff testified that she was about the same as the last time she saw 

the ALJ. On a typical day, she gets up as normal and does the little bit she 

can. According to Plaintiff, her medication keeps her “out” and “down” a 

lot. R at 36. She has taken Vicodin and Meclizine since her injury and 

started Morphine in 2012. R at 36-37. She also takes 800 mg Motrin and 

another pill “for the nerve to counteract the Morphine and the Vicodin.” R 

at 37. 

 Plaintiff’s daughters live with her and help her with personal care. 

Once she gets going in the morning, she just relaxes and sleeps the rest of 

the day. R at 37. Plaintiff naps about twice per day for an hour or two, and, 

because of her medication, she could nod off at any moment. R at 38. She 

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no longer drives, and her husband takes her around. R at 38-39. If she 

needs to, she goes to the store. She can push the cart but is not able to do as 

she once did. R at 39. At the time of the hearing, she had had a cane, which 

had been prescribed, for approximately two years. R at 39-40. Plaintiff 

testified that she could stand for approximately 15 minutes before having to 

sit down and could sit for about 15 minutes before she has to get moving a 

little bit. R at 40-41. 

Upon further examination by her counsel, Plaintiff testified that she 

gets headaches which derive from the neck issue. These headaches require 

her to lay down, independently of her other problems. R at 41. She takes 

Meclizine for a headache. R at 41-42. She gets these headaches once or 

twice per week at any given time. When one occurs, she may lay down from 

approximately 30 minutes to 2 hours. R at 42. Plaintiff also testified that 

she is right hand dominant and is still having problems with her right hand. 

R at 42-43. She experiences numbness and tingling, so her right hand grip 

or grasp is very weak. Plaintiff also has difficulty with holding onto objects; 

when she feels weakness coming on, she switches hands. The weakness is 

something that comes and goes. R at 43. 

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 2. Vocational Expert Testimony

 VE Annette Holder testified that, under the ALJ’s hypothetical, 

Plaintiff could not preform the past work as a home care attendant, cashier 

and housekeeper/cleaner, as all the past work was light or medium. R at 45-

47. The VE further testified that, at the sedentary level, the hypothetical 

Plaintiff could perform the unskilled work of an assembler, a sorter and a 

general office clerk. R at 47-48. The VE reduced the numbers of such 

available jobs to reflect her five pound lifting limitation. R at 48. The VE 

also took into consideration the ability to sit or stand while performing work 

tasks and the ability to use a cane while working. R at 48-49. When adding 

the requirement of missing unscheduled partial days, the VE testified that it 

would preclude all competitive employment at full time RFC. R at 49-50. 

Upon further examination by counsel, the VE testified that the 

additional requirement of using a handheld device, which the Undersigned 

presumes to be a cane, not just for prolonged ambulation and/or uneven 

terrain, but also for standing, with a sit/stand option, would eliminate the 

assembler job, which requires two hands, regardless of whether the worker is 

sitting or standing. R at 51. For example, the VE would reduce the number 

of sorter jobs to 900 in Southeast Michigan. R at 51-52. When counsel 

inquired about changing handling and fingering from frequent to occasional, 

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the ALJ testified that the jobs she identified would be eliminated. R at 53-

54. 

 D. The Administrative Decision (April 12, 2013)3

 1. Step One Analysis: Gainful Activity 

On April 12, 2013, ALJ Rabaut issued his decision. At Step 1 of the 

sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity since August 10, 2007, the alleged onset date. 

R at 17. 

 

3 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim 

through a five-step sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step terminates the 

ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if 

fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions: 

 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

 2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

 3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, 

meet or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s 

Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

 4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the 

claimant perform his or her past relevant work? 

 5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work 

experience, and residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform other 

work available in the national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 

(6th Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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2. Step Two Analysis: Impairments 

At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the severe impairments of 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, lumbosacral 

radiculopathy and cervical radiculopathy, right rotator cuff tear with internal 

derangement status post subacromial decompression, and asthma. R at 17-

18. 

In addition, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with the 

non-severe impairment of baseline anxiety disorder and opined that 

Plaintiff’s anxiety did not significantly limit her ability to perform basic 

work activities. In forming this opinion, the ALJ considered, among other 

things, the January 13, 2010 impression of Nancy Juopperi, D.O. that 

Plaintiff had a baseline anxiety disorder (R at 518-520); the August 10, 2007 

to September 19, 2009 records of Henry Ford Wyandotte Hospital (R at 451-

517); the June 2010 note Arpan R. Bhakta, M.D. that Plaintiff had normal 

mood and affect, and her behavior was normal (R at 686); and a lack of 

evidence of psychological treatment since the alleged onset date. Moreover, 

the ALJ gave great weight to the July 29, 2010 State agency psychological 

consultant’s determination. R at 98-107. 

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3. Step Three Analysis: The Listings 

At Step 3, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled 

the severity of one of the listed impairments. R at 18-19. 

4. Step Four Analysis: The RFC 

At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform 

sedentary work, except Plaintiff: can only lift up to 5 pounds; must be able 

to alternate between sitting and standing at will, but approximately every 15 

minutes; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional climbing of 

ramps or stairs, balancing, stooping, crouching, or kneeling; no crawling; no 

constant (i.e. frequent) reaching; no overhead reaching or handling; frequent, 

but not constant, handling, fingering, and feeling; limited to jobs allowing 

use of a handheld assistive device for prolonged ambulation or uneven 

terrain; avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold or heat, wetness, 

humidity, environmental irritants, poorly ventilated areas, excessive 

vibration, and moving machinery; avoid all exposure to unprotected heights 

and hazards; and work must be limited to only occasional decision making 

and only occasional changes in the work setting. R at 19-23. 

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5. Step Five Analysis: Jobs That Can Be Performed 

 At step five, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, 

and RFC, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers 

in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, such as an assembler, 

with 1,000 jobs in Southeast Michigan; sorter, with 1,200 jobs in Southeast 

Michigan; and general office clerk, with 1,000 jobs in Southeast Michigan. 

R at 24-25. Here, the ALJ relied upon the March 21, 2013 testimony of VE 

Holder (R at 44-56) and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). 

 E. Standard of Review

 The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final 

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a 

case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was 

made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

(“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if 

supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this 

standard, “substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of 

evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 

486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 

284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s decision, the court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts 

in evidence or decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 

506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the 

ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, 

including that of the claimant.”). Furthermore, the claimant “has the 

ultimate burden to establish an entitlement to benefits by proving the 

existence of a disability.” Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1181 (6th Cir. 

1990). 

 Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not 

trivial. The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly 

detracts from [the] weight’” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. 

NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. 

v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is 

substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite 

conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting 

Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 

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405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, 

if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, 

“‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to 

follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the 

merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 

651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 

2007)). 

 F. Analysis 

In her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts three statements 

of error: (1) the ALJ did not properly assess Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, 

limitations and credibility, (2) the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the 

opinion and assessment of Plaintiff’s treating medical source, and (3) the 

VE’s testimony at the 2013 hearing demonstrates that there were no jobs that 

Plaintiff could perform if she required a cane while standing. DE 11 at 20-

32. 

The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff’s motion, asserting that she is 

entitled to a grant of summary judgment, because: (1) the ALJ’s credibility 

determination is supported by substantial evidence, (2) the ALJ properly 

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evaluated the medical opinions of record, and (3) the ALJ’s Step 5 

determination is supported by substantial evidence. DE 12 at 10-23. 

The Undersigned will address each argument in turn. 

1. Credibility Assessment 

Plaintiff’s first statement of error is that the ALJ did not properly 

assess Plaintiff’s complaints of pain, limitations and credibility. DE at 20-

26. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit provides the 

following with regard to credibility assessments: 

Where the symptoms and not the underlying condition form the 

basis of the disability claim, a two-part analysis is used in 

evaluating complaints of disabling pain. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.929(a); Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 

2001); Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1038–39 (6th Cir. 

1994). First, the ALJ will ask whether there is an underlying 

medically determinable physical impairment that could 

reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's symptoms. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.929(a). Second, if the ALJ finds that such an 

impairment exists, then he must evaluate the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms on the 

individual's ability to do basic work activities. Id. 

Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007). 

In his April 12, 2013 decision, the ALJ found that “[a]fter careful 

consideration of the evidence, . . . claimant’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; 

however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and 

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible . . . .” R at 20. 

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The ALJ then discussed the medical records, activities of daily living, work 

history since the alleged onset date, and receipt of unemployment benefits. 

R at 20-23. 

Here, the Court should conclude that the ALJ’s assessment of 

Plaintiff’s credibility as non-persuasive (R at 23) is supported by substantial 

evidence: 

a. Plaintiff’s representations 

Plaintiff argues that “the overall record demonstrates that the ALJ was 

not justified in discounting the plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of her 

symptoms and limitations.” Plaintiff contends that her testimony about pain, 

limited range of motion, tingling and weakness, dizziness, cramping and 

spasm “has been persistent and consistent for more than 7 years.” DE 11 at 

21. According to Plaintiff, “the ALJ[’s] recitation of sporadic and extremely 

limited activities demonstrates the extent that the ALJ skewed the record to 

find some reason to discount the plaintiff’s credibility about her limitations 

and symptoms.” DE 11 at 22. 

Specifically, in support of her claim that her limited daily activities do 

not demonstrate a capacity to perform work 8 hours per day, Plaintiff points 

to the litany of symptoms and limitations listed in her May 18, 2010 SSA 

Function Report (R at 288-295), including her inability to use her right arm, 

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neck mobility problems (R at 293), dizziness (R at 288), the need for 

assistance with her daily chores and activities (R at 289-290), and dizziness 

and drowsiness caused by her medications (R at 295). DE 11 at 22-23. 

Plaintiff also specifically cites her June 23, 2011 testimony in support 

of her claims of: numbness in her right arm and right leg (R at 63), tingling 

in her right hand and fingers (R at 73), week grip or grasp in her right hand 

(R at 77), daily pain of 6/10 to 10/10 (R at 65), ineffectiveness of 

medications to completely reduce her pain, (R at 65-66), grogginess from 

her headache medicine (R at 78), daily dizziness, and discontinuation of 

physical therapy due to lack of improvement for her back (R at 67). Plaintiff 

also cites specific portions of her March 21, 2013 testimony, noting a lack of 

improvement in her symptoms since she testified in 2011, and being on 

Vicodin, Morphine and Meclizine (R at 36). She naps twice a day for an 

hour or two (R at 38, 41), enjoys daytime television (R at 71), and her 

daughters help her with personal needs (R at 37). She further reports being 

prescribed a cane approximately two years earlier (R at 39-40). DE 11 at 23-

24. 

Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ’s reasons to discount the plaintiff[’s] 

testimony about her abilities and limitations is defective and contrary to the 

evidence of record.” DE 11 at 26. However, the ALJ did consider the May 

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18, 2010 function report (R at 288-295 [Ex. 5E]) and Plaintiff’s testimony in 

his decision. R at 23.4

 He also considered “all symptoms and the extent to 

which these symptoms can be reasonably accepted as consistent with the 

objective medical evidence and other evidence.” (R at 19). As the 

Commissioner points out (R at 12 at 10 n.1), the ALJ credited some of 

Plaintiff’s statements. For example, Plaintiff testified on March 21, 2013 

that she could stand or sit for approximately fifteen minutes (R at 40), and 

the ALJ’s RFC finding includes the limitation that Plaintiff “must be able to 

alternate between sitting and standing at will, but approximately every 15 

minutes . . . .” R at 19. On the other hand, the ALJ also considered the 

April 8, 2010 SSA field office disability report (R at 263-265 [Ex. 2E]), 

which notes that the interviewer did not observe/perceive difficulty with 

breathing, sitting, standing or walking, and makes no mention of a cane (R at 

264). R 23. This was entirely permissible and appropriate.5

 

4 Plaintiff’s May 18, 2010 SSA Function Report (R at 288-295) appears to 

have been completed by Plaintiff’s daughter (see R at 296-297). Whether 

the ALJ was pointing to June 23, 2011 testimony (R at 58-96) or March 21, 

2013 testimony (R at 31-57) in his credibility analysis is unclear. R at 23. 

5 “Social Security regulations provide that the Commissioner will consider 

opinion evidence from third-parties, including employees of the agency, 

when evaluating the credibility of a claimant's allegations of symptoms, and 

when assessing RFC for the claimant.” Perkins v. Colvin, No. 12-2219, 

2013 WL 4517295, 4 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1513(d)(4), 416.913(d)(4); 404.1529(c)(3), 416.929(c)(3)); see also 

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b. Medical records 

Plaintiff asserts that the objective evidence includes: the MRIs of the 

cervical spine performed on January 10, 2008 (R at 515), January 12, 2010 

(R at 510, 569) and January 19, 2011 (see R at 742); the MRIs of the right 

shoulder performed on June 28, 2009 (R at 511) and March 17, 2010 (R at 

579); and the EMG of the right upper extremity performed on April 27, 2010 

(R at 577-578). DE 11 at 21. 

However, as the Commissioner points out (DE 12 at 11-12): (a) the 

March 18, 2008 Progressive Rehab Network notes indicate that Plaintiff had 

frequent cancellations (R at 20, R at 380); (b) Dr. Bhakta’s September 12, 

2007 notes indicate that Plaintiff could return to work on October 1, 2007 (R 

at 20, R at 545); (c) the June 30, 2010 post operation evaluation notes state 

that Plaintiff presented without complaints (R at 21, R at 680); and, (d)

August 8, 2012 notes of Dr. Kurz indicate that injections had helped Plaintiff 

“quite a bit” but were starting to wear off after lasting “maybe a couple of 

months,” and that right shoulder range of motion was “limited but a little bit 

improved.” (R at 21, R at 760). 

 

Odette v. Commissioner of Social Sec., No. 09-11484, 2010 WL 2104300, 

10 (E.D. Mich. May 3, 2010) (report and recommendation of Majzoub, M.J.) 

(regarding ALJ’s determination of last date insured and onset date, “The 

ALJ's finding is supported by the Field Office Disability Report and the 

abbreviated Field Office DIB Review Sheet.”).

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Thus, there is substantial evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion that “[t]he 

medical records do not support [Plaintiff’s] allegations of limitations.” R at 

20. 

Moreover, the ALJ’s RFC finding includes several express reasons for 

imposing certain limitations, indicative of the fact that he took her medical 

records and testimony into consideration. For example, the ALJ noted, “[t]o 

combat the effects of the claimant’s medication, as well as the documented 

pain, I limited the claimant to only occasional decision making and only 

occasional changes in the work setting . . . .” R at 21. Furthermore, the ALJ 

stated: 

 Considering the claimant’s physical impairments, as 

evidenced by the numerous diagnostic examinations 

discussed above, the claimant is incapable of work at the 

light exertional level. 

 Thus, while no overhead reaching or handling should be 

performed, she is capable of frequent reaching, handling, 

fingering, and feeling. Additionally, due to the continued 

cervical and lumbar issues, the claimant is incapable of 

lifting greater than 5 pounds at any time. 

 . . . due to the persistent cervical and lumbar issues, the 

claimant is incapable of lifting greater than 5 pounds at 

any time. 

R at 22.6

 

 

6 The regulation which discusses physical exertion requirements does not 

address “reaching.” However, it states, in part: “Sedentary work involves 

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c. Activities of Daily Living 

Plaintiff also submits that her “activities of daily living support her 

claim for benefits rather than negate it.” DE 11 at 22. In other words, 

Plaintiff maintains, “the sporadic activities of daily living, recited by the 

ALJ, in no way equate with an ability to perform work 8 hours a day, 5 days 

a week.” DE 11 at 24. 

In arriving at the conclusion that Plaintiffs credibility was not 

persuasive, the ALJ noted: 

At one point or another in the record (either in forms completed 

in connection with the application and appeal, in medical 

reports or records, or in the claimant’s testimony), the claimant 

reported the following daily activities: riding in a car, watching 

television, talking on the phone, attending doctor’s 

appointments, shopping in stores, and being able to count 

change, handle a savings account, and use a checkbook or 

money order (Exhibit 5E[R at 288-295], testimony [R at 58-96, 

R at 31-57]). Moreover, January 2012 medical records indicate 

that the claimant’s medication helped her get through activities 

of daily living ([R at 751]). The claimant’s activities are not 

limited to the extent one would expect, given the complaints of 

disabling symptoms and limitations, and require functioning 

within or beyond the limited range of sedentary work identified. 

R at 23 (emphasis added). 

 

lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying 

articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job 

is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and 

standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if 

walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria 

are met.” 20 CFR § 404.1567(a)(emphasis added).

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Here, the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility is supported by 

substantial evidence. Preliminarily, “[a]n ALJ may . . . consider household 

and social activities engaged in by the claimant in evaluating a claimant's 

assertions of pain or ailments.” Walters v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 127 

F.3d 525, 532 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Walters admits being able to run all of his 

errands, walk two miles, prepare all of his meals, and drive three times a 

week.”); see also Warner v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 

392 (6th Cir. 2004) (“although Warner alleged disabling pain, he also 

testified, consistent with the objective medical evidence, that he could 

manage his personal hygiene, pick a coin off a table, vacuum, drive short 

distances, and wash spoons and forks.”). 

As the Commissioner further points out (DE at 14-15), “even 

assuming that the specific activities the ALJ cited are not particularly 

illustrative of Plaintiff’s physical capabilities, the ALJ also considered other 

evidence bearing more directly on this point.” For example, as noted above, 

the ALJ relied upon the April 8, 2010 disability report, which notes that the 

interviewer did not observe/perceive difficulty with breathing, sitting, 

standing or walking (R at 23, 264). Also, in addition to the January 12, 2012 

notes expressly referenced by the ALJ in the credibility paragraph (R 23, 

779), the ALJ earlier referenced the November 15, 2012 notes (R 21, 751), 

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both of which indicate that Plaintiff’s medications help her get through 

activities of daily living. 

Thus, while the Undersigned acknowledges Plaintiff’s argument that 

sedentary lifestyles do not always equate to sedentary RFCs, it remains that 

the ALJ’s decision in this particular case is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

d. Work history since the alleged onset date & 

unemployment benefits 

Plaintiff alleges that she has been disabled since August 10, 2007 (R 

at 351), yet there is evidence in the record that Plaintiff’s job actually ended 

late August of the following year, when Marygrove did not renew its 

contract or Plaintiff’s company closed (R at 20, 23, 405, 529 & 700). As 

pointed out by the ALJ, payroll records reflect that the claimant earned 

$7434.86 in 2008 (R at 17 & 23, citing R at 248-250). Furthermore, citing an 

unemployment query and Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.28(1)(a),7

 the ALJ noted 

 

7 In part, this statute provides: “The requirements that the individual must 

report at an employment office, must register for work, must be available to 

perform suitable full-time work, and must seek work may be waived by the 

unemployment agency if the individual is laid off and the employer who laid 

the individual off notifies the unemployment agency in writing or by 

computerized data exchange that the layoff is temporary and that work is 

expected to be available for the individual within a declared number of days, 

not to exceed 45 calendar days following the last day the individual 

worked.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 421.28(1)(a). 

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that Plaintiff received unemployment compensation benefits after the alleged 

onset date (R 23, R 215-216).8

 Specifically, it appears that Plaintiff received 

unemployment benefits during the second and third quarters of 2009. R at 

215-216, 225. 

Thus, as the ALJ reasoned, if Plaintiff represented herself to the State 

of Michigan “as being able to work when she applied for and received 

unemployment benefits[,]” in 2009 “it bears negatively on the issue of [her] 

credibility” here, where she alleges that she has been disabled since 2007. R 

at 23; see also. R at 263-265, 210-to 14. 

 e. Conclusion 

The ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility is supported by substantial 

evidence in the forms of Plaintiff’s medical records, activities of daily living, 

work history since the alleged onset date and receipt of unemployment 

benefits. 

 

8 During the June 23, 2011 hearing, Plaintiff testified about her receipt of 

unemployment benefits, the cessation of unemployment benefits, and a letter 

from unemployment saying that she had to pay money back on the basis that 

she was not able to work during a period of time. R at 76. 

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2. Treating Physician Rule (Weighing of Opinion 

Evidence) 

Plaintiff’s second statement of error is that the ALJ did not give 

proper weight to the opinion and assessment of Plaintiff’s treating medical 

source – Dr. Kurz. DE 11 at 26-30.9

 

a. The ALJ’s Standard of Review 

The ALJ must consider all medical opinions that he or she receives in 

evaluating a claimant’s case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). The regulations 

define medical opinions as “statements from physicians . . . that reflect 

judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including 

your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite 

impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.927(a)(2). “Administrative law judges are not bound by any findings 

made by State agency medical or psychological consultants, or other 

program physicians or psychologists.” 20 CFR § 404.1527(e)(2)(i). The 

ALJ must, however, “consider findings and other opinions” of State Agency 

medical or psychological consultants. 

 

9

 Based on the record medical evidence, Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Kurz as 

early as March 9, 2010 and as late as August 8, 2012. See R at 570-580 

(March 9, 2010 – May 11, 2010), 759-767 (June 15, 2011 – August 8, 2012). 

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The ALJ generally gives deference to the opinions of a treating source 

“since these are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a 

detailed, longitudinal picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and may 

bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained 

from the objective medical findings alone . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2); 

Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). To 

qualify as a treating source, the physician must have an “ongoing treatment 

relationship” with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. 

If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion, the ALJ must meet certain procedural requirements. Wilson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). Specifically, if an 

ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight: 

[A]n ALJ must apply certain factors—namely, the length of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature 

and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, 

consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the 

specialization of the treating source—in determining what weight to 

give the opinion. 

Id.

Furthermore, an ALJ must “always give good reasons in [the ALJ’s] 

notice of determination or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] your 

treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2). Accordingly, the 

ALJ’s reasoning “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any 

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subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s 

medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 09-3889, 2010 WL 1725066, at *7 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal 

quotation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 

has stressed the importance of the good-reason requirement: 

“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let 

claimants understand the disposition of their cases,” particularly 

in situations where a claimant knows that his physician has 

deemed him disabled and therefore “might be especially 

bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she 

is not, unless some reason for the agency’s decision is 

supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir.1999). The 

requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the treating 

physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s 

application of the rule. See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 

32–33 (2d Cir. 2004). 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544–45. Thus, the reason-giving requirement is 

“particularly important when the treating physician has diagnosed the 

claimant as disabled.” Germany-Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312 F. 

A’ppx 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242). 

b. The ALJ’s Analysis of the Medical Record and 

Opinion Evidence 

Within his April 12, 2013 RFC determination, the ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff’s medical records did not support her allegations of limitations. See

R at 20-23. After expressly discussing certain medical records from 2007 

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through 2012, the ALJ assigned weight to certain records.10 Among these 

was the ALJ’s assignment of little weight to Dr. Kurz’s March 11, 2011 

opinion that Plaintiff was incapable of any work during the period of time he 

treated her and that Plaintiff was incapable of performing even a sedentary 

position (see R at 582-676), and his August 8, 2012 opinion that Plaintiff 

was disabled for another six months (R at 761). In addition to noting that 

the issue of disability is ultimately reserved to the Commissioner, the ALJ 

stated, “Moreover, [Plaintiff’s] activities of daily living, including shopping, 

riding in a car, and watching television, are inconsistent with a complete 

inability to perform work activity within the above residual functional 

capacity[.]” R at 22-23. 

i. The ALJ Properly Discounted Dr. Kurz’s 

Opinion 

 

Plaintiff claims that her “ability to perform sporadic and limited 

activities fail[s] to support a valid reason to discount her credibility or the 

assessment and opinion issued by the treating physician.” Plaintiff also 

claims that the ALJ did not address the five criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 

 

10 For example, the ALJ assigned little weight to certain assessments by Dr. 

Abrahamson (see R at 419-424), partial weight to Dr. Robertson’s February 

4, 2009 opinion (R at 437-447), partial weight to the October 21, 2009 

opinion of Dr. Plagens (R at 521) and great weight to Dr. Weingarden’s 

January 27, 2011 evaluation (R at 696-706). 

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404.1527(d). DE 11 at 27. Citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), Plaintiff 

contends that “Dr. Kurz’s opinion, assessment and deposition testimony is 

well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and thus entitled to controlling weight.” In support of her 

position, Plaintiff refers to many portions of Dr. Kurz’s March 11, 2011 

testimony (see R at DE 11 at 28-29), highlighting Dr. Kurz’s October 14, 

2010 clinical impressions that Plaintiff “still had neck pain and right arm 

pain and lower back pain.” R at 643. 

The Commissioner maintains that the ALJ properly evaluated the 

record medical opinions. DE 12 at 16-19. Here, the Court should agree with 

the Commissioner that the ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Kurz’s opinion, 

because it was inconsistent with other substantial record evidence. DE 12 at 

17. 

To begin, the ALJ expressly states he considered opinion evidence in 

accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. R at 19. 

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not consider each of 

the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) factors, the ALJ adequately explained his 

assignment of little weight to Dr. Kurz’s March 11, 2011 and August 8, 

2012 opinions (R at 22-23). As the Sixth Circuit has instructed: 

As to the RFC or medical condition, an ALJ may only choose 

not to give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight if 

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she gives “good reasons ... for the weight give[n],” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(d)(2) (now in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)), and if 

those reasons are “supported by the evidence in the case record, 

and [are] sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent 

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating 

source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight,” SSR 

96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996). If the ALJ decides not 

to give a treating physician's opinion controlling weight, the 

ALJ may not reject the opinion, but must apply other factors to 

determine what weight to give the opinion, such as “the length 

of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, 

the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, 

supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with 

the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating 

source[.]” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (citing § 404.1527(d)(2), 

now in § 404.1527(c)(2)). 

Gentry v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 727 (6th Cir. 2014) 

(emphasis added). 

Here, in assigning little weight to Dr. Kurz’s two opinions, the ALJ 

has provided good reasons which are supported by the evidence and are 

sufficiently specific (see R at 22-23). Namely, as noted above, the ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, including shopping, 

riding in a car, and watching television, were “inconsistent with a complete 

inability to perform work activity within the above [RFC][.]” In this regard, 

the Commissioner notes that these activities were inconsistent with Dr. 

Kurz’s March 11, 2011 testimony that Plaintiff “was incapable of any work 

during the entire period of time that [he] saw her.” R at 656, DE 12 at 18. 

Additionally, the Commissioner points out (DE 12 at 18-19), Kurz’s August 

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8, 2012 notes, which state that Plaintiff “will be disabled another 6-months . 

. . .” and also state that: Plaintiff had received some relief from the two 

cervical epidural steroid injections; there was no evidence of tenderness, 

spasm or masses in the cervical, thoracic, or lumbosacral spine; her right 

shoulder range of motion was limited but somewhat improved; full strength 

in the major muscle groups and normal and symmetric deep tendon reflexes. 

R at 21, 760-761. 

ii. The ALJ Properly Considered the Other 

Medical Opinions and the Record as a 

Whole 

Furthermore, the medical record contains assessments of Plaintiff’s 

ability to work by other treating or examining doctors. For example, there 

are records from Dr. Abrahamson (R at 405-433, 707-740). The ALJ gave 

little weight to Dr. Abrahamson’s November 2007, December 2007 and 

January 2008 opinions that Plaintiff was to remain off work (R at 419-424) 

as durational, noting that Dr. Abrahamson placed Plaintiff on light duty on 

February 21, 2008 (R at 417-418) and contending that “there are no further 

indications of Dr. Abrahamson finding [Plaintiff] unable to perform work 

activity.” R at 22. The ALJ also gave little weight to Dr. Abrahamson’s 

February and March 2008 placement of Plaintiff on light duty (R at 414-

418) and, instead, relied upon diagnostic evidence to determine that Plaintiff 

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was incapable of light exertional level work. R at 22. Thus, the ALJ 

assigned even more restrictions in Plaintiff’s RFC than had Dr. 

Abrahamson’s February and March 2008 placement, by categorizing her 

work capabilities as sedentary, rather than light duty.11

Also, there are Dr. Robertson’s February 4, 2009 notes from an 

independent medical examination (R at 437-447), which state that Plaintiff 

deserved a functional limitation (437-447). The ALJ gave this opinion 

 

11 “To determine the physical exertion requirements of work in the national 

economy, we classify jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very 

heavy. These terms have the same meaning as they have in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles, published by the Department of Labor. In making 

disability determinations under this subpart, we use the following 

definitions: 

(a) Sedentary work. Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds 

at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, 

ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which 

involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary 

in carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are 

required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. 

(b) Light work. Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time 

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even 

though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it 

requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most 

of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be 

considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you 

must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone 

can do light work, we determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, 

unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or 

inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567. 

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partial weight, because it occurred prior to Plaintiff’s June 15, 2010 right 

shoulder surgery (R at 691-693) and the June 30, 2010 post-op visit (R at 

680-681). Although the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff should not perform 

any overhead reaching or handling, the ALJ further observed that Plaintiff 

was capable of frequent reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling. Also, the 

ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s continued cervical and lumbar issues, noting 

that Plaintiff was incapable of lifting more than 5 pounds at any time. R at 

22. 

Furthermore, it appears that Plaintiff was seen at Dr. Plagens’ office 

on three occasions (R at 521-526), and Dr. Plagens’ notes from the October 

21, 2009 visit list Plaintiff’s work restrictions as including “no reaching or 

lifting overhead and no lifting over ten pounds[,]” R at 521. The ALJ gave 

partial weight to this opinion and, in so doing, reiterated the five pound 

lifting limitation and restricted Plaintiff from overhead reaching. R at 22. 

Finally, the January 27, 2011 independent orthopedic evaluation of 

Dr. Weingarden states that, with respect to work activities, Plaintiff should 

be restricted to “no lifting over five pounds and no work above shoulder 

level with the right upper extremity[,]” R at 696-706. In attributing great 

weight to this opinion on the basis that it was consistent with the record as a 

whole – one of the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) factors - the ALJ stated: 

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. . . although the claimant is restricted in her functional abilities, the 

medical evidence indicates that two weeks after her SLAP procedure, 

she presented to Dr. Shapiro without any complaints ([R at 680-681, 

691-693]). Additionally, on November 15, 2012, the claimant 

indicated that her medications continued to help her with her activities 

of daily living (R at 779-782). Thus, limiting the claimant to a 5 

pounds restriction is appropriate, considering the evidence as a whole. 

R at 22. 

 Thus, the Court should conclude that the ALJ appropriately weighed 

the opinion evidence in this case and consider the record as a whole. The 

ALJ did not err by assigning little weight to the above-cited March 11, 2011 

and August 8, 2012 opinions of Dr. Kurz, and he provided good reasons for 

the weight he assigned to the opinions of the other treating sources. 

3. Challenge to RFC 

Plaintiff’s third statement of error appears to challenge the ALJ’s Step 

5 determination but, in substance, challenges the ALJ’s Step 4 finding. 

Plaintiff argues that the VE’s 2013 testimony demonstrates that there were 

no jobs Plaintiff could perform if she required a cane while standing. DE 11 

at 30-32. Within this argument, Plaintiff submits that she “requires the use 

of a cane at all times when standing[;]” “would not be able to frequently 

reach, handle and finger frequently while exercising the sit/stand option 

included in the ALJ’[s] hypothetical question[;]” and “would be unable to 

frequently finger and handle while using a cane to stand.” 

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It is the Commissioner’s position that substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s Step 5 determination. DE 12 at 20-23. More importantly, the 

Commissioner also contends that Plaintiff’s challenges to the ALJ’s Step 5 

determination are, really, “challenges to the ALJ’s RFC assessment . . . .” 

DE 12 at 20. 

The Undersigned agrees and conclude that, in her third argument, 

Plaintiff is really challenging the ALJ’s conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s need 

for a cane. Plaintiff’s RFC is “the most [he or she] can still do despite the 

physical and mental limitations resulting from [his or] her impairments.” 

Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The determination of Plaintiff’s RFC 

is an issue reserved to the Commissioner and must be supported by 

substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). ‘“ALJs must 

not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own 

independent medical findings.’” Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. 

App’x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 

(7th Cir. 1996)). However, the burden of proof at the Step 4 RFC stage 

rests with the claimant. Her v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 

391 (6th Cir. 1999) 

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As noted above, the ALJ’s RFC finding was limited to “frequent, but 

not constant, handling, fingering, and feeling[,]” and “jobs allowing use of a 

handheld assistive device for prolonged ambulation or uneven terrain[.]” R 

at 19 (emphasis added). This is a fair and supportable conclusion. Plaintiff 

having only cited to VE Holder’s March 21, 2013 testimony (R at 46-54), 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles’ description for a sorter (DE 11 at 35-

38), the Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines, and the Appeals 

Council’s September 27, 2012 remand decision (R at 126-129), Plaintiff has 

not demonstrated that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

Moreover, as the Commissioner notes (DE 12 at 21-22), Plaintiff has 

not “demonstrated that the record compels a finding that she requires a cane 

at all times when standing.” Plaintiff points out in her brief, and testified at 

the hearing, that she was prescribed a cane and has used one for the past two 

years. (DE 11 at 17; R 37-40). She does not identify the physician who gave 

this prescription, and did not testify that the cane is required at all times for 

walking, let alone for standing. She does not identify medical records in 

support of this alleged limitation, but instead thrice states in her brief that, 

“It is submitted that [she] requires the use of a cane at all times when 

standing.” DE at 23, 17, 25. Each time that she so “submits,” she noticeably 

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fails to provide any record citation.12 Plaintiff has failed to develop or 

otherwise identify a record which supports her claim that she must be 

holding a cane at all times when standing, and it is not the Court’s 

responsibility in a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 to “comb 

though the record” in search of factual support for a party’s position. 

Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2000). The same 

is true to the extent Plaintiff is challenging the ALJ’s handling and fingering 

limitation. As the Commissioner correctly states, “Plaintiff has not 

explained why she believes the record supports this particular limitation, 

much less demonstrated that the record compels it.” DE 12 at 22-23. 

Plaintiff has failed to prove that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not 

supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, the ALJ’s sedentary 

RFC finding included several specific limitations (R at 19), and the ALJ 

gave great weight to Dr. Weingarden’s January 27, 2011 independent 

orthopedic evaluation (R at 22, 696-706), which noted: 

In regard to work activities, I would place her on a restriction of 

no lifting over 5 pounds and no work above shoulder level with 

the right upper extremity. These would be related to the right 

shoulder as she does have difficulty in lifting the right shoulder 

 

12She also points out that her attorney “interjected”at the hearing to make 

note on the transcript that she had a cane with her. DE 11 at 17; R 40. The 

fact that she had a cane with her at the hearing does not answer the question 

of whether she requires it at all times for standing, nor does her attorney's 

statement count as testimony. 

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above 90 degrees. These would be temporary restrictions until 

she fully rehabilitates from the shoulder procedure. 

R at 706. Thus, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform 

sedentary work, except that she “can only lift up to 5 pounds; must be able 

to alternate between sitting and standing at will, but approximately every 15 

minutes...; no constant (i.e. frequent) reaching; no overhead reaching or 

handling; frequent, but not constant, handling, fingering, and feeling; limited 

to jobs allowing use of a handheld assistive device for prolonged ambulation 

or uneven terrain....”R at 19, is supported by Dr. Weingarden’s evaluation. 

 In light of this, any challenge to the ALJ’s justifiable use of this RFC 

in forming his hypothetical at Step 5 would likewise be unavailing. Ealy v. 

Commissioner of Social Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 516 (6th Cir. 2010) (“In order for 

a vocational expert's testimony in response to a hypothetical question to 

serve as substantial evidence in support of the conclusion that a claimant can 

perform other work, the question must accurately portray a claimant's 

physical and mental impairments.”). Since the hypothetical posed to the VE 

does accurately portray Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments, Plaintiff 

is not entitled to remand on this basis. 

 G. Conclusion 

 In sum, from a review of the record as a whole, I conclude that 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. I find 

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that the ALJ performed a careful and comprehensive analysis of the entire 

record, making findings and conclusions which were well within the range 

of his authority and which should not be disturbed here, particularly under 

this Court’s deferential standard of review. Accordingly, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (DE 11), GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

(DE 12), and AFFIRM the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision. 

III. NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report 

and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days 

of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and 

Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of 

any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing 

objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will 

not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and 

Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 390, 

401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 

1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any 

objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

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 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection 

No. 2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report 

and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after 

service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response 

proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address 

each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as 

“Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the 

Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without 

awaiting the response. 

 

 /s/Anthony P. Patti 

 ANTHONY P. PATTI 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Dated: June 24, 2015 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on June 24, 2015, by electronic means 

and/or ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

HOLLY A. MONDA, in the absence 

of MICHAEL WILLIAMS 

Case Manager 

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