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HAS ME ́RIDA EVOLVED? PART ONE:

THE EVOLUTION OF DRUG CARTELS AND THE

THREAT TO MEXICO’S GOVERNANCE

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 13, 2011

Serial No. 112–60

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CONNIE MACK, Florida, Chairman 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

RON PAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

KAREN BASS, California 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Gary M. Shiffman, Ph.D., adjunct professor, Center for Peace and Security 

Studies, Georgetown University ......................................................................... 7

Andrew Selee, Ph.D., director, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center for 

International Scholars ......................................................................................... 17

Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., senior fellow, Small Wars Journal El Centro ............. 24

Pamela Starr, Ph.D., associate professor in public diplomacy and the School 

of International Relations, director of the U.S.-Mexico Network, University 

of Southern California ......................................................................................... 50

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Gary M. Shiffman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 9

Andrew Selee, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 20

Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 25

Pamela Starr, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................. 52

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: Prepared statement ................................................................................................... 76

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 78

The Honorable Connie Mack: Material submitted for the record ........................ 83

(1)

HAS ME ́ RIDA EVOLVED? PART ONE: THE EVOLUTION OF DRUG CARTELS AND THE 

THREAT TO MEXICO’S GOVERNANCE 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Connie Mack (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere) presiding. 

Mr. MACK. The subcommittee will come to order. I first want to 

thank everyone, especially our witnesses, for joining us for our 

hearing today. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Engel, for 

5 minutes each for opening statements, I will recognize the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations chairman, Mr. Rohrabacher, and the ranking member, Mr. Carnahan, for 5 minutes 

each for their opening statements. We will then proceed directly to 

hearing testimony from our distinguished witnesses. The full text 

of the written testimony will be inserted into the record. Without 

objection, members have 5 days to submit statements and questions for the record. 

After we hear from our witnesses, individual members will be 

recognized for 5 minutes each for questions. I now recognize myself 

for an opening statement. 

And again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I want 

to thank the members, also, who are here and those that are sitting in the audience. 

Today’s hearing will address the evolution of illegal activity in 

Mexico to determine if taxpayer-funded programs have evolved accordingly. The reality is clear, and while Mexico doesn’t want to 

admit this, there is an insurgency taking place in Mexico along the 

U.S. border. 

Since 2006, Mexican drug cartels have evolved into resilient and 

diversified transnational criminal organizations. The drug cartels 

have splintered into subgroups and expanded operations into 

human trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, weapons smuggling, and 

stealing resources such as oil. The result: A well-funded criminal 

insurgency raging along our southern border, threatening the lives 

of U.S. citizens and harming the U.S. Economy by undermining 

legal businesses. 

2

The insurgent activities utilized by the cartel are aimed at undermining the government, protecting their illegal activity, and 

winning the support of the people. For example, one cartel has provided economic and social services in Mexico, and crossing over into 

Central America, where they build roads and provide housing, food, 

clothes, and toys to lower income residents in return for their loyalty. If they are unable to win the hearts and minds, these criminal 

organizations use extreme violence to instill fear in the population 

to undermine the Mexican Government’s ability to control its territory. The violent display of over 40,000 deaths since 2007 is but 

one example. 

It is time that our determination to eradicate the cartels matches 

the cartels’ determination to undermine the freedom, security, and 

prosperity of the United States, Mexico, and the Western hemisphere. The United States has an important national security role 

to play in this fight as a result of our proximity to, and consumption of, the trafficked drugs. However, President Calderon’s efforts 

to place all the blame on the United States is incorrect and counterproductive. The U.S. and Mexico must work together in a joint 

effort to stop illegal activity across our shared border while supporting trade and efficiency in transfer of legal goods. We must 

stop the drugs and criminals or terrorists coming north, and the 

money and guns traveling south on our border. 

Addressing the illegal gun trade is something President Calderon 

has specifically asked us to jointly address. Little did we know that 

the U.S. Department of Justice funded a program called Fast and 

Furious that was sending guns into Mexico. This was an appalling, 

immoral act, and while we investigate and hold the administration 

accountable for implementing and hiding a dangerous and illegal 

program, we need to design a new, productive way forward. 

This productive way forward is not, I repeat, is not the Merida 

Initiative. The State Department’s Merida Initiative, originally a 3-

year, $1.5 billion counterdrug plan with Mexico has seen chronic 

delays and implementation challenges. The Obama administration’s Beyond Merida has failed to set target dates, tangible goals, 

or strategic guidance to ensure the successful use of these funds. 

Showing up to a burning house late with a half assembled hose 

is a waste of time and taxpayer dollars. Meanwhile, the Mexican 

drug cartels continue to work in a coordinated strategy to undermine the Mexican state through insurgent activities that include 

violence, corruption, propaganda, asset control, and social and community programs. The current U.S. policy with Mexico does not seriously address the national security challenges we face. 

It is time that we recognize the need for a counterinsurgency 

strategy that can combat the evolution and resilience of Mexico’s 

transnational criminal organizations. The United States should 

support a targeted, yet comprehensive strategy that works with 

Mexico to secure one key population center at a time in order to 

build and support vital infrastructure and social development for 

lasting results. 

The counterinsurgency measures must include, but not be limited to, an all U.S. agency plan including Treasury, DEA, CIA, ICE, 

and State to aggressively attack and dismantle the criminal networks in the United States and Mexico; second, doubling border paVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Oct 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\091311\68295 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

trol agents, fully funding needed border protection equipment such 

as additional unmanned aerial vehicles, and the completion of a 

double-layered security fence in urban and hard-to-enforce areas of 

the border; and third, teaching the culture of lawfulness program 

to ensure local populations support the government and the rule of 

law over the cartels. 

I look forward to the hearing today and the expert testimony on 

this topic, and it is the goal of these two subcommittees to advance 

the ball and finally have a program in the United States that correctly identifies the problem as an insurgency and, with your recommendations and others, help put a plan forward to combat the 

problem. 

With that, I would like to recognize the ranking member, Mr. 

Engel, for his opening statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an important hearing on a key priority for United States foreign and domestic policy, and I am glad to be here with you today. 

There is no more important relationship to the United States and 

the Western hemisphere than the one we have with Mexico. We 

share a very long border, a rich and intertwined history, deep cultural connection, and problems which extend to both sides of the 

border. In the last several years, the drug trade, which had once 

been the domain predominantly of South America, has moved 

north. It has taken hold in Mexico and ravaged the northern part 

of Central America. If nothing else comes out of today’s hearing, I 

want it to be clear that the United States stands with our friends 

in the south in their efforts to fight the narcotrafficking. 

We have come a long way since the Merida Initiative was first 

announced on October 22, 2007. Between Fiscal Year 2008 and Fiscal Year 2010, Congress appropriated $1.5 billion for Merida Initiative programs in Mexico, with the bulk of that funding dedicated 

to training and equipping Mexican security forces. The program got 

off to a slow start, and provision of our assistance was halted for 

the first couple of years. I am glad to report that as of the beginning of last month, $473.8 

million in assistance have been provided, and the State Department has committed to delivering another $500 million by the end 

of this year. This will include some of the big ticket items, four 

Blackhawk helicopters and a CASA 235 maritime surveillance aircraft. 

Today, the Merida program is moving away from expensive 

equipment to a focus on institution building through training and 

technical assistance. I think this switch in emphasis is critical for 

a number of reasons. Technical expertise is not only less costly 

than helicopters or aircraft, but it is more flexible and can be provided more quickly. In addition, Mexico has long been plagued by 

corruption and weakness in state and local institutions. I believe 

it is a positive sign that we are moving to help in this area. 

Among the areas I would like to explore further in the questioning are illicit weapons trafficking and the importance of reducing demand for illegal drugs here at home. First, I have long been 

concerned about the illegal flow of weapons crossing the border 

from the U.S. into Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America. President Calderon once told me that 90 percent of the weapons used 

4

by the drug criminals come from the United States. That is simply 

unacceptable. In fact, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 

once called the trafficking an iron river of guns. Much more needs 

to be done by both countries to halt the illegal flow of these weapons. 

Two ideas immediately come to mind, both of which are compliant with the Second Amendment. First, too many foreign-style assault weapons are being imported into the United States, and 

under the law and the Constitution, we can stop them before they 

enter our country. How? We should return to enforcement of the 

Gun Control Act of 1968, which authorizes the President to block 

the import of nonsporting weapons. The first President Bush and 

President Clinton enforced the law, and so should President 

Obama. 

No new legislation is needed. This is a law on the books. It 

should be enforced. It doesn’t impinge on Second Amendment 

rights. To me, it is just commonsense rights. 

I am also hoping that at some point soon the Senate will ratify 

the American Convention against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, also known as CIFTA. The State Department 

has repeatedly confirmed that the United States is in compliance 

with CIFTA. Its ratification will help stiffen our resolve to fight illegal weapons trafficking. 

Secondly, helping Mexico combat the drug trade addresses only 

half of the problem. The other half, the demand for illicit, lies within our own borders. I have often thought that we were so busy trying to eradicate the supply side but not doing very much trying to 

eradicate the demand side. We need to do both. 

The original joint statement from October 2007 announcing the 

Merida program said, and I quote, ‘‘The U.S. will intensify its efforts to address all aspects of drug trafficking, including demandrelated portions.’’

Without demand for marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine 

here in the United States, there wouldn’t be a problem in Mexico, 

Colombia, Guatemala, or elsewhere. We simply need to do more to 

drive down demand. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and 

I look forward to the statements by our distinguished panel of witnesses. I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Engel, and I appreciate, as we have 

often said, our abilities to work together on these important issues. 

So thank you for being here. 

Now, I would like to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for 5 minutes for 

his opening statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, 

Chairman Mack. I appreciate your leadership, your willingness to 

take on some very tough issues, and you have jumped right into 

the fight in a number of areas. So I am very proud to be at your 

side. 

Today, all of our witnesses are outside experts who have experience working with, and studying the Merida Initiative. I am interested in hearing your evaluation of how Merida is working. Obviously our southern border poses a serious threat to the well-being 

of the American people, and it is a growing threat. The more attenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:12 Oct 25, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\WH\091311\68295 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tion that we pay to it, the more dangerous it seems; yet, we have 

conflicting interests as to what new policies should be in place to 

meet that challenge. 

Business interests seem to be unwilling to suffer any delays at 

the border to allow adequate inspections and safeguards in terms 

of new commerce going between our countries; thus, they are undermining perhaps the efforts that would uncover smuggling at 

ports of entry, and some of our own business interests actually see 

the uncontrollable flow of illegal immigrants as something that is 

positive in bringing down the wages that they have to pay their 

own people here in the United States. The initiative, for example, 

that we are talking about today seems silent about the border and 

of the lack of adequate barriers and controls. So what about that? 

On the other side, of course, Mexican interests, commercial, governmental, and criminal seem united in their efforts to keep the 

border open at all points. The U.S. ran a $64 billion trade deficit 

with Mexico last year, which means the outsourcing of production 

is almost back to where it was before this great recession that we 

are suffering, even though American production and jobs are not 

back to that level. The Mexican Government and those commercial 

interests who benefit by this imbalance want it to continue. Mexico 

also gains over $20 billion a year in remittances sent home by people working in the United States, many of whom are illegal immigrants. Mexico has no incentive and has shown very little cooperation in helping close the border to illegal immigration, even though 

in a joint statement from April, the U.S.-Mexico conference talked 

of the shared responsibilities for a common border. 

Then there is the question of criminal operations in dealing with 

drugs, weapons, and laundered money. 

This initiative is meant to help Mexico build up its police and judiciary, but it is the open border that provides the cartels with 

money that is used to subvert police and courts and to fund an insurgency, as the chairman just noted, that threatens to make Mexico a failed state. How much cooperation between Mexico and the 

United States law enforcement organizations has been evident 

after we have already spent $1 billion on this program since 2008, 

which was supposed to promote such cooperation? 

So I am interested in hearing the views of the witnesses and 

what they think is the appropriate policy and analyzing what is 

going on, and we need to know if they believe there is any real 

commitment on the part of Mexico to closing our border to illegal 

activity, and does this initiative do enough to move Mexico in the 

direction of border security? 

And, finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just note that just beside 

those issues of the day, we have got some overreaching policies 

that have been with us for a long time that need to be addressed. 

One is the area of drugs which Mr. Engel noted, and as long as 

we are sending billions of dollars in drug money to the cartels in 

Mexico and throughout Latin America—we are sending that to 

them. It is coming from people in the United States directly to 

these criminal elements—I do not see how we are going to be able 

to match that or get the situation under control. I am interested 

in your opinions on that. 

6

And, finally, I believe that we should not just ignore one of what 

I consider to be the most serious scandals that I have seen in 

Washington during my 30 years here. I worked at the White House 

prior to this, and I have been in Congress for 24 years, and that 

a bureau of the United States Government had sent over 3,000 

weapons to the drug cartels and organized crime in Mexico has got 

to be one of the worst scandals that I have ever seen. We should 

not succumb to stepping away from this without demanding a full 

accountability and sending people to prison for doing this. We are 

talking about AK–47s, automatic weapons, sniper rifles—50-caliber 

sniper rifles sent to the drug cartel. 

We understand that people are trying to say, oh, well, I didn’t 

do it, he did it. We need to get to the bottom of this. It is not our 

hearing today, but this is one scandal that we cannot just overlook, 

and I would like to know what your opinions are of how the Fast 

and Furious Program and this disclosure, what does that mean in 

terms of our relations with Mexico and trying to get this situation 

under control. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher, and I would now like 

to recognize Mr. Carnahan for 5 minutes for an opening statement. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to just add my 

thanks to our chairs and my fellow ranking member that is here 

and the work that they have done on this issue, and I want to 

make just a few brief remarks and say that the time is right for 

Congress to be reviewing the success of the initiative to see what 

next steps are needed to improve it. 

At its core, this Initiative acknowledges the challenges in Mexico 

and Central America that are in our direct interests to solve. My 

home State of Missouri continues to be plagued by a multitude of 

problems associated with meth, and continues to be one of the 

hardest hit States in our country year after year. We need to continue to attack this problem from all angles, both domestic and 

international. 

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center’s 2010 National Drug Threat Assessment, ‘‘Methamphetamine availability in 

the U.S. is directly related to methamphetamine production trends 

in Mexico, which is the primary source of methamphetamine consumed in the United States.’’ While availability has previously declined, it began to rise again in 2008 and 2009. I specifically would 

like to hear the panel’s testimony if these trends are continuing 

and the success of the initiative regarding meth. 

So, again, thank you all for being here, and with that Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Carnahan. 

And, now, I would like to introduce the witnesses quickly. First, 

Dr. Gary Shiffman. Dr. Shiffman is a professor for the Center for 

Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University. Prior to 

teaching, Dr. Shiffman was the chief of staff at the U.S. Customs 

and Border Protection, and additionally, Mr. Shiffman is a U.S. 

Navy veteran. And just as a side note, Mr. Shiffman is someone 

who I think this committee can rely upon. He has got a great, vast 

knowledge of topics and he is a very thoughtful person. So I appreciate you being here, Mr. Shiffman. 

7

Second, Dr. Andrew Selee is the director of the Woodrow Wilson 

Center’s Mexico Institute which promotes dialogue and understanding between the United States and Mexico. Additionally, Dr. 

Selee is a professor of government at John Hopkins University in 

the advanced academic programs. 

Third, Dr. Robert Bunker is a senior fellow for the Small Wars 

Journal. Dr. Bunker previously served as the chief executive officer 

of the Counter OPFOR Corporation and was a professor for the national security studies program at California State University, San 

Bernardino. Welcome. 

And finally, Dr. Pamela Starr is the director of the U.S.-Mexico 

Network at the University of Southern California—Go Gators. 

Sorry. I hope my wife’s watching. Additionally, Dr. Starr is an associate professor in public diplomacy and a university fellow at the 

USC Center of Public Diplomacy. Thank you for being here. 

I would like to recognize Dr. Shiffman now for 5 minutes for his 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF GARY M. SHIFFMAN, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES, 

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Chairman Mack, Chairman Rohrabacher, and 

Ranking members Engel and Carnahan, thank you very much for 

the opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the nature 

of violence taking place in Mexico today. I want to particularly 

thank this committee for its leadership bringing needed attention 

to the serious nature of the drug trafficking organizations in this 

hemisphere and their impact on U.S. national security. 

Drug cartels are businesses run by individuals with specific goals 

most often related to power and wealth. It is important to understand the profit motive before discussing the violence. The drugs 

being trafficked by the kingpins represent a commodity, something 

to trade in order to create wealth and power. It is not the 

psychoactive impact of the commodity that the drug traffickers 

seek, simply the ability to sell for a profit. And violence is a byproduct of the nature of the marketplace in which they operate 

when individuals can take coercive power to extremes. As Michael 

Corleone calmly says to his hothead brother Sonny in Mario Puzo’s 

‘‘The Godfather,’’ ‘‘It’s not personal, Sonny. It’s strictly business.’’

Let me make three brief points in summarizing my testimony. 

First, while the organized violence in Mexico may seem complex, it 

makes sense in the context of a battle between and among government and outlaw forces for the hearts and minds of local populations, sometimes we call this an insurgency. Second, once accepted, this insurgency framework can simplify the narrative of events 

taking place in Mexico. And finally, with this enhanced understanding, we can create better policies. So let me say at the outset, 

however, that I have been a supporter of Merida, but I agree with 

the desire to improve its implementation. In addition, I also support the efforts of President Calderon in Mexico. 

I think it is important to note that countless brave and dedicated 

people in the United States and in Mexico have been working tirelessly to defeat the drug trafficking organizations, and we must 

recognize and commend those people. 

8

My first point: Complex threat vectors. Since 2006, as the chairman said, nearly 40,000 people have been killed in Mexico as a result of drug-related violence. More recently, on February 15, 2011, 

members of the Zeta cartel, for example, ambushed two ICE agents 

driving in northern Mexico, unfortunately killing Special Agent 

Jaime Zapata. The common denominator among all of these cases 

of violence is not the drugs specifically, but the environment, the 

environment where people have the means and capability to use violence as a tool to advance their goals. We must address this environment that allows for the widespread use of extreme violence. 

Countering violence in Mexico requires diplomacy, intelligence, 

military, economic, and law enforcement capabilities. 

Second, understanding the Mexican insurgency. The drug trafficking organizations, in fact, behave like an insurgency. In order 

to perform the business functions of a drug trafficker, one requires 

the ability to govern. Specifically, one would need resources, a place 

of business, a workforce, the ability to set and enforce rules, and 

the consent of the governed to abide by those rules. 

The consent comes from the application of two tools: The provision of goods and coercion. As a drug trafficker, one would need political control, and as the state seeks to prevent that control, we 

could see a violent battle for political dominance of a location, an 

insurgency. Academics typically define a state as the institution 

with a monopoly control over the tools of violence. Clearly, the Government of Mexico lacks that control in some places. 

The organizations, the drug trafficking organizations provide economic goods, social services, and jobs, as well as a social safety net. 

Simultaneously, they use violence and the threat of violence to coerce law enforcement, the population, and their enemies. The drug 

trafficking organizations use violence to flex their muscles, for example, the killing of ICE Agent Zapata, to coerce the local population and to battle each other and the Mexican Government for political control. 

Implications for U.S. policy. The profit motive allows us to clearly 

see that insurgent-type behavior will take place when expected revenues exceed expected costs. Our policies must increase the cost of 

doing business for drug traffickers. Where the kingpins earn—

today the kingpins earn the acquiescence of a local population, we 

want to see a strong support for the rule of law, security, and economic freedom. We must focus on the vicious cycle of the slow defeat of the Mexican authorities across local communities. 

U.S. officials must accept the state of insurgency taking place in 

large parts of Mexico today and envision the counterinsurgency 

strategy to combat the evolution and resilience of the transnational 

criminal organizations operating on the border. In classic 

counterinsurgency theory, the battle space is not geography but the 

population, and only the Mexican Government can defeat these cartels. We must support the Mexican Government in these efforts. 

And I will withhold the rest of my comments for the questionand-answer period. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Dr. Shiffman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shiffman follows:]

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Mr. MACK. Dr. Selee, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW SELEE, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MEXICO 

INSTITUTE, WOODROW WILSON CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SCHOLARS 

Mr. SELEE. Thank you, Chairman Mack. Thanks for the invitation to be here. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher. I want to recognize Ranking Member Engel, Ranking Member Carnahan, and 

the other members who are here. Congressman Payne, good to see 

you again. We share a past association with the YMCA. It is always great to see you in things outside of politics and policy. 

There are few, if any, countries that matter more for the future 

of the United States than Mexico. It is our neighbor. We share a 

2,000-mile border. It is our second destination for our exports. It 

is a state that matters economically, not only to Arizona and Texas 

and California and New Mexico but to States like Nebraska and 

Iowa and Indiana and New Hampshire, Michigan, and many other 

States far away from the border. It is an important trading partner. It is the country of heritage for one in 10 Americans and it 

is our ally on numerous issues of global concern from climate 

change to fighting terrorism. 

Mexico is facing an unprecedented spike in violence, spurred by 

the power and ruthlessness of organized crime groups that traffic 

illegal narcotics into the United States, and these groups, as the 

chairman has said, receive billions of dollars from U.S. consumers 

for these illegal sales, about $6 billion to $9 billion in profit, about 

half of that in cocaine; about 20–30 percent in methamphetamine 

and heroin; about 20–25 percent in marijuana, for parenthesis. 

Just to put this in perspective, we should say that Mexico has 

a much lower crime rate than El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela. 

It has a lower crime rate than Colombia or Brazil where the next 

Olympics will be held. That said, there are places in Mexico where 

the violence is extreme. There are places where the violence is critical. We saw a casino fire that took 52 innocent lives a couple of 

weeks ago in Monterrey, and this is serious business. We have both 

ethical and strategic reasons for being concerned about this as the 

two chairs have said. This is a circular trade. It is our consumers 

that fund this violence, but it is also a strategic violence. This is 

a country on our border and Mexico’s ability to strengthen rule of 

law impacts us. Its ability to grow the economy impacts us. 

So I would like to throw out four ideas that I think we can work 

on in partnership with the Government of Mexico. Like Dr. 

Shiffman, I want to say that I have also been a supporter of 

Merida. The Wilson Center takes no position on this, but personally, I think have been a supporter of Merida, but I think there are 

four ways that we could be looking at shifting our strategy that 

would be very helpful. 

The first of these is to think about developing a strategic plan 

for intelligence sharing that reduces violence. Our strategy and 

strategy of the Government to Mexico to date has been to go after 

these organizations organically, try and take down criminals wherever they can find them, and by all means we should always capture criminals wherever we can find them. But in terms of giving 

priority, we should do—increasingly, we should work with Mexico 

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to develop the capacity to go after the worst groups first. The organization—the trafficking organizations that kill civilians, that kill 

mayors, that are willing to take on the military and execute Army 

officers, that kill journalists—which has become an increasingly 

large problem—that kill children and innocent civilians with no regard for life, these are the worst organizations. We should 

prioritize where the killing is worse, okay. 

And this may sound like obvious things. This is what we do in 

the United States to a large extent, but instead of thinking about 

how we take down all these organizations, how we go after the 

most violent organizations, and we make an example every time 

that they do something like this, every time the worst kind of violence that destroys the civic texture of communities, that destroy 

innocent people’s lives and that go against the state, we should be 

making an example of this, and we should help the Mexican Government. 

There are two places where we have done this, in Tijuana and 

Ciudad Juarez, where we have worked very closely with the Mexican Government to look at how we reduce violence, specifically 

where it is not just going after the top of the cartel, but looking 

at how we take apart the whole structure of the most violent organizations. What we have seen is that violence has dropped dramatically in Tijuana, right across from San Diego, dramatically over the 

past 2 years. And Ciudad Juarez is down considerably but we still 

have to see if that holds. 

Violence has now shifted to other parts of Mexico actually, but 

this is something we have to do systematically. Intelligence sharing 

has been key to this, and our ability to share intelligence, but 

share intelligence in a strategic way, not just when we get information on the traffickers, but to sit down and figure out who are the 

targets that we should be going after with the Mexican Government is critical. 

Secondly, how do we map and target the trafficking organizations in the United States? The chair has already referred to this. 

We do not actually have a good mapping of how these organizations 

operate once they cross the U.S. border. We need to develop the 

map that allows us to know particularly how they move their 

money, as well as how they move weapons, but money critically. 

We need to see if we can get Treasury to do the same kind of 

things they have done on counterterrorism to do this on drug trafficking, begin to track how they move their money, and because 

sometimes they use bulk cash, ICE and DEA and local law enforcement—their local law enforcement are absolutely critical also in 

tracking the money. 

Third, support reforms for police, prosecutors, and the courts. I 

am convinced that this is something that Mexico has to do. It is 

something we cannot do. The other we can do. We can certainly—

sharing intelligence, mapping the traffickers in the U.S., this is 

under our control. In terms of police, prosecutors, and the courts, 

this is really on Mexico, but there is a lot we can do. Here, the 

Merida Initiative is critical, supporting the change agents within 

the Mexican Government and outside the Mexican Government 

that are trying to clean up the police, that are trying to support 

the courts, who are trying to change the courts, who are trying to 

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build a real prosecutorial system. The Merida Initiative has been 

very useful in funding projects that the Council of State Governments, the Conference of Western Attorneys Generals that have 

been doing this, as well as a number of—great deal of working with 

Federal and State authorities. 

And finally, let me just say reducing the consumption of illegal 

narcotics, we are not going to start a huge new crusade on this in 

the U.S., but there are certain things we know that work. Eighty 

percent of the hard drugs—80 percent of the profits of the cartels 

are hard drugs; 80 percent of the consumption is 20 percent of the 

users. Most of these folks are in the criminal justice system. We 

know there are a number of things that work, like Project Hope did 

in Hawaii, like drug courts that can be very effective in investing 

to try and take care of that population. It is a small population of 

people that is driving this trade, and we need to focus on those people. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Dr. Selee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Selee follows:]

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Mr. MACK. Dr. Bunker, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. BUNKER, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

SMALL WARS JOURNAL EL CENTRO 

Mr. BUNKER. Thank you, sir. 

It is great privilege to provide testimony before the esteemed 

members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. I will quickly paraphrase the high points and 

takeaways for the subcommittee. 

We need this basic premise to be clear: That Mexico is facing 

something way beyond an organized crime threat. With this as a 

premise from which it starts, this congressional testimony will 

posit that the Merida Initiative, as it stands, is too myopic in nature, given the on-the-ground realities currently present in Mexico. 

These two contentions will hereby be discussed in more detail and 

their merits supported by evidence from my own work and that of 

other subject specialists. 

Of necessity, therefore, this testimony will focus upon the broader security environment and the policy and strategic levels of analysis. It integrates writings that I have done previously, both on my 

own and in collaboration with my colleague, John Sullivan, a law 

enforcement officer, and others on this topic. The analysis is divided into two sections addressing first the narco-criminal threat 

and then governmental policies. Each section, in turn, is divided 

into two main themes. 

Within the first section of narco-criminal threat, the themes that 

I addressed were the increasing cartel and gain evolution toward 

new warmaking entities. The second is the rise of both criminal 

and spiritual insurgencies; hence, societal warfare starting to break 

out in Mexico. 

The second section that I address was governmental policies. I 

went back about 30 years, and there is essentially an ongoing cycle 

of countermoves and unintended consequences, second order effects, stemming from our own and allied governmental policies in 

this area. The second is the myopic nature of the Merida Initiative 

versus the need for a Western hemispheric strategy against cartel 

and gangs. 

Time limitations restrict me from detailing these themes. Hopefully, you have reviewed my written arguments and analyses and 

have found them to have merit. 

The key policy suggestion that I offer is this: Due to the evolution of the cartels and gangs into new warmaking entities, the 

rise in new forms of criminal and spiritual insurgencies promoting 

societal warfare, and the ongoing cycle of countermoves and unintended consequences confounding our own and allied governmental 

policies, the Merida Initiative and others like it directed at Colombia and Central America need to evolve to a more encompassing 

scope and scale and with a greater sense of strategic urgency than 

most congressional policymakers might a priori think is necessary. 

Following the 10-year anniversary of 9/11, the key strategic insight that I offer is this: Without a new strategic imperative for the 

United States, which requires the realignment of our national 

threat perceptions, is needed. This is very serious, folks. The cartels and narco-gangs of the Americas, with those in Mexico of the 

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highest priority, must now be elevated to the number one strategic 

threat to the United States. While the threat posed by al Qaeda 

and radical Islam is still significant, it must be downgraded presently to that of secondary strategic importance. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Dr. Bunker. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bunker follows:]


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Mr. MACK. Dr. Starr, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PAMELA STARR, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE SCHOOL OF 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DIRECTOR OF THE U.S.-MEXICO NETWORK, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 

Ms. STARR. Thank you, Chairman Mack, and thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher as well, and Ranking Members Engel and 

Carnahan for the invitation to address the committee members 

today. 

I would like to look a little bit more at the background of the 

issue and look at how the situation in Mexico has changed on the 

ground since the initiation of the Merida Initiative and how that 

then—what lessons that tells us how about we need to think about 

changing the Initiative itself so that it more effectively addresses 

the situation on the ground. 

Mexico has long been a source for illicit drugs entering U.S. markets. This is nothing new, but it is only in the last generation that 

this cross-border contraband trade has given rise to organized 

crime syndicates that threaten Mexican national security and pose 

the single most important criminal threat to United States’ wellbeing. 

The forces that produce these criminal organizations are many. 

They include obviously demand for the products they produce in 

the United States and a good operating environment in Mexico. 

But another key factor, without a doubt, has been the previous successes of U.S. anti-drug policies at closing the transshipment routes 

through the Caribbean Sea, at helping Colombia disarticulate its 

drug cartels, and most recently, at closing down meth labs in the 

United States. These successes ultimately rerouted Andean cocaine 

destined for the U.S. through Mexico. They shifted control over 

these transshipments to Mexican drug cartels, and they opened the 

new markets to these cartels to supply the U.S. market for meth. 

At the same time that the power of the Mexican cartels consequently grew, Mexico democratized. While democratization in 

Mexico is undoubtedly a very good thing, it distracted Mexican 

politicians from a brewing national security problem, and it weakened a previously all-powerful Presidency without creating democratic institutions to take its place. Instead, democratic Mexico inherited from generations of authoritarian rule profoundly weak law 

enforcement institutions: Police, prosecutors, courts, and jails. 

When President Felipe Calderon launched his Federal offensive 

against Mexican drug trafficking organizations in 2006, he thus 

faced a formidable adversary with a limited supply of policy tools. 

The Merida Initiative was designed at Mexico’s request to help address this challenge. Mexico’s anti-cartel strategy relied on its military and incipient professional Federal police force to disrupt the 

operational capacity of the Mexican cartels by targeting their leaders and other critical employees. The United States assisted this effort by providing material, equipment, intelligence, and police 

training. 

Mexico’s Merida supported fight against organized crime has registered significant successes, but these successes have modified the 

operating environment in Mexico, making the shortcomings of the 

51

strategy that were always there increasingly evident. Four changes 

in this operating environment stand out in particular. 

First, to an important extent, this strategy is successfully, albeit 

gradually, transforming a national security challenge in Mexico 

into a policing problem, but as it does so, the acute weakness of 

Mexican law enforcement is increasingly placed on full display. 

Second, success at weakening some crime syndicates seems to 

have emboldened their competitors, reinforced existing rivalries, 

and thereby provoking further violence. Indeed, the vast majority 

of violence in Mexico is cartel-on-cartel. 

Third, criminal organizations with a weakened capacity to transport drugs into the United States because of the Mexican Government’s efforts have increasingly moved into retail drug sales in 

Mexico and other lines of business including extortion, kidnapping, 

armed robbery, human smuggling, and such. 

But fourth and most troubling, the weakened crime syndicates 

did not turn into disarticulated criminal gangs as was hoped. They, 

instead, have morphed into international criminal networks whose 

structure is more amorphous than in the past, whose operational 

capacity is less susceptible as a result to strategies designed just 

to take out key operatives. This is challenge to which Mexico, with 

our support, must now respond. It is, above all, a law enforcement 

problem. It is not a military problem, and it is one which now extends well into Central America. It, thus, requires law enforcement 

solutions: A redoubled emphasis on police training, especially at 

State and local levels where law enforcement is extremely weak, 

and a significantly expanded effort to improve the quality of Mexican legal and penal systems, and Merida must expand its efforts 

to address a now well-established operation of Mexican criminal 

networks in Central America. 

We need to mend Merida. We do not need to end the program. 

Our long-term national security depends on this success. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Dr. Starr. 

[The prepared statement of Pamela Starr follows:]

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Mr. MACK. We now will move into questions, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

I think, just to give a kind of little premise here, I think all of 

us, everyone, recognizes the importance of our relationship with 

Mexico, the shared responsibility that we have to the citizens of the 

United States and to Mexico and to the hemisphere. I think one of 

the things that at least I am looking at is where have we been and 

what is it that we are trying to accomplish and have we defined 

the problem correctly, because if you don’t define the problem correctly, you can’t put a solution to it unless you understand the 

problem, and that is really what we are charged with hopefully 

today. 

So my first question is this—and I will ask it of Dr. Shiffman. 

I am used to calling you Gary, but I guess for today I will call you 

Dr. Shiffman. The Mexican’s transnational criminal organizations 

have become much more resilient since 2007 when Mexican President Mr. Calderon announced his campaign on the drug trafficking. 

They have diversified and expanded their operation into a wide variety of illicit activities such as human smuggling, the sale of stolen 

oil, extortion, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, sex trafficking, and 

cyber crime. The Mexican transnational criminal organizations 

have also organized, strengthened, and expanded their operations 

into Central America. So the first question is simple. Do you believe that the Mexico’s governance and rule of law is threatened, 

and if so, is it more in jeopardy today than it was in 2007? 

And before you answer, again, I am trying to get to this idea that 

the difference between just the illegal drug activity that is happening and now into a insurgency and what that definition of insurgency is and what it means. So Mr. Shiffman, if you could 

maybe answer that. 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and first of all, the 

testimony you received today is excellent. I congratulate everybody 

else. I think they have laid down really a nice predicate for what 

you are trying to accomplish. 

The argument that I am trying to give you today is that these 

are complex businesses. Now, the amount of money at stake is so 

large and so significant that there is actual significant threat to the 

Government of Mexico today that didn’t exist or not to the same 

degree in 2007. So the basic answer to your question is, absolutely, 

things are in a condition today in Mexico that we have to take very 

seriously. We must elevate it for all of the reasons that the rest of 

the panelists said. 

There is oftentimes this hesitance to use the word ‘‘insurgency’’ 

so I just described it. What you have over large parts of the Mexican population is this battle for political control. So somebody 

wants to control the political space. Whoever controls the political 

space can operate freely. So, if the drug cartels can make billions 

of dollars operating if they just control the political space, the political sphere, then that is what they are going to fight for. 

So, as Dr. Starr just said, she made a really important point. In 

the past, it may have been the drug cartels fighting against local 

governance. What you see now oftentimes is cartel versus cartel. 

That means that the government is not even relevant anymore, 

and it is just cartel-on-cartel fighting for who gets to control that 

57

turf. Whoever gets to control the turf gets to use that turf to run 

their businesses. They can raise money, they can traffic their 

drugs, they can do their recruiting, training. They can really run 

their base of operations, but you need the political control first, and 

that is often called an insurgency. I don’t have a problem saying 

that that is what is going on across large parts of Mexico. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Dr. Selee. 

Mr. SELEE. I think we may actually be misdiagnosing the problem a little bit. Let me say that have had this discussion with colleagues in the Mexican Government who are also beginning to 

rethink this and with people in the U.S. Government. I think we 

tend to think of a sort of six or seven large organizations that run 

drugs to the United States, they are giant organizations, they have 

lots of people working for them. I think, actually, these are much 

smaller groups, much more compact groups. They control about 1 

percent of Mexican GDP, but they are divided among these sort of 

six groups and then there is a bunch of smaller groups that do heroin. The groups that do kidnapping and extortion may or may not 

actually belong to the cartel. They probably give them some money. 

They often use their name, but these are actually loose criminal 

networks of people, and the reason why this is important——

Mr. MACK. I apologize, but my time has expired, and so hopefully 

we will be able to get to it, but I want to try to—I have got to set 

an example by keeping my——

Mr. SELEE. I am not sure that makes them any less dangerous, 

but I think it has implications we will talk about later. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Mr. Engel is recognized for 5 minutes for 

questions. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Any of the panelists that would like to respond to this, I would 

like to hear what you have to say. Reports have indicated that one 

unplanned positive benefit of the Merida Initiative has been the 

closer cooperation and deeper trust between the U.S. and the Mexican Governments. There appears to be more information sharing 

and a strong partnership with Mexico in the fight against drug 

trafficking. Could any of you further characterize the existing level 

of cooperation with Mexico? Do these changes extend beyond the 

breadth of the working relationship we have with the various Mexican ministries and agencies, or are they solely at the top levels of 

these agencies? 

The reason I ask that is because is this new cooperation sufficiently institutionalized or do you see it changing when President 

Calderon finishes his term? Dr. Selee. 

Mr. SELEE. Thank you, Congressman Engel. I think this has 

sunk down within the administration. Dr. Shiffman can correct me 

if I am wrong since he was been at DHS in a past life, but I think 

this is—actually I hear talking to people on both sides a great deal 

of respect at a much lower level in the administration, which I 

think bodes well for future cooperation, which doesn’t mean there 

is not going to be hurdles in the future, because I think any new 

Mexican Government is going to be a little bit more skeptical of 

going after—of being publicly identified with the United States, but 

I think the cooperation is actually fairly deep. 

58

And just to finish an earlier point, I think there is a larger concern of rule of law in Mexico. There is a larger concern of violence. 

Much of the violence is not about drug trafficking; it is about other 

sorts of things. And it is not necessarily Chapo Guzman, or the 

leader of the Zeta’s, one of the two leaders, saying go kill someone 

over this corridor. A lot of it is petty things over extortion. A lot 

of it is petty things over kidnapping. I mean, petty, it is human 

lives here, but these are things that are not sort of part of an actual narrative of we are going to go out and traffic billions of dollars. People are getting killed over small amounts of money in 

some way. So it is a larger question of rule of law in Mexico. I 

think we need to focus on that cooperation. 

Mr. ENGEL. Dr. Shiffman, do you agree with the level of cooperation between Mexico and the U.S.? 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. We need to identify those advocates within the 

Mexican Government that are willing to take this battle on. They 

exist from the local level all the way through the Presidency. Whoever the next President is, we need to make sure that the United 

States is endorsing and working with those people. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I want to ask you about the comment I 

made before about reducing job demand in the United States. Tell 

me what you feel about the job we are doing. I don’t think it is a 

stretch to say that if we didn’t have drug demand in this country 

we would have a much less significant narco-criminal problem in 

Mexico, Colombia, or elsewhere. There was a joint statement when 

we initiated Merida ability tackling that part of the problem as 

well. Are we living up to our original commitments in the Merida 

joint statement? Anyone who would like to comment on that? Dr. 

Starr. 

Ms. STARR. I think it is true that there has been a change of emphasis during the Obama administration in terms of our drug control strategy. So it has become a strategy that, while still heavily 

emphasizing limiting supply available to drug users, it has increased its emphasis on trying to limit demand, and in fact, the selection for the national drug czar was designed to send that message very clearly; there was a going to be a change in emphasis. 

That said, I don’t think the change of emphasis has been sufficiently pushed forward. The United States, we know how to deal 

with addiction to drugs and to minimize the use of it. Our antismoking campaigns demonstrates that we know how to reduce demand for addictive drugs, and if we put our minds to it and put 

together a really strong public relations campaign, I think we can 

do the same thing. 

That said, we will never eliminate demand for illegal drugs and, 

therefore, will never fully eliminate this issue in dealing with the 

trafficking organizations that deal in drugs. That is always going 

to be an underlying factor as long as people want to use illicit 

drugs, and indeed, they always have and always will. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I want to try to get one last question in, 

and that is about CIFTA. Do you think that the Senate should ratify this treaty? Are we in compliance with it? And to what extent 

are arms trafficked from the U.S. into Mexico and then further 

trafficked to Central America? Dr. Bunker. 

59

Mr. BUNKER. Yes, sir. The analysis that I have done recently 

with another colleague was about 20 percent of the arms Mexico, 

the cartels are getting, come from the United States. The bulk of 

the arms come from Central America, from the international arms 

market, and also from Mexico itself, from law enforcement personnel that have defected, and also from some military stores. So 

I think there is more to this than we understand. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. And now I would like to recognize Mr. 

Rohrabacher for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just note for the record that the scourge of kidnapping 

in Mexico is not petty. In fact, it is something that is horrendous 

and affects the lives of people who are trying to lead that country 

and that whole region into a better era, and we have some people 

who I have met personally with who have been victimized by this, 

and it is systematic, and it is, in fact, transnational in its nature 

and just as the drug cartel is. And let me just note, Chairman 

Mack has agreed that we will be having hearings into the 

transnational nature of kidnapping and other crime in Mexico in 

the near future where we will be focusing on not just what is going 

on in Mexico but the contacts with other countries that are part of 

this criminal network. That is number one. 

Number two about intelligence sharing. I don’t want to sound 

skeptical, but I have been deeply involved over the last 30 years 

with Pakistan, and I have come to the conclusion that we have 

been patsies for Pakistan, and that when we share intelligence 

with Pakistan, we end up tipping off the people who we are actually trying to fight against. 

Do any of you disagree with me that there is a high likelihood 

that as we cooperate with intelligence with our Mexican counterparts that some of them may well just be giving that information 

to the cartels? Anyone doubt that? Go right ahead. 

Mr. SELEE. Absolutely. By the way, let me agree with you that 

it is not petty. What I was referring to is that there is a larger 

question of criminality, with the idea that violence is—everyone is 

being killed over $2 billion deals or $2 million deals. Much of this 

is over a $500 ransom. I know, too, people who have been kidnapped and officers killed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. SELEE. So I mean not to say the killing is petty, but a lot 

of the violence is generalized. It is not always the fight between the 

cartels. There is a larger question of violence going on in Mexico. 

Yes, intelligence is often wrongly used, and it is often wrongly 

used within the administration. It is one of the frustrations of the 

people who are trying to do the right thing in the Mexican Government that sometimes when they share it with their colleagues they 

find that it——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Or actually when we get directed, for example, some genius just took the—I guess the advice that they could 

ship 2,000 AK–47s and sniper rifles to the drug cartels and that 

that would be a good way that we could see who really is benefiting 

from the arms trade. 

Mr. SELEE. Chairman, if I could say, I think the evidence is when 

you talk to people in U.S. law enforcement agencies that they feel 

60

that there has been increasingly channels that are trustworthy 

most of the time that have been successful at getting some of the 

people they want to target. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. SELEE. It is far from fail safe. It is far from perfect. My favorite comment came from frontline cops in San Diego. Actually we 

talked to them about their relationship with some of the police in 

Tijuana, and they said, look, our evidence is that more often than 

not when we give them evidence now, the right thing happens. Not 

all the time, but more often than not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. I got the answer. 

Let me just note whatever problems we are talking about, this 

is not a partisan issue. It is not a partisan issue at all, and let me 

know perhaps what I believe is one of the worst undermining of 

our efforts to control our borders happened under the last administration when Ramos and Compean, two Border Patrol agents, were 

arrested and put through hell for stopping a Mexican drug dealer 

from coming across the border. 

And I guess I will ask this question, but obviously, it is to be 

taken as not necessarily as a serious point, and that is, I take it 

that you agree with me that when we arrested Ramos and 

Compean, the two Border Patrol agents, who had clean records I 

might add, perfectly clean records, thrown them into prison for 

stopping this drug mule, whatever he was, carrying the drugs 

across the border, that this was not taken as an act of sincerity 

that endeared us to the drug cartel leaders. 

I take it that you would agree with me that they didn’t take it 

as sincere or they weren’t—and they also weren’t impressed with 

our courageous dedication to the rule of law by arresting Ramos 

and Campion. And you might agree with me that the drug cartels 

that we are talking about today looked at the arrest of Ramos and 

Campion as a sign of weakness and a lack of resolve on the part 

of our Government. So this is not a partisan issue. This is an issue 

where Republicans and Democrats have equally made stupid decisions. And now it is up to us to try to work together to put it right. 

And we will be getting down to the actual international connections 

that are making this task even more difficult. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. And I now recognize 

Mr. Payne for 5 minutes. Welcome. Good to see you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Great. Good to see you. I hope you had a nice summer. 

Mr. MACK. Yeah, pretty good. 

Mr. PAYNE. Good to see the great panel. Of course, Dr. Selee, it 

is good to see you again. And you know I served on the committee 

in Geneva also. It was a great experience. And it is good to see you. 

I just have a question—three quick questions if I can get them 

out. One is the 25th of August, the New York Times had an article, 

‘‘U.S. Widens Role in Mexican Fight,’’ which went on, of course, to 

say that the administration has expanded its role in Mexico’s fight 

in organized crime by allowing the Mexican police to stage 

crossborder drug raids from inside the United States. 

And I just want to question—have any of those raids happened? 

And is there any kind of conflict in U.S. law that concerns constitutionality? Does anybody want to take a shot at that? 

61

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Sir, I don’t know the specifics, Mr. Payne. But 

maybe getting back to Chairman Rohrabacher’s comments as well 

as yours, there is—in local levels again, there is great cooperation 

in an operational level between the U.S. and Mexican side. There 

are often local commanders that operate very well together. So I 

am sure great things are happening. Mexican officials, of course, 

have no authority inside of United States’ borders. It would just be 

an information liaison-type role. The same thing with U.S. officials 

inside of Mexico. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, they went to say it was giving the Mexican police the right to stage crossborder drug raids. I need to maybe take 

a look at that a little bit more. It was the August 25th New York 

Times. You might want to check that out because it kind of 

stunned me a little bit also. 

Quickly, could you tell me how we measure the success, any one 

of you, of the program? It certainly can’t be by the number of 

deaths, because that would mean we are failing. So how is it that 

these billions of dollars that we are allocating are—or when are we 

winning? I mean, anybody know how we can call success? Maybe 

quitting it out. 

Mr. SELEE. I think you have to use two—if I can, Mr. Chairman, 

I think you have to use two sets of measures. I mean, one is I 

would look at violence because I think violence matters. That is 

what matters in people’s daily lives. I think I would look also at 

whether the cartels are splintering, because we have said that is 

part of the objective. I mean, are they fragmenting? Some of the 

violence is because they are fragmenting. Maybe we are winning on 

that front but losing on the violence front. Maybe we have to readjust there, but we want both of those. We want to fragment them 

but we also want to see violence drop in people’s lives. 

And then I think we need to look at rule of law because the larger question is they are not police, they are not prosecutors, and 

they are not courts that make it dangerous for armed criminals to 

operate with impunity. So we need to actually measure with our 

colleagues in Mexico, with our partners in Mexico, what is developing with the police, what can we measure, the Federal and State 

police? What has improved? What has improved in terms of prosecutions? Are prosecutions more successful than they were in the 

past? Are they moving forward on changing their court system, as 

they said they had, to a more transparent system? And are people 

actually being judged correctly in the court system? I think we 

need those measures. 

Ms. STARR. If I might just add quickly, I think we also have to 

measure based on what the Mexican Government has said its objectives are. And its objective from the very beginning has been to 

break down large organized crime syndicates that threaten the national security of Mexico into small armed gangs that can be managed locally and at State level with police. They have done that extremely well. Unfortunately, much of the violence is a consequence 

of having done that extremely well. 

And so we need to take the next step, which Dr. Selee is pointing 

out, that we need to build up the policing and law enforcement capacity to deal with this new kind of problem. 

62

Mr. BUNKER. I think we have another issue when we look at the 

level of violence. You could have a plaza, a city or a region that has 

very low levels of violence. Well, basically one of the cartels now 

dominates that area. So the absence of violence can also be a bad 

thing as far as political control of an area. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. I am able to get my final question 

in. I don’t know how long casino gambling has been in Mexico. Can 

anybody tell me? Five years, one year? Is it relatively new? Do you 

know? Organized crime loves casino gambling, they tell me. And do 

you think that this—well, it is done now. But money laundering—

I mean, I can see all kinds of negative things happening through 

the casinos. What do you think? Quickly, because I only have 10 

seconds left. 

Mr. SELEE. It can’t be a good thing. It certainly creates one more 

area where money can disappear. 

Mr. BUNKER. The cartels also make money through extortion. 

You basically pay our tax or we are going to burn your place down. 

That happens in a lot of areas in Mexico now too. So you should 

look into that issue maybe. 

Ms. STARR. I just want to say the cartels are also very effective 

at laundering their money through legitimate businesses such as 

construction, so they really don’t need the casinos to do it. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. And, Mr. Payne, thank you for 

your questions. If I can add real quick, that is—I think your question about what are the objectives, how do we know, that is very 

much a part of the question that we are trying to get at today, is, 

you know—I don’t know that there is a clear understanding of 

what the objectives are, but certainly defining the problem, whether it is just a drug cartel-type problem or if this is an insurgency 

is what we are trying to get at, so we can work and come up with 

some proposal on how to define the objectives so we can have success. So thank you for that. 

Mr. McCaul is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Shiffman, you said the direct cartels are a threat to the Government of Mexico. I agree with you. 

Dr. Bunker, you said that—you made a very bold statement that 

the drug cartels are the number one greatest threat to the security 

of the United States, surpassing al Qaeda. I happen to agree with 

you as well on that. Political assassinations, extortion, 

kidnappings, terrorizing the Mexican people. 

Recently President Calderon, after the casino—50 killed in the 

casino—said we are facing true terrorists who have surpassed not 

only the limits of the law but basic common sense and respect for 

life. And I would like to read from you as the United States Code 

out of Federal law, Black Law’s definition of terrorism: ‘‘An act of 

terrorism means an activity that involves a violent act or an act 

dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of 

the United States or of any State or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of 

any State’’—this is where it is important—‘‘and it appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the 

policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the 

conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.’’

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Would all of you agree that the drug cartels fall squarely within 

this definition of terrorists? Dr. Shiffman. 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Sir, thank you. And thank you for all of your 

leadership on this issue through the years. The definition of terrorism is an act often including civilians for some sort of political 

goal. Insurgents do take part in terrorist acts, and absolutely it fits 

the definition. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. Dr. Selee. 

Mr. SELEE. I think it is a slippery slope. I mean, I am not sure 

these are organizations involved in political acts. I think this is primarily about the money, as Dr. Shiffman’s paper says actually. 

And this is primarily about the money. I think we get into a slippery slope when we start to confuse them with terrorists. There 

certainly are acts that are very similar, like the casino fire, to what 

terrorists do. But there are also acts in this country that are truly 

terrible that we wouldn’t necessarily qualify as terrorism, right? 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think the tactics of decapitating people and burning people alive and shooting school buses is certainly——

Mr. SELEE. It is terrible and at the same time it is a slippery 

slope. I mean, this is not a clear political message or political intent in most cases. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Dr. Bunker. 

Mr. BUNKER. They engage in terrorist acts, they engage in insurgent acts. You are also getting accidental insurgents where they 

are taking over political control of a city just because they have basically gotten to the point where no one is watching what they are 

doing, so now we have to, like, run this place. The other issue, too, 

is—I will just let it go. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And Dr. Starr. 

Ms. STARR. I am going to obfuscate a little bit. I think it is much 

more important to understand what is happening in Mexico than 

to label it. Because when we label it, we have the tendency of comparing it with other things that have similar labels. My concern 

about calling what is going on in Mexico either as terrorism or insurgency or something like that is then we equate Mexico with 

something like Afghanistan or Pakistan, and they are not equal in 

any way, shape or form. In Afghanistan, in Pakistan, you have terrorists, you have insurgents, whose objective it is to overthrow the 

sitting government. That is not the objective of organized crime 

syndicates in Mexico. They are organized crime. They want to 

make money. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, I agree with President Calderon. He called 

them terrorists. And, Dr. Bunker, it is the number one greatest 

threat to our national security. 

I introduced a bill to designate them as foreign terrorist organizations which would give us—as a Federal prosecutor, it gives us 

greater tools to go after them, including freezing these bank assets, 

which, Dr. Selee, I thought you gave excellent testimony about the 

role of the banks and the laundering of money. How complicit are 

the banks in Mexico with the drug cartels? 

Mr. SELEE. I don’t think we know that answer, actually. I mean, 

I think it is something we need to know and it is something that 

we need to put resources into. We put resources in—our Treasury 

Department is very good at this, into figuring out—and Mexico 

64

needs to put some more resources into this as well. I mean, we are 

both falling down on the job on this. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I have got limited time. But, Mr. Chairman, the 

idea of Treasury doing an audit would be certainly helpful to see 

how complicit they are because they are making money off this 

whole thing. There is no question in my mind. 

Last point. I got to go down with the chairman to Colombia, joint 

intelligence/military operation. It worked very effectively over time. 

We need—in the post-Merida—as we talk about post-Merida, we 

need something like that I think in Mexico. It is a regional concern. 

Guatemala, as we were down there, 25 farmers got their—were 

decapitated by the Zetas. And that is truly a failed State in Guatemala. And the one point take-away I got from that trip and I will—

is in meeting with President Santos. Colombian Special Forces are 

very well trained. He was willing to help Mexico with these Special 

Forces. When we met President Calderon, they are shifting from 

the national police to take over the military’s operation, which I 

think is a right direction for Mexico and they have trained a lot 

of police officers. But in the short term, it seems to me that we 

ought to be using some of the Colombian Special Forces to work 

side by side with the Mexican Special Forces. They clearly would 

blend in from a cultural standpoint, language standpoint, far better 

than, say, the gringo from the United States. 

And so I hope—when we mentioned that to President Calderon, 

he had shown an interest. And the chairman and I mentioned this 

to the Secretary of State as well. And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. I would now like to recognize Mr. Rivera for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all 

of you for being here. 

Dr. Selee, I would like to inquire a little bit about the international support for some of these transnational criminal organizations in Mexico. You mentioned earlier and it struck my attention, 

Chapo Guzman. Who is that? 

Mr. SELEE. The head of the Sinaloa cartel. 

Mr. RIVERA. The head of what? 

Mr. SELEE. The Sinaloa cartel, the largest crime organization in 

Mexico. 

Mr. RIVERA. And where is he? 

Mr. SELEE. Oh, that is a good question. I am not privy to that 

information. 

Mr. RIVERA. Is there any speculation as to if he is in Mexico, outside of Mexico? 

Mr. SELEE. He is largely believed to be inside of Mexico. I think 

if you talk to people in the Intelligence Community, they would say 

he is in Mexico. 

Mr. RIVERA. Inside Mexico. Okay. Would it surprise you if you 

were to ever receive information that he was receiving safe harbor 

from countries outside of Mexico? 

Mr. SELEE. That is certainly possible. It certainly happened in 

the history of organized crime. 

Mr. RIVERA. In your prepared remarks, you mentioned the existence of transnational criminal organizations in the United States 

65

and the need to map their movement as a way to track or stop 

their transactions. Can you expand a little bit on this? 

Mr. SELEE. We have very good operational intelligence. We have 

excellent—our law enforcement entities, both at a State and local 

level, but also DEA, FBI, ICE, CBP and others, do a fantastic job 

of getting operational intelligence, finding where people are, picking them up, figuring out where a network in Houston is, for example. We don’t do as good a job because we don’t do intelligence as 

much in the United States. We have barriers between our Intelligence Community and our law enforcement community in trying 

to do the mapping. 

So in terms of the Zetas, for example, who we have named a 

transnational criminal organization recently, you know, knowing 

what happens to the Zetas when they come into the United 

States—who they are working with, who are their business partners, where do they operate, who their cells are operating in the 

United States, who do they hand off to, which gangs they are working with—we have fragments of this information because our law 

enforcement agencies pick up fragments of this, but we don’t have 

a central depository of all of the information that says this is how 

they operate, this is where their money goes. There is no one who 

is a specialist on the Zetas in the U.S. Government. There are a 

lot of people who are specialists on pieces of the Zetas, but it is 

hard to know where the mapping is. 

Mr. RIVERA. Does the United States Government issue any types 

of rewards or bounties for any of these cartel heads like Chapo 

Guzman? Anyone. Whoever might have information. 

Mr. SELEE. I am not aware of it, but certainly some of them are 

on the 10 Most Wanted. And we do actively go after some of them 

in partnership with Mexico. And Mexico has issued bounties. 

Mr. RIVERA. Is Chapo Guzman on the Most Wanted? 

Mr. SELEE. I believe he is, actually. I don’t know if he is in the 

top ten, but I believe he is, actually. 

Mr. RIVERA. On the FBI Most Wanted? 

Mr. SELEE. I believe he is. I could be wrong about that, though. 

So, I mean, I should check that before—do you know the answer 

to that? 

Mr. BUNKER. Just a statement I wanted to make was, a few 

years ago you could be a bona fide member of the Zetas, have your 

brand on your breast, have your santa muerte tattoo, and you could 

be walking around and you basically were free to do whatever you 

want. It is amazing. 

Mr. RIVERA. Any information on what we can do about going 

after—or what the Treasury Department can do about going after 

some of this drug trafficking financing? 

Mr. SELEE. You have to really—do you want to——

Mr. RIVERA. Dr. Shiffman. 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Congressman, thank you. The thing about running a business, an illicit business, just like any other, is if you are 

successful, you end up with a lot of money. Now, you have to do 

something with it. And if you have ever, you know, seen large bulk 

cash, it actually takes up a lot of space. It is very heavy. It is a 

very difficult thing to deal with. So you have to use banks, you 

have to use—you have to use illicit movement of money. But at 

66

some point, the illicit money transfer organizations have to deal 

with banks. That is how you find them. It is a very complex task 

to do, but that is how you do it. Because if you are making a lot 

of money, you have got to do something with your money. 

Mr. SELEE. You almost have to work in—if I can, Congressman—

in two ways. I mean, one is—Dr. Shiffman says you have to work 

in the banking system. And we have done some things. I mean, 

Treasury has gone after Wachovia Bank, for example, which did 

not have sufficient controls on money laundering, never a very high 

fine on them, so figuring out how this money is getting into the 

U.S. financial system. 

And secondly, some of it still does go back in bulk cash because 

there is a border, there is a 2,000-mile border. The same people 

that bring drugs can bring money and guns back. So also ICE, FBI, 

local law enforcement, CBP, figuring out how this money is packaged. 

And if I can say something controversial. I mean, the best place 

to do border enforcement is actually far away from the border. 

Once things get to the border, they are mostly hidden. So if we can 

do border enforcement in Houston before money gets to El Paso, or 

try and catch drugs in Tamaulipas but before it gets to Tampico, 

before it gets to Matamoros, that is by far the best way. Which is 

not to say you don’t do border enforcement, CBP does a great job 

of that, but most of the stuff is hidden by the time you get to the 

border. We need to find cash in the safe houses, drugs in the safe 

houses, and leadership and organizations. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Rivera. And Mr. Poe is now recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here, 

all of you, all four doctors. The rest of us could be lawyers. That 

is an interesting combination. But be that as it may, a few questions. 

Mr. McCaul talked about the drug cartels being labeled as foreign terrorist organizations. I agree with that philosophy based on 

the current status of the law. The failed State issue that you all 

addressed. Today, which direction is Mexico headed, more to the 

failed State or getting it together? Just a quick opinion. Okay, Dr. 

Bunker? 

Mr. BUNKER. I think there is another avenue and that is 

criminalized State. 

Mr. POE. What is that? 

Mr. BUNKER. That would be a State where the criminals are pulling a lot of the strings in the background politically. And you are 

seeing parts of Mexico that have basically lost—the cities are gone 

in that country. So it doesn’t have to fail. It could become something else. 

Mr. POE. It is a political environment that is controlled by the 

drug cartels in certain areas. Is that a fair statement? In what 

areas? 

Mr. BUNKER. In some of your northern controlled areas with the 

Zetas and Gulf Cartel and some of your—probably your southern 

areas is relatively quiet. You have got some areas in Sinaloa and 

Michoacana also where you have issues. 

67

Mr. SELEE. I throw out another distinction, too, which is think 

the cartels are actually less powerful than they were 5 years ago 

when the Mexican Government got serious about this. The big cartels—I mean, these were six or seven big groups. What you have 

now is lots of small groups that are operating, lots of people who 

call themselves Zetas, that may or may not be, which has increased 

criminality. 

So it is actually not an either/or. What you have is lots of 

places—probably there is less control by these six or seven groups 

that once controlled large swaths of territory, but there are lots of 

freelancers running around controlling, you know, and trying to infiltrate the government. 

Mr. POE. What do you think about that, Dr. Shiffman? Drug cartels, powerful, headed to a failed State—what do you want to call 

the type of government Mexico is heading to with the massive 

amount of drug influence? 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Things are headed in the wrong direction in a 

broad stroke, but you don’t need to want to take over Mexico City 

and run the whole government in order for it to be an insurgency. 

All you need to do is be able to have a base of operations in which 

you want to run and grow your business. And it is becoming increasingly easy for the cartels to do that in Mexico. And that is 

what we need to be concerned about. 

Mr. POE. So they do have political influence in certain areas? 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. POE. This national security issue for Mexico, would you all 

four agree that it is national security—is the issue in Mexico a national security issue for the United States? Without a nod, why 

don’t you say yes or no. Just go down the list. 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. Yes on both. 

Mr. SELEE. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Is that a yes, Dr. Starr? 

Ms. STARR. That is a yes. 

Mr. POE. Is part of the problem the fact that the border is open 

in both directions, not just one direction? The fact that, you know, 

people and money can move north and guns and money—or people 

and drugs come north, money and guns go south. I mean, it seems 

to be open in both directions. Is that part of something that we 

have to figure out here, that the border is open in both directions? 

Mr. SELEE. Yes, although it is less a problem with the border 

than it is of the areas away from the border. I mean, most of what 

is passing through is passing through legal checkpoints. This is not 

a question——

Mr. POE. Ports of entry? 

Mr. SELEE. Ports of entry, right. Things—the high value drugs 

are passing through ports of entry. Not exclusively, but a lot of 

them are. 

Mr. POE. But that is on the border. Ports of entry are on the border. 

Mr. SELEE. It is hard to seal those things. I mean, what you need 

to do is actually stop things before they get to the border, where 

it is a lot easier to get done. We continue to increase the—I think 

we should be very vigilant on the border. And I think it is good we 

have started doing southbound inspections. I mean, these are all 

68

good things. But we are only going to solve this by actually getting 

at the points away from the border where things are bundled and 

put together. And that is strategic intelligence, the kind of things 

that Dr. Shiffman was working on at CBP. 

Mr. POE. I will try to get to a few more questions in the last 

minute. The drug cartels that operate primarily in Mexico—I know 

they operate in other places, but they also have operations in the 

United States. They don’t stop at the border and all of a sudden 

turn that over to somebody else. I mean, the Zetas work in Mexico 

and then they have operatives in the United States that help them 

get rid of their drugs and then get the money and the guns and 

go back south. Is that not true, Dr. Shiffman, or not? 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. It is true. And their cartels go down into Central 

America, Colombia, and other places as well. So Mexico is both a 

source of drugs but also, more significantly perhaps, a transshipment point. And that is where they are making their money. 

Mr. POE. All right. And the last question that I have. Mexico has 

a drug problem among its population as well. President Calderon 

talks about how bad it is in the United States. But they have an 

internal problem with the abuse of drugs as well; is that true? That 

is my last question to all four of you. Just a yes or no is all we 

have got time for. 

Mr. BUNKER. It is increasing. 

Ms. STARR. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Starr? 

Mr. SELEE. And one of the things is reality is this consumption 

of—local distribution in Mexico, like kidnapping and extortion, is 

probably disproportionate to the amount of the violence as well. 

Mr. SHIFFMAN. [Nonverbal response.] 

Mr. POE. All right, Dr. Shiffman, thank you. That was a yes. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Poe. And I want to thank the witnesses. I want to thank the members who showed up. And I would 

like to, if you don’t mind—we don’t typically do this, but I am going 

to allow Mr. Rohrabacher and myself an opportunity to make some 

closing statements. So, Mr. Rohrabacher, you are recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What happens in Mexico is of vital interest 

to the people of the United States and it will be pivotal as to 

whether or not we are successful here as a country as well. I grew 

up in the southwest part of the United States. I am a Californian, 

very proud of the Mexican-American heritage of California. And all 

of us who came from that part of the world or part of our country 

know that God made us neighbors with the Mexican people. They 

are our neighbors and we always said that God made us neighbors. 

But it is up to us whether or not we are going to be friends or not. 

And there is a great sense of loss right now in Southern California—I can’t speak for Arizona or Texas or New Mexico—but 

there is a great sense of loss that we have lost a friend and we are 

losing friends in Mexico. I mean, I lived with a Mexican family for 

3 months when I was in high school down in Guadalajara. And I 

have spent I cannot tell you how many days and weeks of my life—

everybody knows I am a surfer—down the coastline of Baja, California, and in the cantinas at night, et cetera. And I had many, 

69

many good friends. In fact, every time I would go there to Mexico, 

I would meet new friends because they are such wonderful people. 

And now the new generation of Americans in Southern California 

are not having that same experience. Our young people aren’t 

going there to live with a Mexican family. Our young people aren’t 

going down and enjoying camaraderie. I remember I spent about 2 

or 3 days on a beach with a group of Mexican teenagers, guys, all 

guys my age, playing the guitar and drinking mescal—pretty 

heavy-duty stuff. I mean, those things aren’t happening anymore 

and it is a very, very sad thing. 

I think that that relationship between Mexico and the United 

States was a treasure, and we should not let it go easily. We 

should try to recapture it, work with the good people, our friends 

in Mexico, to help drive out the evil forces that are taking that 

country and those people away from us as friends and family. So, 

anything we can do. 

One last thought. I know I—our country didn’t have—drugs 

weren’t illegal in our country until this century, until, what, 1910 

or something like that. These drugs were legal in our country. And 

when they made booze illegal in our country, we found out you 

couldn’t do that and there were repercussions if you have a group 

of people consuming something that is illegal, and then all of a 

sudden you build up organized crime. We did that in the United 

States. Mr. Al Capone and the organized crime was first really developed in the United States. It was during Prohibition. 

Well, now we have large groups of Americans who are using 

these groups, and the side impact of that is the building up of, 

what, of organized crime unfortunately. In Mexico. And we need to 

do something about it. 

I cannot tell you what the—there is no easy answer, but we 

should be committed to that. And I will tell you that I am looking 

forward to working with Chairman Mack, who has again demonstrated his willingness and courage to take on some very serious 

issues. 

So thank you to the witnesses. I appreciate it. We will have more 

joint hearings on the situation in Mexico, especially the international elements that are at play in Mexico that need to be dealt 

with. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher. It is always a 

pleasure to work with you, and I learn something new about you 

at every hearing. 

A couple of things, if I could. First of all, I wanted to just quickly 

mention—and unfortunately my good friend, Mr. Engel, is not here. 

But we keep hearing this number, this 90 percent of the guns are 

coming from the United States. That is just false. When we had a 

hearing not too long—well, it might have been a year or 2 or something like that ago. And the person who did this report admitted 

that it was 90 percent of the guns that they could trace, and it was 

only the U.S. guns that they could trace. I think the issues that 

we need to deal with in Mexico, we need to not let this continue 

to be part of the equation because it is just not—it is just not true. 

A couple of things. We talked a lot about the criminal activity of 

the cartels and whether or not Merida has been successful in kind 

of dismantling or breaking them apart into smaller organizations. 

70

But some of the things that we know are true is that these—this 

criminal insurgency is doing more than just the drug trafficking 

and violence. They are putting on fairs for kids, trying to win the 

hearts and minds of the people to subvert the political and the governmental will in Mexico. There are areas—if you will look up on 

the screen, there is the banner there that is supported by a drug 

cartel, and they have got hotdogs and they have got food and 

drinks and clowns and everything else. They are offering health 

care and better pay. This is an activity that is not being done out 

of the goodness of their heart. This is an activity to try to subvert 

the governmental and political will in Mexico. So that is an activity 

I think that is certainly worth pointing to. 

This definition to me is important because if we continue to look 

at the problem as just a drug trafficking problem, we have missed 

the opportunity to really try to solve the problem. What we have 

seen is that—I believe that Merida, when introduced, was a very 

good plan to try to combat what was happening in Mexico and in 

developing that partnership and relationship with the Government 

of Mexico. Unfortunately, I think the delivery of it has been so 

slow, without clear targets and a clear understanding of the objectives or changing objectives, not being able to keep up with the 

changing influence of the insurgency that we now see, that we need 

to readdress what it is that we want to accomplish. 

And I am of the opinion that Merida, the initial plan of Merida, 

it has evolved to a point where we need to have a completely different way of looking about how to solve the problem and engage 

with Mexico. 

I am going to put into the record a few documents that highlight 

what I think is clearly a definition of criminal insurgency acts by 

the cartels and these groups in Mexico that substantiate and help 

define criminal insurgency with their actions. 

And we appreciate the testimony of all of you. We do plan on in 

this committee taking your testimony, the ideas, the members on 

the committee, on the two committees, hopefully the full committee, and trying to put forward a plan that identifies the problem 

and comes up with solutions to solve the problem that we have 

identified. 

So with that, the meeting is adjourned and I want to thank all 

of the witnesses once again for being here. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

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