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[Senate Report 112-91]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                       Calendar No. 181
112th Congress                                                   Report
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                     112-91

======================================================================

 
             PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2011

                                _______
                                

                November 7, 2011.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

            Mr. Leahy, from the Committee on the Judiciary, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                     ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS

                         [To accompany S. 1151]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the 
bill (S. 1151), to prevent and mitigate identity theft, to 
ensure privacy, to provide notice of security breaches, and to 
enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and 
other protections against security breaches, fraudulent access, 
and misuse of personally identifiable information, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon, with an 
amendment, and recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Background and Purpose of the Personal Data Privacy and Security 
     Act of 2011......................................................2
 II. History of the Bill and Committee Consideration.................10
III. Section-by-Section Summary of the Bill..........................13
 IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate.......................19
  V. Regulatory Impact Evaluation....................................24
 VI. Conclusion......................................................24
VII. Additional and Minority Views...................................25
VIII.Changes to Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported...........35

I. Background and Purpose of the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act 
                                of 2011

                               A. SUMMARY

    Advanced technologies, combined with the realities of the 
post-
9/11 digital era, have created strong incentives and 
opportunities for collecting and selling personal information 
about ordinary Americans. Today, private sector and 
governmental entities alike routinely traffic in billions of 
electronic personal records about Americans. Americans rely on 
this data to facilitate financial transactions, provide 
services, prevent fraud, screen employees, investigate crimes, 
and find loved ones. The Government also relies upon this 
information to enhance national security and to combat crime.
    The growing market for personal information has also become 
a treasure trove that is both valuable and vulnerable to 
identity thieves. As a result, the consequences of a data 
security breach can be quite serious. For Americans caught up 
in the endless cycle of watching their credit unravel, undoing 
the damage caused by security breaches and identity theft can 
become a time-consuming and lifelong endeavor. In addition, 
while identity theft is a major privacy concern for most 
Americans, the use and collection of personal data by 
Government agencies can have an even greater impact on 
Americans' privacy. The loss or theft of Government data can 
potentially expose ordinary citizens, Government employees, and 
members of the armed services alike to national security and 
personal security threats.
    Despite these well-known dangers, the Nation's privacy laws 
lag far behind the capabilities of technology and the cunning 
of identity thieves. The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act 
of 2011 is a comprehensive privacy bill that seeks to close 
this privacy gap by establishing meaningful national standards 
for providing notice of data security breaches, and by 
addressing the underlying problem of lax data security to make 
it less likely for data security breaches to occur in the first 
place.

  B. THE GROWING PROBLEM OF DATA SECURITY BREACHES AND IDENTITY THEFT

    Since the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act was first 
reported by the Judiciary Committee in November 2005, more than 
535 million records containing sensitive personal information 
have been involved in data security breaches, according to the 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse.\1\ For example, during the spring 
of 2011, Sony disclosed several major data breaches involving 
its PlayStation Network, Qriocity music and video service and 
Sony Online Entertainment service, exposing the sensitive 
personal information of more than 101 million users.\2\ In 
another high-profile data security breach, a computer hacker 
penetrated the databases of the online marketing firm Epsilon, 
compromising name and email address information about the 
customers of scores of major U.S. businesses, including Target, 
Citigroup, and Walgreen, and affecting the privacy of millions 
of U.S. consumers.\3\
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    \1\See ``Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Chronology of Data 
Breaches,'' available at http://www.privacyrights.org/.
    \2\``Sony Data Breach Tally Rises to 101 Million,'' eWeek.com, May 
3, 2011.
    \3\``Fact box: U.S. data breach hits Target, Marriott customers,'' 
Reuters/MSNBC, April 4, 2011.
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    In January 2009, Heartland Payment Systems, one of the 
Nation's leading processors of credit and debit card 
transactions, announced that its processing system records 
containing more than 130 million credit card accounts had been 
breached by hackers. In January 2007, mega-retailer TJX 
disclosed that it suffered a data breach affecting at least 
45.7 million credit and debit cards.\4\ These data breaches 
follow many other major commercial data breaches, including 
breaches at ChoicePoint and LexisNexis.
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    \4\``Breach of data at TJX is called the biggest ever, Stolen 
numbers put at 45.7 million,'' Boston Globe, March 29, 2007.
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    Federal Government agencies, and even the Congress, have 
not been immune to data security breaches. In June 2011, 
computer hackers affiliated with the hacker group known as Lulz 
Security breached the United States Senate website.\5\ In 
February 2009, the Federal Aviation Administration revealed 
that computer hackers breached one of its servers and stole 
sensitive personal information concerning 45,000 current and 
former FAA employees.\6\ In June 2008, Walter Reed Medical 
Center reported that the personal information of 1,000 Military 
Health System beneficiaries may have been improperly disclosed 
through the unauthorized sharing of data.\7\ In May 2006, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs lost an unsecured laptop 
computer hard drive containing the health records and other 
sensitive personal information of approximately 26.5 million 
veterans and their spouses.\8\ And, in May, 2007, the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reported that the 
personal and financial records of 100,000 TSA employees were 
lost after a computer hard drive was reported missing from the 
Agency's headquarters, exposing the Department of Homeland 
Security to potential national security risks.\9\
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    \5\``Hackers Break into Senate Computers,'' Reuters, June 14, 2011.
    \6\``FAA Breach Heightens Cybersecurity Concerns,'' Federal 
Computer Week, February 23, 2009.
    \7\``Walter Reed: Data Breach at Military Hospitals,'' The 
Associated Press, June 3, 2008.
    \8\See Testimony of the Honorable James Nicholson, Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs, before the House Committee on Government Reform, June 
8, 2006.
    \9\See ``TSA seeks hard drive, personal data for 100,000,'' USA 
Today, May 5, 2007; see also, the Federal Times, ``Union Sues TSA over 
loss of data on employees,'' May 9, 2007.
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    The steady wave of data security breaches in recent years 
is a window into a broader, more challenging trend. Insecure 
databases are now low-hanging fruit for hackers looking to 
steal identities and commit fraud. Lax data security is also a 
threat to American businesses. The President's report on 
Cyberspace Policy Review noted that industry estimates of 
losses from data theft of intellectual property in 2008 alone 
range as high as $1 trillion.\10\ Because data security 
breaches adversely affect many segments of the American 
community, a meaningful solution to this growing problem must 
carefully balance the interests and needs of consumers, 
business, and the Government.
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    \10\``President's Report on Cyberspace Policy Review,'' May 29, 
2009, at page 2. A recent report to Congress by the Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive also found that cyber-espionage 
conducted by, among others, China and Russia has resulted in the theft 
of tens of billions of dollars of trade secrets, technology and 
intellectual property from U.S. Government and private computer systems 
each year. See ``Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in 
Cyberspace, Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and 
Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011,'' October, 2011.
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         C. THE PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2011

    The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011 takes 
several meaningful and important steps to balance the interests 
and needs of consumers, business, and the Government in order 
to better protect Americans sensitive personal data. This 
legislation is supported by a wide range of consumer, business, 
and government organizations.

1. Data security program

    The bill recognizes that, in the Information Age, any 
company that wants to be trusted by the public must earn that 
trust by vigilantly protecting the information that it uses and 
collects. The bill takes important steps to accomplish this 
goal by requiring that companies that have databases with 
sensitive personal information on more than 10,000 Americans 
establish and implement a data privacy and security program. 
There are exemptions to this requirement for companies already 
subject to and in compliance with data security requirements 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act and the Health 
Information Portability and Accountability (HIPAA) Act. Section 
202(a)(4)(C) directs companies to consider data minimization as 
part of their data security program planning process. 
Eliminating personal data that is no longer needed is a crucial 
and basic element of good data security practice. By contrast, 
retaining sensitive data that is no longer needed for a 
business purpose unnecessarily creates rich targets for data 
breaches and identity theft.\11\
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    \11\For example, one of the recent breaches suffered by Sony 
included the financial information of tens of thousands of individuals 
held on an ``outdated'' database that the company retained but no 
longer used. This practice put the outdated data at an even greater 
risk of breach, because little attention was given to the safekeeping 
of the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, in light of the largely passive role of 
certain service providers that provide electronic data 
transmission, routing, intermediate and transient storage, or 
connections services with respect to sensitive personally 
identifiable information, the bill assigns limited obligations 
to such businesses. In the bill, the term ``service provider'' 
is defined as a business entity that provides electronic data 
transmission, routing, intermediate and transient storage, or 
connections to its system or network for sensitive personally 
identifiable information on an undifferentiated basis from 
other information that such entity transmits, routes, or 
stores, or for which such entity provides connections. Section 
201(b)(3) of the bill exempts such service providers from the 
data security program requirements in the bill, to the extent 
that the service provider is exclusively engaged in the 
transmission, routing, or temporary, intermediate, or transient 
storage of that communication. By ``exclusively,'' the 
Committee intends that a service provider is exempt only to the 
extent it is engaged in the activities of a service provider as 
defined by the bill. The Committee also recognizes that a 
service provider may also be engaged in activities that are 
covered by the bill and does not intend that that an entity 
would lose the service provider exemption for its purely 
service provider functions.\12\
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    \12\The Committee notes that with respect to section 202(d) of the 
bill, the ``providers of services'' under this provision are not the 
same entities as the ``service providers'' defined by the bill. The 
entities subject to this provision are persons or entities other than 
service providers, with whom a business entity contracts for services 
other than the services or functions of a service provider. This 
provision does not impose any obligation on service providers to enter 
into contracts or implement or maintain the requirements of section 201 
or 202 or subtitle B.
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2. Notice

    Second, because American consumers should know when they 
are at risk of identity theft or other harms because of a data 
security breach, the bill also requires that business entities 
and Federal agencies promptly notify affected individuals and 
law enforcement when a data security breach occurs. Armed with 
such knowledge, consumers can take steps to protect themselves, 
their families, and their personal and financial well-being. 
Additionally, law enforcement can also take the steps needed to 
mitigate or thwart a cyberattack. Notice to individuals must be 
provided within 60 days following discovery of the security 
breach, unless delayed by the Federal Trade Commission, or 
Federal law enforcement. The trigger for notice to individuals 
is ``significant risk of identity theft, economic loss or harm, 
or physical harm,'' and this trigger includes appropriate 
checks and balances to prevent over-notification and 
underreporting of data security breaches.
    In this regard, the bill recognizes that there are harms 
other than identity theft that can result from a data security 
breach, including harm from other financial crimes, stalking, 
and other criminal activity. Consequently, the bill adopts a 
trigger of ``significant risk of identity theft, economic loss 
or harm, or physical harm, rather than a weaker trigger of 
``significant risk of identity theft,'' for the notice 
requirement for individuals in the legislation. There are 
exemptions to the notice requirements for individuals for 
national security and law enforcement reasons, as well as an 
exemption to this requirement for credit card companies that 
have effective fraud-prevention programs.\13\ The bill also 
includes a safe harbor exemption from the notice requirement if 
the business entity or agency that suffered the security breach 
concludes, after conducting a risk assessment, that no 
significant risk of identity theft, economic harm or loss, or 
physical harm exists and the FTC concurs with that 
determination. The bill contemplates that a reasonable delay of 
notice could include the time necessary for a victimized 
business or agency to conduct a risk assessment under Section 
212(b).
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    \13\Some have incorrectly argued that S. 1151 will result in over-
notification of consumers and in a lack of clarity for business. To the 
contrary, the bill contains meaningful checks and balances, including 
the risk assessment and financial fraud prevention provisions in 
Section 212, to prevent over-notification and the underreporting of 
data security breaches. The risk assessment provision in Section 212 
furthermore, provides businesses with an opportunity to fully evaluate 
data security breaches when they occur, to determine whether notice 
should be provided to consumers. In addition, the bill compliments and 
properly builds upon other Federal statutes governing data privacy and 
security to ensure clarity for business in this area. For example, to 
avoid conflicting obligations regarding the bill's data security 
program requirements, Section 201(c) specifically exempts financial 
institutions that are already subject to, and complying with, the data 
privacy and security requirements under GLB, as well as HIPAA-regulated 
entities. The bill also builds upon existing Federal laws and guidance, 
such as the data security protections established by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency for financial institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, to strengthen the tools available to law 
enforcement to investigate data security breaches, combat 
identity theft and protect cybersecurity, the bill also 
requires that business entities and Federal agencies notify a 
new Government office to be established by the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security of certain major security 
breaches that are likely to affect law enforcement or national 
security. Such notice to law enforcement is to be provided 
within 10 days following discovery of the security breach and 
at least 72 hours before providing notice to individuals. The 
new Government office will be responsible for disseminating the 
information that it receives to the Secret Service, FBI and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and to other Federal 
enforcement agencies as warranted. This notice will provide law 
enforcement with a valuable head start in pursuing the 
perpetrators of cyber intrusions and identity theft. The bill 
also empowers the FTC, Secret Service and FBI to obtain 
additional information about the data breach from business 
entities and Federal agencies to determine whether notice of 
the breach should be given to consumers.
    This notice mechanism also gives businesses and agencies 
certainty as to their legal obligation to provide notice and 
prevents them from sending notices when they are unnecessary, 
which over time, could result in consumers ignoring such 
notices. The notice of breach provisions for electronic health 
records that Congress enacted in the American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act (ARRA) apply to information that is accessed or 
disclosed from personal health records. The notice of breach 
provisions in this bill are not intended to preempt the notice 
requirements established by ARRA.
    The bill also recognizes the benefits of separating the 
notice obligations of owners of sensitive personally 
identifiable information and third parties who use and manage 
sensitive personally identifiable information on the owner's 
behalf. The bill imposes an obligation on third parties that 
suffer a data security breach to notify the owners or licensees 
of the sensitive personally identifiable information, who 
would, in turn, notify consumers. If the owner or licensee of 
the data gives notice of the breach to the consumer, then the 
breached third party does not have to give notice. The bill 
also states that it does not abrogate any agreement between a 
breached entity and a data owner or licensee to provide the 
required notice in the event of a breach. Separating the notice 
obligations between data owners and licensees, and third 
parties, will encourage data owners and licensees to address 
the notice obligation in agreements with third parties and will 
help to ensure that consumers will receive timely notice from 
the entity with which they have a direct relationship. However, 
this notice can only be effective if the entity that suffers 
the breach, and any other third parties, provide to the entity 
who will give the notice complete and timely information about 
the nature and scope of the breach and the identity of the 
entity breached.
    As discussed above, the bill assigns limited obligations to 
service providers when solely engaging in certain conduct 
involving the transmission, routing, intermediate and transient 
storage, or when connecting to a system or network. A service 
provider's breach notification obligations under subtitle B of 
title II are exclusively set out in Section 211(b)(4) of the 
bill, which provides that if a service provider becomes aware 
of a security breach of data in electronic form containing 
sensitive personal information that is owned or possessed by 
another business entity that connects to or uses the service 
provider's system or network for the purpose of transmitting, 
routing, or providing intermediate or transient storage of such 
data, the service provider is only required to notify the 
business entity who initiated the connection, transmission, 
routing, or storage. Such notice is required only in those 
cases where such business entity reasonably can be identified.

3. Enforcement

    Third, the legislation also establishes tough, but fair, 
enforcement provisions to punish those who fail to notify 
consumers of a data security breach, or to maintain a data 
security program. The bill makes it a crime for any individual, 
with knowledge of the obligation to provide notice of a 
security breach, to intentionally and willfully conceal the 
breach that subsequently causes economic harm to consumers. 
Violators of this provision are subject to a criminal fine 
under title 18, or imprisonment of up to five years, or both. 
This provision is no more onerous than criminal provisions for 
other types of fraudulent conduct that cause similar harm to 
individuals.
    The bill also contains strong but fair civil enforcement 
provisions. The bill authorizes the Secret Service, FBI and the 
FTC to investigate data security breaches and to provide 
guidance to companies that have been the victim of a data 
security breach on their notice obligations under the bill. The 
bill also authorizes the FTC to bring a civil enforcement 
action for violations of the data security program requirements 
in the bill and to recover a civil penalty of not more than 
$5,000 per violation, per day and a maximum penalty of $500,000 
per violation. Double penalties may be recovered for 
intentional and willful violations of these requirements. The 
bill provides that the determination about the amount of the 
civil penalty is to be made by the court. The bill also allows 
State Attorneys General to bring civil actions to recover these 
civil penalties in United States District Court. However if the 
FTC initiates a civil action to recover penalties, the bill 
also prohibits State Attorneys General from commencing another 
civil action against the same defendant, based on the same or 
related violations.
    In addition, the bill contains strong, but fair civil 
enforcement provisions for the requirements to provide notice 
of a security breach. The bill authorizes the FTC and the 
Attorney General of the United States to bring a civil 
enforcement action to recover a civil penalty of up to $11,000 
per day per security breach and a maximum penalty of $1,000,000 
for violation of the security breach notice requirements. 
Double penalties may be recovered for intentional and willful 
violations. The bill provides that the determination about the 
amount of the civil penalty is to be made by the court. The 
bill also allows State Attorneys General to bring civil actions 
to recover these civil penalties in United States District 
Court. However, if the Attorney General or the FTC initiates a 
civil action to recover penalties, the bill prohibits State 
Attorneys General from commencing another civil action against 
the same defendant, based on the same or related violations.
    It is not uncommon for Congress to authorize both Federal 
and State regulators to enforce Federal consumer protection 
laws. In fact, Federal antitrust laws, the CAN-SPAM Act 
(Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act of 2003), and the Communications Act of 1934 also 
authorize State Attorneys General to seek damages or to enjoin 
further Federal law violations. The State enforcement 
provisions in this bill are modeled after those laws.

4. Preemption

    The legislation also carefully balances the need for 
Federal uniformity in certain data privacy laws and the 
important role of States as leaders on privacy issues. Section 
204 of the bill (relation to other laws) preempts State laws 
with respect to requirements for administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards for the protection of sensitive personally 
identifying information. These requirements are the same 
requirements set forth in Section 202 of the bill. Section 
204(b) of the bill also makes clear that the data security 
requirements in the bill do not preempt the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act or that law's implementing regulations, including those 
regulations adopted or enforced by States.
    Section 219 of the bill (effect on Federal and State laws) 
also preempts State laws on breach notification for entities 
that are subject to the bill. The Committee intends for this 
provision to preempt State data breach laws only with respect 
to the business entities and Federal agencies covered by the 
bill. However, in recognition of the important role that the 
States have played in developing breach notification, the bill 
carves out an exception to preemption for State laws regarding 
providing consumers with information about victim protection 
assistance that is provided for by the State.
    In addition, Section 219 of the bill provides that the 
notice requirements in the bill supersede ``any provision of 
law of any State relating to notification of a security breach, 
except as provided in Section 214(b) of the bill.'' The bill's 
subtitle on security breach notification applies to ``any 
agency, or business entity engaged in interstate commerce,'' 
and the term ``agency'' is defined in the bill by referencing 
section 551 of title 5, United States Code, which pertains to 
Federal Governmental entities. As a result, the security breach 
notification requirements in the bill have no application to 
State and local governmental entities, and the Committee does 
not intend for this provision to preempt or displace State laws 
that address obligations of State and local governmental 
entities to provide notice of a security breach.
    Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act-covered and Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act-covered entities are not 
subject to the bill. Consequently, the preemption provisions in 
the bill similarly do not apply to those entities. It is 
possible, however, that other Federal laws that govern these 
entities could preempt State law.

5. Criminal provisions

    Developing a comprehensive strategy for cybersecurity that 
includes a response to cybercrime remains a pressing challenge. 
For this reason, the bill includes, among other things, several 
cybercrime provisions that update the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, so that this law remains a viable tool for law enforcement 
to respond to emerging cyber threats.
    First, the bill creates a new criminal offense for causing 
damage to a critical infrastructure computer that manages or 
controls national defense, national security, transportation, 
public health and safety, or other critical infrastructure 
systems. This new offense includes a three-year mandatory 
minimum sentence. The mandatory minimum sentence drew 
bipartisan opposition from several Judiciary Committee members 
during the Committee's consideration of the provision. In 
particular, Chairman Leahy expressed concern that the mandatory 
minimum sentence would lead to unfair sentencing results, while 
not adding any deterrence value.\14\
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    \14\Full Committee Markup of the Personal Data Privacy and Security 
Act of 2011, S. 1151, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Markup] 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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    Second, the bill amends title 18, United States Code, 
section 1961(1) to add violations of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act to the definition of racketeering activity. This 
update to the law will make it easier for the Government to 
prosecute certain organized criminal groups that engage in 
computer network attacks.
    Third, Section 102 of the bill also makes it a crime for a 
person who knows of a security breach which requires notice to 
individuals under the bill, and who is under obligation to 
provide such notice, to intentionally and willfully conceal the 
fact of, or information related to, that security breach. 
Punishment is either a fine under title 18, or imprisonment of 
up to 5 years, or both.
    Fourth, the bill contains several other amendments to the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Section 103 amends title 18, 
United States Code, section 1030(c), to streamline and enhance 
the penalty structure under section 1030. Section 104 expands 
the scope of the offense for trafficking in passwords under 
section 1030(a)(6) to include passwords used to access a 
protected Government or non-government computer. Section 105 
amends section 1030(b) to clarify that both conspiracy and 
attempt to commit a computer hacking offense are subject to the 
same penalties as completed, substantive offenses. Section 106 
amends 1030(i) and (j) to clarify the criminal forfeiture 
provision in section 1030 and to create a civil forfeiture 
provision to provide the procedures governing civil forfeiture.
    To address civil liberties concerns about the scope of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the bill amends the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act to exclude from criminal liability conduct 
that exclusively involves a violation of a contractual 
obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use policy, or 
terms of service agreement. In particular, the definition for 
``exceeds authorization'' in the statute is amended by the bill 
to exclude conduct solely involving a violation of a 
contractual agreement. The purpose of this amendment is to make 
clear that Congress does not intend for the Department of 
Justice to pursue criminal prosecutions under that statue for 
conduct solely involving a violation of a terms of use 
agreement or contractual agreement involving a private, non-
government computer. The Committee does not, however, intend to 
prohibit the Department of Justice from using evidence of such 
contractual violations to support a charge under 1030, when 
coupled with other evidence.
    During the Judiciary Committee hearing, several Members of 
the Committee, including the Chairman, raised concerns about 
the Justice Department's decision to bring criminal charges in 
United States v. Lori Drew, which involved a Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act charge based solely upon a violation of a MySpace 
terms of service agreement.\15\ In his testimony before the 
Committee, Associate Deputy Attorney General James Baker 
responded to concerns about the Drew prosecution by noting that 
the case was an anomaly. Specifically, Mr. Baker noted that if 
Congress responded to the Drew case by ``restricting the 
statute [by prohibiting claims bases solely upon a violation of 
terms of use or contractual agreements] . . . [that] would make 
it difficult or impossible to deter and address serious insider 
threats through prosecution.'' In addition, Mr. Baker cautioned 
against treating violations of contractual agreements in 
cyberspace any differently from violations of such agreements 
in other context. For example, he noted the fact that law 
enforcement can prosecute an employee who acts in violation of 
an office policy. Mr. Baker conceded that the Department of 
Justice would not appeal the court's decision to overturn the 
conviction in the Drew case.
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    \15\In the Drew case, Ms. Drew was alleged to have violated a 
MySpace terms of service agreement by creating a false user identity, 
which she used to bully a teenager. The teenager later committed 
suicide. A jury found Ms. Drew guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, because she exceeded the authorization to 
use MySpace. A Federal judge subsequently overturned the jury's 
misdemeanor conviction. United States v. Lori Drew, No CR 08-0582-GW 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2009). In doing so, the court concluded that 
permitting a violation of a website's terms of service to constitute an 
intentional access of a computer without authorization or exceeding 
authorization under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act would ``result in 
transforming section 1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly overbroad 
enactment that would convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet 
users into misdemeanant criminals.'' Id. at 29. The Justice Department 
did not appeal the decision.
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    Finally, to further address this issue, Section 107 of the 
bill amends section 1030(g) to preclude civil claims based 
exclusively on conduct that involves a violation of a 
contractual obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use 
policy or terms of service agreement. Section 108 also adds a 
new reporting requirement to section 1030 that requires that 
the Attorney General annually report to Congress on the number 
of criminal cases brought under section 1030(a) in which the 
sole basis for the Government determining that access to the 
non-governmental computer was unauthorized, or in excess of 
authorization, was that the defendant violated a contractual 
obligation or agreement.

          II. History of the Bill and Committee Consideration

                      A. INTRODUCTION OF THE BILL

    Chairman Leahy introduced the Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2011 on June 7, 2011. This privacy bill is 
cosponsored by Senators Schumer, Cardin, Franken and 
Blumenthal.
    This legislation is very similar to the Personal Data 
Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, which Senator Leahy 
introduced on July 22, 2009, the Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2007, S. 495, which Senators Leahy and Specter 
introduced on July 6, 2007, and to the Personal Data Privacy 
and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, which Senators Leahy and 
Specter introduced on September 29, 2005. The Judiciary 
Committee favorably reported S. 1490 by a bipartisan vote of 14 
Yeas and 5 Nays on November 5, 2009; S. 495 on May 3, 2007, by 
voice vote and S. 1789 on November 17, 2005, by a bipartisan 
vote of 13 to 5.
    The Committee has held two hearings related to S. 1151. On 
June 21, 2011, the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime 
and Terrorism held a hearing entitled, ``Cybersecurity: 
Evaluating the Administration's Proposals.'' This hearing 
examined the data breach and cybercrime proposals contained in 
the Obama administration's legislative package on 
cybersecurity. The following witnesses testified at this 
hearing: The Honorable Jim Langevin (D-RI), Member, United 
States House of Representatives; James A. Baker, Associate 
Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice; Greg 
Schaffer, Acting Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection 
and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security; and 
Ari Schwartz, Senior Internet Policy Advisor, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department 
of Commerce.
    On September, 7, 2011, the Judiciary Committee held a 
hearing entitled, ``Cybercrime: Updating the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act to Protect Cyberspace and Combat Emerging Threats.'' 
This hearing examined the cybercrime proposals contained in the 
Obama administration's cybersecurity proposal, including the 
criminal proposals contained in S. 1151. The following 
witnesses testified at this hearing: James A. Baker, Esq., 
Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 
and Pablo A. Martinez, Deputy Special Agent in Charge, Criminal 
Investigative Division, and United States Secret Service.

                       B. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

    On September 7, 2011, S. 1151 was placed on the Judiciary 
Committee's agenda. The Committee considered this legislation 
on September 15 and 22, 2011.
    During the Committee's consideration of S. 1151, six 
amendments to the bill were offered and five amendments were 
adopted by the Committee:
    First, the Committee adopted, without objection, a complete 
substitute bill for S. 1151 (ALB11637), which Chairman Leahy 
offered. The substitute bill made several changes to the bill, 
including (1) striking the data broker and Government use 
titles in the bill; (2) adding a new criminal provision making 
it a felony to intentionally damage a critical infrastructure 
computer; (3) adding a knowledge requirement and economic harm 
requirement in the amount of at least $1,000 to the criminal 
provision on concealment of a security breach; (4) clarifying 
that the definition of security breach excludes public records 
and information obtained from public records; (5) modifying the 
trigger for breach notice to ``substantial risk of identity 
theft, economic loss or harm, or physical harm''; (6) 
clarifying that enforcement actions brought by State Attorneys 
General may only be brought in U.S. District Court; and (7) 
making technical corrections to the bill.
    Second, the Committee adopted, without objection, a 
manager's amendment (ALB11713) to S. 1151 which Chairman Leahy 
also offered. The manager's amendment made several changes to 
the bill, including: (1) adopting an amendment filed by Senator 
Grassley (HEN11631) to strike language authorizing the Federal 
Trade Commission to modify the definition for sensitive 
personally identifiable information in the bill through 
rulemaking; (2) making several technical changes to Section 
202(d) regarding service providers; (3) adding limitation on 
liability language; (4) amending the State Attorney General 
Enforcement provisions in Section 203 to clarify that if a 
Federal civil or criminal action has been filed, a State cannot 
bring another action for the same violation; (5) striking the 
technical requirements for the risk assessment; (6) amending 
Sections 217 and 218 to clarify that civil penalties are 
calculated per security breach, per day and adding limitation 
on liability language; (7) amending the State Attorney General 
Enforcement provisions in Section 218 to clarify that if a 
Federal civil or criminal action has been filed, a State cannot 
bring another action for the same violation; and (8) clarifying 
the preemption provision in Section 219, so that the bill does 
not preempt the Gramm- Leach-Bliley Act, or the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; (9) clarifying 
that the preemption provision governing State data breach laws 
applies only to the entities subject to the bill; (10) 
clarifying the GLB carve-outs for the data security program and 
data breach provisions in Sections 201 and 211; and (11) making 
other technical changes to the bill.
    Third, the Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment 
offered by Senator Grassley (JEN11A19) to amend the definition 
of ``exceeds authorized access'' in title 18, United States 
Code, section 1030, to exclude conduct that only involves 
violating a terms of use agreement, or other contractual 
agreement governing the use of a non-government computer.
    Fourth, when the Committee resumed consideration of the 
bill on September 22, 2011, Senator Grassley offered an 
amendment (ALB11652) to add a mandatory minimum sentence to the 
damage of critical infrastructure computers offense in Section 
109 of the bill. The amendment was accepted on a roll call 
vote. The vote record is as follows:

Tally: 11 Yeas, 7 Nays
Yeas (11): Feinstein (D-CA), Schumer (D-NY), Whitehouse (D-RI), 
        Klobuchar (D-MN), Grassley (R-IA), Hatch (R-UT), Kyl 
        (R-AZ), Sessions (D-AL), Graham (R-SC), Cornyn (R-TX), 
        and Coburn (R-OK).
Nays (7): Leahy (D-VT), Kohl (D-WI), Durbin (D-IL), Franken (D-
        MN), Coons (D-DE), Blumenthal (D-CT), and Lee (R-UT).

    Fifth, the Committee adopted by voice vote a second degree 
amendment offered by Senator Franken (HEN11688) to Senator 
Grassley's amendment (HEN11637) that added a data minimization 
requirement to the data security program requirements in the 
bill.
    Sixth, the Committee rejected by voice vote an amendment 
offered by Senator Grassley (HEN11637) that would have struck 
the data security program requirements in the bill.
    Seventh, Senator Grassley offered an amendment (ALB11646) 
to prohibit State Attorneys General from retaining private 
counsel on a contingency fee basis to enforce the civil 
enforcement provisions in the bill. The amendment was rejected 
on a roll call vote. The vote record is as follows:

Tally: 7 Yeas, 11 Nays
Yeas (7): Feinstein (D-CA), Grassley (R-IA), Hatch (R-UT), Kyl 
        (R-AZ), Sessions (D-AL), Cornyn (R-TX), and Lee (R-UT).
Nays (11): Leahy (D-VT), Kohl (D-WI), Schumer (D-NY), Durbin 
        (D-IL), Whitehouse (D-RI), Klobuchar (D-MN), Franken 
        (D-MN), Coons (D-DE), Blumenthal (D-CT), Graham (R-SC), 
        and Coburn (R-OK).

    The Committee then voted to report the Personal Data 
Privacy and Security Act of 2011, as amended, favorably to the 
Senate. The Committee proceeded by roll call vote as follows:

Tally: 10 Yeas, 8 Nays
Yeas (10): Leahy (D-VT), Kohl (D-WI), Feinstein (D-CA), Schumer 
        (D-NY), Durbin (D-IL), Whitehouse (D-RI), Klobuchar (D-
        MN), Franken (D-MN), Coons (D-DE), and Blumenthal (D-
        CT).
Nays (8): Grassley (R-IA), Hatch (R-UT), Kyl (R-AZ), Sessions 
        (R-AL), Graham (R-SC), Cornyn (R-TX), Lee (R-UT), and 
        Coburn (R-OK).

              III. Section-by-Section Summary of the Bill

Section 1--Short title

    This section provides that the legislation may be cited as 
the ``Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011.''

Section 2--Findings

    Section 2 provides Congressional findings on the threats 
posed by data security breaches and cybercrime.

Section 3--Definitions

    Section 3 contains the definitions used in the bill.

 TITLE I--ENHANCING PUNISHMENT FOR IDENTITY THEFT AND OTHER VIOLATIONS 
                      OF DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY

Section 101--Organized criminal activity in connection with 
        unauthorized access to personally identifiable information

    Section 101 amends 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1) to add violations 
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to the definition of 
racketeering activity. This change would increase certain 
penalties, and make it easier for the Government to prosecute 
certain organized criminal groups who engage in computer 
network attacks.

Section 102--Concealment of security breaches involving personally 
        identifiable information

    Section 102 makes it a crime for a person who knows of a 
security breach which requires notice to individuals under 
Title II of this Act, and who is under obligation to provide 
such notice, to intentionally and willfully conceal the fact 
of, or information related to, that security breach. Punishment 
is either a fine under Title 18, or imprisonment of up to 5 
years, or both.

Section 103--Penalties for fraud and related activity in connection 
        with computers

    Section 103 amends title 18, United States Code, section 
1030(c) to streamline and enhance the penalty structure under 
section 1030.

Section 104--Trafficking in passwords

    Section 104 expands the scope of the offense for 
trafficking in passwords under title 18, United States Code, 
section 1030(a)(6) to include passwords used to access a 
protected government or non-government computer, and to include 
any other means of unauthorized access to a government 
computer.

Section 105--Conspiracy and attempted computer fraud offenses

    Section 105 amends title 18, United States Code, section 
1030(b) to clarify that both conspiracy and attempt to commit a 
computer hacking offense are subject to the same penalties as 
completed, substantive offenses.

Section 106--Criminal and civil forfeiture for fraud and related 
        activity in connection with computers

    Section 106 amends title 18, United States Code, sections 
1030(i) and (j) to clarify the criminal forfeiture provision in 
section 1030 and to create a civil forfeiture provision to 
provide the procedures governing civil forfeiture, to clarify 
that the proceeds that may be forfeited under section 1030 are 
gross proceeds, as opposed to net proceeds, and to allow for 
the forfeiture of real property used to facilitate section 1030 
offenses.

Section 107--Limitations on civil actions

    Section 107 amends title 18, United States Code, section 
1030(g) to preclude civil claims based exclusively on conduct 
that involves a violation of a contractual obligation or 
agreement, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service 
agreement. The purpose of the amendment is to prevent civil 
claims based on innocuous conduct.

Section 108--Reporting of certain criminal cases

    Section 108 adds a new reporting requirement to section 
1030, requiring that the Attorney General annually report to 
Congress on the number of criminal cases brought under section 
1030(a) in which the defendant either exceeded authorized 
access to a non-governmental computer, or accessed a non-
governmental computer without authorization, and in which the 
sole basis for the Government determining that access to the 
non-governmental computer was unauthorized, or in excess of 
authorization, was that the defendant violated a contractual 
obligation or agreement with a service provider or employer. 
The purpose of the provision is to address concerns that the 
Government could bring criminal cases under section 1030 for 
relatively innocuous conduct, such as violating a terms of use 
agreement.

Section 109--Damage to critical infrastructure computers

    Section 109 adds a new criminal provision to tile 18 
specifically making it a felony to damage a computer that 
manages or controls national defense, national security, 
transportation, public health and safety, or other critical 
infrastructure systems or information. Violations are subject 
to a fine and/or imprisonment of at least three years and up to 
20 years.

 TITLE II--PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION

            SUBTITLE A--A DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROGRAM

Section 201--Purpose and applicability of data privacy and security 
        program

    Section 201 addresses the data privacy and security 
requirements of Section 202 for business entities that compile, 
access, use, process, license, distribute, analyze or evaluate 
personally identifiable information in electronic or digital 
form on 10,000 or more U.S. persons. Section 201 exempts from 
the data privacy and security requirements of Section 202 
businesses already subject to, and complying with, similar data 
privacy and security requirements under GLB and implementing 
regulations, as well as examination for compliance by Federal 
functional regulators as defined in GLB, and HIPPA regulated 
entities.

Section 202--Requirements for a data privacy and security program

    Section 202 requires covered business entities to create a 
data privacy and security program to protect and secure 
sensitive data. The requirements for the data security program 
are modeled after those established by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency for financial institutions in its 
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding 
Customer Information, 12 C.F.R. Sec. 30.6 Appendix B (2005).
    A data privacy and security program must be designed to 
ensure security and confidentiality of personal records, 
protect against anticipated threats and hazards to the security 
and integrity of personal electronic records, protect against 
unauthorized access and use of personal records, and ensure 
proper back-up storage and disposal of personally identifiable 
information. In addition, Section 202 requires a covered 
business entity to: (1) regularly assess, manage and control 
risks to improve its data privacy and security program; (2) 
provide employee training to implement its data privacy and 
security program; (3) conduct tests to identify system 
vulnerabilities; (4) ensure that overseas service providers 
retained to handle personally identifiable information, but 
which are not covered by the provisions of this Act, take 
reasonable steps to secure that data; and (5) periodically 
assess its data privacy and security program to ensure that the 
program addresses current threats. Section 202 also requires 
that the data security program include measures that allow the 
data broker (1) to track who has access to sensitive personally 
identifiable information maintained by the data broker and (2) 
to ensure that third parties or customers who are authorized to 
access this information have a valid legal reason for accessing 
or acquiring the information.

Section 203--Enforcement

    Section 203 gives the Federal Trade Commission the right to 
bring an enforcement action for violations of Sections 201 and 
202 in Subtitle A. Business entities that violate sections 201 
and 202 are subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 
per violation, per day and a maximum penalty of $500,000 per 
violation. Intentional and willful violations of these sections 
are subject to an additional civil penalty of $5,000 per 
violation, per day and an additional maximum penalty of 
$500,000 per violation. This section also grants States the 
right to bring civil actions on behalf of their residents in 
U.S. district courts, and requires States to give advance 
notice of such court proceedings to the FTC, where practicable. 
There is no private right of action under this subtitle.

Section 204--Relation to other laws

    Section 204 preempts State laws relating to administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards for the protection of 
sensitive personally identifying information. The requirements 
referred to in this Section are the same requirements set forth 
in Section 202.

                SUBTITLE B--SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION

Section 211--Notice to individuals

    Section 211 requires that a business entity or Federal 
agency give notice to an individual whose sensitive personally 
identifiable information has been, or is reasonably believed to 
have been, compromised, following the discovery of a data 
security breach. The notice required under Section 211 must be 
made without unreasonable delay and no more than 60 days after 
the discovery of the breach, unless extended by the Federal 
Trade Commission.
    Section 211(b) requires that a business entity or Federal 
agency that does not own or license the information compromised 
as a result of a data security breach notify the owner or 
licensee of the data. The owner or licensee of the data would 
then provide the notice to individuals as required under this 
Section. However, agreements between owners, licensees and 
third parties regarding the obligation to provide notice under 
Section 211 are preserved. In addition, Section 211(b) provides 
that service providers who only transmit or route electronic 
data that is subject to a security breach must notify the owner 
of the data of the security breach. The owner of the data has 
the obligation to notify the individuals whose data was 
breached.
    Section 212(d) allows the Secret Service or FBI to delay 
the notice required under Section 211, if notice would impede a 
criminal investigation, or harm national security. The delay 
period is for 30 days, unless extended by law enforcement.

Section 212--Exemptions

    Section 212 provides for certain exemptions to the notice 
requirements under Section 211, for national security and law 
enforcement purposes, a safe harbor, and financial fraud 
programs.
    Section 212(a) allows the Secret Service, or Federal Bureau 
of Investigation to prevent notice if the providing of such 
notice would reveal sensitive sources and methods, impede a 
criminal investigation, or damage national security.
    Section 212(b) exempts a business entity or Federal agency 
from providing notice, if the business or Federal agency 
conducts a risk assessment and determines that there is no 
significant risk that the security breach will result in harm 
or fraud to the individuals whose sensitive personally 
identifiable information has been compromised. The business 
entity or Federal agency must notify the Federal Trade 
Commission of the results of the risk assessment within 45 days 
of the security breach and if the Federal Trade Commission 
concurs with the determination, notice is not required. Under 
Section 212(b) a rebuttable presumption exists that the use of 
encryption technology, or other technologies that render the 
sensitive personally identifiable information indecipherable 
means that there is no significant risk of harm, or fraud. The 
provision also provides certain requirements for the risk 
assessment and states that a failure to satisfy these 
requirements, or submitting a risk assessment with false 
information, constitutes a violation of the provision.
    Section 212(c) also provides a financial fraud prevention 
exemption from the notice requirement, if a business entity has 
a program to block the fraudulent use of information--such as 
credit card numbers--to avoid fraudulent transactions. Debit 
cards and other financial instruments are not covered by this 
exemption.

Section 213--Methods of notice

    Section 213 provides that notice to individuals may be 
given in writing to the individuals' last known address, by 
telephone or via email notice, if the individual has consented 
to email notice. Media notice is also required if the number of 
residents in a particular State whose information was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been compromised exceeds 5,000 
individuals.

Section 214--Content of notification

    Section 214 requires that the notice detail the nature of 
the personally identifiable information that has been 
compromised by the data security beach, a toll free number to 
contact the business entity or Federal agency that suffered the 
breach, and the toll free numbers and addresses of major credit 
reporting agencies. Section 214 also preserves the right of 
States to require that additional information about victim 
protection assistance be included in the notice.

Section 215--Coordination of notification with credit reporting 
        agencies

    Section 215 requires that, for situations where notice of a 
data security breach is required for 5,000 or more individuals, 
a business entity or Federal agency must also provide advance 
notice of the breach to consumer reporting agencies.

Section 216--Notice to law enforcement

    Section 216 requires that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security designate a Federal Government entity to receive all 
of the notices (law enforcement, risk assessment and national 
security) required under Sections 212 and 216 within 60 days of 
the enactment of the Act. The Section further requires that 
business entities and Federal agencies notify this Federal 
entity of the fact that a security breach has occurred as 
promptly as possible, but at least 72 hours before notice is 
given to individuals and no less than 10 days after discovery 
of the security breach, if the data security breach involves: 
(1) more than 5,000 individuals; (2) a database that contains 
information about more than 500,000 individuals; (3) a Federal 
Government database; or (4) individuals known to be Federal 
Government employees or contractors involved in national 
security or law enforcement. The entity designated by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for promptly 
notifying Federal law enforcement agencies, including the 
Secret Service, FBI and FTC, of the data security breach. The 
FTC, in consultation with the Attorney General and Secretary of 
Homeland Security, shall promulgate regulations to clarify the 
reporting required by this section and to adjust the 
thresholds.

Section 217--Enforcement

    Section 217 provides that the Attorney General and Federal 
Trade Commission may bring a civil action to recover penalties 
for violations of the notification requirements in Subtitle B. 
Violators are subject to a civil penalty of up to $11,000 per 
day, per security breach. There is a maximum penalty cap of $1 
million per security breach. Intentional or willful conduct is 
subject to an additional penalty of up to $11,000 per day, per 
security breach, with a maximum penalty of an additional $1 
million. The provision also requires that the Department of 
Justice and FTC coordinate enforcement of this provision and 
also coordinate with other Federal enforcement agencies as 
warranted.

Section 218--Enforcement by State Attorneys General

    Section 218 allows State Attorneys General to bring a civil 
action in U.S. district court to enforce Subtitle B. The 
Attorney General may stay, or intervene in, any State action.

Section 219--Effect on Federal and State law

    Section 219 preempts State laws on breach notification, 
with the exception of State laws regarding providing consumers 
with information about victim protection assistance that is 
available to consumers in a particular State. Because the 
breach notification requirements in the bill do not apply to 
State and local government entities, this provision does not 
preempt State or local laws regarding the obligations of State 
and local government entities to provide notice of a data 
security breach.

Section 220--Reporting on risk assessment exemptions

    Section 220 requires that, no later than 18 months after 
enactment, the Federal Trade Commission report to Congress on 
the number and nature of data security breach notices invoking 
the risk assessment exemption and that the Secret Service and 
FBI report to Congress on the number and nature of data 
security breaches subject to the national security and law 
enforcement exemptions.

Section 221--Effective date

    Subtitle B takes effect 90 days after the date of enactment 
of the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act.

         TITLE III--COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PAY-AS-YOU-GO ACT

Section 301--Budget compliance

    Section 301 contains the language required to comply with 
the Pay-As-You-Go Act.

             IV. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

    The Committee sets forth, with respect to the bill, S. 
1151, the following estimate and comparison prepared by the 
Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:

                                                  October 27, 2011.
Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1151, the Personal 
Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Matthew 
Pickford (for federal costs), and Marin Randall (for the impact 
on the private sector).
            Sincerely,
                                              Douglas W. Elmendorf.
    Enclosure.

S. 1151--Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011

    Summary: S. 1151 would establish new federal crimes 
relating to unauthorized access to sensitive personal 
information. The bill also would require most federal agencies 
and businesses that collect, transmit, store, or use such 
personal information to establish a data privacy and security 
program and to notify any individuals whose information has 
been unlawfully accessed.
    Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO 
estimates that implementing S. 1151 would cost $14 million over 
the 2012-2016 period. Enacting S. 1151 could increase civil and 
criminal penalties and could affect direct spending by agencies 
not funded through annual appropriations; therefore, pay-as-
you-go procedures apply. CBO estimates, however, that any 
changes to revenues and net direct spending would be 
negligible.
    S. 1151 contains intergovernmental mandates as defined in 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO estimates that 
the cost of complying with the requirements would be small and 
would not exceed the threshold established in UMRA ($71 million 
in 2011, adjusted annually for inflation).
    S. 1151 also would impose several private-sector mandates. 
Much of the private sector already complies with many of the 
bill's requirements. However, a large number of entities in the 
private sector would need to implement new or enhanced security 
standards if the bill is enacted. Consequently, CBO estimates 
that the aggregate direct cost of the mandates in the bill 
would probably exceed the annual threshold established in UMRA 
for private-sector mandates ($142 million in 2011, adjusted 
annually for inflation) in at least one of the first five years 
the mandates are in effect.
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of S. 1151 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget functions 050 
(national defense), 370 (commerce and housing credit), 750 
(administration of justice), 800 (general government), and 
other budget functions that contain salaries and expenses.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                         -------------------------------------------------------
                                                            2012     2013     2014     2015     2016   2012-2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Estimated Authorization Level...........................        3        3        3        3        3        15
Estimated Outlays.......................................        2        3        3        3        3        14
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the 
bill will be enacted early in 2012, that the necessary amounts 
will be provided each year, and that spending will follow 
historical patterns for similar programs.

Spending subject to appropriation

    Most of the provisions of the bill would codify the current 
practices of the federal government regarding data security and 
procedures for notifying individuals whose personal information 
may have been disclosed. In general, a data breach occurs when 
sensitive, protected, or confidential information is copied, 
transmitted, viewed, or stolen by someone not authorized to do 
so. The federal government is one of the largest providers, 
collectors, consumers, and disseminators of personal 
information in the United States. Although CBO cannot 
anticipate the number or extent of breaches, a significant 
breach of security involving a major collector of personal 
information, such as the Internal Revenue Service or the Social 
Security Administration, could involve millions of individuals 
and result in significant costs to notify those individuals of 
such a breach. Existing laws generally do not require federal 
agencies to notify affected individuals of such security 
breaches; however, agencies that have experienced security 
breaches have generally provided such notification. Therefore, 
CBO expects that codifying this practice would probably not 
lead to a significant increase in spending.
    The legislation also would require a business entity or 
federal agency--under certain circumstances--to notify the 
Department of Homeland Security that a security breach has 
occurred but would permit entities or agencies to apply to the 
federal government for a delay or exemption from the 
requirements if the personal data were encrypted or similarly 
protected or if notification would threaten national security. 
Other provisions of the bill would require the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to develop and enforce regulations to 
implement the bill's new requirements for data security 
programs and policies. Finally, S. 1151 would require federal 
agencies to provide several reports to the Congress, which 
would include the number and type of data breaches.
    Based on information from the Department of Homeland 
Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FTC, and 
other agencies with a significant information technology 
presence, CBO estimates that additional investigative and 
administrative work under the bill would cost about $3 million 
annually, subject to the availability of appropriated funds.

Direct spending and revenues

    S. 1151 would establish new federal crimes relating to 
unauthorized access to sensitive personal information. Enacting 
the bill could increase collections of civil and criminal fines 
for violations of the bill's provisions. CBO estimates that any 
additional collections would not be significant because of the 
relatively small number of additional cases likely to result. 
Civil fines are recorded as revenues. Criminal fines are 
recorded as revenues, deposited in the Crime Victims Fund, and 
subsequently spent without further appropriation.
    Pay-As-You-Go considerations: The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go 
Act of 2010 establishes budget-reporting and enforcement 
procedures for legislation affecting direct spending or 
revenues. CBO estimates that enacting S. 1151 would have a 
negligible effect on direct spending and revenues.
    Estimated impact on state, local, and tribal governments: 
S. 1151 contains intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA 
because it would explicitly preempt laws in at least 46 States 
regarding the treatment of personal information and impose 
notification requirements and limitations on State Attorneys 
General. Because the limits on State authority would impose no 
duties with costs and because the notification requirements 
would result in minimal additional spending, CBO estimates that 
the costs of the mandates would be small and would not exceed 
the threshold established in UMRA for intergovernmental 
mandates ($71 million in 2011, adjusted annually for 
inflation).
    Estimated impact on the private sector: S. 1151 would 
impose several private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA by:
           Requiring certain business entities that 
        handle personally identifiable information for 10,000 
        or more individuals to establish and maintain a data 
        privacy and security program;
           Requiring any business entity engaged in 
        interstate commerce to notify individuals if a security 
        breach occurs in which such individuals' sensitive 
        personally identifiable information is compromised;
           Requiring providers of electronic 
        communication services to inform any user that 
        initiated transmission of data on their network if they 
        become aware of a data breach; and
           Limiting existing rights to seek damages 
        against a person if the only basis for the suit is the 
        violation of a contractual obligations involving the 
        use of computers or access to personal information.
    The majority of businesses already comply with data 
security standards and breach notification procedures similar 
to many of the bill's requirements. However, some of the 
requirements in the bill would impose new standards for data 
maintenance and security on a large number of entities in the 
private sector. Consequently, CBO estimates that the aggregate 
direct cost of all the mandates in the bill would probably 
exceed the annual threshold established in UMRA for private-
sector mandates ($142 million in 2011, adjusted annually for 
inflation) in at least one of the first five years the mandates 
are in effect.

Data privacy and security requirements

    Subtitle A of title II would require businesses engaging in 
interstate commerce that involves collecting, accessing, 
transmitting, using, storing, or disposing of sensitive 
personally identifiable information in electronic or digital 
form on 10,000 or more individuals to establish and maintain a 
program for data privacy and security. The program would be 
designed to protect against both unauthorized access and any 
anticipated vulnerabilities. Business entities would be 
required to conduct periodic risk assessments to identify such 
vulnerabilities and assess possible security risks in 
establishing the program. Additionally, businesses would have 
to train their employees in implementing the data security 
program.
    The bill would direct the FTC to develop rules that 
identify privacy and security requirements for the business 
entities covered under subtitle A. Some businesses would be 
exempt from the requirements of subtitle A. Those include 
certain financial institutions that are subject to the data 
security requirements under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
entities that are subject to the data security requirements of 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and 
providers of electronic communications services to the extent 
that they are exclusively engaged in the temporary storage, 
transmission, or routing of data.
    The cost per entity of the data privacy and security 
requirements would depend on the rules to be established by the 
FTC, the size of the entity, and its current ability to secure, 
record, and monitor access to data, as well as on the amount of 
sensitive, personally identifiable information maintained by 
the entity. The majority of States already have laws requiring 
business entities to utilize data security programs, and it is 
the current practice of many businesses to use security 
measures to protect sensitive data. However, some of the new 
standards for data security in the bill could impose additional 
costs on a large number of private-sector entities.
    For example, under the bill, businesses covered under 
subtitle A would be required to enhance their security 
standards to include the ability to trace access and 
transmission of all records containing sensitive personally 
identifiable information. The current industry standard on data 
security has not reached that level. According to industry 
experts, information on a particular individual can be 
collected from several places and, for large companies, can be 
accessed by thousands of people from several different 
locations. The ability to trace each transaction involving data 
containing personally identifiable information would require a 
significant enhancement of data management hardware and 
software for the majority of businesses. Further, the bill's 
definition of sensitive personally identifiable information is 
broader than the current industry standard.
    This definition would significantly increase the number of 
entities that would be required to implement new or enhanced 
data security standards. The aggregate cost of implementing 
such changes could be substantial.

Notification of security breaches

    Subtitle B of title II would require business entities 
engaged in interstate commerce that use, access, transmit, 
store, dispose of, or collect sensitive personally identifiable 
information to notify individuals in the event of a security 
breach if the individuals' sensitive, personally identifiable 
information is compromised. Entities would be able to notify 
individuals using written letters, the telephone, or email. If 
a business does not own or license the information, it would 
have to notify the owner or licensee of the information 
following a breach. A notice in major media outlets serving a 
State or jurisdiction also would have to be provided for any 
breach of more than 5,000 residents' records within a 
particular State. In addition, businesses would be required to 
notify other entities and agencies in the event of a large 
security breach.
    Entities that experience the breach of such data would have 
to notify the affected victims and consumer reporting agencies 
if the breach involves more than 5,000 individuals. The bill, 
however, would exempt business entities from the notification 
requirements under certain circumstances.
    According to industry sources, the sensitive personally 
identifiable information of millions of individuals is 
illegally accessed or otherwise breached every year. However, 
according to those sources, 46 states already have laws 
requiring notification in the event of a security breach. In 
addition, it is the standard practice of most business entities 
to notify individuals if a security breach occurs. Therefore, 
CBO estimates that the notification requirements would not 
impose significant additional costs on businesses.
    The subtitle also contains a provision requiring providers 
of electronic communication services (such as Internet service 
providers) to inform the entity that began a transmission of 
information using their systems if they become aware that a 
breach of sensitive personally identifiable information has 
occurred. This would constitute a mandate on those service 
providers. The cost to inform business entities of a breach 
would probably be small.

Elimination of existing rights of action

    Title I would eliminate certain existing rights of action 
against individuals for violating contractual agreements 
involving the use of computers or access to personal 
information. Currently, a lawsuit may be filed against an 
individual for exceeding authorized access (obtaining or 
altering information without the proper authorization) and 
computer fraud if that individual violates the terms of a 
related contractual agreement. The bill would eliminate any 
right of action alleging someone has exceeded authorized access 
or committed computer fraud when the only basis for the suit is 
the violation of a related agreement. Because there are few 
such cases, CBO estimates that the cost of the mandate would be 
minimal.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Department of Homeland 
Security--Jason Wheelock; Federal Trade Commission--Susan 
Willie; U.S. Secret Service--Mark Grabowicz; Other Federal 
agencies--Matthew Pickford.
    Impact on State, local, and Tribal Governments: Elizabeth 
Cove Delisle.
    Impact on the private sector: Marin Randall.
    Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis.

                    V. Regulatory Impact Evaluation

    In compliance with rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the 
Senate, the Committee finds that no significant regulatory 
impact will result from the enactment of S. 1151.

                             VI. Conclusion

    The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011, S. 
1151, provides greatly needed privacy protections to American 
consumers and businesses, to ensure that all Americans have the 
tools necessary to protect themselves from identity theft and 
other data security risks. This legislation will also ensure 
that the most effective mechanisms and technologies for dealing 
with the underlying problem of lax data security are 
implemented by the Nation's businesses to help prevent data 
breaches from occurring in the first place. The passage and 
enactment of this important privacy legislation is long 
overdue.

                   VII. Additional and Minority Views

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS FROM SENATOR COONS

    I was pleased to support the Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2011, which will bolster the security of 
sensitive personal data held by companies and improve notice to 
consumers in the event of a data breach. In this age of digital 
commerce, the stakes surrounding data security are high and 
will only increase. This legislation will help promote consumer 
trust and corporate accountability.
    As I mentioned during Committee consideration, I believe 
the bill could be further improved if the preemption standards 
were strengthened. In particular, I believe it is 
counterproductive to subject banks and financial services 
entities already regulated under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to 
a patchwork of differing or conflicting state laws governing 
data breach and consumer notice. Accordingly, as this bill 
moves forward to full Senate consideration, I will work to 
ensure that the preemption provisions in S. 1151 are broadened 
to establish uniform preemption of state laws where Congress 
has established a national regime for data security and breach 
notification.
                                              Christopher A. Coons.

 MINORITY VIEWS FROM SENATORS GRASSLEY, KYL, SESSIONS, GRAHAM, CORNYN, 
                               AND COBURN

    This legislation seeks a solution to a real problem, but it 
fails to deliver. Protecting an individual's sensitive personal 
identifying information, recognizing vulnerabilities to 
information and providing notification when a breach of 
information has occurred must be addressed. We support a clear, 
uniform, national standard that directs when notice to 
consumers and law enforcement should be provided. Consumers 
should have access to alerts identifying threats that pose a 
significant risk of identity theft. When appropriate notice is 
given, consumers can work with other entities to limit risk and 
protect their identity. This also means that businesses will 
possess the ability to minimize risk and protect their 
consumers' sensitive personal information from any further 
threats.
    Yet at the same time, we must not numb a consumer's senses 
to risk notification. Legislation should not encourage or 
foster an environment where the default response from a 
business is to always issue notice. Requiring notice for 
trivial security incidents will lead to over-notification, 
which in turn will create broad apathy as consumers are 
inundated with inconsequential warnings. Moreover, the security 
breach that does threaten an individual's identity may be 
ignored. While the purpose of this bill is to protect 
individuals, the effect will be the exact opposite as consumers 
will suffer due to constant notification.
    Additionally, the financial and bureaucratic costs 
associated with this bill will burden small and medium sized 
businesses at exactly the wrong time. We know that excessive 
government regulation has a detrimental effect on businesses, 
imposing heavy burdens on small business which must comply or 
face substantial liability penalties. Such regulations may have 
the effect of bankrupting these businesses. During these 
difficult economic times and unemployment northward of 9%, this 
costly legislation is not prudent.
    While we commend the Chairman's efforts on this particular 
subject, we cannot support S. 1151 at this time. We believe it 
is counterproductive to our shared goal of consumer protection, 
as it will lead to consumer over-notification, increased 
financial costs due to new regulations, while imposing 
excessive liability penalties for failure to comply, ultimately 
leading to further job losses throughout the economy.

                               BACKGROUND

    Identity theft is a problem for both consumers and 
businesses. This problem intensifies as criminals become 
increasingly sophisticated at breaching businesses' security 
systems in order to obtain sensitive information. This threat 
is not just limited to private business but to the government 
as well. Business and government work to understand past and 
present incidents so as to prevent future attacks. Law 
enforcement at the federal, state and local levels work 
together and with private business to enhance controls, protect 
information, and improve cooperation should a breach occur. 
Private businesses, which ultimately bear the major cost of 
fraud resulting from an attack, have spent billions of dollars 
to strengthen data security, seeking ways to stop fraud before 
it happens.
    Underlying the need for a uniform, federal standard is the 
expansive growth of State government activity on this matter. 
Since 2002, 46 states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
laws that seek to prevent identity theft, while requiring 
businesses who suffer a data breach to provide notice to 
consumers detailing the risk to their sensitive personal 
information.\1\ Moreover, the trend continues this year as 14 
states have introduced legislation that expands the scope of 
the laws, creating new and additional notification requirements 
as well as new penalties for those responsible for a breach.\2\ 
Due to the ever changing differences between the various state 
laws, there is a need for a single, uniform, federal standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\National Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach 
Notification Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=13489 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2011).
    \2\National Conference of State Legislatures, Security Breach 
Legislation 2011, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=22295 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, as Congress works to craft legislation we must 
ensure there are tools in place to assist consumers in 
protecting themselves should a breach occur. It is important 
that consumers know when their information is compromised so 
they can obtain resources in order to protect themselves. For 
notice to be effective, consumers should be notified when their 
sensitive personal information is compromised in a way that 
jeopardizes their identities. Otherwise, over-notification will 
lead to consumer apathy and, therefore, will expose consumers 
to greater risk.

   MANDATED ``ONE SIZE FITS ALL'' DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY PROGRAMS

    Section 202 of this bill creates a prescriptive, one size 
fits all data security program requirement that businesses with 
sensitive personal information of more than 5,000 individuals 
must follow. Many small businesses, which can easily acquire 
data on more than 5,000 individuals, will be unduly burdened, 
facing increased compliance costs that may force a small 
business to close its doors. Moreover, this burden becomes 
greater given the bill's expanded definition of sensitive 
personally identifiable information in section 3. Instead, we 
believe a more flexible approach should be provided to 
businesses, appropriate to the size and nature of the 
respective business.
    We agree that businesses should have a plan in place to 
ensure the safety of sensitive information. Unfortunately, 
rather than avoid the pitfalls of over regulation, which is a 
legitimate concern to many businesses already facing economic 
hardships, this bill adds to the problem. The Congressional 
Budget Office recognizes this fact in its cost estimate 
contained in this report. It is disappointing that this bill 
fails to recognize that there are tremendous differences and 
other factors present with various businesses. This bill fails 
to take into account those differences in two ways.
    First, this bill applies complex requirements from Congress 
to all businesses that exceed current industry practices. For 
example, over the span of almost seven pages, section 202 lists 
detailed requirements for a personal data privacy and security 
program that must be implemented. A business must perform risk 
assessments, risk management and control, and training and 
vulnerability testing, among other requirements. A small 
business with one or two employees, that finds itself subject 
to these requirements, must take the time to be sure it is 
complying with these requirements, otherwise it will be subject 
to exorbitant liability penalties.
    In addition to the specific requirements set forth in this 
bill, the checklist for compliance is not complete. Section 202 
punts to the Federal Trade Commission the authority to add 
further, ever changing, requirements for businesses that must 
have data privacy and security programs in place. The Federal 
Trade Commission, through a routine rulemaking process, can add 
``any other administrative, technical, or physical safeguards'' 
deemed necessary. Again, ever changing rules will unduly burden 
small and medium sized businesses that not only must comply 
with the congressional requirements, but new requirements from 
the federal bureaucracy. The combination of congressional and 
agency requirements will unduly harm small businesses.
    We recognize, as do others, that increased government 
regulation can suppress a business's ability to survive and 
grow. As the Congressional Budget Office cost estimate 
contained in this report points out, the new requirements in 
section 202 go beyond the scope of the security measures many 
businesses currently have in place. Imposing new requirements 
that exceed the industry standard, coupled with Federal Trade 
Commission rulemaking of those requirements and an expansive 
definition of sensitive personally identifiable information, 
will create substantial costs to businesses already struggling 
against over regulation and a weak economy. Before a bill on 
this matter becomes law, it is important that the requirements 
in section 202 are reexamined in order to avoid what would be a 
legislative nightmare for many businesses.

                           OVER-NOTIFICATION

    This bill provides in section 211 a default rule that 
notice should always be given to consumers of any breach, 
``following the discovery'' of a security breach. Only if after 
conducting a risk assessment, under section 212(b), may a 
business entity be exempt from providing notice. The burden 
that is placed on businesses will inevitably lead to consumer 
over-notification. As discussed above, the bill's definition of 
sensitive personally identifiable information is broader than 
the current industry standard. This means breached information 
that otherwise would not previously have required notice due to 
its inability to pose a risk of identity theft, will now 
require consumer notification. The costs associated with the 
risk assessment, which must be coordinated with bureaucrats at 
the Federal Trade Commission, will exact a high toll on small 
businesses that are not differentiated in any manner from large 
businesses. Rather than face high liability penalties for 
failure to comply, the result will be simply to provide 
notification for trivial incidents that will have the effect of 
desensitizing the public, while also punishing the business 
which is a victim as well.
    The ``safe harbor'' provision in section 212(b) attempts to 
limit instances where notification is required. However, the 
end result will remain the same due to the way this provision 
is drafted. Rather than risk the penalties for failure to 
notify, a business will in most instances err on the side of 
caution and give notice. Again, the bill's default rule is that 
notice should always be given following the discovery of a 
security breach. However, an entity can perform a risk 
assessment, in consultation with the Federal Trade Commission, 
to determine that there is ``no significant risk that a 
security breach has resulted in, or will result in, identity 
theft, economic loss or harm, or physical harm'' to the 
individuals whose personal information was subject to the 
breach. Thus, a business must make the determination that in no 
instance could there be a significant risk of ``identity theft, 
economic loss or harm, or physical harm.'' Rather than play 
offense against a breach, a business will always find itself on 
defense. The business will try and anticipate several steps 
into the future to determine whether to provide notice. This is 
an impossible task which renders the risk assessment worthless 
as there may always be an unknown and unforeseen risk that 
cannot be predicted. A business will therefore do what is in 
its best interest, which may not necessarily be in an 
individual consumer's best interest, and issue notice whenever 
a security incident occurs.
    Unfortunately, there is no relief for a weary business 
faced with making a determination whether notice is required, 
while trying to limit any further security incidents. In order 
to perform a risk assessment and take advantage of the safe 
harbor, a business must consult with the Federal Trade 
Commission, another layer in the bureaucratic minefield, which 
must be informed of a business's decision to invoke the safe 
harbor following the risk assessment. If the Federal Trade 
Commission ``does not indicate, in writing, within 10 business 
days from receipt of the decision, that notice should be 
given[,]'' then no notice is required. However, it is not 
unreasonable to anticipate the exact opposite effect occurring 
as a result of this provision. Instead, it is reasonable to 
question whether the Federal Trade Commission will be able to 
process the potentially high number of risk assessment results 
that will inundate its office as a result of this bill's 
mandate. This is because the expansive definition of sensitive 
personally identifiable information, along with the trigger for 
when notice should be provided, will inevitably lead to greater 
notification and risk assessment reports. Unless the Federal 
Trade Commission operates efficiently and timely when reviewing 
risk assessments, then the risk of over-notification will only 
continue to rise. An over worked Commission staffer may face a 
quickly approaching 10-day deadline and choose to err on the 
side of caution and instruct a business to provide notice.
    Rather than attempt to limit notification to security 
breaches that pose a significant risk of identity theft, S. 
1151 will create serious over-notification problems which will 
desensitize consumers and lead to widespread apathy. A business 
must always give notice unless after performing a risk 
assessment in consultation with the Federal Trade Commission it 
is determined there is no significant risk of ``identity theft, 
economic loss or harm, or physical harm.'' The initial decision 
a business will make is whether it is beneficial to jump 
through the risk assessment hoops, which will involve dealing 
with a federal agency, and instead simply issue notice. 
Assuming a business does decide to try and invoke the safe 
harbor, it is quite possible that an over-burdened Federal 
Trade Commission will simply instruct a business to issue 
notice. Rather than placing a default rule that notice must 
always be given, unless a risk assessment determines otherwise, 
perhaps a better approach would be to require notice only when 
there is a significant risk of identity theft. This subtle 
burden shifting may work to eliminate all but those 
notifications that pose the greatest threat to a consumer's 
sensitive personal information.

                          EXCESSIVE PENALTIES

    Another troubling aspect of this bill is its excessive 
penalties. Under section 203, businesses that make a mistake in 
complying with the requirements of sections 201 and 202 may be 
held liable at a rate of ``$5,000 per violation per day while 
such violation exists with a maximum of $500,000 per 
violation.'' Section 202 imposes no less than seven 
requirements on businesses, not counting the numerous 
subsections. A mistake in compliance with any one of those 
requirements is a potential violation, running at a rate of 
$5,000 per day. Moreover, that business would likely be facing 
arguments by government attorneys that its conduct was willful 
or intentional, thereby deserving an additional penalty of up 
to $500,000 more.
    Under sections 217 and 218, if a business makes a mistake 
in providing notice to a person whose information may have been 
compromised, that business will be facing a penalty of 
``$11,000 per day per security breach'' up to $1 million. That 
business will also be facing arguments by government attorneys 
that its conduct was intentional or willful, deserving an 
additional penalty of up to $1 million.
    The Chairman has made an effort to address the problem of 
``stacked damages,'' which existed in the original version of 
his bill. The potential for stacked damages increases the 
amount of the already excessive penalties. By his manager's 
amendment, the Chairman has inserted ``penalty limits'' into 
the enforcement sections of the bill. For example, under 
section 203, ``the total sum of civil penalties assessed 
against a business entity for all violations . . . resulting 
from the same or related acts or omissions shall not exceed 
$500,000, unless such conduct is found to be willful or 
intentional.''
    The purpose of these ``penalty limit[ation]'' provisions is 
to prevent the situation where a business makes a mistake which 
results in it ``violating'' all seven requirements under 
section 202 and thereby facing liability at a rate of $35,000 
per day, and up to $3.5 million. Under the ``penalty 
limit[ation]'' provision, if a business makes multiple 
mistakes, as part of the same conduct, it will be facing a 
potential penalty of $5,000 per day, up to $500,000. Similarly, 
under sections 217 and 218, if a business suffers a security 
breach and makes a mistake in notifying ten individuals, whose 
information was compromised, that business will be facing 
penalties of $11,000 per day, up to $ 1 million. It will not be 
facing a potential penalty of $110,000 per day and up to $10 
million.
    The ``penalty limit[ation]'' provisions and some of the 
other changes made by the Chairman are a step in the right 
direction. Hopefully, the changes signal a willingness to 
further refine this bill, which covers a significant and 
complex issue. However, in its current form, the bill's 
penalties remain excessive, especially when applied to small 
and medium sized businesses. Many businesses facing these 
penalties will be forced into bankruptcy.
    Remarkably, during the debate on this bill, the majority 
never expressed any concern about bankrupting businesses or 
that the businesses facing these excessive penalties are 
victims of a crime as their computers will have been hacked. 
This is a disturbing omission given that as of September 2011, 
14 million Americans were unemployed and another 9.3 million 
were underemployed.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, News 
Release, ``The Employment Situation--September 2011'' (Oct. 7, 2011) 
(available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf) (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to facing these excessive penalties, businesses 
will be forced to hire defense attorneys, who are well versed 
in computer and cybersecurity issues. There are only a handful 
of law firms that are fully versed in the subject matter, and 
which have the experience and manpower to defend a business in 
a lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade 
Commission and/or State Attorneys General. Those few 
multinational or large businesses that might consider defending 
themselves will spend money on attorneys, computer experts and 
litigation costs, as opposed to hiring new employees and 
creating jobs.
    Our concerns are not a matter of protecting businesses that 
have committed wrongs. We strongly believe that it is important 
to protect our citizens from identity theft. However, our 
approach must be fair and balanced. And again, it should not be 
forgotten that we are talking about businesses that have made a 
``mistake'' in complying with this law. Consequently, the 
amount of a penalty should be a reasonable deterrent. It should 
not be destructive. Indeed, during these difficult economic 
times, Congress should be helping businesses to create jobs, 
not passing legislation that has the real potential to bankrupt 
businesses and kill jobs.

                             ETHICAL ISSUES

    Another troubling aspect of this bill is the fact that it 
allows State Attorneys Generals to hire private law firms on a 
contingency fee basis to enforce it. This raises serious 
ethical concerns. A neutral and impartial government is a 
fundamental requirement for due process. Employing trial 
lawyers on a contingency fee basis will result in governmental 
power being wielded by lawyers primarily interested in 
benefiting themselves, rather than in doing justice. At the 
very minimum, the appearance of State Attorneys General handing 
out valuable contracts with a chance for private attorneys to 
receive contingency fees is disconcerting. As former Alabama 
Attorney General Bill Pryor (now a judge on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit) once explained that ``[t]hese 
[contingency] contracts . . . create the potential for 
outrageous windfalls or even outright corruption for political 
supporters of the officials who negotiated the contracts.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\William H. Pryor, Jr., Curbing the Abuses of Government Lawsuits 
Against Industries, Speech Before the American Legislative Exchange 
Council, Aug. 11, 1999, at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Personal financial interest should not affect the judgment 
of an attorney representing the government. The faith and trust 
of the public in the government's fair and impartial use of its 
powers is critical to our system of government. Accordingly, an 
attorney who represents the government must be neutral and 
impartial, with no personal or financial stake in the case. 
Neutral and impartial justice is not merely a goal. It is a 
matter of well-established federal and state law. An Executive 
Order forbids the federal government from hiring private 
attorneys on a contingency basis.\5\ Also, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 528 
disqualifies any employee of the Department of Justice from 
participating in case that may result in a personal, financial, 
or political conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\Exec. Order No. 13433, 72 Fed. Reg. 28441 (May 16, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The practice of hiring trial lawyers on a contingency fee 
basis should be ended altogether and it certainly should not be 
extended into this new law. Accordingly, Senator Grassley 
offered Amendment ALB11646 to the bill. That amendment would 
have prohibited State Attorneys General from hiring private law 
firms on a contingency fee basis to enforce this new federal 
law. Contrary to the claims of the majority, this issue is not 
a matter of states' rights. Nor is it a question of states with 
budget problems needing to hire trial lawyers on a contingent 
fee basis.
    This issue is a matter of basic and fundamental ethics and 
it is a matter of due process. The focus of this bill should be 
about creating a reasonable national standard to protect 
Americans from identity theft. It should not be about creating 
revenue for trial lawyers. Senator Grassley's amendment should 
have been adopted.

                           MULTIPLE LAWSUITS

    Another concern with the enforcement provisions is the 
likelihood that they will breed multiple lawsuits against 
businesses, which are all based on the same mistake or conduct. 
Specifically, under the bill as introduced, a business could 
have been subjected to lawsuits by the Department of Justice or 
the Federal Trade Commission and anywhere between one and fifty 
States Attorneys General. No small or medium size business 
could defend against that onslaught, let alone survive it.
    The Chairman's manager's amendment begins to address this 
problem by providing that if the Department of Justice or 
Federal Trade Commission commences an enforcement action, ``no 
attorney general of a State may bring an action for a violation 
. . . that resulted from the same or related acts or omissions 
against a defendant named in the Federal criminal proceeding or 
civil action. . . .'' The purpose of this provision is to 
prevent businesses from having to defend against lawsuits by 
both the Federal and State governments. If there is an 
enforcement action, there should only be one lawsuit and 
preferably, it should be a federal enforcement action.
    These provisions in sections 203 and 218 of the bill are a 
step in the right direction. To fully address the issue, the 
bill should be amended to also require state lawsuits to be 
withdrawn with prejudice, if the Department of Justice or 
Federal Trade Commission commences an enforcement action after 
one or more State Attorneys General files a lawsuit. In the 
end, all of the concerns about the enforcement and liability 
provisions are well-founded and must be resolved before we can 
support this bill.
    To further address multiple lawsuits, this bill amends the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to bar civil claims and criminal 
charges resulting from a violation of a ``Term of Service 
Agreement'' with a non-government employer. This amendment is 
intended to bar all contract-based CFAA litigation, except when 
based on a government employment contract, while allowing the 
Department of Justice to bring charges under 18 U.S.C. 1030 
when based on other evidence.

                          CRIMINAL PROVISIONS

    The bill does establish a new criminal offense for damage 
to a critical infrastructure computer system such as electrical 
power grids, water supply systems and nuclear power plants. 
Unfortunately, the majority report blatantly mischaracterizes 
the provision of the bill passed by the Committee, which 
includes an amendment Senator Grassley offered that imposes a 
mandatory minimum sentence of three years' imprisonment for the 
newly created crime of aggravated damage to a critical 
infrastructure computer. The majority, while noting that the 
Chairman opposed the mandatory minimum, fails to mention that 
the President himself included that mandatory minimum in the 
cyber-security bill he proposed to the Congress earlier this 
year.
    The Chairman's original draft of S. 1151 removed the 
President's proposed mandatory minimum for a violation of 
aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer. 
Senator Grassley offered his amendment to recognize the serious 
nature of a cyber-attack damaging critical infrastructure and 
restore the mandatory minimum in line with the President's 
proposal. Furthermore, during Associate Deputy Attorney General 
James A. Baker's testimony, in his appearance before the 
Committee on September 7, 2011, he explicitly endorsed, on 
behalf of the DOJ, the three-year mandatory minimum.
    Thus, in support of the President and with DOJ's 
endorsement, the Committee voted in favor of the Grassley 
amendment by a vote of 11-7. In an attempt to diminish the 
significance of this vote, the majority characterizes the 7 
votes in opposition to the amendment as ``bi-partisan,'' 
because one Republican member voted against it. It is far more 
noteworthy, however, that four members of the Chairman's party 
agreed with Senator Grassley and his Republican colleagues.

                               CONCLUSION

    Protecting an individual's sensitive personally 
identifiable information is of the utmost importance. However, 
this must be done in a way that will ensure individuals are 
notified when there are actual threats to their identity. 
Unfortunately, this bill fails to accomplish this goal as 
individuals will find their email inboxes full every morning 
with notifications of security incidents that a business issues 
for fear of violating one of the requirements in this bill. The 
prescriptive regulation and high penalties will likely end up 
forcing some businesses to shut their doors. As drafted, this 
bill punishes businesses, while providing no real benefit for 
consumers.

                                   Charles E. Grassley.
                                   Jon Kyl.
                                   Jeff Sessions.
                                   Lindsey Graham.
                                   John Cornyn.
                                   Tom Coburn.

      VIII. Changes to Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

    In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
material is printed in italic, existing law in which no change 
is proposed is shown in roman):

                           UNITED STATES CODE

                TITLE 18--CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

PART I--CRIMES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 47--FRAUD AND FALSE STATEMENTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

1001. Statements or entries generally
1002. Possession of false papers to defraud United States
1003. Demands against the United States
1004. Certification of checks
1005. Bank entries, reports and transactions
1006. Federal credit institution entries, reports and transactions
1007. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation transactions
1010. Department of Housing and Urban Development and Federal Housing 
          Administration transactions
1011. Federal land bank mortgage transactions
1012. Department of Housing and Urban Development transactions
1013. Farm loan bonds and credit bank debentures
1014. Loan and credit applications generally; renewals and discounts; 
          crop insurance
1015. Naturalization, citizenship and alien registry
1016. Acknowledgement of appearance or oath
1017. Government seals wrongfully used and instruments wrongfully sealed
1018. Official certificates or writings
1019. Certificates by consular officers
1020. Highway projects
1021. Title records
1022. Delivery of certificate, voucher, receipt for military or naval 
          property
1023. Insufficient delivery of money or property for military or naval 
          service
1024. Purchase or receipt of military, naval, or veterans facilities 
          property
1025. False pretenses on high seas and other waters
1026. Compromise, adjustment, or cancellation of farm indebtedness
1027. False statements and concealment of facts in relation to documents 
          required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
          1974
1028. Fraud and related activity in connection with identification 
          documents, authentication features, and information 1028A. 
          Aggravated identity theft
1029. Fraud and related activity in connection with access devices
1030. Fraud and related activity in connection with computers
1030A. Aggravated damage to a critical infrastructure computer.
1031. Major fraud against the United States
1032. Concealment of assets from conservator, receiver, or liquidating 
          agent
1033. Crimes by or affecting persons engaged in the business of 
          insurance whose activities affect interstate commerce
1034. Civil penalties and injunctions for violations of section 1033
1035. False statements relating to health care matters
1036. Entry by false pretenses to any real property, vessel, or aircraft 
          of the United States or secure area of any airport or seaport
1037. Fraud and related activity in connection with electronic mail
1038. False information and hoaxes
1039. Fraud and related activity in connection with obtaining 
          confidential phone records information of a covered entity
1040. Fraud in connection with major disaster or emergency benefits
1041. Concealment of security breaches involving sensitive personally 
          identifiable information

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 1030A. AGGRAVATED DAMAGE TO A CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE COMPUTER.

    (a) Definitions.--In this section--
          (1) the terms ``computer'' and ``damage'' have the 
        meanings given such terms in section 1030; and (2) the 
        term `critical infrastructure computer' means a 
        computer that manages or controls systems or assets 
        vital to national defense, national security, national 
        economic security, public health or safety, or any 
        combination of those matters, whether publicly or 
        privately owned or operated, including--
                  (A) gas and oil production, storage, and 
                delivery systems;
                  (B) water supply systems;
                  (C) telecommunication networks;
                  (D) electrical power delivery systems;
                  (E) finance and banking systems;
                  (F) emergency services;
                  (G) transportation systems and services; and
                  (H) government operations that provide 
                essential services to the public
    (b) Offense.--It shall be unlawful to, during and in 
relation to a felony violation of section 1030, intentionally 
cause or attempt to cause damage to a critical infrastructure 
computer, and such damage results in (or, in the case of an 
attempt, would, if completed have resulted in) the substantial 
impairment--
          (1) of the operation of the critical infrastructure 
        computer; or
          (2) of the critical infrastructure associated with 
        the computer.
    (c) Penalty.--Any person who violates subsection (b) shall 
be fined under this title, imprisoned for not less than 3 years 
nor more than 20 years, or both.
    (d) Consecutive Sentence.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law--
          (1) a court shall not place on probation any person 
        convicted of a violation of this section;
          (2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of 
        imprisonment imposed on a person under this section 
        shall run concurrently with any other term of 
        imprisonment, including any term of imprisonment 
        imposed on the person under any other provision of law, 
        including any term of imprisonment imposed for the 
        felony violation section 1030;
          (3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be 
        imposed for a felony violation of section 1030, a court 
        shall not in any way reduce the term to be imposed for 
        such crime so as to compensate for, or otherwise take 
        into account, any separate term of imprisonment imposed 
        or to be imposed for a violation of this section; and
          (4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a 
        violation of this section may, in the discretion of the 
        court, run concurrently, in whole or in part, only with 
        another term of imprisonment that is imposed by the 
        court at the same time on that person for an additional 
        violation of this section, provided that such 
        discretion shall be exercised in accordance with any 
        applicable guidelines and policy statements issued by 
        the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
        section 994 of title 28.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 1041. CONCEALMENT OF SECURITY BREACHES INVOLVING SENSITIVE 
                    PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (a) In General.--Whoever, having knowledge of a security 
breach and of the fact that notice of such security breach is 
required under title II of the Personal Data Privacy and 
Security Act of 2011, intentionally and willfully conceals the 
fact of such security breach, shall, in the event that such 
security breach results in economic harm to any individual in 
the amount of $1,000 or more, be fined under this tile or 
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.
    (b) Person Defined.--For purposes of subsection (a), the 
term ``person'' has the same meaning as in section 1030(e)(12) 
of title 18, United States Code.
    (c) Notice Requirement.--Any person seeking an exemption 
under section 212(b) of the Personal Data Privacy and Security 
Act of 2011 shall be immune from prosecution under this section 
if the Federal Trade Commission does not indicate, in writing, 
that such notice be given under section 212(b)(3) of such Act.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (a) Whoever--
          (1) having knowingly accessed a computer without 
        authorization or exceeding authorized access, and by 
        means of such conduct having obtained information that 
        has been determined by the United States Government 
        pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require 
        protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons 
        of national defense or foreign relations, or any 
        restricted data, as defined in paragraph y of section 
        11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to 
        believe that such information so obtained could be used 
        to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage 
        of any foreign nation willfully communicates, delivers, 
        transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or 
        transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, 
        transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or 
        transmitted the same to any person not entitled to 
        receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to 
        deliver it to the officer or employee of the United 
        States entitled to receive it;
          (2) intentionally accesses a computer without 
        authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby 
        obtains--
                  (A) information contained in a financial 
                record of a financial institution, or of a card 
                issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title 
                15, or contained in a file of a consumer 
                reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms 
                are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
                (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.);
                  (B) information from any department or agency 
                of the United States; or
                  (C) information from any protected computer;
          (3) intentionally, without authorization to access 
        any nonpublic computer of a department or agency of the 
        United States, accesses such a computer of that 
        department or agency that is exclusively for the use of 
        the Government of the United States or, in the case of 
        a computer not exclusively for such use, is used by or 
        for the Government of the United States and such 
        conduct affects that use by or for the Government of 
        the United States;
          (4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a 
        protected computer without authorization, or exceeds 
        authorized access, and by means of such conduct 
        furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of 
        value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing 
        obtained consists only of the use of the computer and 
        the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-
        year period;
          (5)(A) knowingly causes the transmission of a 
        program, information, code, or command, and as a result 
        of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without 
        authorization, to a protected computer;
          (B) intentionally accesses a protected computer 
        without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, 
        recklessly causes damage; or
          (C) intentionally accesses a protected computer 
        without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, 
        causes damage and loss.
          [(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics 
        (as defined in section 1029) in any password or similar 
        information through which a computer may be accessed 
        without authorization, if--
                  (A) such trafficking affects interstate or 
                foreign commerce; or
                  (B) such computer is used by or for the 
                Government of the United States;]
          (6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as 
        defined in section 1029) in--
                  (A) any password or similar information 
                through which a protected computer as defined 
                in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection 
                (e)(2) may be accessed without authorization; 
                or
                  (B) any means of access through which a 
                protected computer as defined in subsection 
                (e)(2)(A) may be accessed without 
                authorization;
          (7) with intent to extort from any person any money 
        or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or 
        foreign commerce any communication containing any--
                  (A) threat to cause damage to a protected 
                computer;
                  (B) threat to obtain information from a 
                protected computer without authorization or in 
                excess of authorization or to impair the 
                confidentiality of information obtained from a 
                protected computer without authorization or by 
                exceeding authorized access; or
                  (C) demand or request for money or other 
                thing of value in relation to damage to a 
                protected computer, where such damage was 
                caused to facilitate the extortion;
        shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this 
        section.
    (b) Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an 
offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished 
as provided for the completed offense in subsection (c) of this 
section.
    [(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or 
(b) of this section is--
          [(1)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for 
        not more than ten years, or both, in the case of an 
        offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which 
        does not occur after a conviction for another offense 
        under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense 
        punishable under this subparagraph; and
          [(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than twenty years, or both, in the case of an 
        offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which 
        occurs after a conviction for another offense under 
        this section, or an attempt to commit an offense 
        punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(2)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), a 
        fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 
        one year, or both, in the case of an offense under 
        subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), or (a)(6) of this section 
        which does not occur after a conviction for another 
        offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an 
        offense punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than 5 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(2), or an attempt to commit an 
        offense punishable under this subparagraph, if--
                  [(i) the offense was committed for purposes 
                of commercial advantage or private financial 
                gain;
                  [(ii) the offense was committed in 
                furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in 
                violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
                United States or of any State; or
                  [(iii) the value of the information obtained 
                exceeds $5,000; and
          [(C) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of this 
        section which occurs after a conviction for another 
        offense under this section, or an attempt to commit an 
        offense punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(3)(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for 
        not more than five years, or both, in the case of an 
        offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(7) of this 
        section which does not occur after a conviction for 
        another offense under this section, or an attempt to 
        commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; 
        and
          [(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(7) of this section which 
        occurs after a conviction for another offense under 
        this section, or an attempt to commit an offense 
        punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(4)(A) except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and 
        (F), a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more 
        than 5 years, or both, in the case of--
                  [(i) an offense under subsection (a)(5)(B), 
                which does not occur after a conviction for 
                another offense under this section, if the 
                offense caused (or, in the case of an attempted 
                offense, would, if completed, have caused)--
                          [(I) loss to 1 or more persons during 
                        any 1-year period (and, for purposes of 
                        an investigation, prosecution, or other 
                        proceeding brought by the United States 
                        only, loss resulting from a related 
                        course of conduct affecting 1 or more 
                        other protected computers) aggregating 
                        at least $5,000 in value;
                          [(II) the modification or impairment, 
                        or potential modification or 
                        impairment, of the medical examination, 
                        diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or 
                        more individuals;
                          [(III) physical injury to any person;
                          [(IV) a threat to public health or 
                        safety;
                          [(V) damage affecting a computer used 
                        by or for an entity of the United 
                        States Government in furtherance of the 
                        administration of justice, national 
                        defense, or national security; or
                          [(VI) damage affecting 10 or more 
                        protected computers during any 1-year 
                        period; or
                  [(ii) an attempt to commit an offense 
                punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(B) except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), 
        a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 
        10 years, or both, in the case of--
                  [(i) an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A), 
                which does not occur after a conviction for 
                another offense under this section, if the 
                offense caused (or, in the case of an attempted 
                offense, would, if completed, have caused) a 
                harm provided in subclauses (I) through (VI) of 
                subparagraph (A)(i); or
                  [(ii) an attempt to commit an offense 
                punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(C) except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), 
        a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 
        20 years, or both, in the case of--
                  [(i) an offense or an attempt to commit an 
                offense under subparagraphs (A) or (B) of 
                subsection (a)(5) that occurs after a 
                conviction for another offense under this 
                section; or
                  [(ii) an attempt to commit an offense 
                punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(D) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not 
        more than 10 years, or both, in the case of--
                  [(i) an offense or an attempt to commit an 
                offense under subsection (a) (5)(C) that occurs 
                after a conviction for another offense under 
                this section; or
                  [(ii) an attempt to commit an offense 
                punishable under this subparagraph;
          [(E) if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly 
        or recklessly causes serious bodily injury from conduct 
        in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this 
        title, imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or 
        both;
          [(F) if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly 
        or recklessly causes death from conduct in violation of 
        subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this title, 
        imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or 
        both; or
          [(G) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not 
        more than 1 year, or both, for--
                  [(i) any other offense under subsection 
                (a)(5); or
                  [(ii) an attempt to commit an offense 
                punishable under this subparagraph.]
    (c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or 
(b) of this section is--
          (1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(1) of this section;
          (2)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), a fine 
        under this title or imprisonment for not more than 3 
        years, or both, in the case of an offense under 
        subsection (a)(2); or
          (B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than ten years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under paragraph (a)(2) of this section, if--
                  (i) the offense was committed for purposes of 
                commercial advantage or private financial gain;
                  (ii) the offense was committed in the 
                furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in 
                violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
                United States, or of any State; or
                  (iii) the value of the information obtained, 
                or that would have been obtained if the offense 
                was completed, exceeds $5,000;
          (3) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than 1 year, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(3) of this section;
          (4) a fine under this title or imprisonment of not 
        more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(4) of this section;
          (5)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (D), a fine 
        under this title, imprisonment for not more than 20 
        years, or both, in the case of an offense under 
        subsection (a)(5)(A) of this section, if the offense 
        caused--
                  (i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-
                year period (and, for purposes of an 
                investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding 
                brought by the United States only, loss 
                resulting from a related course of conduct 
                affecting 1 or more other protected computers) 
                aggregating at least $5,000 in value;
                  (ii) the modification or impairment, or 
                potential modification or impairment, of the 
                medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or 
                care of 1 or more individuals;
                  (iii) physical injury to any person;
                  (iv) a threat to public health or safety;
                  (v) damage affecting a computer used by, or 
                on behalf of, an entity of the United States 
                Government in furtherance of the administration 
                of justice, national defense, or national 
                security; or
                  (vi) damage affecting 10 or more protected 
                computers during any 1-year period;
          (B) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not 
        more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(5)(B), if the offense caused a 
        harm provided in clause (i) through (vi) of 
        subparagraph (A) of this subsection;
          (C) if the offender attempts to cause or knowingly or 
        recklessly causes death from conduct in violation of 
        subsection (a)(5)(A), a fine under this title, 
        imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or 
        both; or
          (D) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not 
        more than 1 year, or both, for another offense under 
        subsection (a)(5);
          (6) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(6) of this section; or
          (7) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not 
        more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
        under subsection (a)(7) of this section.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (e) As used in this section--
          (1) the term ``computer'' means an electronic, 
        magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed 
        data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, 
        or storage functions, and includes any data storage 
        facility or communications facility directly related to 
        or operating in conjunction with such device, but such 
        term does not include an automated typewriter or 
        typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other 
        similar device;
          (2) the term ``protected computer'' means a 
        computer--
                  (A) exclusively for the use of a financial 
                institution or the United States Government, 
                or, in the case of a computer not exclusively 
                for such use, used by or for a financial 
                institution or the United States Government and 
                the conduct constituting the offense affects 
                that use by or for the financial institution or 
                the Government; or
                  (B) which is used in or affecting interstate 
                or foreign commerce or communication, including 
                a computer located outside the United States 
                that is used in a manner that affects 
                interstate or foreign commerce or communication 
                of the United States;
          (3) the term ``State'' includes the District of 
        Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any 
        other commonwealth, possession or territory of the 
        United States;
          (4) the term ``financial institution'' means--
                  (A) an institution, with deposits insured by 
                the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;
                  (B) the Federal Reserve or a member of the 
                Federal Reserve including any Federal Reserve 
                Bank;
                  (C) a credit union with accounts insured by 
                the National Credit Union Administration;
                  (D) a member of the Federal home loan bank 
                system and any home loan bank;
                  (E) any institution of the Farm Credit System 
                under the Farm Credit Act of 1971;
                  (F) a broker-dealer registered with the 
                Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to 
                section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
                1934;
                  (G) the Securities Investor Protection 
                Corporation;
                  (H) a branch or agency of a foreign bank (as 
                such terms are defined in paragraphs (1) and 
                (3) of section 1(b) of the International 
                Banking Act of 1978); and
                  (I) an organization operating under section 
                25 or section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act;
          (5) the term ``financial record'' means information 
        derived from any record held by a Financial institution 
        pertaining to a customer's relationship with the 
        financial institution;
          (6) the term ``exceeds authorized access'' means to 
        access a computer with authorization and to use such 
        access to obtain or alter information in the computer 
        that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or 
        [alter;] alter, but does not include access in 
        violation of a contractual obligation or agreement, 
        such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service 
        agreement, with an Internet service provider, Internet 
        website, or non-government employer, if such violation 
        constitutes the sole basis for determining that access 
        to a protected computer is unauthorized; 
          (7) the term ``department of the United States'' 
        means the legislative or judicial branch of the 
        Government or one of the executive departments 
        enumerated in section 101 of title 5;
          (8) the term ``damage'' means any impairment to the 
        integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, 
        or information;
          (9) the term ``government entity'' includes the 
        Government of the United States, any State or political 
        subdivision of the United States, any foreign country, 
        and any State, province, municipality, or other 
        political subdivision of a foreign country;
          (10) the term ``conviction'' shall include a 
        conviction under the law of any State for a crime 
        punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year, an 
        element of which is unauthorized access, or exceeding 
        authorized access, to a computer;
          (11) the term ``loss'' means any reasonable cost to 
        any victim, including the cost of responding to an 
        offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring 
        the data, program, system, or information to its 
        condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, 
        cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred 
        because of interruption of service; and
          (12) the term ``person'' means any individual, firm, 
        corporation, educational institution financial 
        institution, governmental entity, or legal or other 
        entity.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    (g)(1) Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a 
violation of this section may maintain a civil action against 
the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive 
relief or other equitable relief. A civil action for a 
violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct 
involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II), 
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i). Damages for a 
violation involving only conduct described in subsection 
(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) are limited to economic damages. No action may 
be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun 
within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date 
of the discovery of the damage. No action may be brought under 
this subsection for the negligent design or manufacture of 
computer hardware, computer software, or firmware.
    (2) No action may be brought under this subsection if a 
violation of a contractual obligation or agreement, such as an 
acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, 
constitutes the sole basis for determining that access to the 
protected computer is unauthorized, or in excess of 
authorization.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    [(i)(1) The court, in imposing sentence on any person 
convicted of a violation of this section, or convicted of 
conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in addition to 
any other sentence imposed and irrespective of any provision of 
State law, that such person forfeit to the United States--]
          [(A) such person's interest in any personal property 
        that was used or intended to be used to commit or to 
        facilitate the commission of such violation; and
          [(B) any property, real or personal, constituting or 
        derived from, any proceeds that such person obtained, 
        directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation.
    [(2) The criminal forfeiture of property under this 
subsection, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any 
judicial proceeding in relation thereto, shall be governed by 
the provisions of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except 
subsection (d) of that section.]
    (i) Criminal Forfeiture.--
          (1) The court, in imposing sentence on any person 
        convicted of a violation of this section, or convicted 
        of conspiracy to violate this section, shall order, in 
        addition to any other sentence imposed and irrespective 
        of any provision of State law, that such person forfeit 
        to the United States--
                  (A) such person's interest in any property, 
                real or personal, that was used, or intended to 
                be used, to commit or facilitate the commission 
                of such violation; and
                  (B) any property, real or personal, 
                constituting or derived from any gross 
                proceeds, or any property traceable to such 
                property, that such person obtained, directly 
                or indirectly, as a result of such violation.
          (2) The criminal forfeiture of property under this 
        subsection, including any seizure and disposition of 
        the property, and any related judicial or 
        administrative proceeding, shall be governed by the 
        provisions of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug 
        Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 
        853), except subsection (d) of that section.
    [(j) For purposes of subsection (i), the following shall be 
subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property 
right shall exist in them:
          [(1) Any personal property used or intended to be 
        used to commit or to facilitate the commission of any 
        violation of this section, or a conspiracy to violate 
        this section.
          [(2) Any property, real or personal, which 
        constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to 
        any violation of this section, or a conspiracy to 
        violate this section.]
    (j) Civil Forfeiture.--
          (1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to 
        the United States and no property right, real or 
        personal, shall exist in them:
                  (A) Any property, real or personal, that was 
                used, or intended to be used, to commit or 
                facilitate the commission of any violation of 
                this section, or a conspiracy to violate this 
                section.
                  (B) Any property, real or personal, 
                constituting or derived from any gross proceeds 
                obtained directly or indirectly, or any 
                property traceable to such property, as a 
                result of the commission of any violation of 
                this section, or a conspiracy to violate this 
                section.
          (2) Seizures and forfeitures under this subsection 
        shall be governed by the provisions in chapter 46 of 
        title 18, United States Code, relating to civil 
        forfeitures, except that such duties as are imposed on 
        the Secretary of the Treasury under the customs laws 
        described in section 981(d) of title 18, United States 
        Code, shall be performed by such officers, agents and 
        other persons as may be designated for that purpose by 
        the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney 
        General.
    (k) Reporting Certain Criminal Cases.--Not later than 1 
year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 
thereafter, the Attorney General shall report to the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives the number of 
criminal cases brought under subsection (a) that involve 
conduct in which--
          (1) the defendant--
                  (A) exceeded authorized access to a non-
                governmental computer; or
                  (B) accessed a non-governmental computer 
                without authorization; and
          (2) the sole basis for the Government determining 
        that access to the non-governmental computer was 
        unauthorized, or in excess of authorization was that 
        the defendant violated a contractual obligation or 
        agreement with a service provider or employer, such as 
        an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 96--RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 1961. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this chapter--
          (1) ``racketeering activity'' means (A) any act or 
        threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, 
        robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, 
        or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical 
        (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances 
        Act), which is chargeable under State law and 
        punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) 
        any act which is indictable under any of the following 
        provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 
        (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports 
        bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to 
        counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from 
        interstate shipment) if the act indictable under 
        section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to 
        embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 
        891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), 
        section 1028 (relating to fraud and related activity in 
        connection with identification documents), section 1029 
        (relating to fraud and related activity in connection 
        with access devices), section 1030 (relating to fraud 
        and related activity in connection with computers) if 
        the act is a felony, section 1084 (relating to the 
        transmission of gambling information), section 1341 
        (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to 
        wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial 
        institution fraud), section 1425 (relating to the 
        procurement of citizenship or nationalization 
        unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to the reproduction 
        of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 
        (relating to the sale of naturalization or citizenship 
        papers), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene 
        matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of 
        justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of 
        criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the 
        obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 
        1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or 
        an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating 
        against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 
        1542 (relating to false statement in application and 
        use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or 
        false use of passport), section 1544 (relating to 
        misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to fraud 
        and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), 
        sections 1581-1592 (relating to peonage, slavery, and 
        trafficking in persons)., section 1951 (relating to 
        interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), 
        section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 
        (relating to interstate transportation of wagering 
        paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful 
        welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the 
        prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 
        1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary 
        instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in 
        monetary transactions in property derived from 
        specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to 
        use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission 
        of murder-for-hire), section 1960 (relating to illegal 
        money transmitters), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 
        2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), 
        sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate 
        transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 
        and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of 
        stolen property), section 2318 (relating to trafficking 
        in counterfeit labels for phone records computer 
        programs or computer program documentation or packaging 
        and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual 
        works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement 
        of a copyright), section 2319A (relating to 
        unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound 
        recordings and music videos of live musical 
        performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in 
        goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 
        2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles 
        or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating 
        to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 
        2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), sections 
        175-178 (relating to biological weapons), sections 229-
        229F (relating to chemical weapons), section 831 
        (relating to nuclear materials), (C) any act which is 
        indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 
        186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to 
        labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to 
        embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense 
        involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 
        (except a case under section 157 of this title), fraud 
        in the sale of securities, or the felonious 
        manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, 
        buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled 
        substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 
        of the Controlled Substances Act), punishable under any 
        law of the United States, (E) any act which is 
        indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions 
        Reporting Act, (F) any act which is indictable under 
        the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 
        (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), 
        section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain 
        aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 
        (relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) 
        if the act indictable under such section of such Act 
        was committed for the purpose of financial gain, or (G) 
        any act that is indictable under any provision listed 
        in section 2332b(g)(5)(B);

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