alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Smith Barney Futures Management LLC
                         388 Greenwich Street, 7th Floor
                          New York, New York 10013-2396

June 11, 2001


Winton Capital Management
1a. St. Mary Abbot's Place
Kensington, London W86LS, U.K.

Attention:  Mr. Martin Hunt

         Re:      Management Agreement Renewals

Dear Mr. Kemp:

     We are writing with respect to your  management  agreements  concerning the
commodity pools to which reference is made below (the "Management  Agreements").
We are extending the term of the Management Agreements through June 30, 2002 and
all other provisions of the Management Agreements will remain unchanged.

o        Smith Barney Principal Plus Futures Fund L.P. II
o        Smith Barney Diversified Futures Fund L.P.

     Please acknowledge receipt of this modification by signing one copy of this
letter and returning it to the attention of Mr. Daniel  McAuliffe at the address
above or fax to  212-723-8985.  If you have any  questions  I can be  reached at
212-723-5435.

Very truly yours,

SMITH BARNEY FUTURES MANAGEMENT LLC


By:       /s/  Daniel R. McAuliffe, Jr.
         ------------------------------------
         Daniel R. McAuliffe, Jr.
         Chief Financial Officer & Director

AGREED AND ACCEPTED

WINTON CAPITAL MANAGEMENT


By:       /s/ Martin Hunt
         -----------------------------------

Print Name:    Martin Hunt
             --------------------------------
             Chief Financial Oofficer

DRMcA/sr
[No. 3503.]

#### Webermeier v. White.

*Appeals*— Findings *of Fact*— Presumption. Where the evidence heard in the court below is not set out in the record sent to this court, the findings below are conclusive as to the facts.

*Appeal from Phillips District Court.*Hon. H. P. Burke, Judge.

Mr. J. S. Bennett, for appellant.

Messrs. Munson & Munson, for appellee.

Scott, P. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action by the appellee to quiet title to southeast quarter of section 8, township 7, range 43 west, 6th P. M., in Phillips county. The abstract of record contains only the complaint and original answer, together with the court’s findings and decree. The court, in its findings, refers to an amended answer, but if there was such an instrument filed, it does not appear in the abstract of record. The *166abstract fails to show any of the testimony offered by either party — not even the tax deed upon which the appellant relies. The court’s findings of fact and its judgment are, therefore, all that are before us for consideration. From these it appears that at one time, title to the premises was in one Robert Cummins, who gave a trust deed, to whom and in whose interest does not appear; that the trustee refused to act, and that in an action in the county court, by whom or against whom, or for what purpose, is not disclosed, but that the sheriff of the county was appointed by the court to act as trustee; and that foreclosure proceedings were then had and the premises sold thereunder, and a deed subsequently issued to The Commercial Investment Company, who in turn conveyed it to the plaintiff below, appellee here. The findings further show that the grantor in the trust deed was made a party defendant in the foreclosure proceedings, but that such grantor had, prior to the service of summons in that case, conveyed his equity to one Melissa Works. The court further finds that the appellant claims under an amended tax deed secured to remedy defects of a former tax deed admitted to be void on its face. That such amended tax deed was executed and delivered after a tender by the plaintiff to the county treasurer of the amount of money necessary to redeem the land from the sale upon which the tax deed was based. Further, the court finds that the tax deed relied on “conveys no title, because it is established by the evidence that the proceedings leading up to its issuance were void, by reason of a failure on the part of the county treasurer to make his affidavit of posting of notice of sale as *167provided by law, and because the land was advertised for sale for an excessive amount.”

There being no evidence set out in the record, we must-accept these -findings as being conclusive as to the facts.

Then the defendant below had no title or evidence of title, either legal or equitable, upon which he could sustain his right to question the legality of the proceedings upon which the title of the plaintiff was based.

The judgment is affirmed.

All the judges concurring.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Agriculture

###### Forest Service

# AGENCY:

Forest Service, USDA.

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting.

# SUMMARY:

The Deschutes Provincial Advisory Committee will meet on April 5, 2007, starting at 9 a.m. at Jefferson County Firehall on the corner of Adam and “J” Street in Oregon. Agenda items will include a briefing on the progress for Travel Management, PAC upcoming program of work and scheduling, an update on the Five Buttes project on the Crescent Ranger District, and a membership round robin. All Deschutes Province Advisory Committee Meetings are open to the public and an open public forum is scheduled from 3:30  to 4 p.m. 

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Chris Mickle, Province Liaison, Deschutes NF, Crescent RD, P.O. Box 208, Crescent, OR, 97754, Phone (541) 433-3216.

Mike Johnson,

Acting Deschutes National Forest Supervisor.

[FR Doc. 07-1332 Filed 3-19-07; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-20383 

v. Honorable Nancy G. Edmunds 

SYLVESTER BOSTON, JR. (D-2), 

 

 Defendant. 

_______________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

SECOND MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE [438] 

 

Defendant Sylvester Boston, Jr. is currently in the custody of the Federal Bureau 

of Prisons. Pending before the Court is Defendant’s second motion for compassionate 

release brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by § 603(b)(1) of 

the First Step Act of 2018, Pub L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. (ECF No. 438.) The 

Court entered an order denying Defendant’s first motion for compassionate release on 

November 5, 2020. (ECF No. 418.) And on February 16, 2021, the Court denied 

Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of that order. (ECF No. 429.) Defendant also filed 

a motion for appeal of the order denying compassionate release which the Sixth Circuit 

Court of Appeals dismissed as untimely. (ECF Nos. 424, 437.)

Although the present motion is titled as one for compassionate release under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the arguments Defendant makes therein are more suited to a 

motion to vacate typically brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Indeed, Defendant made the 

same or similar arguments in his § 2255 motion which was denied on January 12, 2021. 

(ECF Nos. 374, 378, 421.) His present motion is therefore an improper attempt to relitigate 

Case 2:14-cr-20383-NGE-RSW ECF No. 440, PageID.3643 Filed 06/16/21 Page 1 of 2
2

issues already decided. Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed in detail in the Court’s 

prior orders denying Defendants motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A) (ECF Nos. 418, 429) and 

the order denying his motion under § 2255 (ECF No. 421), Defendant’s current motion 

for compassionate release is DENIED. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 s/Nancy G. Edmunds 

 Nancy G. Edmunds 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: June 16, 2021 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

on June 16, 2021, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. 

 s/Lisa Bartlett 

 Case Manager 

Case 2:14-cr-20383-NGE-RSW ECF No. 440, PageID.3644 Filed 06/16/21 Page 2 of 2
§ 75.468 Specialized service facilities. ( a ) The costs of services provided by highly complex or specialized facilities operated by the non-Federal entity, such as computing facilities, wind tunnels, and reactors are allowable, provided the charges for the services meet the conditions of either paragraphs (b) or (c) of this section, and, in addition, take into account any items of income or Federal financing that qualify as applicable credits under § 75.406.
( b ) The costs of such services, when material, must be charged directly to applicable awards based on actual usage of the services on the basis of a schedule of rates or established methodology that: ( 1 ) Does not discriminate between activities under Federal awards and other activities of the non-Federal entity, including usage by the non-Federal entity for internal purposes, and
( 2 ) Is designed to recover only the aggregate costs of the services. The costs of each service must consist normally of both its direct costs and its allocable share of all indirect (F&A) costs. Rates must be adjusted at least biennially, and must take into consideration over/under applied costs of the previous period(s).
( c ) Where the costs incurred for a service are not material, they may be allocated as indirect (F&A) costs.
( d ) Under some extraordinary circumstances, where it is in the best interest of the Federal Government and the non-Federal entity to establish alternative costing arrangements, such arrangements may be worked out with the Federal cognizant agency for indirect costs.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 11-5199 September Term 2011

1:10-cv-02040-RWR

Filed On: January 13, 2012 [1352679]

Steve Schonberg, Candidate for Congress, 

 Appellant

v.

Federal Election Commission and United

States of America, 

 Appellees

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the United States’ unopposed motion to dismiss the

remainder of the appeal, it is

ORDERED that the motion be granted, and this case is hereby dismissed.

The Clerk is directed to transmit forthwith to the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia a certified copy of this order in lieu of formal mandate.

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Mark A. Butler

Deputy Clerk

USCA Case #11-5199 Document #1352679 Filed: 01/13/2012 Page 1 of 1
#### § 670.35 [Reserved]
#### John J. Marvin, *Appellant, v.*James J. Brooks, *Respondent, Impleaded, etc*.

Judgment affirmed. Opinion by

Daniels, J.
ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

                 American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc.

               American Home Mortgage Assets Trust 2006-4,
            Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-4

            I, David M. Friedman, a duly authorized officer of American Home
      Mortgage Servicing, Inc., as servicer (the "Servicer"), pursuant to the
      Servicing Agreement, dated as of August 30, 2006 (the "Agreement"),
      among Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Master Servicer, American Home Mortgage
      Corp., as Sponsor, the Servicer and Citibank, N.A., as Trustee, hereby
      certify that:

            1. A review of the Servicer's activities during the period from
      and including January 1, 2006 through and including December 31, 2006
      (the "Reporting Period") and of the Servicer's performance under the
       Agreement has been made under my supervision.

            2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer
      has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material
      respects throughout the Reporting Period.

            IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this
      Certificate this 9th day of March, 2007.



                                    By: /s/ David M. Friedman
                                    -----------------------------
                                    Name: David M. Friedman
                                    Title:Executive Vice President
#### § 81.80 Unsponsored written material.

Letters expressing views or urging action and other unsponsored written material regarding matters in issue in a hearing will be placed in the correspondence section of the docket of the proceeding. These data are not deemed part of the evidence or record in the hearing.
§ 11.304 STCW deck officer endorsements. ( a ) Specific requirements for all STCW deck officer endorsements are detailed in the applicable sections in this part. ( 1 ) Master on vessels of 3,000 GT or more (management level).
( 2 ) Chief mate on vessels of 3,000 GT or more (management level).
( 3 ) Officer in charge of a navigational watch (OICNW) of vessels of 500 GT or more (operational level).
( 4 ) Master of vessels of 500 GT or more and less than 3,000 GT (management level).
( 5 ) Chief mate of vessels of 500 GT or more and less than 3,000 GT (management level).
( 6 ) Master of vessels of less than 500 GT (management level).
( 7 ) Master of vessels of less than 500 GT limited to near-coastal waters (management level).
( 8 ) OICNW of vessels of less than 500 GT (operational level).
( 9 ) OICNW of vessels of less than 500 GT limited to near-coastal waters (operational level).
( b ) [Reserved]
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-75,105-02

EX PARTE RANDALL WAYNE MAYS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. B-15,717 IN THE 392ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HENDERSON COUNTY

KELLER, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which SLAUGHTER, J., joined.

The Court imposes the wrong remedy when it grants relief on Applicant’s intellectualdisability claim without having allowed that claim to be tested in an adversarial trial before a jury. 

This remedy conflicts with the legislative decision to require a jury trial in death-penalty cases.

Article 1.13 makes clear that a jury trial cannot be waived in a death-penalty case:

The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense other than a capital felony

case in which the state notifies the court and the defendant that it will seek the death

penalty shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury.

. . .

1

This reflects a legislative determination that all factual issues bearing on the imposition of the death

1

 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.13(a).
MAYS DISSENT — 2

penalty are to be decided by a jury. Logically, that includes the question of intellectual disability.

Under Atkins v. Virginia, intellectual disability is a defensive issue that, if raised and proven,

prevents the imposition of the death penalty.

2

“Atkins and its progeny did not hold that an

intellectual-disabilitydetermination was something other than a sentencing issue.”3 We have likened

the issue to an “affirmative defense” that can be litigated at the punishment stage of trial and must

be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.4 A jury finding against a defendant on intellectual

disability can be reviewed for factual sufficiency on appeal.5 In conducting such a review, we are

required to give “great deference” to the jury’s finding and determine whether the finding is “so

against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be manifestly unjust.”6

But there has been no jury finding here. Despite the fact that Atkins was decided well before

Applicant’s trial, he did not seek a jury determination of intellectual disability. Although the

standards for determining intellectual disability may have changed enough to justify Applicant’s

tardy raising of the claim, that does not mean we should bypass a jury now. In fact, bypassing a jury

on a death-penalty sentencing issue conflicts with the legislature’s imposition of an unwaivable

requirement that a jury decide whether the death penalty should be imposed. Consequently, the

proper remedy is to remand for a new punishment hearing at which the intellectual disability issue

can be decided.

2

 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

3

 Petetan v. State, 622 S.W.3d 321, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

4

 Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

5

 Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d 112, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

6

 Id.
MAYS DISSENT — 3

Because the Court reforms the sentence to life instead of remanding for a jury to consider the

issue of intellectual disability, I respectfully dissent.

Filed: March 27, 2024

Publish
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 16 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 H. R. 16

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the 
           deduction of State and local general sales taxes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 6, 2009

 Mr. Baird (for himself, Mr. Brady of Texas, Mr. Edwards of Texas, Ms. 
Corrine Brown of Florida, Mr. Hensarling, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson of 
  Texas, Mr. Marchant, Mr. Mack, Mr. Cuellar, Mr. Inslee, Mr. Lincoln 
    Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Dicks, Mr. McCaul, Ms. Berkley, Mr. 
 Conaway, Mr. McDermott, Mr. Heller, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Paul, Mr. Wamp, 
   Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers, Mr. Duncan, Mr. 
    Rodriguez, Ms. Castor of Florida, Mr. Smith of Washington, Mr. 
 Culberson, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. 
Miller of Florida, Mr. Burgess, Mr. Putnam, Mr. Reichert, Mr. Stearns, 
    Mr. Smith of Texas, and Mr. Davis of Tennessee) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the 
           deduction of State and local general sales taxes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PERMANENT EXTENSION OF DEDUCTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GENERAL 
              SALES TAXES.

    Subparagraph (I) of section 164(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 is amended by striking ``, and before January 1, 2010''.
                                 <all>
```
#### § 75.365 Restrictions on public access to records.

Consistent with § 75.322, HHS awarding agencies may require recipients to permit public access to manuscripts, publications, and data produced under an award. However, no HHS awarding agency may place restrictions on the non-Federal entity that limits public access to the records of the non-Federal entity pertinent to a Federal award identified in §§ 75.361 through 75.364, except for protected personally identifiable information (PII) or when the HHS awarding agency can demonstrate that such records will be kept confidential and would have been exempted from disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) (FOIA) or controlled unclassified information pursuant to Executive Order 13556 if the records had belonged to the HHS awarding agency. The FOIA does not apply to those records that remain under a non-Federal entity's control except as required under § 75.322. Unless required by Federal, State, local, or tribal statute, non-Federal entities are not required to permit public access to their records identified in §§ 75.361 through 75.364. The non-Federal entity's records provided to a Federal agency generally will be subject to FOIA and applicable exemptions.

[86 FR 2278, Jan. 12, 2021]
#### DuFort v. Conroy, appellant.

*Adverse possession—division fence.*

The owners of adjoining lots occupied up to a division fence for more than thirty years. *Held,*sufficient to give each title by adverse possession up to the fence. *Bobinson*v. *Phillips,*l.N. Y. Sup. 151.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon the report of a referee. The action was brought in Jefferson county by Auguste Du Fort against Bridget Conroy, to recover possession of a strip of land about two feet wide, claimed by both parties, who owned adjoining lands.

*B. Bagley,*for appellant.

*I). O'Brien,*for respondent.

*697E.. Darwin" Smith, J.

The only material point passed upon in the opinion is sufficiently stated in the head-note.

*Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.*
#### § 75.424 Alumni/ae activities.

Costs incurred by IHEs for, or in support of, alumni/ae activities are unallowable.
#### § 89.2 Definitions.

For the purposes of this part:

*Commercial sex act* means any sex act on account of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.

*Leadership Act* means the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, Public Law 108-25, as amended (22 U.S.C. 7601-7682).

*Prostitution* means procuring or providing any commercial sex act.

*Recipients* are contractors, grantees, applicants or awardees who receive Leadership Act funds for HIV/AIDS programs directly or indirectly from HHS.

*Sex trafficking* means the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.
#### § 81.113 Ex parte communications.

Only persons employed by or assigned to work with the reviewing authority who perform no investigative or prosecuting function in connection with a proceeding shall communicate ex parte with the reviewing authority, or the presiding officer, or any employee or person involved in the decisional process in such proceedings with respect to the merits of that or a factually related proceeding. The reviewing authority, the presiding officer, or any employee or person involved in the decisional process of a proceeding shall communicate ex parte with respect to the merits of that or a factually related proceeding only with persons employed by or assigned to work with them and who perform no investigative or prosecuting function in connection with the proceeding.