UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JODY L. NOVACEK, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

 Civ. No. 09-CV-00444 

 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 

 MOTION FOR 

 SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

PLAINTIFF FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan 

General Counsel 

David Kolker 

Associate General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley 

Assistant General Counsel 

Greg J. Mueller 

Attorney 

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

January 7, 2010 (202) 694-1650 

Case 3:09-cv-00444-M Document 25 Filed 01/07/2010 Page 1 of 17
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Table of Contents 

 Page 

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................. 1 

I. Novacek’s Response is Not Supported By Any Sworn Testimony................ 1 

II. Novacek’s Response Admits or Fails to Contest Facts Sufficient 

to Justify Summary Judgment in the Commission’s Favor .......................... 3 

III. Novacek Only Speculates About Portions of One Affidavit and Fails to 

Create a Genuine Issue Regarding Any Material Facts ................................ 8 

IV. The Court Should Issue a Declaratory Judgment, Impose a Substantial 

Civil Penalty, and Enter an Injunction ......................................................... 10 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 12

Case 3:09-cv-00444-M Document 25 Filed 01/07/2010 Page 2 of 17
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Table of Authorities 

Cases 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ............................................... 1, 9 

Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1981) ..................................................... 3, 8 

Cantu v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 579 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2009) ............................... 9 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) ............................................................... 1 

Ellis v. Principi, 246 Fed. Appx. 867 (5th Cir. 2007)..................................................... 3 

FEC v. Committee of 100 Democrats, 844 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.1993) ........................... 11 

FEC v. National Rifle Ass’n, 553 F. Supp. 1331 (D.D.C. 1983) .................................. 11 

FEC v. Odzer, Civ. No. 05-3101, 2006 WL 898049 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) .................. 10, 11 

Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................................................ 3 

Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 1995) ................................................................ 3 

Johnston v. City of Houston, Texas, 14 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1994)................................. 2 

Larry v. White, 929 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1991) ................................................................. 2 

Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ................................ 2 

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) ................................................... 1, 2 

Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003) ................................................ 2 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)...................... 1 

Morales v. Boyd, 304 Fed. Appx. 315 (5th Cir. 2008) ................................................... 2 

Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assocs., 929 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1991) ........................... 2 

Sony Pictures Home Entertainment Inc. v. Lott, 255 Fed. Appx. 878 

 (5th Cir. 2007) ............................................................................................................ 3 

Sturdivant v. Target Corp., 464 F. Supp. 2d 596 (N.D. Tex. 2006) ............................... 1 

Tyler v. Runyon, 70 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 1995) ................................................................. 8 

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Statutes and Regulations 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4) .................................................................................................... 11 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(A) .............................................................................................. 11 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6) (2000) ........................................................................................ 10 

2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6) (2009) ........................................................................................ 10 

2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) .......................................................................................................... 7

2 U.S.C. § 441d(c) .......................................................................................................... 7

2 U.S.C. § 441h ..................................................................................................... 7, 9, 11 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ............................................................................................................ 1 

Republican Party, The Rules of the Republican Party, Sept. 1, 2008, 

http://www.gop.com/images/legal/2008_RULES_Adopted.pdf. ................................... 7 

FEC, Conciliation Agreement, Matter of Adrian Plesha, Matter Under 

Review 4919 (Mar. 20, 2004) 

 http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/000012C1.pdf ................................................... 11 

FEC. General Counsel’s Rept. No. 11, Matter of Adrian Plesha, 

Matter Under Review 4919, at 31 n.29 (June 10, 2002) 

http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/00001172.pdf . ................................................... 11 

Case 3:09-cv-00444-M Document 25 Filed 01/07/2010 Page 4 of 17
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The Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”) has moved this Court for 

summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Defendant Jody L. Novacek’s response 

entirely fails to rely on sworn testimony, and summary judgment should be granted to the 

Commission on that ground alone. Even if the Court were to treat the arguments in Novacek’s 

unsworn brief as testimony, she has admitted ample facts to justify summary judgment in the 

Commission’s favor and there are no disputed material facts that would preclude summary 

judgment. Novacek’s brief largely addresses testimony from only a single affidavit and does not 

dispute the vast majority of the documentary and testimonial evidence establishing that she 

orchestrated a scheme to fraudulently misrepresent that a fundraising program was made on 

behalf of the Republican Party. Novacek has failed to “go beyond the pleadings and designate 

specific facts proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Sturdivant v. Target Corp., 

464 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). “Summary judgment is warranted when the facts as shown in 

the pleadings, affidavits, and other summary judgment evidence show that no reasonable trier of 

fact could find for the nonmoving party as to any material fact.” Sturdivant, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 

600-601 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)); Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986)). 

ARGUMENT

I. Novacek’s Response is Not Supported By Any Sworn Testimony 

The Commission is entitled to summary judgment because Novacek’s brief in response to 

the Commission’s summary judgment motion is not supported by any sworn testimony 

whatsoever. See Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, Dec. 21, 2009 (“Def. SJ 

Resp.”). “[I]t is well established that a nonmovant cannot overcome summary judgment with 

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conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 

624 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en 

banc)). “‘Unsworn pleadings, memoranda or the like are not, of course, competent summary 

judgment evidence.’” Johnston v. City of Houston, Texas, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1994) 

(quoting Larry v. White, 929 F.2d 206, 211 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991)). See also Solo Serve Corp. v. 

Westowne Assocs., 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1991) (The nonmovant’s “burden of ensuring that 

the evidence presented is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact” may be satisfied 

“only [by] evidence — not argument . . . .”). Novacek relies entirely on unsubstantiated 

assertions and argument in her unsworn brief; she thus presents no competent summary 

judgment testimony.1

 

The Fifth Circuit has explained that factual controversies are resolved in favor of the 

nonmoving party “only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have 

submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. “We do not, however, in the 

absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary 

facts.” Id. (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990)). Because 

Novacek has failed to submit any sworn testimony in support of her response, there is no “actual 

controversy” of fact. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. 

Novacek’s failure to rebut the Commission’s summary judgment motion through sworn 

testimony is not excused because she chose to forego representation by an attorney. The 

nonmovant’s obligation to “produce competent summary judgment evidence raising a genuine 

issue of material fact . . . applies equally to pro se litigants.” Morales v. Boyd, 304 Fed. Appx. 

315, 318 (5th Cir. 2008) (“‘We have never allowed such litigants to oppose summary judgments 

 

1

 Novacek similarly cites to virtually no documentary evidence, relying solely on two 

documents to question the authenticity of an affiant’s signature (Def. Resp. at 17) as part of an 

immaterial argument, see infra p. 10. 

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by the use of unsworn materials.’”) (quoting Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 

1981)); see also Ellis v. Principi, 246 Fed. Appx. 867, 869 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[P]laintiff’s pro se 

status does not exempt her from the usual evidentiary requirements of summary judgment.”) 

(citing Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995)). Thus, while courts “liberally 

construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings in his favor, the court will not ‘sift through the record in 

search of evidence’ to support [a pro se litigant’s] opposition to [a] motion for summary 

judgment.” Sony Pictures Home Entertainment Inc. v. Lott, 255 Fed. Appx. 878, 880 (5thCir. 

2007) (quoting Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, this Court 

need not search the record for evidence supporting the unsworn contentions in Novacek’s 

Response and may enter summary judgment in favor of the Commission. 

II. Novacek’s Response Admits or Fails to Contest Facts Sufficient to Justify 

 Summary Judgment in the Commission’s Favor 

Even if Novacek had sworn under oath to the assertions in her response, she nevertheless 

would have failed to rebut the Commission’s showing that she orchestrated fraudulent 

fundraising misrepresentations. Novacek does not contest the vast majority of the facts 

establishing her violation. The undisputed facts alone establish her fraudulent misrepresentation. 

She does not contest that the solicitations she oversaw claimed to be on behalf of the Republican 

Party. See FEC’s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., Nov. 30, 2009 (“FEC SJ Mem.”) at 

3-10; Def. SJ Resp. at 12. In particular, she does not dispute in her brief that: 

• The Republican National Committee had turned down her request to engage in 

fundraising on their behalf due to a concern over her usage of a foreign or “offshore” 

calling center. Def. SJ Resp. at 5. 

• She drafted the call scripts (Appx. 339-40) that were used by the callers, and she 

monitored the calling program to ensure that the call scripts were followed. FEC SJ 

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Mem. at 5; Def. SJ Resp. at 13 (indicating no disagreement with Maddux’s affidavit 

at Appx. 553, ¶ 12). 

• The recordings of phone solicitations and their accompanying transcripts were 

representative samples of calls from Novacek’s calling program. FEC SJ Mem. at 7. 

• She drafted the form mail solicitation (Appx. 334, 578) — which included a number 

of explicit references to the Republican Party — that was used to make the 

solicitations. FEC SJ Mem. at 7-8. 

• The Republican Victory Committee (“RVC”) raised more than $75,000 as a result of 

Novacek’s solicitations, including $50,292 she received as a result of the solicitations 

made by vendor Apex CoVantage, L.L.C. (“Apex”), an additional $14,869 Apex 

raised for the RVC that is still in Apex’s possession, and $10,063 in credit card 

transactions as a result of the calls made by Advantage LP (“Advantage”). FEC SJ 

Mem. at 19. 

• The second set of solicitations through the vendor Advantage occurred as the 

Commission has established: After Novacek had received a cease-and-desist letter 

from the RNC, she again solicited people who had received earlier solicitations made 

through Apex and who had given money in response. FEC SJ Mem. at 9-10. 

• Defendants’ enterprise yielded nearly 100 checks made payable to the RNC, the 

Republican Party, or the Bush-Cheney campaign that were deposited by Novacek into 

her corporate bank accounts for her own use. Appx. 441-472, 639-759; FEC SJ 

Mem. at 8. 

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This evidence establishes the details of an operation that fraudulently misrepresented that 

it was acting on behalf of the Republican Party and/or the RNC.2 Novacek focuses largely on 

only portions of a single affidavit (see infra Sec. III) and leaves undisputed almost all of the 

evidence in this case. The nearly 100 checks with incorrect payee information that Novacek has 

admitted to depositing illustrate at a glance the fraudulent nature of the scheme, as can be seen 

from a few examples from the Appendix: 

Appx. 709. 

 

2

 Novacek is not permitted to attempt to raise new factual disputes regarding the 

Commission’s summary judgment motion in her upcoming January 19 response to the 

Commission’s motion to dismiss. That filing is limited to addressing the legal arguments in the 

Commission’s motion to dismiss — which assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true 

— and may not be used to raise new arguments regarding the summary judgment motion after 

the Commission has filed its reply brief. 

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Appx. 469. 

Appx. 470. 

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Appx. 738. 

Novacek attempts to draw a distinction between the RNC and the Republican Party, 

claiming that she was simply mistaken in not understanding that purporting to act on behalf of 

the Republican Party was equivalent to acting on behalf of the RNC. Def. SJ Resp. at 12. For 

purposes of determining a violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441h, there is no such distinction. The 

Republican Party is an unincorporated association that is under the general management of the 

Republican National Committee. See Republican Party, The Rules of the Republican Party, at 1 

Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.gop.com/images/legal/2008_RULES_Adopted.pdf. The fraudulent 

misrepresentation provision Novacek violated specifically addresses political parties: it is 

unlawful to “fraudulently misrepresent the person as speaking, writing, or otherwise acting for or 

on behalf of any . . . political party . . . for the purpose of soliciting contributions or donations.” 

2 U.S.C. § 441h. Section 441h was designed to prevent misrepresentations precisely like the 

ones Novacek made. In any event, her assertion — even if sworn — would nevertheless fail to 

create a triable issue of fact in light of, inter alia, her long experience with political fundraising, 

her admitted awareness that the RNC did not wish to be associated with “off-shore” call centers, 

her failure to forward any money to Republican Party candidates, and her receipt and deposit of 

checks payable to the RNC and Republican Party. FEC SJ Mem. at 3-8.3

Additionally, Novacek does not contest — or address in any way — the Commission’s 

showing that she and the RVC violated 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a),(c), by failing to include some of the 

required disclaimer information in the solicitations. FEC SJ Mem. at 14-15. This disclaimer 

information, required by statute, would have provided the recipient of the call or the mailer with 

 

3

 The Commission is entitled to summary judgment against the corporate alter ego 

defendants for the additional reason that an attorney has not entered an appearance on their 

behalf. Novacek may appear pro se, but may not represent RVC; BPO, Inc; or BPO Advantage 

LP before this Court. See FEC SJ Mem. at 16. 

Case 3:09-cv-00444-M Document 25 Filed 01/07/2010 Page 11 of 17
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specific identifying information and would have made clear the calls were not authorized by a 

candidate or a candidate committee. If this disclaimer information had been included, Novacek 

would have been less likely to be able to deceive the recipients of the calls and mailers into 

believing they were contributing to the Republican Party. Accordingly, this Court should enter 

summary judgment in the Commission’s favor on this uncontested count, as well as the 

fraudulent misrepresentation count. 

III. Novacek Only Speculates About Portions of One Affidavit and Fails to Create a 

Genuine Issue Regarding Any Material Facts 

Novacek argues in her unsworn response that the affidavit from an Apex employee, Tom 

Maddux, is flawed, and she speculates that it might have been executed under duress or that the 

signature may not be authentic. Novacek’s bald speculation warrants no weight. Tyler v. 

Runyon, 70 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[S]peculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; 

instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary 

judgment.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Even affidavits submitted by pro 

se litigants “must affirmatively show the affiants’ competence to testify as to the matters stated 

therein and that the facts stated in the affidavits are based on the affiants’ personal knowledge.” 

Barker, 651 F.2d at 1123 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 

The assertions in Novacek’s response, however, are largely based on speculation. She 

opines that “[t]he only conceivable circumstance that Ms. Novacek could imagine [Maddux] 

lying was to protect his family” and speculates that he was lying to protect against some 

unspecified threat. Def. SJ Resp. at 2-3. Novacek states at length that she “thinks she knows 

where th[e] ‘storyline’ came from” regarding her acting on behalf of the RNC. Def. SJ Resp. 

at 5. These unsworn statements are entirely speculative, devoid of firsthand knowledge that 

would render them admissible evidence that could be considered at summary judgment. 

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“Disputes about material facts are genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Cantu v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 579 F.3d 434, 

438 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Vague and speculative statements 

regarding the state of mind of another affiant do not raise a genuine factual dispute. 

Moreover, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit could 

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or 

unnecessary will not defeat such judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Here, Novacek has not 

disputed any facts that would necessitate a trial, but instead quarrels about immaterial details in 

the Maddux Affidavit. For example, she disputes the details of her long professional relationship 

with Maddux, suggesting that the affidavit’s claim that Maddux knew Novacek “‘for more than 

ten years’” was “questionable” because that relationship may have been fewer than ten years. 

Def. SJ Resp. at 7. 

Novacek also disagrees with Maddux’s testimony that she had indicated to Apex 

personnel that the calls were being made on behalf of the RNC. Def. SJ Resp. at 2. But the 

undisputed facts show that the solicitations overseen by Novacek unlawfully misrepresented the 

recipient to be the Republican Party. Novacek’s representations to Apex are thus primarily 

relevant to whether Apex (which is not a defendant here) was also complicit in the scheme, not 

whether the solicitations themselves were fraudulent; regardless of the state of mind of Apex’s 

personnel, Novacek violated 2 U.S.C. § 441h. While Maddux’s testimony indeed provides 

compelling additional evidence of Novacek’s violation, summary judgment is appropriate even if 

the Court were to treat Novacek’s brief as testimony and draw inferences in her favor. In other 

words, even if Novacek had not represented to Apex personnel that the funds were being raised 

for the RNC, the undisputed, material facts demonstrate that the fundraising calls and letters 

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Apex sent out at her direction fraudulently misrepresented that they were on behalf of the 

Republican Party. 

Finally, Novacek also complains that the FEC should have investigated “her side of the 

story,” Def. SJ Resp. at 4, but Commission staff did precisely that in taking her administrative 

deposition. In any event, Novacek has had a full opportunity to present any material evidence 

she wishes to the Court in this de novo proceeding. There is no legal basis for defeating the 

Commission’s summary judgment motion by arguing that the Commission failed to conduct a 

more extensive investigation; instead, Novacek must defend herself on the merits in this action 

by disputing the Commission’s factual showing with admissible evidence — an effort she has 

failed to make. See FEC’s Mot. to Dismiss Counterclaims, Nov. 30, 2009 at 3-4. 

IV. The Court Should Issue a Declaratory Judgment, Impose a Substantial 

Civil Penalty, and Enter an Injunction 

As the Commission has explained (see FEC SJ Mem. at 17-20), the Court should enter a 

declaratory judgment, a substantial civil penalty, and an injunction to remedy Novacek’s 

violation of a statute “enacted to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process.” FEC v. Odzer, 

Civ. No. 05-3101, 2006 WL 898049, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (imposing a $12,000 civil penalty as 

part of a default judgment for $6,000 in unlawful contributions made in the name of another in a 

knowing and willful violation of the Act). The Odzer court imposed a penalty that represented 

200% of the total amount of illegal funds at issue, which at that time was the maximum amount 

for the provision of FECA at issue in that case. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6) (2000). Two hundred 

percent of the amount in violation continues to be the maximum amount that the Court can 

impose if calculating the civil penalty through the amount in violation. See 2 U.S.C. § 

437g(a)(6) (2009); FEC SJ Mem. at 19 & n.6. Such a penalty is “necessary to deter future 

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violations and to vindicate the Commission’s authority.” Odzer, 2006 WL 898049, at *4 (citing 

FEC v. Committee of 100 Democrats, 844 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C.1993)). 

As with most violations of FECA, violations similar to Novacek’s have typically been 

resolved through conciliation agreements under 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4) before matters reach 

litigation. See FEC v. National Rifle Ass’n, 553 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (D.D.C. 1983) 

(“conciliation is the preferred method of dispute resolution under FECA”). Violators in such 

cases have paid substantial civil penalties in conciliation agreements with the Commission.4

 For 

example, in the Matter of Adrian Plesha, the Commission and Plesha entered into a conciliation 

agreement for a knowing and willful violation of the fraudulent misrepresentation provision in 

2 U.S.C. § 441h. This conciliation agreement provided for, inter alia, a civil penalty payment by 

Plesha of $60,000 which constituted 156% of the amount of the violation (the total cost of the 

mailing and phone calls that were the basis of the violation was $38,500). See FEC, Conciliation 

Agreement, Matter of Adrian Plesha, Matter Under Review (“MUR”) 4919 at 4 (Mar. 20, 2004) 

http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/000012C1.pdf; FEC. General Counsel’s Rept. No. 11, 

Matter of Adrian Plesha, MUR 4919, at 31 n.29 (June 10, 2002),

http://eqs.nictusa.com/eqsdocsMUR/00001172.pdf . A penalty of similar proportion to the 

amount in violation is appropriate here. 

 

4

 The Act requires that the Commission attempt for at least thirty but not more than ninety 

days to enter into a conciliation agreement with respondents in order to correct violations of the 

Act. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(A). All conciliation agreements must be approved by at least four 

members of the Commission. Id. 

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CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in the Commission’s opening brief, the 

Court should grant the Commission’s motion for summary judgment and the requested relief. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Thomasenia P. Duncan 

General Counsel 

David Kolker 

Associate General Counsel 

Kevin Deeley 

Assistant General Counsel 

 s/ Greg J. Mueller

Greg J. Mueller 

Attorney 

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

January 7, 2010 (202) 694-1650 

Case 3:09-cv-00444-M Document 25 Filed 01/07/2010 Page 16 of 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JODY L. NOVACEK, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

 Civ. No. 09-CV-00444 

 Certificate of Service 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that, on January 7, 2010, I caused Plaintiff Federal Election Commission’s 

Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment by email (pursuant to the stipulation of the 

parties under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)((2)(E)) upon: 

 Jody L. Novacek 

 jodylnovacek@hotmail.com 

 

s/ Greg J. Mueller

Greg J. Mueller 

Attorney 

Federal Election Commission 

999 E Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20463 

January 7, 2010 (202) 694-1650 

Case 3:09-cv-00444-M Document 25 Filed 01/07/2010 Page 17 of 17