(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

No. 07–320. Argued April 22, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008 

Federal-law limits on the amount of contributions a House of Representatives candidate and his authorized committee may receive from an 

individual, and the amount his party may devote to coordinated campaign expenditures, 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A), (c), and (d), 

normally apply equally to all competitors for a seat and their authorized committees. However, §319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 2 U. S. C. §441a–1(a), part of the so-called 

“Millionaire’s Amendment,” fundamentally alters this scheme when, 

as a result of a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, the “opposition personal funds amount” (OPFA) exceeds $350,000. The OPFA 

is a statistic comparing competing candidates’ personal expenditures 

and taking account of certain other fundraising. When a “selffinancing” candidate’s personal expenditure causes the OPFA to pass 

$350,000, a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme comes into play. 

The self-financing candidate remains subject to the normal limitations, but his opponent, the “non-self-financing” candidate, may receive individual contributions at treble the normal limit from individuals who have reached the normal limit on aggregate 

contributions, and may accept coordinated party expenditures without limit. See §§441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C). Because calculating the OPFA 

requires certain information about the self-financing candidate’s 

campaign assets and personal expenditures, §319(b) requires him to 

file an initial “declaration of intent” revealing the amount of personal 

funds the candidate intends to spend in excess of $350,000, and to 

make additional disclosures to the other candidates, their national 

parties, and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as his personal 

expenditures exceed certain benchmarks. 

 Appellant Davis, a candidate for a House seat in 2004 and 2006 
2 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Syllabus 

who lost both times to the incumbent, notified the FEC for the 2006 

election, in compliance with §319(b), that he intended to spend $1 

million in personal funds. After the FEC informed him it had reason 

to believe he had violated §319 by failing to report personal expenditures during the 2004 campaign, he filed this suit for a declaration 

that §319 is unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the FEC 

from enforcing the section during the 2006 election. The District 

Court concluded sua sponte that Davis had standing, but rejected his 

claims on the merits and granted the FEC summary judgment. 

Held: 

 1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Davis’ appeal. Pp. 6–10. 

 (a) Davis has standing to challenge §319(b)’s disclosure requirements. When he filed suit, he had already declared his 2006 candidacy and had been forced by §319(b) to disclose to his opponent that 

he intended to spend more than $350,000 in personal funds. He also 

faced the imminent threat that he would have to follow up on that 

disclosure with further notifications once he passed the $350,000 

mark. Securing a declaration that §319(b) is unconstitutional and an 

injunction against its enforcement would have spared him from making those disclosures and also would have removed the real threat 

that the FEC would pursue an enforcement action based on alleged 

§319(b) violations during his 2004 campaign. Davis also has standing to challenge §319(a)’s asymmetrical contribution limits. The 

standing inquiry focuses on whether the party invoking jurisdiction 

had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed, see, 

e.g., Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 

Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180, and a party facing prospective injury has 

standing where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct, 

see, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102. Davis faced the 

requisite injury from §319(a) when he filed suit: He had already declared his candidacy and his intent to spend more than $350,000 of 

personal funds in the general election campaign whose onset was 

rapidly approaching. Section 319(a) would shortly burden his personal expenditure by allowing his opponent to receive contributions 

on more favorable terms, and there was no indication that his opponent would forgo that opportunity. Pp. 6–8. 

 (b) The FEC’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction because 

Davis’ claims are moot also fails. In Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U. S. ___, this Court rejected a 

very similar claim of mootness, finding that the case “fit comfortably 

within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of 

repetition, yet evading review.” Id., at ___. That “exception applies 

where ‘(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully 

litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Syllabus 

expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the 

same action again.’ ” Ibid. First, despite BCRA’s command that the 

case be expedited to the greatest possible extent and Davis’ request 

that his case be resolved before the 2006 election, the case could not 

be resolved before the 2006 election. See id., at ___. Second, the FEC 

has conceded that Davis’ §319(a) claim would be capable of repetition 

if he planned to self-finance another bid for a House seat, and he subsequently made a public statement expressing his intent to do so. 

See id., at ___ . Pp. 8–9. 

 2. Sections 319(a) and (b) violate the First Amendment. If §319(a)’s 

elevated contribution limits applied across the board to all candidates, Davis would have no constitutional basis for challenging them. 

Section 319(a), however, raises the limits only for non-self-financing 

candidates and only when the self-financing candidate’s expenditure 

of personal funds causes the OPFA threshold to be exceeded. This 

Court has never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes 

different contribution limits for candidates competing against each 

other, and it agrees with Davis that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his own money for campaign speech. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, the Court soundly rejected a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds to finance 

campaign speech, holding that a “candidate . . . has a First Amendment right to . . . vigorously and tirelessly . . . advocate his own election,” and that a cap on personal expenditures imposes “a substantial,” “clea[r,]” and “direc[t]” restraint on that right, id., at 52–53. It 

found the cap at issue not justified by “[t]he primary governmental 

interest” in “the prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the 

political process,” id., at 53, or by “[t]he ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective office,” id., at 54. Buckley is instructive here. While BCRA does 

not impose a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it 

imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right, requiring him to choose between 

the right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to 

discriminatory fundraising limitations. The resulting drag on First 

Amendment rights is not constitutional simply because it attaches as 

a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice. Id., at 54–57, and n. 

65, distinguished. The burden is not justified by any governmental 

interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption, see 

id., at 53. Nor can an interest in leveling electoral opportunities for 

candidates of different personal wealth justify §319(a)’s asymmetrical 

limits, see id., at 56–57. The Court has never recognized this interest 

as a legitimate objective and doing so would have ominous implications for the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates 
4 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Syllabus 

competing for office. Finally, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that §319(a) is justified because it ameliorates the deleterious effects resulting from the tight limits federal election law places 

on individual campaign contributions and coordinated party expenditures. Whatever this argument’s merits as an original matter, it is 

fundamentally at war with Buckley’s analysis of expenditure and 

contributions limits, which this Court has applied in subsequent 

cases. Pp. 10–17. 

 (c) Because §319(a) is unconstitutional, §319(b)’s disclosure requirements, which were designed to implement the asymmetrical 

contribution limits, are as well. “[C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can 

seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by 

the First Amendment,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, so the Court closely 

scrutinizes such requirements, id., at 75. For significant encroachments to survive, there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information 

required to be disclosed” and the governmental interest must reflect 

the seriousness of the burden on First Amendment rights. Ibid. 

Given §319(a)’s unconstitutionality, the burden imposed by the 

§319(b) requirements cannot be justified. P. 18. 

501 F. Supp. 2d 22, reversed and remanded. 

 ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and in which STEVENS,

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined as to Part II. STEVENS, J., 

filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which 

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined as to Part II. GINSBURG, J., 

filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which 

BREYER, J., joined. 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 07–320 

_________________ 

JACK DAVIS, APPELLANT v. FEDERAL 

ELECTION COMMISSION 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[June 26, 2008] 

 JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court in 

which JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE 

GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER joined as to Part II. 

 In this appeal, we consider the constitutionality of federal election law provisions that, under certain circumstances, impose different campaign contribution limits on 

candidates competing for the same congressional seat. 

I 

A 

 Federal law limits the amount of money that a candidate for the House of Representatives and the candidate’s 

authorized committee may receive from an individual, as 

well as the amount that the candidate’s party may devote 

to coordinated campaign expenditures. 2 U. S. C. §441a 

(2006 ed.).1 Under the usual circumstances, the same 

restrictions apply to all the competitors for a seat and 

their authorized committees. Contributions from individual donors during a 2-year election cycle are subject to a 

—————— 

1All undesignated references in this opinion to 2 U. S. C. are to the 

2006 edition. 
2 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

cap, which is currently set at $2,300. See §§441a(a)(1)(A), 

(c); 72 Fed. Reg. 5295 (2007). In addition, no funds may be 

accepted from an individual whose aggregate contributions to candidates and their committees during the election cycle have reached the legal limit, currently $42,700. 

See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(3)(A), (c); 72 Fed. Reg. 5295. A 

candidate also may not accept general election coordinated 

expenditures by national or state political party committees 

that exceed an imposed limit. See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(c), (d). 

Currently, the limit for candidates in States with more 

than one House seat is $40,900. 72 Fed. Reg. 5294.2

 Section 319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 109, 2 U. S. C. §441a–1(a),3 part 

of the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,” fundamentally 

alters this scheme when, as a result of a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, the “opposition personal 

funds amount” (OPFA) exceeds $350,000.4 The OPFA, in 

simple terms, is a statistic that compares the expenditure 

of personal funds by competing candidates and also takes 

into account to some degree certain other fundraising.5 

See §441a–1(a). When a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds causes the OPFA to pass the $350,000 mark 

—————— 

2These limits are adjusted for inflation every two years. 2 U. S. C. 

§441a(c). 3BCRA §319(a) is set out in an Appendix to this opinion. Although 

what we refer to as §§319(a) and (b) are actually §315A(a) and (b) of the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which were added to that Act 

by BCRA §319(a), we follow the convention of the parties in making 

reference to §§319(a) and (b). 4BCRA §304 similarly regulates self-financed Senate bids. 116 Stat. 

97, 2 U. S. C. §441a(i). 5The OPFA is calculated as follows. For each candidate, expenditures of personal funds are added to 50% of the funds raised for the 

election at issue measured at designated dates in the year preceding 

the election. The resulting figures are compared, and if the difference 

is greater than $350,000, the asymmetrical limits take effect. See 

§§441a–1(a)(1), (2). 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

(for convenience, such candidates will be referred to as 

“self-financing”), a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme 

comes into play. The self-financing candidate remains 

subject to the limitations noted above, but the candidate’s 

opponent (the “non-self-financing” candidate) may receive 

individual contributions at treble the normal limit (e.g.,

$6,900 rather than the current $2,300), even from individuals who have reached the normal aggregate contributions cap, and may accept coordinated party expenditures 

without limit. See §§441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C). Once the nonself-financing candidate’s receipts exceed the OPFA, the 

prior limits are revived. §441a–1(a)(3). A candidate who 

does not spend the contributions received under the 

asymmetrical limits must return them. §441a–1(a)(4). 

 In order to calculate the OPFA, certain information is 

needed about the self-financing candidate’s campaign 

assets and personal expenditures. Section 319(b) thus 

requires self-financing candidates to make three types of 

disclosures. First, within 15 days after entering a race, a 

candidate must file a “[d]eclaration of intent” revealing the 

amount of personal funds the candidate intends to spend 

in excess of $350,000. 2 U. S. C. §441a–1(b)(1)(B). A 

candidate who does not intend to cross this threshold may 

simply declare an intent to spend no personal funds. 11 

CFR §400.20(a)(2) (2008). Second, within 24 hours of 

crossing or becoming obligated to cross the $350,000 mark, 

the candidate must file an “[i]nitial notification.” 2 

U. S. C. §441a–1(b)(1)(C). Third, the candidate must file 

an “[a]dditional notification” within 24 hours of making or 

becoming obligated to make each additional expenditure of 

$10,000 or more using personal funds. §441a–1(b)(1)(D). 

The initial and additional notifications must provide the 

date and amount of each expenditure from personal funds, 

and all notifications must be filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC), all other candidates for the seat, 

and the national parties of all those candidates. §441a–
4 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

1(b)(1)(E). Failure to comply with the reporting requirements may result in civil and criminal penalties. 

§§437g(a)(5)–(6), (d)(1). 

 A non-self-financing candidate and the candidate’s 

committee face less extensive disclosure requirements. 

Within 24 hours after receiving an “initial” or “additional” 

notification filed by a self-financing opponent, a non-selffinancing candidate must provide notice to the FEC and 

the national and state committees of the candidate’s party 

if the non-self-financing candidate concludes based on the 

newly acquired information that the OPFA has passed the 

$350,000 mark. 11 CFR §400.30(b)(2). In addition, when 

the additional contributions that a non-self-financing 

candidate is authorized to receive pursuant to the asymmetrical limitations scheme equals the OPFA, the nonself-financing candidate must notify the FEC and the 

appropriate national and state committees within 24 

hours. §400.31(e)(1)(ii). The non-self-financing candidate 

must also provide notice regarding any refunds of “excess 

funds” (funds received under the increased limits but not 

used in the campaign). §§400.50, 400.54. For their part, 

political parties must notify the FEC and the candidate 

they support within 24 hours of making any expenditures 

that exceed the normal limit for coordinated party expenditures. §400.30(c)(2). 

B 

 Appellant Jack Davis was the Democratic candidate for 

the House of Representatives from New York’s 26th Congressional District in 2004 and 2006. In both elections, he 

lost to the incumbent. In his brief, Davis discloses having 

spent $1.2 million, principally his own funds, on his 2004 

campaign. Brief for Appellant 4. He reports spending 

$2.3 million in 2006, all but $126,000 of which came from 

personal funds. Id., at 13. His opponent in 2006 spent no 

personal funds. Indeed, although the OPFA calculation 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

provided the opportunity for Davis’ opponent to raise 

nearly $1.5 million under §319(a)’s asymmetrical limits, 

Davis’ opponent adhered to the normal contribution limits. 

 Davis’ 2006 candidacy began in March 2006, when he 

filed with the FEC a “Statement of Candidacy” and, in 

compliance with §319(b), declared that he intended to 

spend $1 million in personal funds during the general 

election. Two months later, in anticipation of this expenditure and its §319 consequences, Davis filed suit against 

the FEC, requesting that §319 be declared unconstitutional and that the FEC be enjoined from enforcing it 

during the 2006 election. 

 After Davis declared his candidacy but before he filed 

suit, the FEC’s general counsel notified him that it had 

reason to believe that he had violated §319 by failing to 

report personal expenditures during the 2004 campaign. 

The FEC proposed a conciliation agreement under which 

Davis would pay a substantial civil penalty. Davis responded by agreeing to toll the limitations period for an 

FEC enforcement action until resolution of this suit. 

 Davis filed this action in the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia, and a three-judge panel 

was convened. BCRA §403, 116 Stat. 113, note following 2 

U. S. C. §437h. While Davis requested that the case be 

decided before the general election campaign began on 

September 12, 2006, the FEC opposed the request, asserting the need for extensive discovery, and the request was 

denied. Ultimately, the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. 

 Ruling on those motions, the District Court began by 

addressing Davis’ standing sua sponte. The Court concluded that Davis had standing, but rejected his claims on 

the merits and granted summary judgment for the FEC. 

501 F. Supp. 2d 22 (2007). Davis then invoked BCRA’s 

exclusive avenue for appellate review—direct appeal to 

this Court. Note following §437h. We deferred full con-
6 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

sideration of our jurisdiction, 552 U. S. ___ (2008), and we 

now reverse. 

II 

 Like the District Court, we must first ensure that we 

have jurisdiction to hear Davis’ appeal. Article III restricts federal courts to the resolution of cases and controversies. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 

U. S. 43, 64 (1997). That restriction requires that the 

party invoking federal jurisdiction have standing—the 

“personal interest that must exist at the commencement of 

the litigation.” Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189 (2000) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). But it is not enough 

that the requisite interest exist at the outset. “To qualify 

as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual 

controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not 

merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Arizonans for 

Official English, supra, at 67. The FEC argues that Davis’ 

appeal fails to present a constitutional case or controversy 

because Davis lacks standing and because his claims are 

moot. We address each of these issues in turn. 

A 

 As noted, the requirement that a claimant have “standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Arizonans for Official English, supra, at 64. To qualify for 

standing, a claimant must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged behavior; and likely to 

be redressed by a favorable ruling. Lujan, supra, at 560–

561. 

 The District Court held, and the parties do not dispute, 

that Davis possesses standing to challenge the disclosure 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

requirements of §319(b). When Davis filed suit, he had 

already declared his 2006 candidacy and had been forced 

by §319(b) to disclose to his opponent that he intended to 

spend more than $350,000 in personal funds. At that 

time, Davis faced the imminent threat that he would have 

to follow up on that disclosure with further notifications 

after he in fact passed the $350,000 mark. Securing a 

declaration that §319(b)’s requirements are unconstitutional and an injunction against their enforcement would 

have spared him from making those disclosures. That 

relief also would have removed the real threat that the 

FEC would pursue an enforcement action based on alleged 

violations of §319(b) during his 2004 campaign. As a 

result, Davis possesses standing to challenge §319(b)’s 

disclosure requirement. 

 The fact that Davis has standing to challenge §319(b) 

does not necessarily mean that he also has standing to 

challenge the scheme of contribution limitations that 

applies when §319(a) comes into play. “[S]tanding is not 

dispensed in gross.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 358, 

n. 6 (1996). Rather, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press” and “‘for each form of 

relief’” that is sought. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 

U. S. 332, 352 (2006) (quoting Friends of Earth, supra, at 

185). 

 In light of these principles, the FEC argues that Davis 

lacks standing to attack §319(a)’s asymmetrical limits. 

When Davis commenced this action, his opponent had not 

yet qualified for the asymmetrical limits, and later, when 

his opponent did qualify to take advantage of those limits, 

he chose not to do so. Accordingly, the FEC argues that 

§319(a) did not cause Davis any injury. 

 While the proof required to establish standing increases 

as the suit proceeds, see Lujan, supra, at 561, the standing inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome 
8 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

when the suit was filed. Friends of Earth, supra, at 180; 

Arizonans for Official English, supra, at 68, n. 22. As 

noted above, the injury required for standing need not be 

actualized. A party facing prospective injury has standing 

to sue where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and 

direct. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 102 (1983); see 

also Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979) (A 

plaintiff may challenge the prospective operation of a 

statute that presents a realistic and impending threat of 

direct injury). Davis faced such an injury from the operation of §319(a) when he filed suit. Davis had declared his 

candidacy and his intent to spend more than $350,000 of 

personal funds in the general election campaign whose 

onset was rapidly approaching. Section 319(a) would 

shortly burden his expenditure of personal funds by allowing his opponent to receive contributions on more favorable terms, and there was no indication that his opponent 

would forgo that opportunity. Indeed, the record at summary judgment indicated that most candidates who had 

the opportunity to receive expanded contributions had 

done so. App. 89. In these circumstances, we conclude 

that Davis faced the requisite injury from §319(a) when he 

filed suit and has standing to challenge that provision’s 

asymmetrical contribution scheme. 

B 

 The FEC’s mootness argument also fails. This case 

closely resembles Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin 

Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. ___ (2007). There, Wisconsin 

Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit, ideological advocacy 

corporation, wished to run radio and TV ads within 30 

days of the 2004 Washington primary, contrary to a restriction imposed by BCRA. WRTL sued the FEC, seeking 

declaratory and injunctive relief. Although the suit was 

not resolved before the 2004 election, we rejected the 

FEC’s claim of mootness, finding that the case “fit com-
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

fortably within the established exception to mootness for 

disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id., at 

___ (slip op., at 8). That “exception applies where ‘(1) the 

challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully 

litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a 

reasonable expectation that the same complaining party 

will be subject to the same action again.’” Ibid. (quoting 

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 17 (1998)). 

 In WRTL, “despite BCRA’s command that the cas[e] be 

expedited ‘to the greatest possible extent,’” WRTL’s claims 

could not reasonably be resolved before the election concluded. 551 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (quoting 

§403(a)(4), 116 Stat. 113, note following 2 U. S. C. §437h). 

Similarly, in this case despite BCRA’s mandate to expedite 

and Davis’ request that his case be resolved before the 

2004 general election season commenced, Davis’ case could 

not be resolved before the 2006 election concluded, demonstrating that his claims are capable of evading review. 

 As to the second prong of the exception, even though 

WRTL raised an as-applied challenge, we found its suit 

capable of repetition where “WRTL credibly claimed that 

it planned on running ‘materially similar’ future” ads 

subject to BCRA’s prohibition and had, in fact, sought an 

injunction that would permit such an ad during the 2006 

election. 551 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9) (some internal 

quotation marks omitted). Here, the FEC conceded in its 

brief that Davis’ §319(a) claim would be capable of repetition if Davis planned to self-finance another bid for a 

House seat. Brief for Appellee 14, 20–21, and n. 5. Davis 

subsequently made a public statement expressing his 

intent to do so. See Reply Brief 16 (citing Terreri, Democrat Davis Confirms He’ll Run Again for Congress, Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Mar. 27, 2008, p. 5B). As a 

result, we are satisfied that Davis’ facial challenge is not 
10 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

moot.6

III 

 We turn to the merits of Davis’ claim that the First 

Amendment is violated by the contribution limits that 

apply when §319(a) comes into play. Under this scheme, 

as previously noted, when a candidate spends more than 

$350,000 in personal funds and creates what the statute 

apparently regards as a financial imbalance, that candidate’s opponent may qualify to receive both larger individual contributions than would otherwise be allowed and 

unlimited coordinated party expenditures. Davis contends 

that §319(a) unconstitutionally burdens his exercise of his 

First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures of 

his personal funds because making expenditures that 

create the imbalance has the effect of enabling his opponent to raise more money and to use that money to finance 

speech that counteracts and thus diminishes the effectiveness of Davis’ own speech. 

A 

 If §319(a) simply raised the contribution limits for all 

candidates, Davis’ argument would plainly fail. This 

Court has previously sustained the facial constitutionality 

of limits on discrete and aggregate individual contributions and on coordinated party expenditures. Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 23–35, 38, 46–47, and n. 53 (1976) (per 

curiam); Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican 

Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 437, 465 (2001) 

(Colorado II). At the same time, the Court has recognized 

that such limits implicate First Amendment interests and 

that they cannot stand unless they are “closely drawn” to 

serve a “sufficiently important interest,” such as prevent-

—————— 

6 In light of this conclusion, we need not decide whether the threat of 

an FEC enforcement action for alleged 2004 violations would be sufficient to keep this controversy alive. 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

ing corruption and the appearance of corruption. See, e.g.,

McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 136, 

138, n. 40 (2003); Colorado II, supra, at 456; Nixon v. 

Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 387–388 

(2000); Buckley, supra, at 25–30, 38. When contribution 

limits are challenged as too restrictive, we have extended 

a measure of deference to the judgment of the legislative 

body that enacted the law. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 

548 U. S. 230, 248 (2006) (plurality opinion); Nixon, supra,

at 396–397; Buckley, supra, at 30, 111, 103–104. But we 

have held that limits that are too low cannot stand. Randall, supra, at 246–262; id., at 263 (ALITO, J., concurring 

in part and concurring in judgment). 

 There is, however, no constitutional basis for attacking 

contribution limits on the ground that they are too high. 

Congress has no constitutional obligation to limit contributions at all; and if Congress concludes that allowing 

contributions of a certain amount does not create an undue risk of corruption or the appearance of corruption, a 

candidate who wishes to restrict an opponent’s fundraising 

cannot argue that the Constitution demands that contributions be regulated more strictly. Consequently, if 

§319(a)’s elevated contribution limits applied across the 

board, Davis would not have any basis for challenging 

those limits. 

B 

 Section 319(a), however, does not raise the contribution 

limits across the board. Rather, it raises the limits only 

for the non-self-financing candidate and does so only when 

the self-financing candidate’s expenditure of personal 

funds causes the OPFA threshold to be exceeded. We have 

never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes 

different contribution limits for candidates who are competing against each other, and we agree with Davis that 

this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amendment 
12 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

right to spend his own money for campaign speech. 

 In Buckley, we soundly rejected a cap on a candidate’s 

expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech. 

We held that a “candidate . . . has a First Amendment 

right to engage in the discussion of public issues and 

vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election” and 

that a cap on personal expenditures imposes “a substantial,” “clea[r]” and “direc[t]” restraint on that right. 424 

U. S., at 52–53. We found that the cap at issue was not 

justified by “[t]he primary governmental interest” proffered in its defense, i.e., “the prevention of actual and 

apparent corruption of the political process.” Id., at 53. 

Far from preventing these evils, “the use of personal 

funds,” we observed, “reduces the candidate’s dependence 

on outside contributions and thereby counteracts the 

coercive pressures and attendant risks of abuse to which 

. . . contribution limitations are directed.” Ibid. We also 

rejected the argument that the expenditure cap could be 

justified on the ground that it served “[t]he ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of 

candidates competing for elective office.” Id., at 54. This 

putative interest, we noted, was “clearly not sufficient to 

justify the . . . infringement of fundamental First Amendment rights.” Ibid.

Buckley’s emphasis on the fundamental nature of the 

right to spend personal funds for campaign speech is 

instructive. While BCRA does not impose a cap on a 

candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an 

unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly 

exercises that First Amendment right. Section 319(a) 

requires a candidate to choose between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered political speech and 

subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. 

Many candidates who can afford to make large personal 

expenditures to support their campaigns may choose to do 

so despite §319(a), but they must shoulder a special and 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

potentially significant burden if they make that choice. 

See Day v. Holahan, 34 F. 3d 1356, 1359–1360 (CA8 1994) 

(concluding that a Minnesota law that increased a candidate’s expenditure limits and eligibility for public funds 

based on independent expenditures against her candidacy 

burdened the speech of those making the independent 

expenditures); Brief for Appellee 29 (conceding that 

“[§]319 does impose some consequences on a candidate’s 

choice to self-finance beyond certain amounts”). Under 

§319(a), the vigorous exercise of the right to use personal 

funds to finance campaign speech produces fundraising 

advantages for opponents in the competitive context of 

electoral politics. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public 

Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality 

opinion) (finding infringement on speech rights where if 

the plaintiff spoke it could “be forced . . . to help disseminate hostile views”). 

 The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not 

constitutional simply because it attaches as a consequence 

of a statutorily imposed choice. In Buckley, we held that 

Congress “may engage in public financing of election 

campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds 

on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified 

expenditure limitations” even though we found an independent limit on overall campaign expenditures to be 

unconstitutional. 424 U. S., at 57, n. 65; see id., at 54–58. 

But the choice involved in Buckley was quite different 

from the choice imposed by §319(a). In Buckley, a candidate, by forgoing public financing, could retain the unfettered right to make unlimited personal expenditures. 

Here, §319(a) does not provide any way in which a candidate can exercise that right without abridgment. Instead, 

a candidate who wishes to exercise that right has two 

choices: abide by a limit on personal expenditures or endure the burden that is placed on that right by the activation of a scheme of discriminatory contribution limits. The 
14 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

choice imposed by §319(a) is not remotely parallel to that 

in Buckley. 

 Because §319(a) imposes a substantial burden on the 

exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal 

funds for campaign speech, that provision cannot stand 

unless it is “justified by a compelling state interest,” Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 

Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 256 (1986); see also, e.g., McConnell,

540 U. S., at 205; Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 657–658 (1990); id., at 680 (SCALIA, 

J., dissenting); id., at 701, 702–703 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting); Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative 

Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 500–501 (1985); 

First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 

(1978); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. 

Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 609 (1996) (principal opinion) (Colorado I); id., at 640–641 (THOMAS, J., 

concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). No such 

justification is present here.7

 The burden imposed by §319(a) on the expenditure of 

personal funds is not justified by any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption. The Buckley Court reasoned that reliance on personal funds reduces the threat of corruption, and therefore 

§319(a), by discouraging use of personal funds, disserves 

the anticorruption interest. Similarly, given Congress’ 

judgment that liberalized limits for non-self-financing 

—————— 

7Even if §319(a) were characterized as a limit on contributions rather 

than expenditures, it is doubtful whether it would survive. A contribution limit involving “ ‘ “significant interference” with associational 

rights’ ” must be “ ‘ “closely drawn” ’ ” to serve a “ ‘ “sufficiently important interest.” ’ ” McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 

136 (2003). For the reasons explained infra, at 15–16, the chief interest 

proffered in support of the asymmetrical contribution scheme—leveling 

electoral opportunities—cannot justify the infringement of First 

Amendment interests. 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

candidates do not unduly imperil anticorruption interests, 

it is hard to imagine how the denial of liberalized limits to 

self-financing candidates can be regarded as serving anticorruption goals sufficiently to justify the resulting constitutional burden. 

 The Government maintains that §319(a)’s asymmetrical 

limits are justified because they “level electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth.” Brief for 

Appellee 34. “Congress enacted Section 319,” the Government writes,” “to reduce the natural advantage that 

wealthy individuals possess in campaigns for federal 

office.” Id., at 33 (emphasis added). Our prior decisions, 

however, provide no support for the proposition that this is 

a legitimate government objective. See Nixon, 528 U. S., 

at 428 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (“‘[P]reventing corruption 

or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate 

and compelling government interests thus far identified 

for restricting campaign finances’” (quoting National 

Conservative Political Action Comm., supra, at 496–497)); 

Randall, 548 U. S., at 268 (THOMAS, J., concurring in 

judgment) (noting “the interests the Court has recognized 

as compelling, i.e., the prevention of corruption or the 

appearance thereof”). On the contrary, in Buckley, we 

held that “[t]he interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates” did not provide a “justification for 

restricting” candidates’ overall campaign expenditures, 

particularly where equalization “might serve . . . to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition 

or exposure of his views before the start of the campaign.” 

424 U. S., at 56–57. We have similarly held that the 

interest “in equalizing the relative ability of individuals 

and groups to influence the outcome of elections” cannot 

support a cap on expenditures for “express advocacy of the 

election or defeat of candidates,” as “the concept that 

government may restrict the speech of some elements of 

our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others 
16 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” Id., at 48–49; 

see also McConnell, supra, at 227 (noting, in assessing 

standing, that there is no legal right to have the same 

resources to influence the electoral process). Cf. Austin, 

supra, at 705 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (rejecting as “antithetical to the First Amendment” “the notion that the 

government has a legitimate interest in restricting the 

quantity of speech to equalize the relative influence of 

speakers on elections”). 

 The argument that a candidate’s speech may be restricted in order to “level electoral opportunities” has 

ominous implications because it would permit Congress to 

arrogate the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of 

candidates competing for office. See Bellotti, supra, at 

791–792 (“[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted 

with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the 

relative merits of conflicting arguments” and “may consider, 

in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the 

advocate”). Different candidates have different strengths. 

Some are wealthy; others have wealthy supporters who are 

willing to make large contributions. Some are celebrities; 

some have the benefit of a well-known family name. Leveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing judgments about which strengths should be permitted 

to contribute to the outcome of an election. The Constitution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the 

power to choose the Members of the House of Representatives, Art. I, §2, and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws to influence the voters’ 

choices. See Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 791, n. 31 (The “[g]overnment is forbidden to assume the task of ultimate 

judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern 

themselves”). 

 Finally, the Government contends that §319(a) is justified because it ameliorates the deleterious effects that 

result from the tight limits that federal election law places 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

on individual campaign contributions and coordinated 

party expenditures. These limits, it is argued, make it 

harder for candidates who are not wealthy to raise funds 

and therefore provide a substantial advantage for wealthy 

candidates. Accordingly, §319(a) can be seen, not as a 

legislative effort to interfere with the natural operation of 

the electoral process, but as a legislative effort to mitigate 

the untoward consequences of Congress’ own handiwork 

and restore “the normal relationship between a candidate’s financial resources and the level of popular support 

for his candidacy.” Brief for Appellee 33. 

 Whatever the merits of this argument as an original 

matter, it is fundamentally at war with the analysis of 

expenditure and contributions limits that this Court 

adopted in Buckley and has applied in subsequent cases. 

The advantage that wealthy candidates now enjoy and 

that §319(a) seeks to reduce is an advantage that flows 

directly from Buckley’s disparate treatment of expenditures and contributions. If that approach is sound—and 

the Government does not urge us to hold otherwise8—it is 

hard to see how undoing the consequences of that decision 

can be viewed as a compelling interest. If the normally 

applicable limits on individual contributions and coordinated party contributions are seriously distorting the 

electoral process, if they are feeding a “public perception 

that wealthy people can buy seats in Congress,” Brief for 

Appellee 34, and if those limits are not needed in order to 

—————— 

8 JUSTICE STEVENS would revisit and reject Buckley’s treatment of 

expenditure limits. Post, at 2–4 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Government has not urged us to take that step, 

and in any event, JUSTICE STEVENS’ proposal is unsound. He suggests 

that restricting the quantity of campaign speech would improve the 

quality of that speech, but it would be dangerous for the Government to 

regulate core political speech for the asserted purpose of improving that 

speech. And in any event, there is no reason to suppose that restricting 

the quantity of campaign speech would have the desired effect. 
18 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

combat corruption, then the obvious remedy is to raise or 

eliminate those limits. But the unprecedented step of 

imposing different contribution and coordinated party 

expenditure limits on candidates vying for the same seat 

is antithetical to the First Amendment. 

IV 

 The remaining issue that we must consider is the constitutionality of §319(b)’s disclosure requirements. “[W]e 

have repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in itself, 

can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief 

guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley, 424 U. S., 

at 64. As a result, we have closely scrutinized disclosure 

requirements, including requirements governing independent expenditures made to further individuals’ political speech. Id., at 75. To survive this scrutiny, significant 

encroachments “cannot be justified by a mere showing of 

some legitimate governmental interest.” Id., at 64. Instead, there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the 

information required to be disclosed,” and the governmental interest “must survive exacting scrutiny.” Ibid. (footnotes omitted). That is, the strength of the governmental 

interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden 

on First Amendment rights. Id., at 68, 71. 

 The §319(b) disclosure requirements were designed to 

implement the asymmetrical contribution limits provided 

for in §319(a), and as discussed above, §319(a) violates the 

First Amendment. In light of that holding, the burden 

imposed by the §319(b) requirements cannot be justified, 

and it follows that they too are unconstitutional.9

—————— 

9Because we conclude that §§319(a) and (b) violate the First Amendment, we need not address Davis’ claim that they also violate the equal 

protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

 In sum, we hold that §§319(a) and (b) violate the First 

Amendment. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
20 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

APPENDIX

BCRA §319(a) provides: 

“(a) Availability of increased limit 

 “(1) In general 

 “Subject to paragraph (3), if the opposition personal 

funds amount with respect to a candidate for election to 

the office of Representative in, or Delegate or Resident 

Commissioner to, the Congress exceeds $350,000— 

 “(A) the limit under subsection (a)(1)(A) with respect to 

the candidate shall be tripled; 

 “(B) the limit under subsection (a)(3) shall not apply 

with respect to any contribution made with respect to the 

candidate if the contribution is made under the increased 

limit allowed under subparagraph (A) during a period in 

which the candidate may accept such a contribution; and 

 “(C) the limits under subsection (d) with respect to any 

expenditure by a State or national committee of a political 

party on behalf of the candidate shall not apply. 

 “(2) Determination of opposition personal funds amount 

 “(A) In general 

 “The opposition personal funds amount is an amount 

equal to the excess (if any) of— 

 “(i) the greatest aggregate amount of expenditures from 

personal funds (as defined in subsection (b)(1) of this 

section) that an opposing candidate in the same election 

makes; over 

 “(ii) the aggregate amount of expenditures from personal 

funds made by the candidate with respect to the election. 

 “(B) Special rule for candidate’s campaign funds 

 “(i) In general 

 “For purposes of determining the aggregate amount of 

expenditures from personal funds under subparagraph 

(A), such amount shall include the gross receipts advantage of the candidate’s authorized committee. 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

 “(ii) Gross receipts advantage 

 “For purposes of clause (i), the term “gross receipts 

advantage” means the excess, if any, of— 

 “(I) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts 

of a candidate’s authorized committee during any election 

cycle (not including contributions from personal funds of 

the candidate) that may be expended in connection with 

the election, as determined on June 30 and December 31 

of the year preceding the year in which a general election 

is held, over 

 “(II) the aggregate amount of 50 percent of gross receipts of the opposing candidate’s authorized committee 

during any election cycle (not including contributions from 

personal funds of the candidate) that may be expended in 

connection with the election, as determined on June 30 

and December 31 of the year preceding the year in which a 

general election is held. 

 “(3) Time to accept contributions under increased limit 

 “(A) In general 

 “Subject to subparagraph (B), a candidate and the candidate’s authorized committee shall not accept any contribution, and a party committee shall not make any expenditure, under the increased limit under paragraph (1)— 

 “(i) until the candidate has received notification of the 

opposition personal funds amount under subsection (b)(1) 

of this section; and 

 “(ii) to the extent that such contribution, when added to 

the aggregate amount of contributions previously accepted 

and party expenditures previously made under the increased limits under this subsection for the election cycle, 

exceeds 100 percent of the opposition personal funds 

amount. 

 “(B) Effect of withdrawal of an opposing candidate 

 “A candidate and a candidate’s authorized committee 

shall not accept any contribution and a party shall not 

make any expenditure under the increased limit after the 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 
22 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

date on which an opposing candidate ceases to be a candidate to the extent that the amount of such increased limit 

is attributable to such an opposing candidate. 

 “(4) Disposal of excess contributions 

 “(A) In general 

 “The aggregate amount of contributions accepted by a 

candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee under the 

increased limit under paragraph (1) and not otherwise 

expended in connection with the election with respect to 

which such contributions relate shall, not later than 50 

days after the date of such election, be used in the manner 

described in subparagraph (B). 

 “(B) Return to contributors 

 “A candidate or a candidate’s authorized committee 

shall return the excess contribution to the person who 

made the contribution.” 

“(b) Notification of expenditures from personal funds 

 “(1) In general 

 “(A) Definition of expenditure from personal funds 

In this paragraph, the term “expenditure from personal 

funds” means— 

 “(i) an expenditure made by a candidate using personal 

funds; and 

 “(ii) a contribution or loan made by a candidate using 

personal funds or a loan secured using such funds to the 

candidate’s authorized committee. 

 “(B) Declaration of intent 

 “Not later than the date that is 15 days after the date on 

which an individual becomes a candidate for the office of 

Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner 

to, the Congress, the candidate shall file a declaration 

stating the total amount of expenditures from personal 

funds that the candidate intends to make, or to obligate to 

make, with respect to the election that will exceed 

$350,000. 

 “(C) Initial notification 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 23 

Opinion of the Court 

 “Not later than 24 hours after a candidate described in 

subparagraph (B) makes or obligates to make an aggregate amount of expenditures from personal funds in excess 

of $350,000 in connection with any election, the candidate 

shall file a notification. 

 “(D) Additional notification 

 “After a candidate files an initial notification under 

subparagraph (C), the candidate shall file an additional 

notification each time expenditures from personal funds 

are made or obligated to be made in an aggregate amount 

that exceeds $10,000. Such notification shall be filed not 

later than 24 hours after the expenditure is made. 

 “(E) Contents 

 “A notification under subparagraph (C) or (D) shall 

include— 

 “(i) the name of the candidate and the office sought by 

the candidate; 

 “(ii) the date and amount of each expenditure; and 

 “(iii) the total amount of expenditures from personal 

funds that the candidate has made, or obligated to make, 

with respect to an election as of the date of the expenditure that is the subject of the notification. 

 “(F) Place of filing 

 “Each declaration or notification required to be filed by a 

candidate under subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) shall be 

filed with— 

 “(i) the Commission; and 

 “(ii) each candidate in the same election and the national party of each such candidate. 

 “(2) Notification of disposal of excess contributions 

 “In the next regularly scheduled report after the date of 

the election for which a candidate seeks nomination for 

election to, or election to, Federal office, the candidate or 

the candidate’s authorized committee shall submit to the 

Commission a report indicating the source and amount of 

any excess contributions (as determined under subsection 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 
24 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of the Court 

(a) of this section) and the manner in which the candidate 

or the candidate’s authorized committee used such funds. 

 “(3) Enforcement 

 “For provisions providing for the enforcement of the 

reporting requirements under this subsection, see section 

437g of this title.” 2 U. S. C. §441a–1 (footnotes omitted). 

Appendix to opinion of the Court 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 07–320 

_________________ 

JACK DAVIS, APPELLANT v. FEDERAL 

ELECTION COMMISSION 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[June 26, 2008] 

 JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE 

GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join as to Part II, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

 The “Millionaire’s Amendment” of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 109, 2 U. S. C. 

§441a–1 (2006 ed.), is the product of a congressional judgment that candidates who are willing and able to spend 

over $350,000 of their own money in seeking election to 

Congress enjoy an advantage over opponents who must 

rely on contributions to finance their campaigns. To reduce that advantage, and to combat the perception that 

congressional seats are for sale to the highest bidder, 

Congress has relaxed the restrictions that would otherwise limit the amount of contributions that the opponents 

of self-funding candidates may accept from their supporters. In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the District 

Court held that because the Millionaire’s Amendment does 

not impose any burden whatsoever on the self-funding 

candidate’s freedom to speak, it does not violate the First 

Amendment, and because it does no more than diminish 

the unequal strength of the self-funding candidate, it does 

not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth 

Amendment. I agree completely with the District Court’s 

opinion, specifically its adherence to our decision in 

McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93 
2 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

(2003). While I would affirm for the reasons given by the 

District Court, I believe it appropriate to add these additional comments on the premise that underlies the constitutional prohibition on expenditure limitations, and on my 

reasons for concluding that the Millionaire’s Amendment 

represents a modest, sensible, and plainly constitutional 

attempt by Congress to minimize the advantages enjoyed 

by wealthy candidates vis-à-vis those who must rely on the 

support of others to fund their pursuit of public office. 

I 

 According to the Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 

424 U. S. 1, 18 (1976) (per curiam), the vice that condemns 

expenditure limitations is that they “impose direct quantity restrictions” on political speech.1 A limitation on the 

amount of money that a candidate is permitted to spend, 

the Buckley Court concluded, “reduces the quantity of 

expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, 

the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 

reached.” Id., at 19. Accordingly, the Court determined 

that any regulation of the quantity of money spent on 

campaigns for office ought to be viewed as a direct regulation of speech itself. 

 Justice White firmly disagreed with the Buckley Court’s 

holding on expenditure limitations, explaining that such 

regulations should be analyzed, not as direct restrictions 

on speech, but rather as akin to time, place, and manner 

regulations, which will be upheld “so long as the purposes 

they serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial.” 

Id., at 264 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 

—————— 

1The Buckley Court invalidated two different types of limits on campaign expenditures: limits on the amount of “personal or family resources” a candidate could spend on his own campaign, 424 U. S., at 

51–54, and overall limits on campaign expenditures, id., at 54–60. In 

my judgment the Court was mistaken in striking down both of those 

provisions; I treat them together here. 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

part). Although I did not participate in the Court’s decision in Buckley, I have since been persuaded that Justice 

White—who maintained his steadfast opposition to Buckley’s view of expenditure limits, see, e.g., Federal Election 

Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 

470 U. S. 480, 507–512 (1985) (dissenting opinion)—was 

correct. Indeed, it was Buckley that represented a break 

from 65 years of established practice, as well as a probable 

departure from the views of the Framers of the relevant 

provisions of the Constitution itself. See Randall

v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 274, 280–281 (STEVENS, J., 

dissenting). 

 In my view, a number of purposes, both legitimate and 

substantial, may justify the imposition of reasonable 

limitations on the expenditures permitted during the 

course of any single campaign. For one, such limitations 

would “free candidates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fundraising.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 

U. S. 604, 649 (1996) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Moreover, 

the imposition of reasonable limitations would likely have 

the salutary effect of improving the quality of the exposition of ideas. After all, orderly debate is always more 

enlightening than a shouting match that awards points on 

the basis of decibels rather than reasons. Quantity limitations are commonplace in any number of other contexts in 

which high-value speech occurs. Litigants in this Court 

pressing issues of the utmost importance to the Nation are 

allowed only a fixed time for oral debate and a maximum 

number of pages for written argument. As listeners and 

as readers, judges need time to reflect on the merits of an 

issue; repetitious arguments are disfavored and are usually especially unpersuasive. Indeed, experts in the art of 

advocacy agree that “lawyers go on for too long, and when 
4 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

they do it doesn’t help their case.”2 It seems to me that 

Congress is entitled to make the judgment that voters 

deserve the same courtesy and the same opportunity to 

reflect as judges; flooding the airwaves with slogans and 

sound-bites may well do more to obscure the issues than to 

enlighten listeners. At least in the context of elections, the 

notion that rules limiting the quantity of speech are just 

as offensive to the First Amendment as rules limiting the 

content of speech is plainly incorrect.3

 If, as I have come to believe, Congress could attempt to 

reduce the millionaire candidate’s advantage by imposing 

reasonable limits on all candidates’ expenditures, it follows a fortiori that the eminently reasonable scheme 

before us today survives constitutional scrutiny. 

II 

 Even accepting the Buckley Court’s holding that expenditure limits as such are uniquely incompatible with the 

First Amendment, it remains my firm conviction that the 

Millionaire’s Amendment represents a good-faith attempt 

by Congress to regulate, within the bounds of the Constitution, one particularly pernicious feature of many contemporary political campaigns.4

—————— 

2Brust, A Voice for the Write: Tips on Making Your Case From a 

Supremely Reliable Source, 94 A. B. A. J. 37 (May 2008) (interview 

with JUSTICE SCALIA and Bryan Garner). 3The Court is of course correct that “it would be dangerous for the 

Government to regulate core political speech for the asserted purpose of 

improving that speech.” Ante, at 17, n. 8. But campaign expenditures 

are not themselves “core political speech”; they merely may enable such 

speech (as well as its repetition ad nauseam). In my judgment, it is 

simply not the case that the First Amendment “provides the same 

measure of protection” to the use of money to enable speech as it does to 

speech itself. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 

377, 398 (2000) (STEVENS, J., concurring). 4 I note at the outset of this discussion, however, that I agree with the 

Court’s conclusion that Davis has standing to challenge §§319(a) and 

(b), and that the case is not moot; I therefore join Part II of the Court’s 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

 It cannot be gainsaid that the twin rationales at the 

heart of the Millionaire’s Amendment—reducing the 

importance of wealth as a criterion for public office and 

countering the perception that seats in the United States 

Congress are available for purchase by the wealthiest 

bidder—are important Government interests. It is also 

evident that Congress, in enacting the provision, crafted a 

solution that was carefully tailored to those concerns. 

Davis insists, however, that the Government’s interests 

are insufficiently weighty to justify what he believes are 

intrusions upon his rights under the First Amendment 

and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, and that, regardless of the strength of the justifications offered, Congress’ solution is not sufficiently tailored 

to addressing the twin concerns it has identified. His 

arguments are unpersuasive on all counts. 

A 

 The thrust of Davis’ First Amendment challenge is that 

by relaxing the contribution limits applicable to the opponent of a self-funding candidate, the Millionaire’s 

Amendment punishes the candidate who chooses to selffund. Extrapolating from the zero-sum nature of a political race, Davis insists that any benefit conferred upon a 

self-funder’s opponent thereby works a detriment to the 

self-funding candidate. Accordingly, he argues, the 

scheme burdens the self-funding candidate’s First 

Amendment right to speak freely and to participate fully 

in the political process. 

 But Davis cannot show that the Millionaire’s Amendment causes him—or any other self-funding candidate—

any First Amendment injury whatsoever. The Millionaire’s Amendment quiets no speech at all. On the contrary, it does no more than assist the opponent of a self-

—————— 

opinion. 
6 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

funding candidate in his attempts to make his voice heard; 

this amplification in no way mutes the voice of the millionaire, who remains able to speak as loud and as long as 

he likes in support of his campaign. Enhancing the speech 

of the millionaire’s opponent, far from contravening the 

First Amendment, actually advances its core principles. If 

only one candidate can make himself heard, the voter’s 

ability to make an informed choice is impaired.5 And the 

self-funding candidate’s ability to engage meaningfully in 

the political process is in no way undermined by this 

provision.6

 Even were we to credit Davis’ view that the benefit 

conferred on the self-funding candidate’s opponent burdens the self-funder’s First Amendment rights, the purposes of the Amendment surely justify its effects. The 

Court is simply wrong when it suggests that the “governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception 

of corruption,” ante, at 14, is the sole governmental interest sufficient to support campaign finance regulations. 

See ante, at 15–17. It is true, of course, that in upholding 

the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971’s (FECA) 

limits on the size of contributions to political campaigns, 

the Buckley Court held that preventing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption were Government interests of sufficient weight that they justified any 

infringement upon First Amendment freedoms that re-

—————— 

5 “In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, 

for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the 

course that we follow as a nation.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14–15 

(1976) (per curiam). 6The self-funder retains the choice to structure his campaign’s funding as he pleases: He may choose to fund his own campaign subject to 

no limitations whatsoever and still accept limited donations from 

supporters; alternatively, he may forgo self-financing and rely on 

contributions alone, at the same level as his opponent. In neither event 

is his engagement in the political process in any sense impeded. 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

sulted from FECA’s contribution limits; the Court explained that, “[t]o the extent that large contributions are 

given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and 

potential office holders, the integrity of our system of 

representative democracy is undermined. . . . Of almost 

equal concern . . . is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual 

financial contributions.” 424 U. S., at 26–27. It is also 

true that the Court found that same interest insufficient 

to justify FECA’s expenditure limitations. Id., at 45–46, 

52–56. But it does not follow that the Buckley Court 

concluded that only the interest in combating corruption 

and the appearance of corruption can justify congressional 

regulation of campaign financing. 

 Indeed, we have long recognized the strength of an 

independent governmental interest in reducing both the 

influence of wealth on the outcomes of elections, and the 

appearance that wealth alone dictates those results. In 

case after case, we have held that statutes designed to 

protect against the undue influence of aggregations of 

wealth on the political process—where such statutes are 

responsive to the identified evil—do not contravene the 

First Amendment. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber 

of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 660 (1990) (upholding statute 

designed to combat “the corrosive and distorting effects of 

immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated 

with the help of the corporate form and that have little or 

no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 

political ideas”); Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 257 (1986) 

(“Th[e] concern over the corrosive influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that it is 

important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of 

political ideas. . . . Direct corporate spending on political 

activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in the 
8 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair 

advantage in the political marketplace”); cf. Red Lion 

Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding constitutionality of several components of the 

FCC’s “fair coverage” requirements, and explaining that 

“[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an 

uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization 

of that market”).

 Although the focus of our cases has been on aggregations of corporate rather than individual wealth, there is 

no reason that their logic—specifically, their concerns 

about the corrosive and distorting effects of wealth on our 

political process—is not equally applicable in the context 

of individual wealth. For, as we explained in McConnell, 

“Congress’ historical concern with the ‘political potentialities of wealth’ and their ‘untoward consequences for the 

democratic process’. . . has long reached beyond corporate 

money,” 540 U. S., at 116 (quoting United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 577–578 (1957)). 

 Minimizing the effect of concentrated wealth on our 

political process, and the concomitant interest in addressing the dangers that attend the perception that political 

power can be purchased, are, therefore, sufficiently 

weighty objectives to justify significant congressional 

action. And, not only was Congress motivated by proper 

and weighty goals in crafting the Millionaire’s Amendment, the details of the scheme it devised are genuinely 

responsive to the problems it identified. The statute’s 

“Opposition Personal Funds Amount” formula permits a 

self-funding candidate to spend as much money as he 

wishes, while taking into account fundraising by the relevant campaigns; it thereby ensures that a candidate who 

happens to enjoy a significant fundraising advantage 

against a self-funding opponent does not reap a windfall 

as a result of the enhanced contribution limits. Rather, 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

the self-funder’s opponent may avail himself of the enhanced contribution limits only until parity is achieved, at 

which point he becomes again ineligible for contributions 

above the normal maximum. See §§441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C). 

 It seems uncontroversial that “there is no good reason to 

allow disparities in wealth to be translated into disparities 

in political power. A well-functioning democracy distinguishes between market processes of purchase and sale on 

the one hand and political processes of voting and reasongiving on the other.” Sunstein, Political Equality and 

Unintended Consequences, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1390 (1994). 

In light of that clear truth, Congress’ carefully crafted 

attempt to reduce the distinct advantages enjoyed by 

wealthy candidates for congressional office does not offend 

the First Amendment. 

B 

 Davis’ equal protection argument, which the Court finds 

unnecessary to address, ante, at 18, n. 9, fares no better. 

He claims that by permitting only the self-funder’s opponent to avail himself of the increased contribution limits, 

the statute creates an unwarranted disparity between the 

self-funder and his opponent. But, as we explained in 

McConnell, “Congress is fully entitled to consider . . . realworld differences . . . when crafting a system of campaign 

finance regulation.” 540 U. S., at 188. And Buckley itself 

acknowledged, in the course of upholding FECA’s public 

financing scheme, that “the Constitution does not require 

Congress to treat all declared candidates the same.” 424 

U. S., at 97. It blinks reality to contend that the millionaire candidate is situated identically to a nonmillionaire 

opponent, and Congress was under no obligation to indulge any such fiction. Accordingly, Davis has failed to 

establish that he was deprived of the equal protection 

guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. 
10 DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

 

Opinion of STEVENS, J. 

III 

 In sum, I share Judge Wright’s view that nothing in the 

Constitution “prevents us, as a political community, from 

making certain modest but important changes in the kind 

of process we want for selecting our political leaders,” 

Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? 

85 Yale L. J. 1001, 1005 (1976). In my judgment, the 

Millionaire’s Amendment represents just such a change. I 

therefore respectfully dissent. 
 Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 07–320 

_________________ 

JACK DAVIS, APPELLANT v. FEDERAL 

ELECTION COMMISSION 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[June 26, 2008] 

 JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, 

concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

 Agreeing with the Court that appellant Jack Davis has 

standing and that this case is not moot, I join Part II of 

the Court’s opinion. On the merits, however, I part ways 

with the Court. The District Court’s careful and persuasive opinion, as I see it, correctly concluded that the provisions challenged in this case are entirely consistent with 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and all 

other relevant decisions of this Court. I therefore join Part 

II of JUSTICE STEVENS’ opinion. 

 I resist joining other portions of JUSTICE STEVENS’ 

opinion, however, to the extent that they address Buckley’s 

distinction between expenditure and contribution limits 

and, correspondingly, Buckley’s holding that expenditure 

limits impose “direct quantity restrictions on political 

communication,” id., at 18. Appellee Federal Election 

Commission has not asked us to overrule Buckley; consequently, the issue has not been briefed. Convinced that 

the challenged statute encounters no constitutional shoal 

under our precedents, I would leave reconsideration of 

Buckley for a later day and case.