(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MCCUTCHEON ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION
 

COMMISSION 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

No. 12–536. Argued October 8, 2013—Decided April 2, 2014 

The right to participate in democracy through political contributions is 

protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute.

Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against

corruption or the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26–27. It may not, however, regulate contributions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict

the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative influence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom 

Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___. 

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended

by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), imposes

two types of limits on campaign contributions. Base limits restrict 

how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or

committee while aggregate limits restrict how much money a donor 

may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. 2 U. S. C. 

§441a. 

In the 2011–2012 election cycle, appellant McCutcheon contributed 

to 16 different federal candidates, complying with the base limits applicable to each. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him 

from contributing to 12 additional candidates and to a number of

noncandidate political committees. He also alleges that he wishes to

make similar contributions in the future, all within the base limits. 

McCutcheon and appellant Republican National Committee filed a

complaint before a three-judge District Court, asserting that the aggregate limits were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction 

and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss. Assuming that the 
 

 

 

2 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Syllabus 

base limits appropriately served the Government’s anticorruption interest, the District Court concluded that the aggregate limits survived First Amendment scrutiny because they prevented evasion of

the base limits. 

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 

893 F. Supp. 2d 133, reversed and remanded. 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, joined by JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded that the aggregate limits are invalid under the First Amendment. Pp. 7–40.

(a) Appellants’ substantial First Amendment challenge to the current system of aggregate limits merits plenary consideration. Pp. 7– 

14.

 (1) In Buckley, this Court evaluated the constitutionality of the 

original contribution and expenditure limits in FECA. Buckley distinguished the two types of limits based on the degree to which each 

encroaches upon protected First Amendment interests. It subjected 

expenditure limits to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations

on core First Amendment rights of political expression.” 424 U. S., at 

44–45. But it concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech and thus applied a lesser but still “rigorous

standard of review,” id., at 29, under which such limits “may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and 

employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of 

associational freedoms,” id., at 25. Because the Court found that the 

primary purpose of FECA—preventing quid pro quo corruption and 

its appearance—was a “sufficiently important” governmental interest, id., at 26–27, it upheld the base limit under the “closely drawn” 

test, id., at 29. After doing so, the Court devoted only one paragraph

of its 139-page opinion to the aggregate limit then in place under 

FECA, noting that the provision “ha[d] not been separately addressed

at length by the parties.” Id., at 38. It concluded that the aggregate

limit served to prevent circumvention of the base limit and was “no

more than a corollary” of that limit. Id., at 38. Pp. 7–9.

(2) There is no need in this case to revisit Buckley’s distinction 

between contributions and expenditures and the corresponding distinction in standards of review. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or

the “closely drawn” test applies, the analysis turns on the fit between

the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve 

that objective. Here, given the substantial mismatch between the

Government’s stated objective and the means selected to achieve it,

the aggregate limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test. 

Buckley’s ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control here. Buckley

spent just three sentences analyzing that limit, which had not been 
 

 

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separately addressed by the parties. Appellants here, by contrast,

have directly challenged the aggregate limits in place under BCRA, a

different statutory regime whose limits operate against a distinct legal backdrop. Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumvention have been considerably strengthened since Buckley. The 1976 

FECA Amendments added another layer of base limits—capping contributions from individuals to political committees—and an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political committees. Since Buckley, the Federal 

Election Commission has also enacted an intricate regulatory scheme 

that further limits the opportunities for circumvention of the base 

limits through “unearmarked contributions to political committees

likely to contribute” to a particular candidate. 424 U. S., at 38. In 

addition to accounting for such statutory and regulatory changes, appellants raise distinct legal arguments not considered in Buckley, including an overbreadth challenge to the aggregate limit. Pp. 10–14. 

(b) Significant First Amendment interests are implicated here. 

Contributing money to a candidate is an exercise of an individual’s

right to participate in the electoral process through both political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is hardly a “modest

restraint” on those rights. The Government may no more restrict 

how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell

a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse. In its simplest 

terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more 

candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits. And 

it is no response to say that the individual can simply contribute less

than the base limits permit: To require one person to contribute at

lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes

is to penalize that individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his First

Amendment rights. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 

739. 

In assessing the First Amendment interests at stake, the proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The whole point of the First

Amendment is to protect individual speech that the majority might 

prefer to restrict, or that legislators or judges might not view as useful to the democratic process. Pp. 14–18.

(c) The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. 

Pp. 18–36. 

(1) This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental 

interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or 
 

 

 

 

4 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

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the appearance of corruption. See Davis, supra, at 741. Moreover, 

the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo 

corruption. Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an 

officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large

sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or political parties. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 

310, 359. The line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amendment rights, and the Court must “err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” Federal Election Comm’n v. 

Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S. 449, 457 (opinion of ROBERTS, 

C. J.). Pp. 18–21.

(2) The Government argues that the aggregate limits further the

permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contributions of any amount, even though Congress’s selection of a base limit

indicates its belief that contributions beneath that amount do not 

create a cognizable risk of corruption. The Government must thus 

defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention of the base limits, a function they do not serve in any

meaningful way. Given the statutes and regulations currently in effect, Buckley’s fear that an individual might “contribute massive

amounts of money to a particular candidate through . . . unearmarked contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 

U. S., at 38, is far too speculative. Even accepting Buckley’s circumvention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive

“massive amounts of money” that could be traced back to a particular

donor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. The Government’s scenarios offered in support of that possibility are either illegal under current campaign finance laws or implausible. Pp. 21–30.

(3) The aggregate limits also violate the First Amendment because they are not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of 

associational freedoms.” Buckley, supra, at 25. The Government argues that the aggregate limits prevent an individual from giving to

too many initial recipients who might then recontribute a donation, 

but experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions are 

retained and spent by their recipients. And the Government has provided no reason to believe that candidates or party committees would

dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate limits were lifted.

The indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is thus disproportionate to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention. 
 

 

 

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Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress

that would serve the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention while avoiding “unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment 

rights. Buckley, supra, at 25. Such alternatives might include targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and political committees, or tighter earmarking rules. Transfers, after all, are the key 

to the Government’s concern about circumvention, but they can be

addressed without such a direct and broad interference with First 

Amendment rights. Pp. 30–35.

(4) Disclosure of contributions also reduces the potential for 

abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure requirements,

which are justified by “a governmental interest in ‘provid[ing] the

electorate with information’ about the sources of election-related 

spending,” Citizens United, supra, at 367, may deter corruption “by 

exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity,” Buckley, supra at 67. Disclosure requirements may burden

speech, but they often represent a less restrictive alternative to flat

bans on certain types or quantities of speech. Particularly with modern technology, disclosure now offers more robust protections against 

corruption than it did when Buckley was decided. Pp. 35–36.

(d) The Government offers an additional rationale for the aggregate

limits, arguing that the opportunity for corruption exists whenever a 

legislator is given a large check, even if the check consists of contributions within the base limits to be divided among numerous candidates or committees. That rationale dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in prior 

cases. Buckley confined its analysis to the possibility that “massive

amounts of money” could be funneled to a particular candidate in excess of the base limits. 424 U. S., at 38. Recasting as corruption a 

donor’s widely distributed support for a political party would dramatically expand government regulation of the political process. And 

though the Government suggests that solicitation of large contributions poses the corruption danger, the aggregate limits are not limited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. Pp. 36– 

39.

 JUSTICE THOMAS agreed that the aggregate limits are invalid under 

the First Amendment, but would overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 

1, and subject BCRA’s aggregate limits to strict scrutiny, which they 

would surely fail. Buckley’s “analytic foundation . . . was tenuous

from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the intervening years.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 

377, 412 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Contributions and expenditures 

are simply “two sides of the same First Amendment coin,” and this

Court’s efforts to distinguish the two have produced mere “word 
 

 

 

6 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Syllabus 

games” rather than any cognizable constitutional law principle. 

Buckley, supra, at 241, 244 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Pp. 1–5. 

ROBERTS, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered 

an opinion, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, and ALITO, JJ., joined. THOMAS, 

J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., 

joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–536 

SHAUN MCCUTCHEON, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[April 2, 2014]

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS announced the judgment of the

Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE SCALIA, 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE ALITO join. 

There is no right more basic in our democracy than the

right to participate in electing our political leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a variety of ways: They can

run for office themselves, vote, urge others to vote for a

particular candidate, volunteer to work on a campaign, 

and contribute to a candidate’s campaign. This case is 

about the last of those options. 

The right to participate in democracy through political 

contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but

that right is not absolute. Our cases have held that Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect

against corruption or the appearance of corruption. See, 

e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam).

At the same time, we have made clear that Congress 

may not regulate contributions simply to reduce the 

amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political 

participation of some in order to enhance the relative 

influence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise 
 

2 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2011) (slip op., at 24–25). 

Many people might find those latter objectives attractive: They would be delighted to see fewer television commercials touting a candidate’s accomplishments or disparaging an opponent’s character. Money in politics may at 

times seem repugnant to some, but so too does much of 

what the First Amendment vigorously protects. If the 

First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests,

and Nazi parades—despite the profound offense such 

spectacles cause—it surely protects political campaign

speech despite popular opposition. See Texas v. Johnson, 

491 U. S. 397 (1989); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U. S. ___ 

(2011); National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 

U. S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). Indeed, as we have emphasized, the First Amendment “has its fullest and most 

urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns 

for political office.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 

265, 272 (1971).

In a series of cases over the past 40 years, we have 

spelled out how to draw the constitutional line between

the permissible goal of avoiding corruption in the political

process and the impermissible desire simply to limit political speech. We have said that government regulation 

may not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel 

toward those who support him or his allies, or the political

access such support may afford. “Ingratiation and access 

. . . are not corruption.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 360 (2010). They embody a

central feature of democracy—that constituents support

candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and 

candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns. 

Any regulation must instead target what we have called 

“quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. See id., at 

359. That Latin phrase captures the notion of a direct 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

exchange of an official act for money. See McCormick v. 

United States, 500 U. S. 257, 266 (1991). “The hallmark of 

corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 

(1985). Campaign finance restrictions that pursue other 

objectives, we have explained, impermissibly inject the

Government “into the debate over who should govern.” 

Bennett, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 25). And those who 

govern should be the last people to help decide who should 

govern.

The statute at issue in this case imposes two types of 

limits on campaign contributions. The first, called base 

limits, restricts how much money a donor may contribute 

to a particular candidate or committee. 2 U. S. C. 

§441a(a)(1). The second, called aggregate limits, restricts

how much money a donor may contribute in total to all 

candidates or committees. §441a(a)(3). 

This case does not involve any challenge to the base 

limits, which we have previously upheld as serving the 

permissible objective of combatting corruption. The Government contends that the aggregate limits also serve that 

objective, by preventing circumvention of the base limits. 

We conclude, however, that the aggregate limits do little, 

if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process. The 

aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the First 

Amendment. 

I 

A 

For the 2013–2014 election cycle, the base limits in the

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as 

amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 

(BCRA), permit an individual to contribute up to $2,600

per election to a candidate ($5,200 total for the primary 
 

 

4 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

and general elections); $32,400 per year to a national

party committee;1 $10,000 per year to a state or local party 

committee; and $5,000 per year to a political action committee, or “PAC.” 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(1); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532 

(2013).2 A national committee, state or local party committee, or multicandidate PAC may in turn contribute up 

to $5,000 per election to a candidate. §441a(a)(2).3 

The base limits apply with equal force to contributions

that are “in any way earmarked or otherwise directed

through an intermediary or conduit” to a candidate. 

§441a(a)(8). If, for example, a donor gives money to a 

party committee but directs the party committee to pass 

the contribution along to a particular candidate, then the 

transaction is treated as a contribution from the original 

donor to the specified candidate.

For the 2013–2014 election cycle, the aggregate limits in 

BCRA permit an individual to contribute a total of $48,600 

to federal candidates and a total of $74,600 to other political committees. Of that $74,600, only $48,600 may be

contributed to state or local party committees and PACs, 

—————— 

1There are six authorized national party committees: the Republican

National Committee, the Democratic National Committee, the National 

Republican Senatorial Committee, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee,

and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. See 2 

U. S. C. §431(14). 

2A PAC is a business, labor, or interest group that raises or spends

money in connection with a federal election, in some cases by contributing to candidates. A so-called “Super PAC” is a PAC that makes only 

independent expenditures and cannot contribute to candidates. The 

base and aggregate limits govern contributions to traditional PACs, but

not to independent expenditure PACs. See SpeechNow.org v. Federal 

Election Comm’n, 599 F. 3d 686, 695–696 (CADC 2010) (en banc). 3A multicandidate PAC is a PAC with more than 50 contributors that 

has been registered for at least six months and has made contributions 

to five or more candidates for federal office. 11 CFR §100.5(e)(3) (2012).

PACs that do not qualify as multicandidate PACs must abide by the 

base limit applicable to individual contributions. 
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Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

as opposed to national party committees. §441a(a)(3);

78 Fed. Reg. 8532. All told, an individual may contribute 

up to $123,200 to candidate and noncandidate committees 

during each two-year election cycle. 

The base limits thus restrict how much money a donor 

may contribute to any particular candidate or committee; 

the aggregate limits have the effect of restricting how 

many candidates or committees the donor may support, to

the extent permitted by the base limits. 

B 

In the 2011–2012 election cycle, appellant Shaun

McCutcheon contributed a total of $33,088 to 16 different 

federal candidates, in compliance with the base limits

applicable to each. He alleges that he wished to contribute

$1,776 to each of 12 additional candidates but was prevented from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to candidates. McCutcheon also contributed a total 

of $27,328 to several noncandidate political committees, in

compliance with the base limits applicable to each. He 

alleges that he wished to contribute to various other political committees, including $25,000 to each of the three

Republican national party committees, but was prevented 

from doing so by the aggregate limit on contributions to 

political committees. McCutcheon further alleges that he 

plans to make similar contributions in the future. In the 

2013–2014 election cycle, he again wishes to contribute

at least $60,000 to various candidates and $75,000 to 

non-candidate political committees. Brief for Appellant 

McCutcheon 11–12. 

Appellant Republican National Committee is a national

political party committee charged with the general management of the Republican Party. The RNC wishes to 

receive the contributions that McCutcheon and similarly 

situated individuals would like to make—contributions 

otherwise permissible under the base limits for national 
 

6 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

party committees but foreclosed by the aggregate limit on 

contributions to political committees.

In June 2012, McCutcheon and the RNC filed a complaint before a three-judge panel of the U. S. District 

Court for the District of Columbia. See BCRA §403(a), 116

Stat. 113–114. McCutcheon and the RNC asserted that 

the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and to 

noncandidate political committees were unconstitutional 

under the First Amendment. They moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the challenged 

provisions, and the Government moved to dismiss the 

case. 

The three-judge District Court denied appellants’ motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss. Assuming that the base limits 

appropriately served the Government’s anticorruption 

interest, the District Court concluded that the aggregate

limits survived First Amendment scrutiny because they

prevented evasion of the base limits. 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 

140 (2012).

In particular, the District Court imagined a hypothetical

scenario that might occur in a world without aggregate

limits. A single donor might contribute the maximum

amount under the base limits to nearly 50 separate committees, each of which might then transfer the money to 

the same single committee. Ibid. That committee, in 

turn, might use all the transferred money for coordinated

expenditures on behalf of a particular candidate, allowing 

the single donor to circumvent the base limit on the 

amount he may contribute to that candidate. Ibid. The 

District Court acknowledged that “it may seem unlikely

that so many separate entities would willingly serve as 

conduits” for the single donor’s interests, but it concluded

that such a scenario “is not hard to imagine.” Ibid. It 

thus rejected a constitutional challenge to the aggregate 

limits, characterizing the base limits and the aggregate 
 

 

 

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Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

limits “as a coherent system rather than merely a collection of individual limits stacking prophylaxis upon prophylaxis.” Ibid. 

McCutcheon and the RNC appealed directly to this

Court, as authorized by law. 28 U. S. C. §1253. In such a 

case, “we ha[ve] no discretion to refuse adjudication of the

case on its merits,” Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 344 

(1975), and accordingly we noted probable jurisdiction.

568 U. S. ___ (2013). 

II
 

A 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, presented this Court with

its first opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the 

original contribution and expenditure limits set forth in

FECA. FECA imposed a $1,000 per election base limit on

contributions from an individual to a federal candidate. It 

also imposed a $25,000 per year aggregate limit on all 

contributions from an individual to candidates or political

committees. 18 U. S. C. §§608(b)(1), 608(b)(3) (1970 ed., 

Supp. IV). On the expenditures side, FECA imposed

limits on both independent expenditures and candidates’ 

overall campaign expenditures. §§608(e)(1), 608(c). 

Buckley recognized that “contribution and expenditure

limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental 

First Amendment activities.” 424 U. S., at 14. But it 

distinguished expenditure limits from contribution limits

based on the degree to which each encroaches upon protected First Amendment interests. Expenditure limits, 

the Court explained, “necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity of 

expression by restricting the number of issues discussed,

the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience

reached.” Id., at 19. The Court thus subjected expenditure limits to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political

expression.” Id., at 44–45. Under exacting scrutiny, the 
 

8 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

Government may regulate protected speech only if such 

regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least 

restrictive means to further the articulated interest. See 

Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 

126 (1989).

By contrast, the Court concluded that contribution 

limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech because

they “permit[ ] the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do[ ] not in any way infringe

the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 21. As a result, the Court 

focused on the effect of the contribution limits on the 

freedom of political association and applied a lesser but 

still “rigorous standard of review.” Id., at 29. Under that 

standard, “[e]ven a ‘“significant interference” with protected rights of political association’ may be sustained if 

the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest

and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary 

abridgement of associational freedoms.” Id., at 25 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 488 (1975)).

The primary purpose of FECA was to limit quid pro quo

corruption and its appearance; that purpose satisfied the 

requirement of a “sufficiently important” governmental

interest. 424 U. S., at 26–27. As for the “closely drawn” 

component, Buckley concluded that the $1,000 base limit 

“focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions . . . while leaving persons free to engage in

independent political expression, to associate actively 

through volunteering their services, and to assist to a 

limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting

candidates and committees with financial resources.” Id., 

at 28. The Court therefore upheld the $1,000 base limit 

under the “closely drawn” test. Id., at 29. 

The Court next separately considered an overbreadth 

challenge to the base limit. See id., at 29–30. The challengers argued that the base limit was fatally overbroad 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

because most large donors do not seek improper influence

over legislators’ actions. Although the Court accepted that

premise, it nevertheless rejected the overbreadth challenge for two reasons: First, it was too “difficult to isolate

suspect contributions” based on a contributor’s subjective

intent. Id., at 30. Second, “Congress was justified in

concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the

appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity

for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary 

contributions be eliminated.” Ibid. 

Finally, in one paragraph of its 139-page opinion, the 

Court turned to the $25,000 aggregate limit under FECA. 

As a preliminary matter, it noted that the constitutionality of the aggregate limit “ha[d] not been separately

addressed at length by the parties.” Id., at 38. Then, in 

three sentences, the Court disposed of any constitutional 

objections to the aggregate limit that the challengers

might have had: 

“The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate

restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support. But this quite 

modest restraint upon protected political activity

serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution 

limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute 

massive amounts of money to a particular candidate

through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political 

party. The limited, additional restriction on associational freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is thus

no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid.” Ibid. 
 

 

10 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

B 

1 

The parties and amici curiae spend significant energy

debating whether the line that Buckley drew between 

contributions and expenditures should remain the law.

Notwithstanding the robust debate, we see no need in this

case to revisit Buckley’s distinction between contributions 

and expenditures and the corollary distinction in the 

applicable standards of review. Buckley held that the 

Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance was “sufficiently important,” id., at 

26–27; we have elsewhere stated that the same interest 

may properly be labeled “compelling,” see National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 496–497, so 

that the interest would satisfy even strict scrutiny. Moreover, regardless whether we apply strict scrutiny or Buckley’s “closely drawn” test, we must assess the fit between 

the stated governmental objective and the means selected 

to achieve that objective. See, e.g., National Conservative 

Political Action Comm., supra, at 496–501; Randall v. 

Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 253–262 (2006) (opinion of BREYER, 

J.). Or to put it another way, if a law that restricts political speech does not “avoid unnecessary abridgement” of 

First Amendment rights, Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25, it 

cannot survive “rigorous” review.

Because we find a substantial mismatch between the 

Government’s stated objective and the means selected to

achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the “closely 

drawn” test. We therefore need not parse the differences

between the two standards in this case. 

2 

Buckley treated the constitutionality of the $25,000 

aggregate limit as contingent upon that limit’s ability to 

prevent circumvention of the $1,000 base limit, describing 

the aggregate limit as “no more than a corollary” of the 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

base limit. Id., at 38. The Court determined that circumvention could occur when an individual legally contributes

“massive amounts of money to a particular candidate

through the use of unearmarked contributions” to entities

that are themselves likely to contribute to the candidate. 

Ibid. For that reason, the Court upheld the $25,000 aggregate limit.

Although Buckley provides some guidance, we think

that its ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of

the aggregate limit in place under FECA does not control 

here. Buckley spent a total of three sentences analyzing 

that limit; in fact, the opinion pointed out that the constitutionality of the aggregate limit “ha[d] not been separately 

addressed at length by the parties.” Ibid. We are now 

asked to address appellants’ direct challenge to the aggregate limits in place under BCRA. BCRA is a different 

statutory regime, and the aggregate limits it imposes 

operate against a distinct legal backdrop.

Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumvention have been considerably strengthened since Buckley

was decided, through both statutory additions and the 

introduction of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. With 

more targeted anticircumvention measures in place today,

the indiscriminate aggregate limits under BCRA appear 

particularly heavy-handed.

The 1976 FECA Amendments, for example, added another layer of base contribution limits. The 1974 version 

of FECA had already capped contributions from political

committees to candidates, but the 1976 version added 

limits on contributions to political committees. This 

change was enacted at least “in part to prevent circumvention of the very limitations on contributions that this 

Court upheld in Buckley.” California Medical Assn. v. 

Federal Election Comm’n, 453 U. S. 182, 197–198 (1981) 

(plurality opinion); see also id., at 203 (Blackmun, J.,

concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Because 
 

12 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

a donor’s contributions to a political committee are now

limited, a donor cannot flood the committee with “huge”

amounts of money so that each contribution the committee

makes is perceived as a contribution from him. Buckley, 

supra, at 38. Rather, the donor may contribute only

$5,000 to the committee, which hardly raises the specter of

abuse that concerned the Court in Buckley. Limits on 

contributions to political committees consequently create

an additional hurdle for a donor who seeks both to channel 

a large amount of money to a particular candidate and to

ensure that he gets the credit for doing so. 

The 1976 Amendments also added an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling

multiple affiliated political committees. See 2 U. S. C. 

§441a(a)(5); 11 CFR §100.5(g)(4). The Government acknowledges that this antiproliferation rule “forecloses 

what would otherwise be a particularly easy and effective 

means of circumventing the limits on contributions to any

particular political committee.” Brief for Appellee 46. In 

effect, the rule eliminates a donor’s ability to create and 

use his own political committees to direct funds in excess

of the individual base limits. It thus blocks a straightforward method of achieving the circumvention that was the

underlying concern in Buckley. 

The intricate regulatory scheme that the Federal Election Commission has enacted since Buckley further limits 

the opportunities for circumvention of the base limits via 

“unearmarked contributions to political committees likely 

to contribute” to a particular candidate. 424 U. S., at 38. 

Although the earmarking provision, 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(8),

was in place when Buckley was decided, the FEC has since 

added regulations that define earmarking broadly. For 

example, the regulations construe earmarking to include

any designation, “whether direct or indirect, express or

implied, oral or written.” 11 CFR §110.6(b)(1). The regulations specify that an individual who has contributed to a 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

particular candidate may not also contribute to a singlecandidate committee for that candidate. §110.1(h)(1). Nor 

may an individual who has contributed to a candidate also 

contribute to a political committee that has supported or

anticipates supporting the same candidate, if the individual knows that “a substantial portion [of his contribution] 

will be contributed to, or expended on behalf of,” that 

candidate. §110.1(h)(2).

In addition to accounting for statutory and regulatory

changes in the campaign finance arena, appellants’ challenge raises distinct legal arguments that Buckley did not 

consider. For example, presumably because of its cursory 

treatment of the $25,000 aggregate limit, Buckley did not 

separately address an overbreadth challenge with respect 

to that provision. The Court rejected such a challenge to 

the base limits because of the difficulty of isolating suspect

contributions. The propriety of large contributions to individual candidates turned on the subjective intent of 

donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way to

tell which donors sought improper influence over legislators’ actions. See 424 U. S., at 30. The aggregate limit, on

the other hand, was upheld as an anticircumvention

measure, without considering whether it was possible to

discern which donations might be used to circumvent the 

base limits. See id., at 38. The Court never addressed 

overbreadth in the specific context of aggregate limits, 

where such an argument has far more force.

Given the foregoing, this case cannot be resolved merely

by pointing to three sentences in Buckley that were written without the benefit of full briefing or argument on the 

issue. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 

139–140 (1941) (departing from “[l]oose language and a 

sporadic, ill-considered decision” when asked to resolve 

a question “with our eyes wide open and in the light of

full consideration”); Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 

251 (1998) (departing from a prior decision where it 
 

 

14 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

“was rendered without full briefing or argument”). We 

are confronted with a different statute and different 

legal arguments, at a different point in the development 

of campaign finance regulation. Appellants’ substantial First Amendment challenge to the system of 

aggregate limits currently in place thus merits our plenary 

consideration.4 

III 

The First Amendment “is designed and intended to

remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 

discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be

voiced largely into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief 

that no other approach would comport with the premise of 

individual dignity and choice upon which our political 

system rests.” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 24 

(1971). As relevant here, the First Amendment safeguards an individual’s right to participate in the public

debate through political expression and political association. See Buckley, 424 U. S., at 15. When an individual 

contributes money to a candidate, he exercises both of 

those rights: The contribution “serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views” and 

“serves to affiliate a person with a candidate.” Id., at 

21–22. 

Those First Amendment rights are important regardless

whether the individual is, on the one hand, a “lone pamphleteer[ ] or street corner orator[ ] in the Tom Paine

mold,” or is, on the other, someone who spends “substan-

—————— 

4The dissent contends that we should remand for development of an 

evidentiary record before answering the question with which we were

presented. See post, at 28–30 (opinion of BREYER, J). But the parties

have treated the question as a purely legal one, and the Government 

has insisted that the aggregate limits can be upheld under the existing 

record alone. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 43, 55–56. We take the case as it 

comes to us. 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

tial amounts of money in order to communicate [his] political ideas through sophisticated” means. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 493. Either 

way, he is participating in an electoral debate that we

have recognized is “integral to the operation of the system 

of government established by our Constitution.” Buckley, 

supra, at 14. 

Buckley acknowledged that aggregate limits at least 

diminish an individual’s right of political association. As 

the Court explained, the “overall $25,000 ceiling does 

impose an ultimate restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support.” 424 U. S., at 

38. But the Court characterized that restriction as a 

“quite modest restraint upon protected political activity.” 

Ibid. We cannot agree with that characterization. An 

aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees 

an individual may support through contributions is not a 

“modest restraint” at all. The Government may no more

restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may 

support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse.

To put it in the simplest terms, the aggregate limits

prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits 

Congress views as adequate to protect against corruption. 

The individual may give up to $5,200 each to nine candidates, but the aggregate limits constitute an outright ban

on further contributions to any other candidate (beyond

the additional $1,800 that may be spent before reaching 

the $48,600 aggregate limit). At that point, the limits 

deny the individual all ability to exercise his expressive

and associational rights by contributing to someone who 

will advocate for his policy preferences. A donor must 

limit the number of candidates he supports, and may have 
 

16 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

to choose which of several policy concerns he will advance—clear First Amendment harms that the dissent 

never acknowledges. 

It is no answer to say that the individual can simply

contribute less money to more people. To require one

person to contribute at lower levels than others because he 

wants to support more candidates or causes is to impose a

special burden on broader participation in the democratic 

process. And as we have recently admonished, the Government may not penalize an individual for “robustly

exercis[ing]” his First Amendment rights. Davis v. Federal 

Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 739 (2008).

The First Amendment burden is especially great for 

individuals who do not have ready access to alternative 

avenues for supporting their preferred politicians and 

policies. In the context of base contribution limits, Buckley observed that a supporter could vindicate his associational interests by personally volunteering his time and 

energy on behalf of a candidate. See 424 U. S., at 22, 28. 

Such personal volunteering is not a realistic alternative

for those who wish to support a wide variety of candidates 

or causes. Other effective methods of supporting preferred 

candidates or causes without contributing money are 

reserved for a select few, such as entertainers capable of

raising hundreds of thousands of dollars in a single evening. Cf. Davis, supra, at 742.5 

The dissent faults this focus on “the individual’s right to

engage in political speech,” saying that it fails to take into 

account “the public’s interest” in “collective speech.” Post, 

at 6 (opinion of BREYER, J). This “collective” interest is 

—————— 

5See, e.g., Felsenthal, Obama Attends Fundraiser Hosted by Jay-Z, 

Beyonce, Reuters, Sept. 18, 2012; Coleman, Kid Rock Supports Paul

Ryan at Campaign Fundraiser, Rolling Stone, Aug. 25, 2012; Mason,

Robert Duvall to Host Romney Fundraiser, L. A. Times, July 25, 2012; 

Piazza, Hillary Lands 2.5M with Rocket Man, N. Y. Daily News, Apr. 

10, 2008, p. 2. 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 17 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

said to promote “a government where laws reflect the very 

thoughts, views, ideas, and sentiments, the expression of 

which the First Amendment protects.” Post, at 7. 

But there are compelling reasons not to define the

boundaries of the First Amendment by reference to such a

generalized conception of the public good. First, the dissent’s “collective speech” reflected in laws is of course the 

will of the majority, and plainly can include laws that 

restrict free speech. The whole point of the First Amendment is to afford individuals protection against such infringements. The First Amendment does not protect 

the government, even when the government purports to

act through legislation reflecting “collective speech.” Cf. 

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. ___ (2012); Wooley v. 

Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. 

Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). 

Second, the degree to which speech is protected cannot 

turn on a legislative or judicial determination that particular speech is useful to the democratic process. The First 

Amendment does not contemplate such “ad hoc balancing 

of relative social costs and benefits.” United States v. 

Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 470 (2010); see also United States 

v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 818 

(2000) (“What the Constitution says is that” value judgments “are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a 

majority”).

Third, our established First Amendment analysis already takes account of any “collective” interest that may

justify restrictions on individual speech. Under that 

accepted analysis, such restrictions are measured against 

the asserted public interest (usually framed as an important or compelling governmental interest). As explained below, we do not doubt the compelling nature of 

the “collective” interest in preventing corruption in the 

electoral process. But we permit Congress to pursue that 
 

 

18 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

interest only so long as it does not unnecessarily infringe 

an individual’s right to freedom of speech; we do not truncate this tailoring test at the outset. 

IV 

A 

With the significant First Amendment costs for individual citizens in mind, we turn to the governmental interests asserted in this case. This Court has identified only

one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of 

corruption. See Davis, supra, at 741; National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 496–497. We 

have consistently rejected attempts to suppress campaign

speech based on other legislative objectives. No matter 

how desirable it may seem, it is not an acceptable governmental objective to “level the playing field,” or to “level 

electoral opportunities,” or to “equaliz[e] the financial

resources of candidates.” Bennett, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip 

op., at 22–23); Davis, supra, at 741–742; Buckley, supra, at 

56. The First Amendment prohibits such legislative attempts to “fine-tun[e]” the electoral process, no matter

how well intentioned. Bennett, supra, at ___ (slip op., 

at 21). 

As we framed the relevant principle in Buckley, “the 

concept that government may restrict the speech of some 

elements of our society in order to enhance the relative

voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” 

424 U. S., at 48–49. The dissent’s suggestion that Buckley 

supports the opposite proposition, see post, at 6, simply 

ignores what Buckley actually said on the matter. See 

also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair 

Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 295 (1981) (“Buckley

. . . made clear that contributors cannot be protected from

the possibility that others will make larger contributions”). 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 19 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.

 Moreover, while preventing corruption or its appearance

is a legitimate objective, Congress may target only a 

specific type of corruption—“quid pro quo” corruption. As 

Buckley explained, Congress may permissibly seek to rein

in “large contributions [that] are given to secure a political 

quid pro quo from current and potential office holders.” 

424 U. S., at 26. In addition to “actual quid pro quo

arrangements,” Congress may permissibly limit “the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of 

the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large

individual financial contributions” to particular candidates. Id., at 27; see also Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 

359 (“When Buckley identified a sufficiently important

governmental interest in preventing corruption or the 

appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid 

pro quo corruption”). 

Spending large sums of money in connection with elections, but not in connection with an effort to control the 

exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give 

rise to such quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may 

garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or

political parties. Id., at 359; see McConnell v. Federal 

Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 297 (2003) (KENNEDY, J., 

concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).

And because the Government’s interest in preventing the

appearance of corruption is equally confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption, the Government may

not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or 

access. See Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 360. 

The dissent advocates a broader conception of corruption, and would apply the label to any individual contributions above limits deemed necessary to protect “collective

speech.” Thus, under the dissent’s view, it is perfectly fine 

to contribute $5,200 to nine candidates but somehow 

corrupt to give the same amount to a tenth. 
 

 

20 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

It is fair to say, as Justice Stevens has, “that we have

not always spoken about corruption in a clear or consistent voice.” Id., at 447 (opinion concurring in part and 

dissenting in part). The definition of corruption that we 

apply today, however, has firm roots in Buckley itself. The 

Court in that case upheld base contribution limits because

they targeted “the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements” and “the impact of the appearance of corruption

stemming from public awareness” of such a system of 

unchecked direct contributions. 424 U. S., at 27. Buckley

simultaneously rejected limits on spending that was less

likely to “be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” Id., at 47. In any event, this 

case is not the first in which the debate over the proper

breadth of the Government’s anticorruption interest has

been engaged. Compare Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 

356–361 (majority opinion), with id., at 447–460 (opinion 

of Stevens, J.).

The line between quid pro quo corruption and general

influence may seem vague at times, but the distinction 

must be respected in order to safeguard basic First

Amendment rights. In addition, “[i]n drawing that line, 

the First Amendment requires us to err on the side of 

protecting political speech rather than suppressing it.” 

Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 

U. S. 449, 457 (2007) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). 

The dissent laments that our opinion leaves only remnants of FECA and BCRA that are inadequate to combat 

corruption. See post, at 2. Such rhetoric ignores the fact

that we leave the base limits undisturbed.6 Those base 

—————— 

6The fact that this opinion does not address the base limits also belies the dissent’s concern that we have silently overruled the Court’s

holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003). 

See post, at 12–13. At issue in McConnell was BCRA’s extension of the 

base limits to so-called “soft money”—previously unregulated contributions to national party committees. See 540 U. S., at 142; see also post, 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 21 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

limits remain the primary means of regulating campaign 

contributions—the obvious explanation for why the aggregate limits received a scant few sentences of attention in 

Buckley.7 

B 

“When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality 

of its actions.” United States v. Playboy Entertainment 

Group, Inc., 529 U. S., at 816. Here, the Government 

seeks to carry that burden by arguing that the aggregate 

limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid 

pro quo corruption. 

The difficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, 

they ban all contributions of any amount. But Congress’s

selection of a $5,200 base limit indicates its belief that 

contributions of that amount or less do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. If there is no corruption concern in giving nine candidates up to $5,200 each, it is

difficult to understand how a tenth candidate can be regarded as corruptible if given $1,801, and all others cor-

—————— 

at 31–38 (appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J.) (excerpts from 

McConnell record discussing unregulated “soft money”). Our holding

about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits clearly does not 

overrule McConnell’s holding about “soft money.” 7 It would be especially odd to regard aggregate limits as essential to

enforce base limits when state campaign finance schemes typically 

include base limits but not aggregate limits. Just eight of the 38 States

that have imposed base limits on contributions from individuals to 

candidates have also imposed aggregate limits (excluding restrictions 

on a specific subset of donors). See Conn. Gen. Stat. §9–611(c) (2013); 

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 21–A, §1015(3) (Supp. 2013); Md. Elec. Law

Code Ann. §13–226(b) (Lexis Supp. 2013); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 55, 

§7A(a)(5) (West 2012); N. Y. Elec. Law Ann. §14–114(8) (West Supp. 

2013); R. I. Gen. Laws §17–25–10.1(a)(1) (Lexis 2013); Wis. Stat. 

§11.26(4) (2007–2008); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §22–25–102(c)(ii) (2013). The 

Government presents no evidence concerning the circumvention of base

limits from the 30 States with base limits but no aggregate limits. 
 

22 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

ruptible if given a dime. And if there is no risk that additional candidates will be corrupted by donations of up to 

$5,200, then the Government must defend the aggregate 

limits by demonstrating that they prevent circumvention

of the base limits. 

The problem is that they do not serve that function in

any meaningful way. In light of the various statutes 

and regulations currently in effect, Buckley’s fear that an 

individual might “contribute massive amounts of money to

a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked 

contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U. S., at 38, is far too speculative. And— 

importantly—we “have never accepted mere conjecture as

adequate to carry a First Amendment burden.” Nixon v. 

Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 392 

(2000).

As an initial matter, there is not the same risk of quid 

pro quo corruption or its appearance when money flows 

through independent actors to a candidate, as when a 

donor contributes to a candidate directly. When an individual contributes to a candidate, a party committee, or a

PAC, the individual must by law cede control over the 

funds. See 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(8); 11 CFR §110.6. The 

Government admits that if the funds are subsequently rerouted to a particular candidate, such action occurs at the 

initial recipient’s discretion—not the donor’s. See Brief for 

Appellee 37. As a consequence, the chain of attribution 

grows longer, and any credit must be shared among the 

various actors along the way. For those reasons, the risk 

of quid pro quo corruption is generally applicable only to 

“the narrow category of money gifts that are directed, in 

some manner, to a candidate or officeholder.” McConnell, 

540 U. S., at 310 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). 

Buckley nonetheless focused on the possibility that 

“unearmarked contributions” could eventually find their 

way to a candidate’s coffers. 424 U. S., at 38. Even ac-
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 23 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

cepting the validity of Buckley’s circumvention theory, it is 

hard to see how a candidate today could receive a “massive

amount[ ] of money” that could be traced back to a particular contributor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. Ibid. 

The Government offers a series of scenarios in support of 

that possibility. But each is sufficiently implausible that 

the Government has not carried its burden of demonstrating that the aggregate limits further its anticircumvention 

interest. 

The primary example of circumvention, in one form or 

another, envisions an individual donor who contributes 

the maximum amount under the base limits to a particular candidate, say, Representative Smith. Then the donor 

also channels “massive amounts of money” to Smith 

through a series of contributions to PACs that have stated

their intention to support Smith. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee 35–37; Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 6.

Various earmarking and antiproliferation rules disarm

this example. Importantly, the donor may not contribute

to the most obvious PACs: those that support only Smith. 

See 11 CFR §110.1(h)(1); see also §102.14(a). Nor may the 

donor contribute to the slightly less obvious PACs that he

knows will route “a substantial portion” of his contribution 

to Smith. §110.1(h)(2).

The donor must instead turn to other PACs that are 

likely to give to Smith. When he does so, however, he 

discovers that his contribution will be significantly diluted 

by all the contributions from others to the same PACs.

After all, the donor cannot give more than $5,000 to a PAC 

and so cannot dominate the PAC’s total receipts, as he 

could when Buckley was decided. 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(1)(C). 

He cannot retain control over his contribution, 

11 CFR §110.1(h)(3), direct his money “in any way” to Smith,

2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(8), or even imply that he would 

like his money to be recontributed to Smith, 11 CFR 

§110.6(b)(1). His salience as a Smith supporter has been 
 

24 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

diminished, and with it the potential for corruption. 

It is not clear how many candidates a PAC must support 

before our dedicated donor can avoid being tagged with 

the impermissible knowledge that “a substantial portion” 

of his contribution will go to Smith. But imagine that the

donor is one of ten equal donors to a PAC that gives the 

highest possible contribution to Smith.8 The PAC may 

give no more than $2,600 per election to Smith. Of that 

sum, just $260 will be attributable to the donor intent on 

circumventing the base limits. Thus far he has hardly 

succeeded in funneling “massive amounts of money” to 

Smith. Buckley, supra, at 38. 

But what if this donor does the same thing via, say, 100 

different PACs? His $260 contribution will balloon to 

$26,000, ten times what he may contribute directly to 

Smith in any given election.

This 100-PAC scenario is highly implausible. In the 

first instance, it is not true that the individual donor will 

necessarily have access to a sufficient number of PACs to

effectuate such a scheme. There are many PACs, but they 

are not limitless. For the 2012 election cycle, the FEC 

reported about 2,700 nonconnected PACs (excluding PACs 

that finance independent expenditures only). And not 

every PAC that supports Smith will work in this scheme:

For our donor’s pro rata share of a PAC’s contribution to

Smith to remain meaningful, the PAC must be funded by

only a small handful of donors. The antiproliferation

rules, which were not in effect when Buckley was decided, 

prohibit our donor from creating 100 pro-Smith PACs of 

his own, or collaborating with the nine other donors to do 

—————— 

8Even those premises are generous because they assume that the

donor contributes to non-multicandidate PACs, which are relatively 

rare. Multicandidate PACs, by contrast, must have more than 50

contributors. 11 CFR §100.5(e)(3). The more contributors, of course, 

the more the donor’s share in any eventual contribution to Smith is

diluted. 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 25 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

so. See 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(5) (“all contributions made by 

political committees established or financed or maintained

or controlled by . . . any other person, or by any group of 

such persons, shall be considered to have been made by a

single political committee”). 

Moreover, if 100 PACs were to contribute to Smith and 

few other candidates, and if specific individuals like our 

ardent Smith supporter were to contribute to each, the 

FEC could weigh those “circumstantial factors” to determine whether to deem the PACs affiliated. 11 CFR 

§100.5(g)(4)(ii). The FEC’s analysis could take account 

of a “common or overlapping membership” and “similar 

patterns of contributions or contributors,” among other 

considerations. §§100.5(g)(4)(ii)(D), (J). The FEC has in 

the past initiated enforcement proceedings against contributors with such suspicious patterns of PAC donations. 

See, e.g., Conciliation Agreement, In re Riley, Matters 

Under Review 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 (FEC, Dec. 19, 

2001).

On a more basic level, it is hard to believe that a rational 

actor would engage in such machinations. In the example

described, a dedicated donor spent $500,000—donating

the full $5,000 to 100 different PACs—to add just $26,000

to Smith’s campaign coffers. That same donor, meanwhile, could have spent unlimited funds on independent 

expenditures on behalf of Smith. See Buckley, 424 U. S., 

at 44–51. Indeed, he could have spent his entire $500,000

advocating for Smith, without the risk that his selected 

PACs would choose not to give to Smith, or that he would 

have to share credit with other contributors to the PACs. 

We have said in the context of independent expenditures

that “‘[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of 

an expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate.’” 

Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357 (quoting Buckley, supra, 

at 47). But probably not by 95 percent. And at least from 
 

26 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

the donor’s point of view, it strikes us as far more likely 

that he will want to see his full $500,000 spent on behalf 

of his favored candidate—even if it must be spent independently—rather than see it diluted to a small fraction so

that it can be contributed directly by someone else.9 

Another circumvention example is the one that apparently motivated the District Court. As the District Court 

crafted the example, a donor gives a $500,000 check to 

a joint fundraising committee composed of a candidate, a 

national party committee, and “most of the party’s state

party committees” (actually, 47 of the 50). 893 F. Supp. 

2d, at 140. The committees divide up the money so that

each one receives the maximum contribution permissible 

under the base limits, but then each transfers its allocated 

portion to the same single committee. That committee 

uses the money for coordinated expenditures on behalf of a

particular candidate. If that scenario “seem[s] unlikely,” 

the District Court thought so, too. Ibid. But because the 

District Court could “imagine” that chain of events, it held 

that the example substantiated the Government’s circumvention concerns. Ibid. 

One problem, however, is that the District Court’s speculation relies on illegal earmarking. Lest there be any 

confusion, a joint fundraising committee is simply a mechanism for individual committees to raise funds collectively,

not to circumvent base limits or earmarking rules. See 11 

—————— 

9The Justice Department agrees. As Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman recently testified before Congress: “We anticipate

seeing fewer cases of conduit contributions directly to campaign committees or parties, because individuals or corporations who wish to

influence elections or officials will no longer need to attempt to do so

through conduit contribution schemes that can be criminally prosecuted. Instead, they are likely to simply make unlimited contributions to

Super PACs or 501(c)s.” Hearing on Current Issues in Campaign

Finance Law Enforcement before the Subcommittee on Crime and 

Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., 1st 

Sess., 3 (2013). 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 27 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

CFR §102.17(c)(5). Under no circumstances may a contribution to a joint fundraising committee result in an allocation that exceeds the contribution limits applicable to 

its constituent parts; the committee is in fact required 

to return any excess funds to the contributor. See 

§102.17(c)(6)(i).

The District Court assumed compliance with the specific

allocation rules governing joint fundraising committees,

but it expressly based its example on the premise that the

donor would telegraph his desire to support one candidate 

and that “many separate entities would willingly serve as 

conduits for a single contributor’s interests.” 893 F. Supp. 

2d, at 140. Regardless whether so many distinct entities

would cooperate as a practical matter, the earmarking

provision prohibits an individual from directing funds

“through an intermediary or conduit” to a particular candidate. 2 U. S. C. §441a(8). Even the “implicit[ ]” agreement imagined by the District Court, 893 F. Supp. 2d, at

140, would trigger the earmarking provision. See 11 CFR 

§110.6(b)(1). So this circumvention scenario could not 

succeed without assuming that nearly 50 separate party

committees would engage in a transparent violation of the 

earmarking rules (and that they would not be caught if 

they did).

Moreover, the District Court failed to acknowledge that

its $500,000 example cannot apply to most candidates. It 

crafted the example around a presidential candidate, for 

whom donations in the thousands of dollars may not seem

remarkable—especially in comparison to the nearly $1.4

billion spent by the 2012 presidential candidates. The 

same example cannot, however, be extrapolated to most 

House and Senate candidates. Like contributions, coordinated expenditures are limited by statute, with different 

limits based on the State and the office. See 2 U. S. C. 

§441a(d)(3). The 2013 coordinated expenditure limit for 

most House races is $46,600, well below the $500,000 in 
 

 

 

 

28 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

coordinated expenditures envisioned by the District Court.

The limit for Senate races varies significantly based on

state population. See 78 Fed. Reg. 8531 (2013). A scheme 

of the magnitude imagined by the District Court would be

possible even in theory for no House candidates and the 

Senate candidates from just the 12 most populous States. 

Ibid. 

Further, to the extent that the law does not foreclose the 

scenario described by the District Court, experience and 

common sense do. The Government provides no reason to

believe that many state parties would willingly participate 

in a scheme to funnel money to another State’s candidates.

A review of FEC data of Republican and Democratic state 

party committees for the 2012 election cycle reveals just 

12 total instances in which a state party committee contributed to a House or Senate candidate in another State. 

No surprise there. The Iowa Democratic Party, for example, has little reason to transfer money to the California 

Democratic Party, especially when the Iowa Democratic

Party would be barred for the remainder of the election 

cycle from receiving another contribution for its own activities from the particular donor.

These scenarios, along with others that have been suggested, are either illegal under current campaign finance 

laws or divorced from reality. The three examples posed 

by the dissent are no exception. The dissent does not 

explain how the large sums it postulates can be legally 

rerouted to a particular candidate, why most state committees would participate in a plan to redirect their donations to a candidate in another State, or how a donor or 

group of donors can avoid regulations prohibiting contributions to a committee “with the knowledge that a 

substantial portion” of the contribution will support a

candidate to whom the donor has already contributed,

11 CFR §110.1(h)(2).

The dissent argues that such knowledge may be difficult 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 29 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

to prove, pointing to eight FEC cases that did not proceed

because of insufficient evidence of a donor’s incriminating

knowledge. See post, at 24–25. It might be that such 

guilty knowledge could not be shown because the donors

were not guilty—a possibility that the dissent does not 

entertain. In any event, the donors described in those 

eight cases were typically alleged to have exceeded the 

base limits by $5,000 or less. The FEC’s failure to find the 

requisite knowledge in those cases hardly means that the 

agency will be equally powerless to prevent a scheme in

which a donor routes millions of dollars in excess of the 

base limits to a particular candidate, as in the dissent’s 

“Example Two.” And if an FEC official cannot establish 

knowledge of circumvention (or establish affiliation) when 

the same ten donors contribute $10,000 each to 200 newly

created PACs, and each PAC writes a $10,000 check to the 

same ten candidates—the dissent’s “Example Three”—

then that official has not a heart but a head of stone. See 

post, at 19–20, 25. 

The dissent concludes by citing three briefs for the 

proposition that, even with the aggregate limits in place, 

individuals “have transferred large sums of money to 

specific candidates” in excess of the base limits. Post, at 

26. But the cited sources do not provide any real-world

examples of circumvention of the base limits along the 

lines of the various hypotheticals. The dearth of FEC 

prosecutions, according to the dissent, proves only that

people are getting away with it. And the violations that 

surely must be out there elude detection “because in the

real world, the methods of achieving circumvention are

more subtle and more complex” than the hypothetical

examples. Ibid. This sort of speculation, however, cannot

justify the substantial intrusion on First Amendment 

rights at issue in this case. 

Buckley upheld aggregate limits only on the ground that

they prevented channeling money to candidates beyond 
 

 

30 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

the base limits. The absence of such a prospect today

belies the Government’s asserted objective of preventing 

corruption or its appearance. The improbability of circumvention indicates that the aggregate limits instead 

further the impermissible objective of simply limiting the 

amount of money in political campaigns. 

C 

Quite apart from the foregoing, the aggregate limits

violate the First Amendment because they are not “closely 

drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational 

freedoms.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25. In the First 

Amendment context, fit matters. Even when the Court is 

not applying strict scrutiny, we still require “a fit that is 

not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not 

necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope 

is ‘in proportion to the interest served,’ . . . that employs 

not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means

narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Board 

of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 

480 (1989) (quoting In re R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 203 

(1982)). Here, because the statute is poorly tailored to the 

Government’s interest in preventing circumvention of the

base limits, it impermissibly restricts participation in

the political process. 

1 

The Government argues that the aggregate limits are 

justified because they prevent an individual from giving to

too many initial recipients who might subsequently recontribute a donation. After all, only recontributed funds can 

conceivably give rise to circumvention of the base limits.

Yet all indications are that many types of recipients have 

scant interest in regifting donations they receive.

Some figures might be useful to put the risk of circumvention in perspective. We recognize that no data can be 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 31 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

marshaled to capture perfectly the counterfactual world in 

which aggregate limits do not exist. But, as we have noted 

elsewhere, we can nonetheless ask “whether experience 

under the present law confirms a serious threat of abuse.” 

Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal 

Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 457 (2001). It does not. 

Experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions made in excess of the aggregate limits are likely 

to be retained and spent by their recipients rather than

rerouted to candidates. 

In the 2012 election cycle, federal candidates, political

parties, and PACs spent a total of $7 billion, according to

the FEC. In particular, each national political party’s 

spending ran in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The 

National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC),

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), and

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC),

however, spent less than $1 million each on direct candidate contributions and less than $10 million each on coordinated expenditures. Brief for NRSC et al. as Amici 

Curiae 23, 25 (NRSC Brief). Including both coordinated 

expenditures and direct candidate contributions, the

NRSC and DSCC spent just 7% of their total funds on

contributions to candidates and the NRCC and DCCC 

spent just 3%.

Likewise, as explained previously, state parties rarely 

contribute to candidates in other States. In the 2012 

election cycle, the Republican and Democratic state party

committees in all 50 States (and the District of Columbia) 

contributed a paltry $17,750 to House and Senate candidates in other States. The state party committees spent

over half a billion dollars over the same time period, of

which the $17,750 in contributions to other States’ candidates constituted just 0.003%. 

As with national and state party committees, candidates 
 

 

 

32 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

contribute only a small fraction of their campaign funds

to other candidates. Authorized candidate committees 

may support other candidates up to a $2,000 base limit. 2 

U. S. C. §432(e)(3)(B). In the 2012 election, House candidates spent a total of $1.1 billion. Candidate-to-candidate 

contributions among House candidates totaled $3.65

million, making up just 0.3% of candidates’ overall spending. NRSC Brief 29. The most that any one individual

candidate received from all other candidates was around 

$100,000. Brief for Appellee 39. The fact is that candidates who receive campaign contributions spend most of

the money on themselves, rather than passing along donations to other candidates. In this arena at least, charity 

begins at home.10 

Based on what we can discern from experience, the

indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate limits is disproportionate to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention. The Government has not 

given us any reason to believe that parties or candidates 

would dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate

limits were lifted. Absent such a showing, we cannot 

conclude that the sweeping aggregate limits are appropriately tailored to guard against any contributions that 

might implicate the Government’s anticircumvention 

interest. 

A final point: It is worth keeping in mind that the base 

limits themselves are a prophylactic measure. As we have 

—————— 

10 In addition, the percentage of contributions above the aggregate 

limits that even could be used for circumvention is limited by the fact

that many of the modes of potential circumvention can be used only

once each election. For example, if one donor gives $2,600 to 100 

candidates with safe House seats in the hopes that each candidate will

reroute $2,000 to Representative Smith, a candidate in a contested

district, no other donor can do the same, because the candidates in the 

safe seats will have exhausted their permissible contributions to Smith.

So there is no risk that the circumvention scheme will repeat itself with

multiple other would-be donors to Smith. 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 33 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

explained, “restrictions on direct contributions are preventative, because few if any contributions to candidates will

involve quid pro quo arrangements.” Citizens United, 558 

U. S., at 357. The aggregate limits are then layered on

top, ostensibly to prevent circumvention of the base limits. 

This “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach” requires

that we be particularly diligent in scrutinizing the law’s 

fit. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S., at 479 (opinion of 

ROBERTS, C. J.); see McConnell, 540 U. S., at 268–269 

(opinion of THOMAS, J.). 

2 

Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to

Congress that would serve the Government’s anticircumvention interest, while avoiding “unnecessary abridgment” 

of First Amendment rights. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 25. 

The most obvious might involve targeted restrictions on

transfers among candidates and political committees.

There are currently no such limits on transfers among 

party committees and from candidates to party committees. See 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(4); 11 CFR §113.2(c). Perhaps for that reason, a central concern of the District

Court, the Government, multiple amici curiae, and the 

dissent has been the ability of party committees to transfer money freely. If Congress agrees that this is problematic, it might tighten its permissive transfer rules. Doing

so would impose a lesser burden on First Amendment

rights, as compared to aggregate limits that flatly ban

contributions beyond certain levels. And while the Government has not conceded that transfer restrictions would 

be a perfect substitute for the aggregate limits, it has

recognized that they would mitigate the risk of circumvention. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29.

One possible option for restricting transfers would be to

require contributions above the current aggregate limits to 

be deposited into segregated, nontransferable accounts 
 

 

34 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

and spent only by their recipients. Such a solution would 

address the same circumvention possibilities as the current aggregate limits, while not completely barring contributions beyond the aggregate levels. In addition (or as an

alternative), if Congress believes that circumvention is

especially likely to occur through creation of a joint fundraising committee, it could require that funds received 

through those committees be spent by their recipients (or

perhaps it could simply limit the size of joint fundraising 

committees). Such alternatives to the aggregate limits 

properly refocus the inquiry on the delinquent actor: the 

recipient of a contribution within the base limits, who then

routes the money in a manner that undermines those 

limits. See Citizens United, supra, at 360–361; cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514, 529–530 (2001). 

Indeed, Congress has adopted transfer restrictions, and 

the Court has upheld them, in the context of state party

spending. See 2 U. S. C. §441i(b). So-called “Levin funds” 

are donations permissible under state law that may be

spent on certain federal election activity—namely, voter

registration and identification, get-out-the-vote efforts, or 

generic campaign activities. Levin funds are raised directly

by the state or local party committee that ultimately

spends them. §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv). That means that other 

party committees may not transfer Levin funds, solicit 

Levin funds on behalf of the particular state or local committee, or engage in joint fundraising of Levin funds. See 

McConnell, 540 U. S., at 171–173. McConnell upheld

those transfer restrictions as “justifiable anticircumvention measures,” though it acknowledged that they posed 

some associational burdens. Id., at 171. Here, a narrow 

transfer restriction on contributions that could otherwise 

be recontributed in excess of the base limits could rely on a

similar justification.

Other alternatives might focus on earmarking. Many of

the scenarios that the Government and the dissent hy-
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 35 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

pothesize involve at least implicit agreements to circumvent the base limits—agreements that are already prohibited by the earmarking rules. See 11 CFR §110.6. The 

FEC might strengthen those rules further by, for example, defining how many candidates a PAC must support

in order to ensure that “a substantial portion” of a donor’s contribution is not rerouted to a certain candidate. 

§110.1(h)(2). Congress might also consider a modified 

version of the aggregate limits, such as one that prohibits 

donors who have contributed the current maximum sums 

from further contributing to political committees that have

indicated they will support candidates to whom the donor 

has already contributed. To be sure, the existing earmarking provision does not define “the outer limit of acceptable tailoring.” Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 

Comm., 533 U. S., at 462. But tighter rules could have a

significant effect, especially when adopted in concert with

other measures. 

We do not mean to opine on the validity of any particular proposal. The point is that there are numerous alternative approaches available to Congress to prevent

circumvention of the base limits. 

D 

Finally, disclosure of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure 

requirements are in part “justified based on a governmental interest in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ 

about the sources of election-related spending.” Citizens 

United, 558 U. S., at 367 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 66).

They may also “deter actual corruption and avoid the

appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions

and expenditures to the light of publicity.” Id., at 67. 

Disclosure requirements burden speech, but—unlike the

aggregate limits—they do not impose a ceiling on speech. 

Citizens United, supra, at 366; but see McConnell, supra, 
 

36 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

at 275–277 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). For that reason, 

disclosure often represents a less restrictive alternative to 

flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech. See, 

e.g., Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens 

for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 262 (1986).

With modern technology, disclosure now offers a particularly effective means of arming the voting public with

information. In 1976, the Court observed that Congress

could regard disclosure as “only a partial measure.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 28. That perception was understandable 

in a world in which information about campaign contributions was filed at FEC offices and was therefore virtually

inaccessible to the average member of the public. See 

Brief for Cause of Action Institute as Amicus Curiae 15– 

16. Today, given the Internet, disclosure offers much more

robust protections against corruption. See Citizens United, 

supra, at 370–371. Reports and databases are available on the FEC’s Web site almost immediately after they 

are filed, supplemented by private entities such as OpenSecrets.org and FollowTheMoney.org. Because massive 

quantities of information can be accessed at the click of a 

mouse, disclosure is effective to a degree not possible at

the time Buckley, or even McConnell, was decided. 

The existing aggregate limits may in fact encourage the 

movement of money away from entities subject to disclosure. Because individuals’ direct contributions are 

limited, would-be donors may turn to other avenues for

political speech. See Citizens United, supra, at 364. Individuals can, for example, contribute unlimited amounts to

501(c) organizations, which are not required to publicly 

disclose their donors. See 26 U. S. C. §6104(d)(3). Such 

organizations spent some $300 million on independent

expenditures in the 2012 election cycle. 

V 

At oral argument, the Government shifted its focus from 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 37 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

Buckley’s anticircumvention rationale to an argument that

the aggregate limits deter corruption regardless of their

ability to prevent circumvention of the base limits. See Tr. 

of Oral Arg. 29–30, 50–52. The Government argued that 

there is an opportunity for corruption whenever a large 

check is given to a legislator, even if the check consists of

contributions within the base limits to be appropriately 

divided among numerous candidates and committees. The 

aggregate limits, the argument goes, ensure that the check 

amount does not become too large. That new rationale for 

the aggregate limits—embraced by the dissent, see post, at 

15–17—does not wash. It dangerously broadens the circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior cases, and targets as corruption the 

general, broad-based support of a political party.

In analyzing the base limits, Buckley made clear that 

the risk of corruption arises when an individual makes 

large contributions to the candidate or officeholder himself. See 424 U. S., at 26–27. Buckley’s analysis of the 

aggregate limit under FECA was similarly confined. The 

Court noted that the aggregate limit guarded against an

individual’s funneling—through circumvention—“massive

amounts of money to a particular candidate.” Id., at 38 

(emphasis added). We have reiterated that understanding 

several times. See, e.g., National Conservative Political 

Action Comm., 470 U. S., at 497 (quid pro quo corruption

occurs when “[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their 

campaigns” (emphasis added)); Citizens Against Rent 

Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 

290, 297 (1981) (Buckley’s holding that contribution limits

are permissible “relates to the perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate”); McConnell, 540 

U. S., at 296 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (quid pro quo corruption in Buckley involved “contributions that flowed to a 
 

38 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

particular candidate’s benefit” (emphasis added)).

Of course a candidate would be pleased with a donor 

who contributed not only to the candidate himself, but also

to other candidates from the same party, to party committees, and to PACs supporting the party. But there is a 

clear, administrable line between money beyond the base

limits funneled in an identifiable way to a candidate—for 

which the candidate feels obligated—and money within

the base limits given widely to a candidate’s party—for

which the candidate, like all other members of the party,

feels grateful.

When donors furnish widely distributed support within

all applicable base limits, all members of the party or 

supporters of the cause may benefit, and the leaders of the

party or cause may feel particular gratitude. That gratitude stems from the basic nature of the party system, in

which party members join together to further common 

political beliefs, and citizens can choose to support a party 

because they share some, most, or all of those beliefs. See 

Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 214– 

216 (1986). To recast such shared interest, standing

alone, as an opportunity for quid pro quo corruption would 

dramatically expand government regulation of the political process. Cf. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 

U. S. 567, 572–573 (2000) (recognizing the Government’s

“role to play in structuring and monitoring the election 

process,” but rejecting “the proposition that party affairs

are public affairs, free of First Amendment protections”). 

The Government suggests that it is the solicitation of 

large contributions that poses the danger of corruption,

see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–30, 38–39, 50–51; see also post, at 

15–16, 20, but the aggregate limits are not limited to any 

direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. Cf. 

McConnell, supra, at 298–299, 308 (opinion of KENNEDY, 

J.) (rejecting a ban on “soft money” contributions to national parties, but approving a ban on the solicitation of 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 39 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

such contributions as “a direct and necessary regulation of 

federal candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of quids”).

We have no occasion to consider a law that would specifically ban candidates from soliciting donations—within the 

base limits—that would go to many other candidates, and 

would add up to a large sum. For our purposes here, it is

enough that the aggregate limits at issue are not directed 

specifically to candidate behavior. 

* * * 

For the past 40 years, our campaign finance jurisprudence has focused on the need to preserve authority for 

the Government to combat corruption, without at the

same time compromising the political responsiveness at

the heart of the democratic process, or allowing the Government to favor some participants in that process over

others. As Edmund Burke explained in his famous speech

to the electors of Bristol, a representative owes constituents the exercise of his “mature judgment,” but judgment 

informed by “the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his 

constituents.” The Speeches of the Right Hon. Edmund

Burke 129–130 (J. Burke ed. 1867). Constituents have the 

right to support candidates who share their views and 

concerns. Representatives are not to follow constituent 

orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and responsive to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the

very concept of self-governance through elected officials.

The Government has a strong interest, no less critical to

our democratic system, in combatting corruption and its 

appearance. We have, however, held that this interest 

must be limited to a specific kind of corruption—quid pro 

quo corruption—in order to ensure that the Government’s

efforts do not have the effect of restricting the First

Amendment right of citizens to choose who shall govern

them. For the reasons set forth, we conclude that the 
 

 

40 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

aggregate limits on contributions do not further the only

governmental interest this Court accepted as legitimate in 

Buckley. They instead intrude without justification on a 

citizen’s ability to exercise “the most fundamental First

Amendment activities.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 14. 

The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the

case is remanded for further proceedings. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–536 

SHAUN MCCUTCHEON, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[April 2, 2014]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. 

I adhere to the view that this Court’s decision in Buckley
 

v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), denigrates core

First Amendment speech and should be overruled. See 

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 265–267 (2006) 

(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment); Federal Election 

Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 164–165 (2003) 

(THOMAS, J., dissenting); Federal Election Comm’n v. 

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 

431, 465–466 (2001) (Colorado II) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 

377, 412–420 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Colorado 

Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election 

Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 635–640 (1996) (Colorado I )

(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in 

part).

Political speech is “‘the primary object of First Amendment protection’” and “the lifeblood of a self-governing 

people.” Colorado II, supra, at 465–466 (THOMAS, J., 

dissenting). Contributions to political campaigns, no less 

than direct expenditures, “generate essential political

speech” by fostering discussion of public issues and candidate qualifications. Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 

(THOMAS, J., dissenting); see also id., at 410–411. Buckley

itself recognized that both contribution and expenditure 
 

 

2 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

limits “operate in an area of the most fundamental First

Amendment activities” and “implicate fundamental First

Amendment interests.” 424 U. S., at 14, 23. But instead 

of treating political giving and political spending alike, 

Buckley distinguished the two, embracing a bifurcated 

standard of review under which contribution limits receive 

less rigorous scrutiny. Id., at 25. 

As I have explained before, “[t]he analytic foundation of 

Buckley . . . was tenuous from the very beginning and has 

only continued to erode in the intervening years.” Shrink 

Missouri, supra, at 412 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). To 

justify a lesser standard of review for contribution limits, 

Buckley relied on the premise that contributions are different in kind from direct expenditures. None of the 

Court’s bases for that premise withstands careful review. 

The linchpin of the Court’s analysis was its assertion that 

“[w]hile contributions may result in political expression if 

spent by a candidate or an association to present views to

the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 

contributor.” 424 U. S., at 21. But that “‘speech by 

proxy’” rationale quickly breaks down, given that “[e]ven

in the case of a direct expenditure, there is usually some

go-between that facilitates the dissemination of the

spender’s message—for instance, an advertising agency or

a television station.” Colorado I, supra, at 638–639 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Moreover, we have since rejected the

“‘proxy speech’” approach as affording insufficient First

Amendment protection to “the voices of those of modest

means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able 

to buy expensive media ads with their own resources.” 

Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 495 (1985); see Shrink 

Missouri, supra, at 413–414 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

The remaining justifications Buckley provided are also

flawed. For example, Buckley claimed that contribution 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

limits entail only a “marginal” speech restriction because 

“[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support 

for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate 

the underlying basis for the support.” 424 U. S., at 20, 

21. But this Court has never required a speaker to explain

the reasons for his position in order to obtain full First

Amendment protection. Instead, we have consistently 

held that speech is protected even “when the underlying 

basis for a position is not given.” Shrink Missouri, supra, 

at 415, n. 3 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see, e.g., City of 

Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 46 (1994) (sign reading “For

Peace in the Gulf ”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 415– 

416 (1989) (flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 510–511 

(1969) (black armband signifying opposition to Vietnam

War); see also Colorado I, supra, at 640 (opinion of 

THOMAS, J.) (“Even a pure message of support, unadorned

with reasons, is valuable to the democratic process”)

Equally unpersuasive is Buckley’s suggestion that contribution limits warrant less stringent review because

“[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor does

not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,” 

and “[a]t most, the size of the contribution provides a very 

rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s support

for the candidate.” 424 U. S., at 21. Contributions do increase the quantity of communication by “amplifying the 

voice of the candidate” and “help[ing] to ensure the dissemination of the messages that the contributor wishes to 

convey.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 415 (THOMAS, J., 

dissenting). They also serve as a quantifiable metric of 

the intensity of a particular contributor’s support, as 

demonstrated by the frequent practice of giving different

amounts to different candidates. Buckley simply failed to

recognize that “we have accorded full First Amendment

protection to expressions of intensity.” Id., at 415, n. 3; 

see also Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 25–26 (1971) 
 

 

 

4 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

(protecting the use of an obscenity for emphasis). 

Although today’s decision represents a faithful application of our precedents, the plurality’s discussion of Buckley

omits any reference to these discarded rationales. Instead, the plurality alludes only to Buckley’s last remaining reason for devaluing political contributions relative to 

expenditures. See ante, at 8 (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., 

at 21). The relevant sentence from Buckley reads as 

follows: 

“A limitation on the amount of money a person may

give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of

support evidenced by a contribution but does not in 

any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss

candidates and issues.” Ibid. 

That proposition, read in full, cannot be squared with a

key premise of today’s decision.

Among the Government’s justifications for the aggregate

limits set forth in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of

2002 (BCRA) is that “an individual can engage in the

‘symbolic act of contributing’ to as many entities as he 

wishes.” Brief for Appellee 20. That is, the Government 

contends that aggregate limits are constitutional as long 

as an individual can still contribute some token amount (a

dime, for example) to each of his preferred candidates. 

The plurality, quite correctly, rejects that argument, 

noting that “[i]t is no answer to say that the individual can

simply contribute less money to more people.” Ante, at 16. 

That is so because “[t]o require one person to contribute at

lower levels than others because he wants to support more 

candidates or causes is to impose a special burden on

broader participation in the democratic process.” Ibid. 

What the plurality does not recognize is that the same

logic also defeats the reasoning from Buckley on which the 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

plurality purports to rely. Under the plurality’s analysis,

limiting the amount of money a person may give to a 

candidate does impose a direct restraint on his political

communication; if it did not, the aggregate limits at issue 

here would not create “a special burden on broader participation in the democratic process.” Ibid. I am wholly in

agreement with the plurality’s conclusion on this point:

“[T]he Government may not penalize an individual for 

‘robustly exercis[ing]’ his First Amendment rights.” Ibid. 

(quoting Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 

739 (2008)). I regret only that the plurality does not

acknowledge that today’s decision, although purporting

not to overrule Buckley, continues to chip away at its 

footings.

In sum, what remains of Buckley is a rule without a 

rationale. Contributions and expenditures are simply 

“two sides of the same First Amendment coin,” and our efforts to distinguish the two have produced mere “word

games” rather than any cognizable principle of constitutional law. Buckley, supra, at 241, 244 (Burger, C. J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). For that reason, I would overrule Buckley and subject the aggregate

limits in BCRA to strict scrutiny, which they would surely 

fail. See Colorado I, 518 U. S., at 640–641 (opinion of 

THOMAS, J.) (“I am convinced that under traditional strict

scrutiny, broad prophylactic caps on both spending and

giving in the political process . . . are unconstitutional”). 

This case represents yet another missed opportunity to

right the course of our campaign finance jurisprudence by

restoring a standard that is faithful to the First Amendment. Until we undertake that reexamination, we remain 

in a “halfway house” of our own design. Shrink Missouri, 

528 U. S., at 410 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). For these 

reasons, I concur only in the judgment. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–536 

SHAUN MCCUTCHEON, ET AL., APPELLANTS v.
 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[April 2, 2014]

 JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

Nearly 40 years ago in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 

(1976) (per curiam), this Court considered the constitutionality of laws that imposed limits upon the overall

amount a single person can contribute to all federal candidates, political parties, and committees taken together.

The Court held that those limits did not violate the Constitution. Id., at 38; accord, McConnell v. Federal Election 

Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 138, n. 40, 152–153, n. 48 (2003) 

(citing with approval Buckley’s aggregate limits holding).

The Buckley Court focused upon the same problem that 

concerns the Court today, and it wrote: 

“The overall $25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate

restriction upon the number of candidates and committees with which an individual may associate himself by means of financial support. But this quite 

modest restraint upon protected political activity

serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution 

limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute 

massive amounts of money to a particular candidate

through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political 

party. The limited, additional restriction on associa­
 

 

 

2 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

tional freedom imposed by the overall ceiling is thus

no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid.” 424 U. S., at 38. 

Today a majority of the Court overrules this holding. It 

is wrong to do so. Its conclusion rests upon its own, not a 

record-based, view of the facts. Its legal analysis is faulty:

It misconstrues the nature of the competing constitutional 

interests at stake. It understates the importance of protecting the political integrity of our governmental institutions. It creates a loophole that will allow a single 

individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party 

or to a candidate’s campaign. Taken together with Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310 

(2010), today’s decision eviscerates our Nation’s campaign

finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with

the grave problems of democratic legitimacy that those

laws were intended to resolve. 

I 

The plurality concludes that the aggregate contribution

limits “‘unnecessar[ily] abridg[e]’” First Amendment 

rights. Ante, at 8, 30 (quoting Buckley, supra, at 25). It 

notes that some individuals will wish to “spen[d] ‘substantial amounts of money in order to communicate [their] 

political ideas through sophisticated’ means.” Ante, at 14– 

15 (quoting Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 493 (1985) 

(NCPAC)). Aggregate contribution ceilings limit an individual’s ability to engage in such “broader participation in

the democratic process,” while insufficiently advancing

any legitimate governmental objective. Ante, at 16, 21–29. 

Hence, the plurality finds, they violate the Constitution. 

The plurality’s conclusion rests upon three separate but

related claims. Each is fatally flawed. First, the plurality

says that given the base limits on contributions to candi­
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

dates and political committees, aggregate limits do not 

further any independent governmental objective worthy of

protection. And that is because, given the base limits,

“[s]pending large sums of money in connection with elections” does not “give rise to . . . corruption.” Ante, at 19. 

In making this argument, the plurality relies heavily upon 

a narrow definition of “corruption” that excludes efforts

to obtain “‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or 

political parties.” Ibid. (quoting Citizens United, supra, at 

359); accord, ante, at 18–20, 22–29. 

Second, the plurality assesses the instrumental objective of the aggregate limits, namely, safeguarding the base

limits. It finds that they “do not serve that function in any

meaningful way.” Ante, at 22. That is because, even 

without the aggregate limits, the possibilities for circumventing the base limits are “implausible” and “divorced 

from reality.” Ante, at 23, 24, 28. 

Third, the plurality says the aggregate limits are not a

“‘reasonable’” policy tool. Rather, they are “poorly tailored

to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention

of the base limits.” Ante, at 30 (quoting Board of Trustees 

of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480 (1989)). 

The plurality imagines several alternative regulations

that it says might just as effectively thwart circumvention. 

Accordingly, it finds, the aggregate caps are out of “‘proportion to the [anticorruption] interest served.’” Ante, at 

30 (quoting Fox, supra, at 480). 

II 

The plurality’s first claim—that large aggregate contributions do not “give rise” to “corruption”—is plausible only 

because the plurality defines “corruption” too narrowly. 

The plurality describes the constitutionally permissible 

objective of campaign finance regulation as follows: “Congress may target only a specific type of corruption—‘quid 

pro quo’ corruption.” Ante, at 19. It then defines quid pro 
 

 

 

4 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

quo corruption to mean no more than “a direct exchange of

an official act for money”—an act akin to bribery. Ante, at 

2–3. It adds specifically that corruption does not include 

efforts to “garner ‘influence over or access to’ elected officials or political parties.” Ante, at 19 (quoting Citizens 

United, supra, at 359). Moreover, the Government’s efforts to prevent the “appearance of corruption” are “equally 

confined to the appearance of quid pro quo corruption,” 

as narrowly defined. Ante, at 19. In the plurality’s view, a

federal statute could not prevent an individual from writing a million dollar check to a political party (by donating 

to its various committees), because the rationale for any

limit would “dangerously broade[n] the circumscribed

definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our 

prior cases.” Ante, at 37. 

This critically important definition of “corruption” is

inconsistent with the Court’s prior case law (with the 

possible exception of Citizens United, as I will explain 

below). It is virtually impossible to reconcile with this

Court’s decision in McConnell, upholding the Bipartisan

Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). And it misunderstands the constitutional importance of the interests 

at stake. In fact, constitutional interests—indeed, 

First Amendment interests—lie on both sides of the legal

equation. 

A 

In reality, as the history of campaign finance reform 

shows and as our earlier cases on the subject have recognized, the anticorruption interest that drives Congress to 

regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, more

important interest than the plurality acknowledges. It is 

an interest in maintaining the integrity of our public

governmental institutions. And it is an interest rooted in 

the Constitution and in the First Amendment itself. 

Consider at least one reason why the First Amendment 
 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

protects political speech. Speech does not exist in a vacuum. Rather, political communication seeks to secure

government action. A politically oriented “marketplace of 

ideas” seeks to form a public opinion that can and will 

influence elected representatives. 

This is not a new idea. Eighty-seven years ago, Justice

Brandeis wrote that the First Amendment’s protection of

speech was “essential to effective democracy.” Whitney v. 

California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). 

Chief Justice Hughes reiterated the same idea shortly 

thereafter: “A fundamental principle of our constitutional 

system” is the “maintenance of the opportunity for free 

political discussion to the end that government may be 

responsive to the will of the people.” Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931) (emphasis added). In 

Citizens United, the Court stated that “[s]peech is an

essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to 

hold officials accountable to the people.” 558 U. S., at 339 

(emphasis added).

The Framers had good reason to emphasize this same 

connection between political speech and governmental

action. An influential 18th-century continental philosopher had argued that in a representative democracy, the 

people lose control of their representatives between elections, during which interim periods they were “in chains.” 

J. Rousseau, An Inquiry Into the Nature of the Social

Contract 265–266 (transl. 1791).

The Framers responded to this criticism both by requiring frequent elections to federal office, and by enacting a 

First Amendment that would facilitate a “chain of communication between the people, and those, to whom they 

have committed the exercise of the powers of government.”

J. Wilson, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 

States of America 30–31 (1792). This “chain” would 

establish the necessary “communion of interests and 

sympathy of sentiments” between the people and their 
 

 

6 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

representatives, so that public opinion could be channeled 

into effective governmental action. The Federalist No. 57, 

p. 386 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison); accord, T. Benton, 

1 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 

1856, p. 141 (1857) (explaining that the First Amendment 

will strengthen American democracy by giving “ ‘the people’ ” a right to “ ‘publicly address their representatives,’ ”

“ ‘privately advise them,’ ” or “ ‘declare their sentiments by

petition to the whole body’ ” (quoting James Madison)). 

Accordingly, the First Amendment advances not only the 

individual’s right to engage in political speech, but also the

public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which

collective speech matters. 

What has this to do with corruption? It has everything 

to do with corruption. Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary “chain of communication” between the 

people and their representatives. It derails the essential 

speech-to-government-action tie. Where enough money 

calls the tune, the general public will not be heard. Insofar as corruption cuts the link between political thought

and political action, a free marketplace of political ideas

loses its point. That is one reason why the Court has

stressed the constitutional importance of Congress’ concern that a few large donations not drown out the voices of 

the many. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U. S., at 26–27. 

That is also why the Court has used the phrase “subversion of the political process” to describe circumstances in

which “[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to

their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain

to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.” 

NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 497. See also Federal Election 

Comm’n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 

208 (1982) (the Government’s interests in preventing 

corruption “directly implicate the integrity of our electoral

process” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

See generally R. Post, Citizens Divided: Campaign Fi­
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

nance Reform and the Constitution 7–16, 80–94 (forthcoming 2014) (arguing that the efficacy of American democracy depends on “electoral integrity” and the responsiveness 

of public officials to public opinion). 

The “appearance of corruption” can make matters worse. 

It can lead the public to believe that its efforts to communicate with its representatives or to help sway public

opinion have little purpose. And a cynical public can lose

interest in political participation altogether. See Nixon v. 

Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 390 

(2000) (“[T]he cynical assumption that large donors call 

the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take 

part in democratic governance”). Democracy, the Court

has often said, cannot work unless “the people have faith 

in those who govern.” United States v. Mississippi Valley 

Generating Co., 364 U. S. 520, 562 (1961).

The upshot is that the interests the Court has long

described as preventing “corruption” or the “appearance of

corruption” are more than ordinary factors to be weighed 

against the constitutional right to political speech. Rather, 

they are interests rooted in the First Amendment itself. They are rooted in the constitutional effort to create

a democracy responsive to the people—a government

where laws reflect the very thoughts, views, ideas, and 

sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment 

protects. Given that end, we can and should understand 

campaign finance laws as resting upon a broader and 

more significant constitutional rationale than the plurality’s limited definition of “corruption” suggests. We should 

see these laws as seeking in significant part to strengthen, 

rather than weaken, the First Amendment. To say this is 

not to deny the potential for conflict between (1) the need

to permit contributions that pay for the diffusion of ideas, 

and (2) the need to limit payments in order to help maintain the integrity of the electoral process. But that conflict 

takes place within, not outside, the First Amendment’s 
 

 

 

8 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

boundaries. 

B 

Since the kinds of corruption that can destroy the link

between public opinion and governmental action extend 

well beyond those the plurality describes, the plurality’s 

notion of corruption is flatly inconsistent with the basic

constitutional rationale I have just described. Thus, it 

should surprise no one that this Court’s case law (Citizens 

United excepted) insists upon a considerably broader

definition. 

In Buckley, for instance, the Court said explicitly that

aggregate limits were constitutional because they helped 

“prevent evasion . . . [through] huge contributions to the 

candidate’s political party,” 424 U. S., at 26 (the contrary 

to what the plurality today seems to believe, see ante, at 

36–39). Moreover, Buckley upheld the base limits in

significant part because they helped thwart “the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the 

opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions.” 424 U. S., at 27 (emphasis 

added). And it said that Congress could reasonably conclude that criminal laws forbidding “the giving and taking

of bribes” did not adequately “deal with the reality or 

appearance of corruption.” Id., at 28. Bribery laws, the

Court recognized, address “only the most blatant and 

specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action.” Ibid. The concern with corruption 

extends further. 

Other cases put the matter yet more strongly. In 

Beaumont, for example, the Court found constitutional a

ban on direct contributions by corporations because of the 

need to prevent corruption, properly “understood not only 

as quid pro quo agreements, but also as undue influence

on an officeholder’s judgment.” Federal Election Comm’n 

v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 155–156 (2003). In Federal 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 441, 457–460 (2001) (Colorado II ), the Court upheld limits imposed upon coordinated 

expenditures among parties and candidates because it 

found they thwarted corruption and its appearance, again

understood as including “undue influence” by wealthy 

donors. In Shrink Missouri, the Court upheld limitations

imposed by the Missouri Legislature upon contributions to 

state political candidates, not only because of the need to

prevent bribery, but also because of “the broader threat 

from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large

contributors.” 528 U. S., at 389. 

C 

Most important, in McConnell, this Court considered the 

constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 

of 2002, an Act that set new limits on “soft money” contributions to political parties. “Soft money” referred to funds

that, prior to BCRA, were freely donated to parties for 

activities other than directly helping elect a federal candidate—activities such as voter registration, “get out the 

vote” drives, and advertising that did not expressly advocate a federal candidate’s election or defeat. 540 U. S., at 

122–124. BCRA imposed a new ban on soft money contributions to national party committees, and greatly curtailed them in respect to state and local parties. Id., at 

133–134, 161–164. 

The Court in McConnell upheld these new contribution 

restrictions under the First Amendment for the very reason the plurality today discounts or ignores. Namely,

the Court found they thwarted a significant risk of corruption—understood not as quid pro quo bribery, but as

privileged access to and pernicious influence upon elected 

representatives.

In reaching its conclusion in McConnell, the Court relied 

upon a vast record compiled in the District Court. That 
 

 

10 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

record consisted of over 100,000 pages of material and 

included testimony from more than 200 witnesses. See 

251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 209 (DC 2003) (per curiam). What it 

showed, in detail, was the web of relationships and understandings among parties, candidates, and large donors

that underlies privileged access and influence. See 

McConnell, 540 U. S., at 146–152, 154–157, 167–171, 182– 

184. The District Judges in McConnell made clear that 

the record did “not contain any evidence of bribery or vote

buying in exchange for donations of nonfederal money.” 

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481 (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) 

(emphasis added). Indeed, no one had identified a “single

discrete instance of quid pro quo corruption” due to soft 

money. Id., at 395 (opinion of Henderson, J.). But what 

the record did demonstrate was that enormous soft money 

contributions, ranging between $1 million and $5 million 

among the largest donors, enabled wealthy contributors to

gain disproportionate “access to federal lawmakers” and

the ability to “influenc[e] legislation.” Id., at 481 (opinion 

of Kollar-Kotelly, J.). There was an indisputable link 

between generous political donations and opportunity 

after opportunity to make one’s case directly to a Member 

of Congress.

Testimony by elected officials supported this conclusion. 

See, e.g., ibid. (“‘Large donors of both hard and soft money 

receive special treatment’” (Sen. Simpson)); id., at 482 

(“ ‘Donations, including soft money donations to political

parties, do affect how Congress operates. It’s only natural, 

and happens all too often, that a busy Senator with 10

minutes to spare will spend those minutes returning the

call of a large soft money donor’” (Sen. Boren)); id., at 496 

(“‘At a minimum, large soft money donations purchase an

opportunity for the donors to make their case to elected

officials . . .’” (Sen. McCain)). Furthermore, testimony 

from party operatives showed that national political parties had created “major donor programs,” through which 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

they openly “offer[ed] greater access to federal office holders as the donations gr[e]w larger.” Id., at 502. I have 

placed in Appendix A more examples of the kind of evidence that filled the District Court record in McConnell. 

This Court upheld BCRA’s limitations on soft money 

contributions by relying on just the kind of evidence I have

described. We wrote: 

“The evidence in the record shows that candidates and 

donors alike have in fact exploited the soft-money 

loophole, the former to increase their prospects of 

election and the latter to create debt on the part of officeholders . . . . Plaintiffs argue that without concrete

evidence of an instance in which a federal officeholder 

has actually switched a vote [in exchange for soft 

money] . . . , Congress has not shown that there exists

real or apparent corruption. . . . [P]laintiffs conceive of 

corruption too narrowly. Our cases have firmly established that Congress’ legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes corruption to 

curbing ‘undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment, and the appearance of such influence.’” 540 

U. S., at 146, 149–150 (quoting Colorado II, 533 U. S., 

at 441; emphasis added; paragraphs and paragraph

breaks omitted). 

We specifically rejected efforts to define “corruption” in

ways similar to those the plurality today accepts. We 

added: 

“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the 

desires of their constituencies, but according to the

wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.” 540 U. S., at 153. 

Insofar as today’s decision sets forth a significantly nar­
 

 

12 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

rower definition of “corruption,” and hence of the public’s 

interest in political integrity, it is flatly inconsistent with 

McConnell. 

D 

One case, however, contains language that offers the

plurality support. That case is Citizens United. There, as 

the plurality points out, ante, at 19, the Court said that 

“[w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid 

pro quo corruption.” 558 U. S., at 359. Further, the Court 

said that quid pro quo corruption does not include “influence over or access to elected officials,” because “ ‘generic

favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard

First Amendment analyses.’ ” Ibid. (quoting McConnell, 

supra, at 296 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment in

part and dissenting in part)).

How should we treat these statements from Citizens 

United now? They are not essential to the Court’s holding

in the case—at least insofar as it can be read to require

federal law to treat corporations and trade unions like 

individuals when they independently pay for, e.g., television advertising during the last 60 days of a federal election. Citizens United, supra, at 365. Taken literally, the

statements cited simply refer to and characterize stillearlier Court cases. They do not require the more absolute 

reading that the plurality here gives them. 

More than that. Read as the plurality reads them today, the statements from Citizens United about the proper 

contours of the corruption rationale conflict not just with

language in the McConnell opinion, but with McConnell’s 

very holding. See supra, at 9–11. Did the Court in Citizens United intend to overrule McConnell? I doubt it, for 

if it did, the Court or certainly the dissent would have said

something about it. The total silence of all opinions in 
 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Citizens United with respect to this matter argues strongly 

in favor of treating the language quoted above as dictum, as an overstatement, or as limited to the context in 

which it appears. Citizens United itself contains language 

that supports the last mentioned reading, for it says that

“[Buckley] did not extend this rationale [about the reality 

or appearance of corruption] to independent expenditures, 

and the Court does not do so here.” 558 U. S., at 357 

(emphasis added). And it adds that, while “[t]he BCRA 

record establishes that certain donations to political parties, called ‘soft money,’ were made to gain access to elected

officials,” “[t]his case, however, is about independent 

expenditures, not soft money.” Id., at 360–361 (emphasis

added).

The plurality’s use of Citizens United’s narrow definition 

of corruption here, however, is a different matter. That 

use does not come accompanied with a limiting context

(independent expenditures by corporations and unions) or 

limiting language. It applies to the whole of campaign 

finance regulation. And, as I have pointed out, it is flatly

inconsistent with the broader definition of corruption upon

which McConnell’s holding depends. 

So: Does the Court intend today to overrule McConnell? 

Or does it intend to leave McConnell and BCRA in place? 

The plurality says the latter. Ante, at 20–21, n. 6 (“Our 

holding about the constitutionality of the aggregate limits 

clearly does not overrule McConnell’s holding about ‘soft

money’”). But how does the plurality explain its rejection

of the broader definition of corruption, upon which 

McConnell’s holding depends? Compare ante, at 18–21, 

with McConnell, 540 U. S., at 146, 149–153. 

III 

The plurality invalidates the aggregate contribution 

limits for a second reason. It believes they are no longer

needed to prevent contributors from circumventing federal 
 

 

 

 

14 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

limits on direct contributions to individuals, political

parties, and political action committees. Ante, at 22–29. 

Cf. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 38 (aggregate limits “prevent

evasion” of base contribution limits). Other “campaign

finance laws,” combined with “experience” and “common

sense,” foreclose the various circumvention scenarios that 

the Government hypothesizes. Ante, at 28. Accordingly,

the plurality concludes, the aggregate limits provide no 

added benefit. 

The plurality is wrong. Here, as in Buckley, in the 

absence of limits on aggregate political contributions,

donors can and likely will find ways to channel millions of 

dollars to parties and to individual candidates, producing

precisely the kind of “corruption” or “appearance of corruption” that previously led the Court to hold aggregate 

limits constitutional. Those opportunities for circumvention will also produce the type of corruption that concerns 

the plurality today. The methods for using today’s opinion

to evade the law’s individual contribution limits are complex, but they are well known, or will become well known, 

to party fundraisers. I shall describe three. 

A 

Example One: Gifts for the Benefit of the Party. Campaign finance law permits each individual to give $64,800

over two years to a national party committee. 2 U. S. C. 

§441a(a)(1)(B); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532 (2013). The two major 

political parties each have three national committees. 

Ante, at 4, n.1. Federal law also entitles an individual to 

give $20,000 to a state party committee over two years.

§441a(a)(1)(D). Each major political party has 50 such 

committees. Those individual limits mean that, in the 

absence of any aggregate limit, an individual could legally 

give to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party

about $1.2 million over two years. See Appendix B, Table 

1, infra, at 39. To make it easier for contributors to give 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

gifts of this size, each party could create a “Joint Party

Committee,” comprising all of its national and state party 

committees. The titular heads could be the Speaker of the

House of Representatives and the Minority Leader of the

House. A contributor could then write a single check to 

the Joint Party Committee—and its staff would divide the

funds so that each constituent unit receives no more than 

it could obtain from the contributor directly ($64,800 for a 

national committee over two years, $20,000 for a state

committee over the same). Before today’s decision, the 

total size of Rich Donor’s check to the Joint Party Committee was capped at $74,600—the aggregate limit for donations to political parties over a 2-year election cycle. See 

§441a(a)(3)(B); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. After today’s decision, 

Rich Donor can write a single check to the Joint Party

Committee in an amount of about $1.2 million. 

Will political parties seek these large checks? Why not?

The recipient national and state committees can spend the

money to buy generic party advertisements, say television 

commercials or bumper stickers saying “Support Republicans,” “Support Democrats,” or the like. They also can 

transfer the money to party committees in battleground

States to increase the chances of winning hotly contested 

seats. See §441a(a)(4) (permitting national or state political committees to make unlimited “transfers” to other 

committees “of the same political party”). 

Will party officials and candidates solicit these large

contributions from wealthy donors? Absolutely. Such contributions will help increase the party’s power, as well 

as the candidate’s standing among his colleagues.

Will elected officials be particularly grateful to the large

donor, feeling obliged to provide him special access and 

influence, and perhaps even a quid pro quo legislative

favor? That is what we have previously believed. See 

McConnell, 540 U. S., at 182 (“Large soft-money donations 

at a candidate’s or officeholder’s behest give rise to all of 
 

 

 

 

16 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made 

directly to the candidate or officeholder”); id., at 308 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.) (“The making of a solicited gift is a 

quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who

solicits the payment”); Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 460, n. 23 

(explaining how a candidate can “become a player [in his 

party] beyond his own race” by “directing donations to the 

party and making sure that the party knows who raised

the money,” and that “the donor’s influence is multiplied” 

in such instances). And, as the statements collected in 

Appendix A, infra, make clear, we have believed this with 

good reason. 

Example Two: Donations to Individual Candidates (The 

$3.6 Million Check). The first example significantly understates the problem. That is because federal election 

law also allows a single contributor to give $5,200 to each 

party candidate over a 2-year election cycle (assuming the 

candidate is running in both a primary and a general

election). §441a(a)(1)(A); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. There are 

435 party candidates for House seats and 33 party candidates for Senate seats in any given election year. That 

makes an additional $2.4 million in allowable contributions. Thus, without an aggregate limit, the law will

permit a wealthy individual to write a check, over a 2-year

election cycle, for $3.6 million—all to benefit his political 

party and its candidates. See Appendix B, Table 2(a), 

infra, at 39. 

To make it easier for a wealthy donor to make a contribution of this size, the parties can simply enlarge the 

composition of the Joint Party Committee described in 

Example One, so that it now includes party candidates.

And a party can proliferate such joint entities, perhaps 

calling the first the “Smith Victory Committee,” the second

the “Jones Victory Committee,” and the like. See 11 CFR 

§102.17(c)(5) (2012). (I say “perhaps” because too transparent a name might call into play certain earmarking 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 17 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

rules. But the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC)

database of joint fundraising committees in 2012 shows

similarly named entities, e.g., “Landrieu Wyden Victory

Fund,” etc.).

As I have just said, without any aggregate limit, the law 

will allow Rich Donor to write a single check to, say, the 

Smith Victory Committee, for up to $3.6 million. This 

check represents “the total amount that the contributor

could contribute to all of the participants” in the Committee over a 2-year cycle. §102.17(c)(5). The Committee 

would operate under an agreement that provides a “formula for the allocation of fundraising proceeds” among its 

constituent units. §102.17(c)(1). And that “formula” 

would divide the proceeds so that no committee or candidate receives more than it could have received from 

Rich Donor directly—$64,800, $20,000, or $5,200. See 

§102.17(c)(6).

So what is wrong with that? The check is considerably 

larger than Example One’s check. But is there anything

else wrong? The answer is yes, absolutely. The law will 

also permit a party and its candidates to shift most of Rich

Donor’s contributions to a single candidate, say Smith. 

Here is how: 

The law permits each candidate and each party committee in the Smith Victory Committee to write Candidate 

Smith a check directly. For his primary and general

elections combined, they can write checks of up to $4,000

(from each candidate’s authorized campaign committee)

and $10,000 (from each state and national committee). 2 

U. S. C. §§432(e)(3)(B), 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 CFR §110.3(b). 

This yields a potential $1,872,000 (from candidates) plus

$530,000 (from party committees). Thus, the law permits

the candidates and party entities to redirect $2.37 million

of Rich Donor’s $3.6 million check to Candidate Smith. It 

also permits state and national committees to contribute

to Smith’s general election campaign through making 
 

 

 

18 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

coordinated expenditures—in amounts that range from

$46,600 to $2.68 million for a general election (depending 

upon the size of Smith’s State and whether he is running 

for a House or Senate seat). 78 Fed. Reg. 8530–8532. See 

Appendix B, Table 2(b), infra, at 40. 

The upshot is that Candidate Smith can receive at least 

$2.37 million and possibly the full $3.6 million contributed 

by Rich Donor to the Smith Victory Committee, even

though the funds must first be divided up among the 

constituent units before they can be rerouted to Smith.

Nothing requires the Smith Victory Committee to explain 

in advance to Rich Donor all of the various transfers that 

will take place, and nothing prevents the entities in the 

Committee from informing the donor and the receiving

candidate after the fact what has transpired. Accordingly,

the money can be donated and rerouted to Candidate 

Smith without the donor having violated the base limits 

or any other FEC regulation. And the evidence in the 

McConnell record reprinted in Appendix A, infra—with 

respect to soft money contributions—makes clear that 

Candidate Smith will almost certainly come to learn from 

whom he has received this money.

The parties can apply the same procedure to other large

donations, channeling money from Rich Donor Two to 

Candidate Jones. If 10 or 20 candidates face particularly 

tight races, party committees and party candidates may

work together to channel Rich Donor One’s multimillion 

dollar contribution to the Most Embattled Candidate (e.g., 

Candidate Smith), Rich Donor Two’s multimillion dollar 

contribution to the Second Most Embattled Candidate 

(e.g., Candidate Jones), and so on down the line. If this 

does not count as evasion of the base limits, what does? 

Present aggregate limits confine the size of any individual 

gift to $123,200. Today’s opinion creates a loophole measured in the millions. 

Example Three: Proliferating Political Action Commit-
 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 19 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

tees (PACs). Campaign finance law prohibits an individual 

from contributing (1) more than $5,200 to any candidate in 

a federal election cycle, and (2) more than $5,000 to a PAC 

in a calendar year. 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (C); 78 Fed. 

Reg. 8532. It also prohibits (3) any PAC from contributing 

more than $10,000 to any candidate in an election cycle.

§441(a)(2)(A). But the law does not prohibit an individual 

from contributing (within the current $123,200 biannual

aggregate limit) $5,000 to each of an unlimited total number of PACs. And there, so to speak, lies the rub. 

Here is how, without any aggregate limits, a party will

be able to channel $2 million from each of ten Rich Donors to each of ten Embattled Candidates. Groups of party 

supporters—individuals, corporations, or trade unions—

create 200 PACs. Each PAC claims it will use the funds it 

raises to support several candidates from the party,

though it will favor those who are most endangered. 

(Each PAC qualifies for “multicandidate” status because it 

has received contributions from more than 50 persons and 

has made contributions to five federal candidates at some 

point previously. §441a(a)(4); 11 CFR §100.5(e)(3)). Over 

a 2-year election cycle, Rich Donor One gives $10,000 to 

each PAC ($5,000 per year)—yielding $2 million total. 

Rich Donor 2 does the same. So, too, do the other eight 

Rich Donors. This brings their total donations to $20 

million, disbursed among the 200 PACs. Each PAC will 

have collected $100,000, and each can use its money to

write ten checks of $10,000—to each of the ten most Embattled Candidates in the party (over two years). See 

Appendix B, Table 3, infra, at 41. Every Embattled Candidate, receiving a $10,000 check from 200 PACs, will 

have collected $2 million. 

The upshot is that ten Rich Donors will have contributed $2 million each, and ten Embattled Candidates will 

have collected $2 million each. In this example, unlike 

Example Two, the recipient candidates may not know 
 

 

 

20 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

which of the ten Rich Donors is personally responsible for

the $2 million he or she receives. But the recipient candidate is highly likely to know who the ten Rich Donors are,

and to feel appropriately grateful. Moreover, the ability of

a small group of donors to contribute this kind of money to 

threatened candidates is not insignificant. In the example 

above—with ten Rich Donors giving $2 million each, and 

ten Embattled Candidates receiving $2 million each—the

contributions would have been enough to finance a considerable portion of, and perhaps all of, the candidates’ races 

in the 2012 elections. See Appendix C, Table 1, infra, at 

42 (showing that in 2012, the average winning House

candidate spent $1.6 million and the average winning 

Senate candidate spent $11.5 million). 

B 

The plurality believes that the three scenarios I have 

just depicted either pose no threat, or cannot or will not 

take place. It does not believe the scenario depicted in 

Example One is any cause for concern, because it involves

only “general, broad-based support of a political party.” 

Ante, at 37. Not so. A candidate who solicits a multimillion dollar check for his party will be deeply grateful to the 

checkwriter, and surely could reward him with a quid pro 

quo favor. The plurality discounts the scenarios depicted 

in Example Two and Example Three because it finds such 

circumvention tactics “illegal under current campaign 

finance laws,” “implausible,” or “divorced from reality.” 

Ante, at 23, 24, 28. But they are not.

The plurality’s view depends in large part upon its claim 

that since this Court decided Buckley in 1976, changes in

either statutory law or in applicable regulations have 

come to make it difficult, if not impossible, for these circumvention scenarios to arise. Hence, it concludes, there 

is no longer a need for aggregate contribution limits. See 

ante, at 11–13, 22–29. But a closer examination of the five 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 21 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

legal changes to which the plurality points makes clear

that those changes cannot effectively stop the abuses that 

I have depicted.

First, the plurality points out that in 1976 (a few 

months after this Court decided Buckley) Congress “added 

limits on contributions to political committees,” i.e., to 

PACs. Ante, at 11; accord, 90 Stat. 487 (codified at 2 

U. S. C. §441a(a)(1)(C)). But Example Three, the hererelevant example, takes account of those limits, namely, 

$5,000 to a PAC in any given year. And it shows that the 

per-PAC limit does not matter much when it comes to the 

potential for circumvention, as long as party supporters

can create dozens or hundreds of PACs. Federal law 

places no upper limit on the number of PACs supporting a

party or a group of party candidates that can be established. And creating a PAC is primarily a matter of paperwork, a knowledgeable staff person, and a little time.

Second, the plurality points out that in 1976, Congress

“also added an antiproliferation rule prohibiting donors 

from creating or controlling multiple affiliated political 

committees.” Ante, at 12. The rule provides that “all 

contributions made by political committees established or 

financed or maintained or controlled” by the same corporation, labor organization, person, or group of persons, “shall 

be considered to have been made by a single political 

committee.” §441a(a)(5). But different supporters can

create different PACs. Indeed, there were roughly 2,700

“nonconnected” PACs (i.e., PACs not connected to a specific corporation or labor union) operating during the 2012

elections. Ante, at 24. In a future without aggregate

contribution limits, far more nonconnected PACs will 

likely appear. The plurality also notes that the FEC can

examine certain “‘circumstantial factors,’” such as “‘common or overlapping membership’” or “‘similar patterns of

contributions,’” to determine whether a group of PACs are 

affiliated. Ante, at 25 (quoting 11 CFR §100.5(g)(4)(ii)). 
 

 

 

22 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

But the ultimate question in the affiliation inquiry is

whether “one committee or organization [has] been established, financed, maintain or controlled by another committee or sponsoring organization.” Ibid. Just because a 

group of multicandidate PACs all support the same party

and all decide to donate funds to a group of endangered 

candidates in that party does not mean they will qualify 

as “affiliated” under the relevant definition. This rule 

appears inadequate to stop the sort of circumvention

depicted in Example Three. 

Third, the plurality says that a post-Buckley regulation

has strengthened the statute’s earmarking provision. 

Ante, at 12. Namely, the plurality points to a rule promulgated by the FEC in 1976, specifying that earmarking

includes any “designation ‘whether direct or indirect, 

express or implied, oral or written.’” Ibid. (quoting 11

CFR §110.6(b)); accord, 41 Fed. Reg. 35950 (1976). This 

means that if Rich Donor were to give $5,000 to a PAC 

while “designat[ing]” (in any way) that the money go to 

Candidate Smith, those funds must count towards Rich 

Donor’s total allowable contributions to Smith—$5,200 per 

election cycle. But the virtually identical earmarking

provision in effect when this Court decided Buckley would 

have required the same thing. That provision also counted,

when applying the base contribution limits, “all contributions made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on

behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions

which are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed 

through an intermediary or conduit to a candidate.” 88 

Stat. 1264; accord, 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(8) (same). What is 

the difference? 

Fourth, the plurality points out that the FEC’s regulations “specify that an individual who has contributed to a

particular candidate committee may not also contribute to 

a single-candidate committee for that candidate.” Ante, at 

12–13 (citing 11 CFR §110.1(h)(1); emphasis added). The 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 23 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

regulations, however, do not prevent a person who has 

contributed to a candidate from also contributing to multicandidate committees that support the candidate. Indeed, 

the rules specifically authorize such contributions. See 

§110.1(h) (“A person may contribute to a candidate . . . and 

also contribute to a political committee which has supported, or anticipates supporting, the same candidate in

the same election,” as long as the political committee is “not 

the candidate’s principal campaign committee” or a “single

candidate committee” (emphasis added)). Example Three

illustrates the latter kind of contribution. And briefs 

before us make clear that the possibility for circumventing

the base limits through making such contributions is a

realistic, not an illusory, one. See Brief for Appellee 36

(demonstrating that many PACs today explain in their 

public materials just what fairly small group of candidates

they intend to support); Brief for Americans for Campaign

Reform as Amicus Curiae 14–15 (similar).

Fifth, the plurality points to another FEC regulation

(also added in 1976), which says that “an individual who

has contributed to a candidate” may not “also contribute to 

a political committee that has supported or anticipates

supporting the same candidate if the individual knows

that ‘a substantial portion [of his contribution] will be

contributed to, or expended on behalf of,’ that candidate.” 

Ante, at 13 (quoting 11 CFR §110.1(h)(2); brackets in

original); accord, 41 Fed. Reg. 35948. This regulation is 

important, for in principle, the FEC might use it to prevent the circumstances that Examples Two and Three set 

forth from arising. And it is not surprising that the plurality relies upon the existence of this rule when it describes those circumstances as “implausible,” “illegal,” or 

“divorced from reality.” Ante, at 23, 24, 28. 

In fact, however, this regulation is not the strong anticircumvention weapon that the plurality imagines. Despite the plurality’s assurances, it does not “disarm” the 
 

 

 

24 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

possibilities for circumvention. Ante, at 23. That is because the regulation requires a showing that donors have

“knowledge that a substantial portion” of their contributions will be used by a PAC to support a candidate to 

whom they have already contributed. §110.1(h)(2) (emphasis added). And “knowledge” is hard to prove. 

I have found nine FEC cases decided since the year 2000

that refer to this regulation. In all but one, the FEC failed 

to find the requisite “knowledge”—despite the presence of 

Example Two or Example Three circumstances. See Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: Transfund PAC, Matter 

Under Review (MUR) 6221, p. 11 (FEC, June 7, 2010) 

(although the donor “might reasonably infer that some

portion of his contribution” to a candidate’s Leadership 

PAC would be used to support the candidate, “such an

inference alone does not suggest that [he] had ‘actual 

knowledge’ ” of such); Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: 

John Shadegg’s Friends, MUR 5968, pp. 3, 6–7 (FEC, Nov.

10, 2008) (“[T]here is no basis on which to conclude that 

[the donors] knew that the funds they contributed to

LEAD PAC would be used to support the Shadegg Committee” even though Congressman Shadegg solicited the 

donations and LEAD PAC was Congressman Shadegg’s

Leadership PAC); Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: Walberg for Congress, MUR 5881, pp. 6, 9–11 (FEC, Aug. 15,

2007) (finding seven contributors, who gave to a candidate 

and to a PAC that provided 86% of the candidate’s financing, had not shown “knowledge”); Factual and Legal Analysis, In re: Matt Brown for Senate, MUR 5732, p. 11 (FEC,

Apr. 4, 2007) (“Though it may be reasonable to infer that

the individual donors solicited by Brown gave to the State 

Parties under the assumption that some portion of their 

contribution might then be donated to the Brown Committee, such an inference alone is insufficient to find reason to 

believe 11 CFR §110.1(h) has been violated”); First General Counsel’s Report, In re: Liffrig for Senate, MUR 5678, 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 25 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

pp. 8–9 (FEC, Nov. 27, 2006) (similar); First General 

Counsel’s Report, In re: Nesbitt, MUR 5445, pp. 11–12 

(FEC, Feb. 2, 2005) (similar); First General Counsel’s

Report, In re: Keystone Corp., MUR 5019, pp. 23–29 (FEC,

Feb. 5, 2001) (similar); General Counsel’s Report #2, In re: 

Boston Capital Corp., MUR 4538, pp. 17–18 (FEC, Mar.

10, 2000) (recommending the FEC take no action with

respect to the §110.1(h) issue). Given this record of FEC 

(in)activity, my reaction to the plurality’s reliance upon

agency enforcement of this rule (as an adequate substitute

for Congress’ aggregate limits) is like Oscar Wilde’s after 

reading Dickens’ account of the death of Little Nell: “One

must have a heart of stone,” said Wilde, “to read [it] without laughing.” Oxford Dictionary of Humorous Quotations

86 (N. Sherrin 2d ed. 2001).

I have found one contrary example—the single example

to which the plurality refers. Ante, at 25 (citing Conciliation Agreement, In re Riley, MURs 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 

(FEC, Dec. 19, 2001)). In that case, the FEC found probable cause to believe that three individual contributors to 

several PACs had the requisite “knowledge” that the PACs

would use a “substantial portion” of their contributions to

support a candidate to whom they had already contributed—

Sam Brownback, a candidate for the Senate (for two of 

the contributors), and Robert Riley, a candidate for the 

House (for the third). The individuals had made donations 

to several PACs operating as a network, under the direction of a single political consulting firm. The two contributors to Sam Brownback were his parents-in-law, and the 

FEC believed they might be using the PAC network to 

channel extra support to him. The contributor to Robert 

Riley was his son, and the FEC believed he might be doing 

the same. The facts in this case are unusual, for individual contributors are not typically relatives of the candidates 

they are seeking to support, and ordinary PACs do not 

tend to work in coordination under the direction of a con­
 

 

26 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

sulting firm. In any event, this single swallow cannot

make the plurality’s summer.

Thus, it is not surprising that throughout the many

years this FEC regulation has been in effect, political

parties and candidates have established ever more joint 

fundraising committees (numbering over 500 in the last

federal elections); candidates have established ever more 

“Leadership PACs” (numbering over 450 in the last elections); and party supporters have established ever more

multicandidate PACs (numbering over 3,000 in the last 

elections). See Appendix C, Tables 2–3, infra, at 42–43; 

FEC, 2014 Committee Summary (reporting the number of 

“qualified” (or multicandidate) PACs in 2012), online at 

http://www.fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 28, 2014, and available in 

Clerk of Court’s case file).

Using these entities, candidates, parties, and party

supporters can transfer and, we are told, have transferred

large sums of money to specific candidates, thereby avoiding the base contribution limits in ways that Examples 

Two and Three help demonstrate. See Brief for Appellee

38–39, 53–54; Brief for Campaign Legal Center, et al. as 

Amici Curiae 12–15; Brief of Democratic Members of the 

United States House of Representatives as Amici Curiae 

28–29. They have done so without drawing FEC prosecution—at least not according to my (and apparently the 

plurality’s) search of publicly available records. That is 

likely because in the real world, the methods of achieving 

circumvention are more subtle and more complex than our 

stylized Examples Two and Three depict. And persons

have used these entities to channel money to candidates 

without any individual breaching the current aggregate

$123,200 limit. The plurality now removes that limit,

thereby permitting wealthy donors to make aggregate 

contributions not of $123,200, but of several millions of 

dollars. If the FEC regulation has failed to plug a small 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 27 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

hole, how can it possibly plug a large one? 

IV 

The plurality concludes that even if circumvention were 

a threat, the aggregate limits are “poorly tailored” to address it. Ante, at 30. The First Amendment requires “‘a

fit that is . . . reasonable,’” and there is no such “fit” here 

because there are several alternative ways Congress could 

prevent evasion of the base limits. Ibid. (quoting Fox, 492 

U. S., at 480). For instance, the plurality posits, Congress

(or the FEC) could “tighten . . . transfer rules”; it could 

require “contributions above the current aggregate limits 

to be deposited into segregated, nontransferable accounts

and spent only by their recipients”; it could define “how 

many candidates a PAC must support in order to ensure

that ‘a substantial portion’ of a donor’s contribution is not 

rerouted to a certain candidate”; or it could prohibit “donors who have contributed the current maximum sums 

from further contributing to political committees that have

indicated they will support candidates to whom the donor 

has already contributed.” Ante, at 33–35 (quoting 11 CFR

§110.1(h)(2)).

The plurality, however, does not show, or try to show, 

that these hypothetical alternatives could effectively

replace aggregate contribution limits. Indeed, it does not 

even “opine on the validity of any particular proposal,” 

ante, at 35—presumably because these proposals themselves could be subject to constitutional challenges. For 

the most part, the alternatives the plurality mentions

were similarly available at the time of Buckley. Their 

hypothetical presence did not prevent the Court from

upholding aggregate limits in 1976. How can their continued hypothetical presence lead the plurality now to

conclude that aggregate limits are “poorly tailored?” See 

ante, at 30. How can their continued hypothetical presence lead the Court to overrule Buckley now? 
 

 

28 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

In sum, the explanation of why aggregate limits are

needed is complicated, as is the explanation of why other 

methods will not work. But the conclusion is simple: 

There is no “substantial mismatch” between Congress’ 

legitimate objective and the “means selected to achieve it.” 

Ante, at 10. The Court, as in Buckley, should hold that 

aggregate contribution limits are constitutional. 

V 

The District Court in this case, holding that Buckley

foreclosed McCutcheon’s constitutional challenge to the 

aggregate limits, granted the Government’s motion to 

dismiss the complaint prior to a full evidentiary hearing. 

See 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140–141 (DC 2012). If the plurality now believes the District Court was wrong, then

why does it not return the case for the further evidentiary

development which has not yet taken place? 

In the past, when evaluating the constitutionality of

campaign finance restrictions, we have typically relied

upon an evidentiary record amassed below to determine 

whether the law served a compelling governmental objective. And, typically, that record contained testimony from

Members of Congress (or state legislators) explaining why 

Congress (or the legislature) acted as it did. See, e.g., 

McConnell, 540 U. S., at 147–154 (upholding federal restrictions on soft money by drawing on an extensive District Court record that contained declarations from current 

and former Members of Congress); Colorado II, 533 U. S., 

at 457–465 (upholding federal limits on coordinated expenditures between parties and candidates on the basis of 

a summary judgment record that contained declarations

from party operatives, fundraisers, and Members of Congress); Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 393 (upholding

Missouri’s contribution limits on the basis of the lower 

court record, which contained similar declarations). If we 

are to overturn an act of Congress here, we should do so on 
 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 29 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the basis of a similar record. 

For one thing, an evidentiary record can help us determine whether or the extent to which we should defer to 

Congress’ own judgments, particularly those reflecting a

balance of the countervailing First Amendment interests 

I have described. Determining whether anticorruption 

objectives justify a particular set of contribution limits 

requires answering empirically based questions, and applying significant discretion and judgment. To what extent will unrestricted giving lead to corruption or its 

appearance? What forms will any such corruption take? 

To what extent will a lack of regulation undermine public

confidence in the democratic system? To what extent can 

regulation restore it?

These kinds of questions, while not easily answered, are

questions that Congress is far better suited to resolve than

are judges. Thus, while court review of contribution limits 

has been and should be “rigorous,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 

29, we have also recognized that “deference to legislative

choice is warranted.” Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 155. And 

that deference has taken account of facts and circumstances set forth in an evidentiary record.

For another thing, a comparison of the plurality’s opinion with this dissent reveals important differences of 

opinion on fact-related matters. We disagree, for example,

on the possibilities for circumvention of the base limits in

the absence of aggregate limits. We disagree about how 

effectively the plurality’s “alternatives” could prevent

evasion. An evidentiary proceeding would permit the

parties to explore these matters, and it would permit the

courts to reach a more accurate judgment. The plurality

rationalizes its haste to forgo an evidentiary record by

noting that “the parties have treated the question as a 

purely legal one.” Ante, at 14, n. 4. But without a doubt, 

the legal question—whether the aggregate limits are 

closely drawn to further a compelling governmental inter­
 

 

 

30 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

est—turns on factual questions about whether corruption, 

in the absence of such limits, is a realistic threat to our 

democracy. The plurality itself spends pages citing figures

about campaign spending to defend its “legal” conclusion. 

Ante, at 24–26, 27–28, 30–32. The problem with such

reasoning is that this Court’s expertise does not lie in 

marshaling facts in the primary instance. That is why in 

the past, when answering similar questions about the 

constitutionality of restrictions on campaign contributions, 

we have relied on an extensive evidentiary record produced below to inform our decision. 

Without further development of the record, however, I

fail to see how the plurality can now find grounds for 

overturning Buckley. The justification for aggregate contribution restrictions is strongly rooted in the need to

assure political integrity and ultimately in the First

Amendment itself. Part II, supra. The threat to that 

integrity posed by the risk of special access and influence 

remains real. Part III, supra. Even taking the plurality

on its own terms and considering solely the threat of quid 

pro quo corruption (i.e., money-for-votes exchanges), the

aggregate limits are a necessary tool to stop circumvention. Ibid. And there is no basis for finding a lack of “fit” 

between the threat and the means used to combat it, 

namely the aggregate limits. Part IV, supra. 

The plurality reaches the opposite conclusion. The result, as I said at the outset, is a decision that substitutes 

judges’ understandings of how the political process works

for the understanding of Congress; that fails to recognize 

the difference between influence resting upon public opinion and influence bought by money alone; that overturns 

key precedent; that creates huge loopholes in the law; and 

that undermines, perhaps devastates, what remains of 

campaign finance reform.

With respect, I dissent. 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 31 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

APPENDIXES 

A 

Existence of Large Donations 

Expert Report: “During the 1996 election cycle, the top 50 

nonfederal money donors made contributions ranging from

$530,000 to $3,287,175. . . . Soft money financing of party 

campaigning exploded in the 2000 election cycle. Soft 

money spending by the national parties reached $498

million, now 42% of their total spending. Raising a half

billion dollars in soft money [in 2000] took a major effort 

by the national parties and elected officials, but they had 

the advantage of focusing their efforts on large donors. . . .

The top 50 soft money donors . . . each contributed between $955,695 and $5,949,000.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 440 

(opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (citing T. Mann Expert 

Report, pp. 22, 24–25) 

Candidate Solicitation of Large Donations 

Judicial Finding of Fact: “It is a common practice for 

Members of Congress to be involved in raising both federal 

and non-federal dollars for the national party committees, 

sometimes at the parties’ request. The personal involvement of high-ranking Members of Congress is a major 

component of raising federal and nonfederal funds.” 251 

F. Supp. 2d, at 471. 

Senator Paul Simon: “‘While I was in Congress, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and 

the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC)

would ask Members to make phone calls seeking contributions to the party. They would assign me a list of names, 

people I had not known previously, and I would just go 
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

32 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

down the list. I am certain they did this because they

found it more effective to have Members make calls.’” 

Ibid. (quoting Simon Decl. ¶7). 

Senator John McCain: “‘[T]he parties encourage Members 

of Congress to raise large amounts of soft money to benefit 

their own and others’ re-election. At one recent caucus 

meeting, a Member of Congress was praised for raising 

$1.3 million dollars for the party. James Greenwood, a 

Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, recently told 

the New York Times that House leaders consider soft 

money fundraising prowess in assigning chairmanships 

and other sought-after jobs. . . . I share Mr. Greenwood’s 

concerns.’ ” Id., at 476 (quoting McCain Decl. ¶7). 

Representative Christopher Shays: “‘Soft money is raised

directly by federal candidates, officeholders, and national 

political party leaders. National party officials often raise 

these funds by promising donors access to elected officials.

The national parties and national congressional campaign

committees also request that Members of Congress make 

the calls to soft money donors to solicit more funds.’” Id., 

at 471 (quoting Shays Decl. ¶18). 

Representative Marty Meehan: “‘Members of Congress 

raise money for the national party committees, and I have

been involved in such fund-raising for the Democratic

Party. At the request of the Party Members of Congress 

go to the [DCCC] and call prospective donors from lists 

provided by the Party to ask them to participate in Party

events, such as DCCC dinners or Democratic National 

Committee (DNC) dinners. These lists typically consist of 

persons who have contributed to the Democratic Party in

the past.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 471 (quoting Meehan Decl. 

in Republican National Committee v. FEC, No. 98–CV– 

1207 (DC), ¶6). 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 33 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

Lobbyist: “‘Even though soft money contributions often go

to political parties, the money is given so that the contributors can be close to, and recognized by, Members, Presidents, and Administration officials who have power. Members, not party staffers or party chairs, raise much of 

the large soft money contributions.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at

472 (quoting Robert Rozen Decl. ¶15, a partner in a lobbying firm). 

Senator Fred Thompson: “‘We have gone from basically a

small donor system . . . where the average person believed 

they had a stake, believed they had a voice, to one of extremely large amounts of money, where you are not a

player unless you are in the $100,000 or $200,000 range

[or more] . . . .’” Id., at 433 (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. 4622 

(2001)). 

Former DNC official: “Former DNC and DSCC official and 

current lobbyist Robert Hickmott testifies that even incumbents with safe seats have incentives to raise money

for the parties. He explains: ‘Incumbents who were not 

raising money for themselves because they were not up for

reelection would sometimes raise money for other Senators, or for challengers. They would send $20,000 to the 

DSCC and ask that it be entered on another candidate’s 

tally. They might do this, for example, if they were planning to run for a leadership position and wanted to obtain 

support from the Senators they assisted. This would 

personally benefit them, in addition to doing their part to

help retain Democratic control of the Senate, which would 

preserve the legislative power of all Democratic senators.’” 

251 F. Supp. 2d, at 475–476 (quoting Hickmott Decl., 

Exh. A ¶18). 

Judicial Finding of Fact: “The DSCC maintains a ‘credit’ 
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

 

 

34 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

program that credits nonfederal money raised by a Senator or candidate to that Senator or candidate’s state party.

Amounts credited to a state party can reflect that the 

Senator or candidate solicited the donation, or can serve 

as a donor’s sign of tacit support for the state party or

the Senate candidate.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 477 (citation omitted). 

Judicial Finding of Fact: “Federal candidates also raise

nonfederal money through joint fundraising committees

formed with national committees. One common method of 

joint fundraising is for a national congressional committee 

to form a separate joint fundraising committee with a

federal candidate committee. . . . Two experts characterize 

the joint fundraising system as one ‘in which Senate candidates in effect raise[ ] soft money for use in their own

races.’” Id., at 478 (quoting J. Krasno and F. Sorauf Expert Report, p. 13; citation omitted). 

Donor Access and Influence 

Judicial Finding of Fact: “The fact that Members of Congress are intimately involved in the raising of money for 

the political parties, particularly unlimited nonfederal

money donations, creates opportunities for corruption.

The record does not contain any evidence of bribery or vote 

buying in exchange for donations of nonfederal money;

however, the evidence presented in this case convincingly

demonstrates that large contributions, particularly those 

nonfederal contributions surpassing the federal limits,

provide donors access to federal lawmakers which is a 

critical ingredient for influencing legislation, and which 

the Supreme Court has determined constitutes corruption.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481. 

Judicial Finding of Fact: “Individual donors testify that 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 35 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

contributions provide access to influence federal officeholders on issue of concern to them.” Id., at 498. 

Political donor: “‘I’ve been involved in political fundraising

long enough to remember when soft money had little value 

to federal candidates. . . . [I]n recent election cycles, 

Members and national committees have asked soft money

donors to write soft money checks to state and national

parties solely in order to assist federal campaigns. Most 

soft money donors don’t ask and don’t care why the money 

is going to a particular state party, a party with which

they may have no connection. What matters is that the 

donor has done what the Member asked.’” Id., at 472 

(quoting Wade Randlett, Chief Executive Officer, Dashboard Technology, Decl. ¶¶6–9). 

Political donor: “‘As a result of my $500,000 soft money 

donation to the DNC, I was offered the chance to attend events with the President, including events at the

White House, a number of times. I was offered special access. . . .’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 499 (quoting Arnold Hiatt 

Decl. ¶9). 

Senator Alan Simpson: “‘Too often, Members’ first thought 

is not what is right or wrong or what they believe, but how 

will it affect fundraising. Who, after all, can seriously 

contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way 

one thinks about—and quite possibly votes on—an issue? 

. . . When you don’t pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will never get any more money from that 

piper. Since money is the mother’s milk of politics, you

never want to be in that situation.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 

481 (quoting Simpson Decl. ¶10). 

Senator Alan Simpson: “‘Large donors of both hard and 

soft money receive special treatment. No matter how busy 
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

36 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

a politician may be during the day, he or she will always

make time to see donors who gave large amounts of 

money. Staffers who work for Members know who the big 

donors are, and those people always get their phone calls 

returned first and are allowed to see the Member when 

others are not.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 481–482 (quoting 

Simpson Decl. ¶9). 

Senator David Boren: “‘Donations, including soft money

donations to political parties, do affect how Congress 

operates. It’s only natural, and happens all too often, that 

a busy Senator with 10 minutes to spare will spend those

minutes returning the call of a large soft money donor

rather than the call of any other constituent. . . . I know 

from my first-hand experience and from my interactions 

with other Senators that they did feel beholden to large 

donors.” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 482 (quoting Boren Decl. 

¶¶7–8). 

Senator Dale Bumpers: “[Senator Bumpers] had ‘heard

that some Members even keep lists of big donors in their 

offices,’ and [stated] that ‘you cannot be a good Democratic 

or good Republican Member and not be aware of who gave 

money to the party.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 487 (quoting 

Bumpers Decl. ¶¶18, 20). 

Representative Christopher Shays: “‘The candidates know

who makes these huge contributions and what these 

donors expect. Candidates not only solicit these funds

themselves, they meet with big donors who have important issues pending before the government; and sometimes, the candidates’ or the party’s position appear to

change after such meetings.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 487 

(quoting 148 Cong Rec. 1305 (2002)). 

Senator Warren Rudman: “‘Large soft money contri­
BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 37 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

butions in fact distort the legislative process. They affect

what gets done and how it gets done. They affect whom 

Senators and House members see, whom they spend their 

time with, what input they get . . . .’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 

496 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶¶7, 9). 

Senator Paul Simon: “‘While I realize some argue donors 

don’t buy favors, they buy access. That access is the abuse 

and it affects all of us. . . . You feel a sense of gratitude for 

their support. . . . Because few people can afford to give

over $20,000 or $25,000 to a party committee, those people

who can will receive substantially better access to elected 

federal leaders than people who can only afford smaller 

contributions or can not afford to make any contributions. 

When you increase the amount that people are allowed to 

give, or let people give without limit to the parties, you

increase the danger of unfair access.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 

496 (quoting Simon Decl. ¶16). 

Senator John McCain: “‘At a minimum, large soft money 

donations purchase an opportunity for the donors to make 

their case to elected officials . . . in a way average citizens

cannot.’” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 496 (quoting McCain 

Decl. ¶6). 

Senator Warren Rudman: “‘I understand that those who 

opposed passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 

Act, and those who now challenge its constitutionality in 

Court, dare elected officials to point to specific [instances 

of vote buying]. I think this misses the point altogether.

[The access and influence accorded large donors] is inherently, endemically, and hopelessly corrupting. You can’t 

swim in the ocean without getting wet; you can’t be part of 

this system without getting dirty.’ ” 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 

481 (quoting Rudman Decl. ¶10). 
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

38 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Appendix A to opinion of BREYER, J. 

Judicial Finding of Fact: “Lobbyists state that their clients 

make donations to political parties to achieve access.” 251 

F. Supp. 2d, at 489. 

Letter from Republican National Committee (RNC) staffer:

“‘As you know, [this executive] has been very generous

to the RNC. If there is any way you can assist [in obtaining an appointment with an important Senator], it would

be greatly appreciated.’” Id., at 501 (quoting Memorandum from Tim Barnes, RNC, to Royal Roth). 

Letter from RNC: “[The] letter from RNC to Senator Hagel 

staffer [asks] Senator Hagel to meet with a donor for four

‘key’ reasons including: . . . ‘[h]e just contributed $100,000

to the RNC.’” Ibid. (quoting a letter in the judicial record). 

Judicial Finding of Fact: “The political parties have structured their donation programs so that donors are encouraged to contribute larger amounts in order to get access to

more exclusive and intimate events at which Members or 

Congress are present. The evidence also shows that the 

parties use the enticement of access to secure larger donations. ” Id., at 502 (quoting a document in the judicial 

record). 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 39 

Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J. 

B 

Table 1: Donations to Support the Party 

Base 

Limit 

(per 

year) 

Number 

(committees) Years 

Total Contributions (per 2-

year cycle) 

National 

Party

Committees $32,400 3 2 $194,400 

State Party 

Committees $10,000 50 2 $1,000,000 

Total $1,194,400 

Source: See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. 

Table 2(a): The $3.6 Million Check 

Base 

Limit 

(per year/ 

election) 

Number 

(committees/ 

candidates) 

Years 

or Elections 

Total 

Contributions 

(per 2-year 

cycle) 

National 

Party Committees $32,400 3 2 $194,400 

State Party 

Committees $10,000 50 2 $1,000,000 

Candidates 

(Senate) $2,600 33 2 $171,600 

Candidates 

(House) $2,600 435 2 $2,262,000 

Total $3,628,000 

Source: See 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. 
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

40 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
 

Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J. 

Table 2(b): Circumvention of the $3.6 Million Check 

Direct 

Contributions to 

Candidate 

(per 

election) 

Number 

(committees/ 

candidates) 

Elections 

Total 

Direct 

Contributions (per 

2-year 

cycle) 

National Party 

Committees $5,000 3 2 $30,0001 

State Party 

Committees $5,000 50 2 $500,000 

Candidates 

(Senate) $2,000 33 2 $132,000 

Candidates 

(House) $2,000 435 2 $1,740,000 

Total Direct 

Contributions $2,372,000 

Independent Expenditures (IEs) 

(per general election) 

Elections 

Total IEs 

(per 

general 

election) 

House 

Candidate 

Senate 

Candidate 

National Party 

Committees 

$46,600 

(min)2 

$94,100 

(min)3 1 

$46,600–

 $93,100 

(min) 

State Party 

Committees

 $46,600 

(min)2 

$94,100 

(min)3 1 

$46,600– 

$93,100 

(min) 

Total IEs 

 $46,600 

(min)2 

$94,100 

(min)3 

$46,600– 

$93,100 

(min)

 1 $45,400 for a Senate candidate. §441a(h); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. 

2If the State has more than one House seat, this figure is $46,600. If 

it has one House seat, this figure is $93,100. Id., at 8531. 3This figure ranges from $93,100 (Del.) to $2,68 million (Cal.),

depending on the State’s population. Ibid. 

Source: See 2 U. S. C. §§432(e)(3)(B), 441a(a)(2)(A); 11 CFR 

§110.3(b); 78 Fed. Reg. 8530–8532. 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 41 

Appendix B to opinion of BREYER, J. 

Table 3: Proliferating PACs 

Base Limit 

(per year) 

Number 

(PACs) Years 

Total 

Contributions 

(per 2-year 

cycle) 

Rich Donor One $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Two $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Three $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Four $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Five $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Six $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Seven $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Eight $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Nine $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Rich Donor Ten $5,000 200 2 $2,000,000 

Total Contributions to PACs 

(by 10 Donors) $20,000,000 

Total Contributions by Each 

Donor $2,000,000 

Base Limit 

(per 

election) 

Number 

(candidates) 

Elections 

PAC One $5,000 10 2 $100,000 

PAC Two $5,000 10 2 $100,000 

PAC Three $5,000 10 2 $100,000 

. . . etc. etc. etc. etc. 

PAC 200 $5,000 10 2 $100,000 

Total Contributions by PACs 

(to 10 Candidates) $20,000,000 

Total Contributions to Each 

Candidate $2,000,000 

Source: 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(C), 441a(a)(2)(A). 
 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

 

 

 

 

42 MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Appendix C to opinion of BREYER, J. 

C 

Table 1: Costs of a Federal Seat 

2012 Elections 

House 

Average House Winner Spent $1,567,293 

Average House Loser Spent $496,637 

Average Winner's Receipts from PACs $665,728 

Senate 

Average Senate Winner Spent $11,474,077 

Average Senate Loser Spent $7,435,446 

Average Winner's Receipts from PACs $2,185,650 

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, Election Stats, online at 

http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php. 

Table 2: Leadership PACs 

Number of Leadership 

PACs 

(contributing to federal 

candidates) 

Total Contributed 

(to federal candidates) 

2000 Elections 175 $17,000,000 

2002 Elections 228 $25,000,000 

2004 Elections 274 $30,700,000 

2006 Elections 336 $44,700,000 

2008 Elections 378 $40,600,000 

2010 Elections 396 $44,000,000 

2012 Elections 456 $46,400,000 

Source: Center for Responsive Politics, Leadership PACs, online at

http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs. 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 43 

Appendix C to opinion of BREYER, J. 

Table 3: Joint Fundraising Committees 

Number of Joint 

Fundraising 

Committees 

“Senate” 

Related 

“House” 

Related 

2008 Elections 269 31 34 

2010 Elections 367 37 60 

2012 Elections 508 67 89 

Source: Federal Election Commission, online at 

http://www.fec.gov/data/CommitteeSummary.do.