1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

WESTON FANTROY 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 14-13341 

 HON. TERRENCE G. BERG 

DEAN VANN, et al. HON. DAVID R. GRAND 

 

Defendants. 

 / 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 18) 

Plaintiff Weston Fantroy brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 and various state laws against Defendants Police Officer Dean Vann and the 

City of Lincoln Park, Michigan. Plaintiff’s claims arise from his June 13, 2014 

arrest following a traffic stop. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 1-6.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant 

Vann prevented him from showing that there was no probable cause to arrest him 

for driving without a license, and that Defendant Vann nonetheless arrested him in 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the Constitution. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 7-14, 

18.) Defendant now moves for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. (Dkt. 

18.) 

Plaintiff’s August 27, 2014 Complaint contains six counts. (See dkt. 1.) Count 

I alleges that Defendant Vann violated Plaintiff’s right to be free from arrest 

without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 15-19.) Count II 

alleges that Defendants “willfully, wantonly detained and terrorized Plaintiff, 

without justification, provocation or excuse and without consent,” amounting to 

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gross negligence. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-23.) In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff contends that 

Defendants are liable for false arrest (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25) and false imprisonment. (Id.

at ¶¶ 26-27.) Count V advances a claim against Defendants for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.) Finally, in Count VI, Plaintiff claims under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Defendant City of Lincoln Park is liable as a result of the 

City’s policy, practice, or custom for that violated Defendant Vann’s Fourth 

Amendment rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-34) 

 On May 15, 2015, Defendants filed for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s 

claims. (Dkt. 18.) The motion was fully briefed as of June 22, 2015.1 (See Dkt. 23.) 

After carefully reviewing the parties’ briefs, all of the testimony and exhibits in the 

record, and the relevant case law, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment on most of Plaintiff’s claims. First, Defendant City of Lincoln 

Park is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of Plaintiff’s claims against it. 

Not only is Defendant City of Lincoln Park is entitled to governmental immunity on 

all of Plaintiff’s state law claims, but Plaintiff has also failed to establish that 

Defendant Vann’s actions were the result of a policy or custom of Defendant City of 

Lincoln Park. 

 Second, Defendant Vann is entitled to summary judgment on some of 

Plaintiff’s claims. As to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Vann for gross 

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, there is no genuine issue 

of material fact sufficient to allow these claims to survive summary judgment. 

                                                            

1 After careful review and consideration of the parties’ briefs, the Court finds that oral argument 

would not significantly aid the Court’s decision. Accordingly, the motion before the Court will be 

decided without a hearing. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). 

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Plaintiff’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and §1983 claims, however, must 

proceed against Defendant Vann because whether he is protected from these claims 

by qualified or governmental immunity depends upon a contested issue of material 

fact. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 18.) will be 

GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant City of Lincoln Park and 

Plaintiff’s gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims 

against Defendant Vann. As to Plaintiff’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and 

§1983 claims against Defendant Vann, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

will be DENIED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 The Court notes that neither Defendants nor Plaintiff followed the Court’s 

practice guidelines for motions for summary judgment that are available on the 

Court’s website. These practice guidelines provide as follows: 

A Rule 56 motion must begin with a “Statement of Material Facts.” Such a 

Statement is to be included as the first section of the Rule 56 Motion. The 

Statement must consist of separately numbered paragraphs briefly 

describing the material facts underlying the motion, sufficient to support 

judgment. Proffered facts must be supported with citations to the pleadings, 

interrogatories, admissions, depositions, affidavits, or documentary exhibits. 

Citations should contain page and line references, as appropriate... The 

Statement of Material Facts counts against the page limit for the brief. No 

separate narrative facts section shall be permitted. 

The response to a Rule 56 Motion must begin with a “Counter-statement of 

Material Facts” stating which facts are admitted and which are contested. 

The paragraph numbering must correspond to moving party’s Statement of 

Material Facts. If any of the moving party’s proffered facts are contested, the 

non-moving party must explain the basis for the factual disagreement, 

referencing and citing record evidence. Any proffered fact in the movant’s 

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Statement of Material Facts that is not specifically contested will, for the 

purpose of the motion, be deemed admitted. In similar form, the counterstatement may also include additional facts, disputed or undisputed, that 

require a denial of the motion. 

Both Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s response 

included separate narrative fact sections in violation of the Court’s practice 

guidelines. While Defendants’ “Statement of Facts” was not organized in separately 

number paragraphs (Dkt. 18, pp. 1-3), Plaintiff’s response included a “Counterstatement of Facts” that did not correspond to Defendants’ statement (Dkt. 20, pp. 

8-9). Without a statement and counter-statement, the parties fail to identify clearly 

which material facts are subject to dispute.2 The Court nonetheless conducted a 

thorough review of parties’ briefs, deposition testimony, and exhibits and gleaned 

the following facts, which are viewed in a light more favorable to Plaintiff as the 

non-moving party: 

On June 13, 2014, Plaintiff was traveling northbound on I-75 near Southfield 

Road when he was pulled over by Lincoln Park Police Officer Dean Vann for 

speeding. (Dkt 1, ¶ 7; Dkt. 18, p. 1.) Officer Vann asked Plaintiff to produce his 

license, registration, and proof of insurance. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 8; Dkt. 18, p. 2.) Plaintiff 

was driving a rental car and retrieved the appropriate rental paperwork from the 

glove box. (See dkt. 22, Ex. G at 94:25-95:13, 112:7-8; Dkt. 20, p. 8.) Plaintiff then 

reached into his back pocket and pulled out his wallet, removed his Michigan I.D. 

                                                            

2 See, e.g., Akines v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, 512 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (deeming the 

defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts as having been admitted by the plaintiffs, where 

the plaintiffs failed to file a counter-statement of material facts, as directed by local rule).  

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card, and handed his Michigan I.D. card and the rental car paperwork including the 

registration to Defendant Vann. (Dkt. 22, Ex. G, 111:3-113:18.) 

The testimony of parties is in dispute as to what happened next. Plaintiff 

asserts that his Michigan license, a temporary paper license, was in his cell phone 

case in the middle console of the car. (Id. at 102:22-103:9; 113:2-16.) The cell phone 

case also functioned as a wallet where Plaintiff could “put his credit cards.” (Id. at 

113:7-8.) Plaintiff further contends that he repeatedly told Defendant Vann that he 

had a valid driver’s license and that it was in the middle console, but Defendant 

Vann would not let him retrieve it. (Id. at 113:2-16.) Officer Vann testified that 

nothing occurred during the stop that indicated Plaintiff had his license; Plaintiff 

had only his Michigan ID and registration, but no license. (Dkt. 18, Ex. D, ¶¶ 8-13.) 

Officer Vann denies that Plaintiff repeatedly asked to be allowed to present his 

paper license from inside the center console of the vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.) 

Defendant Vann arrested Plaintiff for violating MCL § 257.311; which 

requires anyone operating a vehicle to have a valid operator’s license in their 

immediate possession and to display it in this kind of situation upon the officer’s 

request. (Dkt. 18, Ex. C, p. 2.) While patting Plaintiff down during the arrest, 

Defendant Vann found $1,560 in cash in Plaintiff’s pants pocket. (Dkt. 18, Ex. C, p. 

2; Dkt. 20, p. 9.) Plaintiff gave various explanations for how he obtained this money, 

informing Defendant Vann that the money was from a legal settlement and from 

Plaintiff’s work in Arizona. (Dkt. 18, Ex. C, p. 2; Dkt. 22, Ex. G, 140:4-12.) 

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After finding the money, Defendant Vann had K9 Bruno sniff the car for the 

presence of narcotics odors. (Dkt. 18, p. 2.) Though K9 Bruno did indicate that there 

was a narcotics odor on the rear passenger door, no contraband was found when the 

car was searched. (Id.) Plaintiff’s money was confiscated incident to his arrest. (Id.) 

Once K9 Bruno sniffed the money at the station and indicated that there was a 

narcotics odor, the currency was subsequently seized for forfeiture. (Id. at 3.) The 

forfeiture action was later dropped and the monies returned to Plaintiff after 

further investigation by the Prosecutor’s Office substantiated “the potential source 

of the $1,560.”(Id. at 13.) Plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of either 

dog sniff. 

After his arrest, Plaintiff was detained from June 13, 2014 until June 16, 

2014. (Dkt. 18, p. 3.) Plaintiff’s prisoner intake and property form lists Plaintiff’s 

property at the time of his arrest as including a cell phone, a jacket, tan sandals, a 

belt, a necklace, sunglasses, a watch, and $1,560.00 in cash. (Dkt. 22, Ex. G, p. 73.) 

Defendant Vann searched the car during the period that Plaintiff was detained and 

did not find the license (Dkt. 18, Ex. C, ¶ 21), but Plaintiff claims that this is 

because the license was in his cell phone case that was removed from the car and 

returned to him when he was released (Dkt. 22, Ex. G, 183:2-12). Plaintiff further 

claims that he showed his license to the officer who returned his phone case to him 

while he was being released. (Id.) Plaintiff is unable to identify this officer or 

provide any evidence other than his own testimony in support of this assertion. (Id.) 

After Plaintiff was released on June 16, 2014, the failure to display a license charge 

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was dismissed, no forfeiture action was pursued, and Plaintiff’s money was returned 

in full. (Dkt. 18, p. 3.) Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendants on August 

27, 2014. (See dkt. 1.) 

II. ANALYSIS 

 Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

(Dkt. 18.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim because it is premised on exactly the same facts as 

Plaintiff’s intentional tort claims. (Dkt. 18, p. 25.) Defendants also argue that 

Plaintiff has failed to provide enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that 

either Defendant is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. 18, p. 

23.) Regarding Plaintiff’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and §1983 claim against 

both Defendants, Defendants argue that because Defendant Vann had probable 

cause to arrest Plaintiff, there was no false arrest, false imprisonment, or any 

constitutional violation. (See id. at 22.) In the alternative, Defendants contend that 

they are protected against the state tort claims by governmental immunity, that 

Defendant Vann is protected against Plaintiff’s §1983 claim by qualified immunity, 

and that Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to hold Defendant City of 

Lincoln Park liable under §1983. (Dkt. 18, pp. 17-18, 29, 31.) 

A. Legal Standard

“Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact such that the movant is entitled to 

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a judgment as a matter of law.” Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 

568 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material only if it might 

affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the 

Court must view the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from the 

evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); 

Retting v. St. Edward, 241 F.3d 530, 531 (6th Cir. 2001). 

“As the moving parties, the Defendants have the initial burden to show that 

there is an absence of evidence to support [Plaintiff’s] case.” Selhv v. Caruso, 734 

F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 

Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party “’may not rest 

upon its mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleadings, but rather 

must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 

Ellington v. City of E. Cleveland, 689 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Moldowan 

v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009)). 

Upon review of the entire record, there is conflicting evidence that creates a 

genuine issue of material fact as to Plaintiff’s §1983, false arrest, and false 

imprisonment claims against Defendant Vann. As to Plaintiff’s other claims against 

Defendant Vann, and his claims against the City of Lincoln Park, Defendants are 

clearly entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 

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B. Plaintiff’s Claims for Gross Negligence and Intentional Infliction of 

Emotional Distress against Defendants 

 

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that 

no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Plaintiff’s claims for gross 

negligence (Count II) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V) 

against Defendants. 

As to Count II, Michigan law does not recognize “gross negligence” as an 

independent cause of action where the underlying facts support an intentional tort 

allegation. See Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743, 756 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[a]lthough 

establishing that a governmental official’s conduct amounted to ‘gross negligence’ is 

a prerequisite to avoiding that official’s statutory governmental immunity, it is not 

an independent cause of action.”); see also Latits v. Philips, 298 Mich. App. 109, 120

(Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (“this Court has rejected attempts to transform claims 

involving elements of intentional torts into gross negligence.”) (quoting VanVorous 

v. Burmeister, 262 Mich. App. 467, 483-84 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)). Plaintiff’s gross 

negligence claim rests on precisely the same facts as his intentional tort claims of 

false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

claims. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 7-14.) As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for gross negligence 

under Michigan law. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

with respect to Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(Count V), under Michigan law Plaintiff must show “(1) extreme and outrageous 

conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” 

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Haverbush v. Powelson, 217 Mich. App. 228, 234 (1996). To satisfy these 

requirements, the emotional distress must be “so severe that no reasonable man 

could be expected to endure it.” Id. at 235 (quoting Restatement 2d Torts §46). To be 

considered “extreme and outrageous,” conduct must be “so outrageous in character 

and extreme in degree that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is 

regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Grochowalski v. 

DAIIE, 171 Mich. App. 771, 775-76 (1988). “[L]iability will not be found for mere 

insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Id.

at 776. 

Here, there is no evidence that supports the conclusion that Defendants 

committed any “acts or omissions” that would meet this high standard. Nor does 

Plaintiff point to any conduct committed by Defendants that would allow a 

reasonable jury to conclude that they caused Plaintiff to suffer emotional distress so 

severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. Instead, Plaintiff 

simply claims that “the acts of the [d]efendants in terrorizing Plaintiff, constituted 

any extreme, outrageous and intentional infliction of emotional distress which 

caused him to suffer severe and continuing emotional distress.” (Dkt. 1, ¶ 29.) Other 

than these conclusory allegations, Plaintiff offers no evidence suggesting that either 

Defendant is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 

                                                            

3 In response to Defendants’ interrogatory regarding the severe emotional distress claim that asked 

Plaintiff to disclose any treatment for “mental, emotional, psychological and/or psychiatric 

conditions, including substance addiction” received during the last ten years, Plaintiff responded 

that he had had “counseling with Pastor Claude Allen May of Oasis of Hope Christina Church.” (Dkt. 

22, Ex. G, pp. 67-68.) 

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The Court also notes that, in his response to the motion, Plaintiff did not address 

any of Defendants’ arguments with respect to these Counts, raising the question of 

whether Plaintiff has abandoned these claims. As Plaintiff has failed to adduce 

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact concerning the claims of gross 

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, Defendants are entitled 

to summary judgment on Counts II and V. 

C. Defendant City of Lincoln Park’s Liability on Counts III, IV, and VI. 

Plaintiff alleges in Counts III, IV, and VI that Defendant City Lincoln Park is 

liable under § 1983 for violating his Fourth Amendment rights and for false arrest 

and false imprisonment. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 24-30.) Defendant takes the position that there 

is not sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that a policy or custom of 

Defendant City of Lincoln Park caused Plaintiff’s rights to be violated under §1983. 

(Dkt. 18, p. 31.) Defendants also argue that Defendant City of Lincoln Park is 

shielded from liability for false arrest and false imprisonment by statutory 

governmental immunity. (Id. at 17.) The Court concludes that Defendant City of 

Lincoln Park is entitled to summary judgment on all Counts. 

1. Count VI: Liability under § 1983 

Plaintiff claims in Count VI that Defendant City of Lincoln Park is liable for 

failure to adequately and properly hire, train, and supervise its officers so as to 

prevent the alleged unconstitutional conduct at issue in this case. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 31-34.)

In order to succeed on such a claim, Plaintiff must show (1) that his constitutional 

rights were violated and (2) that a policy or custom of the municipality was the 

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“moving force” behind the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. See Powers v. Hamilton 

County Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell 

v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “A municipality cannot be liable for 

the constitutional torts of its employees; that is, it cannot be liable on a respondeat 

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 

“A Plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating 

one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative 

enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal 

actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the 

existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” 

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of 

Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). A municipality “may not be sued 

under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell, 436 

U.S. at 694. Here, Plaintiff’s argument for municipal liability is based on both an 

alleged policy of inadequate training, and a policy of condoning the unlawful use of 

force against minorities. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 32; Dkt. 20, p. 20.) The Court will address these 

arguments in turn. 

a. Failure to Train 

 Plaintiff claims that Defendant City of Lincoln Park failed to “properly train its 

officers in the proper manner.” (Dkt. 1, ¶ 32-B.) “That a particular officer may be 

unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the 

officer’s shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training 

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program.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). However, a systematic 

failure to train police officers adequately is a custom or policy which can lead to 

municipal liability. See Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 753 (6th Cir. 

2006) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 388). 

“The inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1983 liability 

where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 

with whom the police come into contact.” Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th 

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). To establish deliberate indifference related 

to training, a Plaintiff “must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct 

demonstrating that the [municipality] has ignored a history of abuse and was 

clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to 

cause injury.” Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005); see also City of 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege facts sufficient to support 

municipal liability under § 1983. Plaintiff alleges no more than a single incident, 

while the law requires a series of incidents that can be linked to a municipal policy. 

(Dkt. 18, p. 17.) 

 Despite the case law requiring that Plaintiff allege a pattern or series of 

incidents of unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiff has provided no such examples. 

Plaintiff relies on Penbaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) for the 

proposition that this “policy” element does not require Plaintiff to show proof of 

long-standing practices and that liability may attach via a single incident. (Dkt. 20, 

p. 20.) The Supreme Court in Penbaur, however, did not address the issue of a 

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Plaintiff’s burden under a “failure to train” theory. See 475 U.S. 469. Penbaur held 

that if the allegation is that a municipality has a facially unconstitutional official 

policy or legislative enactment, Plaintiff need not demonstrate that the policy or 

enactment deprived others of their constitutional rights. 475 U.S. at 481 (“[I]t is 

plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal 

policymakers under appropriate circumstances.”) Consequently, the Sixth Circuit 

requirement that a Plaintiff must allege past instances of unconstitutional conduct 

in order to bring a § 1983 suit against a municipality under a “failure to train” 

theory remains good law. See Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(Plaintiff “must show prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating 

that the County has ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the 

training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury.”). Here, 

because Plaintiff does not allege any other instances of unconstitutional conduct, 

there is no genuine issue of material fact raised on the question of whether 

Defendant City of Lincoln Park is subject to §1983 liability under a “failure to train” 

theory. 

 b. Theory of Acquiescence 

Plaintiff’s second theory of municipal liability is that Defendant City of Lincoln 

Park acquiesced to Defendant Vann’s conduct. To establish acquiescence by policy 

makers, a Plaintiff must allege more than isolated instances of police misconduct. 

See Tuttle v. Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (“Proof of a single incident of 

unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability. . . unless proof of the 

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incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional 

municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker.”) 

Plaintiff cites cases from the First and Fifth Circuits to support the proposition 

that a single incident like this one is sufficient to establish acquiescence to 

unconstitutional actions. (Dkt. 20, p. 21.) In Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 

1161 (1st Cir. 1989), the First Circuit found that the incident at issue could be used 

in conjunction with other evidence to establish the existence of a policy or custom. 

The Bordanaro Court did not find that a single incident alone constitutes sufficient 

evidence of a municipal policy or custom, however. See id. In Grandstaff v. City of 

Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), the Court did find an isolated incident to be 

sufficient but the circumstances there were quite different. In that case, a group of 

police officers were chasing a suspect, the officers fired shots, and an innocent 

bystander – that the officers knew was in the area – was killed. The Fifth Circuit 

concluded that this incident resulted from a policy or custom because six officers 

were involved and simultaneously opened fire. See id. at 165, 171. Unlike the 

situation in the case before the Court, the Fifth Circuit in Grandstaff was not 

dealing with a single act by a single police officer. See id. 

In order to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that his 

constitutional rights were infringed as the result of a policy or custom of the 

municipality. Plaintiff here advances a “failure to train” theory and an acquiescence 

theory. Both of these theories of liability require that Plaintiff show a history or 

pattern of past constitutional violations. Plaintiff has not alleged that any 

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additional incidents or behavior occurred that could support such a theory, and 

consequently Plaintiff has failed to present a genuine issue of material fact on the 

issue of municipal liability. Accordingly, Defendant City of Lincoln Park is entitled 

to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s §1983 claim (Count VI). 

2. Counts III and IV: State-Law Liability of Defendant City of Lincoln 

Park 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant City of Lincoln Park is liable for false arrest and 

imprisonment (Counts III and IV). Defendant City of Lincoln Park responds that it 

is protected from state tort liability by governmental immunity. (Dkt. 18, p. 17.) It 

is unclear whether Plaintiff means to hold the City of Lincoln Park liable for false 

arrest and imprisonment under a theory of direct liability or under a theory 

respondeat superior, but under either theory governmental immunity is applicable. 

Michigan’s Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) states that “except as 

otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency is immune from tort liability 

if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a 

governmental function.” Mich. Comp. Laws §691.1407 (1); see also Ross v. 

Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich. 567, 608 (1984). Municipal corporations are 

governmental agencies and cities are municipal corporations. MCL §691.1401 (a), 

(d), (e). Consequently, if Defendant City of Lincoln Park was engaged in exercising 

or discharging a governmental function during the period at issue in this case, it is 

immune from tort liability unless a statutory exception applies.4 

                                                            

4 For example, one statutory exception to this rule is provided in MCL §691.1407(4) which limits a 

governmental agency’s liability when providing medical care or treatment to a patient. 

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It is settled law in Michigan “that the management, operation and control of a 

police department is a governmental function and that tort actions against a 

municipality based on the negligence of its police officers, occurring while the officer 

is engaged in a discharge of that function are barred by the doctrine of 

governmental immunity.” Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 800 

(6th Cir. 2005); see also Isabella Cnty. v. Michigan, 181 Mich. App. 99, 105 (1989); 

Hill v. City of Saginaw, 155 Mich. App. 161, 170 (1986); Dickey v. Fluhart, 146 

Mich. App. 268, 275-76 (1985). For the kind of conduct at issue here, no statutory 

exception applies. A theory of direct liability is thus insufficient to survive a motion 

for summary judgment because Defendant City of Lincoln Park is immune from tort 

liability under the GTLA. 

Defendant City of Lincoln Park cannot be held liable for state tort actions under 

a theory of respondeat superior either. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that 

“[r]espondeat superior liability generally can be imposed only where the individual 

tortfeasor acted during the course of his or her employment and within the scope of 

his or her authority.” Ross, 420 Mich. at 567. Michigan courts have held that 

employees act outside the scope of their authority when they commit intentional 

torts. See, e.g., Payton v. City of Detroit, 211 Mich. App. 375, 392-93 (1995). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges only the intentional torts of false arrest and false 

imprisonment.5 Even if Defendant Vann were found liable to Plaintiff for false 

arrest and false imprisonment, Defendant City of Lincoln Park would not be liable 

                                                            

5 As noted above, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning his claims 

for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. 

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under a theory of respondeat superior because intentional torts are per se outside of 

the scope of Defendant Vann’s authority. See Payton, 211 Mich. App. at 393 (holding 

inter alia that cities cannot be held liable for the intentional torts of their 

employees). Even after construing the pleadings and evidence in a light most 

favorable to Plaintiff, the allegations do not raise a genuine issue of material fact 

that could allow a jury to conclude that Defendant City of Lincoln Park is liable on 

any of Plaintiff’s claims against it. 

D. Plaintiff’s False Arrest, False Imprisonment and § 1983 Claims against 

Defendant Vann 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 (Count I), false arrest (Count III), false 

imprisonment (Count IV) claims against Defendant Vann must fail because 

Defendant Vann had probable cause to arrest and detain Plaintiff on June 13, 2014. 

(Dkt. 18, p. 10.) They maintain that Defendant Vann had probable cause for the 

arrest because Plaintiff told him that he did not have his driver’s license on him. 

(Id. at 11; Dkt. 23, p. 5.) Plaintiff counters that there was no probable cause because 

he repeatedly told Defendant Vann that his license was in the center console 

between the front seats of his car, but Defendant Vann would not let him retrieve it. 

(Dkt. 22, p. 31, 33.) Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 

whether Plaintiff did or did not tell Defendant Vann that the license was in the 

center console of the rental car and whether Defendant Vann refused to allow 

Plaintiff to retrieve it. 

1. Counts III and IV: False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims 

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To prevail on a false arrest claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendant Vann 

“participated in an illegal and unjustified arrest, and that [he] lacked probable 

cause to do so.” Walsh v. Taylor, 263 Mich. App. 618, 626 (2004). To prevail on a 

false imprisonment claim, Plaintiff must show that there was (1) an act committed 

with the intention of confining another, (2) the act directly or indirectly results in 

such confinement, and (3) the person confined is conscious of his confinement.” Id.

at 627 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition to these 

elements, false imprisonment requires that the restraint occur without probable 

cause. Id. The only element in dispute in this case is whether there was probable 

cause. 

a. Probable Cause to Arrest Plaintiff 

A police officer has probable cause if “facts and circumstances” within the 

officer’s knowledge [ ] are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of 

reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has 

committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 

443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). The circumstances are viewed from the perspective “of a 

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” 

Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); cf. Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396 (applying the same test in the context of judging the reasonableness of 

force used by officers). 

Here, there is no question that the only offense Defendant Vann could have 

believed Plaintiff had committed was driving without a license. Any concern 

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regarding the money that Plaintiff was carrying, or the odor of narcotics identified 

by K9 Bruno, only arose after Plaintiff’s arrest. (Dkt. 18, p. 2.) The question is 

whether the facts and circumstances within Defendant Vann’s knowledge were 

sufficient to warrant a prudent person believing that Plaintiff did not have his 

license. 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court must 

consider Plaintiff’s allegations that he repeatedly told Defendant Vann that he had 

his license with him and that it was in the center console of his car. (Dkt. 22, p. 30.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Vann prevented Plaintiff from getting his 

license from that location in order to show Defendant Vann. (Id.) 

Where testimony is in conflict, the jury is the judge of credibility unless the 

Plaintiff’s version of events is “so utterly discredited by the record that no 

reasonable jury could believe it.” Coble v. City of White House, Tenn., 634 F.3d 865, 

870 (6th Cir. 2011). Defendant Vann’s own testimony is the only evidence that 

directly contradicts Plaintiff’s version of this event. (Dkt. 18, Ex. 5.) If Defendant 

Vann is to be believed, then Plaintiff told him that he did not have his license on 

him. (See id. at 4.) This statement by Plaintiff, coupled with Plaintiff’s failure to 

produce the license, if such alleged fact were proven, would warrant a reasonable 

and prudent officer to believe that Plaintiff was driving without a license. However, 

if the evidence were sufficient to prove Plaintiff’s version, that Plaintiff proclaimed 

that he had his license, and that the Defendant Vann refused to allow Plaintiff to 

retrieve it, an arrest under such circumstances could reasonably be found to be 

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lacking probable cause. When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this 

conflict in testimony creates a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was 

probable cause for the arrest. Accordingly, summary judgment must be denied on 

this issue. 

b. Defendant Vann is Not Clearly Entitled to Individual 

Governmental Immunity under State Law 

 

As to Plaintiff’s state law intentional tort claims for false arrest and false 

imprisonment, Defendants claim that Defendant Vann should be entitled to 

governmental immunity even if he did arrest Plaintiff without probable cause. (Dkt. 

18, p. 6.) Under Michigan law, a Defendant is entitled to governmental immunity if: 

(a) The acts were undertaken during the course of employment and the employee 

was acting, or reasonably believed he was acting, within the scope of his 

authority, 

(b) The acts were undertaken in good faith, or were not undertaken with malice, 

and 

(c) The acts were discretionary as opposed to ministerial. 

Odom v. Wayne Cnty., 482 Mich. 459, 480 (2008). 

Under Michigan law an officer’s decisions regarding an arrest are considered 

both discretionary and within the scope of their authority. See id.; Norris v. Lincoln 

Park Police Officers, 292 Mich. App. 574, 579 (2011). Thus, to defeat Defendants’ 

claim of governmental immunity, Plaintiff must show that Defendants “utilized 

wanton or malicious conduct or demonstrated a reckless indifference to the common 

dictates of humanity.” Odom, 482 Mich. at 475. 

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 “The good-faith element of [this] test is subjective in nature. It protects a 

Defendant’s honest belief and good-faith conduct with the cloak of immunity while 

exposing to liability a Defendant who acts with malicious intent.” Id. at 481-82. 

Accordingly, to be protected by governmental immunity in the context of a false 

arrest, a police officer need not have probable cause or even a reasonable belief that 

there is probable cause. “[A] police officer would be entitled to immunity [...] if he 

acted in good faith and honestly believed that he had probable cause to arrest, even 

if he later learned that he was mistaken.” Id. at 482 (citing Ross v. Cosumers 

Powers Co., 420 Mich. 567 (1984). 

Even under this more relaxed standard, Plaintiff’s and Defendant Vann’s 

conflicting testimony regarding what Plaintiff told him about his license creates a 

genuine issue of material fact that undermines Defendant’s claim of governmental 

immunity. A reasonable jury could believe that Plaintiff told Defendant Vann that 

he had his license in the car’s middle compartment. Further, a jury could choose not 

to credit Defendant Vann’s testimony that, whatever was said, his understanding at 

the time was that Plaintiff did not have his license in his possession. (Dkt. 18, p. 3.) 

More damaging for Defendant Vann, the jury could also credit Plaintiff’s statement 

that Defendant Vann knowingly prevented Plaintiff from presenting his license – 

that he knew the driver was trying to show his license but he nevertheless arrested 

him for having no license. This scenario, if believed, substantially undermines any 

claims of good faith by the officer. There is a sufficient issue of fact as to Defendant 

Vann’s conduct such that is not entitled to individual governmental immunity. 

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Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment must therefore be denied as to 

Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims against Defendant Vann. 

2. Count I: The §1983 Claim 

If Defendant Vann arrested Plaintiff without probable cause, this would 

constitute a violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. See Gregory, 444 F.3d 

at 745. Because the evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to 

whether Defendant Vann had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, it also creates a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights 

were violated. However, even if Defendant Vann violated Plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment rights, Defendant Vann may be protected from liability by the doctrine 

of qualified immunity. 

“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government officials performing 

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Phillips v. 

Roane County, 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 

U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Determining whether government officials are entitled to 

qualified immunity generally requires two inquiries: “First, viewing the facts in the 

light most favorable to the Plaintiff, has the Plaintiff shown that a constitutional 

violation has occurred? Second, was that right clearly established at the time of the 

violation?” Id. at 538-39. These prongs need not be considered sequentially. See 

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Jones v. Byrnes, 585 F.3d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223 (2009)). 

Qualified immunity “gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all 

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,’” Hunter v. 

Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 

(1986)), and applies irrespective of whether the official’s error was a mistake of law, 

a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact. See 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 

Viewing the facts in light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could 

find that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without 

probable cause was violated. Moreover, the right to be free from arrest without 

probable cause is a clearly established constitutional right. See Gregory, 444 F.3d at 

745. Accordingly, to defeat Defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, there must be 

sufficient evidence in the record to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether, under 

the circumstances, a reasonable officer in Defendant Vann’s position would have 

understood that no probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff. 

If one accepts Plaintiff’s version of what happened, which the Court must do at 

this stage whether it is plausible or not, then Defendant Vann refused to allow 

Plaintiff to show him his license even after Plaintiff repeatedly told him that he had 

it on his person. If true, no reasonable officer could have believed that there was 

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving without a license. Whether Defendant 

Vann’s account or Plaintiff’s is more believable is irrelevant. “When the legal 

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question of immunity is completely dependent upon which view of the facts is 

accepted by the jury, the jury becomes the final arbiter of a claim of immunity.”6

Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 888 (6th Cir. 2007); See also Harris v. 

Lasseigne, No. 14-1033, slip. op. at 6 (6th Cir. Feb. 4, 2014) (citing Younes, 739 F.3d 

885, 889 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that police officers’ statements contradicting the 

Plaintiff’s version of events were “not the type of evidence in the record which 

‘utterly discredits’ the Plaintiff’s evidence for the purpose of reviewing qualified 

immunity)). 

This case presents two opposing views of what Plaintiff said to the officer about 

his license, statements which form the basis of – or disprove – probable cause to 

arrest. Under such circumstances, if Plaintiff’s version is credited, Defendant Vann 

is not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

must be denied as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Vann (Count I) 

because it is hinges on a question for the jury to resolve. 

III. CONCLUSION 

In sum, Defendants have shown that no genuine issues of material fact 

remain with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for gross negligence (Count II) and 

                                                            

6 The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. In the absence of evidence which 

conclusively discredits Plaintiff’s version that he informed Defendant Vann that his temporary paper 

license was inside his cell phone case in the vehicle’s center console, there is an issue of fact as to 

what really happened. There is no video or audio of the arrest in the record. Although Defendant 

Vann searched the vehicle while Plaintiff was being questioned and states that he did not find the 

license (Dkt. 18, Ex. D, ¶ 21), Plaintiff’s intake and property form states “yes” next to the check box 

for “cell phone” (Dkt. 22, Ex. G, p. 73), providing support for Plaintiff’s assertion that the cell phone, 

and possibly Plaintiff’s driver’s license, was available to be examined at the time he was arrested. At 

the same time, it is not clear from the record how or where the cell phone was found. In all events, 

Plaintiff maintains that when the cell phone was returned to him upon his release, he opened up its 

case and showed his paper license to the officer processing him. (Dkt. 22, Ex. G, 183:2-22.) 

Defendants have not proffered any evidence to the contrary. 

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intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V) against both Defendants. As to 

all of the remaining claims against Defendant City of Lincoln Park, Plaintiff’s 

failure to allege any series of similar violations prevents him from showing there 

was any constitutional violation that resulted from a policy or custom of the City. 

Defendant City of Lincoln Park is therefore entitled to governmental immunity 

under Michigan Law and a grant of summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s 

claims. Finally, as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 (Count I), false arrest (Count III), and false 

imprisonment (Count IV) claims, the state of the evidence admits of a genuine issue 

of material fact on the question of whether Defendant Vann had probable cause to 

make the arrest. On these claims, therefore, summary judgment may not be 

granted. 

Wherefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 18.) is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Defendants’ motion is 

GRANTED as to all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant City of Lincoln Park 

and as to Plaintiff’s gross negligence (Count II) and intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (Count V) claims against Defendant Vann. 

Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to Counts I, III, and IV against Defendant 

Vann. 

 SO ORDERED.

s/Terrence G. Berg 

 TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 

Dated: September 8, 2015 

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Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on September 8, 

2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party. 

s/A. Chubb 

 Case Manager 

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