UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, Case No. 14-cr-20427-02 

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

 Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris 

KWAME AMIN MATHEWS, 

 Defendant-Petitioner. 

__________________________________________/ 

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, DENYING MOTIONS TO VACATE, GRANTING MOTION TO 

SUPPLEMENT, GRANTNG MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING SUPPLEMENTAL 

MOTION, DENYING MOTION FOR CREDIT TO FEDERAL SENTENCE, DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING PERMISSION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

Defendant Kwame Amin Matthews pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution 

of cocaine on October 8, 2014. ECF. Nos. 78, 95, 98. After being sentenced to 151 months 

incarceration, Matthews appealed. ECF Nos. 141, 147. On September 2, 2015, the Sixth Circuit 

Court of Appeals granted the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal by relying on the 

appellate waiver provision in Matthews’s plea agreement. ECF No. 169. On February 4, 2016, 

Matthews filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. ECF No. 199. The 

government filed a motion to dismiss Matthews’s motion to vacate his sentence on February 29, 

2016. ECF No. 207. On March 28, 2016, Matthews then filed a motion to supplement his prior 

motion. ECF No. 214. The government countered on April 12, 2016, by filing a motion to deny 

Matthew’s supplemental motion. ECF No. 217. 

 Between his original and supplemental motions, Matthews alleged that his attorney 

provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily made. ECF 

No. 199 at 1; ECF No. 214 at 1. The government asserted that Matthews had waived his right to 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1791 Filed 02/28/17 Page 1 of 12
- 2 - 

collaterally attack his sentence by entering into the Rule 11 plea agreement and that Matthews 

had waived his voluntariness argument by failing to raise it on direct appeal or in his initial § 

2255 motion. On July 14, 2016, Judge Morris issued a report recommending that Matthews’s 

motion to vacate his sentence be denied and the government’s motion to dismiss be granted 

because Matthews waived his right to appeal. See Rep. & Rec. 4–7, ECF No. 239. Judge Morris 

also recommended that, even if not waived, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be 

dismissed because the alleged errors did not prejudice Matthews. Id. at 7–10. Finally, Judge 

Morris recommended that Matthews’ motion to supplement his § 2255 motion be granted and 

that the government’s motion to deny that supplemental motion be denied. ECF Nos. 214, 217. 

The same day Judge Morris issued her report and recommendation, Matthews filed an 

“amended motion to vacate sentence.” ECF No. 240. On August 4, 2016, Matthews filed two 

objections to the report and recommendation. ECF No. 241. Matthews has also filed a motion for 

a recommendation that his state jail time be credited to his federal sentence. ECF No. 242. 

Matthews’s objections to the report and recommendation will be addressed first. Then, 

his amended motion to vacate his sentence and his motion for a recommendation that his state 

jail time be credited to his federal sentence will be addressed. 

I. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to and seek review of 

a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Objections must 

be stated with specificity. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985) (citation omitted). If 

objections are made, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate 

judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De novo review 

requires at least a review of the evidence before the magistrate judge; the Court may not act 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1792 Filed 02/28/17 Page 2 of 12
- 3 - 

solely on the basis of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. See Hill v. Duriron Co., 

656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981). After reviewing the evidence, the Court is free to accept, 

reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. See Lardie v. Birkett, 

221 F. Supp. 2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 

Only those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo review under the statute. 

Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties have the duty to pinpoint those 

portions of the magistrate’s report that the district court must specially consider.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A general objection, or one that merely restates the 

arguments previously presented, does not sufficiently identify alleged errors on the part of the 

magistrate judge. See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (E.D. Mich. 2004). An 

“objection” that does nothing more than disagree with a magistrate judge’s determination, 

“without explaining the source of the error,” is not considered a valid objection. Howard v. Sec’y 

of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Without specific objections, 

“[t]he functions of the district court are effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the 

district court perform identical tasks. This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources 

rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrate’s Act.” Id. Matthews 

has presented two objections to the report and recommendation. 

II. 

 Judge Morris rested her report and recommendation primarily on a finding that Matthews 

knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement and thus waived his right to appeal or 

collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. Judge Morris noted that “the court, government 

counsel and defense counsel all concluded that Petitioner was capable of tendering a knowing 

plea . . . and Petitioner was noted to be following along as government counsel was summarizing 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1793 Filed 02/28/17 Page 3 of 12
- 4 - 

the plea agreement provisions.” Rep & Rec. at 6, ECF No. 239. Matthews argues that he had 

been treated at a hospital for a concussion mere hours before entering into the plea. Id. at 5. But 

Judge Morris explained that “Petitioner does not connect ‘concussion’ with any failure to 

understand what was happening or any other symptoms that would prevent his plea from being 

knowing or voluntary at the time of the plea taking.” Id. Judge Morris alternatively found that, 

even if the appeal waiver were unenforceable, Matthews’s counsel was not ineffective and thus 

Matthews is not entitled to relief. 

1. 

 In his first objection, Matthews again argues that his plea was not entered into 

voluntarily. Specifically, he asserts that his “counsel was ineffective in not requesting a 

psychological or medical evaluation” into the “extent of [Matthews’s] head injury” and his other 

disorders. Objs. at 1, ECF No. 241. As Matthews characterizes his objection, his counsel was 

ineffective for 1) failing to investigate Matthews’s medical and psychological background, 2) 

obtain a psychological evaluation of Matthews, and 3) assert psychological and medical 

background as “mitigating factors during plea negotiations or during [the] plea hearing.” Id. at 2. 

Matthews has not demonstrated an issue of fact regarding the voluntariness of his plea. 

Even if Matthews’s allegations regarding the concussion are accurate, there is no evidence that 

Matthews’s decision to accept the plea was unknowing or involuntary. 

An appeal waiver is enforceable as long as that waiver was knowing and voluntary. 

United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2012). The competency standard for pleading 

guilty is identical to the standard for standing trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993). 

Thus, if Matthews was unable to “consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding” or did not have a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1794 Filed 02/28/17 Page 4 of 12
- 5 - 

against him,” he was not competent to waive his right to appeal. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 

402, 402 (1960) (internal quotations omitted). 

“Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetency to stand trial.” 

Gurnsey v. Prelesnik, No. 2:11-CV-15038, 2014 WL 1977021, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 15, 2014). 

Likewise, mere allegations that the petitioner was suffering from a head injury at the time of the 

plea hearing are insufficient to demonstrate involuntariness. See id. at 5 (“Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas relief on this claim because there was nothing in the plea transcript to indicate 

that due to mental illness, medications being taken by petitioner, or the head injury sustained in 

the accident, he lacked understanding of the proceedings.”). Rather, when the transcript of the 

plea hearing indicates that the petitioner was in possession of his facilities and the petitioner has 

presented no affirmative evidence of incapacity, “after the fact” involuntariness or incompetency 

claims are rejected. See id. See also United States v. Calvin, 20 F. App’x 452, 453 (6th Cir. 

2001) (“Calvin described with specificity the conduct underlying his guilty plea. Calvin was 

lucid and articulate at the plea hearing, and no evidence exists in the record that Calvin was not 

in possession of his faculties. Therefore, his ‘after-the-fact’ claim of incompetency must fail.”); 

Hastings v. Yukins, 194 F. Supp. 2d 659, 672 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (same). 

As Judge Morris noted, Matthews was asked at the plea hearing whether he was under the 

influence of any medication. Oct. 2014 Tr. at 5, ECF No. 98. Matthews stated that he had taken 

medicine “for my stiches.” Id. The Court then asked if Matthews was “feeling okay today?” Id.

Matthews stated that he was and denied that the medication affected his ability to understand or 

think. Id. The Court then asked if Matthews had recently been treated for any mental illness 

issues, and Matthews denied that he had. Id. Finally, Matthews denied being under the influence 

of any prescription drugs, alcohol, or other substances. Id. At this point, the Court concluded that 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1795 Filed 02/28/17 Page 5 of 12
- 6 - 

Matthews was “capable of entering a knowing plea.” Id. at 6. When asked, both the government 

prosecutor and Matthews’ defense attorney agreed with that conclusion. Id. Later in the plea 

hearing, the Court summarized the nature of the appeal waiver to Matthews and asked if he 

understood. Id. at 18–19. Matthews stated that he did. Id. Matthews also denied that he had been 

promised anything that was not written in the plea agreement or otherwise threatened. Id. at 20–

21. 

In short, there is nothing in the plea hearing transcript which would indicate that 

Matthews was unable to understand the proceedings or communicate with his attorney. There 

was no indication in Matthews’s words or actions that he was having difficulty understanding 

what was occurring or the implications of the plea agreement. In fact, Matthews specifically 

denied that he had recently been treated for any mental illness issues. Matthews has presented no 

evidence indicating that he was not in possession of his mental faculties during the plea hearing. 

To the contrary, all available evidence indicates that the plea was knowing and voluntary. 

Matthews may have had a concussion or unspecified mental illnesses at the time, but those 

conditions had no apparent impact on his understanding of the plea hearing. Given the lack of 

physical manifestations of incompetence and Matthews’ own denials of any such conditions, 

Matthews’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate Matthews’s mental background, 

obtain a psychological evaluation, or discuss Matthews’s mental deficiencies during the hearing. 

2. 

In his second objection, Matthews provides a myriad of other complaints. He asserts, 

without details, that “anyone looking over my full file . . . would quickly draw the conclusion of 

prosecutorial misconduct.” Objs. at 3. He also argues that the Court should have ordered that his 

state jail time credit run concurrently with his federal credit. He finally asks “when is the state of 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1796 Filed 02/28/17 Page 6 of 12
- 7 - 

Michigan to be held responsible,” referencing his difficult childhood in the foster-care and 

adoption system. 

As stated above, only those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo review 

under the statute. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). Matthews’s references to 

“prosecutorial misconduct” do not reference any specific actions. This level of generality 

prevents a specific inquiry into this allegation. Absent evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, 

Matthews is not entitled to relief. Likewise, the Court is sympathetic to the difficulties Matthews 

experienced during his youth. But the concerns he raises do not give rise to a legal entitlement to 

relief in the context of a motion to vacate pursuant to § 2255. 

Matthews’s arguments regarding the computation of his jail time credit are not properly 

cognizable via a § 2255 motion. However, Matthews has separately filed a motion seeking a 

commendation that his state and federal sentence be computed concurrently. See ECF No. 242. 

That motion will be addressed below. 

In short, the arguments which Matthews makes in his second objection are not cognizable 

on § 2255 review. Judge Morris’s report and recommendation will be adopted and Matthews’s 

objections will be overruled. 

III. 

 The same day Judge Morris issued her report and recommendation, Matthews filed what 

he described as his “amended” motion or relief under § 2255. ECF No. 240. Although Matthews 

did not seek leave for this additional amendment to his original motion, the Court will accept this 

motion as filed and resolve it on the merits. In the motion, Matthews raises three arguments. 

 First, Matthews argues that his counsel was ineffective because he told Matthews that he 

would receive a downward departure for accepting responsibility. At the hearing, Matthews’s 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1797 Filed 02/28/17 Page 7 of 12
- 8 - 

attorney requested a downward departure. Jan. 2015 Tr. at 7, ECF No. 148. In response, the 

prosecutor stated: “I would just want to remind defendant that pursuant to the plea agreement, 

he’s prohibited from arguing for a departure. . . from the career offender. If he wishes to do so, 

then the government will withdraw from the plea agreement.” Id. at 12. According to Matthews, 

he “would not have accepted this plea had [he] known a downward departure was not available.” 

ECF No. 242 at 2. 

 “To prove constitutionally deficient performance, petitioner must show that his counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 

norms.” Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Further, when challenging a guilty plea based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must “show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going 

to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance 

must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Likewise, there is “a strong presumption 

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.

 Here, Matthews’s counsel misunderstood a provision of the plea agreement. But 

attorneys make mistakes and it is not clear that this single error was, considering all the 

circumstances, “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. Even 

if it was, Matthews has not shown that he would have insisted on going to trial but for his 

counsel’s error. To begin with, Matthews has offered no affirmative evidence, beyond his selfserving statement in the present motion, that he would have insisted on going to trial. The Sixth 

Circuit has not expressly held that affirmative evidence is required, but the Seventh and Second 

Circuits have. See Magana, 263 F.3d at 547 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Paters v. United States, 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1798 Filed 02/28/17 Page 8 of 12
- 9 - 

159 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 

1998)). Additionally, Matthews’s counsel only requested a one level downward departure. A one 

level decrease in his sentencing guidelines would have lowered Matthews’s sentence. But it 

seems unlikely that this marginal difference in his sentence would have been the deciding factor 

for Matthews regarding whether to go to trial or plea. In fact, Matthews himself asserts that 

“[a]nother attorney would have negotiated me a better plea and explained the plea I actually took 

to the point I wouldn’t have been tricked by my attorney’s misunderstanding.” ECF No. 240 at 2. 

The implication of this argument is that Matthews intended to plead guilty regardless, but 

believes he should have received a better deal. This is not prejudice sufficient to establish 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

 Second, Matthews argues that his counsel was ineffective for not investigating or filing 

motions related to Matthews’s various illnesses. Third, Matthews argues that his counsel “poorly 

addressed [his] mental state” at sentencing. Those arguments were raised in Matthews’s original 

motions for relief and found meritless above. In short, none of the arguments raised in 

Matthews’s amended motion for relief under § 2255 entitle him to relief. That motion will be 

denied. The Court further concurs with Judge Morris’s finding that there is no material factual 

dispute which an evidentiary hearing could address. Accordingly, no hearing will be held. 

IV. 

Finally, Matthews has filed a motion for a recommendation that his state jail time be 

credited to his federal sentence. ECF No. 242. The computation of jail-time credit is, in the first 

instance, a matter for the Bureau of Prisons. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 

(1992) (explaining that jail-time credit computations are made by the Bureau of Prisons). 

Prisoners who wish to challenge that computation may utilize administrative procedures with the 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1799 Filed 02/28/17 Page 9 of 12
- 10 - 

Bureau of Prisons. Id. After exhausting their administrative remedies, prisoners may seek 

judicial review of the computations. Id. See also Broadwater v. Sanders, 59 F. App’x 112, 113 

(6th Cir. 2003). 

In his motion, Matthews states: “I ask that you grant me a favorable recommendation. 

With the understanding that even in you doing so it doesn’t mean it will happen. As I have to file 

a 6p-9 with your recommendation attached with the BOP.” ECF No. 242 at 2–3. Thus, Matthews 

has not exhausted his administrative remedies for challenging the computation of his jail time 

credit. At this stage, the Court has no jurisdiction to review the computation. Matthews’s motion 

for a recommendation regarding his jail time credit computations will be denied. 

V. 

Before Petitioner may appeal this Court’s dispositive decision, a certificate of 

appealability must be issued. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A 

certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court rejects a habeas 

claim on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claim debatable 

or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this 

standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In 

applying that standard, a district court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its 

examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of the petitioner’s claims. Id. at 

336-37. “The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1800 Filed 02/28/17 Page 10 of 12
- 11 - 

final order adverse to the applicant.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. 

§ 2254. 

 Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is not warranted in this case. The Court further 

concludes that Petitioner should not be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, as 

any appeal would be frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). 

VI. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, 

ECF No. 239, is ADOPTED. 

 It is further ORDERED that Petitioner Matthews’s objections, ECF No. 241, are 

OVERRULED. 

 It is further ORDERED that Petitioner Matthews’s motion to vacate and amended 

motion to vacate, ECF Nos. 199, 240, are DENIED. 

It is further ORDERED that Petitioner Matthews’s motion to amend his motion to 

vacate, ECF No. 214, is GRANTED. 

 It is further ORDERED that the Government’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 207, is 

GRANTED. 

 It is further ORDERED that the Government’s motion to deny Matthews’s motion to 

amend, ECF No. 217, is DENIED. 

It is further ORDERED that Petitioner Matthews’s motion for a recommendation that his 

state jail time be credited to his federal sentence, ECF No. 242, is DENIED. 

It is further ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

 It is further ORDERED that leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is DENIED. 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1801 Filed 02/28/17 Page 11 of 12
- 12 - 

Dated: February 28, 2017 s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on February 28, 2017. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

Case 1:14-cr-20427-TLL-PTM ECF No. 263, PageID.1802 Filed 02/28/17 Page 12 of 12