NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 10-1019

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v.

WILLIAM I. SCHWARTZ, JR.,

 Appellant

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. 2:06-cr-00382-005)

District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls

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Submitted Pursuant to LAR 34.1(a)

November 18, 2010

Before: BARRY, CHAGARES, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Filed December 14, 2010)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant William I. Schwartz, Jr. pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4. Over a year and one-half later, he moved to withdraw his 

plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court denied Schwartz‟s motion. On 

appeal, Schwartz argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion. Because we 

find no error, we will affirm. 

I.

As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and the 

procedural history of the case, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis. 

On May 17, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a thirteen-count Indictment, eight of 

which were brought against Schwartz. The Indictment stemmed from a scheme to 

defraud the United States and the Department of Defense (“DoD”) undertaken by 

employees of Parmatic Filter Corporation, a manufacturer of air, oil, and water filters 

used commercially and militarily. Schwartz was an Assembly Foreman at Parmatic. In 

1996 and 1997, the DoD awarded Parmatic two contracts worth more than $6 million. 

Parmatic, in a cost saving effort, and against DoD guidelines, produced defective filters

and passed them on as authentic, functioning filters. In 2002, federal agents executed a 

search warrant of Parmatic‟s headquarters, and discovered documents in Schwartz‟s work 

station indicating that he was aware of, and participated in, the defective filter scheme. 

On August 13, 2007, in accordance with a written plea agreement, Schwartz 

pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony pursuant to a one-count Superseding Information. 
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Nineteen months later, and prior to sentencing, Schwartz, with new counsel, filed a 

motion to withdraw his plea. 

The District Court held hearings on July 7, 2009, and August 19, 2009. At the 

conclusion of the hearings, the District Court issued an oral decision, denying the motion 

to withdraw the guilty plea. On December 17, 2009, the District Court sentenced 

Schwartz to three years‟ probation and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of 

$180,900. Judgment was entered on December 21, 2009. Schwartz filed a notice of 

appeal that same day. The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and 

we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II.

The determination of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is committed to the sound 

discretion of the district judge, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. 

See United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986). The district court must 

ascertain whether there is a “fair and just” reason for withdrawing a plea of guilty. 

United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Three factors 

guide judicial consideration of a request to withdraw a guilty plea: (1) whether the 

defendant asserts innocence; (2) the strength of the reasons for withdrawing the plea; and 

(3) prejudice to the government by the withdrawal. United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 

811, 815 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Huff, 873 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1989). “The 

burden of demonstrating a „fair and just‟ reason falls on the defendant, and that burden is 

substantial.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 252 (citing United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676-77 
4

(1997); United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 485 (3d Cir. 1998)). “„A shift in defense 

tactics, a change of mind, or the fear of punishment are not adequate reasons to impose 

on the government the expense, difficulty, and risk of trying a defendant who has already 

acknowledged his guilt by pleading guilty.‟” Brown, 250 F.3d at 815 (quoting United 

States v. Jones, 979 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds

as stated in United States v. Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Schwartz argues on appeal that he offered a fair and just reason for withdrawing 

his plea. Specifically, he maintains that he consistently asserted his innocence, the 

factual basis for the guilty plea was insufficient, he was pressured by his family into 

pleading guilty, and that the District Court “leaped to its conclusion” that the “passing of 

time” prejudiced the government. (Appellant‟s Br. at 10-11.) 

Schwartz first argues that the District Court “ignored the evidence of Schwartz‟s 

persistent claim of innocence.” (Id. at 13.) According to Schwartz, he “asserted his 

innocence from the time he was initially charged, up until moments before he entered his 

plea.” (Id.) Further, he alleges that after he pleaded guilty, he told Attorney Strazza, his 

trial counsel, that he wanted to withdraw his plea. No action, however, was taken for 

more than a year and a half.

The government counters that the court carefully considered the evidence which 

demonstrated that Schwartz was guilty and his plea was entered into freely and 

voluntarily. During the plea colloquy, Schwartz admitted: that he knew Parmatic had 

engaged in a scheme to submit fraudulent air, oil, and water filters to the DoD; that he 
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failed to report the offense to the DoD or other authorities; that he personally created or 

assisted in creating fraudulent sample filters; and that he concealed documents relating to 

the fraudulent filters. 1(See A. 305-10.) Furthermore, Schwartz admitted in his Rule 11 

guilty plea form that he knew his employer committed a felony that he failed to report, 

and that he concealed the fact that a felony was being committed. (S.A. 14.) 

“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” 

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). The District Court did not err in finding

that Schwartz did not rebut the “presumption of verity” accorded to his admissions made

during the plea colloquy. In this regard, other than bald assertions that he did not engage 

in acts of concealment of the fraud, Schwartz presented no evidence that would contradict 

the fact that the government would have been able to show that there were documents 

maintained by Schwartz at his workstation that revealed the fraud and were not kept by 

Schwartz in the ordinary course of his responsibilities. Accordingly, Schwartz‟s “bald 

assertion” of innocence is insufficient, and this factor weighs against withdrawal of the

guilty plea.2 Jones, 336 F.3d at 252. 

 

1 The four elements of misprision, 18 U.S.C. § 4, are: (1) the principal committed 

and completed the alleged felony; (2) the defendant had full knowledge of that fact; (3) 

the defendant failed to notify authorities; and (4) the defendant took steps to conceal the 

crime. United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The 

plea colloquy established an adequate factual premise for each element. 

2

It bears observation that Schwartz‟s admission that he participated in the creation 

of sixteen fraudulent sample filters likely sufficed to establish his guilt to the conspiracy 

and substantive fraud charges asserted against him in the Indictment. Schwartz‟s counsel 

believed that a guilty verdict on the charges of the Indictment would have exposed 
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Under the second factor, Schwartz asserts that a compelling reason for seeking to 

withdraw his guilty plea is the absence of a sufficient factual basis for the concealment 

element of the misprision charge. This contention is based upon Schwartz‟s post hoc

recantation of the admissions he made during the plea colloquy. For the reasons set forth 

above, Schwartz simply cannot show that the District Court failed to assure that Schwartz 

acknowledged the existence of a factual basis for each element of the crime charged. 

As the government points out, the “record flatly contradicts Schwartz‟s contention 

that he „never knew that Parmatic had committed any fraud in producing filters, let alone 

took any steps to conceal any information or illegal conduct.‟” (Appellee‟s Br. at 23)

(quoting Appellant‟s Br. at 15.) The District Court and Schwartz participated in the 

following exchange:

Court: And beginning sometime around July 2001, were you aware 

that Parmatic managers and employee [sic] created a scheme 

to substitute substituted and fraudulent sample filters to the 

Department of Defense?

Schwartz: Yes, your Honor.

Court: And sometime around July 2001, did you create or assist in 

the creation of approximately 16 filters?

Schwartz: Yes, your Honor.

Court: And after knowing that Parmatic had fraudulently created and 

submitted these substituted and fraudulent sample filters to 

the Department of Defense, did you report that information to 

any judge or police officer or federal law enforcement officer 

or any United States Department of Defense representative or 

official or anyone else in civilian authority?

Schwartz: No, I did not, your Honor.

 

Schwartz to a prison term of more than ten years. (S.A. 39.) Thus, Schwartz realized a 

substantial benefit from his plea agreement.
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Court: After these 16 substitute sample filters were created and 

submitted to the Department of Defense, did you hide 

documents and records pertaining to those 16 filters from the 

Department of Defense? That is to say, did you conceal these 

documents from the Department of Defense?

Schwartz: Yes, your Honor.

Court: Did you do what I just discussed with you of your own free 

will, voluntarily, knowingly, and willfully?

Schwartz: Yes, your Honor.

(A. 307-09) (emphasis added). The District Court did not err in finding that there was an 

adequate factual basis for Schwartz‟s guilty plea. 

Nor did the District Court err in finding unpersuasive Schwartz‟s claim that his 

plea was coerced due to family pressure. Schwartz testified that “my wife told me that if 

I was found guilty and went to jail, she wouldn‟t be there when I got out.” (A. 182.) As 

the District Court noted, and contrary to Schwartz‟s assertion, “at no time during [Mrs. 

Schwartz‟s] testimony did she say that” she “threatened to leave him if he went to jail.” 

(A. 267.) Regardless, family pressure to plead guilty provides an insufficient basis for 

granting leave to withdraw a plea of guilty. See United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 

1535, 1541 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that although family pressure may be “probative of an 

accused‟s motivation for pleading guilty, it does not necessarily show coercion, duress, or 

involuntariness”) (emphasis in original); Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 792 

(2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting undue coercion claim based on appellant‟s assertion that he 

pleaded guilty because he was afraid that his male paramour would not wait for him if he 

went to trial); United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1970) 
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(concluding that statements from defendant‟s lawyers and mother to plead guilty were not 

coercive, but rather “sound advice”).

Finally, under the third factor, Schwartz argues that, although the District Court 

stated that the passing of time prejudiced the government, it “made no particular findings 

that material witnesses are unavailable now or that relevant discovery has been lost or 

destroyed.” (Appellant‟s Br. at 16.) The government counters that it represented to the 

court that the case was essentially closed, “given that all but one of Schwartz‟s codefendants—John Parkinson—had pleaded guilty and that „there‟s no chance‟ of 

[Parkinson] going to trial.” (Appellee‟s Br. at 30) (quoting A. 261.) Parkinson was ill, 

and the government represented to the court that there was a potential issue concerning 

his competency. The court found that these circumstances, coupled with the obvious fact 

that, after nineteen months, “the availability and the memory of witnesses becomes more 

difficult to retrieve[,]” sufficed to show prejudice to the government. (A. 271.) We 

cannot say that the District Court erred in making this finding. In any event, when 

defendants, like Schwartz, are unable to support claims of actual innocence or present 

adequate reasons for withdrawal of their guilty pleas, the government is not required to 

show prejudice. See United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 460 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005). 

In short, all three factors weigh against Schwartz‟s request to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Therefore, Schwartz has failed to meet his substantial burden, and the District 

Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Schwartz‟s motion for leave to withdraw his

plea of guilty.
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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.