No. 12-536 

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SHAUN MCCUTCHEON, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE 

LISA J. STEVENSON

Deputy General Counsel 

KEVIN DEELEY

ADAV NOTI

Acting Associate General 

Counsels 

CHARLES KITCHER

Attorney 

Federal Election Commission

Washington, D.C. 20463 

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR. Solicitor General 

Counsel of Record 

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General 

ERIC J. FEIGIN

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

Department of Justice 

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov 

(202) 514-2217 
(I) 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether the three-judge district court correctly rejected appellants’ constitutional challenge to the federal 

statutory limits on the aggregate amounts that an individual may contribute to all federal candidates, political 

parties, and other political committees in a single election cycle, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3). 
(III) 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinion below .................................................................................. 1 

Jurisdiction ...................................................................................... 1 

Constitutional provisions, statutes, and regulations 

 involved ....................................................................................... 2

Statement ......................................................................................... 2 

Summary of argument ................................................................. 13 

Argument ....................................................................................... 16 

I. This Court should adhere to Buckley’s holding 

 that aggregate contribution limits are not subject 

 to strict scrutiny .............................................................. 17 

A. The court in Buckley declined to apply strict 

 scrutiny to contribution limits, including aggre- 

 gate contribution limits ............................................ 17 

B. Appellants’ arguments for applying strict 

 scrutiny to aggregate contribution limits 

 cannot be squared with Buckley ............................. 19 

C. Appellants provide no sound reason to overrule 

Buckley’s longstanding distinction between 

 contribution limits and expenditure limits ............ 25 

II. This Court should adhere to Buckley’s holding that 

 aggregate contribution limits are constitutional ......... 31 

A. The court in Buckley upheld FECA’s base and 

 aggregate contribution limits as valid mea- 

 sures to help prevent actual and apparent 

 corruption................................................................... 31 

B. FECA’s current aggregate contribution limits 

 serve the same important purposes as the 

 aggregate contribution limit upheld in 

Buckley ....................................................................... 34 

C. Buckley forecloses appellants’ challenge to 

 the aggregate limits in the current version of 

 FECA ......................................................................... 43
IV 

Table of Contents—Continued: Page 

 1. The current version of FECA has not 

 changed in any relevant way from the 

 version considered in Buckley ........................... 43 

2. Appellants’ challenges to FECA’s aggregate 

 contribution limits cannot be reconciled with 

Buckley .................................................................. 49 

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 57 

Appendix — Constitutional, statutory and regulatory 

 provisions .......................................................... 1a 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases: 

Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 

Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) ......................... 11, 24, 25, 34 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .............................. passim 

California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 

(1981) .......................................................................... 12, 48, 49

Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 

454 U.S. 290 (1981) ............................................................... 26 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) ................... 7, 25 

Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990) ................... 28 

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) .................................. 24, 35

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) ................. 29

FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) .................... 17, 25, 30

FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign 

Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ........................................ passim 

FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 

454 U.S. 27 (1981) ................................................................. 39 

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 

479 U.S. 238 (1986) ......................................................... 25, 30 

FEC v. National Conservative Political Action 

Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) ................................................. 26 
V 

Cases—Continued: Page

FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 

(1982) ................................................................................ 27, 30 

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 

(2007) ...................................................................................... 52 

Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995) ............. 29, 30

McConnell v. FEC: 

540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens 

United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) ................. passim 

251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.), aff’d in part, rev’d 

in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ............................................ 8 

Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 

(2000) ............................................................................. passim

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) ........ 13, 26, 29, 31, 35 

SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.), 

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010) ................................ 21, 22 

Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 

(1986) ...................................................................................... 25 

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 

398 (1999) ............................................................................... 28 

Constitution, statutes, regulations and rule:

U.S. Const. Amend. I ..................................................... passim 

Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 4, 54 Stat. 770 ........................ 2 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 

No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 ........................................................ 8 

§ 102, 116 Stat. 86-87 .......................................................... 8 

§ 307, 116 Stat. 102-103 ...................................................... 8 

§ 401, 116 Stat. 112 ............................................................ 56 

§ 403(a), 116 Stat. 113-114 ................................................ 11 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 

92-225, 86 Stat. 3 ..................................................................... 3 
VI 

Statutes, regulations and rule—Continued: Page

2 U.S.C. 431(8)(B)(i) .......................................................... 22 

2 U.S.C. 431(11) ................................................................. 35 

2 U.S.C. 431(17) ................................................................. 22 

2 U.S.C. 432(e)(3)(B) ......................................................... 38 

2 U.S.C. 439a ...................................................................... 29 

2 U.S.C. 439a(a)(4) ................................................ 15, 23, 39 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A) ........................... 9, 15, 35, 37, 38, 48 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(B) ........................... 9, 15, 23, 36, 37, 48 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(C) ................................. 9, 15, 35, 37, 48 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(D) ........................... 9, 15, 23, 36, 37, 48 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)(A) ............................... 15, 23, 35, 37, 48 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)(B) ....................................................... 36 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)(C) ....................................................... 36 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(A) ......................................................... 9 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(B) ................................................... 9, 10 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(4) .................................... 15, 23, 37, 39, 49 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(5) ............................................................ 46 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)(B)(i) ................................................... 38 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(8) ............................................................ 44 

2 U.S.C. 441a(c)(1) ............................................................... 9 

2 U.S.C. 441a(d)(3) ............................................................ 38 

2 U.S.C. 454 note ............................................................... 56 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 

1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263 ........ 4, 5, 6 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 

1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112, 90 Stat. 487 ...................... 6 

18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1)................................................................... 41 

18 U.S.C. 608(b)(6)................................................................... 44 
VII 

Regulations—Continued: Page

5 C.F.R.: 

Section 2653.202(a)(2) ....................................................... 28 

Section 2635.203(f)(2) ....................................................... 42 

11 C.F.R.: 

Section 100.2 ........................................................................ 9 

Section 100.5(g) ................................................................. 46 

Section 102.6(b)-(c) ............................................................ 37 

Section 102.17 .................................................................... 37 

Section 110.3(b)(3) ............................................................. 37 

Section 110.6(c)(2) ............................................................. 45 

Section 113.2(c) .................................................................. 39 

Senate R. 35(b)(2)(A) .............................................................. 42 

Miscellaneous: 

David W. Adamany & George E. Agree, Political 

Money: A Strategy for Campaign Financing in 

America (1975) .................................................................... 3, 5 

Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: Money, 

Elections and Political Reform (1976) ............................ 3, 5 

American Legacy PAC, Who We Support, 

http://www.americanlegacypac.org/who-we-support 

(last visited July 17, 2013) ................................................... 36 

Kevin Bogardus, Lobbyists Fear Shakedown If 

Supreme Court Lifts Campaign Contributions 

Cap, The Hill, Feb. 26, 2013, http://thehill.com/

business-a-lobbying/284817-lobbyists-fearshakedown-if-court-lifts-campaign-cap# 

ixzz2M23oRhX0 .................................................................... 42 

Conciliation Agreement, In re DSCC (Aug. 21, 1995) ........ 44 

86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940) ......................................................... 2 

117 Cong. Rec. (1971):

p. 28,811 ................................................................................ 4 
VIII 

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

p. 29,306 ................................................................................ 4 

p. 43,410 ................................................................................ 4 

122 Cong. Rec. 12,199 (May 3, 1976) ....................................... 6 

147 Cong. Rec. 4634 (Mar. 27, 2001) ....................................... 9 

148 Cong. Rec. 3615 (Mar. 20, 2002) ....................................... 8 

Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Red To Blue 

2012, http://www.dccc.org/pages/redtoblue (last 

visited July 17, 2013) ............................................................ 46 

Democratic Party of N.M., Report of Receipts and 

Disbursements, Apr. 8, 2013, http://images.nictusa. 

com/pdf/488/13961253488/13961253488.pdf ...................... 45 

Dep’t of Justice, Former Lobbyist Jack Abramoff 

Pleads Guilty to Charges Involving Corruption, 

Fraud Conspiracy, and Tax Evasion (Jan. 3, 2006), 

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 2006/January/ 

06_crm_002.html ................................................................... 54 

FEC: 

2011-2012 Election Cycle: Total Disbursements 

by Entity Type, http://www.fec.gov/law/

2012TDbyEntity.shtml (last visited July 17, 

2013) .............................................................................. 29 

2012 Leadership PACs and Sponsors, 

http://www.fec.gov/data/Leadership.do?

format=html&election_yr=2012 (last visited 

July 17, 2013) ............................................................... 39 

Committees And Candidates Supported/ 

Opposed: Conservative Action Fund, 

http://query.nictusa.com/cgi-bin/com_ 

supopp/C00496505 (last visited July 17, 2013) ........ 22 

Detailed Files About Candidates, Parties and 

Other Committees, http://www.fec.gov/

finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml (last visited 

July 17, 2013) ............................................................... 38
IX 

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

Disclosure Data Catalog, http://www.fec.gov/

data/DataCatalog.do?cf=downloadable (last 

visited July 17, 2013) ................................................... 38

PAC Count—1974 to Present, Jan. 2013, http://

www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2011/ 

2011paccount.shtml ..................................................... 36

Transaction Query By Individual Contributor, 

http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/

norindsea.shtml (last visited July 17, 2013) ............. 22 

76 Fed. Reg. 8369-8370 (Feb. 14, 2011) ................................ 10 

Final Report of the Select Committee on 

Presidential Campaign Activities, S. Rep. No. 981, 

93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) ........................................... 4, 5, 40 

Fletcher’s Opinion on the Application of Hatch Act, 

N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1940 ....................................................... 3 

James V. Grimaldi & Susan Schmidt, Lawmaker 

From Ohio Subpoenaed In Abramoff Case, 

Washington Post, Nov. 5, 2005 ........................................... 54 

Letter from Jin Lee, Attorney, FEC, to Mark Elias 

and Jonathan Berkon, Perkins Coie LLP (Nov. 19, 

2012), http://eqs.sdrdc.com/eqsdocsMUR/ 

13044330348.pdf .................................................................... 45 

James C. McKinley, Jr., DeLay Convicted In 

Donation Case by a Texas Jury, N.Y. Times, Nov. 

25, 2010 ................................................................................... 54 

Missouri Democratic State Comm., Report of 

Receipts and Disbursements, May 13, 2013, 

http://images.nictusa.com/pdf/727/13962195727/

13962195727.pdf .................................................................... 46 

Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, and Courts: 

The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law

(1988) ........................................................................................ 3 
X 

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

National Conference of State Legislatures, 

Contribution Limits: An Overview, http://

www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/

elections/campaign-contribution-limitsoverview.aspx (last visited July 17, 2013) .......................... 30 

Louise Overacker, Presidential Campaign Funds

(1978) ........................................................................................ 3 

Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and 

Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling 

Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. (Feb. 6, 2013): 

p. 8530 ................................................................................... 9 

pp. 8531-8532...................................................................... 38 

p. 8532 ..................................................... 9, 10, 35, 36, 37, 48 

Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the 

White House (2001) ................................................................ 5 

S. Rep. No. 167, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) ........................ 7 

Steve Schultze & Richard P. Jones, Chvala Charged 

With Extortion, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Oct. 18, 

2002 ......................................................................................... 54 

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 

Appropriations, Full Committee Members, http://

appropriations.house.gov/about/members/ (last 

visited July 17, 2013) ............................................................ 43 

Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Chvala Pleads 

Guilty To Two Felonies, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, 

Oct. 16, 2005 ........................................................................... 53 

Jodi Wilgoren, Leader Charged With Extortion and 

Misconduct, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2002 ............................. 54 

Young Americans for Liberty, YAL PAC, 

http://www.yaliberty.org/pac (last visited 

July 17, 2013) ......................................................................... 36 

 
(1) 

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 12-536 

SHAUN MCCUTCHEON, ET AL., APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE 

OPINION BELOW 

The opinion of the three-judge district court granting 

appellee’s motion to dismiss (J.S. App. 1a-17a) is reported at 893 F. Supp. 2d 133. 

JURISDICTION

The order and final judgment of the three-judge district court was entered on September 28, 2012. A notice 

of appeal was filed on October 9, 2012, and the jurisdictional statement was filed on October 26, 2012. This 

Court noted probable jurisdiction on February 19, 2013. 

The jurisdiction of this Court rests on Section 403(a)(3) 

of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 

No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 113-114. 
2 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 

AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED 

The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and 

regulations are reprinted in an appendix to this brief. 

App., infra, 1a-21a. 

STATEMENT

1. For more than 70 years, federal law has generally 

limited the amounts that individuals may contribute to 

political candidates, political-party committees, and nonparty political committees for the purpose of influencing 

elections for federal office. Both Congress and this 

Court have recognized that such limits are an important 

tool in combating corruption and the appearance of 

corruption in federal politics. See, e.g., Buckley v. 

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam). Since 1974, 

federal law has included both (a) base limits on the 

amount an individual may contribute to particular entities and (b) aggregate limits on the total amount of an 

individual’s contributions. This Court has upheld both 

against constitutional challenges. Id. at 23-35, 38. 

 a. Amendments to the Hatch Act enacted in 1940, 

Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 4, 54 Stat. 770, prohibited 

the “pernicious political activity” of “directly or indirectly” making “contributions in an aggregate amount in 

excess of $5,000, during any calendar year” to “any 

candidate for an elective Federal office” or to “any 

committee or other organization engaged in furthering, 

advancing, or advocating the nomination or election of 

any candidate for any such office or the success of any 

national political party.” The provision’s sponsor stated 

that it was common knowledge that “large contributions 

to political campaigns * * * put the political party 

under obligation to the large contributors, who demand 

pay in the way of legislation.” 86 Cong. Rec. 2720 (1940) 
3 

(statement of Sen. Bankhead). He expressed his hope 

that the new provision would help to “bring about clean 

politics and clean elections.” Ibid. 

The 1940 limit proved “ineffective,” however, “because its vague wording permitted it to be interpreted 

not as an overall limit on an individual’s contributions, 

but as one applying only to contributions made to one 

committee.” Robert E. Mutch, Campaigns, Congress, 

and Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance 

Law 66 (1988). Individuals regularly circumvented the 

limitation by routing contributions in excess of $5000 

through multiple committees that supported the same 

candidate. Ibid.; see Louise Overacker, Presidential 

Campaign Funds 36 (1978); id. at 42-43 (summarizing 

spending in the 1944 elections and concluding that “the 

‘sky was the limit’” for “generous, determined donors”); 

see also, e.g., Herbert E. Alexander, Financing Politics: 

Money, Elections and Political Reform 86 (1976) (Financing Politics) (listing the number of individuals who 

contributed $10,000 or more in each election cycle from 

1952 through 1972, along with the total amounts of their 

contributions); David W. Adamany & George E. Agree, 

Political Money: A Strategy for Campaign Financing 

in America 45 (1975) (Political Money) (observing that 

21 members of a single family contributed $1.8 million in 

the 1968 elections, an average of more than $85,000 

each). Contributors could also give amounts above 

$5000 to state and local political-party committees, 

which were exempt from contribution limitations. 

Fletcher’s Opinion on the Application of Hatch Act, 

N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1940, at 2. 

b. In the early 1970s, Congress substantially overhauled the campaign-finance laws, first by enacting the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. 
4 

No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, and then, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, by enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (1974 FECA Amendments), Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. The concerns 

that informed the debates on the new campaign-finance 

laws included concerns that the Hatch Act’s $5000 contribution limit was being “routinely circumvented”; that 

“parties and candidates alike” were “rely[ing] extensively on a few big givers to meet their expanded needs”; 

and that the best estimates were “that 90 percent of the 

money raised for political campaigns c[ame] from 1 

percent of the contributors.” 117 Cong. Rec. 43,410 

(1971) (statement of Rep. Abzug); see id. at 28,811 

(statement of Sen. Prouty) (“[A]n individual can give 

$5,000 to many separate committees supporting the 

same candidate.”); id. at 29,306 (statement of Sen. 

Pastore) (“The question has been raised time and time 

again that the trouble was not with the $5,000 limitation, 

but the idea that you can multiply that $5,000 by many 

different committees.”). 

 A 1974 congressional report identified multiple instances in which contributions to numerous separate 

entities had been made at the request of a particular 

candidate. For example, the dairy industry had avoided 

then-existing reporting requirements by dividing a 

$2,000,000 contribution to President Nixon among hundreds of committees in different States, “which could 

then hold the money for the President’s reelection campaign.” Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, S. Rep. No. 981, 93d 

Cong., 2d Sess. 615 (1974) (Final Report). Shortly 

thereafter, President Nixon “circumvented and interfered with” the “legitimate functions of the Agriculture 

Department” by reversing a decision unfavorable to the 
5 

dairy industry, and Attorney General John Mitchell 

(who was also President Nixon’s campaign manager) 

halted a grand-jury investigation of the milk producers’ 

association. Id. at 701, 1184, 1205, 1209; see Richard 

Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House

309 (2001) (noting the Secretary of Agriculture’s estimate that President Nixon’s actions cost the government “about $100 million”). On another occasion, a 

presidential aide promised an ambassadorship to a particular individual in return for “a $100,000 contribution, 

which was to be split between 1970 Republican senatorial candidates designated by the White House and [President] Nixon’s 1972 campaign.” Final Report 492. That 

arrangement was not unique. Id. at 501 (describing a 

similar arrangement with someone else); see id. at 493-

494 (listing substantial contributions by ambassadorial 

appointees); see also Political Money 39-41 (collecting 

instances of large contributors “giving and getting”); 

Financing Politics 124-126 (describing contributions 

that gave the appearance of quid pro quo corruption and 

may have raised “suspicio[ns] about * * * large campaign gifts”). 

Informed by those findings, the 1974 FECA Amendments included tighter limits on contributions by individuals. The amended law imposed a $1000 base limit on 

an individual’s contributions to any single candidate 

seeking federal office (or seeking party nomination for 

such an office), or to a committee controlled by that 

candidate, with respect to any given election (or set of 

elections within a single calendar year). § 101(a), 88 

Stat. 1263. The amended law also imposed a $25,000 

aggregate limit on all contributions by an individual, 

whether to candidates or other entities, within a single 

calendar year (with contributions in non-election years 
6 

counting towards the limit for the year in which the next 

election occurred). Ibid. 

In Buckley v. Valeo, supra, this Court rejected First 

Amendment challenges to both the base limit and the 

aggregate limit. 424 U.S. at 23-38. The Court found 

that the base limit permissibly furthered the government’s interest in limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption. Id. at 23-35. The Court further 

concluded that the aggregate limit validly “serve[d] to 

prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation by 

a person who might otherwise contribute massive 

amounts of money to a particular candidate through the 

use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.” Id. at 38. 

c. In 1976, Congress enacted “additional contribution 

limitations * * * intended to be coextensive with the 

scope of the $25,000 limitation on contributions by an 

individual.” 122 Cong. Rec. 12,199 (May 3, 1976) (statement of Rep. Hays). In particular, Congress imposed an 

annual limit of $20,000 on contributions to “political 

committees established and maintained by a national 

political party” and an annual limit of $5000 on contributions to any single non-party political committee (commonly known as a “PAC”). Federal Election Campaign 

Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283 § 112, 90 

Stat. 487. Congress also reenacted the $25,000 aggregate limit. Ibid. Without that aggregate limit, an individual could, for example, have contributed $5000 each 

to multiple political committees, which in turn could 

each have contributed to a candidate, including a candidate to whom the individual himself had already given 

the maximum contribution of $1000. 
7 

Through the use of so-called “soft money,” however, 

candidates and parties were able “to circumvent 

FECA’s limitations on the source and amount of contributions in connection with federal elections.” 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003), overruled in 

part on other grounds by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 

U.S. 310 (2010). Soft money consisted of contributions 

to political parties that were ostensibly for the purpose 

of influencing state or local elections, and thus fell outside FECA’s contribution limits, which applied only to 

federal elections. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122-123. As it 

became clear that activities funded with soft money—

such as get-out-the-vote drives, generic party advertising, and even advertisements that mentioned the name 

of a federal candidate—benefited federal candidates, 

“the amount of soft money raised and spent by the national political parties increased exponentially,” reaching nearly half a billion dollars in 2000. Id. at 124. Contributions of soft money “were in many cases solicited 

by the candidates themselves.” Id. at 125. It was “not 

uncommon,” for example, for legislators facing reelection to urge supporters who had already contributed the 

maximum allowable amount to the legislator’s campaign 

to make additional soft-money contributions. Ibid. 

A 1998 Senate Report determined that “the ‘soft 

money loophole’ had led to a ‘meltdown’ of the campaign 

finance system that had been intended ‘to keep corporate, union and large individual contributions from influencing the electoral process.’” McConnell, 540 U.S. 

at 129 (quoting S. Rep. No. 167, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 

4611, 7515). As this Court later explained, “evidence 

connect[ed] soft money to manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’ failure to enact, 

among other things, generic drug legislation, tort re-
8 

form, and tobacco legislation.” Id. at 149-150. According to former Senator Paul Simon, for example, Federal 

Express obtained favorable labor-related legislation 

“not on the merits of the legislation, but just because 

they had been big contributors,” who had given $1.4 

million to incumbents and almost $1 million in soft money during the election cycle preceding the vote. 

McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 482 (D.D.C.) 

(Kollar-Kotelly, J.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 

93 (2003). One Senator emphasized that “we’ve got to 

pay attention to who is buttering our bread,” and Senator Feingold testified that a colleague urged him to 

support the legislation because “they just gave us 

$100,000.” Ibid. 

d. In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 

116 Stat. 81. One of BCRA’s “central provisions” closed 

the soft-money loophole by amending FECA to prohibit 

national party committees from soliciting or spending 

soft money and to prohibit state and local party committees from using soft money for federal election activity. 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132-134. In conjunction with the 

soft-money ban, Congress also restructured and increased FECA’s contribution limits, including the aggregate contribution limit, and provided for certain 

automatic future adjustments to account for inflation. 

BCRA §§ 102, 307, 116 Stat. 86-87, 102-103. Those 

changes were intended, at least in part, to provide additional lawful avenues for contributions to candidates and 

party committees, thereby reducing incentives for contributors to make donations through back-door channels. See 148 Cong. Rec. 3615 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“The soft money ban will work 

because we came to a reasonable compromise with re-
9 

gard to raising some of the existing hard money contribution limits by modest amounts, and indexing those 

limits for inflation.”). Concern remained, however, that 

the limits be maintained at a level that would not allow 

“large amounts of money to be channeled directly to 

individual candidates.” 147 Cong. Rec. 4634 (Mar. 27, 

2001) (statement of Sen. Schumer). 

In its current form, and as inflation-adjusted for the 

2013-2014 election cycle, FECA’s base contribution 

limits permit an individual to contribute up to $2600 per 

election (counting primary and general elections separately) to “any candidate and his authorized political 

committees”; up to $32,400 per year to “the political 

committees established and maintained by a national 

political party”; up to $10,000 per year to “a political 

committee established and maintained by a State committee of a political party”; and up to $5000 per year to 

“any other political committee.” 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A)-

(D); 2 U.S.C. 441a(c)(1); Price Index Adjustments for 

Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 

8532 (Feb. 6, 2013); see 11 C.F.R. 100.2 (definition of 

“election”). FECA’s aggregate contribution limits, 

inflation-adjusted for the 2013-2014 election cycle, permit an individual to contribute a total of $123,200 per 

election cycle. 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(A) and (B); 78 Fed. 

Reg. at 8532. An individual can contribute $48,600 to 

candidates for federal office and their authorized political committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(A); 78 Fed. Reg. at 

8532, and can contribute another $74,600 to noncandidate entities—i.e., national political-party committees, state political-party committees, and non-party 

political committees—so long as no more than $48,600 of 

that amount is given to state political parties or non-
10 

party political committees. 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(B); 78 

Fed. Reg. at 8532. 

2. Appellants are Shaun McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee (RNC), a national committee 

of the Republican Party. J.S. App. 1a, 4a-5a. McCutcheon alleges that he would like to make, and the RNC 

alleges that it would like to receive, contributions that 

are within FECA’s base limits but that would (in combination with other contributions made by McCutcheon) 

exceed FECA’s aggregate limits. Id. at 4a-5a. In particular, McCutcheon alleges that during the 2011-2012 

election cycle he contributed a total of $33,088 to 16 

different federal candidates and wished to contribute 

$1776 apiece to 12 more candidates. Ibid. Those additional contributions would have brought his total candidate contributions to $54,400, which would have exceeded FECA’s then-current aggregate limit on such contributions by $8200. Ibid.1

 

McCutcheon also alleges that he wished to contribute 

$25,000 to each of three national political committees 

established and maintained by the Republican Party: 

the RNC, the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), and the National Republican Congressional 

Committee (NRCC). J.S. App. 5a. Those contributions 

would have brought his total contributions to noncandidate recipients—which included a $20,000 contribution to the Alabama Republican Party and a $2000 

contribution to the Senate Conservatives Fund (a nonparty political committee)—to $97,000. That amount 

would have exceeded FECA’s then-current aggregate 

 

1

 For the 2011-2012 election cycle, the aggregate limit on contributions to candidates was $46,200, and the aggregate limit on contributions to non-candidate recipients was $70,800. 76 Fed. Reg. 8368, 

8369-8370 (Feb. 14, 2011). 
11 

limit on contributions to non-candidate entities by 

$26,200. Ibid; see p. 10 n.1, supra. McCutcheon additionally alleges a desire to make a similar pattern of 

contributions in future election cycles. J.S. App. 5a. 

3. Appellants filed suit in the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia, raising First 

Amendment challenges to FECA’s aggregate contribution limits. J.S. App. 1a, 4a-6a. A three-judge district 

court—convened pursuant to Section 403(a) of BCRA—

denied appellants’ request for a preliminary injunction 

and granted the government’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 

1a-17a. 

As an initial matter, the district court rejected appellants’ argument that the aggregate contribution limits 

are subject to strict scrutiny. J.S. App. 6a-9a. The 

district court recognized that although this Court has 

applied strict scrutiny to expenditure limits, which restrict the amounts that can be spent directly on political 

speech, it has not applied strict scrutiny to contribution 

limits, which instead restrict the sums that can be given 

to support others’ political activity. Id. at 6a (citing, 

inter alia, Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club 

PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2817 (2011)). Rather, 

the Court has held that contribution limits are “valid as 

long as they satisfy ‘the lesser demand of being closely 

drawn to match a sufficiently important interest.’ ” Ibid.

(quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136). The Court has 

found that less stringent standard to be appropriate 

because contribution limits “primarily implicate the 

First Amendment rights of association, not expression, 

and contributors remain able to vindicate their associational interests in other ways.” Id. at 8a (citing Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 22, 28). The district court applied that less 

stringent standard here, observing that FECA’s aggre-
12 

gate limits “do not regulate money injected directly into 

the nation’s political discourse; the regulated money 

goes into a pool from which another entity draws to fund 

its advocacy.” Id. at 9a (citing California Med. Ass’n v. 

FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 195-196 (1981) (plurality opinion)). 

In applying the governing standard to the aggregate 

limits at issue here, the district court explained that this 

Court has identified two important governmental interests that can justify contribution limits: (1) “preventing 

corruption or the appearance of corruption”; and (2) 

“preventing circumvention of contribution limits imposed to further [the government’s] anti-corruption 

interest.” J.S. App. 9a (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-

27, 38). The district court reasoned that, because appellants had not challenged the base contribution limits 

(e.g., the now-$2600 per election limit on contributions to 

candidates), the court could “assume [those base limits] 

are valid expressions of the government’s anticorruption 

interest.” Id. at 11a. “[T]hat being so,” the court concluded, “we cannot ignore the ability of aggregate limits 

to prevent evasion of the base limits.” Ibid. 

The district court explained that, in Buckley, this 

Court had upheld the aggregate contribution limit in the 

then-current version of FECA as “no more than a corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that 

[the Court had] found to be constitutionally valid.” J.S. 

App. 11a (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38). The district 

court drew additional support for the constitutionality of 

the current aggregate contribution limits from this 

Court’s decision in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal 

Campaign Committee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (Colorado 

II), which upheld FECA’s restrictions on party expenditures that are coordinated with a candidate. The district 

court noted, inter alia, that the decision in Colorado II
13 

had rested largely on the Court’s concern that contributions to one entity (a political party) could be used effectively to circumvent the base limits on contributions to 

another (an individual candidate). J.S. App. 12a (citing 

Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 459). The district court reasoned that the aggregate contribution limits here prevent similar circumvention, which might otherwise occur 

through schemes such as transfers of contributions 

between different party committees, with the funds 

eventually spent in coordination with a single candidate. 

Id. at 12a-13a. The district court stated that it would 

“follow [this] Court’s lead and conceive of the contribution limits as a coherent system” that includes both base 

limits and aggregate limits, “rather than merely a collection of individual limits stacking prophylaxis on 

prophylaxis,” as appellants contended. Id. at 13a. 

The district court also rejected appellants’ arguments 

that FECA’s aggregate contribution limits are too low. 

J.S. App. 13a-15a. The district court cited several decisions of this Court for the proposition that “[i]t is not 

the judicial role to parse legislative judgment about 

what limits to impose.” Id. at 13a (citing Randall v. 

Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006) (plurality opinion); Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 466; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 

PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-388 (2000); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

30). It further explained, inter alia, that “individuals 

remain able to volunteer, join political associations, and 

engage in independent expenditures.” Id. at 15a. 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), 

this Court upheld Congress’s authority to impose aggregate limits on individual political contributions in 

order to prevent circumvention of the base limits on 

contributions to particular candidates, parties, and polit-
14 

ical committees. The aggregate contribution limits in 

the current version of FECA are not distinguishable in 

any relevant respect from the aggregate contribution 

limit that Buckley upheld. The holding of Buckley thus 

controls this case, and this Court should adhere to it. 

I. The Court in Buckley declined to apply strict scrutiny under the First Amendment to either base contribution limits or aggregate contribution limits. The 

Court recognized that limits on contributions, in contrast to limits on expenditures for direct advocacy, impose only “a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s 

ability to engage in free communication.” Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 20-21. The Court also recognized that contributions are only one way among many in which an individual can exercise his associational rights. Id. at 22. The 

Court concluded that contribution limits, including aggregate contribution limits, are constitutional so long as 

the government “demonstrates a sufficiently important 

interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Id. at 

25. 

Appellants’ arguments for strict scrutiny of the aggregate contribution limits at issue here cannot be reconciled with Buckley. The burdens imposed by the 

current aggregate contribution limits are indistinguishable in both kind and degree from the aggregate limit 

the Court in Buckley upheld against a similar First 

Amendment challenge. Buckley’s distinction between 

regulation of contribution limits and regulation of expenditure limits has provided the structure for constitutional review of campaign-finance laws for nearly 40 

years. This Court has expressly reaffirmed it, and Congress has relied upon it, as have numerous state legisla-
15 

tures. Its reasoning remains sound, and overruling it 

now would disserve important principles of stare decisis. 

 II. In upholding FECA’s then-current aggregate 

contribution limit against a First Amendment challenge, 

the Buckley Court explained that “this quite modest 

restraint upon protected political activity” was “no more 

than a corollary” of the base limit on contributions to 

candidates that the Court had determined to be a permissible anti-corruption measure. 424 U.S. at 38. The 

Court explained that the aggregate limit “serve[d] to 

prevent evasion” of that base limit “by a person who 

might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money 

to a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to 

contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to 

the candidate’s political party.” Ibid. Under the current statutory regime as well, a contributor could potentially funnel massive amounts of money to a favored 

candidate or set of candidates if the aggregate limits 

were held to be unconstitutional. The contributor could 

give $5000 to each of an unlimited number of political 

committees, each of which could then give money directly or indirectly to particular candidates. 2 U.S.C. 

441a(a)(1)(A) and (C). On top of that, the contributor 

could also give more than $3.6 million to party candidates and to state and national party committees, much 

of which could be used to support a specific candidate or 

set of candidates. 2 U.S.C. 439a(a)(4); 441a(a)(1)(B) and 

(D), (a)(2)(A), (a)(4). Indeed, even if the money were not 

funneled to a specific candidate or set of candidates, the 

solicitation and contribution of multi-million dollar sums 

to support a party’s electoral slate (which could be conveyed to a joint funding committee in a single check) can 
16 

cause precisely the sort of actual and apparent corruption that Congress is empowered to prevent. 

None of Congress’s post-Buckley amendments to 

FECA undermines the role of aggregate contribution 

limits in reducing actual and apparent corruption of the 

political process. The statutory modifications highlighted by appellants—such as base limits on contributions to 

political committees and restrictions on affiliated political committees—would not preclude a contributor from 

carrying out the schemes that FECA’s original aggregate contribution limit was intended to prevent. Appellants’ other arguments, such as the contention that Congress has no interest in regulating an individual’s total 

contributions so long as each contribution is below the 

applicable base limit, are analytically unsound and 

would have applied equally to the aggregate contribution limit upheld in Buckley. 

ARGUMENT 

Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of 

FECA’s base limits on an individual’s contributions to 

particular candidates, party committees, or other political committees. They instead contend that, notwithstanding the constitutionality of those base limits as 

anti-corruption measures, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from imposing any limit whatever on the 

aggregate amount of an individual’s contributions. That 

contention is foreclosed by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 

(1976) (per curiam), which held that FECA’s aggregate 

contribution limit is a permissible legislative effort “to 

prevent evasion” of the base limits. Id. at 38. 

Appellants cannot meaningfully distinguish the aggregate limits in their current form from the aggregate 

limit upheld in Buckley. They instead seek to relitigate 

Buckley. Appellants directly challenge Buckley’s cen-
17 

tral holding that contribution limits are subject to less 

exacting First Amendment scrutiny than are expenditure limits. And they attack FECA’s current aggregate 

limits on grounds that would necessarily have invalidated the aggregate limit the Buckley Court found to be 

constitutional. Accepting appellants’ contentions, and 

striking down FECA’s aggregate limits on campaign 

contributions, would disserve fundamental principles of 

stare decisis, would be wrong as an original matter, and 

would invite into the political process the serious harms 

that the aggregate limits are designed to prevent. 

I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADHERE TO BUCKLEY’S HOLDING THAT AGGREGATE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ARE 

NOT SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY 

A core tenet of this Court’s campaign-finance jurisprudence is that “contributions lie closer to the edges 

than to the core of political expression.” FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003). The Court therefore has 

consistently treated contribution limits, including aggregate contribution limits, “as merely ‘marginal’ speech 

restrictions subject to relatively complaisant review 

under the First Amendment.” Ibid. Appellants offer no 

reason to abandon nearly four decades of well-settled 

law by applying strict scrutiny for the first time in this 

case. 

A. The Court In Buckley Declined To Apply Strict Scrutiny 

To Contribution Limits, Including Aggregate Contribution Limits 

In Buckley, this Court upheld the constitutionality of 

various contribution limits in the 1974 version of FECA, 

including the base limit of $1000 on contributions by an 

individual to a candidate and the aggregate limit of 

$25,000 on total contributions by an individual in any 
18 

calendar year. 424 U.S. at 23-38. The Court held that 

limits on contributions, unlike limits on expenditures, 

are not subject to strict scrutiny under the First 

Amendment. Compare, e.g., id. at 24-25, with id. at 52-

54. Under that approach, limitations on contributions 

are constitutional so long as the government “demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs 

means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment 

of associational freedoms.” Id. at 25. 

The Court in Buckley explained that, “[b]y contrast 

with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amount that any one person 

or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.” 424 

U.S. at 20-21. That is because “the transformation of 

contributions into political debate involves speech by 

someone other than the contributor.” Id. at 21. While 

the contribution itself “serves as a general expression of 

support for the candidate and his views,” it “does not 

communicate the underlying basis for the support,” and 

the “quantity of communication by the contributor does 

not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, 

since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, 

symbolic act of contributing.” Ibid. Furthermore, although contribution limits “impinge on protected associational freedoms” by “limit[ing] one important means of 

associating with a candidate or committee,” they do not 

preclude other means of association, and they “leave the 

contributor free to become a member of any political 

association and to assist personally in the association’s 

efforts on behalf of candidates.” Id. at 22. 

The Court in Buckley reviewed FECA’s $25,000 aggregate contribution limit under the lesser standard of 
19 

scrutiny applicable to contribution limits, rather than 

the strict scrutiny applicable to expenditure limits. 424 

U.S. at 38. The Court’s discussion of the aggregate 

contribution limit appeared in the section of the opinion 

entitled “Contribution Limitations,” id. at 23, 38; the 

Court consistently referred to the limit as a restriction 

on “contribution[s]” or on “contributing,” see, e.g., id. at 

7, 13, 34 n.40, 38, 58; and the Court discussed the First 

Amendment implications of the limit in terms of “associational freedom” rather than freedom of expression, id.

at 38. At no point did the Court suggest that strict scrutiny should apply. 

B. Appellants’ Arguments For Applying Strict Scrutiny To 

Aggregate Contribution Limits Cannot Be Squared With 

Buckley

1. Notwithstanding Buckley, the RNC contends (Br. 

7-14) that the aggregate contribution limits at issue in 

this case should be reviewed under a strict-scrutiny 

standard. That argument is misconceived. Each of the 

two distinctions the RNC posits between aggregate 

contribution limits and base contribution limits was 

equally present in Buckley, and neither justifies subjecting the former to more demanding scrutiny than the 

latter. 

First, the RNC asserts (Br. 8) that aggregate contribution limits and base contribution limits “have different 

justifications.” That is not so. The Buckley Court described the aggregate limit as a “corollary” of a base 

limit that “serves to prevent evasion” of that base limit. 

424 U.S. at 38. The Court thus recognized that aggregate contribution limits are designed to further the 

same ultimate anti-corruption objective as limits on 

contributions to particular federal candidates. 
20 

Second, the RNC asserts (Br. 9) that, “while base 

limits restrict how much one may contribute to particular [entities], aggregate limits restrict how many such 

entities one may support at the full-base-limit amount” 

(emphasis omitted). The RNC’s focus on how many 

contributions an individual can make “at the full-baselimit amount” is misplaced. The Court explained in 

Buckley that “[a]t most, the size of the contribution 

provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s support.” 424 U.S. at 21. Rather, because 

“[t]he quantity of communication by the contributor 

does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,” the expressive value of a contribution “rests 

solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.” Ibid. Under the current FECA framework, as 

at the time of Buckley, an individual can engage in the 

“symbolic act of contributing” to as many entities as he 

wishes. 

Indeed, McCutcheon has not alleged in this case that 

he wished to contribute the full base-limit amount to any 

additional candidate or political committee. J.S. App. 

4a-5a. Because McCutcheon’s total contributions to 

candidates in the 2011-2012 election cycle were $13,112 

less than the applicable aggregate limit, he could have 

contributed an additional $1092 to each of the 12 additional candidates that he allegedly wished to support. 

Id. at 4a-5a; p. 10 & n.1, supra.

2

 McCutcheon does not 

suggest that the additional $684 he wished to contribute 

to each of those candidates would have meaningfully 

enhanced the candidate’s electoral prospects or ability 

to communicate his message. To the contrary, McCut-

 

2

 McCutcheon also did not reach the limit on contributions to noncandidate entities, and thus could have made more of those contributions as well. J.S. App. 4a-5a; pp. 10-11 & n.1, supra. 
21 

cheon asserts that even a contribution at the full baselimit amount “is likely to be only a small—potentially 

even miniscule—fraction of the recipient’s overall assets.” Br. 51. Rather, McCutcheon simply wishes to 

place on each contribution check a number (1776) that is 

of particular significance to him and to this Nation. His 

inability to utilize that additional symbolism, over and 

above the “symbolic act of contributing” (Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 21), is of marginal First Amendment significance. 

 Unlike expenditure limits, and like base contribution 

limits, aggregate contribution limits do not “reduce the 

total amount of money potentially available to promote 

political expression.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22. Instead, 

they “merely * * * require candidates and political 

committees to raise funds from a greater number of 

persons” and “compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to 

expend such funds on direct political expression.” Ibid. 

Aggregate contribution limits therefore do not seek to 

level the political playing field or correct for any possible distorting effects of speech on the electorate. In no 

sense do aggregate limits “reduce the greater potential 

voice of affluent persons and well-financed groups,” who 

“remain free to spend unlimited sums directly to promote candidates and policies they favor in an effort to 

persuade voters.” Id. at 26 n.26. 

An individual’s ability to influence public debate 

through means other than contributions to candidates 

and parties is even greater now than it was when Buckley was decided. Under the D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (en banc), 

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010), an individual is constitutionally entitled not only to spend as much as he 
22 

desires on his own campaign-related speech, but also to 

donate unlimited sums to advocacy groups that make 

only “independent expenditures,” which are not coordinated with a candidate or a political party. See id. at 

696; see also 2 U.S.C. 431(17) (defining “independent expenditure”). During the 2011-2012 election cycle, McCutcheon spent more than $300,000 in support of two independent-expenditure-only PACs (commonly known as 

“super PACs”) that he established. See FEC, Transaction Query By Individual Contributor, http://www. 

fec.gov/finance/disclosure/norindsea.shtml (last visited 

July 17, 2013). One of those super PACs spent nearly 

$135,000 supporting and opposing candidates. See FEC, 

Committees And Candidates Supported/Opposed: Conservative Action Fund, http://query.nictusa.com/cgibin/com_supopp/C00496505 (last visited July 17, 2013).3

McCutcheon was entirely free to spend even more on 

his independent-advocacy endeavors had he wished to. 

Nor would federal law have restricted McCutcheon from 

donating his time and energy to assist and associate 

with electoral candidates. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22. 

As was true when Buckley was decided, FECA in its 

current form expressly excludes volunteer work from 

the definition of “contribution.” Id. at 183; 2 U.S.C. 

 

3

 Some of appellants’ amici suggest (see, e.g., Cato Inst. Amicus Br. 

14-15) that court decisions invalidating certain limits on donations to 

advocacy groups give such groups a fundraising advantage over candidates, and that this disparity should be remedied through more demanding First Amendment scrutiny of limits on contributions to candidates. That suggestion is misguided. Advocacy groups can as easily support a candidate as oppose a candidate; contributions to candidates present corruption concerns that contributions to advocacy 

groups do not; and Congress is not required to level the playing field 

to assure that candidates (or parties) can raise the same amount of 

money as advocacy groups. 
23 

431(8)(B)(i). Advances in communication technology—

including cheaper long-distance telephone calls, the 

invention of the Internet, and the rise of social media—

make volunteering for and participating in geographically distant campaigns much easier now than it was when 

Buckley was decided. 

2. McCutcheon does not explicitly endorse the 

RNC’s view that Buckley would permit courts to scrutinize aggregate contribution limits more closely than 

base contribution limits. He contends (Br. 24-31), however, that aggregate contribution limits are uniquely 

burdensome. His arguments—which, to a significant 

extent (see, e.g., id. at 24-26), proceed from the erroneous premise that aggregate contribution limits restrict 

the number of entities to which an individual can contribute—are misconceived. 

McCutcheon contends (Br. 28-31) that aggregate contribution limits burden First Amendment rights by 

creating competition within a single political party for a 

contributor’s dollars. The Court in Buckley, however, 

rejected the proposition that “merely * * * requir[ing] 

candidates and political committees to raise funds from 

a greater number of persons” would “have any dramatic 

adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political 

associations.” 424 U.S. at 21-22. Nor does McCutcheon 

offer any reason to suppose that FECA’s aggregate 

contribution limit will induce candidates and committees 

within a single political party to compete for permissible 

contributions by disparaging each other in a way that 

muddles the party’s message. To the contrary, by authorizing candidates and party committees to contribute 

to each other, see 2 U.S.C. 439a(a)(4); 441a(a)(1)(B) and 

(D), (a)(2)(A), (a)(4), federal campaign-finance law estab-
24 

lishes much greater incentives to intra-party cooperation than to destructive internecine competition. 

McCutcheon also contends (Br. 25-26) that aggregate 

contribution limits are especially burdensome because 

contributions “are the only realistic way to meaningfully 

and publicly demonstrate support for, associate with, 

and assist a variety of candidates and state parties” in 

different parts of the country. See also RNC Br. 13. As 

discussed above, however, aggregate contribution limits 

do not preclude a contributor from contributing to as 

many candidates, parties, and other committees as he 

desires. They instead limit only the average amount of 

the contributions when a particular donor wishes to 

support so many recipients that he cannot contribute the 

full base-limit amount to all of them. See pp. 20-21, 

supra; Buckley, 424 U.S. 21, 38. 

McCutcheon’s reliance (Br. 26-28) on Davis v. FEC, 

554 U.S. 724 (2008), and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 

Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) 

(AFECFCP), is likewise misplaced. In both of those 

decisions, the Court invalidated laws that sought to level 

the playing field by allowing a candidate’s opponents to 

receive more money (either through contributions or 

public financing) when expenditures in support of a 

candidate (either by the candidate himself or by independent advocacy groups) reached a certain level. Davis, 554 U.S. at 728-732; AFECFCP, 131 S. Ct. at 2813. 

The constitutional burden the Court identified in each 

case was that the laws effectively penalized independent 

expenditures, and the laws were thus subject to strict 

scrutiny. Davis, 554 U.S. at 737-744; AFECFCP, 131 S. 

Ct. at 2816-2824. The restrictions at issue here, by contrast, are on contributions rather than expenditures—a 

type of restriction this Court has long viewed as “less 
25 

onerous” and warranting “a lower level of scrutiny.” 

AFECFCP, 131 S. Ct. at 2817.4

C. Appellants Provide No Sound Reason To Overrule Buckley’s Longstanding Distinction Between Contribution 

Limits And Expenditure Limits 

Appellants alternatively suggest (e.g., RNC Br. 14, 

McCutcheon Br. 32 & n.17) that the Court should overrule Buckley and subject all contribution limits to strict 

scrutiny. That suggestion contravenes sound principles 

of stare decisis and has little to recommend it as a matter of First Amendment law. 

1. In the nearly four decades since Buckley, this 

Court has consistently reaffirmed the foundational distinction between expenditure limits (which are subject 

to strict scrutiny) and contribution limits (which are 

not). See, e.g., AFECFCP, 131 S. Ct. at 2817; Davis, 554 

U.S. at 737; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 134-138 

(2003), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens 

United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Beaumont, 539 U.S. 

at 161-162; FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign 

Committee, 533 U.S. 431, 440 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink 

Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-388 (2000); FEC v. 

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-

260 (1986). That distinction reflects the “fundamental 

constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one’s views independently of the candidate’s campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be 

 

4

 Other decisions on which McCutcheon relies likewise did not address contribution restrictions. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of 

Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (restriction on open primaries); FEC v. 

Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (restriction 

on corporate independent expenditures).
26 

spent on his campaign.” FEC v. National Conservative 

Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985). 

Contrary to the RNC’s suggestion (Br. 13), neither 

Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 

U.S. 290 (1981), nor Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 

(2006), suggests that strict scrutiny would apply to contribution limits in the context of federal-candidate elections. In Citizens Against Rent Control, the Court 

recognized that restrictions on contributions to committees that support state ballot measures affect First 

Amendment rights differently than do the restrictions 

on contributions for federal-candidate elections at issue 

in Buckley and here. 454 U.S. at 296-297. In Randall, 

where the Court held that particular state limits on 

contributions to candidates were unconstitutionally low, 

the plurality opinion applied the First Amendment 

framework set forth in Buckley. 548 U.S. at 241-242, 

246-247. This Court has never viewed either decision as 

applying strict scrutiny to contribution limits, or as 

undermining “the careful line that Buckley drew to 

distinguish limits on contributions to candidates from 

limits on independent expenditures on speech.” Citizens 

United, 558 U.S. at 379 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 

2. The rationale for that “careful line” is as sound 

now as it was when Buckley was decided. Particularly 

because individuals and corporations can now spend 

unlimited amounts on independent speech in support of 

favored candidates, contribution limits continue to leave 

“communication significantly unimpaired.” Shrink Mo. 

Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 387. Compared to such independent expenditures, or to other direct activities such 

as speaking or volunteering on a candidate’s behalf, the 

expressive value of a contribution—which funds someone else’s speech—is limited. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 
27 

U.S. at 135. And while a contribution “serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his 

views, * * * [t]he quantity of communication by the 

contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size 

of his contribution.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 

This Court’s post-Buckley precedents have also recognized other reasons, in addition to “the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms,” for 

declining to apply strict scrutiny to contribution limits. 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136. The Court’s longstanding 

approach “reflects the importance of the interests that 

underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing 

‘both the actual corruption threatened by large financial 

contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the 

electoral process through the appearance of corruption.’” Ibid. (quoting FEC v. National Right to Work 

Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)). “Because the electoral process is the very means through which a free 

society democratically translates political speech into 

concrete governmental action, contribution limits, like 

other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the 

process, tangibly benefit public participation in political 

debate.” Id. at 137 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying a “less rigorous standard of 

review” both “shows proper deference to Congress’ 

ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an 

area in which it enjoys particular expertise” and “provides Congress with sufficient room to anticipate and 

respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations 

designed to protect the integrity of the political process.” Ibid.

Less stringent scrutiny of contribution limits is also 

appropriate because such limits are analogous to other 

anti-corruption measures of unquestioned constitution-
28 

ality. Federal law contains “an intricate web of regulations, both administrative and criminal, governing the 

acceptance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by 

public officials.” United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 409 (1999). Executive Branch officials, 

for example, are barred (subject to limited exceptions) 

from soliciting or receiving any gift “[g]iven because of 

the employee’s official position.” 5 C.F.R. 

2635.202(a)(2). Such restrictions serve to prevent actual 

and apparent corruption of the federal work force and to 

ensure that federal officers and employees bear undivided loyalty to their public employer. See, e.g., Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 165 (1990). 

The anti-corruption rationale for limits on campaign 

contributions, accepted by this Court in Buckley and its 

progeny, closely resembles the long-accepted bases for 

more sweeping restrictions on the receipt by public 

officials of payments and gifts from persons outside the 

government. See Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 

390. Outside the context of electoral campaign contributions, it is uncontroversial that persons who wish to 

register their approval of official actions cannot do so by 

giving money to federal personnel. The existing FECA 

regime is not a unique constraint on the use of money to 

express political views or achieve political objectives, 

but instead represents a pragmatic effort to achieve 

goals like those that underlie federal anti-corruption and 

conflict-of-interest laws, while allowing federal candidates to obtain the funds needed to wage vigorous electoral campaigns. Federal campaign-finance laws balance those objectives by allowing contributions far in 

excess of the (essentially de minimis) value of the gifts 

federal officials can otherwise receive, subject to the 
29 

condition (see 2 U.S.C. 439a) that the funds not be converted to personal use. 

To be sure, contribution limits could impede political 

speech if they were set so low as to “prevent[] candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy.” Buckley, 424 

U.S. at 21; see Randall, 548 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 397. Appellants 

do not contend, however, that either the FECA contribution limits generally, or the limits on aggregate contributions in particular, are likely to have that effect. 

Any such contention would be implausible, since federal 

candidates spent more than $3 billion, and parties more 

than $2 billion, in the 2012 election cycle. FEC, 2011-

2012 Election Cycle: Total Disbursements by Entity 

Type, http://www.fec.gov/law/2012TDbyEntity.shtml (last 

visited July 17, 2013). 

3. In any event, “[w]hether or not” the Court today 

“would agree with” Buckley’s “reasoning and its resulting rule” in the first instance, “principles of stare decisis 

weigh heavily against overruling it now.” Dickerson v. 

United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000). Although “stare 

decisis is not an inexorable command, * * * even in 

constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive 

force that [the Court has] always required a departure 

from precedent to be supported by some special justification.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). If “mere demonstration that [an] opinion was 

wrong” were sufficient to justify overruling it, the doctrine of stare decisis “would be no doctrine at all.” Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, 

J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 

Overruling Buckley now would severely disrupt the 

considerable reliance interests that have accrued over 
30 

the last four decades. The outcome of a number of this 

Court’s important campaign-finance precedents would 

be cast into doubt. See, e.g., Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162 

(observing that the contribution/expenditure dichotomy 

“is the only practical way to square two leading cases,” 

National Right to Work Comm., supra and Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc., supra); see also McConnell, 

540 U.S. at 138 n.40 (citing cases applying “less rigorous” scrutiny to contribution limits). Congress and state 

legislatures, which have enacted numerous campaignfinance laws in reliance on Buckley, would no longer 

have any assurance that those laws are constitutional. 

See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137 (observing that “in 

its lengthy deliberations leading to the enactment of 

BCRA, Congress properly relied on the recognition of 

its authority contained in Buckley and its progeny”); 

National Conference of State Legislatures, Contribution 

Limits: An Overview, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatureselections/elections/ca mpaign-contributionlimits-overview.aspx (last visited July 17, 2013) (reporting that 46 States have some form of contribution limits). And legislatures and lower courts would have little 

practical guidance about how to proceed going forward. 

See Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 714 (opinion of Stevens, J.) 

(observing that stare decisis “has special force when 

legislators or citizens have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in th[at] instance overruling the decision would * * * require an extensive legislative response”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Appellants identify no justification for such massive 

upheaval in this important area of law. This Court’s 

repeated reliance on Buckley has not only reinforced 

Buckley’s centrality but also demonstrated its workabil-
31 

ity. Ten years ago, this Court concluded that stare 

decisis, “buttressed by the respect that the Legislative 

and Judicial Branches owe to one another, provide 

* * * powerful reasons for adhering to the analysis of 

contribution limits that the Court has consistently followed since Buckley was decided.” McConnell, 540 U.S. 

at 137-138; see Randall, 548 U.S. at 243-246 (opinion of 

Breyer, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.) (likewise relying on 

stare decisis in respect to Buckley’s distinction between 

contributions and expenditures). Since McConnell, an 

additional decade of judicial and legislative reliance on 

this Court’s decision in Buckley has reinforced that 

conclusion. 

II. THIS COURT SHOULD ADHERE TO BUCKLEY’S HOLDING THAT AGGREGATE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS ARE 

CONSTITUTIONAL 

Buckley controls not only the level of scrutiny that 

should apply in this case, but also the result of its application. The aggregate contribution limits in the current 

version of FECA cannot be distinguished in any meaningful way from the aggregate contribution limit upheld 

in Buckley. 

A. The Court In Buckley Upheld FECA’s Base And Aggregate Contribution Limits As Valid Measures To Help 

Prevent Actual And Apparent Corruption 

Applying the reduced degree of scrutiny appropriate 

to contribution limits, the Court in Buckley rejected 

First Amendment challenges to both the base and aggregate contribution limits in the then-current version 

of FECA. 424 U.S. at 23-38. The Court held that the 

contribution limits permissibly furthered the important 

governmental interests of preventing “the actuality and 

appearance of corruption resulting from large individual 
32 

financial contributions.” Id. at 26 (discussing base limits); see id. at 38 (finding aggregate limits to be “no 

more than a corollary” of the base limits); see also 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 298 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 

the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (observing 

that Buckley recognized Congress’s “interest in regulating the appearance of corruption that is ‘inherent in a 

regime of large individual financial contributions’”) 

(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27). 

The Court specifically identified two “weighty interests * * * sufficient to justify” the then-current $1000 

limit on individual contributions to candidates. Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 29. First, the limit reduced the opportunity 

for individuals to use large contributions “to secure a 

political quid pro quo from current and potential office 

holders.” Id. at 26. While acknowledging that “the 

scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably 

ascertained,” the Court observed that “the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election 

demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.” 

Id. at 27. The Court also recognized that “the integrity 

of our system of representative democracy is undermined” by such corrupt arrangements. Id. at 26-27. 

Second, and “[o]f almost equal concern,” the limit reduced “the appearance of corruption stemming from 

public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent 

in a regime of large individual financial contributions.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27. The Court recognized that “the 

reality or appearance of corruption” would be “inherent 

in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, 

even when the identities of the contributors and the 

amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed.” Id.

at 28. “Congress,” the Court reasoned, “could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of 
33 

improper influence is * * * critical, if confidence in the 

system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” Id. at 27 (internal quotation 

marks, ellipsis, and citation omitted). The base contribution limits furthered that goal by “focus[ing] precisely 

on the problem of large campaign contributions—the 

narrow aspect of political association where the actuality 

and potential for corruption have been identified—while 

leaving persons free to engage in independent political 

expression, to associate actively through volunteering 

their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless 

substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources.” Id. at 28.

Turning to the $25,000 aggregate contribution limit, 

the Court found this “limited, additional restriction on 

associational freedom” to be “no more than a corollary 

of the basic individual contribution limitation” that the 

Court had “found to be constitutionally valid.” Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 38. The Court recognized that the “overall 

$25,000 ceiling does impose an ultimate restriction upon 

the number of candidates and committees with which an 

individual may associate himself by means of financial 

support.” Ibid. It concluded, however, that “this quite 

modest restraint upon protected political activity serves 

to prevent evasion of the $1,000 contribution limitation 

by a person who might otherwise contribute massive 

amounts of money to a particular candidate through the 

use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.” Ibid. 
34 

B. FECA’s Current Aggregate Contribution Limits Serve 

The Same Important Purposes As The Aggregate Contribution Limit Upheld In Buckley

Appellants in this case raise a very particularized 

challenge to FECA’s current aggregate contribution 

limits. They do not dispute that FECA’s base limits on 

contributions to candidates, party committees, and other 

political committees are permissible measures to combat 

corruption and the appearance of corruption. See 

AFECFCP, 131 S. Ct. at 2825 (“Limiting contributions 

* * * is the primary means we have upheld to combat 

corruption.”). They also do not dispute the general 

proposition—reaffirmed after Buckley—that the government’s interests in combating corruption and its 

appearance can be “sufficient to justify not only contribution limits themselves, but laws preventing the circumvention of such limits.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144; 

see Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 456 (“[A]ll Members of the 

Court agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”); see, e.g., RNC Br. 16; McCutcheon Br. 40. 

And they do not expressly renew in this Court the challenge they raised in the district court to the precise 

dollar amounts of the aggregate contribution limits in 

the current version of FECA. Compare J.S. ii (raising 

that issue in a separate question presented), with RNC 

Br. i (failing to do so); McCutcheon Br. i (same).5

 

 

5

 The RNC adverts to this argument in passing (e.g., Br. 55 & n.43), 

but makes no sustained attempt to support it. In any event, the argument lacks merit for reasons explained in the government’s motion to 

dismiss or affirm. See Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 21-24. This Court 

has “ordinarily * * * deferred to the legislature’s determination of” 

exact dollar figures for contribution limits, recognizing that a “legislature is better equipped to make such empirical judgments” based 

on legislators’ “particular expertise in matters related to the costs 
35 

Rather, appellants’ basic argument is that no conceivable level of aggregate contribution limits in the 

current version of FECA could be justified as a constitutionally valid anti-corruption or anti-circumvention 

measure. Buckley forecloses that contention. Without a 

ceiling on aggregate contributions, contributors now 

could do exactly what the Buckley-era aggregate limit 

permissibly prevented: “contribute massive amounts of 

money to a particular candidate through the use of 

unearmarked contributions to political committees likely 

to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to 

the candidate’s political party.” 424 U.S. at 38. 

1. A particularly effective circumvention technique, 

both when Buckley was decided and today, would be to 

contribute money to many different entities, each of 

which could then make its own contribution to the candidate. The individual could contribute up to $5000 

apiece to numerous non-party political committees, 2 

U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(C), which could each in turn contribute 

at least $2600 during the primary, and another $2600 

during the general election, to a single candidate, 2 

 

and nature of running for office.” Randall, 548 U.S. at 248 (plurality 

opinion) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see, e.g., 

Davis, 554 U.S. at 737 (“When contribution limits are challenged as 

too restrictive, we have extended a measure of deference to the 

judgment of the legislative body that enacted the law.”). The Court 

has, in particular, rejected the proposition that Buckley “set a minimum constitutional threshold for contribution limits,” explaining that 

“the dictates of the First Amendment are not mere functions of the 

Consumer Price Index.” Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 396-397. 

Rather, an otherwise-permissible contribution limit will be set aside 

as unduly low only if its practical effect is “to impede the ability of 

candidates to ‘amas[s] the resources necessary for effective advocacy.’” Id. at 397 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). Appellants do not 

and could not plausibly contend that the aggregate contribution 

limits at issue here have that effect. See p. 29, supra. 
36 

U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A) and (2)(A) (multicandidate political 

committees can contribute $5000 per candidate per 

election); 78 Fed. Reg. at 8532; see 2 U.S.C. 431(11). 

The political committee could also route the funds to the 

candidate’s benefit more indirectly, by contributing to 

party or non-party committees that could then make 

their own contributions to the candidate. 2 U.S.C. 

441a(a)(1)(B)-(D); 78 Fed. Reg. at 8532 (political committees can contribute $32,400 apiece to each nationalparty committees, $10,000 apiece to each state party 

committee, and $5000 apiece to other non-party political 

committees); 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)(B)-(C) (multicandidate 

political committees can contribute $15,000 apiece to 

national-party political committees, and $5000 to other 

political committees). 

The use of political committees as conduits for contributions to candidates is even easier now than it was 

when Buckley was decided. First, more than five times 

as many political committees exist today as in 1976. 

FEC, PAC Count—1974 to Present, Jan. 2013, http://

www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2011/2011paccount.shtml 

(listing 1146 political committees as of Dec. 31, 1976, and 

6331 as of Jan. 1, 2013). Second, it is much simpler today than in 1976 to determine which political committees 

are “likely to contribute to” a particular candidate, 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38, since many committees provide 

that information on their websites. See, e.g., American Legacy PAC, Who We Support, http://www. 

americanlegacypac.org/who-we-support (last visited 

July 17, 2013) (listing one federal candidate for 2013 

election cycle and one federal candidate for 2014 election 

cycle); Young Americans for Liberty, YAL PAC, 

http://www.yaliberty.org/pac (last visited July 17, 2013) 

(listing 12 candidates for 2012 election cycle). A donor’s 
37 

ability to use committees as conduits in this way would 

be limited only by his own resources and the number of 

such committees that support candidates he wishes to 

support—and such committees can be expected to proliferate further in number if aggregate contribution 

limits are invalidated. 

2. Even putting non-party committees to one side, an 

individual could still contribute a “massive” (Buckley, 

424 U.S. at 38) $3,628,000 in a single two-year election 

cycle to entities affiliated with a single party: $2,262,000 

to candidates for the House of Representatives ($2600 to 

each of 435 candidates at both the primary and generalelection stages); $171,600 to Senate candidates ($2600 to 

each of 33 candidates at both the primary and generalelection stages); $1,000,000 to state party committees 

($10,000 per year to each of 50 committees); and 

$194,400 to national party committees ($32,400 per year 

to each of three committees). 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A)-

(D); 78 Fed. Reg. at 8532. Indeed, as the district court 

observed (J.S. App. 12a), the contributor could accomplish much of this with a single check. Candidates, the 

national party committees, and their state party affiliates could simply form a “joint fundraising committee,” 

which could then receive a lump-sum contribution of 

hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars to be parceled out in base-limit-compliant pieces to the various 

party-affiliated entities. See ibid.; see, e.g., 11 C.F.R. 

102.6(b)-(c), 102.17. 

These entities would then have considerable discretion to funnel most or all of this money to a narrow set of 

candidates. National and state party committees, for 

example, can each contribute $5000 apiece to candidates. 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)(A) and (4); see 11 C.F.R. 110.3(b)(3). 

Those committees can also each direct additional 
38 

amounts towards coordinated expenditures, i.e., expenditures made “in cooperation, consultation, or concert 

with” a candidate’s campaign. 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)(B)(i); 

see 2 U.S.C. 441a(d)(3). This Court has found “no significant functional difference between a party’s coordinated expenditure and a direct party contribution to the 

candidate,” and it has treated coordinated expenditures 

like contributions for constitutional purposes. Colorado 

II, 533 U.S. at 464; see id. at 447-465. In the current 

election cycle, the coordinated expenditure limits for 

national and state party committees allow for $46,600 in 

coordinated expenditures on behalf of each House candidate in States with more than one representative, and 

between $93,100 and $2,682,200 (depending on state 

population) in coordinated expenditures on behalf of 

each Senate candidate (or House candidate in States 

with a single representative). 2 U.S.C. 441a(d)(3); 78 

Fed. Reg. at 8531-8532. 

Candidates themselves can contribute up to $2600 

apiece per election to other candidates (2 U.S.C. 

441a(a)(1)(A); 78 Fed. Reg. at 8532), and the authorized 

campaign committee of each candidate can contribute 

another $2000. 2 U.S.C. 432(e)(3)(B). Appellants do not 

appear to dispute that such transfers take place, and 

FEC data show that candidates in “safe” districts regularly contribute campaign funds to candidates in their 

party who face more difficult elections. See generally 

FEC, Detailed Files About Candidates, Parties and 

Other Committees, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure

/ftpdet.shtml (last visited July 17, 2013); FEC, 

Disclosure Data Catalog, http://www.fec.gov/data/

DataCatalog.do?cf=downloadable (last visited July 17, 

2013). In particular, FEC data reveal that in the 2011-

2012 election cycle, federal candidates collectively con-
39 

tributed more than $11 million to other federal candidates, including 77 transactions totaling $104,268 to 

Rep. Louise Slaughter (New York’s 25th District); 71 

transactions totaling $100,500 to Rep. John Tierney 

(Massachusetts’s 6th District); 76 transactions totaling 

$100,106 to former Rep. Francisco Raul Canseco (Texas’s 23rd District); 59 transactions totaling $97,799 to 

Sen. Joe Donnelly (Indiana); 78 transactions totaling 

$97,500 to Rep. Kathy Hochul (New York’s 26th District); 73 transactions totaling $94,500 to former Rep. 

Betty Sutton (Ohio’s 13th District); and 71 transactions 

totaling $93,500 to former Rep. Mark Critz (Pennsylvania’s 12th District). Officeholders today have additionally established hundreds of “leadership PACs” dedicated 

to spending funds in support of their colleagues, which 

raised more than $138 million in the 2011-2012 election 

cycle, and to which candidate committees themselves 

can contribute. FEC, 2012 Leadership PACs and Sponsors, http://www.fec.gov/data/Leadership.do?format=

html&election_yr=2012 (last visited July 17, 2013). 

Candidates can also transfer funds without limit to 

national and state party committees. 2 U.S.C. 

439a(a)(4); 11 C.F.R. 113.2(c). Those party committees 

can in turn transfer funds without limit among each 

other, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(4), and then potentially use the 

funds for candidate contributions or for coordinated 

expenditures. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124 (noting 

transfers from national to state parties); id. at 161 

(“BCRA’s restrictions on national committee activity 

would rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees remained available as a conduit.”); FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 30 

(1981) (describing system of state parties giving national 

parties control over state party’s spending). 
40 

3. A system in which an individual can provide millions of dollars—potentially in response to direct solicitations from the President and Members of Congress—

to finance parties and their candidates would substantially replicate the Watergate-era and soft-money systems that resulted in well-documented instances of actual or apparent corruption and circumvention of existing 

law. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27 & n.28; McConnell, 

540 U.S. at 129-131, 145-152. Political candidates and 

parties could become increasingly dependent on the 

largesse of a small number of donors willing to underwrite the cost of campaigns. As Buckley recognized, 

“public awareness the opportunities for abuse inherent” 

in such a regime would have a disastrous effect on the 

public’s confidence in our system of representative government. 424 U.S. at 27. 

Congress is entitled to conclude that an individual 

who makes contributions of a magnitude that the aggregate limits would currently prevent might acquire actual 

or perceived “improper influence,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

27, over a party’s elected officials, regardless of how the 

money is spent. As the aforementioned practices of 

candidate-to-candidate contributions and leadership 

PACs illustrate, a candidate’s political prospects are 

intertwined with the prospects of his party and its other 

candidates. An improper arrangement between a contributor and a candidate can thus involve not only contributions to the candidate himself, but also contributions to his party or to other party candidates. For 

example, the Senate Report accompanying the 1974 

FECA Amendments detailed how contributors were 

promised ambassadorships in return for contributions 

not just to the President, but to the President’s favored 

Senate candidates as well. Final Report 492, 501. Simi-
41 

larly, large soft-money donations to national and state 

parties have directly affected legislative outcomes in 

areas such as generic-drug regulation, tort reform, tobacco regulation, and labor relations. See McConnell, 

540 U.S. at 149-150; pp. 7-8, supra. 

In upholding the ban on soft-money contributions, 

the Court in McConnell recognized that the “close connection” and “alignment of interests” between candidates and parties meant that “soft-money contributions 

to national parties [were] likely to create actual or apparent indebtedness on the part of federal officeholders, 

regardless of how those funds [were] ultimately used.” 

540 U.S. at 155; see id. at 155-156. A single donor’s 

large aggregate contributions to a political party and the 

party’s candidates could be expected to give rise to similar indebtedness. Indeed, “there is no meaningful separation between the national party committees and the 

public officials who control them,” because the “national 

committees of the two major parties are both run by, 

and largely composed of, federal officeholders and candidates.” Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks and 

brackets omitted). 

The principle that payments made to a surrogate may 

have the same corruptive effect as payments made directly to a federal official is a fundamental tenet of many 

federal anti-corruption and conflict-of-interest laws. 

The federal criminal prohibition against the payment 

and receipt of bribes and illegal gratuities, for example, 

encompasses payments made to a third party designated 

by the relevant federal official, so long as the requisite 

connection between the payment and official action is 

present. See 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1). Ethics regulations for 

Executive Branch employees likewise provide that the 

“gift[s]” subject to the regulatory restrictions include 
42 

gifts “[g]iven to any other person, including any charitable organization, on the basis of designation, recommendation, or other specification by the employee.” 

5 C.F.R. 2635.203(f)(2). Senate Rule 35(b)(2)(A) is to 

the same effect. The evident premise of all those prohibitions is that a federal officer or employee will feel a 

natural affinity of interests with an organization with 

which he is closely affiliated. Congress is entitled to 

reach that same conclusion with respect to candidates 

for federal office (many of whom are already incumbent 

officeholders). 

4. The absence of aggregate contribution limits 

would also enable and encourage contributors to give 

money to candidates and parties irrespective of whether 

the recipients’ ideology aligns with the contributor’s. 

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 148 (noting frequency with 

which particular donors made soft-money contributions 

to both parties, “leaving room for no other conclusion 

but that these donors were seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular 

ideology”). Some lobbyists have acknowledged that they 

currently rely on the aggregate limits to avoid “shakedown[s]” for contributions. Kevin Bogardus, Lobbyists 

Fear Shakedown If Supreme Court Lifts Campaign 

Contributions Cap, The Hill, Feb. 26, 2013, http:// 

thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/284817-lobbyists-fearshakedown-if-court-lifts-campaigncap#ixzz2M23oRhX0. 

Without any aggregate limits, donors could feel pressured not only to contribute more to the candidates and 

parties they favor, but also to hedge their bets by contributing to competing candidates and parties as well. 

See ibid. (describing comments of a former FEC chairman that removing the aggregate contribution limits 

would allow donors to contribute $32,400 apiece to all 
43 

three national committees of each major party). The 

current aggregate limits are the only measure that prevents, for example, an individual from contributing the 

full base limit, in both the primary and general elections, 

to each of the 51 members of the powerful House Appropriations Committee (a total contribution of 

$265,200). See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Full Committee Members, http:// 

appropriations.house.gov/about/members (last visited 

July 17, 2013). 

C. Buckley Forecloses Appellants’ Challenge To The Aggregate Limits In The Current Version of FECA 

Appellants contend that post-Buckley amendments to 

FECA have undermined the original justification for the 

statute’s aggregate contribution limit. That argument is 

unpersuasive, and appellants’ remaining arguments are 

inconsistent with Buckley. 

1. The current version of FECA has not changed in any 

relevant way from the version considered in Buckley

Appellants do not explicitly argue that the Court in 

Buckley erred in upholding the aggregate contribution 

limit in effect at that time. They instead contend that 

the overall statutory scheme has changed so substantially since 1976 that the justification on which Buckley 

relied to uphold that limit no longer applies. That argument is misconceived. 

a. The RNC notes (Br. 22) that, after Buckley, Congress prohibited candidates from putting campaign 

funds to personal use. But the Buckley Court’s conclusion that FECA’s aggregate contribution limit was constitutional did not depend on the possibility that candidates could use campaign funds for personal expenses. 

See 424 U.S. at 38. And, by accepting the validity of the 
44 

current base contribution limits, appellants effectively 

concede that a contribution to a candidate has the potential to cause actual or apparent corruption even if the 

candidate cannot convert the funds to personal use. 

b. Appellants contend (RNC Br. 39-41; McCutcheon 

Br. 42-43, 49-50) that the government’s anti-corruption 

and anti-circumvention interests are adequately protected by FECA’s “earmarking” provision, 2 U.S.C. 

441a(a)(8). Under that provision, a contribution to one 

entity (e.g., a political committee) earmarked for transfer to a second entity (e.g., a candidate) is treated as a 

contribution to that second entity for purposes of the 

original contributor’s base contribution limits (e.g., the 

$2600 limit on contributions to a particular federal candidate). Ibid. FECA’s earmarking provision, however, 

already existed when Buckley was decided. 424 U.S. at 

190 (appendix reproducing 18 U.S.C. 608(b)(6)); see id.

at 23-24 (discussing earmarking). The Court in Buckley

specifically recognized that aggregate limits serve the 

permissible interest of preventing circumvention of the 

base limits “through the use of unearmarked contributions.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 

Appellants’ argument is also foreclosed by this 

Court’s decision in Colorado II, which rejected the contention that the earmarking provision constitutes “the 

outer limit of acceptable tailoring” in support of the 

government’s anti-corruption and anti-circumvention 

interests. 533 U.S. at 462. The Court in Colorado II

explained that such a contention “ignores the practical 

difficulty of identifying and directly combating circumvention under actual political conditions,” which can 

include various informal ways for political-party contributors to indicate how they want their money spent, 

and which make circumvention “very hard to trace.” 
45 

Ibid.; see id. at 459 (describing “tally system,” through 

which political parties helped channel funds from contributors to candidates while avoiding formal earmarking).6

 

Before BCRA’s restrictions on soft money were enacted, contributors frequently “create[d] debt on the 

part of officeholders” through massive donations to 

parties, notwithstanding anti-earmarking laws and the 

absence of any formal mechanism for assuring that a 

particular contribution would benefit a particular candidate. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 146. Even without earmarking, contributors can accurately determine how 

their contributions will be used. Party committees, like 

other political committees, frequently focus on particular candidates. For example, more than 96% of the 

nearly $210,000 in coordinated expenditures by the 

Democratic Party of New Mexico in 2012 was in support 

of a single candidate, and the entirety of the $334,604 in 

coordinated expenditures by the Missouri Democratic 

State Committee in 2012 was in support of a single candidate.7

 Even in contexts where contributions are not 

 

6

 Contrary to the RNC’s assertion (Br. 41-42), the FEC has not 

conceded that such tallying lacks corrupting potential. The RNC 

relies on a three-sentence letter sent by the FEC to the Democratic 

Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) in 2012, following up on an 

FEC enforcement action from the 1990s. To resolve that enforcement action, the DSCC admitted that its use of a tally system violated an FEC regulation (11 C.F.R. 110.6(c)(2)), paid a fine, and entered 

into a conciliation agreement. Conciliation Agreement, In re DSCC

(Aug. 21, 1995). The letter cited by the RNC simply acknowledged 

that the DSCC had “fulfilled its obligations” under the conciliation 

agreement. See Letter from Jin Lee, Attorney, FEC, to Mark Elias 

and Jonathan Berkon, Perkins Coie LLP (Nov. 19, 2012). 

7

 See Democratic Party of N.M., Report of Receipts and Disbursements 4, 219-220, Apr. 8, 2013, http://images.nictusa.com/pdf/488/ 
46 

made directly to federal candidates, “federal officeholders [have been] well aware of the identities of the donors.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 147. 

c. Appellants observe (e.g., RNC Br. 21-22, 32-33; 

McCutcheon Br. 42) that the current version of FECA 

prohibits a single entity from evading contribution limits 

by creating or controlling multiple affiliated political 

committees. 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(5); 11 C.F.R. 100.5(g). 

That prohibition forecloses what would otherwise be a 

particularly easy and effective means of circumventing 

the limits on contributions to any particular political 

committee. In the discussion upholding FECA’s aggregate contribution limit in 1976, however, the Court in 

Buckley did not allude to the possibility that a single 

entity might create multiple political committees, much 

less suggest that the prevention of that risk was the sole 

justification for the aggregate limit. See 424 U.S. at 38. 

Buckley’s concern with “unearmarked contributions to 

political committees likely to contribute to [a favored] 

candidate” exists regardless of whether the committees 

are created by the same entity or by different entities. 

Ibid. And FECA does not limit the number of political 

committees that may exist. As previously discussed, see 

pp. 36-37, supra, the current proliferation of committees, along with the simplicity of researching and contacting them, makes it quite easy for individual donors 

to identify committees that are likely to contribute to a 

particular candidate. If an individual gives the maxi-

 

13961253488/13961253488.pdf; Missouri Democratic State Comm., 

Report of Receipts and Disbursements 4, 70, May 13, 2013, http:// 

images.nictusa.com/pdf/727/13962195727/13962195727.pdf; see also 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Comm., Red To Blue 2012, 

http://www.dccc.org/pages/redtoblue (last visited July 17, 2013) 

(identifying specific candidates for support). 
47 

mum contribution of $5000 to each of 100 non-party 

political committees, and one-fifth of that money is 

passed on to a favored candidate, that candidate will 

receive nearly 20 times the maximum amount the individual could give to the candidate directly. 

d. Appellants contend (e.g., RNC Br. 17, 34-36; 

McCutcheon Br. 41) that the government’s anticorruption and anti-circumvention interests are adequately protected by base limits that did not exist when 

Buckley was decided. The version of FECA in effect in 

1976 imposed base limits on contributions to candidates, 

see 424 U.S. 23-36 (upholding the constitutionality of 

those limits), but it did not include the current limits on 

contributions to party committees or to other political 

committees. The addition of these further base limits, 

however, does not in itself prevent the harm at which 

the aggregate contribution limits are directed, namely, 

the possibility that someone could “contribute massive 

amounts of money to a particular candidate through the 

use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate’s political party.” Id. at 38. 

Such a scheme would not have been significantly easier to carry out when Buckley was decided than it is to 

carry out now. Even at the time of Buckley, FECA 

limited the amounts that political committees—including 

party committees—could contribute to political candidates (to $1000 or $5000 per election, depending on the 

particular type of committee). See 424 U.S. at 23 (explaining that $1000 limit on contributions to candidates 

applied to, inter alia, any “committee” or “association”) 

(citation omitted); id. at 35 (explaining that certain political committees could contribute up to $5000); id. at 182, 

187, 189 (reproducing relevant provisions). A contribu-
48 

tor seeking to implement the scheme described in Buckley would thus have had to divide his money among 

many different political committees (potentially both 

party and non-party committees) to ensure that the 

targeted candidate would indeed receive the desired 

amounts. The Court nevertheless recognized the government’s interest in restricting such a scheme through 

the use of aggregate contribution limits. 

The current version of FECA limits not only the 

amounts that party and non-party political committees 

can contribute to candidates, see 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A) 

and (2)(A), but also the amounts that individuals can 

contribute to such committees ($32,400 for nationalparty committees, $10,000 for state party committees, 

and $5000 for other political committees). 2 U.S.C. 

441a(a)(1)(B)-(D); 78 Fed. Reg. 8532. Although those 

additional base limits may reduce circumvention of the 

base limits on contributions to candidates in certain 

ways, see California Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 

198 n.18 (1981) (plurality opinion), they do not make the 

scheme described in Buckley materially harder to execute. The success of such a scheme does not depend on 

the ability to contribute vastly more to a political committee than a political committee itself can contribute to 

the candidate. Rather, it depends on the ability of contributors to find various conduits through which unearmarked funds can reach a candidate. Notwithstanding 

the intervening enactment of limits on contributions to 

particular committees, donors can find suitable conduits 

as easily, or more easily, now than they could at the time 

of Buckley. 

This Court’s decision in California Medical Association v. FEC, supra, confirms that aggregate limits and 

limits on contributions to particular political committees 
49 

can coexist under the First Amendment. In that case, 

the Court upheld the constitutionality of a $5000 limit on 

contributions by an individual or an unincorporated 

association to a particular type of political committee, 

known as a “multicandidate political committee,” that 

receives contributions from more than 50 people and 

contributes to five or more candidates. 453 U.S. at 184-

185 & n.1 (citing 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(4)). A plurality of the 

Court reasoned that, if a contributor could give unlimited amounts to a multicandidate political committee, he 

could circumvent both the $1000 limit on individual contributions to candidates (because the multicandidate 

political committees could contribute up to $5000 to a 

candidate) and the $25,000 limit on aggregate contributions (because the multicandidate political committee 

was not subject to any aggregate limit). Id. at 198 (plurality opinion). Justice Blackmun’s concurrence contained similar reasoning. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that the limit on contributions to multicandidate 

committees could be upheld on anti-circumvention 

grounds, and analogizing the limit to “the $25,000 limitation on total contributions in a given year that Buckley 

held to be constitutional”). A majority of the Court thus 

recognized that aggregate limits can operate in tandem 

with limits on contributions to political committees, and 

that Congress is not required to choose between the 

two. 

2. Appellants’ challenges to FECA’s aggregate contribution limits cannot be reconciled with Buckley 

Because the current FECA framework is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from the FECA 

framework addressed in Buckley, this Court’s decision 

upholding FECA’s aggregate contribution limit remains 
50 

controlling. Appellants’ criticisms of FECA’s present 

aggregate contribution limits would have applied equally 

to the aggregate contribution limit at issue in Buckley. 

a. Appellants repeatedly contend (e.g., RNC Br. 20, 

33, 36; McCutcheon Br. 37, 51-52) that Congress has 

effectively disavowed any interest in preventing a 

scheme of the sort described in Buckley, in which 

unearmarked funds contributed to numerous entities are 

funneled to a particular candidate. In appellants’ view, 

Congress has “made the judgment” that a contribution 

to a single entity within the base limit (e.g., a contribution to a political-party committee up to $32,400) presents no “cognizable” risk of corruption. RNC Br. 36. 

They further assert that, because “[d]oing something 

posing zero cognizable risk multiple times does not 

increase the risk,” Congress can have no valid interest 

in limiting the number of contributions up to the base 

limit a particular individual can make. Ibid. Appellants 

also make the related argument that Congress has “asserted no * * * concern” about the possibility that a 

funneling scheme might be carried out through the 

transfer of contributions between various party entities, 

because it has not enacted a specific law restricting such 

transfers. Id. at 20. 

Appellants’ arguments are flawed. First, it could just 

as easily have been argued in Buckley that base limits 

and the absence of transfer restrictions operated to 

disavow any congressional interest in preventing funneling schemes. The Court nevertheless upheld the aggregate limit as a reasonable means of preventing individual donors from funneling outsized contributions to candidates through the use of intermediaries. 424 U.S. at 

38. Congress’s decision to address such schemes in one 

way (aggregate contribution limits) rather than in an-
51 

other (say, limits on transfers) does not cast doubt on 

Congress’s interest in addressing them. 

Second, Congress’s choice of applicable base limits on 

contributions to candidates and other entities does not 

reflect any implicit determination that contributions 

below those limits pose no risk whatever of corruption 

or circumvention. Rather, FECA’s base limits reflect 

Congress’s effort to balance competing objectives, enabling individuals to legitimately influence elections while 

reducing the opportunities for actual and apparent corruption. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (noting that 

“the Act’s primary purpose [is] to limit the actuality and 

appearance of corruption”) (emphasis added). One of 

the factors Congress presumably considered in setting 

the base limits was the existence (and constitutionality) 

of “corollary” aggregate contribution limits, id. at 38, 

that would work in combination with the base limits. 

Congress also presumably relied on the existence of 

aggregate contribution limits as a factor in deciding not 

to regulate certain types of transfers. 

b. Appellants characterize the aggregate contribution limits as an impermissible “prophylaxis-uponprophylaxis” (RNC Br. 30-31) and argue that they are 

not sufficiently tailored (McCutcheon Br. 55-61). These 

contentions are incorrect and inconsistent with Buckley. 

In characterizing FECA’s aggregate limits as a 

“prophylaxis-on-prophylaxis,” appellants assume that 

the base contribution limits are simply a prophylactic 

measure against bribery-like quid pro quo arrangements with public officials. See RNC Br. 27 n.18; 

McCutcheon Br. 61. The Court in Buckley observed, 

however, that because bribery laws reach “only the most 

blatant and specific attempts” to corrupt public officials 

with money, those laws do not fully vindicate the gov-
52 

ernment’s anti-corruption interests. 424 U.S. at 28; see 

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143 (noting that the Court in 

Buckley “expressly rejected the argument that antibribery laws provided a less restrictive alternative to 

FECA’s contribution limits”); Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 

528 U.S. at 389 (“In speaking of ‘improper influence’ and 

‘opportunities for abuse’ in addition to ‘quid pro quo

arrangements,’ [the Court in Buckley] recognized a 

concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but 

extending to the broader threat from politicians too 

compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”). The 

decision on which the RNC relies for the proposition 

that a “prophylaxis-upon-prophylaxis approach” is unconstitutional, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 

U.S. 449, 479 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.), involved 

expenditure restrictions that, unlike the contribution 

restrictions at issue here, limited direct political speech 

and were subject to strict scrutiny. See ibid.; id. at 455-

457. 

McCutcheon’s overbreadth argument (Br. 55-61) 

cannot be squared with Buckley, which rejected an analogous overbreadth challenge to the base contribution 

limits. The Court in Buckley assumed arguendo “that 

most large contributors do not seek improper influence 

over a candidate’s position or an officeholder’s action.” 

424 U.S. at 29. The Court concluded, however, that this 

assumption did not “undercut the validity of the $1,000 

contribution limitation.” Id. at 29-30. “Not only is it 

difficult to isolate suspect contributions,” the Court 

explained, “but, more importantly, Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding 

against the appearance of impropriety requires that the 

opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising 

large monetary contributions be eliminated.” Id. at 30. 
53 

The “corollary” aggregate contribution limits, which the 

Court in Buckley likewise found constitutional, serve the 

same salutary purposes. Id. at 38. 

c. Appellants contend (RNC Br. 29; McCutcheon Br. 

44-48) that FECA’s aggregate contribution limits cannot 

be upheld because the government has failed to provide 

sufficient “actual evidence” to establish the need for 

them. As McCutcheon acknowledges (Br. 46), however, 

the “quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy 

heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will 

vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the 

justification raised.” Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. at 

391. The justification for the aggregate contribution 

limits at issue here is neither novel nor implausible, but 

is instead the same justification the Court deemed sufficient in Buckley. See ibid. (“Buckley demonstrates that 

the dangers of large, corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither 

novel nor implausible.”); see also ibid. (“Buckley’s evidentiary showing exemplifies a sufficient justification 

for contribution limits.”); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165 

(explaining that Congress has “been taught the hard 

lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation”). 

Furthermore, not only the Watergate-era and softmoney-era abuses previously discussed, see pp. 4-5, 7-8, 

40-41, supra, but also more recent events, demonstrate 

the need for regulation that deters quid pro quo exchanges in which an officeholder solicits contributions 

not only to himself, but also to other entities. In 2005, 

Wisconsin Senate Majority Leader Chuck Chvala pleaded guilty to two felonies, following criminal charges that 

he solicited contributions to a variety of candidates and 

political committees in return for political favors. See 
54 

Steven Walters & Patrick Marley, Chvala Pleads Guilty 

To 2 Felonies, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Oct. 26, 2005, at 

A1; Steve Schultze & Richard P. Jones, Chvala Charged 

With Extortion, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Oct. 18, 2002, at 

A1; see also Jodi Wilgoren, Leader Charged With Extortion and Misconduct, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 2002, at A24. 

In 2006, former federal lobbyist Jack Abramoff pleaded 

guilty to corruption-related charges after evidence surfaced that he had, inter alia, directed contributors to 

make three separate contributions (totaling $32,000) to a 

congressman and political committees in return for the 

congressman’s acquiescence in inserting language into a 

bill. James V. Grimaldi & Susan Schmidt, Lawmaker 

From Ohio Subpoenaed in Abramoff Case, Washington 

Post, Nov. 5, 2005, at A4; Dep’t of Justice, Former Lobbyist Jack Abramoff Pleads Guilty to Charges Involving 

Corruption, Fraud Conspiracy, and Tax Evasion (Jan. 

3, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/January/06_ 

crm_002.html. And in 2010, former House Majority 

Leader Tom DeLay was found guilty following charges 

that he, inter alia, circumvented state law by using his 

political committee and the RNC as conduits to funnel 

$190,000 from several contributors to seven Texas state 

candidates. James C. McKinley, Jr., DeLay Convicted 

in Donation Case by a Texas Jury, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 

2010, at A26. Although these particular schemes were 

eventually discovered and punished, such schemes are 

not always easy to detect, and Congress thus has strong 

reasons to limit a donor’s ability to contribute large 

sums at a candidate’s or officeholder’s request. 

d. In addition to asserting facial challenges to 

BCRA’s aggregate contribution limits, the RNC argues 

(e.g., Br. 32 & n.24, 42 & n.33) that the aggregate limit 

on contributions to non-candidate political committees is 
55 

unconstitutional as applied to contributions received by 

national party committees.8

 In rejecting a facial challenge to the then-existing aggregate limit, however, the 

Court in Buckley specifically recognized Congress’s 

interest in preventing parties from serving as conduits 

for large contributions. 424 U.S. at 38. Buckley’s conclusion on that point was reinforced by this Court’s 

subsequent decision in Colorado II, which rejected the 

argument that contributions to political parties have no 

potential for corruption or circumvention of other campaign-finance laws. The Court recognized that, “whether they like it or not, [parties] act as agents for spending 

on behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.” 533 U.S. at 452; see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 

146 (observing that parties served as “willing intermediaries” for soft-money contributions). Congress thus has 

at least as much interest in regulating aggregate contributions to parties as it does in regulating aggregate 

contributions to other types of entities.9 

 

8

 Unlike the single aggregate contribution limit upheld in Buckley, 

the current aggregate contribution limits are broken into separate 

categories for different types of contributions. See pp. 9-10, supra. 

That modification provides no basis for avoiding the binding force of 

Buckley’s holding that an aggregate limit is constitutional. As the 

Court recognized in Buckley, the undifferentiated $25,000 limit had 

the purpose and effect of limiting total contributions to parties, candidates, and political committees. 424 U.S. at 38. It is irrelevant that 

Congress now pursues the same objectives through multiple aggregate contribution limits, rather than through a single aggregate cap. 

9

 The RNC argues (Br. 52-53) that, if the aggregate limit (currently 

$74,600 per election cycle) on contributions to non-candidate committees is held invalid as applied to the contributions received by national parties, the subsidiary limit (currently $48,600) on contributions to 

other non-candidate committees is inseverable and therefore should 

be struck down as well. BCRA’s severability clause forecloses that 

contention. That clause states that the invalidation of “any provision 
56 

e. Appellants suggest (RNC Br. 44; McCutcheon Br. 

38-39) that aggregate contribution limits constitute an 

impermissible attempt to equalize the amount of speech 

on different sides of a political campaign. But the Court 

in Buckley recognized that contribution limits, unlike 

expenditure limits, are not speech-equalization measures. 424 U.S. at 25-26 & n.26. “Contribution limitations alone,” the Court explained, “would not reduce the 

greater potential voice of affluent persons and wellfinanced groups, who would remain free to spend unlimited sums directly to promote candidates and policies 

they favor in an effort to persuade voters.” Id. at 26 

n.26. Contribution limits, including aggregate contribution limits, are instead an effort to curtail corruption and 

the appearance of corruption stemming from outsized 

campaign contributions. Id. at 23-38. Because FECA’s 

current aggregate contribution limits further that purpose in precisely the same way as the aggregate contribution limit at issue in Buckley, appellants’ challenge to 

those limits lacks merit. 

 

of [BCRA] * * * , or the application of a provision * * * to any 

person or circumstance,” does not affect the validity of other provisions or applications of BCRA. BCRA § 401, 116 Stat. 112; 2 U.S.C. 

454 note. 
57 

CONCLUSION 

The judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted. 

LISA J. STEVENSON

Deputy General Counsel 

KEVIN DEELEY

ADAV NOTI

Acting Associate General 

Counsels 

CHARLES KITCHER

Attorney 

Federal Election Commission

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR. Solicitor General 

MALCOLM L. STEWART

Deputy Solicitor General 

ERIC J. FEIGIN

Assistant to the Solicitor 

General 

JULY 2013 
(1a) 

APPENDIX 

1. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part: 

Congress shall make no law * * * abridging 

freedom of speech. 

2. 2 U.S.C. 431(11) provides: 

Definitions

* * * * * 

(11) The term “person” includes an individual, 

partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor 

organization, or any other organization or group of 

persons, but such term does not include the Federal 

Government or any authority of the Federal Government. 

3. 2 U.S.C. 441a provides in pertinent part: 

Limitations on contributions and expenditures

(a) Dollar limits on contributions

(1) Except as provided in subsection (i) of this 

section and section 441a-1 of this title, no person shall 

make contributions— 

(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for 

Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed 

$2,000; 
2a 

(B) to the political committees established 

and maintained by a national political party, which 

are not the authorized political committees of any 

candidate, in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $25,000; 

(C) to any other political committee (other 

than a committee described in subparagraph (D)) 

in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000; or 

(D) to a political committee established and 

maintained by a State committee of a political 

party in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, 

exceed $10,000. 

(2) No multicandidate political committee shall 

make contributions— 

(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any election for 

Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed 

$5,000; 

(B) to the political committees established 

and maintained by a national political party, which 

are not the authorized political committees of any 

candidate, in any calendar year, which, in the aggregate, exceed $15,000; or 

(C) to any other political committee in any 

calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed 

$5,000. 

(3) During the period which begins on January 1 

of an odd-numbered year and ends on December 31 of 
3a 

the next even-numbered year, no individual may make 

contributions aggregating more than— 

(A) $37,500, in the case of contributions to 

candidates and the authorized committees of candidates; 

(B) $57,500, in the case of any other contributions, of which not more than $37,500 may be 

attributable to contributions to political committees which are not political committees of national 

political parties. 

(4) The limitations on contributions contained in 

paragraphs (1) and (2) do not apply to transfers between and among political committees which are national, State, district, or local committees (including 

any subordinate committee thereof) of the same political party. For purposes of paragraph (2), the term 

“multicandidate political committee” means a political 

committee which has been registered under section 

433 of this title for a period of not less than 6 months, 

which has received contributions from more than 50 

persons, and, except for any State political party organization, has made contributions to 5 or more candidates for Federal office. 

(5) For purposes of the limitations provided by 

paragraph (1) and paragraph (2), all contributions 

made by political committees established or financed 

or maintained or controlled by any corporation, labor 

organization, or any other person, including any parent, subsidiary, branch, division, department, or local 

unit of such corporation, labor organization, or any 

other person, or by any group of such persons, shall be 
4a 

considered to have been made by a single political 

committee, except that (A) nothing in this sentence 

shall limit transfers between political committees of 

funds raised through joint fund raising efforts; (B) for 

purposes of the limitations provided by paragraph (1) 

and paragraph (2) all contributions made by a single 

political committee established or financed or maintained or controlled by a national committee of a political party and by a single political committee established or financed or maintained or controlled by the 

State committee of a political party shall not be considered to have been made by a single political committee; and (C) nothing in this section shall limit the 

transfer of funds between the principal campaign 

committee of a candidate seeking nomination or election to a Federal office and the principal campaign 

committee of that candidate for nomination or election 

to another Federal office if (i) such transfer is not 

made when the candidate is actively seeking nomination or election to both such offices; (ii) the limitations 

contained in this Act on contributions by persons are 

not exceeded by such transfer; and (iii) the candidate 

has not elected to receive any funds under chapter 95 

or chapter 96 of title 26. In any case in which a corporation and any of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, departments, or local units, or a labor organization and any of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, 

departments, or local units establish or finance or 

maintain or control more than one separate segregated 

fund, all such separate segregated funds shall be 

treated as a single separate segregated fund for pur-
5a 

poses of the limitations provided by paragraph (1) and 

paragraph (2). 

(6) The limitations on contributions to a candidate 

imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection 

shall apply separately with respect to each election, 

except that all elections held in any calendar year for 

the office of President of the United States (except a 

general election for such office) shall be considered to 

be one election. 

(7) For purposes of this subsection— 

(A) contributions to a named candidate made 

to any political committee authorized by such candidate to accept contributions on his behalf shall 

be considered to be contributions made to such 

candidate; 

(B)(i) expenditures made by any person in 

cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at 

the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents, shall 

be considered to be a contribution to such candidate; 

(ii) expenditures made by any person (other 

than a candidate or candidate's authorized committee) in cooperation, consultation, or concert 

with, or at the request or suggestion of, a national, 

State, or local committee of a political party, shall 

be considered to be contributions made to such 

party committee; and 

(iii) the financing by any person of the dissemination, distribution, or republication, in whole 
6a 

or in part, of any broadcast or any written, graphic, or other form of campaign materials prepared 

by the candidate, his campaign committees, or 

their authorized agents shall be considered to be 

an expenditure for purposes of this paragraph; 

and1

(C) if— 

(i) any person makes, or contracts to 

make, any disbursement for any electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 434(f)(3) of this title); and 

(ii) such disbursement is coordinated with 

a candidate or an authorized committee of 

such candidate, a Federal, State, or local political party or committee thereof, or an agent 

or official of any such candidate, party, or 

committee; 

such disbursement or contracting shall be treated as a 

contribution to the candidate supported by the electioneering communication or that candidate's party 

and as an expenditure by that candidate or that candidate's party; and 

(D) contributions made to or for the benefit 

of any candidate nominated by a political party for 

election to the office of Vice President of the 

United States shall be considered to be contributions made to or for the benefit of the candidate of 

 

1

 So in original. The word “and” probably should not appear. 
7a 

such party for election to the office of President of 

the United States. 

(8) For purposes of the limitations imposed by 

this section, all contributions made by a person, either 

directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular candidate, including contributions which are in any way 

earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to such candidate, shall be treated as 

contributions from such person to such candidate. 

The intermediary or conduit shall report the original 

source and the intended recipient of such contribution 

to the Commission and to the intended recipient. 

* * * * * 

(c) Increases on limits based on increases in price 

index 

(1)(A) At the beginning of each calendar year 

(commencing in 1976), as there become available necessary data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the 

Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor shall 

certify to the Commission and publish in the Federal 

Register the percent difference between the price 

index for the 12 months preceding the beginning of 

such calendar year and the price index for the base 

period. 

(B) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), in 

any calendar year after 2002— 

(i) a limitation established by subsections 

(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (b), (d), or (h) of this 
8a 

section shall be increased by the percent difference determined under subparagraph (A); 

(ii) each amount so increased shall remain in 

effect for the calendar year; and 

(iii) if any amount after adjustment under 

clause (i) is not a multiple of $100, such amount 

shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of $100. 

(C) In the case of limitations under subsections 

(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and (h) of this section, increases shall only be made in odd-numbered years and 

such increases shall remain in effect for the 2-year 

period beginning on the first day following the date of 

the last general election in the year preceding the year 

in which the amount is increased and ending on the 

date of the next general election. 

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)— 

(A) the term “price index” means the average 

over a calendar year of the Consumer Price Index 

(all items—United States city average) published 

monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and 

(B) the term “base period” means— 

(i) for purposes of subsections (b) and (d) 

of this section, calendar year 1974; and 

(ii) for purposes of subsections (a)(1)(A), 

(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), and (h) of this section, calendar year 2001. 
9a 

(d) Expenditures by national committee, State committee, or subordinate committee of State committee in connection with general election campaign of 

candidates for Federal office 

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law 

with respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions, the national committee of a 

political party and a State committee of a political 

party, including any subordinate committee of a State 

committee, may make expenditures in connection with 

the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office, subject to the limitations contained in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of this subsection. 

(2) The national committee of a political party 

may not make any expenditure in connection with the 

general election campaign of any candidate for President of the United States who is affiliated with such 

party which exceeds an amount equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States 

(as certified under subsection (e) of this section). Any 

expenditure under this paragraph shall be in addition 

to any expenditure by a national committee of a political party serving as the principal campaign committee 

of a candidate for the office of President of the United 

States. 

(3) The national committee of a political party, or 

a State committee of a political party, including any 

subordinate committee of a State committee, may not 

make any expenditure in connection with the general 

election campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a 

State who is affiliated with such party which exceeds— 
10a 

(A) in the case of a candidate for election to 

the office of Senator, or of Representative from a 

State which is entitled to only one Representative, 

the greater of— 

(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age 

population of the State (as certified under 

subsection (e) of this section); or 

(ii) $20,000; and 

(B) in the case of a candidate for election to 

the office of Representative, Delegate, or Resident 

Commissioner in any other State, $10,000. 

(4) INDEPENDENT VERSUS COORDINATED EXPENDITURES BY PARTY.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—On or after the date on 

which a political party nominates a candidate, no 

committee of the political party may make— 

(i) any coordinated expenditure under 

this subsection with respect to the candidate 

during the election cycle at any time after it 

makes any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle; or 

(ii) any independent expenditure (as defined in section 431(17) of this title) with respect to the candidate during the election cycle at any time after it makes any coordinated 

expenditure under this subsection with re-
11a 

spect to the candidate during the election cycle. 

(B) APPLICATION.—For purposes of this paragraph, all political committees established and 

maintained by a national political party (including 

all congressional campaign committees) and all political committees established and maintained by a 

State political party (including any subordinate 

committee of a State committee) shall be considered to be a single political committee. 

(C) TRANSFERS.—A committee of a political 

party that makes coordinated expenditures under 

this subsection with respect to a candidate shall 

not, during an election cycle, transfer any funds to, 

assign authority to make coordinated expenditures 

under this subsection to, or receive a transfer of 

funds from, a committee of the political party that 

has made or intends to make an independent expenditure with respect to the candidate. 

(e) Certification and publication of estimated voting 

age population 

During the first week of January 1975, and every 

subsequent year, the Secretary of Commerce shall 

certify to the Commission and publish in the Federal 

Register an estimate of the voting age population of 

the United States, of each State, and of each congressional district as of the first day of July next preceding 

the date of certification. The term “voting age population” means resident population, 18 years of age or 

older. 
12a 

(f) Prohibited contributions and expenditures 

No candidate or political committee shall knowingly 

accept any contribution or make any expenditure in 

violation of the provisions of this section. No officer 

or employee of a political committee shall knowingly 

accept a contribution made for the benefit or use of a 

candidate, or knowingly make any expenditure on 

behalf of a candidate, in violation of any limitation 

imposed on contributions and expenditures under this 

section. 

* * * * * 

(h) Senatorial candidates 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 

amounts totaling not more than $35,000 may be contributed to a candidate for nomination for election, or 

for election, to the United States Senate during the 

year in which an election is held in which he is such a 

candidate, by the Republican or Democratic Senatorial 

Campaign Committee, or the national committee of a 

political party, or any combination of such committees. 

 
13a 

4. 78 Fed. Reg. 8530 (Feb. 6, 2013) provides: 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

[Notice 2013–03] 

Price Index Adjustments for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold 

AGENCY: Federal Election Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of adjustments to contribution and 

expenditure limitations and lobbyist bundling disclosure threshold. 

SUMMARY: As mandated by provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended 

(“FECA” or “the Act”), the Federal Election Commission (“FEC” or “the Commission”) is adjusting certain 

contribution and expenditure limitations and the lobbyist bundling disclosure threshold set forth in the 

Act, to index the amounts for inflation. Additional 

details appear in the supplemental information that 

follows. 

DATES: Effective Date: The effective date for the 

limitation at 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A) is November 7, 

2012. The effective date for the limitations at 2 

U.S.C. 434(i)(3)(A), 441a(a)(1)(B), 441a(a)(3), 441a(d) 

and 441a(h) is January 1, 2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 

Elizabeth S. Kurland, Information Division, 999 E 

Street NW., Washington, DC 20463; (202) 694–1100 or 

(800) 424–9530. 
14a 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the 

Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. 431 

et seq., coordinated party expenditure limits (2 U.S.C. 

441a(d)(2) and (3)(A), (B)), certain contribution limits 

(2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A) and (B), (a)(3) and (h)), and the 

disclosure threshold for contributions bundled by 

lobbyists (2 U.S.C. 434(i)(3)(A)) are adjusted periodically to reflect changes in the consumer price index. 

See 2 U.S.C. 434(i)(3) and 441a(c)(1), and 11 CFR 

109.32 and 110.17(a), (f). The Commission is publishing this notice to announce the adjusted limits and 

disclosure threshold. 

Coordinated Party Expenditure Limits for 2013 

Under 2 U.S.C. 441a(c), the Commission must adjust the expenditure limitations established by 2 

U.S.C. 441a(d) (the limits on expenditures by national 

party committees, state party committees, or their 

subordinate committees in connection with the general 

election campaign of candidates for Federal office) 

annually to account for inflation. This expenditure 

limitation is increased by the percent difference between the price index, as certified to the Commission 

by the Secretary of Labor, for the 12 months preceding 

the beginning of the calendar year and the price index 

for the base period (calendar year 1974). 

 
15a 

1. Expenditure Limitation for House of Representatives in States with More Than One Congressional District 

Both the national and state party committees have 

an expenditure limitation for each general election 

held to fill a seat in the House of Representatives in 

states with more than one congressional district. 

This limitation also applies to those states and territories that elect individuals to the office of Delegate or 

Resident Commissioner.2 The formula used to calculate the expenditure limitation in such states multiplies 

the base figure of $10,000 by the difference in the price 

index (4.65647), rounding to the nearest $100. See 2 

U.S.C. 441a(c)(1)(B) and 441a(d)(3)(B), and 11 CFR 

109.32(b) and 110.17. Based upon this formula, the 

expenditure limitation for 2013 general elections for 

House candidates in these states is $46,600. 

2. Expenditure Limitation for Senate and for House 

of Representatives in States With Only One Congressional District 

Both the national and state party committees have 

an expenditure limitation for a general election held to 

fill a seat in the Senate or in the House of Representatives in states with only one congressional district. 

The formula used to calculate this expenditure limitation considers not only the price index but also the 

 

2

 Currently, these states are the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the territories of American Samoa, 

Guam, the United States Virgin Islands and the Northern Mariana 

Islands. See http://www.house.gov/representatives/. 
16a 

voting age population (“VAP”) of the state. The VAP 

of each state is published annually in the Federal Register by the Department of Commerce. 11 CFR 

110.18. The general election expenditure limitation is 

the greater of: The base figure ($20,000) multiplied 

by the difference in the price index, 4.65647 (which 

totals $93,100); or $0.02 multiplied by the VAP of the 

state, multiplied by 4.65647. Amounts are rounded to 

the nearest $100. See 2 U.S.C. 441a(c)(1)(B) and 

441a(d)(3)(A), and 11 CFR 109.32(b) and 110.17. The 

chart below provides the state-by-state breakdown of 

the 2013 general election expenditure limitation for 

Senate elections. The expenditure limitation for 2013 

House elections in states with only one congressional 

district3

 is $93,100. 

 

 

3 Currently, these states are: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, 

North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. See http:// 

www.house.gov/representatives/.
17a 

SENATE GENERAL ELECTION 

EXPENDITURE LIMITS—2013 ELECTIONS

State Voting 

age population 

(VAP) 

VAP x .02 

x the 

price 

index 

(4.65647) 

Senate 

expenditure limit 

(the greater of the 

amount in 

column 3 or 

$93,100) 

Alabama............... 3,697,617 $344,400 $344,400 

Alaska.................. 544,349 50,700 93,100 

Arizona................. 4,932,361 459,300 459,300 

Arkansas............... 2,238,250 208,400 208,400 

California.............. 28,801,211 2,682,200 2,682,200 

Colorado............... 3,956,224 368,400 368,400 

Connecticut......... 2,796,789 260,500 260,500 

Delaware............... 712,042 66,300 93,100 

Florida.................. 15,315,088 1,426,300 1,426,300 

Georgia................. 7,429,820 691,900 691,900 

Hawaii.................. 1,089,302 101,400 101,400 

Idaho.................... 1,169,075 108,900 108,900 

Illinois.................. 9,811,190 913,700 913,700 

Indiana................. 4,945,857 460,600 460,600 

Iowa..................... 2,351,233 219,000 219,000 

Kansas.................. 2,161,601 201,300 201,300 

Kentucky............... 3,362,177 313,100 313,100 

Louisiana.............. 3,484,090 324,500 324,500 

Maine................... 1,063,274 99,000 99,000 

Maryland.............. 4,540,763 422,900 422,900 

Massachusetts........ 5,244,729 488,400 488,400 
18a 

Michigan............... 7,616,490 709,300 709,300 

Minnesota............. 4,102,991 382,100 382,100 

Mississippi............ 2,239,593 208,600 208,600 

Missouri............... 4,618,513 430,100 430,100 

Montana............... 783,161 72,900 93,100 

Nebraska.............. 1,392,120 129,600 129,600 

Nevada................. 2,095,348 195,100 195,100 

New Hampshire...... 1,045,878 97,400 97,400 

New Jersey............ 6,838,206 636,800 636,800 

New Mexico........... 1,571,096 146,300 146,300 

New York.............. 15,307,107 1,425,500 1,425,500 

North Carolina....... 7,465,545 695,300 695,300 

North Dakota......... 545,020 50,800 93,100 

Ohio..................... 8,880,551 827,000 827,000 

Oklahoma.............. 2,877,457 268,000 268,000 

Oregon.................. 3,038,729 283,000 283,000 

Pennsylvania......... 10,024,150 933,500 933,500 

Rhode Island......... 833,818 77,700 93,100 

South Carolina....... 3,643,633 339,300 339,300 

South Dakota......... 629,185 58,600 93,100 

Tennessee............. 4,962,227 462,100 462,100 

Texas.................... 19,073,564 1,776,300 1,776,300 

Utah..................... 1,967,315 183,200 183,200 

Vermont................ 502,060 46,800 93,100 

Virginia................. 6,329,130 589,400 589,400 

Washington......... 5,312,045 494,700 494,700 

West Virginia......... 1,471,372 137,000 137,000 

Wisconsin.............. 4,408,841 410,600 410,600 

Wyoming............... 440,922 41,100 93,100 
19a 

Limitations on Contributions by Individuals, 

Non-Multicandidate Committees and Certain Political 

Party Committees Giving to U.S. Senate Candidates for 

the 2013–2014 Election Cycle 

The Act requires inflation indexing to: (1) The 

limitations on contributions made by persons under 2 

U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A) (contributions to candidates) and 

441a(a)(1)(B) (contributions to national party committees); (2) the biennial aggregate contribution limitations applicable to individuals under 2 U.S.C. 

441a(a)(3); and (3) the limitation on contributions made 

to U.S. Senate candidates by certain political party 

committees at 2 U.S.C. 441a(h). See 2 U.S.C. 441a(c). 

These contribution limitations are increased by multiplying the respective statutory contribution amount by 

1.29668, the percent difference between the price index, as certified to the Commission by the Secretary of 

Labor, for the 12 months preceding the beginning of 

the calendar year and the price index for the base 

period (calendar year 2001). The resulting amount is 

rounded to the nearest multiple of $100. See 2 U.S.C. 

441a(c) and 11 CFR 110.17(b). Contribution limitations 

shall be adjusted accordingly: 

 
20a 

Statutory provision Statutory 

amount 

2013–2014 

Limit 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A)... $2,000........... $2,600. 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(B)... $25,000......... $32,400. 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(A)... $37,500.......... $48,600. 

2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(3)(B)... $57,500 (of 

which no more 

than $37,500 

may be attributable to contributions to 

political committees that 

are not political committees 

of national political parties). 

$74,600 (of 

which no more 

than $48,600 

may be attributable to contributions to 

political committees that 

are not political committees of national political 

parties). 

2 U.S.C. 441a(h)........... $35,000......... $45,400. 

The increased limitation at 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(A) is 

to be in effect for the two-year period beginning on the 

first day following the date of the general election in 

the preceding year and ending on the date of the next 

regularly scheduled election. Thus the $2,600 figure 

above is in effect from November 7, 2012, to November 

4, 2014. The limitations under 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(B), 

441a(a)(3)(A) and (B), and 441a(h), shall be in effect 

beginning January 1st of the odd-numbered year and 

ending on December 31st of the next even-numbered 

year. Thus the new contribution limitations under 2 

U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(B), 441a(a)(3)(A) and (B), and 
21a 

441a(h) are in effect from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2014. See 11 CFR 110.17(b)(1). 

Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold for 2013 

The Act requires certain political committees to 

disclose contributions bundled by lobbyists/registrants 

and lobbyist/registrant political action committees 

once the contributions exceed a specified threshold 

amount. The Commission must adjust this threshold 

amount annually to account for inflation. The disclosure threshold is increased by multiplying the $15,000 

statutory disclosure threshold by 1.13887, the difference between the price index, as certified to the Commission by the Secretary of Labor, for the 12 months 

preceding the beginning of the calendar year and the 

price index for the base period (calendar year 2006). 

The resulting amount is rounded to the nearest multiple of $100. See 2 U.S.C. 434(i)(3)(A) and (B), 

441a(c)(1)(B) and 11 CFR 104.22(g). Based upon this 

formula ($15,000 × 1.13887), the lobbyist bundling 

disclosure threshold for calendar year 2013 is $17,100. 

On behalf of the Commission. 

Dated: January 31, 2013. 

Ellen L. Weintraub, 

Chair, Federal Election Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2013–02520 Filed 2–5–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6715–01–P