UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

)

STOP RECKLESS ECONOMIC )

INSTABILITY CAUSED BY )

DEMOCRATS, et al., )

) Civ. No. 1:14-397 (AJT-IDD)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

) MOTION

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, )

)

Defendant. )

)

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Federal Election Commission respectfully moves that this Court grant 

summary judgment in its favor. A Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 

and Proposed Order are submitted with this Motion.

Respectfully submitted,

Lisa J. Stevenson*

Deputy General Counsel – Law

Kevin Deeley*

Acting Associate General Counsel

Harry J. Summers*

Assistant General Counsel

 

 Holly J. Baker*

Kevin P. Hancock*

_______/s/___________________

Esther D. Gyory (VA Bar # 76826)

Attorneys

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Case 1:14-cv-00397-AJT-IDD Document 57 Filed 09/19/14 Page 1 of 2 PageID# 673
2

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463

Telephone: (202) 694-1650

September 19, 2014 Fax: (202) 219-0260

Case 1:14-cv-00397-AJT-IDD Document 57 Filed 09/19/14 Page 2 of 2 PageID# 674
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION 

 

 ) 

STOP RECKLESS ECONOMIC ) 

INSTABILITY CAUSED BY ) 

DEMOCRATS, et al., ) 

 ) Civ. No. 1:14-397 (AJT-IDD) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION’S MEMORANDUM 

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Lisa J. Stevenson* 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

Kevin Deeley* 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

Harry J. Summers* 

Assistant General Counsel 

Holly J. Baker* 

Esther D. Gyory (VA Bar # 76826) 

Kevin P. Hancock* 

Attorneys 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

September 19, 2014 (202) 694-1650 

* Admitted Pro Hac Vice 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................2 

A. Legal Background ..............................................................................................2 

B. Procedural History .............................................................................................3 

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS ........................................................4 

ARGUMENT ...........................................................................................................................10 

I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER STOP PAC’S CLAIMS ..................10 

A. Stop PAC Lacks Standing ................................................................................10 

B. Stop PAC’s Claims Are Moot ..........................................................................11 

II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY REJECTED THE CLAIMS 

STOP PAC MAKES ABOUT THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD AND 

THE $2,600 CONTRIBUTION LIMIT .......................................................................11 

III. THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD AND $2,600 CONTRIBUTION LIMIT DO 

NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT ...........................................................12 

A. The Six-Month Period Limits Circumvention of FECA’s 

Candidate Contribution Limit ..........................................................................13 

1. The Six-Month Period Helps Prevent Individuals from Using 

“Dummy”-Like PACs to Bootstrap Themselves to the Increased 

Contribution Limit ...............................................................................13 

2. PACs That Are Less Than Six Months Old Present an Increased 

Risk of Circumvention .........................................................................14 

3. Stop PAC and Its Close Ties with the Innis Campaign Illustrate 

How the Six-Month Period Prevents Potential Circumvention ...........16 

4. The Six-Month Period Remains a Vital Part of FECA’s 

Anti-Circumvention Safeguards ..........................................................18 

B. The Six-Month Period Promotes Campaign Finance Disclosure ....................19 

C. The Six-Month Period and $2,600 Contribution Limit Are Closely Drawn ...20 

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D. The Six-Month Period and $2,600 Contribution Limit Place 

Minimal Burdens on a New PAC’s Ability to Speak and 

Associate with a Candidate ..............................................................................21 

IV. NEITHER THE $2,600 CONTRIBUTION LIMIT NOR THE LIMITS ON 

MULTICANDIDATE PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO PARTIES VIOLATES 

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT ......................................................................................22 

A. FECA Does Not Discriminate Against New PACs 

or Multicandidate PACs ...................................................................................23 

B. New PACs and Multicandidate PACs Are Not Similarly Situated .................24 

C. Rational Basis Is the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny .......................................25 

D. The Contribution Limits Plaintiffs Challenge Are at a Minimum 

Rationally Related to the Government’s Important Interests ..........................26 

1. The $2,600 Contribution Limit for New PACs Is Rationally 

Related to Lessening the Risk of Circumvention and 

Promoting Disclosure ..........................................................................27 

2. The Limits on Contributions to Parties Lessen the Risk and 

Appearance of Corruption While Allowing Parties to Maintain 

Their Important Role in the Political System .....................................27 

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................30 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases Page 

Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ..........................................................................26 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) ................................................................................ passim 

Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .....................................12, 14, 18, 19 

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) ................................................................................13 

Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) ...........................................13, 19, 23, 24, 25, 27 

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) ................................................................3, 15, 19 

Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) ...................................................... 10 

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)..........................28 

Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011) ..................................22 

FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) ........................................................26, 27 

FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) ......................................................................13, 20, 26 

FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) ..........................13 

Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) .................................................................................27 

Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2007) .................................................................. 11 

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) .............................................................3, 11, 21, 22, 28 

McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) ..............................................................13, 18, 26 

Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) ............................................................................21, 29 

RNC v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C.), aff’d mem., 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010) ............12, 24 

Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) ...........................................................................21

Stop This Insanity Inc. v. FEC, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 3824225 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 2014)......24 

U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860 (2011) .........................................................................11 

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U.S. v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2012) .....................................................................23, 26

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) .....................................................................................26 

Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4thCir. 2002) ..................................................................24, 25 

Statutes and Regulations 

Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 

116 Stat. 81 ..........................................................................................................................3 

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 

Pub. L. No. 94-283 § 112(2), 90 Stat. 475 ...........................................................................3 

Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-46, 

(formerly 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57) ................................................................................... passim 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(7) ...........................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(11) ...................................................................................................2, 24 

52 U.S.C. § 30101(14)-(15) .................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1) .......................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(2) ......................................................................................................2

52 U.S.C. § 30104 ..........................................................................................................2, 19 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4)(A) ...............................................................................................19 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4)(A)(ii) ..........................................................................................20 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4)(A)(iii) .........................................................................................20 

52 U.S.C. § 30104(b) .........................................................................................................20 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) ...........................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A) .....................................................................................2, 24, 29 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(B) ...........................................................................................3, 29 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C) .........................................................................................18, 19 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(D) ...........................................................................................3, 29 

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52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A) ...........................................................................................2, 11 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(B) .................................................................................................3 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(C) ...............................................................................................18 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(4) .......................................................................................................2 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(5) ...............................................................................................18, 19 

52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) .....................................................................................................18

52 U.S.C. § 30116(c)(1)(B)(i)..............................................................................................3 

52 U.S.C. § 30118 ..............................................................................................................24 

52 U.S.C. § 30121 ..............................................................................................................24 

11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a).................................................................................................................15 

11 C.F.R. § 100.5(f)(1) ............................................................................................................18 

11 C.F.R. § 100.5(g)(5) ............................................................................................................19 

11 C.F.R. § 102.1(d) ................................................................................................................15 

11 C.F.R. § 102.7(a).................................................................................................................15 

11 C.F.R. § 103.2 .....................................................................................................................15 

11 C.F.R. § 104.1(b) ................................................................................................................11 

11 C.F.R. § 110.1(h)(1)-(2) ......................................................................................................18 

11 C.F.R. § 110.2(a)(1) ..............................................................................................................4 

11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1) ............................................................................................................18 

Legislative Materials

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1057 at 58 (Apr. 28, 1976) [(76 Greenbook PDF at 1059)] .............28 

120 Cong. Rec. H7810 (Aug. 7, 1974) (PDF 825) ..................................................................14 

148 Cong. Rec. S2153 (2002) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ...................................................29 

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Miscellaneous

Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=1000&year1=1976&year2=2014 (last viewed 

Sept. 11, 2014) .............................................................................................................20

Nicholas Confessore & Derek Willis, 2012 Election Ended With Deluge of Donations and 

Spending, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2012) ..........................................................................15 

Harry Enten, If Hillary Clinton Runs for Present, When Might She Announce?, 

FiveThirtyEight.com (June 19, 2014) ..........................................................................15 

 

FEC, Contribution Limits 2013-14, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml 

 (last viewed Sept. 14, 2014) ........................................................................................22 

FEC, Disclosure Data Search, Candidate and Committee Viewer, Tea Party 

Leadership Fund, http://www.fec.gov/fecviewer/CandidateCommitteeDetail.do .......25 

FEC, Nonconnected PAC Registration Toolkit, 

http://www.fec.gov/info/toolkit.shtml#nonconnected (last viewed 

Sept. 10, 2014) .............................................................................................................15

FEC Press Release, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011-2012 

Election Cycle (Apr. 19, 2013), 

http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130419_2012-24m-Summary.shtml .............29 

FEC Press Release, Party Committees Raise More Than $1 Billion in 2001-2002, 

http://www.fec.gov/press/press2003/20030320party/20030103party.html. ................29 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ..................................................................................................................3 

Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 

S. Rep. No. 93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 615 & n.44, 736-42 (1974) ....................14 

Colby Itkowitz, How to Start a Super PAC Because You Can, 

Wash. Post (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/ 

2014/04/10/how-to-start-a-super-pac-because-you-can/ .............................................15 

NIFC Report of Receipts and Disbursements at 25, 34 (Aug. 27, 2014), 

http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?14970730473 ...............................................17 

Alex Pappas, Tea Party Activist Niger Innis Considering Congressional Run, 

DailyCaller.com (Nov. 7, 2013) ................................................................................... 5 

Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (Simon & Schuster 

2001) ............................................................................................................................14 

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Justin Sink, Tea Party Group Hopes to Draft Sarah Palin for Senate Run in Alaska, 

The Hill (May 1, 2013) ................................................................................................25 

Stop PAC Report of Receipts and Disbursements at 7-8 (July 8, 2014): 

http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?14961526994 ...............................................17 

Reid Wilson, Tea Party Attacks John Boehner at Home, Wash. Post (Apr. 22, 2014), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/tea-party-attacks-boehner-at-home 

/2014/04/22/f0724228-c96f-11e3-95f7-7ecdde72d2ea_story.html .........................9, 25 

U.S. Const. Amend. I .................................................................................................................1 

U.S. Const. Amend. V .........................................................................................................1, 22 

78 Fed. Reg. 8530 (Feb. 6, 2013) ....................................................................................2, 3, 21 

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In the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”), Congress implemented a system of 

carefully calibrated limits on the amount of money that different groups can contribute to 

candidates, political parties, and others to combat the risk and appearance of corruption arising 

from large contributions. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs — two political committees (“PACs”) and a 

political party committee — incorrectly assert that the First and Fifth Amendments require this 

Court to upset this balance and rewrite several of these provisions. 

In their first two claims, plaintiffs challenge two provisions that the Supreme Court has 

already upheld because they prevent individuals from circumventing FECA’s $2,600 limit on 

contributions to candidates. FECA requires newly registered PACs to comply with this $2,600 

limit for at least six months before earning an increased $5,000 limit that Congress reserved for 

bona fide “multicandidate” PACs. This six-month period prevents individuals from forming 

“dummy”-like PACs to quickly obtain the $5,000 limit during the critical pre-election window to 

assist only one or two candidates — a practice of the Watergate era. This circumvention risk 

persists today. In fact, the many close ties between the PAC plaintiff making these claims here 

and the candidate who was initially a plaintiff in the case illustrate the threat. In addition, there 

is no jurisdiction for these claims, in part because that PAC has now become a multicandidate 

PAC, with the higher limit. 

In their third claim, plaintiffs complain that FECA sets higher limits for contributions to 

party committees made by persons other than multicandidate PACs. But the statute strikes a 

constitutional balance between two important interests: ensuring that political parties have 

sufficient resources and limiting the recognized corruption risks posed by large contributions. 

These are reasonable exercises of legislative judgment on how best to fight corruption 

and its appearance while permitting candidates and parties the resources necessary for effective 

advocacy. Plaintiffs’ myopic complaints of “discrimination” overlook that the Supreme Court 

has evaluated such claims in the context of FECA as a whole. And in that context, the law treats 

political committees as a privileged class, granting them benefits not available to other groups. 

For all these reasons, the Court should grant the Commission summary judgment. 

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BACKGROUND 

A. Legal Background 

In response to the 1972 federal election’s “deeply disturbing examples” of large 

contributions being “given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office 

holders,” Congress enacted FECA, see 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-46 (formerly 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-57), in 

part “to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial 

contributions[.]” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).1 FECA limits contributions to 

candidates and political committees and requires those persons to file periodic public reports 

with the FEC disclosing their receipts and disbursements. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a), 30104.2 

FECA limits over a dozen different types of contributions involving candidates, parties, 

individuals, and other groups. See FEC, Contribution Limits 2013-14.3 The most broadly 

applicable limit provides that no “person” shall contribute more than $2,600 per election 

(primary or general) to a federal candidate. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A); 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 

8532 (Feb. 6, 2013). “Person” includes individuals, partnerships, associations, and some other 

groups. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(11). But a “multicandidate” PAC can contribute up to $5,000 per 

candidate per election. Id. § 30116(a)(2)(A). A PAC can qualify for this higher limit if it can 

demonstrate that it is a bona fide multicandidate PAC by (1) receiving contributions from more 

than 50 persons; (2) making contributions to at least five federal candidates; and (3) being 

registered with the FEC for at least six months (the “six-month period”). Id. § 30116(a)(4). 

Soon after these provisions were enacted, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo upheld 

the constitutionality of the $2,600 limit (which was then $1,000) and the multicandidate PAC 

                                                           

1

 Effective September 1, 2014, the provisions of FECA that were codified in Title 2 of the 

United States Code were recodified in a new title, Title 52. See Editorial Reclassification Table, 

http://uscode.house.gov/editorialreclassification/t52/Reclassifications_Title_52.html. 

2

 There are different types of political committees. Candidates operate principal campaign 

committees. 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(1). Political parties operate national, state, and local party 

committees. See id. §§ 30101(14)-(15). Committees not sponsored by corporations or unions 

are called nonconnected committees (hereinafter “PACs”). Cf. id. §§ 30101(7), 30103(b)(2). 

3

 http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml (last viewed Sept. 19, 2014). 

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requirements. 424 U.S. at 26-29, 35-26. Congress later added higher limits for contributions to 

national political party committees, allowing annual contributions of up to $20,000 from any 

person and $15,000 from any multicandidate PAC. FECA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 

94-283 § 112(2), 90 Stat. 475 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(B), (2)(B)). 

In 2002, Congress amended FECA to ban unregulated “soft-money” donations to national 

party committees, and in return, increased FECA’s “hard-money” limits on how much persons 

could contribute to parties and candidates.4 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. 

L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (“BCRA”). As a result, today a person may contribute $2,600 per 

election to a candidate (instead of $1,000); $32,400 annually to a national party committee 

(instead of $20,000); and $10,000 annually to a state or local party committee (instead of 

$5,000).5 52 U.S.C. §§ 30116(a)(1)(A)-(B), (D); 78 Fed. Reg. at 8532. 

B. Procedural History 

Stop Reckless Economic Instability caused by Democrats (“Stop PAC”) contends that the 

six-month period violates the First Amendment rights of PACs that are less than six months old 

(hereinafter “new PACs”) and have satisfied the other two multicandidate PAC requirements. 

(Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 51-55 (Doc. No. 37).) Stop PAC also claims FECA 

violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by applying the $2,600 limit to new 

PACs before they qualify for the $5,000 limit. (Id. ¶¶ 43-50.) Finally, the Tea Party Leadership 

Fund (“Tea Party Fund”) claims that FECA violates equal protection by more strictly limiting 

contributions to parties from multicandidate PACs than from other persons. (Id. ¶¶ 56-63.) 

The FEC now moves for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (summary 

judgment is appropriate if there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). 

                                                           

4

 “Soft money” is money raised outside FECA’s restrictions ostensibly for purposes other 

than influencing a federal election. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 122-23 (2003), overruled in 

part on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 

5

 These limits on contributions to candidate and national party committees are indexed for 

inflation. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(c)(1)(B)(i); see 78 Fed. Reg. at 8532. 

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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 

A. Plaintiff Stop PAC and Former Plaintiffs Niger Innis and NIFC 

1. Plaintiff Stop PAC is a hybrid nonconnected political committee that registered 

with the FEC on March 11, 2014. (Stop PAC Stmt. of Org. (rec’d Mar. 11, 2014), FEC Exhibit 

(“Exh.”) 1.) FECA limited Stop PAC’s contributions to each federal candidate to $2,600 per 

election until September 11, 2014, when Stop PAC became a multicandidate PAC and was 

permitted to contribute $5,000. (11 C.F.R. § 110.2(a)(1); Pls.’ Joinder Mem. at 1, 6 (Doc. No. 

50-1).) Stop PAC’s founder and chairman is Greg Campbell. (Declaration of Greg Campbell 

(“Campbell Decl.”) ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 6-2).) Dan Backer is Stop PAC’s treasurer, custodian of 

records, and counsel. (Stop PAC Stmt. of Org. at 3, FEC Exh. 1; Am. Compl. at 17.) 

2. Former plaintiff Niger Innis was a candidate in the June 10, 2014 primary election 

for the Republican Party nomination for the U.S. House of Representatives in Nevada’s fourth 

congressional district. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Former plaintiff Niger Innis for Congress (“NIFC”) 

was Innis’s principal campaign committee. (Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶ 5 (Doc. No. 1).) 

1. Stop PAC’s Efforts to Support Innis and Other Candidates 

3. On April 4, 2014, Stop PAC contributed $2,600 to the Innis campaign for the 

June 10, 2014 primary election. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Stop PAC states that it wanted to 

contribute $2,400 more to Innis for the primary. (Id. ¶ 21.) Stop PAC has not made or desired to 

make any independent expenditures on behalf of Innis or any other candidate. (Stop PAC Resps. 

to FEC’s Disc. Reqsts. (“Stop PAC Disc. Resps.”) at 4, Interrog. 6, FEC Exh. 2.) Stop PAC also 

never considered organizing volunteers to assist the Innis campaign (Deposition of Stop PAC 

(“Stop PAC Dep.”) 100:2-5, FEC Exh. 3), though Innis would have welcomed such help 

(Deposition of Niger Innis for Congress (“NIFC Dep.”) 26:22-27:7, FEC Exh. 4). 

4. On June 16, 2014, Stop PAC contributed $2,600 to Dan Sullivan, a candidate in 

the August 19, 2014 primary election for the Republican Party nomination for Senate in Alaska. 

(Am. Compl. ¶ 24.) Stop PAC states that it wanted to give Sullivan $2,400 more. (Id. ¶ 25.) 

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5. On July 7, 2014, Stop PAC contributed $2,600 to Rep. Joe Heck for his candidacy 

in the November 6, 2014 general election for the U.S. House of Representatives in Nevada’s 

third congressional district. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) Stop PAC states that it wants to contribute 

$1,800 more to Heck for the general election (id. ¶ 30), and since it has become a multicandidate 

PAC, it may now do so (see FEC Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“FEC Facts”) ¶ 1). 

2. Stop PAC’s Ties with Niger Innis’s Congressional Campaign

6. Campbell and Innis met in 2013 when Innis started work at TheTeaParty.net, an 

organization related to the Tea Party News Network, a group that had employed Campbell since 

November 2012. (Deposition of Gregory Campbell (“Campbell Dep.”) 9:14-19, 11:1-19, FEC 

Exh. 5; (Deposition of Niger Innis (“Innis Dep.”) 6:13-7:20; 9:14-10:19, FEC Exh. 6.) The two 

became personal friends, and Innis introduced Campbell to people in Nevada political circles. 

(Innis Dep. 17:11-19:4, FEC Exh. 6; Campbell Dep. 27:22-28:6, FEC Exh. 5.) 

7. Innis met Backer in early 2013 at TheTeaParty.net, where they worked together. 

Innis later hired Backer to start NigerInnis.com. (Innis Dep. 23:18-25:14, FEC Exh. 6.) 

8. In late 2013, Innis started considering a run for Congress and established an 

exploratory committee. (Innis Dep. 12:18-13:18, FEC Exh. 6) According to Innis, when 

Campbell learned that Innis might run, Campbell expressed support: “[H]ey, I heard about your 

candidacy. It’s exciting. Whatever I can do to help. I’m there to help.” (NIFC Dep. 28:4-9, 

FEC Exh. 4; see also Innis Dep. 14:1-8; 15:7-14, FEC Exh. 6.) Campbell joined the Innis 

campaign in October or November 2013. (NIFC Dep. 35:16-36:2, FEC Exh. 4.) 

9. On November 5, 2013, Innis held a fundraiser for his exploratory committee, and 

Innis invited Campbell to attend. (NIFC Dep. 35:13-36:7, FEC Exh. 4; Stop PAC Dep. 55:17-

18, FEC Exh. 3; Alex Pappas, Tea Party Activist Niger Innis Considering Congressional Run, 

DailyCaller.com (Nov. 7, 2013)6

.) Backer also attended this fundraiser. (NIFC Dep. 40:4-5, 

                                                           

6

 See http://dailycaller.com/2013/11/07/tea-party-activist-niger-innis-consideringcongressional-run/. 

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FEC Exh. 4.) Campbell contributed $500 to the Innis campaign two days later. (Itemized 

Receipts for NIFC at 2-3, FEC Exh. 7; Campbell Dep. 24:20-25:21, FEC Exh. 5.) 

10. Niger Innis for Congress was Innis’s principal campaign committee. Backer was 

its treasurer and attorney. (NIFC Stmt. of Org. at 1 (rec’d Jan. 9, 2014), FEC Exh. 8; NIFC Dep. 

10:3-4, FEC Exh. 4.) 

11. The Innis campaign hired Campbell as its policy director in January 2014, when 

Innis officially declared his candidacy. (Campbell Dep. 20:18-21:4, FEC Exh. 5; NIFC Dep. 

31:10-21, 33:9-19, FEC Exh. 4.) While Campbell consistently stated that he was the campaign’s 

policy director, Innis described Campbell as “policy scribe,” “policy writer,” and “campaign 

scribe.” (NIFC Dep. 12:12-18, 29:19, 33:15, FEC Exh. 4.) Campbell helped formulate Innis’s 

campaign platform, drafted public statements of Innis’s policy positions, wrote op-eds, and 

drafted speeches. (Campbell Dep. 21:5-10, FEC Exh. 5; NIFC Dep. 29:18-30:11, FEC Exh. 4.) 

Campbell worked directly with Innis and others in the campaign’s “inner circle.” (NIFC Dep. 

30:12-20, FEC Exh. 4.) As a consultant and vendor for the campaign, Campbell was paid on a 

regular basis. (Id. 32:20-33:5.) Campbell was the campaign’s policy director until the June 10 

primary election, in which Innis did not prevail. (Campbell Dep. 23:15-18, FEC Exh. 5.) 

12. Starting Stop PAC was “something that has always interested” Campbell. (Stop 

PAC Dep. 21:6-12, FEC Exh. 3.) He first discussed it with Backer “several months prior to the 

official FEC filing” in March 2014; it was likely in “November, December of 2013.” (Id. 21:13-

17.) After “various discussions” between the two, Backer suggested that Campbell start Stop 

PAC. (Stop PAC Disc. Resps. at 4-5, ¶ 8, FEC Exh. 2.) Stop PAC registered as a political 

committee with the FEC on March 11, 2014, after Campbell authorized Backer to submit the 

necessary paperwork. (Id. at 5, ¶ 8.) By March 25, Stop PAC had “over 1000 contributors,” 

raising “around $20,000” using only email solicitations. (Id. at 3, ¶ 4; Stop PAC Dep. 23:9-18, 

FEC Exh. 3; E-mail from Dan Backer to Dave Levinthal at 1 (Apr. 18, 2014), FEC Exh. 9.) 

13. Innis was aware of Stop PAC at some point before March 13, 2014, when Backer 

suggested to Innis that Stop PAC be listed on the invitation for an upcoming fundraiser that was 

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being held for Innis by Nevada billionaire Sheldon Adelson. (E-mail from Backer to Innis and 

Julie C. Hereford at 1 (Mar. 13, 2014), FEC Exh. 10; NIFC Dep. 46:13-48:18, FEC Exh. 4.) The 

Adelson fundraiser occurred on March 26, 2014, and both Campbell and Backer attended. 

(NIFC Dep. 41:21-42:4, FEC Exh. 4; Stop PAC Dep. 50:6-7, FEC Exh. 3.) 

14. Nine days after the Adelson fundraiser, on April 4, 2014, Stop PAC satisfied the 

second multicandidate PAC requirement by contributing to five federal candidates, which it did 

in one day. (Declaration of Dan Backer (“Backer Decl.”) ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 29-1).) Stop PAC 

contributed $2,600 to Innis and $250 each to four other candidates. (Id.) 

15. Stop PAC has stated that federal law “likely” would have barred it from making 

or hampered its ability to make independent expenditures on behalf of Innis because, according 

to Stop PAC, its use of “some of the same vendors” would preclude it from being deemed 

“independent” of the Innis campaign. (Stop PAC Disc. Resps. at 4, Interrog. 6, FEC Exh. 2.) 

3. New PACs Often Register with the FEC as Elections Draw Near, 

Spend Significant Amounts of Money, and Terminate Soon After

16. In presidential election years from 2004 to date, the number of PACs registering 

with the FEC has significantly increased just before the general election. (Declaration of Paul 

Clark (“Clark Decl.”) ¶ 9, FEC Exh. 11.) Eight of the 10 days in 2012 on which the highest 

number of PACs registered with the FEC occurred between September and November. (Id.) 

17. On the dates of the last five general elections, there have been hundreds of active 

new PACs, i.e., PACs that were less than six months old. For example, there were 464 new 

PACs at the time of the general election on November 5, 2012. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

18. New PACs have contributed significant funds to candidates and have made 

significant independent expenditures in the last several election cycles. For instance, in 2012, 

the 464 PACs that registered within six months before the general election contributed $154,619 

to candidates while making about $5.4 million in independent expenditures. (Id.) 

19. There is a significant turnover rate among PACs. Since 2008, many PACs have 

registered in an election year and then closed before the next general election. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

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20. Approximately 77 percent of PACs that have registered with the FEC since 2003 

had not become multicandidate PACs as of August 26, 2014. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

B. Plaintiffs Tea Party Leadership Fund and Alexandria Republican City 

Committee

21. Plaintiff Tea Party Leadership Fund (“Tea Party Fund”) is a hybrid nonconnected 

multicandidate PAC that registered in 2012. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4; Tea Party Fund Stmt. of Org. at 

1-2, 5 (rec’d May 9, 2012), FEC Exh. 12.) The Tea Party Fund’s chairman is Todd Cefaratti, 

and Backer is its treasurer and counsel. (Deposition of Tea Party Fund (“Tea Party Fund Dep.”) 

10:6-12, 13:2-5, FEC Exh. 13.) Cefaratti attended the late 2013 and early 2014 fundraisers for 

the Innis campaign. (NIFC Dep. 39:20-21; 54:7-9, FEC Exh. 4.) Cefaratti founded 

TheTeaParty.net, where Innis is now executive director, reporting to Cefaratti. (Innis Dep. 31:4-

20, FEC Exh. 6.) By May 2014, the Tea Party Fund had over 100,000 contributors and had 

contributed to dozens of candidates. (Declaration of Caitlin Contestable ¶¶ 7-8 (Doc. No. 6-4).) 

22. Plaintiff Alexandria Republican City Committee (“Alexandria Committee”) is a 

local political party committee. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) 

1. The Tea Party Fund’s Efforts to Support the Alexandria Committee 

and the National Republican Senatorial Committee 

23. On April 4, 2014, the Tea Party Fund contributed $5,000, the maximum FECA 

permits, to the Alexandria Committee. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38.) The Tea Party Fund states that it 

wants to give the Alexandria Committee another $5,000 in 2014. (Id. ¶ 39.) The Alexandria 

Committee’s chairman could not recall having ever received a contribution from a 

multicandidate PAC before. (Alexandria Comm. Dep. 16:2-21, FEC Exh. 14.) 

24. The Tea Party Fund states that it wants to give $32,400 in 2014 to the National 

Republican Senatorial Committee (“NRSC”), a national party committee. (Am. Compl. ¶ 39.) 

25. The Tea Party Fund claims that it wants to contribute to the Alexandria 

Committee and the NRSC “as a way of further associating” with them and “assisting the 

campaigns in which those entities are involved,” among other reasons. (Id. ¶ 41.) The Tea Party 

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Fund also states that it wishes to contribute more to obtain “more constitutionally protected 

noncorrupting ingratiation and access.” (Tea Party Fund Dep. 92:15-93:3, FEC Exh. 13.) 

26. Before contributing to the Alexandria Committee, the Tea Party Fund had only 

once before contributed to a party committee.7 The Tea Party Fund has never contributed to the 

NRSC (Tea Party Fund Dep. 47:5-8, FEC Exh. 13), even though FECA permits the Tea Party 

Fund to give $20,000 to the NRSC right now. 

27. The Tea Party Fund has never made any independent expenditures in favor of any 

candidate supported by the Alexandria Committee or the NRSC. (Tea Party Fund Resps. to 

FEC’s First Set of Disc. Reqsts. (“Tea Party Fund Resps.”) at 11, ¶ 9, FEC Exh. 15.) 

28. The Tea Party Fund organized a volunteer effort to assist the campaign of J.D. 

Winteregg in his bid to defeat Speaker of the House John Boehner in the May 6, 2014 primary 

election for the Republican Party’s nomination for the House of Representatives in the 8th 

district of Ohio. (Tea Party Fund Resps. at 7, ¶ 8, FEC Exh. 15; see Reid Wilson, Tea Party 

Attacks John Boehner at Home, Wash. Post (Apr. 22, 2014)8). But the Tea Party Fund has never 

engaged in a similar effort to support candidates supported by any other political committee. 

(Tea Party Dep. 84:14-85:6, FEC Exh. 13; Tea Party Fund Resps. at 7, ¶ 8, FEC Exh. 15.) 

29. Volunteers are essential to the Alexandria Committee’s operations and it would 

be happy to receive volunteers that were organized by a PAC, but the Tea Party Fund has never 

offered to help its candidates in this way. (Alexandria Comm. Dep. 25:22-26:12, 29:14-35:13, 

36:17-22, 38:4-7, FEC Exh. 14.) 

30. The Alexandria Committee admits that the FECA provisions it challenges in this 

case do not treat it differently from any other local party committee or otherwise discriminate 

against it. (Id. 45:1-21.) 

                                                           

7

 See FEC, Disclosure Data Search, Candidate and Committee Viewer, Tea Party 

Leadership Fund, http://www.fec.gov/fecviewer/CandidateCommitteeDetail.do. 

8

 See http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/tea-party-attacks-boehner-at-home/ 

2014/04/22/f0724228-c96f-11e3-95f7-7ecdde72d2ea_story.html. 

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2. Multicandidate PACs Contribute Directly to Candidates Far More 

Often Than They Give to Political Parties 

31. As of August 3, 2014, there were 482 active multicandidate PACs registered with 

the FEC. (Clark Decl. ¶ 13, FEC Exh. 11.) 

32. From the start of the 2004 election cycle until August 4, 2014, multicandidate 

PACs contributed in excess of $239.1 million to candidates and approximately $30.1 million to 

party committees. (Id. ¶ 14.) During that same period, multicandidate PACs made in excess of 

$51.4 million in independent expenditures. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

33. Since the 2008 election cycle, multicandidate PACs have made many more 

contributions to candidates than to political party committees. (Id. ¶ 16.) Of the 481 

multicandidate PACs that have been active during the 2014 election cycle, 366 have made no 

contributions to political party committees. (Id. ¶ 17.) When multicandidate PACs do contribute 

to party committees, however, they often give the maximum permitted by FECA. (Id. ¶ 18.) 

ARGUMENT 

I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER STOP PAC’S CLAIMS 

A. Stop PAC Lacks Standing 

Stop PAC’s claims should be dismissed for lack of standing, since Stop PAC caused its 

own alleged injury. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1152-1153 

(2013) (finding respondents whose “self-inflicted injuries” were “not fairly traceable to the 

Government’s purported activities” lacked standing). Stop PAC asserts that FECA prevented it 

from contributing more than $2,600 to candidates in three elections, the first of which was 

Innis’s primary election on June 10, 2014. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20-21, 24-25, 28-30.) But the 

evidence shows that Stop PAC could have registered at least as early as November 2013, early 

enough to become a multicandidate PAC before that election.9

 And had it done so, Stop PAC 

                                                           

9

 Stop PAC’s chairman, Greg Campbell, was aware of the Innis campaign at least as early 

as November 2013, when he attended an Innis fundraiser. (FEC Facts ¶ 9.) Also as early as 

November 2013, Campbell first discussed the idea for Stop PAC with its future counsel and 

treasurer Dan Backer. (Id. ¶ 12.) Nothing prevented Campbell and Backer from registering Stop 

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would have become a multicandidate PAC as early as May 2014. Instead, Stop PAC waited 

months until March 11, 2014 to register, ensuring that the June 10 and other elections would fall 

squarely within the six-month window when Stop PAC would be restricted to contributing 

$2,600 instead of $5,000. It is therefore plaintiff’s own delay that caused its injury, not FECA. 

Such self-inflicted harm cannot support standing. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 228 (finding 

no standing for political candidates whose alleged injury was caused by “their own personal 

‘wish’ not to solicit or accept large contributions”). 

B. Stop PAC’s Claims Are Moot 

Even if Stop PAC had standing, it is no longer subject to the FECA provisions it 

challenges and thus its claims are moot. See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2864-65 

(2011) (finding respondent’s claim moot once he “was no longer subject to the sex-offenderregistration conditions he sought to challenge on appeal”). Stop PAC became a multicandidate 

PAC on September 11, 2014, when six months had passed since it registered with the FEC. 

(FEC Facts ¶ 1.) Stop PAC may now contribute $5,000 to a candidate per election instead of 

$2,600. See 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(2)(A). As a result, FECA no longer prohibits Stop PAC from 

contributing the additional $1,800 it wishes to give to Representative Joe Heck for the upcoming 

November 6, 2014 general election. (FEC Facts ¶ 5.) Stop PAC had also wanted to contribute in 

excess of $2,600 to other candidates, but those elections already occurred in June and August 

2014. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) It is therefore “impossible for the court to grant” Stop PAC “any effectual 

relief” and so its claims are moot. Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir. 2007). 

 

II. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY REJECTED THE CLAIMS STOP PAC 

MAKES ABOUT THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD AND THE $2,600 

CONTRIBUTION LIMIT 

Stop PAC’s claims fail as a matter of law because in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court 

directly affirmed the constitutionality of the six-month period (and other qualifying criteria) for 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

PAC then to start the six-month clock. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.1(b) (groups may register at any 

time). In fact, starting Stop PAC was “something that ha[d] always interested” Campbell. (Id.) 

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groups seeking to become multicandidate PACs and take advantage of the $5,000 limit on 

contributions to candidates. See 424 U.S. at 35-36. The Court recognized that these criteria 

“serve the permissible purpose of preventing individuals from evading the applicable 

contribution limitations by labeling themselves committees.” Id. And the Court rejected the 

argument that the criteria “unconstitutionally discriminate against ad hoc organizations in favor 

of established interest groups and impermissibly burden free association.” Id. at 35. As a result, 

the Court denied First and Fifth Amendment challenges to the six-month registration 

requirement. Id. at 35-36, 59 n.67. The Court’s ruling affirmed the D.C. Circuit, which had 

similarly observed that the six-month period is a constitutionally valid 

loophole-closing provision intended to prevent proliferation of dummy 

committees, each of a few persons, in support of federal candidacies. 

Otherwise, two or three persons could acquire the $5,000 committee 

contribution authority . . . merely by organizing themselves as a political 

committee. The challenged Act limits such bootstrapping by interposing a 

six-month protective shield. 

Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), aff’d in relevant part and 

rev’d in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Supreme Court’s holding controls Stop PAC’s claims in 

their entirety. For this reason alone, plaintiffs’ motion should be denied. See, e.g., Republican 

Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 160 (D.D.C. 2010) (three-judge court) (“As a lower 

court . . . we do not believe we possess authority to clarify or refine [Supreme Court precedent] . 

. . or to otherwise get ahead of the Supreme Court.”), aff’d mem., 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010). 

III. THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD AND $2,600 CONTRIBUTION LIMIT DO NOT 

VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT 

Even if Buckley did not foreclose Stop PAC’s claims, the six-month period and $2,600 

contribution limit would still easily survive constitutional scrutiny. Because contribution limits 

impose only “marginal restriction[s]” on contributors’ First Amendment rights, courts assess the 

constitutionality of those limits under only an intermediate level of scrutiny. Buckley, 424 U.S. 

at 20, 25. That standard is satisfied if a law is “closely drawn” to further an “important 

government interest.” Id. at 25. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld FECA’s base 

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contribution limits because they further two important interests: reducing the opportunity for 

contributors “to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders” in 

exchange for large contributions, and reducing “the appearance of corruption stemming from 

public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial 

contributions.” Id. at 26-27; see also, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014); 

FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152-56 (2003); Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 198-99 

& n.19 (1981) (plurality). These interests also justify laws that prevent circumvention of the 

limits on direct contributions to candidates. See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452; FEC v. 

Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (“Colorado II”). 

“Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance 

regulation,” Congress has the power to “[p]revent[ ] corrupting activity from shifting” to take 

advantage of gaps in FECA’s statutory regime. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 165-66; see also Cal. 

Med. Ass’n, 453 U.S. at 198 n.18; Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 464. 

The six-month period and $2,600 contribution limit have been the law for approximately 

40 years. Therefore, to show that those provisions continue to further the anti-corruption 

interests by limiting circumvention, the FEC need only demonstrate that “experience under the 

present law confirms a serious threat of abuse” still exists. Colorado II, 533 U.S. at 457 (citing 

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992) (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (noting difficulty of 

mustering evidence to support long-enforced statutes)). 

A. The Six-Month Period Limits Circumvention of FECA’s Candidate 

Contribution Limit 

1. The Six-Month Period Helps Prevent Individuals from Using 

“Dummy”-Like PACs to Bootstrap Themselves to the Increased 

Contribution Limit 

The “six-month protective shield” works to prevent a circumvention scheme the D.C. 

Circuit has called “bootstrapping,” in which “two or three persons . . . acquire the $5,000 

committee contribution authority . . . merely by organizing themselves” as a “dummy” political 

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committee. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 857-58. Congress imposed the increased $5,000 limit on 

multicandidate PAC contributions to candidates to acknowledge the important role that party 

committees and other “broad-based citizen interest groups” play in federal elections. 120 Cong. 

Rec. H 7810 (Aug. 7, 1974). Requiring groups seeking a nearly doubled contribution limit to 

meet each of the three statutory criteria for multicandidate PAC status — including the sixmonth period — ensures that such groups are legitimate broad-based citizen interest groups 

rather than dummy organizations created during a campaign to circumvent the $2,600 limit. 

One of the most egregious examples of quid pro quo corruption that motivated Congress 

to enact the six-month period involved dummy PACs. In the two-week period before the 1972 

presidential election, the dairy industry funneled $2 million in support for President Nixon into 

$2,500 contributions made to hundreds of “dummy” political committees. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 

839 n.36; Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, S. Rep. No. 

93-981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 615 & n.44, 736-42 (1974) (“Final Report”). Those dummy 

committees then contributed the money to the Republican Party, which passed the money on to 

the President’s re-election campaign. Final Report at 738. In return, the administration reversed 

the Agriculture Department’s two-week old decision not to increase milk price supports. Id. at 

1209. This transaction reportedly cost the American public about $100 million. Richard Reeves, 

President Nixon: Alone in the White House 309 (Simon & Schuster 2001). 

2. PACs That Are Less than Six Months Old Present an Increased Risk 

of Circumvention 

 The six-month period is an essential aspect of the multicandidate PAC criteria. The other 

two requirements — that a PAC have at least 51 contributors and have made at least five 

candidate contributions — help limit the risk of circumvention by ensuring that a PAC has a bare 

minimum threshold amount of broad-based financial support and diverse candidate interest 

before earning the $5,000 limit. But those two requirements alone are insufficient because they 

can be satisfied quickly, and the risk of circumvention can persist long after that time. 

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 Starting a PAC is easy. It requires just two people, one bank account, and one form. See

11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(a), 102.1(d), 102.7(a), 103.2.10 Satisfying the first two requirements for 

multicandidate PAC status can also be done quickly; Stop PAC took only 24 days to do so after 

its registration. Stop PAC obtained not just 51, but “over 1000 contributors,” raising “around 

$20,000,” within just two weeks of its registration using nothing but emails. (FEC Facts ¶ 12.) 

Stop PAC then contributed to five candidates in one day, when it gave $2,600 to Innis but only 

$250 to four other candidates. (Id. ¶ 14.) Thus, but for the six-month period, Stop PAC would 

have obtained the increased contribution limit in just over three weeks. 

However, the risk that a PAC is not a real multicandidate PAC and instead is simply a 

circumvention tool formed by supporters of a particular candidate can persist for much longer — 

and increase as an election draws near. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 334 (“It is well known 

that the public begins to concentrate on elections only in the weeks immediately before they are 

held.”). In the throes of election season, a campaign’s supporters commonly seek all avenues to 

increase the candidate’s odds of winning. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Derek Willis, 2012 

Election Ended with Deluge of Donations and Spending, N.Y. Times (Dec. 7, 2012).11 

Candidates often start their campaigns long before an election. See, e.g., Harry Enten, If Hillary 

Clinton Runs for Present, When Might She Announce?, FiveThirtyEight.com (June 19, 2014) 

(“Most [presidential] candidates in most years have declared more than 200 days before the Iowa 

caucus since 1980 — and sometimes double that.” (emphasis added)).12 And thus the six-month 

                                                           

10 The FEC’s website provides instructions on the process, see FEC, Nonconnected PAC 

Registration Toolkit, http://www.fec.gov/info/toolkit.shtml#nonconnected (last visited Sept. 19, 

2014), which is so simple that the Washington Post recently reported on a 17-year-old “and his 

buddies” who said they started a PAC “as a joke” just “because we could.” Colby Itkowitz, How 

to Start a Super PAC Because You Can, Wash. Post (Apr. 10, 2014) (reporting that the teen said, 

“This can’t really be this easy”), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/wp/ 

2014/04/10/how-to-start-a-super-pac-because-you-can/. 

11 See http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/2012-election-ended-with-deluge-ofdonations-and-spending/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 

12 See http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/if-hillary-clinton-runs-for-president-when-mightshe-announce/. 

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protective shield is critical for limiting dummy PAC circumvention schemes that are motivated 

by a particular candidate’s campaign in the height of the election season. 

Even with the six-month period in place, PACs are often short-lived operations that 

proliferate just prior to elections and spend significant amounts of money, only to disappear 

before the next election. (See FEC Facts ¶¶ 16-20.) For example, in 2012, 464 PACs registered 

within six months before the November 6 general election and contributed in excess of $154,000 

to candidates. (Id. ¶ 18; Clark Decl. ¶ 10, FEC Exh. 11.) The pace of PAC registrations 

increased significantly in the weeks prior to the election. In September and October alone, 305 

PACs registered. (FEC Facts ¶ 16; Clark Decl. ¶ 9, FEC Exh. 11.) Then in November, another 

207 PACs registered in time to make contributions on or before the November 6 general election 

— and 100 of those PACs registered in just one day. (Id.) And of all the PACs that registered in 

2012 in time to make contributions for the 2012 general election, at least 97 have already 

terminated their operations prior to this year’s general election. (FEC Facts ¶ 19; Clark Decl. 

¶ 12, FEC Exh. 11.) Previous election years show similar patterns. (Id.) With a higher 

contribution limit, the incentive to create PACs for circumvention purposes would nearly double. 

3. Stop PAC and Its Close Ties with the Innis Campaign Illustrate How 

the Six-Month Period Prevents Potential Circumvention 

 The Court need not look beyond the parties to this case for a paradigmatic example of the 

risks that a candidate’s supporters might establish dummy PACs to bootstrap the $5,000 limit, 

were it not for the six-month period. Stop PAC and the congressional campaign of former 

plaintiff Niger Innis share extraordinarily close ties. The Innis campaign’s paid policy director, 

Greg Campbell, founded and is the chairman of Stop PAC. (FEC Facts ¶¶ 1, 11.). The Innis 

campaign’s treasurer, custodian of records, and counsel (Dan Backer) is also the treasurer, 

custodian of records, and counsel for Stop PAC. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 10.) Around the same time that Innis 

began exploring his run for Congress, Campbell first discussed the idea for Stop PAC with 

Backer, and he formed it at Backer’s urging right in the midst of Innis’s campaign. (Id. ¶ 9, 12.) 

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After Campbell and Innis met in 2013, Innis introduced Campbell to others in Nevada 

political circles, and the two worked at related groups. (FEC Facts ¶ 6.) During his work at 

TheTeaParty.net, Innis also met Backer, an attorney for that group. (Id. ¶ 7.) In November 

2013, Innis held a fundraiser and invited Campbell, who then donated to the campaign. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Soon after declaring his candidacy, Innis hired Campbell as policy director. (Id. ¶ 11.) 

Around the time of Innis’s November 2013 fundraiser, Campbell discussed the idea for 

Stop PAC with Backer. (FEC Facts ¶¶ 9, 12.) Backer advised Campbell that he should start the 

PAC. (Id. ¶ 12.) Stop PAC registered with the FEC on March 11, 2014 (id. ¶ 1), about three 

months before Innis’s June 10 primary (id. ¶ 2). By March 25, just two weeks later, Stop PAC 

had at least 51 contributors, satisfying the first multicandidate PAC requirement. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

The next day, Nevada billionaire Sheldon Adelson held a fundraiser for Innis, which 

Campbell and Backer attended. (FEC Facts ¶ 13.) During the planning for the event, Backer 

suggested to Innis that Stop PAC be listed on the fundraiser’s invitation, but Innis declined to 

have committees on the invitation. (Id.) Nine days later, on April 4, 2014, Stop PAC satisfied 

the second multicandidate PAC requirement by contributing to five federal candidates in one 

day. (Id. ¶ 14.) One of the candidates was Innis, to whom Stop PAC gave $2,600. (Id.) Before 

the election, there were two donors who had given the maximum to both Innis and Stop PAC.13 

As of April 4, 2014, over two months before Innis’s primary election, the only thing 

standing between Stop PAC and the $5,000 contribution benefit reserved for “broad-based 

citizen interest groups” was the six-month period. Even though Stop PAC had satisfied the other 

two multicandidate PAC requirements, the new PAC and the Innis campaign were so intertwined 

that Stop PAC itself has stated that it feared it would not be considered legally “independent” of 

the Innis campaign. (FEC Facts ¶ 15.) This scenario illustrates precisely the risk of potential 

                                                           

13 The two donors were the Tea Party Fund and Shaun McCutcheon, both with extensive 

ties to the Innis campaign’s treasurer. (See Stop PAC Report of Receipts and Disbursements at 

7-8 (July 8, 2014): http://docquery.fec.gov/cgi-bin/fecimg/?14961526994; NIFC Report of 

Receipts and Disbursements at 25, 34 (Aug. 27, 3014), http://docquery.fec.gov/cgibin/fecimg/?14970730473.) 

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circumvention that Congress intended the six-month “protective shield” to guard against. 

Buckley, 519 F.2d at 857-58.14 The donors who had maxed out to the Innis campaign could 

certainly utilize a new PAC like Stop PAC to provide additional support to the candidates of 

their choice without violating any other FECA provisions, as explained below. 

4. The Six-Month Period Remains a Vital Part of FECA’s AntiCircumvention Safeguards 

 Since Buckley, Congress and the FEC have enacted a number of additional anticircumvention safeguards that supplement the six-month period. In 1976, Congress limited 

contributions to political committees to $5,000 per calendar year. See 52 U.S.C. 

§§ 30116(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C)). Congress also enacted an “anti-proliferation” provision that treats 

contributions from PACs that are “established or financed or maintained or controlled” by the 

same person or entity as contributions from a single PAC. Id. § 30116(a)(5). Also, the FEC 

promulgated regulations implementing FECA’s earmarking provision, id. § 30116(a)(8), which 

in certain cases considers contributions made to a candidate through an intermediary to be a 

contribution from the original source, see 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(h)(1)-(2), 110.6(b)(1). 

 As the Supreme Court recently explained in McCutcheon, this post-Buckley anticircumvention framework limits large-scale circumvention schemes involving donors who seek 

to “channel[] massive amounts of money” to candidates “through a series of contributions to 

PACs” that intend to support those candidates. 134 S. Ct. at 1453-54 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, a donor no longer may flood a series of affiliated PACs that intend to contribute 

to one candidate with large sums of money earmarked for that candidate. See id. 

 These post-Buckley provisions, however, do not effectively prevent smaller-scale 

circumvention similar to, though possibly less blatant than, the type Buckley said justifies the six-

                                                           

14 Indeed, Stop PAC may be an authorized committee of, and share contribution limits with, 

the Innis campaign. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(f)(1). The FEC was not asked to address this 

question in the course of this constitutional challenge, but in any event, the facts here 

demonstrate the circumvention risk for this and other schemes that incorporate more individuals, 

including individuals less closely involved in a candidate’s campaign, in a new PAC’s creation. 

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month period: where “individuals . . . evad[e] the applicable contribution limitations by labeling 

themselves committees.” 424 U.S. at 35-36. The $5,000 limit on individual contributions to 

PACs, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(C), does not prevent this scenario. Nor would the antiproliferation provision, id. § 30116(a)(5), as the new PAC could not be deemed affiliated with 

the candidate’s campaign, 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(g)(5). Finally, the six-month period complements 

and bolsters the protections offered by the FEC’s earmarking regulations by ensuring disclosure 

by new PACs before they become multicandidate PACs, see infra Part III.B, which aids the 

detection and enforcement of violations, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68. 

As a result, the six-month period today remains an integral part of the legislative and 

regulatory anti-circumvention system, standing alongside Congress’s and the FEC’s efforts to 

prevent other types of circumvention. Cf. Cal. Med., 453 U.S at 199 n.20 (rejecting argument 

that limit on contributions to PACs was “superfluous” in light of other anti-circumvention 

provisions, since “Congress could reasonably have concluded § [30116](a)(1)(C) was a useful 

supplement to the other antifraud [FECA] provisions”). 

B. The Six-Month Period Promotes Campaign Finance Disclosure 

The six-month period also furthers the government’s important interests in promoting the 

disclosure of the sources of campaign funds by ensuring that groups seeking multicandidate PAC 

status file at least one disclosure report before becoming eligible to make candidate contributions 

of up to $5,000 per election. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 (FECA disclosure requirements 

justified by, inter alia, the need to “provide the electorate with information as to where political 

campaign money comes from” (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Citizens United, 558 

U.S. at 369 (affirming the government’s informational interest in disclosure of “who is speaking 

about a candidate shortly before an election”). The D.C. Circuit upheld the six-month period in 

part because “[d]uring the waiting period,” new PACs “would be subject to the reporting and 

disclosures provisions” of 52 U.S.C. § 30104. Buckley, 519 F.2d at 858. FECA requires PACs 

to file a disclosure report at least every six months. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(a)(4)(A). In these 

reports, a PAC must reveal most of its receipts and disbursements, and the identities of those 

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who contribute more than $200 in a calendar year. Id. § 30104(b). FECA requires PACs to file 

disclosure reports more frequently in election years, see, e.g., id. § 30104(a)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring 

a “pre-election report” that covers financial activity up to 20 days before an election), but even 

those reports provide a nearly three-week pre-election window in which a dummy-like PAC 

could form, become an ostensible multicandidate PAC, and affect election results without having 

first provided any disclosure about who it is or where it gets its funds until a month after the 

election, see id. § 30104(a)(4)(A)(iii). Given the high number of PACs that already register at 

the eleventh hour before an election (see FEC Facts ¶ 16), the last minute proliferation of new 

PACs with undisclosed donors is a threat to the integrity of the campaign finance system. 

C. The Six-Month Period and $2,600 Contribution Limit Are Closely Drawn 

The six-month period and $2,600 contribution limit strike an appropriate balance between 

giving PACs a unique opportunity for increased electoral participation while guarding against 

circumvention by first requiring just six months to pass. Under closely-drawn scrutiny’s 

“relatively complaisant” level of review, Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, this Court may not secondguess Congress’s judgment that a temporary six-month contribution limit of $2,600 (instead of 

$5,000) is an appropriately tailored means of achieving those goals. 

In Buckley, the Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to the one plaintiffs assert 

here: that the $2,600 limit (which was then $1,000) was “unrealistically low” because larger 

contributions allegedly would not cause corruption. 424 U.S. at 30. The Court explained that 

Congress need not engage in this kind of “fine tuning” — if Congress is “satisfied that some 

limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling 

might not serve as well as $1,000.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That constitutionally 

insignificant $1,000 difference in 1976 amounts to $4,180 in today’s dollars.15 And yet Stop 

PAC complains that its temporary inability to give an extra $2,400 violates the First Amendment. 

It does not. Congress has determined that different types of contributions present certain risks of 

                                                           

15 Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=1000&year1=1976&year2=2014 (last viewed Sept. 19, 2014). 

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corruption and has set limits accordingly. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 8530 (noting current limits 

ranging from $2,000 to $45,400). It is not the courts’ role to second-guess legislative judgments 

about the exact levels of these limits. Closely-drawn scrutiny is designed to “provide[] Congress 

with sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of regulations 

designed to protect the integrity of the political process.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137. 

To the extent plaintiffs challenge the length of the registration period, the Court should 

similarly defer to Congress’s judgment — which both the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit have 

affirmed — regarding how long a PAC must exist to demonstrate its multicandidate bona fides. 

Courts are not in a position to determine “with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction 

necessary to carry out the statute’s legitimate objectives. In practice, the legislature is better 

equipped to make such empirical judgments.” Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006). 

Because the registration period furthers the government’s important anti-circumvention interest, 

the First Amendment does not require that period to be any specific length that plaintiffs might 

prefer. Cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (upholding state law requiring 

voters to be registered with a political party for at least 30 days to be eligible to vote in primary). 

 

 D. The Six-Month Period and $2,600 Contribution Limit Place Minimal 

Burdens on a New PAC’s Ability to Speak and Associate with a Candidate 

The restrictions Stop PAC challenges place a relatively minimal burden on new PACs’ 

ability to associate with candidates and no burden on new PACs’ ability to speak. Buckley

analyzed the First Amendment implications of contribution limits, noting that they restrict “one 

aspect of the contributor’s freedom of political association” but do not prevent a contributor from 

speaking. 424 U.S. at 24, 28. Specifically, the Court held that the speech value of a contribution 

lies in its function as a “symbolic act” that provides “a general expression of support for the 

candidate and his views.” Id. at 21. But because a contribution does not “communicate the 

underlying basis for the support[,] . . . [t]he quantity of communication by the contributor does 

not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution.” Id. Thus, contribution limits leave 

contributors free to engage in the “symbolic act of contributing,” while in no way inhibiting their 

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ability to conduct other political activity, such as “discuss[ing] candidates and issues” or 

“becom[ing] a member of any political association and . . . assist[ing] personally in the 

association’s efforts on behalf of candidates.” Id. at 21-22. 

Nevertheless, plaintiffs complain that the provisions they attack place a “substantial 

burden” on their ability to “associate with and demonstrate their support for candidates in a 

timely manner.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 54.) But Stop PAC has already contributed to Innis and other 

candidates, and thus Stop PAC has associated with those candidates. The “general expression of 

support” conveyed by Stop PAC’s contributions would “not increase perceptibly with the size of 

[Stop PAC’s desired increased] contribution.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. And so FECA’s 

requirement that Stop PAC wait a few months before contributing more to those same candidates 

imposes no substantial burden on its ability to associate. Stop PAC’s claims also ring hollow in 

light of its failure to use alternative ways to support candidates. (FEC Facts ¶ 3.) 

IV. NEITHER THE $2,600 CONTRIBUTION LIMIT NOR THE LIMITS ON 

MULTICANDIDATE PAC CONTRIBUTIONS TO PARTIES VIOLATES THE 

FIFTH AMENDMENT 

 Congress’ ability to “weigh competing constitutional interests” while setting contribution 

limits is “an area in which it enjoys particular expertise.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137. FECA 

limits more than a dozen different types of contributions in amounts ranging from $2,000 to 

$45,400 per election, each reflecting a balance between promoting participation in the political 

system and limiting the risk and appearance of corruption.16 The Fifth Amendment does not 

prevent Congress from exercising its expertise, nor does it require FECA to treat different groups 

the same, as plaintiffs ask in their equal protection claims (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-50, 56-63). 

Plaintiffs must show that they were “treated differently from others who were similarly 

situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus.” Equity in 

Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011). They cannot. But even if they 

                                                           

16 See FEC, Contribution Limits 2013-14, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ 

contriblimits.shtml (last viewed Sept. 19, 2014). 

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could make that showing, the “discrimination” they allege would easily be justified under 

rational basis review, which applies here since there is no suspect class or fundamental 

constitutional right at stake. See, e.g., U.S. v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2012). And 

even if “closely drawn” scrutiny applied, these limits would satisfy it. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 

95 (rejecting equal protection challenge to provision that discriminated between candidates of 

different parties because it was in furtherance of sufficiently important governmental interests”). 

A. FECA Does Not Discriminate Against New PACs or Multicandidate PACs 

The first reason that plaintiffs’ equal protection claims fail is that FECA does not 

discriminate against new PACs or multicandidate PACs. Stop PAC and the Tea Party Fund each 

complain that they want a specific benefit the other has. Stop PAC wants the Tea Party Fund’s 

$5,000 per election candidate contribution limit. The Tea Party Fund wants Stop PAC’s higher 

party contribution limits. They both miss the bigger picture: PACs as a whole are generally a 

privileged class among FECA-regulated entities. And as plaintiffs’ own claims highlight, new 

PACs and multicandidate PACs each enjoy benefits under FECA not available to others. 

Plaintiffs can claim discrimination only by narrowly focusing on isolated FECA 

provisions. But FECA is a much broader statute, and the Supreme Court has rejected plaintiffs’ 

myopic approach in determining whether FECA limits violate equal protection. In California 

Medical Association v. FEC, an association argued that FECA’s $5,000 limit on its contributions 

to multicandidate PACs violated equal protection because FECA permits corporations to give 

unlimited amounts to their connected political committees for administrative and certain other 

purposes. 453 U.S. at 200. But the Court held that this did not qualify as “discrimination” given 

that plaintiffs’ “claim of unfair treatment ignores the plain fact that the statute as a whole 

imposes far fewer restrictions on . . . associations than it does on corporations and unions.” Id. 

Similarly, FECA as a whole bestows many advantages on new and multicandidate PACs 

that other contributors do not enjoy. First, while PACs may contribute $2,600 or $5,000 per 

election to candidates and tens of thousands annually to parties, other groups like corporations, 

unions, and foreign nationals may not contribute at all to candidates or parties. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 

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30118, 30121. Second, the opportunity that PACs have to make $5,000 contributions to 

candidates is a benefit that only political parties share — individuals, partnerships, and 

associations are always limited to $2,600 per candidate. Id. §§ 30101(11), 30116(a)(1)(A). 

Third, new and multicandidate PACs may register as “hybrid” PACs that can accept unlimited 

contributions from nearly any source to fund unlimited independent expenditures, as Stop PAC 

and the Tea Party Fund have done. (FEC Facts ¶ 1, 21; Clark Decl. ¶ 5, FEC Exh. 11.) In 

contrast, political parties and connected political committees, like those linked to candidates or 

corporations, may not accept such unlimited funds. See Stop This Insanity Inc. v. FEC, --- F.3d -

--, 2014 WL 3824225 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 5, 2014); Republican Nat’l Comm., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 

150. This is a nuanced structure that grants different groups an increased ability to participate in 

the political process consistent with their particular corruption risk. 

Plaintiffs have not suffered discrimination at the hands of FECA and thus their equal 

protection claims fail on this ground alone.17 See Cal Med., 453 U.S. at 200. 

B. New PACs and Multicandidate PACs Are Not Similarly Situated 

Plaintiffs’ equal protection claims also fail because new PACs and multicandidate PACs 

are not similarly situated. “Similarly situated” requires that the subjects of the claimed 

differential treatment “are in all relevant respects alike.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730-31 

(4thCir. 2002). But plaintiffs’ own complaint effectively acknowledges that they do not meet 

that standard by describing new PACs as “grassroots organizations that have spontaneously 

mobilized” but multicandidate PACs as “entrenched institutions.” (Am. Compl. at 1.) 

In addition, new PACs are more likely than multicandidate PACs to be tools for 

circumvention created at the behest of a candidate or his or her supporters. See supra Part III.A. 

This is particularly true during the critical six months leading up to an election when both PAC 

registrations and the incentive to funnel funds to a candidate may increase. Id. Furthermore, 

                                                           

17 Plaintiff Alexandria Committee admitted in discovery that the FECA provisions it 

challenges do not treat it differently from any other local party committee (FEC Facts ¶ 30), and 

so its claim should be dismissed as well. 

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new PACs are less likely to have disclosed any information to the public, and they are more 

likely to be unknown than bona fide multicandidate PACs are. See supra Part III.A-B. 

Stop PAC and the Tea Party Fund themselves are radically different. On April 4, 2014, 

when it first had more than 50 contributors and had made at least 5 candidate contributions, Stop 

PAC was still the paradigmatic example of a circumvention risk. See supra Part III.A.3. It was a 

little over three weeks old, had yet to file a disclosure report, and its founder, treasurer, and 

counsel were also working for the Innis campaign, to whom Stop PAC contributed the maximum 

permitted by FECA. Id. Two maximum contributors to the Innis campaign had also contributed 

the maximum to Stop PAC, providing a significant portion of Stop PAC’s receipts. See supra p. 

18 n.14. In stark contrast, the Tea Party Fund appears to be a model of the “broad-based citizen 

interest groups” to which Congress intended the $5,000 limit apply. By May 2014, the Tea Party 

Fund had over 100,000 contributors and had contributed to “dozens” of federal candidates. (FEC 

Facts ¶ 21.) The Tea Party Fund has filed scores of disclosure reports, reflecting millions in 

receipts and disbursements.18 It has also engaged in prominent campaigns to oust Speaker of the 

House John Boehner from office and to recruit former Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin to 

run for Senate in Alaska.19 New and multicandidate PACs are therefore not similarly situated. 

C. Rational Basis Is the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny 

Because the limits plaintiffs challenge do not discriminate against similarly situated 

groups, this Court need not consider the “second question” of “whether the discrimination 

alleged . . . is justified.” Cal. Med., 453 U.S. at 200; accord Veney, 293 F.3d at 730-31 

(declining to ask if “the disparity in treatment can be justified under the requisite level of 

                                                           

18 See FEC, Disclosure Data Search, Candidate and Committee Viewer, Tea Party 

Leadership Fund, http://www.fec.gov/fecviewer/CandidateCommitteeDetail.do. 

19 See Reid Wilson, Tea Party Attacks John Boehner at Home, Wash. Post (Apr. 22, 2014), 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/tea-party-attacks-boehner-athome/2014/04/22/f0724228-c96f-11e3-95f7-7ecdde72d2ea_story.html; Justin Sink, Tea Party 

Group Hopes to Draft Sarah Palin for Senate Run in Alaska, The Hill (May 1, 2013), 

http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/senate-races/297129-tea-party-group-hopes-to-draft-palin-forsenate-run. 

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26

scrutiny” because the plaintiff had not shown discrimination). If this Court does find it proper to 

apply constitutional scrutiny, however, the deferential “rational basis” standard should apply 

because this case involves no suspect class or fundamental right. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 

Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993); Pruess, 703 F.3d at 247. 

Plaintiffs could not reasonably contend that PACs constitute a “suspect class” akin to a 

racial- or gender-based classification. Also, we are aware of no court that has ever held that 

making a contribution is a “fundamental right” for equal protection purposes. Such a holding 

would be inappropriate in light of the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that contributions are 

not akin to pure speech as independent expenditures are; instead, they are “symbolic acts” that 

provide a “general expression” of support for a candidate, but do not “communicate the 

underlying basis” for that support. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21; see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 

1441 (noting that right to make contributions is “not absolute”); Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161 

(contributions “lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression”). 

In a similar context, the D.C. Circuit has upheld contribution limits against an equal 

protection claim applying only rational-basis scrutiny. Blount v. SEC considered a law 

prohibiting municipal securities professionals from contributing to certain state political 

campaigns. 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The petitioner claimed that the law “violate[d] ... the 

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment” because it did not also apply to “bank officers and 

bankcontrolled political action committees.” Id. at 946 n.4. The court found it “unnecessary to 

evaluate this contention,” however, because the “Fifth Amendment requires only that the 

government have a rational basis for its distinction . . . and rational-basis review requires, if 

anything, less ‘mathematical nicety’ . . . than the First Amendment requires.” Id. (quoting Vance 

v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979)). 

D. The Contribution Limits Plaintiffs Challenge Are at a Minimum Rationally 

Related to the Government’s Important Interests 

Under rational basis review, a court is not to judge the “wisdom, fairness, or logic of 

legislative choices.” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313. A statute cannot be struck down simply 

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because it draws a classification that “is not made with mathematical nicety or because in 

practice it results in some inequality.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Rational-basis review requires a court to accept a legislature’s 

rationale for enacting a law, “even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Id. 

Accordingly, it is plaintiffs’ burden “to negative every conceivable basis which might support” 

the laws they claim are unconstitutional. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

1. The $2,600 Contribution Limit for New PACs Is Rationally Related to 

Lessening the Risk of Circumvention and Promoting Disclosure 

The “differing restrictions” that FECA places on new and multicandidate PACs, like 

other varied limits in FECA, “reflect a judgment by Congress that these that these entities have 

differing structures and purposes, and that they therefore may require different forms of 

regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.” Cal. Med., 453 U.S. at 201. 

As explained in detail above, see supra Part III.A, PACs that are less than six months old present 

an increased risk of circumvention, and that risk increases further as an election draws near. 

Indeed, Stop PAC’s many close ties with the Innis campaign illustrate how easily that risk could 

appear in the midst of a campaign. See supra Part III.A.3. In contrast, older PACs like the Tea 

Party Fund present less risk of bootstrapping. Such PACs are typically more established, have 

disclosed more information, are supported by a broader base of contributors and have supported 

a broader range of candidates. See supra Part IV.B. Thus, FECA’s requirement that new PACs 

prove their bona fides for a six-month period is rationally related to the important interests in 

deterring circumvention and promoting disclosure. 

2. The Limits on Contributions to Parties Lessen the Risk and 

Appearance of Corruption While Allowing Parties to Maintain Their 

Important Role in the Political System 

FECA’s limits on contributions from multicandidate PACs to political parties strike a 

balance between two important Congressional interests. On the one hand, those limits are set at 

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levels that help parties carry out their important electoral functions of selecting and supporting 

candidates for office. On the other hand, as the Supreme Court has held, reasonable ceilings on 

contributions to parties are justified to prevent parties from becoming “agents for spending on 

behalf of those who seek to produce obligated officeholders.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 145 

(internal quotation marks omitted).20 FECA’s PAC-to-party limits are calibrated to 

accommodate the corruption risks posed by contributions and the constitutionally compelled 

need to ensure adequate resources, and include special high limits on contributions from persons 

in recognition of the important role that individuals play in funding political-party activity. 

In 1976, Congress first limited contributions from individuals and PACs to political 

parties. Congress found it “appropriate to set a higher limit” on contributions “persons” may 

make to parties than it set on their contributions to candidates so as “to allow the political parties 

to fulfill their unique role in the political process.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1057 at 58 (Apr. 28, 

1976); cf. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 618 (1996) 

(noting Congress’s “general desire to enhance . . . an important and legitimate role for political 

parties in American elections”). Thus, while contributions from persons and multicandidate 

PACs to a candidate were limited to just $1,000 and $5,000 per election at the time, Congress 

allowed persons to give up to $20,000 annually, and multicandidate PACs $15,000 annually, to 

the national party committees.21

 In 2002, Congress enacted BCRA, which ended the parties’ practice of accepting socalled “soft money” contributions — a then-major source of party funding. McConnell, 540 U.S. 

at 122-26, 133. In the last election cycle before BCRA went into effect, nearly half of the money 

                                                           

20 Because political parties and their candidates and officeholders share “a special 

relationship and unity of interest,” contributions to a party “threaten to create — no less than 

would a direct contribution to the candidate — a sense of obligation” on the part of the 

candidate. McConnell, 540 U.S at 144. As a result, the “idea that large contributions to a 

national party can corrupt or, at the very least, create the appearance of corruption of federal 

candidates and officeholders is neither novel nor implausible.” Id.

21 State and local party committees were limited to receiving $5,000 annually. 

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raised by party committees reporting to the FEC came in the form of soft money.22 To ensure 

that political parties and candidates would still have sufficient funds, Congress increased 

FECA’s limits on contributions from persons to party committees.23 Congress rationally looked 

to individuals to replace those funds, as multicandidate PACs had contributed very little of 

political parties’ funding pre-BCRA.24 The person-to-national-party limit was raised from 

$20,000 to $25,000 per year (and indexed for inflation), and the person-to-state-and-local-party 

limit was raised from $5,000 to $10,000 per year. BCRA §§ 102, 307(a)(1)-(2) (codified at 52 

U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)(A)-(B), (D)). Congress thus enabled the parties to continue to “amass[] the 

resources necessary for effective advocacy” — a constitutional requirement when legislatures 

enact limits. Randall, 548 U.S. at 247 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21)). 

Because these increases were sufficient to provide the parties with needed resources, the 

limits on multicandidate PAC contributions to parties remained at their already generous levels. 

And more than a decade later, it is clear that no additional contribution limits need to be raised in 

order for candidates and parties to advocate effectively. In the last election cycle, candidates 

raised nearly $1.9 billion and political parties more than $1.6 billion in federal funds.25 

 The lower limits on multicandidate PAC contributions to political parties help limit 

corruption while imposing minimal burdens on PACs. PAC contributions to parties are “general 

expressions of support” that do “not increase perceptibly with the size of [the] contribution.” 

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. Therefore, the Tea Party Fund’s inability to give the Alexandria 

Committee an extra $5,000 does not burden its associational rights. Cf. supra Part III.D. 

                                                           

22 See FEC Press Release, Party Committees Raise More Than $1 Billion in 2001-2002

(Mar. 20, 2003), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2003/20030320party/20030103party.html. 

23 148 Cong. Rec. S2153 (2002) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“The soft money ban will 

work because we came to a reasonable compromise with regard to raising some of the existing 

hard money contribution limits by modest amounts, and indexing those limits for inflation.”). 

24 See, e.g., supra n. 24 (first four appended Tables). 

25 FEC Press Release, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of the 2011-2012 Election Cycle 

(Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/20130419_2012-24m-Summary.shtml. 

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Also, the lower limits have not imposed any substantial burden on multicandidate PACs 

generally or the Tea Party Fund in particular. Multicandidate PACs have generally focused their 

efforts on directly supporting candidates, not parties. (See FEC Facts ¶¶ 32-33.) For example, 

from the start of the 2004 election cycle, multicandidate PACs have contributed in excess of 

$239.1 million to candidates and only $30.1 million to party committees. (Id. ¶ 32.) The Tea 

Party Fund had only ever contributed once to a party committee before its contribution to the 

Alexandria Committee for this case. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 26.) At the same time, the Tea Party Fund has 

made no effort to assist the Alexandria Committee in other ways. (Id. ¶¶ 28-29.) 

Thus, Congress constitutionally permits “persons” under FECA to make higher 

contributions to party committees to ensure those committees have sufficient resources. 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons above, the FEC’s motion for summary judgment should be granted. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Lisa J. Stevenson* 

Deputy General Counsel – Law 

Kevin Deeley* 

Acting Associate General Counsel 

Harry J. Summers* 

Assistant General Counsel 

* Admitted pro hac vice

September 19, 2014 

Holly J. Baker* 

Kevin P. Hancock* 

/s/ 

Esther D. Gyory (VA Bar #76826) 

Attorneys 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

(202) 694-1650 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION 

 

 ) 

STOP RECKLESS ECONOMIC ) 

INSTABILITY CAUSED BY ) 

DEMOCRATS, et al., ) 

 ) Civ. No. 1:14-397 (AJT-IDD) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

 ) 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on September 19, 2014, I will electronically file the foregoing with 

the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of such filing 

to the following counsel for plaintiff: 

Dan Backer, Esq. 

DB Capitol Strategies PLLC 

203 South Union Street, Suite 300 

Alexandria, VA 22314 

DBacker@DBCapitolStrategies.com 

Michael Thomas Morley, Esq.

Coolidge-Reagan Foundation

1629 K Street, Suite 300

Washington, D.C. 20006

morley@coolidgereagan.org

Jerad Najvar

Najvar Law Firm

4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 625

Houston, TX 77027

jerad@najvarlaw.com

Case 1:14-cv-00397-AJT-IDD Document 57-1 Filed 09/19/14 Page 39 of 40 PageID# 713
2

 /s/ 

Esther D. Gyory (VA Bar # 76826) 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 

999 E Street NW 

Washington, DC 20463 

Telephone: (202) 694-1650 

Fax: (202) 219-0260 

EGyory@fec.gov 

Case 1:14-cv-00397-AJT-IDD Document 57-1 Filed 09/19/14 Page 40 of 40 PageID# 714