1

Filed 8/31/15 P. v. Gosai CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ASHIKA PRIYA GOSAI,

Defendant and Appellant.

A142535

(San Mateo County

Super. Ct. No. SC079613A)

Two children, ages 11 and 16, ran across a six-lane road against a red light and 

were hit by a car driven by defendant Ashika Priya Gosai, a 21-year-old nursing student, 

whose view of the children was blocked by a truck in the next lane and who thus was 

unable to avoid impact. Defendant panicked, drove away from the scene of the accident, 

but within five minutes voluntarily returned and cooperated with the police who had just 

arrived on scene. Defendant was exonerated of all fault for the accident but prosecuted 

for leaving the scene of an injury accident, an offense that may be punished as a felony or 

misdemeanor. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a).) Defendant contends the court erroneously 

precluded her from presenting expert testimony that she failed to stop at the scene 

because of an acute stress response and abused its discretion in refusing to designate the 

offense as a misdemeanor. We shall affirm the conviction but modify the judgment to 

reduce the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor.

Evidence Presented at Trial

The following evidence was presented at a trial.
2

On the morning of August 7, 2012, defendant, a 21-year-old nursing student, left 

work and was driving to her cousin’s house in Millbrae. Less than a mile from her 

destination, she stopped at a red light at the intersection of El Camino Real and Hillcrest 

Boulevard. When the traffic light turned green defendant and other motorists started 

through the intersection. Two children, 16-year-old Kara and her 11-year-old brother

Justin, jumped off the curb on the opposite side of the street and ran through the 

intersection against a red light and across six lanes of traffic. Defendant, whose view was 

obscured by a large truck in the next lane, did not see the children until it was too late. 

She struck and injured them.

Defendant had not taken any drugs or consumed any alcohol that day and was not 

texting or talking on the phone. When she struck the children she was driving at about 30 

miles per hour, within the posted speed limit. An expert on auto collisions who testified 

for the prosecution found the children wholly at fault for the accident. The expert testified 

that the children were visible to defendant for only about one second as they ran in front 

of her car, which did not provide sufficient time for a driver to stop and avoid impact.

Defendant knew she hit “a person” but later said that she did not see that she hit 

two children. Defendant admitted she “panicked.” She testified that “[i]t just happened so 

fast” that she “didn’t know what to do,” “didn’t know how to help,” and “didn’t even 

know what to do with [her]self.” She drove to her nearby cousin’s house for help. She 

sped down El Camino Real, turned onto the street where her cousin lived, and pulled into 

the driveway of her cousin’s house. The distance from the site of the accident to the 

cousin’s house is .8 miles, about a two-minute drive.

Defendant stepped from her car and from the driveway called to her cousin for 

help. A neighbor heard defendant repeatedly “screaming” her cousin’s name. The 

neighbor described defendant as “hysterical” and “out of control.” The cousin came out 

of the house and defendant asked her to accompany her to the accident site but the cousin 

said she could not leave her three children unattended. Defendant decided to return alone, 

backed out of the driveway onto the street, and pointed her car toward El Camino Real.

However, a motorist who had followed her from the scene of the accident pulled in front 
3

of her car, blocking her departure. The motorist testified he “believe[d]” defendant had 

just stepped from the car into the driveway when he “was able to catch up” with her but 

the neighbor corroborated defendant’s statement that she had backed out of the driveway 

and was heading toward El Camino Real when confronted by the motorist. The motorist 

testified that he parked his car to block hers from leaving, called 911, and yelled at her 

that she “hit two kids” and “need[ed] to go back.” Defendant responded, “I know, I 

know.” Defendant testified that she asked the motorist to return with her because she was 

“scared” and “didn’t want to drive” but he testified “I don’t remember that.” The motorist 

moved his car so defendant could leave and she drove back, returning to the scene within 

five minutes of the collision. At the scene, other motorists with medical training had 

provided aid to the children until paramedics arrived. Defendant returned about one 

minute after the first police officer and ambulance had reached the site.

Witnesses described defendant upon her return as “hysterical,” “in shock,” 

“upset,” “stunned,” and “[t]rying to absorb what had just happened.” One witness said 

defendant was crying hysterically, had her hands to her face, and kept repeating “Did I do 

that?” An officer who interviewed defendant testified that she was “very upset,” “crying,” 

and asked “a couple of times” about the children’s condition. The officer said it took 10

minutes “to get her enough calmed down where [he] was able to talk to her.” An audio 

recording of the police interview reveals defendant to be crying and distraught. 

Defendant provided a valid driver’s license, her vehicle registration and proof of 

insurance to the officer. She told the officer she drove to her cousin’s house because she 

“panicked” and was “in shock.”

The children were taken to the hospital for treatment. Kara suffered a deep 

laceration to her foot from a sandal strap driven into her heel by the force of the collision. 

She was released from the hospital the same day of the accident but was wheel-chair 

bound for over two months. Justin suffered a serious head injury and has cognitive 

impairment, necessitating his placement in special education classes.
4

Verdict and Sentencing

The prosecutor charged defendant with two felony counts of failing to stop at the 

scene of an injury accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)) and the jury found defendant 

guilty as charged. The probation officer’s sentencing report notes that defendant has been 

gainfully employed since age 18, is pursuing a career in nursing, and has no criminal 

history apart from a traffic infraction incurred as a minor. Months before the report was 

prepared, defendant passed the vocational nurse examination but her eligibility for 

licensure is under review due to this conviction. The probation officer recommended 

probation but concluded “the extent of the victims’ injuries and [defendant] leaving the 

scene warrant a significant sanction. Therefore, [it] is recommended the defendant serve a 

one-year jail commitment” as a condition of probation. The probation officer reasoned:

“Although the collision was unavoidable, the outcome of the entire incident may have 

been different had she stopped to assist the victims.”

The injured children’s parents provided written statements included in the 

probation officer’s report. The children’s father asked, “What makes someone do what 

she did? – to leave two hurt children lying in the street expecting someone else to help 

them. That is the low of the low. . . . I am so mad at [defendant] for leaving them there –

that being said I do not think the court should go lightly on her. . . . I think she needs to 

learn a lesson that takes away her freedom just like ours were taken away on the 7th day 

of August, 2012.”

Defendant’s counsel submitted a sentencing memorandum asking the court to 

reduce the felonies to misdemeanors and stating defendant’s “one desire in life is to 

become a health care professional and to help others. Certainly, the public interest is 

served by her achieving that goal. A felony conviction would for all intents and purposes 

make that goal impossible.” (Pen. Code, § 17, subd. (b).) Defendant wrote to the court 

saying she “felt disgusted” with herself because she grew up wanting to “save lives” and 

“be a hero to someone” but, when the accident happened, “panicked” and “was not able 

to think right away.” Defendant wrote: “I realize I made a mistake, but please give me 

another chance to show you how I can help society, please don’t take away what I have 
5

worked so hard to accomplish. I know I can make a difference. I was not able to prove 

myself the first time in my accident, but please give me an opportunity to show you the 

second time around.” Defendant’s employer, nursing instructor, friends, and family 

members wrote to the court attesting to her good character.

At the sentencing hearing on June 20, 2014, E. Robert Cassidy, a psychologist,

testified the accident was “a highly emotional traumatic event” that caused defendant to 

experience “an acute stress response” marked by “a sense of panic, extreme anxiety, a 

loss of rational thinking,” impulsive behavior and disconnection from reality. Cassidy 

noted that defendant sought medical attention for her anxiety on the evening of the 

accident and an evaluation showed her to have a rapid pulse rate and elevated blood 

pressure, “all indicating that she was experiencing even that many hours after the incident 

a great deal of distress.” He interviewed defendant and found her extremely remorseful 

about her conduct and unlikely to reoffend. The psychologist testified: “I didn’t see her as 

a person who was given to criminality and needs to have a period [of incarceration] 

where she can be rehabilitated.”

The court dismissed one of the two counts of failing to stop at the scene of an 

injury accident, finding a single violation even though more than one person was injured.

The Attorney General acknowledges the correctness of this ruling. (People v. Newton 

(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1002-1005.)

In sentencing, the court stated the following: “This is a general intent offense. 

[Defendant] ultimately at different points has indicated she panicked. I do think that she 

knows she hit two children. The thing that I am concerned with here is the kind of the 

overall tone of what I am hearing here. [¶] Yes, the two minors involved in this case 

Justin and Kara did an incredibly stupid thing. Their actions back on that date in August 

are going to irreparably change their lives just like the actions on that day will change 

[defendant’s] life. They shouldn’t have crossed the roadway in a red light. And I think 

they have learned a very hard reality having done that. [¶] That having been said, that 

doesn’t mean that [defendant] is the victim in this whole thing. Had she simply stopped at 

the scene, the great likelihood is she would not have faced any real civil [or criminal]
6

liability because it’s evident from the testimony put on at trial that the underlying 

collision was caused by the actions of Justin and Kara by having crossed the street 

against the red light. [¶] It’s what occurred from that point forward that we are dealing 

with here, and [from] that standpoint [defendant] is no victim, and her actions throughout 

the trial candidly I did not take as being simply honest, the uncontrolled emotion, I 

believe there were many times [that] things . . . were being enhanced for the purpose[] of 

trying to influence the jury . . . . I have considered [this] as it relates to the defense 

requests here [on] a number of things.”

Following this statement, the court denied defendant’s request to reduce the 

offense from a felony to a misdemeanor. The court said it reviewed cases on the matter

but provided no reasons for its ruling apart from its general comments noted above. The 

court stated the denial was “without prejudice for further and future review” but stated no 

conditions that, if met, would support reducing the offense to a misdemeanor. The court 

suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation conditioned upon serving six 

months in county jail. The court said it reached this result by “a balancing and measuring 

in terms of understanding the underlying collision which clearly was not the fault of 

[defendant] versus her actions by having fled the scene.” The court found defendant’s 

conduct “warrants some form of punishment. [¶] As the parents of Justin had indicated in 

their statements to the court here, their anger in leaving two hurt children laying on the 

road expecting that somebody else is going to help them, that being the lowest of the 

low.” The court denied defendant’s request for bail pending appeal and set a date for her 

to surrender, subsequently continued to September 6, 2014. Defendant presumably has 

now served her jail sentence and remains on felony probation.

Discussion

1. The court did not err in precluding a psychologist from testifying that defendant had 

an acute stress response that made her failure to stop at the scene of the accident

reasonable under the circumstances.

In pretrial proceedings, the defense offered the psychologist who later testified at 

the sentencing hearing to testify at trial that defendant had an acute stress response that 
7

made her failure to stop at the scene of the accident reasonable under the circumstances.

Defense counsel argued that a motorist must stop at the scene of an injury accident “as 

promptly as possible under the circumstances” (People v. Odom (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 

641, 647) and that those circumstances include the motorist’s mental state. Defense 

counsel told the court: “We are not saying that this is evidence of diminished capacity or 

insanity or an affirmative defense. . . . [W]e are saying a crime was never committed . . .

because . . . the driver must stop his or her vehicle as soon as is reasonably possible under 

the circumstances” and defendant’s “acute stress response . . . required that she goes 

eight-tenths of a mile until she got a grip of herself and then turned around and came 

back.” The prosecution objected to the proffered evidence. The court ruled that expert 

testimony on defendant’s mental state is irrelevant to the charged offense, a general intent 

crime and, thus, inadmissible.

On appeal, defendant argues that exclusion of the psychologist’s testimony 

deprived her of her constitutional right to present a defense. (Washington v. Texas (1967) 

388 U.S. 14, 18-19.) The Attorney General responds that defendant forfeited the

constitutional claim by failing to assert it in the trial court and, in any event, the evidence 

was properly excluded as irrelevant.

Defendant’s contention, whether addressed as a state law or constitutional claim, 

fails on the merits. “The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a 

person . . . shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene” and present identification and 

render reasonable assistance to the injured. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a).) “ ‘The 

legislative purpose of [the law] is to prevent the driver of a vehicle involved in an injurycausing accident from leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of medical 

care and from attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by 

failing to identify oneself.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 82, 87.)

It is true, as defendant argues, that the law must be given a “reasonable 

interpretation” and does not “require the driver to do an impossible or useless thing.” 

(People v. Steele (1929) 100 Cal.App. 639, 646.) Thus, a motorist rendered unconscious 

by a collision is not expected to provide identifying information until he regains 
8

consciousness. (People v. Scofield (1928) 203 Cal. 703, 708.) Likewise, “it is conceivable 

that a vehicle might be traveling at such a high rate of speed that it could not be stopped 

immediately after the collision, or that the highway is in such condition that the driver

would be compelled to move on to a safe stopping place.” (Steele, supra, at p. 646.) The 

law, however, clearly contemplates that a motorist stop at the scene of an injury accident 

as soon as physically possible. Defendant has not cited any case in which a motorist’s 

panic, or other subjective mental state, was found to excuse the obligation to stop. Injury 

accidents are traumatic events that inevitably cause mental distress, but the law requires 

motorists to maintain sufficient self-control to meet the basic obligation to stop and 

provide identification and aid. The offense of failing to stop at the scene of an injury 

accident is a general intent crime. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1019.) 

In a general intent crime, “the required mental state entails only an intent to do the act 

that causes the harm.” (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 518, fn. 15.) Defendant 

intended to leave the accident scene and the proffered expert testimony would tend to 

prove only why she did so. The testimony was properly excluded as irrelevant.

2. The court abused its discretion in punishing defendant as a felon.

Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying her request to 

treat the offense as a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The Attorney General argues that 

“the court stated the reasons for its decision, and made the ‘thoughtful and conscientious 

assessment’ that Alvarez [People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968] 

requires. The most [defendant] has shown is that reasonable people might disagree with 

the assessment of those factors. That showing is not sufficient to find an abuse of 

discretion.” However, the Attorney General makes no further attempt to defend the 

reasonableness of the sentencing decision or to explain why the relevant criteria do not 

compel reduction of the offense to a misdemeanor. “[T]rial court discretion is not 

unlimited. ‘The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a 

legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the 

subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is 
9

shown.’ ” (Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 

348, 355.) We can find no reasonable basis for punishing defendant as a felon.

“The Legislature has classified most crimes as either a felony or a misdemeanor, 

by explicitly labeling the crime as such, or by the punishment prescribed. . . . . There is, 

however, a special class of crimes involving conduct that varies widely in its level of 

seriousness. Such crimes, commonly referred to as ‘wobbler[s]’ [citation], are chargeable 

or, in the discretion of the court, punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” 

(People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 789 (Park).) Failing to stop at an injury accident 

is a “wobbler.” (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b).) 

The prosecutor’s decision to charge a wobbler as a felony is not determinative of 

whether a defendant is properly punished for a felony; that decision is for the court. (Pen. 

Code, § 17, subd. (b)(3); Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 790.)1“[T]he Legislature has 

empowered the courts to decide, in each individual case, whether the crime should be 

classified as a felony or a misdemeanor.” (Park, supra, at p. 801, italics added.) Penal 

Code section 17 “ ‘ “specifically leaves the determination of the nature of the conviction 

to the discretion of the judge.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 800.) “The court’s authority to exercise 

discretion in this regard is a long-established component of California’s criminal law.”

(Id. at p. 790.)

A court properly exercises its discretion to reduce a wobbler to a misdemeanor

when it finds that felony punishment, and its consequences, are not appropriate for that 

particular defendant. (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 801.) “Such a defendant is not 

blameless” (ibid.) but neither is such a defendant one that requires felony punishment for 

rehabilitation or to deter future criminality by the threat of increased punishment for a 

subsequent felony offense (id. at pp. 790, 801-802). In making its determination, the 

 

1

Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3) provides, in relevant part: “When a crime is 

punishable, in the discretion of the court, either by imprisonment in the state prison or 

imprisonment in the county jail . . . it is a misdemeanor for all purposes . . . [w]hen the 

court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence and at the time of 

granting probation, or on application of the defendant or probation officer thereafter, the 

court declares the offense to be a misdemeanor.”
10

court should consider factors relevant to similar sentencing decisions, including “ ‘the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude 

toward the offense or his [or her] traits of character as evidenced by his [or her] behavior 

and demeanor at the trial.’ [Citations.] When appropriate, judges should also consider the 

general objectives of sentencing such as those set forth in California Rules of Court, 

rule 410 [now rule 4.410].”

2

(People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra, 14 Cal.4th at 

p. 978.)

Virtually all of these factors militate in favor of treating defendant’s offense as a 

misdemeanor, rather than branding defendant as a felon. Defendant left the accident site

in a state of panic, not with cold indifference to the possibility of injuries or in a 

calculated effort to avoid liability. Defendant testified the accident “just happened so 

fast” that she “didn’t know what to do,” “didn’t know how to help,” and “didn’t even 

know what to do with [her]self.” Eyewitnesses confirm that defendant’s upset was real, 

not feigned. Defendant drove less than one mile to her cousin’s house seeking help and 

voluntarily returned to the accident site minutes later. The probation report says “[i]t is 

unknown whether she would have returned to the scene had she not been followed,” but 

the weight of the evidence supports defendant’s claim that she resolved to return to the 

scene and repositioned her car to do so before the motorist who followed her appeared 

and blocked her return. The motorist testified he “believe[d]” defendant had just reached 

her cousin’s driveway when he confronted her, but a neighbor who witnessed the 

 

2 California Rules of Court, rule 4.140 states as follows: “(a) General objectives of 

sentencing include: [¶] (1) Protecting society; [¶] (2) Punishing the defendant; 

[¶] (3) Encouraging the defendant to lead a law abiding life in the future and deterring 

him or her from future offenses; [¶] (4) Deterring others from criminal conduct by 

demonstrating its consequences; [¶] (5) Preventing the defendant from committing new 

crimes by isolating him or her for the period of incarceration; [¶] (6) Securing restitution 

for the victims of crime; and [¶] (7) Achieving uniformity in sentencing. [¶] (b) Because 

in some instances these objectives may suggest inconsistent dispositions, the sentencing 

judge must consider which objectives are of primary importance in the particular case. 

The sentencing judge should be guided by statutory statements of policy, the criteria in 

these rules, and the facts and circumstances of the case.”
11

confrontation corroborated defendant’s account (stated to the police and at trial) that 

defendant had backed her car out of the driveway and was heading toward the El Camino 

accident site when the motorist arrived. Defendant’s cousin also corroborated defendant’s 

account in a letter to the court at sentencing.

Defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense also supports a lesser 

punishment. There is ample evidence that defendant understands she made a grave 

mistake and is remorseful. Defendant expressed concern for the children when she 

returned to the scene and saw their injuries. A witness saw defendant crying and, with her 

hands to her face, asking repeatedly “Did I do that?” and the officer who interviewed 

defendant at the scene testified that defendant was “very upset,” “crying,” and asked “a 

couple of times” about the children’s condition. Defendant wrote to the court that she was 

“disgusted” with herself, “extremely sorry” and “will always regret what I have done for 

the rest of my life.” She wrote: “I realize I made a mistake, but please give me another 

chance to show you how I can help society.” Defendant’s employer wrote that defendant 

expressed to him “regret for the collision as well as remorse for leaving the scene.” 

Defendant’s nursing instructor wrote that defendant has repeatedly “expressed great 

remorse for what happened” and attested to defendant’s “nature as being one who will 

greatly apply the lessons from this experience and will not repeat the same mistake.”

Defendant’s character, background and lack of criminal history also weigh heavily 

in favor of leniency. Since graduating high school, defendant has been working steadily 

while attending school to become a nurse. Her employer vouched for defendant’s strong 

work ethic and her nursing instructor said defendant has the potential to become a highly 

capable Vocational Nurse “because of her kind, caring ways as well as her excellent 

nursing skills” but noted that a felony conviction will impair her ability to obtain a 

professional license necessary to a nursing career. Defendant’s rehabilitation and ability 

to pay restitution are ill-served by a felony conviction that will limit her occupational 

prospects. “[T]he court’s exercise of discretion . . . contemplates the imposition of 

misdemeanor punishment for a wobbler ‘in those cases in which the rehabilitation of the 
12

convicted defendant either does not require, or would be adversely affected by’ ”

punishment as a felon. (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 790.)

The reasons offered by the probation officer and the court to justify the more 

extreme characterization of the offense do not withstand scrutiny. The probation report 

states that “the extent of the victims’ injuries and [defendant] leaving the scene warrant a 

significant sanction.” The trial court noted that defendant left “two hurt children laying 

on the road.” Every violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) leaves 

potentially injured persons at the scene of an accident but the offense is a wobbler

because the Legislature has recognized that violations “var[y] widely in its level of 

seriousness.” (Park, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 789.) Many factors may make a particular 

violation more blameworthy so as to warrant felony punishment but the extent of the 

accident victims’ injuries is not one of those factors. The children’s injuries are of course 

unfortunate but they provide no basis for refusing to treat the offense as a misdemeanor. 

Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) “makes criminal the flight from the accident, 

not the accident” (People v. Valdez, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 85) and, thus, a violator 

of the statute is not criminally responsible for injuries caused by the collision that 

occurred prior to leaving the scene (id. at p. 90). This principle applies even where the 

defendant is at fault for the accident, which defendant here was not.

The probation officer stated: “Although the collision was unavoidable, the 

outcome of the entire incident may have been different had she stopped to assist the 

victims.” Nothing in the record supports this statement. To the contrary, the record 

reflects that other medically trained persons came to the victims’ immediate assistance.

Moreover, the record also reflects that although the defendant was aware she had struck a 

person, she was not aware that she had injured the two children. Further, this incident did 

not occur on a lonely road where the victims were likely to go unattended if the defendant 

did not stop, but on a busy thoroughfare where others were present to provide needed 

assistance, as in fact occurred. The children’s injuries were not aggravated by defendant’s 

flight and would not have been ameliorated had defendant immediately stopped. Their 

injuries were a result of the collision, not defendant’s flight.
13

In sentencing defendant, the court did not state reasons specific to its denial of her 

request for misdemeanor treatment but did make general comments that defendant saw 

herself incorrectly as a victim and had emotional outbursts at trial that were “enhanced 

for the purpose[] of trying to influence the jury.” Assuming the correctness of the court’s 

observations, we cannot agree that a defendant’s self-pity and emotional appeal to a jury

warrant felony punishment, given the overwhelming weight of the factors favoring 

leniency. The Legislature intended that some motorists who leave the scene of an injury 

accident shall be treated as felons and others as misdemeanants. The record contains no 

reason to question defendant’s characterization of herself as a “remorseful young nursing 

student with no criminal history of any consequence who, when blamelessly caught up in 

a harrowing accident, first panicked and fled, and then came back of her own free will 

within five minutes.” Indeed, the court may well have recognized the appropriateness of 

ultimately reducing defendant’s offense to a misdemeanor when it expressly made its 

ruling “without prejudice to further and future review.” In all events, we conclude that 

felony punishment, and its consequences, are not appropriate in this case, and that it was 

an abuse of discretion to fail to immediately reduce defendant’s offense to a 

misdemeanor.

Disposition

The judgment is modified to reduce the Vehicle Code section 20001, 

subdivision (a) conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor and is affirmed as so 

modified. 
14

_________________________

Pollak, Acting P.J.

We concur:

_________________________

Siggins, J.

_________________________

Jenkins, J.