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MERIDA PART TWO: INSURGENCY AND

TERRORISM IN MEXICO

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 4, 2011

Serial No. 112–108 Serial No. 112–48

(Foreign Affairs Committee) (Homeland Security Committee)

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

and http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

CONNIE MACK, Florida, Chairman 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

(III)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota 

JOE WALSH, Illinois 

PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

ROBERT L. TURNER, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JANICE HAHN, California 

MICHAEL J. RUSSELL, Staff Director & Chief Counsel 

KERRY ANN WATKINS, Senior Policy Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILLY LONG, Missouri, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex 

Officio) 

DR. R. NICK PALARINO, Staff Director 

DIANA R. BERGWIN, Clerk 

TAMLA SCOTT, Minority Subcommittee Director 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S Department of State . 8

Mr. Rodney G. Benson, Assistant Administrator, Chief of Intelligence, Drug 

Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice ............................... 14

Ms. Mariko Silver, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 29

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement ............................... 10

Mr. Rodney G. Benson: Prepared statement ......................................................... 16

Ms. Mariko Silver: Prepared statement ................................................................. 31

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere: 

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 66

Material submitted for the record ...................................................................... 68

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Texas: Material submitted for the record ............................................ 75

(1)

MERIDA PART TWO: INSURGENCY AND 

TERRORISM IN MEXICO 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Washington, DC. 

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Connie Mack 

[chairman of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere] presiding. 

Mr. MACK. The committee will come to order. 

I’d first like to start by asking unanimous consent that the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, be allowed to sit in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

That was a close call, Mr. Cuellar. That was a close call. 

I first want to thank everyone, especially our witnesses, for joining us today. After recognizing myself and the ranking member, 

Mr. Engel, for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Keating for 5 minutes each for 

their opening statement, we will proceed directly to hearing testimony from our distinguished witnesses. The full text of their written statements will be inserted into the record. Without objection, 

members may have 5 days to submit statements and questions for 

the record. 

After we hear from our witnesses, individual members will be 

recognized for 5 minutes each for questions. 

And I now recognize myself 5 minutes for my opening statement. 

Two weeks ago, four expert witnesses testified in this hearing 

room. Two experts explained that an insurgency is raging along our 

southern border. The other two focused on the fact that violence 

and crime in Mexico has taken a unique turn and the U.S. response has not followed. All agree that the situation has evolved 

and fragmented into violent criminal control over parts of Mexico. 

It is clear that today Mexico represents a unique situation requiring the development of its own specific classification to successfully combat the authority of this expanding criminal control. 

Today I will continue to make the case that Mexico is facing a 

criminal insurgency. 

The attack on the state are clear. The criminal organizations are 

capturing the allegiance of the population through economic and 

2

social programs and as they undermine institutions, they have no 

desire to replace them. This makes the insurgency in Mexico more 

of a threat to democratic governance then we have seen in any 

other insurgency scenarios. Furthermore, these transnational 

criminal organizations are employing increasingly gruesome terrorist tactics to carry out their threats. 

The potential threat of criminal organizations controlling our 

southern border creates grave national security and economic implications for the United States. That is why in 2007 the United 

States began funding the Merida Initiative to improve the situation 

in Mexico. Unfortunately, we face more extreme threats and violence from our border region today than we did 4 years ago. 

The Merida Initiative has been successful in two areas: First, establishing deeper cooperation between the United States and Mexico, and that is clear; and two, removing major drug kingpins in accordance with the goals of the Mexican Government. 

Unfortunately, the game has changed. The reality in Mexico is 

that U.S. assistance has lagged while the traditional cartels evolve 

into diversified transnational criminal organizations perpetrating 

insurgent tactics to protect their assets. 

After 4 years of the Merida Initiative our border region with 

Mexico is more violent today then it was 4 years ago. A reduction 

in violence, while maintaining a full attack on the criminal organizations and strengthening the institutions to prosecute and punish 

them, is required in order to regain control. This is the basis of the 

counterinsurgency strategy that I outlined in the prior hearing. 

The United States should support a targeted yet comprehensive 

strategy that works with Mexico to secure one key population center at a time in order to build and support vital infrastructure and 

social development for lasting results. The counterinsurgency 

measures must include: (1) An all-U.S. agency plan including the 

Treasury Department, Department of Justice, CIA, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the State Department and others 

to aggressively attack and dismantle the criminal networks in the 

U.S. and Mexico; (2) once and for all we must secure the border between the United States and Mexico by doubling Border Patrol 

agents, fulling funding and delivering on the needed border protection equipment such as additional unmanned aerial vehicles and 

the completion of a double layered security fence in urban hard to 

enforce areas of the border; and (3) we must take key steps to ensure local populations support the government and the rule of law 

over the cartels such as by promoting culture of lawfulness programs. 

As I stated before, the current U.S. policy with Mexico does not 

seriously address the national security challenges we face. It is 

time that we recognize the need for a counterinsurgency strategy 

that can combat the evolution and resilience of Mexico’s transnational criminal organizations. This is a severe threat and requires a serious response. 

I look forward to hearing from our experts from the Department 

of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice represented by 

the DEA and the State Department on how the situation on the 

ground has evolved, the impact on U.S. personnel and their activities and tactical ways to squash this criminal insurgency. 

3

I now would like to recognize Mr. Keating for 5 minutes for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

holding today’s subcommittee. As a member of both the House 

Committees on Foreign Affairs and Homeland Security, I appreciate the opportunity to jointly examine this very important topic. 

Our combined presence indicates the extent to which we take the 

security of our southern border seriously, and I look forward to continuing to work with the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee on 

this topic. 

Mr. Chairman, we are here today to examine the progress of the 

Merida Initiative and how effective it has been in halting in full 

violence related to criminal activities and Mexican drug trafficking 

organizations, also known as DTOs, in moving illegal drugs and 

weapons across the southwest border. 

That being said, the brutality of these DTOs overshadowed a 

number of facts that are relevant to our discussion today. As we 

seek tangible solutions to the increasingly levels of violence in Mexico, let us remember that those responsible, particularly for violence against women, are not distinctive and the Mexican military 

is not always impartial. Yes, Mexico is an ally but we cannot paint 

the battle between the drug cartels and Mexican law enforcement 

in black and white. 

With minimum controls for corruption and impunity in Mexico 

it’s difficult to decipher who exactly is committing the crimes. In 

two widely published cases cited by the Robert F. Kennedy Center 

for Justice and Human Rights, Ines Ferna ́ndez Ortega and 

Valentina Rosendo Cantos, two indigenous women were raped by 

soldiers from the Mexican Army in the municipality of Xalitla 

Guerrero State in 2002. However, to this day the State has refused 

to admit that these two women were raped. After nearly a decade, 

these cases were finally transferred to civilian courts, but these two 

cases are not insulated instances in the violence perpetrated by the 

military. 

The National Human Rights Commission says its received more 

then 5,000 complaints about the alleged abuses by the military 

since the offensive against the drug gangs began in 2006. 

I note this not to discredit our ally, President Caldero ́n or the 

Merida Initiative, since both of them have led reform in the Mexican judicial system. But I want to for the purposes of this hearing 

as well, go into this hearing with a complete picture of what’s happening on the ground in Mexico and what President Caldero ́n is up 

against. 

At a time when we’re all tightening our belts, we must monitor 

funding for the Mexican police and military closely, lest we add suffering to the innocent people who unfortunately have nowhere to 

turn. For this reason I strongly support the training assistance 

that we provide the Mexican military and police along with strong 

oversight mechanisms. The U.S. and Mexico have made strides in 

developing strong working relationships with diplomatic levels 

down to field agents patrolling both sides of the southwest border. 

At present more then 17,500 Border Patrol agents, 1,200 National 

Guardsmen are cleared for deployment along the border and over 

4

250 Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agents, ICE 

agents, are assigned to securing the border. 

Certainly this does not mean that incursions along the border do 

not exist, and undoubtedly more work has to be done. However, 

this is the highest number of personnel to ever protect our border 

in this region, and these numbers represent a step in the right direction. In fact, more effort and resources are deployed along the 

southwest border today then ever before. 

By the end of Fiscal Year 2011, according to the State Department, the U.S. will have invested almost $900 million in equipment 

and training to advance the Merida Initiative and to assist our 

neighbor south of the border. Since Fiscal Year 2008 the U.S. has 

contributed approximately $1.6 billion overall to the Initiative, 

while Mexico has allocated $26 billion to promote public safety and 

security within its own borders. 

Furthermore, a new effort is being implemented to strike the 

Mexican civil society institutions by offering training and technical 

assistance. 

I hope that the advances in the Merida Initiative are followed 

along with efforts to strengthen our borders as opposed to making 

them more vulnerable with strangled budget cuts. Although we 

need to be incredibly weary of the money that goes into the Mexican Government, this is not the time to decrease the number of 

Border Patrol agents and thus have the effect of making the southwest border less safe. I urge all of my colleagues, on both sides of 

the aisle, to stand against such cuts. 

I look forward to this afternoon’s testimony. Real progress has 

been made since the inception of the Merida Initiative and I am interested in hearing about the documented results of Americans participation in this program, which with proper oversight can lead to 

real success. It’s vital that we, as Congress, work closely with our 

diplomatic and Federal agency personnel to ensure that they have 

the resources they require to continue partnering with Mexico to 

fulfill the goals of the Merida Initiative while combating crime and 

injustice on all side. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. 

And now I would like to recognize the chairman Mike McCaul for 

his opening statement. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Mack, for agreeing to hold 

this important joint hearing on a very important issue facing our 

neighbor and friend to the south, that is Mexico, and even beyond 

Mexico to the region of Central America. 

And I also want to thank Ranking Members Keating and Engel 

for participating as well. 

Over the past 5 years, more then 40,000 men, women and children have been brutally murdered by insurgents including 12 mayors, a gubernatorial candidate, U.S. citizens and law enforcement 

officers. Local governments are harassed and intimidated while the 

bodies of those who stand up against these terrorists are hung from 

bridges and tossed into the streets. I’m not speaking about alQaeda or the Taliban. I’m describing the acts of the Mexican drug 

cartels. 

5

Mexico’s President Felipe Caldero ́n declared war on the drug cartels when he took office in 2006. He described the violence in his 

country as a ‘‘challenge to the state, an attempt to replace the 

state.’’ And in response to the recent Casino Royale fire in 

Monterrey claiming 53 lives, he said, ‘‘We are facing true terrorists.’’

In 2008 the United States launched the Merida Initiative to assist Mexico in its war against the drug cartels. Over $1.5 billion 

has been appropriated, but to date only a third of it, I am sure the 

witnesses will tell me more now, has been delivered. According to 

reports issued by the GAO, the Merida Initiative lacks the central 

goals, performance measures and accountability. This raises serious issues: What is our strategy and plan to help Mexico win this 

war? Is it now time to move beyond Merida? And what do the Federal agencies need from Congress to accomplish this mission that 

we all agree is so vital, not only to Mexico’s national security but 

to ours? 

The United States efforts need to be reexamined. We are under 

resourced along our border with Mexico. There have been threats 

and attempts to kill U.S. citizens and Federal and state law enforcement officials. 

As a Member of Congress, I have had the privilege to travel and 

meet with our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. But during one visit 

to the El Paso Intelligence Center I requested to go into Juarez. I 

was told by the State Department they could not guarantee my 

safety. Six thousand people have been killed in Juarez alone. Earlier this year I did visit Juarez, but we were given the same security measures that we were given in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

The cartels have not only breached our border but are now creating narco safe havens across the border, including in my home 

state of Texas. This is the conclusion of a recent report by Generals 

Barry McCaffrey and Robert Scales. And they also say that the cartels are using prisons and recruitment centers and cities in the 

United States for their drug operations. Both of these generals will 

testify before my subcommittee next week. 

Additionally, a very recent report from the Department of Justice 

reveal that the drug cartels operate in more than 1,000 across the 

United States. One thousand cities. They control distribution of the 

most heroin, marijuana, methamphetamines and other narcotics. 

These terrorists both in Mexico and the United States are a threat 

to national security and should be treated as such. 

I introduced legislation requiring the State Department to classify drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, similar to what 

President Clinton to the FARC in Colombia. This would limit the 

groups financial and property and travel interests, and prosecute 

individuals who provide them any assistance. The legislation must 

also be tied to fighting the cartels both here and abroad using 

every means available. 

The drug cartels do intimidate and coerce the civilian population. 

They do effect the conduct of the Mexican Government and they 

threaten the national security of the United States. If you look at 

the Black Law definition and also under Federal law, this is the 

very essence of terrorism. There is a real war happening along our 

6

border and the enemy is covertly infiltrating our cities. We must 

take this threat seriously and take decisive action. 

In closing, I wanted to point to two more events. Just recently 

during rush hour the Gulf Cartel dumped two truckloads of 35 bodies at a busy intersection in the coastal city of Veracruz, and most 

disturbingly five severed heads were stuffed in a sack and placed 

outside a primary school in Acapulco, after the DTO threatened to 

attack elementary school teachers if they did not pay half their 

wages to the drug cartels. 

I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that they are terrorizing the population. I submit to you that these drug cartels are terrorizing the 

school and the children and those schools. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Chairman McCaul. 

And I would like now to turn to Mr. Engel for his opening statement. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is the second in an important series of hearings on the 

Merida Initiative and in the situation in Mexico. 

Let me first say I welcome all the witnesses here, especially my 

friend Bill Brownfield who has been doing such wonderful work. 

And it’s good to see all three of you. Very respected. I am happy 

that you are all here. 

I want to commend Chairman Mack for taking the opportunity 

to conduct oversight on this key priority for U.S. foreign and domestic policy. I am very happy to be here today. 

There is no more important relationship for the United States 

and Latin America then the one we have with Mexico. We share 

a border almost 2,000 miles long, a rich and intertwined history, 

deep cultural connections and economies which are now interwoven 

and mutually dependent: Yet today’s serious challenges and problems extend to both sides of the border. 

In the last several years the drug trade, which had once been the 

domain mostly of the andine nations has moved north. It has taken 

hold in Mexico and severely damaged the northern parts of Central 

America. As I stated in the first of these hearings, I want it to be 

clear that the United States stands with our friends to the south 

in the fight against narco trafficking. 

Mr. Chairman, I am as disturbed as you by the horrors carried 

out by the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. They are brutal criminals who prey on the narcotics abuse of people in the U.S. 

while ravaging communities in Mexico and elsewhere. We are in 

complete agreement that their actions are dangerous, illegal, and 

hideous. 

I do not want to have a semantical discussion. I am not sure if 

we could exactly call them insurgents in terrorism. I am not sure 

that actually describes what is going on in Mexico. DoD defines insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a 

constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. DoD defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuant of 

goals that are generally political, religious or ideological. 

7

The drug gangs I do not believe have political, religious or ideological goals. They are criminals trying to make money to peddle 

their illicit narcotics. It is not exactly terrorism and not exactly insurgency but it do not make it any less awful. We in the United 

States, obviously, have a real stake in trying to get at them and 

trying to defeat them. I think Mr. McCaul’s examples of what we 

have seen that these people are capable of is something that we, 

in the United States, obviously have a very important stake in. 

When I mentioned before about the definition of terrorism, because I am concerned that if we were to put these groups on the 

terrorist lists with the gun dealer who provides them weapons, the 

drug abuser who buys the drugs or the banks which loaned them 

the money would be prosecutable under terrorism laws; it is unclear. But at the very heart I think the possibility of adding these 

DTOs to the terrorism lists raises serious questions that we need 

to explore in this hearing. It does not mean that we have to go 

after them any less, in fact we need to do everything we can. I 

raise this because I just think it is important before we jump and 

call them terrorists or insurgents, I think we need to be careful. 

Among the other questions that I would like our witnesses to discuss today are: (1) whether we are doing enough at home to reduce 

demand for drugs. I’ve said many, many times when I chaired this 

committee and as ranking member that if we did not use the drugs, 

there would not be a need for these people to do what they do; (2) 

how can we slow the illicit flow of weapons into Mexico? I think 

we should discuss that today; (3) is the Merida Initiative moving 

fast enough? We have had a problem with that in the past. I think 

that is important to concentrate on; (4) and finally, how are U.S. 

authorities coordinating on the border with Mexican authorities? 

So, Mr. Chairman, I am very happy that we are having this 

hearing. I think that these issues are very important. I think our 

goals are identical. We need to see these criminals and these thugs 

brought to justice. We need to stop it. And we have a stake in it 

just as much as Mexico does. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

And I now would like to introduce our witnesses. 

First, The Honorable William R. Brownfield. Ambassador 

Brownfield is the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. Prior to this appointment, Mr. Brownfield served as U.S. Ambassador to Colombia 

from August 2007 until August 2010. Before serving in Colombia, 

Ambassador Brownfield served as U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela 

and Chile. Welcome and thank you so much for being here today. 

Second, Mr. Rodney G. Benson. Mr. Benson is the Assistant Administrator of Intelligence for the Drug Enforcement Administration. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Benson served as a Special 

Agent in charge of the Atlanta Field Division where he directed 

and lead Federal drug enforcement operations throughout the state 

of Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Additionally, Mr. Benson served as Special Agent in charge of the Seattle Field Division. 

And third is Ms. Mariko, did I say that right? Mariko Silver. Ms. 

Silver is the Acting Assistant Secretary for International Policy of 

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Prior to her appointVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Feb 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\WH\100411\70582 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment Ms. Silver served as policy advisor for Innovation and Higher 

Education and Economic Development to then Governor Janet Neapolitan in the State of Arizona. Before joining the Governor’s office, 

Ms. Silver served as Special Advisor to the President and Director 

of Strategic Project for the Office of the President at Arizona State 

University. 

Thank you all very much for being here. 

I now would like to turn to Ambassador Brownfield and recognize him for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Brownfield, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, members of the Foreign Affairs and 

Homeland Security Committees. Thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you today. 

I have a written statement for the record which I have submitted 

and would like to offer a brief oral summary. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to spend your time describing the 

origin, history and purpose of the Merida Initiative. You know 

them better than I do. I will say that this has been more of a partnership between two governments than a traditional foreign assistance program. The Congress has been generous in funding it, and 

the Merida Initiative has delivered some concrete successes over 

the past 4 years. 

Since 2009, more than 33 high level cartel leaders have been removed or arrested. This compares with one in the preceding 6 

years. 

Thanks to the Merida Initiative, the Mexican Government now 

has 14 additional helicopters, hundreds of sophisticated non-intrusive inspection suites of equipment, more then 150 K–9 teams, 

more then 52 Mexican police and prosecutors have received some 

professional training under the Merida Initiative. By the end of 

this year, we will have delivered more than $900 million worth of 

equipment and training to Mexico with more then $500 million delivered this year alone. 

There is no doubt in my mind, ladies and gentlemen, that the 

United States is better and safer today thanks to our support for 

the Merida Initiative. But, ladies and gentlemen, Merida is in transition. Where we once focused on delivering equipment and goods, 

we now focus more on providing specialized training. For 4 years 

we concentrated on building strong Federal institutions. We now 

concentrate more on state and municipal institutions. And we will 

initially focus our support in northern Mexico where the violence 

is greatest and where we have shared border security interests. 

Mr. Chairman, the Merida Initiative was not engraved in stone. 

It is a living strategy that is modified, adjusted and corrected as 

circumstances change on the ground and we learn lessons. Some of 

those lessons came from the United States Congress and came from 

some members in this very chamber. It is a valuable idea to integrate our efforts against illicit drugs, organized crime and terVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Feb 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\WH\100411\70582 HFA PsN: SHIRL
9

rorism in a unified holistic approach to support the Merida Initiative. We have learned the lessons from other theaters of operations 

around the world what can and should be integrated into our 

Merida efforts. But, Mr. Chairman, there are two lessons that we 

did not have to learn because we already knew them. 

The first is that Merida is a cooperative agreement between the 

U.S. and Mexico, with the Government of Mexico in charge of all 

activities within their territory. If we do not work together with the 

Mexican Government, then we accomplish little for either the 

American or the Mexican people. 

And second, as I learned it the hard way during my years in Colombia, is the lesson of strategic patience. I’m an optimist, Mr. 

Chairman, and I believe we have already made serious progress 

under this Initiative. But it took our two nations many years to get 

into this situation, and it is going to take us some years to get out 

of it. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Chairman. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brownfield follows:]

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Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

And now Mr. Benson is recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RODNEY G. BENSON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT 

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. BENSON. Good afternoon, Honorable Chairman, Ranking 

Members and distinguished members of the Foreign Affairs and 

Homeland Security Committees. Thank you for the opportunity to 

speak with you today on a subject of critical importance. 

My name is Rodney Benson, and I have the privilege of serving 

as the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Chief of Intelligence. 

During my 28-year career with DEA, I have witnessed firsthand 

the evolution of Mexican drug trafficking organizations for marijuana suppliers in the ’80s, the subordinance of the powerful Colombian cartels in the late ’80s and early ’90s, to one of the primary and most violent actors in the global drug market today. 

From my supervisory position on the southwest border, to coordinating multi-jurisdictional and transnational investigations at the 

headquarters level, and from my position as Special Agent in 

charge of offices as diverse as Seattle and Atlanta I have witnessed 

the remarkable spread of Mexican trafficker influence throughout 

the United States and around the world. 

Currently we enjoy unprecedented levels of cooperation and coordination with our Mexican counterparts and greatly appreciate 

the unwavering commitment and leadership of President Caldero ́n. 

The fruits of the Merida Initiative have been critical in sustaining 

Mexican security forces against a formidable enemy. DEA has benefitted from the opportunity to work with better equipped and better trained police officers and prosecutors. The U.S. State Department has administered the provision of technical, material, and 

educational support to our tireless partners resulting in the dismantling and fracturing of several DTOs and encouraging our partners in Mexico to move forward in far-reaching judicial and law enforcement reforms. 

Information sharing between our two nations with the goal of 

capturing Mexico’s most violent and prolific traffickers have never 

been more robust. As these warring groups have splintered into 

smaller, often legalist factions, we see that these surrogate bosses 

lack not only the discipline of their elders and former leaders, but 

the international connections and influence to realize the accustomed level of profit. 

Some might call the resulting behavior anarchy, and DEA recognizes that extreme seemingly arbitrary criminal violence begs a 

label when some of that violence is directed at government officials, 

police officers, soldiers, and civilians. And despite some groups resorting to terrorist-like tactics such as bombings and beheadings, 

these shocking acts are not precipitated by any motivation other 

than greed and rivalry. The members of these desperate organizations are not fighting in the name of an ideology or loss of their 

religion, or for political power and influence but to eliminate competition, settle scores and increase profits. Extortion, kidnapping, 

oil pipeline theft, prostitution, carjacking and robbery, even media 

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piracy all serve to bolster drug trafficking revenue and they are the 

hallmark activities of organized crime. 

The Government of Mexico continues to work to build law enforcement capacity, and funding from the Merida Initiative was 

critical in the transformation of the Federal police agency and the 

training of police officers and prosecutors at all levels. In June of 

last year our partners passed some of the most effective anti-money 

laundering legislation in the country’s history and the results have 

our bilateral efforts to claim a portion of the estimated $18–$39 billion in drug profits crossing our border every year are improving 

exponentially. 

As a next step, improving the effectiveness of Mexico’s state and 

local police agency is tantamount for lasting success. I stress again, 

it has only been in this area of remarkable cooperation that U.S. 

efforts have been matched or exceeded by our partners in Mexico. 

We are committed to our partners and must continue to support 

their endeavors to bring security to Mexico and its citizens. Supporting the Merida Initiative and President Caldero ́n as well as the 

next administration in Mexico is the only option. 

Thank you again for the privilege of speaking to you on behalf 

of the men and women of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

And I will gladly respond to any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Benson follows:]

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Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Benson. 

Ms. Silver, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MS. MARIKO SILVER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. SILVER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Mack and Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Engel 

and Ranking Member Keating and distinguished members of the 

subcommittees on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security 

Janet Neapolitan, first I want to thank you for your continued support and for the opportunity to testify today about our work with 

Mexico and on the Merida Initiative. 

DHS components have participated in the State Department-led 

Merida Initiative since its inception in 2007, and Secretary Neapolitan continues to support DHs’ active participation in Meridafunded programs. While the State Department has responsibility, 

as you know, for policy oversight and dispersing Merida funds, 

DHS and other interagency partners participate heavily in implementing specific programs. This approach is consistent with the 

Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review which states: ‘‘Given the national security implications of 

security sector assistance, State will look first to the Department 

of Justice, Department of Defense, and Homeland Security to implement State programs involving counterterrorism capacity building, foreign law enforcement, or strengthening justice and interior 

ministries.’’ And we are pleased to participate in that with respect 

to Mexico. 

In my written testimony I provided some specific examples regarding the types of engagement that CBP, ICE, Coast Guard and 

US–VISIT in particular have had during the course of the Merida 

Initiative. We work with State Department and with our Mexican 

partners on everything from training to procuring equipment paid 

for by the Merida Initiative. We believe that DHS’ unique expertise 

and skill sets have contributed greatly to furthering the goals of 

the Merida Initiative. 

I want to note that the Merida Initiative marked a change in the 

nature and extent of collaboration with Mexican on security and 

law enforcement issues. We saw this at the policy level and we see 

it on the ground. As part of this shift, it lead to a significant reframing and reorganization of much of our bilateral engagement. 

The Merida Initiative, as you know, is now framed around four 

pillars. DHS work engages in all four, but we focus on pillar three, 

which is creating a 21st century border. 

During the State visit of Mexican President Filipe Caldero ́n in 

May 20, 2010, President Obama and Caldero ́n specifically noted 

the importance of the work being accomplished under pillar three. 

President Obama and Caldero ́n’s joint statement set out a policy vision for our countries articulating that ‘‘the Twenty-First Century 

Border must ensure the safety and security of residents and communities along both sides of the border.’’ They affirm the mutual 

interests of Mexico and the United States to prevent entry into our 

countries of people who pose a threat to national security. 

30

The Presidents’ border vision also recognizes the need to develop 

the border and manage it in a holistic fashion which we’ve been 

working on with our Mexican partners. 

This policy vision requires us to move beyond seeing border management as simply guarding or policing the jurisdictional line between the United States and Mexico. The border and the interior 

are inextricably linked as was pointed out. Thus, government efforts at the border and the interior should be complimentary, coordinated, of course deconflicted, and mutually re-enforcing leveraging the good work of all interagency counterparts. 

Enforcement at the border, that is between and at the ports of 

entry, is necessary but it should be part of a more comprehensive 

approach. Through this approach we need to engage domestically 

at the border and aboard, which we’re here to talk about today, to 

secure the United States. We need to also leverage opportunities 

working with our foreign partners to intercept and neutralize 

threats before they reach the U.S. border. 

DHS recognizes, of course as I’m sure do all of you, that more 

places and more countries are interconnected through networks of 

trade and travel everyday. The very nature of travel, trade and 

commerce today means that vulnerabilities or gaps anywhere 

across the globe, including of course in our neighbor Mexico, have 

the ability to affect activity thousands of miles away and here in 

the United States. Our efforts to secure our borders then must also 

include efforts to secure global trade and travel networks. This 

view of border security highlights the importance of collaboration 

and coordination with federal, state, local and travel governments 

as well as international and private sector partners. It’s built on 

approaches to ensure both economic competitiveness and national 

security. We, of course, can’t let commerce grind to a halt. 

DHS appreciates the support Congress has shown for our work 

and your support of the United States relationship with Mexico 

through the Merida Initiative. From the field level to senior departmental leadership the United States and Mexico are closer now 

then we have been. 

While challenges remain, we believe there’s a strong foundation 

of cooperation on which we will build. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to achieve these goals and with our 

Mexican partners. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I’m happy to take 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Silver follows:]

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Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Ms. Silver. 

And I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

First of all, let me make this perfectly clear. The people of the 

United States and the people of Mexico have a shared interest in 

this. The people of Mexico and the people of the United States have 

similar desires, and that is for the ideas of freedom, security, and 

prosperity. And this hearing today is to get at some of the questions about where we have been, which have been documented, but 

if we have diagnosed the problem correctly and what do we do moving forward. 

So first, let me ask just kind of a baseline question here for all 

of you. And, hopefully, I can get a yes or a no. I know that might 

be difficult for some of you, but please try. 

Have the drug cartels in Mexico evolved in their criminal activities and level of violence since 2007? 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I’ll start, Mr. Chairman. They have 

evolved. They are different cartels than they were at the start of 

this process. They are smaller. They are more numerous. They are 

more diverse. And as a consequence, they are a different kind of 

strategic and tactical problem to address than they were 4 years 

ago. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. 

Mr. Benson? 

Mr. BENSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We have seen an evolution, expansion. Some of those cartels splintering and then essentially creating more criminal groups that we are targeting. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. 

And Ms. Silver? 

Ms. SILVER. Yes, I would concur with that. They are definitely 

more fragmented. We have many more on the ground, small 

groups. And so, as Ambassador Brownfield pointed out, the law enforcement challenge is different. 

Mr. MACK. Okay. Ambassador Brownfield, according to the CIA, 

and I quote: ‘‘Insurgent activities include guerrilla warfare, terrorism and political mobilization such as propaganda, recruitment 

and international activity.’’ Do you agree that the cartels in Mexico 

are engaging in the activities listed by the CIA? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. It’s a label, Mr. Chairman, but I will 

not question whether certain members and certain organizations 

are doing certain things. Although to be honest, I could probably 

make the same comment about organizations in the United States 

as well. 

Mr. MACK. But you don’t deny that the cartels are engaged in 

guerrilla warfare, terrorism and political mobilization such as propaganda, recruitment and international activities? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I accept that individuals of some of 

these organizations are doing at some time and in some places this 

sort of activity. I do not suggest it is systematic nationwide or institutional. 

Mr. MACK. We have a slide here. Guerrilla Warfare. So you have 

got examples of Mexican Federal police officers attacked in Mexico. 

40

Next slide. Terrorism. You have a gunman who killed 52 people 

and burned the Casino Royale in Monterrey, Mexico. And I believe 

the President himself indicated that that was terrorism. 

Political Mobilization. You have a candidate for governor who 

was assassinated in June 28, 2010. You have political protests. Increasing pressure and awareness surrounding the war on drugs. 

Again, next slide, Propaganda and Recruitment. You actually 

have the cartels holding fairs and providing food and drinks and 

music, happy children’s day and at the same time recruiting and 

offering better pay and health care. So I think that would go toward that. 

And then you have International Activity, which we have all 

talked about here today. 

So, I am having a little bit of a hard time understanding the 

reluctancy in saying that the activities that the cartels are showing 

do fit the definition the CIA talks about activities as an insurgency. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I don’t question your facts, Mr. Chairman, nor do I question your motivation. You and I have exactly the 

same objective in mind here. If on the other hand, you are asking 

me do I see exactly the same thing here as I see in other parts of 

the world that we have described as an insurgency, obviously they 

are different. 

Mr. MACK. Ambassador, I am not asking about other parts of the 

world. I am asking specifically about whether or not the cartels are 

partaking in an insurgent activity as outlined as we just did. 

The last question here. The Department of Homeland Security 

and the Department of Justice are addressing some of these newer 

concerns such as drug trafficking financing in the United States 

and Border Protection programs, but separate from the Merida Initiative. Would it not make sense to have a coordinated U.S. strategy to meet strategic U.S. goals in Mexico? 

Ambassador, if you want to take a quick shot at that? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure, although we would have to work 

our way through just as you do when you are melding what your 

subcommittee does with what Mr. McCaul’s subcommittee does. We 

have to address those same issues as we are dealing with a foreign 

issue and a domestic issue. 

But the answer to your question is yes. 

Mr. MACK. All right. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. So you agree 

that there has been an evolution in the activities in the violence 

by the cartels. You can agree that there has been insurgent activities in Mexico from the cartels. And that we need to have a coordinated U.S. strategy to meet the strategic goals. 

Mr. Benson, do you agree with that? 

Mr. BENSON. Mr. Chairman, I think right now we have a very 

robust interagency targeting effort as we target Mexican organized 

crimes and their cells here domestically. And that intelligence that 

is generated is shared very timely to our counterparts in Mexico. 

And our goal obviously being able to impact the largest piece of the 

organization as possible, and we continue to do that as the Ambassador mentioned on some of these captures that we have had over 

the last couple of years. Unprecedented numbers of high value targets of cartel leadership that has created these smaller groups has 

been a great success. 

41

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Benson. 

And my time has expired. I would now like to recognize to Mr. 

Engel for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, again, I do not want to get into semantics, but I just 

think that it is important that we define these things. 

I want to read something that Mexican Ambassador Arturo 

Sarukha ́n wrote on April 11th of this year in the Dallas Morning 

News, and I quote him:

‘‘These transnational criminal organizations which operate in 

both our countries are not terrorist organizations. They are 

very violent criminal groups that are well structured and well 

financed. They pursue a single goal. They want to maximize 

their profits and do what most businesses do: Hostile takeovers 

and pursue mergers and acquisitions. They use violence to protect their business from other competition, from other competitors, as well as our two governments’ efforts to roll them back. 

There is no political motivation or agenda whatsoever beyond 

their attempt to defend their illegal business. Misunderstanding the challenge we face leads to wrong policies and bad 

policy making. If you label these organizations as terrorists, 

you will have to start calling drug consumers in the U.S. financiers of terrorist organizations and gun dealers providers of 

material support to terrorists.’’

So I am wondering, and we can start with Ambassador 

Brownfield, could you discuss the implications of labeling the Mexican DTOs as terrorist groups? Do you agree with Ambassador 

Sarukha ́n? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Ambassador Sarukha ́n, obviously, is a 

very wise man. He does not speak for the United States Government or for me. He does speak for the Government of Mexico. 

I think his reasoning is pretty sound, Congressman. And that is 

to say that we have to look through just the label and we have to 

think through what the implications of the label would be. 

I agree with virtually all the suggestions that the facts are consistent with the label. I then say that is only half of our job, the 

next half is to assess what is the implication of us making this determination? Does it have domestic legal implications? Does it have 

implications that are political in nature? What does it give us that 

is more than we already have? These are the questions that I think 

we should ask, as well as whether the specific acts of these organizations are in fact consistent with the acts of insurgency or of a terrorist organization. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Benson? 

Mr. BENSON. Sir, in my career I have targeted Mexican organizations operating on the border, up on the north border across in the 

southeast, the northeast it has been targeting of organized criminal 

gangs, cartel representatives and linking that back to those leaders 

back in Mexico. We do clearly show our intelligence that we generate here in the United States and as we target, they are clearly 

taking direction from their leadership south of the border. 

Mr. ENGEL. So is Ambassador Sarukha ́n right? Do you agree 

with his statement that I read that he wrote? 

42

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. As a career Special Agent I view those 

Mexican trafficking groups as organized criminals, organized crime. 

Mr. ENGEL. Ms. Silver? 

Ms. SILVER. From our perspective at DHS, we also view them as 

organized crime. And our interest is less in the semantics, as you 

say less in the label but what the label implies operationally for us. 

And for us we find that the law enforcement tools that we have are 

best suited to the job that we see it as. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

The original statement jointly issued by the U.S. and Mexican 

Governments in October of ’07 announcing the Merida Initiative, 

and I remember it very well because I chaired this subcommittee 

then, said that reducing demand in the United States is a major 

goal of the program. Without demand in this country it is clear 

that there would not be a significant narco/criminal problem in 

Mexico, Colombia or elsewhere. Since FY ’04 spending on demand 

reduction has increased $2 billion. But why are we not doing more 

to reduce demand for illicit narcotics in the U.S.? Are we living up 

to our original commitment under the Merida joint statement to 

fight demand? And if we do not deal with demand at home, are we 

not treating the symptoms and not the disease? 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I will start on this, Congressman, although as you know I look externally as opposed to internally. 

Obviously, it is a very simple matter to say if there is no demand, there is no supply because you are not supplying any demand. It is much more complicated then that, as we all know. We 

have been addressing this internal drug consumption problem in 

the United States in a serious way for nearly 50 years. We have 

not been sitting on our hands. We spend more money on this than 

I think any other nation on the planet. It has integrated into our 

domestic policy. 

And, I would offer a foreign affairs suggestion as well. Let us not 

assume that when the day arrives that we have solved our drug 

problem, the foreign drug supply problem is going to disappear. It 

will not. Evidence Exhibit 1 is U.S. cocaine demand has reduced 

some 50 percent over the last 6 or 7 years. Has the production of 

cocaine disappeared 60 percent? No, it has not. The producers have 

sought out new markets and it goes to additional locations. They 

are in it for the money and they will create markets if markets are 

denied to them. 

Mr. ENGEL. I guess my time is up. I do not know if anyone just 

wants to jump in quickly. 

Mr. MACK. Does somebody have a quick answer to this? 

Mr. BENSON. I would just say that we have a primary enforcement arm, but there is that constant of time frequently where 

agents are going to our local schools and many, many outside 

events on demand reduction. Because that, obviously, is an important component as we look at the drug abuse problem in the U.S. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. I now recognize Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

43

Let me first commend all three witnesses for your dedication and 

service to this country in a very challenging time. 

I think we do not pay enough attention to this issue. I know, Ambassador, you are the expert and you have been on this issue for 

decades. You were an Ambassador to Colombia. And we recently 

went down to Colombia to visit with the President down there to 

talk about what worked and what did not with Colombia. And we 

do know that one of the things that President Clinton did was designate the FARC as a foreign terrorist organization. 

And I think it is important to point out this is more than just 

a label. It is not just a label. It is a designation that provides authorities. It is a designation that provides tools to combating them 

by freezing bank assets in the United States, by prosecuting with 

a 15-year enhancement for anybody who aids and abets a terrorist, 

by allowing us to go after—unlike the Kingpin which only you go 

after the head—this allows you to go after the body of the organization. In addition, it does not have to be just a portion of the United 

States, it could be a foreign national which I think is critical. So 

jurisdiction is beyond the United States. 

And I just wondered your experience, Ambassador, in being down 

there in Colombia and watching that successful operation, with this 

foreign terrorist organization designation, can you tell me whether 

that was helpful? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. A very fair question, Mr. Chairman. 

And I will offer you a couple of observations. 

First, I have absolutely no objection to having placed the FARC, 

the ELN and at that time the AUC, the paramilitaries, on the FTO 

list. I participated in that process in 1999/2000, and I believe 2001. 

It was helpful to the extent that it got at their support network. 

I do not think it had a direct and immediate impact on them inside 

Colombia because the guys that were in the camps and jungle, obviously, were not worried a great deal about their designation. But 

their external support structure was in fact effected. And in fact, 

their external support structure was small enough that you are 

able to verify who they were and go after that. That was helpful. 

Being able to call them terrorists was helpful. 

Being able to asset every time we talked about the hostages that 

they were keeping in jungle camps and referring to them as terrorist was helpful. 

Being able to say that we, the European Union, the Canadians 

and there may have been one other government, had all put them 

on the same list was helpful. 

I do not deny it: It was helpful in Colombia and I do not and I 

have said it once and I will say it again, you and I have exactly 

the same objective. The question is: How are we going to get there? 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I think that is a fair assessment. 

The definition of ‘‘under Federal law’’ is to intimidate or coerce 

a civilian population or government by extortion, kidnapping, political assassination. You know, when I look at what is going on down 

there, it seems to me they fall squarely within that definition. I 

mean, maybe it is semantics, Mr. Engel, but I do think this law 

would provide additional authorities to help President Caldero ́n 

win this war. He described the violence in his country as a chalVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Feb 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\WH\100411\70582 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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lenge to the state, an attempt to replace the state. That sounds 

much more than just organized crime. 

And in the recent casino fire he says that we are facing true terrorists. 

So, Mr. Benson, I appreciate everything you do wit the DEA and 

your agents, particularly down in Mexico an Central America. I 

mean, they are really in the line of fire. 

In your testimony you have under here, ‘‘The Threat to Governance. Those who organize, finance, direct and control drug trafficking thrive in areas where government control is weak.’’ We 

know that they are looking, just as the Taliban and al-Qaeda does, 

for failed states. I would argue that Guatemala is on the verge of 

being a failed state. 

When we were in Mexico City, 25 farmers’ heads were cut off 

that day. This is real stuff. And it seems like everyday we are hearing about some new report. And they are looking for safe havens. 

They are looking to manipulate the governments. 

In your testimony you said, ‘‘More troubling is the fact that many 

of these brutal murders were committed with the specific intent to 

intimidate the public and influence the government to suspend action against the cartels.’’ To intimidate the public and influence the 

government. Again, going back to the definition under Federal law, 

to intimidate and influence. They terrorize civilians. They terrorize 

the Mexican people. There is no question about it. 

The example of the school bus, trying to extort money from 

teachers and throwing heads in the front of the school. You know, 

this is beyond some of al-Qaeda’s worst tactics. There is a real 

problem down there. 

And I guess the debate we are having is how best to handle that. 

I want to allow you, Mr. Benson, to respond. 

Mr. BENSON. Sir, I agree they are attempting to instill fear in the 

public because they want to try to instill this fear on the public to 

prevent the government from increasing their operation tempo and 

targeting. The government is having a continued success and so 

they are reverting to these vicious acts to instill that fear. 

So in my opinion we need to keep that operational tempo going 

forward both in the United States and in Mexico, what we are 

doing now and those successes that I have highlighted. Because if 

we continue attacking their leadership in both countries simultaneously with that information flow going back quickly, that will result in positive success down the road. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I agree with you that partnership is key. 

I do not know if we are going to have a second round. Are we? 

Okay. 

Just for the record, I would like to put into the record the response from the Dallas Morning News to the letter described by 

Mr. Engel. It was very interesting that these are not just businessmen trying to make money. They are more than that; they are killers and they do terrorize. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

I would now like to recognize Mr. Keating for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

45

Ambassador Brownfield, you made reference to the fact that 

Merida is in transition and we have moved from equipment and 

good to training, and I just want to ask a question in that regard 

and also make aside that in 2010 we withheld 15 percent of Merida 

funds pending compliance of some basic human rights. 

I’ll jump to this because I think it’s more important for me. To 

what extent do you think the people in local communities, particularly indigenous communities, feel comfortable going to the Mexican miliary or the police to report crimes? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Congressman, obviously it will depend 

upon the community and there is a difference between the military 

and the police. The military does not tend to be local. They obviously have come in from somewhere else for the mission of whatever duration. The police are local and are members of the community. 

And in some communities in Mexico, I would say to you that 

probably the community is very uncomfortable reaching out to the 

authorities seeing them as part of the problem rather then part of 

the solution. In others, I suspect that is different. 

One thing that I would suggest to you fairly strongly, however, 

is that since the Merida Initiative more Mexican communities have 

seen their law enforcement and military as part of the solution 

rather than the problem then they did before Merida. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. And I just want to follow-up, too. How 

have women been impacted by the violence of the drug cartels and 

by cases also Ines and Valentina where the very forces that were 

supposed to protect them harmed them and then ignored the allegation of rape? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. A two-part answer for a two-part 

question. 

In my judgment women have been inordinately affected by the 

drug cartels in their attempts to intimidate through violence, 

through extortion, through threats the communities and the institutions because of the belief that by threatening the female population they will have greater impact then threatening, killing or 

otherwise abusing males. 

The second part of your question deals with the institutions that 

are supposed to be protecting them. And, obviously, every time that 

you have a case, an incident in which the institution that is held 

responsible for protecting that community in fact go to the dark 

side and becomes part of the problem, you’ve taken a giant step 

back that it takes years sometimes to restore the confidence in the 

institution. 

Mr. KEATING. Yes. Do you think that withholding funds specifically geared to that would be a deterrent to that? What’s going to 

change that? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I’ll offer you my view with which you 

have every right not to agree with completely. Congressman, in my 

judgment there are many ways to attack this issue. Some of them 

are direct and blunt and frontal, and that is to withhold funding 

until or put specific training components into the program that 

says you will be trained on human rights, you will be trained on 

respect for women and children, whatever that may be. 

46

Part of this is indirect. You build institutions, prosecutors, and 

even special courts that are designed specifically to address this 

issue. 

But in my personal opinion the most important thing we an do 

is professionalize across the board throughout the nation Mexican 

law enforcement. When you have more professional, more competent, better trained law enforcement officers, just trained in law 

enforcement, they are far less likely to commit that sort of abuse. 

And that kind of cuts against holding too much of the funding in 

abeyance, because that 15 percent is obviously 15 percent that for 

that period of time is not being used for that training purpose. I 

swing either way, it depends upon the day and what I had for 

lunch. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, none of that will do any good if we don’t have 

oversight that’s going to bring this to the surface. What are we 

doing and American taxpayers are funding many of these initiatives, what are we doing to make sure this is being rooted out and 

we discover this and then through training or maybe other actions, 

withholding money and other actions, we could deal with that? I 

know I’m only leaving you about 25 seconds, but I want to ask you 

about that oversight; how are we going to find that out? Are we 

doing a good enough job in that regard? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. My own view is I give us about between a C-plus and a B-minus right now, but I would do that with 

almost any program of this size that we’re just getting started. 

Your problems will almost always occur in the first 2 or 3 years 

of your massive program. And I don’t care if you’re talking about 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Mexico, Colombia, that’s where you’re 

biggest number of problems are. 

We’re out of that period right now. You have a right to ask of 

us what is our specific evaluation and oversight mechanism, and I 

will tell you that I believe that that is our challenge for this year 

that we’re still in and next year. 

Part of the problem that we have to work our way through is 

how we work this with the Government of Mexico, because at the 

end of the day these are their institutions, their police, their military. 

I actually hope you will call me up and haul me over the coals 

in another 6 months time on just that issue because I am in fact 

hopeful we’re going to have a much better, clearer and more precise 

story to tell by that time. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you. And since I’m over my time, if you 

could in writing forward to me not just the grade but what actions 

and oversight you’re going to implement and then we’ll look at the 

grade afterwards. 

Thank you. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Keating. And just for the record, Mr. 

Ambassador will be happy to call you back and rack you over the 

coals. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Bless the——

Mr. MACK. I would now like to recognize Mr. Bill Bilirakis for 5 

minutes for questions. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very 

much. 

47

To the panel, for several months now I’ve expressed my deep concern regarding reports that the administration participated in multiple acts of gun walking, such as we’ve seen, of course, in the case 

of ‘‘Fast and Furious,’’ allowing firearms to pass into the possession 

of criminal and other third party organizations south of our border. 

I strongly support efforts to disrupt criminal syndicates that 

traffick firearms, and of course drugs, and conduct other illicit and 

illegal activities. However, when those efforts serve to fuel the operations of criminal enterprises through the provisions of firearms, 

they must be stopped. 

It is extremely troubling that the United States Government will 

willfully allow weapons to be acquired by dangerous criminals and 

drug trafficking organizations in direct contravention to our strategic and national interests. 

Can the panel please explain for the committee what efforts your 

agencies are currently taking to enforce current laws and to ensure 

that we are not allowing weapons to fall into the hands of Mexican 

drug cartels and criminal organizations? 

Mr. BENSON. Congressman, when I look at drug trafficking, and 

drug trafficking and violence go hand-in-hand, and as we target 

those cartel representatives whom are deployed to the United 

States, we encounter weapons frequently and we seize those weapons. And we do that continuously throughout operations throughout the country. 

Ms. SILVER. Also, thank you for the question. 

From the DHS point of view, obviously we are constantly on the 

lookout in the southwest border and in the region for weapons that 

are south bound. We have instituted checks of rail and of cars that 

far outstrip anything we’ve done in the past for exactly that reason, 

and we’ll continue to do so. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. And finally if I could add on, from our 

end, Congressman, and that’s the external side, what we do on the 

southern side of the border. We are working to support both training for Mexican law enforcement and military in terms of identification of and how to do investigations of illicit firearms and illegal 

firearms. And second, we support tying them in to our own electronic tracing systems that we have, whereby we can track through 

serial numbers and other identifying data a firearm to give the 

Mexican institutions access to that same system. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. The safety of our men and women in 

uniform remains, obviously, my concern and I’m going to demand 

that those who are on the front lines of this battle get the training, 

resources and support they need to do their job as safely and as 

effectively as possible. 

We must act decisively to gain operational control of the border. 

To do anything less would be a disservice to our Border personnel 

and leave the door open through which criminals, drug smugglers, 

human traffickers, and terrorists can destroy the fabric of our society. 

While the Merida Initiative involves bolstering the effectiveness, 

accountability, and professionalism of Mexican police at the Federal level, corruption among local police forces is consistently cited 

as one of the key reasons as to why the drug cartels are able to 

continue exporting their product to the United States. Whether 

48

they turn a blind eye or actively work for the cartels, corrupt police 

officers enable the drug gangs to remain a national, as opposed to 

a regional, threat. 

My question on this matter is twofold. How does the Merida Initiative address the issue of corruption among the local police officers? If Merida does not address this issue, what plan of action 

would you recommend to this committee to counter the crippling 

influence of corrupt police officers, corrupt police forces on what the 

Initiative is trying to accomplish? A question for the panel. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Let me start, Congressman, and I’ll 

start by the last sentence that I offered in my oral statement, and 

that is it took us many years to get into this situation, it’s going 

to take some years to get out. And corruption clearly falls in that 

category. 

What are we doing right now? First, we are attempting to professionalize first the Federal police forces and increasingly in the future, the state and local police forces, because a professional law 

enforcement institution is less likely to be corrupt then a non-corrupt one. 

Second, we are supporting the development of internal investigatory capability; the equivalent of an IAD in a U.S. or municipal or 

state or Federal police institution. These individuals within the police force whose job is to monitor, investigate and if necessary, 

sanction corrupt members of the institution. 

Third, we are trying to work to ensure that they have salaries that you can actually live on. If your salary is $15 a month, it is 

highly likely that you will try to supplement that through external 

month. If your salary is a $1,000 a month, it’s at least $985 less 

likely per month that you will try to supplement it. 

And finally, we are working with the Attorney General’s Office 

of Mexico and will increasingly work with the State Attorney’s 

General to ensure public prosecution that becomes visible to everyone in the community of corrupt officials and officers that thereby 

sends a signal that corruption will not be tolerated. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, how much progress have we made in this 

area, though? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I would say it depends upon where 

you are and what the institution is that you’re dealing with. But 

I will talk about the one that I believe has seen the greatest 

progress in this regard, and that is the Federal Police of the SSP, 

an institution that before the Merida Initiative totaled about 6,000 

is now nearly 40,000. And my own personal opinion is that this is 

an institution that is much more highly regarded for its professionalism, and by the same token its relative honesty than it was 

4 or 5 years ago. If we could get to that level in the 32 states and 

hundreds of municipal institutions, I would suggest to all of you, 

ladies and gentlemen, that we have made some real serious 

progress. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

I would now like to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for 5 minutes for 

questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

appreciate this hearing. We need to pay attention to Mexico. I have 

been in and out of Mexico since I was a kid. I am a southern CaliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Feb 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\WH\100411\70582 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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fornian. Spent a lot of time in Baja and lived with a Mexican family, actually, for several months when I was in college. And it 

seems that since that time—which at that time Mexico was a very 

pleasant place, the people were very wonderful people—it just 

seems that this horrendous cloud has come over our neighbor and 

is now enveloping these wonderful people. 

I want to suggest that law enforcement—I mean, basically what 

I am hearing today is that law enforcement is going to be the answer. I would just like to suggest to you I do not think that is the 

case. I do not think you are going to solve the problems down there 

with law enforcement. 

We have been trying to bolster. We have had military groups 

that we have bolstered and then have turned against the authorities and joined the cartels. For 20 years now we have been trying 

to suggest that cooperation of law enforcement can solve this problem, yet it has gotten worse and worse and worse. 

Let me ask you a little bit about something that was just brought 

up. Did any of your agencies know about the ‘‘Fast and Furious’’ 

operation that saw that thousands of military-style weapons transferred from our Government into the hands of the cartels, including 

high caliber sniper rifles? Did any one of your organizations know 

about that operation prior, as it was going on and it was being instituted? 

Let us go right down the line. Did you personally know about it 

and did someone in your operation know about it? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I did not, and to the best of my knowledge no one in my part of the U.S. Government did. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So nobody from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs knew about ‘‘Fast 

and Furious’’ is your testimony today? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I became aware of it at the same time 

that it hit the media. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. What about Drug Enforcement Administration? 

Mr. BENSON. Well, Congressman, currently we are working with 

those committees that are investigating that matter. At this time 

that would be the comment I would make. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So your comment is that you are not 

going to comment on a direct question about whether or not your 

agency knew about ‘‘Fast and Furious’’? 

Mr. BENSON. My comment would be is that we are working with 

those subcommittees that are investigating ‘‘Fast and Furious.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, this happens to be a Member of Congress who is very interested and you are now under oath, so maybe 

you could answer the question for me? 

Mr. BENSON. That would be my comment at this point. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. All right. Which is no comment; I find 

that to be of great interest that your predecessor, I mean your fellow that just spoke, Mr. Brownfield, could absolutely go on the 

record and say he did not know anything about it and you cannot. 

How about you, Ms. Silver, did you know about ‘‘Fast and Furious’’? 

50

Ms. SILVER. I learned about it in the press when it became when 

it became exposed to all of you. And in terms of my office, I can 

say that no one in my office knew about it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. You personally did not know anything 

about it nor did anyone in your office——

Ms. SILVER. I did not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. As far as you know? 

Ms. SILVER. That is correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I appreciate that. I just wanted to put 

that on the record, Mr. Chairman. 

One thing, I voted for NAFTA years ago based on the promise 

that NAFTA would in some way help the economy of Mexico and 

thus prevent, or at least offer an alternative, to drugs as being a 

means of earning a living down there. Didn’t have a positive impact and can we make these economic agreements and accept that 

they will have a better impact elsewhere then they’ve had on Mexico? 

And feel free, whoever thinks they can answer that. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Congressman, I suppose I should say 

that we are not the right people to answer that question, however 

my wife says there is never an issue I should not talk not, that I 

am not willing to talk about. So, I will have very simple views. 

As Congressman Engel knows, I spent 3 years in Colombia, actually trying to make a case for an FTA, which has finally found its 

way to this institution. So, I will make that basic generic case. 

Free trade agreements for the most part are good for the economies for both countries involved. They are good for the economies 

involved because they allow free trade and commerce to come 

across——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you compare that to Mexico for us, 

could you? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. At the end at the end of the day I do 

not claim to be an expert on NAFTA, but I would say to you that 

the logic is that the cost of moving goods back and forth across the 

border, you produce more trade. By producing more trade, the factories and companies produce more stuff. As they produce more 

stuff, they employ more people. As they employ more people, their 

economies grow. The logic, therefore, is the economy grows on both 

side of the border. That’s the logic behind a free trade agreement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. But it has gotten worse in Mexico 

since we passed NAFTA, unfortunately. I mean, that is just the observation that we make. I mean, it is inescapable to see that. 

But listen, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. And I thank the gentleman from California. 

Next I would like to recognize Mr. Duncan for 5 minutes for 

questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I think we have done a good job exploring this topic today. 

I want to thank the panelists for being here and for your service 

to our nation in your various capacity. 

I am going to take a little different line of approach here because 

it is a topic that is interesting to me and we have talked about this 

many times on the Committee of Homeland Security. And that is 

the issue of an international terrorist organization Hezbollah and 

51

its involvement with the Mexican drug cartel. Many experts believe 

that the international terrorist organization Hezbollah and the 

Mexican drug cartel have been working together for years. And it 

is well known that Hezbollah and drug cartels have cooperated in 

countries in Western Africa, South America, Central America and 

most importantly, the tri-borders region in South America. 

U.S. authorities have long described Hezbollah as the A team of 

international terrorism with far more discipline than al-Qaeda, 

with vast financing from the Governments of Iran and Syria and 

a global network of sleeper operatives who could be called on to 

launch an attack at anytime. 

Just last year in July 2010, we saw the first IUD explode south 

of the U.S. border in Mexico. Since the fall of 2008, at least 111 

suspects of Hezbollah-linked international network of drug traffickers and money launderers have been arrested as part of an 

international operation coordinated by DEA. 

And I can go on and talk about the owner of a cafe in Tijuana 

arrested in 2002, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, who traveled all the 

way to Dearborn, Michigan, spent 4 years in prison for conspiring 

to raise money for Hezbollah. There are just a lot of cases out 

there. 

And so, Mr. Benson, I would ask how much of a priority should 

Hezbollah be to American counterterrorism policy? 

Mr. BENSON. Congressman, as we look at the tie between drug 

trafficking and terrorism, we do see that around the globe. So I 

mean clearly for the DEA it is a priority that we look at those organizations and we continue to look at their connection across the 

globe. 

Mr. DUNCAN. And thank you for serving our region of South 

Carolina where I am from, by the way. I meant to mention that. 

However in your activities with DEA, is there any conclusive evidence of Hezbollah’s involvement with the tunneling activities of 

the cartels? 

Mr. BENSON. I guess I would say a general statement on the link 

between drug trafficking and terrorism does exist. I do not necessarily see that to a great degree with the Mexican cartels, but 

other locations around the world where we see like in Afghanistan 

or in places like that. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Ambassador, I know you were not necessarily 

in the tri-border region, but in South America in your service there, 

the tri-border region, how much emphasis was put on that are during your time in South America and Chile, and also Colombia? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. You may have left out the third one, 

where it probably has the greatest focus, and that would be Venezuela. 

Congressman, first I believe you are absolutely dead on right to 

be focused on Hezbollah as a potential threat. 

Second, if Hezbollah were to develop operational capabilities in 

the Western Hemisphere, that would be one real, major serious 

problem for the United States of America. 

Third, I believe as we look at Hezbollah we have to break the 

threat into two parts. One is kind of the fundraising possibilities 

that they have, and I actually think there is evidence of that in a 

52

number of countries in South American. The second part of the 

threat is operational capability. 

I at this stage do not see operational capability by Hezbollah in 

the Western Hemisphere. That said, I do not focus on this issue for 

a living. There are others who do that, and you would be far better 

advised to get an opinion from them than from the guy who does 

organized crime, drugs, rule of law and law enforcement. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes. Thank you very much. 

Ma’am, would you like to chime in on this issue at all? 

Ms. SILVER. I think it is has been well covered by my colleagues. 

I think from the perspective of DHS, obviously we are constantly 

looking through our intelligence and analysis branch for those 

kinds of linkage and for any indication of those kinds of linkages. 

And we will continue to do so. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back the balance. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Duncan. 

I now would like to recognize Mr. Rivera for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you to all the witnesses for being here today. 

I want to try to hone in on this issue of Mexico and its ability 

to carry out primary responsibility in protecting its citizens, and 

also the impact that the diversification of criminal activity and 

criminal organizations in Mexico, what other types of criminal 

insurgencies against the state may be developing or whether they 

are making headway. 

I am wondering if perhaps all three of you could comment your 

thoughts on the drug cartels in Mexico and whether they have indeed diversified into a variety of illicit activities and what that 

comprised? 

Maybe we can start with Secretary Brownfield. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Sure, Congressman. And I will give 

you my answered filtered through not just my experience of the 

past year dealing directly with the Merida Initiative in Mexico, but 

the prior 3 years when I was in Colombia. 

As I suggested in an earlier answer, I believe what is happening 

in Mexico is the larger cartels are taking serious, they are breaking 

up to consider extent. There are now more organizations but small 

in nature, less national and nationwide in scope and more regionally focused. So whereas previously you would have had X number, 

maybe now you have three times X number, but each one of those 

organizations is smaller. 

Mr. RIVERA. And would you agree as well that their illicit activities have moved beyond just drug trafficking? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. First, I think they have expanded 

their drug trafficking in terms of what they are willing, able, and 

capable of doing. I could say it is no longer just cocaine if they can 

also make money out of methamphetamines, out of heroin, or out 

of other products they do. They can use the same networks, they 

can use the same people, they can use the same institutions, they 

can use the same logistic systems to move product. If they are moving it in a criminal enterprise, to a certain extent it does not matter what is in the truck, the plane, the boat or the backpack; if 

53

they can make money by moving it, they can and they will. And 

to that extent, I suppose my answer to your question would be yes. 

I do see some signs of diversification. 

Mr. RIVERA. Administrator Benson, your thoughts on if there has 

been some diversity of illicit activities or an evolution of illicit activities? 

Mr. BENSON. Yes, Congressman. We have seen the same evolution as well. I mean, they have transitioned over a period of time 

from marijuana traffickers to cocaine traffickers. They basically 

pushed their operations and the Colombians have receded over the 

last decade, two decades where now you have Mexican organized 

crime. I mean they are the wholesale distributors in the United 

States with methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. 

But then also as we have impacted their leadership in Mexico, they 

have then diversified as well into other revenue streams; kidnapping, extortion and a number of other crimes as well. 

Mr. RIVERA. Secretary Silver? 

Ms. SILVER. Congressman, certainly we see the same, both the 

fragmentation and some of the diversification both across the narcotics spectrum and then we also have a significant concern about 

human trafficking and human smuggling and engagement in that 

on the part of some of the criminal organizations and we are focusing some significant energy on that as well. 

Mr. RIVERA. Well, I would hope that if there is indeed this evolution or diversification of the illicit activities with respect to the 

drug cartels moving beyond just the drug trafficking even if the 

drug trafficking perhaps has moved to different forms of trafficking 

and different forms of drugs, then I think it is important as we go 

forward that we also look at diversifying our strategy as well. If it 

is not just drug trafficking, if it includes human trafficking and 

smuggling and other activities, then I think that is something that 

would perhaps concern many Members of Congress to make sure 

that the administration as we go through looking at the genesis of 

the Initiative and what was its primary responsibility at the beginning and what the threat was at the beginning of the Initiative, if 

that threat has indeed changed and if the illicit activity has diversified or evolved over the years, that we would make sure and focus 

in on that as well, and be responsive to the changing threats of the 

illicit activities. 

So, I will yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Rivera. 

I would now like to recognize Mr. Cuellar for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both of you all and the ranking members for allowing me to sit here. 

Assistant Secretary Brownfield, good seeing you again. 

For 175 years, the U.S. and Mexico have held strong relations, 

you know signing several treaties, sharing various membership in 

international organizations. We share a maritime border and a 

land border with them. Every day there is $1 billion of trade between the U.S and Mexico. 

54

Would you agree that the current relationship between the U.S. 

and Mexico is at its strongest and most positive point that it has 

ever been in the last 175 years? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Congressman, as you know, you and I 

come from the state, and I would use exactly those words. I believe 

the bilateral relationship right now is unprecedented in terms of 

the willingness of both governments to work together in the face 

of a long history of complications. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Would you agree that we should be working with 

our Mexican partners to bring them in closer, especially with all 

the examples that have been given them or should we be pushing 

them away by going into what names we ought to call them or the 

groups that are working there? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. I would never offer an opinion direct 

or indirect on what other members of these two distinguished committees have suggested. 

I would say to you, as I said in my opening statement, that if 

we cannot reach basic agreement with the Government of Mexico, 

our efforts probably will not succeed. It has to be cooperative. They 

have to agree with what we are trying to do. If not, we are unlikely 

to succeed. 

Mr. CUELLAR. And this is more for Mr. Benson. 

If drug cartels were designated as terrorist organizations, and 

consider that they are dealing in a couple of hundred cities in the 

U.S., how do we deal with U.S. citizens who purchase drugs from 

them? And if somebody purchased a bag of marijuana for personal 

consumption, will he be charged with aiding and abetting a terrorist? I am sure we will catch somebody because we send what, 

$25 billion or $30 billion of monies down to Mexico? I mean, would 

that be a possibility? 

Mr. BENSON. Well, as I look at it, Congressman, from an organized crime standpoint, I believe our authorities, our Federal narcotic laws are sufficient to address the trafficking problem that exists now. 

Mr. CUELLAR. You didn’t answer my question. So I guess you are 

saying that we do not need to go into—and I am one of those that 

I believe in law enforcement. I’ve got three police officers in my 

family. When it comes to law enforcement, just as I like to listen 

to our generals in Iraq and Afghanistan, I want to listen to folks 

who are doing the day-to-day. So I certainly would agree with your 

assessment on that. 

Let me ask you a specific question. The U.S. and Mexico got into 

an Initiative, or whatever, that established multi-national, multiagency intelligent centers, and one has been established that is 

called the Regional Intelligence Operation Coordination. 

My understanding is that the U.S. Government designated one 

agency, which you might be familiar with, to take the lead on this 

and they designed a Mexican agency to take the lead on this. According to the Mexican agency on that fusion center, there’s been 

about $10 million have been spent for equipping and staffing the 

U.S. participant agencies at this regional intelligence agency, 

which is good. But according to the Mexican agency where the plan 

Merida is supposed to be putting the money, they are saying that 

they still have not gotten any of that money. They are saying they 

55

have not been equipped, they have not been trained. And again, 

there are two sides to every story, but I am just saying what the 

Mexican Government who was designated to help establish this 

center, they are saying that they have not gotten any of that. That 

all the $10 million has gone to equip the U.S. agencies, which 

again I am okay with but are we forgetting our Mexican partners 

on this? 

Mr. BENSON. I think as we look at exchange of intelligence, Congressman, it is very robust as I mentioned earlier. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Do not mean to interrupt you. I am not talking 

about exchange of information, how robust. I know we have the 

best relationship. Just answer my question: The money that has 

been there, around $10 million, $9 or $10 million, has any of that 

been spent to help equip the Mexicans who are training at the fusion center for the one that is operational now? Just say or no. 

Mr. BENSON. I do not know exactly the monetary figure. I really 

could not answer that. I do not know the answer to that question. 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. Well, let me restate this a little bit, because my time is up. Is there any reason to doubt the Mexican 

agency that was given the lead just like the American agency, is 

there anything there that would question the statements that they 

made that you know of? 

Mr. BENSON. I do not information to answer that, sir at this 

time. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. All right. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. 

And if the witnesses do not mind, we would like to ask a few 

more questions and give the members an opportunity for another 

round and taking the Ambassador up on his offer. 

I would now recognize myself 5 minutes for questions. 

You know, I think this is an important hearing. And, you know 

it is interesting. So some of the take-aways right off the bat is that 

there is not a lot of disagreement in things like the evolution of the 

drug cartels, that the activities that the cartels are engaged in 

meet a definition by the CIA of activities that are insurgent activities. 

But I wanted to, before I get into that, I wanted Ambassador 

Brownfield, in answering some questions earlier you posed three 

questions to the committee that you would suggest asking. And the 

first one is, what would we get by using a label or the terminology 

designation? And I would say this: That with criminal insurgency 

it would allow us to develop a countersurgery strategy that pulls 

all U.S. resources together for a comprehensive and effective response to the reality on the ground and increase awareness in the 

U.S. of the threat of the threat we face. That’s one. 

The second question: What are the domestic legal implications of 

this? And the answer to that is there are none. 

And third: What impact would the designation have on programs 

on the ground? And I think what my suggestion is is that this 

would simply be utilization of the good U.S./Mexico relations to simultaneously address the threat on all levels. 

So, I think for me, and I think for a lot of people, this isn’t as 

much as saying that Merida has failed. There has been some sucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Feb 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\WORK\WH\100411\70582 HFA PsN: SHIRL
56

cesses in Merida that you cannot deny and that are good things. 

But as we look forward, if we continue to kind of make the determination not to label what is happening in Mexico as it is, it also 

hamstrings our ability to confront the challenges because we are 

not properly identifying what those are. 

Mr. Benson, in your written testimony you talked about the evolution and some of the cartel’s activities here in the United States. 

Would it not be helpful if the Treasury Department, all of the agencies, a whole of government approach, do you not think that would 

be helpful in completing your task? 

Mr. BENSON. Chairman, we do that now. We leverage every department in the U.S. Government across a number of different 

agencies as we target their leadership here in the United States 

and in other countries. So, as we look at their money flow, for example, as we look at their movement of drug loads back and forth 

across the border, their movement into countries it is across many 

different department and agencies where we’re impacting those organizations. 

Mr. MACK. So the cooperations there, you do not need anymore 

help. You have got everything you need? 

Mr. BENSON. Well, I think the authorities that we have are sufficient to tackle and battle Mexican organized crime. 

Mr. MACK. Right, but how about to battle an insurgency? 

Mr. BENSON. As I said, Chairman, I believe our Title 21 authorities that we have, our Federal narcotics statutes are sufficient to 

target the cartels and their leadership. 

Mr. MACK. And I think this gets back to the point of the definition and why it is important to define what it is that we are challenging. I mean, most people recognize that the cartels’ activity has 

gotten worse, that they are using every tool available to displace 

government. I mean, they are offering health care and other things 

to the citizens in the Mexico to try to gain favor. And so if you just 

want to go after it as a drug enforcement policy, then I would say 

‘‘Okay, you have the support you need from some of these other departments.’’ But if we describe what is happening as it is, as an 

insurgency, there are a lot of other tools in the toolbox to be used 

and we cannot continue to sit back and watch the growth of these 

cartels and their criminal insurgent activities in Mexico because it 

put not only the people of the United States at risk, our freedom, 

security and prosperity, but also the people of Mexico, their freedom, security and prosperity. 

My time has expired. 

I would now recognize Mr. Engel for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to just talk about Merida. But before, I just want to comment on something Mr. Duncan said about Hezbollah. I think it 

would be good for us to, perhaps, get a briefing down the line about 

it. There is a flight, a plane, that has been going from Iran to Syria 

to Venezuela and back every week. We do not know who is on it. 

We do not know what is on it. But you can believe that it has some 

Hezbollah connection to it. So I think that was a good thing that 

you raised it and I think we should pursue that more. 

I want to talk about Merida. We talked about it initially, and I 

wanted to just talk about it. When we announced the Initiative in 

57

October 2007, we were told that it would be a 3-year program. And 

last year we had the announcement of beyond Merida and continued funding to the FY 2011/2012 budget. So it appears that Merida 

is here to stay, at least for the near future. 

How long does the administration plan for the Merida Initiative 

funding to continue? Should it continue for the foreseeable future 

or should we start thinking about phasing it out and maybe doing 

something new? 

Ambassador? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Congressman, that is a perfectly legitimate question. You have every right to grill us on this question 

every time we come before you. 

My answer once again is filtered through my experience in Colombia, another example of a program where we set out saying it 

is a 5-year program; we are now wrapping year 12 of the program. 

But, it is down to a level, it is now about 25 percent of where we 

were when we started it in the year 2000. That does not strike me 

as an incoherent way of approaching the Mexican challenge. 

The simple and simplistic answer to your question is we are 

going to deal with the realities on the ground that are presented 

and we are not going to ask the American people to subject their 

own security to an artificial timeline and time table. But it should 

be realistic for you to say to someone like to me ‘‘I expect to see 

a downward glide path. I expect you to have that program at a long 

term sustainable level in a finite period of time and to force me to 

give you some sort of estimate as to what that finite period of time 

would be.’’

If you were to really twist my arm really hard——

Mr. ENGEL. I would never do that. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD [continuing]. I would say that you were 

generous with us for 3 years. We are now into the fourth year. You 

should expect and you are seeing a reduction in the amount of resources and funding that is being put into the Merida Initiative. 

You should expect that to continue for a period of time until we 

mutually agree that we are at a sustainable level. That is the best 

answer I can give you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. That is fine. 

Let me ask you some specifics about Merida. The majority of the 

police in Mexico are at the local and state level. But funding from 

Merida goes mostly to the military and to Federal security units. 

We know that corruption at the local and state levels in Mexico is 

very high. So it is understandable, I think, that President Caldero ́n 

has turned to the Federal police and the military. On the other 

hand, most crime takes place at the local and the state levels and 

those police will eventually need to be professionalized. 

So, can you tell me how would you characterize efforts under 

Merida to assist local and state institutions? And how would you 

assess the progress that Mexico has made in implementing police 

reform at the Federal level? And at what point do you think that 

the government might be able to disengage the military from its 

present role in domestic security? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Thank you, Congressman, I think that 

is a brilliant question because it leads right into what I call the 

58

transition that we are trying to do right now in the Merida Initiative. 

You are quite correct. The first 3 years were focused on the Federal institutions. Our objectives that we set for ourselves this year 

and next year is to pivot from the Federal institutions to the state 

and municipal institutions. The way we would hope to do it in absolute and complete agreement with the Federal Government of 

Mexico which controls and decides everything that we do in Mexico 

by way of support and assistance is to focus initially on three 

northern states of Mexico; Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leo ́n and Chihuahua, which just happened to comprise much of our southwestern border as well. Focus on their state and municipal police, 

follow-up on the Mexican Government’s own system of creating 

what they call ‘‘model police units,’’ which is units of about 422 police officers from each of the 32 states, trained to a common standard, equipped to a common standard with vehicles that are of a 

common standard so that the Federal Government knows exactly 

what it is working with if this unit deploys. And train up enough 

of them to be able to address these issues. 

When, Congressman, the police and law enforcement are able to 

do their job, then I predict we see less military involved in law enforcement which in any country in the world, including our own, 

is not the mission that they are trained or equipped for. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Engel. 

And Mr. Mr. McCaul is recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When the chairman and I were down in Mexico City we saw exactly what you were talking about. I think President Caldero ́n believes there is sort of a turning point, which was encouraging. I am 

not sure if that was reality or not. But his goal was to replace his 

military with the national police force, which makes sense. And I 

think his people look at the military cracking down their own country. 

He also, there is a high level of trust with the national police and 

they are all polygraphed. 

I wanted to bring up another—we have talked about this, Ambassador, but when we were down in Colombia, President Santos, 

he talked about his special forces trained by our guys, almost just 

as good as our guys, assisting Mexico and was very willing to assist 

in anyway that he could. And we took that message to President 

Caldero ́n, and he was very interested. And I understand they are 

providing some training in Mexico. But could you just elaborate on 

that? 

To me, you know a lot of people say why do we not put our military down there. You and I know with the sovereignty issues, we 

cannot go down there. But I think the Colombian special forces can 

assimilate better from a cultural standpoint. And it was an intriguing idea I think that we heard on that trip that we thought could 

provide some assistance. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I not only think it is 

an intriguing, I think it is an excellent idea. It probably would not 

surprise you to learn that I am a great fan and admirer of what 

59

the Colombian people, their government, and their institutions 

have accomplished over the last 11 or 12 years. I think they are 

now quite capable of exporting some of those capabilities through 

training and support elsewhere in the region. I think it is a net 

positive for the United States of America to see Colombia engage 

in this effort together. 

I think it is, among other things, an excellent return for our in- vestment of $8.5 billion or more in support of Colombia over the 

last 11 going on 12 years. 

I think you are absolutely correct. The Colombians have reached 

a level where I would argue they have capabilities that almost no 

other law enforcement or military institution has anywhere in the 

world. And in some issues, I would even stand them up with our 

own armed forces. I believe in jungle operations, for example, that 

the Colombians may well at this stage be the very best in the 

world. 

They can make much of this training cheaper. They can do it 

without, shall we say, the historical baggage that we bring to the 

U.S./Mexico relationship. They can do it in a common language. 

They can do it where they are literally sharing real time and real 

world experience saying ‘‘This is what we did when we were taking 

down the Medellin and Cali Cartels. This is not educational. This 

is not academic. I am the guy who did it, and this is how we did 

it.’’

I think it is excellent value. And may I tell you that I, like you, 

whenever I am in conservation with either of the two governments, 

I am trying to encourage this sort of exchange. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think, I mean certainly from Colombia’s standpoint, they are very willing to partner. And I think Caldero ́n was 

very interested in the idea. I think we got his attention on that. 

And I think that that is something we should a great take-away 

from the sharing and a positive thing, I think we all can agree on 

that we can move forward with that in mind. 

But I do want to clear up just a couple of things. Usually Henry 

Cuellar and I are on the same, and we are best of friends. You 

know, in Colombia when you have the foreign terrorist designation 

with the FARC, were you ever aware of any casual drug users that 

were prosecuted? 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. No, not that I am aware. I mean, it 

could well be there as in here, you know you got a charge sheet 

of 11 charges and you add on drug use just in case you lose the 

other 11. But other than that, you are asking if someone was prosecuted solely for that purpose. And, obviously the answer is——

Mr. MCCAUL. Because I think that has been misrepresented by 

many, and that is not the way it works. But I like the idea, you 

know the Kingpin statute, they talk about that a lot, and that really goes after the head of the organization, whereas the FTO would 

go after the body of the organization in a far greater jurisdiction 

with heavier penalties. I think I am diplomatic. I know this one is 

not a diplomatic issue. At times with the Ambassador, we have had 

long conversations about this. But I do think it would provide 

greater authorities to go after these very dangerous cartels. 

And just finally, I mean we did not have any problems with 

working with Colombia when we had this designation, did we? 

60

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. Not that I’m aware of. Though, to be 

honest and to be fair to the other side, Mr. Chairman, and I do not 

want to have an argument with you on this because I believe we 

are trying to accomplish exactly the same thing. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I agree. 

Ambassador BROWNFIELD. But I would remind you in Colombia 

we never put the Medellin or the Cali Cartel on the FTO list. And 

I assume there is a reason for that as well. So, I think this is worth 

more conversation, and I will leave it at that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And it certainly has been a provocative issue. 

And thank you for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. McCaul. 

And Mr. Duncan is recognized for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, guys, this might be the last question of the day, so I appreciate you bearing with us. 

Mr. Benson, as Special Agent in charge of Atlanta’s DEA you 

were reported as saying that the Mexican drug cartels were able 

to blend right in and establish Metro Atlanta as that strategic 

trans-shipment point. So my question is how real is the threat of 

these cartels in American cities, and what other cities are the Mexico drug cartels operating out of? 

Mr. BENSON. Well, Congressman, it is very real. As you know, 

Atlanta is the hub for business in the southeast. And the Mexican 

cartels recognized that for a lot of the same reason. I mean, you 

go from the southwest border to Atlanta in about 1,100 miles, a 15-

hour trip. And then from there we would see those cartels then 

push up loads of cocaine, for example, all the way up the eastern 

seaboard. And then they would also use strategic trans-shipment 

hubs in Atlanta, Dallas and Los Angeles, and many other places, 

that then collect money and then push that back down to cartel 

leadership. 

So they have strategically identified locations like Atlanta because it is a good business model for them. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Certainly it is a good business model for companies 

like DHL and FedEx and others where they use hubs to distribute 

certain things. And if we know that, though, if we know they’re 

using Atlanta and Dallas and Phoenix and some those areas, would 

that not make it easier to crack down on them? 

Mr. BENSON. Yes, it does. And we have hit them in a hard way 

in places like Atlanta and some of their trans-shipment locations. 

And what we have seen as we hit them in a place like Atlanta, 

they then will adjust and make tactical changes in the way they 

do business. So it is just a matter of us keeping on top of them as 

they make their adjustments to our enforcement forces. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Just one other quick question about methamphetamine. So it is cheaply made, but is it cost effective from Mexico 

and for a drug cartel to bring meth into the U.S. versus having it 

manufactured and cooked here? 

Mr. BENSON. We see a great deal of methamphetamine on the 

streets of the United States today. And most of it is produced 

there. They do produce it, it is inexpensive and they bring up very 

61

large amounts of, for example, crystallized methamphetamine, high 

purity, that they push out into our streets. 

So, I still believe that we will see Mexican organizations supplying the lion’s share of methamphetamine to our U.S. market. 

We will also see those smaller lab operations that support either 

individual habit or those of a few. But I believe Mexican organizations will remain the primary supply for methamphetamine in the 

U.S. market. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Is it easier for them to get the Sudafed and other 

ingredients through Mexican channels since we have thwarted 

their efforts of over-the-counter products here? 

Mr. BENSON. Well, they have instituted and they do have some 

very good chemical control laws in Mexico now. But we have seen 

those lab operators adjust their manufacturing techniques to use 

other methods to produce methamphetamine. And I believe we will 

continue to see that. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. 

I do not have any further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back the balance of the time. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Duncan. 

Well, this concludes the hearing. 

I want to thank the staffs on both the Majority and the Minority 

for both the two subcommittees for your hard work in this. 

I also want to thank the members who participated today. 

And most importantly, I want to thank Ambassador Brownfield 

and Mr. Benson and Ms. Silver for your time and sharing with us 

your thoughts on what I think is a very important topic. 

So with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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