BACKGROUND PAPER

Strengthening NATO:

Pomcus and other Approaches

February 1979

e

Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office
STRENGTHENING NATO:

POMCUS AND OTHER APPROACHES

The Congress of the United States

Congressional Budget Office

TTF
.Jill
PREFACE

As the Congress debates the First Concurrent Resolution

on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1980, the President's commitment

to increase defense spending by 3 percent per year will be one of

the most important issues• This commitment reflects an agreement

by the NATO countries to strengthen the alliance.

As part of that agreement, the United States has pledged to

increase the amount of U.S. equipment pre-positioned in Europe, in

order to accelerate the arrival of U.S. reinforcements in the

event of a Warsaw Pact attack. Such a step has significant

political and long-term budgetary implications. In response to a

request from the Senate Budget Committee, this paper examines

the current military balance in Europe, describes the proposed

pre-positioning program and two other ways in which NATO's conventional defenses could be strengthened, and estimates the

long-term costs of pre-positioning more equipment in Europe.

This paper was prepared by Pat Hillier of the National

Security and International Affairs Division of the Congressional

Budget Office, under the supervision of David S.C. Chu. The

author gratefully acknowledges the preliminary work of Robert

Kleinbaum and the contribution of Edward Swoboda of CBO's Budget

Analysis Division, who prepared the cost estimates. Helpful

comments on earlier drafts were provided by Ted Parker of the

Rand Corporation, and by Damian Kulash, Andrew Hamilton, Dov

Zakheim, John Harare, and Nancy Swope of the CBO staff. (The

assistance of external reviewers implies no responsibility for the

final product, which rests solely with the Congressional Budget

Office.) Marion F. Houstoun edited the manuscript; Connie Leonard

prepared the paper for publication.

Alice M. Rivlin

Director

February 1979

iii

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CONTENTS

PREFACE . . ill

SUMMARY xiii

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 1

Background , ... . 1

Defense of NATO's Central Region and the

U.S. Contribution to NATO Ground Forces . . 2

DoD's New Program 5

Purpose of This Study 7

CHAPTER II. THE UNFAVORABLE WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE

RATIO AND NORTHAG VULNERABILITIES ..... . 9

The Unfavorable Theater Force Ratio 9

A Possible Force Ratio Goal for NATO 11

Forces Available to NATO , 15

NORTHAG Vulnerabilities 17

How to Improve Conditions—

A NATO Problem 24

Conclusions 25

CHAPTER III. THE DoD PLAN AND ITS COST 27

The DoD POMCUS Plan for

Strengthening NORTHAG 27

Costs of the DoD Proposal 29

Conclusions •• 34

CHAPTER IV. OPTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING NATO 35

The Need to Improve the Overall Force

Ratio and Strengthen NORTHAG 35

Available Design Strategies 35

Alternative U.S. Options 39

Summary 43

CHAPTER V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 47

IT IT
JJi
CONTENTS (continued)

APPENDIX A.

APPENDIX B.

APPENDIX C.

APPENDIX D.

APPENDIX E.

GLOSSARY OF MILITARY UNITS

DERIVATION OF FORCE RATIOS

ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF

UNFAVORABLE FORCE RATIOS .

CALCULATION OF WARSAW PACT/NATO

FORCE RATIOS: MANPOWER IN

DIVISIONS AND FIREPOWER ....

Page

51

53

59

61

NATO'S LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP) ... 63

vii

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TABLES

Page

TABLE 1. CURRENT COMPOSITION OF POMCUS 6

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED COST OF PRE-POSITIONING

THREE DIVISION SETS OF EQUIPMENT 33

TABLE 3. POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED MECHANIZATION

OF ALLIED FORCES 36

TABLE 4. COST COMPARISON OF U.S. OPTIONS,

FISCAL YEARS 1980-1984 45

APPENDIX TABLES

TABLE B-l. 1978 WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE RATIOS 54

TABLE B-2. ESTIMATE OF CHANGE IN NATO BUILDUP 55

TABLE B-3. BUILDUP DATA FOR OPTIONS 56

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40-616 O - 79 - 2

"TTTT'
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FIGURES

Page

FIGURE 1.

FIGURE 2.

FIGURE 3.

FIGURE 4.

FIGURE 5.

FIGURE 6.

FIGURE 7.

CORPS SECTORS OF MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY

IN NATO'S CENTRAL REGION

IMPACT OF THEATER FORCE RATIOS ON NUMBER

OF CORPS PROVIDING REINFORCEMENTS TO

OTHER CORPS IN THE EVENT OF A

WARSAW PACT INVASION

IMPACT OF DoD PLAN ON THE THEATER

FORCE RATIO

THEATER FORCE RATIO IMPROVEMENT

PROJECTED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983

COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES I AND II

FORCE RATIO WITH THE PROJECTED

FISCAL YEAR 1983 FORCE RATIO . . .

COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES I, II, AND III .

COMPARISON OF LAND FORCES (CENTER REGION) .

13

28

40

41

44

53

xi
JL1L
SUMMARY

NATO has two strategic disadvantages vis-a-vls the Warsaw

Pact. First, the Pact would have a head start on mobilization

because of the defensive nature of the alliance. Second, NATO

would not be able to match the Pact's buildup because one-third of

its reinforcements during the first four months after mobilization

would come from the United States.

As the Pact has improved its capability to exploit these

advantages, the United States has responded by improving its

reinforcement capability. In particular, a program known as

POMCUS (pre-positioned materiel configured to unit sets) was

developed to reduce U.S. response time to a Pact attack. POMCUS

pre-positions the equipment for U.S.-based divisions (and support

units) in the U.S. sectors of NATO's Central Region. _!_/ This

reduces NATO's strategic deployment problem because only the

personnel of POMCUS units need to be transported to Europe in time

of war. A "2+10" POMCUS package—pre-positioned equipment for

one armored and one mechanized division plus 10 support units—was

first used in response to the 1961 Berlin crisis. This program

was expanded in 1968, when the U.S. balance-of-payments problem

led to the return of two-thirds of the First Infantry Division

from Germany to the United States.

CURRENT NATO VULNERABILITIES; THE PACT/NATO FORCE RATIO AND

NORTHAG

During the last decade, however, NATO has not kept pace with

the Warsaw Pact's modernization and expansion of its forces.

_!_/ NATO's Central Region includes the countries of West Germany,

the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and France. This

region, which would be the focal point of a Pact/NATO war,

is divided into two zones: NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) and

CENTAG (Central Army Group). U.S. forces are responsible for

defending two corps sectors in CENTAG. West German forces

defend the other two CENTAG sectors and one sector in NORTHAG.

Belgian, British, and Dutch forces each defend one corps

sector in NORTHAG.

xiii

•TT1T
Not only are Warsaw Pact forces superior to NATO's in many areas,

but they are also large enough and positioned in such a way

as to capitalize on their basic advantages. Hence it is possible

that the Pact forces could attack, after only two weeks of

mobilization, with an overall force ratio as great as 1.8:1 over

NATO. That ratio would permit a 7.4:1 ratio at the point of main

attack, while maintaining a 1:1 ratio in other sectors of the

Central Region. That situation could present the NATO defenders

with severe problems.

If the Warsaw Pact were to direct the main attack through

the north German part of NATO's Central Region (NORTHAG), which

provides a more favorable terrain to the attacker as well as a

direct route to NATO's supply lines, it would encounter the

weakest part of NATO's defense. West German, British, Dutch,

and Belgian forces defend that critical region, and coordinating

the efforts of such a multinational force would be difficult.

Moreover, those forces are not as modern, as mechanized, or as

heavily armed as the Warsaw Pact forces that they are likely to

face. Non-U.S. NATO forces must increase their firepower by

13 percent—in terms of a standard firepower score—to make

their manpower as productive as the Warsaw Pact's manpower.

Additionally, forces in NORTHAG are scarce, and it would be

difficult to form a mobile reserve that could be used to counter

Warsaw Pact penetrations. This would make it difficult to maintain the integrity of the defense.

POMCUS AND OTHER PLANS TO STRENGTHEN NATO

To strengthen NATO, each NATO ally has pledged to increase

defense spending by 3 percent a year and to make certain force

improvements, as specified in NATO's 1978 Long-Term Defense

Program (LTDP). Such efforts are certain to be beneficial, but

published accounts of the LTDP are too vague to allow an estimate of its effect on the overall balance of forces. The one

commitment that is specific enough to be evaluated is the U.S.

plan to pre-position three additional division sets of equipment

in NORTHAG. This plan, announced in the Department of Defense

(DoD) budget request for fiscal year 1979, calls for one POMCUS

set to be in place by the end of 1980 and the last two by 1982.

The Congress has approved the funding for the first set, and

Germany has located the necessary storage sites. NATO is currently surveying sites for the remaining two sets, and the Administration is expected to request funding for them in either the

fiscal year 1981 or 1982 budget request.

xiv
COST AND EFFECTS OF THE DoD POMCUS PLAN

The DoD plan could cost $2.6 billion for investment and

operations during fiscal years 1980-1984. Although only limited

funds are included in the fiscal year 1980 budget, if the Congress were to wait until submission of the fiscal year 1981

budget to debate the program, its ability to influence the

direction of the program could be severely limited. In addition, this plan represents a key element in U.S. efforts to

strengthen NATO. Hence, this effort, and the associated pledge to

achieve 3 percent real growth in the U.S. defense budget, are

central to the fiscal year 1980 debate on national security

expenditures.

The combination of pre-positioning the first division

set of POMCUS equipment and the U.S. strategic airlift improvements planned for the next several years would reduce the overall force ratio from 1.8:1 to 1.5:1 after 14 days of Warsaw

Pact mobilization, a major improvement. With the addition of the

two remaining division sets of POMCUS equipment, the Pact/NATO

ratio would drop to 1.44:1. To the extent that NATO considers

a 1.44:1 overall force ratio to be acceptable, the non-U.S. NATO

allies may find it difficult to justify the defense expenditures

that would enable them to compensate for their current firepower

deficiency and modernize their forces at the same rate as the

Warsaw Pact.

The DoD POMCUS proposal could also reduce the readiness of

U.S. forces, or keep it from improving, because the war reserve

stockpiles in the United States—the source of POMCUS equipment—

are insufficient to support the program, j?/ To meet the emplacement schedule, the Army would have to withdraw some items of

equipment both from Reserve Component units and from the active

divisions that would deploy to the pre-positioned equipment. In

some other cases, it would be necessary to divert equipment.

There is no indication of when DoD's procurement programs would be

able to correct the readiness problems that could result from the

withdrawal of this equipment.

_2/ Two sets of equipment are required for each division in

POMCUS; one is pre-positioned in Europe, and another is used

in the United States for training.

xv

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ALTERNATIVE, U.S. OPTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING NATO

The major question confronting the alliance is how to

correct NATO's current shortage of combat capability in the

first four weeks after mobilization while also matching future

Warsaw Pact modernization. This study estimates the costs and

benefits of three alternatives that would each reduce the Pact/

NATO force ratio to 1.44:1 within 10 days of a NATO mobilization,

on the assumption that NATO's defense expenditure targets are

sufficient to match any further modernization of Warsaw Pact

forces. Options I and II would give the non-U.S. NATO allies more

responsibility for correcting the balance than would the DoD

POMCUS proposal. Option III is identical to the DoD proposal,

except that it includes full funding of the program, to preclude

any detrimental effects on the readiness of U.S. forces. Under

all three alternatives, the United States would complete prepositioning of the first set of equipment in northern Germany

as now planned.

Option I; Non-U.S. NATO Forces Increase Their Firepower by 13

Percent

Under this alternative, the non-U.S. NATO allies would

increase their firepower by 13 percent. This option requires

replacing old equipment, changing light artillery for heavy, and

increasing; the amount of artillery. The United States would

ensure that all POMCUS units would be available in Europe within

10 days of mobilization. Only the first division set of equipment

would be pre-positioned in NORTHAG. Given these improvements, an

overall force ratio of 1.44:1 could be achieved within 10 days of

NATO's mobilization. By strengthening the allied forces, which

would be the first to meet a surprise attack, this option would

significantly reduce NATO's vulnerability to a surprise attack.

The cost of the U.S. portion of this option would be $0.6

billion, which might be partially funded by the European allies.

The funds that DoD currently has earmarked in the five-year

program for fiscal years 1981-1985 for pre-positioning two more

sets of POMCUS equipment could be used to improve the capability

of U.S. forces, and there would be no need to withdraw equipment

from units. Thus, Option I would not impair U.S. force readiness.

The additional cost of this option to the other NATO allies cannot

be estimated because the amount of improvement already in their

defense budgets and in their 3 percent real growth is not known.

xvi
This option would involve a change in the United States'

commitment to NATO under the Long-Term Defense Program, which

might adversely affect the other NATO allies' willingness to

modernize their forces.

Option II; Non-U.S. NATO Forces Increase Their Firepower by 10

Percent; United States Stations Two More Brigades in Germany

Under this alternative, the non-U.S. NATO allies would

increase their capabilities relative to the Warsaw Pact by

10 percent. The United States would pre-position one division

set of POMCUS equipment in northern Germany, ensure that POMCUS

units would be available within 10 days of mobilization, and

move to northern Germany two U.S. brigades together with the

necessary fire support and logistics support. Moving the two

brigades of the First Infantry Division would vacate Fort Riley,

Kansas, which could then be used to house the Second Infantry

Division, when it is withdrawn from Korea.

Option II would achieve the same force ratio and the same

reduced vulnerability to a surprise attack as Option I, but would

do so through additional efforts of both the United States and

the other NATO allies. The readiness of U.S. forces would not

be adversely affected. The cost of the U.S. portion of this

option would be $1.6 billion, which might be partially funded by

the European allies. The cost of the non-U.S. NATO portion

cannot be estimated, again because the degree of modernization

already in the allies' budgets and in future budget plans is

unknown.

Option II could leave the United States open to criticism for

failing to comply fully with the Long-Term Defense Program.

Option III; The United States Pre-Positions Two More Division

Sets of Equipment in Northern Germany

Under this alternative, the United States would complete

pre-positioning the division set of equipment programmed for 1980,

it would pre-position two more sets by the end of 1982, and it

would ensure that units would be delivered to all of the POMCUS

sites within 10 days of mobilization.

xvii

40-616 O - 79 . 3
II

Unlike Options I and II, this approach would not reduce

NATO's vulnerability to a surprise or extremely short-warning

attack, but it would achieve the force ratio objective of 1*44:1

by 10 days after NATO mobilization. If the allies' current

defense budgets and the 3 percent real growth in those budgets is

enough to achieve a greater rate of modernization than the Warsaw

Pact, then the allies' firepower deficit would eventually be

eliminated. However, if the allies' current plans do not meet

that objective, this alternative might remove the incentive for

them to correct their current firepower deficit.

This alternative differs from the current POMCUS proposal in

that funds are specifically provided to buy enough equipment to

ensure that there would be no need to withdraw or divert equipment from units. The $2.6 billion cost of this option would be

partially funded by the European allies. This option would not

impair U.S. force readiness in the mid-1980s.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In sum, in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion, the current

balance of forces is unfavorable for 30 days after mobilization.

To change that balance, NATO must improve its forces at a greater

rate than the Warsaw Pact, or U.S. reinforcements must arrive

sooner, or both.

Further, the non-U.S. NATO forces are not as firepowerintensive as the Warsaw Pact. If they were, the Pact/NATO force

balance would reach an acceptable level within 10 days of a NATO

mobilization, without the United States pre-positioning two more

division sets of equipment.

Are the allies' plans to increase defense expenditures by 3

percent per year in real terms sufficient to achieve comparability

with the Pact's current combat capability? Unfortunately, what is

publicly known about the allied contribution to the NATO Long-Term

Defense Program is too vague to estimate its effect on the force

balance. Moreover, some of the real growth may be needed just to

match further modernization by the Warsaw Pact. It is clear,

however, that the need for pre-positioning additional U.S. equipment is closely linked both to Warsaw Pact modernization and to

the actions of the NATO allies. And those factors will affect

not only the need for POMCUS, but also the wider debate over 3

percent real growth for defense.

xviii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The defense of Europe holds a dominant position in establishing U.S. defense policies and in fashioning the capabilities

of U.S. conventional forces. Although war between the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact may be

unlikely, the political stakes in Europe are quite high. In

peacetime, weak conventional forces could put NATO at a disadvantage; in wartime, they could force early resort to nuclear

weapons•

NATO has certain vulnerabilities that the numerically

superior Warsaw Pact could exploit. In particular, NATO takes

longer than the Warsaw Pact to reach its full combat potential

because one-third of its forces come from the United States. A

sudden and intense Warsaw Pact attack would therefore strike NATO

before much of its forces could be available. Further, NATO's

weakest defenses are in the north German plain, where the terrain

is the most favorable for an attack. Thus, the Pact: could take

advantage of the strategic initiative that the defensive nature of

the NATO alliance gives them by choosing to make their main

effort against that weak region. Not only would this avenue of

attack offer the easiest route of advance, but a successful attack

of this sort would sever NATO's supply lines, which could quickly

unravel the entire NATO defense.

NATO's problem is to reduce its vulnerabilities while

simultaneously keeping pace with whatever improvements the

Warsaw Pact makes in its conventional forces. To reduce its

weaknesses, NATO could improve the quality of its immediately

available forces for defense of the northern region, increase the

rate of arrival of U.S. reinforcements, or use some combination of

these two measures. In theory, any one of these could produce

the same military result, but they differ in how the burden of

defense is shared between the United States and the other NATO

allies.

The United States is committed to strengthening NATO.

The Department of Defense (DoD) budget for fiscal year 1980 grows

largely because of this commitment, and the thrust of new or
expanded programs is likely to be in the direction of improving

capabilities to defend Europe. Discussions of the new or expanded

programs would be more effective if they occurred in the context

of a particular program's contribution to the elimination of a

current NATO vulnerability.

This paper analyzes NATO's vulnerabilities and reviews

the alternatives for buttressing defense of the alliance. The

remainder of this chapter describes the role of the United States

in NATO and summarizes the most recent proposal for increasing

U.S. participation in order to help reduce NATO's present vulnerabilities.

DEFENSE OF NATO'S CENTRAL REGION AND THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

GROUND FORCES

The organization of NATO's defensive forces in the Central

Region, where any war is likely to be focused, is shown in

Figure 1. NATO's Central Region includes the territory west of

the East German border, extending north from Austria and Switzerland to the English Channel, and the countries of West Germany,

the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, and France.

Two army groups defend the Central Region: the Northern

Army Group (NORTHAG) and the Central Army Group (CENTAG). These

two zones have been subdivided into corps sectors defended by

U.S., German, British, Belgian, and Dutch forces. West German

forces are responsible for defending three national corps sectors

(two in CENTAG and one in NORTHAG); U.S. forces are responsible

for two corps sectors located in CENTAG; and Dutch, British, and

Belgian forces, one sector each in NORTHAG.

The United States maintains four divisions, four brigades,

and two armored cavalry regiments in West Germany to support

its NATO obligations. One brigade is stationed in Berlin,

another is in NORTHAG, and the remainder of the U.S. forces are

stationed in CENTAG. _!/ Should a major conflict erupt in central

Europe, these troops would be reinforced by 11 active divisions,

_!_/ A division contains about 16,000 men organized into three

brigades, plus support elements. See Appendix A for a

definition of division, brigade, regiment, and other units.
Figure 1.

Corps Sectors of Military Responsibility in NATO's Central Region

WEST

ERM

SCHLESWIGHOLSTEIN

GERMANY /

c''

UNITED

tonkfurtu STATES

SOURCE: Adapted from Richard Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, U.S. Force Structure in NATO (Washington, D.C.:

The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 31 and also from U.S. Army materials,

a/ NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) and CENTAG (Central Army Group) are the two subdivisions of NATO

forces in West Germany. The line dividing the two runs from Belgium through West Germany, just south of Bonn,

and into East Germany.

TTIT
ill

eight National Guard divisions, and more than 20 National Guard

brigades stationed in the United States. ^/ The personnel

and equipment of eight of the active divisions would be transported to Germany by a combination of airlift and sealift.

The personnel of the three remaining active divisions, plus an

armored cavalry regiment, would be airlifted to Germany, where

equipment and ammunition has been stored for them. _3/ Upon

arrival, the troops would draw their equipment and ammunition

from the storage sites and move to their combat positions. Thus,

those three divisions and the armored cavalry regiment can be said

to constitute the "leading edge" of U.S. reinforcements. The

National Guard divisions and brigades would deploy as soon as they

were ready and air or sea transportation was available to move

them.

The program governing the storage of equipment in Europe

for U.S.-based troops that would deploy there in time of war

is known as POMCUS (pre-positioned materiel configured to unit

sets). DoD began the POMCUS program after the Berlin crisis in

1961, when it became apparent that the United States could not

move forces to Europe quickly enough to counter Soviet moves.

A decision was made to store the equipment for two divisions

(plus 10 support units) in the CENTAG region, thus lessening

the strategic deployment problem by requiring that only the

personnel of those units be transported to Europe in time of

war. Response time would thereby be reduced and flexibility

enhanced. This first POMCUS package became known as the "2+10"

package.

The POMCUS program was expanded in 1968, when the U.S.

balance-of-payments problem necessitated the return of twothirds of the First Infantry Division from Germany to the United

States. To assure the NATO allies that the withdrawal did

not imply a slackening of the U.S. commitment to NATO, additional equipment was pre-positioned in Europe in order to support

the quick return of the division in time of war. Annual exercises, called REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany), were

_2/ U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980,

p. 141.

3/ Ibid., p. 196.
also begun to provide a regular testing of the ability of the

United States to reinforce Europe during a crisis. k_l

More recently, the Department of Defense has modified POMCUS

by:

o Withdrawing equipment from POMCUS stocks to supply two

new U.S. brigades stationed in West Germany. These

troops—Brigades 75 and 76—were moved to Germany after

passage of the Nunn amendment to the fiscal year 1975

defense authorization bill; 5/

o Adding equipment for support units assisting in the

operation of the supply line (MRLOGAEUR); 6_/

o Adding the equipment for the additional medical units

required by the high level of casualties anticipated in

the early stages of a war with the Warsaw Pact.

The current composition of POMCUS is summarized in Table 1.

DoD'S NEW PROGRAM

In its budget request for fiscal year 1979, DoD announced

a plan to add three new division sets of equipment to POMCUS—

one to be in place in fiscal year 1980; the remaining two, by

the end of fiscal year 1982. The plan also calls for the addition of equipment for 43,000 support personnel. Partial funding

for pre-positioning the first additional POMCUS division set

was included in the defense budget approved by the Congress

kj The Posture of Military Airlift, Hearings before the Research

and Development Subcommittee, House Committee on Armed

Services, 94:1 (November 1975), pp. 584-586.

J5/ Ibid., p. 587. The Nunn amendment required DoD to reduce

support manpower in Europe by 18,000 personnel. The law

permitted DoD to replace the support units with combat

personnel. Some of the personnel were replaced by two

brigades (Brigades 75 and 76) that the Army moved to Europe.

J3/ MRLOGAEUR stands for Minimum Required Logistic Augmentation

Europe.
.;IML

for fiscal year 1979. Funds for the remaining two division sets

are expected to be requested in the President's budget for fiscal

year 1981.

TABLE 1. CURRENT COMPOSITION OF POMCUS

Package Units

2+10 2 Divisions

10 Miscellaneous Nondivisional Units

REFORGER 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment

74 Miscellaneous Nondivisional Units

MRLOGAEUR 36 Miscellaneous Combat Support Units

Medical Augmentation 28 Medical Units

DoD's new program was prompted by a perceived need to

strengthen defenses in northern Germany through more rapid

U.S. reinforcement. Current U.S. responsibilities in northern

Germany are limited to stationing a brigade there in peacetime

and planning for the probable wartime employment of a corpssized force, assembled from the stream of U.S. reinforcements

arriving in Europe after mobilization. This new program would

introduce a fully supported corps within 10 days after mobilization to help defend NORTHAG. The program is one of the U.S.

contributions to the long-term improvement of NATO's defenses, as

formalized in the NATO Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP). Tj If

the program is completed, U.S. responsibilities in NATO would

include defense of two corps sectors in CENTAG and provision of

three divisions within 10 days of mobilization to reinforce allied

forces permanently stationed in NORTHAG.

T_l U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report. Fiscal Year 1980,

p. 212.
The United States also contributes significant quantities of air power to NATO. In fact, U.S. air forces would

probably be the first U.S. reinforcements to arrive in Europe.

Although such forces make a substantial contribution to the

defense of NATO and would affect the ground battle in the event of

a Pact attack, there is no method available at the. moment for

including those effects in an analysis of the ground forces

balance. Therefore, this paper, which seeks to analyze ground

forces, can only acknowledge that air forces (both Warsaw Pact and

NATO) could affect the battle.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

The DoD proposal—with its expansion of U.S. defense responsibilities in Western Europe, multiyear funding requirements, and

significant international political considerations—is developing

considerable momentum. If the Congress waits until fiscal year

1980 to debate this program, it could confront an irreversible

commitment. In addition, the DoD plan is a key element in

the United States' support for NATO. %_/ That support, and the

associated pledge to 3 percent real growth in the defense budget,

are central to the fiscal year 1980 debate on national security

expenditures.

This study analyzes the current military balance in Western

Europe and NATO's resulting need for more rapid reinforcement,

identifies the costs and benefits of the DoD plan, and evaluates

several alternatives to it that the Congress might wish to

8/ U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980,

Executive Summary, p. 22:

"As a result of the NATO Summits in May, 1977 and

1978, we have endorsed both a goal of three percent

real annual increase in the defense outlays of the

NATO countries, and an ambitious Long-Term Defense

Program for the Alliance. We are already taking

steps to preposition more equipment and stocks so

as to reduce the deployment times of our reinforcements to NATO. We are also improving our longrange airlift and otherwise seeking to increase

our worldwide mobility. To continue with, these

programs, we will need additional resources."

40-616 O - 79 - 4
consider. Chapter II discusses NATO's need for quick reinforcement and explains why the lack of a significant reserve

force for NORTHAG constitutes an important vulnerability, exploitable by the Warsaw Pact. It also identifies the elements

of NATO's defenses that could be strengthened to reduce that

vulnerability. Chapter III estimates the total cost of DoD's

POMCUS proposal and discusses its effec t on the strength of

NORTHAG. Chapter IV identifies two alternatives to the DoD

program. Chapter V summarizes some of the key considerations in

the debate.
CHAPTER II. THE UNFAVORABLE WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE RATIO AND

NORTHAG VULNERABILITIES

This chapter reviews the current military balance in Europe,

which shows NATO's vulnerability to a sudden and intense Warsaw

Pact attack. In addition to identifying an overall force ratio

goal that could give NATO confidence in its conventional defense

capability, the chapter also provides a summary overview of the

British, Dutch, Belgian, and German forces that defend the NORTHAG

sector, where NATO's defenses are the weakest. Lastly, the

chapter identifies three fundamental defense strategies that could

be used to strengthen NATO.

THE UNFAVORABLE THEATER FORCE RATIO

The Pact's Numerical Superiority

In recent years, the Warsaw Pact has made major investments

in conventional weapons for its ground forces. Although the

manpower in its standing armies is just slightly larger than

NATO's, the Pact has more tanks (2.7:1), more armored vehicles for

infantry (1.2:1), and more artillery (2.2:1). _!/ Thus, the Warsaw

Pact can field a stronger force than NATO. Whether this advantage

would be decisive in the outcome of a conflict depends on many

unquantifiable factors, such as the quality of the officer corps,

troop morale and fighting capabilities, weather, and simple luck.

These factors have unpredictable effects on a battle. But with

numerical superiority, the Warsaw Pact is better able to cope

Derived from The Military Balance, 1978-1979 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978). The Warsaw

Pact forces counted include Czechoslovakia, the German

Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, and that part of Soviet

forces not allocated to the Sino-Soviet border. NATO includes Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Netherlands, and that

part of U.S. forces not allocated to the South Korea commitment.

TOT"
with the unpredictable effects of those factors while simultaneously complicating NATO's defensive task. Just how NATO's

defense coxild be affected by the superior Warsaw Pact forces is

investigated later in this chapter.

The Pact's Strategic Advantage Over Time

More important than overall superiority is the advantage

the Warsaw Pact gains from being on the Continent. While 33

percent of NATO's forces would have to be transported overseas

to Europe from the United States, the Warsaw Pact could take

advantage of multiple overland routes to assemble its forces

quickly, creating the opportunity for a quick, decisive victory.

The Pact's early force advantage could reach 2:1 shortly after it

mobilizes. Its advantage would erode to 1.4:1 by 24 days after

its mobilization, when the U.S. REFORGER and 2+10 units would

have arrived. (Appendix B shows the change in the force ratio

over time.) The situation after four weeks is less clear,

however. If the Warsaw Pact committed none of its central

reserve and shifted none of its forces from the Sino-Soviet

border or from the northern and southern part of the Soviet Union,

and if some of the U.S. National Guard units could be ready for

combat, the force ratio by about 120 days after mobilization would

drop to 1.2:1.

If the Warsaw Pact could capitalize on its superiority in

the first two weeks after mobilization and attack with 100

percent effectiveness, NATO would find it difficult to counter

the main attack. To demonstrate the problem, consider a hypothetical case in which NATO forces are distributed evenly among

its corps sectors. The Warsaw Pact, with a 1.8:1 overall advantage 10 days after NATO mobilizes, could concentrate its

reserves against a single NATO corps to achieve a 7.4:1 ratio

while maintaining a 1:1 ratio in other corps sectors to discourage

NATO from shifting forces to meet the attack. To counter this

option, NATO would have to shift forces from other corps sectors

to reduce the force ratio in the main attack sector to below

3:1. 2/ In this example, NATO would have to shift forces from at

2j A force ratio of 3:1 or less in a corps sector where forces

are defending is considered acceptable. See Department of the

Army, Army Field Manual 100-5 (July 1976), p. 5-3.

10
least three other corps sectors, accepting an unfavorable force

ratio of at least 2:1 in those sectors. This move would reduce

the Pact advantage in the main attack sector to about 3:1, which

would be satisfactory if the Warsaw Pact had not achieved a

breakthrough before the reinforcements arrived. In this case,

however, the sum of NATO's reaction time plus the time that would

be required to move forces from all three corps could easily

exceed the time the Warsaw Pact would need to penetrate the

defenses.

On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact's force includes Category

II and III divisions, which are not fully manned in peacetime.

If these divisions were not 100 percent ready at the start

of a war, then the Warsaw Pact's overall advantage would be

close to 1.5:1 and NATO's problem would be less severe. Under

these conditions, the Warsaw Pact could achieve a 5:1 ratio

in the main attack sector, but NATO could counter by shifting

forces from only two corps sectors, thus reducing the force

ratio in the main attack sector to 2.5:1, as contrasted with

the 3:1 ratio in the previous example. In this case, the sum

of reaction time and movement time could be considerably less

than the above example, especially if the reinforcements were

shifted from the corps sectors adjacent to the main attack

sector. _3/

The above discussion shows that NATO's defense becomes

more manageable as the overall force ratio declines. The following section more closely examines the relationship between

the overall force ratio and NATO's management of the defense.

A hypothetical example is presented, which illustrates this

relationship.

A POSSIBLE FORCE RATIO GOAL FOR NATO

The examples discussed below suggest that NATO could feel

confident with an overall force ratio of less than 1.44:1,

that ratios between 1.44:1 and 1.62:1 could allow unfavorable

3/ The details of the analysis supporting these two examples is

found in Appendix C.

11

'1HF
conditions to develop, and that force ratios exceeding 1.62:1

would be intolerable. kj

Figure 2 shows how the number of NATO corps to be thinned

out varies with the Pact/NATO overall force ratio. If the

theater-wide force ratio were between 1.25:1 and 1.44:1, then a

3:1 ratio iii the main attack sector could be achieved by shifting

forces from only one corps sector, which would seem to be manageable for NATO. NATO would have to draw upon two corps sectors for

reinforcements if the overall ratio exceeded 1.44:1. This situation would be manageable if the main attack did not strike a

flank corps, thereby enabling reinforcements to be drawn from two

adjacent corps. Under those conditions, reaction time should be

the same as the case in which reinforcements are needed from only

one corps. On the other hand, if a flank corps were struck, half

of NATO's counterattack force would have to come from a corps not

adjacent to the main attack sector, and reaction time would equal

that of the case in which reinforcements are drawn from three

corps sectors. The likelihood of a successful counterattack would

then be low. If the theater force ratio exceeded 1.62:1, reinforcements from three or more corps would be needed, and the time

required to assemble them could exceed the time available.

Could the Pact Exploit Its Early Advantage?

A decade ago, DoD considered it unlikely that the Warsaw Pact

could capitalize on its potential early advantage; however,

changing conditions have led DoD to modify that assessment. The

Soviets have expanded their presence in Eastern Europe by adding

4/ U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Years 1976

and 197T. p. 111-15:

"Third, certain ratios—whether we are talking

about manpower, manpower in maneuver battalions,

firepower scores, or weapons effects indicators—

should not be allowed to favor an attacker by too

great a margin. For example, if an attacker could

achieve a favorable overall ratio of perhaps 1.5:1

in several of these respects, he could embark on

such large local concentrations that the defender

would find it difficult to prevent one or more

breakthroughs."

12
Figure 2.

Impact of Theater Force Ratios on Number of NATO Corps

Providing Reinforcements to Other Corps in the Event of a

Warsaw Pact Invasion3

'> o

I?

ai

So 0

il

" 58 s °

•?.£

I I

1.0 1.2 1.4

Warsaw Pact/NATO Force Ratio

1.6 1.8 2.0

a

 The NATO objective is to achieve a 3:1 Pact/NATO force ratio in the corps sector where the main

Pact attack occurs while maintaining at least 2:1 in the other corps sectors. Although a 3:1 ratio is

technically acceptable in the other corps sectors, in practice it may create a condition in the thinnedout corps where there is insufficient force to cover the corps frontage. If so, even the relatively small

Warsaw Pact forces in those corps might penetrate and disrupt the flow of NATO's reinforcements

to the main attack sector. Consequently, this analysis concentrates on the somewhat safer assumption

that 2:1 is the acceptable ratio.

13

"TFIT
II

150,000 men to their Warsaw Pact forces. This includes the 70,000

men in five divisions deployed in 1968 to Czechoslovakia. _5_/ They

have also strengthened the divisions of the Group Soviet Forces

Germany (GSFG) by adding 1,000 men to each tank division and 1,500

to each motorized rifle division. 6/ These changes have reduced

the number of ground forces that would have to be moved to support

an attack, thus increasing the Pact's ability to launch an

attack with little warning.

In addition to expanding the size of the Warsaw Pact forces,

the Soviets have undertaken a substantial equipment modernization program. About 50 percent of the GSFG tank fleet has

been supplied with the T62 tank (possibly somewhat less effective

than the U.S. M60). ]_/ The more modern T64 (probably slightly

superior to the M60) and the newest Soviet tank, the T72, have

been issued to the Group Soviet Forces Germany. The combined

assets are estimated to total 2,000 tanks. _8/ The Pact's towed

artillery has been replaced or augmented by more survivable,

mobile, armored self-propelled artillery. The sophisticated

armored fighting vehicles, air defense weapons, attack helicopters, and antitank guided missiles that have been added to GSFG

divisions also contribute to increased combat effectiveness. 9/

This strengthening of the GSFG divisions through modernization has

further reduced the need to move large forces from the Soviet

Union to support an early Pact attack.

If the Warsaw Pact were to continue to modernize and expand

its forces and NATO were to take no action to improve its forces,

then the force ratios would worsen. The Warsaw Pact now has the

initiative in this area, and the extent to which it presses

_5/ Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1979,

Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations,

95:2 (February and March 1978), p. 60.

6/ Ibid., p. 61.

7J "Soviets Double T64s in GDR," International Defense Review,

No. 5 (1978), p. 668.

%J Ibid.

_9/ Departmen t of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1979,

Hearings, p. 61.

14
its advantage will determine in large measure what NATO must do

during the next five years to keep the military balance from

deteriorating.

FORCES AVAILABLE TO NATO

The countries that defend NATO's Central Region provide

forces that could be thought of in two categories: those needed

to defend the corps sectors and those held in reserve to be

used by the Supreme Allied Commander to counter Warsaw Pact

penetrations. In the first category, one would find almost all of

the British, Dutch, Belgian, and German active-duty forces as well

as most of the reserve components of all but the German forces.

The U.S. forces stationed in Germany, and possibly some of the

early arriving reinforcements, would also be in this category.

Thus, the bulk of the immediately available forces are British,

Dutch, Belgian, and German.

The Current Non-U.S. NATO Firepower Deficiency

In creating their national forces, the non-U.S. NATO allies—

who are responsible for the defense of most corps sectors in

NATO's Central Region—seem to generate less firepower per man

than the Warsaw Pact. If the armies of the non-U.S. NATO allies

are compared with the Warsaw Pact armies that would face NATO

within two to three weeks after mobilization, some interesting

differences can be noted. Although non-U.S. NATO has only

slightly less manpower in its standing armies than the Pact,

and both non-U.S. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have substantial pools

of trained reservists, non-U.S. NATO would put only a little

more than half as many men in divisions after mobilization as

would the Pact. If non-U.S. NATO had a larger inventory of

tanks, artillery, and armored infantry vehicles, this might be a

reflection of a doctrine to maintain a sustainable force. As

things stand now, however, this disparity reflects the Warsaw

Pact's heavy investment in materiel combined with its offensive

doctrine calling for maximum surge firepower as opposed to longterm sustained firepower. 10/

1Q/ "Firepower" as used here includes all weapons, regardless of

size, that would be employed against the opposing force.

15

40-616 O - 79 - 5
Jill.

For many years it has been said that NATO has relied on

superior technology to offset the Warsaw Pact's quantitative

superiority. If that were true, one would expect the Pact/

non-U.S. NATO force ratio, when measured in armored division

equivalents (an indication of firepower capability), to be equal

to or better than the ratio of manpower in divisions. Such is not

the case, however. The ratio of armored division equivalents is

13 percent more favorable to the Pact, ll/

Looking at the relationship between U.S. active-duty forces

and the Warsaw Pact threat, a different picture emerges. The

ratio of active-duty ground forces manpower is about 2.5:1

favoring the Warsaw Pact. The ratio of manpower in divisions

is 3.7:1, also favoring the Pact. The armored division equivalent ratio is 14 percent lower (3.2:1), which shows that U.S.

manpower is more productive in terms of firepower than Warsaw Pact

manpower. 12/

The above analysis demonstrates that the allied forces, which

would have to absorb the brunt of a Warsaw Pact assault, are

outmanned and outgunned. This problem is particularly severe in

NORTHAG. Later sections more closely examine the NORTHAG defenses

in order to identify the specific problems that contribute to the

13 percent deficiency in the firepower of the non-U.S. NATO

allies.

Available Reserves

The United States provides 27 percent of NATO's peacetime

ground force capability (as measured in armored division equivalents) and 43 percent of its wartime capability. 13/ In the

11 / The actual ratios are 1.97:1 for manpower in divisions and

2.23:1 for armored division equivalents, both favoring the

Warsaw Pact.

12/ Appendix D shows how the U.S. and non-U.S. ratios were calculated .

13/ Derived from U.S. Department of Defense, A Report to Congress

on U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO (June 1976),

p. IV-3. Measured at approximately 110 days after mobilization and does not include the combat power of the National

Guard divisions or most of the National Guard brigades.

16
event of a Pact attack, not all of the U.S. reinforcements would

be needed to defend the two U.S. corps sectors in CENTAG; those

that would not be needed in CENTAG would fall into the second

category—forces to be used by the Supreme Allied Commander to

counter Pact penetrations of NATO defenses. French forces,

assuming that they were made available to NATO, could likewise

be used as reinforcements in allied sectors, since they are

assigned no corps sector to defend. 14/ As discussed later in

this chapter, the six German home defense groups, now being

equipped with tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers,

would be suited for a reserve role, provided that Germany released

them to NATO.

The following sections more closely examine NATO's weaknesses

in order to identify which aspects of the defense could be

targeted for improvement. Most of NATO's current problems occur

in the NORTHAG region.

NORTHAG VULNERABILITIES

In addition to its tactical and geographical advantages,

the Warsaw Pact would have the strategic initiative, by virtue of

the defensive nature of the NATO alliance. Thus, Pact forces

could choose to strike NATO where its defenses were weakest and

the terrain most favorable to an attack: across the north German

plain in the NORTHAG region. Not only are NATO's weakest defenses

located in that region, but the terrain there is relatively flat

and open, favoring a swift advance of Pact armored forces and

complicating NATO defenses. Moreover, a successful Pact attack

across the north German plain into the Benelux countries could

sever the transportation routes used to deliver supplies and

ammunition to U.S. and German forces further south in CENTAG.

Four nations are responsible for defending the critical

NORTHAG region, and coordination problems are likely to arise,

which could complicate the defense of that region. Furthermore,

those problems could be compounded by several other factors.

First, the British, Dutch, and Belgian forces defending NORTHAG

14/ The French have two divisions stationed in Germany and three

divisions stationed near the French-German border. Although

these forces are not technically part of NATO, it seems

reasonable to count on their being made available.

17

TTTHT
are stationed well to the rear of their corps sectors during

peacetime. Moreover, about half of their wartime strength

would come from reserve components that would not be available

until completion of mobilization. In addition, NORTHAG lacks

sufficient forces to form a reserve with which to counterattack

Pact penetrations. Finally, as discussed below, the allied

defenders in each corps sector of NORTHAG would be outgunned by

the Warsaw Pact attacking formations.

Dutch Corps 15/

The Dutch corps' defense depends heavily on NATO's having

two to four days of warning of an attack so that the two active

Dutch divisions could be brought to full strength and moved

to their corps sector in Germany. Although the Dutch are modernizing their forces, major deficiencies remain in tanks, infantry

fighting vehicles/infantry carriers, and artillery, which would

limit their effectiveness against Warsaw Pact forces.

Only one Dutch brigade is stationed in the Federal Republic

of Germany; the other five active brigades are stationed in the

Netherlands. The six active brigades are organized into two

divisions. Each division has one-third of its wartime combat

power in the reserve component. A third division is comprised

entirely of reservists.

Half of the 800 Dutch tanks are Centurions—a tank designed

at the end of World War II that is now obsolete—and half are

Leopard Is—a basically sound tank that will require some improvements if it is to remain competitive through the 1980s. The

Dutch recognize the need to replace their Centurion tanks.

They are closely watching the development of the Leopard II

and XM-1, and may choose one of them as a replacement for the

Centurion.

15/ The description of the Dutch corps is a synthesis of information gathered from The Military Balance 1978-1979; Jane's

Weapon Systems 1978; Government of the Netherlands, "Policy

Report: of the 1979 Defense Budget (1978; processed); Ministry

of Defence, The Netherlands 1974 Defence (July 1974; processed) ; and an interview with an official of the Netherlands

Army Military Attache Office, Embassy of the Netherlands.

18
The 15 infantry battalions of the three Dutch divisions are

all mechanized. Obsolete French infantry fighting vehicles in

four of the battalions are being replaced by new infantry fighting

vehicles produced by the Food Machinery Corporation (FMC), the

U.S. manufacturer of the M-113 armored personnel carrier, which is

standard equipment in the U.S. Army. This program will be completed in 1979. The remaining 11 battalions are mounted in

Dutch-built wheeled armored personnel carriers, which might not be

able to keep up with tank formations proceeding cross country.

The artillery battalions supporting each brigade are selfpropelled. The battalions that support mechanized brigades use

light 105mm howitzers, which the United States and Germany consider to be too light for such a role, as do the Dutch. It is

likely that these weapons will be replaced, but a program to do so

has not yet been developed. The Dutch army is not equipped with

multiple rocket launchers, an effective weapon for increasing

firepower per man, and apparently does not intend to introduce

such a weapon.

Antitank units are located at the battalion and brigade

levels. The antitank platoons in each battalion have the U.S.

wire-guided TOW system, an effective system but vulnerable because it lacks armor protection. The antitank companies in

each brigade have AMX-13s—a French-built light tank with a

105mm gun, possibly equipped with a laser rangefinder—and

TOW systems. The U.S. Dragon medium antitank weapon is being

purchased to supplement the unguided antitank weapons in each

company.

German Corps 16/

The German army has just embarked on an ambitious reorganization that will significantly strengthen its forces by the

mid-1980s. The Leopard II (120mm gun) will replace its M-48A2s,

16/ This description of the German corps is a synthesis of

information gathered from the Military Balance 1978-1979;

Jane's Weapon Systems 1978; Federal Republic of Germany

Ministry of Defence, White Paper 1975/1976, The Security of

the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the

Federal Armed Forces (Bonn: January 1976); and from an

interview with an official of the Military Attache Office,

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

19
which now constitute 36 percent (1,342 tanks) of the German tank

fleet. The remaining 2,437 German tanks are Leopard Is. The

M-48s will be upgunned to 105mm and issued to the six home

defense groups and the six heavy Jager regiments, newly organized

in the territorial army. Some of the M-113 armored personnel

carriers will be replaced by the HARDER infantry fighting vehicle.

The M-113s will then be issued to the home defense groups. Both

the home defense groups and the Jager regiments will receive the

105mm howitzers that will be replaced by 155mm howitzers in the

active force.

The new organization will have 17 (as compared with 12)

tank brigades and 16 mechanized infantry brigades (as compared

with 12 mechanized infantry and six Jager brigades). This

will increase the tank strength of the active German army by 30

percent. The new organization calls for an expansion of antitank

missile systems in the brigades from 545 old systems to more than

2,500 of the new technology TOW, HOT, and MILAN systems. Another

major addition will be an attack helicopter regiment with 100

HOT-equipped helicopters for each of the three German corps.

In sum, once the modernization program is completed in the

mid- to late 1980s, the West German active army will be much

stronger: according to German plans, the home defense groups will

be strong enough to counter Warsaw Pact penetrations, and the

heavy Jager regiments will be strong enough to counter airborne or

helicopter-landed assaults.

The British Corps 17/

The major weaknesses of the British corps appear to be its

rather low peacetime strength, a lack of mechanized or armored

reinforcements, obsolete armored personnel carriers, inadequate

105mm howitzers, and a low density of artillery in general.

In peacetime, the corps has a strength of 55,000 men, organized into four small armored divisions, one independent infantry

17/ This description of the British Corps was derived from

information obtained from The Military Balance. 1978-1979;

Jane's Weapon Systems 1978; British Secretary of State for

Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1978 (London:

February 1978); and an interview with an official of the

Military Attache Office, Embassy of Great Britain.

20
brigade, and artillery units. After mobilization, the corps

would expand to a strength of about 120,000, with the addition

of brigade-sized infantry units from the reserve components.

The effective peacetime strength of the corps is really less

than 55,000 because nine infantry battalions (50 percent of the

infantry strength) are on temporary duty in Northern Ireland. It

would take 72 hours for these battalions to be transported to

northern Germany. 18/

The British army has 900 Chieftain main battle tanks,

which were developed in the 1950s and entered service in the

early 1960s. The tank's turret is designed to give the crew

good survivability and mounts a 120 mm gun. Some studies show

that the Chieftain would kill four Warsaw Pact tanks for every

Chieftain lost. 19/ The major problem with the tank is its

poor engine. With engine improvements, the tank could remain

competitive well into the late 1980s.

The British mechanized infantry and artillery are not

nearly so well armed to counter Warsaw Pact forces. Their

current armored personnel carrier became standard equipment in

1964. It has no capability to destroy Warsaw Pact armored

personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, and the infantry

cannot fight while mounted. The mainstay of the artillery is

the self-propelled Abbot 105mm howitzer, which is used to provide direct support to the maneuver battalions. The British

have concluded that this weapon is too light to support armored

and mechanized units, and they will probably replace it with a

new self-propelled 155mm howitzer, which is currently under

development. With only 0.270 artillery pieces per tank and no

multiple rocket launchers or heavy mortars, British units have

considerably less artillery to support armored and mechanized

forces than do U.S. units (0.52 per tank) and German units (0.31

per tank; 0.61 when heavy mortars and multiple rocket launchers

are counted).

18/ Ministry of Defence, Public Relations Staff, NATO—The

British Contribution to Allied Defence (London: April 1978),

p. 11.

19/ "Soviets Double T64s in GDR," International Defense Review,

No. 5 (1978), p. 668.

21

TTTTIF
British antitank weapons consist primarily of the wireguided Swingfire missile, which, unlike the TOW, HOT, or MILAN

systems, is not automatically guided to the target. Considerable

skill is needed to hit targets with the Swingfire; thus, many

hours must be devoted to training Swingfire gunners. This could

be a major disadvantage if Swingfire gunners sustained heavy

casualties in a war. To complement Swingfire and increase

the antitank capability of mechanized infantry, the new Milan

shoulder-fired, wire-guided, medium-range antitank weapon will

soon be added to the force.

The Belgian Corps 20/

Overall, the Belgian corps is weak. With only two divisions

to defend the Belgian sector, there do not appear to be sufficient

forces to cover the front and form a mobile reserve force to

counterattack penetrations. The mechanized infantry is equipped

with obsolete antitank weapons and personnel carriers. The

motorized infantry that constitutes one-third of the combat power

of a division would have difficulty defending against mechanized

Warsaw Pact forces. Finally, the preponderance of light artillery

and obsolescence of a significant portion of the heavier artillery

would severely restrict the effectiveness of Belgian supporting

fire.

The Belgian corps has a peacetime strength of 34,000 stationed in Germany. The principal combat elements are four brigades (one armored, three mechanized infantry), which are organized into two divisions. After mobilization, a mechanized infantry brigade and a motorized infantry brigade would reinforce

the corps, bringing each division to a strength of three brigades.

Additional combat troops and logistics elements would also join

the corps, bringing it to a total wartime strength of 62,000.

The active-duty brigades are equipped with Leopard I tanks,

which will probably need to be upgraded to remain competitive

through the late 1980s. The reserve component tank units have

20/ This description was developed from information contained

in The Military Balance 1978-1979; Jane's Weapon Systems

1978; Belgian Ministry of Defense, The National Defense White

Paper. 1977; DMS Market Intelligence Report. (Greenwich,

Connecticut: DMS Inc., 1978; processed).

22
M-47 tanks, the same model used by the U.S. Army in the Korean

conflict. The tank's 90mm gun would be of questionable effectiveness against Warsaw Pact armored forces. The shape of the

tank hull and turret does not appear to be sloped enough to give

the crew good survivability. There are some indications that the

M-47 will be replaced by the Leopard I. Mechanized infantry

formations are equipped with M-75 armored personnel carriers,

manufactured by FMC in the early 1950s, and with the French-built

AMX-56, developed in the early 1950s. Both vehicles are obsolete.

The AMX-56 is being replaced by the Irish-designed Timoney BDX

armored personnel carrier. Evidence of the capabilities of this

vehicle is not yet available. Whatever its capabilities, with an

initial procurement of only 124 vehicles, it will take a long time

to improve the overall capability of the armored personnel carrier

fleet, which now numbers more than 1,200 vehicles.

As is the case with the Dutch and British forces, the Belgian

army relies on the 105mm howitzer to support its brigades.

(Fifty-six percent of all Belgian artillery is 105mm.) In the

Belgian case, the inadequacy of the artillery itself is aggravated

by the artillery-attenuating effects of the forests and hills that

characterize the terrain in the Belgian sector. The artillery

density of 0.54 artillery pieces per tank compares favorably

with the U.S. Army's 0.57, but it is not as high as the West

German army's 0.61. Nevertheless, significant parts of the

Belgian artillery are severely outmoded: 38 percent of the 155mm

self-propelled artillery was built in the mid-1950s, and it is

extremely vulnerable because it lacks overhead protection.

Multiple rocket launchers could significantly enhance Belgian

artillery.

Antitank weapons include the ENTAC (a first-generation French

system, which the operator must guide to the target), Swingfire

(an improved British system), MILAN (a short-range system that is

automatically guided), and the JPK antitank 90mm gun. The

ENTAC is obsolete, and the JPK is almost so. 21/

The Need for a NORTHAG Mobile Reserve

To counter a Warsaw Pact attack, a key element in NORTHAG's

defense would be the effective employment of a strong, mobile

J!/ The German army plans to phase out the JPK during the 1980s.

23

40-616 O - 79 - 6
.1111.

reserve force. At present, it would not be easy to form such a

reserve. The forces that might be available soon after mobilization for that mission would have two other claimants: CENTAG

and SACEUR reserves. 22/ Thus, in order to create a reserve force

large enough to counter a Pact penetration, the NORTHAG commander

would probably have to thin out his forward defenses until a

significant number of U.S. reinforcements had arrived (sometime

between M+14 and M+30 days).

HOW TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS—A NATO PROBLEM

The Warsaw Pact is clearly capable of mounting an attack with

little warning, and one can only assume that it would attempt to

use that capability to exploit a NATO weakness. The fundamental

weakness of the NORTHAG sector provides such an opportunity; thus,

it jeopardizes NATO's forward defense strategy.

Significant improvements in NATO's forward defense require

a coordinated, comprehensive NATO program. To develop such a

program, one must know which elements of the defense can be

changed. How one would combine them to develop a NATO program

depends in large measure on how one believes the defense burden

should be shared among the NATO countries. Three fundamental

design strategies for strengthening NATO are described below.

o Strategy I—Strengthen NORTHAG Defenders. Measures

to strengthen NORTHAG forces would include moving forces

further forward in their sectors, modernizing their

equipment, and mechanizing light infantry units in both

the active and reserve components. Such measures would

have to be ambitious enough to compensate for existing

deficiencies and to keep pace with future Warsaw Pact

improvements.

o Strategy II—Increase the Rate of U.S. Reinforcement.

Stationing more U.S forces in Europe, expanding the POMCUS

program (the DoD proposal), and buying more strategic

airlift would be the principal ways of increasing the rate

of U.S. reinforcements to NATO.

22/ SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) is the senior military commander in Europe.

24
Strategy III—Form a Reserve Force. This strategy would

not reduce the overall force ratio; it would simply buy

time for the arrival of U.S. reinforcements. Several

alternatives could be considered for forming a SACEUR

reserve. First, the forces defending the least likely

route of attack could be thinned out. Second, the German

home defense groups could be used to form a reserve.

Third, the U.S. REFORGER and 2+10 divisions could be used.

Lastly, French forces could be used if they were made

available after a NATO mobilization.

CONCLUSIONS

The Warsaw Pact apparently could capitalize on its advantages

by attacking NATO before most U.S. reinforcements arrived.

Moreover, the Pact could exploit its strategic initiative by

concentrating its attack against the weak NORTHAG sector, where

a successful Pact attack could undermine NATO's entire conventional defense.

This chapter has described the design strategies that could

be combined to form a comprehensive program of improvements in

NATO's defenses. Chapter III describes the DoD plan to expand the

POMCUS program, discusses its contribution to the NATO Long-Term

Defense Program (LTDP), and estimates its cost.

25

TTflT
,1111.
CHAPTER III. THE DoD PLAN AND ITS COST

THE DoD POMCUS PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING NORTHAG

Current DoD plans for Improving U.S. forces committed to NATO

call for the creation of a three-division corps force to be deployed as a Northern Army Group mobile reserve. To be effective,

the corps would have to be in position soon after mobilization,

preferably before war broke out. Because these troops would be

deployed far from the existing logistical network in southern

Germany, a separate logistics system (including about 43,000

personnel) would have to be provided for them in NORTHAG.

In order to have the corps and its supporting logistics

network in position early, DoD plans to pre-position equipment for

the three divisions and their support units at several POMCUS

storage sites to be constructed in NORTHAG. In addition, a small

planning group (including approximately 77 personnel) would be

permanently stationed in NORTHAG, to plan and coordinate the

arrival of the corps and its tactical employment.

The impact of the POMCUS program can be estimated by adjusting the fiscal year 1978 force deployment as though the

new pre-positioned equipment were already in place and then

calculating the new force ratio. This ratio would be an estimate

of the 1983 conditions after the new equipment had been prepositioned, on the assumption that NATO and Warsaw Pact force

modernization and expansion programs proceed at the same rate.

Figure 3 compares the new force ratio for the first 30 days

after a Warsaw Pact mobilization with the current 1978 force

ratio. The DoD plan achieves the force ratio goal suggested in

Chapter II, which would significantly improve NATO's chances for

success. Moreover, pre-positioning the equipment in NORTHAG

better positions SACEUR's forces to counter penetrations that

could occur in that weak sector, which should further reduce the

Pact's confidence in the success of a conventional attack.

The DoD plan to pre-position three more division sets

of equipment in Europe is included in NATO's Long-Term Defense

Program. Recognizing that the Warsaw Pact's improved conventional capabilities were outstripping NATO's and that the

alliance needed strengthening, NATO heads of state met in May

27

TTFTIT
Figure 3.

Impact of DoD Plan on the Theater Force Ratio

2.5

cc

8 2.0

o

1

I

1

-

5

CO

1.0

Key: 1 1 1 1 1 1 The range of the theater force ratio that could exist if war broke out in 1978. The upper limit

results if all forces are 100% effective. Lower limit results from reducing the effectiveness of

those forces not fully manned in peacetime.

tffffSi The range of the theater force ratio that could occur after pre-positioning three more division

sets of equipment in Europe.

12 16 20

Days After Warsaw Pact Mobilization

24 28 32

1977 and agreed to increase real defense spending by 3 percent a

year, _!_/ and to develop a long-term plan of improvements. In May

_!_/ The base from which the 3 percent would be measured is the

subject of considerable debate and will not be discussed in

this paper. However, it is useful to know approximately how

much money a 3 percent increase would represent for each

country. Using the defense expenditures shown in The Military

Balance 1978-1979 as a base, the following real program

increases would be expected:

Country Program Increases (in millions of dollars)

Belgium

Britain

Germany

Netherlands

United States

55 (real growth in 1978)

391 (real growth in 1978)

518 (real growth in 1978)

126 (real growth in 1978)

3,456 (real growth in fiscal

year 1980 outlays)

28
1978, a plan, now known as the NATO Long-Term Defense Program

(LTDP), was presented to and approved by the heads of state.

The essential elements of that plan are summarized in Appendix E.

It is not clear how much the LTDP will affec t the military balance in Europe. Published reports are vague about

how extensively the allies will modernize their forces; there

seem to be no commitments to buy enough equipment to form more

units in the reserve components or to mechanize light infantry.

(The German force improvement plans detailed in Chapter II

were implemented subsequent to approval of the LTDP.) Moreover, in contrast to the POMCUS plan, some elements in the

program, such as improved electronic warfare and chemical warfare capabilities, are difficult to quantify and are generally

not included in quantitative assessments of force balance—

hence they would cause no change in standard measures of the

military balance, even though their effects might be significant.

A disadvantage of the DoD POMCUS plan is that it would

achieve NATO's force ratio goal without correcting the allies'

firepower deficiencies, which could make it difficult for the

allies to justify the additional defense spending needed to

make up their deficit and keep pace with the Warsaw Pact modernization. Increasing POMCUS is, however, only one of several ways

to improve the force balance. Moreover, as discussed later in

this chapter, if NATO had only 5 to 10 days of mobilization before

an attack, options other than increasing POMCUS might be more

effective.

COSTS OF THE DoD PROPOSAL

Primary Costs

The primary costs of the POMCUS proposal are those associated

with establishing storage sites and emplacing and maintaining

equipment. These costs can be subdivided into the following

categories:

o Site construction,

o Transportation charges (for moving equipment to Europe),

o Operation and maintenance, and

29

TTTTH"
1111.

o Procurement (flexible-barrier shelters and stress-tension

shelters) . _2/

Site construction costs are likely to be shared by the United

States and NATO. Barrier fences and controlled humidity warehouses probably would be built with NATO infrastructure funds. ^/

Maintenance shops and living quarters at POMCUS sites do not now

qualify for infrastructure funding. The Army has requested that

NATO change its criteria to make these facilities eligible for

infrastructure funding, but until such a change is effected, the

United States would either have to pay these costs or do without

the facilities.

The Army plans to use controlled humidity warehouses and

flexible-barrier shelters to store equipment at the new POMCUS

sites. Flexible-barrier shelters do not now qualify for infrastructure funding, so the United States must pay for them. The

estimated life of the shelters is about eight years, and the Army

plans to start replacing them with controlled humidity warehouses

in 1983 or 1984. At that time, NATO infrastructure funds might

be available to pay for the warehouses.

DoD states that its POMCUS proposal would require no additional equipment procurement. ^/ Theoretically, equipment to be

pre-positioned would be borrowed from war reserve stocks that

would be bought whether or not the POMCUS program was expanded.

It is possible, however, that several factors could combine to

create pressure to expand procurement programs. These factors are

discussed in the following section.

2.1 Flexible-barrier shelters are plastic bags custom-made to

encase one piece of equipment in a controlled humidity

environment. Bags are made for even the largest items, such

as tanks. Stress-tension shelters are tent-like structures

that provide a controlled humidity environment for one or more

items of equipment.

_3_/ The NATO infrastructure fund is established by annual contributions from member nations and is used to build facilities

needed for defense. The United States provides 22 percent of

the infrastructure fund.

f\_l U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report. Fiscal Year 1979,

p. 232.

30
Follow-On Costs

The DoD program could have adverse effects not now foreseen, or the adverse effects currently predicted could be more

severe than envisioned. In either instance, the cost of the

DoD proposal would increase. For the purposes of this study,

such costs are called follow-on costs. This section identifies

several problem areas that could increase the cost of the DoD

proposal.

Equipment. The Army maintains two sets of equipment for

each division in POMCUS—one pre-positioned in Europe and another

used in the United States for training purposes. In theory,

one set is bought for the unit and the other is borrowed from

the war reserve stockpile, to be returned after mobilization

when the unit draws its pre-positioned equipment. In practice,

the war reserve stockpile is insufficient to meet this demand.

Consequently, the equipment must be borrowed from the only other

available source—the active and Reserve Component units. In

the past, the Army has taken equipment solely from the Reserve

Components, but meeting the full requirement of NORTHAG POMCUS

would leave them at less than half of their authorized level of

armored personnel carriers and some truck lines. The Army does

not want to take these units below 50 percent of their authorized

level of equipment; consequently, the active divisions that would

use the pre-positioned equipment will not be provided full sets

of equipment for training in the United States. The Army has

not yet determined all of the implications of this decision.

Preliminary analyses indicate that it may be necessary to withdraw M-113 armored personnel carriers from mechanized infantry

units and that current shortages of five-ton trucks would be

exacerbated. According to these same analyses, even these

measures will leave the second and third division sets of equipment to be pre-positioned short of requirements. CBO estimates

that the shortage could be as great as 20 percent.

Although units now train with less than a full set of

equipment, the new POMCUS program would make the shortages worse.

Training difficulties in the active POMCUS divisions could develop

because of the shortage of armored personnel carriers, trucks,

and other less visible, but nonetheless important, equipment.

Some officials believe that these problems would not become severe

enough to nullify the benefits of POMCUS, even though they would

grow somewhat in the near future. This may be a fair assessment

at this time, but experience may prove otherwise. Withdrawing

31
equipment from the Reserve Components could aggravate the recruiting and training problems already being encountered. In

fact, if the impact were too severe, it might not be possible to

withdraw the equipment. In that case, the Army probably would

be hard pressed to meet the pre-positioning schedule without

procuring more equipment than now programmed.

The 20 percent deficiency that could occur in the last

two division sets being pre-positioned in NORTHAG could also

lead to larger procurement requests in the early 1980s. It

could be argued that, having expended the effort to pre-position

the first 80 percent, it would make little sense to delay the

remaining 20 percent until the late 1980s, when the currently

planned procurement program would probably make up the difference.

War Reserve Stocks and Ammunition. Because the three new

POMCUS divisions would be in theater earlier than under existing

reinforcement plans, more war reserve equipment and ammunition

would be needed to support them. Therefore, more of those stocks

would have to be procured and pre-positioned in Europe. If

procurement programs were not expanded in the 1980s, the Army

would have to reduce CENTAG stocks in order to provide some war

reserves for NORTHAG.

NORTHAG Support Structure. Until 1977, when a U.S. brigade

was moved to NORTHAG, the United States did not formally participate in the defense of NORTHAG and had no reason to maintain a

logistics base there. DoD's plan to commit three POMCUS divisions

to NORTHAG changes that situation considerably and creates the

possibility of even greater increases in the program's cost.

The POMCUS divisions are likely to be in combat very soon

after their arrival, and will need medical support, ammunition,

fuel, maintenance assistance, and other logistical support almost

immediately. The logistics units included in the NORTHAG POMCUS

package (43,000 personnel) are designed to provide that support.

But without an existing logistics base on which to build, the

first week or two after deployment would be spent in establishing such a base. During that period, support for the divisions

would be difficult to provide.

The ideal solution would be to have a small logistics base

in NORTHAG in peacetime that could be quickly expanded by using

the logistics units in POMCUS. The logistics system could

then be immediately responsive to the needs of the divisions.

Although this alternative is not now part of DoD's NORTHAG POMCUS

32
proposal, the problem is real and the Congress can expect that

sooner or later DoD will want to move in that direction. CBO

estimates the cost of providing a skeleton peacetime support

base to be $640 million, which includes the addition of 12,500

military personnel to the Europe-deployed strength.

Costs Through Fiscal Year 1984

Table 2 shows CBO's estimate of the cost of the DoD POMCUS

program through fiscal year 1984. The estimate includes the

cost of programs CBO considers as probable additions, even though

they are not part of the current DoD plan. Some costs might be

deferrable beyond 1984, but not if the full benefit of the DoD

proposal is to be realized when the pre-positioning is completed.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED COST OF PRE-POSITIONING THREE DIVISION SETS OF

EQUIPMENT: IN MILLIONS OF FISCAL YEAR 1980 DOLLARS a./

Item Cost

Primary Costs

Operations 300

Construction of POMCUS sites 400 b_/

Procurement of flexible-barrier shelters 40

Transportation and spare parts 200

Follow-On Costs

Equipment to fill last 20 percent of POMCUS 360

Increased support structure in NORTHAG

(12,500 personnel) 640

War reserve stocks 580

Total 2,520

aj Includes direct U.S. funding, NATO infrastructure funding, and

host nation support.

Jj/ Construction of POMCUS sites (excluding maintenance shops

and living quarters) will be funded through the NATO infrastructure fund.

33

mnr
JllL

The costs after fiscal year 1984 would be about $100 million

a year for operation and maintenance of POMCUS and the war

reserves. A one-time cost of possibly $150 million for replacing

the flexible-barrier shelters with controlled humidity warehouses should be expected, although the NATO infrastructure fund

would probably pay for that expense.

CONCLUSIONS

Although the DoD POMCUS plan is part of the overall NATO

Long-Term Defense Program to improve alliance defenses, implementation of the U.S. program could make it more difficult for

the other allies to justify the expense of correcting the major

deficiencies in their forces while also matching Warsaw Pact

modernization. The U.S. program also might cause training

problems in the near term, and it could exert considerable

pressure for larger procurement programs in the mid-1980s. Thus,

the Congress may wish to explore alternative ways of strengthening

NATO before present U.S. plans become irrevocable commitments.

Chapter IV discusses three alternative comprehensive NATO

plans to strengthen NORTHAG defenses. The level of U.S. responsibility varies with each alternative.

34
CHAPTER IV. OPTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING NATO

THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL FORCE RATIO AND STRENGTHEN NORTHAG

The notion that the Warsaw Pact would have the strategic initiative, combined with the fact that it could get its forces to

the battle faster than NATO, has important implications for the

design of NATO's conventional defenses. Because NATO can know

neither where nor when an attack might come, its corps sectors

should be uniform in strength. Additionally, it should have

enough forces to form a mobile reserve that could move to reinforce whichever corps sectors the Warsaw Pact main attack struck.

Chapter II showed that NATO's corps sectors are not now uniform in

strength and that there are not enough forces available to form a

reserve quickly after mobilization. Chapter II also suggested

that if NATO could design its forces to achieve a 1.44:1 overall

force ratio within 10 days of mobilization, then combat capability

should be sufficient to conduct a successful conventional defense.

Three force design strategies were identified, two of which would

lead directly to the objective force ratio. The third strategy

would simply buy the time needed for the majority of U.S. reinforcements to arrive.

This chapter discusses the strengths and weaknesses of each

design strategy and develops alternative options for strengthening

NATO by using the design strategies in different ways.

AVAILABLE DESIGN STRATEGIES

Strategy I—Strengthen NORTHAG Defenders

Options included in this strategy are moving peacetime

stations closer to wartime defensive positions, modernizing

equipment, and mechanizing more units. Changing peacetime

locations for the entire force in NORTHAG is probably unworkable.

It might, however, be practical to move more Dutch forces into

Germany, which would somewhat reduce the Dutch corps sector's

vulnerability to a no-warning attack.

The non-U.S. NATO allies could improve the overall force

ratio by increasing the capability of their forces and by providing more combat units. To increase their force capability, the

35

mnr
allies could modernize and mechanize their units. Vintage tanks

could be replaced with newer ones; armored personnel carriers

could be replaced by armored fighting vehicles; medium artillery

(155mm howitzers) could replace light artillery (105mm howitzers);

artillery densities could be brought up to those of U.S. forces;

and second-generation antitank weapons (TOW, Dragon, HOT, Milan)

could replace first-generation weapons. A modernization program

such as this would release equipment that could be used either

to mechanize existing reserve component units or to form new

mechanized units manned with the abundant reserve manpower available in each country. Table 3 shows the allies' potential for

increased mechanization.

TABLE 3. POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED MECHANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES

West Germany Belgium The Netherlands Britain

3 Light 1 Paracommando 1 Reconnaissance 9 Armored

Infantry Regiment Battalion Reconnaissance

Brigades Regiments

3 Reconnaissance 1 Independent 15 Infantry

Battalions Infantry Brigade Battalions

2 Motorized

Infantry

Battalions

SOURCE: The Military Balance 1978-1979 (International Institute

for Strategic Studies: London), pp. 19-28.

Strategy II—Increase the Rate of U.S. Reinforcement

This strategy is relevant only to situations in which

warning time is short. Longer-warning times (say, 60 to 90

days) would give the united States enough time to transport the

bulk of its forces to Europe before war broke out. Two options

for improving U.S. combat readiness will be discussed: stationing

more forces in Europe and increasing the size of POMCUS. A

36
third option, buying more airlift, could also be considered but

will not be explored in detail because of its prohibitive cost.

(One DoD analysis shows that POMCUS delivers units 11 to 12 times

as fast as an air fleet of equal cost.)

The United States could choose to station more forces in

Europe as a way of improving NATO's ability to respond to a Pact

attack that came with extremely short warning. As noted earlier,

Warsaw Pact forces are assumed to be increasingly capable of

launching an attack with little warning. To the extent that

they could conceal their preliminary preparations or confuse

allied commanders about their intentions, the likelihood of an

attack with little warning would be increased. In such a circumstance, NATO's situation would be the same as if there had

been no warning.

Either the First Infantry Division (mechanized) or the Second

Armored Division could be stationed in Germany without reducing

the United States' capability to react to contingencies that

might develop in other parts of the world. The domestic and

international political response to such a move is unknown,

however, and falls beyond the scope of this study. A related

consideration—also beyond the scope of this study—is the impact

that more forward deployments would have on the Mutual and

Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations.

On a one-for-one basis, POMCUS is less expensive than stationing units in Europe, but its effectiveness is more dependent

on warning time. Although both forward-deployed units and

POMCUS stocks would be vulnerable to a Pact air attack that was

launched with little or no warning, forward-deployed units would

be better able to disperse their equipment before a second attack

could be launched. Too few personnel are at the POMCUS sites to

disperse equipment as quickly, and follow-on attacks might find

equipment still in warehouses and POMCUS personnel exposed. Even

so, the Warsaw Pact would have to concentrate a significant

portion of its air attack assets against POMCUS in order to do any

real harm. Since vehicles are stored without fuel and ammunition,

there is little likelihood that an attack would cause secondary

explosions or fires. Consequently, only direct hits with bombs

would damage armored vehicles. Trucks and trailers could be

damaged by near misses, but they would not necessarily be made

useless. Thus, it appears that the Warsaw Pact would have to

conduct a heavy, sustained attack in order to neutralize POMCUS.

37

TTTTir"
The Pact could reduce the effectiveness of the POMCUS reinforcement option with attacks on higher priority targets or with

attacks against the soft links in the transportation network that

would be used by reinforcing units. For example, attacks on NATO

airfields in the early days of an air war could delay the arrival

of U.S. reinforcements, thus disrupting the entire POMCUS process.

If aircraft transporting U.S. troops to Germany had to be diverted

to alternate air fields, possibly in France, the troops' arrival

at the POMCUS storage sites would be delayed significantly.

This could give a significant advantage to attacking Warsaw

Pact forces. Thus, in the case of a surprise attack, forward

deployment is the more effective reinforcement option.

CBO estimates that with five days' warning time, a significant portion of the POMCUS stocks could be distributed to

arriving troops, provided that a decision to deploy U.S. units was

made shortly after the warning was received. With 10 days'

warning, all stocks could be issued. _!/ Thus, POMCUS is likely to

be the most cost-effective alternative in scenarios with warning

times greater than five days.

Strategy III—Form a Reserve Force

This strategy includes two options for forming a reserve

in NORTHAG; the options could be used independently or in combination. The first alternative would be to form a reserve force

by using the six West German home defense groups and the U.S.

division whose equipment will be in NORTHAG POMCUS by the end

of fiscal year 1980. Since it would take perhaps a week to

mobilize the home defense groups and move them to NORTHAG, this

solution has low utility in no-warning scenarios. 2_l The second

option would be to make use of the two French divisions stationed

in Germany and the three in France. With adequate warning time

(say, a week or so), the French divisions could take over a corps

\J U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979.

p. 7.

2_l Federal Minister of Defense, White Paper 1975/1976. The

Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces (Bonn: January 1976),

p. 89.

38
sector in CENTAG now assigned to West Germany. The German corps

could then be moved to NORTHAG, where it would assume control of

the U.S. POMCUS division and form a NORTHAG reserve. In shortwarning scenarios, the French forces could move directly to

NORTHAG and act as the reserve force. This solution would be

somewhat more difficult for the French to sustain. It must be

remembered that French forces are no longer officially committed

to NATO's defense, and any option for the use of their forces

assumes that France would make its divisions available quickly

after mobilization.

ALTERNATIVE U.S. OPTIONS

Using the three strategies described above and the following

criteria,

o The force ratio should be kept below 1.44:1 after NATO

M+10,

o The initial defense in all corps sectors should be

uniformly strong,

three equally effective options for the United States are described in this section. The alternatives are examples of the

directions in which the United States could move to satisfy its

security interests in NATO.

Each option assumes successful completion of the program

to pre-position one division set of equipment in NORTHAG in fiscal

year 1980, improved readiness of the REFORGER and 2+10 units, and

completion of any airlift improvement that might be needed to

ensure that the REFORGER and 2+10 units could arrive within 10

days of NATO mobilization. In addition, it is assumed that NATO

and the Warsaw Pact will modernize at the same rate during the

period 1980-1984. Figure 4 shows how much these programs would

improve the overall force ratio by fiscal year 1983.

Option I—Non-U.S. NATO Increases Firepower by 13 Percent

In this alternative, the non-U.S. NATO allies would improve

their firepower capabilities by 13 percent over their fiscal year

1978 position. The allies' increased strength, the one U.S.

39

"TTTF'
Figure 4.

Theater Force Ratio Improvement Projected for Fiscal Year 1983'

Key: lllll l Range of theater force ratio in 1978.

t:::*s*3 Range of theater force ratio projected

for 1983.

0 4 8 12 16 20

Days After Warsaw Pact Mobilization

a

 Assumes completion of programs necessary to ensure that REFORGER, 2 + 10, and one division for

NORTHAG could be in Europe within 10 days of NATO mobilization, and that NATO and Warsaw

Pact modernize at the same rate.

division pre-positioned in NORTHAG, the stronger German home

defense groups, and the French forces would be available to

form mobile reserves.

Under this option, the 13 percent improvement in the non11. S. NATO allies would achieve the 1.44:1 overall force ratio

objective. Such improvement would also significantly strengthen

the peacetime force and reduce NATO's vulnerability to a nowarning attack (see Figure 5).

How much each ally would have to improve its forces cannot be calculated. It is also not possible to determine how

much improvement is planned as part of the NATO Long-Term Defense Program. Thus it is not clear whether this alternative

would demand more or less of the allies. Another complication

is that, while making up the deficit, the allies would also have

to match the Pact's rate of modernization, as would the United

States.

40
Figure 5.

Comparison of Alternatives I and II Force Ratio

with the Projected Fiscal Year 1983 Force Ratio

Key: ffttttt Projected range of 1983 force ratio.

II111I I Range of force ratio that would

result from either Alternative I or II

NATO Force Ratio Goal

12 16 20

Days After Warsaw Pact Mobilization

Nevertheless, on the basis of Chapter II's analysis of the

deficiencies in each corps, it is possible to estimate that the

allies would need to achieve the following, just to erase the

firepower deficit:

o One hundred percent of tank fleet equivalent to or better

than either the M-60A1 or the Leopard I;

o Fifty percent of all infantry-type units equipped with

armored fighting vehicles, and the remainder with vehicles

equivalent to the U.S. M-113 armored personnel carrier

(the 50 percent split is strictly arbitrary);

o Artillery densities equal to U.S. forces, and 105mm

howitzers replaced by 155mm howitzers;

o All first-generation antitank guided weapons replaced by

second-generation systems.

41
It should be remembered that although this option emphasizes non-U.S. NATO Improvements, the United States would still

pre-position one division set of equipment in NORTHAG and ensure the delivery to Europe of all POMCUS units within 10 days

after mobilization. Both of these help to achieve an overall

theater level force ratio of 1.44:1. (The force ratio curves

projected for fiscal year 1983 shown in Figure 5 include these

programs.)

A major disadvantage of this alternative is that the United

States would be proposing that the allies substitute a 13 percent

increase in their firepower for the second and third additional

division sets of equipment promised by the United States in the

LTDP. Whether the allies would be willing to eliminate the 13

percent deficit as well as match the Warsaw Pact modernization is

unknown.

Option II—Non-U.S. NATO Increases Firepower by 10 Percent; The

United States Stations Two More Brigades in Germany

This option would move to Germany the two brigades of the

First Infantry Division stationed in the United States plus an

appropriate amount of fire support and logistical support.

The allies would increase their firepower capability by 10 percent

over their fiscal year 1978 level.

Both Options I and II would significantly reduce NATO's

vulnerability to a no-warning attack. Option II would produce the

same force ratio over time as Option I (see Figure 5), but at

greater cost to the United States and less to the other allies.

Under this alternative, NORTHAG would have a two-division U.S.

corps. The 10 percent improvement in allied firepower should

do a lot to make corps sectors uniformly strong.

The effective cost of this alternative for the United

States could be reduced by stationing the Second Infantry Division

at Fort Riley, Kansas, the post vacated by the movement of the

First Infantry Division to Europe. A stationing plan of this kind

would avoid the construction costs of preparing another location

for the Second Infantry Division.

Under this alternative, there would be no need to withdraw

or divert equipment from active-duty or Reserve Component units.

Thus, readiness of all U.S. units would probably improve, relative

to the current DoD proposal.

42
The substitution of a 10 percent increase in allied firepower and forward deployment of two U.S. brigades for the last two

sets of U.S. pre-positioned equipment might be criticized on the

ground that the United States would thereby fail to meet its LTDP

commitment. On the other hand, some would argue that increased

deployments represent a greater commitment than pre-positioning

equipment.

Option III—The United States Pre-Positions the Second and Third

Additional Division Sets of Equipment

Under this alternative, the United States would pre-position

two more division sets of equipment in NORTHAG. Non-U.S. NATO

would match Warsaw Pact modernization rates but would not make up

its current firepower deficit.

Option III would provide a strong three-division U.S. corps

for a NORTHAG reserve. As noted in Chapter III, this substantial

addition to NORTHAG would have the same effect as uniformly

strengthening the initial defense of its corps sectors without

further effort by the allies. To preclude a reduction in the

readiness of U.S. units stationed in the United States, this

option would procure all necessary equipment to execute the plan.

Figure 6 shows that the effectiveness of Option III is

virtually the same as the effectiveness of Options I and II. The

effectiveness of this option would, however, depend on NATO's

detecting a Warsaw Pact mobilization and promptly mobilizing

its own forces. If there were a failure in either area, so that

U.S. personnel were moving to POMCUS sites after the war broke

out, then Option III could be significantly less effective than

either Options I or II because of the probable disruption of the

flow of reinforcements. The U.S. costs of Option III are almost

60 percent more than the costs of Option II.

SUMMARY

All three options would achieve the theater force ratio goal

of 1.44:1 after 10 days of NATO mobilization. Options I and II

would increase the strength of the peacetime force as well as

the postmobilization force; therefore, they would reduce the

risks associated with a no-warning attack. Options I and II

would entail substantial improvement in the allies' forces.

Insufficient evidence is available to estimate how much the

43

~TTTT"
Jill.

Figure 6.

Comparison of Alternatives I, II, and

Key: E3SSI Alternative III.

Alternatives I or II.

1.0

12 16 20

Days After Warsaw Pact Mobilization

NATO LTDP would contribute to the needed improvement; thus,

It Is not possible to estimate the additional burden to the

allies of reducing their force deficit and matching the Warsaw

Pact modernization rate. Option III is the most expensive for

the United States. The U.S. cost of Option II could be reduced

by 21 percent if the Second Infantry Division were stationed at

Fort Siley, Kansas after it is withdrawn from Korea. Table 4

summarizes the costs of the options.

44
TABLE 4. COST COMPARISON OF U.S. OPTIONS, FISCAL YEARS 1980-1984: IN

MILLIONS OF FISCAL YEAR 1980 DOLLARS a/

Option II

(U.S. Deploys Option III

One Division United States

Option I to Germany; Pre-Positions

(Allies Increase Allies Increase 2nd and 3rd

Firepower by Firepower by Additional Sets

13 Percent) 10 Percent) of Equipment)

Operations 140 300 350

Construction — 790 400

Procurement of FlexibleBarrier Shelters 15 15 40

Transportation and

Spare Parts 50 95 200

Equipment to Fill

POMCUS — — 360

Increased Support

for NORTHAG 220 425 640

War Reserves 190 390 580

Savings — -430 b/ —

Total 615 cj 1,585 2,570

a/ Includes direct U.S. funding, NATO infrastructure funding, and host

nation support only for the U.S. portion of each alternative. The cost

of the allies' action cannot be determined.

b/ This option assumes that the First Infantry Division is deployed to

Europe, leaving Fort Riley, Kansas, vacant. If the Second Infantry

Division were stationed there, there would be a. cost avoidance of

at least $430 million, which is taken as a savings. The costs of

stationing the Second Infantry Division range from $430 to $810 million,

depending on what location is chosen.

_c/ Cost to the United States to complete the pre-positioning of the first

division set of equipment, which will be in NORTHAG by 1980.

45

CHAPTER V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

NATO can expect to face an unfavorable balance of forces

for at least 30 days after a decision to mobilize; hence, the

alliance cannot be confident of its ability to conduct a conventional defense of Europe. This lack of confidence could

have a negative effect in any political confrontation between

NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The imbalance is not new; it has

been developing for a long time. Moreover, it cannot be easily

or quickly changed. Continued aggressive force modernization

and expansion by the Warsaw Pact could considerably increase the

burden of NATO efforts to change the balance.

Because no NATO corps sector should be weaker than any

other, the organization of NATO's defense into national corps

sectors implies that any effort to improve the force balance be a

coordinated, comprehensive program. That does not mean that

all countries must be equally strong; rather, it implies that

there should be no asymmetries among the corps sectors that a

Warsaw Pact attack could exploit.

Such asymmetries exist today, and it is not at all clear

that the NATO countries are committed to eliminating them while

at the same time matching Warsaw Pact modernization and expansion. The Long-Term Defense Program commits NATO to improve

its forces, but too little information is available on the

allied force improvement plans to permit a complete evaluation

of them. Additionally, the United States' promise to pre-position

three division sets of equipment in NORTHAG would make such

a substantial improvement in the overall force balance that

it could make it difficult for the Dutch, British, and Belgians—

who have the greatest force deficiencies—to achieve a net increase in their capability vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact.

Because the Warsaw Pact modernization and force expansion

rate plays such a significant role in determining what NATO

has to do to improve the overall force balance, it might be

possible to restrain the future growth of NATO defense budgets

by negotiating with the Warsaw Pact limits to modernization

and force expansion. A logical forum for such negotiations

would be the ongoing Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks in

Vienna.

47
1

From the perspective of the Congress, therefore, budgetary

decisions concerning NATO's defense are related to two sets of

issues. The first is the rate at which the Warsaw Pact continues

to expand and modernize its forces. The second involves actions

by the Europeans to redress the firepower gap between their

forces and those of the Warsaw Pact. Assessment of both steps is

central to decisions concerning the pre-positioning of additional

U.S. equipment, as well as to the broader decisions concerning

fulfillment of the pledge of 3 percent real growth in defense

expenditures.

48
APPENDIXE S

~FTT
J1L
APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY OF MILITARY UNITS

Maneuver Platoon

The smallest standard fighting formation commanded by a

commissioned officer. A tank platoon has about 20 personnel

and 5 tanks; a mechanized infantry platoon has about 40 personnel,

divided into 3 squads of 11 men each, plus a headquarters element. Each squad is mounted in an armored personnel carrier.

Maneuver Company

The next largest standard fighting formation commanded by a

commissioned officer. It consists of three maneuver platoons and

support elements. Its strength varies from about 90 personnel and

17 tanks in a tank company to about 150 personnel and 9 infantry

carriers in a mechanized infantry company.

Maneuver Battalion

A maneuver battalion consists of three maneuver companies; a

company-sized element, to provide mortar and antitank fire support

to the maneuver companies; and another company-sized element for

command and control, maintenance support, medical support, food

service, and supply. A tank battalion has about 550 personnel and

54 tanks. A mechanized infantry battalion has about 800 personnel.

Brigade

A command and control unit capable of controlling up to five

maneuver battalions. Three or four battalions are normally

assigned to it. A "mechanized" brigade has more mechanized

infantry battalions than tank battalions.

Division

The standard elements of a division include command and

control units; artillery battalions (500-600 personnel each);

51
aviation elements; an engineer battalion (approximately 900

personnel); several other battalion-sized units that can provide

medical, maintenance, supply, and other types of support; and

three brigade headquarters. Maneuver battalions are assigned to

a division on the basis of the division's probable missions;

as few as 6 or as many as 15 maneuver battalions could be assigned

to a division. The missions of a division also determine the mix

of tank battalions and mechanized infantry battalions. Armored

divisions stationed in Europe have six tank battalions and five

mechanized infantry battalions. Mechanized infantry divisions in

Europe have six mechanized infantry battalions and five tank

battalions.

This is a command and control unit that is staffed and

equipped to control from two to five divisions. Artillery

battalions, communications units, supply, medical, maintenance,

engineer, and other support organizations are assigned to the

corps to provide the added support structure each division needs

to fight.

Armored Cavalry

Armored cavalry units accomplish a variety of missions,

including reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance operations.

To maintain some of the cavalry tradition, armored cavalry units

have different labels than standard units, as shown below:

Standard Unit Armored Cavalry Unit

Platoon Platoon

Company Troop

Battalion Squadron

Brigade Regiment

52
APPENDIX B. DERIVATION OF FORCE RATIOS

The chart shown below was taken from page iv of A Report to

Congress on U.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO, prepared by

the Office of the Secretary of Defense in June 1976. Adding a

scale, adjusting the buildup curves to show the latest estimates,

and making the assumptions detailed below enables one to read

force units by time period from the chart, which can be converted

to force ratios (see Table B-l, which also shows the force

ratio measured by manpower in divisions). Table B-2 provides the

data estimating how the NATO buildup could change as the amount of

pre-positioned equipment increases. Table B-3 provides the

buildup data for Options I and II.

Figure 7.

Comparison of Land Forces (Center Region)

Uncertainty in Soviet Buildup Rate & Readiness

U.S. Contribution of Ground Forces

Non-U.S. NATO

12 16 20

Time After Pact M-Day

53

~rrr~
JIL

TABLE B-l. 1978 WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE RATIOS

Time

Pact NATO

Warsaw Pact/NATO Force Ratio

Armored Division Manpower in

Equivalents _a/ J)/ c_/ Divisions cj

M-Day

M+4

M+7

M+8

M+12

M+14

M+16

M+20

M+21

M+24

M+28

M+32

M-Day

M+3

M44

M+8

M+10

M+12

M+16

M+17

M+20

M+24

M+28

1.2

1.8-2.0

1.7-1.8

1.6-1.9

1.6-1.9

1.4-1.8

1.5-1.8

1.5-1.8

1.4-1.7

1.4-1.6

1.2-1.4

1.4

1.5

1.5

1.6-1.7

1.4-1.5

1.4-1.5

a/ Derived from U.S. Department of Defense, A Report to Congress on U.S.

Conventional Reinforcements for NATO (June 1976), p. IV-3. See Appendix

B for details.

b/ Armored division equivalents is a standard measure of combat potential

used by the Department of Defense. It is developed by a scheme that

gives a score to all weapons on the basis of their laboratory-tested

capability, weighs that score judgmentally based on the weapon's relationship to other weapons on the battlefield, and sums the weighted

values of all weapons in the force. The total score is then divided by

the weapons score for a standard U.S. armored division to yield the

armored division equivalent.

cl In order to generate sufficient forces to launch an attack, the Warsaw

Pact would have to use Category II and III divisions, whose readiness

may not be at 100 percent at the time of attack. This creates some

uncertainty about the quality of the threat.

A_l Original work done by Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central Front; The

Balance of Forces. Adelphi Paper No. 127 (London: International Institute

for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1976), was based on a seven-day lag between

Warsaw Pact and NATO mobilization. This analysis adjusts his work in two

ways. First, the time between a Warsaw Pact and NATO mobilization is

reduced to four days. Second, Fischer estimated that the REFORGER and

2+10 POMCUS units would not be available for combat until NATO M+21.

Secretary of Defense Brown, on the other hand, has specified that allied

forces could be augmented by one or two U.S. divisions by NATO M+10. (See

U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979. p. 38.)

Thus, this analysis assumes that one unit is available for combat by M+12

and the other two are phased in between M +12 and M+21.
TABLE B-2. ESTIMATE OF CHANGE IN NATO BUILDUP a/

J

1

Force Units

Time

Pact M-Day

M+4

M+8

M+12

M+14

M+16

M+20

M+24

M+28

M+32

Warsaw

Pact

6.5

10-11

11.5-15.5

12.5-16.0

12.75-16.75

13.25-16.75

13.75-16.75

14.00-16.75

14.50-16.75

14.75-16.75

Non-U.S.

NATO

4.0

4.0

5.5-6.5

6.5-7.25

7.0-7.25

7.0-7.5

7.5

7.5

7.5

7.5

1978

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

2.1

2.1

2.1

2.5

2.5

3.0

U.S.

1983 b_/

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

3.6

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.0

5.2

Warsaw Pact/NATO Force Ratio

1983' c/

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

4.4

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.2

5.2

1978

1.18

1.82-2.00

1.64-1.94

1.56-1.83

1.40-1.79

1.46-1.74

1.43-1.74

1.40-1.68

1.45-1.68

1.40-1.60

1983 b_/

1.18

1.82-2.00

1.64-1.94

1.56-1.83

1.20-1.54

1.25-1.51

1.18-1.43

1.14-1.36

1.16-1.34

1.16-1.32

1983' c/

1.18

1.82-2.00

1.64-1.94

1.56-1.83

1.12-1.44

1.16-1.41

1.14-1.38

1.14-1.36

1.16-1.32

1.16-1.32

NOTE: The table is constructed under the premise that the only change in the forces between 1978

and 1983 is the increased POMCUS. In reality, all forces are undergoing modernization and

expansion that will cause the absolute value of the force units to change. However, if

all forces improve at the same rate, the force ratios would be unchanged by the modernization and expansion. Therefore, this analysis assumes that NATO matches Warsaw Pact

modernization and expansion, which allows identification of the impact of POMCUS changes.

&l NATO lags Warsaw Pact by four days.

_b/ The 1983 column assumes the REFORGER and 2+10 units and only one NORTHAG division arrive by

Pact M+14 (NATO M+10).

_c/ The 1983' column assumes the REFORGER and 2+10 units and three NORTHAG divisions arrive by

Pact M+14 (NATO M+10), as proposed in the DoD POMCUS plan.
TABLE B-3. BUILDUP DATA FOR OPTIONS a/

Time

Pact

M-Day

M+4

M+8

M+12

M+14

M+16

M+20

M+24

M+28

M+32

Option

I

4.52

4.52

6.22-7.35

7.35-8.19

7.91-8.19

7.91-8.48

8.48

8.48

8.48

8.48

Non-U.S.

Option

II

4.32

4.32

6.02-7.15

7.15-7.99

7.71-7.99

7.71-8.28

8.28

8.28

8.28

8.28

NATO Force

Option

III

4.0

4.0

5.5-6.50

6.5-7.25

7.0-7.25

7.0-7.50

7.5

7.5

7.5

7.5

Units

Option

I

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

3.6

3.6

4.2

4.8

5.0

5.2

U.S.

Option

II

1.7

1.7

1.7

1.7

3.8

3.8

4.4

5.0

5.0

5.2

Option

III

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

4.4

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.2

5.2

Force Ratio

Option

I

1.08

1.66-1.83

1.49-1.75

1.41-1.65

1.11-1.42

1.15-1.39

1.08-1.32

1.05-1.32

1.08-1.24

1.08-1.22

Option

II

1.08

1.66-1.83

1.49-1.75

1.41-1.65

1.11-1.42

1.15-1.39

1.08-1.32

1.05-1.32

1.08-1.24

1.08-1.22

Option

III

1.18

1.82-2.00

1.64-1.94

1.56-1.83

1.12-1.44

1.16-1.41

1.14-1.38

1.14-1.36

1.16-1.32

1.16-1.32

„

ji/ Warsaw Pact force units for all options are same as those presented in Table B-l.
Assumptions and Adjustments

The DoD report specifies that NATO mobilization lags behind

the Warsaw Pact's, but does not state by how much; however,

analysts have used a 23/30 scenario (a seven-day NATO lag) for

nearly a decade. _!/ Assuming that the 23/30 scenario was used

to build the chart, then distance A equals seven days, which

allows the time scale to be converted to days after Warsaw Pact

mobilization.

Adjusting the Warsaw Pact buildup to the predominant view

that 86 to 90 divisions would be available within 14 days of Pact

mobilization produces point B. "l_l

Adjusting the NATO buildup for the earlier availability of

U.S. divisions, announced by Secretary Brown in DoD's posture

statement for fiscal year 1979, produces curve C.

Estimates

DoD's fiscal year 1979 posture statement also states that, by

1983, the United States would be able to deploy five divisions

within 10 days of mobilization. Curve D is an estimate of the

improved buildup.

\J Congressional Budget Office, Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact

Military Balance, Budget Issue Paper for Fiscal Year 1979

(December 1977), p. 21.

_2/ See Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central Front; The Balance

of Forces, Adelphi Paper No. 127 (London: International

Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1976), p. 23.

57

APPENDIX C. ANALYSIS OF IMPACT OF UNFAVORABLE FORCE RATIOS

Assume:

o NATO forces are Initially distributed evenly among the

corps sectors;

o The Warsaw Pact/NATO force ratio in all but the main

attack sector is 1:1;

o NATO can successfully defend against 3:1 in the main

attack sector;

o NATO would accept a 2:1 ratio in non-main attack sectors.

Let:

x = NATO's strength;

y = Warsaw Pact's strength;

z = The number of corps sectors (eight for

this analysis).

Then:

x

NATO strength in all sectors at start of

war and Warsaw

attack sectors;

Z

 war and Warsaw Pact strength in non-main

Warsaw Pact strength in main attack sector;

+ 1 = Force ratio in main attack sector.

59
1IL

The number of corps that would have to send reinforcements to

achieve a 3:1 ratio in the main attack sector is then found

by:

y - x (-4-)

X

~2z

Which simplifies to!

2zy

3x

2z

3

- 1-

Substituting z = 8,

the equation becomes:

5.3331—*—I - 6.666 = Number of corps involved.

Figure 2 was constructed using the above formula and assumptions.

60
APPENDIX D. CALCULATION OF WARSAW PACT/NATO FORCE RATIOS:

MANPOWER IN DIVISIONS AND FIREPOWER

Warsaw Pact

Manpower In divisions at 35 days after mobilization =

934,000. _!/

Armored division equivalent force units (firepower) = 16.75

(see Appendix B).

Non-U.S. NATO

Manpower = 474,000. _2/

Armored division equivalent force units (firepower) = 7.5

(see Appendix B).

United States

Active division manpower:

(15 division equivalents + 3 ACRs + 6th ACCB) x 16,000 » 261,328.

Estimate active armored division equivalent force units

(firepower) = 5.25.

Force Ratios

Manpower

Warsaw Pact/Non-U.S. NATO = 474*OOQ

 = 1<97

JY See Lucas Fischer, Defending the Central Front; The Balance

of Forces, Adelphi Paper No. 127 (London: International

Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1976), p. 23.

I/ Ibid.

61

TTTT
Warsaw Pact/U.S. «

Firepower

Warsaw Pact/Non-U.S. NATO =

Warsaw Pact/U.S.

934.000

261,328

3.57

16.75

7.5

16.75

5.25

2.23

3.19

62
APPENDIX E. NATO'S LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP) I/

Improved Readiness

o Increased national holdings of tanks, anti-armor weapons,

missiles, armed helicopters, and air-to-surface weapons;

o Purchase of protective equipment against chemical warfare;

o Pursuit of cooperative and coordinated development of

next-generation anti-armor weapons and a common family of

air-to-surface weapons.

Reinforcement

o Accelerate the movement of significant fighting units to

forward areas;

o Pre-position the equipment for three heavy U S. divisions;

o Some allies will modify civil aircraft to carry equipment

that cannot be pre-positioned;

o Improved amphibious lift for British and Dutch marines.

Reserve Mobilization

o Bring national reserve forces up to NATO standards and

improve readiness of certain reserve formations;

o A number of European countries will consider providing

more reserve brigades.

_!/ Summary of information contained in U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980, pp. 211-14.

63
Maritime Posture

o Improved command and control;

o Improved air defense for naval units;

o Better antimissile defense for naval units;

o Greater mine warfare capabilities.

Air Defense

o Improved ability to identify hostile aircraft and control

NATO's own aircraft;

o Improve fighter aircraft;

o Acquire improved surface-to-air weapons.

Communications, Command, and Control

o Implementation of second phase of the NATO Integrated

Communications System;

o Cooperation and coordinated efforts in maritime communications, tactical trunk networks, single-channel radio

access, NATO/national area interconnection, strategic

automatic data processing, and war headquarters improvements .

Electronic Warfare

o Improved capability to counter Warsaw Pact electronic

warfare;

o Improved organization and procedures.

Rationalization

o New procedures for long-range armaments planning;

° Improved formulation and utilization of standardization

agreements;

64
o Continuation of work undertaken by the Conference of

National Armaments Directors in the field of intellectual

rights.

Logistics

o Policy and organizational improvements to harmonize and

coordinate arrangements to improve logistics support;

o Development of a logistics master planning system;

o Increased war reserve stocks;

o Improved flexibility in the use of ammunition stocks.

Theater Nuclear Modernization

o Measures are being developed to ensure these forces

continue to play their essential role.

65

O

iir
"nr