Office of Inspector General 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to 

Critical Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Database 

(Redacted)

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, has redacted this report 

for public release. The redactions are identified as (b)(2), comparable to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). A 

review under the Freedom of Information Act will be conducted upon request.

OIG-05-43 September 2005

Office of Information Technology 
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

DHS oversight responsibilities to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the 

department. 

This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of database security controls over Emergency 

Preparedness and Response (EP&R) resources. It is based on interviews with EP&R officials, direct 

observations, technical scans, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 Richard L. Skinner 

 Inspector General
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

 Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 1 

 Background................................................................................................................................... 3 

 

Results of Audit ............................................................................................................................ 5 

Strengthening of Database Security Procedures Is Needed.................................................... 5 

 Recommendations................................................................................................................... 9 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ........................................................................... 9 

NEMIS Servers Are Vulnerable ............................................................................................. 10 

 Recommendations................................................................................................................... 18 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ........................................................................... 18 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ...................................................................... 20 

Appendix B: Management’s Response..................................................................................... 22 

 Appendix C: Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed ............................................................ 28 

Appendix D: FISMA Metrics.................................................................................................... 29 

Appendix E: NEMIS Architecture............................................................................................ 31

Appendix F: Major Contributors to this Report ....................................................................... 32 

Appendix G: Report Distribution.............................................................................................. 33 

Abbreviations 

ATL Advanced Technology Laboratory 

C&A Certification and Accreditation 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

DBMS Database Management System 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DHS Handbook DHS Sensitive Systems Handbook 

DHS Policy DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Publication 4300A 

EP&R Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate 

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 

ISS Internet Security Systems

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

 IT Information Technology 

NACS NEMIS Access Control System

NEMIS National Emergency Management Information System

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

OIG Office of Inspector General 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

POA&M Plan of Action and Milestones 

--------- -------------- ----------------

SP Special Publication 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 1 

Executive Summary 

 

 

We audited the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its organizational 

components’ security program to evaluate the security and integrity of select 

sensitive but unclassified mission critical databases.1

 This audit included a 

review of access controls, continuity of operations, and change management 

policies and procedures. This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of 

security controls over Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) database 

resources. 

Our objective was to determine whether EP&R had implemented adequate and 

effective controls over sensitive data contained in its National Emergency 

Management Information System (NEMIS). We interviewed EP&R officials, 

reviewed database security documents, and performed technical tests of six 

-------------------servers and two domain controllers. 

EP&R has not established adequate or effective database security controls for 

NEMIS. EP&R has developed and implemented many essential security 

controls for the NEMIS system, including the establishment of a change 

management process and the development of a NEMIS Information Technology 

(IT) contingency plan. However, additional work remains to implement the 

access controls and continuity of operations safeguards necessary to protect 

sensitive NEMIS data adequately. Specifically, EP&R has not (1) implemented 

effective procedures for granting, monitoring, and removing user access; 

 

1

 DHS “organizational components” are defined as directorates, including organizational elements and bureaus, and critical 

agencies. 
(2) maintained and reviewed adequate --------- ----- - --------- -

 or (3) conducted 

NEMIS IT contingency training or testing. In addition, vulnerabilities existed 

on NEMIS servers related to access rights and password administration, 

configuration management, --------- ------ ------------------------ . Due to these 

database security exposures, there is an increased risk that unauthorized 

individuals could gain access to critical EP&R database resources and 

compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive NEMIS 

data. In addition, EP&R may not be able to recover NEMIS following a 

disaster. 

Subsequent to the completion of our audit work, officials from EP&R stated 

that they had taken or planned to take corrective action to address --- of the 

---- vulnerabilities identified during our technical testing. As our fieldwork was 

complete, we did not verify that the vulnerabilities had been remedied. EP&R 

did not provide a corrective action plan for the remaining 56 vulnerabilities. 

See Appendix C for an overview of the vulnerabilities we identified. 

We are recommending that the EP&R Under Secretary direct the Chief 

Information Officer (CIO) to: 

• Ensure that adequate controls for granting, monitoring, and removing 

user access to NEMIS are implemented. 

• Develop and implement an IT contingency training and testing program

for NEMIS. 

• --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------

• Develop and implement corrective action plans to address all identified 

NEMIS vulnerabilities and configuration weaknesses. 

In addition, to comply with the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) 

Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) reporting 

requirements, we evaluated the effectiveness of EP&R’s information security 

program and practices as implemented for NEMIS.3

 EP&R has not aligned 

 

-

-- --- - --- ----- - - - -- ------- ---------- ------ ----- ---- ------- ---------- --- ----------------- ----- ---------- - --------- ---- -

-- - ----------- -------------------------- ---- ----- -------- - - ---------------- -------------------- ------- ------- ---- --------------

----------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- -------- ------------------- ------- --------------- - --------------

------------------------- -------------- ----- --------------------------------- ---------------- ---- -------- ----------- ----- ---------- -----

------------- ----- ------ --- - -- - ------------------------ - - ---- - -- --- ---------- ----------------------- ---------------------

------ - ----- ------ ---------- ----------------- - ----- --- --- - 3

 FISMA is included under Title III of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347). 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 2 
 

fully its security program with DHS’ overall policies, procedures, or practices. 

For example, security controls had not been tested in over a year; a contingency 

plan has not been tested; security control costs have not been integrated into the 

life cycle of the system; and, system and database administrators have not 

obtained specialized security training. Appendix D summarizes the results of

our FISMA evaluation. 

Fieldwork was conducted from December 2004 through January 2005 at the 

EP&R Office of the CIO; Mount Weather Facility in Bluemont, VA; regional 

offices in Atlanta, GA and Philadelphia, PA; and the Office of Inspector

General’s (OIG) Advanced Technology Laboratory (ATL).4

 See Appendix A 

for our purpose, scope, and methodology. 

In response to our draft report, the EP&R CIO generally concurred with our 

recommendations and is in the process of implementing corrective measures. 

In addition, based on the results of our review, the CIO plans to implement an 

independent annual security assessment of NEMIS. EP&R’s response is 

summarized and evaluated in the body of this report and included, in its 

entirety, as Appendix B. 

Background 

A database is one or more large structured sets of data (fields, records, and files) 

organized so that the data can be easily accessed, managed, and updated. Most 

often, databases are associated with software used to update and query the data, 

called a database management system (DBMS). The DBMS can be an 

extremely complex set of software programs that controls the organization, 

storage, and retrieval of data in a database. In addition, the DBMS, in 

conjunction with its host operating system, controls access to the data and

ensures the security and integrity of the database. DBMS’ can be classified 

according to their architectural model (e.g., relational, hierarchical, or network), 

and can be centralized on one platform or distributed across multiple servers. 

Databases and DBMS’ have become a more frequent target of attack for 

malicious users. Such an attack can result in financial loss, loss of privacy, or a 

breach of national security as well as the many other varieties of corruption that 

result from unauthorized access to sensitive data. To counter this threat, a 

4

 The ATL supports our capability to perform effective and efficient technical assessments of DHS information systems 

and diverse operating environments. The ATL is a collection of hardware and software that allows the simulation, testing,

and evaluation of the computing environments that are most commonly used within DHS. 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 3 
number of security options are available to protect the data housed in databases. 

For these measures to be effective, however, DBMS security controls must be 

properly configured and maintained. In addition, as database products have 

become more complex and the attacks against them have increased, a number of 

vulnerabilities have been identified that could be exploited by attackers. DBMS 

vendors have responded by issuing patches or fixes for discovered 

vulnerabilities. These patches must be applied—quickly and appropriately—to 

ensure that critical data is protected adequately. 

NEMIS is a component-wide system of hardware, software, 

telecommunications, and applications that provide an information technology 

base to EP&R and its partners for carrying out the organization’s emergency 

management mission. Since the system became operational in late 1998, 

NEMIS has allowed EP&R to manage responses to disasters, public and 

congressional activities, financial activities, presidential disaster declarations, 

response programs, and state government recovery projects more effectively. 

For example, NEMIS provides incident tracking and coordination activities, 

allows individuals and small businesses to apply for assistance, and processes 

requests from the states for funding of hazard mitigation projects. 

NEMIS utilizes a three-tiered client/server architecture based on a -------------

------------ database, server-based applications, and individual user 

workstations.5 The system requires significant utilization of --------------------

on geographically dispersed dedicated servers with corresponding requirements 

for system and database administration. NEMIS consists of many integrated 

subsystems that are distributed over as many as --- separate servers in the 

production environment and accessed by thousands of client workstations. See 

Appendix E for an overview of the NEMIS architecture. 

DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Publication 4300A (DHS Policy) provides 

direction to DHS components regarding the management and protection of 

sensitive systems. Also, this policy outlines the management, operational, and 

technical controls necessary for ensuring confidentiality, integrity, availability, 

and authenticity within the DHS IT infrastructure and operations. DHS Policy 

requires that its components ensure that strong access controls, IT contingency 

planning safeguards, and change and configuration management procedures are 

 

-

------- -------- ----- - ----- ------- ---------------- ---- --------------------- ----------- -------- ------- - ----- - - ---- ----------- ----

----- --- --- - - ------- ------ -------- ---------------------------- ------- - ----------------- ------- ------------- ---- ----- --------

----------------- ----------------- ----------------------------- ------ ----------------- --- ------------------------ --- --------------- -------

- ---- ------ -- ---- -- ---- ---- ------------------ --------- ------ --- --------- --- ------ ---- ---- ---- - - --- - ------- --- --

------------------------------- ------------ ---------- -- --------------------- -----

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 4 
implemented for all systems processing sensitive but unclassified information. 

The department developed the DHS Sensitive Systems Handbook 

(DHS Handbook) to provide components with specific techniques and 

procedures for implementing the requirements of this policy. Further, in 

November 2004, DHS published a series of secure baseline configuration 

guides for certain software applications, such as --------- ---------. 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has issued several 

publications related to database system access controls, change and 

configuration management, and IT contingency planning. Specifically, NIST 

Special Publication (SP) 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The 

NIST Handbook, provides guidance for establishing adequate access controls for 

sensitive government systems, including the use of strong passwords, 

encryption, and user administration practices. Also, NIST SP 800-12 provides 

guidance on effectively controlling changes to sensitive information systems. 

Further, NIST SP 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information 

Technology Systems, provides instructions, recommendations, and 

considerations for government IT contingency planning. 

Results of Audit 

Strengthening of Database Security Procedures Is Needed 

EP&R has not developed and implemented the security controls necessary to 

protect NEMIS and its data. In assessing the procedures governing sensitive 

data contained in NEMIS, we identified user administration, auditing, and IT 

contingency planning weaknesses. As a result, there is significant risk that the 

security procedures protecting EP&R’s critical databases may not prevent 

unauthorized access to its systems and data. In addition, EP&R may not be able 

to recover NEMIS operations following a disaster or disruption. 

User Administration Procedures Are Incomplete

EP&R has implemented a process for granting, monitoring, and removing 

NEMIS user access that includes many of the controls necessary to protect 

access to the system and its data. For example, EP&R has established a process 

to document user access authorizations in a standard format and maintain these 

authorizations on file. Further, EP&R has implemented a process to disable 

automatically user accounts that have not been utilized in 90 days, and NEMIS 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 5 
officials conduct weekly reviews of -----------------------------. However, 

additional work remains to implement the access control procedures needed to 

limit system access to the appropriate personnel adequately and effectively. 

Specifically: 

• -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---

----------------------------------------- ------- ---------- ------------------- ------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------

• EP&R has not implemented procedures for performing periodic 

revalidations of NEMIS access authorizations. NEMIS officials do not 

perform regular reviews of all accounts with access to the system to 

ensure that the access granted remains appropriate. These reviews are 

not being performed because of the large number of user accounts on the 

system (15,503 at the time of our review). 

DHS Policy requires that components ensure that user access is controlled and 

limited based on positive user identification and authentication mechanisms that 

support the minimum requirements of access control, least privilege, and system

integrity.6

 The policy also requires that: 

• ----------- - ----------- ------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------

• System managers or owners revalidate all accounts at least annually. 

Because NEMIS user administration procedures have not been fully 

implemented, there is greater risk that ----- ------------------------------------

----------------- , while current users may have more access to the system than 

needed to fulfill their job responsibilities. As a result, the sensitive information 

in NEMIS may not be adequately protected. 

 

6

 The principle of least privilege requires that users be granted the most restrictive set of privileges needed to perform

authorized tasks. 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 6 
NEMIS Auditing Is Inadequate

EP&R does not ---------------------------------------------------- ------------------

---- --------- for NEMIS. Specifically: 

• EP&R has not developed sufficient procedures to --------------------

-------------- ----- ----------------- --------- for NEMIS. EP&R maintains 

------------- ---- pertinent information related to -----------------------

-------------------------------------------------- ------ - ------------ - -----

--------------- ----- ------------------------------ ------- ---- . However, audit 

trail records are ------------------------------------ -----------------------

--------------------------------------------- ------- ------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------- ----- ------------- - ------------------------

------------------------------- ------------------- -- --- - ------------- ------ - -

--------- . In addition, only two and a half years of historical -----------

----------------------------------- exists for NEMIS, as the earlier ----- had 

been deleted. 

• None of the database servers we examined had --------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------. According 

to NEMIS officials, --------------------------------------------------------

--------- due to the concern that it would negatively impact system

performance. 

According to DHS Policy, audit trails must contain sufficient information to 

facilitate the reconstruction of events if compromise or malfunction occurs or is 

suspected. Further, DHS Policy requires that Information Systems Security 

Officers review audit trail information weekly or in accordance with the system

security plan, and that audit trail information be retained for seven years. 

Audit trails help ensure individual accountability by providing the ability to 

track a user’s activities while accessing an automated system. However, to be 

effective, significant security events must be recorded and the audit trails must 

be reviewed and retained. According to the DHS Handbook, the review of audit 

trail information is essential because unauthorized access, modification, or

destruction of data may only be discovered through the review process. As a 

result of the lack of database auditing and adequate audit review and retention 

procedures, inappropriate access to sensitive data or malicious changes to

NEMIS may not be detected and investigated. 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 7 
IT Contingency Training and Testing Has Not Been Accomplished 

EP&R has established an IT contingency plan for NEMIS that outlines the 

procedures to recover the system following a disruption in services as a result of 

an emergency or a disaster. However, EP&R has not provided training to key 

personnel on its NEMIS IT contingency plan, and an annual test of the NEMIS 

IT contingency plan has not been conducted. According to the NEMIS 

Contingency Plan Coordinator, a scheduled tabletop exercise of the plan was 

delayed due to the resources needed to respond to the 2004 hurricane season. 

Further, we identified the following issues related to NEMIS data backup, 

restoration procedures, and environmental controls: 

• The backup tapes used for onsite and offsite storage of NEMIS data are 

not stored in fireproof and waterproof containers. 

• EP&R has not conducted a formal test of data backup and restoration 

procedures for NEMIS. 

• Cleaning supplies were stored in one of the server rooms housing 

NEMIS computer equipment, and another server room had regular 

carpeting installed, rather than anti-static carpet. 

According to NEMIS system administrators, some of the data backup and 

environmental control weaknesses have not been addressed due to the cost 

associated with procuring the proper equipment. Further, formal tests of the 

NEMIS data restoration procedures have not been performed because some data 

is occasionally restored for operational purposes, and the officials felt that this 

provided sufficient assurance that the procedures were adequate. 

According to DHS Policy and NIST guidelines, each element of an IT 

contingency plan must be tested annually to confirm the accuracy of individual 

recovery procedures and the overall effectiveness of the plan. DHS and NIST 

also require that all personnel involved in IT contingency planning efforts be 

identified and trained in the procedures and logistics of IT contingency planning 

and implementation. According to NIST, this training should be provided at 

least annually. Further, DHS requires that quarterly tests of data backup and 

restoration procedures be performed, and that adequate environmental controls 

be established for sensitive systems and data. 

IT contingency testing and training are essential to ensuring that contingency 

planning is successful. Testing enables deficiencies to be identified and 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 8 
addressed, and helps evaluate the ability of the recovery staff to implement the 

plan quickly and effectively. Formal tests of established data restoration 

procedures are an integral part of testing the overall contingency plan, and help 

ensure that all necessary data can be recovered in the event of a disaster. In 

addition, contingency plan personnel should be trained to execute their 

respective recovery procedures without the aid of the actual document, in the 

event that paper or electronic versions of the plan are unavailable for the first 

few hours after a disaster. As a result of the lack of IT contingency plan 

training and testing, including tests of the NEMIS data restoration process, 

EP&R lacks assurance that the component will be able to resume operations in a 

timely manner following a disaster. 

Recommendations 

To protect sensitive NEMIS data effectively, we recommend that the EP&R 

Under Secretary direct the CIO to: 

1. Ensure that adequate controls for granting, monitoring, and removing 

NEMIS user access are implemented according to DHS requirements as 

well as NIST guidelines. 

2. Develop and implement an IT contingency training and testing program

for NEMIS to ensure that key personnel are trained on the plan annually, 

and that an annual test of the NEMIS IT contingency plan is conducted. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

EP&R concurs with recommendation 1. EP&R plans to adopt additional 

measures to improve NEMIS user administration and access control, including 

------ ------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ ; 

staggered annual revalidation of all user accounts; and, an automated method to 

notify system administrators and information system security officers of 

individuals who no longer require access. In addition, EP&R plans to 

implement ------------------------------- on all NEMIS platforms, including ---

--------------------------------- ------------------------------------- --------------- 

However, the implementation of -------------------- is pending the completion of 

the NEMIS continuity of operations site, which is planned to become

operational by the end of fiscal year 2005. Further, EP&R plans to archive 

NEMIS audit logs for seven years, as required by DHS Policy. 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 9 
We accept EP&R’s response to implement additional NEMIS user 

administration and access controls, as well as -- -------------- -------

----- ----------------------------------------------. However, we maintain that EP&R 

should implement ------------------------------------------------ , and the component 

should establish a process to -------------- --------------------------------------- -----

---------------------------------------- -- ------------------------ -------------

-------------- . Also, EP&R should establish a timeline for the implementation of 

these additional NEMIS controls. 

EP&R concurs with recommendation 2. EP&R plans to establish a NEMIS 

continuity of operations site by the end of fiscal year 2005. As part of this 

process, EP&R will conduct IT contingency training for NEMIS personnel. In 

addition, EP&R plans to develop a standard tabletop exercise for testing IT 

contingency plans by October 2005. Further, EP&R has instituted --------

-------------- ------------------- backup capability for NEMIS, and has conducted 

data restoration tests using this functionality.7

We accept EP&R’s response to train NEMIS personnel on the system’s IT 

contingency plan as well as to conduct a tabletop test of the NEMIS IT 

contingency plan. Also, we accept EP&R’s response to test NEMIS data 

restoration procedures using ---------. However, EP&R did not indicate that 

annual IT contingency plan testing or training would be completed, or that 

quarterly data restoration tests would be performed. We maintain that EP&R 

should ensure that periodic contingency testing and training are conducted. 

NEMIS Servers Are Vulnerable 

EP&R has not established effective database security controls for NEMIS. To 

assess the security of NEMIS databases, we performed vulnerability assessment 

scans to identify configuration weaknesses and vulnerabilities on NEMIS 

servers; and, conducted manual checks of the security settings on the central 

NEMIS database server to identify additional configuration weaknesses as well 

as to verify the results of our vulnerability assessment scans. In assessing the 

effectiveness of database controls, we identified issues related to access rights 

and password administration, configuration management, --------- -------------

----------------- . These control weaknesses could provide an attacker with the 

ability to gain inappropriate access to NEMIS and its data. 

 

-

-- -- ----- ------- ----- - -------- - ----- - -- ------------- -- --- ------------

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 10 
Access Privileges Were Not Appropriately Restricted

EP&R did not enforce strong identification and authentication measures for 

NEMIS. Many of the servers we tested did not appropriately restrict access to 

the system. For example: 

• ------------------------------------ --------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------- ------

-------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------

------------------------------------------- ------------------------- -----------

------------------------ ---- -------------- -----------------------------------

----------------------------- -------------- ----------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------

• ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------- -------------------- - ---- --------

----------------------------- --- -

• ------------- ------------------------------------------- -----------------------

------ - ------------------------------------------------------------------------

------ - ------ ----- -----------------------------------------------------------------

----------- ---------------------------------------------------------------

• ------------------------------- ----- ----- ----------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

According to NEMIS officials, several of these access rights and password 

vulnerabilities are the result of weaknesses in the NEMIS Access Control 

System (NACS) application. EP&R is in the process of implementing an 

upgrade to the NACS application that will enforce stronger identification and 

 

-

--------------------------------- - -------- --------------- -------------- --- ----------- ---------------- -- --------------- ------------------

----- - ------------------- ----------------- ------------- - --------------- -

--- -- ------------------ ----- - ---- --------- --- ---- --- --- --- ----- --- ------ --- - --- --- ----- -- ------------ ------ ------- - -

----------- -----------------

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 11 
authentication controls for NEMIS. The implementation of the new system was 

scheduled for February 2005. 

Table 1 illustrates the number of access rights and password management

vulnerabilities that we identified for the NEMIS database servers and related 

hosts, along with the number of corrective actions that EP&R has planned or 

already taken to address these weaknesses. 

Table 1: Access Rights and Password Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

Number For Which

No Corrective Action 

Plan Was Provided 

--------------- ----- --

------------------- - --- 2 7 9

2 

(22%) 

1 

(11%) 

3 

(33%) 

6 

(67%) 

-----------------------

------ - 1 4 5

1 

(20%) 

1 

(20%) 

2 

(40%) 

3 

(60%) 

----------------

----------------------

-------------------

1 6 7

1 

(14%) 

2 

(29%) 

3 

(43%) 

4 

(57%) 

------------------- --

--------------------

------ -

1 4 5

1 

(20%) 

1 

(20%) 

2 

(40%) 

3 

(60%) 

--------------------

------------- 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A

---------- ------------

------ -- 2 9 11

1 

(9%) 

7 

(64%) 

8 

(73%) 

3 

(27%) 

---------- -----------

------------- 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A

---------- ------------

------ -- 3 9 12

2 

 (17%) 

7 

(58%) 

9 

(75%) 

3 

(25%) 

Total 10 39 49

8 

(16%) 

19 

(39%) 

27 

(55%) 

22 

(45%) 

(a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the NEMIS ---------- --- - ---- ---- Database Server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with EP&R personnel.

DHS Policy requires that its components ensure that user access is controlled 

and limited based on user identification and authentication mechanisms that 

support the minimum requirements of access control, least privilege, and

system integrity. Further, the DHS Handbook and secure baseline 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 12 
configuration guidelines provide specific requirements related to system

security settings, including ---------- -------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------- -- ---- - ---------------------------- ---- - --

------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------

Often, passwords are the first lines of defense against hackers or insiders who 

may be trying to obtain unauthorized access to a computer system. The use of 

weak password controls, combined with inappropriate account policy settings 

and access rights, might allow unauthorized internal users or external hackers to 

gain access to EP&R networks and systems. 

NEMIS Servers Are Not Configured Appropriately 

EP&R did not configure network services and security parameters to protect 

NEMIS data and files. For example: 

• --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------ --------------------------------

------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------- ------------- ----

• ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------

---------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------

--------------- --------

Table 2 illustrates the number of configuration management vulnerabilities that 

we identified for the NEMIS database servers and related hosts, along with the 

number of corrective actions that EP&R has planned or already taken to address 

these weaknesses. 

 

------ ---------------------- --- - ----- ----------- - ----- ------------ ------- ---------- - ---- - -- ------- -

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 13 
Table 2: Configuration Management Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

Number For Which

No Corrective Action 

Plan Was Provided 

--------------- ----- --

------------------- - -- 1 15 16 0

1 

(6%) 

1 

(6%) 

15 

(94%) 

-----------------------

------ -- 2 2 4

1 

(25%) 

1 

(25%) 

2 

(50%) 

2 

(50%) 

----------------

----------------------

-------------------

2 0 2

1 

(50%) 

0 

1 

(50%) 

1 

(50%) 

------------------- --

--------------------

------ -

1 1 2 0 0 0

2 

(100%) 

--------------------

------------- 0 2 2 0 0 0

2 

(100%)

---------- ------------

------ -- 1 5 6 0

1 

(17%) 

1 

(17%) 

5 

(83%) 

---------- -----------

-------------

 

0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A

---------- ------------

------ -- 1 5 6 0

1 

(17%) 

1 

(17%) 

5 

(83%) 

Total 8 30 38 

2 

(5%) 

4 

(11%) 

6 

(16%) 

32 

(84%) 

 (a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the NEMIS --------------- --------- Database Server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with EP&R personnel.

According to NEMIS officials, some of the configuration weaknesses noted 

above are required for the proper functioning of the system. Specifically, 

EP&R officials stated that ----- ---------------------------------- --------------

------------------------------------------------. However, we determined that it 

would be possible to allow ------------------------- without allowing -----

----------------------------------------------- ------------------------ ------ 

NEMIS Had Not Been -

EP&R had not ------------------------------------ ------------ . We examined each of 

the eight servers to determine if all of the appropriate -----------------------------

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 14 
--------------------- Also, we reviewed the master database server to determine if 

all of the appropriate ------------------ ---------------- . Although EP&R had 

--------------------------------------------------- each of the servers we tested, the 

component had not -------- -------------------------- --------------------------------

----------- Specifically, we identified --- ----------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------ ---

In addition, ----------------------------- ------------- ----------------------------

---------------------------------------------- ------------------- -------------------------

------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------

--------------------------------------------- ---------------------------- ----------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------

-------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------

------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------

----------------------------. EP&R officials stated that ---------------------------------

--------------- because they were planning to upgrade the NEMIS servers and 

transition to a new operating system, which occurred in February 2005. 

Table 3 illustrates the number of --------- ------------ vulnerabilities that we 

identified for the NEMIS database servers and related hosts, along with the 

number of corrective actions that EP&R has planned or already taken to address 

these weaknesses. 

Table 3: - Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

--------------- ----- ---

------------------- - -- 1 1 2

2 

(100%) 

0 

2 

(100%) 

(a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the NEMIS ------------------------- Database 

Server, and---------------------- weaknesses were only identified on this server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with EP&R personnel.

DHS Policy requires that IT security ---------------------- in accordance with 

configuration management plans or direction from higher authorities. 

According to --------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 15 
---------- is critical to the operational availability, confidentiality, and integrity 

of information technology systems. NIST recommends that organizations have 

an explicit and documented ------------------------------- policy as well as a 

systematic, accountable, and documented process for --------------------. 

Because EP&R officials have not -- -------------------------------- the master 

NEMIS database server, a malicious user could ---------------------------------

------------- ------------- ------------------------------------------ ---------- . In 

addition, critical vulnerabilities likely to exist in the system are not being 

addressed ---------------- ------------------------------------- 

NEMIS Data And Files Were Not - 

NEMIS was not configured to protect sensitive data and files through the use of 

------------ . Specifically: 

• -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------- ----------------------- ---- ---------------------------------

-------------- ----------------------------------------

• ----------------------------------------- --------------- -------- ------------

---------------------------------- --------------------------------- -------------------

• ------------------------------------------- ----------------------

EP&R officials stated that the implementation of some of the ------------

protections noted above was pending the completion of an upcoming operating 

system upgrade. The upgrade was scheduled to be completed in June 2005. 

Table 4 illustrates the number of ------------ vulnerabilities that we identified for 

the NEMIS database servers and related hosts, along with the number of 

corrective actions that EP&R has planned or already taken to address these 

weaknesses.

 

------ - -------------------------------------------- --- --------------- ------------------------------ --------------------- ------------

-------- ------- ---------- ----------- ---------------------- - -------- - ------------------------------------- ---- - -------------------

---- ------------- ---------- --- --------------------------- - ------------- --- ------------------------------------ ---------- ------------- ---- - --------------- ----- - ---------------- ---- ---------------

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 16 
Table 4: - Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of Vulnerabilities Identified Number That Have Been Addressed

Server High 

Risk 

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

Number For Which

No Corrective Action 

Plan Was Provided 

--------------- ----- --

------------------- - --- 1 3 4 0

2 

(50%) 

2 

(50%) 

2 

(50%) 

-----------------------

------ - 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A

----------------

----------------------

-------------------

1 1 2 0

2 

(100%) 

2 

(100%) 

0 

------------------- --

--------------------

------ --

1 1 2 0

2 

(100%) 

2 

(100%) 

0 

--------------------

------------- 1 0 1 0

1 

(100%) 

1 

(100%) 

0 

---------- ------------

------ -- 1 1 2 0

2 

(100%) 

2 

(100%) 

0 

---------- -----------

------------- 1 0 1 0

1 

(100%) 

1 

(100%) 

0 

---------- ------------

------ -- 1 1 2 0

2 

(100%) 

2 

(100%) 

0 

Total 7 7 14 0 

12 

(86%) 

12 

(86%) 

2 

(14%) 

(a) Manual security parameter tests were only conducted on the NEMIS ---------- --- - ---- ---- Database Server. 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with EP&R personnel.

According to the DHS Handbook, --------------- a reliable and achievable way to 

ensure confidentiality for sensitive data. DHS Policy requires that the 

department’s components identify IT systems transmitting sensitive information 

that may require protection, and develop ------------------- for their sensitive IT 

systems. In addition, NIST recommends that ---------------- tools be 

implemented to protect the integrity and confidentiality of critical data and 

software programs. As a result of these -------------------------------

------------------------------------------------- ------ - --------------------- --------------

--------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------

------

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 17 
Subsequent to the completion of our review, EP&R officials stated that they 

have taken or plan to take steps to address many of the access rights and 

password administration, configuration management, --------- ------ -----------

------------ weaknesses we identified. We did not verify that the problems have 

been resolved. EP&R did not provide a corrective action plan for the remaining 

vulnerabilities. 

Recommendations 

To protect sensitive NEMIS data, we recommend that the EP&R 

Under Secretary direct the CIO to: 

3. ----------------------------------------------------- ------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----- ------

4. Develop and implement corrective action plans to address all identified 

NEMIS vulnerabilities and configuration weaknesses to reduce the risk 

of system compromise or failure. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

EP&R concurs with recommendation 3. EP&R plans to ---------------------

-------------------------------------------------- ----------- However, certain database 

servers cannot be --------- due to the use of a commercial product -------------

------ ---------------------- -------------- ---- -------------------- . EP&R will need to 

engineer the software product out of NEMIS and replace it with another product 

prior to ----------------------------------- on these servers. Also, EP&R plans to 

establish a process to ----------------------------------------- for the NEMIS system. 

We accept EP&R’s response to ---------------------------------- --- , and to ---------

------------- ---------------------------- . EP&R should establish a process for 

------ -------------------------------------------- - in addition to a timeline for the 

implementation of these changes. 

EP&R concurs with recommendation 4. EP&R stated that the component has 

taken or plans to take action to address the vulnerabilities identified during the 

review. However, the remediation of some weaknesses is pending the 

completion of NEMIS system upgrades. In addition, EP&R is determining the 

feasibility of acquiring -------------------- -------------------- ------------------ . 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 18 
However, EP&R estimates that implementation will cost approximately $10,000 

per connected computer. 

We accept EP&R’s response to address the vulnerabilities identified during our 

review. In addition, we recommend that EP&R determine the feasibility of 

using the software-licensing contract under negotiation between DHS and 

--------. Once finalized, this contract is projected to reduce the cost of obtaining 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- , by 85 

percent. 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 19 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of this audit was to determine whether DHS has implemented 

adequate and effective controls over sensitive data contained in its mission 

critical databases. As part of our audit of DHS database security, we 

conducted reviews of critical databases at the following DHS components: 

• Emergency Preparedness and Response 

• United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

• United States Coast Guard 

• United States Secret Service 

For each of the databases included, we determined whether the component 

had implemented effective access controls, continuity of operations 

capabilities, and change management processes. Our focus was to test the 

implementation of secure configurations on the hosts controlling access to

sensitive DHS data. In addition, we obtained FISMA information required for 

our annual independent evaluation. 

To identify EP&R’s critical database systems, we analyzed the DHS 

Enterprise Architecture inventory of the Department’s IT assets as of 

October 2004. We supplemented this information with NIST SP 800-26 

Security Self-Assessments, where available. Based on our analysis, we 

selected NEMIS for inclusion in our review. 

We used two software tools to conduct internal security tests to evaluate the 

effectiveness of controls implemented for NEMIS: 

• Internet Security Systems (ISS) Internet Scanner 7.0 was used to 

detect and analyze vulnerabilities on DHS servers. NIST SP 800-42, 

Guideline on Network Security Testing, identifies ISS Internet Scanner 

as a common testing tool. 

• ISS Database Scanner 4.3 was used to analyze the configurations of 

the databases and DBMS’ selected for review. 

In addition, we performed extensive manual security parameter checks on the 

master NEMIS database server to confirm the results of our scans and identify 

any additional security weaknesses. Upon completion of the tests, we 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 20 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology

provided EP&R with technical reports detailing the specific vulnerabilities

detected on the NEMIS system and the actions needed for remediation. 

We conducted fieldwork at the EP&R Office of the CIO in Washington, DC; 

Mount Weather Facility in Bluemont, VA; regional offices in Atlanta, GA and 

Philadelphia, PA; and the OIG’s ATL. We conducted our audit between 

December 2004 and January 2005 under the authority of the Inspector General 

Act of 1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Major OIG contributors to the audit are identified in 

Appendix F. 

Our principal points of contact for the audit are Frank Deffer, Assistant 

Inspector General for Information Technology Audits, at (202) 254-4100; and 

Edward G. Coleman, Director, Information Security Audit Division at 

(202) 254-5444. 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 21 
Appendix B

Management’s Response

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 22 
Appendix B

Management’s Response

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 23 
Appendix B

Management’s Response

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 24 
Appendix B

Management’s Response

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Page 25 
Appendix B

Management’s Response

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 26 
Appendix B

Management’s Response

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Page 27 
Appendix C

Vulnerabilities Identified and Addressed

Number of

Vulnerabilities Identified

Number of Vulnerabilities 

That Have Been Addressed

Server 

High 

Risk

Medium 

Risk Total Corrected Planned Total 

Nu

A

Password and Access Rights 10 39 49

8 

(16%) 

19 

(39%) 

27 

(55%) 

Configuration Management 8 30 38

2 

(5%) 

4 

(11%) 

6 

(16%) 

-----------------------

1 1 2

2 

(100%) 

0 

2 

(100%) 

----------- 7 7 14 0

12 

(86%) 

12 

(86%) 

Total 26 77 103

12 

(12%) 

35 

(34%) 

47 

(46%) 

Source: OIG table based on the results of technical testing and interviews with EP&R personnel.

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 28 
Appendix D 

FISMA Metrics 

 

FISMA Requirements 

Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled FISMA, provides a comprehensive 

framework to ensure the effectiveness of security controls over information 

resources that support federal operations and assets.13 The agency’s security

program should provide security for the information as well as the systems 

that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided 

or managed by another agency, contractor, or other source. 

To comply with OMB’s FISMA reporting requirements, we evaluated the 

major applications selected for this audit to determine whether DHS continues 

to make progress in implementing its agency-wide information security 

program. We collected information related to certification and accreditation 

(C&A), system impact level determination, NIST SP 800-26 annual 

assessment, security control costs integrated into the life cycle of the system, 

assessment of E-authentication risks, specialized security training, and plan of 

action and milestones (POA&M).14 

Our evaluation of NEMIS shows that EP&R has not implemented certain 

security management practices into its information security program, as 

required by FISMA. 

13 The E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347), signed into law by the President on December 17, 2002, 

recognized the importance of information security to the economic and national security interests of the United States. 14 As required by: OMB M-04-04, E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, and NIST 800-63, Electronic 

Authentication Guideline.

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 29 
Appendix D 

FISMA Metrics 

Table 2: FISMA Compliance Metrics 

FISMA Reporting Requirements EP&R 

(NEMIS) Notes 

Does the major application have a complete 

and current C&A, including a risk assessment 

and security plan?

Yes 

The system has a current authority to operate,

and the C&A documentation includes a 

security plan and a risk assessment 

Has the major application’s impact level been 

determined according to Federal Information 

Processing Standard 199 criteria?

Yes 

The loss of confidentiality, availability or 

integrity of NEMIS would have an overall

high impact on EP&R’s mission. 

Does the major application have a complete 

and current NIST SP 800-26 annual 

assessment?

Yes A NEMIS assessment was completed on 

August 13, 2004. 

Does the assessment indicate that security

controls have been tested and evaluated in the

last year? No

The assessment indicated that security 

controls had been routinely tested. However, 

security controls had not been tested in over a 

year. 

Does the assessment indicate that a

contingency plan has been established and

tested?

No The assessment indicated that the IT

contingency plan had not been tested. 

Have security control costs been integrated

into the life cycle of the system? No

EP&R plans to incorporate security control 

costs into the life cycle for upcoming version 

releases. 

Has an assessment of E-Authentication risk

been performed for the major application? 

Yes 

The NEMIS applications that are publicly

accessible have been assessed for 

E-Authentication risk, though some

assessments were in draft at the time of our 

review. 

Have the system and database administrators 

obtained specialized security training? No

System and operations personnel were not

being provided specialized security training

due to funding limitations. 

Does the major application have any existing 

POA&Ms? Yes As of September 23, 2004, there were POA&Ms for five NEMIS weaknesses. 

Source: OIG table based on interviews with EP&R personnel and analysis of database documentation.

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 30 
Appendix E 

NEMIS Architecture 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 31 

------------- --------------------------------
Appendix F 

Major Contributors To This Report 

Information Security Audits Division

Edward G. Coleman, Director 

Patrick Nadon, Audit Manager 

Jason Bakelar, Audit Team Leader 

Chris Udoji, Auditor 

Pedro Calderon, Referencer 

Advanced Technology Division

Jim Lantzy, Director 

Michael Goodman, Security Engineer 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 32 
Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Emergency Preparedness and Response, Under Secretary 

Executive Secretary 

General Counsel 

Chief Information Officer 

Chief Information Security Officer 

Public Affairs 

Emergency Preparedness and Response, Chief Information Officer 

Emergency Preparedness and Response, Audit Liaison 

Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Director, Compliance and Oversight Program 

Chief Information Officer Audit Liaison 

Office of Security 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress

Appropriate Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

Security Weaknesses Increase Risks to Critical EP&R Database

Page 33 
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 

er.

Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov/oig.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of 

Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations – 

Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, DC 20528; fax 

the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or e-mail DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and call

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY