NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 10-3743

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TAMARA ANTHONY,

 Appellant

v.

DUFF & PHELPS CORPORATION; DUFF & PHELPS, LLC

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-03918)

District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 20, 2011

Before: HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges

and RESTANI * Judge.

(Filed: June 22, 2011)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

 *

The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States Court of International 

Trade, sitting by designation.
2

Tamara Anthony appeals the District Court’s summary judgment on her Title VII 

claim for national origin discrimination. We will affirm, essentially for the reasons stated 

by the District Court in its careful and thorough opinion.

I

Because we write for the parties, we recount only the essential facts, and we do so 

in the light most favorable to Anthony.

Anthony worked as a real estate analyst at Duff & Phelps, LLC from September 

2006 to June 2008. As a Russian emigrant, Anthony claimed that she was being singled 

out for unfair treatment by her co-workers and supervisors. Specifically, Anthony 

testified that one of her supervisors, Jay White, “constantly corrected” her pronunciation 

of English words and another supervisor, John Corbett, assigned her low-billable hour 

work “that nobody else seemed to want.” In contrast, Anthony claims her direct 

supervisor, Paul Sipala, was a “fair and reasonable supervisor” who exhibited no obvious 

bias against persons of Russian origin.

In the spring of 2008, “as a result of the general economic downturn,” Duff & 

Phelps, LLC “implemented Project Pearl, a nationwide reduction-in-force.” The 

company directed Ross Prindle, the national manager of the real estate group, to terminate 

one analyst position from the Philadelphia office. At the time, two real estate analysts 

worked in Philadelphia: Anthony and an American-born college graduate, Robert 
3

Wasenius. Prindle had not met either candidate. Accordingly, he relied on the company’s

“utilization data”—measuring employee productivity and efficiency—to determine which

employee to fire. The data showed that “between January 1, 2007 and March 31, 2008, 

[Anthony’s] overall utilization score was 10-15% lower per year than Wasenius’s score.”

Prindle contacted Corbett to determine whether the employees’ utilization scores 

“grossly mischaracterized the overall quality of their respective work performance.” 

Corbett was unaware, during his conversation with Prindle, that the company was 

planning to lay off workers. Believing that Prindle merely called to discuss the 

employees’ annual performance reviews, Corbett noted the analysts’ “good qualities and 

qualities that needed work.” Corbett made no mention of either candidate’s national 

origin. Following this conversation, Prindle selected Anthony for termination and she 

was officially notified of the company’s decision on June 9, 2008.

Two months later, Anthony filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District 

of Pennsylvania, alleging national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The District Court entered summary 

judgment against Anthony on August 12, 2010, holding that she could not make out a 

prima facie case of discrimination. This timely appeal followed.1

 1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

II

We review the District Court’s summary judgment de novo, and apply the same 

standard as the District Court. Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 

2010).

The District Court found no “causal nexus” between Anthony’s membership in a 

protected class and her termination. Anthony v. Duff & Phelps Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 83161, *18-19 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2010) (citing Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 

F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003)). The Court held that “it is counterintuitive to infer that 

[Prindle] discriminated [against Anthony]” based on her national origin, because there is 

no evidence that Prindle was aware of Anthony’s nationality at the time of her 

termination. Id. at *16 (quoting Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 

1996)).

Anthony argues that because Prindle’s decision was based, in large part, on her 

supervisors’ recommendations, a “causal nexus” exists between her supervisors’ antiRussian bias and Prindle’s ultimate determination. See Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 

F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir. 1988) (“it plainly is permissible for a jury to conclude that an 

evaluation at any level, if based on discrimination, influenced the decisionmaking 

process”).

The District Court rejected this argument, however, finding that Anthony failed to 

point to any evidence showing that her “supervisors (Corbett, Sipala, or White) . . . 
5

influenced Prindle’s decision based upon an anti-Russian bias.” Anthony, 2010 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 83161, at *17. Apart from Anthony’s allegations that Corbett assigned less 

desirable work to her than he did to her co-workers, no evidence in the record shows that 

Corbett was motivated by discriminatory animus, let alone that he allowed such animus to 

infect his recommendations to Prindle. Rather, Corbett testified that he did not 

recommend that Anthony be laid off, but rather spoke to Prindle about the employees’

2007 evaluations. In 2007, Anthony received an overall competency score of 

“proficient”—the second lowest possible rating.2

Nor is there evidence that White’s alleged bias against persons of Russian origin 

influenced Prindle’s decision to terminate Anthony. During his deposition, White 

claimed that Prindle never contacted him to discuss Anthony’s performance. 

Nevertheless, Anthony argues that a reasonable jury might find that White was part of the 

decision making process, because Prindle claimed to speak to multiple “individuals,” but 

only identified one person by name. We decline Anthony’s invitation to assume that one 

Like Anthony’s “utilization data,” this 

score reflected Sipala’s objective analysis of Anthony’s performance. Thus, no evidence 

in the record supports Anthony’s allegation that Corbett’s recommendation to Prindle was 

tainted by discriminatory animus.

 2Although Wasenius received an even lower score that year—“requires 

development”—Sipala explained that this score is given to all employees in their first 

year. In fact, Anthony received the same low rating during her first year at Duff & 

Phelps, LLC.
6

of the individuals with whom Prindle spoke was White. Such “unsupported assertions, 

speculation, and conclusory allegations are insufficient to withstand a motion for 

summary judgment.” Nelson v. DeVry, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38161, *27-28 (E.D. 

Pa. Apr. 23, 2009). Thus, we find no “causal link” between White’s alleged bias and 

Prindle’s decision to terminate Anthony.

As the District Court found, the record contains no evidence that Anthony’s 

termination was based on anything other than the “utilization data” and her overall 

competency score. Thus, the District Court did not err in holding that Anthony failed to 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, we will affirm the District 

Court’s summary judgment.3

 3 Because we hold that Anthony failed to make out a prima facie case of 

discrimination, we need not consider her assertion that the “economic” justification for 

her layoff was pretextual. Moreover, where a plaintiff fails to make out a prima facie 

case of discrimination under McDonnell-Douglas, “there is no basis to allow the plaintiff 

to proceed on a mixed motive theory.” Sulit v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Phil., 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 77699, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2009).