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70–663PDF 2011

THE INTERNATIONAL EXPLOITATION OF DRUG

WARS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 12, 2011

Serial No. 112–66

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

RON PAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

KAREN BASS, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Eduardo Garcia Valseca, kidnap victim ......................................................... 8

Mr. Douglas Farah, senior fellow, International Assessment and Strategy 

Center .................................................................................................................... 15

Mr. Eric Farnsworth, vice president, Council of the Americas ............................ 34

Andrew Selee, Ph.D., director, Mexico Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center ........ 40

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Eduardo Garcia Valseca: Prepared statement ............................................... 10

Mr. Douglas Farah: Prepared statement ............................................................... 19

Mr. Eric Farnsworth: Prepared statement ............................................................ 37

Andrew Selee, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 43

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Washington Post article entitled ‘‘For Kidnap Victim, Tranquility 

Taken,’’ by David Montgomery, dated August 12, 2009 ................................... 68

(1)

THE INTERNATIONAL EXPLOITATION OF 

DRUG WARS AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT 

IT 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is 

called to order. 

I am Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, and I will have a shortor a medium-sized opening statement, and opening statements 

from the other members who are here, including the ranking member Carnahan. We will then hear from our witnesses, and then we 

will proceed to have questions after the testimony of each witness. 

And I would ask—if indeed your testimony can be summarized, 

that would be nice. And then we would proceed to go into greater 

detail during the question and answer part of the hearing. 

Today I am reminded of a friend who is not with us. I am reminded of Constantine Menges, who worked with me in the White 

House and over the years warned us about many of the dangers 

that threatened the security of the United States of America, and 

the safety of our people. Constantine passed away, and we miss 

him very much. 

We invited his wife Nancy to testify today, because she picked up 

his work and his research, but she was unable to join us. 

Yesterday, of course, revealed something that Constantine 

Menges warned us about many years ago, and that was foreign involvement in Mexico, and in a way that did indeed threaten the security of our country and the safety of our people. Yesterday it was 

revealed that Federal agents had foiled a plot by Iranian officials 

who were seeking to recruit a Mexican drug cartel to kill Saudi 

Arabia’s Ambassador to the United States. 

The idea was to bomb a Washington restaurant, and not only 

would the Saudi Ambassador clearly have been killed, but there 

would have been many other victims as well. This case—and I 

quote,

‘‘This case illustrates that we live in a world where borders 

and boundaries are increasingly irrelevant, a world where indiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:01 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\101211\70663 HFA PsN: SHIRL
2

viduals from one country sought to conspire with a drug trafficking cartel in another country to assassinate a foreign official on United States soil.’’

And that was a quote from FBI Director Robert Mueller. 

This kind of linkage between foreign enemies and drug traffickers, as well as other domestic criminals, is not new. It has been 

growing for years, and nowhere is that more evident than in Mexico, right next door to the United States. And that is beginning to 

have a real and dangerous repercussion here in our own country. 

So today we look at the foreign elements that are engaged in Mexico and how that might affect not only the people there but also 

the safety and security of the United States. 

Jayne Garcia Valseca is an American citizen who, along with her 

husband Eduardo, was the victim of a brutal abduction in Mexico. 

She was released a few days—after a few days, but he was held 

for 7 long months during which he was tortured and he was shot. 

In 2008, he was recovered alive after the payment of a substantial 

sum, a substantial ransom. 

The likely perpetrators of this crime, which is not, again, just 

against this particular family, but is being experienced throughout 

Mexico and in other countries in Latin America, the perpetrators 

of this crime and the continuing crime against these other folks 

south of the border, were members of the Popular Revolutionary 

Army—that is the EPR—or one of its splinter groups. 

The EPR is a Marxist insurgency with ties to FARC—that is, the 

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—which is both tied to the 

drug trade and backed by anti-American regimes, especially that in 

Venezuela. 

So there is more at work south of our border than just crime for 

profit. There is an international threat to the stability and the safety of our entire hemisphere. There is also crime and terrorism, of 

course, being perpetrated for political motives, and those political 

motives are basically those people with an anti-American agenda. 

So we have both criminal elements mixing with political elements, and taking advantage of international borders in order to 

facilitate their crimes in another country. Yet, looking into the 

Valseca case, I found little cooperation between the Mexican and 

American law enforcement organizations. 

Yesterday we saw evidence that there was cooperation, at least 

when trying to save the life of a Saudi Ambassador. But what we 

need to ask ourselves is: Do we need to have that same sort of cooperation in breaking this threat and eliminating this threat to the 

hemisphere that I just described? which is the cooperation between 

criminal elements on a transnational basis. 

So, however, in the Valseca case, when we looked into it, even 

though we have spent billions of dollars to fight the drug cartels, 

which was supposedly aimed at establishing a level of cooperation 

between the Mexican Government and Mexican law enforcement, 

and law enforcement in the United States, we did not see the level 

of cooperation and we didn’t see the cooperation that should have 

been expected. And we will hear more about that later on in the 

testimony. 

The problem may or may not, however, be solely or even primarily with the Mexican Government. As recent hearings by—with 

3

other Foreign Affairs subcommittees, they have shown that the 

United States Government has a myopic focus on drug cartels, 

which has blinded us to larger, more strategic threats in Latin 

America, which may or may not be drug cartels, may be criminal 

cartels that are allied with various ‘‘revolutionary movements.’’

Well, that turmoil that these alliances have created, that turmoil 

is moving northward, and we need to understand that. 

And what happened yesterday should underscore that for all of 

us. Perhaps the exposure of the Iranian assassination plot by a 

DEA undercover agent posing as a drug cartel gangster will now 

alert us to the danger that we face, the same sort of kidnappings 

that the Valseca family has gone through, the hardship and actually in many cases the death of a loved one, in this case the torture 

of a loved one, and, of course, the taking of a large sum of money 

and destroying the financial ability of a family. That happened in 

Mexico. That could be happening here and will be happening here, 

and we will be anxious to hear from Eduardo about the details of 

that danger. 

Among these threats that we face are forces from outside Latin 

America, including Hezbollah, which is, of course, backed by Iran, 

and a growing Chinese influence working through left wing regimes that in turn use ‘‘revolutionary groups’’ to spread their own 

power and influence. 

Our first witness, Eduardo, who will put a human face to this 

growing danger will be with us. Then, our other witnesses will put 

Mr. Valseca’s experience into a larger strategic concept. 

Those witnesses are Douglas Farah, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, where he specializes in 

research, writing, and training on transnational criminal organizations and armed groups. He has spent most of his career covering 

conflicts around the world after graduating with honors from the 

University of Kansas with degrees in both Latin American studies 

and journalism. 

In 1985, he was named bureau chief for United Press International in El Salvador. And we seem to remember that El Salvador was quite a different place then than it is today, and hopefully it won’t go back to what it was then. 

Covering the civil war there, he distinguished himself, and he 

has also written for The Washington Post, the Boston Globe, the 

U.S. News & World Report, The Financial Times, Foreign Policy, 

and The Journal for International Security Affairs. He is author of 

‘‘Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror,’’ written in—published in 2004, and ‘‘Merchant of Death: Victor Blout 

and the New World Order,’’ published in 2007. 

Eric Farnsworth is the vice president of the Council of the Americas. He holds an MPA in international relations from Princeton’s 

Woodrow Wilson School. He has worked for the Department of 

State and in the White House Office of Special Envoy to the Americas from 1995 to ’98. Between his government service and his current position, he was the managing director of Manatt Jones Global 

Strategies LLC. 

Mr. Farnsworth has authored or co-authored articles in the 

American Interest, Americas Quarterly, Current History, the Journal of Democracy, and Latin American Policy. 

4

And, last, Dr. Andrew Selee is the director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, with 

a Ph.D. in policy studies from the University of Maryland, a master’s degree in Latin American studies from the University of California at San Diego. San Diego—that is good. There we go. We will 

talk about that later. [Laughter.] 

Maybe Eduardo can talk to us about the sun, surfing, and San 

Diego, but we will leave that for another occasion—in Latin American studies, and from Washington University in St. Louis. 

Before joining the Wilson Center, he was an adjunct professor at 

Johns Hopkins University from 2006 to the present, professional 

staff for the House of Representatives right here in 1999 and 2000. 

He is the author of ‘‘Shared Responsibility: U.S.-Mexico Policy Options for Confronting Organized Crime,’’ and he was co-editor of the 

Wilson Center for last year. 

So we have some very fine witnesses, and I would ask my ranking member if he would proceed with his opening statement. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief, but I 

want to thank you for putting this hearing together. We didn’t 

know just how timely this was going to be when this got started, 

but it certainly is. 

And to our witnesses, thank you for being here, sharing your experiences and your expertise with the committee. 

The international drug trade continues to plague countries 

throughout the world, but—and the U.S. is not immune from that. 

My home state of Missouri, right in the very heartland of the country, continues to be plagued by a multitude of problems associated 

with meth. It continues to be one of the hardest hit states in the 

country year after year. 

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center’s 2010 national drug threat assessment, methamphetamine availability in 

the U.S. is directly related to methamphetamine production trends 

in Mexico, which is the primary source of methamphetamine consumed in the U.S. 

There have been numerous reports of other types of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, imported from Latin America that are infiltrating our communities. Last year, Missouri saw an increase in reported deaths from highly potent, low cost forms of heroin. According to the NDIC’s 2011 report, increased Mexican heroin production, coupled with increased transportation of South American heroin, has likely contributed to increased heroin availability in some 

U.S. markets, including Missouri. 

We are faced with a difficult problem that clearly has the potential for getting even worse. Over the past several years, legislation 

has been enacted to address domestic production and consumption 

of meth and other drugs. However, we also need to ensure that we 

are addressing this problem from all angles. 

Congress has appropriated hundreds of millions of dollars to address drug-related problems in Mexico and throughout Latin America. We need to ensure these programs are operating efficiently and 

in our best interest here in the U.S. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses here today. Thank 

you, and I will yield back. 

5

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And we now have 

Judge Poe, who adds a great deal to this committee, because he 

was not only a Member of Congress, but also someone who is deeply involved with the criminal justice system at the very top level 

in terms of being a judge from Texas. So I am sure you have some 

insights for us, Your Honor. 

Judge POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The drug war is bloody, 

it is costly, and it is bloody and costly not only in Mexico but the 

United States as well. A thousand people die each month in drug 

dealing violence in Mexico. And the United States, I think because 

Mexico is our neighbor and our partner, we should be just as concerned about Mexican nationals being murdered as we are about 

Americans that may be murdered by the drug cartels. 

Meanwhile, the United States sends five times as many drug 

dealers to prison as it did 30 years ago, but the worst may be yet 

to come. Terrorists and drug cartels have a mutual enemy—the 

United States. Our police and our military do the best to stop the 

drug cartels from smuggling drugs into our country. I have been to 

the Texas-Mexico border many times, but the border still is an area 

that is poorest in certain places, and the drug cartels have their 

way at several places in between the legal ports of entry. 

They actually control the turf. The United States doesn’t control 

the area. Mexico doesn’t control the area, the drug cartels control 

the area, and we have to deal with the reality of this truth. We 

must continue our multi-agency effort to go after the terrorists, and 

everyone in the Treasury Department to the Department of Defense is involved in finding these folks, weeding them out, tracking 

them down, and bringing them to justice. 

The drug cartels, they are all in it for the money. They don’t 

have a political philosophy. They have a philosophy of greed, and 

they will do anything to make money. And it is not just in the drug 

trafficking—kidnappings, extortions, theft, anything that will bring 

money into their criminal enterprise they are willing to do, and 

they are willing to do so at any cost, including violence. 

A weak United States is great—a great area—turf, I should say, 

for the terrorists who plan and can carry out greater attacks if the 

United States wasn’t watching them. It is interesting that a scenario, say, in the group of worldwide terrorists joining the drug 

cartels is something that is not out of the question. And we have 

seen that yesterday. 

Yesterday’s scenario was somewhat different, because terrorists 

normally operate not from state sponsorship of terrorism but cells 

that are across borders. And yesterday, if the truth comes out that 

it was the Iranian Government that was behind the assassination 

of the Saudi Ambassador and killing Americans in the process, that 

puts a new light on terrorism. 

So we should deal with Iran, but we should also understand that 

the people involved in this assault, this attack on the Saudi Ambassador, on American soil, are willing to work with criminal enterprises—the drug cartels—who are glad to do anything for a buck. 

It is important that we understand deal with the reality of 

Ahmadinejad and his willingness to destroy the United States, 

Israel, the West, how his mischief is throughout the Middle East, 

6

and the fingers of Ahmadinejad are in much—are in many of the 

countries that are now having turmoil in the Middle East. 

Although Iran was unsuccessful at this time to create as I call 

an assault, an attack on the United States, thanks to the good 

work of law enforcement agents in the United States, and apparently in Mexico as well, that doesn’t mean they won’t try again. 

But the narco-terrorists’ proven ability to come across to the United 

States at will make them an attractive partner for Iranian Government terrorists. This is an example of how the drug cartels in the 

poorest border of the United States they cross daily are a threat 

to the United States. 

I personally think that we should specifically make the drug cartels of foreign terrorist organizations, specifically the Zetas, but we 

have to be realistic. We did, thanks to our law enforcement, were 

able to thwart this, but the will to commit crimes against the 

United States by terrorist states, such as Iran, working with the 

drug cartels, has not diminished. 

I think the Iranians are only going to continue to keep trying, 

especially if there is no consequences for a failed attempt on the 

United States. If this action by the terrorist from Tehran would 

have been successful, it would have been interesting to see what 

the United States would do. But this is still a serious threat, and 

it remains so, and should not be diminished because we were able 

to stop this attack on the United States. 

So we need to understand what resources the United States has 

that they are not using against their drug cartels. I think we ought 

to treat them in a more serious—more seriously than we really 

are—have been treating them for the last numerous years. 

And just a few weeks ago before this very subcommittee we 

heard testimony arguing that it is the drug cartels, and not Islamic 

terrorist groups, that are the number one threat to the United 

States. I repeat: It is the drug cartels, not Islamic terrorist groups, 

that are the number one threat to this nation. We must deal with 

that fact. 

It really doesn’t make a difference who is number one or number 

two. They are both bad, and they are a joint terrorist criminal enterprise that are willing to work together. They are the new axis 

powers of evil—the Iranian terrorists working with the drug cartels. And you gentlemen have the answers, and we are looking forward to hearing from you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Your Honor. 

And I understand Ms. Bass has no opening statement, or would 

you like to say——

Ms. BASS. Let me just very briefly——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Congresswoman Bass, you are welcome to 

take as much time as you would like. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, thank you. I will be very brief, because I am very 

interested in the witnesses. And, you know, as I think about what 

is going on right now in Mexico, and then, of course, spilling over 

into our borders, I recall the whole drug wars that were going on 

in the early ’80s in Colombia and in South America. 

And the level of violence that we are seeing in Mexico today just 

doesn’t seem to be compared to what happened before. And maybe 

you will address that. Maybe I just don’t recall, but this is just a 

7

level of violence to me that almost seems, you know, in comparison, 

and the viciousness in comparison to what we saw in Baghdad, you 

know, a couple of years ago. 

One thing, though, that I was not aware of that the chairman 

was speaking about is some of the political relationships. So I was 

not aware of that in terms of connections with the Chavez regime 

or other regimes in South America, and so perhaps you can talk 

about that. I do remember those relationships in South America. 

I don’t remember—I am not aware of those relationships in Mexico. 

So hopefully through your testimony you can address some of the 

comparisons with South America and also the political relationships. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. That was a very 

thoughtful opening statement. 

Just one note from the chairman. I grew up in Southern California, and which means that I have a very special place in my 

heart for Mexico. And I lived with a Mexican family for 3 months 

when I was younger. I spent a lot of time on the beach in Mexico 

and up in the hills drinking Muscao with the caballeros and all 

that goes along with the beach scene in California. 

And I will have to tell you that when I see the turmoil and the 

agony that is going on south of the border now it brings—and it 

should bring tears to the eyes of anyone who cares for these people. 

They are wonderful people. Mexican people have always been wonderful to my family and wonderful to all of the Americans that I 

know. 

And to see them going through the turmoil and the agony where 

tens of thousands of their people have been murdered—tens of 

thousands—there is a cloud of oppression over these people’s heads 

every minute of the day realizing that these gangsters and these 

monsters are around them, and that their family is in grave jeopardy. 

We need to make sure that we understand this isn’t just statistics, and it is not just the people of the United States, but it is 

those wonderful people in Mexico. But if we don’t do our best to 

help and solve that problem, it will impact on us, and the danger 

and the turmoil is heading in our direction. What happened yesterday, or what was exposed yesterday, with a plot by a foreign government, in this case the Iranians, to try to hire these gangsters 

from Mexico in order to commit a violent crime in the United 

States, this is just the tip of the iceberg. 

And our first witness today, Eduardo Garcia Valseca, will put a 

human face to the suffering that is going on and the personal suffering that it caused one family. But we have to multiply that by 

millions of families in Mexico who are so suffering and so much in 

danger and are crying out for us to join with them to solve this 

problem and eliminate the danger from their lives and also from 

our future, if that is the way it is. 

Eduardo, would you proceed and give us your story, and then I 

would like to ask Jayne, his wife, to join us during the question 

and answer session, if she has something to add to that testimony. 

Eduardo, you may proceed. 

8

STATEMENT OF MR. EDUARDO GARCIA VALSECA, KIDNAP 

VICTIM 

Mr. VALSECA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and honorable representatives. Thank you for inviting me to share my testimony at 

this very important and timely hearing. 

I am a Mexican citizen, now a resident of the United States of 

America. On June 13, 2007, my American wife and I were kidnapped from our ranch in central Mexico. My wife was released, 

but I was held for ransom for 71⁄2 months. I was held in a small 

box and tortured brutally, both physically and mentally, barely surviving the ordeal. 

My kidnappers, after beating me and even shooting me twice, 

sent photos to my wife to pressure her into paying a multi-million 

dollar ransom. This was an amount we didn’t have. My wife requested that the FBI assist in the investigation of our case, but the 

Mexican authorities denied that request. Although my wife and I 

have cooperated completely with the Mexican Federal authorities, 

there has never been a proper investigation. 

There have been thousands of kidnaps in Mexico in the past 5 

years. In many of these cases, arrests have been made, but not in 

our case. There are only two reasons why the current Mexican administration would turn a blind eye to our kidnappers—because 

they choose to continue their long-standing position of tolerance of 

criminal terrorist groups like this, or because they are members of 

the Mexican Federal police implicated in our kidnapping. 

According to the members of the Federal police, our kidnappers 

are members of the Mexican Revolutionary Army, terrorists with 

international ties. They have committed more than 200 

kidnappings in the past 20 years, raising millions and millions of 

dollars. In almost all of these cases, there has been absolutely impunity. 

Since the appearance of these armed revolutionary groups in 

Mexico, there has been a position of tolerance by the Mexican Government. Their acts of terror, attacks with explosives, kidnappings, 

have gone largely unpunished. It is also possible that the criminals 

who kidnapped me are somehow closely related to the Federal authorities. Police also mimic the MO of these revolutionaries knowing they will then go unpunished. 

My wife is not the only American to have been victimized by this 

group of terrorists. This group continues to kidnap, victimizing, 

even a former Mexican Senator and Presidential candidate. They 

currently have yet another victim. 

The Federal authorities told my wife the following, that this terrorist revolutionary army with international links numbering in 

the thousands, with cells in every state, they have attacked several 

Sears, Citibanks, Banamex locations, and Pemex pipelines with the 

use of explosives. 

This group has already infiltrated the Mexican political system 

with members holding political office in many states. They have 

ties to the Venezuela Government, former Cuban agents, former 

ETA members from Spain, who trained them in use of explosives. 

They have ties to criminal organizations in other Latin American 

countries. It is suspected that there are members who are American citizens. 

9

The members of these terrorist organizations have Marxist tendencies and are driven by an ideology with a hatred toward the 

United States and all capitalists. 

It should be noted that as soon as my wife and I went public 

with our story, the Mexican authorities denied any mention of the 

event. Having the world know that they have been tolerating acts 

of terror targeting Americans and American companies, among others, could have serious implications. 

After all that I have experienced and learned since my kidnapping, I beg that you increase the U.S. involvement in Mexico. The 

Mexican Government, military, and police are infected with corruption. Any official statistics of crime coming from Mexico are completely unreliable and manipulated. The vast majority of criminal 

acts, including kidnappings, are never even reported. 

Please investigate this armed revolutionary terrorist group with 

known international links before they have a chance to damage on 

a bigger scale. 

I am very sad to say that Mexico, your neighbor, and the country 

of my birth, has become an international criminal paradise. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Valseca follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you for your testimony, Eduardo. I am 

just—before we go to the other witnesses, let me just ask you, 

when you were kidnapped, how much did you weigh? And how 

much did you weigh after being kept in that box, that stone box? 

Mr. VALSECA. My regular weight, sir, is about 160 pounds, and 

when I came out of the box I was barely around 82, 83 pounds. And 

they destroyed my left leg, they shot me with a .45 pistol, and they 

made a huge damage into my liver that I am still suffering from 

it. They broke my ribs, they shot me also on the arm. They thought 

that I was lying. 

But the interesting thing about all of this, sir, is that the authorities in my country, they have absolutely no interest in investigating it. They only thing they asked me, the federal—the chief 

of the Federal police flew his private jet to Austin, Texas, to tell 

me to be quiet. That is all I have heard from them. 

They have never, including Senerro that was kidnapped, they 

have never asked me to talk to him or for him to talk to me. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, Eduardo, we will go into that during 

the question and answer period. But I thought it would be important for us all to understand, as we are talking about this ‘‘problem 

or challenge’’ that we face, we are talking about human beings who 

are suffering, our neighbors. We are talking about our next-door 

neighbors, and that is why we should look at the people of Mexico, 

our wonderful people who live next door, and they are going 

through agonies like this. 

And so behind the statistics, and behind the plans that our Government has, are some real-life suffering of human beings who deserve our attention. 

And we will go on now to our other witnesses. 

Mr. Farah? 

STATEMENT OF MR. DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, 

INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify today on this important topic. 

As the chairman noted, yesterday the Justice Department announced that it stopped the plot by the Iranian Government using 

special Quds force operatives to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador 

in the United States, and carry out other attacks on U.S. soil. 

I have been looking at this relationship between transnational 

organized crime and terrorist organizations for some time, and 

what makes this plot so different is the allegation that the Quds 

force operative was seeking to hire an assassin from the Zetas, the 

notorious Mexican drug trafficking organization, to carry out that 

hit. 

This is significant for many reasons. As my written testimony describes, there are multiple alliances forming across Latin America 

among transnational criminal organizations, drug trafficking structures, terrorist groups in criminalized states, that present a significant and perhaps unprecedented challenge to the U.S. national security from that region. 

The allegation that Iran, a criminalized state which sponsors 

Hezbollah, one of the world’s premier terrorist organizations, which 

is dealing with the Zetas, a non-state drug trafficking organization 

16

that controls key access points to cross the U.S. border regularly, 

is surely a perfect storm. 

This possibility—a hostile state using special forces and proxy 

agents to engage criminal organizations for operations inside the 

United States—has long been downplayed and sometimes ridiculed 

by policymakers, yet the signs of this type of gathering storm have 

been evident for some time, including possible collaboration on the 

transportation of WMD components. 

The choice of Mexico as the recruitment stage for these activities 

is no surprise, given its proximity to the United States and attention to other matters the government there is engaged in. Other 

designated terrorist organizations, such as the FARC in Colombia 

and its multiple front groups and allies, in outlined in my written 

testimony, and the Basque separatists, ETA organizations, and others, have also set up shop in Mexico. 

Among the cases that indicate the different threats that run 

through Mexico are those of Jameer Nasr, arrested in Tijuana, 

Mexico, in July 2010 and reportedly charged with setting up the 

Hezbollah network in Mexico, a concern later validated by the Tucson, Arizona police. 

In the case of Jamal Youssef, who according to a 2009 indictment 

in the U.S. Southern District of New York was a former Syrian 

military officer arrested in Honduras, seeking to sell weapons to 

the FARC, weapons he claimed that came from Hezbollah and were 

provided by a relative who was residing in Mexico. 

There is no evidence that I am aware of showing that the Mexican Government supports these activities of extra-regional actors 

or condones them. In the case of Mr. Nasr, the Mexican authorities 

had him under surveillance and arrested him, showing little tolerance for the establishment of this type of foreign terrorist entity on 

its soil. They also appear to have helped in yesterday’s case. 

Rather, the government struggles with a host of intractable problems, and these activities and alliances are largely under the radar 

and, given the scarce resources, not a priority. But Mexican 

DTOs—the drug trafficking organizations, both in the United 

States and Mexico, are often analyzed as entities operating only in 

Mexico or geographically contiguous regions that directly affect 

their specific cocaine-related endeavors. 

Yet these groups, particularly the Sinaloa cartel, are part of a 

large and expanding web of alliances that now have operational access to Mexico through the drug trafficking and other transnational 

criminal activities. It includes not only designated terrorist entities 

and drug trafficking organizations, but state actors including state 

sponsors of terrorism. 

Mexican drug trafficking organizations are key gatekeepers along 

an extensive network of highly adaptable criminal pipelines, both 

organizational and geographical in dimension. These pipelines ultimately breached the southern border of the United States thousands of times a day. 

The established presence of Hezbollah in Latin America, a designated terrorist entity that operates as a proxy for Iran, is an important factor and one that raises the possibility of an exchange of 

knowledge, technology, and lessons learned with the FARC as well 

as Mexican drug trafficking organizations. 

17

As the chairman noted, China’s growing presence, including control of four key ports in Mexico, through which extensive movement 

of precursor chemicals and significant money laundering operations 

occur, is another significant factor in the transnational criminal activity in Mexico. 

Mexico is a key part of China’s comprehensive strategy to expand 

its influence throughout Latin America and the western hemisphere, in direct challenge to America’s vital interest in long-held 

preeminence in the region. This strategy is already unfolding 

across a multi-dimensional framework in political, ideological, military, economic, and other realms. 

These relationships among criminalized states and non-state 

proxies have real and important consequences within and beyond 

drug trafficking. There is growing concern that Hezbollah is providing technology for the increasingly sophisticated narco tunnels 

now being found along the U.S.-Mexican border, which strongly resemble the types Hezbollah uses in Lebanon. 

Numerous former intelligence and law enforcement officials have 

publicly discussed the appearance in recent years of arrested gang 

members entering the United States with Farsi tattoos and other 

items that could indicate Hezbollah influence. Within this context, 

it is interesting to note Iran’s concerted effort to push into Mexico 

and solidify government-to-government ties and trade alliances. 

Since 2009, several senior level Iranian delegations have visited 

Mexico, the first such envoys since the Shah was overthrown in 

1979. The Iranian Ambassador in Mexico has taken an unusually 

activist role, including being the lead public Iranian voice in accusing the CIA of assassinating Neda, the pro-democracy activist 

gunned down by Iranian security forces during the anti-regime 

demonstrations. 

As a joint DHS-State Department symposium concluded recently, 

the confluence of illicit networks and corruption in an enabling environment can facilitate not only the movement of drugs, arms, stolen, and pirated goods, and traffic persons, but also the smuggling 

of terrorist weapons of mass destruction, WMD materials, and 

other dangerous weapons and technologies that threaten global security. 

The Mexican drug trafficking organizations are well-armed violent structures already at war with the state and are at the nexus 

of a variety of threats from facilitating the possible transport of 

WMD components to allies with terrorist groups and hostile nation 

states who wish to harm our homeland. The reason is obvious: If 

harming the United States is the ultimate goal, the positioning of 

hostile actors and structures as close as possible is imperative. 

While Mexican drug trafficking organizations pose a significant 

threat in and of themselves, they are part of a much broader network of entities that raise the threat level exponentially. 

In answer to Congresswoman Bass’ earlier comments—and it is 

in my written testimony—I think the clearest indication of the alliances that are developing there is this book Guerra Periferica y el 

Islam Revolucionario, Asymmetrical Warfare and Revolutionary 

Islam, which is a book written by a Spanish ideologue whose basic 

premise is that weapons of mass destruction are a viable, legitimate use against the United States to destroy the empire. 

18

This was adopted as official military doctrine by the Government 

of Venezuela after—with its close ties with Iran, and it has been 

published as a pocket-sized book for all of the officer’s corps to 

carry around with them, memorize, and study. It has also been 

transmitted to the Bolivian military. The Government of Ecuador 

has so far refused to do that. 

And the U.S. Government is now translating it. They were unaware of this book for a considerable period of time, and they are 

now I think aware of it. 

On the issue of violence, I think if you look at the period of 

Medellin——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I tell you what we will do. 

Mr. FARAH. I am sorry. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. During the question and answer period, we 

will have—go right ahead and finish that point. 

Mr. FARAH. I apologize. The homicide rate in Medellin during the 

worst of the time there—1988, ’89, ’90—was about 400 people per 

100,000. It has never reached that level in Mexico. I think Andrew 

may know better than me on that, but it has never reached that 

level. 

The average around the world is 10. The U.S. homicide rate is 

five per 100,000, and Canada is one per 100,000. So 400 is extraordinary. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Actually, you will find that as chairman I try 

to be as generous as I can with—we do have to move on, but I actually made a little statement, too, so thank you for letting me do 

that. 

Mr. Farnsworth, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC FARNSWORTH, VICE PRESIDENT, 

COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good 

morning to you and members of the subcommittee. It is a real 

privilege to have the opportunity to appear before you. 

Yesterday’s dramatic news notwithstanding, Latin America is a 

region transformed from Cold War days when politically motivated 

violence led to untold pain and suffering across the hemisphere. 

Out of that difficult period, however, came a hemispheric commitment to democracy, a commitment that was formalized exactly 10 

years ago last month with the signing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in Lima, Peru. 

The hemispheric commitment to democracy is a recognition that 

strong democracies with strong institutions provide the fairest 

means of governance. As a result, they offer the best inoculation to 

Latin American societies against the scourge of political violence, 

much of which flared in previous decades as a result of the perception that authoritarian political and economic systems were exploitative and unfair. 

At the same time, however, nations where democratic institutions and state control are weak or threatened can become incubators for criminal activities—and we have heard already about that 

this morning—creating permissive environments that can be exploited by those intent on pursuing extra legal activities. 

An example of such a scenario is the tri-border region of South 

America, a somewhat lawless region joining Argentina, Brazil, and 

Paraguay, that has been linked to fund raising for extra legal global actors, including Hezbollah. Criminal enterprises, primarily 

smuggling operations, provide ill-gotten gains that can then be 

used to fund terrorist activities abroad. 

Elsewhere in Latin America, the situation is less clear cut perhaps. For many years, the Government of Colombia, for example, 

exercised only cursory control, if any, over much of the country. 

The lack of state control was exploited by the FARC, the ELN, and 

other guerrilla movements, allowing them the freedom to build contacts with other extra-regional revolutionary groups, including 

Spain’s ETA, links with Cuban intelligence and others. 

As the Government of Colombia has effectively taken the fight to 

the guerrillas over the past decade, political violence has been dramatically reduced and the guerrillas have increasingly sought safe 

haven in neighboring countries. They have also turned to criminal 

enterprises, making common cause with drug traffickers as a 

means of survival. 

In the case of Colombia, links between the two came in later 

years as the political insurgency became effectively degraded by the 

Government of Colombia. There is no doubt that permissive environments can attract global mischief-makers and that the drug 

trade, by undermining the effectiveness of, and public confidence 

35

in, democratic institutions can lead to such permissive environments. 

Central America is perhaps the best example in this regard. The 

region has become one of the most dangerous on earth—according 

to a recent Senate report, more violent even than Mexico. After a 

generation of bipartisan efforts to midwife democracy to Central 

America—and, Mr. Chairman, you were a leading voice in that effort—the institutions of these mostly young, fragile democracies are 

being hollowed out, corrupted by the drug traffickers and their allies. 

Impunity is rampant, and the police and security forces in several countries have been penetrated by the drug gangs. Violence is 

a daily reality for far too many citizens of the Central American region. We should be working with these nations, with purpose and 

resolve, to ensure that the inclination to politically motivated violence does not arise. 

So, too, with Mexico. As in Central America, at this point we do 

not see a pattern of politically motivated violence engendered by 

the cartels. Rather, we see the cartels fighting each other and the 

Mexican security forces to maintain control over lucrative drug 

transit corridors into the United States. 

The cartels prefer either a weak state or a state that turns a 

blind eye to their activities. They do not appear to want to overthrow the state at this point, nor are they using violence to support 

one political party or political actor over another. 

Nonetheless, their activities are undermining the institutions of 

the state, both in Mexico and in neighboring countries, particularly 

Guatemala, which has become a safe cross-border sanctuary for 

Mexican drug cartels. As well, certain drug trafficking groups in 

Mexico, in particular the Zetas, have served as guns for hire with 

others involved in the drugs trade. 

And to the extent that they are now also willing to offer their 

services and firepower, not just to other drug traffickers but also 

to outside groups, including the al Quds force, as has been alleged, 

this would be a new development and a cause for concern. With 

this in mind, it is vital that we work in tandem with democratically 

elected leaders across the region to address these issues to help ensure that criminal activities do not blossom into a politically motivated effort. 

This includes, of course, an emphasis on vetting and 

professionalization of police and security forces and a focus on the 

entire administration of justice. I would argue, in fact, that such 

cooperation with Mexico was, in part, responsible for our success 

in taking down yesterday’s alleged plot. 

At the same time, of course, we can do a better job in this country to reduce the demand for drugs, which is driving much of the 

insecurity impacting the region. I would like to see a renewed public campaign, for example, including new media, which potentially 

would reach more of the target audience that defines drugs, much 

as the way diamonds, for example, have been defined out of Africa 

in the blood diamonds trade. I think there is no reason, for example, why we can’t link drugs to conflict and death in Mexico and 

Central America. 

36

We can also think creatively about ways to support our democratic allies in our common fight by considering the transfer of excess equipment, as appropriate, from the downsizing effort in Iraq 

that is now underway. In particular, mobility and communications 

equipment would be useful for a region with vast unpoliced and 

underresourced areas. 

At the same time, I believe we also must do a better job working 

to prevent the supply of firepower into the region. Otherwise, 

criminals will begin to—will continue to have access to such firepower that can challenge the ability of the state to control its own 

territory, which is one of the key indicators of a failing state and 

the means by which politically motivated ends can begin to take 

root. 

For the most part, drug traffickers and others involved in illegal 

activities prefer weak states which allow them to conduct their affair unmolested. They don’t seek to overthrow states. Nonetheless, 

by their destabilizing presence and ability to generate large sums 

of untraceable cash resources, they do have the potential of supporting such groups as in Colombia, to the extent such groups may 

seek to find common cause. 

And as we saw just yesterday, they also have the potential to be 

used as hired muscle by those with extra-regional connections. And 

in this regard, I believe the best antidote remains for cooperation 

with Latin America nations as they consolidate and build upon the 

democratic gains of the past. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for the opportunity 

to appear before you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farnsworth follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Selee. 

STATEMENT OF ANDREW SELEE, PH.D., DIRECTOR, MEXICO 

INSTITUTE, WOODROW WILSON CENTER 

Mr. SELEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the ranking 

member. Thanks for the opportunity to testify. 

I also want to recognize Chair Ros-Lehtinen of the committee, 

and the ranking member Berman, who have a great commitment 

to the relationship with Mexico and Latin America. The chairwoman is actually hosting a dinner on U.S.-Mexico relations tonight. 

And I especially want to acknowledge Eduardo Garcia Valseca 

and Jayne for their courage in coming here to testify. They have 

gone through, you know, one of the most horrible experiences that 

anyone could imagine, and to have the courage to come here—and 

they have also been in the news talking about this, trying to make 

people aware of what has gone on, and so that takes enormous, 

enormous courage. 

You know, this hearing couldn’t be more timely, given the events 

yesterday, what we found out yesterday, and I think it is important 

to know this is the first attempt we know of of trying to link terrorism and the cartels, the first we know of, and it failed. 

And I think there are two lessons here that are important to 

take away. One is that we need to be vigilant—the reason for this 

hearing—it is important to keep this on our radar screen. It is important for the U.S. and Mexican Governments to be talking about 

this, as we have been, and perhaps to put it up a notch in our conversations, our bilateral conversations. 

And, secondly, the cooperation worked in this case. This is a case 

where there was a common interest. The U.S. Government is monitoring terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, and Mexico is also monitoring 

it, because the Mexican economy—you know, not only are they trying to be good neighbors, but they are also concerned about what 

would happen if there ever were a terrorist attack from Mexico. 

Hugely in Mexico’s interest. 

The borders and boundaries are irrelevant, as the chairman said 

earlier, for crime. But states remain incredibly relevant, and cooperation among states, for trying to disrupt those criminal networks. And so to the extent that we can continue to work with our 

partners in the region, I think this is fundamental for trying to interrupt these criminal networks. 

Let me say that Mexico has seen a sharp rise in crime over the 

past 3 years. Some of this represents a rise in homicides because 

of seven criminal organizations that have been fighting with each 

other, often called ‘‘cartels.’’ They primarily get their income from 

illegal narcotics smuggling into the United States, but some of the 

rising crime is by other groups—kidnapping rings, smaller smuggling organizations, extortion gangs and local thugs, who proliferated in the environment of violence created by the large 

groups. 

And what we have seen is an increase in these smaller groups 

out there. Sometimes they are supported by the large cartels. It is 

their folks who are allowed to do this. And sometimes they are simVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:01 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\101211\70663 HFA PsN: SHIRL
41

ply freestanding folks who are taking advantage of the perceived 

climate of impunity. 

There is little, if any, real evidence yet of foreign influence in 

these criminal enterprises, large or small, except of course that the 

largest and best organized groups are transnational organizations 

and operate in multiple countries. Cocaine appears to represent 

about half of the illegal narcotics income of the large Mexican trafficking organizations, according to a recent Rand study. 

This means that these groups work closely with suppliers in Colombia, transshipment specialists in Central America, and of 

course U.S. gangs, mafia organizations, and other distributors who 

distribute the narcotics in the United States. And there are $6–$9 

billion in illegal drug sales, according to the Rand study, that come 

back from U.S. consumers of illegal narcotics back to Mexico every 

year. 

As they say, we have seen the enemy, and it is us in this case. I mean, this is $6–$9 billion a year. This is the Rand study. The 

U.S. Government manages slightly higher numbers, but this is 

based on a market study of the narcotics. 

There are also—and it is worth saying—Mexican-led immigrant 

smuggling rings that specialize in non-Mexicans. The Zetas have 

gotten into this business, Central Americans, Cubans, South Americans, Chinese, Iraqis, and others. And there is, of course, in addition to the smaller kidnapping rings that do most of the kidnapping, there is the group that Eduardo was talking about, which is 

an excision from the EPR, from the Popular Revolutionary Army, 

which has done a number of kidnappings and continues to operate 

with impunity in Mexico. 

This is a Mexican-run organization, but obviously they do have 

ties abroad, much as the smugglers. I mean, Mexican-run organizations, but with ties abroad. 

There is no evidence to date of operational ties between terrorist 

organizations, I say again, and the Mexican cartels or the Mexican 

turrett has been used successfully by terrorist organizations. However, we should be aware that in the underworld of illegal enterprises these groups may well be in contact with each other. It 

would be surprising if they weren’t. 

And if the U.S. and Mexican Governments, in fact, in monitoring 

these links—and it is probably one of the greatest unheralded successes of cooperation to date, and one we may want to consider upping a notch in terms of our cooperation. 

And let me finish by pointing to four challenges. They are developed more in the written remarks, but I just point them out very 

quickly. There are four things that we could be doing better in our 

relationship with Mexico to deal with organized crime. 

First is developing a strategic plan for intelligence sharing that 

goes after the most violent groups first, and that look at the kind 

of violence that particularly affects citizens like Eduardo and Jayne 

and others, and the kind of violence that specifically is affecting civilians. And there are certain kinds of violence that are worse than 

others. 

I mean, it is all bad, but there are certain things that really affect the life of people who are outside the business. And we can 

help the Mexican authorities do this, if the Mexican authorities are 

42

open to it, which I think they are. I think it is something that they 

want to be doing. 

Secondly, we can do a better job of mapping the trafficking organizations in the United States. We don’t really have a critical mapping on how they organize once they get across the border. They 

try to keep their heads down in the United States. They are much 

less violent on this side of the border, much, much less violent. So 

we could do a great—a much better job of that, and also following 

their money trail in the United States, again, the $6–$9 billion that 

flows southward to Mexico every year. 

Third, we could do much more to support reforms of the police, 

prosecutor, and courts. One of the things that would be particularly 

helpful, by the way, is—and we have put money in there, if I am 

not mistaken—is a police database that actually fingerprints, does 

retina scan—does fingerprint, voice recording, and retina scan of 

all police in the country. 

It is something that partially exists, but not completely, because 

that way when police do collaborate with organized crime groups 

the Mexican Government can identify them, which right now is 

very hard to do. They are working on it, but a lot more to do. There 

is a lot more we can do to protect journalists, civic leaders, and 

elected officials, who are standing up and being courageous and denouncing violence, and a lot more we can do to invest in communities that are under stress. 

And, finally—we can talk about this later if you’d like—there is 

a lot more we can do on this side in terms of curbing demand of 

narcotics, which is a long-term challenge. But we actually do know 

some of the things that work, and it would be good to actually be 

investing in some of the things that work to bring down demand. 

That is a domestic challenge for us as a country, and this is a public health challenge for us, but it would do a great deal to actually 

help our neighbors to the south as well. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Selee follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you all very much for your testimony today. And I will begin the question session here, and I 

would like to start out with Eduardo. Eduardo, you believe that 

your kidnappers were not just Mexican nationals from the city next 

door who have gotten out of hand. This isn’t a situation, as far as 

you’re concerned, with just domestic—you know, a domestic problem for Mexico. 

Why do you believe that there—was there some indication that 

you have that either while you were being held or in your investigation into the crime against you since then, that would lead you 

to believe that there was a foreign element involved in this other 

than Mexico? I would ask your wife Jayne to join us, please. 

Mr. VALSECA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I was held in 

that box, one day I got just overwhelmed with the abuse, and I told 

the guy who made me call him ‘‘el jefe’’ that to go ahead and kill 

me. And the first words that I can read on his lips, because he was 

very careful not to have a voice, so I wouldn’t recognize his voice, 

were English words. he said——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. English words. 

Mr. VALSECA. English words. That he got automatically, in the 

moment that I told him, ‘‘Go ahead and kill me,’’ he got very, very 

vicious and mean. And he went and grabbed a gun and he put a 

gun in my mouth, and he told me, not in loud words, but he called 

me son of a bitch and mother fucker and all kinds of things without 

speaking loud. 

When I came out, sir, and I had the opportunity to talk to Ron 

Lavender—this is an American who was kidnapped in Acapulco 

from the same group—I had—my wife and I had a chance to talk 

to him for about 21⁄2 hours privately. 

And he—I said to him that—explains what I am just sharing 

with you, and he said, ‘‘I am certain he is from California. He is 

from your state.’’ And he said, ‘‘I am certain that at least three or 

four members of this group, they speak perfect English from the 

east coast of United States.’’ So this is not something that was out 

of my imagination. It is something that I proved with another victim, and we are certain that they are English speaking. And so 

that is why we know that they are international groups. 

My wife just reminded me that one of the things, you know, that 

also tells you—Mexicans have a large lunch and a very light dinner. That is cultural. In the United States, it is the other way 

around. You have a very short—a very short time for lunch and 

then you have a large dinner when you get home. 

Well, the way they treat me was always a very small lunch in 

terms of the—it was just a salad, which in the Mexican diet people 

don’t eat salads, you know? So it was always a salad, and the dinner was always bigger portion. So that is very, very American. So 

those things, but the most important thing is Ron Lavender. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And, Jayne, if you could move your 

microphone up there. So you know that those—so those people who 

were involved in this kidnapping—and we are talking about—what 

level of kidnapping is taking place now? How many families are 

going through what you went through in Mexico? 

Ms. VALSECA. Well, it is important to understand that the EPR 

was sort of the parent group, if you will, and it has splintered 

50

through the years, over the past, say, 20 years. So now you have 

many different cells that share a similar ideology and way of working. But all of these cells, and specifically the one that had 

Eduardo, they demand multi-million dollar ransoms. They rarely 

accept less than $1 million. As a matter of fact, in many cases they 

have received $40-, $35-, $25 million in one ransom payment. 

They typically—this cell alone typically kidnaps two victims per 

year, and they hold them for a minimum of 6 months. One of the 

victims—as a matter of fact, the previous victim, the one before 

Eduardo was kidnapped, was held for almost 2 years. And they collected a multi-million dollar ransom. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And you are convinced that these are, number one, not Mexicans, or at least——

Ms. VALSECA. Not exclusively Mexicans. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. At least the leadership is not 

Mexican. And what makes you think that there is a connection of—

number one, these are—they may well be Americans, as you have 

just testified, or they—there was some indication that they may 

have been permitted to operate out of another country rather than 

the United States—Venezuela or Cuba or such? Do you have information about that? 

Ms. VALSECA. Yes. Well, that information came directly from the 

Federal authorities in Mexico, and was expressed to me in private 

meetings. And this goes all the way to Genaro Garcia Luna himself. They have probably regretted telling me those things at this 

point. They never imagined we would go public with our story. 

But what was expressed to me very clearly by all of these people 

was that this was a terrorist group with international links. And 

I asked which countries those links were to, and they didn’t mention them all, but they did say that there were suspected former 

Cuban agents, links to the Venezuelan Government, links to the 

FARC, links to the United States’ members that were suspected to 

be from the United States, and it went on from there. 

ETA from Spain, they—and I asked why that would be, and they 

said that they were members of ETA who had taken refuge in Mexico, hiding, and that they had joined forces with this group and others like them and shared their information on how to build explosives, among other things. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am going to let Mr. Carnahan have his 

shot, and then we are going to do a second round as well after 

Judge Poe also has his shot. But let me just note, what we are 

talking about here now is there are criminals in every country, 

which we know, and there are criminal networks in every country, 

but we now know that the drug cartel networks have been with 

this $6–$9 billion that we send—are sending the criminal elements 

in Mexico every year with our purchases of drugs, that we do know 

that there are—that criminal web, you might say, or organization 

exists. 

We also know that there are terrorists who are ideologically driven to hate the West, and especially hate the United States and 

hate our way of life. And so what we have are two elements now 

that we seem to be seeing as being in some way intertwined in 

their activity to be mutually reinforcing. Let us just note where the 

51

international or the foreign government connection comes into is 

this and should not be missed. 

The terrorist element that now is intertwined with criminal networks, those terrorists have been given—from day one have been 

given support from governments that find them—that are headed 

by people who share their hatred of the West, and of the United 

States. 

So if you have a government that hates the United States, it 

would not be any way inconsistent for the heads of that government to permit terrorists and actually provide terrorists with not 

only a safe haven but a means of support, a place to come and a 

safe haven, and there is indication, as we know—and I will ask the 

witnesses to comment on this after—on the second round—that terrorists have been given safe haven, and criminals have been given 

safe haven, in Venezuela. And we know that. 

There is—and our witnesses may want to comment on that. And 

if these same terrorists are tied into an international criminal ring, 

there is where you have this connection, and it is very consistent. 

We had in Cuba for years—certain criminals were permitted to 

escape from the United States and given safe haven in Cuba. And 

I remember there was a fellow from the United States who actually 

was a guy who bilked a lot of people out of his money, he ended 

up in Cuba for 20 years. And his name will come to me by the end 

of this hearing—Robert Vesco, there you go. 

So here you had Robert Vesco, a recognized international criminal, who was given safe haven in Cuba, very openly over those—

well, how about all of the other criminals that we don’t know their 

name? Robert Vesco comes to mind, but what about all of those 

people at the next level who make their money by kidnapping people? 

And maybe Robert Vesco stole about a couple hundred million 

dollars. He is at—maybe we know about him, but what do we—if 

they are willing to take the Robert Vescos in, who spent, I might 

add, an enormous amount of time while in Cuba becoming an inbetween to the drug cartels and various networks, what about the 

other people there? Are the Robert Vescos involved? Are they the 

English speakers that Eduardo is talking about who threw him 

into a tiny box and almost destroyed his life? And who would do 

him harming now if they could get to him? 

So we have this—what I guess we call—we have the evil—axis 

of evil as the Judge—maybe we should call it the evil web or the 

evil network that now is operating in our hemisphere, as close to 

us as Mexico. And if we don’t do anything about this, we can—I 

am—let me just note, there is no doubt that it will start spreading 

across the border. 

And what happened yesterday indicates that the type of violence 

that we have been predicting would spread across our border is on 

the way, and we need to go and start focusing on this and doing 

something about it before it starts doing something about us as individuals. 

Mr. Carnahan, you may proceed, and you have got as much time 

as you would like. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you 

again. I am not going to be able to stay for the second round, so 

52

I am going to try to get in three areas to cover. First, for the 

Valsecas, thank you for being here and sharing your incredible 

story and for being forthright. I think it is really helpful. 

You mentioned talking to another victim and some of the similar 

patterns. Have you, or do you know of anyone else who has really 

analyzed these kidnappers for—is there a similar pattern there in 

terms of what they do, how they do it, that could be helpful in really targeting how we deal with that? 

Ms. VALSECA. I have a copy of a PowerPoint presentation that 

was shown to me within days of Eduardo’s kidnapping. It was 

shown to me by Mexican Federal authorities, and I do have a copy 

of that, and I could provide it to American authorities, whoever 

needs to see that. And it has names, pictures, an outline of all 

the—of all of the documented previous victims, not—it doesn’t include all of them, because so many of those people many years ago 

didn’t even report these cases to the authorities. But I can provide 

all of that, yes. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. If you could——

Ms. VALSECA. And there is a very, very well documented MO. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. If you could—if you want to provide 

that to the committee, I think that would be a great addition to the 

record for this hearing. Thank you. 

Secondly, we have a very active group back home where I am 

from. It is the St. Louis Interfaith Community on Latin America. 

They have been—they had submitted a question for the hearing 

today about the Merida Initiative and wondering what is the return on that U.S. investment, given the rise in violence, the increase in cartels, the continuing drug trafficking problems? I would 

ask the other three witnesses to just give me their quick take on 

that. Mr. Farah? 

Mr. FARAH. Thank you. I think the Merida Initiative is badly 

needed. I think—I don’t deal so much directly with Mexico, as Andrew and others do. I think the biggest failing, in my mind, is the 

incredible lack of resources allocated to Central America, which is 

allowing the entire back door of Mexico to stay open. 

When you look at the territorial control of the Zetas in Guatemala, more than 40 percent of the Guatemala national territory is 

now under Zeta control. Sinaloa cartel’s deep roots in Honduras, 

the ongoing struggle and the money laundering activities in El Salvador, they are facing, as you squeeze Mexico a little bit on our 

side, the rest of the stuff is just flooding into Central America. 

So I would say in the Merida Initiative the biggest weakness to 

me, outside of what specifically goes to Mexico, is the non-factoring 

in of the balloon effect, which we know so well, and this stuff rolling south in ways that are utterly, utterly destroying Central 

America, in ways that are very hard to describe. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. Mr. Farnsworth? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Thank you, sir. No, I completely agree. I think 

Merida Initiative is a good initiative. It is solid. If anything, it was 

conceived to be a national initiative for Mexico instead of the regional initiative that Doug is talking about. Central America has 

been added to that secondly, but probably should have been part 

of the initial package that may have also needed to include some 

of the Andean region as well. 

53

The second thing is there have been reports that some of the assistance promised under Merida have been delayed in arriving, 

whether it is equipment or other things. But I think the successes 

are real in that intelligence cooperation has dramatically improved, 

training has occurred, for the Mexican authorities, necessary and 

important work. And I think we saw, again, some of the results of 

that yesterday, fortunately. That is not to say that it is a perfect 

program. It is not. But I think it is a very timely and important 

initiative. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Okay. Dr. Selee? 

Mr. SELEE. Always good to hear from old friends in St. Louis. Actually, I know some of the people involved there. It is—I would 

agree with what they have both said, which is I think Merida has 

been very, very important in stimulating particularly bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico. 

It has been absolutely fundamental in getting us to share intelligence, getting us to talk about shared responsibility for the first 

time seriously and consistently, and to recognize that this is as 

much our issue as Mexico’s. And this is our money. It is their weak 

rule of law, right? I mean, this is really a coming together of our 

appetite for illegal narcotics with Mexico’s really weak institutions. 

Merida is really just starting to flow. I mean, the money is really 

just starting to flow. The most important part of Merida, as far as 

I am concerned, is whatever we can do—in terms of the funding 

part of it, what we can do to help Mexico build their institutions 

for the long term, the court systems, and they have some really 

good court reforms going on. 

But we need to nurture those, together with the Mexican Government, and we can’t do it. We can help the Mexican Government do 

it, help some of the Mexican states, police reform, prosecutorial reform, creation of intelligence databases, like the one on the police. 

I think those are critical, building the institutional structure in 

Mexico. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. And my third area I wanted to follow up with 

you, Dr. Selee, the fourth item of your challenges, you mentioned 

curbing demand of narcotics in the U.S. I mean, that number, that 

$6–$9 billion number is really staggering. Can you address some 

of those initiatives? Has anyone done—who do you think has done 

the best work in terms of evaluating and focusing on what that 

should look like? 

Mr. SELEE. Some of the people worth looking at—the people that 

were involved in the study, Peter Reuter, Jon Caulkins, Mark 

Kleiman, who was not involved int eh study, but Mark Kleiman 

has done some very good work, and he is the——

Mr. CARNAHAN. You are talking about the Rand study. 

Mr. SELEE. The Rand study, yes, exactly. Kleiman wasn’t—Reuter and Caulkins were involved in the Rand study, with a couple 

of other folks. I don’t Kleiman was. But they have all done similar 

work together on looking at what is effective in terms of drug policy. And I think recognizing—I mean, realistically, we are not going 

to get rid of drug addiction in this country. 

I mean, unfortunately, it is—there are some real limits to this. 

But in terms of what drives the drug trade in Latin America, and 

in Mexico, and drives the violence, and in terms of the worst health 

54

issues in the United States, there is a set of chronic users of hard 

drugs who spend—who are actually most of that $6–$9 billion. 

We are talking about half of the profits of the Mexican cartels 

are probably cocaine, from what they have discovered from the 

Rand study. About 20 or 25 percent is marijuana, and 25–30 percent is methamphetamines and heroin. 

Of the hard drugs, the sort of shorthand that they tend to use 

is that 80 percent of the profits are generated by 20 percent of the 

users. You know, you have to look at some of the more—I am not 

a drug policy specialist, so I can’t, you know, guarantee that is exactly right. But it is sort of a shorthand there. 

I mean, we are talking about 20 percent of the people who use 

hard drugs drive most of this trade. Most of these folks are in the 

criminal justice system. And so there is some thinking of things 

like Project Hope in Hawaii, which takes people who are already 

in the criminal justice system—I am sure the Judge and Congressman Poe knows this well—it takes people who are already under 

judicial supervision and gives them incentives to stay off narcotics. 

Instead of sort of sending them back to jail, it does sort of shortterm—you know, immediate short-term reactions if they aren’t 

clean. And those kind of things give people an ability to get off 

drugs. About 90 percent of the people who actually get off drugs 

don’t go through rehabilitation. People who are addicts actually get 

clean on their own. And so creating incentives in the criminal justice system for people who have been hooked for a while doesn’t always work, but it has a much higher success rate than other things 

we have done. 

And there are things in prevention we can do as well. Montana 

has done some things on meth prevention that seem to be fairly 

successful. So there are models out there. It is worth looking at 

them. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Carnahan. Let us 

just note that it may or may not have been the drug cartels that 

kidnapped Eduardo. They may well have had nothing to do with 

narcotics or——

Mr. CARNAHAN. I think they didn’t, right? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. So it is a—what you are talking about, 

it is all interrelated, but even if we eliminated that there might be 

an increase in kidnapping, because these are evil—there are evil 

people in the world, and what we are talking about today are evil 

human beings and how they use their activity. 

And one guy who has dealt with evil human beings all of his 

life—[laughter]—trying to thwart them is the good judge from 

Texas. Judge Poe, you may proceed. 

Judge POE. That is right, Mr. Chairman. I feel like Luke 

Skywalker sometimes fighting the forces of evil. But thank you for 

being here. 

Eduardo, you are a man to be admired. I have here the Washington Post article and your photograph and how you suffered 

through this. You are a remarkable man, and you have married, 

obviously, a remarkable woman. And I thank you both for coming 

forward and talking about this dastardly deed. 

55

Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to submit the 

Washington Post article of August 2009 into the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Without objection. 

Judge POE. I want to just ask you all a few questions. This happened in Mexico. Is the same group operating in the United States 

and kidnapping in the United States and taking folks to Mexico? 

Jayne? 

Ms. VALSECA. I don’t have any information in that regard. I don’t 

think so, although, of course, it can’t be disregarded that it is suspected that there are American members of this group. But it also 

is worth noting that in the case of the former Mexican senator and 

Presidential candidate Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, it is a perfect 

match as far as the MO goes. 

It is highly suspected, even at the highest level in the Mexican 

national authorities, that this was committed yet again by the 

same group that had Eduardo. And in a communication to the 

press, following his release after the kidnapping, they have now 

started calling themselves the Network for Global Transformation. 

Judge POE. There are anecdotal instances that I have heard from 

local sheriffs on the Texas border of Mexican nationals living in the 

United States being kidnapped and taken back to Mexico for ransom. And then, of course, extortion rings, the same thing—Mexican 

nationals or Americans of Hispanic descent in the U.S. being extorted for money with the—if they don’t pay, then they—some relative in Mexico is going to be harmed. 

I am starting to hear sporadic comments by local law enforcement that that is occurring. Like all crimes like this, people who 

are threatened and the victims do not cooperate with law—they 

don’t want to report it, because they are afraid of their own lives. 

I will talk about the ultimate result of all of this is that drugs 

come to the United States. The United States has a demand. I 

think there was a study yesterday that said that 9 percent of 

Americans are chemically dependent, so much so that they are not 

hirable, they can’t get a job because they are chemically dependent. 

If that is true, 10 percent of the United States is dependent on 

some chemical, and makes them non-productive, that is a tragedy. 

On the long range, we, as a society, must make a social change 

about our addiction to chemicals, whatever they are, because there 

is a demand, so there is a source. 

Let me ask this question, Mr. Farnsworth. Do you think, just 

kind of yes or no, should we look to the drug cartels, like the Zetas, 

and label them a foreign terrorist organization? And then deal with 

them that way with more laws that we have that are available, or 

should we just not do that yet? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. I would say not yet. I would like to see more 

evidence that they are actually linked up. What happened yesterday is not an encouraging sign in that regard. So, but as of now, 

I think that they remain guns for hire, without much of a political 

agenda. And I agree with your earlier comments that they are really in it for the money, and whether that is kidnapping, people trafficking, drug trafficking, other bad things, they are doing it primarily for the money, not for political change, as far as I see them. 

Judge POE. The situation with the Iranian Government operative, that is my opinion, and the Zeta cartel, which they—obviously 

56

was not, thank goodness. Is that a link—foreign terrorist organizations, whether it is Hezbollah or whoever, working through Mexican drug cartels to do harm in the United States, is that something 

that we are going to see, or we have been seeing more of? This is 

just one incident that was captured? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. It is certainly something that we have to 

watch very, very closely. I completely agree with that. And I guess 

it is too early to know if this is a one-off or if it is a pattern. 

Judge POE. One other thing since my time has expired. When I 

was in Colombia, it was interesting that the Colombians blame a 

lot of their problems not on the United States but on Mexico, and 

the Mexican lack of law enforcement. The Mexican drug cartels are 

now going to Colombia, and they are competitors with the local 

drug dealers. They had some pretty harsh words for the nation of 

Mexico. 

Last question, and I am going to ask you questions later at another subcommittee, Mr. Farah, so—just so you know, because I 

value your expertise. Give me a—when we talk about Mexico, what 

is the state of the state of Mexico? We hear everything that it is 

a failed state to ‘‘Ah, it is a tourist’s paradise.’’ You know, we hear 

all of that in between. What is your opinion, Mr. Farnsworth? I am 

going to ask you, Doctor. 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Well, thank you, sir. I think the state of Mexico is a democracy that remains in transition. It certainly has some 

problems, and the drug issues I would put front and center. But 

it is a healthy democracy. It is a country with economic growth 

that is creating jobs, so I wouldn’t agree with either extreme, that 

it is a paradise for tourists or that it is a failed state. I would say 

that the truth lies in between, and I would say that it is evolving. 

The government I think is doing relatively well under some very, 

very difficult circumstances, not to say, again, that the government 

is perfect or has done everything perfectly right. But I do think 

that under some very trying circumstances they have done relatively well. 

I do think, however, that this new element that was introduced 

yesterday is potentially worrisome, and that would change the dynamic somewhat to certainly if this were proven to be more than 

just a one-time occurrence, and I think that is something that we 

have to watch very closely. 

Judge POE. Just to follow up before I let Dr. Selee answer this 

question, do you agree or is your opinion that the Mexican Government helped cooperate, to some extent, in thwarting this plot? Mr. 

Farnsworth? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Yes, I do. 

Judge POE. Okay. 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Yes. 

Mr. SELEE. You know, I actually agree with what Mr. 

Farnsworth says. I mean, I think Mexico is a country that has gone 

through a democratic transition over the past 10 years, 10, 12 

years. It is trying to build a rule of law. It is hard to do when you 

have organized crime groups with billions of dollars at their disposal, trying to subvert that. 

And I think this is, you know, where Mexico is today, trying to 

become a modern, successful, prosperous democracy. In some ways 

57

it is moving ahead as we become more of a middle class society 

than it ever has, which is good. There is some growth there. It has 

become a manufacturing economy. There are some things—the Supreme Court has become relevant. I mean, there are some good 

things you can talk about, but at the same time, when you get 

down to the local level, there is a real attempt to subvert rule of 

law. And it is hard in places where organized crime wants to operate to get around that. 

If you look at the overall crime rate, you know, Mexico has much 

less—has a much lower homicide rate than Brazil does, much lower 

than Colombia does, about half of Brazil actually, maybe a little 

bit—maybe it is not quite that anymore, but it is at least—it is 

not—Brazil not double, at least it is very close to that, one and a 

half times higher homicide rate. We don’t think of Brazil as a failed 

state. 

That said, if you go to Acapulco, Ciudad Juarez, Monterrey, right 

now, which are all major cities in Mexico—Acapulco, a tourist destination; Monterrey, the industrial capital of Mexico; Ciudad 

Juarez, a major city on the border—the homicide rate is incredibly 

high, right? And it has been very hard to control this. 

There have been some successes. Tijuana, nearby San Diego, is 

actually doing better than it has done in years. They were able to 

get the organized crime rings under control, so there are some successes here. Juarez has actually gotten marginally better as well. 

I mean, at least homicides are down. It is less open. It is less in 

the street. Individual civilians seem less at risk than they were a 

couple of years ago, though it is still bad. 

But there are some places that are still, you know, among the 

worst in the world, and that is—that tells you there is an inability 

to completely enforce the rule of law in a way that citizens expect. 

Judge POE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will give the other two witnesses a chance 

to answer that last question, Mr. Farah, and then Eduardo. 

Mr. FARAH. Well, I think that Mexico is exactly in transition. I 

think that you see these huge spikes in specific areas, because I 

think what we often don’t understand is how important geographic 

control is to narcotics trafficking organizations or transnational organized crime. They need specific roots and specific places in order 

to move their product. 

And one of the things I think that I have been looking at a lot 

in my research, both for the U.S. Government and privately, is that 

what you are seeing increasingly—and the Zetas I think are a perfect example of this—is more and more you see the same—or different criminal organizations and terrorist organizations using the 

same pipelines to move products. 

If you want to move 30 illegal Chinese across Venezuela into 

Mexico, or 30 AK–47s or 30 kilos of cocaine, you pass the same 

checkpoints, the same choke points along the way. So you are operating with the same small group of people who control that 

transnational pipeline. 

And I would also like to say just briefly on the kidnapping 

issue—you know this well—if you look at what happened right 

after the Central American wars, what did both the unrepentant, 

58

unregenerate far right and the Communist Party and other groups 

do immediately? They went into kidnapping. 

They would train in kidnapping. They went to the ETA for training, as these groups have done. And the premier group for sponsoring this type of kidnapping now across the region are all tied 

to the FARC, and I think that that is one of the incredible misunderstandings or lack of understandings we have about the FARC 

is the Colombian Government has done better in pushing them to 

the margins of Colombian political life. 

They retain an incredibly vibrant transnational organization and 

front group structure. It goes to Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, many 

other places, and those groups are trained specifically in how to 

kidnap, how to negotiate, and how to raise—and this group that 

you are talking about, the global transformation, directly tied to 

the FARC. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you are suggesting that this kidnapping 

cartel, for lack of a better description, is not tied to the drug cartel 

in the sense that they may have different roots. 

And, in fact, when you think about it, it is a totally different type 

of a criminal activity in the same way that there is a different profession in the legal professions, too, where you have to have different expertise to kidnap people and to extort money from their 

family as compared to transporting drugs and selling it and then 

getting the money laundered. 

Mr. FARAH. It is a specialization, without a doubt. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is a specialization. 

Mr. FARAH. And the FARC, and particularly the Communist 

Party, the remnants of the Communist Party in El Salvador, remnants of the Sandinista government, or what was the hardline Sandinista that never demobilized, as well as factors on the far right 

that maintain exactly the same structures they did during the war, 

are masters at that. And I think it—the effects are being felt across 

Latin America in ways that we often find incomprehensible, but 

they are not that hard to understand. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, that is fascinating. And, Eduardo, did 

you have a comment for Judge Poe’s last question? 

Mr. VALSECA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to share 

that the comment about Tijuana is doing better was a very good 

article just 2 or 3 days ago in The Washington Post. And one of 

the most important reasons Tijuana is doing better is because they 

have a lot of American enforce helping them to grab these guys. 

I think that the Mexicans alone, they are not capable of doing—

they don’t have the manpower. They don’t have the will of doing 

it. The corruption is tremendous. And it is thanks to the enforcement of the United States right on the border, and they were really 

suffering because they were not making any money anymore. These 

people were going somewhere else. And thanks to the authorities 

of the United States, that is a good proof why we need so much 

the support of the United States. This is the only way that we can 

do better is by sharing that. 

And another thing I want to share with you is that my son lives 

in California, my older son, that you met, and he went to Mexico. 

He is in the film industry, and he was taking a film about, you 

know, what happens in Mexico with most—we have 7 million peoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:01 Nov 10, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\OI\101211\70663 HFA PsN: SHIRL
59

ple in Mexico in poverty, and they come to the United States like 

a dream to come across illegal and get a job here, of cutting people’s grass or whatever. 

And he came filming this guy—the real person that is leaving his 

family and coming to the United States, saying bye to his mother 

and all of—the whole thing. The incredible part was—and he 

shared with me—when he came to Laredo, crossed into Texas, it 

is totally controlled by Zetas. 

And when I asked him, ‘‘Where is the police?’’ he laughed at me. 

He says, ‘‘That is the business of the police.’’ There are like a hundred Zetas with machine guns and with very good pistols, brand 

new, and a very sophisticated way of communicating, and $300 

apiece, I mean, each illegal Mexican who comes across. And he said 

there are thousands of illegals coming across. 

Each one of them have to give $300 or they won’t come across. 

If you try to play smart, they kill you right there. And the police 

knows about this thing is going on, and they control certain areas 

of the border. They know about it; they don’t do a thing about it. 

So that is what I want to share with you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you. And we have been 

joined by Congressman Rivera, which you may proceed with your 

line of questioning. Then, we will have one more round of questions 

after Congressman Rivera’s. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much. I am sure we have exhausted 

the topic throughout the hearing, but there is just one item that 

I would like to try to focus in one if—and if you could provide some 

insight into someone called El Chapo Guzman. Mr. Selee, can you 

tell us, who is El Chapo Guzman? 

Mr. SELEE. He is the reputed leader of the Sinaloa cartel, the 

largest drug trafficking organization in Mexico. 

Mr. RIVERA. What is it called? 

Mr. SELEE. The Sinaloa cartel. 

Mr. RIVERA. And that is the largest in Mexico. 

Mr. SELEE. Yes. 

Mr. RIVERA. And do we know——

Mr. SELEE. I think certainly. 

Mr. RIVERA [continuing]. His whereabouts or his latest activities? 

Mr. SELEE. I mean, media reports put him in Durango, in the 

state of Durango, in northern Mexico. But to be honest, I don’t 

have any intelligence myself on that. I mean, that is what you hear 

from people who follow this in Mexico, from good reporters. He is 

in a rural area of Durango. But, again, I can’t—you know, I have 

no independent confirmation of this. 

Mr. RIVERA. And media reports as to also relatives of his, his 

son, for example, and presence in Bolivia, have you heard of any 

connection between Bolivia and El Chapo Guzman’s drug cartel? 

Mr. SELEE. I have not, to be honest, but obviously these are 

transnational networks. I am sure they do have relationships in 

Bolivia and Peru and Colombia and Ecuador and elsewhere, you 

know, as well as in Central America——

Mr. RIVERA. Mr. Farah? 

Mr. SELEE [continuing]. As well as throughout the U.S. 

60

Mr. FARAH. I spent a great deal of time working on Bolivia, and 

I think it is—El Chapo Guzman’s son actually crashed an aircraft 

there. So, and according to internal intelligence reports, there is—

I think that he has been there. They have a fairly robust structure. 

I don’t know if he is still there. I don’t think he is a permanent 

fixture there. I think he moves around a lot. But I think that given 

their transnational spread that they have—they are—he maintains 

operational control in the southern——

Mr. RIVERA. And you said his son crashed an aircraft in Bolivia. 

When was that? 

Mr. FARAH. I would have to go back and look. I think 2009, 2010. 

It was fairly relatively recently. 

Mr. RIVERA. So a few years ago. That aircraft—he survived the 

crash, I assume. 

Mr. FARAH. All I have seen is a brief intelligence report that said 

he crashed it, and I assume he survived, yes. It didn’t say he perished in it. 

Mr. RIVERA. Because I had also heard that previous to that crash 

that he was taking flight lessons. That is where he was learning 

to fly was in Bolivia. What do we—do we know of any cooperation 

between members of the Bolivian Government and drug cartels 

narco trafficking? 

Mr. FARAH. I think the case of General Sanabria, who was just 

convicted in a Miami court and sentenced to 14 years, the former 

head of the Counter Narcotics Police, is clear evidence. I think if 

you look at the structure that he ran inside the Bolivian Government, it goes up very high. 

I think if you look at the internal reporting that went on between 

members of the Bolivian law enforcement community and their superiors, including ministers in the cabinet where they warned that 

these things were happening and were ignored, I think that there 

is ample evidence that very senior levels of the Bolivian Government are deeply involved, at least protecting drug trafficking, if not 

sponsoring it. 

Mr. RIVERA. And any other—this conviction, did the conviction 

have—do you know if the conviction had anything to do with the 

relationship between his activities in the Bolivian Government and 

Mexican drug cartels? 

Mr. FARAH. In this particular case, what he was tried for was not 

that. It was a shipment that went out through Chile to Panama 

and then to Miami where he talks explicitly about the support he 

is receiving from the Bolivian Government and his ability to move 

large sums for specific amounts of money, or large amounts of cocaine for specific amounts of money. In that particular case, I am 

not aware of any tie to Mexico. 

Mr. RIVERA. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am going to ask a couple more questions, 

or at least have a bit of discussion here, and then we will close up 

hopefully before noon. 

So today what we have heard is that there seems to be networks 

that seem to be meshing, evil networks that seem to be meshing 

into something that is turning into a nightmare for honest people, 

not only in Mexico but could well turn into a nightmare for the people of the United States as well. Underscoring that was yesterday’s 

61

revelation that a foreign government, terrorist government, was attempting to utilize—hire a drug cartel gangsters to commit an assassination here in the United States. 

If that sort of thing becomes prevalent, we could face the same 

enormous challenge—and other countries—where honest judges are 

murdered, where honest generals are murdered, where honest police officers are murdered, and others are corrupted. And we have 

to put ourselves in the position of these people. People do not understand that if someone comes up to you in Mexico and says, ‘‘We 

will give you $50,000 a month, or we are going to kill your family, 

you make the choice,’’ how difficult a decision that would be for 

even an honest person to do that. That is the type of incredible 

pressure that is going on. 

We need to recognize that this meshing of the networks between 

a criminal network and a terrorist network may well be happening. 

Mr. Farah’s observation that the type of kidnapping, international 

kidnapping, that—how this perhaps relates actually to the modus 

operandi of terrorist and ideological groups, based on the Marxist 

philosophy anyway, more than fits just simply what the drug cartels are doing. That was very insightful and something that should 

help members of this committee in how we judge what is going on. 

Mr. Selee, let me just note about your observations about drug 

use and the resources that are available. I personally don’t believe 

that we should be putting people in jail in the United States for 

consuming whatever substance they want to consume. I think it is 

a waste of our money, when there are other people in the United 

States who are being victimized by rapists, murderers, et cetera. 

We need a criminal justice to focus on them. 

But with that, then there is some argument that even if you just 

do that that would bring the price of drugs down, if people were 

now no longer facing these criminal penalties, et cetera. However, 

I don’t necessarily buy that part of the argument, and I would suggest that there are other ways of dealing with the drug problem 

that we have not tried. 

And, for example, we—I would think that drug testing is something that we played around with for a while, and they never, as 

a society, decided that drug testing was the way to go. And it 

seems to me that as long as we are testing people for drugs, but 

not for a criminal penalty, meaning that they are discovered—if 

you have drug testing within certain professions, and you discover 

someone who is involved with drugs, that is legal to do that, because it is not self-incrimination, unless you plan to prosecute that 

person for using those drugs. 

But certainly drug testing, if we discover people are using drugs, 

we can put impediments in the way of people. For example, young 

people who would like to get driver’s licenses should have to test, 

maybe in their gym classes in high school, before they can get a 

driver’s license. Not to put them in jail, but to make sure they don’t 

get their driver’s license. That may deter the use of drugs dramatically among young people. 

For example, drug testing should be required of airline pilots, 

truck drivers, cab drivers, et cetera, et cetera, because drugs do affect people’s ability to do their job. And in their job, if there is a 

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life—people’s lives are at stake by their job, they should be drug 

tested. 

But, furthermore, perhaps if someone is, you might say, dining 

at the public largesse, meaning receiving government stipends of 

some kind, whether they are—whether it is scholarships or whatever they are, or welfare payments, that perhaps drug testing 

should be required before someone receives government largesse. 

If we indeed have that kind of commitment, frankly, I think that 

would be a great deterrent than our current system of simply locking—trying to lock people up. 

Mr. SELEE. Can I just clarify something, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. SELEE. I completely agree with you, actually. I would not 

suggest locking more people up. In fact, I think we lock up too 

many people for consumption, which makes no sense. And I don’t 

think I explained myself well. I mean, I am not saying we should 

lock up more people. There is a high correlation between people 

who have addictions to hard drugs who are already in the criminal 

justice system, often for other sorts of crimes, not only drug-related 

crimes, but often for robbery and other things. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. SELEE. In terms of probation, what Project Hope does and 

other experiments like this, South Dakota does this actually on 

drunk driving, interestingly enough, with people who are on probation, make sure they stay clean as long as they are in the system. 

And they actually have a very high success rate in getting people 

to stay clean, creating the incentives to help them get off drugs, so 

they don’t commit crimes again and they stop using heavy drugs. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I would——

Mr. SELEE. If we can focus on that population, surprisingly, that 

is already in the criminal justice system, surprisingly, we can be 

fairly effective at getting rid of a large set of consumers of——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And if we are talking about $6–$9 billion 

going into the hands of criminal elements, that is an overwhelming 

challenge for a country like Mexico, and even an overwhelming 

challenge for people in the United States I might add. 

So I think we have covered some really—some good ground here, 

and let me—before I finish up, one last question or two, but, Congressman Rivera, do you have anything else? I found Congressman 

Rivera’s focus on Bolivia interesting. And would someone like to 

comment on that? Because we focused so much on Mexico, and Bolivia and Venezuela and Cuba are national entities that we need 

to—obviously need to pay attention to as well. Mr. Farnsworth? 

Mr. FARNSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do want to 

congratulate you for this hearing and the timeliness of it, but also 

for bringing the human dimension, the human element into these 

discussions—very important. 

I think it highlights the fact that the narcotics trade is truly regionwide, and that strategies to address it really have to be conceived in that type of manner. And if we break them down to a bilateral issue or even a subregional issue, we find, as we did when 

we focused on Mexico with Merida, that it is like a balloon. You 

push on one side and it bubbles out somewhere else, and that is 

what is happening in Central America. 

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It doesn’t help in the Bolivia context, for example, however, that 

the government has kicked out the DEA and has intentionally tried 

to change the relationship with the United States in the way that, 

frankly, is against some U.S. interests, I would argue, in trying to 

address some of these very difficult issues. 

So it does go to the point that when there are governments in 

the region that are cooperative with us and we can be cooperative 

with them, it lends to a much greater level of success, as we have 

seen in Colombia, as we have seen with Peru, as we have seen with 

some of our other friends and allies in the region. 

And when there are leaders who may democratically elected, and 

may be serving at the behest of their people, who nonetheless take 

a different view on these issues, whether it is through production 

of some of these substances or serving as safe havens or transit 

points, or what have you, it immeasurably complicates these issues. 

So I think that points out a very important aspect, and I am glad 

you raised the question. Thank you for allowing me to address it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And let us note, again, we—this hearing was meant to focus on foreign governments’ influence on these 

issues. A foreign government can—their involvement means a lot. 

I mean, for example, if a foreign government simply gives safe 

haven, let us suggest that Eduardo believes that perhaps the people who kidnapped him were Americans, you know, from the 

United States, but the chances of those Americans actually operating in Venezuela rather than in the United States may be very 

high. 

If in Venezuela they determine that their job is to bring down—

that the government feels some sort of kinship with those who 

would bring down the Mexican Government and replace it with a 

radical left wing government, they would then provide a safe 

haven. 

When I mentioned Robert Vesco—and thank you for reminding 

me what his name was—Rivera knew what that—knew Robert 

Vesco very well. But Robert Vesco was given safe haven for decades 

in Cuba—decades—and he was deeply involved, we now know, in 

helping the international drug cartels and was actually—I remember there was some intercept that suggested that there was a dispute and he was going to become the arbiter of the dispute, which 

shows you his deep involvement. 

And why did Fidel Castro permit a guy like Robert Vesco, right? 

Money and Fidel Castro thinks this is a good way to bring down 

the United States, so it couples his financial interest with his ideology. And I think that—so as we close today, we are talking about 

and this seems to be revealing, you might say, a network, an evil 

network, and an evil meshing of two different groups. 

And between the terrorists and the drug cartel, and what goes 

along with that, that meshing is a national government’s—other 

government’s involvement, because of their ideological desire as 

well as their desire for money. So I think we have reached the 

point where there—we have demonstrated that there is a correlation between these factors and why there is a correlation between 

these factors. 

We will perhaps have another hearing on this issue in the near 

future, and I think that it is worth us to document what is going 

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on in Bolivia and what is going on in Cuba, what is going on in 

Venezuela, that will lead to the horrible crime that was committed 

against this family and how this family represents thousands, if 

not hundreds of thousands, of other families who have been victimized by this criminal element that is now part of, as we say, an evil 

meshing and an evil network that threatens the—eventually will 

threaten the United States. 

So thank you all very much. This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

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ARTICLE SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS


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