97-206

 No. 97-206

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

ROBERT J. BLACKWELL,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

RONALD U. LURIE,

 Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Gallatin,

 The Honorable Mike Salvagni, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 Ronald U. Lurie, Pro Se, Bozeman, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Phillip F. Walsh, Walsh & McKenna,

 Bozeman, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: June 26, 1997

 Decided: September 4, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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 This is an appeal by Ronald U. Lurie from the Gallatin County District Court's

March 3, 1997, memorandum and order denying his motions to compel the release of a

foreign judgment against him filed by Robert J. Blackwell. We affirm and remand. 

 The issues on appeal are:

 1. Did the District Court err in upholding the Bankruptcy Court's

determination that Lurie was unable to close as a matter of law and that the release 

filed

by Lurie on October 22, 1996, did not comply with 25-9-311, MCA, and therefore was

unenforceable?

 2. Did the District Court err in holding that Blackwell had conformed with the

requirements of 25-9-504, MCA? 

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 On November 9, 1994, Robert J. Blackwell filed a foreign judgment and affidavit

in support of filing foreign judgment in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, 

Gallatin

County. The judgment originated from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the 

United

States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Missouri (the Bankruptcy Court), Case 

No.

92-42218-293. Blackwell, as the liquidating trustee for the Popkin & Stern 

Liquidating

Trust, filed an adversary action against Ronald U. Lurie in the Chapter 11 

proceeding. 

On October 20, 1996, the Bankruptcy Court entered a judgment in favor of Blackwell 

and

against Lurie in the amount of $1,121,743. The judgment was entitled "judgment in

favor of plaintiff, liquidating trustee, and against defendant Ronald U. Lurie on 

complaint

to recover deficiency pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 723."

 Also, on November 9, 1994, an execution was issued and property was seized

from the Lurie home by the Gallatin County Sheriff pursuant to the writ of 

execution. 

 Blackwell, the Luries, and other interested parties entered into negotiations 

to settle

all claims and disputes arising from the Chapter 11 proceeding. These negotiations

resulted in three Global Settlement Agreements (agreements): one involving Ronald

Lurie, one involving Nancy Lurie, and one involving their sons, Michael and Ryan. 

The

Bankruptcy Court approved the agreements on October 19, 1995. On October 21, 1995,

the Bankruptcy Court entered an order extending the closing date of the agreements 

from

November 18, 1995, to December 13, 1995.

 On December 15, 1995, the Bankruptcy Court held a show cause hearing to

determine whether the Luries were capable of closing in accordance with the terms and

conditions of the agreements. On January 18, 1996, the Bankruptcy Court issued its

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order on show cause order. The Bankruptcy

Court found, as a matter of law, that the Luries were unable to close the agreements 

on

November 18, 1995, and December 13, 1995. The Luries did not appeal the Bankruptcy

Court's findings, conclusions, and order.

 In the Bankruptcy Court, two adversary proceedings involving the fraudulent

transfer of assets proceeded to trial against the Luries. In these proceedings, the 

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Luries

moved to dismiss Blackwell's claims based on the release language in the agreements. 

On April 16, 1996, the Bankruptcy Court ruled against the Luries on their motion, 

stating

that the agreements are unenforceable as releases.

 On October 22, 1996, Lurie filed a "release" in the Gallatin County District 

Court.

Attached to the filed "release" were the three agreements dated August 30, 1995, 

August

31, 1995, and September 13, 1995, and designated Release A, Release B, and Release

C, respectively. As stated above, the sole purpose of the agreements was to 

compromise

and settle all claims arising in the bankruptcy proceeding between Blackwell and the

Luries. The agreements were signed by Blackwell in his capacity as Liquidating 

Trustee

of the Popkin & Stern Liquidating Trust. The clerk of court who filed the "release" 

did

not release the foreign judgment because the agreements were not signed by Lurie, nor

was there any documentation from Blackwell satisfying the judgment, nor was there an

order from the court. 

 On November 18, 1996, Lurie filed the first of multiple motions to compel,

requesting that the District Court of Gallatin County order that the foreign 

judgment be

fully released as in compliance with 25-9-311, MCA. Since Lurie only appeals the

District Court's determinations on the motions filed on November 18, 1996, and

December 3, 1996, we set forth the background of these motions as they are relevant 

to

this Court's discussion.

 The essence of Lurie's first motion is that he executed the three agreements, 

all

of which became effective on November 18, 1995, the date first set for closing by the

Bankruptcy Court. Lurie claimed that the agreements did not require that a closing

actually take place for them to be effective. Blackwell argued that because there 

was no

closing, as contemplated by the agreements, the agreements do not release the filed

foreign judgment.

 Another motion filed by Lurie on December 3, 1996, claimed that the foreign

judgment was defective because it did not state the name of the judgment creditor, as

required by 25-9-504, MCA. He argued that Blackwell incorrectly identified himself

in his individual capacity, rather than as the liquidating trustee of the trust. 

 The District Court held a hearing on February 13, 1997, to consider all four of

Lurie's motions. On March 3, 1997, the District Court issued a memorandum and order

denying all of Lurie's motions. The District Court ruled that because the closing 

never

took place, the agreements were never completed and, thus, were unenforceable. The

District Court also concluded that Blackwell properly identified himself in his 

filing of

the foreign judgment because 25-9-504, MCA, only requires that the notice identify 

the

plaintiff/judgment creditor, and does not require that their representative capacity 

be

identified. Lurie appeals from the memorandum and order of the District Court.

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 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err in upholding the Bankruptcy Court's determination 

that

Lurie was unable to close as a matter of law and that the release filed by Lurie on

October 22, 1996, did not comply with 25-9-311, MCA, and therefore was 

unenforceable?

 Our standard of review for findings of fact is whether a finding is "clearly

erroneous." Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474, 803 

P.2d

601, 603. "[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to 

support

it, a review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction 

that a

mistake has been committed." Steer, 245 Mont. at 474, 803 P.2d at 603.

 When we review a district court's conclusions of law, our standard of review is

plenary and we must determine whether the court's conclusions are correct as a matter

of law. In re Matter of Kovatch (1995), 271 Mont. 323, 326, 896 P.2d 444, 446; 

Steer,

245 Mont. at 474-75, 803 P.2d at 603.

 Lurie argues that the District Court erred in failing to release the foreign 

judgment

obtained by Blackwell and filed with the District Court when Lurie filed his release 

along

with copies of the three agreements. Lurie contends that the three agreements filed 

with

his release on October 22, 1996, comply with the provisions of 25-9-311, MCA, and

thus, satisfy the judgment. Section 25-9-311, MCA, provides:

 Entry of satisfaction of judgment in docket. Satisfaction of a judgment

 may be entered in the clerk's docket upon an execution returned satisfied

 or upon an acknowledgment of satisfaction filed with the clerk, made in the

 manner of an acknowledgment of a conveyance of real property by the

 judgment creditor or by his endorsement on the face or on the margin of the

 record of the judgment or by his attorney unless a revocation of his

 authority is filed. Whenever a judgment is satisfied in fact otherwise than

 upon an execution, the party or attorney must give such acknowledgment

 or make such endorsement, and upon motion, the court may compel it or

 may order the entry of satisfaction to be made without it. 

 Lurie claims that it is undisputed that the three agreements have been executed 

by

Blackwell, that the agreements were executed by Blackwell in the manner of an

acknowledgment of a conveyance of real property according to the provisions of 25-

9-

311, MCA, and that the three agreements were appropriately filed with the District 

Court

on October 22, 1996. Lurie asserts that the District Court's finding that there 

exists no

documentation executed by Blackwell satisfying the foreign judgment is clearly 

erroneous. 

Accordingly, Lurie argues that the District Court's failure to release the foreign 

judgment

based on that finding is erroneous and asks this Court to reverse the District 

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Court's

memorandum and order and direct it to release the foreign judgment filed against him.

 Blackwell counters that the District Court did not err in relying on the 

Bankruptcy

Court's determination that Lurie was unable to close as a matter of law and that the

release language contained in the agreements between Lurie and himself was

unenforceable. Blackwell argues that the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact, 

conclusions

of law, and order on show cause order were binding on the District Court under 26-

3-

201, MCA, and by the 

language of the agreements themselves. Thus, the agreements do not operate to 

satisfy

the judgment under the provisions of 25-9-311, MCA, because they are unenforceable.

 Section 26-3-201, MCA, provides: 

 Effect of judgment or final order -- when conclusive. The effect

 of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding before a

 court or judge of this state or of the United States having jurisdiction to

 pronounce the judgment or order is as follows:

 (1) In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in

 respect to the probate of a will or the administration of the estate of a

 decedent, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or

 relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the

 title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or relation of

 the person.

 (2) In other cases, the judgment or order is, in respect to the matter

 directly adjudged, conclusive between the parties and their successors in

 interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special

 proceeding, litigating for the same thing under the same title and in the

 same capacity, provided they have notice, actual or constructive, of the

 pendency of the action or proceeding. 

 This Court determines that the District Court was correct in relying upon the

Bankruptcy Court's findings, conclusions, and order dated January 18, 1996. The

Bankruptcy Court's findings, conclusions, and order are final. Lurie did not appeal 

the

Bankruptcy Court's finding that the closing, as contemplated by the agreements, could

not take place "because Ronald and Nancy Lurie are not ready and able to close." 

Under

 26-3-201(2), MCA, the findings of the Bankruptcy Court regarding the agreements and

their enforcement are conclusive between Lurie and Blackwell. Neither, the District

Court nor this Court can alter or amend the findings or conclusions contained in the

Bankruptcy Court's January 18, 1996, order. 

 Furthermore, as Blackwell points out, the language of the agreements precludes

any litigation in the courts of Montana concerning the agreements. Each agreement

includes the 

following provision:

 IX. Governing Law and Forum. This agreement shall by governed

 and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Missouri. All

 disputes or legal proceedings arising out of or relating to the binding effect

 of this Agreement upon claimants under the Popkin & Stern Liquidating

 Trust Agreement or relating to the scope, binding effect, duration or

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 interpretation of the injunction issued by the Bankruptcy Court shall be

 submitted to and heard by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the

 Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, pursuant to its original

 jurisdiction. If any party hereto files a Motion to Withdraw the reference

 of P& S's Bankruptcy Case with respect to an adversary proceeding among

 the parties hereto relating to a breach or interpretation of this Agreement

 then the other parties hereto shall be deemed to consent to the Motion to

 Withdraw the Reference. 

 Under this forum selection clause, the Gallatin County District Court is not the

appropriate forum for Lurie to litigate any issue relating to the enforcement of the

agreements because it lacks jurisdiction. Both parties agreed that any legal 

proceedings

involving any aspect of the agreements and their enforcement would be heard only by 

the

Bankruptcy Court.

 Thus, this Court concludes that the District Court did not err in finding that 

the

agreements were unenforceable and did not, by Lurie's filing with his "release," 

operate

to satisfy the foreign judgment filed by Blackwell. Pursuant to 26-3-201(2), MCA, 

the

District Court correctly relied upon the Bankruptcy Court's determination that the 

closing

never took place and that the agreements were never completed. The issues relating 

to

the agreements or to whether Lurie had closed cannot be litigated in the District 

Court

or by this Court. 

 Because this Court concludes that the District Court was correct in finding 

that the

agreements were unenforceable and do not operate to release the foreign judgment, we

decline to address Lurie's arguments regarding whether the agreements were effective

without there being a closing, and whether he has standing to assert the release 

provisions

in the agreements regarding his wife, Nancy, and his sons, Michael and Ryan.

 ISSUE 2

 Did the District Court err in holding that Blackwell had conformed with the

requirements of 25-9-504, MCA? 

 We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine whether they are

correct. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995), 271 Mont. 459, 469, 898

P.2d 680, 686. 

 Lurie claims that the foreign judgment is defective because the notice of 

filing does

not state the name of the judgment creditor as required by 25-9-504, MCA. Section

25-9-504(1), MCA, provides:

 At the time of the filing of the foreign judgment, the judgment

 creditor or his attorney shall file with the clerk of the court an affidavit

 setting forth the name and last-known post-office address of the judgment

 debtor and the judgment creditor. The affidavit must also include a

 statement that the foreign judgment is valid and enforceable, and the extent

 of which it has been satisfied.

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 Lurie argues that the notice of filing incorrectly names "Robert J. Blackwell" 

as

the plaintiff and judgement creditor instead of "Robert J. Blackwell, Liquidating 

Trustee

of the Popkin & Stern Liquidating Trust" as the true plaintiff and judgment 

creditor. 

 Blackwell counters that there is no requirement that the judgment creditor must

acknowledge his representative capacity or provide any information other than his 

name

and address. Thus, he contends he has fully complied with the statutory provision.

 As stated above, the statute provides that the notice sent by the judgment 

creditor

to the judgment debtor "must include the name and post office address of the judgment

creditor." Section 25-9-504(1), MCA. The plain language of the statute requires 

only

that the person preparing the notice identify the judgment creditor; there is no

requirement that the judgment creditor must acknowledge his representative capacity 

or

provide any information other than his name and address. In addition, Rule 17(a),

M.R.Civ.P., states in relevant part that: 

 A personal representative, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a

 party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit

 of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's own

 name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought . .

 . .

In his capacity as the liquidating trustee for the Popkin & Stern Liquidating Trust,

Blackwell is allowed to file suit in his own name. Thus, Blackwell has complied with

both the statutory requirements of 25-9-504, MCA, and Rule 17(a), M.R.Civ.P. 

 This Court notes that the caption of the present action was styled after the 

caption

of the judgment from the Bankruptcy Court. The caption only identifies Blackwell as 

the

plaintiff and makes no mention of his capacity as the liquidating trustee for the 

Popkin

& Stern Liquidating Trust. However, Blackwell is clearly identified as the 

liquidating

trustee in the title of the judgment, as well as in the first paragraph of the 

judgment. 

 Furthermore, from the Bankruptcy Court proceedings, Lurie must have known or

should have known that Blackwell was suing him, not in an individual capacity, but as

the liquidating trustee of the Popkin & Stern Liquidating Trust. The foreign 

judgment that

Blackwell filed with the Gallatin County District Court resulted from the Bankruptcy

Court proceedings. Also, with the notice of filing of foreign judgment, Lurie 

received

a copy of the foreign judgment and an affidavit of Blackwell's attorney, both of 

which

identify Blackwell as the liquidating trustee for the Popkin & Stern Liquidating 

Trust. 

Therefore, if Lurie could not determine Blackwell's status from the notice itself, 

he could

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have reasonably concluded Blackwell's status from the attached copy of the foreign

judgment and the affidavit.

 This Court concludes that the District Court did not err in ruling that 

Blackwell's

notice of filing of foreign judgment conformed with the requirements of 25-9-504,

MCA. Blackwell fulfilled all statutory requirements regarding the notice and filing 

of the

foreign judgment and Lurie suffered no prejudice from the procedure involved.

 Affirmed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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